



# Canadian Military Colleges Review Board (CMCRB) Report

January 2025



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## **Canadian Military Colleges Review Board (CMCRB) Report**

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Chantal Beauvais, Ph.D.

Michael Goldbloom C.M., BCL/LL.B.

Chairperson Kathy Hogarth, Ph.D.

Renée Légaré, Ph.D.

Martin Maltais, Ph.D.

Suneeta Millington, J.D.

Kyle Solomon, BGen, M.A.Sc.

**For more information:**

**Mail:** Department of National Defence  
101 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON, K1A 0K2

**Telephone:** 1-888-995-2534

**Email:** [information@forces.gc.ca](mailto:information@forces.gc.ca)

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Canadian Military Colleges Review Board (CMCRB) Report – January 2025.

Cat. No.: D2-695/2025E-PDF (Electronic PDF, English)  
ISBN: 978-0-660-75696-7

Cat. No.: D2-695/2025E (Print, English)  
ISBN: 978-0-660-75697-4

DGM No.: DGM-41024-ZSP



# Executive Summary

In her 2022 Independent External Comprehensive Review, which examined sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces, retired Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour raised concerns about a culture of misogyny and sexual misconduct in Canada's two Military Colleges. She posited that sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces finds its origins, in part, in the culture of the Canadian Military Colleges and she questioned whether the situation at the Colleges was remediable.

Pursuant to Madame Arbour's report, the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board was established to examine and make recommendations about whether the Royal Military Colleges of Canada in Kingston (RMC) and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) – collectively, “the Colleges”, “the Military Colleges” or “the CMCs” – should continue to exist and, if so, to what extent and how they should be reformed.

The question of whether misogyny and sexual misconduct are so ingrained in the culture of the Military Colleges as to render them irremediable was a threshold issue for the Board. We therefore began our work with a multifaceted examination of the state of the CMCs. The Board undertook three visits to each of the Colleges, studied multiple information sources, reviewed input from approximately 400 Canadians from across the country and met in person and virtually with several hundred stakeholders, including current and former Naval and Officer Cadets, military and academic leaders, professors and staff.

Through these extensive engagements, alongside a detailed analysis of a large amount of qualitative and quantitative data which focused on systemic and structural issues, the Board was able to develop a rich picture regarding the history, evolution, design, dynamics, programs and living conditions of and at the CMCs. This yielded, in turn, a deep understanding of the state of culture and conduct at these institutions.

The Board is acutely aware that over the decades the Military Colleges have been the sites of deeply harmful and traumatizing experiences for some individuals, resulting from a range of harmful attitudes and behaviours. While the instances of such events are not prevalent, they continue to be present and to create harm.

Moreover, despite the largely positive experiences of many who have attended the CMCs, we also know that there remain significant differences between the experiences and perceptions of women and men who are enrolled at the Colleges.

The Board acknowledges that robust policies, procedures and practices have been adopted at the Colleges to prevent sexual misconduct and to respond to it when it occurs. We believe that these top-down and grassroots efforts must continue to be pursued and given time to yield results.

However, in light of the time constraints of its mandate, as well as the fact that some of these mechanisms and tools have only been implemented recently, the Board was not able to fully assess their effectiveness. The Board has consequently recommended that, as has been done at several civilian universities, the Colleges be required to mandate and publish a comprehensive analysis of the impact and effectiveness of their policies, procedures and practices with respect to preventing sexual misconduct and supporting those who experience it.

We have also recommended that Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres be established at each College to help prevent and respond to all forms of harmful behaviour through a mix of education, intervention, response and advocacy. We have further recommended that the percentage of female Naval and Officer Cadets be increased from 25% (which was reached in 2024) to 33% by 2035, as a greater presence of women at the CMCs would have a positive impact on the culture of the Colleges and would be beneficial for the Canadian Armed Forces.

Lastly, the Board has determined that a restructuring of the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) is required to fully address issues of culture and conduct at the CMCs. This peer leadership model, which has for decades featured as a signature element of the Regular Officer Training Plan at the Military Colleges, was called into question by Madame Arbour, who recommended its elimination. The Board agrees with the concerns she raised but believes that key changes to the CCOR can mitigate harm and return value to the model. In particular,

the CCOR should revert to its original purpose of providing practical opportunities for the Naval and Officer Cadets to acquire hands-on leadership experience, and any authority—real or perceived—for discipline over their peers should be removed from the Cadets.

In sum, the Board witnessed a profound commitment at all levels and within all constituencies at the Military Colleges to ensure that they are safe, healthy and respectful places in which each Naval and Officer Cadet is enabled to achieve their full potential. As such, we believe that although instances of misconduct continue to exist at the Colleges, significant progress has been made towards diminishing negative and unhealthy attitudes and behaviours, and we are confident that there is a collective determination to do more. It is this determination that has allowed the Board to conclude that Canada's Military Colleges should remain degree-granting institutions, with a mandate to educate and train Naval and Officer Cadets to join the Profession of Arms and become officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

However, this conclusion rests on another assumption: that there is, *prima facie*, inherent value in the Canadian Military Colleges. The Board did not take this for granted; we dedicated significant time and energy to identifying and evaluating the value proposition of the Colleges. The results of these efforts led us to conclude that the Military Colleges are indeed critical national institutions of significant import to Canada, which play a distinctive role in advancing the defence and security interests of our country. They are unique establishments that cannot be replicated by civilian universities or other military units within the Canadian Armed Forces. They should be sources of pride for Canadians and should reflect Canada's ability to project national power. As currently organized and run, however, they have failed to demonstrate a distinct value proposition, to prove their value in relation to escalating costs or to assert their relevance vis-à-vis the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces or the country.

Through a process that included studying discrete thematic issues and undertaking comparative analyses (including an examination of the varied approaches to pre-commissioning military education in fifteen countries), we have concluded that while the current structural model of the Military Colleges remains the right fit for our country's distinct needs and characteristics, major reforms are required vis-à-vis many aspects of the Colleges' operations. To this end, in addition to our recommendations with respect to conduct, culture, health, wellbeing and peer leadership, we have also crafted a series of recommendations related to identity, gover-

nance, program design, and infrastructure, operations and support, all with a view to refocusing, restructuring, rebalancing and rejuvenating the CMCs.

### **Refocus (Identity)**

The Board believes that the Military Colleges must conceive of themselves as, and be understood to be, military units. Although they grant university degrees, they are not the same as civilian universities. Rather, they are military academies whose primary purpose is to prepare officers to be leaders in the Profession of Arms for Canada, only one element of which is the delivery of an undergraduate university education. Their governance structures, authorities, activities, programs, training curricula, names, branding and public affairs/communications materials should all be revised and realigned in service of this distinct identity.

### **Restructure (Governance)**

The Colleges have a dispersed, complex and inefficient leadership and governance model. The Board has recommended several changes in order to clarify and simplify structures, responsibilities and authorities. These include a proposal to designate the Commandants as the Presidents and Vice-Chancellors of their respective Colleges, vested with the authority to lead all aspects – military and academic – of the institutions.

We have also recommended changes to more effectively select and support the Commandants and Directors of Cadets, and to lengthen their tenures in order to give them greater time to be able to understand the Colleges (which are unique even within the Canadian Armed Forces), provide greater organizational stability, build trust with the Naval and Officer Cadets and other key stakeholders, and establish the buy-in needed to lead the Canadian Military Colleges through significant change.

### **Rebalance (Program Elements)**

The Colleges have long pointed to the 4-Pillar Program, which incorporates academics, military training, bilingualism and fitness, as manifesting the CMCs' relevance to the Canadian Armed Forces. However, over decades the utility and viability of the program as currently configured has come into greater question.

### **Academics**

The Colleges have talented professors who deliver a high-quality academic program, but as the curriculum

has grown it has become less and less connected to the principal mission of the CMCs. Moreover, the demands the academic program places on the limited time of the Naval and Officer Cadets has negatively impacted the Cadets' ability to dedicate attention to the other Pillars. Additionally, the very low ratio of students to professors has resulted in the Colleges' academic programs being much more expensive to operate than those of the universities against which we compared the CMCs. (It should be noted that the Board used cost as only one of several comparators for assessing the value of the CMCs, in acknowledgement of the fact that the unique nature of the Military Colleges impacts the overall cost-benefit calculus).

### **Military Training**

The Military Training program at the Military Colleges is a source of deep dissatisfaction for the Naval and Officer Cadets due to a variety of weaknesses. It remains inferior vis-à-vis the breadth, depth, structure and quality of the training and development offered by Canada's allies and partners around the world, and the time allotted to it is insufficient. This is troubling given that military training should be a primary purpose of the Military Colleges and a fundamental differentiator between the Colleges and civilian universities.

### **Bilingualism**

The value of second language training is well understood by the CMCs, and the Board fully endorses the importance of a bilingual military for Canada in terms of identity, inclusivity and operational advantage. The current program design does not place sufficient value on this Pillar, however, as reflected by the limited time and lack of credit afforded to it.

### **Fitness**

A high level of physical fitness is understandably a requirement for all members of the Canadian Armed Forces, including its officers. Achieving a high level of physical fitness should remain an important component of the Naval and Officer Cadets' curriculum. However, a narrow conception of health and wellbeing, which is overly focused on physical fitness and is tied to testing and standards that do not exist elsewhere in the Canadian Armed Forces, has undermined the impact and value of the Fitness Pillar at the CMCs. This is exacerbated by the limited time afforded to physical activities, which are often jammed into early morning and late night schedules, and the lack of credit given to them.

In light of this suite of issues, the Board has proposed a wide variety of interconnected recommendations. These include a reduction and redesign of the academic programs and the proposal to achieve, within five years, a minimum ratio of 15 students per professor – to be accomplished by both increasing the number of Naval and Officer Cadets and reducing the number of professors.

We have also recommended that RMC Saint-Jean no longer offer a CÉGEP program and instead direct its resources towards its university-level programs, which should be expanded beyond the single degree that it offers. Concurrently, a number of other recommendations seek to elevate the standing and stature of RMC Saint-Jean as one of two equal Military Colleges in Canada, alongside the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston.

We have further recommended that a new Integrated Officer Development Program be introduced, composed of academic study, second language training, military skills and leadership development, and fitness, health and wellbeing courses. Academic credit should be granted for satisfying requirements related to each of these elements, to better recognize their importance and to ensure that they are allocated appropriate time within the schedules of the Naval and Officer Cadets. Within this, ongoing second language training should be offered for those who wish to achieve a higher level of proficiency beyond the minimum requirements.

Additionally, a new three-year Military Skills and Leadership program should be developed that provides standardized, sequenced and substantive military training and is much more focused on character development, personal growth, experiential learning and hands-on practical experience.

Lastly, the approach to fitness should be expanded to a broader health and wellbeing construct that includes education about a much wider range of issues such as nutrition, sleep, substance abuse, addictions and stress and anger management, so that the Naval and Officer Cadets have the understanding and tools to address these issues not only in relation to themselves but also in support of the members of the Canadian Armed Forces they will be commissioned to lead.

### **Rejuvenate (Infrastructure, Operations & Support)**

The Military Colleges should be symbols of national pride and prestige which help project a positive image of the Canadian Armed Forces to Canadians and to the

world. Attractive buildings, well-maintained grounds, modern facilities and secure sites should reflect the historic and ongoing significance of the Colleges and a high standard of respect for the Naval and Officer Cadets.

Unfortunately, given that infrastructure projects at the Military Colleges compete for funding with all other infrastructure projects in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, many parts of the campuses, particularly in Kingston, are in a state of disrepair. Funding requests for dormitories, libraries or athletic facilities must contend against aircraft hangars, jetties and barracks for prioritization. It is therefore not surprising that the Colleges do not generally fare well in these competitions. Moreover, while RMC Saint-Jean benefits from having a dedicated facilities management contract with an organization that is deeply invested in the overall success of the College, RMC has no such arrangement in place, which creates short and long-term negative impacts.

More broadly, mindsets and attitudes need to change, to place greater value on architectural excellence, quality design and high-calibre craftsmanship, alongside a genuine commitment to respect the historical look and feel of the campuses and to maintain beautiful and inspiring environments.

The Board has consequently recommended that, as Canada moves towards fulfilling its commitments towards greater defence spending, a dedicated funding framework should be established for 1) major capital projects, 2) minor construction, and 3) maintenance and repair, to support training and education establishments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Canadian Military Colleges. Baseline funding should be increased for all three as well. A dedicated facilities management contract should also be established at RMC in Kingston.

Ultimately, the recommendations the Board has made are interdependent and essential to an effective reform of the Military Colleges. Recognizing that responsibility for their implementation is held by different actors in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, often outside of the Military Colleges, we have recommended that

- the Minister of National Defence provide a written response to this Report within 60 days of its receipt to provide clarity regarding the Government's intent and expectations;

- an Implementation Team be established to oversee the development and execution of a sequenced, time-bound and measurable Implementation Plan; and
- the Minister of National Defence provide an annual report on the progress of implementation until all of the recommendations have been addressed.

The world is experiencing its most significant shifts since the end of the Cold War. Canada is no longer protected by geography, with threats coming from cyber space and outer space, from growing national emergencies including floods and fires, and from foreign influence/interference in our systems and institutions.

More than ever, Canada will need an effective military led by a strong cadre of officers who are well prepared to navigate this increasingly complex environment. The Military Colleges are uniquely equipped to develop the outstanding leaders required by the Canadian Armed Forces and can serve as a major source for positive change both within the armed forces and within society at large.

Although issues of negative conduct and culture remain at the Colleges, the Board believes that closing them is not the solution; exporting those challenges to other institutions would merely avoid addressing the very issues that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are seeking to solve.


Instead, Canada should continue to invest in and support the Military Colleges. They should be held to attaining and maintaining the highest standards, but they must also be equipped with the leadership and resources required to do so.

Once refocused, restructured, rebalanced and rejuvenated, the Military Colleges will offer great value and be uniquely positioned to meet the needs and expectations of Canadians as our country takes on the critical challenges of the coming decades.




# Declaration


The undersigned concur with the content and recommendations of this Report.




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
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Martin Maltais, Ph.D.




Michael Goldbloom, C.M., BCL/LL.B.



Suneeta Millington, J.D.



Renée Légaré, Ph.D



Brigadier-General Kyle Solomon, M.A.Sc



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# Introduction

The Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada was established in 1876 for the purpose of imparting a comprehensive education in all branches of military tactics, fortification, engineering and general scientific knowledge, in subjects connected with, and necessary to, a thorough knowledge of the military profession. It offered a new and independent way for a young nation to train its officers – particularly technical officers for the Canadian Army.

The Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) opened in 1952 to help increase the presence of Francophones in the Canadian Armed Forces Officer Corps.<sup>i</sup> Subsequently, the Royal Roads Military College (RRMC) was established in 1968 (after originating in 1942 as HMCS Royal Roads and then evolving into the Royal Canadian Naval College).

In 1995, the Government of Canada closed both RMC Saint-Jean and RRMC. Although it divested the RRMC site in Victoria, B.C. (now Royal Roads University), it retained the RMC Saint-Jean location and forged a partnership with the community-based Corporation Fort St-Jean to maintain the site. RMC Saint-Jean was re-opened in 2007 to provide a preparatory year for aspiring officers joining the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) from the Quebec school system. RMC Saint-Jean returned to university status in 2021.

Consequently, Canada has two Military Colleges: the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Collectively, these are known as the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs). They share the responsibility to “educate and train cadets and commissioned officers for a career of effective service in the Canadian Forces” and are vested with the powers to grant university degrees in support of this role. At present, the CMCs graduate approximately 280 Naval and Officer Cadets (N/OCdts) annually and provide one of the principal commissioning streams for officers in the CAF.

The majority<sup>ii</sup> of N/OCdts attend the four-or-five-year Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges (ROTP CMC) (which is structured around four distinct Pillars: academic education, physical fitness,

military training and development, and bilingualism), the successful completion of which leads to earning an undergraduate degree and meeting the commissioning requirements to become an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>iii</sup>

In her 2022 Independent External Comprehensive Review (IECR),<sup>iv</sup> the Honourable Louise Arbour raised concerns about a problematic culture in the CMCs, including harassment and sexual misconduct, particularly with respect to its impact on female N/OCdts. She recommended that a Review Board be established to assess the benefits, disadvantages and costs – both to the Canadian Armed Forces and to Canada – of continuing to educate N/OCdts at the Military Colleges. She further recommended that the review focus on the



comparative quality of education, socialization and military training in the Military College environment, and assess the different models for delivering university-level and military leadership training. She also emphasized the need to determine whether the peer leadership structure upon which the Canadian Military Colleges base their military training (known as the Cadet Chain of Responsibility [CCoR]) should be modified or discontinued, and whether Canada's Military Colleges should remain undergraduate degree-granting institutions.

Pursuant to these recommendations, the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board ("the Review Board," "the Board," "this Board," or "the CMCRB") was established on December 6, 2023 and convened on January 15, 2024 to begin its 12-month mandate. (See Annex 1 – Terms of Reference and Annex 2 – Composition of the Board.)

In her reflections on the value of the CMCs to the CAF and to Canada, particularly in relation to any harm they might cause, Madame Arbour asserted that the "entire raison-d'être of the military colleges must rest on the assumption that it is the best way to form and educate tomorrow's military leaders." It is the validity of this assumption that lies at the heart of the mandate given to the Canadian Military College Review Board, and it is this issue that the Board has sought to address.

The Board began this process by answering the threshold question of whether Canada's Military Colleges are so riven with issues of misconduct as to render them irremediable (thus warranting their dismantlement or closure), or whether, despite any flaws in the current structure, program, operation or culture of these institutions they can be improved and are worth preserving.

The Board concluded that, although problems persist at the CMCs, they are not fatal to the institutions; the findings of the Independent External Comprehensive Review have led to serious introspection and concrete changes by the CAF and the CMCs, and significant efforts are already underway to acknowledge and address outstanding deficiencies at the Military Colleges. The CMCs of thirty, fifteen, or even five years ago are not the CMCs of today and, with further evolution, they offer the potential to provide great value to the CAF and enduring benefit to Canada.

Canada's Military Colleges are symbols of national power and should be symbols of national prestige and national pride. They are critical vehicles for recruiting, training, and educating the number of officers needed annually by the CAF and for fulfilling specific occupa-

tions the military needs in order to function. They are institutions of social mobility that have the capacity to transform lives and help contribute to the economic success of the nation. They can be catalysts for important cultural evolution within the Canadian Armed Forces and within Canadian society, and they reflect Canada's stature and professionalism to its citizens, partners and allies. As such, the Board believes that Canada's Military Colleges should remain degree-granting institutions, with a mandate to educate and train N/OCdts to become members of the Profession of Arms.

At the same time, the Board acknowledges that the CMCs have also been the source and site of deeply harmful, traumatizing and negative experiences for certain N/OCdts over decades. The Board holds the weight of the stories that have been shared in the process of this work with great care and concern. Harmful conduct, such as racism, discrimination, sexual assault and misogyny, may not be prevalent at Canada's Military Colleges, but it is nevertheless present. More must be done to create a healthy culture and inclusive experience for all. The challenge before the CMCs is how to honour the past and draw strength from tradition while acknowledging negative historical legacies, redressing their profound impact and promoting positive change.

Multiple, substantial reforms will be required to realize the value of the Canadian Military Colleges as world-class institutions of excellence that remain relevant to the security and defence of Canada; to mitigate against and respond to future harm; and to ensure that these institutions survive and thrive. These reforms will demand the full commitment of the Military Colleges themselves, as well as sustained attention from the senior leadership of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, alongside increased investment from the government.

The two CMCs are not starting from the same place in this journey. RMC has a significantly longer history than RMC Saint-Jean, and a different one. RMC Saint-Jean has escaped many of the pitfalls into which RMC has fallen over past decades, but it has its own unique challenges. Each College has its respective strengths and weaknesses. The Board recognizes that some of the analysis and observations in this Report do not apply to both institutions in the same way, and that in some instances they may feel irrelevant or unjust. The Board has nevertheless made a deliberate choice to look at both Colleges through a single lens with the intention of holding them both to the same high standards.

In addition to the IECR, previous Reports<sup>v</sup> and recommendations have addressed similar issues to those identified and examined by this Board. It is the Board's estimation that had DND/CAF undertaken timely implementation of the guidance found in those documents, many such issues could have been solved. However, they have demonstrated a pattern of ignoring, stalling, underfunding or otherwise delaying necessary action, which has led to ongoing challenges and, in turn, to more scrutiny of the CMCs.

This has been exhausting and demoralizing for all involved. No one person or organization is to blame; these are complex and systemic problems, and many of the key individuals being held responsible and accountable for change do not have the authority or the tools to effect it. Indeed, in many cases, the continued successes of the CMCs can be attributed to the sheer tenacity and commitment of many individual leaders, faculty members and staff, whose professionalism, dedication to the N/OCdts and hard work have been the decisive factors between likely failure and tenuous progress.

Going forward, the health, success and credibility of the CMCs will require effective implementation of the CMCRB's recommendations, within a clear timeframe, guided by an accountability framework and overseen by an organization with the appropriate authorities to enforce progress. To facilitate and simplify this task, the Board has reviewed all outstanding recommendations stemming from previous Reports. Those that continue to be valid have been incorporated into this Report. As such, this CMCRB Report should stand as the operative analysis of the current state of Canada's Military Colleges, and the only source of recommendations specific to the CMCs to be implemented.







# Context

The world is changing at an unprecedented rate, and we can expect that the decades to come will be marked by further upheaval. New threats continue to emerge; transformative technology is shaping society in new ways; conventional war has returned to Europe and conflict rages in the Middle East, merging high technology with brute human force; the United States is entering a period of domestic transition as it continues to face ongoing competition; China is asserting itself globally; authoritarianism is on the rise; and climate change has taken on heightened urgency. As the international landscape experiences its most significant shift since the end of the Cold War and the “Peace Dividend” that followed, Canada’s role in the world, its ability to influence geopolitics in a multipolar paradigm and the capacity of the CAF to fulfill its missions are under scrutiny at home and abroad.

No longer protected by geography – with threats coming from outer space and cyber space, from growing national emergencies including floods and forest fires, and from foreign influence/interference in our systems and institutions – Canada is facing increasing challenges to its economic security, to its social stability and to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Canada also continues to evolve as a society, with changes to its demographics and sense of identity. The domestic landscape is shifting, with the emergence of a more divisive political culture, ongoing regional tensions, a growing urban/suburban/rural divide, diminished civility in civic discourse, a general sense of voter apathy and only minimal public appreciation of the nexus between international security and national defence. The instability that arises out of this amalgam of factors has placed more complex demands on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces and is imposing rising pressure on an increasingly strained military force.

Within this intricate web of interconnected elements and environments, Canada’s Military Colleges exist as unique national institutions that fulfill a function no other organizations are designed to fill. With a history that stretches back to the founding of our nation, the CMCs have played a critical role in the defence of the country for well over a century. They remain the only places in Canada dedicated to educating and training citizens and permanent residents to become members of the Profes-

sion of Arms, with a specialized focus on leadership development. However as federally funded, administered and governed military units that are also provincially regulated academic institutions, the Military Colleges have struggled to maintain a clear sense of purpose and a strong sense of identity.

The CMCs are not alone in this regard. Military academies across the world have grappled with similar dilemmas, and many are undergoing significant transformations to reflect shifts in geopolitical dynamics, military strategy and societal imperatives. This has manifested in changes to organizational structure, curriculum development and learning objectives. It has also impacted pedagogical approaches: military academies have gone from primarily preparing officers for major wars to now also training leaders capable of handling complex, multinational, and non-traditional missions, including by seeking to develop officers who are not only technically and tactically proficient, but who also possess the integrity, character and intellectual flexibility to navigate delicate political and cultural environments.

The drivers, factors and catalysts emerging out of this international, national and institutional context will influence and shape the topography within which the CAF will be required to operate now, and far into the future. By remaining mindful of these layers of context in its examination and assessment of the CMCs, the Board believes its recommendations will be more pertinent and enduring in impact – thus helping to ensure that Canada’s Military Colleges continue to produce outstanding officers of good character who are ready to defend our nation domestically and advance our national interests abroad, in the face of whatever circumstances that future may hold.



# Methodology

The credibility of the Board's recommendations lies in the mix of skills, experience and expertise of its members and in the integrity of its process. Within the provisions of the mandate proposed in the Independent External Comprehensive Review and the parameters of its Terms of Reference (Annex 1), the Board took a data-driven, evidence-based methodological approach, using the lenses of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, to answer the question of whether the CMCs should continue to exist as undergraduate degree granting institutions, and if so, what changes may be required.

The Board's work was guided by transparency as a means of safeguarding the integrity and credibility of its findings, and by inclusiveness as a means of seeking information and input from diversified stakeholders and eliciting diverse perspectives and opinions. It also relied on the use of trauma-informed processes, in consideration of the context of sexual misconduct that gave rise to the CMCRB's mandate. Lastly, it was driven by a systems-centric approach, given that previous review processes had already identified many symptoms of problems at the CMCs without necessarily focusing on their systemic causes.

Relying upon triangulated qualitative and quantitative data as well as differing theoretical perspectives – as a means of both counterbalancing the limitations of any single method and enhancing the richness of the findings<sup>vi</sup> – the Board focused on three areas of comparative analysis as well as seven areas of discrete analysis, where it assessed the Colleges not in relation to comparators, but unto themselves:

## Comparative Analysis

- The quality of education, socialization, and military leadership training in the CMCs compared to other CAF officer entry streams and to foreign military academies
- The potential of different models for delivering university-level education and military training
- The costs, benefits, disadvantages, and advantages, both to the CAF and the nation, of continuing to educate ROTP N/OCdts at the CMCs.

## Discrete Analysis

- Structure
- Identity
- Governance
- Programs
- Peer Leadership Model
- Conduct, Health & Wellbeing
- Infrastructure, Operations & Support

To contextualize the above and inform the Board's understanding, additional consideration was given to the following issues:

- CMC Non-Regular Officer Training Plan activities (such as the Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year, Graduate Studies and Distance Learning)
- The Role of the CAF
- CAF Recruiting
- Officer Training and Education

Overall, the Board engaged virtually and in person with several hundred stakeholders, which helped yield a very rich data set and allowed for a rigorous analysis, providing for confidence in the findings and recommendations herein. In presenting this Report, the Board has deliberately refrained from attributing contributions, to safeguard the confidentiality with which many of them were shared, and to avoid singling out any individual or group of individuals unless essential to the analysis or discussion.

Nevertheless, there were two identifiable gaps in the review process. Firstly, deeper engagement with partners in the Global South may have enriched the analysis; although breadth of data sources was achieved, some of the Board's outreach/queries went unanswered. Secondly, self-identified Francophone voices were largely absent in data collected through the *Consulting with Canadians* online portal, despite the portal being available in both official languages. It is not clear whether this reflects an absence of input from Francophone Canadians, or a choice by Francophones to not self-identify.



## Primary Data Sources

### Listening Sessions

Listening Sessions were designed to hear firsthand accounts of experiences at and with the CMCs. One hundred and eleven Listening Sessions were conducted during April, May and August 2024. The sessions were conducted in groups of no more than 15 individuals, with military staff, public servants, academic faculty and N/OCdts at both CMCs, as well as with junior and senior officers and senior non-commissioned officers at CFB Gagetown, CFB Halifax and 12 Wing Shearwater to ensure engagement with the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Board conducted specific Listening Sessions to understand the perspectives of female N/OCdts, as well as racialized and LGBTQ2+ N/OCdts.

Upon request, the Board also conducted engagements with a variety of other individuals, including a number who self-identified as having had traumatic or otherwise problematic experiences at the CMCs.

### Consulting with Canadians Online Portal and Other Electronic Submissions

Launched on June 15, 2024, the *Consulting with Canadians* online portal received 392 submissions from across the country before it closed on September 15, 2024. The CMCRB also established an electronic mailbox through which it received 47 e-mail submissions.

## International Engagements

The Board undertook a comparative analysis of 15 foreign partners and allies from around the world regarding approaches to pre-commissioning professional military education (*Figure 1*). International engagement constituted a four-step approach:

Firstly, the Board undertook a literature review based on open-source information designed to gather data points on things like organizational structures, entry plans, officer selection, and education scholarship and bursary plans, and to capture them in a standardized way.

Secondly, the Board undertook discussions with Canadian and foreign Military/Defence Attachés to validate these findings and to fill in gaps.

Thirdly, the Board undertook virtual engagements with a subset of these countries' military academies to probe deeper into specific areas of interest.

Lastly, the Board held additional in-depth discussions and conducted in-person site visits with select Allies.

### Canadian Military Colleges Site Visits

The Board conducted three multi-day visits to RMC and RMC Saint-Jean respectively. The focus of the first visit was orientation and information gathering regarding the state of the College. The second visit provided the opportunity for the Board to engage in Listening Sessions with the academic faculty and support staff. The




Figure 1: International Engagements



third visit focused on Listening Sessions with N/OCdts and the military staff. During each of these visits, the Board had the opportunity to observe and engage with N/OCdts informally and to tour the facilities. The Board also attended First Year Orientation Program (FYOP) activities and the Obstacle Course competitions at both CMCs, as well as and the Badging Ceremony at RMC Saint-Jean.

## Canadian Armed Forces Base Visits

Visiting CAF bases provided the Board with exposure to the operational and training conditions for junior officers in the Army, Navy and Air Force. These visits highlighted the military training conditions N/OCdts will encounter during their On-the-Job-Experience, as well as during occupation training and upon graduation. The Board further observed portions of the Basic Military Officer Qualification course at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, as well as training activities at CFB Gagetown and CFB Halifax/Shearwater. These Base visits included Listening Sessions with junior officers, senior officers, and senior non-commissioned officers.

## Stakeholder Engagements

The Board undertook more than 85 internal and external consultations to gather a range of perspectives and information regarding the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Canadian Military Colleges. An initial meeting with The Honourable Louise Arbour provided insight into her report and context for her specific recommendations regarding the CMCs. Two meetings with the External Monitor, Madame Jocelyne Therrien, ensured that the Board remained apprised of ongoing monitoring and oversight work regarding the implementation of Independent External Comprehensive Review recommendations. The Board also met with all CAF Command leaders (L1 Commanders), select DND Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs), and a range of departmental experts. The Board further engaged with the CMC Faculty Association, the Chairs of the two CMC Boards of Governors, and the Association representing CMC alumni.

## Canadian Military Colleges Student Experiences

The Board utilized current N/OCdts' responses to existing DND<sup>vii</sup> surveys from current N/OCdts to assess their experiences at the CMCs, including two years' worth of data from the Student Experience Health and Wellbeing Survey, to assess their experiences at the CMCs.

DND's Review Services branch also conducted a review to identify gaps in the CMC policy framework related to prevention of and response to sexual misconduct, as compared to the relevant provincial and federal frameworks.

## Canadian Military Colleges Graduate Experience Survey

The Board commissioned a CMC Graduate Experience Survey that was administered by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis at DND. This survey focused on the experiences of the graduating classes of 2020 and 2021 and received 151 responses, constituting a 35% response rate.



## Secondary Data Sources

The Board conducted extensive literature reviews on a range of topics relevant to its mandate and undertook detailed examination of DND/CAF-specific information gathered from departmental and external experts. Existing scientific literature from the department was made available to the Board through the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis. Information and data specific to the CMCs were provided to the Board through the Canadian Defence Academy and directly from both Military Colleges, both proactively and in response to specific information requests.

## Presentation

The Board gave extensive consideration to how best to present its findings and recommendations in such a way as to render this Report accessible and impactful in relation to its target audience – which includes informed and interested Canadians, some with a direct stake in the outcomes of this work and some who are broadly interested in the future of Canada's Military Colleges and the overall evolution of the Canadian Armed Forces. In this context, the Board reflected upon the extent to which the body of the Report should include references and/or citations, and the extent to which content of interest should be captured within Annexes.

Ultimately, for the purposes of readability, flow and style, the Board decided to include a limited number of end-notes when there was particular value in drawing the reader's attention to the source of evidence upon which the Board had relied. Notwithstanding this approach, the Board has systematically documented, in a standalone repository, all further data, reference resources, background material and additional factual information that have informed, underpinned or influenced its work, in a standalone repository.



# Overview of the Canadian Military Colleges

## The 4-Pillar Model

The Mission of the CMCs is to educate, develop and inspire “bilingual, fit, and ethical leaders who serve the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada.” Both Colleges have long relied on the “4-Pillar” program model, which combines an undergraduate education, second language training and testing, military training and development, and physical fitness training and testing, in order to prepare and motivate N/OCdts for effective service as commissioned officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

## Academics

The CMCs offer accredited undergraduate and post-graduate university programs across the faculties of Engineering, Science, and Social Sciences and Humanities. Designed to foster critical intellectual skills relevant to the complexities of the 21st century through a balanced liberal, scientific and military education, the academic program is intended to emphasize the practical application of learnings to military settings and daily operational demands.

Within the Academic Pillar, the Core Curriculum is a mechanism through which the CMCs impart common, baseline knowledge and skills to all N/OCdts related to the Profession of Arms, irrespective of their field of academic study. Comprising of 16 courses, it represents the minimum content N/OCdts must acquire as a degree requirement in the areas of Mathematics (which also includes Logic and Information Technology), Sciences (Chemistry or Biology and Physics), Canadian History, Language and Culture, Political Science, International Relations and Leadership and Ethics.

## Bilingualism

Officers are expected to be fluent in both of Canada's Official Languages. All N/OCdts must take up to four years of mandatory second language training, including through daily courses and an intensive summer term, in order to attain a minimum second language proficiency score as a prerequisite for commissioning, including

through daily courses and an intensive summer term. Those who meet or exceed the Government of Canada's BBB level are exempt from additional training. RMC requires this level of second language proficiency for academic convocation, while RMC Saint-Jean does not.

## Military Training

The Military Pillar is intended to develop personal skills and abilities that underpin success in life. It seeks to prepare N/OCdts to make difficult decisions under stressful conditions through deeper understanding of the factors affecting their roles as leaders, including through studies in military psychology and leadership. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of personal integrity, ethical behaviour and professional responsibility. At present, the programs do not have clearly defined objectives or activities, and while all N/OCdts must participate in this training, there is no shared program standard between the two Colleges; the Enhanced Military Program at RMC Saint-Jean – which includes two leadership field training activities – is the most developed, although a new draft Training Plan has recently been produced at RMC.

## Physical Fitness

The CMCs aim to impart to the N/OCdts the importance of attaining and sustaining a high level of fitness and of maintaining a healthy lifestyle throughout their lives. All Cadets are required to take part in the physical education program, which is designed to ensure that they achieve and maintain a high level of fitness and learn the fundamentals in a wide variety of team and individual sports. They must also pass the CAF Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) test on an annual basis to meet the commissioning standard. Until the Fall of 2024, N/OCdts were further required to pass a Physical Performance Test (PPT) in First or Second Year, and again in Third or Fourth Year, in order to meet the commissioning standard.

## The Cadet Chain of Responsibility

At the CMCs, all N/OCdts are members of the Cadet Wing and are part of a hierarchy called the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR), wherein upper-year Cadets have authorities over and responsibilities for their peers and more junior Cadets. The Cadet Wing and the CCOR reflect the organizational structure typical of military organizations.

The CCOR differs slightly between the two CMCs. At RMC, the CCOR is comprised of the Cadet Wing Headquarters and its subordinate Divisions, Squadrons, Flights and Sections. Appointments of the N/OCdts to the CCOR “Barslate” positions count towards completion of commissioning requirements. At RMC Saint-Jean, the Cadet Wing Headquarters positions were eliminated in fall 2023 and there are insufficient numbers of N/OCdts to constitute a Division, so the CCOR is made up of Squadrons, Flights, and Sections only. Barslate positions do not count towards completion of the commissioning requirements at RMC Saint-Jean.

Currently the CCOR at both Colleges is vested with certain disciplinary authorities. This allows Cadet leaders in the CCOR to impose loss of privileges and corrective measures<sup>viii</sup> upon other N/OCdts (although all sanctions must be approved by and administered under the supervision of the chain of command, which in practice means that all N/OCdt-imposed sanctions must be authorized by the Squadron Commander). N/OCdts in the CCOR who are in direct leadership positions also perform supervisory and administration functions.

## Service Obligations

The Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) is a subsidized education program that provides participants with a free university-level education and with salary and benefits throughout this period of study. All ROTP participants, whether attending the CMCs or a civilian university, incur a service obligation based on their number of months of subsidized education. Two months of obligatory service is accrued for each month of subsidized education, to a maximum of 60 months.<sup>ix</sup> This means that ROTP graduates typically incur five years of obligatory service after graduation and commissioning. Direct Entry Officers, whose university education is not subsidized by the CAF, have no such service obligation.





# Value of the Canadian Military Colleges

The question of whether the CMCs should remain in their current form or whether they require reform and/or restructuring ultimately hinges on their value – real and perceived – to the CAF and to Canada. At the heart of this calculation lies the threshold issue that provided the genesis of the Board’s mandate in the first instance: harmful conduct and culture, and particularly the issue of sexual misconduct. (NB: For the purposes of this Report, “sexual misconduct” has been used as an umbrella term to capture all conduct deficiencies of a sexual nature, harassment of a sexual nature and crimes of a sexual nature.) The Board reflected extensively upon this issue and returned to it many times.

Had the Board determined that – as posited in the Independent External Comprehensive Review – negative conduct and culture at the CMCs is so entrenched, widespread and systematic that the institutions are inherently problematic and irrevocably broken, the Board would have argued for their closure, despite having ideas regarding how they could be improved in other respects. Had the evidence pointed to institutions rife with toxic masculinity or racism or misogyny or homophobia, for example, whose origins were embedded within the marrow of the Military Colleges, the Board would not have hesitated to conclude that the cost to the CAF and to Canada of maintaining them was too high a price to pay given the harm they caused, regardless of their history, utility, relevance or symbolism.

This was not the case. In their current state, the Board found no singular fatal flaw, toxic mix of circumstances or irredeemable structural weakness that would call for their demise.

The Colleges are not perfect – far from it. There are elements intrinsic to their nature as military institutions, such as hierarchy, emphasis on physical prowess and a culture of deference to authority, that give rise to problematic notions of what it takes to be an officer. There are aspects of their character as residential institutions, with a high percentage of male N/OCdts, that present ongoing challenges, contributing to a concerning disconnect between the experiences and perceptions of men and women at the CMCs. And there are events that have happened on their grounds and in their facilities that are deeply traumatic and harmful – ranging from attitudes to

actions, from the subtle to the explicit, from the distasteful to the unlawful. This combination of factors must be meaningfully and consistently addressed; it is shameful that anyone who has chosen to serve our country experiences harm in the very places where they have come to join the Profession of Arms.

But there is also deep value in what the Canadian Military Colleges offer to the CAF and to the country, and tremendous potential for them to deliver even more for Canadians.

The Board arrived at this conclusion by evaluating the quality of education, socialization and military training provided to N/OCdts compared to those entering the CAF via other officer entry streams (who have earned degrees at civilian universities), and in relation to the experiences offered at foreign military academies. It also examined the advantages and drawbacks of the CMCs as currently structured and run, particularly compared to alternative education and training models, and assessed the overall benefits they offer in relation to the costs they incur. The Board further examined six interconnected thematic areas that impact the CMC’s overall effectiveness, relevance and health:

- Identity;
- Governance;
- Program Structure;
- Peer Leadership Model;
- Conduct, Health & Wellbeing; and
- Infrastructure, Operations & Support.

The findings and analysis that flowed from this exercise form the backbone of the Board’s recommendations. Taken together, these recommendations will spur enough meaningful reform to help realize the full potential and significant value of the Military Colleges as important national institutions that are critical to Canada in this period of growing global competition, insecurity and change. It is the hope of the Board that its observations and recommendations will also help honour the experiences of all of those who have been, and continue to be, part of the fabric of Canada’s Military Colleges.



# Comparative Quality of Education, Socialization & Military Training

## In Relation to Other Entry Streams

There exist multiple mechanisms\* through which to become an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces; however, three entry streams in particular represent 90% of the recruitment of officers every year: the Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military College (ROTP CMC), the Regular Officer Training Plan - Civilian University (ROTP Civ U) and the Direct Entry Officer Program (DEO). The Board has therefore limited its analysis of the CMCs to comparisons with the ROTP Civ U and DEO streams only.

Underpinning this analysis is the Board's view that, while having multiple entry streams may pose challenges in terms of standardization across the CAF, that is greatly outweighed by the value that the diverse backgrounds, perspectives and life experiences of its officers bring to the Canadian Armed Forces. A variety of entry streams is beneficial for an all-volunteer military in other ways as well: it supports recruiting by offering entry at different life stages, it fills key occupations by drawing candidates with different areas of expertise, and it supports the rapid expansion of military forces, if required.

As such, the Board accepts that there is variety in the programmatic elements of each entry stream, and that what may be identified as positive/valuable/effective for one stream does not necessarily need to be replicated in another. In sum, the benefits of diversity outweigh the establishment of any common denominator across the entry streams, beyond Basic Training and the requirement to hold an undergraduate degree from an accredited institution.

This degree requirement stems from a recommendation in Defence Minister Douglas Young's 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, which responded to findings and recommendations in the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*.<sup>xi</sup>

The Board considered whether to revisit the requirement for officers to hold undergraduate degrees and decided against doing so; the CMCRB supports the rationale upon which this requirement is based and believes that it still holds. The judgment, critical thinking skills, founda-

tional knowledge and personal growth that are cultivated in response to the demands of a university-level education remain as important, valuable and impactful now as they were when the decision was first taken. The Board is firm in its view that the CAF, and Canada, are better served by having a university-educated officer corps.

Beyond a few exceptions for particular occupations within the Profession of Arms, however, the CAF does not prescribe any specific type of degree, and therefore degrees from all civilian universities in Canada are accepted to meet this requirement. Moreover, the CAF is agnostic with respect to how incoming officers meet their academic degree requirements (which are typically set by their universities), so long as, when applicable, those requirements satisfy external oversight requirements (such as professional accreditation bodies like the Engineers Canada Accreditation Board).

## Education

In light of the above, the starting point for comparison between the three entry streams is not whether an officer has a degree or what degree they hold, but rather whether the quality of that degree varies between entry streams. Because candidates in the DEO and ROTP Civ U streams earn their degrees via civilian universities, this would require the Board to compare the quality of every institution from which an officer in the CAF has earned a degree, in relation to all the other institutions, including the CMCs, and vice versa.

This is near impossible; the wide range of degree offerings, credit requirements, types of institutions, number of students and professors, geographic locations, course delivery modes and program structures, among other variables, make undergraduate educational experiences across the Canadian university landscape rich, yet highly individualized. For example, to try to compare a small, residential English-language university in Quebec like Bishop's University to a multi-campus research-intensive institution with a high commuter population like Simon Fraser University, let alone to compare Canada's Military Colleges to the diverse array of civilian universities across the country, particularly in terms of quality of the education, is an impractical and unhelpful exercise.

What all of these organizations have in common, however, is that they are accredited institutions of higher learning that have been granted the power to confer degrees via provincial legislative authority. In satisfying the Quality Assurance Framework of their respective provincial oversight bodies via an Institutional Quality Assurance Process (IQAP), they are considered credible

by the academic community, by society and by applicable professional oversight bodies.

As such, the Board accepts that degrees granted by the Canadian Military Colleges, in line with the legislative authorities conferred upon them by the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and in compliance with the requirements of their respective Quality Assurance Frameworks, are of equal quality to any other undergraduate degree from any other civilian university in Canada (or nationally recognized international institution), and the CMCRB holds them to be of equal value.

Separate from variations in the academic experiences of officers coming from all three entry streams, there are three key differentiators in the academic experience between ROTP CMC and both ROTP Civ U and DEO: the Core Curriculum, second language training and physical fitness activities.

While its current structure and delivery model are ripe for change, the objectives of the Core Curriculum remain valid. The ability to leverage the Core Curriculum to deliver tailored academic offerings in areas of specific interest to the CAF, and to provide a depth and breadth of study directly related to the Profession of Arms, is a unique feature of the CMCs. Moreover, it offers a broad liberal education which teaches skills such as critical thinking, and it exposes N/OCdts to different academic disciplines and different ways of thinking, analyzing and communicating. Equivalents to the Core Curriculum are not generally found in civilian universities, and it therefore provides great value to those enrolled in the ROTP CMC.

Although Bilingualism stands as its own Pillar under the 4-Pillar Model, second language training forms a *de facto* part of the academic experience for most N/OCdts, as they are required to attend language classes until such time as they achieve a BBB<sup>xiii</sup> level, as a prerequisite for earning their degree. This dedicated second language training is a unique and valuable opportunity in a bilingual country and within a bilingual institution: it yields significant positive outcomes for the N/OCdts in terms of promotion rates and skill development, as well as meaningful institutional outcomes in terms of communication, cultural integration and cost savings. Few, if any, Canadian civilian universities offer such training, making it another unique feature of the Military Colleges that the Board views as particularly valuable and noteworthy.

Physical Fitness also stands as its own Pillar but, until recently, successful completion of a physical performance test was included as a criterion for earning an academic degree and thus factored into the Board's

consideration of the comparative value of the CMC's academic program. Moreover, both CMCs require N/OCdts to attend physical education classes for the duration of their program, the content of which varies slightly between the two Colleges. Offered as non-credit mandatory courses, these classes include a mix of lectures, individual and group physical fitness activities, and sports. This is a unique feature of the CMCs, but not an exclusive one: a number of civilian universities offer physical fitness activities within their academic programs, albeit typically within Kinesiology and other health-related programs. As such, while the Board sees value in an emphasis on health and fitness, the current ROTP CMC construct provides only a minimal comparative advantage in this domain.

## Socialization

The Board has interpreted "socialization" as referring to the process of becoming a member of the Profession of Arms. This process of coming to understand norms and expectations, accepting beliefs and embracing values comprises a variety of elements, including mindset and lifestyle changes. It represents the transition between civilian life and life as a member of the collective professional body that is empowered to use force on behalf of Canada. More specifically, this transition reflects the personal journey of each member as they acquire the appropriate knowledge, skills, abilities and attributes to become a leader in an institution charged with the use of organized violence. This process can be difficult for many people, and particularly for junior officers who are new to the profession and who must be prepared to apply deadly force or expose themselves to lethal dangers, and order others to do so as well.

The Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) course, Parts 1 and 2, which all new officers must take, coupled with training specific to each member's occupation, is designed to facilitate this transition and deliver the functional and organizational competencies necessary for success in their first jobs in the military. These training courses further include material on the CAF Ethos<sup>xiii</sup> as well as on *The Fighting Spirit*<sup>xiv</sup> and its reflections and directives on the Profession of Arms in Canada.

Although ROTP Civ U entrants are members of the CAF while completing university, they have limited engagement with the CAF regarding the Profession of Arms until they graduate. DEO entrants have none. As such, these members will often find themselves leading soldiers, sailors and aviators, with minimal to no previous experience and with generally less than one year of combined basic and occupation training.

As was shared with the Board during the Listening Sessions held at CAF bases, this transition from civilian to officer in the Canadian Armed Forces can feel abrupt and can present a steep and challenging learning curve. While this does not impair the longer-term integration and success of ROTP Civ U and DEO entrants, many of these individuals indicated that they felt inadequately prepared at the outset of their careers to flourish in their new roles, particularly compared to their peers who attended a Military College. Nevertheless, the life experience that the ROTP Civ U and DEO entrants often bring with them to the CAF – based on things like travel, time at civilian universities and previous exposure to the workforce – are valuable to the institution and serve these members well in terms of their maturity, confidence and judgment.

ROTP CMC entrants experience a no less rapid transition from civilian society into the military, but they have a four-year period of gradually increasing responsibilities to adjust to the idea of being a member of the Profession of Arms. The CMCs dedicate significant time and effort to developing the principles of leadership, professionalism and ethics that form the foundation for continued service in the CAF, as delivered through the Core Curriculum, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) and the Military Pillar, all of which place particular emphasis on teamwork and leadership.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the Core Curriculum, the CCOR and the military training (all of which are discussed in detail below), exposure to these three elements plays an important role in habituating N/OCdts to the challenges and opportunities of military life. They typically move into their roles as junior officers with greater ease and with a higher level of comfort vis-a-vis the expectations and responsibilities that accompany these early posts; data collected during CMCRB Listening Sessions at 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Division Support Base Galetown, at Royal Canadian Air Force 12 Wing Shearwater and at Canadian Forces Base Halifax – which focused extensively on engagement with recent CMC graduates, with recent ROTP Civ U and DEO entrants and with the supervisors of these newly commissioned officers – showed that graduates from the CMCs typically came into their roles as junior officers with a higher degree of familiarity with the military, greater comfort in taking on leadership roles, and a deeper baseline knowledge in areas of relevance to the mandate and mission of the CAF.

While these were viewed as positive outcomes, participants in the Listening Sessions also noted that CMC grads often carried with them a reputation for arrogance

or a lack of humility, had limited “adult” life experience outside of the military, and were frequently less mature than their non-ROTP colleagues. Moreover, it was noted that the benefits of having gone to Military College were largely neutralized within a couple of years, and that commanding officers were rarely able to differentiate between an ROTP CMC graduate and their ROTP Civ U or DEO counterparts once the officers had fully entered the workforce.

The limited literature regarding the comparative impact of socialization between various officer entry streams paints a slightly different picture. An 2018 internal DND study assessed the impact of entry stream on career development and retention rates from 1997 to 2018. While the study noted that no high-quality data exists in any CAF system of record that can be used to distinguish officer entry streams with confidence, and that interpretation of correlated data was required to determine the actual entry stream, it nevertheless found that

- CMC graduates were promoted from Captain/Lieutenant (Navy) to Major/Lieutenant-Commander and from Major/Lieutenant-Commander to Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander more quickly than graduates from other entry streams;
- CMC graduates had significantly higher levels of second language abilities, particularly at the level of Captain/Major and Major/Lieutenant-Colonel;
- CMC graduates had lower attrition rates than the officers from other entry streams in the short, medium and long terms; and
- CMC graduates were found to make up a relatively high proportion of CAF senior ranks at the levels of Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander and higher (*Figure 2*).

Despite challenges in accessing clean data, the Board was able to draw some additional insights into the issue of quality of socialization by assessing the percentage of General and Flag Officers (GOFOs) (senior leaders in the CAF at the rank of Brigadier-General/Commodore and above) and those at the rank of Colonel/Captain(Navy) who are graduates of the CMCs, versus graduates of the other entry streams. The results are notable: in fiscal year 2023/2024, 67% of GOFOs and 58% of Colonels/Captains(N) were CMC graduates – an upwards trend for GOFOs and a similar proportion for Colonels/Captains(N) compared to the 2018 results.

The degree to which CMC graduates are represented among the highest ranks in the CAF is particularly striking, as only about 33% of the CAF's officer corps is drawn from the Military Colleges. However, it is less surprising




Figure 2: CAF Officers by Entry Program and Rank, 2018

when one takes into account the fact that CMC graduates are more likely to remain in the CAF for longer than ROTP Civ U or DEO entrants, and therefore have a higher chance of being promoted. This assessment does not factor in the impact that military training, leadership development and networking at the CMCs may also have on these disproportionately high rates.

Either way, the initial investment in the ROTP CMC appears to pay long-term dividends for the CAF; although a definitive causal link is difficult to prove, such statistics cannot be discounted. The Board is of the view that the socialization which occurs at the CMCs for young, newly minted N/OCdts is formative and is likely connected to their sense of commitment to a lifetime of service in the CAF. While not proof of the quality of socialization they receive at the Military Colleges, it nevertheless speaks to the importance of the CMCs for new recruits in supporting their transition from civilian to military life.

The Board observed that the CAF is less successful at recruiting into the DEO stream than into ROTP (both CMC and Civ U) for almost all occupations. A comparison between the success of recruiting under the ROTP and DEO entry streams reveals a large disparity between the performance of the two programs. The seven-year average for success in recruiting into the ROTP is 92%; for the DEO stream, it is 70% in the DEO stream. In pure numbers, over those seven years the ROTP recruited 3,125 people on a target of 3,386, while the DEO stream recruited 2,658 people on a target of 3,811.

DEO recruiting success was not evenly distributed across occupations. Occupations such as Pilot (92%), Intelligence Officer (133%), and Military Police Officer (127%) had great success recruiting DEOs; however, occupations that require a science or engineering degree such as Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (43%), Army Engineer (34%), Communication and Electronics Engineer (53%) and Naval Combat Systems Engineer (55%) struggled to recruit DEOs, even with recruiting incentives of up to \$40,000. In all cases, the ROTP entry stream for occupations that require a science or engineering degree achieved significantly greater success than the DEO entry stream (100%, 90%, 97%, and 77% respectively).

The key takeaway here is that the ROTP contributes in a substantially way to the recruitment of Canadians into the CAF and provides considerably greater recruiting success for occupations that require a science or engineering degree.<sup>xv</sup>

The Canadian Military Colleges also contribute positively towards achieving the employment equity goals of the CAF (Figure 3). The statistics demonstrate that representation of designated groups (in particular, women and visible minorities) consistently trends significantly higher at the CMCs than in the general CAF population and exceeds CAF officer statistics. This represents a meaningful contribution to the CAF's overall approach to addressing the historic underrepresentation of designated groups within the military. Conversely, the representation of Indigenous peoples and persons with disabilities at the CMCs remains



5-Year Comparison Table for CAF Employment Equity Designated Groups				
	Combined Royal Military Colleges (Kingston + Saint-Jean)			
CMC Stats (CAF Officer stats) (CAF General pop stats)	Women	Visible Minorities	Indigenous Peoples	Persons with Disabilities
31-Mar-20	20.9% (19.7%) (15.9%)	16.6% (12.5%) (9.4%)	2.3% (1.9%) (2.8%)	0.8% (0.7%) (1.2%)
31-Mar-21	21.9% (19.9%) (16.3%)	19.3% (13.1%) (9.5%)	2% (2.0%) (2.8%)	0.5% (0.7%) (1.1%)
31-Mar-22	22.7% (20.2%) (16.3%)	22.1% (14.2%) (10.8%)	3.1% (2.0%) (2.9%)	0.6% (0.6%) (1.1%)
31-Mar-23	31-Mar-23 23.5% (20.4%) (16.5%)	26.1% (15.7%) (12.0%)	2% (2.0%) (3.1%)	0.7% (0.8%) (1.2%)
31-Mar-24	21.8% (20.6%) (16.5%)	26.2% (16.4%) (12.2%)	1.9% (2.0%) (3.0%)	0.6% (0.8%) (1.2%)
Notes: These statistics were provided by the Director Inclusion from the Canadian Forces Employment Equity Statistics Database. The statistics were derived from voluntary self-identification of N/OCdts at the Canadian Military Colleges.				

Figure 3: 5-Year Comparison Table for CAF Employment Equity Designated Group

at or below overall CAF representation trendlines. More generally, the underrepresentation of Indigenous peoples within the CAF officer corps remains a challenge. Special measures, especially the Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year (ILOY) at RMC, endeavour to address this issue, and such efforts should continue.

## Military Training

DEO, ROTP Civ U and ROTP CMC entry streams all participate in the Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) course, Parts 1 and 2, and this common training is the only requirement for commissioning. As such, the single differentiating element between the military training experiences of N/OCdts and their ROTP Civ U and DEO counterparts – prior to occupation-specific training – is the additional training that N/OCdts receive at the CMCs under the auspices of the Military Pillar.

Military training at the CMCs – as currently structured and delivered – leaves much to be desired; the program standard and training plans are *ad hoc*, vague and misaligned between the two Colleges, the time allocated to developing military skills and leadership is not sufficiently prioritized, and the Cadet Chain of Responsibility that is intended to equip N/OCdts with practical leadership learning opportunities is not currently fulfilling that function. The result is a Pillar that has no clear purpose and is not particularly effective. It is also the area in which more than 70% of recent graduates wish they had learned more during their time at the CMCs.<sup>xvi</sup>

Ultimately, military training at the CMCs has no comparator in the ROTP Civ U or DEO streams, and therefore its quality cannot be assessed against other programs. Unto itself, however, a lack of rigour around the design and implementation of the Military Pillar has seriously

undermined the important function of the CMCs as exceptional leadership institutions of singular value to the CAF and to Canadian society. The creation of a systematic, standardized and well-sequenced military training program should help create a greater sense of identity and a clearer sense of value at the CMCs, as well as an improved product in terms of the development of officers with better character and greater leadership capabilities. In the pursuit of these objectives, the CAF cannot be satisfied with mediocrity; a revised military training program must strive for excellence.

## In Relation to Foreign Military Academies

Canada is not alone in its need to produce military officers to serve in the nation's armed forces or in its decision to establish dedicated institutions responsible for doing so. Across the world, allies and partners are seized with the critical importance of educating and training young officers in support of their defence and security requirements, and they have developed a wide variety of models to meet these needs.

The Board had the opportunity to engage with, visit and learn from a range of countries – from NATO Allies to traditional and non-traditional defence partners across North and South America, Europe, the Indo-Pacific and Africa – all of which have some sort of military academy/academies that provide training for their officer corps. While no two models are alike, and each reflects the particular history, social values, demographic profile and geopolitical context of its respective country, these military academies nevertheless share some common objectives, similar philosophical underpinnings and comparable challenges.<sup>xvii</sup>

These include a commitment to investing in education and training as the backbone of a strong military – present and future; a focus on equipping cadets with the appropriate skills, knowledge, character and competencies to become effective officers as well as skilled leaders and upstanding citizens; and a determination to ensure that their professional military educational institutions remain relevant and responsive to the needs of their armed forces.

Many of them are also grappling with misconduct issues that are not dissimilar to the challenges faced at the CMCs, particularly since many of the foreign academies are also fully residential and have co-educational dormitories. This is particularly true of other Western countries, whose military cultures are evolving alongside rapid

societal change – often in response to scandals, public outcry, and negative incidents – and who face tremendous pressure to keep up.

Although these issues are not necessarily seen as prevalent or pressing by all interlocutors, most foreign military academies have developed, or are developing, policies and procedures to address misconduct in a variety of forms, and in all cases have, demonstrated a commitment to continual improvement. The United States Naval Academy's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program,<sup>xviii</sup> the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst's Critical Mass trial,<sup>xix</sup> and the Norwegian Military Academy's *Mitt Lag* (My Team) initiative provide meaningful examples of these efforts.

Another point of commonality is that most countries intake officers through multiple entry streams, rather than relying on their military academies alone. These entry streams typically include a mix of 1) academic bursary/scholarship programs to support N/OCdts attending civilian university, 2) direct entry from civilian university programs, and 3) prior-service commissioning schemes (wherein former non-commissioned members are able to commission without requiring a degree). For example, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) recruits officers to the Australian Defence Force Academy; offers a Defence University Sponsorship scheme that subsidizes education at civilian universities in exchange for service in the military; recruits university and high school graduates directly into its officer corps to attend one of the ADF's three service training academies; and offers a pathway for non-commissioned members to transition to become officers.

Notwithstanding these similarities, the respective geopolitical ambitions of each country, alongside public attitudes towards their military and their levels of defence spending, all make a difference in how foreign partners and allies treat professional military training and education. This is reflected in both structure and substance.

In most cases, foreign militaries deliver officer basic training by service academies (army, navy, air force) or training schools, not by a joint (tri-service) training school. For example, in the United States each of the three services operates independently and provides an officer training and education program that is specific to the unique requirements of its service. Canada is among the minority of countries that have combined all services to deliver a joint basic officer training program, and this is currently provided by the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS) in Saint Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec.

Therefore, while all officers in the CAF go through the same common and service-specific training phases as other armed forces, the CMCs do not play a meaningful role in this process; military training at the CMCs is not part of common training requirements and has not been well structured or standardized in the way it is in comparable foreign institutions.

Moreover, while several nations have established a joint military academy that provides an undergraduate degree alongside military training (i.e., Australia, Japan, Belgium, Germany), this joint military training is supplemented by occupation training that is delivered by service-specific military training organizations. Meanwhile, in the Canadian context, service/occupation-specific training at the CMCs remains largely absent and unstandardized across the services, falling short of the structured approach taken by most other nations.

Thus, while each country has its own distinct approach to the common and service-specific training phases, and while Canada is unusual in having a joint model, most countries nevertheless better leverage their military academies to deliver military training. At present, the CMCs are not contributing in a formal, measurable or systematic way to either common training or service-specific training, calling into question the value of the Military Pillar, not just unto itself, as noted above, but in particular as compared to other militaries.

The varying degrees of emphasis placed on academics versus military training is another key differentiator between the various models. Some countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia do not require a university degree for entry into their military academy, let alone for commissioning, while others call for an undergraduate degree as a pre-requisite for entry into the academy (e.g., Denmark). Yet others deliver an undergraduate education as part of the military academy program (e.g., Sweden, United States, Brazil, Philippines, Norway, Japan, Belgium and South Africa). In this latter context, the program can take several forms, such as delivering academics and military training concurrently or taking a mixed/sequential approach. Some separate military training entirely in time and space from academic studies. For example, in Germany, the military relies on civilian academics who are separate from the State to educate their officers, and on their military to train their officers, and these periods of study and training occur independently of one another.

In some instances, the academic education is delivered by the provider of military training (like Brazil's Military Academy of Agulhas Negras), whereas in others the

academic education is outsourced to another governmental institution (like the Norwegian Defence College) or a private service provider (like the University of New South Wales in Australia). In all cases, there is a high degree of clarity regarding the intent, objectives and expected outcomes of the academic program in relation to its relevance to its country's armed forces, a factor that is missing from the broad academic offerings of the CMCs.

Additionally, while various actors may be responsible for different aspects of the program delivery, the relationship between the military academy and its armed forces is typically strong; practices such as ongoing feedback sessions, formalized dialogue opportunities or the regular surveys seeking input from the services that the Philippine Military Academy uses, help ensure that the military academies remain relevant and that the skills, knowledge, character and capabilities of newly commissioned officers meet the overall needs of their armed forces.

In situations where a degree is required, almost all countries take a narrow approach to program offerings. For example, the Swedish Defence University offers only three "profiles of study" as part of their Officer Programme (military science, military technology or naval science), all of which lead to a Bachelor of Military Science, while the Philippines Military Academy offers a number of areas of study (including Humanities, Management, Psychology and International Relations) but only grants a single Bachelor of Science degree with a major in Security Studies. The academic program at the United States Naval Academy is focused on science, technology, engineering and mathematics programs, in order to meet the U.S. Navy's technical needs, and offers only one degree – a Bachelor of Science – albeit with 26 options for majors.

Within their degrees, many academies still require Cadets to take some form of core curriculum. However, this takes a wide variety of forms, and in most cases it manifests through a more standardized approach to leadership training that includes elements of the liberal arts.

In terms of physical and psycho-social infrastructure, investment varies, although all countries acknowledge the importance and value of a high-quality environment on the health, wellbeing and learning outcomes of their Cadets. On-campus support and access to health and wellbeing resources also vary widely, and in this regard, the CMCs are leaders from whom many other countries could learn; access to resources and on-campus support networks are among the most comprehensive and robust at the CMCs as compared to most other academies.

mies, and the CMCs also benefit from fitness facilities that are of exceptionally high quality compared to many other countries.

Apart from Belgium, the specific challenges facing Canada as a bilingual country do not exist elsewhere, such as the requirement to deliver the programs at the CMCs in both Official Languages. Very few military academies require second language training, though many offer second language courses; typically, when they do, the second language offered is English. As such, it is of limited value to draw on lessons learned from other military academies to apply to the CMCs in terms of second language training.

In sum, it is clear that there is no “right model” for delivering professional military training and education, nor is there a “better model” – each comes with particular strengths, weaknesses, drawbacks and opportunities specific to its distinct context. The Canadian model, while shares touchpoints with other militaries but is unique to Canada, and for good reason: there are numerous features of Canada, and the CAF, that require a one-of-a-kind approach, including linguistic duality, diversity and equity considerations, geography and joint training, that cannot simply be pulled from other models.

Nevertheless, there are myriad opportunities for the CMCs to look to, and be inspired by, best practices among other countries, even if they may not be fully applicable. For example, in Nordic countries selective conscription allows those nations to influence the demographic composition of their military and can result in a greater percentage of female members being recruited into the military than is common for volunteer-service forces. While Canada is not moving towards a conscription model, understanding the impact of having a critical mass of women is nonetheless valuable in terms of influencing recruitment strategies and program design. The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst’s Critical Mass initiative noted above – in which some training platoons will boost the number of women cadets to 30% in order to help offset the negative pressures associated with women being a small minority in an otherwise male-dominated living, working and study environment – provides another example from which we can learn.

More generally, Canada can draw lessons from the attitude and mindsets driving all of the foreign military academies. They are unequivocal about the importance of their armed forces in defending their national interests, values and ways of life, and are therefore unapologetic

about the imperative to prepare their junior officers to be able to fight and win in the contemporary geopolitical security environment. They view their military academies as extensions of their armed forces and use them as tools of military diplomacy, as centres of leadership excellence, as symbols of strength and as vehicles for projecting power. They take their success seriously.

The Board was inspired by the thoughtful and deliberate approach taken by the Swedish Defence University to its public art collection – designed to stimulate deep reflection on themes of war and peace, defence and security. It was motivated by the efforts of the Norwegian Defence College, which runs a sought-after leadership course every year that is so highly respected that it counts national leaders and industry scions among its regular participants. It was persuaded by the Australian Defence Force Academy’s belief in the value of psychosocial infrastructure as tool for addressing issues such as health and wellbeing, community cohesion and risk reduction. It was moved by the importance of tradition, connection to history and sense of place that the Karlberg Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy evoked through the high quality of their buildings and grounds. And it was impressed by the way in which the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst leverages adventure training, experiential learning and field exercises to teach N/OCdts to foster deeper relationships with self, grapple with fear, develop courage and learn to manage risk. These are just a few of the ways in which the CMCs and the CAF can learn and benefit from the experiences, expertise and approaches of Canada’s partners and allies.

## Alternative Education & Training Models

An assessment of whether Canada’s Military Colleges as currently structured are effective in generating the professional officer corps required by the Canadian Armed Forces – which in turn speaks to the overall value proposition of the CMCs – benefits from a comparison to alternative models.

As noted above, a wide range of models exists, each with its own permutations and combinations. The Board elected to draw upon its review of foreign military academies – from NATO Allies to traditional and non-traditional partners – in order to develop six types of organizational models capable of delivering military training and education (*Figure 4 and further described in Annex 3*).



These vary from a model that is very similar to the present structure (the Integrated Model), to a model in which academic education is separated from the purview of the military academy and the degree-granting function of the institution is removed (the Military Academy Model).

Each of these six models offers a feasible method for DND/CAF to deliver pre-commissioning training and education, but each comes with its own opportunities and challenges. For example, transforming the CMCs into strictly military academies and sending all applicants to civilian universities for their education would provide clarity of purpose and improve governance of the military academy. However it would also increase the amount of time required to train and educate officers, limit valuable opportunities for the kind of career-long networking that occurs at the CMCs, and reduce the second Official Language abilities of the officer corps.

Establishing a separate defence university that delivers a university education alongside a distinct military academy would facilitate greater alignment between the defence university and a civilian university model, but would be more expensive and would not resolve the challenge of dividing the N/OCdts' time between the four Pillars of the CMCs.

Contracting out the provision of academic services to a civilian university would streamline the academic offerings and crystallize governance but would prove more costly to deliver and risk removing the close relationship that exists between the faculty and the N/OCdts.

Changing the sequence of training would offer greater distinction between activities but would trade off the opportunity to accomplish multiple objectives concurrently with no real additional benefits.




Figure 4: Organizational Models Examined

Lastly, pursuing greater cost efficiencies – though a critical aspect of the value calculation of the CMCs – is not a sufficient factor unto itself to determine the optimal design of the CMCs.

Ultimately, as detailed further below, after examining the pros and cons of each of the models, the Board determined that the Integrated Model (which most resembles the current CMC model), serves Canada best.

## Costs

Canada's post-secondary institutions vary widely, including in terms of the size of the student body, the number of campuses, the residential or commuter nature of the school, and its areas of specialization. This makes it difficult to undertake a comparative analysis of the cost of the CMCs relative to civilian universities. Moreover, the Military Colleges are unique national institutions that fulfill a different function in society than other academic bodies. It is difficult to quantify the benefits, advantages and disadvantages they yield, relative to their costs, in terms of the defence and security of Canada, is difficult to quantify. The Board also accepts that there are particularities associated with running Military Colleges, and in particular running two Military Colleges, that are distinct and that further impact the cost-benefit calculus. Put

another way, cost is not the exclusive comparator on which to base a determination of the value of the CMCs.

Nonetheless, a reflection on the costs of operating and maintaining Canada's Military Colleges is necessary and worthwhile. Such an exercise reveals that the CMCs are markedly more expensive than civilian universities. Some of the factors that increase costs have a strong and justifiable rationale, others less so.

To effectively compare the costs of the CMCs to civilian universities – with costs commonly assessed by determining the operating expenses of an institution compared to the number of full-time equivalent students – the CMCRB selected eight universities that most closely resemble the CMCs in scope and scale (*Figure 5*).

Annex 4 details the basis upon which the Board selected these universities for comparison and the sources upon which it drew to do so, as well as the methodology used to undertake the exercise.

<b>RMC Kingston</b>	<b>RMC Saint-Jean</b>
<b>Acadia University</b>	<b>Brescia University College</b>
<b>Brandon University</b>	<b>Canadian Mennonite University</b>
<b>Cape Breton University</b>	<b>Huron University College</b>
<b>St. Francis Xavier University</b>	<b>St-Thomas More College</b>
<b>University of Northern British Columbia</b>	<b>The King's University</b>
<b>Université du Québec en Abitibi-Témiscamingue</b>	<b>Université Sainte-Anne</b>
<b>Université du Québec à Chicoutimi</b>	<b>Université Saint-Boniface</b>
<b>Université du Québec à Rimouski</b>	<b>Université Saint-Paul</b>

*Figure 5: Selected Comparable Canadian Universities*

## Comparative Cost Observations Regarding RMC

The comparison between RMC and the selected institutions reveals that the cost per student at RMC is 1.6 times greater than the average cost per student at a civilian university. It also reveals that the student-to-faculty ratio is more than 2.5 times lower than the average ratio (Figure 6). While the current cost per student ratio is lower than previous studies, these findings are consistent with the findings of the 2017 Office of the Auditor General Report that concluded that the cost per student was higher at RMC compared to civilian universities, and that the student-to-faculty ratio was low.

## Comparative Cost Observations Regarding RMC Saint-Jean

The comparison between RMC Saint-Jean and the selected institutions indicates that the cost per student

at RMC Saint-Jean is four times greater than the average cost per student at a civilian university, and that the student-to-faculty ratio is three times lower than the average ratio (Figure 7). The 2017 Office of the Auditor General audit did not examine RMC Saint-Jean.

In order to assess the overall value proposition of the CMCs from a financial perspective, the Board sought to contextualize the above observations in relation to four guiding principles:

1. Canada's Military Colleges are unique institutions that play a critical role in the education, training and development of junior officers.
2. Such education, training and development is the backbone of the Canadian Armed Forces and requires ongoing and significant investment.
3. The CMCs are not the only source of capable, talented, effective leaders for the CAF; the costs of running the CMCs must be reasonable, sensible and defensible.

	RMC Kingston	Université du Québec à Chicoutimi	St. Francis Xavier University	Université du Québec à Rimouski	Acadia University	University of the Northern British Columbia	Brandon University	Cape Breton University	Université du Québec en Abitibi-Témiscamingue
FTE	1,951	6,222	4,738	4,258	3,745	2,488	3,145	3,617	2,691
Academic	228	240	228	225	174	183	171	129	150
OE	71,782	116,234	96,909	88,934	77,518	90,156	59,226	67,421	65,686
OE/FTE	36,792	18,681	20,454	20,886	20,699	36,236	18,832	18,640	24,410
FTE/Acad.	8.6	25.9	20.8	18.9	21.5	13.6	18.4	28.0	17.9

Figure 6: Full-Time Enrollment (FTE), Number of Faculty, and Operation Expenses (OE) at RMC and Comparable Universities, with Ratios

	RMC Saint-Jean	Université St-Paul	Université St-Boniface	Huron University College	The King's University	Canadian Mennonite University	Université Sainte-Anne	Brescia University College	St. Thomas More College
FTE	318	916	756	1 560	868	507	440	1,239	1,160
Academic	40	66	42	45	48	32	29	35	29
OE (K\$)	30,979	22,338	29,662	38,736	18,719	12,280	20,266	24,215	15,947
OE/FTE	97,418	24,386	39,235	24,831	21,566	24,221	46,059	19,544	13,747
FTE/Acad.	8.0	13.9	18.0	34.7	18.1	15.8	15.2	35.4	40.0

Figure 7: Full-Time Enrollment (FTE), Number of Faculty, and Operation Expenses (OE) at RMC Saint-Jean and Comparable Universities, with Ratios

4. The CMCs must ensure that they have a distinct identity, a clear sense of purpose, an excellent track record and a first-rate program in order to justify any major discrepancies in costs relative to comparable civilian universities.

Viewed through this lens, while variation is to be expected, the overall scale of difference is difficult to justify; it is evident that there is a need to reduce costs at the CMCs and that certain areas are particularly ripe for reform.

Arguably the most critical cost driver for the CMCs is the low number of N/OCdts, who make up one-half (RMC) to one-third (RMC Saint-Jean) of the average size of the student body at comparable universities. Growing this number, predominantly through an increase of N/OCdts within the ROTP CMC cohort, would serve as a key lever for reducing the cost per student, while also serving to promote other CAF objectives around reconstitution (growing the trained strength of the CAF), recruitment and diversity.

The large number of faculty members relative to the student body is also a key factor in driving costs at the CMCs. While small class sizes can be very beneficial for learning outcomes and are often seen as desirable by both students and faculty members (although this remains a point of debate and the “ideal” ratio remains contested),<sup>xx</sup> the significant discrepancy between the CMCs and comparable universities is notable and evidences a compelling need to increase the student-to-faculty ratio.

RMC Saint-Jean also shoulders costs (including internal resources and contracted resources) that are absent from comparable universities and from RMC, primarily as a consequence of offering the *Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel* (CÉGEP) program. The value of continuing to offer CÉGEP is highly debatable from a variety of perspectives and will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this Report. Additionally, the facilities maintenance and service support contract with the Corporation Fort St-Jean is a significant cost driver unique to RMC Saint-Jean, although it yields great benefit, as reflected by the quality of services and facilities at RMC Saint-Jean, and provides an excellent example of the principle that “you get what you pay for.”

Certain other cost drivers are also more understandable and defensible, particularly when they are linked to the unique nature of the CMCs as federally regulated military institutions that reflect the unique socio-political realities of our bilingual country. For example, the decision to maintain two separate, small institutions in two different

provinces results in significant duplication (whereas some of the comparable universities are satellite organizations of larger universities, an arrangement that helps reduce costs). Consequently, between the CMCs there are two Commandants, two Principals, two Boards of Governors, two Registrar's Offices and two Fitness Directors, etc. Canada is the only country among the foreign partners and allies studied to adopt this approach.

The need for federal government bodies to offer services to employees in both official languages, and to provide comparable instruction in both official languages, presents another cost factor; such a requirement is absent from the Canadian civilian university landscape, and it both increases costs and presents staffing hurdles.

The fact that N/OCdts are employees of the CAF introduces another area of difference; as part of their employment, they are provided with uniforms at public expense, including for their upkeep and maintenance. Their activities, including On-the-Job-Experience, are paid for by their employer, the CAF. These costs, over which the Military Colleges themselves have little control, are included in the cost assessment and contribute to the greater overall operating costs of the CMCs.

In sum, while there are a range of socio-political and regulatory imperatives that impact the cost of operating the CMCs, as well as particular elements of their inherent character that present additional costs as compared to comparable civilian universities, there are also key opportunities available to the Military Colleges to deliver a more cost-effective outcome in service of their overall value proposition.





# Findings, Analysis & Recommendations

As discussed above, the Board believes that the CMCs have value 1) in relation to other entry streams; 2) as compared to civilian universities; and 3) relative to foreign military academies.

This conclusion is separate, however, from the question of the inherent value – real and perceived – of Military Colleges to Canadians. Historically, the role the CMCs have played in the defence and security of Canada, and in the country's journey towards sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic security and social stability, have rendered this obvious.

However, in recent decades, a recognition that the Military Colleges have at times been the venue for exclusion and harm, and that there has been a hidden cost to aspects of the traditional ways of operating them, has diminished their worth in the eyes of many Canadians. Coupled with negative public attention and a sense of post–Peace Dividend complacency, some have even come to question why the country needs to invest in professional military education and training in the first place, or whether the Military Colleges are the best venues for its delivery.

Putting aside comparative value, the Board therefore also focused extensive efforts on examining the current utility of the Military Colleges as institutions unto themselves, by undertaking a discrete analysis of seven thematic areas. Through this process, the Board identified a series of key levers where pressure can and should be exerted in order to result in the changes required to ensure that Canada's Military Colleges deliver exceptional value for Canada and the CAF.

## Organizational Structure

### Function

In the context of Madame Arbour's findings in the Independent External Comprehensive Review and the mandate given to the CMCRB, the first issue before the Board, as discussed at the outset, is whether, in their current state, the CMCs are so out of step with society and so broken that they are irredeemable, and therefore

require major structural change or even closure. Or whether, despite any shortcomings that may endure, the CMCs as currently structured remain "the best way to form and educate tomorrow's military leaders."

The Board believes the latter: Canada's Military Colleges remain an important vehicle through which to develop this nation's leaders of tomorrow. As will be discussed in more detail below, the evidence shows that while misconduct in all its forms continues to occur at the Military Colleges, the CMCs are largely the place where, not the reason why, that it happens. Moreover, to the extent that issues of misconduct arise, they are not disproportionate to the incidence rate elsewhere in Canadian society, particularly at similarly sized residential civilian universities with a similar-age peer group.

Furthermore, the CMCs are, at their core, functioning organizations that generate well-educated, well-trained, bilingual and physically fit officers for the CAF and for Canada. Removing their degree-granting function and outsourcing the formative education of N/OCdts to civilian universities would amount to dissolving organizations that play an important strategic and social function in Canada which cannot be fulfilled by any other institution, and that serve as an important complement to the Direct Entry Officer Plan and the Regular Officer Training Plan – Civilian University entry streams.

This does not mean that the CMCs are as effective, relevant, healthy or fit-for-purpose as the nation requires them to be. Major elements of the program, culture, and physical and psychosocial infrastructure at the CMCs are problematic and, among other outcomes, permit or foster negative, inappropriate or unacceptable behaviour. These issues must continue to be addressed. The Board is encouraged by the fact that both Military Colleges have proven themselves willing, able and determined to do so.

For example, demonstrable efforts to positively evolve the culture of the CMCs – such as the establishment of a "Chair, Cultural Evolution" position at RMC and the establishment of a "Specialist in Resources and Training on Sexual Violence and Promoting a Positive Culture" at RMC Saint-Jean – have prompted observable change at the CMCs, in keeping with global best practice, impact-

ing everything from policies and procedures to management practices. Key initiatives have been developed, are taking root and are being tracked, from the creation of the Athena Network supporting women and the Agora LGBTQ2+ support group to the establishment of the Indigenous Knowledge and Learning Group. These need to be given a chance to yield greater dividends.

Overall, given their comprehensive influence as places of work, study and personal life, the CMCs have an outsized ability to shape N/OCdts. This presents challenges, but also huge opportunities. The CMCs offer an effective instrument to bring meaningful change to the CAF, through the training and education of a new generation of officers who will be exemplars of the Profession of Arms as they move into leadership positions within the institution. Thus, to the extent that the CAF is committed to making positive change, this change can find its origins in the Military Colleges.

However, this also means that the CAF and the CMCs have an even greater responsibility towards these vulnerable and impressionable young adults, particularly because as representatives of the CAF, expectations of N/OCdts are high regarding reputation and conduct, and scrutiny is intense. The Board is persuaded that the CMCs can rise to this occasion, but a genuine commitment is required from the Government of Canada and the leadership of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to support them in this work.

Dismantling the CMCs at this stage and dispersing the N/OCdts to civilian universities would not solve the challenges identified above. Rather, this would simply shift them to other institutions that are perhaps less equipped to help foster the character, behaviour and attitudes needed to advance positive culture evolution in the CAF.

It should also be noted that due to their design, their funding model and their academic human resource considerations, removing the undergraduate degree programs from the CMCs would effectively cause the collapse of the graduate and research programs. Ultimately, the CMCs would thus cease to be institutes of higher learning. The impact of this – while outside of the scope of this Board's focus – should not be underestimated. In complementarity with the work of Defence Research and Development Canada, the CMCs play a critical role in producing timely and relevant defence and security research that is highly valued, both by DND/CAF and by international partners and NATO Allies. A loss of this capacity would have serious negative practical and reputational consequences for Canada, and pose challenges to the country's ability to meet its defence and security objectives.

## Form

Once it had determined that the CMCs should retain their degree-granting function, the Board identified ten factors that play a significant role in ensuring the health, quality, viability, credibility and relevance of the institutions:

1. Identity;
2. Governance;
3. Cost;
4. Culture;
5. Military Training;
6. Academic Education;
7. Bilingualism;
8. Health, Fitness & Wellbeing;
9. Recruitment; and
10. Diversity & Inclusion.

It then assessed the six organizational models discussed above (and detailed in Annex 3) against each of these factors, using a question-based five-point scale. It further considered whether a new model would improve the *status quo* and/or introduce other consequences.

Through this process (detailed further in Annex 5), the Board determined that the Integrated Model, which most closely aligns with the current structure of the CMCs, remains the right fit for Canada in the current domestic and geopolitical context. Under this model, the form of the Canadian Military Colleges should appear very similar going forward to what it has looked like in past decades, particularly at RMC. Specifically:

- Both Colleges should continue to offer military training alongside an accredited academic education, through which N/OCdts earn a degree.
- No new body or mechanism should be created to deliver the academic elements of the program (be it an external service provider or a new DND/CAF-run academic Defence & Security university).
- Responsible fiscal management should guide program delivery, but cost-cutting and efficiencies should not be the primary drivers for change.

In sum, while meaningful reform is needed in how the program is governed and delivered (as discussed below), the function and form of the CMCs will not appear significantly different.



### Recommendation 1

Maintain the Canadian Military Colleges as undergraduate degree-granting institutions. Continue to train and educate Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges through an Integrated Model.

## Systemic Reform

The Board's recommendation to maintain the CMCs as undergraduate degree-granting institutions via an Integrated Model is premised on the assumption that retaining the existing organizational structure is accompanied by substantive change in several areas. The Board has focused on a systems-centric approach to understanding and solving the existing issues, and the systemic reforms that are proposed aim to address the underlying problems that have plagued the Military Colleges, not simply treat the symptoms.

The findings, analysis and recommendations laid out herein are designed to identify the problematic issues, articulate why they are of concern, and propose the action needed to address them.

Collectively, these reforms should yield impactful, sustainable and positive change for the CMCs, helping to crystallize their value proposition, sharpen their clarity of purpose, reinforce their culture evolution efforts and shield them from the need for constant cycles of scrutiny.

## Identity

The foundational issue undermining the CMCs at this juncture is the absence of a clear identity. The ramifications of this uncertainty – stemming from a contested understanding of their purpose – are numerous, and are the source of many of the attendant challenges facing the Military Colleges.

To some, the CMCs are military units defined by their mandate to develop N/OCdts as leaders in the Profession of Arms who are preparing for careers in warfighting and conflict management. They want to “put the M(ilitary) back into RMC” and speak of the overemphasis on academic coursework as a distraction from time that could be spent honing the military skills, gaining the practical knowledge and developing the physical fitness needed to produce excellent officers.

To others, the CMCs are first and foremost institutions of higher learning whose primary purpose is to educate university students who may ultimately serve as officers in the Canadian Armed Forces. Demands regarding drill and deportment are seen as a nuisance, and time spent playing sports, undertaking adventure training or learning about risk management is not viewed as relevant to developing the critical thinking abilities, judgment or cognitive function needed to produce smart and thoughtful citizens.

Most, however, hold a more nuanced view that adapts elements of both extremes to see the Military Colleges as places that should be responsible for all of the above, with a mandate to develop N/OCdts as both leaders and scholars – as currently reflected by the 4-Pillar model. In principle, this seems wise. In practice, it is failing.

Over time, to support this balance, three distinct, sometimes contradictory, institutional identities have emerged. Specifically, the CMCs have simultaneously become military units, federal public service institutions, and provincially chartered universities. Each identity carries its own culture and values, which do not necessarily align with one another, and each has its own stakeholders with distinct interests, divergent expectations and differing objectives. This recipe gives rise to chronic problems and ongoing tensions.

For example, for prospective N/OCdts who are leaving secondary school and seeking to join the CAF as officers, attending the CMCs provides a subsidized pathway to a university education. But it also requires commitment to joining the military and becoming part of the Profession of Arms, and as members of the CAF they are subject to terms and requirements of employment even while studying that are not applicable to students at civilian universities. It is therefore troublesome that many N/OCdts are unclear about whether they are attending a military academy where they can expect to learn leadership and military skills or whether they are post-secondary students who can expect an undergraduate education identical to that being delivered at a civilian institution. This uncertainty has longer-term ramifications, as the expectations of N/OCdts while they attend the CMCs have a critical impact on their recruiting, retention and satisfaction as CAF members.<sup>xxi</sup>

Meanwhile, academic faculty are full-time, indeterminate public servants, whose terms of employment are governed by the policies of the Treasury Board of Canada, but they have also come to expect employment conditions and authorities that are aligned with civilian academic institutions. This creates significant friction, par-

ticularly in relation to the issue of institutional autonomy, which is the capacity of the institution to administer its own affairs, including its academic programming and the deployment of its financial resources, without external interference. Institutional autonomy is a fundamental characteristic of civilian universities in Canada, and the academic faculty and staff at the CMCs therefore expect the same.<sup>xxii</sup> However, unlike civilian universities, the CMCs are federal institutions and have been established as military units empowered to grant degrees. They are inherently and purposefully not autonomous from the CAF or the Government of Canada, and therefore the entire concept of institutional autonomy is inapplicable by design.

Unlike institutional autonomy, academic freedom – as defined in sources such as provincial legislation<sup>xxiii</sup> and international guidelines<sup>xxiv</sup> – is a fundamental characteristic of both civilian universities and the Canadian Military Colleges. However, over the years the concept of academic freedom has been invoked to advocate for decision-making independence for academics at the CMCs in a way that has created ongoing tensions within the institutions, particularly given that the military leadership has struggled to understand its own scope of authority or to effectively exercise its management rights.

In the context of the CMCs, wherein the role of an academic education is to serve the Canadian Armed Forces, it is squarely within the purview of DND/CAF to determine what degrees and programs should be offered and how to allocate financial and human resources accordingly. Doing so is neither an infringement on academic freedom nor inconsistent with the nature of the CMCs and the degree of autonomy they enjoy.<sup>xxv</sup>

Moreover, some members of the Academic Wing – comprising of the faculty and staff who deliver the academic program – have struggled to understand that academics are intended to form but one part of the N/OCdts' experience at the CMCs and have steadily placed increasing and unrealistic demands on their time. This combination of factors leads to persistent strain between many of the faculty members and management, as well as between the civilian and military sides of the institution, which negatively pervades the environment at the CMCs and consumes significant energy and attention.

For its part, the military often appears uncomfortable working alongside its public service colleagues, issuing directives in lieu of engaging in dialogue and taking unhelpfully rigid approaches to uncontroversial issues. Moreover, the CAF has paid little attention to the CMCs in past decades, with the Army, Navy and Air Force hav-

ing largely abdicated any active role in the evolution or development of the Military Colleges in a sustained or systematic way. This has sent mixed messages to the academic faculty, who have been given limited guidance and guardrails in terms of vision, direction and boundaries, but who feel reprimanded when they are seen to stray off course.

As a result of each group developing differing diagnoses and devising differing solutions to what they think the problems are, the CMCs have become mired in convoluted governance structures, unclear authorities and ballooning programs, many of which deliver costly yet ineffective outcomes at the expense of the N/OCdts and the CAF more broadly. Ultimately, there is no sense of shared vision regarding the fundamental role and purpose of the Military Colleges.

So what are they? The Board believes that the CMCs are first and foremost military institutions, whose *raison d'être* is to develop exceptional leaders for the Canadian Armed Forces. Their programs must be laser-focused and resolutely committed to being relevant and responsive to the needs and demands of the CAF. DND/CAF senior leaders must be prepared to align allocated fiscal and human resources in support of this renewed focus.

A critical element of this officer development process is the acquisition of a rich and reputable academic education, the quality and credibility of which should continue to be reflected by earning a nationally recognized, provincially regulated undergraduate degree. But despite their use of the tagline, the CMCs are not "Universities with a Difference" or even "Universities that make a difference." They are military academies.

To this end, more weight, attention and resources must be given to the other elements that also make up an integral part of the N/OCdt's journey at these institutions. This includes language training, military skills, leadership development, and overall fitness, health and well-being, as will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this Report.

Canada has more than a hundred universities, none of which can fully respond to the specific needs associated with the mission and mandate of the CAF. What Canada does not need from the CMCs is for them to be civilian university equivalents that simply add fitness, language and military training requirements into packed academic schedules that have little specific nexus to the CAF.

What Canada does need – even more so in the highly contested, adversarial geopolitical space in which this



country now operates – and what only the CAF can provide, are world-class institutions focused on defence and security, underpinned by the values, ethics and judgment that are fostered by exposure to the liberal arts, and dedicated to educating and training leaders in the Profession of Arms. It has only two of these, and they must be leveraged to their maximum potential.

Increasing the number of graduates is one way of doing so. In addition to reasons of costs and academic efficiency, enlarging the N/OCdt Corps will help create a critical mass of individuals every year who are going through dedicated foundational military education and training, with a specific focus on the defence and security needs of the country.

Another important avenue for maximizing the impact of the CMCs is to raise their profile and stature within the national psyche and around the world. Too few Canadians know about the Military Colleges, and many of those who do are aware of them solely through the lens of critical reports and media coverage. Globally, Canada's Military Colleges are well respected, but they do not have a distinct brand that elevates them to the echelons of certain other institutions. The CMCs should be a source of pride for Canadians, and should be better leveraged as a source of national power for the country.

While this must start with appropriately resourcing their programs, increasing investment in their infrastructure and ensuring ongoing support for their operations and maintenance – none of which are easy to justify absent a strong value proposition – it must also be accompanied by a major overhaul in the branding and marketing of the Colleges. At present, recruitment efforts are lacklustre and untargeted, and completely misaligned with the calendars of civilian universities, meaning that N/OCdts often receive admission offers from civilian universities long before they hear from the CMCs, which disincentivizes many from choosing the Colleges in the first place. The CMC websites are disorganized, hard to navigate and distinct from one another in structure, content and look-and-feel, rendering them ineffective as communications and public affairs tools. And promotional materials have lost focus on the military identity and specific value proposition of the Colleges, negatively impacting their ability to inspire, excite and draw in a new generation of talent who could be motivated to join the CAF.

“Branding and marketing” has a concrete impact on the quantity and quality of applicants, the credibility of the institutions and the ability of the CAF and the CMCs to demonstrate to Canadians what they do and why it matters. It is critical for all Canadians to see themselves

reflected in the composition of the CAF and to see a role for themselves within the CMCs.

Some key changes are therefore needed: new elements of a recruitment strategy should be developed and implemented by the CAF to more effectively compete for talent across the country, including by taking into account the dates at which civilian universities make acceptance offers; exemptions are needed from Government of Canada standards to build more user-friendly, harmonized and organized Military College websites, which serve as the main point of entry into the CMCs for potential applicants and interested Canadians; more tailored outreach is needed to connect with young people and their families who might not otherwise be familiar with the CMCs and what they offer; and new promotional materials must be developed that better reflect the identity, programs and value proposition of the CMCs.

Alongside these changes, elevating the stature of the Canadian Military Colleges also requires that RMC Saint-Jean's standing vis-à-vis RMC be equalized. While both CMCs are part of a proud military tradition in Canada and are seen as distinct yet complementary counterparts, differences in size, budget, history and leadership rank have effectively relegated RMC Saint-Jean to the role of “younger sibling”, with less clout and a lower national profile than RMC. Standardizing the nomenclature used to refer to the Colleges will be an important way to reflect RMC Saint-Jean's equal status. Currently, the Colleges are formally known as the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean). Colloquially, the College in Kingston is known as the Royal Military College or RMC, whereas the College in Saint-Jean is known simply as Saint-Jean or CMR Saint-Jean. In both instances, this terminology perpetuates the idea that the College in Kingston is the central military academy in Canada, and that the college in Saint-Jean is merely an add-on to the main institution.

The Board therefore considered whether to rename the institutions entirely, in order to equalize the two Colleges, better reflect the role and purpose of the CMCs, and bring them in line with the names of comparable institutions around the world. It contemplated dropping the words “College,” given the university-level education the CMCs provide, and “Royal” from the names, given a desire to modernize and nationalize the institutions. Ultimately, the Board rejected such changes as unwarranted, unnecessarily polarizing, and potentially confusing.

Instead, to help underscore the fact that Canada has two unique military colleges of which the country should be proud, in two distinct locations, with historical linkages to each of our Official Language communities, the Board believes that the names of the CMCs should be modified as follows:

- Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston (RMC Kingston)
- Collège militaire royal du Canada, Kingston (CMR Kingston)

and

- Royal Military College of Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (RMC Saint-Jean)
- Collège militaire royal du Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (CMR Saint-Jean)

The Board also considered whether to propose upgrading the rank of the Commandant at RMC Saint-Jean to Brigadier-General in order to help increase the profile of RMC Saint-Jean within the CAF and within Canada, to better project its value to Canadians, and to establish greater equality between RMC Saint-Jean and RMC. The Board believes this could be appropriate, when certain conditions are met, as discussed further below.

An increase in the number of degrees offered at RMC Saint-Jean from one to three, as also proposed and discussed below, would further serve to elevate the stature of the College.

Overall, the shift in mindset and approach that is needed to reaffirm the primary identity and value-add of the CMCs as military institutions will require greater assertiveness on the part of the military leadership at the Colleges and full support from the academic leadership. It will also require acknowledgement by the academic faculty and staff that academics – while of high calibre – exist in service of the military’s needs, not independently from them. Lastly, it will require much greater attention to, engagement with and investment in the CMCs on the part of the Canadian Armed Forces, which has long abdicated responsibility in this space.

### Recommendation 2

Revise governance structures, authorities, activities, programs and training to reflect the fact that the Canadian Military Colleges are first and foremost military institutions responsible for training and educating officers as members of the Profession of Arms.

### Recommendation 3

Amend the Ministerial Organizational Orders to change the name of the Royal Military College of Canada to the “Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston” (RMC Kingston) and the name of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) to the “Royal Military College of Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu” (RMC Saint-Jean).

### Recommendation 4

Update all branding and marketing and all public affairs and communications products to align with the changes proposed in this Report, and to support a revised recruitment strategy.

## Governance

The mission of the CMCs is to provide N/OCdts and officers with the education and training they need for a career in the Canadian Armed Forces. Under the *National Defence Act*, the CMCs are governed and administered in the manner prescribed by the Minister of National Defence, who has established the institutions via Ministerial Organization Orders<sup>xxvi</sup> as units of the Canadian Armed Forces and assigned them to the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). The Minister has also determined that Canada’s Military Colleges should have the status of universities.<sup>xxvii</sup>

As higher education in Canada is a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, Ontario and Quebec we required to enact legislation establishing both RMC and RMC Saint-Jean as universities. The *Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act* was passed in 1959 by the Province of Ontario, and the *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Act* was passed in 1985 by the Province of Quebec. RMC Saint-Jean lost its status when it was closed in 1995, but regained it, along with the right to grant degrees, in 2021. Despite running a CÉGEP program, RMC Saint-Jean does not have authority to grant CÉGEP diplomas, and it has entered into a contract with CÉGEP Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu<sup>xxviii</sup> to award the *diplôme d’études collégiales*.

These Constitutional realities have had far-reaching, often negative impacts on the CMCs. In particular, the way in which governance models have been set up at the Colleges – to grapple with the fact that the CMCs are federally-run military institutions into which provincially-regulated elements are embedded – is leading to signifi-




Figure 8: Canadian Military Colleges Basic Governance Model

cant, systemic, widespread and chronic problems, as well as undermining the clear sense of identity and purpose that is fundamental to their value-add, as discussed above.

Currently, the governance framework, prescribed *inter alia* by the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges (QR Canmilcols)<sup>xxix</sup> looks like Figure 8.

Within this model, the Minister of National Defence is designated as the Chancellor and President of both CMCs, but is equipped with no specific Terms of Reference. The heads of the CMCs are the two Commandants, who are designated in the QRCanMilCols as the Vice-Chancellors of their respective institutions and who chair the Senate in the absence of the Chancellor. The two Commandants have full command of their organizations and are responsible for their effective operation, including achieving mission objectives, managing resources and fostering a healthy workplace environment.

However, the Commandants are not fully autonomous. They report to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, who in turn reports to the Chief of Military Personnel, who in turn reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Commandants thus sit squarely within the military chain of command, and are subordinate to CDA,

which sets the training standards, allocates financial resources to the CMCs and serves as the training authority responsible for CAF-common training and education.

Notwithstanding this, the chain of command does not have exclusive authority over the Military Colleges; the Deputy Minister of National Defence holds specific authorities that directly impact the CMCs, the most significant relating to financial resource allocations, infrastructure management and civilian human resource management.

Notionally, the Minister is supported by two Boards of Governors which submit annual reports regarding the activities of both the CMCs and the Boards themselves. Effectively, however, the Boards of Governors – which have undergone a series of changes over their lifespans – function purely as advisory bodies to the Commandants and to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy.

Within the CMCs, the Principal (known as the Academic Director at RMC Saint-Jean) serves as the academic head of the College and reports to the Commandant, with a mandate to manage the interface between the military culture of the CAF and the institutional culture of a civilian university. The Principal further functions as the

academic advisor to both the Commandant and the Commander of CDA, and is also considered a “senior academic” of the Department of National Defence.

This framework gives rise to significant problems for the CMCs. It is unnecessarily complex, poorly defined and extremely confusing, even to actors within its system. It remains founded in an instrument (QR CanMilCols) that is decades out of date, and it has been stretched sideways to fit into a civilian mould that does not reflect the particular needs, functions or objectives of a military institution.

What is particularly frustrating is that these observations reflect the same findings made by previous reviews; both the 2017 Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV)<sup>xxx</sup> and the 2017 Office of the Auditor General (OAG) Report<sup>xxxi</sup> proposed substantive amendments to the CMC governance model, yet few of their relevant recommendations have been implemented.

This Board thus finds itself back in the same space, proposing a new approach to governance and a series of concrete revisions – particularly in relation to the existence, roles, responsibilities and authorities of the Chancellor, Board of Governors and Principals, but also in relation to the appointment, tenure and career advancement of the Commandant and the Director of Cadets.

### **Chancellor/President**

Beyond conferring degrees at convocation, successive Ministers of National Defence irrespective of political stripe have had little substantive engagement with the CMCs in their role as Chancellor and President. Without defined Terms of Reference, the expected roles and obligations of the Chancellor and President are unclear, and this lack of clarity gives rise to further confusion from other actors within the CMC governance structure regarding how and when to interface appropriately with the Minister.

It also hampers the ability of the CMCs to accomplish some of their key activities. For example, in a civilian university, the Chancellor serves as a titular or ceremonial head of the institution, and by statute presides over convocation ceremonies, confers degrees and acts as an ambassador in advancing institutional interests. The President typically serves as Chief Executive Officer, providing leadership, management and oversight. None of these functions – which are as integral to the functioning of the CMCs as to civilian universities – are easily achieved under a construct wherein the Minister of National Defence of Canada serves as the Chancellor and President of the country’s Military Colleges. In real-

ity, competing demands on the Minister’s time preclude his/her ability to undertake these functions in an effective and sustained way, and yet occupying the position precludes others from taking up the mantle. This enduring challenge – common across political lines since the establishment of the Boards of Governors – was addressed in the 1993 Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges,<sup>xxxi</sup> which recommended that the Minister of National Defence should be considered a “Visitor” and that each College should elect its own Chancellor, based on recommendations from the Board of Governors.

This Board shares a similar perspective; the current designation of the Minister of National Defence as Chancellor and President contributes significantly to confusion and ineffectiveness vis-à-vis the governance of the CMCs and stands as an impediment to allowing a person better-suited for the role (by virtue of position) to take on these roles, particularly in terms of actually leading the institution by serving as an advocate/champion for each College.

### **Board of Governors**

Importing the concept of a Board of Governors from the civilian university context into DND/CAF has also brought significant confusion and uncertainty to the CMCs (although the underlying intent of this approach, in terms of trying to introduce greater accountability to the Military Colleges, is laudable). While in a civilian context the Board of Governors has the authority to approve the institutional strategic plan and budget, to select the President, to evaluate the President’s performance and to oversee remuneration, the Boards of Governors of the CMCs have no such authority. They play no role in civilian hiring, in performance assessment or remuneration of the Commandant or Principal, in financial matters, or in adopting the strategic plans of the Colleges. In fact, they have no actual power. Conversely, they play a limited, albeit important advisory role to the Commandants, the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy and the Minister (as Chancellor and President). A comparison of the roles and responsibilities of the CMC Boards of Governors compared to Canadian civilian universities is presented at Annex 6.

Calling these two groups of distinguished people “Boards of Governors” is therefore misleading. Instead, they are *de facto* Advisory Committees and should be referred to as such. As they have no actual or meaningful relationship with the Minister, and their role is to advise and make recommendations to the Commandants and the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, their Terms of Reference should further reflect these facts.

## Senate

The function of the Senate is to grant degrees and honorary degrees, and the Colleges have empowered a number of Senate Standing Committees, as part of Academic governance, to ensure that the quality of those degrees is of the highest standard. However over time, lack of clarity and misunderstandings regarding this function have caused consternation and confusion.

While it is up to the Senate to ensure that all academic programs are appropriately constituted in order to meet the applicable university degree requirements, it is up to the CMCs to establish and periodically review/amend the list of programs offered at the Colleges in light of institutional priorities, with the Commandant holding authority to allocate resources and set priorities in relation to academic programs. Indeed, it is within the power and authority of the federally regulated and federally run CMCs to establish and make changes to the list of academic programs at the Military Colleges, not the Senate – a misunderstanding that was recently perpetuated via the amendments approved to QRCanMilCols Chapter 2, Part VI: paras 2.50 (2) and 2.56 (2) pursuant to the November 2021<sup>xxxiii</sup> exchange of correspondence between the Minister and the Commandant of RMC. More specifically, the assertion that the Senate is the “final authority for all academic matters” should be qualified. As such, the Board believes that a further amendment to the QRCanMilCols is required to clarify the Senate’s actual authority and reassert the primacy of the CMCs in making determinations regarding the academic programs at the Military Colleges.

## Commandant

The Commandants of the CMCs are the leaders of the Military Colleges. In this regard, their roles are akin to those of a President and Vice-Chancellor in a civilian university; consistent with the findings of the 2017 OAG Report, the Board sees the Commandants as the pre-eminent institutional leaders of large and complex organizations who ultimately hold responsibility and authority for the training, education and wellbeing of the N/OCdts. It is appropriate, therefore, that they be identified as such, by designating them as the President and Vice-Chancellor of the Colleges. The effect of this would not only help clarify what they do and the position they occupy within the institution, but would further help underscore the fact that the CMCs are military institutions, led by military officers, for military purposes. This designation will also firmly establish the Commandant as Chair of the Senate, and as the executive head and the formal representative of the institution. Having the Com-

mandant in this role is key to creating a shared vision for Canada’s Military Colleges.

Such a designation must be accompanied by changes to the tenure of the Commandants. At present, the length of time in position has varied among incumbents, but on average has lasted no more than two years, as the office holders regularly depart for promotion or reassignment.

It is not realistic to expect that a leader can help effect the changes that are required in the CMCs, or provide the degree of stability needed at the top to ensure the ongoing health and success of the institutions, if they are given only two years to do so. Significantly more time is required in the position to establish baseline knowledge, build trust, foster relationships and develop networks, in support of the overall mandate of the Colleges. These observations are not new; the high turnover of senior military personnel has been highlighted multiple times in previous reports as a critical impediment to effective governance at the CMCs and reiterated repeatedly during this Board’s Listening Sessions by military staff and academic faculty members. In response, the Report of the RMC Board of Governors by the Withers’ Study Group<sup>xxxiv</sup> recommended a tenure of five years, while the SSAV recommended a minimum tenure of three years, but noted that a four-to-five-year tenure would be optimal.<sup>xxxv</sup> The Board recommends that the CAF extend the appointments of the Commandants to a minimum of four years and develop innovative human resource practices to break the cycle of two-year appointments.

Given that the Military Colleges are unique national institutions with a global profile, responsible for a subset of particularly vulnerable members of the CAF, exposed to regular public scrutiny, and responsible for foundational leadership training within the Profession of Arms, the Board also believes that it is appropriate that the Commandant be a General Officer/Flag Officer. While other organizations within the CAF of similar size are led by officers at the rank of Colonel/Captain(N) and below it is the Board’s view that this speaks more to the leadership talent within the CAF (wherein even junior officers hold positions with spans of responsibility that far outstrip any comparable position within a civilian context) than to the import of those organizations.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Furthermore, the distinct features and functions of the CMCs allow for their distinct treatment.

Nevertheless, the Board accepts that the role, responsibilities, level of risk and budget that the Commandant of RMC Saint-Jean currently manages are better aligned with the rank of Colonel/Captain(N) than with the rank of Brigadier-General. Therefore, despite the Board’s



views regarding the importance of ensuring equality between the two Colleges and increased stature for RMC Saint-Jean, it is comfortable in accepting that an upgrade to the rank of the Commandant should happen only in due time and in step with the proposals found elsewhere in this Report to grow the size of the N/OCdt body and increase the program offerings at RMC Saint-Jean.

When this occurs, the position of Director of Cadets at RMC Saint-Jean should correspondingly be upgraded from a Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander to a Colonel/Captain (Navy), premised on the same rationale. This follows the logic employed in the Special Staff Assistance Visit Report regarding its recommendation to upgrade the position of Director of Cadets at RMC from a Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander to a Colonel/Captain(N).

Aside from the question of rank, not every officer is necessarily the right fit for leading the Military Colleges. Selecting Commandants with the right skills, competencies, character and knowledge for this unique role will be critical to ensuring the overall outcomes that this Board is seeking to achieve. Leading a military unit within which an academic institution is embedded presents challenges that are not common across the CAF, particularly one that is responsible for educating and training some of the youngest and most at-risk members of the Profession of Arms.

Decades of experience as a CAF officer should prepare the Commandant to lead the military and public service aspects of the CMCs. Special consideration should also be given to the knowledge and skills required to run an academic institution. As most officers may not have received such exposure before this stage in their career, a newly appointed Commandant should be required to enroll in a Development Period Four Fellowship Program at a civilian university focused on understanding university governance and operations. Timely selection of the Commandant may also allow exposure to university President training programs that are available in Canada and the United States.

The Board understands that the current selection process does not lend itself to equipping future Commandants with the necessary competencies and skills and considers that access to the right training and experience is essential to enable their success. This means that the selection process must happen much earlier, in effect “deep selecting” the Commandants well ahead of their respective appointments.

At RMC, this would mean identifying the next Commandant as a Colonel/Captain(N) and sending them on their Development Period Four training with the express intent of selecting them to be the Commandant in the future. It may also require the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence to exercise an “Acting While So Employed” promotion process to align timing. At RMC Saint-Jean, until changes are made to up-rank the position of Commandant to a Brigadier-General, the future Commandant should attend their Development Period Four training either prior to promotion to Colonel/Captain(N) or immediately upon promotion, to provide them the time necessary to complete four years at the helm of the institution.

## Principal

There remains much confusion regarding the role of the Principal at the CMCs (known as the Academic Director at RMC Saint-Jean), largely because of an erroneous tendency to import civilian university concepts into the Military College construct. This creates tension between the Commandant and Principal positions, breeds resentment between military and academic faculty and staff, and undermines the identity of the CMCs as first and foremost military institutions.

For example, many members of the academic community at the CMCs articulated an expectation that the Principal / Academic Director should be empowered to perform the functions associated with the President (also called the Principal or Rector) of a civilian university, such as control of financial resources, control of hiring decisions and involvement in dispute resolution processes within the academic faculty. The fact that the Principal/Academic Director does not have those authorities at the CMCs, and that they are vested instead in the Commandant, was a source of consternation and frustration for many academics.

These sentiments are understandable but misplaced. In reality, the role of the Principal / Academic Director at the Military Colleges is more akin to that of a Provost and Vice-President Academic at a civilian university, and it should be re-named accordingly. This would better reflect both what the position entails and what it does not, helping to create clarity and to set more appropriate expectations.

In better aligning the title to the function of the position, thought must also be given to the way in which this position is filled. At present, the Principal at RMC is appointed through a Governor in Council (GIC) process (a process that is currently being replicated at RMC Saint-Jean),

which lends it gravitas and helps ensure a high calibre of candidate. Those who have filled the roles to date have brought professional seniority, strong leadership, academic credibility and high-quality experience to the job, yielding important benefits to the CMCs. On the flip side, appointing the Principal / Academic Director via a GIC process typically results in hiring someone who may not be expecting, at this stage of their career, to report to another executive or be hierarchically subordinate to a military Commandant.

To better clarify the parameters of the position and associated expectations, both for the office-holder and for other stakeholders at the CMCs, the position of Principal should be re-designated as Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research. It should also be made a GIC appointment to attract the right talent and appropriate experience level for this position – with the clear caveat that the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research will be working with, and subordinate to, the Commandant. Representatives from both DND and the CAF should serve on the Appointment Committees, with the Commandants of the respective Colleges best suited to serve as the CAF Representative on the Committee.

### **Director of Cadets**

A key figure in the lives of the N/OCdts and a lynchpin in the success of their military training experience is the Director of Cadets. This role thus requires the right person for the right length of time. Two years in position, which has become the general norm, is insufficient. In line with the arguments made for extending the tenure of the Commandant, the Board believes that a longer tenure is also required for the Director of Cadets. This will create greater institutional stability, deepen trust with N/OCdts, and provide more time to implement change and see initiatives through.

Given that the driving argument behind longer tenure is both a need for stability and the ability to oversee and implement effective change management, it is also important that the terms of the Commandant, the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research and the Director of Cadets be staggered, so as to avoid a situation in which all three are arriving or departing in the same year. This will further enhance the positive experiences of the N/OCdts during their three-to-four-year journeys at the Colleges, as they will be able to build more enduring and trusting relationships with the key individuals who have an impact on their daily lives. While there are various combinations and permutations that can achieve the desired effect, the Board views it as critical that the three positions be managed together in this regard.

Extending the length of tenure for the Director of Cadets should in no way preclude career advancement for the incumbent; a posting at the Colleges should be viewed as an asset and the timing of promotion opportunities should be aligned accordingly.

In sum, the temptation to turn towards civilian universities for inspiration in respect of CMC governance frameworks must be resisted unless it makes specific sense to do so. When efforts to make the Military Colleges align with the civilian model have a clear purpose tied to their institutional identity as a military unit responsible for training and educating members of the Profession of Arms, then those should continue. When such efforts confuse or undermine this identity and purpose, they need to be revised.

#### **Recommendation 5**

Remove the Minister of National Defence from the position of Chancellor and President of the two Canadian Military Colleges. Amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

#### **Recommendation 6**

Appoint an eminent Canadian to the ceremonial role of Chancellor of the two Canadian Military Colleges. Amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

#### **Recommendation 7**

Re-designate the Board of Governors at each Military College as an Advisory Committee that advises and makes recommendations to the Commandant. Update the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

#### **Recommendation 8**

Clarify the parameters of the Senate's authority and stipulate that the responsibility to allocate resources and set priorities in relation to academic programs at the Military Colleges lies with the Commandant. Update the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

### Recommendation 9

Designate the Commandants as the “President and Vice-Chancellor” of their respective Military Colleges, vested with appropriate authorities and responsibilities. Amend the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

### Recommendation 10

Establish the tenure of the Commandant at each Military College for a minimum of four years.

### Recommendation 11

“Deep select” the Commandant for each Military College and use a Developmental Period Four Fellowship Program and/or University President Training Program to expose them to university governance and operations.

### Recommendation 12

Re-designate the Principal at each Military College as the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research and appoint them, via a Governor-in-Council process, as the most senior academic officer of their respective Colleges, reporting to the Commandant. Amend the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

### Recommendation 13

Establish the tenure of the Director of Cadets for a minimum of three years.

To date, the CMCs have relied on the 4-Pillar model as the value-add for the Colleges. In reality, however, the Academic Pillar has functioned as the lodestone around which the other Pillars take a lesser role. As such, while a detailed examination of these four Pillars led the Board to conclude that the model addresses the right substantive areas, the Board also found that 1) the program in its current form is flawed, and has contributed to a growing disconnect between the CMCs and the Profession of Arms; and 2) the Academic Pillar merits particular attention because of the impact it has had on the overall evolution and success of the Canadian Military Colleges.

On that front, the CMCs benefit from a cadre of well-respected, high-calibre and actively engaged academic faculty and staff who develop and deliver a wide range of top-quality programs and courses. They are committed to excellence, enthusiastic about education and research, and genuinely interested in the success of the N/OCdts, who, in turn, hold them in high regard.

In recent years – in response to growing opportunities, fresh ideas and evolving trends – faculty and staff have created new programs, identified new degrees, pursued new areas of study and added new personnel. This has been exciting for the institution and very well received by the N/OCdts. Unfortunately, while each of these initiatives may have been positive in isolation, the collective result has been costly growth – in terms of money, human resources and time – that increasingly runs at cross-purposes with the broader objectives of the Military Colleges. These costs are now too big to ignore, too difficult to justify and too entrenched to be solved with superficial fixes. An examination of the current size and scope of the academic program, its linkages to the mandate and mission of the CAF, and its impact on the other Pillars of the ROTP CMC reveal that meaningful reform to this Pillar is required.

## Program: The Academic Pillar

The Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges (ROTP CMC) is a fully residential four-year (or five-year) program comprising of academics, military training, physical fitness and bilingualism. It is this 4-Pillar program, described above, that differentiates the Military Colleges from civilian universities, and thus it is this program that is at the core of the CMC’s value proposition. Without a strong, distinct and rationalized Military College program that goes beyond the academic courses all other officers receive through their civilian university education, the additional costs of running the CMCs are not justifiable and the entire *raison d’être* of the Military Colleges is called into question.

## Size & Scope

The starting point for these problems is the size of the academic program and the scope of its offerings, particularly as compared to the size of the student body. At present, RMC has three Faculties (Social Sciences and Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences), with fourteen Departments that offer 44 undergraduate programs (22 in English and 22 in French). The academic faculty includes 189 indeterminate University Teacher (UT) positions plus 39 military faculty positions, and is supplemented with additional term and sessional instructors, though not all UT or military faculty positions are filled at all times. RMC typically has around 1,100 N/OCdts who are part of the ROTP and an additional 3,000 post-

graduate, part-time, and other students. RMC Saint-Jean has two Faculties (Social Sciences and Sciences), runs three Departments (Language, Science, and Humanities and Social Sciences) in addition to Professional Military Education, and provides one university-level program in International Studies. RMC Saint-Jean employs 40 faculty and teaching staff for a student body of 350 (including university and CÉGEP offerings). Academic salaries are not the only driver of costs at the Military Colleges, but they are significant.

The program offerings at the Military Colleges also extend across a variety of disciplines, and while this breadth of options is popular with the N/OCdts, it is not necessary to meet the needs of the CAF; the CAF is largely agnostic to the nature of the undergraduate degree earned, and with only a very few exceptions, almost all degrees and programs are acceptable for almost all occupations. Although Canada is not alone in offering a wider variety of degrees and programs (with countries such as Japan and Germany taking a similar approach), this differs from many foreign military academies, which offer more tailored degrees with clear thematic ties to the Profession of Arms and the requirements of their Armed Forces.

The wide range of types of degrees and programs offered at the Military Colleges further gives rise to the creation of a high number of courses. Due to this volume of courses and programs, compared to the number of N/OCdts, many of them are seriously undersubscribed. For example, the Mathematics, English Culture & Communications, French Culture & Communications and Economics programs have all failed to graduate more than fifteen participants in any one of the last five years yet have consistently been supported by over forty academic faculty members. Many courses consequently suffer the same fate, compounded by the duplication of course offerings to fulfill bilingualism imperatives, resulting in classes with as few as three N/OCdts. Despite a recent decision to impose a minimum threshold for running a course (now set at three N/OCdts per class), class sizes remain significantly lower than in civilian universities and the overall number of course offerings remains vastly out of sync with national averages. This contributes to an associated issue, which is the very low ratio of N/OCdts to faculty; at both CMCs this figure stands at 8:1 which far outweighs the average of 21:1 for comparable Canadian civilian universities, as detailed above (see Figures 6 and 7).

Another factor driving up the number of course offerings, while concurrently imposing additional demands on the time of the N/OCdts, is the 16-credit Core Curriculum. As

noted above, this series of required courses represents the minimum content that N/OCdts must acquire as part of their degrees, in two thematic areas (1) Math and Sciences, and 2) Canadian History, Language and Culture, Political Science, International Relations and Leadership and Ethics). The Core Curriculum amounts to a significant portion of the approximately 40-credit Social Sciences & Humanities degree and turns Engineering into a 48–51 - credit degree program that requires a minor in Social Sciences & Humanities. It also requires significant human resources to deliver. While the Core Curriculum provides an excellent academic foundation for CMC graduates, when taking into consideration the reality that it is only one component of the ROTP CMC program, it takes up too much of the N/OCdts' time and constitutes "too much of a good thing".

The fact that RMC Saint-Jean runs a *Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel* (CÉGEP) program also contributes to the expansive size and scope of the CMCs. This two-year college-level program (equivalent to Grade 12 and First Year university in the rest of Canada) is a unique feature of Quebec's higher education system and is normally provided at nominal cost to residents of Quebec by the Government of Quebec. Because the federal government has no authority unto itself to offer the program, it is contracted out by RMC Saint-Jean to the CÉGEP de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu for support and accreditation. Moreover, running a second program alongside university-level education programs means that a high number of Education Specialist (EDS) public service positions must also be funded. Additionally, because those N/OCdts who go into CÉGEP do so at the ages of 16 and 17, there are additional downstream costs for the government in terms of pension and salary dollars due to how young these individuals are when they become employees of the Canadian Armed Forces.

A smaller but impactful issue is the degree of variance between the academic calendars at the two Colleges. Due to the fact that RMC Saint-Jean is constrained by the provincially set CÉGEP calendar, it has limited flexibility with scheduling, which in turn makes it difficult to coordinate its timings with the CAF and with RMC in relation to everything from course timetables to special events and exams. More specifically, the CÉGEP academic term is 16 weeks, including exam weeks, whereas Quebec and Ontario universities have 15-week academic terms, including exams. While this may seem inconsequential, the discrepancy has a profound effect on the possibilities for the movement of N/OCdts between Colleges in order to leverage different course offerings, language learning opportunities and interchange possibilities.

For example, N/OCdts must return at RMC Saint-Jean must return earlier than those at RMC, resulting in less summer training time, especially military training time, and that further eliminates many possibilities for synergies around things like distance learning and virtual classes. As a result, there is a high degree of duplication in course offerings and materials between the Colleges that could otherwise be reduced.

The cumulative effect of all of these factors is to drive up costs; at present, the Canadian Military Colleges are 1.6 times (RMC) and 4 times (RMC Saint-Jean) more expensive than comparable civilian universities, when adjusted for non-academic activities.<sup>xxxvii</sup> While the calibre, professionalism and overall quality of academics at the Military Colleges is unassailable, it far surpasses industry standards in relation to class size, student-to-professor ratio and quantity of offerings and cannot be justified against the baseline objective of delivering a credible undergraduate university degree.

### Strength of Linkages

Another problem facing the academic program is its tenuous relationship with the defence and security mandate of the CAF. Academic faculty and staff are cognizant of the mission of the CMCs, and they often seek ways to incorporate officer development and leadership skills formally and informally into their programs. This manifests in myriad ways, from the development of courses that directly support CAF operations (e.g. CCE409 Combustion and Explosives Engineering) and the establishment of course reading lists within courses that stimulate relevant reflections and discussions (e.g. ENE331 World Literature: Crisis and Conflict), to the inclusion of experiential elements within courses that build practical officership skills. Such efforts are laudable and valuable. They are appreciated by the N/OCdts and reflect the care with which the faculty members typically engage with the student body.

However, these approaches are limited and *ad hoc*. They are not standardized or easily replicable, they are not tethered to specific learning outcomes and they are not systematically measured. Moreover, beyond these efforts, there are no explicit links between the Academic Pillar and the overarching objectives of the CMC's professional military education and officer development, rendering the relationship negligible at best. To be clear, this is not a failing of any individual, and it does not reflect neither on character, capability or professionalism. Rather, it is a reflection of a flaw in the way the system was originally designed and has evolved over decades.

The vast assortment of programs noted above dilutes focus and clarity, with the CMCs being neither Liberal Arts schools nor Engineering or Technical schools. Although there is strength in some aspects of this mix, the lack of a clear identity as a military academy makes it difficult for the academic program as a whole to anchor itself to a clear vision or sense of common institutional purpose.

### Impact on the Other Pillars

In addition to resource concerns, the amount of time required to fulfill the requirements of the academic program at the CMCs creates significant issues regarding its impact on other key elements of the Military College experience, severely hampering the ability of N/OCdts to invest sufficient energy into anything else. Any "extra" hours are found in the early mornings or late evenings, which effectively relegates all non-academic activities to the margins of the workday and to weekends. This in turn creates undue stress, negatively impacts sleep and sends a clear message regarding the prioritization of academics at the expense of language learning, military skills training, fitness, health and wellbeing, and leadership development.

### A Way Forward

In short, the proliferation of programs and courses offered at the Military Colleges, coupled with the high number of academic faculty and staff currently employed to deliver those activities – particularly in relation to the overall number of N/OCdts, and in part given the lack of harmonized schedules between the Colleges – has driven up the staffing levels and the associated support and operating costs to problematic levels. Coupled with the lack of clear connection between academics and the CAF's defence and security mandate, an over-prioritization of academic studies at the expense of other important program elements, and the availability of alternative models that can effectively develop strong officers, the Academic Pillar as currently configured is too expansive and too expensive to support.

The Board accepts that the Military Colleges are unique institutions that require significant investment. Whether the costs are more or less than those of civilian institutions is only one of the factors the Board has taken into consideration in assessing the value proposition of the Colleges. However, it is critical that public money be well spent. In this regard, costs must not only be reasonable, but they must also be directly tied to the *raison d'être* of the Military Colleges and must directly support the objectives of the organization that they exist to serve.



Accordingly, and in line with common management practice in government and across academia, there is a need to redeploy existing financial and human resources from within the academic program towards higher-priority items, to streamline offerings and to strengthen linkages to the requirements of the Profession of Arms.

Several groups of interconnected reforms are needed to accomplish this. In developing this list, the Board has considered various approaches taken by other military academies, together with innovations in the civilian university context.

Firstly, it makes no sense that the one undergraduate degree offered at the Military Colleges that is specifically tied to the military identity of the institutions – the Bachelor of Military Arts and Science – is not available to N/OCdts.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Going forward, this degree should be added to the offerings within the ROTP CMC, to bring the total to four degrees:

- A Bachelor of Arts
- A Bachelor of Science
- A Bachelor of Military Arts & Science
- A Bachelor of Engineering

The first three degrees would be offered at RMC Saint-Jean, and all four would be offered at RMC.

Secondly, the number of programs and courses offered by the Canadian Military Colleges needs to be significantly reduced. All programs that have neither accepted nor graduated more than 15 N/OCdts at least once in the last five years should be eliminated, and more reductions should be undertaken in line with the intent to significantly streamline offerings that are undersubscribed. Alongside this, a commensurate reduction in the number of University Teacher (UT) positions at RMC should occur. At both Colleges, a minimum 15:1 student-to-faculty ratio should be implemented. In this way, the CMCs would transition from having a N/OCdt-to-faculty ratio that is one-third of the comparable average, to two-thirds of the comparable civilian university average. This would maintain small class sizes and personal connections between faculty and students, but also take into account the requirement to improve the financial efficiency of these institutions.

Thirdly, the number of N/OCdts must also be increased at both Colleges, to reduce costs per N/OCdt, maximize resources and effectively leverage the CMCs for the benefit of the CAF. In total, the number of N/OCdts should be increased to a minimum of 1,850 (or increased in line with limits imposed by the CAF regarding its ability

to absorb and train new officers), to be distributed between the two Colleges.

The Board considered two permutations regarding the appropriate distribution of this growth. The first would see the number of N/OCdts at RMC increase from 1,000 to 1,500, with the number of N/OCdts at RMC Saint-Jean increasing from 100 to 350. This option could require building additional residences in Kingston. The second permutation would see the number of N/OCdts at RMC increase from 1,000 to 1,200, while the number of N/OCdts at RMC Saint-Jean would increase from 100 to 650. Taking into account a number of factors – the current infrastructure at both Colleges, the existing number of faculty, the respective areas of expertise resident at each College, the opportunities to create greater equality between the Colleges, the importance of avoiding the gender segregation that would arise if RMC Saint-Jean focused exclusively on Liberal Arts and RMC focused exclusively on Science & Technology, and the proposed changes to the degree offerings – the Board is of the view that the second option should be pursued.

Nevertheless, the Board is conscious that such changes could create unintended consequences, particularly in relation to the presence of the Osside Institute at RMC Saint-Jean, and must be considered among factors such as infrastructure, logistical feasibility, program delivery considerations and existing contractual requirements. Thus, the Board believes that the Canadian Defence Academy and the CMCs themselves are ultimately best placed to make final determinations regarding allocation of growth allocation between the two Colleges.

Fourthly, the Core Curriculum should be eliminated. Its purpose is valid and important, and it is laudable to provide a balanced education that includes arts and science to all N/OCdts regardless of their field of study, with a view to instilling values and ethics, developing solid judgment and critical thinking abilities, establishing a strong foundation of relevant knowledge and building effective writing skills. But the intensive staff complement and significant cost required to deliver it make the Core Curriculum difficult to rationalize. This is particularly true given the availability of alternative mechanisms for achieving similar outcomes.

Fifthly, the CÉGEP program at RMC Saint-Jean should be eliminated. Over the past five years, it has cost between \$2.2 million and \$3.5 million annually<sup>xxxix</sup> to pay the CÉGEP de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (CSJR) for support and accreditation of the RMC Saint-Jean program, since the Military College does not have authority to deliver this program, which includes approximately

\$500,000 to accredit and administer these programs. In addition, it pays approximately \$1.5 million in salary dollars to the education services staff at RMC Saint-Jean to deliver the courses under the CÉGEP program, meaning that in total, the Government of Canada pays over \$5 million a year to offer a program that is within provincial jurisdiction and that is already offered at only nominal cost to all residents of Quebec. These expenditures are indefensible cannot be defended, particularly in the absence of any compelling rationale for running a CÉGEP at a Military College.

In advancing the recommendation to eliminate the CÉGEP program, the Board has considered concerns raised during consultations regarding the potential impact of this loss to RMC Saint-Jean. These include fears that it will undermine recruiting efforts in Quebec and decrease interest by Quebecers's interest in attending the CMCs, diminish the status of RMC Saint-Jean, hurt efforts to maintain a strong Francophone presence in the CAF and lead to the eventual closure of the institution. Most of these arguments are speculative, though some raise valid considerations. Nevertheless, all can be effectively managed and mitigated.

For example, the argument that the CÉGEP program at RMC Saint-Jean is a primary driver of recruitment in Quebec is not borne out by the facts, and the notion that the CAF must maintain the program in order to meet recruiting targets in Quebec is flawed. Nonetheless, should the CAF determine that eliminating the CÉGEP program is negatively impacting traditional sources of recruits in Quebec, various alternatives are available to offset this – particularly via new, targeted strategies. For instance, the CAF could enroll interested CÉGEP students in the Primary Reserve Force for periods of military training during the summer months, until those students have completed either one or two years of CÉGEP, and then enroll them as Regular Force officers under a paid education program. Alternatively, CÉGEP students could be enrolled under the ROTP Civ U program and attend civilian CÉGEPs at no cost to the Government of Canada, entering into the CMCs after the completion of their first or second year of study. In all cases, CAF recruiting efforts are likely to be more impactful when they can be concentrated on the 48 CÉGEPs and approximately 60 private colleges in Quebec, rather than being spread more broadly across the 521 secondary schools in the province. These are but a few options for a revised approach to ensuring suitable recruitment from residents of Quebec into the CAF.

The concern that removal of the CÉGEP program will diminish the status of RMC Saint-Jean may have been

convincing unto itself, but the fact that this Board is proposing to rename the institution, to upgrade the rank of its Commandant in due time, to triple the number of degrees it offers and to increase the number of N/OCdts it educates and trains should offset any such qualms. Indeed, eliminating the CÉGEP at RMC Saint-Jean would allow 250 spots to be re-allocated to university-level N/OCdts, creating a baseline of 350 N/OCdts in the ROTP CMC at RMC Saint-Jean, separate from any additional growth. Taken together, this suite of changes will reassert and reinforce the value of RMC Saint-Jean as an important national institution, an important part of Quebec's higher education landscape, and an important conduit for drawing Francophone Canadians into the CAF, notwithstanding the elimination of CÉGEP.

It should be noted that while the Board's recommendation to eliminate CÉGEP is premised primarily on misgivings related to costs, it is further concerned that running this program dilutes the focus of the College and presents unnecessary risk. Although the inherent nature of the Military Colleges means that their key constituency will be young people, there is a significant difference between the maturity, life experience, level of judgment and brain development of an 18-year-old versus a 16-year-old. Many of the issues currently facing the CMCs, which underpin this Board's mandate, stem from the particularities of young adults living, studying and working together. Including more minors in this already challenging mix through the presence of the CÉGEP adds a heightened level of risk and responsibility which brings no added value to the CMCs, and for no discernible reason.

In short, there is no convincing reason for Canada's Military Colleges to be in the business of running a CÉGEP. Eliminating this program would allow RMC Saint-Jean to reinforce its identity as a military institution, re-orient towards its real purpose in supporting university-level academic elements of the ROTP CMC, and redirect funds towards the activities that better serve its *raison d'être* – including proposed new university degree programs.

Lastly, the program offerings and schedules should be fully harmonized between both Colleges, something that should be significantly facilitated by changes to the degree programs themselves. When coupled with increased reliance on educational technology and distance learning opportunities, these changes will further allow the Colleges to minimize the duplication of courses due to bilingualism requirements and to increase access to second language learning opportunities for N/OCdts.

In addition, because people attend the Military Colleges for a variety of reasons, including the strong desire to

serve in the military as quickly as possible, the CMCs may wish to consider offering a three-year, 30-credit general degree alongside a four-year, 40-credit degree (or the equivalent, for those coming out the Quebec system). This has traditionally been precluded by the CMCs, in order to maintain the integrity of the 4-Pillar ROTP structure. However, it is commonly found at civilian universities, is currently available at RMC to non-ROTP CMC candidates, and has been acceptable in meeting the requirements of other entry streams. Provided that all other graduation and commissioning requirements are met in relation to language training, military skills & leadership, and health, fitness & wellbeing, this accelerated degree program could be a useful way of meeting the organizational needs of the CAF while catering to individual desires, by providing an optional pathway to matriculation that is shorter than the current four-year model.

#### Recommendation 14

Streamline the academic offerings at the Canadian Military Colleges to offer four undergraduate degrees within the Regular Officer Training Plan: a Bachelor of Arts (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); a Bachelor of Science (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); and a Bachelor of Engineering (at RMC).

#### Recommendation 15

Establish a minimum 15:1 student-to-faculty ratio at both Canadian Military Colleges within five years.

#### Recommendation 16

Increase the number of Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges to a minimum of 1,850 within five years.

#### Recommendation 17

Eliminate the Core Curriculum at the Canadian Military Colleges.

#### Recommendation 18

Eliminate the *Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel* program at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and all associated teaching and administrative positions.

#### Recommendation 19

Harmonize the academic calendars between the Royal Military College of Canada and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and align them with the reconfigured Military Skills & Leadership strand proposed in Recommendation #22.

### Program: The Other Pillars

#### Military

The Board's observations, coupled with findings in previous reports, information gleaned from the Listening Sessions with N/OCdts, and the results of the 2023 and 2024 CMC Student Experience Survey and the 2024 Graduate Experience Survey, all reveal chronic levels of deep dissatisfaction with military training at the CMCs. Indeed, the general perception of the Military Pillar is that it is, at best, an inconvenience, and at worst, a waste of time. This is highly troubling given that this Pillar is the primary differentiator between the CMCs and civilian universities. It is clear that major change is required to military training at the CMCs to support their value proposition.

The CMCs still do not have well-defined objectives or activities relating to the Military Pillar, and while the Board recognizes that RMC Saint-Jean has a more developed program than RMC (including the Enhanced Military Program offered from Second to Fourth Year that includes workshops and two leadership field training activities), even this falls well short of expectations. Overall, the Military Pillar is missing defined standards, measurement criteria and clear structure, and is far from matching the breadth and quality of the training and development offered by partners and allies around the world. In this regard, a key area of concern for the Board is the minimal amount of time dedicated to military skills and leadership activities, especially at RMC. One two-hour session per week and one weekend per month are insufficient to meet expectations in terms of the quantity and quality of such training at a national institution dedicated to this goal.

The First Year Orientation Program (FYOP) exemplifies many of these problems. Serving as the introductory program for incoming N/OCdts, FYOP is ostensibly but not explicitly intended to help them transition out of civilian life into their new roles as members of the Profession of Arms. Deeply ingrained in the CMC culture, FYOP stands as a cornerstone of the military training regime. It

culminates in the Obstacle Course and Badging Parades, which are both important and long-standing traditions at the Colleges and are critical to forming a sense of belonging and identity for incoming N/OCdts.

Under the rubric of developing teamwork skills, building *esprit de corps* and honing leadership abilities, FYOP consist of a mix of orientation and military training activities that take place on campus over 24 hours a day, seven days a week, lasting from 20 days at RMC Saint-Jean to 29 days at RMC. The activities range from cleaning barracks and preparing for inspections to physical training activities, small group leadership training and team-building exercises. The practice of sleep deprivation also features as a program element at RMC – where N/OCdts are limited to 6.5 hours of sleep a night, with a view to purposefully creating challenging conditions in which to undertake these various activities – while at RMC Saint-Jean N/OCdts are allowed 7.5 hours a night, a difference that adds up significantly over three-plus weeks.

Each set of activities has some inherent value, but there is no program standard for the FYOP, which means that there is no articulated objective or expected outcome, no clarity regarding the purpose behind structure and approach, and no guidance on how to deliver it, which can contribute to abuses of authority. Basic inconsistencies between the two Colleges result in wide variations between the experiences of N/OCdts. Ultimately, a lack of clear rationale for the program itself makes it difficult to justify the heavy physical toll, emotional stress and psychological burden that FYOP places on these newest members of the CAF.

## Bilingualism

Currently, all N/OCdts at the CMCs must achieve the federal government second language proficiency level of BBB for commissioning into the CAF. It takes an average of 1,680 hours of instruction<sup>xi</sup> to go from a Government of Canada “XXX” language profile to the BBB standard,<sup>xii</sup> and the CMCs are currently able to offer only about 650 total hours of instruction; daily second language training courses amount to (up to) approximately six hours/week during the academic terms and approximately eight weeks during an intensive summer term of second language training (SOLET). A second SOLET is offered to some of those who need it, but participation is limited by the number of available spots – primarily at the Canadian Forces Language School (Asticou) and at Canadian Forces Base Valcartier – in competition with other organizations within the CAF. While RMC requires a BBB level of second language proficiency for academic convocation, RMC Saint-

Jean does not, due to decisions taken by the respective Senates – an issue that merits revision as work towards harmonizing the two Colleges moves forward.

Second language training benefits from a complement of engaged instructors in both Official Languages, who take a holistic approach to language training and support a variety of experiential learning opportunities for the N/OCdts, including volunteering in the community and related activities. Coupled with small class sizes of approximately 10 N/OCdts, which is of particular value in the context of language acquisition, the second language training at the CMCs has delivered effective results for the CMCs and the CAF; when following the full 4-Year ROTP CMC pre-COVID, almost 95% of N/OCdts at RMC achieved their BBB levels. At RMC Saint-Jean, the figure was closer to 99%. Although these percentages declined as a result of COVID and more limited in-person instruction hours, overall the numbers are stabilizing once again, and the second language training can be viewed as a continued success.

## Physical Fitness

Under the auspices of the Physical Fitness Pillar, the CMCs offer well-developed physical education courses, delivered in a professional manner by a dedicated and competent staff comprising of Public Servants and Personnel Support Program employees of the Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services organization. The physical education courses provide training in individual fitness activities, group fitness activities and military-related fitness training and also offer training in the foundations of health and fitness. Additional programs on nutrition, sleep management, stress management, addiction prevention and control, and anger management, as well as a variety of other health-related programs are also available on an optional basis, all of which are of value to the development of N/OCdts, are available on an optional basis. Physical fitness classes are delivered as mandatory, non-credit courses.

However, the benefits of this Pillar have been undermined by the way in which it has been used. By reducing the concept of fitness to the CMC-specific Physical Performance Test (PPT) – which requires N/OCdts to pass one PPT in First or Second Year and one PPT in Third or Fourth Year in order to meet commissioning standards and even, at RMC, to earn a degree – the CMCs missed an opportunity to approach health and wellbeing more holistically. Moreover, they created a standard that exists nowhere else in the CAF, which uses the annual Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test as the baseline.

The PPT has been controversial since its inception at the CMCs, and the Board shares associated concerns. Arguments that it is necessary to motivate the N/OCdts to get fit are unfounded, while concerns that the PPT plays a role in gender-based shaming and hyper-competitiveness are convincing. The PPT serves as a proxy for masculinity that is used to determine social standing. This leads to a system where N/OCdts are being denigrated not because they are not masculine enough (since this is no longer socially acceptable), but rather because they are not fit enough (which is socially palatable) thus achieving the same effects in terms of exclusion and power. In this way, the PPT has contributed to overall problems around misconduct, and has undermined the many other positive efforts to improve the culture at the CMCs.

The PPT was removed as a commissioning requirement effective 11 August 2024 and replaced with the FORCE Test, a decision this Board applauds. However, the PPT continues as a compulsory activity at the CMCs.

## A New Delivery Model

Due to the significant over-emphasis on academics at the expense of the other Pillars, as well as a lack of vision for the purpose and objectives of military training and leadership development – among other issues detailed above – it is clear that an entirely new delivery model is needed at the CMCs.

Building on the proposed reforms proposed to the Academic Pillar, the Board believes that the ROTP CMC 4-Pillar model itself should be restructured in favour of a new integrated leadership development program for officers. This program would rely on the same foundational elements, but it would conceive, organize and deliver them in a way that better serves the requirements of the Profession of Arms and the needs of the CAF. The 4 Pillars would evolve into the Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP), comprising four complementary and interwoven strands: Academics, Military Skills & Leadership, Second Language Training, and Fitness, Health & Wellbeing – all of which would be accredited elements of ROTP CMC that would count towards earning a degree.

### Academics

The Academic strand should be delivered within the parameters described above; this new structure would free up the ROTP CMC schedule, reduce the overall burden on the N/OCdts and provide time in the schedule

to undertake the language training, military skills, leadership and wellness activities described below, which are the key differentiators for the Military Colleges.

These activities should also be accredited, serving to recognize and validate their importance to the value proposition of the Colleges. Ultimately this would allow the N/OCdts to earn 16 credits towards their graduation requirements through non-academic course work – an approach that is already taken by a number of civilian universities that provide academic credit for military training.<sup>xiii</sup>

### Military Skills & Leadership

Preliminary efforts are underway at the Canadian Defence Academy and within the two Colleges to conduct an ROTP CMC Program Review, to better define the program standard, and to develop an associated Program Standard and Training Plan. The September 2024 draft of the RMC Military Pillar Training Plan reflects progress towards a comprehensive, multi-year military training program that is designed to provide relevant, timely and professional military training as a part of the ROTP CMC. But the fact that each Military College is developing its own training plan is concerning and runs the risk of creating two distinct approaches. CDA should play a stronger role in defining the program standard and harmonizing most aspects of the military training plan.

Furthermore, military training should have a greater focus on leading the Profession of Arms, leading CAF operations and leading human performance, taking into account best practice from allies and partners regarding the value of elements like adventure training, experiential learning and field exercises in developing judgment, building skills, improving relationships with self and others, understanding fear and managing risk.

This should take the form of a new 3-year “Military Skills & Leadership” (MSL) strand that provides standardized, sequenced and substantive military training across both Colleges. The MSL should reflect the CAF’s broader approach to culture evolution, receive academic credit, be aligned with the CAF character and competency framework,<sup>xiii</sup> use policies, procedures and tools that are common in the CAF and employ a mix of theory, application/practice and experiential learning.

As outlined in Figure 9, the Military Skills & Leadership strand would include allocated time every week during the academic terms in Second to Fourth Year, and be anchored by three dedicated intensive sessions that occur at the beginning, middle and end of that period. Specifically, the MSL would begin with a one-month-long



*Foundations* session in Second Year to introduce N/OCdts to the leadership essentials that will underpin their journey at the CMC and throughout their careers. This session would include completion of the Obstacle Course. Subsequently, the two-week *Consolidation* session would occur prior to the start of classes in Third Year, and would focus on preparing N/OCdts for their roles as Cadet Section Leaders within a revised Cadet Chain of Responsibility (discussed below). Lastly, after a compressed Winter Academic Term in Fourth Year, the N/OCdts would close out their CMC experience with the month-long *Capstone* session, prior to convocation and commissioning activities.

To take into account provincial variations between Quebec and the rest of Canada in relation to the CÉGEP requirements, the proposed Integrated Officer Development Program is deliberately structured to ensure that First Year at the CMCs will be fully dedicated to academic study, language acquisition, fitness, health and wellbeing, and facilitating the transition from civilian to military life, but will not touch upon Military Skills & Leadership. This means that the CÉGEP graduates joining the CMCs will not be disadvantaged in any way vis-à-vis other entrants in relation to the MSL strand.

While this is a workable solution, RMC Saint-Jean should nevertheless consider seeking a provincial ministerial exemption from the requirement in Quebec that only students with a CÉGEP diploma can be admitted into an undergraduate program in that province (however,

exceptions can be made if an applicant is at least 21 years of age and has acceptable experience and academic potential). This would permit Quebec CÉGEP students to begin university studies at RMC Saint-Jean after their first year of CÉGEP, thus better aligning their CMC journey with that of the Grade 12 graduates coming into the Colleges from the rest of Canada.

Examples abound of the type of military skills and leadership training that should form the body of the MSL strand (from its three anchor sessions to its weekly offerings), and the CMCs can turn to multiple sources for inspiration – from Sandhurst in the United Kingdom to Karlberg in Sweden to the CAF's own Osside Institute, which provides professional development programs for senior non-commissioned members of the CAF. Indeed, the Osside Institute's recently reviewed and revised Intermediate Leadership Qualification course would be of great value to the Canadian Defence Academy and the CMCs as they build the Military Skills & Leadership strand. They should draw heavily upon its instructional material, in keeping with broader best practice regarding CAF culture evolution and adapted to the specific audience of N/OCdts, in order to design, develop and implement a new Military Skills & Leadership strand at the Military Colleges.

This will require dedicated staff, and as the 4-Pillar construct evolves into an Integrated Officer Development Program, the profile of the people needed to deliver it must also evolve. Similar to the approach used at the

	Integrated Officer Development Program		
	Summer Terms	Fall Terms	Winter Terms
<b>Year 1</b>	Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) 1	Academic Focus	Academic Focus
<b>Year 2</b>	Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) 2	<b>1</b> Integrated Program compressed	Integrated Program
<b>Year 3</b>	<b>2</b> Second Language Training	Integrated Program	Integrated Program
<b>Year 4</b>	Military Training /On the Job Experience	Integrated Program	<b>3</b> Integrated Program compressed
1. MSL Foundations (4 weeks) 2. MSL Consolidation (2 weeks) 3. MSL Capstone (4 weeks)			

Figure 9: Three Anchors of the Military Skills & Leadership Strand

Osside Institute, a combination of military and civilian instructors should be engaged to expose N/OCdts to a rich mix of theoretical and practical experience and expertise. In particular, the MSL strand will need to be supported by the creation of approximately 15 civilian instructor positions at RMC and approximately 5 civilian instructor positions at RMC Saint-Jean. On the military side, staff can be sourced by converting military faculty positions to military instructor positions, including leadership to run the program, as proposed in Figure 10.

Unfortunately, the key military leadership positions that will be responsible for the MSL tend to be laden with administrative demands, which seriously undermines the ability of the officers and senior non-commissioned officers filling those roles to lead and mentor the N/OCdts.

Leaders at the Squadron level, including the Squadron Commanders and Squadron Warrant Officers, play a particularly pivotal role in this leadership development process, and yet they are significantly overburdened with administrative tasks. Due to the importance of their role in the lives of the N/OCdts, this has an outsized negative impact on the experiences of those young people at the

CMCs. Going forward, the military members who are posted into these leadership positions should be focused on leading, supporting, mentoring and coaching the N/OCdts rather than on dealing with administration. Accordingly, additional administrative support in the form of approximately 16 new permanent administrative support staff CR4 positions at the Squadron level will be required to enable this (i.e., one CR4 position per Squadron).

The Board notes that this recommendation was also included in the 2017 SSAV report and that administrative support positions were added at the CMCs in response to those recommendations. Although the impact was positive and helped resolve the issue, the Salary Wage Envelope allocation was not baseline funded to the Military Colleges and the in-year financial allocation was restricted in subsequent years. As a result, the situation has reverted to that which existed previously.

A new approach to orientation is also needed within the Military Skills & Leadership strand. Specifically, the First Year Orientation Program should be replaced by an entirely reconfigured annual Orientation Week that runs in First and Second Year and is specifically designed to help new N/OCdts transition into life within the Profes-

	Position Number	Current Designation	Current Rank	New Designation	New Rank
1	34993	MILITARY FACULTY ARTS (History)	LCol	CMC MSLD Program Lead	LCol
2		ATL that feeds 34993	LCol	RMC MSLD Program Lead	Maj
3	6702	MIL FACULTY ARTS (Policy & Economics)	Maj	RMCSJ MSLD Program Lead	Maj
4		ATL that feeds 6702	Maj	CMC MSLD Staff Officer	Maj
5	695	MILITARY FACULTY ENGR (Elec & Comp)	Capt	RMC MSLD Instructor	Capt
6		ATL that feeds 695	Capt	RMC MSLD Instructor	Capt
7	699	MILITARY FACULTY SCIENCE (Physics)	Capt	RMC MSLD Instructor	Capt
8		ATL that feeds 699	Capt	RMCSJ MSLD Instructor	Capt
9	6464	MILITARY FACULTY ARTS (Business Administration)	LCol	RMC MSLD Instructor	Maj
10		ATL that feeds 6464	LCol	RMCSJ MSLD Instructor	Maj
Legend: LCol = Lieutenant Colonel • Maj = Major • Capt = Captain • ATL = Advanced Training List • RMC = Royal Military College RMCSJ = Royal Military College St-Jean • MSLD = Military Skills and Leadership Development					

Figure 10: Suggested List of Military Faculty Positions and Associated Advanced Training List Positions to be Converted to the Military Skills & Leadership Team

sion of Arms and to support the objectives and expected outcomes of the Integrated Officer Development Program. The Obstacle Course and Badging Parade are important elements of the N/OCdt experience, with a clear rationale, and should continue to have a place within that process, but the FYOP in its current form should be dismantled.

In particular, all practices of sleep deprivation should be abandoned. Sleep deprivation creates undue stress, undermines wellbeing, gives rise to injury and compounds pre-existing problems, particularly given the intense physical and mental demands already being placed on new N/OCdts through the orientation process. It also results in N/OCdts regularly sleeping through their classes – a reality that was repeatedly raised during Listening Sessions, was widely acknowledged by faculty and staff, and was almost seen as a rite of passage by many within the CMC community.

While sleep deprivation training can be valuable for military members training for conflict, it otherwise has no value outside of specific, time-bound, clearly articulated parameters, and it is counterproductive and antithetical to the key messages and behaviours the CMCs are trying to instill regarding fitness, health and wellbeing. Moreover, the CMCs have failed to provide any clear rationale for depriving the N/OCdts of healthy levels of sleep during FYOP, making it difficult to understand what the practice is intended to achieve beyond a general sense of hardship.

## Second Language Training

The Board fully endorses the value of bilingualism as a touchstone of the ROTP CMC and a cornerstone of Canada's national identity. Forming bilingual N/OCdts who can function in both Official Languages, who are steeped in the traditions of Canada's two official language communities and who are able to connect across cultural lines yields a number of concrete benefits. Not only does language acquisition foster communication, but it also deepens trust between colleagues, increases the credibility of leaders who can better connect with their troops, and helps improve cognitive abilities. It also costs much less to provide second language training (SLT) to N/OCdts at this stage in their careers than it does to pull Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels out of leadership or staff positions years down the line, at a much higher salary, for months of dedicated training to make them eligible for promotion. The benefits of a bilingual military force were highlighted during the Board's engagements, both in terms of cultural sensitivity and operational advantage. It is thus imperative that

Canada's Military Colleges, which service a fully bilingual military, create the foundation for bilingualism among the officer cadre in Canada.

Despite the significance of bilingualism, and the fact that the N/OCdts' careers depend upon successful attainment of the BBB language profile as a commissioning requirement, the approach taken to second language training within the current ROTP schedule – where it has taken a backseat to academic coursework – does not reflect its importance. While this has not hindered the ability of a significant proportion of N/OCdts to achieve their BBB level, it has come at a cost; the Board heard extensively from N/OCdts during the Listening Sessions about the high levels of stress created by treating second language training as an afterthought vis-à-vis the academic calendar, and jamming it into an already full schedule without providing any academic credit for this work.

While the second language training is well developed at both CMCs and strongly supported by a qualified and dedicated group of instructors, the time spent on learning a second language is not sufficiently valued by the system. To mitigate this, the hours invested in second language training should be accredited and count towards completion of a degree within the ROTP CMC. Furthermore, enrichment opportunities should be offered in the summers for all those who require them, and these hours should also be accredited; it is easier to get from "XXX" to BBB in fewer than 1,680 hours when language instruction is spread out over more time (as this is typically a better way for most learners to acquire language),<sup>xiv</sup> and encouraging learners to participate in activities in their second language by offering a selection of interesting experiential learning opportunities also facilitates this process.

With Bill C-13, the *Act for the Substantive Equality of Canada's Official Languages*, coming into force in 2025, the value of a bilingual officer corps will increase. The minimum second language proficiency requirements for bilingual positions involving supervision of employees occupying positions in bilingual regions will be increased from BBB to CBC, which will mean that Majors in service trades are expected to need a CBC profile, and members of the CAF who are responsible for public servants in bilingual regions are expected to be bilingual earlier in their careers. Therefore, additional effort should thus be expended by the CMCs to assist N/OCdts who aspire to improve their second language ability beyond the BBB minimum requirement. Providing access to ongoing language training, on an optional basis, should be included in the ROTP CMC.

## Fitness, Health & Wellbeing

A high standard of physical fitness is and should remain important for all members of the CAF. At issue is how best to support this objective, and how best to measure it.

On the first point, rather than being based upon the Physical Performance Test (PPT) as before, the Physical Fitness Pillar should be expanded into a Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand that receives one academic credit for a 3-hour/week training block. It would be run predominantly by Personnel Support Programs staff and should build upon some aspects of the current Physical Fitness Pillar: for example, by continuing to encourage intramural sports activities and expanding the program, although eliminating the mandatory requirement to participate. Additional offerings should be established to address issues like healthy attitudes and behaviours regarding nutrition, sleep, stress, and substance use – including addictions awareness and anger management. More broadly, it should focus on personal growth and self-improvement, as well as on providing skills for leaders who will need to understand these issues for their subordinates. It should also continue to address the particular needs of members of the Profession of Arms, such as combatives and waterborne training.

On the second point, the CAF defines the minimum physical fitness standard as the Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test, and the Board believes that if this standard is good enough for the rest of the CAF, it should be good enough for the CMCs. Additionally, the CAF has recently removed any consideration of FORCE Test completion or FORCE Test results from the Selection Board promotion review process. Moreover, during the transition from the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System to the Performance and Competency Evaluation (PaCE) system, the CAF removed the requirement to monitor annual completion of the FORCE Test from the performance appraisal system. Therefore, while completion of the FORCE Test is required for substantive promotion to the next rank level, its removal from PaCE indicates that the CAF does not use fitness testing to measure the performance or potential of its members.

The CMCs should follow this approach; since the initial justification for the Physical Performance Test stems from the requirement in the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges (QR CanMilCols) to prepare N/OCdts for service in the CAF by “developing a high standard of physical fitness,” it may

be time for the CAF to amend the QR CanMilCols and remove this requirement, while clarifying expectations related to the required standard of fitness.

In line with this, and notwithstanding the elimination of the PPT as a commissioning requirement, the Board believes that many outdated views will persist if the PPT remains as a mandatory activity at the CMCs. These include the notions that PPT standards are more challenging for men, that women have it easier (particularly in reaching the 400 and 450 Clubs), and that women are less fit (because of their significantly greater failure rates). Such enduring stereotypes perpetuate harm and run counter to the culture evolution goals to which the CMCs aspire. Therefore, the PPT should be eliminated as a mandatory activity at the CMCs.

In sum, a new model that integrates Academics, Military Skills & Leadership, Second Language Training and Fitness, Health & Wellbeing could be structured in a variety of ways to deliver the desired features and outcome. The Board has invested considerable time in developing one such option. The proposed framework (included at Annex 7) is designed to respond to the shortcomings of the current approach, meet the objectives of building a world-class professional military education and training program, and yield the associated outcomes required by the CAF in terms of the character, capabilities, skills and knowledge of its officers. In this way, the implementation of this new integrated model, together with the other recommendations that follow, should support the creation of a compelling officer development program that helps crystallize the value proposition of Canada's Military Colleges, that provides important clarity to faculty, staff and N/OCdts, and that reinforces the relevance and utility of the CMCs to the CAF.

### Recommendation 20

Establish and publish the Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges Program Standard.

### Recommendation 21

Design, develop and implement the Integrated Officer Development Program.

### Recommendation 22

Design, develop, implement and accredit the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

### Recommendation 23

Create new civilian instructor positions at both the Royal Military College of Canada and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean to support the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

### Recommendation 24

Reduce military faculty positions at both Military Colleges and their associated Advanced Training List positions and reallocate those positions to support the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

### Recommendation 25

Increase the baseline Salary Wage Envelope allocation to the Canadian Military Colleges to create and fund permanent administrative support staff positions to support the Squadron leadership teams. Allocate one administrative support staff position per Squadron.

### Recommendation 26

Design, develop, implement and accredit a revised Second Language Training strand.

### Recommendation 27

Offer optional, ongoing second language training to Naval and Officer Cadets who have attained the BBB commissioning requirement.

### Recommendation 28

Design, develop, implement and accredit a revised Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand.

### Recommendation 29

Eliminate the Physical Performance Test as a mandatory activity at the Canadian Military Colleges.

### Recommendation 30

Establish the Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test as the physical fitness standard for the Regular Officer Training Plan – Canadian Military Colleges.

## Cadet Chain of Responsibility

In the Independent External Comprehensive Review (IECR), Madame Arbour recommended the elimination of the Cadet Wing responsibility and authority command structure due to concerns regarding a range of interconnected systemic issues, from the co-ed nature of the dormitories at the Colleges to misalignment between espoused leadership ideals and actual institutional attitudes and requirements. The Board considered these extensively in its assessment of whether the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) could be sufficiently remediated to deliver a benefit for N/OCdts, without perpetuating harm, or should indeed be eliminated, even if the other changes proposed in this Report are implemented.


In theory, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) provides a valuable opportunity for N/OCdts to experience the demands of leadership, perhaps for the first time. In practice, it has largely become a tool for the CMCs to function within their allocated resources by relying on N/OCdts to carry out administrative tasks under the guise of leadership training. Perhaps most problematically, as noted by Madame Arbour, it places some N/OCdts into positions of inappropriate power over their peers.

In its current state and structure (as outlined in Annex 8), the CCOR is cumbersome, lacks sufficient oversight and mentorship support, has poorly defined learning objectives and is highly variable in terms of experience. For the CMCs to derive benefit from and mitigate risk associated with the CCOR, the Colleges must be focused on its primary purpose, which is to offer experiential leadership opportunities to the N/OCdts. While the Board sees value in maintaining elements of the CCOR, it should be overhauled to ensure that it serves this purpose.

More specifically, the *raison d'être* of the CCOR needs to be re-affirmed as providing direct experience to N/OCdts in leading people, thus allowing them to practise leadership without causing harm to others, culminating in a practicum experience in which they will lead and administer approximately five to eight other N/OCdts as Cadet Section Leaders. Within this, this Board accepts that administration, paperwork, event management and communications activities may be part of such leadership training, but not that they are its purpose. The CCOR should not be primarily used to fulfill administrative functions at the CMCs that are created by gaps in resourcing. It is perfectly acceptable for N/OCdts to fill secondary duty positions, a practice that is common across the CAF, but these requirements should not form



## Proposed Structure



\*The number of naval and officer cadets may fluctuate at any time during the academic year.

Figure 11: The Proposed Structure of the CCOR at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean

a part of the CCOR. In addition, the use of student government positions may be required to allow sports teams, the school yearbook or the band to operate, but these activities do not replace the purposeful learning activities provided by direct leadership of subordinates and they should not be considered CCOR positions.

To achieve this renewed approach, the Board envisages three key changes to the CCOR: eliminate the Cadet Wing Headquarters and Division-level Cadet Chain of Responsibility positions at RMC (Figure 11); introduce an obligation to complete a Cadet Section Leader position in order to meet commissioning requirements; and establish optional leadership opportunities at the Flight and Squadron level for those N/OCdts who have the desire and capacity to take on them on.

In implementing this new structure, a rigorous process should be established to select the N/OCdts who will serve as Cadet Section Leaders for the First Year Cadets, given the additional challenges inherent in leading this younger cohort. These Cadet Section Leaders

should receive additional training on how to provide a supportive, respectful and healthy environment as the First Years begin their careers in uniform, adapt to service in the CAF, live away from home for the first time and adjust to adulthood.

The existing mentorship program at the CMCs should also be strengthened in support of the restructured CCOR. All Cadet Section Leaders should be mentored by their respective Squadron Warrant Officers, while all Cadet Flight Leaders and Cadet Squadron Leaders should be mentored by their respective Squadron Commanders. This mentorship should include daily supervision of performance, ongoing coaching and regular feedback.

To this end, military leadership at the CMCs needs to be addressed. Over the years, there have been repeated calls in previous reports to improve the quality of such leadership at the CMCs, with a special focus on the Squadron Commander and Squadron Warrant Officer positions.

The Board observed that there are a range of leadership capabilities, styles and approaches among those who are posted into these positions at the CMCs, giving rise to inconsistent and widely varying experiences for N/OCdts. The Board also noted that these staff leadership positions are increasingly difficult to fill, particularly as the CAF navigates this period of personnel shortages, largely in response to a perception that the CAF (specifically the occupation authorities and career managers) does not value the experience related to staff positions at the CMCs. While the Chief of Military Personnel has allocated additional points for a posting to the Training Wing at the CMCs in the annual Selection Board selection criteria, no other incentives appear to have been established to attract top talent to serve in direct leadership positions at Canada's Military Colleges.

The Board endorses IECR Recommendation 23, which proposes that the CAF equip all training schools with the best possible people and instructors, and understands that the CMCs will be included in the CAF efforts to address this recommendation. The possibility of establishing incentives to promote postings to the training and education system is viewed with optimism. There are, however, additional specific initiatives that should be put in place at the CMCs.

One way to incentivize a posting to the CMCs, especially for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers in direct leadership roles, is to provide specialized training prior to their service as a Squadron Commander or a Squadron Warrant Officer. More specifically, the CMCs should create an "Advanced Leader Development Program" (ALDP) to train the Squadron-level leadership and incentivize CAF members to seek out this employment opportunity. The ALDP would be a post-graduate leadership program specifically designed to train Squadron Commanders and Squadron Warrant Officers, comprising a mix of academic classes, military training, language training and practical experience. In particular, it would include specific training on how to support N/OCdts in their journey through the Military Skills & Leadership (MSL) strand. The ALDP would be offered under the competitive process for selection into post-graduate training programs, and would include one year of study and two years of obligatory service at the CMCs, in order to provide stability for all parties.

Ultimately, learning the skills necessary to lead N/OCdts and to teach the MSL strand would strengthen overall leadership development at the CMCs. Granting a professional Master's degree in leadership development for those who already hold an undergraduate degree, or granting credits towards an undergraduate degree for

those who do not, would further offer short and long-term career benefits to participants, thus helping attract high-quality staff to the CMCs. Access to second language training as a core component of the program would also increase the bilingualism of staff at the CMCs, providing participants with additional career advancement benefits.

The initial focus of the Advanced Leader Development Program should be on training the Squadron-level leadership teams. This means establishing a program for eight Captains and eight Warrant Officers to feed the proposed 16 Captain and 16 Warrant Officer leadership positions at the two CMCs. To facilitate rapid implementation of this program and demonstrate the significance of these leadership positions, the 16 military positions at both Military Colleges that are required to create this program should be sourced from the existing CMC military faculty and the associated Advanced Training List (ATL) positions (*Figure 12*). The CAF can then determine whether the value of the military faculty is sufficient to invest in and re-establish those 16 additional positions in the Colleges and their associated ATL positions. At a later stage, the ALDP could be expanded to offer training to Division-level leadership positions, or even to all of the Training Wing – which is responsible for the N/OCdts' military training, including officership, physical fitness and drill. This would require more offsets to generate the ATL credits, unless more positions were added.

A final element of the concerns noted by Madame Arbour regarding the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, as reflected in IECR Recommendation 28 and in the mandate of the CMCRB, relates to the risk of abuse of authority within this peer leadership model. The Board shares those concerns. No matter how smart, developed or capable they might be as individuals, N/OCdts are still too immature and too inexperienced to be in positions of power over one another. Moreover, not only can leadership experience be gained in multiple ways that do not require the leader to exercise power over the follower, but true leadership actually manifests through strength of character, not through the accrual of power. Perhaps counterintuitively, conferring authority can be unduly limiting to the leadership development and growth of the N/OCdts, and the risks associated with inappropriate or harmful exercises of such authority vis-à-vis other N/OCdts far outweigh any positive learnings.

Accordingly, the Board believes that no N/OCdt should have disciplinary authority over another N/OCdt. This would align with the best practice adopted by the many foreign military academies this Board examined for whom peer leadership is a common feature but who do

	Position Number	Current Designation	Current Rank	New Designation	New Rank
1	709	MILITARY FACULTY ARTS (MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP)	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
2		ATL THAT FEEDS 709	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
3	690	MILITARY FACULTY ENGINEERING (CIVIL)	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
4		ATL THAT FEEDS 690	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
5	681	MILITARY FACULTY SCIENCE (MATH&COMP)	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
6		ATL THAT FEEDS 681	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
7	685	MILITARY FACULTY ENGINEERING (CHEM&CHEM)	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
8		ATL THAT FEEDS 685	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
9	6622	MILITARY FACULTY ARTS (ENGLISH)	LCol	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
10		ATL that feeds 6622	LCol	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
11	6868	MILITARY FACULTY ARTS (FRENCH)	Lt/Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
12		ATL that feeds 6868	Lt/Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
13	694	MILITARY FACULTY ENGINEERING (ELEC&COMP)	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
14		ATL that feeds 694	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
15	687	MILITARY FACULTY ENGINEERING (MECHANICAL)	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	Capt
16		ATL that feeds 687	Capt	Advanced Leadership Training ATL	WO
Legend: LCol = Lieutenant Colonel • WO = Warrant Officer • Capt = Captain • Lt = Lieutenant • ATL = Advance Training List					

Figure 12: Proposed Military Faculty Positional Offsets to Establish the Advanced Leader Development Program

not vest their Cadets with disciplinary authority. In situations where corrective measures may be required or loss of privileges should be imposed, they should be administered by the Squadron Commander, supported by the Squadron Warrant Officer, following appropriate processes.

If the purpose of the CCOR is reconceived and its structure revised accordingly, the Board believes that it can become an effective mechanism through which to support the leadership development of N/OCdts. Moreover, the significant changes recommended below should

serve to mitigate the potential for harm noted in the IECR, and thus help justify the continued use of the CCOR – in its revised form – as an important tool within the ROTP CMC.

### Recommendation 31

Reduce the Cadet Chain of Responsibility at both Canadian Military Colleges to three types of positions: Cadet Squadron Leaders, Cadet Flight Leaders and Cadet Section Leaders.

### **Recommendation 32**

Establish as a commissioning requirement that all Third Year Naval and Officer Cadets complete a session as a Cadet Section Leader.

### **Recommendation 33**

Establish and incentivize optional leadership opportunities for Fourth Year Naval and Officer Cadets to fill Cadet Flight Leader and Cadet Squadron Leader positions.

### **Recommendation 34**

Eliminate the Cadet Wing HQ and Division positions at the Royal Military College of Canada. Retain positions such as administrative roles and team captains but remove them from the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and eliminate their use as a graduation requirement.

### **Recommendation 35**

Design, develop and implement the Advanced Leader Development Program to better prepare the Training Wing staff to support the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and to incentivize postings to the Canadian Military Colleges for Captains and Warrant Officers.

### **Recommendation 36**

Reduce Military Faculty positions and their associated Advanced Training List positions and reallocate those positions to the Advanced Leadership Development Program to support the leadership development of the Naval and Officer Cadets and provide greater mentorship to the Cadet Chain of Responsibility.

### **Recommendation 37**

Ensure that the Military Skills & Leadership strand equips Naval and Officer Cadets to be successful as Cadet Section Leaders.

### **Recommendation 38**

Remove from the Cadet Chain of Responsibility all authority – and all appearance of authority – to impose corrective measures or loss of privileges, in order to ensure that no Naval and Officer Cadet has disciplinary authority, real or perceived, over another Naval and Officer Cadet.

## **Conduct, Health & Wellbeing**

The experience of being an N/OCdt at the CMCs is more similar to being a member of the CAF than to being a civilian university student, and therefore N/OCdts are directly impacted by the CAF's ability to keep pace with the changing nature of society. Historically, the CAF has been resistant to change, often undertaking necessary reform only in response to significant external pressure. This dynamic has played out on issues ranging from the full integration of women into the military to the harms caused by the Somalia Affair and has continued in relation to the CAF's struggle to provide a workplace free from all forms of misconduct, particularly sexual misconduct.

Most recently, the Independent External Comprehensive Review has served as a catalyst for change in the CAF. In response to its findings and recommendations, the CAF has taken, and continues to take, meaningful action, as reflected in the Status Reports of the External Monitor. The Board has observed both a commitment to change and evidence of change – within the CAF and at the CMCs – extending not only to issues of conduct and culture but more broadly to diversity, equity and inclusion, decolonization, and reconciliation. This is a source of optimism. It is also important context for the work of the CMCRB; this Board has made the deliberate choice to limit its recommendations on Conduct, Health and Wellbeing to only those elements that are specific to the CMCs and that are not being addressed via other mechanisms and initiatives currently underway within the CAF.

Notwithstanding positive progress that has occurred, misconduct and harmful behaviour continues in multiple forms at the Military Colleges. This manifests, among other ways, in discriminatory attitudes and actions based on race, gender, sexual orientation, religion and physical ability. Survey data reflects ongoing instances at both Colleges of harassment and discrimination, racism, abuses of authority, hazing and bullying, in addition to sexual misconduct.

Other data sources corroborate this evidence. The Board heard from a number of individuals who shared

deeply personal experiences – often with the hope of preventing further harm – and received these testimonies with appreciation and care; these stories have allowed the Board to develop a fuller understanding of the ways in which people have been deeply affected by harmful, traumatizing and negative experiences at the Canadian Military Colleges. These direct engagements further allowed the Board to deepen its insights into power structures within the CAF and the CMCs, to understand better their impact on behaviours and attitudes, and to propose ways in which to create meaningful systemic change.

Against this background, it is important to note that the prevalence of sexual misconduct at the CMCs is largely consistent with what is happening at civilian universities.<sup>xiv</sup> This reflects the reality that there continue to exist attitudes and behaviours within Canadian society *writ large* that give rise to harm, manifesting in various forms and in various places. Indeed, the Military Colleges draw from Canadian society; they reflect the views, experiences, ideas and comportment of the people who are there at any given time.

At both civilian universities and the CMCs, most incidences of sexual assault and unwanted sexualized behaviour occur on campus, with residential campuses reporting higher incidences of sexual misconduct than commuter schools or those with off-campus housing. However Canadian female students living “off campus with roommates” were as likely to report they had experienced sexual assault (17.4%) as were students living in campus housing.<sup>xv</sup> These data points tell us something about the conditions under which misconduct arises, and are particularly noteworthy in the context of the CMCs, given that the Colleges require all ROTP students to live on-campus throughout their program.

More broadly, it can be expected that changes in the attitudes and behaviours of Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges will evolve alongside such changes within society at large, as that is the source from which N/OCdts are drawn. At present, the student body at the CMCs is more diverse than at any other point in history and reflects the demographic makeup of Canada better than ever before. These N/OCdts hold views that are informed by broader societal change, and not only do they not condone misconduct, they are increasingly apt to speak up against it. In this way, the most impactful change at the CMCs is driven by the N/OCdts themselves. At the same time, positive progress is fragile and faces backlash. Moreover, the reality is that instances of misconduct continue, and, in some cases, are egregious enough that they have driven N/OCdts out of the CAF. This is indica-

tive of the need for continued work with respect to both prevention and response.

In order to determine what actions are required to stop misconduct, change negative attitudes, foster a healthy environment and mitigate harm, the Board first sought to establish what prevention and response tools are already available exist and what gaps persist. To this end, the Board undertook both a comparative and a discrete analysis of the prevention and response policy frameworks at the CMCs.

## Comparative Analysis

The Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) (ADM (RS)) assessed the existing policy framework at the CMCs surrounding sexual assault prevention and response – as compared to the relevant policy and legal requirements in Quebec, Ontario and the federal government, as well as in relation to benchmarks established at Queen’s University, Nipissing University, Bishop’s University, the University of Quebec in Abitibi-Témiscamingue (UQAT) and the United States Naval Academy – to determine whether any gaps existed between the policy/legal tools employed by provincial and federal governments and other comparable institutions and those employed by the CMCs.

This ADM (RS) review revealed the existence and application of an extensive series of DND/CAF policies, directives and programs. Together with federal legislation (the *Employment Equity Act*, the *Canadian Human Rights Act* and the *Canadian Labour Code*), these are translated into DND/CAF-specific documents via a series of Department Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) and unit orders. They are further brought to life through a variety of programs designed to prevent misconduct and to respond effectively when it occurs. In this respect, the CMC framework aligns extensively with the other provincial and federal comparators.

However, some important gaps exist. In particular, the following thematic areas are not fully or appropriately addressed at one or both of the CMCs within extant policy frameworks:

- Articulation of the rights that affected persons have to legal or other representation.
- Description of the appeal process with respect to decisions made following an investigation.
- Prohibition of irrelevant questions during an investigation.



- Requirement to collect data related to the number of times N/OCdts use supports and services relating to sexual violence.
- Identification of the safety measures that are in place to counter sexual violence, including infrastructure adjustments to secure premises.
- Requirement for the Military Colleges to submit annual reports to the Canadian Defence Academy on the number and types of complaints.
- Establishment of measures to protect and keep confidential the personal information of involved persons.
- Improvement of online accessibility to relevant documentation.
- Consideration of how to organize and oversee social activities.

## Discrete Analysis

### Prevention

While a wide variety of policies are in place to prevent misconduct in the military, the Board focused its attention on the specific tools that help inculcate new members into the Profession of Arms and inform them of the requirements and expectations for personal and professional conduct immediately upon enrollment.

This process begins within the first week of service in the CAF during the Basic Military Officer Qualification course at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School, which includes information sessions on the CAF Ethos and on professional conduct. These sessions, along with a continued focus on personal and professional conduct during BMOQ, are designed to inform new recruits of their rights and obligations as members of the CAF.

Naval and Officer Cadets are further exposed to key concepts as part of the *Building Our Future* training program at the CMCs. Designed by the Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre (SMSRC) and Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC), this four-year program is centred on the critical themes of consent, barriers to consent, healthy relationships, receiving disclosure of incidences of sexual misconduct, stress management, bystander intervention training, and how to respond to situations as an effective leader. While *Building Our Future* training continues to be refined and would benefit from a more knowledgeable and credible instructor cadre, the Board recognizes the value of this program within the prevention toolkit for N/OCdts at the CMCs.

The CMCs also offer a series of training sessions regarding expected behaviours and available resources for individuals affected by misconduct. Additionally, the CMCs have recently established two new positions to support prevention work on campus at the Colleges: a Chair of Cultural Evolution (RMC) and a Specialist in Resources and Training on Sexual Violence and Promoting a Positive Culture (RMC Saint-Jean). Both directly support the N/OCdts and advise the CMC leadership teams on systemic issues.

The CAF also operates support and advocacy groups for communities that have historically been marginalized within the CAF and at the CMCs, including Defence Advisory Groups for the designated equity seeking groups and local support organizations, such as the Athena Network<sup>xlvii</sup> for women and the Agora Network<sup>xlviii</sup> for members of the LGBTQ2+ community.

In sum, there exists a robust suite of tools in place to help prevent misconduct within the CMCs. Notwithstanding this, N/OCdts have repeatedly indicated that many of the teachings are repetitive, feel pointless and are maladapted to the specifics of the Military College environment. In particular, many N/OCdts feel that the current training fails to take into account their needs and characteristics as modern young adults. While the CMCs are working hard to better tailor new programs like *Building Our Future* to this audience, a degree of cynicism, indifference and disengagement persists, resulting in outcomes that are antithetical to the desired objectives of such training. These issues have, over time, contributed to shortcomings in the effectiveness of education and training tools to fully eliminate harmful behaviours.

### Response

Until such time as all harmful conduct has been prevented and eradicated, response mechanisms will still be required, not only to support affected persons and hold perpetrators accountable, but also to deter future misconduct.

Many such mechanisms already exist at the CMCs; in an environment comprised mainly of young people, who may be away from home for the first time, are adapting to life in the military and are learning how to behave as members of the Profession of Arms, a broad network of support services has been established. The chain of command serves as the primary source of response to support affected persons (similar to the rest of the CAF) and is supported by a rotating duty staff that provides a 24/7 presence on campus and is accessible to all N/

OCdts. N/OCdts can also access peer-based support through the Sentinel program and the Professional Conduct Advisors (fellow N/OCdts trained in these roles), as well as faith-based support through the CMC chaplaincy, including access to 24/7 in-person crisis intervention support.

Recognizing that victims may not seek support from the chain of command for highly personal issues, anonymous mental health support services are also available to N/OCdts through the 24/7 Member Assistance Program and through in-person local CAF mental health support services. N/OCdts also have 24/7 access to the Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre crisis hotline, and local agreements have been established to provide N/OCdts with access to community-based sexual assault support services, including a 24/7 support hotline and emergency civilian medical care. A proliferation of informational posters, located on campus in dormitories, washrooms and near dining areas also provide quick reference for the N/OCdts regarding available resources.

In terms of technological support resources, all CAF members have access to the *Respect in the CAF* mobile app delivered by the Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre, which serves as a repository of resources, guides, and contact information. The app can be used to help access support services, to help CAF members support those who have been affected by sexual misconduct, and to ensure that CAF members are informed about policies and procedures within the organization. RMC Saint-Jean also has a dedicated mobile app that includes contact information to access sexual harassment, discrimination and violence support services.

In instances where an individual has been affected by sexual misconduct, and that individual has come forward to report an incident, the CMCs have established immediate steps (“interim measures”) that can be taken by the chain of command or the supervisor/manager to provide support in advance of the requirement for initiation or completion of an investigation. These interim measures are designed to ensure safety and provide options to support affected persons while the judicial or administrative systems follow their prescribed processes, which in some cases can take well over a year, during which both the alleged offender and the affected person may be living on-campus. However, the Board is equally conscious that the presumption of innocence must be respected, which means that an alleged offender cannot be treated like a guilty party in the absence of a conviction or determination via the appropriate process. The Board therefore supports the interim measures approach that the

CMCs have taken to navigate this fine line, but would nonetheless encourage the Colleges to explore opportunities to increase transparency through greater communication with affected individuals, as appropriate.

In terms of such processes, incidences of misconduct that meet the threshold for legal action may be addressed by the military police or civilian police services, for disposition through either the military or civilian legal systems. Based on the recommendations of the Independent External Comprehensive Review, the CAF has committed to transfer the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute criminal code sexual offences to the civilian criminal justice system. Other Code of Service Discipline offences may be dealt with by the military justice system, including Court Martial. Issues that contravene the Code of Service Discipline but are considered minor in nature may also be dealt with through the use of Summary Proceedings, a mechanism that is unique to the military justice system.

The CAF may also apply workplace remedial measures to identify and correct performance or conduct deficiencies that do not meet the threshold for legal prosecution. Applied by the chain of command, the remedial measures program is designed to remedy conduct or performance that fails to meet the required professional standards but does not constitute a service offence. Remedial measures may be applied concurrently to legal proceedings.

Certain cases of performance or conduct deficiencies can require an assessment of whether the individual should remain a member of the Profession of Arms. In extreme cases, or cases of repeated issues with no improvement, the chain of command may recommend or decide that an individual should be released from the CAF.

Currently, the Commandants have release authority for N/OCdts who fail to meet the *performance* requirements of the ROTP CMC, but they do not have authority to release N/OCdts who have *conduct* issues, no matter how significant. As such, a Commandant can release from the CAF a N/OCdt who fails the CMCs’ academic, fitness, military training, or second language requirements, but not one who has committed an offence, including sexual misconduct, as that authority has been assigned to the Director of Military Career Administration by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

In sum, the Board believes that the range of support services that are available at the CMCs provide a comprehensive foundation for a robust and effective

response framework. However, it is also complex and can be challenging for junior members of the CAF to navigate. Moreover, the Board heard that confidence in the chain of command to respond appropriately to misconduct and to handle complaints in an expeditious, respectful or effective manner is low.<sup>xlix</sup> Indeed, the drawback of the legal veil of confidentiality that must surround certain processes to ensure fairness can paradoxically give rise to erroneous perceptions that “nothing is being done,” which in turn breeds cynicism, anger and frustration. Increasing opportunities for follow-up with affected individuals, as appropriate, demonstrates compassion and can help offset this.

It is clear that not only must justice be done, but it must also be seen to be done. This imperative factored significantly into the Board’s perspective on how best to move forward with building trust, evolving culture, improving communication and establishing a healthy environment at Canada’s Military Colleges.

## The Way Forward

Based on the current state of the prevention and response framework at the CMCs, three main lines of effort are required to help the Colleges continue to build an inclusive and diverse community, characterized by a healthy environment free from harassment, discrimination, sexual misconduct and violence: strengthening existing mechanisms, increasing trust in and engagement with these mechanisms, and filling gaps where no mechanisms exist but should.

To inform its thinking on how best to address these challenges, the Board undertook a detailed examination of best practice within Canada and around the world, via site visits to foreign military academies and Canadian civilian universities, as well as through a literature review.

### Strengthening Existing Mechanisms

The review by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) was valuable in assessing the existing prevention and response framework, and in determining that it is comparatively robust. It did not assess the *effectiveness* of this framework, however. A more extensive analysis is required in order to measure whether the policies and procedures in place are effective in helping prevent and respond to misconduct. In keeping with best practice, as reflected by the approach taken at several civilian universities and government organizations, this analysis should be undertaken by experts in the field. Examples of this include the Canadian Centre for Legal Innovation in Sexual Assault Response (CCLISAR), which has

conducted assessments such as the *Independent Review of Bishop’s University’s Practices and Policies Related to Sexualized Violence and the Sexual Violence Prevention and Response Framework* at Queen’s University.

Another way to strengthen existing prevention and response mechanisms is to harmonize them. In particular, all relevant policies, procedures, programs and practices should be the same at both Colleges, differing only when required to align with different provincial legislative requirements. This will ensure greater clarity and will standardize expectations, engendering clearer communication between leadership and N/OCdts, improving understanding by the N/OCdts regarding available resources and reporting mechanisms, and facilitating the movement of N/OCdts between Colleges, given that they will be well versed in what is expected of them regardless of where they are studying. Harmonization must extend to the support resources available at both Colleges (as discussed further below) – from training to personnel to events – in order to facilitate equality, efficiency and effectiveness.

Additionally, despite the presence of 24/7 rotating duty staff, some N/OCdts reported an inability to access these individuals when the need arose. Ensuring that all N/OCdts know when and how to access duty officers is essential, and to this end more effective and transparent communication between the Colleges and the Cadets would be beneficial. Moreover, it is imperative that the duty staff have a high level of credibility and trust with the N/OCdt community, so that the individuals who may need support feel comfortable in seeking it out.

Lastly, both new and existing policies, procedures, programs and practices at the CMCs should undergo a holistic Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) to ensure that they are fully considered, responsive, inclusive, tailored and sensitive to all N/OCdts, and that they are contributing, and seen to be contributing, to a shared vision for the Colleges as places that are free from harm and where all members feel safe and secure at all times.

### Increasing Trust in and Engagement with Existing Mechanisms

As noted above, it is not merely the absence of response mechanisms that is concerning but the lack of trust in and engagement with those that do exist. Solving this requires that N/OCdts see and believe that the authority figures they rely on are vested with the appropriate tools and powers to address the problems the N/OCdts are facing. At present, the inability of the Commandants to

release N/OCdts from the CMCs for conduct issues undermines this belief.

Under the current rules, it is the Director of Military Career Administration who holds this authority – someone with no presence on campus and whom the N/OCdts do not know. This approach creates a reasonable system of checks and balances, which in part serves to prevent Commandants from taking this significant decision unilaterally and from being, or being viewed to be, unduly influenced by proximity to the issue and/or influenced by personal bias against the individual in question. However, it also fosters the sense that the Commandants are not sufficiently empowered to enforce appropriate conduct, and undermines the credibility of the system in the eyes of the N/OCdts.

Outside of this context, the rationale for vesting the Director of Military Career Administration with this authority makes sense, and it helps ensure an equitable application of release authorities for misconduct across the CAF. But it is also time-consuming and burdensome, and it hampers the ability of the chain of command to respond in a rapid and transparent manner to significant issues of misconduct at the CMCs.

To balance these two imperatives, the Board considers that the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy should be designated as the appropriate level of release authority for misconduct at the CMCs. This change in the position vested with the release authority should help ensure that broad perspective and objectivity are maintained when making release decisions, while also enhancing the system's actual ability to respond to misconduct independently, fairly and expeditiously.

### Filling Gaps

New mechanisms and new approaches are also needed to help build a respectful and supportive campus culture marked by positive behaviour and healthy spaces.

This starts with training. Although the CMCs already have many such initiatives in place, most are perceived by the N/OCdts as redundant, performative and ineffective. The fact that most training is delivered by members of the chain of command or other N/OCdts, who typically lack specific subject-matter expertise, compounds this problem. As such, the training offerings at the CMCs – including bystander intervention, discussion on the role of alcohol and drugs in sexual assaults, and instruction on reporting and response mechanisms – should be wholly modernized and fully enmeshed within both the Military Skills & Leadership strand and the Fitness,

Health & Wellbeing strand (as appropriate), within the proposed new Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP). Moreover, given the sensitivity of and the nuance required when addressing issues such as racism, homophobia, healthy sexuality, toxic masculinity and relationship with self, training should be delivered by subject-matter experts who are respected and seen as credible by the N/OCdts.

Efforts must also be taken to provide a safe environment, particularly for women and vulnerable populations, including as related to living facilities. On this issue, while N/OCdts and leadership/management had conflicting views on the adequacy of available support resources (particularly after hours and on weekends), and while many foreign partners and allies diverge on this point (taking a more hands-off approach to the lives of their Cadets outside of education and training hours), greater consideration is needed regarding institutional, structural and cultural factors that may put women and vulnerable populations at more or less risk while living on campus at the CMCs.

In support of the above imperatives, there is a need for dedicated on-campus support in the form of new Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres (HSWRC) to be established at each College. These should be led by civilian directors and should be mandated to prevent and respond to harmful behaviour through a balance of focused education, targeted interventions, comprehensive response and compassionate advocacy in order to promote professionalism, respect and trust. In particular, the Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres should do the following:

- Support the delivery of the Military Skills & Leadership, and the Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strands of the Integrated Officer Development Program, by:
  1. providing training to N/OCdts, including the *Building Our Future* program and bystander intervention, in alignment with the Integrated Officer Development Program learning outcomes;
  2. supporting the professionalization of the instructor cadre and other support staff (such as Duty Officers), including through the delivery of “train the trainee” programs; and
  3. developing relevant educational materials.
- Facilitate access for N/OCdts to CAF support services addressing sexual misconduct, mental health, anti-racism, addictions, conflict management, etc., support services, including by

integrating and coordinating resources offered by the Sexual Misconduct Support Resource Centre, the Integrated Conflict and Complaint Management (ICCM) program, the Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) and the Canadian Forces Health Services.

- Train, manage, mentor and coach a contingent of peer-elected N/OCdt Advocates who provide direct support to N/OCdts in need.
- Develop insights and advice and produce recommendations to inform the decision making of CMC leadership in relation to the Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centre mandate.
- Undertake on-campus awareness-raising and harm-prevention activities.
- Collaborate with stakeholders to implement and enforce adequate safety and security measures.

Appropriate human and financial resources will be required to establish and run successful and sustainable Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centres. Taking into consideration already existing resources that are currently spread around different teams at both Colleges and that should be consolidated, the Board expects that the new Centres will need to be staffed with approximately ten full-time employees distributed between the two Colleges with comparable positions/titles. These employees should hold functional expertise in fields that respond to the mandate of the HSWRCs.

These objectives should be further advanced by transforming the positions of Professional Conduct Advisors into a contingent of peer-elected N/OCdt Advocates, who will serve as ambassadors of positive and respectful culture and as on-the-ground support for individual N/OCdts in interfacing with the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and CMC leadership, including on issues that require immediate attention.

In line with the guiding principles of centralized policy and program development and decentralized support, the HSWRCs should have a physical footprint at both Colleges that is easily and discreetly accessible to N/OCdts, including during off-hours (i.e., evenings and weekends).

Another way to offset the harm that arises around sexism, toxic masculinity and misogyny and all of their attendant parts, is to address the associated issue of the preponderance of men in the Military College environment. To this end, the Board applauds the CAF's stated goal of increasing the percentage of women in the Profession of Arms to 25% by 2026 and recognizes that the CMCs already play a notable role in growing the number of women joining the

Canadian Armed Forces, as highlighted in an earlier section of this Report. While there are a number of ways to mitigate the negative impacts of this imbalance, these initiatives do not address the underlying issue of having disproportionately more men at the CMCs.

Sustained change will require a tipping point in terms of gender parity. Recent efforts by the CAF to address this have yielded success, and in 2024 the CMCs notably attracted 25% women to their ranks. Building on this momentum, the Board believes that setting the realistic yet intermediate target of 33% women N/OCdts over ten years to ensure greater gender parity at both Military Colleges will help build a healthier, safer, more welcoming environment that better reflects Canadian society. The Board acknowledges that full gender parity is unlikely and that efforts to emulate the percentage of women at civilian universities fails to account for the current realities in the CAF or the state of militaries across the world. Over time, and in response to a mix of concerted recruiting efforts, ongoing broader institutional culture evolution and specific changes proposed in this Report, the intent is to help set conditions within which more women are interested in joining the CAF and enrolling in the CMCs and are met with an environment in which to thrive when they do.

Overall, the Board is confident about the possibilities for progress and positive change at the CMCs. However, some concerning obstacles still stand in the way of realizing their full potential. Women remain significantly more likely to have suffered negative experiences at the CMCs than men. They strongly view misconduct as more present and problematic than men do, and they have more negative perceptions about the Colleges' handling of instances of misconduct, highlighting that a lack of timely and transparent institutional response is often more traumatizing than the initial incident itself. Overall, the lived experiences of women continue to differ significantly than those of men at Canada's Military Colleges. This needs to change.

In this vein, all members of the CMC community must recognize and validate the experiences of their fellow N/OCdts, must actively contribute to a positive culture, and must hold themselves to account in support of these efforts. Action must match rhetoric in fact and in perception. The recommendations proposed below represent significant steps towards that end.



### Recommendation 39

Amend the policy framework at the Canadian Military Colleges to address gaps identified by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) in its Advisory on Sexual Violence Prevention at Canadian Military Colleges.

### Recommendation 40

Mandate experts in the field of sexual misconduct prevention and response to assess the effectiveness and impact of the policies and procedures of the Canadian Military Colleges.

### Recommendation #41

Assign release authority for Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy for the following release items:

- 5d - Not advantageously employable – conduct deficiency
- 5f - Unsuitable for further service – conduct deficiency

### Recommendation #42

Establish a Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centre at each Military College, staffed by professionals with a wide range of relevant expertise and sufficiently resourced to deliver on its mandate to provide prevention and response support to the Canadian Military Colleges seven days a week.

### Recommendation #43

Increase the percentage of female Naval and Officer Cadets at the CMCs to 33% by 2035.

## Infrastructure, Operations & Support

As symbols of national pride, power and prestige which help project an image of the Canadian Armed Forces to Canadians and to the world, the state of infrastructure and maintenance at the CMCs matters. Thanks to its unique and successful partnership with the Corporation Fort Saint-Jean (Corpo St-Jean) – a community-based non-profit in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu entrusted with the responsibility of running operations and maintenance on the campus – RMC Saint-Jean reflects the best of what

Canada's professional educational and training institution should be. Notwithstanding challenges it faces vis-à-vis funding for its major capital projects (such as the arena and pool), attractive buildings, well-maintained grounds, modern facilities and secure sites all help highlight the historic value of the campus, demonstrate a high standard of care towards the Naval and Officer Cadets, and reflect global best practice in terms of psycho-social infrastructure.

More specifically, due to the nature of the contract in place between Corpo St-Jean and RMC Saint-Jean – which is financially significant but yields great value – the College benefits from timely, high-quality support from a dedicated local company that is deeply invested in the success and wellbeing of the institution. RMC Saint-Jean does not have to compete with other service units in the St-Jean Garrison area to address real property maintenance or repairs for its 33 assets because it has dedicated access to this private, third-party facility manager.

Conversely, at RMC, through little fault of its own, the state of physical infrastructure at RMC leaves much to be desired, creating a harmful psychosocial environment for N/OCDts and negatively impacting Canada's image and reputation. Although chronic underinvestment in time, money and attention has harmed both Colleges, the impact is particularly noteworthy and noticeable at RMC, creating an unacceptable divergence in standards between the two Colleges. This is due in large part to the different operations and support model for servicing Kingston. Unlike in Saint-Jean, RMC is supported by the Real Property Operations Group Detachment (RP Ops) for CFB Kingston, which provides all infrastructure support to both the Military College and all other units at CFB Kingston. This means that in-year facility maintenance and minor repairs work orders for RMC – from cutting the grass, removing snow and cleaning windows, to fixing broken toilets and repairing heating and cooling systems – are triaged by RP Ops against all other demands at CFB Kingston.

As a result, RMC's 55 real property assets, many of which have heritage designation, have been plagued by a history of significant deferred maintenance, creating all sorts of problems, from more breakdowns and growing costs to increased future liability and chronic challenges for users.

RMC is also dealing with the impacts of significant funding shortfalls for RP Ops for the 2024-2025 fiscal year, resulting in a 50% reduction in maintenance and repair funding at CFB Kingston. For example, at the time of

writing this Report, RMC had been informed that only emergency facilities repairs – such as no heat in winter, power outages, no running water, flooding, sewer backup or smoking electrical outlets – would receive service. Consequently, repairs such as restoring laundry facilities, fixing broken sinks, patching holes in walls and removing bird feces from balconies will not even be considered for action until after April 2025 at the earliest.

In addition to an ongoing lack of resources, the roots of this problem are also linked to issues of responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities. The Deputy Minister of National Defence is responsible for all infrastructure maintenance and construction for DND/CAF. Since 2016, this responsibility has been consolidated and executed through the Associate Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment) and subordinate units and detachments across Canada, made up of a blend of civilian public servants and CAF members. In this construct, neither the Chief of the Defence Staff, nor the Service Commanders, nor the Canadian Defence Academy, nor the Canadian Military Colleges have any authorities for real property management, construction, or associated financial expenditures.

Major capital construction and minor new construction projects at the CMCs follow the standard Department of National Defence processes that compete for funding, project approval and project support with all other DND/CAF construction demands. As such, demands for dormitories, libraries or arenas at the CMCs must contend against aircraft hangars, jetties and barracks for soldiers, across the country, for prioritization. It is not surprising that, in this context, investments in the CMCs do not fare well against demands to support operational requirements, especially within the constraints of systemic underfunding of defence infrastructure requirements *writ large*.

The Department of National Defence has acknowledged some of the aforementioned issues, with the 2022/2023 Departmental Results Report recognizing the systemic underfunding of real property, for example. This is only a first step, however. In a context where significant funding shortfalls persist, a vicious cycle has taken hold wherein the impact of DND's investment in maintenance and repair continually decreases, while costs and demands continually increase. This in turn creates a situation in which the existing infrastructure portfolio cannot be maintained, leading to an acceleration of asset deterioration. Urgent action is needed now.

The CMCs are an appropriate place to start; under a

construct in which investment in the Military Colleges competes against operational demands, the CMCs will never win. But if the CMCs are viewed as having a defence and security purpose unto themselves, which serve Canadians and directly advance the interests of the CAF, then dedicated investment in the Military Colleges will not only support these professional military training and education institutions, but will also help to fulfill the social contract between the country and the N/OCdts who choose and are mandated to serve it.

This requires greater overall investment in Canada's Military Colleges, which would provide timely opportunities to increase defence spending towards 2% of GDP on expenditures within the Canadian economy that will have a direct positive impact on the quality of life for CAF members. It also requires a new funding paradigm to address the CMCs specifically. Lastly, it requires a different operations and maintenance model for RMC, akin to that which exists at RMC Saint-Jean, to ensure that support is outsourced and the needs of RMC prioritized. This would lead to the privatization of some public service jobs but would significantly raise the quality of life at RMC and, importantly, render it on par with RMC Saint-Jean in terms of infrastructure, operations and maintenance, and site security.

Overarching all of this, a reset in attitude and expectations is required regarding the value of Canada's built heritage and the importance of architectural excellence and quality design at the CMCs. Such a shift would bring Canada in line with countries like Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom, which place great significance on the quality and attractiveness of their campuses.

For too long, the Government of Canada and DND/CAF have accepted mediocrity. This has resulted in infrastructure additions to the campuses in recent decades that are incongruent with the broader historical look-and-feel of the CMCs, renovations that are approached piecemeal rather than holistically, and an acceptance of operations and maintenance standards that leave the Colleges looking tired and unkempt, particularly at RMC. This, in turn, has undermined the health and wellbeing of the N/OCdts, hindered Canada's ability to leverage the CMCs to project national power, and eroded Canadians' pride in these institutions.

Going forward, any new buildings, infrastructure additions, renovations or upgrades should be held to the highest standards, and the long-term value of building and maintaining beautiful and inspiring campuses, in their historical style, should become a central consideration.

Overall, a recalibrated approach will be instrumental in recognizing the CMCs as prestigious institutions of national esteem, as befitting a G7 country, and in attaching importance to the experience of those who attend them.

#### **Recommendation #44**

*Establish a dedicated funding framework for major capital projects, minor construction, and maintenance and repair to support training and education establishments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Canadian Military Colleges.*

#### **Recommendation #45**

*Increase baseline funding for major capital projects, minor construction, and maintenance and repair at the Canadian Military Colleges.*

#### **Recommendation #46**

Establish a dedicated facilities management contract at the Royal Military College of Canada, similar to that which exists at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean.



TO THE GLORIOUS MEMORY OF THE EX-CADETS  
OF THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA  
WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR THE EMPIRE  
ERECTED ANNO DOMINI MCXXVII



# Implementation

Extensive and meaningful change is required to address the longstanding problems that have plagued Canada's Military Colleges and to help them achieve their full potential. This change will affect the very structures and systems that have underpinned the CMCs for decades, and the Board is under no illusions regarding how difficult it will be to implement.

While it might be tempting to shy away from the recommendations in this Report that are perceived as the most challenging, or to delay addressing them and instead parse out and prioritize those that are considered more palatable, such an approach will only delay the inevitable and, if left too long, could eventually undermine the very survival of the CMCs. Not everything can or should happen at once, but every recommendation plays a critical role in ameliorating the system, and together they are intended to be mutually reinforcing. Redesigning the Cadet Chain of Responsibility while failing to streamline the degree programs, for example, or introducing the Integrated Officer Development Program without scaling up the number of N/OCdts at the Colleges, will not yield the desired end state and will simply lead the CMCs back into a vicious cycle of reflection and recalibration with few concrete results.

Knowing what recommendations are expected to be implemented at the outset will help the institution and interested stakeholders to adapt and prepare accordingly. To this end, the Board recommends that the Minister of Defence provide a publicly-available written response to this document within 60 days of receipt. This will provide clarity and increase transparency, which in turn will help build the public trust that is essential to national institutions like DND/CAF and the Canadian Military Colleges.

Building and maintaining public trust also requires that DND/CAF not only oversee and monitor the implementation of the Board's recommendations but also to report publicly on progress until such time as the recommendations have been fully addressed.

The Board recognizes that many of its recommendations may profoundly impact the lives and livelihoods of CMC faculty and staff. Implementation must consequently be undertaken in a nuanced, dignified and considerate manner, as human resources are readjusted and financial resources reprioritized.

The Board also recognizes that responsibility for implementing various recommendations will be held by different actors throughout myriad parts of DND/CAF, often outside of the CMCs themselves. Within this context, it would be unfair and impractical to expect the leadership teams at the Military Colleges to run the Colleges while concurrently asking them to navigate the complexities of delivering upon the initiatives that this Report proposes.





As such, the Board recommends that a properly resourced Implementation Team should be established to oversee the development and execution of a sequenced, time-bound and measurable Implementation Plan.

The Team should be co-led by senior representatives of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence, who jointly enjoy sufficient authority, respect and credibility within the institution to effect the requisite changes. The team itself should be made up of both DND and CAF members who hold a mix of skills and expertise relating to civilian human resources, public affairs, CAF recruitment, organizational change management, financial management and infrastructure management, alongside an extensive understanding of the mandates of the Canadian Military Colleges, the Chief of Military Personnel, the Canadian Defence Academy, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment), the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources - Civilian), the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.

The Implementation Team should include the Commandants and Principals of both Military Colleges as Ex-Officio advisory members, and it should be further supported by external experts with particular expertise related to institutional change management in academic settings.

#### **Recommendation #47**

*That the Minister of National Defence provide a publicly available written response to the recommendations contained in this Report within 60 days of its receipt.*

#### **Recommendation #48**

*That the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff establish an Implementation Team to enable the implementation of these recommendations, within the framework of a sequenced, time-bound and measurable Implementation Plan.*

#### **Recommendation #49**

*That the Minister of National Defence provide a publicly available annual report on the progress of implementation until such time as all the recommendations have been addressed.*



# Conclusion

The coming decades will present challenges to Canada unlike any the country has seen before. Successfully navigating these will require a military that is, *inter alia*, cognitively superior, more operationally effective and better equipped than our adversaries. It will also require the public support of Canadians, who will need to trust and believe in the integrity of its leaders, the calibre of its officers and the capabilities of its soldiers, sailors and aviators.

In many regards, this starts with the Canadian Military Colleges, which contribute in countless ways to the success of the Canadian Armed Forces and of Canada. Once reformed and properly financed, the CMCs have the potential to help increase recruitment into the CAF, to produce exceptional officers who can excel in various facets of military and civilian life, and to be a force for positive cultural change within the armed forces and beyond.

By taking a more integrated and streamlined approach to the key elements of its program that have long stood the Colleges in good stead, and by centring the military identity of the CMCs more prominently at their core, the Colleges would be positioned to demonstrate their deep value to Canadians as highly regarded, effective and prestigious institutions with a singularity of purpose that cannot be replicated elsewhere. This is critical in a time of overall reduced government spending; as Canadians take a more active interest in, and recognize the value of, investment in defence and security, the Colleges must be able to draw a clear and cogent line between what happens at the CMCs, its relevance to the CAF and its contribution to broader national interests.

In turn, DND/CAF must invest more in the Military Colleges in terms of time, resources and attention. Comparative analysis highlights the fact that CMC graduates, compared to their peers from other officer entry streams, exhibit higher promotion rates, superior second language proficiency and lower attrition rates. In this and other ways, the Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges is of great value to the CAF, and the people who go through the program deserve to be treated with attention and care. It is shameful that those who have chosen to serve our country have experienced harm in the very places where they have come to join the Profession of Arms, and disappointing that one of

the consequences of this reality is that Canadians may have lost awareness of and pride in these important institutions. N/OCdts deserve better, members of the CAF deserve better, and Canadians deserve better; the CMCs are too important to the success of the country to be allowed to flounder.

In seeking to ameliorate the CMCs, differences in views between male and female N/OCdts regarding their Military College experience cannot be overlooked. This points to a need to keep pressing forward with positive change; for the Military Colleges to fulfill their unique function, they must ensure that all N/OCdts who move through their halls feel seen, safe and supported.



The Board's recommendations aim to preserve the core strengths of the CMCs while addressing their shortcomings. The proposed reforms are designed to enhance the CMCs' contributions to the CAF and to Canada, ensuring that they remain vital components of the nation's defence and security framework. These are not piecemeal proposals; it is the amalgam of these recommendations that is critical to creating systemic change at the Military Colleges and to assuring the CMCs' ongoing success. Failing to implement them risks letting the Colleges slide into costly irrelevance.

The Board is deeply cognizant of the negative impact that the implementation of some of these recommendations may have on people who have dedicated their careers to teaching at and supporting the CMCs, and it wishes to recognize their contributions and commitment. Their dedication and engagement, and the extent to which they care for the Naval and Officer Cadets and for the institution is reflected in the many positive elements of the CMCs, which inevitably get short shrift in a report such as this.

Change is difficult and can often feel painful. But change is also critical to the survival of the CMCs, and it lies at the heart of their ability to adapt and evolve to meet the needs of the CAF and of Canadians. Fortunately, the calibre of the leadership at the CMCs, at all levels, instills great confidence in the ability of the Colleges to support the complex and daunting task of implementing this Report's recommendations and effecting this necessary change.

To return to Madame Arbour's foundational point, that the "entire raison-d'être of the Military Colleges has to rest on the assumption that it is the best way to form and educate tomorrow's military leaders," the CMCRB believes that the CMCs are invaluable institutions. Historically, graduates of Canada's Military Colleges have gone on to earn Victoria Crosses and to become Rhodes Scholars, Olympians, astronauts, Chiefs of the Defence Staff and leaders in both the military and within civilian society. Through targeted reforms to address existing issues and optimize their potential, the CMCs can continue to produce exemplary officers who embody the highest standards of leadership, integrity, and service.

The path to renewed success will not be easy. Long-term, multifaceted effort, organizational agility, courageous leadership, openness to doing things differently, and renewed investment in defence will all be required to meet this moment. So too will public support. Canadians from across the country, including institutional and community leaders, elected officials and members, both past and present, at all levels of the Canadian Armed Forces must rally behind their Military Colleges, demanding excellence, yes, but also celebrating what they stand for, what they contribute and what they can achieve.



# List of Recommendations

## Recommendation #1

Maintain the Canadian Military Colleges as undergraduate degree-granting institutions. Continue to train and educate Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges through an Integrated Model.

## Recommendation #6

Appoint an eminent Canadian to the ceremonial role of Chancellor of the two Canadian Military Colleges. Amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

## Recommendation #2

Revise governance structures, authorities, activities, programs and training to reflect the fact that the Canadian Military Colleges are first and foremost military institutions responsible for training and educating officers as members of the Profession of Arms.

## Recommendation #7

Re-designate the Board of Governors at each Military College as an Advisory Committee that advises and makes recommendations to the Commandant. Update the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

## Recommendation #3

Amend the Ministerial Organizational Orders to change the name of the Royal Military College of Canada to the "Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston", (RMC Kingston) and the name of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) to the "Royal Military College of Canada, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu", (RMC Saint-Jean).

## Recommendation #8

Clarify the parameters of the Senate's authority and stipulate that the responsibility to allocate resources and set priorities in relation to academic programs at the Military Colleges lies with the Commandant. Update the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

## Recommendation #4

Update all branding and marketing materials and all public affairs and communications products to align with the changes proposed under Recommendation #2 and Recommendation #3 and to support a revised recruitment strategy.

## Recommendation #9

Designate the Commandants as the "President and Vice-Chancellor" of their respective Military Colleges, vested with appropriate authorities and responsibilities. Amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

## Recommendation #5

Remove the Minister of National Defence from the position of Chancellor and President of the two Canadian Military Colleges. Amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

## Recommendation #10

Establish the tenure of the Commandant at each Military College for a minimum of four years.



### Recommendation #11

"Deep select" the Commandant for each Military College and use a Developmental Period Four Fellowship Program and/or University President Training Program to expose them to university governance and operations.

### Recommendation #12

Re-designate the Principal at each Military College as the Provost and Vice-President Academic & Research and appoint them, via a Governor-in-Council process, as the most senior academic officer of their respective Colleges, reporting to the Commandant. Amend the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges accordingly.

### Recommendation #13

Establish the tenure of the Director of Cadets for a minimum of three years.

### Recommendation #14

Streamline the academic offerings at the Canadian Military Colleges to offer four undergraduate degrees within the Regular Officer Training Plan: a Bachelor of Arts (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); a Bachelor of Science (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean); and a Bachelor of Engineering (at RMC).

### Recommendation #15

*Establish a minimum 15:1 student-to-faculty ratio at both Canadian Military Colleges within five years.*

### Recommendation #16

Increase the number of Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges to a minimum of 1,850 within five years.

### Recommendation #17

Eliminate the Core Curriculum at the Canadian Military Colleges.

### Recommendation #18

Eliminate the *Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel* program at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and all associated teaching and administrative positions.

### Recommendation #19

Harmonize the academic calendars between the Royal Military College of Canada and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and align them with the reconfigured Military Skills & Leadership strand proposed under in Recommendation #22.

### Recommendation #20

Establish and publish the Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges Program Standard.

### Recommendation #21

Design, develop and implement the Integrated Officer Development Program.

### Recommendation #22

Design, develop, implement and accredit the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

### Recommendation #23

Create new civilian instructor positions at both the Royal Military College of Canada and the Royal Military College Saint-Jean to support the Military Skills & Leadership strand.

### Recommendation #24

Reduce military faculty positions at both Military Colleges and their associated Advanced Training List positions and reallocate those positions to support the Military Skills & Leadership strand.



### **Recommendation #25**

Increase the baseline Salary Wage Envelope allocation to the Canadian Military Colleges to create and fund permanent administrative support staff positions to support the Squadron leadership teams. Allocate one administrative support staff position per Squadron.

### **Recommendation #26**

Design, develop, implement and accredit a revised Second Language Training strand.

### **Recommendation #27**

Offer optional, ongoing second language training to Naval and Officer Cadets who have attained the BBB commissioning requirement.

### **Recommendation #28**

Design, develop, implement and accredit a revised Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand.

### **Recommendation #29**

Eliminate the Physical Performance Test as a mandatory activity at the Canadian Military Colleges.

### **Recommendation #30**

Establish the Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (FORCE) Test as the physical fitness standard for the Regular Officer Training Plan - Canadian Military Colleges.

### **Recommendation #31**

Reduce the Cadet Chain of Responsibility at both Canadian Military Colleges to three types of positions: Cadet Squadron Leaders, Cadet Flight Leaders and Cadet Section Leaders.

### **Recommendation #32**

Establish as a commissioning requirement that all Third Year Naval and Officer Cadets complete a session as a Cadet Section Leader.

### **Recommendation #33**

Establish and incentivize optional leadership opportunities for Fourth Year Naval and Officer Cadets to fill Cadet Flight Leader and Cadet Squadron Leader positions.

### **Recommendation #34**

Eliminate the Cadet Wing HQ and Division positions at the Royal Military College of Canada. Retain positions such as administrative roles and team captains but remove them from the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and eliminate their use as a graduation requirement.

### **Recommendation #35**

Design, develop and implement the Advanced Leader Development Program to better prepare the Training Wing staff to support the Cadet Chain of Responsibility and to incentivize postings to the Canadian Military Colleges for Captains and Warrant Officers.

### **Recommendation #36**

Reduce Military Faculty positions and their associated Advanced Training List positions and reallocate those positions to the Advanced Leadership Development Program to support the leadership development of the Naval and Officer Cadets and provide greater mentorship to the Cadet Chain of Responsibility.

### **Recommendation #37**

Ensure that the Military Skills & Leadership strand equips Naval and Officer Cadets to be successful as Cadet Section Leaders.

### **Recommendation #38**

Remove from the Cadet Chain of Responsibility all authority – and all appearance of authority – to impose corrective measures or loss of privileges, in order to ensure that no Naval and Officer Cadet has disciplinary authority, real or perceived, over another Naval and Officer Cadet.

#### **Recommendation #39**

Amend the policy framework at the Canadian Military Colleges to address gaps identified by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) in its Advisory on Sexual Violence Prevention at Canadian Military Colleges.

#### **Recommendation #40**

Mandate experts in the field of sexual misconduct prevention and response to assess the effectiveness and impact of the policies and procedures of the Canadian Military Colleges.

#### **Recommendation #41**

Assign release authority for Naval and Officer Cadets at the Canadian Military Colleges to the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy for the following release items:

- 5d - Not advantageously employable – conduct deficiency
- 5f - Unsuitable for further service – conduct deficiency

#### **Recommendation #42**

Establish a Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centre at each Military College, staffed by professionals with a wide range of relevant expertise and sufficiently resourced to deliver on its mandate to provide prevention and response support to the Canadian Military Colleges seven days a week.

#### **Recommendation #43**

Increase the percentage of female Naval and Officer Cadets at the CMCs to 33% by 2035.

#### **Recommendation #44**

Establish a dedicated funding framework for major capital projects, minor construction, and maintenance and repair to support training and education establishments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Canadian Military Colleges.

#### **Recommendation #45**

Increase baseline funding for major capital projects, minor construction, and maintenance and repair at the Canadian Military Colleges.

#### **Recommendation #46**

Establish a dedicated facilities management contract at the Royal Military College of Canada, similar to that which exists at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean.

#### **Recommendation #47**

That the Minister of National Defence provide a publicly available written response to the recommendations contained in this Report within 60 days of its receipt.

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That the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff establish an Implementation Team to enable the implementation of these recommendations, within the framework of a sequenced, time-bound and measurable Implementation Plan.

#### **Recommendation #49**

That the Minister of National Defence provide a publicly available annual report on the progress of implementation until such time as all the recommendations have been addressed.

The background of the page is decorated with an abstract geometric pattern. It consists of numerous triangles of various sizes, some pointing upwards and some downwards. The triangles are colored in three main shades: a dark teal, a light sky blue, and a light grey. These triangles are arranged in a way that creates a sense of depth and movement, with some appearing to overlap others. The overall effect is a modern, minimalist design.

# **Annexes**



# Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

## Background

Reference: Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review 20 May 2022

1. On 29 April 2021, the Minister of National Defence (MND) announced the launch of an Independent External Comprehensive Review (IECR) of current policies, procedures, programs, practices, and culture within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Department of National Defence (DND). In May 2021, DND/CAF engaged former Supreme Court Justice, The Honourable Louise Arbour, to undertake the review. The aims of this review were to: shed light on the causes for the continued presence of harassment and sexual misconduct despite efforts to eradicate it; identify barriers to reporting inappropriate behaviour; assess the adequacy of the response when reports are made; and make recommendations on preventing and eradicating harassment and sexual misconduct.
2. The Report of the IECR (the “Report”) included the views and workplace experiences of current and former DND employees, CAF members, and defence contractors. The IECR team conducted a review of the recruitment, training, performance evaluation, posting, and promotion systems in the CAF, as well as the military justice system’s policies, procedures, and practices to respond to allegations of harassment and sexual misconduct. It also considered all relevant independent reviews concerning DND/CAF, along with their findings and recommendations.
3. The Report was produced on 20 May 2022, and on 30 May MND welcomed the Report. In her 13 December 2022 report to Parliament, MND directed DND/CAF officials to move forward on implementing all of the 48 recommendations as described within the Report.
4. The Report identified serious deficiencies and systemic issues with the experience of naval/officer cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), in Kingston and Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean), known collectively as the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs), and documented persistent concerns with sexual harassment, discrimination, and misconduct. The Report concluded that the CMCs “appear as institutions from a different era, with an outdated and problematic leadership model”. In particular, the Report viewed the CMC Cadet Wing structure as antiquated and counter-productive and recommended that it should be eliminated. Further, the Report identified systemic deficiencies and harmful cultural issues at the colleges and concluded by questioning the purpose, outcomes, and methods for, and with which, the CMCs currently operate.
5. These findings led to two recommendations specifically focused upon the CMCs, as follows:
  - a. Recommendation 28. The Cadet Wing responsibility and authority command structure should be eliminated; and
  - b. Recommendation 29. This recommendation consists of two parts, as follows:
    - i. Part 1. A combination of Defence Team members and external experts, led by an external education specialist, should conduct a detailed review of the benefits, disadvantages, and costs, both for the CAF and more broadly (i.e. the nation), of continuing to educate Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP); cadets at the CMCs. The review should focus on the quality of education, socialization and military training in that environment. It should also consider and assess the different models for delivering university-level and military leadership training to officer cadets, and determine whether RMC and RMC Saint-Jean should continue as undergraduate degree-granting institutions, or whether officer candidates should be required to attend civilian university undergraduate programs through the ROTP;
    - ii. Part 2. In the interim, the Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture (CPC) should engage with RMC and RMC Saint-Jean authorities to address the long-standing culture concerns unique to the military college environment, including the continuing misogynistic and discriminatory environment and the ongoing inci-



dence of sexual misconduct. Progress should be measured by metrics other than the number of hours of training given to cadets. The Exit Survey of graduating cadets should be adapted to capture cadets' experiences with sexual misconduct or discrimination.

- c. Recommendation 28 is directly related to both parts of Recommendation 29 and, as such, has been subsumed into the work to address the latter.

## **Mandate**

- 6. As per Part 1 of Recommendation 29 of the Report, the conduct of a review of the CMCs will be conducted by a blended DND/CAF and external review board as directed by MND. Part 2 is being led by the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) and supported by CPCC, Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), and the CMCs. These terms of reference apply to Part 1 of Recommendation 29 and will address Recommendation 28 as well.

## **Convening Authority**

- 7. The Deputy Minister of National Defence (DM) and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) will jointly convene the CMCs Review Board to address Recommendation 28 and Part 1 of Recommendation 29 of the IECR; they will be hereafter referred to as the "Convening Authority".

## **Scope of the Board**

- 8. The Convening Authority mandates the CMCs Review Board (hereafter referred to as the "Board"):
  - a. to review the costs, benefits, disadvantages, and advantages, both to the CAF and the nation, of continuing to educate ROTP naval/officer cadets at the CMCs;
  - b. to assess the comparative quality of education, socialization (including inculcation of Canadian values and expectations), and military leadership training in the CMCs environments;
  - c. to assess the potential of different models for delivering university-level education and military leadership training to naval/officer cadets;
  - d. to recommend whether RMC and RMC Saint-Jean should continue in their current or an altered capacity as undergraduate degree-granting insti-

tutions, or whether all ROTP naval/officer cadets should instead be required to attend civilian university for their undergraduate education;

- e. if it is recommended that the CMCs should continue as undergraduate degree-granting institutions, the Board will examine:
  - i. the model of early leadership development that draws upon the current Cadet Wing structure and recommend whether it should be eliminated or modified; and
  - ii. any other changes required to improve the conduct of the CMCs ROTP model, such as ensuring that ethics courses are taught by independent specialists;
- f. if it is recommended that all ROTP naval/officer cadets attend civilian university undergraduate programs, the Board will assess:
  - i. the feasibility of integrating: military leadership; physical fitness and sports; and bilingualism into naval/officer cadet development by means of a modified military college model;
  - ii. how to transition to a modified military college model, ensuring the academic completion for those cadets still in the CMCs system; and
  - iii. the implications for other programs at the CMCs, such as: undergraduate education to other members of the Defence Team, and the public; graduate studies (to include those offered through the Canadian Forces College), other related programs; and defence research.

## **Responsibilities of the Board**

- 9. The Board will submit a final report to the Convening Authority to include specific recommendations on the following:
  - a. the recommended model for university-level education and military leadership training to naval/officer cadets;
  - b. whether RMC and RMC Saint-Jean should continue as undergraduate degree-granting institutions. If it is recommended that they should continue as such, the Board will make recommendations as to:

- i. whether the Cadet Wing structure should be eliminated or modified;
  - ii. any changes required to improve the conduct of ROTP at the CMCs; and
  - iii. any additional courses and curriculum changes that are warranted;
- c. whether ROTP naval/officer candidates should be required to attend university undergraduate programs solely through the ROTP Civilian University model. If this course of action is proposed, the Board will make recommendations on the feasibility of the CAF adopting a modified military college model; and
- d. if significant change is recommended, an outline plan for:
- i. the transition to a modified military college model and the completion of under-graduate education by currently enrolled cadets; and
  - ii. the delivery of other functions in support of the Defence Team currently provided by the CMCs.
10. The Board will employ an evidence-based approach in executing their mandate. They will consult broadly with subject-matter experts across a range of domains, both in Canada and abroad, and with both current and former members of the Defence Team with lived experiences at the CMCs. All information received by the Board will be duly considered, and all recommendations will be based upon a documented, transparent process of analysis, derived from evidence and research. All information gathered, submitted, or considered will be appropriately catalogued and archived.

### **Board Composition**

11. As stated in the Report, Recommendation 29 Part 1 is clear in that this review will be led by an external education specialist, and that it be composed of a combination of external and Defence Team members. An effective review will require different perspectives, competencies, and qualifications. Therefore, the CMCs Review Board will be comprised of the following:
- a. Chairperson: an independent external-to-DND education specialist.

### **b. Members:**

- i. Four external civilian members; and
- ii. Two Defence Team members, with at least one General/Flag Officer or Captain(Navy)/Colonel, and one executive level DND public service employee.

12. The Board will have access to specialist advice and be supported by a team for its administrative needs.

### **Methodology and Approach**

13. The following guidance is provided to the Board:

- a. the Board's recommendations will apply to both CMCs, noting and addressing circumstances unique to either RMC or RMC Saint-Jean;
- b. the Board will examine the conduct of naval/officer cadet education and military leadership training from a sample of allied nations for models from which best practices would be adaptable, feasible, and advisable to the Canadian context; and
- c. the Board's work plan will include a review of previous studies into the operation of the CMCs including, but not limited to, the following:
  - i. Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges (May 1993);
  - ii. Report of the RMC Board of Governor's Study Group – Review of the Undergraduate Programme at RMC (Withers Report, 24 September 1998);
  - iii. Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV) – Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada (10 March 2017);
  - iv. 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Parliament of Canada, Report 6 – Royal Military College of Canada – National Defence (OAG Report 6 – RMC);
  - v. A Qualitative Study on the Career Progression of General Officer / Flag Officers in the CAF, Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Letter (July 2018);

- vi. Distribution of Scientific Brief: Highlights of Studies Comparing Officers From Various Entry Plans, Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (23 November 2018); and
- vii. The RMC Response to Report 6, RMC, of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada (10 July 2019).

## **Deliverables**

- 14. The Chairperson shall ensure the production of the following deliverables:
  - 1. Written work plan and verbal briefings to Convening Authority
  - 2. Progress Reports to the Convening Authority
  - 3. Draft Report to the Convening Authority
  - 4. Final Report to the Convening Authority

## **Language Requirements**

- 15. The Board shall conduct all meetings and interviews in English and/or French as required by the person being interviewed. When required, document translation, including of any deliverables, will be facilitated by the support organization.

## **Support to the Review Board**

- 16. DND has overall responsibility for funding and support to the Board. As a minimum, the support staff will include a Director/Chief of Staff (COS), with public affairs-/communications, legal, linguistic, intersectional analyst, and administrative (clerical, travel, etc.) support).
- 17. The support staff will provide a liaison function between the Board and DND/CAF organizations and external expertise. The support staff will facilitate timely access to DND/CAF documents, employees/members, and, to the degree possible, external experts, stakeholders, and foreign military organizations. The support staff will also coordinate any briefings to be provided by the Defence Team to the Board and facilitate access to other relevant source material or people.
- 18. The Board will be provided with access to relevant records under the control of the DND, or the CAF, through the support staff. All access to relevant records will be provided subject to applicable exemptions, or those ordinarily applied under the Access to

Information Act and Privacy Act, with the support staff consulting with the Director of Access to Information and Privacy if required.

## **Confidentiality and Disclosure**

- 19. The meetings of the Board, as well as information gleaned throughout the interview and report-writing process, and the contents of the Draft Review Report and Final Review Report (until published), are confidential. In addition, the Board will conduct the review with discretion and confidentiality.

## **Conflict of Interest**

- 20. The actual and perceived impartiality of the Board, and the support staff, is of utmost importance in order to ensure the credibility of the report and its corresponding recommendations, and their utility for the evolution of the CMCs and, in turn, the CAF. Before empanelment, all board members will be required to disclose any real, apparent, or potential conflicts of interest. Board members will be briefed after empanelment on mitigating any apparent or potential conflicts of interest. Should an issue arise wherein a Board member has a conflict that cannot be mitigated, the Convening Authority may remove the individual from the Board.
- 21. To reduce potential undue influence, the support staff will be geographically separated from either Kingston or Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

# Annex 2 – Composition of the Board

## **Chairperson – Dr. Kathy Hogarth**

Dr. Kathy Hogarth holds a PhD in Social Work from Wilfrid Laurier University. She has more than 20 years' experience as an adult-education specialist at York University, King's University College, the University of Waterloo - Renison University College and Wilfrid Laurier University, specifically in the roles of professor, special advisor on anti-racism and inclusivity, and dean. Dr. Hogarth currently is an Associate Vice President, Global Strategy at Wilfrid Laurier University. She is a published book author and published in numerous academic journals in the areas of social work, psychology, anti-racism, diversity and inclusion, and has spoken widely at national and international conferences on the topics of race and race representation, decolonization, and the lived experiences of racialized peoples. She has consulted with several organizations and institutions through their organizational change management processes and has served on numerous Boards nationally and internationally.

## **Young Adult Socialization Expert – Dr. Chantal Beauvais**

Dr. Chantal Beauvais has 20 years' experience in university management, most recently as Rector at the University of Saint-Paul where she was responsible for implementing the strategic vision of the university, including transformative change in its day-to-day operations. As a professor of philosophy, she relaunched the faculty and department by creating new programs in philosophy and ethics. She has experience in university governance, including as past Chair of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean Board of Governors and is involved in public sector associations and committees focused on social integration and the accessibility of higher education to marginalized people. She sits on several boards of directors, including the Gîte-Ami in Gatineau, a community organization that works with people experiencing homelessness.

## **Culture Evolution Expert – Mr. Michael Goldbloom**

Mr. Michael Goldbloom, C.M. served as Principal and Vice-Chancellor of Bishop's University from August 2008 to July 2023. Prior to that he was Vice-Principal Public Affairs at McGill University. He began his professional career as a labour lawyer and was subsequently President of the YMCA de Montréal. Mr. Goldbloom has extensive experience in Canada's news industry, initially as a journalist and editorial writer, and subsequently as the publisher of *The Gazette* in Montreal and of the *Toronto Star*. In 2013 he received the Order of Canada in recognition of his work in building bridges between Montreal's English- and French-speaking communities. He is experienced in institutional leadership, strategic planning, labour relations, governance, government relations, equity, diversity and inclusion initiatives, finance and risk management. Mr. Goldbloom has served as Chair of the Board of Directors of CBC/Radio-Canada since 2018.

## **Executive Expert – Dr. Renée Légaré**

Dr. Renée Légaré is a human resources executive with more than 25 years of experience in various industries, including healthcare, security, transportation and education. Her background is in talent development and management, behaviour and change management practices, and organizational development and design. As the Executive Vice-President and Chief Human Resources Officer at The Ottawa Hospital, Dr. Légaré built a responsive and agile human resources department responsible for 12,000 employees, and oversaw the performance and engagement of more than 15,500 staff working at more than 19 locations. Her specialty is performance management and culture change, specifically as it relates to health and safety, retention, reward and recognition and staff morale. Dr. Légaré now serves as an Executive-in-Residence and the Director of the Master of Health Administration Program at the University of Ottawa's Telfer School of Management.

### **Academic Expert – Dr. Martin Maltais**

Dr. Martin Maltais holds a Doctorate in Educational Administration and Evaluation from Université Laval in Québec City. Prior to joining the CMCRB, he was a professor of financing and education policies at the Lévis campus of the Université du Québec à Rimouski (UQAR). Author of several reports and research projects, he has experience in the development of higher education, research and digital policies. Dr. Maltais was a member of the Council of Directors and served on the executive committee of UQAR. He holds other membership roles at various Canadian university governing bodies and is a visiting research fellow at international universities in Europe and the United States.

### **DND Public Service Executive – Ms Suneeta Millington**

Ms Suneeta Millington studied Humanities at the University of Calgary before obtaining her Juris Doctor from the University of Western Ontario. She joined the Canadian Foreign Service in 2006 and was called to the Bar of the Law Society of Ontario as a Barrister and Solicitor in 2007. With expertise in international law, multilateral diplomacy, strategy development and governance, Ms Millington has held a variety of increasingly senior diplomatic, legal and policy positions in Canada and abroad, including at the United Nations in New York and Geneva (Global Affairs Canada); within the Office of the Judge Advocate General and the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (Canadian Armed Forces); in the International Security Policy Bureau (Department of National Defence) and, most recently, within the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Privy Council Office.

### **Military Representative – Brigadier-General Kyle Solomon**

Brigadier-General Kyle Solomon is an Army Engineer and a registered Professional Engineer who graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston in 1997 with a degree in Chemical and Materials Engineering. He has command experience at the Troop, Squadron, Unit and Formation levels and broad staff experience across DND/CAF. He has deployed internationally to Kosovo and Afghanistan and also holds experience in domestic operations. A graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Brigadier-General Solomon holds a Master's Degree in Environmental Engineering, a Master's Degree in Military Arts and Science, and a Master of Business Administration. Prior to his secondment to the CMCRB, he was the Commandant of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College.



# Annex 3 – Six Types of Organizational Models

A range of models exist to deliver the training and education necessary to generate a professional officer corps required by the CAF and the nation.

Inspired by the various models for military officer training and education offered by the partners and allies the Board studied, the CMCRB developed six representative models, each of which takes a different approach to balancing and delivering military training and academic education in terms of sequencing and organizational structure.

Ranging from an “Integrated Model,” in which academic study and military training are undertaken concurrently and delivered by the same institution, to a “Military Academy Model” wherein no academics are even offered, each of these models presents unique challenges and opportunities and offers a variety of benefits and drawbacks. To determine which was best suited to Canada, the Board scored them against ten criteria, as detailed in Annex 5.

## **Model #1: The Integrated Model**

The Big Idea: The CMCs have provided a solid foundation for the officer corps in Canada, but changes are necessary to improve the current model and better align the CMCs with expectations of the CAF and Canadian society.

Inspiration: Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea, Republic of South Africa and United States.

Description: Training and education are delivered via an integrated program designed around an undergraduate academic education, second language acquisition, military and leadership training, and fitness, health and wellbeing development. The program is delivered at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean, which exist as provincially accredited, federally funded institutions of higher learning that serve the Canadian Armed Forces.

Key reforms are required to the *status quo* in relation to identity and governance, cost and program structure, peer leadership and the Naval and Officer Cadet experience. These include: renewed focus on the military identity of

the CMCs, streamlined and better defined governance structures, an increase in the number of N/OCdts, a reduction in the number of academic staff, the elimination of the CÉGEP program at RMC Saint-Jean, the restructuring of the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, greater focus on language training, a re-conceptualization of “fitness”, new approaches to addressing misconduct prevention and response, an ameliorated approach to infrastructure, operations and support, and more dedicated financial resources.

## **Model #2: The Integrated Efficiency Model**

The Big Idea: Critics of the CMCs argue that they are more expensive than sending candidates to civilian universities. This model seeks to reduce the cost associated with the CMC program.

Inspiration: The 2017 Auditor General of Canada Report

Description: The Integrated Efficiency Model seeks to reduce the costs of training and educating officers via the ROTP CMC to a cost comparable to the ROTP Civ U stream, by reducing the number of academic programs offered and increasing the number of N/OCdts who attend the CMCs.

Activities that do not directly result in officer training and university-level education are eliminated, such as the ILOY program, the Non-Commissioned Member Executive Professional Development Programme (NEPDP), Army Technical Warrant Officer (ATWO)/Army Technical Staff Officer (ATSO), the cyber program, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) training. To ensure the adequacy of facilities, the Deputy Minister of National Defence should create a fenced financial account dedicated to infrastructure maintenance and development at the CMCs. The concept of two campuses should be re-evaluated. Key reforms to the status quo in relation to identity and governance, cost and program structure, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, and the cadet experience are still required, as per Model #1, with additional cost reduction items.

### **Model #3: The Sequence of Training Model**

The Big Idea: The blending of academic and military training is problematic. Separating the time dedicated to the delivery of military training from the time allocated to academic study will provide clarity of purpose for the CMCs and allow the N/OCdts to focus on one major activity at a time.

Inspiration: Germany.

Description: Training and education are delivered by the same institution and remain focused on academic study, second language acquisition, military and leadership training, and fitness, health and wellbeing development. The program is delivered at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean, which exist as provincially accredited, federally funded institutions of higher learning. However, the military skills and leadership training, second language training, and fitness, health and wellbeing programs take place separately from the academic education, occurring at a different time entirely.

The fall and winter academic terms should focus on academics, second language training, and health and fitness activities. All military training activities take place during the summer semesters, when CAF training objectives take precedence over academics.

Additional reforms in relation to identity and governance, cost and program structure, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, and the cadet experience are still required.

### **Model #4: The Education as a Service Model**

The Big Idea: The overlap between the military, the public service, and the academic worlds has caused irreconcilable frictions at the CMCs between the academic staff, the public service, and the military. Contracting out the provision of academic services will allow academics and military leadership to both do what they do best: academics teach and research, and the military trains officers.

Inspiration: Australia, The Canadian Coast Guard College.

Description: Training and education are delivered by the same institution and remain focused on academic study, second language acquisition, military and leadership training, and fitness, health and wellbeing development. The military, fitness and language programs are delivered by the CMCs, and the academic program is delivered by a third party under contract. RMC and RMC

Saint-Jean exist as military academies. The CAF pays only for academic programs that they determine are required for their officer corps. All academic accreditation and governance are provided via the service provider.

Key reforms to the status quo in relation to identity and governance, cost and program structure, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, and the cadet experience are still required, as per Model #1.

### **Model #5: The Separate Military College and Defence University Model**

The Big Idea: The overlap between the military, the public service, and the academic worlds has caused irreconcilable frictions at the CMCs between the academic staff, the public service, and the military. Separating the military training and academic education components of the CMCs into two entities will clearly delineate responsibilities and accountabilities that can be measured and funded according to the priorities of the CAF.

Inspiration: Sweden

Description: The military, fitness, and language program are delivered by the CMCs, and the academic program is delivered by a separate Defence University that exists as a provincially accredited, federally funded university.

To ensure the autonomy necessary for a Canadian university, the Canadian Defence University (CDU) is established as a crown corporation. As such the CDU is wholly owned by the federal government but is structured like an independent university. The CMCs are Military Academies operated by the CAF. The Commandants work with the President of the Canadian Defence University to deliver the academic degree requirements for the CAF.

Additional reforms in relation to identity and governance, cost and program structure, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility, and the cadet experience are still required.

### **Model #6: The Military Academy Model**

The Big Idea: Civilian universities can provide a better education at a cheaper cost than the CMCs. All CAF officers will be required to attend civilian universities, and the CAF will operate a military academy (or academies) that provide only military training. The CMCs, in their current forms, will be closed.

Inspiration: United Kingdom, New Zealand.

Description: The Regular Officer Training Plan - Civilian University is expanded. All CAF officers attend a military training program that is delivered via a joint military academy for initial training (basic training currently takes place at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit school) and via service academies for service-specific training. Education is received from civilian universities, either independent from the CAF (for DEOs) or via a CAF-subsidized education program. Second language training is provided to CAF members using the existing second language training and education program.

All university education programs and research activities at the CMCs are eliminated, along with associated academic and support staff positions. The CAF must determine the preferred organization and construct to deliver military training. The CAF should also establish a mechanism to accredit or provide the academic component of the Joint Command and Staff Program and National Security Program, via a contract with an existing Canadian university.

# Annex 4 – Cost Analysis

The method used to identify comparable universities is the 6-dimensional Euclidean Distance Method. The dimensions in question are the total number of full time equivalent students (FTES) and professors (3 ranks) for each of the major fields (Health, Pure and Applied Sciences, and Social Sciences and Humanities).

Information regarding these civilian universities was drawn from Statistics Canada, as well as from the following sources:

- Financial Information of Universities and Colleges produced by the Canadian Association of University Business Officers (FIUC-CAUBO);
- Postsecondary Student Information System (PSIS);
- University and College Academic Staff System (UCASS).

The following should also be noted:

- Full-time equivalent students (FTES) are calculated based on the number of students according to the study program. A full-time equivalent student represents 1 FTES while a part-time student represents 1/3.5 FTES.
- Students at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean include college (CÉGEP) students.
- Professors at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean include two types of professors: University Teachers (UTs), who are similar in status to civilian university professors, and Education Specialists (EDSs) who are similar in status to college (CÉGEP) teachers. Military faculty members are also included.

It is important to recall that the Royal Military College Saint-Jean is not recognized as a college (CÉGEP)-level establishment by the Ministry of Higher Education in Quebec and does not have the power to grant a college diploma, making it difficult to compare RMC Saint-Jean costs with those of civilian universities.

The expenses at civilian university establishments included in this analysis are those paid out of the operating fund. Expenditures from other funds were excluded.

Information for the CMCs was drawn from the Defence Resources Management Information System, the Human Resource Management System and the Cost Factors Manual. CMC costs were adjusted to remove expenditures attributed to second language training, military training, and fitness activities, all of which are unique to the ROTP and are not replicated at civilian universities. Financial information for RMC Saint-Jean was further adjusted to remove costs that are attributable to the Osside Institute (which is located on its campus but is not part of the College).

# Annex 5 – Scoring Process for the Organizational Models

Drawing from its respective areas of expertise, the Board identified ten factors that play a significant role in determining the health, quality, viability, credibility and relevance of the CMCs. It then used these factors as the lens through which to assess which of the six models outlined in Annex 3 would best serve Canada in the current domestic and geopolitical context, using a five-point scale that ranged from 1 (Not At All) to 3 (Moderately) to 5 (Very Much):

**1. Identity:** Does the model support a clear identity for the CMCs as a military institution?

**2. Governance:** Does the model promote clarity and create clear lines of responsibility, authority and accountability at the CMCs?

**3. Cost:** Does the model promote a more efficient cost per N/OCdt?

**4. Culture:** Does the model facilitate, support or promote the desired culture to which the CAF aspires?

**5. Military Training:** Does the model support the development and delivery of effective military skills and leadership training to meet CAF requirements, including the development of the right character and competencies?

**6. Academics:** Does the model support the development and delivery of an appropriate academic program that meets national standards and effectively supports officer development?

**7. Bilingualism:** Does the model support the delivery of second language training and facilitate the N/OCdts' ability to achieve requisite second language qualifications?

**8. Health, Fitness & Wellbeing:** Does the model support the development and delivery of health, fitness and wellbeing programs in support of healthy lifestyles?

**9. Recruitment:** Does the model support and promote the recruitment of officers into the CAF?

**10. Diversity and Inclusion:** Does the model support CAF diversity and inclusion objectives?

This exercise produced a consolidated assessment (Figure 13). The Board then further reflected on whether, broadly speaking, a new model would improve the *status quo*, and/or introduce other consequences. Based on the results of the scoring and on this reflection process, the Board concluded that Model 1 represents the best model for Canada.

Assessed Categories	Integrated Model	Efficiency Model	Sequence of Training Model	Education as a Service Model	Separate Military Colleges and Defence University Model	Military Academy Model
Identity	4.0	3.7	3.4	4.0	4.0	4.9
Govenance	3.9	4.0	3.3	3.9	3.3	4.9
Cost	3.4	3.9	2.3	1.9	2.3	3.3
Culture	4.1	3.4	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.9
Military Training	4.7	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.9
Bilingualism	4.3	3.6	3.4	2.3	2.3	1.1
Health and Fitness	4.6	3.7	3.4	2.7	2.6	3.4
Academics	4.6	3.9	3.6	3.9	3.9	2.7
Recruiting	4.3	3.6	3.1	3.4	3.1	3.6
Diversity and Inclusion	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>31.2</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>35.2</b>

Total scores for each model out of 50.

Figure 13 - Comparison Matrix Collective Assessment Results



# Annex 6 – Boards of Governors Comparison Charts

## Comparative Roles

Canadian Universities	Canadian Military Colleges
Boards of Governors (BoG) at civilian universities govern and manage the affairs of the University, including oversight of the governance, conduct, management and control of the University and its property, revenues, expenditures, business and related affairs. Overall, they ensure sound governance and stewardship of the University.	The role of the Boards of Governors (BoG) at the CMCs are partially similar to those of civilian universities. Even though the BoG do not govern and manage the affairs of the CMCs, they provide strategic oversight and ensure sound governance.

## Comparative Responsibilities

Area of Responsibility	Canadian Universities	Canadian Military Colleges	Assessment
Governance	Promote a culture of accountability; ensure effective management; approve Board governance policies; and manage succession planning.	Bicameral system. The BoG manages its succession plan and procedures through the Governance and Nominating Committee. The Commandant provides a report to the Board at each meeting, allowing members to ask questions and exercise oversight.	Similar
Strategy	Ensure that a robust strategic planning process is in place; provide input, review and approve the University's strategic plan; contribute to the development of the mission, vision and values of the university; review and approve the University's annual operating and capital plans and budgets.	The Terms of Reference provide direction on this function (i.e. "assist in the development of the strategic direction, and review and advise on the business and long-range development plans"). Even though the BoG has not been traditionally involved in development plans, it has made recommendations on the process. A BoG member is also part of the development of the Strategic Research Plan.	Partially Similar
Finances	Ensure that financial results are reported fairly and with accepted accounting principles; ensure adequate resources and financial solvency; review operating performance relative to budgets and objectives.	The BoG has no fiduciary responsibilities. Funding in the CAF is under the authority of the DM, and funding allocations are managed by the chain of command (CMP/CDA).	Not Similar

Area of Responsibility	Canadian Universities	Canadian Military Colleges	Assessment
Reporting, Monitoring & Internal Controls	Ensure that the University reports on performance against the objectives set out in its strategic and operational plans; monitor performance against the objectives; ensure appropriate internal and external audit and control systems and receive regular status updates.	The Commandant reports to the Board at each meeting on key activities. Performance objectives are seldom discussed. The BoG does not have visibility on audit or control systems.	Partially Similar
Risk Management	Understand the University's key risks; ensure that there is a process to identify, monitor, and mitigate/manage risks; receive regular risk assessments and reports.	The BoG has no extant responsibilities related to risks. The Strategy Committee has recently raised an interest in cybersecurity and network risks.	Not Similar
Human Resources	Appoint and support the President; provide advice to the President and monitor their performance; review HR strategies and plans for appointment of senior management.	The MND is the President, and the role is executed by the Commandant. The BOG is not involved in their appointment or performance. However, the BoG Chair is part of the selection committee for the Principal.	Not Similar
Code of Conduct & Ethics	Approve and act as a guardian of the University's values; promote a culture of integrity through its own actions and interactions with senior executives and external parties.	Members of the BoG are either CAF members, public servants or civilians under contracts, who all must adhere to a Code of Ethics.	Similar
Communications	The President is the spokesperson for the University, and the Chair of the Board is the spokesperson for the Board. The Chair will seek guidance from the Board and consult with the President to determine items to be released publicly.	The same is true of the BoG at the CMCs. For external communications, the chain of command and ADM (PA) hold the authority regarding release of public-facing communications.	Partially Similar
Signing Authorities	Appoint committees it considers necessary to carry out the Board's functions, and to confer on the committees the power and authority to act for the Board; and to enter into agreements on behalf of the University.	The BoG has the authority to appoint committees and confer powers as stated in the ToR. The BoG is not authorized to enter into any agreements.	Partially Similar

# Annex 7 – Proposed Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP) Framework

Year 1	Spring/Summer (2 Months)	Fall (4 Months)	Winter (4 Months)
Entry Stream	July – August	September – December	January - April
High School Graduates going into First Year of CMC in Ontario or Quebec	<b>Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) 1 Course</b> <b>FORCE Test</b> <b>Initial Language Assessment</b> <i>+ Varsity Try-Outs during last two weeks</i> <b>No Academic Credit</b>	<b>Academic Term</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Includes Orientation Program (1 Week)</li> <li>Arts/Science : 4 Courses</li> <li>Engineering : 5 Courses                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <b>Arts/Science: 4 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b> <b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b>	<b>Academic Term</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arts/Science : 4 Courses</li> <li>Engineering : 5 Courses                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <b>Arts/Science: 4 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b> <b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b>
CEGEP Students who have completed one year of CEGEP and are going into First Year of CMC in Ontario or Quebec	<b>BMOQ 1 Course</b> <b>FORCE Test</b> <b>Initial Language Assessment</b> <i>+ Varsity Try-Outs during last two weeks</i> <b>No Academic Credit</b>	<b>Academic Term</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Includes Orientation Program (1Week)</li> <li>Arts/Science : 4 Courses</li> <li>Engineering : 5 Courses                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <b>Arts/Science: 4 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b> <b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b>	<b>Academic Term</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arts/Science : 4 Courses</li> <li>Engineering : 5 Courses                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <b>Arts/Science: 4 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b> <b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1 Credit LT/FHW</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The First Year Orientation Program is eliminated at the CMCs. The CMCs will run a one-week Orientation Program that is aligned with how civilian universities welcome their new students.</li> <li>The obstacle course is completed in Second Year as a part of Military Skills &amp; Leadership - Foundations</li> </ul>			

Year 2	Spring/Summer (4 Months)	Fall (4 Months)		Winter (4 Months)
	May – August	September – December		January - April
All Students + N/OCdts Merge Into A Single Cohort At This Point	<p><b>BMOQ 2 Course (7 Weeks)</b></p> <p><b>Language intensive (3 Weeks)</b> + <i>Varsity Try-Outs during last two weeks</i></p> <p><b>Orientation (1 Week)</b> For CEGEP Grads beginning the CMC Program</p> <p><b>1 Credit</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ 1 Credit for BMOQ1&amp;2</li> <li>◦ No Credit for Language Intensive (RMCSJ)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP) Launch</b></p> <p>The IODP will begin with the four-week Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL) - Foundations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Theoretical Foundations</li> <li>◦ Practical Applications</li> <li>◦ Experiential Learning (2-Day Trip, Obstacle Course)</li> <li>◦ Builds on BMOQ1&amp;2</li> <li>◦ Military-led with Civilian Expert Support</li> </ul> <p><b>1 Credit</b></p>	<p><b>Academic Term Compressed)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arts/Science : 3 Courses</li> <li>• Engineering : 4 Courses</li> <li>◦ Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>◦ Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> <li>◦ Plus Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL)</li> </ul> <p><b>Arts/Science: 3 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p> <p><b>Engineering: 4 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p>	<p><b>Academic Term</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arts/Science : 4 Course</li> <li>• Engineering : 5 Courses</li> <li>◦ Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>◦ Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> <li>◦ Plus Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL)</li> </ul> <p><b>Arts/Science: 4 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p> <p><b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p>

- The Military Skills & Leadership strand is run by the Military Wing and delivered by a mix of military and civilian staff.
- The Fall Term in Second Year has two components: the month-long MSL - Foundations training and a compressed 3-month academic term with reduced course load.

Year 3	Spring/Summer (4 Months)		Fall (4 Months)	Winter (4 Months)
	May – August		September – December	January - April
	<p><b>Communications Intensive (10 Weeks)</b></p> <p>Focus on Language Acquisition (in 2<sup>nd</sup> Language Environment where possible). Followed by focus on experiential learning (including exposure to Service/ Occupation Training).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unilingual: Enriched Second Official Language Education and Training (SOLET)</li> <li>• Bilingual Navy/Air Force: Military Training/ On-the-Job-Employment (OJE)</li> <li>• Bilingual Army: BMOQ(Army)</li> <li>• Bilingual All: Summer School</li> </ul> <p><b>1 Credit</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1 Credit for Enriched SOLET</li> <li>- 1 Credit for Military Training/OJE</li> <li>- 1 Credit for BMOQ(A)</li> <li>- Credit for Summer Courses</li> </ul>	<p><b>Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL) – Consolidation (2 Weeks)</b></p> <p>As part of the MSL – Consolidation, the last two weeks of the Spring/Summer Term are dedicated to the CCOR Intensive Leadership Preparatory Course</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Geared towards preparing for Section Head Responsibilities, including via a focus on Relationship with Self, Relationship with Others and Mentorship</li> <li>• Experiential Learning Focus</li> <li>• Military-led with Civilian Expert Support</li> </ul> <p><b>No Credits</b></p>	<p><b>Academic Term</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arts/Science : 3 Courses</li> <li>• Engineering : 5 Courses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>◦ Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> <li>◦ Plus Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• CCOR Section Head Responsibilities</li> <li>• International Exchange Opportunity</li> </ul> <p><b>Arts/Science: 3 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p> <p><b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p>	<p><b>Academic Term</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arts/Science : 3 Courses</li> <li>• Engineering : 5 Courses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>◦ Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> <li>◦ Plus Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• CCOR Section Head Responsibilities</li> <li>• International Exchange Opportunity</li> </ul> <p><b>Arts/Science: 3 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p> <p><b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p>



Year 4	Spring/Summer (4 Months)	Fall (4 Months)	Winter (4 Months)	
	May – August	September – December	January - April	
	<p><b>Military Culture Intensive</b> Focus on Experiential Learning (Exposure to Services &amp; Occupations). Followed by focus on language acquisition (in 2<sup>nd</sup> Language Environment where possible).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bilingual Army: BMOQ(A)</li> <li>• Bilingual Navy/Air Force: Military Training/OJE</li> <li>• Unilingual: Enriched SOLET</li> <li>• Bilingual All: Summer School</li> </ul> <p><b>1 Credit</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1 Credit for Enriched SOLET</li> <li>- 1 Credit for Military Training/OJE</li> <li>- 1 Credit for BMOQ(A)</li> <li>- Credit for Summer Courses</li> </ul>	<p><b>Academic Term</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arts/Science : 3 Courses</li> <li>• Engineering : 5 Courses               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>◦ Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> <li>◦ Plus Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• International Exchange opportunity for Arts/ Science programs</li> <li>• Cadet Flight Leader and Cadet Squadron Leader opportunities</li> </ul> <p><b>Arts/Science: 3 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p> <p><b>Engineering: 5 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p>	<p><b>Academic Term (Compressed)</b> (3 months with reduced course load)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arts/Science : 3 Courses</li> <li>• Engineering : 4 Courses               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Plus Language Training (LT)</li> <li>◦ Plus Fitness, Health &amp; Wellbeing (FHW)</li> <li>◦ Plus Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Cadet Flight Leader and Cadet Squadron Leader opportunities</li> </ul> <p><b>Arts/Science: 3 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p> <p><b>Engineering: 4 Credits + 1.5 Credit LT/FHW/MSL</b></p>	<p><b>Military Skills &amp; Leadership (MSL) - Validation &amp; Wrap-Up (4 Weeks)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leadership Reflections</li> <li>• Thesis/Capstone Project</li> <li>• Experiential Learning (i.e. Site Visits)</li> <li>• Military-led with Civilian Expert Support as needed</li> </ul> <p><b>1 Credit</b></p>
<p>Academic Credits: 25 (Arts/Science) // 38 (Engineering) Mandatory Officership Credits: 16 // 16 Total Credits: 41 // 54</p>				

## Notes

- Language Training (LT) = 6 Hours/Week, 0.5 Credit/Term (As required until achievement of BBB)
- Military Skills & Leadership (MSL) = 3 Hours/Week, 0.5 Credit/Term
- Fitness, Health and Wellbeing (FHW) = 3 Hours/Week, 0.5 Credit/Term (Run by PSP)
- Academic Courses = Variable Hours/Week, 1 Credit/Course

## Key Principles

- The academic calendars must be aligned between the two Colleges (including Academic Courses; the Integrated Officer Development Program, the Military Skills & Leadership strand, the Fitness, Health & Wellbeing strand, the Experiential Education periods; the International Exchanges; and Exams). All CMC N/OCdts should be given the same foundational military skills and leadership training.
- Movement between campuses during the N/OCdts time at the CMCs is encouraged and should be facilitated.
- The IODP and MSL strand is fully standardized between both Colleges.
- DND/CAF should not operate a CEGEP.

## Additional Questions/Considerations/Points

- The content, approach and expected outcomes of the Integrated Officer Development Program (IODP) must be further developed in detail, to include a detailed Overview of the MSL across all three years. The CAF Intermediate Leadership Program run by the Ossid Institute provides an excellent starting point.
- The content of the current Core Curriculum three Psychology and Leadership courses should be integrated into the MSL strand. Other key elements of the current Core Curriculum should be considered for integration into the restructured IODP (i.e. regarding Values & Ethics, Judgment, Critical Thinking, etc.)
- Courses in Engineering may need to be offered during Summer Term (Years 3 & 4).
- Teaching Staff will be required during the Summer (UTs funded through SWE; Sessional Instructors funded through O&M).
- Lab hours are part of courses (i.e. they have no separate credits allocated to them).
- This Program Configuration will reduce the number of courses required of Arts/Science/SSH students from 40 to 25; it will reduce the number of courses required of Engineering students from 48 to 38. This means that on average Engineering students will take 3 courses/year more than Arts/Science students but their overall courseload is still reduced by ten courses.

# Annex 8 – The Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR)

The CMCs have a Cadet hierarchy called the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCOR) with an organizational structure typical of military organizations, wherein upper-year Cadets have authorities and responsibilities over their peers and more junior Naval and Officer Cadets.

## Royal Military College of Canada

The CCOR is comprised of the Cadet Wing Headquarters and its subordinate Divisions, Squadrons, Flights and Sections. Two separate appointments to the CCOR occur each year – one each for the Fall and Winter academic terms – where N/OCdts are appointed to the

Barslate. Approximately 161 out of 1,050 N/OCdts occupy a Barslate position. Other types of positions also exist related to supporting and administrative positions. In total, there are 50 types of CCOR positions and 16 types of Secondary Duty positions, the Terms of Reference for which are defined in the Cadet Wing Instructions (CADWINS). CCOR positions are classified as Junior Appointments for Third Year Cadets and Senior Appointments for Fourth Year Cadets. In addition, there are Secondary Duty positions for Second to Fourth Year Cadets, but these do not count towards completion of the RMC commissioning requirements.

## Current Structure




Figure 14: Current Structure of the Cadet Chain of Responsibility at RMC and RMC Saint-Jean

## Royal Military College Saint-Jean

The CCOR is slightly different at RMC Saint-Jean. RMC Saint-Jean eliminated the Cadet Wing Headquarters positions in the Fall of 2023 and it does not require a “Division level” in its organizational hierarchy due to the low number of N/OCdts who attend the College. As such, at RMC Saint-Jean, the Cadet Chain of Responsibility comprises Squadrons, Flights and Sections only. The Terms of Reference for each position are defined in the CADWINS. Cadet Wing Barslate positions are classified as Junior Appointments for Second to Third Year Cadets and Senior Appointments for Third to Fourth Year Cadets. In addition, there are Secondary Duty positions for Second to Fourth Year Cadets, but these do not count towards completion of the RMC Saint-Jean commissioning requirements.

The CCOR construct has given rise to concerns, most recently as articulated by Madame Arbour in the Independent External Comprehensive Review, but also as highlighted by the 2017 Special Staff Assistance Visit and the 2017 Office of the Auditor General’s Report.

In particular, Madame Arbour recommended that the Cadet Wing responsibility and authority command structure be eliminated, based on four systemic concerns:

- The basis of the CCOR finds its origins in the English private school system, where upper-year students are invested with responsibilities towards their juniors.
- The co-educational nature of the residences at the CMCs.
- The tension between the Duty to Report and the need for N/OCdts to fit in with their peers.
- Potential misalignment between leadership ideals taught at the CMCs and actual institutional perspectives and requirements.

Concerns and considerations regarding the CCOR have also been voiced by the N/OCdts themselves, as well as by the leaders at the CMCs. Cadets held a range of opinions and perspectives – negative and positive – regarding the structure and value of the CCOR, many of which elicited strong emotion.

Among these, the way in which the CCOR has been leveraged to facilitate the effective operation of the Colleges – given the impact of limited resources to engage more staff – was raised as an issue. Some felt that this undermined the real purpose of the CCOR, while others noted that removing the CCOR would have significant

negative consequences for the CMCs due to the extent to which the Colleges rely on it to fulfill administrative and supporting functions.

The need for more interaction, coaching and mentoring from staff also surfaced as a critical missing piece in the existing CCOR leadership model; at the Section, Flight, and Squadron levels, most direct leadership is performed by Cadets who occupy positions within the CCOR, given the dearth of officers and non-commissioned members allotted to the CMC for the direct supervision and leadership of the N/OCdts.

Additionally, given the wide range of types of interactions the N/OCdts have with the CCOR, many graduates did not have any systematic exposure to specific learning objectives related to this leadership experience.

Lastly, as noted in the IECR, the power dynamic created through the CCOR – in which some N/OCdts have the ability to sanction other Cadets – was flagged by many as deeply problematic. As the CCOR contains certain disciplinary authorities, in the form of loss of privileges and corrective measures (described in CADWINS), N/OCdts in certain CCOR positions are able to impose loss of privileges and corrective measures on other Cadets. Although these must be approved by and administered under the supervision of the military chain of command (meaning that all Cadet-imposed sanctions must be authorized by the Squadron Commander, who holds the rank of Captain), this “safeguard” does little to mitigate perceived and actual abuses of power.

Notwithstanding scope for improvement, a scan of the approaches taken by partner and allied nations reveals that the appointment of students to positions of peer leadership is also a longstanding practice adopted by most service academies. Such appointments vary in nature and duration, from a single task to responsibilities that can last anywhere from 24 hours to a week to a full semester. In every case, the objective of the exercise is to provide Cadets with a greater leadership experience, enhanced stability, and sustained learning opportunities.

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# Table of Abbreviations

(N)	Navy
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADM(Fin)	Associate Deputy Minister (Finance)
ADM(HRCiv)	Associate Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian)
ADM(IE)	Associate Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and Environment)
ADM(RS)	Associate Deputy Minister (Review Services)
ALDP	Advanced Leader Development Program
ATL	Advance Training List
BBB	Intermediate Level of Bilingualism
BMOQ	Basic Military Officer Qualification
CADWINS	Cadet Wing Instructions
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CC	Core Curriculum
CCOR	Cadet Chain of Responsibility
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CDSB	Canadian Division Support Base
CEGEP	Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel (in Québec)
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CMC	Canadian Military College
CMCRB	Canadian Military Colleges Review Board
CMP	Chief Military Personnel
CMR	Collège militaire royal
CPCC	Chief Professional Conduct and Culture

CR	Clerical and Regulatory classification
CSJR	CÉGEP de Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu
DAOD	Defence Administrative Orders and Directives
DEO	Direct Entry Officer Program
DGMPRA	Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
EDS	Education Specialist
FHW	Fitness, Health and Wellbeing
FORCE (test)	Fitness for Operational Requirements of Canadian Armed Forces Employment (test)
FTE	Full-Time Enrollment
FTES	Full-Time Equivalent Student
FYOP	First Year Orientation Program
GBA+	Gender Based Analysis Plus
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIC	Governor in Council
GOFOs	General and Flag Officers
HSWRC	Health, Safety and Wellbeing Resource Centre
ICCM	Integrated Conflict and Complaint Management
IECR	Independent External Comprehensive Review
ILOY	Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year
IODP	Integrated Officer Development Program
IQAP	Institutional Quality Assurance Process
LGBTQ2+	Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender/Queer/Two-Spirit
MND	Minister of National Defence
MSL	Military Skills and Leadership
N/OCdts	Naval and Officer Cadets

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OJE	On-The-Job-Experience
PaCE	Performance and Competency Evaluation
PME	Professional Military Education
PPT	Physical Performance Test
PSP	Personnel Support Program
QRCanMilCols	Queen's Regulations and Orders Canadian Military Colleges
RMC	Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario
RMC Saint-Jean	Royal Military College in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec
ROTP	Regular Officer Training Program
ROTP CivU	Regular Officer Training Program Civilian University
ROTP CMC	Regular Officer Training Program Canadian Military Colleges
RPOps	Real Property Operations
RRMC	Royal Roads Military College, Victoria, British Columbia
SEHWS	Student Experience Health and Wellbeing Survey
SMSRC	Sexual Misconduct Support and Resource Centre
SOLET/SLT	Second Official Language Training
SSAV	Special Staff Assistance Visit
SSH	Social Sciences and Humanities
SWE	Salary Wage Envelope
USNA	United States Naval Academy
UT	University Teacher

# Terminology

<b>Chain of command</b>	Dictates a hierarchy of who is in charge of whom, and of whom permission must be asked. <i>Trusted to Serve</i> (2022)
<b>Character</b>	Attributes or features that make up and distinguish an individual, group or nation leading to principled moral excellence. <i>Trusted to Serve</i>
<b>Commissioned Officer</b>	Officers in the CAF hold positions of authority and respect. They are responsible for the safety, well-being and morale of a group of soldiers, sailors or aviators. Analyzing, planning, making decisions and providing advice are a few aspects of an Officer's role. CAF
<b>Cadet Chain of Responsibility</b>	The CMCs have a Cadet hierarchy called the Cadet Chain of Responsibility where upper-year Cadets have authorities and responsibilities over their peers and more junior Cadets. See Annex 8.
<b>Culture</b>	A shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values and assumptions that a group has learned over time as an effective means of maintaining internal social stability and adapting to its environment, and that are transmitted to new members as the correct ways to perceive, think and act in relation to these issues. <i>Trusted to Serve</i>
<b>Defence Team</b>	All Canadian Armed Forces members, Department of National Defence employees and employees of the Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services. <i>The Fighting Spirit</i> (2024)
<b>Diversity</b>	Possessing diverse or different qualities and perspectives. In the CAF context, it means the respect for and appreciation of differences in thought, ethnicity, language, sex, gender, age, national origin, ability, sexual orientation, education and religion. <i>Trusted to Serve</i>
<b>Equity</b>	Equity recognizes that each person has different circumstances and allocates the exact resources and opportunities needed to reach an equal outcome. Equity recognizes the need to adjust structures, policies, practices and access to opportunities for particular individuals or groups of people to facilitate their full participation or full benefit from opportunities and entitlements. <i>Trusted to Serve</i>
<b>Ethos</b>	The characteristic spirit of an organization. It is a collection of expectations, standards, values and ways of being that are held to be important to the organization and are consistent within it. For the CAF, the ethos comprises ethical principles, military values and professional expectations. <i>The Fighting Spirit</i>

<b>GBA+ Analysis</b>	GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion, and sexual orientation. (Government of Canada)
<b>Non-Commissioned Member</b>	A non-commissioned member (NCM) is any person, other than an officer, who is enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). NCMs are soldiers, sailors and aviators. They are the skilled experts whose hands-on experience and trade specialties are required to conduct all CAF operations domestically and abroad. As they gain leadership experience and rise through the ranks, they become part of the command team. CAF
<b>Peace Dividend</b>	The money saved by a country when it no longer needs to make or buy weapons because the threat of war has grown less (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus)
<b>Profession of Arms</b>	The profession of military members dedicated to the defence of their country and its interests, as directed by government. <i>The Fighting Spirit</i>
<b>Qualitative Research</b>	Qualitative research is rooted in the social sciences and is concerned with people and their social realities with how the social world is understood, experienced, interpreted, and constituted; with individual and collective meanings, interpretations, practices/behaviours, and social processes. Bryman (2004)
<b>Regular Force</b>	Members of the Regular Force serve full time protecting Canada and defending our sovereignty. They contribute to international peace and security, and work with the United States to defend North America. They are ready to respond at a moment's notice to threats, natural disasters or humanitarian crises at home and around the world. CAF
<b>Reserve Force</b>	Members of the Reserve Force serve part time in the CAF. Their main role is to support the Regular Force at home and abroad. Reservists typically serve one or more evenings a week and/or during weekends at locations close to home. Some Reservists may volunteer to be deployed on operations, if there are positions available. CAF
<b>Social mobility</b>	Social mobility refers to how a person's socio-economic situation improves or declines relative to that of their parents or throughout their lifetime. It can be measured in terms of earnings, income, social class, and well-being dimensions such as health and education. Promoting social mobility benefits individuals, the economy, and social cohesion. OECD



<b>Socialization</b>	Socialization is the process through which people are taught to be proficient members of a society. It describes the ways that people come to understand societal norms and expectations, to accept society's beliefs, and to be aware of societal values. <i>Introduction to Sociology</i> – 1 <sup>st</sup> Canadian Edition OpenTextBC
<b>Total institutions</b>	A “total institution” is “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.” Goffman (1961)
<b>Training Wing</b>	The Training Wing Staff, under the command of the Director of Cadets, are responsible for the officer cadets' military training including officer-ship, physical fitness and drill. The Staff are available to answer cadet inquiries and provide advice on military matters. RMC
<b>Trust</b>	The willingness to accept the decisions or influence of another person based on a belief in that person's reliability. <i>The Fighting Spirit</i>
<b>Values</b>	Norms or standards of desirable behaviour that give direction to and set limits on individual and collective behaviour. For Canadian military professionals, conduct values include the civic, legal, ethical and military values embodied in the military ethos. <i>Trusted to Serve</i>
<b>4-Pillar Model</b>	In order to graduate from the College and receive their commission, N/OCdts must successfully complete all four Pillars: Academics, Bilingualism, Military, and Physical Fitness.

# Endnotes

- i The Canadian History Museum provides an in-depth historical overview of the Colleges. <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/fr/musee/histoire-patrimoine-cmr>.
- ii A minority of N/OCdts attend the Regular Officer Training Plan - Civilian University (ROTP Civ U).
- iii The Chief of the Defence Staff sets the promotion requirements upon which commissioning is contingent. The Crown is the authority for commissioning. For consistency with previous reports and ease of reading, the CMCRB has adopted the use of the term 'commissioning' to refer to both of these aspects.
- iv The Independent External Comprehensive Review was presented to the Department of National Defence (DND) by former Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour. It contains 48 recommendations for DND and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to address current cultural issues within the organization. [Independent External Comprehensive Review - Canada.ca](#).
- v These include the Stedman Report (1947), The Rowley Report (1969), The Morton Report (1995), The Young Report, 1997), The Withers Report (1998), The Richard Report on the Evolution of Canadian Military Colleges Project (2010), The Wu Report (2012), the Deschamps Report (2015), the SSAV Report (2017), the OAG Report (2017) and Statscan Survey on Experiences of unwanted sexualized and discriminatory behaviours and sexual assault among students at Canadian military colleges, 2019.
- vi Al-Homedawy H. 2024. From findings to insights: Harnessing triangulation to elevate your research: A pathway to meaningful, actionable UX research. [From findings to insights: harnessing triangulation to elevate your research | by Hajer Al-Homedawy | Bootcamp | Medium](#).
- vii Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA) conduct The Canadian Military College's Student Experience, Health & Well-Being Survey on an annual basis. The latest survey was: Norton, S., & Sowinski, C. (2024), Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs) Student Experience, Health and Well-Being Survey – Topline Results. DRDC-RDDC-2024-L086. Defence Research and Development Canada.
- viii The Cadet Wing Instructions (CADWINS) are distributed internally to the Colleges. They apply to all Naval/Officer Cadets (N/OCdts), and are implemented is done by staff. These orders and instructions regulate life at RMC, and all Cadets are required to both adhere to and enforce them.
- ix In accordance with Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 5049-1, "The purpose of obligatory service is to restrict the right to voluntary release of CAF members who have received subsidized education or training, the Pilot Terminable Allowance or the Medical or Dental Officer Direct Entry Recruitment Allowance in order to: maintain the effectiveness of the CAF; and ensure that those members provide an equitable return of service." See [DAOD 5049-1, Obligatory Service](#).
- x [Joining the Canadian Armed Forces | Canadian Armed Forces](#)
- xi D. Young (Minister of National Defence). (1997). Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Armed Forces Ottawa: DND. [Wednesday, February 12, 1997-- com: National Defence \(09\)](#)

- xii BBB refers to the level of fluency achieved in reading, writing and oral interaction, with level A being beginner and level C being advanced. Individuals obtaining an X are demonstrating that their performance does not meet the minimum requirements for Level A for this ability. [Qualification Standards in Relation to Official Languages - Canada.ca](#)
- xiii [Values & Ethos | Canadian Armed Forces](#) Ethos is defined as the characteristic spirit of a culture, community or organization as manifested in its beliefs and aspirations. The CAF Ethos comprises seventeen elements categorized as three ethical principles, six military values, and eight professional expectations.
- xiv [Fighting Spirit: The Profession of Arms in Canada](#) is the second publication in a series of doctrine that first started with *The Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve* (2022), both of which now replace *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (2009).
- xv This analysis was informed by the FY 17/18 to FY 23/24 Strategic Intake Plan scorecards.
- xvi M. G. Huebner & C. Sowinski (2024), Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs) Graduates' Experience Survey (GES) - Topline Results. Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPPRA).
- xvii The Board undertook an analysis of 15 military services and academies. The analysis included an overview of entry plans, education scholarship and bursary plans, and service academies.
- xviii For an overview of the program: [Sexual Assault Prevention and Response \(SAPR\)](#).
- xix Based on the work of American sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter's critical mass theory, which found that when a minority assumes the presence of one third or more of a group it can influence the culture of the overall circle, the trial aims to boost female numbers in a platoon from 10% to 30%. For more, see [Sandhurst to boost number of female recruits in mixed gender training after scandal](#).
- xx What is [the best college class size](#)? Using class scores and performances as metrics, U.S. News & World Report found that classes with fewer than 20 students outperform those with more than 50 students. F. Antoniou, M.H. Alghamdi and K. Kawai. The effect of school size and class size on school preparedness. *Front Psychol.* 2024 Feb 26;15:1354072. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354072. PMID: 38596335; PMCID: PMC11002959.
- xxi This was mentioned several times during the Board's listening sessions with CMC graduates.
- xxii Jungblut, J., Maltais, M., Ness, E. & Rexe, D. (2023). *Comparative Higher Education Politics: Policymaking in North America and Western Europe*. Springer: Cham.
- xxiii For example, the Government of Quebec has voted for an *Act Respecting Academic Freedom in the University Sector*.
- xxiv See UNESCO's [Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel - Legal Affairs](#).
- xxv M. Maltais (2021). *Rapport sur le développement des activités de recherche et d'enseignement du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean comme université militaire québécoise - Rapport produit pour sa majesté la Reine du chef du Canada*, CMR St-Jean : St-Jean-sur-Richelieu.
- xxvi Minister of National Defence, Ministerial Organization Order 2007071 n.d. (Royal Military College Saint-Jean) and Ministerial Organization Order 2007070 n.d. (Royal Military College of Canada). Internal Document.

- xxvii The authority of the Minister of National Defence is determined by the *National Defence Act*, para.47 (2). <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/ACTS/N-5/index.html>
- xxviii University-level degree programs are offered under the Act to recognize the Royal Military College Saint-Jean as an educational institution at the university level. Pre-university programs are offered through a service contract with Formation Cégep Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. [Academic Regulations - Royal Military College Saint-Jean \(RMC saint-Jean\)](#)
- xxix QR&O: Volume IV - Appendix 6.1 The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges (QR Canmilcols), Chapter 2. [QR&O: Volume IV - Appendix 6.1 The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Military Colleges \(QR Canmilcols\) - Canada.ca](#)
- xxx [Special Staff Assistance Visit - Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston - Canada.ca.](#)
- xxxi [Report 6—Royal Military College of Canada—National Defence.](#)
- xxxii P. Martin, R.J. Baker, H. Critchley and N. Ross (1993). *Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Canadian Military Colleges*. Canada: National Defence. Recommendation 11.
- xxxiii Minister of National Defence, Letter to Commodore J. Kurtz, concerning the Clarification of University Governance for the Canadian Military Colleges, November 2021.
- xxxiv Report of the RMC Board of Governors by the Withers' Study Group: Balanced Excellence Leading Canada's Armed Forces in the New Millenium, 1998. [Report of the RMC Board of Governors By the Withers' Study Group](#)
- xxxv Recommendation 2j, [Special Staff Assistance Visit - Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston - Canada.ca.](#)
- xxxvi For example, it would be unthinkable for most EX01 positions within the Federal Public Service to lead the number of people, manage the size of budget, and hold the same responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities as Colonels/Captains(N) do in Command positions in the CAF.
- xxxvii This assessment is based on data in Figures 6 and 7 contained in the above section on costs.
- xxxviii See RMC website: [Undergraduate Academic Programmes.](#)
- xxxix Briefing Note from the Royal Military College Saint-Jean received 6 December 2024. Internal Document.
  - xl *Guidelines on Second Official Language Training*. This document is available on the Government of Canada website at [Guidelines on Second Official Language Training](#) - See para 3.2.2.
  - xli [Qualification Standards in Relation to Official Languages - Canada.ca.](#)
  - xliv For example, the University of Manitoba ([umanitoba.ca/student-supports/military-support-office](http://umanitoba.ca/student-supports/military-support-office) [Military Support Office | University of Manitoba](#)) and the University of New Brunswick ([www.unb.ca/cel/students/military-support.html](http://www.unb.ca/cel/students/military-support.html)).
  - xlvi Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction 01/23 – Performance and Competency Evaluation (PaCE). <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/pace-epc/en/competencies.asp>.

- xliv [Guidelines on Second Official Language Training- Canada.ca](#). See para 3.2.2.
- xlvi C. Sowinski (2024). *2024 Canadian Military Colleges' (CMCs) Student Experience, Health and Well-Being Survey – Topline Results*. Presentation given to the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board (CMCRB), 19 September 2024.
- xlvi Ibid.
- xlvi The Athena Network provides RMC cadets with unique opportunities to cultivate professional academic and social connections through mentoring and networking, all through a gendered perspective. [Network offers RMC cadets mentorship opportunities - Canadian Military Family Magazine](#).
- xlvi AGORA provides a safe space for all cadets and members of the RMC family, along with a fun and relaxed environment. [rmc-cmr.ca/sites/default/files/agora.svg](http://rmc-cmr.ca/sites/default/files/agora.svg).
- xlvi This became evident during the Listening Sessions held with N/OCdts at both Colleges.