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Evaluation of Military Police Services

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

APRV	Annual Personal Readiness Verification
ASD	Alternate Service Delivery
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CCC	<i>Criminal Code of Canada</i>
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFDS	<i>Canada First Defence Strategy</i>
CFMPA	Canadian Forces Military Police Academy
CFPM	Canadian Forces Provost Marshall
CFSPDB	Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks
CJOC	Canadian Joint Operations Command
CRS	Chief Review Services
CSD	Code of Service Discipline
DND	Department of National Defence
DSO	Departmental Security Officer
FY	Fiscal Year
HQ	Headquarters
JAG	Judge Advocate General
MP	Military Police
MPCC	Military Police Complaints Commission
MP Svcs Gp	Military Police Services Group
NDA	<i>National Defence Act</i>
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
PRes	Primary Reserve
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
TB	Treasury Board
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff



Executive Summary

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the evaluation of the provision of military police services by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Department of National Defence (DND). The evaluation was conducted by Chief Review Services (CRS) between June of 2012 and October of 2013, as a component of the DND/CAF Five-Year Evaluation Plan (2012/13 to 2016/17), and in compliance with the Treasury Board (TB) Secretariat Policy on Evaluation (2009). As per this TB policy, the evaluation examines the relevance and the performance of the program over a five-year period (2008-2013).

Program Description

The military police contribute to the effectiveness and readiness of the CAF/DND through the provision of professional police, security, custody/detention, and operational support services. They do this for all CAF/DND facilities and units, domestic and deployed, as well as all personnel subject to the Code of Service Discipline (CSD). The program is delivered by the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) whose mandate is to assist the chain of command in enforcing discipline, to maintain security and the rule of law, and to provide support to operations.

Relevance

Evidence collected during the evaluation indicated that the provision of military police services addresses a demonstrable and ongoing need. For example, during the evaluation period the military police regularly contributed to the core missions of the CAF.

Internationally, this involved ongoing participation in and support to Joint Task Force Afghanistan, including the responsibilities for training the Afghan Uniformed Police at the Regional Training Centre—Kandahar, support to humanitarian assistance to Haiti after its earthquake, and support to the CAF counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

Domestically, the program supported the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in providing security for the Vancouver Winter Olympics and the G8 and G20 Summits, and humanitarian assistance in Newfoundland following Hurricane Igor.

Overall Assessment

- The program is well aligned with the roles and responsibilities of the CAF/DND.
- Overall, the program performance is effective, but there are some significant challenges with respect to security related to personnel, equipment and policy.
- |||
- The program has strongly demonstrated its ability to support operations. |||
- Military police services are delivered efficiently and economically.



Furthermore, the program plays a critical role in enforcing the military CSD and maintaining the rule of law among military members and upon federal bases and establishments. As such, the program is and is aligned with federal government and departmental roles and legislative responsibilities.

Performance

Over the course of the evaluation period, the program met the needs and expectations of the CAF and DND with respect to the provision of quality policing services, and, going forward, it should be able to continue to do so. |||, as well as custody and detention services. The issues lie primarily with a need for more specialized training, replacement of antiquated equipment, and greater consideration for security at all levels of activity—including during the design of infrastructure, the procurement of equipment, and the pre-planning and conduct of operations. With respect to support to operations, the program was seen to be effective and met the expectations of force employers. The high operational tempo observed during the evaluation period ||| As such, there was a heavy reliance on the use of Primary Reserve (PRes) personnel, both in garrison and on operations, |||

The evaluation team found that military police services are being delivered in an appropriate, efficient and economical manner in the delivery of outputs and achievement of outcomes. Benchmarks to other police forces found the expenditures and size of the program to be reasonable. Further study of some aspects of governance, as well as of custody and detention, may yet identify some efficiency—which, in turn, may free personnel resources for redistribution and achieve some minor cost savings.

Based on this evaluation, alternate service delivery (ASD) of most military police services, other than selected security services, is not feasible.

Key Findings

Key Finding 1: The provision of military police services addresses a demonstrable and ongoing need.

Key Finding 2: The provision of military police services is consistent with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government.

Key Finding 3: The objectives of the provision of military police services are consistent with DND strategic objectives and federal government priorities.

Key Finding 4: Despite some equipment challenges, military policing services are meeting stakeholder expectations.

Key Finding 5: |||

Key Finding 6: |||

Key Finding 7: A re-occurring concern was that the military police |||

Key Finding 8: While training is meeting the general needs of the program, there are shortcomings in certain areas—|||

Key Finding 9: Both the chain of command and the military police agree that, although some challenges remain, the changes to governance instituted in 2011 have worked well and have improved the program.

Key Finding 10: |||

Key Finding 11: The PRes has been a critical component to enabling the program to support both garrison operations and deployed operations.

Key Finding 12: The CAF military police are well respected within the Department and across other police forces.

Key Finding 13: Military police contribute to missions in support of the *Canada First* Defence Strategy (CFDS); however, there is no mechanism in place to qualitatively assess and institutionalize valuable lessons learned to the benefit of the government, the CAF, and the CFPM branch.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Profile of Military Police Services

1.1.1 Background

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the evaluation of military police services.

The evaluation was undertaken by CRS between September 2012 and November 2013, as per the DND/CAF Five-Year Evaluation Plan. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess, in accordance with the 2009 Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation, the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and economy of the provision of military police services. The evaluation was supported throughout by an Advisory Committee comprised of key stakeholders representing the program providers. The evaluation covers the five-year period from 2008 to 2013.

1.1.2 Program Objectives

The provision of military police services exists primarily to assist the CAF chain of command² in enforcing discipline, and maintaining security during both operational and non-operational duties. Military police services strive to achieve the following:

- Provide military policing, security, and custody/detention services to CAF/DND facilities and units.
- Have the capability to provide services in concert with deployed forces.
- Show excellence, professionalism, integrity and transparency.
- Contribute to the core missions of the CFDS.
- Contribute to capacity-building for other nations.

The relationship between activities and outcomes of military police services is illustrated in the program logic model shown in Annex B. This logic model was developed by the evaluation team with assistance from the Advisory Committee.

1.1.3 Program Description

The CAF military police contribute to the effectiveness and readiness of CAF/DND through the provision of professional policing, security, custody/detention, and operational support services. These services are provided for all CAF/DND facilities and

² The Chain of Command is an authority and accountability system linking the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) to the lowest level of the CAF. It is a fundamental aspect of the structure and operation of the CAF. It is also a hierarchy of individual commanders who make decisions within their connected functional formations and units.



units, domestic and deployed, as well as all personnel subject to the CSD³ wherever they are located.

Policing services include

- preventive and community policing;
- emergency and first response;
- law enforcement and investigation;
- specialist skills;
- evidence collection and handling;
- victims assistance services;
- criminal intelligence; and
- coordination and liaison with civilian law enforcement.

Security services⁴ include

- specialized security advice and planning;
- security investigation and incident management;
- security clearance program;
- resource protection (infrastructure, material, personnel and information);
- threat risks and assessments; and
- access control.

Custody and detention includes

- operating the Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks (CFSPDB);
- operating unit detention facilities;
- custody training for the CAF;
- operational custody advice and planning;
- personal handling and holding; and
- prisoner escorts.

Support to operations includes

- mentoring;
- close protection;
- detention;
- policing;
- security;
- force protection;
- aircraft security;

³ The CSD is the basis of the CAF military justice system. It is designed to assist military commanders in maintaining discipline, efficiency, and morale within the CAF. It is found in Part III of the NDA.

⁴ Overall responsibility for security rests with the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS)/DSO. The military police have tactical security investigation and enforcement responsibilities.



- liaison with local police forces;
- port security; and
- tactical operational support.

As part of operations, military police also contribute to stability operations for other states in several ways, including

- security sector reform advice and planning;
- police capacity building;
- support to civilian law; and
- policing occupied territories.

MP members are also employed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for Canadian Embassy policing and security duties.

1.1.4 Stakeholders

For the purposes of this evaluation, the term “stakeholder” refers to individuals, groups or organizations within the CAF/DND and elsewhere that provide, oversee, or use military policing services. These specifically include the CFPM, force employers (represented by the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and the force generators (represented by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)).

Stakeholders also include the Judge Advocate General (JAG), the Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) as well as the Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development.

1.2 Evaluation Scope

1.2.1 Coverage and Responsibilities

Within DND, military police services are linked to the following DND Performance Activity Architecture sub-programs:

- 2.4.2.4 General Support, Joint Support, Theatre Support
- 5.1.1.1 Management and Oversight
- 1.2.2.1 Basic Individual Military Qualification Training
- 1.2.2.2 Initial Individual Occupation Training
- 1.2.2.3 Initial Individual Primary Reserve Training

For the purpose of the evaluation, these sub-programs included the following organizational elements:

- The Canadian Army, RCN and RCAF Military Police groups that provide military policing services to their units as well as support to CAF operations, be they



- domestic, continental or expeditionary; the Military Police Services Group (MP Svcs Gp) and its three subordinate units: the CAF Protective Services Unit, located in Ottawa, the Military Police Security Service, and the CFSPDB. The formation also has its HQ in Ottawa.
- The CAF National Investigation Service, which investigates serious and sensitive matters related to DND and the CAF. It performs a function similar to that of a Major Crime Unit of the RCMP or large municipal police agency.
 - The Canadian Forces Military Police Academy (CFMPA), which conducts basic, advanced and specialist MP and security training to meet the operational needs of the MP Branch.

The activities of the Special Operations Forces MP Unit have not been considered in this evaluation.

The evaluation also did not include in its scope indirect corporate support functions, which are provided as common or internal services for all organizations within DND—such as civilian human resources, Military Personnel recruitment, training and management, corporate finance, public affairs, procurement and material management, real property, etc.

1.2.2 Resources

Direct spending for military policing in fiscal year (FY) 2012/13 totalled approximately \$193 million, which includes approximately \$124 million for personnel salary and benefits (1,383 Regular Force, 765 reservists, and 145 civilians), \$66 million for Operations and Maintenance, and \$3 million in capital funding.

Also not included in the evaluation are internal services that provide infrastructure, procurement, personnel recruitment and initial training, and other corporate support functions.

Beginning in FY 2012/13, as a result of changes to command and control arrangements for the military police, (see section 2.4.1.3), funding responsibilities for the military police were transferred from individual commanders to the CFPM. The correct amounts required by the CFPM are still being resolved, so funding trends are only valid from FY 2008/09 to FY 2011/12. Although FY 2012/13 can be considered reasonably accurate (and, likely, more so than previous years' figures), it cannot be considered consistent with respect to trends in individual cost elements.



1.2.3 Issues and Questions

This evaluation is structured around the requirements of the TB Policy on Evaluation and the five core issues articulated in the TB Directive on the Evaluation Function.

Relevance

Question 1: Does the provision of military police services address an actual and ongoing need?

Question 2: Is the provision of military police services consistent with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government?

Question 3: Are the objectives of the provision of military police services consistent with DND strategic objectives and federal government priorities?

Performance

Question 4: To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when providing military police services?

Question 5: Are the most appropriate and efficient means being used by DND in delivering this program?

An evaluation matrix listing each of these evaluation questions, with associated indicators and methodologies, is provided at Annex D. The methodologies to gather evidence in support of the foregoing evaluation questions are described at Annex B.



2.0 Findings and Recommendations

2.1 Continued Need

This section examines the extent to which the provision of military police services addresses an actual and ongoing need. To make this determination, the following were assessed:

- Program data concerning use of military police services (policing, security, custody and detention, and support to operations) during the evaluation period.
- A review of internal documentation.
- Interview evidence from force employers and program managers, to confirm the findings from the data analysis and the document review.

The findings are based upon evidence from program data, document reviews, and key informant interviews.

Key Finding 1: The provision of military police services addresses a demonstrable and ongoing need.

2.1.1 Policing

In support and enforcement of the CSD and/or the *Criminal Code of Canada* (CCC), the CFPM conducts various policing activities. Thousands of military personnel and their families live and work on CAF bases and establishments, and, as such, there is a requirement for police services to maintain law and order and provide policing services. In addition, other than for CSD offences, some CCC incidents and offences were carried out by persons other than CAF members on CAF/DND establishments.

Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the number of incidents that MPs responded to during the evaluation period.



Offence	Year			
	2008	2009	2010	2011
Against the Person ^(1 and 2)	713	633	704	722
Property ⁽³⁾	6,220	6,691	5,504	5,332
Other CCC-related ⁽⁴⁾	2,569	2,800	2,803	2,859
Other Investigations ⁽⁵⁾	5,049	5,972	6,146	6,276
Drug Related	149	154	176	237
Service Offences ⁽⁶⁾	490	563	507	642

Table 1. Policing Statistics. This table shows the number of reported offences requiring policing in a number of categories from 2008 to 2011. The table reflects all incidents that came to the attention of the MP, whether the MP or a civilian law enforcement agency was the lead investigating agency.

Notes:

- (1) Statistical data is from CFPM Annual Reports, 2010 and 2011. The statistics relate to all incidents reported to the military police over the period 2008 to 2011, regardless of the outcome of the investigation.
- (2) Examples include CCC offences, such as causing death, assault and sexual assault.
- (3) Examples include arson, break-and-enter, and theft.
- (4) Examples include moral offences, weapons offences and vehicle offences.
- (5) Examples include safety and operations.
- (6) Service offences are those against the Code of Service Discipline. Commanding Officers have the prerogative to lay some charges without the involvement of the military police and are not reflected in these statistics unless they were reported to the military police. Service offences include, for example, offences against authority, such as disobedience of a lawful command, violence to a superior, or insubordination.

	Calls	General Occurrences	Tickets	Parking
Three-year average	34,863	16,928	8,833	29,875

Table 2. Incidents Resulting in a Police Report. This table shows the number of incidents reported and averaged over the three-year period 2008 – 2010. Figures reflect all incidents reported to the military police, regardless of the outcome of investigations. Sources of statistical data are the CFPM Annual Reports 2010 – 2011.

2.1.2 Security

In addition to policing services, the CFPM conducts various security services related to the protection of infrastructure, material, personnel and information.

The CFPM statistics in Table 3 represent incidents carried out by CAF members as well as by other persons on DND/CAF establishments. The statistics clearly demonstrate that there is a wide range of activities and behaviour that contravene the security regulations for the CAF/DND. In precise terms, the statistics show an increase in the occurrence of



security-related violations, which reinforces the need for an organization that is responsible to ensure that DND’s mission-critical personnel and resources are protected through the application of security safeguards.

Table 3 indicates security statistics of incidents requiring military police.

Activity ^(1 and 2)	Year			
	2008	2009	2010	2011
Security Offences Investigated	42	21	21	Not available
Security ⁽³⁾	3,490	3,657	3,791	4,029
Safety ⁽⁴⁾	1,146	1,141	1,050	1,097

Table 3. Security Incidents. This table shows the number of incidents reported and averaged over the three-year period 2008 – 2011. The statistics relate to all incidents that were reported to the MP regardless of the outcome of the investigation.

Notes:

- (1) Statistical data from CFPM Annual Reports 2010 – 2011.
- (2) These statistics reflect only offences brought to the attention of the Military Police.
- (3) Includes all security breaches or violations.
- (4) Includes bomb threats, fires or false alarms, suspicious packages, labour disputes, and missing or injured persons. “Injury” includes traps intended to cause injury and criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

2.1.3 Service Detention and Imprisonment⁵

The statistics in Table 4 illustrate that there are offences to the CCC and the CSD carried out by members of the CAF that require a period of detention for minor offences or imprisonment for major offences. This demonstrates the need for facilities that support the detention and imprisonment requirements of the military justice system.

The following table lists statistics related to the imprisonment and detention of CAF members:

⁵ Service Detention is unique to the CAF, and is an essential corrective training and rehabilitation program for service offenders for less serious offences with the intent to re-instill discipline with emphasis on retention. Discipline is achieved by instilling military values and expectations through adherence to military customs and tradition, as referred in. Queen’s Regulations and Orders Volume II Article 104.09, note A. Once the sentence of detention has been served, the member will normally be returned to his or her unit without any lasting effect on his or her career. All sentences of imprisonment must be served at the CFSPDB or a civilian prison; otherwise, any Service Detention of 14 days or fewer is normally served at a unit detention room.



	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total number of days in detention at CFSPDB (number of persons detained) ⁽¹⁾	878 (47)	771 (36)	688 (26)	869 (43)	638 (37)
Total number of days in imprisonment at CFSPDB (number of persons imprisoned) ⁽¹⁾	565 (4)	1,876 (7)	75 (2)	321 (3)	439 (3)
Total numbers of days in detention at all unit detention facilities other than CFSPDB (number of persons) ⁽²⁾	143 (13)	123 (14)	246 (27)	191 (26)	148 (20)
Total number of days of suspended sentence (number of persons) ⁽²⁾	35 (3)	33 (4)	17 (2)	40 (4)	53 (5)

Table 4. Service Imprisonment and Detention. This table shows the number of persons detained or imprisoned at CAF facilities over the five-year period 2008 – 2012.

Notes:

(1) Figures provided by CFSPDB.

(2) Figures provided by JAG DLaw Military Justice Policy & Research.

2.1.4 Support to Operations

A key activity of the military police program is to prepare military police forces for support to deployed operations. The following table illustrates the number of MPs that have been deployed, and the number of operations the military police have supported during the period 2008 – 2011.

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Number of MPs deployed	200	225	331	231
Number of CAF operations supported	3	6	9	9

Table 5. Support to Operations. This table shows the number of CAF operations supported by the MP and the number of MPs deployed during 2008 – 2011. Figures provided by CFPM staff.

Interviews with force employers and a review of CAF doctrine revealed a need for numerous types of military police services during CAF operations. The type and number of military police services required varies, depending upon the particulars of the operation, but may include, among other things:

- traditional policing and security duties;
- aircraft and port security;
- provision of a framework of practical measures to reform or establish security institutions in fragile, failing and failed states in order to prevent or mitigate conflict (this includes assisting with a reform or restoration of indigenous police); and
- force protection.



Interviews with key force employers and force generators have confirmed that the skills and capabilities that are brought forward by the military police are key functions, and are of a nature that cannot be provided by non-specialist soldiers. For example, the training required to conduct proper policing and investigation services is in-depth—MP officers are licensed peace officers as per the CCC, and must be able to liaise properly with civilian law enforcement and the justice system. Furthermore, the careful and lawful handling of detainees, protection and security of CAF assets, and enforcement of the CSD both at home or overseas, requires trained and independent service members.

Accordingly, having dedicated personnel to carry out military policing activities for policing, security, detention, and while on operations, is a critical need that has been directly demonstrated over the past five years.

2.2 Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

This section examines the extent to which the provision of military police services aligns with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government. The findings in this section are based on evidence from legislative documents reviewed for the evaluation.

Key Finding 2: The provision of military police services is consistent with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government.

The principal legislative authority for the establishment and role of the military police function lies within the NDA. In accordance with Section 60 of the NDA, members of the CAF are subject to the CSD at all times. To enforce the CSD, under Section 18.1 of the NDA, the CDS is authorized to appoint a Provost Marshal who is responsible to the CDS for the CAF Military Police branch.

Through Bill C-15, the CAF Provost Marshal is given responsibility for all aspects of CFPM. While discipline is the responsibility of the military chain of command, the military police are responsible for supporting the military chain of command to enforce both the CSD and the rule of law to achieve this outcome. The MPs themselves are given authority and appointed as peace officers under section 156 of the NDA.

With respect to activities related to civilians, the military police are given authority as peace officers under section 156 of the NDA, as well as through Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution of Canada, which together set forth the instructions to the government for the enforcement of the rule of law. Finally, under Section 4 of NDA, the Minister of National Defence exercises the authority to build and maintain defence establishments, issue orders and directions, and maintain law and order.

This legislative authority also links to the role of military police during the conduct of operations. When deployed, the CAF requires the services of military police to enforce the CSD, both domestically and abroad. There also is a need at times to support the civil power in the rule of law and order, conduct detention activities, and protect CAF assets. It



would not be appropriate for another federal department to be responsible for CAF personnel or assets, as they do not have the legislative authority to enforce the CSD.

Therefore, based upon these legislative and operational requirements, the military police function is an appropriate role and responsibility for the Government of Canada and DND.

2.3 Alignment with Government Priorities

This section examines the extent to which the provision of military police services aligns with federal government priorities and DND strategic outcomes. The findings in this section are based on evidence from relevant (2008 – 2013) documents that were reviewed for the evaluation, including the Departmental Plans and Priorities, DND Branch and Command Business Plans, the Speech from the Throne, and CFDS.

Key Finding 3: The objectives of the provision of military policing services are consistent with DND strategic objectives and federal government priorities.

The strategic outcomes of the DND include the contribution to the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and international peace and stability. This is further articulated in the CFDS, which outlines the key missions of the CAF. As the mandate of the military police is to deliver professional police, security and custody capabilities in support of DND during expeditionary, domestic and institutional support operations, the role of the military police can be seen to be a priority of the DND.

With respect to the Government of Canada, the 2011 Throne Speech stated that “The Canadian Armed Forces play a crucial role in defending our sovereignty and national security.” The Prime Minister’s own online statement of priorities affirms that “..the Government ...is also attending to our other important long-term priorities, including rebuilding the Canadian Forces...”

The military police play a key role in the delivery of these objectives through the provision of security services and supporting the rule of law domestically, and in enabling the conduct of military operations abroad.



2.4.1.1 Level of satisfaction with policing, security and custody/detention services

Policing

Through interviews and surveys, the evaluation team found that the effectiveness of the provision of policing services⁶ was felt to be acceptable by the users of those services—the force generators and the force employers. Reports linked to surveys of the larger military community reinforce this view. Senior representatives from each of the three environments confirmed both the importance and the effectiveness of the military police in enabling the chain of command to maintain discipline in the CAF.

|||||

Another key concern is with respect to equipment. Across the CFPM organization, the military police pointed out several policing equipment deficiencies. For example, the procurement process for new vehicles requires them to sit unused for extended periods following their acquisition while they await the installation or modification of specialized equipment. ||||| In both cases, and others, projects are under way to rectify such situations, but these must be carefully monitored.

Security

Through interviews and surveys, the evaluation team found |||||

Although the DSO has the overall responsibility for security for the CAF/DND, the military police are responsible for the provision of several tactical-level security services.⁷ |||||

⁶ See section 1.1.3.
⁷ Ibid.



Concerns with the security services include:

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There are various reasons why this is occurring. Many stakeholders interviewed felt that the military police program is |||

Program data has shown that, over the past five years, on average almost 250 MPs have been on deployed operations at any given time. |||

|||||
|||||

At a higher level, the policy framework driving the provision of security services was also seen to be a serious concern. Funding for various aspects of security is not attributed to the military police but falls under the applicable organization the security is provided for. As such, military police provide tactical-level advice and security services, they do not bear the responsibility for most security expenses. |||||

The Department has recognized the need for authorities, responsibilities, accountabilities, and resources to be better aligned to improve defence security, and, as such, it has created a Security Reform Team. This Security Reform Team will address the underpinning processes and supporting structures needed to establish a sustainable defence security program. In the context of this work, the CFPM needs to identify and coordinate security concerns and requirements.

CRS Recommendation

1. CFPM, working with the DSO, needs to assess the security concerns and requirements of the military police and ensure that they are properly addressed in the Departmental Security Plan.

OPI: VCDS

Custody and Detention

All military police units require detention facilities and either have their own on base or, in some cases, use the facilities of local civil police forces. The CAF also operates a larger facility, the CFSPDB, for service personnel sentenced to imprisonment by a Service Tribunal or for longer periods of detention.

Although all of these facilities fill the need of detaining people, interviews with program managers and a document and literature review have noted numerous and significant issues, including:

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- The CFSPDB has not been inspected since 2006.

On a positive note, the evaluation team observed that CFPM is well aware of these problems, and several initiatives are currently under way to rectify the policies, standards and quality of detention facilities across the CAF.

CRS Recommendation

2. Report on progress and plans to rectify custody and detention procedures and facilities.

OPI: VCDS

2.4.1.2 Adequacy of Training

Overall, program users and service providers found occupational training to be satisfactory, meeting basic needs both in content as well as in design and delivery. The CFMPA provides occupational training for all military police as well as specialty training for selected members, as required. As evidenced throughout this report, |||

With respect to the CFMPA, a commonly held view by interviewees is that enforcement of the CSD is not given adequate emphasis at the school, resulting in an overall loss of operational focus for the occupation. The school’s capacity for training appropriate numbers of MPs was deemed to be sufficient for general needs. One issue noted was that there are difficulties with the ability of CFMPA to take on additional training requirements (such as specialization) due to staff limitations.

Further, neither interviews nor a document review revealed any evidence of a rigorous lessons learned process that would identify and transmit lessons learned from the experiences of providing policing services on operations back into the relevant curriculum at CFMPA. There is concern among the military police leadership that valuable lessons learned, particularly in Afghanistan, are being rapidly lost or forgotten (see section 2.4.4).

Overall, the following concerns were identified through the interviews concerning training requirements:

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CRS Recommendation

3. Conduct a review of training needs for occupation training and prioritize specialty training for all MPs.
OPI: VCDS

2.4.1.3 Effectiveness of Current Governance Structure

Until 2011, the military police were under the command and control of the operational chain of command. Past experiences during the 1990s had shown⁸ that this was not a satisfactory method of operation, and a decision was taken to remove the policing function away from the chain of command to allow the military police to operate with full independence. In 2011, the CFPM was given full command over the military police for the purpose of policing functions, while the operational chain of command retained command over the security function and the military police for security related activities.

The military police have indicated that, thanks to these changes, it is much easier to respond to and investigate policing matters. Both the chain of command and the military police say that this arrangement has worked acceptably well for the most part, although several problems exist:

- There are issues with respect to divided responsibilities and accountabilities. For the military police it is difficult to determine who they are reporting to at times, since

⁸ Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. The Inquiry concluded that there were numerous deficiencies in the operation of more indirect accountability mechanisms, such as courts martial and summary trials, MP investigations and reports and the... [military justice system]. The Inquiry examined the specialized and dedicated Military Police reporting system, composed of qualified non-commissioned members and officers who routinely file police reports and investigations specifically for the use of commanders, and determined that the processes failed to penetrate the chain of command. The Inquiry determined that the following recommendations were necessary:

- 40.6 Military Police be independent of the chain of command when investigating major disciplinary and criminal misconduct.
- 40.10 The Director of Military Police oversee all Military Police investigations of major disciplinary and criminal misconduct.
- 40.11 The Director of Military Police be responsible and accountable to the Chief of the Defence Staff for all Military Police purposes, except for the investigation of major disciplinary or criminal misconduct.

Source: http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/6881/6/somalia_exe_summ.pdf. Consulted September 27, 2103.

their tasks often do not divide neatly along the lines of policing or security; what begins as a security matter can quickly become a policing matter, and vice versa. As a result, the military police stated that they struggle to meet expectations of both the CFPM and the operation commander. Military police formation commanders and staff report that they have at times struggled to make the dual commands work. To a certain extent, it reportedly depends on personalities. It should be noted that force employers have emphasized that they are still getting the effects they need, and that the governance structure is still relatively new and has not been institutionalized.

- The organization structure developed in 2011 has been shown to have some operational drawbacks and inefficiencies (the inefficiencies are discussed in section 2.5.6). Operationally, the military police are organized along environmental lines as opposed to regionally. This has resulted in some difficulty in trying to coordinate domestic response requirements.
- Prior to 2011, the military police had little opportunity for command. Following the reorganization, several command positions were created in the CFPM organization. Several comments were made that the lack of command experience has resulted in some growing pains for the new organization, and that pre-command training was required across CFPM. To address this, CFMPA is looking at existing pre-command training to see if it can be developed.
- Funding for the new command and control structure is still evolving. Prior to the reorganization, each operational commander was responsible for funding their own military police requirements. A process was developed to identify and transfer these monies to the CFPM. This continues to evolve, and the VCDS must be approached directly to provide additional funds to the CFPM where shortfalls have resulted.

Another aspect of governance is the policy framework. Military policing policy has lagged due to the large changes required and the availability of staff. Security policy, although not the responsibility of the military police, is implemented by the military police. It is described as archaic and contradictory—both by the military police and the policy owner.

Lastly is the issue of police oversight. At present, independent oversight is provided by the MPCC. While there appears to be friction between the CFPM and the MPCC, particularly around issues related to mandate and access to information, the model of using the MPCC as an independent review body appears, overall, to be working well.

2.4.2 Immediate Outcome 2: Capacity of military police to maintain the capability to deploy forces.

The ability of the MP to be properly trained, prepared and ready to support deployed forces is a critical aspect of the program. This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indicators:

- annual personal readiness verification (APRV) of the military police; and



||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The Canadian Army has made widespread use of PRes MP augmentation for all deployed operations and some domestic requirements. Reservists were able to meet most Canadian Army needs, except those positions that required the powers of an accredited police officer.⁹ During the Afghanistan missions for example, 25 to 40 percent of deployed military police were reservists. All interviewees agreed overwhelmingly that, without this augmentation, the CFPM branch would have failed in answering the challenges of providing front-line military police for the full spectrum of tasks, including garrison policing, security, custody and detention, and deployed operations.

The evaluation team noted through stakeholder interviews that there are concerns with respect to Army PRes MPs not being trained to regular force standards, and/or credentialed under NDA, Section 156, as peace officers. ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

Producing sufficient numbers of PRes MPs has been problematic because PRes commitments are dependent on employer and educational institution support for time away and academic breaks. The Canadian Forces Liaison Council continues to be an effective enabler in this process, as it links units, personnel, employers and schools for support to individuals who volunteer for deployment. However, documentary evidence shows that there have been insufficient training days and funding allotted to the military police PRes to complete the training necessary for full accreditation as peace officers. Due to the part-time nature of PRes employment, skill atrophy further affects the ability to force generate PRes MPs. There is some indication that PRes training needs are reportedly being prioritized lower and lower each year.

Evidence drawn from the CFPM Strategic Evaluation Report and from the Military Family Resource Centres illustrates, however, that despite these pressures, Base and Wing Commanders, local police agencies, crown council, and especially the local community all report a high level of satisfaction with the military police and their ability to maintain garrison responsibilities.

⁹ QR&O 22.02 – Powers Of Officers And Non-Commissioned Members Appointed As Military Police, (1) Section 156 of the *National Defence Act*, provides:
 “156. Officers and non-commissioned members who are appointed as military police under regulations for the purposes of this section may
 1. detain or arrest without a warrant any person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, regardless of the person’s rank or status, who has committed, is found committing, is believed on reasonable grounds to be about to commit or to have committed a service offence or who is charged with having committed a service offence; and
 2. exercise such other powers for carrying out the Code of Service Discipline as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council.”
 (2) The following persons are appointed for the purposes of section 156 of the *National Defence Act*:
 1. every officer posted to an established position to be employed on military police duties, and
 2. every person posted to an established military police position and qualified in the military police trade, provided that such officer or person is in lawful possession of a Military Police Badge and an official Military Police Identification Card.
 (G) (P.C. 1999-1305 of July 8, 1999 effective September 1, 1999).

CRS Recommendation

4 Review PRes MP contracts, training programs, and qualification standards with a view to achieving additional qualified PRes military police accredited under NDA 156.
OPI: VCDS

2.4.3 Intermediate Outcome 1: The CAF military police are recognized for the ideals of excellence, professionalism, integrity and transparency.

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indicators:

- processes are in place to identify and correct incidents contrary to these ideals;
- opinions of stakeholders; and
- findings of reports.

Key Finding 12: The CAF military police are well respected within the Department and across other police forces.

2.4.3.1 Processes are in place to identify and correct incidents contrary to these ideals.

The evaluation team found that a very robust mechanism is in place to ensure public confidence, a high standard of integrity and transparency of the military police function. The conduct of military police is governed by both the military police themselves and by an independent reviewing body, the MPCC. The professional standards of the military police center on the MP Code of Conduct; it is the core document and provides overarching guidance.

Every suspected breach of the Code of Conduct, whether generated by an internal or external complaint, is referred to the professional standards section of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshall HQ for investigation. This investigation may resolve the matter or it may be further referred to the more formal Credential Review Board, or even to the CAF National Investigation Service for further investigation. Findings are presented and appropriate action is taken. If the complainant is unsatisfied with the outcome, the matter is then referred to the MPCC who carry out their own formal, independent investigation.

The MPCC cannot direct corrective action but can make recommendations back to the CFPM, which is able to make final decisions. A review of MPCC investigation findings reflects instances of both professional and unprofessional MP conduct, which precipitated either praise for excellence by the MP or direct, specific action that was undertaken by the CFPM. For example, documentary evidence drawn from the MPCC related to Public Interest Inquiries on detainee handling in Afghanistan speak to the integrity, transparency and professionalism of military police on deployed operations.



2.4.3.2 Opinions of Stakeholders

Through stakeholder interviews and program documentation, the evaluation team found that the vast majority of stakeholders strongly feel that the military police are capable, professional and transparent. Although some complaints have arisen, which, due to their nature, are often widely reported on in the media, such instances are typical for any police operation, and the frequency of concern is comparably low. When the military police were found to be in error, they issued a formal apology.

Further examples that demonstrate the high standards of the military police include the fact that CAF MPs often instruct courses for other police forces,¹⁰ and that CFMPA targets training levels at or above the national police training academy standard.¹¹

2.4.3.3 Findings of reports

A review of the Military Justice System¹² noted the necessity for the CFPM to operate with the highest degree of independence to ensure the integrity of MP investigations and professional standards. At that point, the military police were under the operational chain of command, with a potential risk of command interference in their day-to-day work. The CDS reorganized the command and control of the military police to ensure the integrity of MP investigations and professional standards, as well as to achieve credibility, transparency, and to promote accountability in the performance of policing duties and functions in the CAF. Documentary evidence drawn from the MPCC related to Public Interest Inquiries on detainee handling in Afghanistan speak to the integrity, transparency and professionalism of military police on deployed operations.

2.4.4 Intermediate Outcome 2: Degree to which the military police contribute to the six core missions of the CFDS.

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indicators:

- level of satisfaction with policing and security during deployed operations;
- number of deployed operations and MPs on deployment; and
- observations in after-action reports and lessons learned processes.

¹⁰ CFMPA and CAF military police have regularly provided expertise and personnel as instructors in high-profile areas and on unique subject matter. Examples of these courses include:

- Major Case Management, at the Canadian Police College;
- Major Crime Investigator; and
- Major Case Management Team Commander.

Further, CFMPA is a national level partnered agency that regularly provides instructors and subject matter experts for the Ontario Police College for the Front Line Supervisor and Leadership courses.

CFMPA has a significant participation and influence in shaping the NATO level MP programs. Other members include the US and UK MP organizations as part of this effort and developmental process.

¹¹ Hay Group Report: National Review of New Constable Training Programs, November 25, 2011, www.haygroup.com/ca. Consulted October 8, 2013.

¹² See footnote 9.



Key Finding 13: Military police contribute to missions in support of the CFDS; however, there is no mechanism in place to qualitatively assess and institutionalize valuable lessons learned to the benefit of the government, the CAF, and the CFPM branch.

During the evaluation period, the military police regularly contributed to the six core missions of the CFDS. These included ongoing participation and support to Joint Task Force Afghanistan, including the responsibilities for training the Afghan Uniformed Police at the Regional Training Centre – Kandahar. In other international operations, CFPM branch personnel operated in support of Operation HESTIA to help the task force that provided humanitarian assistance to Haiti after its earthquake. Military police also provided support to CAF counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

Domestically, MP also supported two large-scale operations, Op PODIUM and CADENCE, in which the CAF MP assisted the RCMP in providing security for the Olympics and the G8 and G20 Summits, as well as deployment to Op LAMA, whereby MP members participated in CAF efforts in Newfoundland following Hurricane Igor.

For statistics detailing the number of MPs that have deployed, and the number of operations the military police have supported over the period of 2008 to 2011, see Table 5 in section 2.1.4.

While the evaluation noted much anecdotal information concerning the success and quality of the MP when deployed on operations, CFPM annual reports only indicate the number of events that the CFPM branch supports on an annual basis. They do not provide qualitative assessments. Further, while the Army Lessons Learned Centre captures and processes information drawn from After Action reviews, Unsatisfactory User Reports, and observations drawn from the sub-unit level, they do not speak to how well the military police have performed on deployed operations in either the domestic or international contexts. This is a concern, as it appears that military police performance on operations is only noted if there is a significant problem, but is not being examined overall.

CRS Recommendation

5. Implement and monitor a robust system of capturing and analyzing post-operation (domestic and international) lessons learned, with a view to qualitatively assess and institutionalize them.

OPI: VCDS

2.4.5 Intermediate Outcome 3: Adequacy of contribution by the military police to capacity building for other nations.

This outcome was assessed by examining the following performance indicators:

- Observations in Post-Op reports
- Opinions of users/stakeholders



Key Finding 14: Military police have successfully contributed to capacity building for other nations.

During the evaluation period there were several successful examples of the MP contribution to capacity building in other nations. For example, CFPM participated with Joint Task Force Afghanistan, and absorbed the responsibilities for training the Afghan Uniformed Police in basic skills at the Regional Training Centre—Kandahar. This included working with the RCMP and combat arms personnel in training the Afghan National Police. In other international operations, CFPM force generated CFPM branch personnel in support of Operation HESTIA by quickly deploying more than 80 MP from the three environmental commanders to help the task force that provided humanitarian assistance to Haiti after the earthquake.

Due the reasons mentioned in section 2.4.4, the lack of relevant post-operations reports and lessons learned information made it impossible for the evaluation to make a qualitative assessment. Senior leaders in the military police organization are pleased with the work performed in this area, and stated that capacity building only represents a very small segment of military police work abroad.



2.5 Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

This section examines the extent to which DND has used the most efficient means to deliver the program outputs and the most economical means to achieve expected outcomes.

As per the program's logic model (Annex C) the program has four primary outputs:

- Policing services
- Security services
- Custody and detention services
- Training services

Note that due to the nature of the work of the military police, the current financial structure within DND does not directly attribute military police expenditures to specific activities. For example, an MP on a single shift could be conducting a routine policing patrol and stop someone for questioning. During the course of the questioning, the situation could become a security incident and investigation. During the same shift, the MP might be required to spend some time providing guard duty for a prisoner in custody in the detention barracks.

Key Finding 15: Although military police services are being delivered in an efficient and economical manner, there are potential efficiencies to be achieved.

Key finding 16: Alternate service delivery for the provision of military police services is not a viable option.

The following performance measures were assessed to determine the efficiency and economy of the program:

- numbers of MP;
- annual cost per MP;
- daily cost to keep an individual in custody at CFSPDB; and
- trends in the relative ratios of policing and security, custody and detention, and training and administrative/HQ costs.

2.5.1 Numbers of MP

To determine if the overall size of the program was reasonable for the needs of the Department, a needs assessment was applied based upon force-generation ratios for deployed personnel, civilian police force sizes based upon population, and security needs as indicated by garrison requirements.

As indicated, MPs conduct all types of activities and are not dedicated to deployments, policing, security, custody or administration. However, personnel numbers were



attributed to these activities in order to assess whether the current number of MP is reasonable.

Activity	Demand/Requirement (MP)	Source
Operational Deployment	750 ⁽¹⁾	Based upon deployment of 250 MPs at all times during evaluation period
Policing Services	250 ⁽²⁾	Based upon Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) personnel numbers per 1,000 population for small communities
Security/Garrison	250 ⁽³⁾	Based upon Garrison demands
Other Military duties	270	Based upon program assessments of time spent

Table 6. Requirement for MPs. This table shows the estimated average number of MPs required to perform assigned tasks. Data reflects calculations made by CRS.

Notes:

- (1) Based upon the need for equal time spent on pre-deployment training and post-deployment reconstitution.
- (2) Based upon military base population policed.
- (3) Based upon domestic infrastructure requirements.

The foregoing table shows that the average demand for overall MP personnel numbers was 1,520. The average number of trained regular force personnel during the period was 1,332. This last value would actually have been lower due to any injury or leave requirements. As such, to address the shortfall the program has had to rely upon the use of reservists. Accordingly, the program has made a very efficient use of personnel numbers, the concern being that the effectiveness may have been reduced.



2.5.2 Annual Cost per MP

The overall cost for providing military policing services is shown in the following table.

	FY 08/09	FY 09/10	FY 10/11	FY 11/12	FY 12/13
Personnel ⁽¹⁾	\$117,068,823	\$113,074,180	\$119,813,922	\$123,191,184	\$125,169,912
O&M	\$38,658,471	\$43,510,344	\$42,038,282	\$45,938,345	\$66,273,246
Capital	\$1,183,154	\$2,408,948	\$1,313,692	\$352,115	\$2,579,593
Other	\$1,766,595	\$1,815,394	\$1,854,340	\$1,837,224	\$1,918,459
Total	\$156,910,448	\$158,993,472	\$163,165,896	\$169,481,644	\$194,022,751
Number trained MP ⁽²⁾	1,282	1,287	1,321	1,373	1,398
Cost per MP	\$122,395	\$123,538	\$123,517	\$123,439	\$138,786
Military Support ⁽³⁾					\$19,919,539
Corporate Support ⁽⁴⁾					\$42,591,049
Support Cost/MP					\$44,714
Comparative Cost					\$ 183,500
Cost per RCMP ⁽⁵⁾					\$ 218,000
Cost per OPP ⁽⁶⁾					\$ 161,375

Table 7. Annual Cost per MP Member. This table shows the total costs of military policing, the trained effective strength of the occupation, and the average annual cost per MP member. Infrastructure costs are not included. Similar average costs for the RCMP and OPP are included.

Notes:

- (1) Source of this table’s financial data is analysis carried out by the CFPM comptroller with the evaluation team.
- (2) Data calculations made by CRS.
- (3) Includes cost of recruiting, basic military qualification training, occupational training and associated salaries, as well as military personnel management. Based upon a proration of overall cost.
- (4) Includes civilian corporate and common internal services, such as finance, human resources, public affairs, real property, information management/information technology, etc. Excludes material management and procurement. Based upon a proration of overall costs.
- (5) Data calculations from the RCMP quarterly report, June 2012.
- (6) Data calculations from the OPP 2011 Annual Report.

As Table 7 shows, the cost per uniformed MP member was consistent from FY 2008/09 to FY 2011/12. The apparent jump in FY 2012/13 is due to the change in command and control arrangements made in 2011. At that time, the CFPM became responsible for his



own budget and anticipated estimated funding requirements were transferred to that organization. In all likelihood, the FY 2012/13 costs are more accurate than previously for expenses other than personnel; prior to that time, military police expenses were buried inside the budgets of numerous Level 1 organizations, and not always clearly identified as military policing costs. For the purpose of comparing costs with other police forces, the evaluation team used the FY 2012/13 costs as the point of comparison.

Two police forces were considered—the RCMP and the OPP. Both are large police forces covering large geographic areas. To make the comparison, the evaluation factored in corporate and personnel support costs to the DND values. These services are provided by other organizations within DND, and are outside of the scope of the evaluation. However, they were included for comparison as they are in the OPP and RCMP values. As Table 7 shows, the comparative costs per police member are \$183,500 for the MP, \$161,375 for the OPP, and \$218,000 for the RCMP.

It is important to note that the comparison of the per-member costs cannot be utilised directly, as the concept of operations is different for each of the police forces. For example, both civilian police forces maintain their own aircraft fleets. On the other hand, the military police have a much broader concept of operations, expanding beyond conventional policing to include security, operating a prison, and training for/supporting deployed operations. Further, due to the structure of the DND, financial system costs are largely based upon attributions.

Despite the variances and exceptions, the evaluation team determined that the difference between police forces is not unreasonable. Furthermore, there is no evidence of “cost creep” in military police operations. Accordingly, the cost per MP member is deemed to be in line with that of other forces. The concern, therefore, is that while overall expenditures and numbers of MP appear to be reasonable, |||, which brings into question the value for money achieved.

2.5.3 Custody and Detention

The CAF maintains its own facilities, the CFSPDB, both for detention and imprisonment. There is a fundamental difference between these two types of confinement. Detention for less serious offenses is used as a corrective training-and-rehabilitation mechanism for service offenders, with the intent to re-instil discipline—with emphasis on retention. Following detention, the member is normally returned to his or her unit without any lasting career impact. Time spent in detention is used to re-instil military values, ethos and expectations through adherence to military customs and traditions. Specially-trained service personnel and counsellors are used.

Service imprisonment, by contrast, does not have the same expectation of retention. Following imprisonment, service members face a Career Review Board and, in the vast majority of instances, the member is released from the CAF. No evidence was found of any instance where someone imprisoned had been retained in the CAF.



From a financial viewpoint, service detention can be viewed as an investment to prevent the loss of resources already spent in training and development of a service member. Imprisonment, however, is a direct expenditure without collateral benefit.

The cost of detention and imprisonment at the CFSPDB for the period 2008 – 2012 is shown in Table 8. Costs for unit detention facilities were not obtained.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total number of days in detention (number of people) ⁽¹⁾	878 (47)	771 (36)	688 (26)	869 (43)	638 (37)
Total number of days in imprisonment (number of people) ⁽¹⁾	565 (4)	1,876 (7)	75 (2)	321 (3)	439 (3)
Total number of days spent at CFSPDB	1,443	2,647	763	1,190	1,077
Total number of staff ⁽¹⁾	28	28	26	26	24
Staff salaries ⁽²⁾	\$2,138,479	\$2,138,479	\$1,985,731	\$1,985,731	\$1,832,982
Prisoner allowances ⁽¹⁾	\$340	\$2,006	\$1,400	\$745	\$1,660
Inmate travel ⁽¹⁾	\$77,055	\$35,697	\$109,059	\$55,834	\$109,557
Inmate O&M ⁽¹⁾	\$18,235	\$34,916	\$22,875	\$46,034	\$31,419
Total Cost	\$2,234,109	\$2,211,116	\$2,119,065	\$2,088,344	\$1,975,618

Table 8. Cost of Detention and Imprisonment at CFSPDB. This table shows the costs of detention and imprisonment at CFSBDB from 2008 to 2012, and the average daily cost per inmate. The infrastructure costs are not included.

Notes:

- (1) Data taken from figures provided by CFSPDB.
- (2) Data taken from calculations made by CRS.

The daily cost per inmate at the CFSPDB ranges from \$835 to \$2,777, with the fluctuations attributed to the number of actual inmates. The costs are actually higher, as food costs are absorbed by the supporting base, Canadian Forces Base Edmonton. As shown, the majority of expenditures are for personnel. For comparison, the daily cost of incarceration per inmate in a federal civilian institution is \$357, while for the provinces it is \$171.¹³ For CFSPDB, the staff-to-inmate ratio varies approximately from 1/1 to 1/2, which is far higher than civilian institutions.

¹³ Statistics Canada—Adult Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2010/2011. Updated 2012. Text Box 2



As the CAF generally is not looking to reinstate personnel following incarceration, it is likely that the services of the CFSPDB should be provided by the federal or provincial system, at a much lower cost to the CAF.

Detention, on the other hand, is a tool to attempt to salvage a career. It appears to be successful, as the recidivism rate is reported as low by the Commander of the CFSPDB. Whether or not it is cheaper to use the current combination of a central and unit detention facilities, rather than some other combination like regional and/or unit detention facilities, needs to be studied.

The Department may decide to look at the feasibility of closing the CFSPDB and transferring the prison function to civilian agencies and the detention function to regional and/or unit detention facilities.

2.5.4 Trends in the relative ratios of policing and security, custody and detention, and training and administrative/HQ costs

The relative costs of the various military policing functions, as well as administrative functions, are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Relative Costs of Policing Services—Percentage of Total Expenditures. This figure shows the percentage costs of policing and security, custody and detention, administration and HQ, and selection/training. Costs are for personnel, operations and maintenance, and capital, but do not include infrastructure. Source of data is analysis carried out together by the comptroller of the CFPM and the evaluation team. The data is summarized in the following table:

	FY 08/09	FY 09/10	FY 10/11	FY 11/12
Policing and security services	68.41%	67.90%	65.06%	65.08%
Custody and detention services	1.70%	1.76%	2.13%	2.12%
Administration and HQ services	19.41%	20.19%	23.16%	23.89%
Training and selection	10.48%	10.14%	9.65%	8.91%



Table 9. Percentage of Total Expenditures, by Service Area. Source of data is analysis carried out by the comptroller of the CFPM with the evaluation team.

These relative costs are demonstrated to be fairly stable over time. However, administration and HQ costs rose from 19.4 percent to 23.9 percent during the period, while policing and security expenditures dropped from 68.4 to 65.1 percent. Numerous interviewees have claimed that the HQ structure created during the overhaul of the governance structure in 2011 was unnecessarily large, and depleted personnel resources from front-line military police service work.

CRS Recommendation

6. Review the CFPM governance structure created in 2011 to assess if its goals were achieved, and determine if there are more efficient HQ structures available that don't compromise operational effectiveness.

OPI: VCDS

Economy of Program

Table 10 shows the percentage of CAF/DND funding used in the provision of military police services.

	FY 08/09	FY 09/10	FY 10/11	FY 11/12	FY 12/13
MP service costs as percentage of the CAF/DND budget	0.84%	0.82%	0.82%	0.84%	0.98%

Table 10. The Costs of Providing Military Police Services as a Percentage of CAF/DND Budget. This table shows the percentage costs of MP services from FY 2008/09 to 2012/13. Note that the data is from calculations made by CRS.

As explained in other sections, data for FY 2012/13 is not comparable with prior years due to the reorganization. Trends from FY 2008/09 to FY 2011/12 indicate that military police service costs have been consistent over time. There is no evidence of “cost creep” in the conduct of military police business. Given that this is an essential core service that contributes to the safety and security of all CAF facilities, personnel and information, both at home and abroad, and actively participates in every CAF operation, it can be concluded that an expenditure of less than 1 percent of the defence budget represents an economical program for the Department and the Government of Canada.



Throughout the evaluation, the question of contracting out the domestic policing, security, and custody and detention services was discussed. In fact, some contracting out already exists through the use of the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires for security services not requiring the complete training of fully-accredited MPs. As a general policy, however, any ASD would have to enforce the CSD and be responsive to the military justice system, the military chain of command, and, ultimately, the federal government through DND.

In order to meet legislative requirements, any outsourcing activity would require amendments to parliamentary-level governance, federal legislation including the NDA, and potentially also provincial legislation, such as police acts, in order to bring the changes into effect. Any outsourcing organization must be ultimately responsible through the chain of command to the CDS. In reality, the only police force potentially capable of taking over the domestic military police services function is the RCMP. From Table 6 above, which displays average annual percentage costs, it can be concluded that achieving any savings from ASD of the domestic military police services function is unlikely.



Annex A—Management Action Plan

CRS Recommendation

1. CFPM, working with the DSO, needs to assess the security concerns and requirements of the military police and ensure that they are properly addressed in the Departmental Security Plan.

This action item is largely overtaken by events with the promulgation of VCDS 2103 (Director General Security Reform Team), VCDS Defence Security Renewal Action Directive, November 26, 2013 (SECRET |||||¹⁴), which lays out the new direction for security within DND. In accordance with the directive, the CFPM has been tasked to support the DSO with a number of security-related initiatives. In this plan, responsibility for a number of security responsibilities that were formerly under the purview of the CFPM, are being realigned to the DSO. While the new departmental security architecture and establishment are being implemented, the CFPM will continue to work with the DSO with respect to the delivery of security services within his remit. Key milestones include:

- **Security Policy.** The DSO expects to have new security policy developed by 31 Mar 14. CFPM will be in a better position to assess MP requirements at this time.
- **Defence Security Program Master Implementation Plan.** Work on the Defence Security Program MIP is ongoing and not expected to be completed until 1 Apr 14. CFPM will support the development of the MIP and action as required.

With the transfer of the bulk of security responsibilities to the DSO and the reinvigorated departmental security plan, this action has effectively been addressed.

OPI: VCDS

Target Date: Apr 2014: Note that detailed results will be classified.

CRS Recommendation

2. Report on progress and plans to rectify custody and detention procedures and facilities.

The CFMP Group is currently taking immediate action to improve service at custody facilities and regarding all aspects related to the delivery of safe and efficient service custody to the CAF. The following initiatives are ongoing:

¹⁴ This upper-case script denotes a secret document releasable only in Canada and the United States.



Annex A

- **Promulgation of CAF MP Services Group (Svcs Gp) Orders for Service Custody.** To include the composition of two CAF MP Svcs Gp orders—Pre Trial Service Custody and Post Trial Committal to Service Custody—with emphasis on individual responsibilities, processes and duty of care. Deputy Provost Marshall Police and Commander CFSPDB will have oversight through Security and Military Police Information System. Orders are to be drafted by January 15, 2014, and promulgated by spring 2014.
- **Training Enhancements.** Directed training associated with the two custody orders—which place emphasis on responsibilities, custody procedures, accountability and SAMPIS application—are to be delivered by all MP Group Commanders to their subordinate units. The two orders will be introduced to the CFMPA curriculum, with emphasis being placed on enhancing knowledge of Pre Trial Service Custody for all MP ranks. Training packages will be prepared and delivered by April 2014, and the amendments to the CFMPA curriculum will occur by summer 2014.
- **Facility Designation.** The state of most Service Custody facilities in the CAF, excepting the CFSPDB, is deficient, and will require extensive upgrading to improve safety, functionality and compliance with industry standards. A specification guide for the construction and renovation of service custody facilities has been produced. This guide will enable the CAF MP Svcs Gp to assess all Unit Detention Rooms. Once completed, the CFPM will make a recommendation to the VCDS on those facilities that require upgrading or potential closing. Implementation of these upgrades is beyond the scope of CAF MP Svcs Gp budget, and will require additional funding. The condition of Unit Detention Rooms will be established by May 2014, with a recommendation to the VCDS in the fall of 2014.
- **Review of the CFSPDB.** A review of statistics related the use of the CFSPDB in recent years indicates very low rates of detention and imprisonment. A joint CFPM/JAG review of the CFSPDB should be undertaken to assess its continued utility within the Military Justice System.

OPI: VCDS

Target Date: December 2014

CRS Recommendation

3. Conduct a review of training needs for occupation training and prioritize specialty training for all military police.

The CFPM will convene the CAF MP Training Steering Committee in February 2014 to discuss the results of this evaluation. This Committee includes membership from all subgroups of the CF MP Svcs Gp and CFMPA. The Committee will address the issues identified in this report by validating the requirements and identifying champions and milestones, where appropriate.



In addition, Deputy Provost Marshall Selection and Training will convene several qualification standards boards in 2014, to validate course content. The Force Protection, Unit Security Supervisor, Use of Force and Military Police Officer courses are scheduled to be convened by late August 2014, pending resource availability (funding, subject matter expertise and Training Development Officer services).

OPI: VCDS

Target Date: September 2014

CRS Recommendation

4. Review PRes MP training programs, contracts, and qualification standards with a view to achieving additional qualified PRes military police accredited under NDA 156.

From 2008 – 2011, the CFPM attempted to transform the PRes MP from a primarily un-credentialed to a primarily credentialed component of the CAF MP. Unfortunately, this initiative failed to produce the desired effect. What became apparent during this process was that the employment model, while working for a select few, was not suitable for universal application across the PRes MP. Furthermore, it was demonstrated in the 2012 PRes MP Strategic Intake Plan that the changes to recruiting, selection and training, which was implemented to affect the new credentialed employment model, resulted in significant detrimental secondary effects, not the least of which was a dramatic drop in Trained Effective Strength. This drop was directly attributed to limiting recruiting to a very small demographic by increasing entry standards and by the implementation of a very long and difficult qualification standard, which required a two-year training commitment—compared to far easier entry-and-qualification regimes for civilian security employment and other (non MP) PRes components. In response to the crisis in Pres Military Police staffing, it was decided to opt for a primarily un-credentialed PRes Military Police employment model.

Based on this determination to maintain an un-credentialed PRes component, the CFPM will undertake a review of PRes employment to ascertain exactly what roles can and should be performed by the PRes. Upon completion of the review, amendments and changes to PRes Military Police and Military Police Officer Occupational Standards, Qualification Standards, and courseware will follow, to ensure that the PRes remains poised to support the Regular Force MP in both domestic and deployed operations.

OPI: VCDS

Target Date: December 2014



CRS Recommendation

5. Implement and monitor a robust system of capturing and analyzing post-operation (domestic and international) lessons learned, with a view to qualitatively assess and institutionalize them.

Historically, the CF MP Svcs Gp has utilized the Army Lessons Learned Center for the collection and promulgation of operational lessons learned. While the Army Lessons Learned Center has produced many MP-specific lessons learned, it does not have a resident MP subject matter expert, and does not focus on specific MP issues.

This recommendation has already been actioned, in that the CFPM has already directed the Comd MP Svcs Gp to establish a lessons analysis, dissemination, and archiving capability within MP Svcs Gp. With the establishment of this new capability, a comprehensive lessons learned program is being developed that is focussed on not just observing lessons but following through and ensuring that lessons are incorporated into MP doctrine, policy, procedures, orders and training. This program is expected to reach Full Operational Capability by June 2014.

OPI: VCDS

Target Date: June 2014

CRS Recommendation

6. Review the CFPM governance structure created in 2011 to assess if its goals were achieved, and determine if there are more efficient HQ structures available that don't compromise operational effectiveness.

The new governance structure for the Military Police that was implemented in 2011 has significantly increased the independence and effectiveness of the CFPM. For ease of implementation, that governance structure remained based on historical environmental structures (Army, RCN, RCAF).

Since that time, a number of redundancies and inefficiencies have been highlighted, suggesting a better governance structure for the CF MP Svcs Gp if commanded along regional vice environmental lines. Roughly estimated, this could eliminate approximately 50 percent of current CAF MP Svcs Gp at HQ. While retaining the CFMP Group HQ as a Level 2 HQ, the four Level 3 HQs and 17 units could be replaced by seven to nine Level 3 units. This would allow for reinvestment in the newly created Regional HQs to make them more viable and operationally effective. Additionally, the Regional HQs would be aligned to the Regional Joint Task Forces, providing the bulk of regional and local MP



Annex A

policing and operational capability, while the remainder provide specialized services and national support.

The CFPM will stand up a working group to examine the viability of a regionalized command structure, and report to the VCDS no later than September 2014.

OPI: VCDS

Target Date: September 2014



Annex B—Evaluation Methodology and Limitations

1.0 Methodology

The evaluation methodology was set out in an Evaluation Work Plan developed during the evaluation planning phase. The evaluation used multiple lines of evidence, and complementary qualitative and quantitative research methods, as the means to help ensure the reliability of information and data to support evaluation findings. Using multiple lines of evidence, the methodology established a consistent approach in the collection and analysis of data to support the evaluation findings and recommendations. Based on the evidence from available sources, the evaluation developed a balanced picture of the relevance and performance of the provision of military policing services. Information and data were compared and contrasted, and correlated to each evaluation question and corresponding indicators.

1.1 Overview of Data Collection Methods

Data collection methods were selected based on the data required to address performance indicators. The following data collection methods were used to gather qualitative and quantitative data for each type of operation in the evaluation:

- literature and document review;
- key informant interviews;
- site visits; and
- administrative and financial data reviews.

1.1.2 Literature and Document Review

Preliminary documents reviewed included background documentation, as well as materials related to departmental priorities such as the CFDS, Defence Priorities FY 2012/13, the Report on Plans and Priorities, CDS documents, such as the Reviews of Military Policing and the CFPM Strategic Review, and visit reports by the MPCC. In addition, Canadian federal policy documents and priority identification instruments (e.g., Budget Speeches, Canada's International Policy Statement) were reviewed. All relevant documents were organized according to evaluation questions and indicators in the evaluation matrix (Annex D).

1.1.3 Key Informant Interviews

Interviews were held with key senior stakeholders from CFPM and its major formations/units, senior staff from the Canadian Army, RCN, RCAF and CJOC, the DSO as well as representatives from the JAG. The MPCC was also interviewed. These interviews provided context to the document review and data analysis as well as qualitative input on the evaluation questions.



All interviewees received an interview guide in advance. Interviews were mostly conducted in person except, for some, by telephone due to the distances involved. Follow-up to some of the interviews was conducted by e-mail and telephone. A template organized according to evaluation questions and indicators was used to summarize the interview data, which was then analysed.

The evaluation team used the following qualifiers in the findings to give the reader a sense of the “weight” of the interview respondents:

- “some or a few” refers to fewer than five respondents;
- “many” refers to less than half of the respondent group, but more than “some”;
- “most” refers to the majority of respondents; and
- the “vast majority” of respondents refers to more than 80 percent of the respondent group.

1.1.4 Site Visits

During the evaluation, site visits were made to Ottawa, Borden and Winnipeg. In Ottawa, the evaluation team visited the CFPM HQ, CJOC HQ, Chief of Army HQ, Chief of Navy HQ as well as JAG, DSO, and the MPCC, to speak with numerous staff who are stakeholders in the delivery of military policing services. In Borden, the evaluation team toured the CFMPA and talked with several key school staff about training-related issues. In Winnipeg, the evaluation team met with the Commander 1 Canadian Air Division, and the Air Force Provost Marshall.

1.1.5 Administrative and Financial Data Reviews

Program performance data was reviewed to determine to what degree the program was achieving its intended outcomes. Administrative data for the five-year period (FYs 2008/09 to 2012/13) covered by this evaluation that was reviewed included statistical reports and expenditures, and budget-related reports and/or analysis of these reports. The administrative data review also introduced various issues that were pursued further in interviews and questionnaires. The comptroller for the CFPM was able to generate numerous ad hoc reports to provide sufficient financial reports to enable a comprehensive financial analysis.

1.1.6 Advisory Group

An advisory group of key stakeholders was formed to provide their views on policy, operational issues, the logic model, and an evaluation matrix related to military policing.

1.1.7 Benchmarking

A search for “best practices” in other domestic civil police forces, as well as military police forces in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, was conducted to



establish a comparative analysis. The results provided a basis for comparison between similar organizations. This information was derived from various sources, including the Web sites of police forces and defence departments of the mentioned countries, previously completed studies, newspaper articles and (interviews with) contacts made through Canadian defence attachés stationed in these countries.

2.0 Limitations

This section identifies constraints and limitations of the evaluation (e.g., limitations of design, methods and consultations; actual/potential biases; reliability of data and the impact on evaluation findings), and how the evaluation attempted to overcome the limitations.

The evaluation team encountered a number of limitations with this material, and devised mitigation strategies to address them. These limitations and their mitigation strategies are captured in this table:

Limitation	Mitigation Strategy
Responsibility for the funding of military police services resided within numerous Level 1 budgets until FY 12/13, and was not clearly identified. At that time, funding responsibility and funds were transferred to CFPM based on estimated spending requirements. Exact requirements are still being fine-tuned.	Trend analyses were only used for FY 08/09 to FY 11/12, as data obtained was consistent across that period. FY 12/13 financial data is likely more accurate, while inconsistent with previous years, and was used for cost comparison purposes.
Surveys could have been used as a methodology for some Persons of Interest but weren't, due to time constraints	Alternative sources of data were used (such as CFPM Strategic Reviews and MPCC site visits) to address the same issues.
Cost comparisons with similar programs were complicated by differences in funding elements between the programs.	The evaluation considered best and/or worst cases as applicable to make the comparisons.

Table B-1. Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Strategies. This table lists three main limitations for undertaking this evaluation, along with the mitigation strategies devised to address them.



Annex C—Logic Model

Military Policing

Inputs

- People
- Money
- Guidance/direction
- Policy

Activities

- **Personnel**
 - Recruiting/basic training
 - Qualification Level training
 - Specialty training
 - Pre-deployment training
 - Leadership and professional development
- **Equipment**
 - Requirements
 - Procurement
- **Support and Infrastructure**
 - Requirements
 - Procurement
 - Construction
 - Security and Military Police Information System
- **Relationships**
 - Liaison with other law enforcement, justice agencies and militaries
- **Governance**
 - Committee structure
 - Command and control relationships
 - Policy development and dissemination
 - Establishment
 - Organization structure
 - HQ services
 - Oversight



Outputs

- Policing services
- Security services
- Custody and detention services
- Training
- Management oversight

Immediate Outcomes

- CAF facilities and units have adequate military policing, security, and custody/detention services
- Military Police maintain the capability to deploy forces

Intermediate Outcomes

- CAF Military Police are recognized for excellence, professionalism, integrity and transparency.
- Military Police contribute to the six core missions of the CFDS
- Military Police contribute to capacity building for other nations

Ultimate Outcome(s)

- Enhanced safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad
- A strong and beneficial North American partnership
- Contribute to a safe and secure world through international engagement



Annex D—Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Matrix—Relevance				
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Document Review	Key Informant Interviews
1.1 Does the provision of military police services address an actual and ongoing need?	1.1.1 Statistical and documentary evidence from program data that there is a bona fide requirement for the provision of military police services:	Yes	Yes	
	1.1.3 Interview evidence from force employers, as well as service providers, as to the requirement for military police services			Yes
1.2 Are the objectives of the provision of military police services consistent with DND strategic objectives and federal government priorities?	1.2.1 Documentary evidence of the degree of alignment between military police services' objectives and the priorities of the federal government		Yes	
	1.2.2 Documentary evidence of the degree of alignment between military police services' objectives and the objectives of DND		Yes	
1.3 Is the provision of military police services consistent with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government?	1.3.1 Evidence of the federal government's role and responsibilities for providing a military justice system and the role of the military police in that system.		Yes	

Table D-1. Evaluation Matrix—Relevance. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the relevance of the program.



Annex D

Evaluation Matrix—Performance: Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)					
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Key Informant Interviews	Document Review	Other
2.1 CF Facilities and Units have adequate Military policing, security, and custody/detention services	2.1.1 Level of satisfaction with policing, security, and custody/detention services		Yes	Yes	
	2.1.2 Adequacy of training		Yes		Yes Benchmarking
	2.1.3 Effectiveness of current governance structure		Yes	Yes	
2.2 Military Police maintain the capability to deploy forces	2.2.1 Annual Personal Readiness Verification of the Military	Yes	Yes	Yes	
	2.2.2 Capability to simultaneously maintain garrison responsibilities while supporting deployed taskings		Yes	Yes	
2.3 The Canadian Armed Forces Military Police are recognized for excellence, professionalism, integrity and transparency.	2.3.1 Processes are in place to identify, investigate and correct incidents contrary to these ideals		Yes	Yes	
	2.3.2 Opinions of stakeholders		Yes	Yes	Yes Benchmarking
	2.3.3 Findings of Reports			Yes	
2.4 Military Police contribute to the 6 core missions of the CFDS	2.4.1 Level of satisfaction with policing and security during deployed operations		Yes	Yes	



Annex D

Evaluation Matrix—Performance: Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)					
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Key Informant Interviews	Document Review	Other
	2.4.2 Number of deployed operations and MPs on deployment	Yes	Yes		
	2.4.3 Observations in after-action reports and lessons learned processes	Yes		Yes	
2.5 Military Police contribute to capacity building for other nations	2.5.1 Observations in Post-Op Reports		Yes	Yes	
	2.5.2 Opinions of users/stakeholders		Yes		

Table D-2. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Effectiveness). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the performance in terms of effectiveness of the program.



Evaluation Matrix—Performance: Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy				
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Other	Key Informant Interviews
3.1 Are the most appropriate and efficient means being used by the DND/CAF in delivering the program	3.1.1 Trends in overall cost per MP member	Yes	Yes Benchmarking	
	3.1.2 Daily cost to keep an individual in custody ay CFSPDB	Yes	Yes Benchmarking	Yes
	3.1.3 Cost to produce an occupationally qualified MP	Yes	Yes Benchmarking	Yes
	3.1.4 Attrition rates at CFMPA	Yes	Yes Benchmarking	
	3.1.5 Trends in the relative ratios of policing and security, custody and detention, and training and admin/HQ costs	Yes		
	3.1.6 Evidence that MP training does not exceed job requirements			
3.2 Are the most economical means being used by the DND/CAF in delivering the program	3.2.1 Trends in overall costs of military police services as a percentage of the CAF budget	Yes		
	3.2.2 Feasibility assessment of providing military police services by alternative service providers	Yes	Yes Benchmarking	Yes



Evaluation Matrix—Performance: Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy				
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Other	Key Informant Interviews
	3.2.3 Comparison of cost per inmate compared to other similar militaries and Correctional Service Canada	Yes	Yes Benchmarking	

Table D-3. Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Efficiency and Economy). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the performance in terms of efficiency and economy of the program.

