



Introduction to the Study of

MILITARY HISTORY

for Canadian Students



Edited by

COLONEL C.P. STACEY, O.C., O.B.E., C.D.,
FORMER DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY,
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS
OTTAWA

Sixth Edition, 4th Revision



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PREFACE

This sixth edition, 4th revision of *Military History for Canadian Students* has been published in response to a continuing demand, particularly by the Royal Canadian Army Cadet Corps.

Revisions have been limited to minor textual changes, and the book lists have been brought up to date. In its present form, this book continues to serve as a useful introduction to the study of military history.

W.A.B. Douglas
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F O R E W O R D

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY

This pamphlet is designed to provide an introduction to the study of military history suitable for Canadian students and particularly for members of the Canadian Officers Training Corps.

It is not intended to provide in itself a completely adequate account of the subject, but merely to supplement other books such as Colonel A. H. Burne's *The Art of War on Land*. Books by British and American authors usually take little account of Canadian aspects of military history, and while it is obviously desirable that Canadian students should not limit their knowledge of the subject to Canadian campaigns, it is equally important that they should know something of the military history of their own country. This pamphlet, accordingly, offers nine examples of campaigns of Canadian interest chosen from different periods of history. It also includes a very brief history of the development of Canadian Army organization. All this material is reprinted from the *Canadian Army Journal*.

The comments on the campaigns are presented mainly in terms of the usually accepted Principles of War. Those principles, in the form adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, are printed as an appendix. Another appendix offers definitions of a few military terms with which the student requires to be familiar. A very brief list of books for further reading is also included.

Some knowledge of military history is an essential part of any officer's education. It is unnecessary to labour the argument. There has been no great modern commander who has not been in some degree a student of war; and while it might be argued that changing conditions and changing weapons reduce the value of the study of the campaigns of the past, the fact remains that the fundamental problems and principles of military leadership do not change as a result of technological advances. The Principles of War can be illustrated from ancient as well as modern campaigns. There is in fact no campaign, of whatever date, from which something cannot be learned concerning the behaviour of human beings at war.

The intelligent officer will not of course expect the study of history to provide him with formulas to overcome every situation that may confront him. An officer who tries to solve his problems by consciously searching the historical precedents will not have a long career. Nevertheless, the judicious study of history can be an essential aid even in tactical or administrative matters. This is particularly the case, naturally, with recent history. Many lessons have been learned over and over again, at unnecessary cost in lives, simply because of neglect of the experience of the past.

It is not in matters of tactical detail, however, that military history makes its main contribution to the education of a soldier. The historical study of military institutions and campaigns is an admirable method of training and conditioning the mind for the solution of the problems of the present and the future. By thoughtfully reading the records of the campaigns and great captains of the past the modern soldier can discover the qualities of mind and heart which go to the making of a great commander, and can thereby prepare himself for his own future tasks. "Providence", says Colonel G. F. R. Henderson in his life of Stonewall Jackson, "is more inclined to side with the big brains than with the big battalions." Jackson's own career is evidence that the best means of training the intellect for the larger problems of command is the study of past wars.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADIAN ARMY

I: The First Two Centuries: The Old Militia

The history of the Army in Canada is as long as the history of the country itself, and forms a larger part of it than many Canadians realize. The Canadian soldier of today is the heir of a very old and a very proud tradition, and a tradition peculiarly his own. The Canadian Army shares many historical experiences with other forces - particularly the British Army - but some of those that helped to shape it are uniquely Canadian and are shared with nobody.

The present account is no more than a thumbnail sketch of the long process that has brought the Army to its present stage of development. It mentions only the salient points in the story. It is concerned primarily with organization, not with campaigns and battles it is designed to provide some background for those more dramatic episodes, which are rather more familiar to most Canadians and some of which are described elsewhere in this pamphlet.

The French Regime

It can be said that a militia based on the principle of universal service existed in the St. Lawrence valley and in Acadia from the earliest years of French settlement there in the first decade of the seventeenth century. In every pioneer community surrounded by warlike natives, every settler must performe be a soldier too on occasion; and French Canada was no exception.

About the middle of the century, when there were still only a couple of thousand settlers in New France, something like a formal militia system began to take shape. We have an order issued in 1651 by the Governor to the "captain of the inhabitants of Three Rivers", requiring the people to have arms and to drill, and to take turns at guard duty. After 1663, when company rule ended and the French Crown assumed direct control of the colony, an efficient and formidable defence organization came into existence.

The basic conditions which made such an organization necessary are evident. Three menaces faced New France: the Iroquois, who terrorized the colony for many decades; the British colonies, which were much more populous than the French and which were involved in four long and bitter wars with them from 1689 onwards; and behind the British colonies the naval and military power of Britain herself, which at last was brought to bear to destroy the empire of France in America. That New France succumbed to these menaces only after over seventy years of conflict was due in great part to the efficiency of her military system.

The system was effectively centralized in a manner unknown in the thirteen English colonies. At the head of it was the Governor, who in addition to being the political ruler of the colony was also the commander of all its military forces. He retained this position even in the presence of a large force of regulars from France commanded by a senior general. In the last days of French rule this centralization of authority, long a source of strength to the colony, became a disadvantage; for it enabled Governor de Vaudreuil to interfere with the military dispositions of Montcalm with injurious effect.

The basis of the defence system of New France was the presence of a considerable body of regular troops.

These were of two categories; units of the regular army of France, the *troupes de terre*; and units of colonial regulars, the *troupes de la marine*.

Regiments of the French regular army proper served in Canada at only two periods. In 1665 the famous Carignan-Salières Regiment arrived to conduct a campaign against the Iroquois. Most of it was sent back to France in 1667-68; and regular regiments appear in Canada again only in 1755, when the last great struggle for the colony is beginning. In 1758 Montcalm had eight fine French regular battalions under his command. Two more were at Louisbourg in Cape Breton Island. These regulars were the most formidable element in the final defence of New France.

However, from the time when the Carignan regiment was withdrawn the colony was garrisoned by regular forces permanently localized there. These were termed *troupes de la marine* simply because they were under the Ministry of Marine, which administered the French colonies; to call them marines, as is sometimes done, is misleading. They were organized in independent companies, which were united into battalions only when some great crisis required it. As a result of this organization, their discipline and general efficiency were rather lower than those of the regulars proper. The number

of companies varied from time to time. In 1687 there were 32. Before the beginning of the Seven Years' War there were 30, but in 1756 the number was increased to 40, the authorized strength of each being fixed at 65 men. In the course of time, the commissioned ranks of these companies had come to be filled largely with Canadians; the men were recruited in France, but there may have been some Canadians among them too.

* * *

The third element in the Canadian defensive system was the Militia. What may perhaps be called the first generalized Canadian militia regulations are contained in a letter from King Louis XIV to Governor de Courcelles dated 3 April 1669. It instructs him to divide the inhabitants into companies; to appoint officers; and to ensure that drill is carried out once a month and that the militiamen have arms and ammunition ready for use at all times. Normally, as the system developed, each parish had one company of militia, composed of all the male inhabitants capable of bearing arms; but a populous parish might have two or more. The Captain of Militia was an important man in the parish. He was not the seigneur, but a substantial habitant whose commission served to confer upon him a position in the community second only to that of the seigneur himself. As time passed,

these captains of militia acquired civil as well as military functions and became the local administrators and mouthpieces for the central government.

In the frontier wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the militia of New France had an important part. Since the militia companies comprised all the able-bodied men of their parishes, it will be understood that they could be called out for service as a whole only in great emergencies, such as that arising out of Phips' attack in 1690, when the militia played a vital role. However, it was easy to call upon the companies to furnish detachments for prolonged or distant service, and it may be assumed that these would as far as possible be composed of volunteers.* Small militia forces of this sort are found taking part, along with the regulars, in almost every action the French fought against the English and their Indian allies. It was in the guerrilla warfare of the forests that the Canadian militiaman made his greatest and most distinctive contribution. In the words of Parkman, the habitant was "more than ready at any

* A report written by General Murray in 1762 sketches the organization as the British found it at the Conquest: "The Canadians are formed into a militia for the better regulation of which each parish in proportion to its extent and number of inhabitants is divided into one, two or more Companies who have their proper officers ... From these Companies detachments are formed, and sent to any distance and in 1759 and 1760, the whole were in arms for the defence of their country."

time for any hardy enterprise; and in the forest warfare of skirmish and surprise there were few to match him. An absolute government used him at will, and experienced leaders guided his rugged valour to the best account."

The forces used by the French in this warfare were usually of very mixed composition. Take for instance the one that intercepted and crushed General Braddock's British army as it advanced on Fort Duquesne in 1755. The majority of its members were Indians; but of the white troops two thirds were militia, the rest being colonial regulars. It is true, however, that on this occasion a good many of the militia ran at the first volley (the commandant at Duquesne explained indulgently that they were only youngsters); and so the regulars played a part disproportionate to the smallness of their numbers. This was the case in many actions.

The militia did much work apart from combat duty. A great deal of transport work was involved in maintaining the western posts and the Indian trade and supporting military operations. This was done by militia boatmen and was a heavy tax on manpower. At the same time, the needs of agriculture constantly hindered the employment of the militia in the field. If seeding and harvest were interfered with, the colony would starve; and Montcalm found that he could keep the great body of

the farmer-soldiers on duty for only a few weeks at a time.

As a normal thing, it will be observed, the militia had no organization higher than the company, and it is probably fair to say that normally the parish captain of militia was more an administrator than a commander, and his company more a source of manpower for ad hoc units than a tactical unit itself. When larger units of militia were organized in a crisis, they were commanded by officers of the colonial regulars. In New France's last campaigns, in 1759-60, militia were actually incorporated into the regular units of both types; in 1759, 108 selected militiamen were attached to each battalion of the troupes de terra, and in 1760 almost the whole of the elective militia was distributed through the regular force. At the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (13 September 1759) this infusion of militia into the regular battalions may have helped produce the French disaster, for we read of the militiamen, having fired their muskets, throwing themselves down to reload in the backwoods manner, and thereby making confusion in the ranks. The most useful contribution made by militia was probably that of the sharpshooters who skirmished on the French flanks and to some extent covered the retreat of the defeated army.

All the various forces we have described so far were infantry; and infantry was the master arm in opera-

tions in a heavily forested country of primitive communications. The artillery arm was represented in the French army in Canada in the Seven Years' War by two companies of 50 gunners each, which seem to have been on the same basis as the *troupes de la marine*. As for cavalry, it was little used; but in 1759 Montcalm organized from the militia a corps of 200 mounted volunteers.

In these last years of New France the country's manpower was mobilized to the limit. The whole population of Canada was only perhaps 65,000, yet about 13,000 militia were called out to help defend Quebec against Wolfe. It was all for nothing. Wolfe's smaller but more efficient army of regulars, backed by British sea power, won the day. A sound military system had postponed the final catastrophe, but in the end the odds were too great. The colony capitulated in 1760; the Treaty of Paris ceded it to Great Britain; and the Militia of Canada found themselves owing allegiance to a new sovereign.

The Militia after the Conquest

The most remarkable thing about the military system in the early days of British rule is the extent to which the French system simply continued to exist. There was, it is true, no permanent continuity of units (as we shall see, no unit in the modern Army has an officially recognized

organization date earlier than 1855). The French regular regiments went back to France under the terms of the capitulation, and the colonial regulars were allowed to do the same, though many of the officers and men chose to remain in Canada. Nevertheless, it was clearly understood that the militia system went on as before, and during the period of "military government" much use was made of the captains of militia. Although all these officers had been required to resign, the great majority had at once received new British commissions; and they in fact carried on the whole of the local administration of justice. Unfortunately, when civil government was set up in 1764 it was considered that the law prevented Roman Catholics from exercising judicial functions, and this useful link in the chain of government was broken. It appears, however, that the captains of militia were still considered to retain their military functions, though the loss of their civil ones greatly reduced their general importance.

As early as 1764 the British military authorities raised a battalion of Canadians, to take part in the Pontiac War. It was recruited by volunteering (though not entirely without the threat of compulsion) and was commanded by a former officer of the French colonial regulars. It did good service though it saw no fighting. Thereafter, however, except for some limited

attempt to use the militia to produce men for transport service, the system tended to fall into neglect, and it seems that no annual muster or training was held.

Every colony of British America had its compulsory-service militia system, which however it might be neglected in peacetime received due attention in time of war. The first elected assembly of Nova Scotia (where Halifax had been founded as a British naval station in 1749) passed a stringent militia law at its initial session in 1758. It required every male inhabitant between 16 and 60 to serve and to furnish himself at his own expense with "a Musket, Gun, or Fuzil, not less than Three Feet long in the Barrel, two spare Flints, and Twelve Charges of Powder and Ball". Regimental musters were to be held every six months, and commanding officers were to "draw forth" their units every three months, "to exercise them in Motions, the Use of Arms, and shooting at Marks, or other military Exercises". This, of course, was in the middle of the Seven Years' War.

* * *

For a decade after the Treaty of Paris, the Union Jack flew from the Gulf of Mexico to Hudson Bay, and defence was mainly a question of protection against the western Indians. But an attempt by the British Government to finance the garrisons required for this purpose by taxing the colonists led to rebellion in the

thirteen seaboard colonies, and in 1775 the troops of the revolutionary government invaded Canada. Governor Carleton called upon the militia. Some of the King's "new" (French) subjects rallied to his cause, others joined the invaders; but the great majority, not surprisingly, were content to watch the British and the Americans fight it out. Quebec, and Canada, were saved for the Crown by troops brought from England by the Royal Navy. In 1777 a militia ordinance was enacted, the first militia legislation since the conquest; until then the old French laws had sufficed. The new law was based upon them. Like the Nova Scotia act, it defined military age as 16 to 60. Captains of militia were required to turn out their companies for drill on the last two Sundays in June and the first two in July. Provision was made for drawing as many men as required from the companies and marching them ("tho' still as militia") in conjunction with the regular forces to any place where they might be needed, and keeping them in service until the need was over.

The revolting colonies won their independence, but failed to absorb Canada and Nova Scotia; and from 1783 onwards the new and smaller British America had a new and different defensive problem. For a century or more, defence meant almost exclusively defence against the United States. British naval power

protected the provinces from overseas invasion, but could not prevent attack from the south. And it must be remembered that in those days war with the republic was far from “un-thinkable”. It actually happened once, in 1812-14; and there was grave danger of it many times thereafter. The great turning-point, after which Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations show steady improvement, is the Treaty of Washington of 1817, which settled the serious Anglo-American issues arising out of the American Civil War.

Luckily, though the United States had both many more people and far more wealth than British North America, it was not a military power. Its military potential was not organized, and it maintained only a very small regular army. In these circumstances, defence against it was not an impossible problem to solve. The system adopted for the purpose was essentially the old one with which we are already familiar. The most vital feature of it was a considerable garrison of British regulars, usually comparable in strength to the whole US. Army. The colonial contribution was a militia organized on the traditional basis of universal compulsory service. The system did not vary much between colonies. When a new colony was set up - as was done in Upper Canada in 1791 - legislation establishing the normal militia was usually passed very shortly.

This militia - later quaintly called the “sedentary” militia* - was a very cheap force to maintain, for it existed only on paper for 364 days a year. Battalions were organized on a territorial basis, one or more per county as a rule, and slates of officers were appointed to them; but in normal times they were not armed, uniformed, paid or trained. Only once a year did the battalion appear as such - on “training day” or “parade day”, long the Fourth of June, the birthday of King George III; and usually it did not present a very martial appearance. Much fun was made of the spectacle of civilians, in mufti or odd bits of uniform, carrying ancient weapons or no weapons at all, stumbling awkwardly through a few drill movements and ending the day, in many cases, by getting splendidly drunk at the expense of the C.O. But the people who made these jokes didn’t understand what was really going on. The annual “training” was not really training, but a muster parade; it served to keep the battalion rolls up to date and to remind the citizen that he was in fact a militiaman, liable to be called out to defend his country in a time of crisis.

The War of 1812

This was the organization that de-

* This term does not seem to have appeared in legislation until the Canadian act of 1855, but it was in common use at least as early as 1812.

fended Canada successfully during the War of 1812. It must be emphasized that the popular Canadian legend of the ploughboys who beat off the invader with just a little help from the regulars doesn't hold water. No one can read the records of the war without realizing that the professional soldier played the dominant role in saving the colonies. Not only did he provide leadership which was usually competent and was sometimes inspired; he bore the brunt of nearly every engagement. Consider the casualty lists of Lundy's Lane, the bitterest action of the war. The unit that suffered most heavily was the 89th Foot, a British regular regiment, now the Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's); it had 254 casualties, including 29 killed. A battalion of Incorporated Militia, a long-service unit on a quasi-regular basis, had 142 casualties (7 killed). But the local units of the sedentary force, which were present to the number of 500 men, had only 22 casualties altogether and only one man killed.* These figures tell the story. Canadians, and other British Americans, played a great part in the war; but the most effective local units were those most closely assimilated to regulars. Among them were five "Fencible" regiments (units liable for service in North America

only) recruited in the provinces; these were borne on the list of the British Army and may be considered colonial regulars. Another, the Canadian Voltigeurs, though raised under the Lower Canada militia law, was in virtually the same category. Few Canadians realize that the Voltigeurs' gallant commanding officer, Colonel Charles de Salaberry, perhaps the most renowned native Canadian hero of this war, was himself a regular soldier, who had learned his trade in the 60th Rifles.

The Sedentary Militia as such was rarely found in the battleline (Lundy's Lane however exemplifies the way in which sedentary units were some times called out to help in a temporary crisis). Its organization was "administrative rather than tactical". It provided an effective mobilization system which made the manpower of the provinces readily available. From the sedentary units the most willing or most suitable men could be, and were, drafted away into long-service units which after a few months' duty approximated fairly closely to regulars.

The successful issue of this war probably had an unfortunate influence on Canadian military policy. The successes were largely due to effective prewar preparations, but the preparations had been made by the Mother Country, not the colonies. The people of British America were left with a vague idea that "the Mili-

* *The small proportion of killed to wounded is said to have been due to the Americans' use of buckshot.*

tia" had done the job, and this led them to think that it was time enough to start preparing for war after war had begun. This idea was to die very hard.

The result was that the militia, system was little altered for nearly half a century. Britain continued to provide a costly regular garrison at her own expense; British America was content to maintain her economical paper militia with its annual muster.* Yet it must be remembered that the colonies were poor, thinly populated, and torn by political dissension; they could not and would not have supported an expensive military organization. And as an auxiliary and support to the regular forces the old militia had much to commend it under the conditions of the day.

Through the Anglo-American crises of the first half of the nineteenth century the system continued to do yeoman service in all the North American provinces. The sedentary units could always be called out in their own organization to meet a sudden emergency, and could always furnish volunteers for *ad hoc* units raised for a longer commitment. The sedentary units of Upper Canada came marching in to Toronto to defend the government against the rebels of 1837; and they

found the men for the volunteer regiments recruited at imperial expense, during the next couple of years, to protect the frontier in the troubles that the rebellion touched off. When filibusters from the United States landed near Prescott on the St. Lawrence in November 1838, they were attacked within a few hours by two columns. One was headed by a party of Royal Marines, the other by a detachment of the 83rd Foot (today the Royal Ulster Rifles); but the majority of the troops were Canadians, partly from the new volunteer regiments, partly from the local militia units. In this "Battle of the Windmill," a very fierce little action, the sedentary force, fighting in their own dooryards, gave a good account of themselves. But it was regular reinforcements that finally dislodged the raiders.

By the middle of the century a new era was beginning. The North American colonies had lately achieved a very full measure of self-government.

They were growing in wealth and population; and parliamentarians and publicists in Britain were now asking, with good reason, whether it was not time that the British taxpayer was relieved of the financial burden of colonial defence. These new conditions were shortly to produce fundamental changes in the military policies of Canada.

* *As late as the fiscal year 1857-8 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick together spent only £432 on their own defence?*

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II: The Volunteer Militia, 1855-1902

The Militia Act of 1855

The Crimean War of 1854-56, a war in which Canada had no direct part, helped to produce an important alteration in her military arrangements. For some years past, the British Government, aided by the conditions mentioned in the last chapter and the tranquil state of Anglo-American relations, had been reducing the regular garrison of the North American colonies. When war with Russia broke out, and an expeditionary force had to be sent to the Crimea, there was an immediate further reduction. In 1855 there were only about 3000 soldiers in British North America; there had been 7000 a couple of years before, and nearly twice that number in 1838-42.

In these circumstances some substitute for the regulars was necessary - particularly since the colonial police arrangements were still inadequate and the troops had often been called upon to support the civil power. The patriotic excitement of the war, and the fact that it was a

time of prosperity, made the moment propitious for some widening of colonial military responsibilities. So the government of the Province of Canada (the former Upper and Lower Canada, united under one legislature in 1841) appointed a commission to advise on the best means of reorganizing the militia. It reported early in 1855, and a new militia act based upon the report was passed later in the year.

The heart of the commissioners' scheme was the retention and improvement of the old Sedentary Militia, with its basis of universal compulsory service. (They recommended in fact that arms, accoutrements and ammunition for 100,000 men should be obtained and kept in the province to equip this force in the event of its having to be called out; but this provision fell by the wayside in the course of the bill's passage through Parliament) But the scheme's most original feature was the provision of a new and separate force of *Volunteers*. These volunteer units would be

uniformed and armed even in peacetime, and would carry out annual training, for which their members could draw pay. The new act provided that the volunteers (termed by it the "Active Militia") should not be more than 5000 in number. It is clear that its underlying conception was that only the ancient system of universal service could defend the province against full-scale attack by the United States, but that the new situation required in addition a small partially-trained force always available to deal with sudden minor emergencies.

The tiny volunteer force created by the Militia Act of 1855 is the immediate origin of today's Canadian Army (Militia). The largely paper units of the old Sedentary Militia are not perpetuated in the present-day organization; but the modern Army List contains five batteries of artillery which carry organization dates in 1855. Those dates testify that these units were among the first formed under the new organization.

There are also three armoured corps regiments (and one artillery regiment) which incorporate cavalry troops, and four infantry regiments (as well as one armoured regiment and one artillery battery) which incorporate rifle companies formed that year. The volunteer cavalry and infantry units organized under the 1855 Act were all independent troops or companies. Regimental organiza-

tion came later. The oldest infantry regimental date in the list is 1859, reflecting the fact that in that year the nine independent companies of Montreal were formed into a battalion.*

Many units of the modern Army claim, with varying degrees of justification, descent from military organizations existing before 1855; all regiments claim, very properly, to be the inheritors of the traditions of the earlier units that existed from time to time in their recruiting areas; but no organization date earlier than 1855 is recognized in the Army List.

In many respects the formation of the volunteer force marks a turning point in the history of Canadian military organization. Notably, it represents some advance towards genuine self-defence, an assumption by Canada of larger military responsibilities. This was reflected in the acceptance of the increased expenditure caused by the new force. Until 1855 the Canadian militia had cost the province only about £2000 a year. Now the cost leaped up to about £25,000. Of course, this was still small potatoes - only about half the cost of a single regular battalion; but it was an important new departure. And the new force was capable of at least some slight degree of independent action, where as the Sedentary

* *The First Battalion Volunteer Militia Rifles of Canada, now The Canadian Grenadier Guards.*

Militia could never be anything but auxiliary to a regular force. Admittedly, the volunteers' efficiency could not be expected to be high, since the act of 1855 provided for only ten days' annual training for cavalry and rifles, and twenty days for artillery; but the idea of having any kind of trained force in being was almost entirely new.*

It must also be noted that, in spite of the emphasis which the commissioners of 1855 laid upon the importance of maintaining the principle of universal service, their report marks the beginning of that principle's decline. Indeed, the decline was rapid. The annual enrolment was maintained for a time, but the Sedentary Militia of Canada was never called upon for service in any crisis after 1855. In Nova Scotia for a few years in the 'sixties the whole sedentary force was called out for brief training, but this was a flash in the pan. The volunteers were always more available than the Sedentary Militia in a sudden emergency, and of course more efficient. More and more, as time passed, the compulsory service principle survived only as a legal obligation. The volunteer militia, composed of those Canadians

who chose to serve, became in practice the country's only military force.

The Ten Years' Crisis

The volunteer force was relatively popular from the beginning - so much so that in 1856 the legislature permitted the formation of unpaid corps in addition to the paid ones authorized the year before. But there after a depression set in, the militia appropriations were cut and the condition of the force declined accordingly. This was unfortunate, since serious trouble with the United States was just around the corner.

In the spring of 1861 the American Civil War broke out. The following autumn the British Empire was almost drawn into it, when the Union Navy took two Confederate diplomats off a British steamer on the high seas. This "Trent Affair" brought an Anglo-American war closer than it has ever been since 1814. About 11,000 British troops were hastily sent to Canada, increasing the total strength of the regular garrison of British North America to some 18,000 men. (The force had been increased at the end of the Crimean War, and though it was reduced again later a precautionary reinforcement was sent immediately after the Civil War broke out.) The immediate crisis ended when President Lincoln surrendered the two Southerners; but it left deep bitterness behind it, which was increased

* Before 1895 there were in existence a very few volunteer units, slept together, and in some degree trained, merely as a result of the public spirit of officers and men. The Canadian Militia Act of 1846 had authorized such units.

later by the depredations of the Alabama and other Confederate cruisers fitted out in British ports and by Confederate attempts to use Canada as a base of operations.

The Civil War finished in 1865, but immediately the Fenian Brotherhood, an Irish-American organization in the United States, began promoting attacks on Canada. An invasion on a considerable scale was attempted in June 1866, and the Canadian volunteers had their baptism of fire in fighting in the Niagara peninsula. A Fenian band defeated a detached column of volunteers at Ridgeway and slipped away before larger forces which were closing in could make contact. The Fenians continued to be a constant menace until another raid was broken on the Vermont and New York borders in 1870 and a smaller enterprise failed in Manitoba the next year. All this time Anglo-American relations were in a critical state and the U.S. Government showed no very strong desire to interfere with the Fenian operations until the Alabama question was liquidated in 1871 by Britain's agreeing to arbitrate it on terms unfavourable to herself.

The most important result of this decade of chronic crisis was the federation of British North America. Other causes were also at work, but without the immediate menace of Fenianism and the fear of an Anglo-American war it is very doubtful

whether the Dominion of Canada could have been brought into being in 1867. These critical years also had great influence on Canada's military system. In particular, they served to confirm the country's allegiance to the volunteer idea.

The Trent Affair had caused the institution for the first time of a defence portfolio in the Canadian ministry; John A. Macdonald, in addition to being Attorney General for Canada West, was designated "Minister of Militia Affairs". It also led to arrangements being made to call out a large number of the Sedentary Militia for training; these were cancelled when the immediate crisis passed. The Canadian government, however, seeing that the United States was now a military power and realizing that another crisis might come at any moment, appointed a new commission to advise on militia organization. It reported that only a large trained force could meet the new situation; and in the spring of 1862 the John A. Macdonald - George E. Cartier government brought in a militia bill providing for a force of 50,000, to be raised by voluntary enlistment as far as possible, but thereafter by ballot (i.e. by lot). But Parliament would not have it; the bill was defeated, and the government fell. The episode was doubtless widely interpreted as a warning against attempting to apply conscription in Canada in time of peace.

The succeeding government, headed by John Sandfield Macdonald and L.V. Sicotte, at first did nothing except to augment the volunteer force, which by the beginning of 1863 amounted to about 18,000 men. But during that year the tide of the Civil War turned against the Confederacy, and the people and government of Canada became increasingly alarmed; and two new military laws were now passed - a volunteer act increasing the force to 35,000, and a militia act providing for "service battalions" recruited by ballot and trained for up to six days annually. Such battalions were enrolled up to a strength of 88,000 men, but were never called out for training. However, one very useful measure was carried out at this time - the formation of military schools for officer training, conducted by the regular units in the province. These were popular and effective, and soon provided a considerable reserve of qualified young men who would have been invaluable if it had become necessary to embody the service battalions.

The Fenian troubles did much to make the country volunteer-minded. The volunteer units were not ill-suited to the task of dealing with filibustering expeditions; the immediate threat of such raids led the legislature to spend money more freely on the force than ever before, and the young men of Canada pressed for-

ward to enlist. In 1866 the provincial defence appropriations rose to nearly \$2,000,000, and the strength of the volunteers, less than 20,000 in the spring of that year, was up to 33,750 by the end of 1867.* The year 1866, when the Fenian menace reached and passed its high tide, left a permanent mark on the Canadian Army List. No less than 38 battalions of infantry and rifles, and ten batteries of artillery, were organized in that exciting twelvemonth. Many of these are still on the list in one form or another; some of our present artillery batteries represent infantry regiments formed in 1866.

The Military System of the Dominion

The military system set up for the new nation after Confederation was largely a transcript of that of the Province of Canada. This was no shock to the Maritime Provinces, for they too had volunteer forces, having copied the "volunteer movement" of 1859 in the mother country. It is true that Nova Scotia, as we have seen, had lately tried the interesting experiment of calling out the whole Sedentary force for annual training; but the training period was only a

* These figures are for the Province of Canada (after 1 July 1867, the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec). Despite the statutory limit of 35,000, the government of Canada had imposed a Ceiling of 25,000 until the raids of 1866.

few days and the units were not armed or uniformed.

The first federal Militia Act was passed in 1868. It set up the Department of Militia and Defence and divided the whole country into Military Districts - nine in number in the first instance. It maintained, in theory at least, the ancient principle of universal compulsory service. Section 4 ran:

The Militia shall consist of all the male inhabitants of Canada, of the age of eighteen years and upwards, and under sixty-not exempted or disqualified by law, and being British subjects by birth or naturalization; but Her Majesty may require all the male inhabitants of the Dominion, capable of bearing arms, to serve in case of a *Levee en Masse*.

In practice, there was never any resort to this portion of the Act. The enrolment of the "Reserve Militia"* (in effect, the old Sedentary Militia) was taken for the last time in 1873. (Latterly, it had been taken, not by a muster, but by house-to-house canvass.) In the various emergencies which arose at home and abroad in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth no need was found for using the compulsory-service provisions of the Militia Act. In both World Wars, conscription was necessary, but it was provided by special statutes

* *Under the act of 1868, the Volunteer Militia, the Regular Militia and the Marine Militia constituted collectively the Active Militia. The Reserve Militia was all men "Not saving in the Active Militia of the time being".*

passed at the time. Finally, when the new National Defence Act, codifying almost all defence legislation in a single statute, was passed in 1950, the old universal-service provisions were eliminated as archaic, thus ending a story that had begun three hundred years before, in the early years of the French regime.

The "Reserve Militia", then, remained strictly a paper force. The Volunteer Militia was Canada's first and only line of defence apart from the Royal Navy. The British Army, to which the country owed so much, took its leave within a few years of Confederation: the last imperial troops left Quebec on 11 November 1871. A regular garrison remained at Halifax, just as garrisons remained at Malta and Gibraltar; later in the century a smaller force was stationed at Esquimalt; but the old military stations in Central Canada saw the English soldiers no more. To replace them, the Canadian government took a very modest measure. It raised in October 1871 two batteries of garrison artillery which could protect and maintain the fortifications of Quebec and Kingston and also serve as schools of gunnery for the militia batteries. (They did some infantry instruction too.) This was the earliest nucleus of the Canadian regular service, called today the Active Force. The two batteries, "A" and "B", still exist as sub-units of the 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.

The departure of the British regulars coincided in time with the end of the Fenian troubles and the beginning of better times in Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations. And the Canadian parliament and public, who had taken an interest in defence in the 'sixties because there was an actual enemy in the gate, now lost interest again. Defence expenditure fell in 1876-7 to \$690,000, the lowest annual total in the country's post-Confederation history. Limited funds meant limited training (for many years the rural regiments, which did all their training in camp, were allowed to train only every second year) and enthusiasm and efficiency suffered accordingly. From 1874 onwards the Militia was commanded by a General Officer Commanding who was a British regular lent to Canada. In the circumstances of the day the officers who held this appointment found it rather frustrating.

However, there were occasional useful developments. The Royal Military College of Canada was established at Kingston in 1876, and thereafter was a source of qualified officers for both permanent and non-permanent corps. (The universities began to be drawn upon effectively for this purpose only in 1912, when the first contingents of the Canadian Officers Training Corps were formed.) A Government Cartridge Factory, later known as the Domin-

ion Arsenal, started production at Quebec in 1882. Thus, in a very modest degree, the country gradually became increasingly self-sufficient.

The most important advance since Confederation came in 1883. Since the departure of the imperial troops the militia's declining efficiency had led many observers to the conclusion that the presence of some regular units was essential to the health of the citizen force; and the formation of instructional corps of cavalry and infantry similar to "A" and "B" Batteries had long been recommended. Now a new Militia Act was passed containing the following section:

It being necessary in consequence of the withdrawal of Imperial regular troops, to provide for the care and protection of forts, magazines, armaments, warlike stores and such like service, also to secure the establishment of Schools of Military Instruction in connection with corps enlisted for continuous service, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty to raise... one troop of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, (of which two shall be "A" and "B" Batteries now embodied), and not more than three companies of Infantry, - the whole strength of which several corps shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty men ...

An amended act passed in 1886 raised the number of infantry companies to five and the total strength permitted to 1000 men. As a result of this new policy there came into existence in 1883 a Cavalry School Corps (now The Royal Canadian Dragoons) and an infantry School Corps (now The Royal Canadian Regiment); while the artillery batter-

ies were brigaded as The Regiment of Canadian Artillery. The third battery ("C"), at Esquimalt, was not actually formed until 1887.* A School of Mounted Infantry was formed at Winnipeg in 1885. These innovations, plus some increase in the grant for the militia's annual drill, raised the country's defence expenditure considerably; for the fiscal year 1883-84 it was above \$1,200,000.

The North-West Campaign

The little Permanent Force, as it came to be called, went into action for the first time as part of the North-West Field Force organized to suppress the rising in the valley of the North Saskatchewan in 1885. This was the first occasion when Canada conducted a campaign entirely on her own; the whole force, except the G.O.C., Major-General (later Sir) Fred Middleton, and a few staff officers, was Canadian. Nearly 6000 troops were employed, including 363 of the Canadian regulars and 550 Mounted Police. It was very much an improvised army, and improvised at very short notice. Middleton recorded that some of the militiamen in his own column "had never fired a rifle" before they joined it. Equally serious was the lack of trained staff

and of administrative services. Medical and transport services had to be organized after the shooting began: Since 1868 the Militia Act had provided that "a military train, and a medical staff, as well as commissariat, hospital and ambulance Corps" might be formed when required; but this was not done until the crisis arose.) All things considered, it is not surprising that there were some tactical setbacks; but the force did the job it was sent to do, and did it pretty rapidly. The first shots were fired on 26 March; and Louis Riel's headquarters at Batoche was captured and the back of the movement broken on 12 May. In the interim more than 3000 men had been brought from the East over the still uncompleted C.P.R., and three columns had been organized and had moved against the centres of disaffection.

No very great improvement in the condition of the militia is visible during the decade following this campaign, except in the strength and efficiency of the permanent units. The inadequacy of the militia's training, and the deplorable state of its clothing and equipment, continue to be the burden of the G.O.C.'s annual reports. But in the last years of the century a wind of reform begins to blow. An important turning-point is a queer international incident of 1895. There was a long-standing dispute between Britain and the United

* All these permanent corps were granted the prefix "Royal" in 1893.

States over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. Now President Cleveland sent a message to Congress on the subject which amounted to a threat of war. Before the matter blew over it occasioned the last important military preparations ever made in Canada against attack by the United States. The militia at this time was still armed with .45 single-shot Sniders issued during the Fenian troubles. The Snider had never been more than a stopgap weapon (it was the 1855 Enfield muzzle-loading rifle converted into a breech-loader) and by 1895 had been obsolete for many years. The crisis led the government to rearm the militia with the most modern magazine rifle then available the .303 long Lee-Enfield. Improved artillery weapons and some machineguns were also purchased. And from 1897, for the first time since 1876, all regiments were trained every year.

Major-General E. T. H. (later Sir Edward) Hutton, General Officer Commanding, 1898-1900, was not a tactful man and seems to have found it hard to believe that a G.O.C. Canadian Militia owed the Canadian Government the same respect and obedience that the Commander-in-Chief in Britain owed the government there; and in the end a quarrel with Sir Wilfrid Laurier's ministry led to his departure. Nevertheless, he left a mark, and a useful one, on the country's military system. The line

of his thought and action is indicated in a sentence from his 1898 report: "The militia force of Canada is not under the existing system, an army, in its true sense; it is but a collection of military units without cohesion, without staff, and without those military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness." The object of his policy was the creation of a "militia army" - a balanced force of all arms, possessing the administrative services without which no army can take the field, and well enough trained and equipped to have a real military value in emergency. The same general line was followed by Lord Dundonald (G.O.C. 1902-4). He too got into trouble, and got dismissed; but his period of command was one of reform and advance. During these years, when Sir Frederick Borden was Minister of Militia and Defence (1896-1911), the militia was almost transformed. A proper Corps of Engineers - there had been a few engineer units since Confederation - came into existence; so did a Medical Corps, an Army Service Corps, and other departmental corps. Even a Signalling Corps was set up - before one existed, as a separate entity, in the British Army. The Permanent Force was increased to 1500 all ranks in 1903.

There were also reforms on the staff side. Militia headquarters at Ottawa was reorganized. From 1905

onwards two vacancies in the Staff College in the United Kingdom were reserved for Canadians; and Hutton set up a Militia Staff Course to instruct citizen officers in staff duties. The professional calibre of the Permanent Force was raised and the military knowledge of militia officers improved.*

The South African War

In the midst of these reforms, and making a considerable contribution to them, came Canada's participation in the South African War (1899-1902). This was the first occasion when units of the Canadian forces served in a campaign abroad (the Canadian Voyageur Contingent, which took part in the Nile Expedition of 1884-5, was a civilian organization, though officered by militia officers). The force provided was small, about 8300 men altogether, including a battalion to garrison Halifax and so release British troops. Nearly 5000 were in units raised by the United Kingdom or that raised by Lord Strathcona, and cost the Canadian taxpayer nothing. Canada sent fewer than 2500 men in her own contingents, and even they were paid by Britain after reaching South Africa, Canada merely making up the difference between British rates of pay and her own.

The raising of the First Canadian Contingent deserves a glance. The first British proposal was that the colonies should provide independent companies; but after a moment of reflection Canada preferred to offer a battalion of infantry under a Canadian lieutenant colonel. This was the small beginning of an important and persistent Canadian idea: a national preference for having Canadian troops operate as far as possible concentrated under a single Canadian command. The battalion was raised as a second battalion of The Royal Canadian Regiment, and was made up of volunteers from 82 different militia units.* The Permanent Force provided about 150 men. The unit sailed for Cape Town 16 days after the order to recruit it was issued, and distinguished itself in the Battle of Paardeberg after only four months of existence.

Small as the whole episode was - the war cost Canada just 89 fatal battle casualties, and less than three million dollars in money - it was important in the country's military history. It did much to revive public interest and pride in her forces; the four V.Cs. won in South Africa served as symbols of Canadian prowess in the field. It disseminated up-to-date military knowledge within

* *These reforms are described in more detail in Appendix B to C. P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada (Toronto, 1940).*

* *In due course, the units that had made the most substantial contributions of volunteers to the South African contingents received the campaign honour "South Africa".*

the militia and thereby helped the cause of militia reform. And it emphasized the fact that Canada could not avoid involvement in the issues of world politics. Once, Canadian defence had meant defence against the United States and nothing else. Now people were beginning to call

another American war “unthinkable”; but the young nation was finding that there were other dangerous problems. Participation in the war in South Africa set a precedent for larger participation in the greater crises which the new century was to bring.

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III: The Early Twentieth Century, 1902-1918

Preparing for Armageddon

The period between the South African War and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 was a time of continued reform and expansion. The situation in Europe became steadily more strained and, it was more and more evident that there was danger of Britain's being drawn into conflict with Germany. This possibility is the explanation of many developments in Canada.

The "Dundonald incident" of 1904, in which the Canadian Government dismissed the General Officer Commanding, coincided in time with important developments in military administration in the United Kingdom resulting from the South African War. A committee headed by Lord Esher recommended the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief and the substitution of an Army Council presided over by the Secretary of State for War and comprising both civil and military members. The first Military Member would be the Chief of

the General Staff, who would replace the Commander-in-Chief as the government's senior military adviser.

These recommendations were acted on, and were copied in Canada. A new Militia Act was passed in 1904. This provided, "The Governor in Council may appoint a Militia Council to advise the Minister on all matters relating to the Militia which are referred to the Council by the Minister. The composition, procedure and powers of the Council shall be as prescribed." The composition of the Council (the Minister as President; four Military Members - Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General, Quartermaster General and Master General of the Ordnance; the Deputy Minister as Civilian Member and the Accountant of the Department of Militia and Defence as Financial Member; and a civilian Secretary) was prescribed by an order in council later in 1904. Although the new act continued to permit the appoint-

ment of a major general to be "charged with the military command of the Militia", Lord Donaldson was the last G.O.C. Hereafter, as in the United Kingdom, the senior military adviser to the government was the Chief of the General Staff. The first C.G.S. to be appointed was Major-General Sir Percy Lake; the first Canadian to hold the appointment was Brigadier-General W. D. (later General Sir William) Otter, appointed in 1908.

The thirty years during which British officers acted as commanders of the Militia had been a period of transition. It is hard to see how any other system could have worked better in the circumstances of the time, but the arrangement could not have been perpetuated. The position of the British G.Os.C. had always been difficult, and their difficulties had been increased by their inevitable lack of acquaintance with Canadian conditions. And the new system of administration proved a better one. A careful student of the history of the Army writes of the situation after 1904, "It is a fact that disputes between the Minister and the principal soldier became fewer, and of more limited scope. It is a further fact that after the change the soldiers had more of their own way than before." This was the case even though after 1904 "the civilian

Minister became the practical Commanding Officer of the Militia".*

The Militia Act of 1904 fixed the limit of strength of the Permanent Force at 2000 men. Shortly, however, it had to be raised again. The Royal Navy was concentrating its forces increasingly in home waters to meet the German threat. This led to the decision to abandon Halifax and Esquimalt as Imperial naval bases, and this in turn to the withdrawal of the British garrisons. Early in 1906 the last British troops left Canada and the two fortresses were transferred to the Canadian Government. An amendment to the Militia Act raised the authorized strength of the Permanent Force to 5000, and steps were taken to recruit additional men to replace the British garrisons of these bases. By 1914 the actual strength of the force had risen to 3000 all ranks.

During these years of preparation preceding 1914 the strength, armament and efficiency of the Non-Permanent Active Militia were all improved. The force was popular and received considerable encouragement from the government, both during Sir Frederick Borden's tenure as Minister of Militia and, after the change of government in 1911, under Sir Sam

* Colonel C. F. Hamilton, "The Canadian Militia: The Change in Organization" (*Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, October 1930).

Hughes. The number of men trained increased from 44,000 all ranks in 1909-10 to 57,000 in 1913-14. During the same period Militia expenditure rose from less than \$6,000,000 to nearly \$11,000,000. However, the twelve days' annual drill which was permitted did not allow much more than the teaching of the simplest rudiments. The result was that when the First World War broke out Canada had available no force capable of playing an immediate active part; she had, however, a foundation upon which an important structure could be built.

A series of Imperial Conferences had made improved arrangements for military co-operation within the Empire. The Colonial Conference of 1907 and the Defence Conference of 1909 witnessed considerable advances. Several of the Dominions, and particularly Canada, were doubtful of proposals that they should earmark definite contingents for use in a future crisis; but there was agreement upon maintaining general uniformity throughout the Empire in matters of war organization, armament and equipment, training doctrine, etc. This was very sound policy in the circumstances of the day, and it paid large dividends in 1914. Approval was given also to the principle of an Imperial General Staff, branches of which would exist in all the self-governing nations of the Empire.

Officers throughout the Empire performing General Staff duties were to be members of this one body, while however remaining responsible to and under the control of their own governments. This arrangement, though it did not become permanent, is commemorated by the title still held by the senior soldier in Great Britain: Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

In one respect Canada had already strayed from the principle of uniformity of armament. Her forces had adopted the Ross rifle in 1902. The chief reason for adopting it, and the best one, was that it offered the prospect of rifles for the Militia being manufactured in Canada. The possibility of having the British Lee-Enfield so manufactured was investigated but the company concerned refused the government's overtures and in consequence a contract was made for production in Canada of the Ross. The latter proved an excellent target weapon but in 1915 it showed itself inferior to the new short Lee-Enfield under service conditions. The Canadian forces overseas were re-armed with the Lee-Enfield in 1916.*

The closer links with the British forces evident in this period appear

* *The complicated story of the Ross rifle is told in detail in Appendix III to Colonel A. F. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, General Series, Vol. 1 (Ottawa, 1938).*

in visits to Canada by two eminent British soldiers, Sir John French (1910) and Sir Ian Hamilton (1913). These officers held the appointment of Inspector General of Overseas Forces and visited Canada by invitation. One result of Sir John French's report was the reorganization of the Militia in Eastern Canada on a divisional basis (six divisions and four mounted brigades), on the principle of providing in peacetime an organization that could be used in war. The Divisions replaced the six eastern Military Districts; in the west the Districts continued to exist and the highest formation was the brigade. It may be noted that in 1905 a move in the direction of higher organization had been taken when the Districts in Eastern Canada were grouped into four "Commands" for training and administrative purposes. These were now abolished.

On the eve of the outbreak of war in August 1914 the Non-Permanent Active Militia was at the greatest strength Canada's citizen force has ever possessed in a time of peace. Fully 59,000 troops carried out training that year, and "had the war not broken out, the number would have reached 64,000". Over 34,000 trained in camps. At Petawawa, which had been acquired as a central training camp in 1905, approximately 10,000 were assembled for training under conditions said to have corresponded more closely to

active service than in any manoeuvres since the Fenian troubles.

Until the twentieth century the defence forces of Canada had been, in the main, land forces only, and such naval militia as had existed at various times was administered by the Militia Department. There was, of course, no air force, for heavier-than-air flying began only in 1903. However, some contribution by Canada to naval defence became a matter of urgent discussion early in the new century, and in 1910 Parliament passed the Naval Service Act which was the origin of the Royal Canadian Navy. The Navy was controlled by a Minister of the Naval Service who was also Minister of Marine and Fisheries; this arrangement lasted until 1922. Two old cruisers were purchased from the Admiralty as training ships, but political controversy turning on the question of a national fleet versus a contribution to the Royal Navy militated against any large progress, and the force was still in its infancy when war came. The first aeroplane flight in Canada took place in 1909; in the same year demonstrations were given at Petawawa for the Militia Council; however, no Canadian military flying service was organized until after war broke out.*

The First World War

* In the United Kingdom the Royal Flying Corps was organized in Jars, its nucleus being the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers.

The First World War, 1914-18, was in many respects the most important episode in Canadian history. That it had the effect of greatly enhancing Canada's national status was very largely due to the size of the forces the country raised and the importance of their contribution in the field.

Before the outbreak of war a mobilization scheme was in existence. In addition to plans for the general mobilization of the Militia, there was a plan for providing one division and one mounted brigade for service abroad. However, on 31 July 1914, on Sir Sam Hughes' instructions, orders were sent out voiding this scheme and enjoining consideration of plans on a new basis. In fact, the First Canadian Contingent, which was offered by the Canadian Government even before Britain's declaration of war, was organized by the rather peculiar procedure of direct communication between Militia Headquarters in Ottawa and the 226 individual units of the Militia, bypassing the Divisions and Districts. This arrangement might have led to chaos, but the abounding energy of the Minister of Militia and the enthusiasm of the units and the country at large produced a rapid and valuable result even by these means. The British Government had suggested a force of one division. By 18 August volunteers for overseas service were arriving at the

designated concentration centre at Valcartier, and by 8 September over 32,000 men had been collected there. The 1st Canadian Division, sailing in an impressive convoy of 31 transports, left Gaspé Basin on 3 October and entered Plymouth Sound eleven days later.

The units of the Canadian Expeditionary Force were new units raised for the occasion, although after some discussion the point was satisfactorily established that they were units of the Canadian Militia. The infantry units of the C.E.F. were, in general, numbered battalions not wearing the badges of pre-war militia regiments, though there were a few exceptions to this rule, notably in the case of the one Permanent Force infantry unit, The Royal Canadian Regiment. The procedure followed in 1914 was that individual militia regiments were called upon to provide volunteers for the C.E.F. units being raised in their areas. A good many of the men enlisted into the new units came from the public and had had no training. The vast majority of the officers, however, had held commissions in the Non-Permanent Active Militia.

The immature state of Canada and Canada's military organization in 1914 was reflected in the fact that an officer of the British regular army (Lieutenant-General E. A. H. Alderson) was appointed to com-

mand the 1st Canadian Division. When the Canadian Corps was formed in France in September 1915, Alderson became its commander; and only in June 1917 was a Canadian, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, a pre-war officer of the N.P.A.M. who had been given a brigade of the 1st Division in 1914, appointed to command the Corps. And all through the war virtually every first-grade staff officer in the Corps was a British regular.

The one division raised in 1914 was the nucleus of a formidable force. When the Canadian Corps was first formed it had a strength of only two divisions, but in August 1916 it reached its full strength of four divisions, each of three brigades of four battalions. In 1918 a proposal was made for reorganizing the Corps. At this time the British Army, faced with a serious crisis in reinforcements, reduced its infantry brigades from four battalions to three. The suggestion was that Canada should follow suit and convert the existing Corps of four divisions into an Army of two corps of three divisions each on the smaller establishment. General Currie successfully opposed this proposal. The Canadian brigades continued to consist of four battalions and the Corps organization was maintained. The result was that the Canadian Corps was far stronger, in the final stages of the war, than any comparable

British formation; it has been called "the most powerful self-contained striking force on any battlefield". The 5th Canadian Division, which had been formed in England, was broken up and used for reinforcements, except that its divisional artillery was brought to France and used to increase the artillery resources of the Canadian Corps.

In the beginning, and for the greater part of the war, all Canadian soldiers were volunteers, and the Corps was kept up to strength by voluntary enlistment. But in 1917 declining recruiting made compulsory service necessary, and Parliament passed the Military Service Act to provide for it. a measure excited much opposition, particularly in Quebec. Of the men actually sent overseas, only about eleven per cent were draftees, though the proportion would have increased had the war been prolonged. There was no reduction in the establishment of the Corps, and - unlike the five-division Australian Corps, whose strength was greatly reduced and which was withdrawn from the line, on its government's insistence, early in October 1918 - it remained in action to the end.

The Corps in Action

Of the Canadians' battles on the Western Front there is no need to speak at length here. The 1st Division entered the line in France in February 1915, and in the following

April, in the Second Battle of Ypres, it stood up to the first German gas attack. The withdrawal of troops on its left exposed its flank, but it hung on. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Sir John French, reported later, "In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences". Such was Canada's first appearance on European battle-fields. It was one of few important defensive actions the Canadians fought. Their normal role was that of assault troops, which in the trench warfare of the Western Front usually involved heavy losses.

The Canadians carried an increasing share of the battle burden on the British front as the war progressed. In April 1917 the Corps gave an impressive demonstration of its power and efficiency in the capture of Vimy Ridge; and in 1918, in the final epic "Hundred Days" that began with the great triumph in front of Amiens on 8 August and ended with the German surrender on 11 November, General Currie's Corps served to a large extent as the spearhead of the victorious British armies.

As the months passed a Canadian

national spirit moved more and more strongly in the Canadian Corps, and it was reflected in the actions and policy of the Corps Commander, who, like his country, grew steadily in stature under the stress of responsibility. It is true that, throughout, the Corps functioned as part of the British armies in France and was always under the operational command of a British Army Commander.* This was essential and was never questioned; nevertheless, in 1917-18 a growing autonomy was evident even in operational matters. It appears in the facts, attested by Sir Arthur Currie's biographer, concerning the attack on the Passchendaele Ridge in the autumn of 1917. This assault across a sea of liquid mud was a particularly formidable job; even the Australians and New Zealanders had failed to take the Ridge. Currie was asked to detach two divisions to attempt the operation. He replied that he would not accept the task except on the condition that the Corps would go as a whole. It is known too that he declined to serve under the Fifth Army. He was supported by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, who also saw to it that he was

* *On the other hand, "in matters of organization and administration, the Canadian Government ... retained full responsibility in respect to its own Forces", and in July 1913 a "Canadian Section" was formed at G.H.Q. British Armies in France to deal with these matters.*

given the time and the resources which he required for mounting the attack. The result was that the carefully-prepared offensive succeeded. The Ridge was taken by a succession of operations which followed the timetable almost exactly; though the cost was staggering.

Finally, in the spring of 1918, in the crisis occasioned by the last great German offensive, when Currie found that divisions were being taken from him to such an extent that the Canadian Corps was being broken up, he asserted himself effectively. As a result of his representations the Corps was reunited, and all four Canadian divisions remained under his command during the heavy fighting down to the Armistice. The record of those battles gives strong support to the view that Canadians fight most effectively as a united national force. Currie himself wrote after the war that the Canadian Corps, "while technically an army corps of the British Army, differed from other army corps in that it was an integral tactical unit, moving and fighting as a whole".

The Canadian effort in this war was enormous by any standard, and the cost in blood was great. In all, it is recorded, 619,636 men served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force; 424,589 all ranks went overseas; and 60,661 sacrificed their lives. In such fires as this are nations forged.

In the First World War Canada

had no air force of her own, though Sir Sam Hughes did authorize a tiny nucleus in 1914 and Canadian squadrons were being organized at the end. But about 24,000 Canadians, many of them first enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, served in the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Naval Air Service and (after its formation on 1 April 1918) the Royal Air Force; and more than 1500 of these lost their lives. At least a quarter of all the officers in the Imperial air forces were Canadians, and the individual quality of the country's fighting airmen was the very highest. The Royal Canadian Navy started the war at a disadvantage, with a very small existing force overshadowed by political wrangles. In 1914, when an informal inquiry was made of the British Admiralty as to whether it would recommend an expansion of Canadian naval forces, the reply favoured concentration on the army. Consequently, Canada's sea forces remained comparatively small. Nevertheless, at the Armistice they numbered over 5000 men. A large proportion served in the Atlantic Coast patrols, a force of small craft, mainly trawlers and drifters, which guarded Canadian ports and waters against the German submarines. At the end, the Royal Canadian Navy was operating 134 vessels, not including motor launches.

Throughout the war, however,

Canada's national effort had centered heavily upon her land forces and on the Western Front. Amid the blood and fire of that grim arena

was written a new chapter of Canadian history, proud, sorrowful and exalted.

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IV: The Canadian Army, 1919-1953

Between the Wars

Considering the tremendous effect of the First World War on almost all other departments of Canadian life, it is curious how little influence, on the whole, it had on Canada's military policies. It would almost seem that Canadians believed that this "war to end war" had really done so; for there was remarkably little interest in military matters in Canada for nearly twenty years after 1918. Broadly speaking, the country reverted to its pre-war defence policies, and even went further, maintaining the barest minimum of armed force.

A brief flurry of interest immediately after the Armistice was reflected in an amendment to the Militia Act, passed raising the maximum permitted strength of the Permanent Force from 5000 to 10,000. This policy, however, was never carried into practical effect, although in 1920 the force's strength rose to 4125 all ranks compared with 3000 before the war. The British Government presented Canada with several naval vessels; and in 1920 the Canadian Air Force was organized

(though on a nonprofessional basis) under the control of the Air Board, which was constituted under an act of 1919. But the economy axe fell in 1922, and the activities of all three services were curtailed thereafter. The Permanent Active Militia's strength was again reduced. The Royal Canadian Air Force* was finally placed upon a solid basis, with permanent, non-permanent and reserve components, in 1924; but its work for years afterwards was mainly on "civil government air operations". Most of the vessels of the Royal Canadian Navy were placed in reserve and its strength in men was materially reduced.

Steps were taken to preserve in the Militia the great traditions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Two new infantry regiments were added to the Permanent Force: Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, perpetuating the first Canadian combatant unit to reach France; and the Royal 22e Régiment, perpetuating the celebrated French-speaking

* The King had granted it the prefix "Royal" in 1923

unit of the C.E.F., the 22nd Battalion. But restricted establishments kept these units very small, and at no time between the two World Wars could the Permanent Force have put an effective infantry brigade in the field. Most of the war-time units were perpetuated in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. Perpetuations were accorded to Militia units on the basis of the volunteers they had provided for C.E.F. battalions, and in 1929 Battle Honours were awarded, where appropriate, to perpetuating units.

On paper the postwar establishment of the N.P.A.M. was imposing; it provided for eleven divisions and four cavalry divisions. This, however, had little practical meaning, for the actual strength of the force was considerably less than it had been before the war. In 1928, the number of men trained was only 34,000. The sums of money available for training were in fact somewhat smaller than before 1914. There were almost no purchases of new equipment, and the stocks left over from the war became increasingly obsolescent. No attempt was made to revive the pre-war divisional organization; the country was again divided into Military Districts whose headquarters controlled training and administration, and no field formation existed above brigade level.

There was however an important

change in military - administration during these years. In 1922 Parliament passed the Department of National Defence Act, which provided for the organization of a department of that name whose Minister was to be "charged with all matters relating to defence, including the Militia, the Military, Naval, and Air Services of Canada". Thus all the defence services came under the control of one minister, who directed the work formerly supervised by the Department of Militia and Defence, the Department of the Naval Service, and the Air Board. This was a useful reform and probably produced a material increase in both efficiency and economy. It was the economy motive that the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, mainly emphasized in discussing the proposal in Parliament. It is probably fair to say that economy was the dominant consideration in the military policy of every Canadian government until after 1935.

The Department of National Defence Act came into effect at the beginning of 1923, and at that time a Defence Council, on which the Director of the Naval Service and the Director, R.C.A.F. had seats, replaced the old Militia Council. A short-lived and ineffective move was made in the direction of integration of the three services on the military as well as the political level. The Chief of the General Staff

was redesignated by order in council "Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence" and also became Inspector General of the Militia, Navy and Air Force. This arrangement was strongly resisted by the Director of the Naval Service* and may be said to have never become effective. It was abandoned in 1927, when the senior soldier's appointment was again styled "Chief of the General Staff".

As the years passed, expenditure on the three armed services gradually increased. It had fallen below \$13,500,000 in 1924-25. By 1930-31 the total disbursements of the Department of National Defence rose to about \$23,700,000. At this moment, however, the world depression, whose advent had been signalled by the Wall Street crash of October 1929, led to renewed drastic economies, and in 1932-33 the Department spent little more than \$14,000,000. In the later stages of the depression, un-employment relief funds financed a number of construction projects of military importance, but little was done for the forces themselves.

Rearmament and Reorganisation

About 1935, under the influence

* *This appointment was changed to "Chief of the Naval Staff" in 1928. The Director, R.C.A.F. (redesignated Senior Air Officer in 1932) reported through the Chief of the General Staff until 1938, when he was made directly responsible to the Minister of National Defence and his appointment was denominated "Chief of the Air Staff"*

of a world situation which was deteriorating daily, the Canadian people and their representatives in Parliament again began to take an interest in defence. Hitler had been in control of Germany since 1933; Japan had been engaged in aggression against China since 1931. A very modest programme of rearmament was adopted in 1936.

In the new plan the Air Force was given the highest priority and the Navy came second, with the Militia third. This reflected the fact that the programme was presented as primarily one of home defence. This in turn reflected the fact that Canadian government policy at this period, when public opinion appeared to be divided as to what course Canada should follow in the event of another war, was based on "no commitments" in advance of an actual crisis. The Army aspect which received most consideration was coast defence, and the Pacific coast got most attention. In spite of the low priority given the Militia, the actual funds available to it increased materially during the pre-war years, and the general condition of the force improved in proportion. The total expenditure of the Department of National Defence rose to nearly \$35,000,000 in 1938-39; the Militia's share was about \$15,700,000. It had had \$17,200,000 the year before, which compared favourably with \$8,700,000 at the depth of the de-

pression.

In September 1938 came the "Munich Crisis", which forced even the most optimistic to realize how serious was the danger of war and how unlikely it was that Canada could stand aside if war came. The shock was reflected in the defence estimates for 1939-40, which rose to about \$64,500,000 for the three services. But these appropriations, authorized in the spring of 1939, came too late to have much effect before Hitler launched his war.

The whole defence programme encountered very serious difficulties in the matter of supply, and it became evident that a country which over a long period has maintained very small forces and no defence industry to speak of cannot greatly improve its defences at short notice merely by spending more money. Canada had no armament industry,* and the British factories which were her traditional sources of supply were working to capacity under Britain's own rearmament plan. Accordingly, the choice was either to develop production facilities in

Canada or wait for weapons and equipment from England. In either case there would be a long delay. Not a great deal was done before the outbreak of war to develop Canadian production, although an important contract was let for the manufacture of Bren guns. A good many small orders were placed in Britain, but not much material was delivered before the war began.

In 1936 the Militia underwent important changes in organization. It had long been recognized that the existing organization made little sense. The paper establishment of 11 divisions and four cavalry divisions was absurdly inflated, and moreover the force was not properly balanced: it contained too many infantry and cavalry units in proportion to the artillery and the other technical arms and the services. It was now reorganized on a theoretical basis of six divisions and one cavalry division (though these divisions were not actually formed); the number of cavalry and infantry units was reduced, that of units of other arms and services increased. Features of the new organization were the first appearance of armoured units - although the Canadian Armoured Corps did not come into being until 1940 - and the triumph of mechanization. Except in the cavalry, where he got a very brief reprieve, the horse virtually disappeared from the establishment. But

* *Although the country had made a large industrial contribution in the First World War it was mainly in the manufacture of shells. No weapons were made except Ross rifles. In the Second World War it was to be different. A great variety of weapons were manufactured, and in great quantity. It should be noted however that the absence of a prewar armament industry resulted in Canadian arms production not reaching its peak until 1943*

for the present, unfortunately, the tank battalions had no tanks and the "mechanized" units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia had no vehicles.

The state of the Militia in 1939 can be briefly described. Its actual strength had not greatly increased. The Permanent Force numbered only a little over 4000 men; the Non-Permanent Active Militia's strength was about 51,000 - less than in 1914, though the country's population had grown greatly in the interim. Larger appropriations, however, had lately helped raise the standard of training; 46,521 all ranks trained in 1938-39 as compared with 39,175 in 1934-35, and there was a particularly large increase in camp training and attendance at schools of instruction. The equipment was still in the main that of 1918. At the outbreak of war the Militia possessed exactly four modern anti-aircraft guns and four anti-tank guns. Its armoured component had fourteen light tanks, almost all of which had just been received.

The Second World War

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Although Great Britain did not declare war until 3 September, nor Canada until 10 September, the Canadian Government decided to carry out partial mobilization at once. Precautionary action for protecting vulnerable

points and manning coast defences had already been ordered on 25 August. Now the Mobile Force of two divisions and ancillary troops contemplated in the pre-war defence scheme was ordered to mobilize. No corps headquarters was formed at this time. Later in September the Government decided to send one division overseas, the intention being that it should take its place in due course alongside the British forces which were beginning to move to France. The 1st Canadian Division, commanded by Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, arrived in the United Kingdom in December 1939.

Unlike the C.E.F. of 1914-18, the force mobilized in 1939 was mainly composed of service battalions or regiments of existing units of the Militia, wearing familiar titles and badges. In contrast with the 1914 policy also, there was no question in 1939 of employing British commanders or staff officers. To a considerable extent, Canada's own Permanent Force provided for her expanded wartime army the personnel which the British Army had found for the Canadian formations of the First World War.

In common with other Allied countries, Canada did not begin to exert a really massive effort until the disasters in Norway, France and the Low Countries in the spring and

summer of 1940 demonstrated how dire was the crisis. The Army* was now greatly expanded, a 3rd and then a 4th Division being mobilized. In 1941 an armoured division was raised and was subsequently designated the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. In 1942 the 4th Division was converted into an armoured division for overseas service. The Canadian field force in Britain was steadily built up until by the end of 1942 it had reached nearly its final stage of development. A Canadian Corps had been formed in December 1940. In the spring of 1942 the First Canadian Army came into existence, with Lieutenant-General McNaughton as G.O.C.-in-C. Ultimately the overseas force amounted to an Army Headquarters, two Corps Headquarters, three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, two independent armoured brigades, and a great number of ancillary units.

Although the attacks upon Canadian soil which had been widely foretold before the war never materialized, it was thought necessary to maintain considerable forces for home defence, particularly after Japan entered the conflict in December 1941. In July 1941 the Government had authorized forming for home-defence purposes the three

brigade groups of a 6th Division. Now, in March 1942, this division was completed and two more divisions, the 7th and 8th, were formed. Two of the three home-defence divisions were stationed on the Pacific Coast. They continued to exist until the autumn of 1943, when the tide in the Pacific had turned and the Japanese had been expelled from the Aleutian Islands. Two of the divisions were then disbanded and the third reduced.

The Army in Action

The experiences of the Army in the Second World War differed widely from those in the First. In particular, it was a long time before the Canadians got into action. Although it had been assumed that they would join the British Expeditionary Force in France, the Allied defeat in the campaign of 1940 and the expulsion of British forces from the Continent intervened before the 1st Canadian Division could take the field. One brigade reached France only to be withdrawn. Thereafter the main Canadian field force found itself for a long period helping to protect the United Kingdom. This was an important task, particularly in 1940-41 when the shadow of invasion hung over the English beaches; but it began to pall after the German attack on Russia in 1941 rendered invasion much less likely. The Canadian Army Over-

* The designation "Canadian Army" was substituted in the autumn of 1940 for the time-honoured but now less appropriate term "Militia".

seas fought its first battle only on 19 August 1942, when two brigades of the 2nd Division, with some other troops, supported by large naval and air forces, raided Dieppe. The casualties were very heavy, and the town was not taken; but the lessons learned helped to lay the foundation for the successful assault in Normandy in June 1944.

Canadian troops were not committed to a protracted campaign until July 1943, when the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade took part in the assault on Sicily. They were sent to the Mediterranean at the request of the Canadian Government, which felt that it was important to end the Army's long inaction and give part of it at least some battle experience. Later in the year the 1st Division and 1st Army Tank Brigade saw action on the Italian mainland and took Ortona after desperate fighting. The Canadian force in the Mediterranean was augmented at this time by the arrival of Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps, Corps Troops and the 5th Armoured Division. The Corps came into action in the spring of 1944. It played an important part in the Liri Valley offensive which produced the capture of Rome, and again in the autumn in the heavy fighting which broke the Gothic Line and led to the capture of Rimini and Ravenna. Temporary and special circumstances had led

the Canadian Government to depart from the traditional Canadian policy of concentration, but it now desired a reunion of its forces overseas under a single command; and both the Government and the troops were glad when early in 1945 it was possible to move the 1st Corps to North-West Europe, where it came under the command of General H. D. G. Crerar, who had commanded the First Canadian Army since March 1944.

The departure of the 1st Corps for Italy to fight as part of the British Eighth Army had left the Canadian Army in England with only one corps, three divisions and an independent armoured brigade. The result was that during the greater part of the eleven-month campaign in North-West Europe beginning in June 1944 the majority of the formations serving under General Crerar were non-Canadian. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade took part in the famous assault on the coast of Normandy on 6 June, fighting under the 1st British Corps. The 2nd Canadian Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds, came into action during July; and in the same month Headquarters First Canadian Army took over the extreme leftward sector of the Allied front, which it never afterwards relinquished. It fought throughout as part of Field-Marshal Montgomery's

21st Army Group, which also included the Second British Army and at times an American army as well.

In the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead in August 1944, and the battle of the Falaise Gap which followed, the First Canadian Army played a great part and paid a heavy price for victory. It pursued the defeated Germans through Northern France and Belgium to the Scheldt, taking the Channel Ports by storm, and subsequently had the task of clearing the Scheldt Estuary and opening the great inland port of Antwerp. This was done in a month of bloody fighting which ended early in November. In February 1945 the Canadian Army, with several British divisions under command, drove south-east to clear the corridor between the Rhine and Maas Rivers and prepare the way for crossing the Rhine. This task was completed by 10 March, again at great cost; but the damage inflicted upon the German Army in this Battle of the Rhineland was such as to preclude its offering very effective opposition in the later fighting east of the Rhine.

In the initial Rhine crossing on 23 March only a few Canadian units were committed, but the main force shortly came into action again and advanced astride the Dutch-German frontier. Lieut.-General C. Foulkes' 1st Canadian Corps from Italy, coming in on the left, drove the Ger-

mans back into the Western Netherlands. The 2nd Corps, pushing northward, cleared Northern Holland. In North-West Germany the enemy still fought bitterly as he retreated, and the Canadians remained in action until the German surrender became effective on the morning of 5 May 1945. At this time the First Canadian Army's line stretched from the lower Rhine almost to Bremen, and eight divisions (five Canadian, two British, and one Polish) were fighting under its command.

In the war in the Pacific the Canadian Army played only a small part, for the main field force had been built up in the United Kingdom before Japan attacked. In the autumn of 1941 the British Government asked for two battalions from Canada to reinforce the garrison of Hong Kong. They arrived there just three weeks before the Japanese attack in December and lost heavily during the brave defence which came to its inevitable end on Christmas Day. In 1942 the Japanese invaded the Aleutian Islands, and the Canadian Army gave some assistance in evicting them the following year. A Canadian brigade group formed part of the military force directed against the island of Kiska, but when the assault troops landed it was found that the Japanese had withdrawn.

It seemed likely that a final at-

tack on the Japanese home islands would be necessary, and arrangements were made for a Canadian division to take part. This formation was to be organized on American lines and serve under United States higher command. However, it never went into action. Japan had been seeking a way out of the war ever since hostilities ended in Europe, and in August 1945 the use against her of a terrible new weapon, the atomic bomb, hastened the end. She surrendered a few days later, before the organization of the Canadian Army Pacific Force was complete.

During this war the Army followed in the footsteps of the Canadian Corps of the First World War. As in the earlier conflict, the Canadian formations served under British higher command in operations, almost, though not quite, as though they had been British themselves. However, in matters of organization and administration, including discipline, Canadian autonomy was complete. As in the First World War also, all Canadian overseas soldiers were volunteers for a long period. The European crisis of 1940, however, led to the enactment of the National Resources Mobilization Act, which provided for compulsory service for home defence, and from then onwards considerable numbers of men were called up. In 1942 a national plebiscite authorized the extension of compulsory service to

the overseas field, but N.R.M.A. soldiers were not actually sent overseas until a shortage of infantry reinforcements developed late in 1944.

During the Second World War 630,052 Canadians, including 25,251 women, served in the Active Army, in addition to 100,573 called up under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Approximately 370,000 all ranks of the Army served overseas in the European zone; while some 2,800 served in the Pacific war zone, apart from the 5,300 engaged in the Kiska operation. The Army's fatal casualties numbered 22,917.

In the Second World War, unlike the First, Canada maintained large naval and air forces of her own; in 1940, Parliament authorized what amounted to separate departments of government to control these services. Nearly 250,000 Canadians served in the Royal Canadian Air Force and about 106,000 in the Naval forces. Both services played distinguished parts and suffered heavy losses. The Air Force had more fatal casualties than the Army in proportion to its strength. The Army thus no longer enjoyed the near-monopoly of the national effort which it had had in 1914-18; and yet it still maintained a certain primacy. Not only was it far the largest of the services; it was also in a definite sense the most national.

The Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy both found their identities submerged to some extent in the British services with which they fought. But the Army served under Canadian command up to the Army Headquarters level; and as in the previous war many of the public saw in it the embodiment of the national spirit.

Cold War and Korea

Canadian military policy after the Second World War showed a marked contrast with that pursued after the First. It would seem that the people of Canada had now decided that peace would not be secure without organized forces to protect it. At any rate, Canada after 1945 did not reduce her armed forces to insignificance, as she had done after 1918.

An important factor in producing the new policy was a change in attitude towards commitments abroad. The policy of "no commitments" was replaced by readiness to join with other nations in organizing collective defence. This found expression in Canada's attitude to the United Nations after that organization was set up in 1945, but still more strikingly in her advocacy of a North Atlantic alliance and her signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. By that treaty the signatory nations, twelve in number at first and including Britain and the United

States as well as Canada, bound themselves to consider an armed attack against any of them an attack against them all; and they agreed to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". This was a reaction to the advance of militant Communism, which had appeared particularly in the coup d'état which brought a Communist government to power in Czechoslovakia early in 1948.

The establishments fixed for the Canadian armed services in the period immediately after the war provided for larger regular forces than ever before. The regular strength of the Army was tentatively fixed in 1946 at about 25,000 men. This permitted the maintenance of a small but effective mobile striking force, a brigade group in strength, always ready for action—something Canada had never had before. At the same time it provided for headquarters staffs, training establishments, personnel to assist the administration and training of the Reserve Force, and the miscellaneous units essential to the functioning of a modern army. As for the Reserve Force (the former Non-Permanent Active Militia), the 1946 plan provided for "six divisions, four armoured brigades and selected corps and army troops for an Army of two corps, together with coast-defence and anti-aircraft units". The country

was divided into five Commands, whose headquarters could serve as divisional headquarters in emergency, with subordinate Areas for local administration.

A feature of the post-war programme was increased integration of the three fighting services. In 1946 Canada returned to the system, in abeyance since 1940, by which a single Minister controlled all three services. The arrangements for the training of officer cadets were unified. In 1948 the Royal Military College at Kingston and the former Naval College at Royal Roads, B.C., began to work as joint services colleges, producing officers for the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. A third cadet college, primarily for French-speaking students, was set up at St. Jean, P.Q., in 1952. In 1950 a consolidated National Defence Act replaced the separate statutes governing the three fighting forces, and provided, among other matters, a uniform code of discipline for them. Early in 1951 a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was appointed, with the duty of coordinating the three forces' operations and training.

The expenditure of the Department of National Defence as a whole fell from the wartime peak (\$2,938,000,000 in 1944-45) to about \$196,000,000 in 1947-48; but under the influence of the danger-

ous international situation dubbed the "Cold War" and the new responsibilities accepted through the North Atlantic Treaty, it immediately began to rise again. In 1951 a greatly expanded defence programme was adopted; it was estimated to cost about \$5,000,000,000 during the next three years. The following year the programme was further enlarged. The defence estimates for 1952-53 amounted to \$2,001,725,000. As in the 1936 programme, there was heavy emphasis on the Air Force in the new one.

These developments were largely due to the Korean War, which broke out in June 1950. The United Nations, under the leadership of the United States, rallied to defend South Korea against invasion by the Communist North. Canada, in addition to providing a small naval force and a contribution to the Pacific airlift, raised for service in Korea an infantry brigade group basically composed of second battalions of the three Active Force infantry regiments then existing. One battalion was sent to Korea shortly, and the whole brigade group was there by the spring of 1951. That summer it was incorporated in the 1st Commonwealth Division which was then formed.

The Canadians gave a good account of themselves among the razor-back hills of Korea. There is no

need to give details here. In November 1950, when it appeared that the United Nations were winning a decisive victory, Communist China intervened and pushed their forces back. But the Chinese were held and pushed back in their turn, and the war turned into a stalemate. In July 1951, truce negotiations began. Fighting while they continued was usually limited to relatively minor operations. Losses also continued, however; and in the autumn of 1952 and spring of 1953 there were fierce local actions. By 27 July 1953, when at long last a truce was signed, the Canadians had suffered a total of 1543 battle casualties, of which 309 had been fatal. The small war in Korea had become the third most costly overseas conflict in Canada's history.

While Canadian soldiers were fighting in Korea, others were moving to Europe to join the armies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An infantry brigade group was raised for this purpose, largely through the agency of Reserve Force units, in the spring of 1951. It arrived in Germany later in the year and took up quarters in the British Zone.

As a result of these events, the Army's strength greatly increased. For the first time in history, except for the periods of the two World Wars, the regular force outnumbered the citizen force. At 31 March

1954 the strength of the Active Force was 49,978 all ranks and that of the Reserve Force 46,506. The contrast with the situation before 1939 was remarkable, and it was clear that there had been what amounted to a revolution in Canadian defence policy. Particularly striking was the change in the attitude of the public. A people who traditionally had been very unwilling to do much in the way of military preparation in time of peace had clearly learned a great deal from the hard experience of two World Wars.

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CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES

1690-1945

SIR WILLIAM PHIPS' ATTACK ON QUEBEC

1690

The campaign that took place around the infant city of Quebec in the autumn of 1690 is a small episode in Canadian history but not without significance. It was one of the earliest occasions when the military forces of Canada were in action on a considerable scale. Although a fairly large force of French regulars was present, the actual fighting was almost all done by Canadian militiamen under their own officers. And there are definite military lessons to be learned even from these minor actions which took place over two and a half centuries ago.

The Background of the Attack

The year 1689 saw the beginning of the series of conflicts between Britain and France which is sometimes called the Second Hundred Years' War. In that year the War of the League of Augsburg (called by Americans King William's War) broke out in Europe. Inevitably it was fought on the western as well as the eastern side of the Atlantic, and French and English colonists were soon at each other's throats in a struggle which was embittered by

the religious hatreds existing between Puritan New England and Roman Catholic New France.

It was fortunate for the French colony that this same year 1689 saw the return as Governor of the old but formidable veteran Count Frontenac,* perhaps the stoutest defender it ever had. During the winter of 1689-90 Frontenac sent out three war parties - over the snow against the frontiers of the English colonies. The blows struck by these expeditions goaded New England and New York into making a great effort to clear the French from America. In 1690 they produced a grand design for an attack upon New France and in particular upon the centre of French power, the town of Quebec.

The English colonies were far stronger than New France in population and in wealth. Luckily for the French, however, the English were disunited and full of mutual jealousy. In these circumstances, the courage, sound leadership and effective or-

* He was now 69. He had served a previous term as Governor, 1672-82.

ganization of the French community enabled it to resist its aggressive and numerous neighbours not only in 1690, but for two generations afterwards. Its autocratic system of government, while certainly adverse to the progress of the colony in the long run, was favourable to military efficiency. When at last New France fell it was not the American colonies that conquered it, but a great armament dispatched from England, backed and transported by the Royal Navy.

The English colonies' plan for the campaign of 1690 was conceived on lines similar to those followed with success seventy years later; but the military resources of the colonies at this time were unequal to carrying out such a great conception. The intention was to make a double attack. A land expedition was to move up the line of the Hudson River and Lake Champlain against Montreal; while, simultaneously, a seaborne force was to sail up the St. Lawrence and attack Quebec. The command of this latter enterprise was given to Sir William Phips, a "rude sailor" who owed his reputation and his knighthood to his success in salvaging the cargo of a wrecked Spanish treasure galleon, and had little military experience. Phips' attempt to carry out the scheme produced one of the most dramatic episodes in the early history of Canada.

Frontenac Prepares for Defence

Count Frontenac, anticipating the attack, had taken steps to strengthen Quebec. At this time the place was far from being the fortress which it later became. There was a small fort in the Upper Town and a few guns mounted; and the cliffs gave the town good natural protection on two of its three sides, fronting the St. Lawrence and St. Charles rivers. But the side looking south and west towards the open country was completely unprotected, and Frontenac now fortified it for the first time. The defences which he provided here consisted of "palisades and small stone redoubts at intervals;" they were obviously not much more than fieldworks. They did not enclose any part of the great hump of Cape Diamond, the site of the modern Citadel, on which there were no buildings at this time. Frontenac says in his report that he felt "unpresentiment" that it was very important to get on with this work, and it was nearly finished when on 31 July 1690 the Governor left Quebec for Montreal, evidently to take measures to resist the expected overland attack. As it turned out, the English expedition against Montreal came to practically nothing. Internal quarrels among the colonists themselves and inadequate preparations combined with a timely onslaught of smallpox to defeat it. The main

body never got beyond Lake George, and the only blow struck was a hit-and-run raid by a small party on La Prairie, across the St. Lawrence from Montreal, on 4 September.

Phips' expedition by sea was a more formidable threat. However, it was launched far too late in the season. Phips had devoted the spring to a successful expedition against Port Royal in Acadia; and the Quebec enterprise was held up in the hope of getting help, in the form of arms and ammunition, from the home government in England. But that government was fighting a war in Ireland, and sent no assistance. Only on 9 August did Phips' fleet finally set sail from Hull, near Boston. It consisted of from 30 to 34 ships (different accounts vary slightly) with more than 2000 men on board. The troops were Massachusetts militia; the ships were not war vessels, and only four of them were of any size. Unlike the later colonial expedition which took Louisbourg in 1745, this one got no assistance from the Royal Navy; and no British regular troops were involved. At this period, although France maintained an effective regular force in Canada, the only English troops in America were a few inefficient independent garrison companies. Both French and English colonies had militia systems based on the obligation of universal service.

Phips made a very slow voyage. He was hampered, in his own words, "by bad weather and contrary winds," and had no pilot to show him the way up the St. Lawrence. He arrived at Tadoussac on 3 October. (The English called this date 23 September, for they were still using the Old Style calendar.) The squadron did not reach the Isle of Orleans until 15 October, and it anchored close below Quebec only on the 16th. This dilatory approach had robbed Phips of his best hope of an easy victory, for when he entered the river Frontenac was still in Montreal. On 10 October a report that a hostile fleet had sailed from Boston led him to set out for Quebec. The next day he heard that the enemy ships had actually been sighted in the St. Lawrence. Frontenac paused just long enough to send orders to Callières, the Governor of Montreal, to follow him to Quebec with all his troops except a small garrison, and to collect as many as possible of the militia on the way; then he pushed on by canoe, through a violent storm, to the capital. He reached it on the morning of 14 October, when Phips was still seven leagues away.

Frontenac's arrival raised the spirits of garrison and people, and he himself tells how "la resolution et la gayeté" shone in the faces of the inhabitants as they made their preparations. The Governor was de, lighted

to find that during the past few days the Town Major of Quebec, Prévost, had greatly improved the batteries and other defences. A map prepared, probably the following year, by the engineer Robert de Villeneuve indicates that, all told, there were 23 cannon mounted by the time Phips appeared. Six of these were in two batteries in the Lower Town, and three were emplaced to cover the crossing of the St. Charles River. Quebec was still not especially strong, but it was stronger now than ever before; and with nearly 3000 fighters to defend it, as it had after Callières came marching down St. Louis Street with his merry men from the upper country on the evening of 17 October, it proved more than equal to beating off the amateur warriors of New England.

Phips Before Quebec

On the morning of the 16th took place the famous episode of the flag of truce. Phips sent to Frontenac a letter (carefully composed by the expedition's four chaplains) demanding the surrender of Quebec. The messenger was one Major Thomas Savage.* The New England accounts call him "young Thomas

Savage," evidently to distinguish him from his father, another Major Thomas Savage, for he was a man of 50. The reception he got is a part of Canadian legend, but unlike many legends it is fully supported by the evidence of the people who were there. The emissary, blindfolded, was led up to Fort St. Louis, where he found himself, as reported later in a letter written by James Lloyd, a Boston merchant, "in a stately Hall" full of brave Martial men. He proceeded to present the ultimatum, which demanded an answer within an hour. But the menaces concocted by the Puritan men of God did not have the effect Phips had hoped for. Frontenac told Savage proudly that he would not keep him waiting as long as an hour; he did not recognize the new King (William III) in whose name the English came; and neither he nor his officers had any intention of surrendering Quebec. When Savage asked for a written answer, the Governor made the haughty reply that has been familiar to generations of schoolboys: "No! I have no answer for your General save from the mouths of my cannon and from my musketry; let him learn that this is not the way to summon a man like me. Let him do his best, and I shall do mine." The New Englander was taken back to his boat and reported to his commander. If Lloyd is to be

* *The letter has been preserved and is published in Parkman. Although Savage wrote an account of the campaign, which has also been preserved, he makes no mention of his mission to Frontenac. His impressions of the incident would have been interesting!*

believed, Frontenac's bold attitude "startled" Phips' men, for they had been "preached to other things."

However, an English council of war had prepared, or now prepared a plan of attack, which is described both by Savage and by Major John Walley, the second-in-command of the expedition. Like the planners of the raid on Dieppe in 1942, the Massachusetts men confronted a fortified town and a formidable coast; like them, they were faced with the choice between a frontal attack and encirclement from the flanks; and like them they tried to combine the two. The scheme adopted was to land the main body of the troops on the section of the Beauport shore called La Canardière, across the St. Charles east of the city. The landing force was then to advance across the St. Charles, which was fordable, with the help of the fleet's boats, which were also to bring in the field guns and land them on the Quebec side of the St. Charles. Walley writes;

... it was also agreed that, when we were over the river, the men of war were to sail up with the town, and when they perceived we were upon the hill, especially if we then fired a house, they were then to land 200 men under their guns, and were to make a brisk and resolute charge to enter the town; also agreed that Shute and others of the larger vessels that were not men of war, were to go beyond the town, that the enemy might think we had another army to land there...

The weakness of this plan was that it was too complicated for the untrained and inexperienced forces

that had to carry it out. It required a degree of co-ordination between the force afloat and that ashore to which the New Englanders' discipline was not equal.

The Fighting on Shore

The English continued to act slowly. Nothing was done on the 16th, and on the 17th bad weather prevented a landing. Finally, on the 18th, the militia were put ashore on La Canardière without meeting any immediate resistance. Major Walley, who commanded the landing force, says that it numbered between 1200 and 1300 men.

Count Frontenac had a definite plan, which he outlines in his dispatch to the Minister of Marine. Although he had three French regular battalions he did not propose to send them into the broken country beyond the St. Charles. This area, he says, was "impracticable for large bodies of troops, because of the woods, the rocks and the mud [of the foreshore] ... and suitable only for little platoons skirmishing in the Indian way, which our soldiers are not capable of doing." Frontenac was obviously no Braddock. But he had other troops well fitted for guerrilla work "our Canadian officers and other volunteers, and the people of the country, along with those French officers and soldiers who had already become used to this sort of thing." Among the

"Canadian officers" present were at least two of the eleven famous Le-Moyne brothers, native Canadians who deserve a high place on the roster of Canadian fighting men. One of them, Jacques, Sieur de Sainte-Hélène - the seigneur of St. Helen's Island - was to be the great hero of the defence. Frontenac planned to use his local irregulars to harass the New England landing party. His main battle, however, he intended to fight on the open ground on the Quebec side of the St. Charles, which was more suitable for European tactics. The river could be forded only at low water, and Frontenac hoped that the New Englanders would come at him across it. Then, with the stream rising behind them, he planned to attack them with his brigade of regulars, drive them downhill into the St. Charles and destroy them completely. It was a sound plan, designed to make the best use of the forces at Frontenac's disposal; but as it turned out the invaders never made enough progress to give him the chance to put it fully into operation.

When Walley's men landed Frontenac sent out the militia of Montreal and Three Rivers, under Ste-Hélène, to help the Beauport men and the local Indians harry them. As soon as the English began to move inland they came under fire from among the trees and bushes, and

although they advanced some distance they lost fairly heavily (according to Walley, four killed and not less than 60 wounded) and soon camped for the night. They expected the ships' boats to come in with the tide before dawn to help them cross the St. Charles, but they were disappointed, the shipmasters blaming the wind for the failure. But the six cannon, which the plan required should be put ashore west of the St. Charles, were prematurely landed, without Walley being warned, close to his camp. He had no means of getting them across the river.

Phips' whole scheme was falling apart. There is no evidence that the proposed feint above the town was ever made; and on the evening of the 18th Phips himself took action quite contrary to the plan. The four large ships, not waiting for Walley's men to cross the St. Charles, moved up the river, anchored before Quebec and opened fire. The batteries replied, and firing went on until after dark. Early the next morning the cannonade was resumed. The ships went in close ("within musquett shott," says Phips) and the six big guns in the Lower Town bore the brunt of the action. Ste-Hélène had come back to the city and was laying the guns in one of the batteries. The English were forced to break off the action on the 19th after several hours' firing, when their ships, and particularly

Phips' flagship, the Six Friends, had been seriously damaged. They had shot away most of their scanty supply of ammunition without doing much harm to the solid stone buildings of Quebec or inflicting any casualties worth mentioning.

In the meantime, the New England landing force had remained inactive and made no attempt to exploit such diversion as the bombardment provided. The men suffered greatly from cold (winter was coming on early) and lack of essential supplies (the shortage of rum seems to have been the main complaint); and there was smallpox in the camp. The fleet's boats still did not come; and on the night of the 19th a council of war decided to recommend that the force re-embark on the night of the 20th, with a view to making another attack elsewhere after the troops were refreshed. On the morning of the 20th Walley went aboard the flagship and Phips reluctantly agreed to the suggestion.

On this day there was another skirmish. According to Monseignat, the author of one of the best French accounts, in the afternoon the English vanguard was seen marching along the bank of the St. Charles as though intending to cross. Frontenac now moved his regular battalions out to his chosen ground, formed them in order of battle and placed himself at their head. But the battle for which he had set the stage never

took place. No Englishman crossed the St. Charles. The incredibly active Ste-Hélène was now back on the Beauport side, leading and inspiring the Canadian skirmishers who were engaged with the head of the English column. This was his last fight, for in it he received a mortal wound from a musket ball. His brother Longueuil was wounded in the same affair, in which the French lost two other men killed.

The English boats came in shortly before dawn, but there was so little darkness left and his men were in such confusion that Walley thought it best to put off the evacuation until the next night. There was further minor fighting on the 21st, with Walley sending out parties of skirmishers to hold the French back. That night the boats appeared again, and the English force was evacuated without interference from the French, whose outposts did not even discover what was going on. Perhaps they would have done better if Ste-Hélène had still been on his feet. The English, as the result of some misunderstanding, left five of their six guns behind them. Lloyd quaintly says that they hoped to recover them next day, "but by that time they spoake french."

Frontenac had probably failed to fathom the enemy's intention to make an immediate evacuation. He had missed an opportunity for offensive action which might have

wiped out the landing force. It seems likely that in any case he continued to feel that his European troops were unfitted to an offensive movement in broken country, and feared that any attempt to use them in this manner might produce a disaster. He preferred to sit tight.

The English attempted nothing more. A council of war on the 22nd did not finally decide to abandon the attack, although many of the officers argued that their men were unfit for action, sickness being rampant. But on the 23rd and 24th an exchange of prisoners was arranged and effected, and the New England fleet then dropped down the river on its way back to Boston. Some of the ships never reached home, and many men who had survived the fighting died on the voyage. The failure of the expedition was a painful blow to Massachusetts, who had spent a great deal of money on fitting it out and was now obliged for the first time in her history to resort to an issue of paper currency. While Boston mourned, Quebec rejoiced. But the English retreat had come none too soon, for New France was short of food, and with almost all the able-bodied men in the country assembled at Quebec there would soon have been no way of feeding them.

Comments

The French had reason to be

proud of the manner in which they had met and repulsed the attack, but much of the explanation for the victory lies in the inefficiency of the New England force. The great Bostonian historian Parkman penned in 1877 what may be regarded as the best possible commentary: "Massachusetts had made her usual mistake. She had confidently believed that ignorance and inexperience could match the skill of a tried veteran, and that the rude courage of her fishermen and farmers could triumph without discipline or leadership... A trading republic, without trained officers, may win victories; but it wins them either by accident, or by an extravagant outlay in money and life."

Frontenac's defensive measures were well calculated. As we have said, the only serious allegation that can be made against him is that of over-caution. He repulsed the enemy, but because he did not feel equal to taking the offensive he did not destroy him. It must be said in Frontenac's favour that with the season so far advanced (when Phips appeared it was over a month later than the date of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759) the Governor had only to hold his position for a limited time, and the approach of winter would then inevitably drive the invaders away. All the same, he had a larger force than Phips', and it was of better quality;

and he had an opportunity, by running some risk, to strike a most telling blow at the English in America. We can admire his realistic recognition of the shortcomings of European-trained troops in American warfare; but did he not, perhaps, overdo it?

It may seem almost ludicrous to discuss this small episode, which sometimes verges on the comic, in terms of the Principles of War. Nevertheless, in this as in every action the operation of those principles can be observed.

The static defensive measures of Frontenac and Prévost made ample and most useful provision for *Security*; what was lacking in the French operations in the final phase was the *Offensive Action* which might so usefully have been launched from this firm base. The failure of the English to implement effectively their plan for a double attack enabled Frontenac to effect at Quebec a *Concentration of Force* which made their success there virtually impossible. This concentration was facilitated in turn by the *Flexibility* conferred upon the French by their possession of easy and rapid water communications, byway of the St. Lawrence, from one end of the colony to the other.

The English colonists, on the other hand, seem to have sinned against almost every sound principle of action that has ever been enun-

ated. Notably, the slowness of their proceedings at every point deprived them of all chance of achieving that *Surprise* which was their best hope of victory. Not entirely through the fault of the colonial planners, their *Administration* was inadequate; the expedition was launched without being provided with the supplies essential to success. The spirit of *Co-operation* was sadly lacking within the New England force, with the results that might have been expected. Finally, as the consequence of many circumstances, but mainly the absence of energetic, determined and informed leadership, it seems clear that the *Morale* of the expedition declined steadily from the moment when it arrived before the enemy. The New Englanders were fortunate not to suffer a worse disaster than the one that actually befell them.

BOOKS ON THE CAMPAIGN

Francis Parkman, *Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV* (Boston, 1877 and later editions). (Still the best general account.)
Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic* (Toronto, 1950), Chap. IV.

(Note: The foregoing narrative is based mainly upon documents contained in Ernest Myrand, 1690: *Sir William Phips devant Québec* (Quebec, 1893) and W. K. Watkins, *Soldiers in the Expedition to Canada in 1690* (Boston, 1898). There are additional documents in *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1689-1692* (London, 1901); and James Lloyd's letter is in the Report of the Public Archives of Canada, 1912. The chief French official reports, transcribed from the French archives, are in Public Archives of Canada, Series C 11A, vol. 11.)

THE CONQUEST OF CANADA

1758-1760

British policy in the campaigns of the Seven Years' War which resulted in the transfer of the sovereignty of Canada from France to Great Britain affords a classic example of grand strategy. In particular it exemplifies the co-ordination of effort between several widely separated theatres of operations in such a way as to ensure decisive success in the area where it is most desired. The architect of this effective strategy was the elder William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham.

The Seven Years' War

The year 1755 saw the outbreak in America of the fourth of the series of Anglo-French colonial wars that had begun in 1689. The two powers were not officially at war in Europe until the following year, when the Seven Years' War broke out and Britain and Prussia were ranged against France, Austria, Russia and, later, Spain. This alignment,

the result of the celebrated "reversal of alliances of 1756, brought the predominant sea-power, Great Britain, into alliance with the rising military state, Prussia, whose army, commanded at this time by an able and ruthless sovereign, Frederick the Great, was becoming a major factor in the European power pattern.

The long intercolonial struggle had brought Britain less success in America than might have been expected. The English in America outnumbered the French twelve to one, but their fourteen disunited and uncooperative colonies were ill organized for war by comparison with New France. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) had given the British Nova Scotia, but they had failed to make headway against the colony on the St. Lawrence. As the Seven Years' War drew on, the rival empires were struggling for the control of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. The

British colonies were exposed to the imminent danger of being contained, between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic coast, by a chain of French military posts connecting Canada with Louisiana. The very first shots of the war were fired in the Ohio Valley in 1754, between French outposts and troops commanded by Colonel George Washington, who had been sent by the governor of Virginia to warn the French off.

In 1755 the British government intervened on a large scale in the intercolonial conflict. Edward Braddock was sent out as Commander-in-Chief, and the British Army, represented by two regular infantry battalions, made its first attempt at operating actively in America. The expedition, advancing on Fort Duquesne, was disastrously defeated at the hands of an inferior French and Indian force. The next two years witnessed a largely unrelieved series of British disasters. The French commander Dieskau did meet defeat on Lake George a couple of months after Braddock's reverse, but in 1756 a new general, the Marquis of Montcalm, arrived from France. His first move was against Oswego, the only British post on the shores of the Great Lakes, which he captured out of hand. In 1757 he took Fort William Henry, on Lake George, and ended for that year any idea of a British advance on Montreal. The


British commander-in-chief, Lord Loudoun, did not venture to deliver an attack on the great French naval fortress of Louisbourg in Cape Breton Island because he was doubtful whether his naval support was equal to mastering the French ships based there.

Pitt and his System

The coalition ministry of Pitt and Newcastle came to power in June 1757, and it was Pitt who made the war plan for 1758. His strategic system seems to have evolved in his mind rather gradually, but we may describe it in the complete form which it had assumed by the spring of 1758.

For Pitt, North America was the vital theatre, the area where the issues of the war centred and where the harvest was to be reaped. But action in Europe was to play a vital part in achieving the desired result. France was to be contained and kept busy there while a vigorous campaign deprived her of her possessions in America. British subsidies encouraged and supported Prussia and helped to keep her armies in the field. A small British army* operated on the Continent and made its

* *There were only six British infantry battalions at the battle of Minden in 1759. In the same year 23 were employed on the continent of America, plus others in the West Indies. In the beginning Pitt had been unwilling to send any British troops at all to fight in Europe.*



contribution. And the main strength of the Royal Navy was concentrated off the ports of France, blockading them and preventing the French fleet either from carrying reinforcements to Canada or delivering a counter-attack against Britain. This containment was made more effective by seaborne raids delivered against the French coast. In these same years British soldiers and sailors were defeating the French in India and founding a British empire there; but this was achieved with Pitt's concurrence rather than at his instigation.

Combined with all this was the main offensive in America. Large British land forces were sent thither and supported by powerful naval squadrons. The British colonies were given a strong lead and encouraged to place important forces of their own in the field, the home government paying most of the cost.

Even so, Montcalm held his own in 1758. Pitt's plan for that year involved three attacks. The main movement, under General James Abercromby, was directed by the line of Lake Champlain towards Montreal. Another major blow, under General Jeffrey Amherst, was aimed at Louisbourg. Thirdly, Brigadier John Forbes was given command in the southern colonies and ordered to undertake such offensive operations as he thought fit. He chose to march against Fort Du-

quesne. Amherst took Louisbourg, and thereby weakened the French naval position in North American waters and helped to cut New France off from Old France. Forbes took Duquesne, renamed it Fort Pitt (the city of Pittsburgh now occupies the site) and ended the French dream of controlling the Ohio valley. A subsidiary operation took Fort Frontenac (Kingston) and crippled French naval power on Lake Ontario, thereby seriously interfering with communications with the West. But Montcalm defeated Abercromby heavily at Ticonderoga and held the main French position for that year.

The Campaign of 1759

Pitt, nothing daunted, planned a still greater effort for 1759. Amherst, the successful assailant of Louisbourg, was now given the chief command in America and ordered to strike by the Lake Champlain route, or by the upper St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario, at Montreal or Quebec. James Wolfe, whose conduct as a brigadier at Louisbourg had caught Pitt's eye, and who was only 32, was given an essentially independent command and a more uncertain task: a direct sea-borne attack on Quebec by the St. Lawrence. Pitt also desired an attack on Fort Niagara, at the Lake Ontario end of the Niagara River.

It must be remembered that at the

same time significant events were taking place in Europe. British troops, British fleets and British money were at work there, and the French court was too busy with these menaces near home to pay much attention to Canada's plight. This was the year when a partly British army under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick won the battle of Minden,* and when a French plan to invade England was defeated by Admiral Hawke's victory of Quiberon Bay. Minden, Quiberon, and Quebec were the names that were to make 1759 for - Englishmen the *annus mirabilis* - the wonderful year.

As the crisis of the struggle approached, New France was almost entirely cut off from the Mother Country and the French forces there felt themselves orphans. The British control of the North Atlantic, though not absolute, was so complete as to discourage any large-scale attempt to reinforce Canada in the spring of 1759, and none was made. Indeed, Montcalm and Vaudreuil did not really press for one. (They asked for drafts and specialists - and even so didn't get all they asked for). What they did

strongly recommend was a powerful diversion against the coasts of the southern British colonies. But the French government preferred to aim the diversionary attack at Britain herself. As we have just seen, this scheme failed.

The forces defending Canada consisted basically of eight regular battalions from France; 40 companies of colonial regulars; and the citizen militia, perhaps as many as 13,000 strong. These forces were weaker than the attackers in both quantity and military quality; and they had to be divided to meet the various British menaces. The main body under Montcalm protected Quebec against the seaborne threat; but three regular battalions, eight companies of colonial regulars and a considerable number of militia, under Brigadier Broulmaque, were stationed on Lake Champlain to guard against Amherst; and detachments held Fort Niagara and the other western posts. The French position was further weakened by the lack of good understanding between Montcalm and his superior, Governor de Vaudreuil.

The British forces moving to the attack were large and efficient. Wolfe had 8500 troops, almost all regulars. His force was transported and backed by a powerful fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders. The relations between the naval and military commanders were excellent.

* This victory saved Hanover from conquest. Hanover being a possession of King George II, it was a natural objective for the French, offering the hope of diverting British forces from America and perhaps providing a makeweight against British conquests there in a peace settlement.

Amherst had 11,000 men, about half colonials. Another column commanded by Brigadier Prideaux moved against Fort Niagara.

The centre attack achieved little. Amherst, a skilful administrator but very deliberate in action, advanced ponderously. The French abandoned Ticonderoga to him, but stood ready to fight at Isle aux Noix in the Richelieu, covering Montreal. The Commander-in-Chief spent so much time preparing a necessary flotilla for Lake Champlain and building a quite unnecessary fortress at Crown Point that the campaigning season ended before he had accomplished anything to assist Wolfe's operation. Prideaux was killed in besieging Fort Niagara, but his successor Sir William Johnson beat off a relieving force and took the place. However, the decisive point was Quebec, and Wolfe and Saunders had to win their fight there without the co-operation of other British forces.

There is no space to tell the tactical story of Wolfe's campaign here. It is enough to note the advantage he derived from the co-operation of the fleet. British naval control of the St. Lawrence enabled him to threaten Montcalm at one point after another, moving his forces about the theatre of operations as he chose. The ships, slipping up and down the river, kept the French in a constant state of uncertainty and wore them out by forc-

ing them to keep constantly on the move. Wolfe was able to choose his point of attack freely; and, when he had finally made his brilliant - or fortunate - choice, the navy put him ashore at the precise time and place he desired and next day he won his battle. The small forces actually engaged on the Plains of Abraham were apparently about equal in strength; but Wolfe's men were almost all professional soldiers, while many of Montcalm's were amateurs; and this is the explanation of the result. Wolfe and Montcalm both fell. Quebec surrendered a few days later.

The Campaign of 1760

The French field army was not captured with Quebec; Montreal remained untaken; and another campaign was necessary to complete the conquest of Canada. Through the winter of 1759-60 the British under General James Murray held Quebec. Early in the spring Montcalm's successor, Lévis, marched against the city. Murray went out to meet him and was defeated on 28 April in the battle of Ste. Foy. This action in the snow was New France's last victory. Murray fell back into Quebec and Lévis besieged him. The colony might still have been saved for France by powerful aid from the mother country. But the fleet that came up the St. Lawrence in May was British, not French.

For the final campaign, Pitt again

called upon the British colonies for great efforts. He gave Amherst a free hand, and the Commander-in-Chief resolved on a triple attack. Brigadier Haviland would make the advance upon Montreal by Lake Champlain; Murray would sail up the St. Lawrence from Quebec; and Amherst himself, with the main army, over 10,000 strong, was to move down the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario. This converging strategy prevented any possibility of French forces withdrawing into the west, where Detroit was still in French hands. The French hoped to concentrate against the smaller detachments successively and defeat them in detail; but they were unequal to the task.

On the Lake Champlain line, Isle aux Noix and St. Johns had to be abandoned to Haviland's superior force, which soon drove on to the St. Lawrence. Murray simply bypassed the French garrisons on his route; and the only serious obstacle encountered by Amherst was a petty fortification, Fort de Lévis, on an island at the head of the St. Lawrence rapids near the modern site of Prescott. He landed guns and solemnly and systematically blew it to smithereens. After losing some men in descending the rapids, he landed on the island of Montreal. ("I have suffered by the *Rapides* not by the enemy", he wrote later.) In the words of Sir Julian Corbett, "So,

like the striking of a clock, Amherst's wide-flung movements chimed together at the appointed hour." With the British forces concentrated, and their own men deserting in shoals, Lévis and Vaudreuil had scarcely more than 2000 troops to face 17,000. They had no choice but to capitulate; and on 8-9 September Montreal, and Canada, passed into British hands. Thus ended the long struggle between France and Britain in North America.

Comments

Sea power is the dominant fact in the conquest of Canada. The war in America was fought mainly by forces from Europe; and as long as British forces could cross the Atlantic freely, and French forces attempting to do so were exposed to the almost certain prospect of interception and defeat, the ultimate result was a foregone conclusion.

The Seven Years' War affords an excellent example of Selection and *Maintenance of the Aim*. For Pitt the war was an American war; its object was the security and extension of the British dominions in America; and he never lost sight of this. All his measures, in Europe and America alike, were primarily directed towards this end. His operations in Europe were containing operations. His eyes and his efforts were fixed upon Quebec and Montreal, and he

moved towards those objectives with single-minded energy until they were attained.

Thanks to this single-mindedness, and to British naval superiority, he was able to effect a destructive *Concentration of Force* in the decisive theatre. The great military strength of France was devoted to European enterprises, while Britain, whose total military power was much smaller, was allowed to bear down the French detachment in Canada by superior numbers. Here is a true *Economy of Effort*. The British effort, it is true, was tremendous; but unlike the still greater effort of France it was put forth so efficiently as to ensure "an effective concentration at the decisive time and place". The place was Canada, and the result was the conquest of the country.

Finally, a word on *Co-operation*. In this war in America the British Army and the Royal Navy worked together in a manner which has often been cited as inter-service concord at its best. In particular, the hand-in-glove partnership between Wolfe and Saunders at Quebec is remembered as a monumental example of what can be achieved when all selfish considerations are subordinated to the achievement of the maximum combined effort towards the defeat of the enemy.

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THE DEFENCE OF UPPER CANADA

1812

The Principles of War can be illustrated by small campaigns as well as great, and by old campaigns as well as those of our own times. It would be difficult to find a series of operations providing a much better object lesson than those of 1812 in which Major-General Sir Isaac Brock defeated the attempt of superior United States forces to conquer the Province of Upper Canada. This campaign, fought nearly a century and a half ago against an adversary who is now our fast friend and essential ally, will repay study by anyone seeking enlightenment as to the qualities that make a great commander.

The Situation at the Outbreak of War

When the United States declared war in June 1812, General Brock was in command of the forces in Upper Canada and was also temporarily administering the civil government of the province. The military prob-

lem that faced him was one of extreme difficulty, for the force at his disposal was very small and the boundary line to be defended was very long.

There was only one British regiment of the line in Upper Canada. This was the 41st (which is now the Welch Regiment). There was also a considerable detachment of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, another of the Royal Newfoundland Fencibles (chiefly used as marines on the Lakes) and one artillery company. Behind these regular forces stood the provincial Militia, which was simply the men of military age organized in paper battalions on a basis of universal service, and at the outbreak of war virtually without training. A considerably larger British force, including five battalions of the line, was stationed in Lower Canada. All told, the two Canadas (now Ontario and Quebec) were defended by roughly 7000 troops fit to be consid-

ered regulars; of these, only a little over 1600 were in the upper province.


The United States Government had of course a relatively tremendous reservoir of manpower to draw upon, but its regular army was small. Though the establishment when war broke out was more than 35,000 all ranks, the actual strength was much less. The total number of regulars serving may have been in the vicinity of 13,000. Moreover, a large proportion of these were very recent recruits, and the effective force was certainly not superior to the British regulars in the Canadas alone. During the war, the United States called into service over 450,000 militiamen; but the average efficiency of these citizen soldiers, as events on the battlefield amply showed, was decidedly low.

The greater part of the British force had, however, to be retained in Lower Canada, for strategically this was the most important part of the country. Had the Americans followed a sound line of operations, they would have concentrated against Montreal, using the excellent communications available by Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. The capture of Montreal would have severed the essential line of communication - that by the St. Lawrence - on which the defence of Upper Canada entirely depended, and the whole of that province would have fallen

into their hands at an early date. The Americans, however, instead of acting in this manner, operated mainly against the frontier of Upper Canada, chopping at the upper branches of the tree rather than the trunk or the roots. In a long view this was fortunate, but it meant that the first shock of their attack had to be met by very inadequate British forces.

In the first months of the war, however, the defenders had one decided advantage: they possessed a distinct naval superiority on the Great Lakes. This was due to the existence of the force known as the Provincial Marine of Upper Canada. In a naval sense this force was very inefficient (it was primarily a transport service and was administered by the Quartermaster General's Department of the Army); but its armed vessels were superior to anything possessed by the Americans on the Lakes in the beginning, and it was in great part responsible for the preservation of Upper Canada in the first campaign. It must be noted that at this time the land communications of the province were extremely primitive, the roads being very few and very bad. Only by water could troops be moved with any speed.

Against this advantage we must balance a disadvantage. A large proportion of the population of Upper Canada were recent immigrants from the United States, people who could not be expected to come forward to



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repel an American invasion. Many other Upper Canadians, though loyal enough in a passive way, considered that the Americans' superiority in physical strength made defence useless. In view of the Canadian school-book legend of 1812, it may come as a surprise to some people to know that in July Brock wrote to the Adjutant General at Headquarters in Lower Canada as follows:

My situation is most critical, not from any thing the enemy can do, but from the disposition of the people - The population, believe me is essentially bad - A full belief possesses them all that this Province must inevitably succumb - This prepossession is fatal to every exertion - Legislators, Magistrates, Militia Officers, all, have imbibed the idea, and are so sluggish and indifferent in all their respective offices that the artful and active scoundrel is allowed to parade the Country without interruption, and commit all imagine able mischief...

What a change an additional regiment would make in this part of the Province! Most of the people have lost all confidence - I however speak loud and look big...

No commentary upon the campaign of 1812 should overlook this element in the situation. With greatly superior forces assembling on the frontier, and with the morale of the population (which was largely identical with the Militia) at such a low ebb, many a commander would have adopted a supine defensive attitude. It was the greatness of Brock that, far from allowing these circumstances to discourage him, he

realized that the best hope of carrying out his task successfully lay in assuming a vigorous local offensive.

The First Blow: Michilimackinac

A matter of great importance to the salvation of Canada was the attitude of the Indians on both sides of the border, particularly in the west. In view of the great disparity between the white populations of Canada and of the United States, and the thinness of the western population on both sides, the behaviour of the Indian tribes was likely to be decisive. If they were friendly to the Americans, or even neutral, Upper Canada would be much more difficult to defend. If their active aid could be enlisted for the British cause, the province's chances would be very much better.

All this was very clear to General Brock, and as early as December 1811 he emphasized it in a letter to Sir George Prevost, the Governor General and Commander of the Forces, remarking, "before we can expect an active co-operation on the part of the Indians, the reduction of Detroit and Michilimackinac, must convince that People ... that we are earnestly engaged in the War". He had thus formed, well in advance of the outbreak of war, the elements of a plan. Upper Canada was to be defended by a series of offensive strokes with limited objectives, which would have the special ad-

* Another regiment, the 49th, was sent to Upper Canada in August.

vantage of influencing the Indians to take the British side. On learning that the United States had declared war, Brock sent instructions to Capt. Charles Roberts, commanding the small British post at distant St. Joseph Island, near Sault Ste. Marie, giving him discretion as to whether to stand on the defensive or to attack the American garrison at Michilimackinac. Roberts decided to attack, and on 16 July, the day after he received these orders, he embarked his few regulars and a body of Canadian fur-traders and Indians (a little over 500 men in all) and led them against Mackinac. The British seized the heights commanding the fort and dragged up a gun; and the American commander, who had had no information of his country's declaration of war, had no choice but surrender. This early and bloodless success brought the neighbouring tribes flocking to the British standard, and it had a great influence, accordingly, on the subsequent events on the Detroit frontier.

On this frontier the Americans attempted their first offensive. Brigadier-General William Hull, an old and inefficient officer, had advanced from the interior of Ohio before the declaration of war, with some 2500 men; and on 11 July he crossed the Detroit River and invaded Canada. The small British force on that frontier did not resist his crossing - which considerably

displeased Brock; but Hull took no active steps to dislodge it, and it continued to hold the fort at Amherstburg and the territory around it, a constant threat on the American's flank.

The British naval superiority now made itself felt. The last 60 miles of Hull's line of communications running back to Ohio lay along the shores of Lake Erie and the Detroit River, and was always exposed to interruption by an enemy having control of the water. Hull twice sent detachments back to "open the communication"; both were cut up, by British Indians under Tecumseh and troops from Amherstburg, in engagements on 5 and 9 August. The Provincial Marine had previously captured a schooner carrying Hull's official correspondence. More mail was captured in the fight on the 5th. The American general was easily discouraged. He began to withdraw from Canada to Detroit on 7 August, and completed the withdrawal on the 11th.

The Capture of Detroit

General Brock with his small force could not take the offensive at any point on the frontier without leaving other points unguarded, and had the Americans been enterprising and efficient his situation would have been impossible. As it was, his own first move was to the Niagara frontier, where he contemplated an

attack on Fort Niagara. However, he did not attempt this, arguing that it was more important to get on with training the militia; and the Americans made no immediate offensive move in this sector. Brock then returned to York (now Toronto), the provincial capital, for the session of the legislature. This gave him an opportunity, in his civil capacity, of addressing himself to the province and giving a strong lead to its people, so many of whom were uncertain and disheartened.

By the time the Assembly was prorogued, it was clear that for the moment the main threat to Upper Canada was on the Detroit frontier. Brock immediately launched a vigorous counter-offensive. Hull's invasion and a bombastic proclamation which he had issued had considerably discouraged the Canadian militia along the Detroit, but when Brock asked those assembled at York for volunteers to march against the invaders, more came forward than transport could be found for. The general had already ordered a small regular reinforcement to Amherstburg. He had tried to organize a force to operate on the Thames, but this had been largely frustrated by the unwillingness of the militia in the nearby districts. He now dispatched 100 militiamen from York to the Long Point district on Lake Erie. At that place, he wrote to Prevost on 29 July, "I pro-

pose collecting a force for the relief of Amherstburg."

On the night of 5 August, the same day on which he prorogued the Assembly, Brock himself sailed from York for the head of Lake Ontario. Pushing rapidly on overland to Port Dover, he found the relief force awaiting him there, along with boats to carry them up Lake Erie. (Colonel Thomas Talbot, the redoubtable founder of the Talbot Settlement, had had considerable difficulty with the militia of the district, but had finally obtained a fair number of volunteers.) On the 8th Brock embarked his tiny "mass of manoeuvre", which amounted in all to about 50 regulars and 250 militia with one 6-pounder, and, coasting along the lake shore, reached Amherstburg and made a junction with the British force there on the night of 13 August. Bad weather and bad boats had delayed the movement, which nevertheless seems very rapid in the existing circumstances.

The general immediately divided his whole force into three miniature "brigades", two consisting of militia stiffened by small regular detachments and the third of the main body of the 41st Regiment. On 15 August orders were issued for crossing the Detroit and moving against the American army.

Few officers would care to cross a broad river with the prospect of attacking on the farther shore a

force twice as strong as their own in a fortified position. Brock himself recorded afterwards that his colonels advised against it. The general, however, was taking a "calculated risk". The captured correspondence had told him how low was the Americans' morale and how discouraged their commander, and the very fact of their retreat from Canadian territory had further emphasized the poor state of their army. Even so, his decision remains a fine example of the offensive spirit which wins battles.*

On the evening of 15 August Brock opened fire upon Fort Detroit with five guns which had been emplaced on the Canadian shore. The bombardment inflicted some casualties and further discouraged the Americans; Brock had made a judicious contribution to the disintegra-

tion of poor Hull by sending him a demand for surrender which remarked that, while he did not intend to "join in a war of extermination," the Indians would "be beyond controul the moment the contest commences"; and soon after daylight on the 16th the little British force crossed the river in boats and landed three miles below Detroit. The army consisted of some 700 white troops, of whom 400 were militia, and 600 Indians, with five small field guns. The battery opposite Detroit was served on this day by gunners landed from the Provincial Marine. Although Brock does not mention it, Hull in his apologia emphasizes that the British landed "under cover of their ships of war", and it is clear that co-operation between the land forces and the Marine was close throughout.

Brock had planned to take up a strong position and trust to the effect of his artillery fire to compel Hull to come out and meet him in the open field. He now received information, however, that a detachment of 500 men had left Detroit three days before and that their cavalry were only three miles in rear of his own force. He accordingly took another bold decision - to make an immediate assault upon Detroit. The troops advanced upon the fort, but before the attack could begin the American commander sent forward a flag of truce and proposed a dis-

* *Brock's own account of his appreciation of the situation has been preserved; "Some say that nothing could be more desperate than the measure, but I answer that the state of the Province admitted of nothing but desperate remedies. I got possession of the letters my antagonist addressed to the Secretary at War, and also of the sentiments which hundreds of his army uttered to their friends. Confidence in the General was gone, and evident despondency prevailed throughout. I have succeeded beyond expectation. I crossed the river contrary to the opinion of Cols. Procter, St. George, etc.; it is therefore no wonder that envy should attribute to good fortune what in justice to my own discernment, I must say, proceeded from a cool calculation of the pours and contres."* (Brock to his brothers, 3 September 1812.)

cussion of terms. The sequel was the surrender within an hour of Hull's whole army (including the detachment above referred to), with 35 guns and a great quantity of other arms and stores.

Thus General Brock had won a resounding victory and entirely removed the menace to the western frontier, almost without firing a shot. Well might he write to the Commander-in-Chief, "When I detail my good fortune Your Excellency will be astonished". There was, however, more than good fortune to thank for what had happened. The energy and boldness with which Brock himself had acted were the chief causes of this extraordinary result.

On Hull's own showing, it was the vulnerability of his communications (constantly exposed to interruption as a result of the British control of the water), and the fear of the Indians, that induced him to his ignominious surrender. As he put it, the loss of Mackinac had "opened the northern hive of Indians" and the expectation of the upper tribes "swarming down" upon his army went far to take the heart out of him. What the success at Mackinac had done in the case of the Indians the capture of Detroit may be said to have done among the white population of Upper Canada. This brilliant victory silenced the croakers and encouraged loyal

citizens.* Canadians now realized that a successful defence of the country was quite possible. The militiamen whom so many had considered dupes suddenly became saviours and heroes, and before the year 1812 was over the Canadian legend that attributes the saving of the country primarily to the militia was already well on the way to establishment.

The Final Phase of the Campaign

Having saved the situation in the west, Brock handed over the forces there to a subordinate and rushed back east; he arrived at Fort George on the Niagara eight days after Detroit surrendered. For a time operations were suspended as the result of an armistice negotiated by Prevost, and during this period the United States brought up additional strength to the Niagara frontier.

On 13 October the Americans collected here began to cross into Canada at Queenston. Brock, with characteristic energy and offensive spirit, galloped to the spot; and in leading the small force on the ground against the Americans, who had gained the summit of the escarpment, he fell in action. He never knew that the capture of Detroit had brought him a knighthood. His suc-

* "The militia have been inspired by the recent success with confidence - the disaffected are silenced," (Brock to his brothers, 3 September 1812).

cessor, General Sheaffe, collected all available troops and destroyed the invading force later in the day, winning a victory which further raised the spirits of the people of Upper Canada. In November another incompetent American commander made a gesture at invasion on the Niagara above the Falls, but this came to nothing. The campaigning season ended with no part of Upper Canada held by the Americans, and with an important section of the Territory of Michigan in British occupation.

Although the war went on for two more years, the worst danger to Upper Canada had passed in 1812. In that year, when the British forces were so small and the morale of the population so low, the Americans had their great opportunity. That they failed to profit by it was due partly to their own unpreparedness, but to a large extent also it was due to Isaac Brock.

Comments

Although Canadian histories have rarely recognized this, the successful defence of Upper Canada was due in great part to the fact that the province was better prepared for war than the United States. The latter had a great superiority in numbers and physical power, but their power was not organized. The Mother Country had provided in Canada the elements of organized

power which the Americans largely lacked: a naval force equal to controlling the Lakes and their connecting rivers; a small but efficient body of regular troops; and trained officers capable of skilful and energetic leadership. The forces were tiny, but in the circumstances they were enough.

There have been few campaigns in which the vision, energy and decision of a commander have been more influential than in this one of 1812. The manner in which Brock rose superior to discouragements which a lesser man would have used as excuses for inactivity may serve as an object lesson to every officer who would learn the arts of command.

Most if not all of the Principles of War as they are defined today could be illustrated from this campaign. We will mention only some which seem to appear in it with special clarity.

The whole campaign exemplifies in a particularly striking manner the importance of Maintenance of Morale. It was in great part superior morale that enabled Brock's force to impose upon and overcome Hull's; and this superiority in morale was mainly the result of bold and effective leadership. In turn, the victory at Detroit itself gave a fillip to Canadian morale generally which made the continued defence of the country possible. There has never

been a better illustration of Lord Montgomery's remark, "High morale is a pearl of very great price. And the surest way to obtain it is by success in battle."

It would be difficult also to adduce a better example of the dividends to be gained from *Offensive Action*. In spite of the odds against him, Brock saw the importance of seizing the initiative from the enemy and taking the offensive; and the results which he obtained should be an inspiration to every commander who is faced by superior forces.

Similarly, we see in this campaign a successful application of the principles of *Concentration of Force* and *Economy of Effort*. Brock could not concentrate *material* force superior to that of the enemy, but he did concentrate all the force he had the means to move. Of his superiority in moral force, there is no need to speak further. His resources were slender, but he employed them judiciously and produced at the decisive time and place a concentration which proved equal to the task. His operations also illustrate the principle of *Flexibility*. British naval superiority on the Lakes conferred upon him "physical mobility of a high order", enabling him to use his limited resources to the best advantage. The manner in which he was able to shuttle his forces freely and rapidly back and forth along the long frontier they

had to guard compensated, to a considerable extent, for the forces' smallness, and made a great contribution to the saving of Upper Canada in this campaign.

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(Note: The foregoing narrative is based on documents contained in E. Cruikshank, *Documents relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812* (Ottawa, 1913), the same author's *Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1812* (Welland, n.d.) and W. Wood, *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (Toronto, 3 vols. in 4, 1920-28).

THE NORTH-WEST CAMPAIGN

1885

The North-West Campaign of 1885 was a minor affair as campaigns go, but has some importance in the military history of Canada. It was the first occasion when the Canadian forces conducted a campaign without British assistance. It gave the units of the new Canadian Permanent Force their baptism of fire. And small as the operations were, there is still something to be learned from them.

Background of the Campaign

With the causes of this unfortunate little civil war we have nothing to do. What is more important to note is the rudimentary nature of the military organization Canada had available to deal with the crisis which arose in the North-West in 1885. The Active Militia, as the volunteer force was now termed, was deficient in both training and equipment. No unit was allowed more than 12 days' annual training, and rural units trained only every second year. Little equipment had been bought since the Fenian troubles. Fortunately, however, the Dominion's tiny regular force, which

from 1871 until 1883 had consisted of artillery only, had now been expanded by the addition of small units of cavalry and infantry. Nevertheless, an adequate staff did not yet exist, nor did the administrative services essential to maintaining an army in the field.*

In the North-West Territories, when the rising began, there were few military resources. No regular troops were stationed there, and the only effective militia units in the whole of the still largely unpopulated prairie country were one infantry battalion, one troop of cavalry and one battery of artillery, all at the small city of Winnipeg. The North-West Mounted Police were only 550 strong and not in particularly good shape for campaigning. To make matters worse, communications with the East were still imperfect. The Canadian Pacific Railway was under construction but was incomplete. In these circumstances, organizing a force for action in the North-West, and concentrating it in

* These matters are discussed above, pages 17-18

the theatre of operations, were very considerable tasks.

The prospective enemy was not without formidable aspects. The Saskatchewan halfbreeds who acknowledged the leadership of Louis Riel were good shots and good horsemen, and would be fighting on ground with which they were thoroughly familiar. There were over 25,000 Indians on the plains, and if they all joined the movement it would be very serious. Fortunately, as it turned out, not more than perhaps 1000 halfbreeds and Indians actually rose in arms. Under these conditions, the worst problems the military commanders had to encounter were the result of logistical difficulties and of the inexperience of their troops.

Concentrating the Field Force

On 23 March the situation in the North-West had become so serious that the Government instructed the General Officer Commanding Canadian Militia, Major-General Fred Middleton, to go to Winnipeg at once. Travelling by rail through the United States, he arrived there on the 27th. Bloodshed had already taken place, a party of Mounted Police and local volunteers having been repulsed by Riel's adherents at Duck Lake the previous day. The General decided to take the field immediately with the Winnipeg militia units. Before moving by rail to

Qu'Appelle, from which a practicable trail led towards Riel's headquarters at Batoche, he telegraphed to the Minister of Militia and Defence, Mr. (later Sir) Adolphe Caron, "Matter getting serious, better send all Regular* and good City Regiments".

Back at Ottawa Caron was working energetically to get reinforcements into the North-West. The two regular artillery batteries had already been placed under orders to move, and on 24 March the Minister had telegraphed Mr. Harry Abbott, who was in charge of building the C.P.R. west from Sudbury, "Make all necessary arrangements for transport and subsistence of four hundred men to Winnipeg over line". Abbott set about doing so, but advised the Minister to work through Mr. (later Sir) William Van Home, the railway's vigorous General Manager. Van Home proceeded to organize the movement. It is notable that the feeding of the troops en route was arranged by the C.P.R., not by the Militia Department. The latter's organization would scarcely have been equal to the task at that date.

When the movement began there were still four gaps in the railway north of Lake Superior, although the whole line was graded "from Mont-


*As a matter of fact, not all the regular units were used.

real to the summit of the Selkirks". The steel was laid to the vicinity of Lochalsh, 68 miles west of Chapleau. There was then a gap of 42 miles. Beyond this there were about 93 miles of track, then another gap of some 17 miles. Now came 15 more miles of track, on which there was little rolling stock, and a third gap 20 miles long. Rail transport was available for the next 52 miles. The final gap, about seven miles, was just east of Nipigon. From Nipigon to Winnipeg the line was complete.*

To move a force with guns and horses over this line in bitter winter weather (the temperature went as low as 22 below zero) was no small task, but thanks to the railway's efficient arrangements and the cheerful determination of the officers and men it was successfully done. On the rail stretches the men were carried in flat cars "boarded up about six feet and a half, and filled with hay". The first and third gaps

were traversed in contractors' sleighs taken off the work of construction, the others on foot over the ice of Lake Superior, there being only sleighs enough for the baggage. And the movement was rapid. Caron telegraphed to the officers commanding the leading detachments on 31 March, "Wish you to travel night and day. I want to show what the Canadian Militia can do." Many books say that the two regular batteries which formed the first flight made the journey from the East in four days. The actual facts are stated in a telegram which Lt.-Col. C. E. Montizambert, who was in command, sent to Mr. Caron from Winnipeg on the evening of 4 April: "Just arrived at nine-forty with Mounted division, exactly one week from Renfrew. Garrison division following behind me. No casualties of any kind." On the same day Lt.-Col. W. D. (later General Sir William) Otter telegraphed from Jackfish Bay: "All well and in good spirits, travelling night and day. Yesterday 'C' Company [Infantry School Corps, now The Royal Canadian Regiment] and Queen's Own [Rifles] had to march twenty miles across the ice and did it splendidly". It was a good performance, and there is little doubt that the speedy arrival of the eastern troops at Winnipeg, reinforcing the effect of the promptitude with which Middleton himself had acted, did much to keep

* *These details are from an interview with Van Horne in the Toronto Globe of 30 March 1885. The contemporary accounts seem to indicate that though the fourth gap was east of the present Nipigon, topography forced the units to march through the woods and across the neck of Nipigon Bay and entrain at Red Rock, several miles west of Nipigon. Different account, of the North Shore march vary slightly on details, and indeed the gaps shortened steadily as construction proceeded. The last unit to move, the Montreal Garrison Artillery, arrived at Winnipeg on 20 May on the first through passenger train from the East.*



the Indians quiet.

All told, 3323 all ranks were moved from the East during the campaign. In Manitoba, where a number of new units were raised for the emergency, 1222 all ranks took the field; and 789 were organized in units raised on the prairies west of Manitoba. None of these figures include the Mounted Police.

Supply transport and medical services all had to be improvised on the spur of the moment. The first real Canadian medical service was temporarily organized for this campaign. As for the transport service, nearly 1800 civilian drivers were employed, at very large expense. Transport, indeed, was the great limiting factor in the campaign. Middleton realized this as early as 28 March, when he telegraphed Caron, "The great difficulty will be

transport and the time of the year is the worst for traffic, but I will overcome that".

Middleton has often been criticized for the manner in which he used his mounted troops. He employed actively only new units improvised in the West, while the trained cavalry brought from the East (both regular and militia) were kept on the line of communications. This policy, however, was suggested to him by high authority. On 29 March the Prime Minister, Sir John Macdonald, had sent him what he called "some of my crude ideas". Sir John wrote in part, "It occurs to me that with the breaking up of the winter, the roads will be almost impassable for infantry, and that the services of a mounted force will be nearly, if not quite, indispensable... If you can get men

enough from the prairies, they would, of course, be much more serviceable than town bred men who compose our cavalry." The Government, indeed, had already authorized a former militia cavalry officer now living near Calgary to raise one improvised mounted unit.* Middleton himself records that he considered it very necessary to have horses which were accustomed to the country, and this made him refrain from using the militia cavalry with the columns.


Although mounted troops might seem at first glance the most useful type of force for prairie operations, a serious practical consideration set limits to their employment. On 12 May, when he had had plenty of experience, Middleton telegraphed to Caron, "If more troops are necessary then good infantry is the best for even Mounted Infantry unless mounted on Indian ponies require so much forage, that it cannot be carried."

Middleton made surprisingly little use of the Mounted Police. He left the main body of the force sitting static in Prince Albert. He apparently lacked confidence in at least some of their officers, and in this he was not entirely alone. One observer wrote, "they are not the force they were... they have been demoralized ... by making simply

whiskey detectives of them, - they should be soldiers". Nevertheless, N.W.M.P. detachments did excellent work for Strange and Otter, and won golden opinions from those officers. After the rising was suppressed, the Government offered the Commission of the N.W.M.P. to Lord Melgund, who had served as Middleton's Chief of Staff. When Melgund declined, another outsider was appointed.

Melgund - afterwards, as Lord Minto, himself Governor General - was serving as Lord Lansdowne's Military Secretary at Government House in Ottawa when the rising began. He had been a regular soldier, and had lately seen active service in the Egyptian campaign of 1882. Some Canadian officers resented Middleton's apparent preference for Englishmen and regulars; his appointment of Lt.-Col. Bowen Van Straubenzee, a Canadian long in the British Army, and now on the permanent staff of the Militia, to command his infantry brigade nettled militia officers whose rank antedated Van Straubenzee's. (The 1883 Militia Act, like earlier ones, gave British regular officers seniority over all militia officers of the same rank, but said nothing of Canadian regulars.) But Middleton's appointments can be defended on the ground of the importance of military experience.

* *Sir Joseph Pope, ed., Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald (Toronto n.d.), 340-41.*



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The Three Columns Advance

By about 11 April Middleton, after some uncertainty, had developed his plan of action. He himself with the largest force, amounting finally to about 800 men, advanced up the Touchwood Trail towards Batoche. Another body of about 550 men had been concentrated under Lt.-Col. Otter at Swift Current. Middleton's original intention was to have it cooperate with him in the advance on Batoche. Ultimately, however, it was ordered to "relieve" Battleford. The Prime Minister had directed Middleton's attention to that place, and it was calling for help. Farther west, Major-General T. B. Strange, a retired regular officer, who had been the first commander of "B" Battery and is sometimes called "the father of the Canadian Artillery", had been placed in command in the District of Alberta, and he advanced from Calgary in the direction of Edmonton. Thus three columns were moving north from the line of the C.P.R. into the disaffected area along the North Saskatchewan.

Middleton has been accused of conducting the operations which followed with excessive caution. But the critics have paid too little attention to the extraordinary greenness of most of his troops (some of whom "had never pulled a trigger" before the campaign began) and the serious consequences which might

have followed a bad setback. What could happen to untrained men on the battlefield had been demonstrated by the panic which overtook a militia force at Ridgeway during the Fenian Raid of 1865. On 15 April a civilian who knew the region well, Mr. (later Sir) Sandford Fleming, warned the Minister of Militia that the country which Middleton was approaching, broken and well adapted to ambushes, was very favourable to the Indian and half-breed style of fighting. He wrote, "Even a momentary check... would cause thousands of Indians who are at present quiet to rise. The great danger is haste. Would it be possible to make General Middleton aware that what is needed at the moment is not courage but a superfluity of caution, much very much depends on the first meeting, one mistake would be followed by the most disastrous consequences. A little delay will strengthen the General and weaken the rebels." Caron passed the warning on to Middleton. "Beware of surprise", he telegraphed.

On 16 April Middleton's column reached the South Saskatchewan at Clarke's Crossing. Hearing that Riel had men on both sides of the river at Batoche, and that his force was not large, the General took the doubtful course of dividing his own force between the two banks. On the 23rd the column advanced towards Bato-

che. The following day the troops on the right bank encountered Riel's people, who had taken up a well covered position barring the way at Fish Creek. There was a stiff engagement which cost the troops ten fatal casualties.

The result was not better than a draw, though the enemy ultimately withdrew. Three days later Middleton sent the Minister impressions of the affair which, he said, he had not wished to communicate even in cypher:

As I told you in my telegram the troops behaved well on the occasion of their first meeting with the enemy, but I must confess to you that it was very near being otherwise, and if it had not been for myself and A.D.C.'s it would have been a disaster. You will probably have heard that I exposed myself needlessly. That is not the case... I saw that one of two things must be done; either I must retire the men which would have ended in a rout or I must do my duty to the Government and run certain risks. I did so and I am glad to say was successful, ably and energetically assisted by my two aides who deserve well of Canada. Once I had them in hand things became safe, but I at once saw that with every inclination to do the best, the officers were little or no assistance to me. That is the weak spot in the force...

The Attack on Batoche

Evidently shaken by this experience, Middleton decided to change his plan, and instead of pushing on to Batoche to move to Prince Albert and wait for Otter to join him before attacking. However, after a few days' rest at Fish Creek during which he contrived to evacuate his wounded and some reinforcements

arrived, he reverted to his original intention and moved directly against Batoche. This time he kept his whole force on the right bank of the river, on which Batoche stood. On 9 May the column came in contact with the insurgents' position there. They were well dug in in concealed rifle-pits, and Middleton, feeling that time was on his side and desiring to avoid heavy casualties and the possibility of a reverse, pursued cautious tactics. For three days he skirmished in front of Batoche. In a telegram to Caron he said that he proposed to "peg away"; he had plenty of ammunition and the enemy had not. He felt himself in a "rather ticklish position" and needed "more troops". He now ordered some of the units on his line of communication to move up to help him, and Caron called out more regiments; but the serious fighting was over before reinforcements could arrive.

On 12 May Middleton was able to report to Caron that he had just made a general attack and carried the whole settlement, the troops behaving extremely well. Middleton wrote, "Now find that all the trouble I have taken with my three regiments* has borne good fruit and the four-day advanced post work in front of the

* *The 10th Battalion "Royal Grenadiers" (now The Royal Regiment of Canada); the 90th "Winnipeg" Battalion of Rifles (now The Royal Winnipeg Rifles); and the Midland Battalion (a composite unit from Ontario).*

Indians and Half-breeds has made them more like what I want." People who disliked Middleton circulated the story that his hand was deliberately forced by militia officers who put in the attack without orders, but this is not supported by the contemporary records, including letters written by the two Commanding Officers most concerned. There seems however to have been an element of the fortuitous in the result. Middleton had made a demonstration with his mounted troops against the flank and rear of Batoche on the understanding that when this had drawn the enemy's attention the infantry would advance in front. The direction of the wind prevented the mounted troops' firing from being heard, with the result that the infantry advance was not made when planned. This however may have been fortunate, since the absence of activity in front led the enemy to neglect that part of his position and when the infantry finally did attack the opposition was less than might otherwise have been the case. Years later Middleton wrote that he had planned to make his final attack that day, but this seems rather doubtful; his telegram to Caron sent immediately after the fight says, "I saw my chance and ordered a general advance." Whatever the precise facts may be, Batoche was taken, at a cost for the final day's operations of five killed and 25 wounded. This success broke the back of the rising, and Riel

surrendered a few days later.

In the meantime, the other columns had been having their own troubles. Otter had relieved Battleford successfully, but he then decided, without consulting Middleton, to make a reconnaissance in force against Chief Poundmaker, whose Indians had been threatening the settlement. The result was an engagement at Cut Knife Hill on 2 May which cost Otter eight killed and 14 wounded and ended in his withdrawing to Battleford. (The trails of both Otter's guns - N.W.M.P. 7-pounders served by "B" Battery - had broken under the strain of firing.) As for General Strange's column, it duly reached Edmonton and pushed on down the North Saskatchewan. On 28 May Strange had a brush with Chief Big Bear at Frenchman's Butte, and retired "to more open ground" after suffering slight casualties.

The final phase of the campaign consisted of mopping up. On 24 May Middleton's force reached Battleford and formed a junction with Otter; on the 26th Poundmaker came in and surrendered. Middleton's column then moved on up the North Saskatchewan and made contact with Strange in the vicinity of Fort Pitt.* Big Bear's band broke up

* *Forts Pitt and Carlon had been evacuated by the N.W.M.P. early in the rising, the Police from Carlon withdrawing to Prince Albert, those from Pitt to Battleford.*

when pursued, and the chief finally surrendered on 2 July.

In the campaign as a whole the loss to the Government forces amounted to 38 killed and 115 wounded. The insurgents' losses cannot be precisely stated, but were probably somewhat higher.

General Middleton was no genius, and he lacked the happy faculty of getting on with Canadian soldiers which some British generals in Canada had been blessed with; but his conduct of the campaign was more competent than has often been admitted, and his difficulties were formidable. The material he had to work with was very imperfect, and if the enemy had been stronger or more enterprising the results might have been embarrassing. As it was, the North-West Field Force carried out its task successfully and rapidly.

The records of the campaign reflect an ignorance of normal military procedure which was not surprising in the circumstances. Very irregular "channels of communication" were sometimes used. (That so many battalion commanders chose to communicate direct with the Minister of Militia was perhaps influenced by the fact that as many as five of the units in the North-West were commanded by Members of Parliament.) There was a general absence of goodwill between the various commanders, and a good deal of backbiting. When General

Strange wrote privately to his wife complaining of Middleton's treatment of him, Mrs. Strange, who was acquainted with Mr. Caron, promptly sent the letter to the Minister! She took the precaution, however, of warning him not to let her husband know what she had done.

Comments

Although the force placed in the field in the North-West in 1885 performed its task successfully, the basic impression left by the campaign is that a country which had done so little in the way of military preparation for many years was fortunate to surmount this crisis without more serious difficulty. The units of the Militia did far better than they might have been expected to do in all the circumstances; but the tactical mishaps which were encountered emphasize the fact that a community which has to rely upon almost totally untrained troops to meet a sudden emergency is running the risk of disaster.

Considering the campaign in terms of the Principles of War, the result indicates that Middleton made a sound appreciation when he decided to direct his main effort against the centre of disaffection at Batoche. This was an example of proper *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*. Sound policy, indeed, would have dictated a still heavier concentration against this vital

paint; but Middleton and the Government were deluged with requests for protection from settlements throughout the West, and political necessity required more dispersion than strictly military considerations would have justified.

It is clear that *Administration* dominated the campaign. Once considerable forces were brought to bear on the centres of the rising, the result was not in doubt; but concentrating and maintaining those forces was a very heavy administrative

task. The fact that the movement of the troops from the East over the unfinished Canadian Pacific, and the transport for the columns in the theatre of operations itself, were successfully improvised, is much to the credit of all concerned. However, had the Militia possessed a proper stag and supply organization, improvisation would have been unnecessary, money would have been saved, and there would have been less risk of calamity.

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(Note: The foregoing narrative is based largely on the Caron Papers in the Public Archives of Canada. A letter of Lt.-Col. H.J. Grasett of the Royal Grenadiers, describing the action at Batoche, was kindly provided by the Ontario Archives.)

THE CAPTURE OF VIMY RIDGE

1917

On the summit of Vimy Ridge in Northern France, far-seen across the surrounding plains, stands the greatest of Canada's European war memorials. It commemorates one of the most resounding British tactical triumphs of the First World War, and one of the most famous victories of the Canadian Army. In plain and rugged words the inscription tells the visitor the story "The Canadian Corps, on April 9th, 1917, with four divisions in line on a front of four miles attacked and captured this ridge."

Vimy Ridge is worthy of attention because it is perhaps the most celebrated Canadian battle of 1914-18. It is also, however, an episode from which the soldier can learn much - an outstanding example of a successful "set-piece" attack against formidable prepared positions.

Allied and Enemy Plans for 1917

The year 1916 had seen both Allies and Germans suffer tremendous

losses on the Western Front, especially at Verdun and on the Somme without breaking the deadlock which trench warfare had imposed upon a battlefield stretching from the Swiss border to the North Sea. The year 1917 was to see great changes in the opposing orders of battle. The United States entered the war in April, but many months were to pass before it could make its strength felt effectively in Europe. Russia underwent a revolution in March, but Kerensky's socialist Provisional Government which came to power strove to continue the war against Germany. Not until November did Lenin's Bolsheviks, in a second revolution, oust Kerensky; they then proceeded to make peace. In these circumstances, the 1917 campaign in the west witnessed another series of great battles of position, bloody and, in the strategic sense, inconclusive.

The original Allied plan to continue the Battles of the Somme during the spring of 1917 with four French

and three British armies was cancelled when General Nivelle, a comparatively junior officer, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and North East and entrusted with the overall direction of the spring operations. Instead of waging a campaign of attrition Nivelle hoped to break the enemy's will to fight by a smashing blow delivered by 46 French divisions along the Chemin des Dames (between Reims and Soissons) while diversionary attacks were mounted elsewhere on the British and French sectors. Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig agreed to extend his Fourth Army's front 25 miles southwards so that additional French divisions might be withdrawn for Nivelle's offensive, but insisted that his own more limited preliminary attack should extend as far north as Vimy Ridge. The acquisition of Vimy Ridge, in addition to securing the left flank of the operations to the south, would deprive the enemy of a valuable vantage point. The task of capturing it was assigned to the Canadian Corps of General Horne's British First Army, while General Allenby's Third Army launched the main British attack along the valley of the Scarpe.*

* *The attack of the British 17th Corps between the Scarpe and the Canadian Corps boundary extended on to the lower sections of Vimy Ridge, but it is officially considered part of the First Battle of the Scarpe which, along with the Battle of Vimy Ridge, forms a portion of "The Battles of Arras, 1917."*

The Germans, who had had even heavier casualties than the Allies in 1916, had decided to conduct a defensive campaign on the Western Front during the coming year, and to attempt to bring Britain to her knees with their U-boat campaign. While the French were changing both their commander-in-chief and their plans Hindenburg and Ludendorff were trying to decide whether to shorten their front by withdrawing from two salients south of Arras and conserve the troops saved for more urgent tasks elsewhere. Moreover the Somme battles had demonstrated that the existing system of rigid defence was no longer suitable, since British artillery had been able not only to batter out of recognition the forward trench system, 400-600 yards in depth, but also neutralize the entire forward zone falling within range of its guns, to a depth of 1500-2000 yards. Therefore, towards the end of 1916 Ludendorff had introduced a new tactical doctrine, instructing infantry to fight a mobile defence in a series of zones once the lightly-held forward trenches had been overrun; even though strongpoints might momentarily be cut off, counter-attacks by special reserve formations (supported by artillery) could destroy the attackers struggling across the forward zones cratered by their own bombardment. Steps were taken, therefore, to convert the additional authorized rear lines of defence into

zones capable of mobile defence in depth. The formidable "Siegfried" position constructed behind the German salients became known to the Allies as the Hindenburg Line and its more northerly adjunct (the "Wotan" position) as the Drocourt-Quéant Switch. The offensive launched up the Ancre valley during January and early February by the British Fifth Army forced the Germans to yield some ground and decided them to withdraw from these salients, although not from the stronger positions further north in the valley of the Scarpe and atop Vimy Ridge. Not until mid-March, however, did they make an ordered withdrawal of nearly 20 miles into the Hindenburg Line. In accordance with a prearranged plan aptly named "Alberich" after the malicious dwarf of the Nibelung Saga, they laid waste the whole evacuated area.

The German withdrawals eliminated the possibility of a French subsidiary attack and altered the operation planned for the British Third Army. The latter was now to break through the advanced defences covering the Hindenburg Line, crack that position itself and advance towards Cambrai. If this succeeded the British Fifth Army would enlarge the frontal attack and the Cavalry Corps and the available reserve divisions would exploit. The role of the First Army remained unchanged, however, as the capture of Vimy Ridge. Both


operations were to be launched on Easter Monday, 9 April. Nivelles's main attack went in on 16 April.

The Ridge and the Plan

Running across the western edge of the Douai plain and rising to a maximum height of some 350 feet above it, Vimy Ridge protected the important industrial area around Lille held by the Germans and dominated the Lens-Bethune coal-producing area. The highest summit, known as Hill 145, where the Canadian memorial stands today, was at the northern end. A more southerly height was called Hill 135. From the latter the ridge broadened and sloped gradually to the south-west and south, with only a few villages and copses to break the monotony of its surface, until it reached the upper reaches of the Scarpe river. Its eastern slope, steep and wooded, dropped sharply to the Douai plain, in one place over 200 feet in 750 yards. To the north Hill 120 ("the Pimple") overlooked the smaller Souchez river, beyond which the high ground continued to the northwest as the Lorette ridge.

Late in 1914 the French had tried and failed to drive the enemy from Vimy Ridge. Attacks the following year gained some ground on the forward slope but this was lost in 1916.

When the Canadian Corps took over the sector during October the German forward defences were found to consist of three lines of trench, protected by deep belts of



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barbed wire and interspersed with elaborate redoubts and concrete machine-gun emplacements; the major part of the garrison was housed in deep dugouts, tunnels and caves burrowed into the chalk. The second position on the reverse slope was a mile to the rear on the north-west and two miles on the south-east. Running diagonally between these two, from the village of Vimy southwards, was an intermediate line of trenches. Supporting artillery was disposed chiefly along the upper edge of the woods which covered the escarpment or along the open ground at its foot, sheltered by the Arras-Lens railway embankment. During the winter a third system of trenches, running through Oppy and Méricourt, was begun. The German Sixth Army had been slow to alter its forward dispositions, however, and most of the defended localities about Vimy Ridge were still in the front rather than the rear of the battle zone as March came to an end; moreover, the reserve divisions were held too far back to counter-attack promptly.

The Canadian Corps was commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng (afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount Byng of Vimy). His preparations were based on a First Army plan of operations dated 31 January; subsequent changes were in detail only. Capture of the main crest, and particularly Hill 135 and the village of Thélus, was the objective of a first

(Southern) operation; if this was successful, the Pimple and the Bois en Hache were to be assaulted 24 hours later as a separate (Northern) operation.

Attacking on a 7000-yard front stretching from Ecurie to west of Givenchy, the four Canadian divisions (in numerical order from right to left) were to carry out the first and main operation, with the British 5th Division as corps reserve. The tasks of the Canadian divisions differed in scope due to the fact that, while their trenches ran north and south and their advance was to be eastward, the Ridge ran from south-east to north-west. The Canadian right would have to cover 4000 yards to its final objective, but an advance of 700 yards would place the 4th Canadian Division on the summit of Hill 145. Divisions were to attack on two-brigade frontages, and capture of the first objective would carry the whole across the three enemy forward trenches for an average gain of 700 yards. This should give the 4th Canadian Division possession of Hill 145. The extent of the advance and the capture of each objective were to be reported back by patrolling aircraft. After a pause of 40 minutes for consolidation the attack was to be resumed, The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were to carry out a further advance of 400 yards; the 3rd would press on slightly to reach the far edge of the Ridge and units of the 4th,

advancing down the reverse slope of Hill 145, were to seize the German reserve trenches there. By zero plus 95 minutes these latter divisions should have secured their final objective.

The 1st and 2nd Divisions would then employ their reserve brigades against the remaining objectives. The latter's sector being wider, the British 13th Infantry Brigade would be introduced on the left. This third phase would clear the enemy out of the last segment of his intermediate line, secure the village of Thélus and breach the second-line trenches in this sector. Final attack would secure the remainder of these and give the Canadians possession of the eastern escarpment. While patrols moved forward as far as the Arras-Lens railway embankment the final position: all along the corps frontage would be consolidated against counter-attack by a line of posts among the woods on the eastern slope; machine-gunners were to be taken along for that specific purpose. Subsequently a main line of resistance would be constructed 100 yards behind the crest (on what would then be the reverse slope) while additional machine-gun posts were built a further 100 yards to the rear. The later Northern operation would be carried out by the left (4th) Canadian Division and the 24th (right) Division of the adjacent British 1st Corps.

Preparations for the Attack

No particular secret was made of the plan, except as regards the day and hour of attack, and the Canadians were given an unprecedented opportunity to learn their roles. Thoroughness was the keynote of the preparations. In the rear area the German defences were reproduced in full-scale detail from aerial photographs, with tapes to mark trenches and flags to mark strongpoints, and repeated rehearsals were held. All ranks were well acquainted with the sector on their own side of No Man's Land. Great numbers of detailed maps were provided. Meanwhile the Engineers were extending the roads and light railways so that the necessary stores and ammunition could be moved forward. Complementary increases in telephone and telegraph facilities, water supply and other services were undertaken. Even though this activity was carried on in full view of the enemy, little effort was made to disrupt the preparations.

It was planned to destroy the enemy's defences by a two-week bombardment. With the aid of aerial photographs all essential targets were carefully tabulated and arrangements made to take immediate action upon the correlation of information subsequently obtained from aircraft, balloons, sound rangers, flash spotters and ground observers. It was emphasized that success would depend largely upon close co-operation be-

tween artillery and machine-guns and between the Intelligence sections of First Army and Canadian Corps Headquarters. Observed fire would be laid down daily on trenches, dug-outs, concrete machine-gun emplacements and other strongpoints, entrances to tunnels, road-junctions, ammunition dumps and light railways to a depth of 4000-5000 yards behind the German front line; it was realized, however, that apart from the foremost lines of defence the total destruction of barbed wire entanglements would be out of the question. By night attention would be switched to the enemy's communications which would be harassed by incessant shell and machine-gun fire. Unprecedented importance was attached to counter-battery work, the ruling principle being that isolated batteries should be dealt with first, since those that were closely grouped could be more easily and economically neutralized later by high explosive and gas shells. These tasks were to be carried out by 245 pieces of heavy artillery and 618 field guns and howitzers placed at the disposal of the Canadian Corps, assisted by 280 more guns of the flanking British 1st Corps. The resulting density was one heavy gun for every 20 yards of frontage and one field gun for every 10 yards, a considerable increase over the firepower available for the earlier Somme offensive. The Canadian Machine Gun Companies'

280 guns were allotted harassing fire tasks, and trench mortars were to join in the destruction of the foremost German trenches.

The first phase of the bombardment began on 20 March, but only about half the batteries participated in order to conceal as long as possible the great concentration of artillery on such a narrow front. The guns of the Third Army joined in on 2 April for the second and more intensive phase which the Germans called "the week of suffering." Special attention was given to the villages of Thélus, Les Tilleuls and Farbus and the German support troops resting there were driven into the open fields with a consequent loss in sleep and efficiency. Numbers of Germans in the forward trenches went without food for two or three days and were further exhausted by the endless task of trying to keep open the entrances to their deep dug-outs. The persistently bad weather impeded the flow of ammunition required to replenish our forward dumps but increased the effect of the shelling, causing the enemy's forward defence system to lose its continuity in places.

Nightly raids were conducted during the bombardment, varying in size from a few individuals to the 600 all ranks sent out by the 10th Canadian infantry Brigade on 31 March. It was learned that the Ridge was defended by five regiments; four of these had

been in the line for at least five weeks and many of the rifle companies were greatly reduced in strength. The first and second trenches were manned by a forward battalion of each regiment, a second battalion was either in the third trench or immediately to the rear as close support, while the third battalions were resting in villages five or six miles back and could not reach the battlefield in less than two hours. Thus there would be approximately 5,000 troops to oppose the initial attacks by 15,000 Canadians and a reinforcement of 3,000 to meet the 12,000 Canadian and British troops available to support the first attacks or press forward to the subsequent objectives. The only further German reserves were two divisions 12 to 15 miles distant near Douai.

Haig points out in his dispatch that the artillery preparation depended largely upon air reconnaissance. Accordingly, "a period of very heavy air fighting ensued, culminating in the days immediately preceding the attack in a struggle of the utmost intensity for local supremacy in the air." Bad flying weather and superior German aircraft and equipment resulted in the Royal Flying Corps suffering considerable losses; but thanks to its good work some 86 per cent of the enemy's 212 active batteries were located. Starting with the night of 5 April limited bombing was carried out against German air-

fields and railway installations and, although the weather was far from ideal, these operations were continued on each succeeding night.

The Attack, 9 April

Easter Sunday found the Canadian Corps augmented to a strength of approximately 170,000 all ranks, of whom 97,184 were Canadians; apart from the British 5th Division in corps reserve the non-Canadians were chiefly artillery, engineer and labour units attached for special tasks. That evening the infantry battalions began to move forward to their assembly areas, guided by luminous painted stakes and in many cases completing their journey through one of the elaborate subways constructed by the tunnellers beforehand. The enemy's forward wire had been cut and patrols now cut lanes through the Canadian wire so that forward companies could file through to occupy the shallow ditches in No Man's Land from which they would assault. By 4 a.m. the troops were in position, without alarming the German outposts a bare 100 yards away.

Not until 5:30 a.m. did the batteries open fire. After three minutes of rapid fire on the German forward trench the field artillery barrage began to creep forward, lifting 100 yards every three minutes. Ahead of it a bullet-swept zone was created by 150 machine-guns. Simultaneously

the heavy guns deluged the German battery positions and ammunition dumps with high explosive and gas shells, the latter killing horses and thus putting an end to the mobility of guns and wagons. Observation posts either had been destroyed or now were clouded by smoke and their telephone communications disrupted. Seldom has counter-battery work been so effective.

A driving wind from the northwest made the attacking infantry shiver as they followed the barrage closely across the cratered and soggy ground; but it blew the falling snow and sleet into the defenders' faces. Furthermore, coming after a comparatively quiet night the first hurricane of the bombardment had taken the enemy garrison by surprise and many failed to get out of their deep dugouts before Canadian infantrymen were at the entrances. There was some hand-to-hand fighting, but the assault was a rapid and unqualified success. Within thirty minutes the six assaulting battalions of the 1st Canadian Division had cleared all three trenches of the German forward defences. After the planned pause during which the objective was consolidated under cover of a standing barrage, the rear companies continued the advance behind the creeping barrage to capture the intermediate line. The experience of the 2nd Canadian Division, advancing on a frontage of 1400 yards, was very similar; and

from its second objective, reached according to timetable, Thélus and the rounded summit of Hill 135 could be seen through the snow and smoke. Enemy machine-gun posts had caused a considerable number of casualties, however. On the 3rd Division front so much destruction had been caused by the artillery that the enemy was unable to offer any serious resistance. By 7:34 a.m. the 7th and 8th Brigades had secured their second, and in this instance final, objective—roughly a mile of the crest of Vimy Ridge. As their patrols moved down the wooded eastern slope they were fired on by snipers, however, and casualties began to mount.

The 4th Canadian Division had the hardest fighting of the day. In its attack on Hill 145 the 11th (right) Brigade ran into a German strong-point which had been repaired following an earlier bombardment. Machine-gun fire combined with uncut wire caused heavy losses here, and this affected the advance of the 12th (left) Brigade which at first had made good progress. It was not until repeated attacks had been made and darkness was falling that the last of the enemy was driven from the summit.

Although it was assumed that the 1st and 2nd Divisions would meet less opposition assaulting their third and fourth objectives there was no absolute certainty that the Germans

were "on the run:" it was considered necessary, therefore, to adhere to the artillery programme. Thus only at 8:35 a.m. did the reserve brigades move forward to the attack, with the British 13th Infantry Brigade on the left front of the 2nd Division's wider sector. By 11 a.m. the 1st Canadian Division's 1st Brigade was in possession of its third objective, 1100 yards distant, while the 6th Canadian and 13th British Brigades had passed through the German intermediate line to occupy respectively Thélus village and the fortified ground north of it. Moving forward again at midday they cleared the second system of trenches on the reverse slope of the Ridge, and passed through Farbus. By late afternoon patrols had penetrated to the railway embankment and the units were consolidating their gains in anticipation of counter-attack. As the neighbouring 51st Division of the 17th Corps did not achieve its final objective until the following morning a defensive right flank had to be extended back to the intermediate line.

Subsequent Operations, 10-14 April

Artillery reconnaissance aircraft directed harassing fire on German reserves moving forward across the Douai plain, with the result that effective counter-attacks never materialized. On 10 April the 10th (reserve) Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division assaulted the two German trenches remaining on the reverse

slope of the Ridge, following close behind a creeping barrage and clearing both within thirty minutes, though not without heavy loss. The Canadian Corps now occupied the whole of its original objectives.

The necessity of employing the 10th Brigade in this last attack meant that a delay of 24 hours would be necessary before it could participate in the second (Northern) operation against the Pimple. Again assisted by a snowstorm and driving wind, two of its battalions launched this previously-rehearsed attack at 5 a.m. on 12 April, moving forward behind a barrage fired by 96 field guns. Here also the German first and second trenches had been almost obliterated by the earlier bombardment and only slight opposition was encountered from the badly dazed garrison. Meanwhile the 73rd Infantry Brigade of the British 24th Division captured the Bois en Hache to complete the operation.

Following the discovery that the Germans were making a general withdrawal an advance was ordered along the whole Corps front on the afternoon of 13 April. The next morning, however, patrols came up against stiffened resistance along the forward defences of the German third line, running through Oppy and Méricourt. This was far enough from the Ridge to reduce the advantages of observation and was too strong to attack without intensive preparation

by heavy guns which could not be moved forward until the almost obliterated roads had been rebuilt. Here the Canadian advance was stayed for the moment. The operation had cost the Corps over 11,000 casualties.

The first phase of the Battles of Arras was at an end. The Third British Army had had good success in front of Arras, though it had not got through the Hindenburg Line, and this combined with the Canadian advance at Vimy had resulted in the capture of more ground and more prisoners than any previous British offensive on the Western Front. Nivelle's offensive on the Chemin des Dames was a bloody failure and was followed by widespread disaffection in the French armies. The brunt of the rest of the year's campaign was to fall on the British, whose centre of activity moved northwards to Flanders.

Comments

On the "strategic" level the operations of April 1917 were unsatisfactory from the Allied viewpoint. As so often on the Western Front in this war, one sees the effect of lack of clear-cut *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*. Important local successes were gained without achieving any genuine effect upon the outcome of the war. The plans made for exploitation were ineffective, and the main operation to which those at Vimy and on the Scarpe were supposed to be

subsidiary accomplished nothing.

On the lower "tactical" level, on the other hand, the Battle of Vimy Ridge presents a bright picture: a sound plan effectively carried out.

With all arms and services it was the same - labour crowned with success. The Heavy Artillery destroyed the field defences, silenced the enemy's batteries and broke up his reserves; the Field Artillery fired a perfect barrage under which the infantry moved steadily forward in accordance with an exact time, table overcoming one centre of resistance after another and proceeding to one objective after another; and as each objective was reached it was consolidated and machine guns disposed to meet counter attacks.

The wounded were brought back and cared for, ammunition, rations, and forage were brought forward at the proper time and in the proper order; there was neither hurry, nor confusion, nor delay. To an unusual extent the course of this battle can be followed by the orders issued...*

The preparatory bombardment ruled out the possibility of achieving *Surprise* on the strategic level, but a useful degree of tactical surprise was obtained on 9 April. Much of the success obtained was due to effective *Co-operation* between the arms and services. The increased importance of the assistance of the air arm is a notable feature of the operation in this connection. Efficient detailed *Administration* was, as always, the forerunner of victory. Finally, the thorough preparations made and the pains taken to ensure that every individual fully understood his own task

* Col. A. F. Duguid, "Canadians in Battle, 1915-1918" (*Annual Report, Canadian Historical Association, 1935*).

helped to produce and maintain the high *Morale* required to carry through successfully an operation so formidable as the breaching of the enemy's long prepared defences on Vimy Ridge.

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THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

1918

The "Great War", 1914-19, was the first overseas conflict in which Canadian military forces played a major part. It is a most vital incident in the national history of Canada and, quite apart from its purely military importance, one with which every Canadian soldier certainly ought to be well acquainted.

The Canadian Army made its contribution almost entirely on the Western Front. The operations of 1915-18 there have been regarded, with reason, as generally uninspired and conveying only negative lessons to the strategist and the tactician. The battle here described, however, was conducted with greater skill and imagination than earlier ones and proved to be the beginning of a series of victories which led directly to the Armistice.

Background of the Battle

Following the Germans' failure to obtain a quick decision in 1914 trench warfare and stalemate developed. Both the British and French High Commands came to believe

that prolonged artillery bombardment, if only heavy enough, could crush out all life in an area, leaving assaulting infantry merely the task of mopping up. Time and again it was tried, but invariably after the barrage passed the Germans emerged from their deep dugouts and mowed down the advancing infantrymen with machineguns, firing in enfilade along barbed wire obstacles. In 1916 the British produced an answer to the lethal combination of automatic weapons, field defences and wire - the tank; but it was long before it was properly employed.

By 1918 both sides were beginning to feel a shortage of men.* The

* *Infantry shortages led the British Army to reorganize its brigades into three, instead of four, battalions, at the beginning of 1918. Furthermore, it was now necessary to employ low-category men in forward units, with a further decrease in operational efficiency. Although only three brigades of the five Australian divisions were so reorganized, this corps was experiencing periodic shortages of reinforcements. The Canadian Corps, as noted on page 27, above, retained its original organization.*

United States had not yet been able to deploy its great resources; and Ludendorff utilized the temporary advantage afforded by the Russian collapse of 1917, which gave him 192 divisions against the Allies' 173. In March 1918 he attacked the weakest point of the Allied line. Initial German penetration was deep but was halted. It was not until July, however, that the Allies were able to regain the initiative. Ferdinand Foch had been appointed Allied Generalissimo during the critical March days, and now his governing idea was to strike successively at widely dispersed points, to free his own lateral communications and give the Germans no respite while his own resources were growing.

Foch had wanted Haig to attack in Flanders, but Haig convinced him that it was more desirable to eliminate the German salient east and southeast of Amiens, which interfered with the use of the town and its railway running back to Paris. Haig proposed a combined Franco-British operation under his own control, the main effort being made by General Rawlinson's Fourth Army which would attack north of the Luce River while the First French Army (Debeney) advanced on its right.

By 1918 the Germans had become accustomed to regard the arrival of either the Canadians or the Australians as a notice of impending

attack. Four of the five Australian divisions were already on the Fourth Army front and it was planned to bring the 1st Australian Division back from Flanders to reinforce the coming stroke. On 20 July Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, commanding the Canadian Corps, then under the First Army on the Arras front, was informed of the intended operation and told that his Corps was to take part. Although Currie visited Fourth Army Headquarters for planning conferences, his divisional commanders were kept in the dark until 31 July. To deceive the enemy two Canadian infantry battalions, two casualty clearing stations and the Corps wireless section were sent north to Flanders, where these Canadians made their presence known to the Germans opposite. Only on 30 July did the Canadian Corps begin its secret move to the Fourth Army sector, with officers and men completely unaware of where they were going or what they were to do. Pending their arrival a French corps was withdrawn southward and the Australian front extended. Since British units had not previously served in this area, there was the added problem of creating rear area installations, which placed one more burden upon the overworked railways and limited motor transport. By the night 3/4 August the Canadians had arrived in the Amiens area

but vast quantities of ammunition still had to be brought to forward dumps for the artillery. By the night of 6/7 August all was in readiness, however, and the troops could be informed of the pending operation.

To attract still more enemy attention to Flanders, the newly-organized Royal Air Force had been ordered to occupy additional airfields and to increase air activity there until 6 August. Above the British Fourth Army front abnormal air activity was avoided, although on the night preceding the attack Handley-Page bombers patrolled the front line to drown the noise of assembling British tanks. As an innovation, the officer commanding the R.A.F. formation had drawn up a memorandum, to be communicated to all pilots and observers on the afternoon prior to attack, setting forth the general outline of the plan of battle so that they would be better able to appreciate the operations and turn in more valuable reports. At that time total available British air strength consisted of 147 day bombers, 92 night bombers, 75 fighter reconnaissance aircraft, 376 fighters and 110 corps planes. Similarly the French had concentrated 1104 aircraft to support their First Army. The main German air strength was still in Champagne and there were only 365 aircraft of all types to oppose the Allies' 1904.

On the German side the prospect of an Allied offensive was viewed

with so much apprehension that Ludendorff felt it necessary, just four days, before the attack, to issue a morale-raising order. Evidently the German command was sufficiently uneasy about the defeatism which was spreading among the common soldiers to misread any omen. Reports of tank noises were described by higher staffs as "phantoms of the imagination or nervousness."

The Plan of the Offensive

The British plan was as follows. In order to pinch out the German salient and reach the old Amiens Defence Line, five to seven miles ahead of the existing front, attacks were to be made against three successive objectives - the forward German defences, the reserve localities and gun lines, and finally what were believed to be only scattered enemy strongpoints. As at Cambrai,* preliminary bombardment was dispensed with, in order to

* On 20 November 1917 a force of 381 tanks, followed by a relatively small proportion of infantry, had rolled forward in the early morning light, without preliminary bombardment, and caught the Germans napping. Tactical surprise was restored to the Western Front, but by the time a five-mile penetration had been made the surviving tank-crews were exhausted and the infantry unable to progress further on their own: thus, with open countryside just beyond, decisive success was in sight when the momentum failed. German counter-attacks retrieved the situation, but the British had learned the lesson of proper tank employment.

heighten surprise, but a lifting barrage was scheduled to move just ahead of the first wave of tanks. Two-thirds of the British guns were assigned to counter-battery tasks. At the same time the R.A.F. would attack German aerodromes to reduce enemy air activity and other aircraft were to give close support to the advancing troops; however, railway junctions were not to be attacked until evening as it was considered that 12 hours would elapse before enemy reserves, set in motion by the attack, would be within striking distance. On the eve of battle the British Fourth Army had a striking force of 13 divisions (plus three available in G.H.Q. reserve) and a cavalry corps of three divisions (also earmarked as G.H.Q. reserve), supported by 1386 field guns and howitzers and 684 heavy pieces, 342 heavy tanks, 72 whippets (light tanks) and 120 supply tanks.

The ground to be crossed, between the Avre and Somme rivers, was a rolling plateau well suited for the employment of tanks. In front of the French, on the extreme right, it was a "real billiard table" but, on the British front, it was scooped by hollow depressions leading towards the rivers. There were a few large villages, usually surrounded by orchards so that they resembled woods, which would also obstruct the advance. On the Canadian right the plateau was cut by the valley of

the Luce, which, though a mere stream in August, presented obstacles in the form of swamp, pools and small belts of trees. On the extreme left the plateau was little more than a flat-topped ridge; however, spurs and re-entrants made it unsuitable for tank operations where it sloped towards the rivers.

The Canadian Corps was to attack on a three-division front of approximately 7000 yards, with the 4th Canadian Division in reserve. The most difficult task fell to the 3rd Division on the right; in addition to having to effect a crossing over the Luce in the beginning it had to maintain contact with the French who, unsupported by tanks, were not to move without a preliminary bombardment. The 3rd Division was to attack its first objective with two brigades; the reserve brigade would then take over for the second objective. The final phase on this front would be undertaken by the 4th Division brought forward from reserve. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, centre and left, were each to attack with one brigade forward and merely leapfrog a fresh brigade forward for each succeeding phase. The Canadian Independent Force of two motor machine-gun brigades, a cyclist battalion and a section of medium trench mortars was to protect the right flank and maintain liaison with the French. British tank battalions were to lead the assault on each divisional sector and R.A.F. aircraft

were detailed to work with the tanks.

The Australian Corps on the left was to assault in a similar manner, but with two of its four assaulting divisions advancing abreast on a front of roughly 7500 yards. The battle-worn 1st Australian Division was in reserve. On the extreme left the British 3rd Corps was given only the limited task of keeping abreast of the Australians, to be undertaken in two phases.

Although the proposal had been Haig's and the plan evolved mainly by Rawlinson, it was Foch who first proposed an enlargement of the original scheme. At an important conference held on 5 August he directed that, if the initial attack was successful, reserves should be pushed south-eastwards as far as possible. During this stage the Cavalry Corps would be held ready to pass through any where there was an opening. It may be noted that the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was serving with the 3rd Cavalry Division, which had been placed under the command of Canadian Corps until the breakthrough had been accomplished when it, and the cavalry brigade and whippet tanks placed at the disposal of the Australian Corps, were to revert to Cavalry Corps command.

The First Day's Fighting

A few minutes before zero hour, 4.20 a.m. on 8 August, 430 British

tanks started from their assembly areas and at zero hour, behind a lifting barrage, they rumbled ahead, guided through a mist which hid them from the enemy by a leading wave of infantrymen. Behind them, in extended order, came the assault battalions, followed by the units of the reserve brigades in close formation. Very few casualties were suffered in the early stages as the enemy artillery was not effective and soon was silenced by counter-battery fire.

The advance was a departure from the methodical plodding of earlier battles and taking a leaf from the German infiltration tactics, introduced in the preceding March, troops and tanks pushed ahead regardless of what lay on their immediate flanks, bypassing strong opposition where it could not be pinched out by a flanking movement. In less than an hour and a half the Canadians had secured their first objective and, after a pause while field guns were brought forward and reserve brigades of infantry took over the assault role, the advance was resumed at a somewhat slower pace.

By ten o'clock in the morning the mist had cleared sufficiently for German machine-gun nests to bring down withering fire on the advancing troops. Mopping up such strong points took time, even when tanks were available. There had been little real co-operation between infantry


and tanks previously, but the errors apparent at Cambrai had been corrected and, generally speaking, the infantry now followed closely enough behind the tanks to prevent the enemy reorganizing.

Towards 11 a.m. the Canadian Corps was on its second objective and, while the 4th Division and the still fresh reserve brigades of the 1st and 2nd Division were forming on the last start line, the 3rd Cavalry Division and a battalion of whippet tanks passed through to attack across what was now open country. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade got through the village of Beaucourt but the wood beyond was strongly held by infantry and guns and the troopers were unable to approach. On the whole the Cavalry's work did not come up to expectations; it had never before co-operated with light tanks, which were too slow to keep up with horsemen across open country but got ahead too quickly when machine-gun fire was encountered. There was no lack of gallantry but horses and men proved to be too easy targets for machine-gun bullets. Thus the hoped-for breakthrough of the Cavalry Corps never materialized.

Undismayed by the sight of many empty saddles coming back through their advancing waves, the infantry mopped up the remaining enemy posts and relieved the few hard-pressed squadrons who were on the

final objective. Except on their right the Canadians had taken all their objectives and the Australian Corps had managed to do the same after considerable hard fighting. The French were about a mile behind on the extreme right while the British 3rd Corps had only been able to take the first of its two objectives.

The same mist which had aided the infantry and tanks to advance had kept the Air Force grounded until late forenoon. Once visibility was restored, however, aircraft began close support sorties, flying at tree top level; German reserves were strafed and their forward movement harassed by bullets and bombs. Smoke screens were laid on both corps fronts and flares also were dropped by reconnaissance planes to guide infantry and tanks on to enemy strongpoints. Unfortunately, however, although 205 bombing flights were made and 12 tons of small (25-lb.) bombs were dropped, concerted efforts to destroy the Somme bridges and prevent fresh enemy divisions being rushed up proved unsuccessful. Owing to the inability to bomb enemy airfields earlier these could now be used for refuelling by the inferior force of German planes hurriedly transferred from neighbouring army fronts. For example, the notorious Richthofen Circus, now commanded by Hauptmann Hermann Göring, was able to remain in action almost continuously until reduced from 50 to 11



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aircraft. The R.A.F. lost 97 aircraft out of about 700 serviceable (day flying) planes in action and still was faced with the problem of destroying the bridges over the Somme.

Success had been sweeping and the penetration of six to eight miles had eliminated the enemy salient and with it more than 27,000 Germans, or almost the whole of the garrison of the sector-nearly 16,000 being prisoners. More than 440 guns and masses of material were captured, and all this was accomplished with the lightest casualties yet sustained in a major attack on the British front. More important, however, the morale of the German Supreme Command suffered a shock from which it did not recover. Ludendorff afterwards referred to 8 August as "the black day" of the German Army.

Later Phases of the Offensive

It should be remembered that London and Paris were busy planning a 1919 campaign when Foch and Haig launched this first of a series of attacks with limited objectives. In later life General Sir Arthur Currie wrote of Amiens as follows:

The success of the Australians and Canadians on August 8th was so startling... that in my opinion GHQ had no definite ideas what to do.

...senior staff officers hurried up from GHQ to see me and to ask what I thought should be done. They indicated quite plainly that the success had gone far beyond expectation and that no one seemed to know just what to do. I replied in the Canadian vernacular:

"The going seems good: let's go on!"

It was not until just before midnight, however, that General Rawlinson told his three corps commanders to continue the advance next day. There seemed no reason then why the general line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray sur Somme-Demancourt could not be reached, as the next organized enemy defence was the old Hindenburg position.

Before the first day's fighting had ended, however, the Germans had been able to bring up six fresh divisions, and every succeeding hour brought more support. The single Canadian objective (on the right) remaining from the previous day was captured on the 9th by a brigade of the 4th Canadian Division but, due to a series of frustrating delays, the main corps attack did not get under way until noon. In turn this held up the Australian advance on the left. Worst of all, only 145 British tanks were still serviceable. According to the official British account:

The ground fighting during the day was of a very disjointed nature; the attacks of various divisions and brigades started at different times and under different conditions. Some of them were covered by artillery, some supported by tanks, whilst others were carried out by infantry unaided. The German defence was similarly very uneven and without any serious attempt at counter-attack. In the result only a bare three-miles advance, half the way to Roye-Chaulnes was accomplished.

The R.A.F. continued its attempt

to destroy the Somme bridges but without success.

Similar fighting took place on the two following days. By then the weary troops had reached the extensive German defences of the old Somme battlefield of two years previously. German reinforcements totalled 13 divisions, or a strength equal to the attackers', and they now had the advantage of fighting from behind well-organized defences while, as at Cambrai, the British Army had exhausted its local reserves. Very few tanks remained in action. With the approval of Sir Douglas Haig, the attack scheduled for 12 August was called off. It was intended to continue the general attack on 14 or 15 August and indeed General Foch still believed important success to be possible. It was obvious to the commanders on the spot, however, that further advance was impossible without incurring heavy casualties. General Currie now considered that there was no object in persevering. Haig insisted that the operation be wound up and Foch reluctantly agreed. Although less spectacular than those of the 8th, the advances of the three concluding days had increased the total penetration to as much as 12 miles. Fourth Army casualties for the four days of battle were only 22,202 (killed, wounded and missing),* of whom 9074 came

from the Canadian Corps, while it is believed that the Germans lost more than 75,000. Later in the month Foch struck heavily at other points and thereafter the Germans were steadily rolled back. In the autumn their High Command sought an end to hostilities.

Comments

In later days the Germans tried to attribute their defeat at Amiens to a massed attack by tanks, but, as readers will have surmised, credit for the victory actually belongs primarily to the infantryman, though he got the best of support from artillery and armour and from the air.

The plan for the Battle of Amiens, incorporating the experience gained at Cambrai in 1917, represents the return to the Western Front of an imaginative conception of strategy and tactics very different from that which had ruled there so long. The battle plans based on mere weight of bombardment, which had gained so little ground at such heavy cost, were replaced by an intelligent attempt to profit by the potentialities of powerful new weapons employed in combination. Above all, the Amiens plan is remarkable for its exploitation of the principle of *Surprise*, that great old winner of battles, which had been so completely neglected by the planners of the Somme and Passchendaele. An effective deception scheme, in conjunction with the elimination of pre-

* *The French, however, suffered 24,232 casualties in their mere limited advance, designed mainly to keep abreast of the Canadians.*

liminary bombardment (the tanks, to some extent, replacing the artillery as support for the assaulting infantry), supplies the chief explanation for the victory.

The other Principles of War were not all so completely applied by the Allies in this battle. It is apparent that there was some lack of clarity in the matter of *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*; the higher command had evidently not thought beyond the possibility of a local success, nor - as was natural in view of the whole Western Front background - had it provided for that degree of *Flexibility* which might possibly have permitted an exploitation that would have increased the victory. It was the Germans, indeed, whose operations showed most flexibility; in spite of the way they had been surprised, they reacted rapidly and reinforced their front in time to prevent a complete breakthrough.

Thanks once more to surprise, the Fourth Army was able to achieve effective *Concentration of Force*, massing strength superior to that of the Germans at the decisive time and place. The surprise attained likewise enhanced the effect of the blow dealt by the battle to German *Morale*, and its favourable effect upon the morale of our own forces - results which were powerfully felt throughout the later stages of the campaign.

In spite of the inadequate training of the cavalry for action with tanks, Amiens is an outstanding example of *Co-operation* - between infantry, tanks and artillery, and between the ground forces and the air. Finally, the victory rested - as usual - upon a foundation of effective *Administration*. The rapid, secret and orderly move of the Canadian Corps across the lines of communication of two Armies, and the speedy accumulation in the forward area of the huge stocks of ammunition and other material required, were vital preliminaries of a battle that marked the turning-point of the war.

The use of one new weapon of war - the aeroplane - deserves separate mention. The close support provided by the R.A.F. for troops on the ground, which has been described, was an important feature of the battle. Furthermore, as a result of the almost continuous air battles, the German Air Force suffered losses which it could not make good. The Allied air forces, however, were unable to prevent the Germans from bringing up sufficient reinforcements to halt the Allied advance. Could the battlefield have been isolated, the R.A.F. official historian observes, the victory might have been still greater than it was; but not until the later stages of the Second World War were strategic and tactical air

forces able to make a success of diction.”
 what came to be known as “inter-

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THE CONQUEST OF SICILY

1943

Early on the morning of 10 July 1943 troops of two Allied armies began landing at various beaches in the south-east corner of Sicily. The conquest of the island was successfully concluded 38 days later, when the last of the German garrison retired across the Messina Strait to the Italian mainland. This campaign, in which Canadian forces played a not inconsiderable part, marked the first major blow against the so-called "soft underbelly of the Axis", and provided the Allies with a spring-board for operations against the mainland of Hitler's Europe.

The Sicilian operation is interesting to the soldier on several counts. The assault involved amphibious organization on a very large scale. The subsequent fighting meant, on one side, a difficult advance across mountainous terrain which gave great advantages to the defenders; on

the other side, a delaying action maintained in the face of superior forces.

The Plan of Invasion

The decision to attack Sicily was taken at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. The Conference set the favourable July moon period as the target date for the invasion, to which was given the code-name "Husky". General Sir H. R. L. G. Alexander was named Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's supreme command, and was charged with the detailed planning, preparation and execution of the operation.

Planning began immediately under a special staff, but the fighting in Tunisia continued to occupy the attention of the Supreme Commander and his Deputy, as well as that of the two designated army commanders

(General Sir Bernard Montgomery and Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.) until mid-May. The result was that the first outline plan, which called for separate assaults by the United States Seventh Army near Palermo in the north-west corner of the island, and the British Eighth Army near Catania on the east coast, did not meet with the full approval of those who would be responsible for carrying it out. The chief objection was to the wide dispersion of the proposed landings. Eventually the plan was completely recast "on the sound strategic principle of concentration of strength in the crucial area." The landings in the north-west were cancelled and the entire Western Task Force was diverted to the south-eastern assault, being placed on the Eighth Army's immediate left.

The plan as finally adopted fulfilled three main requirements: the landings were to take place on suitable beaches which could be given fighter cover from Allied airfields in Tunisia and on Malta; the major port of Catania would be an early objective (although administrative demands would be met initially by the use of lesser ports, and to an unprecedented extent, particularly in the American sector, by maintenance over the beaches); and the airfields in south-eastern Sicily would be seized in order to ensure protection for our ships lying off the beaches and to afford greater security for further

offensive operations.

The assault area extended for more than 100 miles around Cape Passero, the extreme south-easterly tip of the island, to include the port of Syracuse on the right and the smaller harbour of Licata on the left. After preparatory operations by Allied naval forces and air forces to neutralize enemy naval efforts and gain air supremacy, the two task forces would launch pre-dawn seaborne assaults, assisted by airborne landings, designed to secure Syracuse and Licata and adjacent air bases and establish a firm lodgement area from which to conduct operations against the ports of Augusta and Catania and the important Gerbini group of airfields in the Catania Plain. The capture of these objectives would pave the way to the reduction of the island.

Allied estimates of the strength of the Axis garrison in Sicily proved substantially correct. Actually at the time of the invasion there were two German and four Italian field divisions and between five and six Italian coastal divisions on the island—the whole being under command of the Headquarters of the Italian Sixth Army, which was at Enna, the hub city of Sicily. The Italian forces, particularly those of the coastal formations, were of low fighting quality, considerably inferior to the battle-seasoned troops of the two German divisions - the Hermann Goring Pan-

zer Division and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. On the morning of 10 July the bulk of the Hermann Göring Division was at Caltagirone, midway between Augusta and Licata, where it formed, with two Italian field formations - the 4th (Livorno) and the 54th (Napoli) Divisions-a mobile reserve for counter-attack after the coastal divisions had met the first shock of invasion. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had been moved a few days earlier to the western end of Sicily in order to counter any assault on Palermo.


Against this garrison the Allies were to employ in the assault nine divisions (two of them airborne), an independent brigade and certain Commando units. To carry out the tasks assigned to the Eighth Army, General Montgomery planned five simultaneous landings, using the 13th Corps (the 5th and 50th Divisions) on his right; and the 30th Corps (the 1st Canadian and 51st (Highland) Divisions and the 231st (Malta) Brigade) on the left, on both sides of the Pachino peninsula. The main assault in the north was to be preceded by the drop of an airlanding brigade group of the 1st Airborne Division west of Syracuse and a landing by Commando troops south of the port with the joint object of securing road communications and capturing coastal batteries guarding the harbour. On completion of the assault phase the 13th Corps was to

advance north across the River Simeto and capture Catania. On the Allied left General Patton would assault with the U.S. 2nd Corps (the 1st and 45th Divisions) in the Gulf of Gela to take the town of Gela and the Comiso group of airfields, and land the 3rd Division (reinforced by part of the 2nd Armoured Division) farther west to capture the port of Licata and its airfields. Once the lodgement area was secured, the Seventh Army's role was to protect the Eighth Army's left flank.

As D Day approached, a carefully coordinated convoy programme brought the invasion forces from many points of the compass to the assembly area south of Malta. British formations of the Eighth Army came from the Middle East and Tripolitania; the 1st Canadian Division sailed directly from the United Kingdom. The American assault divisions embarked at ports in Algeria and Tunisia. By the evening of 9 July more than 3000 merchant ships and naval craft were assembled in readiness for the descent upon Sicily. The Allied air forces had done their work well; seven weeks of heavy blows against Sicilian airfields had left many of them unserviceable and driven half the enemy's aircraft to bases on the Italian mainland.

The Assault, 10 July 1943

As dusk fell the glider-borne 1st Airlanding Brigade (of the British 1st Airborne Division) and American



Historical Section, G.S.

paratroops of the 82nd Airborne Division-in all 5000 strong-took off from Tunisian airfields for Sicily. Their mission was only partly successful, both formations being widely dispersed. By late evening a gale which had threatened to postpone the seaborne assault moderated, and the first landings were made covered by naval bombardment shortly after midnight. They achieved success in all sectors. Caught completely by surprise, the Italian coastal defences offered little organized resistance, and by the end of D Day the Allies had captured all their initial objectives.

Major-General G. G. Simonds 1st Canadian Division made its assault with the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades on a five-mile stretch of coast just west of the tip of the Pachino Peninsula, while farther west a Special Service Brigade of two Royal Marine Commandos, also under General Simonds, carried out simultaneous landings on the extreme left of the Eighth Army's front. Meeting only very slight resistance the 1st Brigade seized in rapid succession an Italian coastal battery and the deserted Pachino airfield, while on the left the 2nd Brigade linked up with the Commando forces and exploited three or four miles inland. Canadian casualties in the first 24 hours of the invasion were almost negligible.

Neither Army had yet encountered any Germans. On the east coast the 13th Corps, which was commanded

by Lieutenant-General Miles C. Dempsey, had made rapid progress during the morning, and by 9:00 p.m. the 5th Division had reached Syracuse-to take the port undamaged. On the right of the Canadians the other formations of Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese's 30th Corps-the 51st Division and the Malta Brigade-had secured Pachino and the eastern half of the peninsula. The assault divisions of the U.S. Seventh Army, having landed in generally rougher surf conditions on the more exposed western beaches, had warded off scattered Axis bombing and strafing attacks, and by nightfall were holding firm bridgeheads about Licata and Gela.

Securing the Bridgehead

The next three days saw the establishment of the lodgement area envisaged in General Alexander's final invasion plan. On 11 July the 13th Corps gave its bridgehead over to the 30th Corps, and advanced northward on Augusta, which the 5th Division captured early on the 13th. The 30th Corps moved on two axes into the rough table-land which reaches down from Caltagirone to cover most of the south-east corner of the island. The 51st Division reached Vizzani on the 13th. Advancing on the Corps' left the Canadians found resistance in the towns near the coast completely broken by Allied aerial bombing and naval shelling. By the

morning of the 12th they had made contact with the 45th U.S. Division in Ragusa.

Meanwhile, on the Allied left General Patton's forces had gained possession of a continuous bridgehead which extended to a point 20 miles west of Licata. They were putting into use the captured airfields near the coast and preparing to deepen their holdings sufficiently to provide the necessary protection for the Eighth Army's left flank. The Americans had been the first to clash with the Germans. On 11 July their 1st Division had beaten back with the support of naval gunfire three fierce counter-attacks delivered in the Gela area by a battle group of the Hermann Göring Division using 60 tanks.

It was General Alexander's intention that after the assaulting armies had secured a firm base "on a line from Catania to Licata" his forces should proceed to "split the island in half." The first step in this direction would be to seize the central group of road junctions about Enna, and thence press on to the north coast in order to sever the east-west communications completely. Control of the road centres was of great tactical importance, for in the rugged terrain that covered the greater part of the island manoeuvre off the roads and tracks was extremely difficult, if not impossible. The unexpectedly light resistance encountered during the

first few days of the campaign enabled General Montgomery to make a start on this plan before Catania had been captured. On 12 July he directed Leese to advance on Caltagirone and Enna, and thence on Leonforte, an important road centre on the main Catania-Palermo highway; the 13th Corps was to continue its drive northward along the coast.

The attack on the Army's right flank met strong opposition. On the night of 13-14 July Commando troops, landing in the Gulf of Catania, secured a road bridge on the main Syracuse-Catania highway; while farther north the 1st Parachute Brigade (of the 1st Airborne Division), dropping at the mouth of the Simeto River, captured the important Primosole Bridge six miles south of Catania. Both bridges were held until the arrival of relieving troops, and on the 16th, after very bitter fighting, a small foothold was established north of the Simeto. Efforts by the 50th Division to break out of this bridgehead failed; it was apparent that the Germans were determined to oppose as long as possible the capture of Catania and the important Gerbini airfields.

The Canadian Advance into the Hills

Late on the 15th, when already there were indications of a deadlock at the Simeto, the Army Commander wrote to General Leese urging him in view of the slowdown in operations on the right to "swing hard with our

left" and push the Canadians on with all speed to Caltagirone, Enna and Leonforte. The Canadian advance had been resumed after a 36-hour rest ordered by General Montgomery. On 15 July the 1st Canadian Brigade passed through the 51st Division at Vizzini to lead the attack on the Corps' left flank. The Canadian axis of advance was the Syracuse-Vizzini-Enna highway, a section of which through Caltagirone lay within the area of the Seventh Army's bridgehead. The inter-army boundary was adjusted to give General Montgomery the exclusive use of the road, and the American axis of advance was turned sharply westward.

From Vizzini the paved highway ran north-westward over the plateau, climbing beyond Caltagirone into the irregular chain of hills which strikes down through the centre of Sicily from the main mountain barrier in the north. From the earliest days of Sicily's turbulent history the population have been forced to establish their inland communities on easily defended sites, usually on commanding heights. The main roads generally ascended to each of these lofty hill towns, and the Canadians were thus faced with the task of ousting the German defenders from a series of positions of great natural strength.

The enemy fully realized the importance of delaying as long as possible the Canadian advance through the hills. Field-Marshal Albert Kes-

sel ring, who as Commander-in-Chief of all German air and ground forces in Italy was directing the Axis operations in Sicily, was faced with the immediate problems of preventing the Allies from reaching Catania and pushing beyond to the Messina Strait in order to cut off the escape route to the mainland, while at the same time holding open his communications in central Sicily so as to allow the evacuation of his troops from the west. He decided to use the Catania-Etna area as a pivot for a withdrawal into the north-east corner of the island. By his orders the bulk of the Hermann Goring Division fell back to the north bank of the Dittaino River, a major tributary of the Simeto crossing the Catania Plain south of the Gerbini airfields. To protect the Hermann Garings' open right flank and preserve a route for the passage of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division from the west became the important tasks of the German rearguards along the axis of the Canadian advance.

The first encounter of Canadian forces with the Germans took place on 15 July ten miles beyond Vizzini, when a mobile infantry and armoured column of the 1st Brigade was surprised by Hermann Goring detachments of artillery and tanks lying in wait in a hilltop town. After a three-hour skirmish the enemy retired, having inflicted 25 casualties and achieved his purpose of halting a

much superior force. From this time the Canadians met increasingly stubborn opposition, both in the skilful delaying actions fought by the enemy rearguards from strong positions of their own choosing and the ingenious demolitions carried out by the German engineers along the narrow and tortuous mountain roads. It was to take the 1st Division a full week to reach and capture Leonforte, 70 miles by winding road from Vizzini.

Early on the 16th General Simonds sent forward from Caltagirone (which had been taken unopposed after destructive Allied air raids) the three battalions of the 2nd Brigade in troop-carrying vehicles, supported by a regiment of the 1st Army Tank Brigade and two regiments of field artillery (one self-propelled). In a defile three miles south of Piazza Armerina the leading battalion and its accompanying squadron of tanks came under heavy machine-gun and anti-tank fire from the surrounding hills. The infantry, hampered by the failure of wireless communications, fought their way up the steep hillsides, driving the defenders (a battalion of the 13th Panzer Grenadier Division) from the summits, but it was early morning of the 17th before Piazza Armerina was finally secured, and noon before the advance was resumed.

For his next stand the enemy chose a highly defensible road junction narrowly enclosed between high

hills eight miles north of Piazza Armerina. Here a side road branched off from the main Enna highway towards Valguarnera, a hilltop town overlooking the Dittaino valley and the western Catania Plain. As soon as the presence of the Germans in the pass was established, General Simonds ordered an attack in force on a two-brigade front, the 3rd Brigade, which was now in the lead, to seize the road junction and press on towards Enna, and the 1st Brigade to strike through the bills on the right and capture Valguarnera. The Germans repulsed with heavy mortar fire an attack up the main road by moonlight, but were driven from their posts on the afternoon of the 18th by a flanking thrust on the right supported by fire from four artillery regiments. In the meantime two battalions of the 1st Brigade had by dawn on the 18th made their way independently across a tangle of ravines and hills to the edge of a ridge overlooking the steep approaches to Valguarnera. Companies had become separated in the uncompromising terrain, and the breakdown of communications prevented any artillery support. In such circumstances there was no coordinated effort by the two battalions against the town, and heroic attempts on a one- or two-company scale were repulsed by counter-attack and by effective fire from the commanding German positions. It was late in the day when the

enemy began to withdraw from Valguarnera as the remaining battalion came forward with artillery support to complete the brigade task. The 24 hours' fighting, the heaviest yet experienced by the Division, had been costly to both sides.

The occupation of Enna was left to the U.S. 2nd Corps, and early on the 19th the 2nd Canadian Brigade moved northward from Valguarnera towards Leonforte. During the day General Simonds announced new objectives for the Division, arising from a decision of the Army Commander to abandon temporarily the thrust by the 50th Division against Catania because of strong enemy resistance near the coast, and instead to increase the pressure farther west. General Montgomery ordered the 5th and 51st Divisions on the inner flanks of the two Corps to attack in the centre towards the northern edge of the plain, and the Canadians to turn eastward from Leonforte and drive towards Adrano, on the south-western skirts of Mount Etna. General Patton, whose forces were meeting only very light resistance as they overran western Sicily, was directed by General Alexander to develop a two-pronged threat eastward along the northern coast and the interior road through Nicosia.

General Simonds now widened his front to two brigades in order to make simultaneous attacks on Leonforte and Assoro, two miles to the

east, and cut the highway east of Leonforte. At the same time he directed the 231st Brigade, which had come under his command on the right flank, to advance northward across the Dittaino valley in a threat against Agira, which was to become the target of a full divisional attack.

Assoro, perched near the top of a 2900-foot bill, was taken in a surprise assault by a battalion of the 1st Brigade after a hazardous cross-country march by night, which culminated in a daring ascent of the precipitous face of the mountain. The 2nd Brigade's attack on Leonforte was made frontally, but here again our tactics caught the Germans by surprise. The enemy's destruction of the bridge carrying the main road across a deep ravine south of the town seemed to have given him immunity from attack by our armour. Late on the 21st infantry companies, under cover of a heavy bombardment, fought their way into Leonforte on foot while engineers began bridging the 50-foot gap. A fierce struggle developed in the streets, and the Canadians were cut off from outside support; but thanks to the strenuous and heroic efforts of the engineers under fire the bridge was completed during the night, and at daylight a "flying column" of infantry with tanks and anti-tank guns burst into the town. There was more bitter street-fighting, but by mid-afternoon Leonforte was clear. The

enemy's determined efforts to hold the Leonforte-Assoro ridge marked a change from his earlier rearguard tactics of "delay and withdraw". From now on the Canadian advance was to be stubbornly opposed by strong forces charged with prolonged resistance at all costs.

The Eighth Army's Change of Plan

The German garrison in Sicily had been reinforced in the first few days of the invasion by two regiments of the 1st Parachute Division. On 16 July the Headquarters of the 14th Panzer Corps arrived to assume command, and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division began moving over from the mainland. The Corps Commander, General Hans Hube, with direct instructions from Hitler's headquarters "to fight a delaying action and gain further time for stabilizing the situation on the mainland," acted promptly and with skill. To secure his lifeline to Italy he organized the defences of the Messina Strait, placing a highly capable officer in full charge. To meet the American threat to his right flank (for by 22 July the Seventh Army had captured Palermo and was beginning to push eastward along the northern coast) Hube placed the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division between the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the north coast, thereby establishing a continuous defence line across north-east Sicily from Catania

to San Stefano.

On 21 July General Montgomery, deciding that Catania could not be taken by frontal attack without incurring heavy casualties, directed all formations of the Eighth Army except the 1st Canadian Division to pass to the defensive along the line of the Dittaino River. The Canadians would carry the Army attack pending the arrival of the 78th Division, which he had ordered over from Tunisia to reinforce the 30th Corps for a drive through Adrano around the west side of Mount Etna.

The Drive Eastward

On the afternoon of 24 July the 1st Canadian Division attacked towards Agira (eight miles east of Assoro), supported by fighter bombers and artillery concentrations from five field and two medium regiments. From a rocky ridge a mile east of the intervening village of Nissoria, troops of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division threw back with heavy losses successive assaults by each of the 1st Brigade's three battalions. Late on the 26th a barrage from 80 guns crushed the enemy's resistance as the 2nd Brigade took over the attack. The position was quickly overrun and a battalion broke through to fight its way on to a second ridge a mile to the east. Up to this point the nature of the country, which prevented the attackers from deploying on a large scale, had meant that a

German force of not much more than one battalion had been successively engaged by five Canadian battalions, one at a time; circumstances had enabled the enemy to give a practical demonstration of the principle of economy of effort. On the night of the 27th, however, the 2nd Brigade put in a two-battalion attack, which drove the enemy from three heights overlooking Agira. The German garrison, whose line of retreat was threatened by the 231st Brigade, withdrew towards Regalbuto. The five-day battle for Agira was the largest and costliest in which the 1st Division was involved in Sicily.

Regalbuto, nine miles to the east, and the lofty hill town of Centuripe were the main outposts in front of the key position of Adrano. Regalbuto was captured on 3 August after the 231st Brigade and the 1st Canadian Brigade had gained control of the surrounding hills in four days of bitter fighting. On the same day the Centuripe stronghold fell to a full-scale assault by a brigade of the 78th Division. The newly arrived division had been committed at the Dittaino on 30 July, advancing from a bridge head established by the 3rd Canadian Brigade. The 3rd Brigade had then pushed forward on the 78th Division's left flank to clear the enemy from the hills between Centuripe and Regalbuto.

From Centuripe the 78th Division took over the axis of the main high-

way to Adrano, and the 1st Canadian Division swung north across the Salso River. The task of clearing enemy held heights towering more than 1000 feet above the river flats involved fighting on foot over rough trackless terrain, with mules carrying wireless sets and supporting weapons and ammunition. On the morning of 5 August General Simonds sent forward a tank-infantry force with mobile artillery which, paralleling a successful attack on the right by the 78th Division, in a brilliantly-executed operation cleared the north bank of the Salso to its junction with the Simeto.

The German Retreat from Sicily

The Canadian Division's active participation in the Sicilian campaign ended with a bloodless crossing of the Simeto River by the 3rd Brigade on the night 5-6 August. Only pursuit operations remained, for after the loss of Regalbuto and Centuripe the enemy had begun falling back from the Catania Plain; on the 5th and 6th he gave up all the towns south of Mount Etna from Catania to Adrano. In the American sector Troina fell to the 1st U.S. Division on 6 August after a bitterly contested five-day battle, but on the northern coast the 3rd Division was held up by determined resistance west of Sant'Agata.

The final ten days of the campaign revealed General Hube's mastery in

the retreat. On 26 July Hitler had authorized a withdrawal from Sicily; the evacuation began on 10 August. By sharp rearguard actions and extensive demolitions in the rugged terrain of the Messina peninsula Hube was able to hold Allied progress to his own timetable of withdrawal. Although he had very little air support and no naval support, he maintained effective control of the Messina Strait with his artillery, which included a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft guns. Thinning out his forces on a succession of shortening lines of resistance, he succeeded in evacuating to the mainland the entire surviving German garrison and a large quantity of equipment.

During the last week of operations the 30th Corps took over control of the narrowing Eighth Army front. On 15 August the 78th and 51st Divisions completed the encirclement of Mount Etna, and on the same day the 50th Division on the coast reached within 30 miles of Messina. Meanwhile the American advance along the north coast had been accelerated by two amphibious landings, and on the morning of 17 August infantry of the 3rd United States Division entered Messina, followed shortly by British Commando troops, who had landed ten miles down the strait two nights before.

Comments

The conquest of Sicily was

achieved by a well planned and executed assault on an unprecedented scale against a defended coast, followed by an arduous advance over extremely difficult country. The experience gained in the technique of amphibious warfare, although not as extensive as would have been produced by more strongly opposed landings, was to be of great value to the Allied forces in mounting subsequent operations of a like nature. The fighting inland was a foretaste of the hard campaign in Italy, in which a determined enemy skilled in defensive tactics made the best use of rugged and mountainous country to retard the Allied advance. The German operations in Sicily afford an excellent example of skilful delaying action. The Allied troops had the advantage of numbers and of excellent and powerful air and artillery support; yet the victory was won mainly by the resolution and endurance of the infantry. So far as the Canadian Division was concerned, the course of the operations gave it a harder task than had been assigned to it in the original plan. That it did so well in its first campaign is evidence of the soundness of its training.

As in all amphibious operations, *Co-operation* was of vital importance here. The naval forces covered the landings, put the army ashore and maintained it afterwards; the air forces prepared the way for the invasion and gave constant assistance in

the struggle across the island; the infantry relied with confidence on the support of the tanks, the artillery, the engineers and the services. The powerful influence of *Surprise* contributed to the easy success of the Allied assault; on the other hand, the rapid German reaction to the unexpected blow is an effective example of *Flexibility*, which appears also in the subsequent alteration of the Allied campaign plan to meet the new

situation, and in the use of improvised seaborne landings to shake loose the Germans and hasten the advance. Efficient detailed *Administration*, as usual, lay at the root of the Allied victory. In this connection, the extensive maintenance over beaches, carried out in this operation with notable success, had considerable influence on the planning of the later assault in Normandy.

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THE NORMANDY ASSAULT

1944

The Normandy landings of June 1944 were one of the most decisive operations of the Second World War and, indeed, one of the most significant in modern military history. The invasion of North-West Europe marked the beginning of the final phase of the war with Germany and led, less than a year later, to the final German collapse. Canadian forces played an important part in the operation, which was tremendously complicated and on a vast scale.

Development of the Plan

In the summer of 1940 British forces were expelled from the continent of Europe, and Britain and the Commonwealth were thrown back on the defensive. The entry of the United States into the war late in 1941 made it possible to accelerate planning for a return to the continent, and American strategists were anxious to invade North-West Europe at the earliest possible date. During 1942, however, neither trained divisions nor landing craft were available in sufficient numbers to launch such an operation successfully, even though hard-pressed Russia was ur-

gently demanding a "Second Front" in the west. Instead, available forces were diverted to North Africa where victory was achieved in 1943.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the decision was taken that the build-up of men and material for an assault upon North-West Europe should be resumed. Lt.-Gen. F. E. Morgan, a British officer, was appointed "Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)" in March, and under him an Anglo-American planning staff began work on a broad operational plan for the great invasion. The target date for the operation was 1 May 1944.

The first task facing the COSSAC planners was the selection of the area to be assaulted. Command of the sea enabled the Allies to strike almost anywhere, but short-range fighter aircraft based on England could maintain command of the air only over the enemy-held coastal sector between Flushing and Cherbourg. Study of the beaches on this coast soon narrowed the choice to two main areas; the Pas de Calais (Strait of Dover) and that from Caen to

Cherbourg. Although direct assault on the Cotentin peninsula would bring the Allies the valuable port of Cherbourg, this area lacked suitable airfields and might become a dead end since the enemy could hold the neck of the peninsula with relatively light forces. The Pas de Calais offered a sea crossing of only twenty miles, good beaches, a quick turnaround for shipping and optimum air support; here, however, the German defences were at their most formidable. This left only the Bay of the Seine, where defences were light and the beaches of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Its distance from the south of England would make air support less easy but the terrain, especially south-east of Caen, was suitable for airfield development. Therefore the Caen area was selected for the initial assault, the intention being to expand the foothold into a "lodgement area" to include Cherbourg and the Brittany ports.

It had long been believed that the immediate capture of a major port was essential to the success of an invasion operation; but the Dieppe raid had shown how difficult such capture was likely to be, and experience in the assault on Sicily had encouraged Allied planners to rely on the possibility of maintaining an invasion force over open beaches. In the English Channel, however, it is always necessary to count on the

possibility of bad weather; and with this in view General Morgan reported that in the absence of a major port it would be necessary to improvise sheltered water somehow. He recommended that two artificial ports be made by sinking blockships. This was the origin of the famous "Mulberry" harbour.

The availability of landing craft would limit the size of the assaulting force, and General Morgan had been told that he must plan on the basis of an assault by three divisions. He aimed to land these on a front of roughly 35 miles from Caen to Grandcamp, with three tank brigades and an extra infantry brigade following on the same day. A similar shortage of transport aircraft determined that only two-thirds of an airborne division* could be dropped; its main object was to be the capture of Caen. Assuming the best possible weather conditions the fifth day after the assault would find nine Allied divisions, with a proportion of armour, in the bridge-head. It was hoped that by D plus 14 about 18 divisions would have been landed, Cherbourg captured and the bridgehead expanded some sixty miles inland from Caen. On this basis General Morgan completed an outline plan during July 1943, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved it at the Quebec Conference in August.

* Although two had been made available.

No Supreme Commander had yet been appointed; but in December 1943 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the American officer who had been commanding the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, was named to this post. His ground commander for the assault phase was to be the C.-in-C., 21st Army Group, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. Both these officers were convinced that under the COSSAC plan the initial assaulting forces were too weak and committed on too narrow a front. On his arrival in London the Supreme Commander approved changes suggested by General Montgomery; subsequently these were ratified by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To enable more landing craft to be available from production, the target date was put back to 31 May; subsequently a simultaneous landing which had been planned for the south coast of France was postponed until August. This made it possible to increase the initial assault force to five divisions supported by two follow-up divisions pre-loaded on landing craft.

The front to be assaulted was widened. On the west, it now included the beaches beyond the Vire estuary on the Cotentin Peninsula, behind which it was planned to drop two American airborne divisions to speed the capture of Cherbourg; eastward it was extended somewhat to facilitate the seizure of Caen and the vital airfields in its vicinity. A British air-

borne division was to be dropped here to seize the crossing over the river Orne. The D Day objectives on the British flank included Caen and Bayeux; on the American side the plan was to penetrate to the vicinity of Carentan. Thereafter, as reported later by the Supreme Commander,

...our forces were to advance on Brittany with the object of capturing the ports south-ward to Nantes. Our next main aim was to drive east on the line of the Loire in the general direction of Paris and north across the Seine, with the purpose of destroying as many as possible of the German forces in this area of the west.

The immediate purpose, however, and the one we are concerned with here, was the establishment of bridge heads, connected into a continuous lodgement area, to accommodate follow-up troops. This initial assault phase was known by the code name "Neptune." The great liberation operation as a whole was called "Overlord." General Eisenhower's international headquarters, which absorbed the COSSAC organization, became known as SHAEP (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force).

The Enemy Situation

Allied Intelligence had been able to provide a picture of German dispositions in the west which proved, in the main, to be accurate. By 3 June enemy strength in the Low Countries and France had been increased to some 60 divisions. This included troops on the Biscay coast

and the Riviera. All these formations were under the Commander-in-Chief West, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt. Army Group "B", commanded by Field-Marshal Rommel, included the Fifteenth Army, covering the Pas de Calais, where most German strategists believed invasion would come, and the somewhat smaller Seventh Army in Normandy and Brittany. The divisions holding the beach defences were not of high category and had limited transport. Thus German plans to defeat invasion in the north were chiefly built around seven panzer or panzer grenadier divisions which were held in reserve. The plans have usually been considered a compromise between the views of Rundstedt, who favoured defence in depth supported by strong mobile reserves and those of Rommel, who believed that the place to defeat invasion was on the beaches and therefore favoured placing the reserves close up to the coast.

Hitler's "Atlantic Wall," though he had ordered its construction in 1942, was still far from completion as 1944 opened. Attention had been directed mainly to the ports and the Pas de Calais. After Rommel's Army Group "B" took over the coast early in the year the defences of other areas began to be reinforced with underwater obstacles, mines and more concrete; but in June much still remained to be done. The garrison of the assault area was also somewhat

reinforced; in mid-March a good German field division appeared in the American sector. One coastal division manned almost the whole of the beaches allotted for British and Canadian assault; however, one panzer division was actually in the Caen area and two others were within a few hours' march.

The Final Preparations

Since the middle of 1943 the air assault by R.A.F. Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force against German war industry (particularly aircraft production) had been gaining momentum and, at the same time, decimating the enemy fighter force which tried to oppose this strategic bombing. About three months before D Day the air forces also began to strike at the French and Belgian railway systems to reduce enemy mobility all over North-West Europe. Somewhat later still attacks began on tunnels and bridges* with the purpose of isolating the battlefield from the rest of France. Attacks upon enemy airfields within a radius of 130 miles from the assault area began by D minus 21, to force the removal of German fighters to more distant bases. In order to delude the

**The Seine bridges were particularly heavily hit. Those over the Loire were, with a few exceptions, left alone until after D Day. As the Seine bridges would have been equally important had we landed in the Pas de Calais, these attacks did not give the plan away.*

enemy, however, only a part of the bombing effort was expended against the intended assault area; the Pas de Calais and other possible landing areas continued to receive attention.

These preliminary air operations had a vital effect upon the great Allied enterprise. To them must be attributed the almost total failure of the German air force either to attack the great pre-invasion concentrations of men and material in Southern England or to offer opposition to the actual assault. "Our D Day experience," General Eisenhower wrote later in his report, "was to convince us that the carefully laid plans of the German Command to oppose 'Overlord' with an efficient air force in great strength were completely frustrated by the strategic bombing operations. Without the overwhelming mastery of the air which we attained by that time our assault against the Continent would have been a most hazardous, if not impossible undertaking."

It was essential to mislead the Germans as to the time and place of the Allied attack. Elaborate security precautions, including the prohibition of travel out of Britain and even the denial to ambassadors of the use of uncensored diplomatic bags, were taken to prevent information reaching the enemy; and a cover plan was adopted to encourage him to think that we were going to attack the Pas de Calais. As part of this, Canadian

formations were moved into the Dover area. Arrangements were made for naval and air diversions in the Channel to give the same impression.

The administrative preparations required were enormous. It was planned to land more than 175,000 men and more than 20,000 vehicles and guns in the first two days; and the requirements of the invading force in ammunition, food and supplies of every sort would be great from the beginning and would increase steadily as more troops landed. Since every unit and every item had to have a place in some ship or craft, and such a place as would enable it to perform its assigned function on the other side, very detailed administrative orders were required. To protect the camps and the depots near the embarkation ports, special air precautions and a special deployment of anti-aircraft guns were necessary; however, as we have mentioned, the anticipated enemy air attacks did not come.

The Plan of Assault

The greatest lesson drawn from the Dieppe raid of 1942 had been the necessity of overwhelming fire support for any opposed landing on a fortified coast; and the 3rd Canadian Division, in a series of exercises with the Royal Navy, had helped to work out a "combined fire plan" suitable for the task. As used on D Day, the plan was as follows.

During the night before the assault, the R.A.F. Bomber Command attacked the ten main coastal batteries that could fire on our ships. Immediately before the landings, the U.S. Eighth Air Force attacked the beach defences. In each case, over 1000 aircraft were used. While the Eighth was attacking, medium, light and fighter-bombers were also in action. Naval gunfire began at dawn, the bombarding force including five battleships, two monitors, 19 cruisers and numerous destroyers; naval rockets increased the storm just before the first troops touched down, and small craft gave close gunfire support. In addition, the Army made its own contribution; its self-propelled guns fired on enemy strongpoints from their tank landing craft.

Many special devices, and particularly special armoured vehicles, had been developed to assist the assault. Notable among them were the AVREs (Assault Vehicles, Royal Engineers) - tanks mounting "petards" for hurling heavy demolition charges - and the "D.D." or amphibious tanks, capable of swimming in from landing craft offshore. These two types of vehicles were to lead the assault, landing before the first infantry. A night landing had been discussed, but the Navy considered daylight essential to enable it to land the troops at the correct points and to increase the accuracy of the bom-

bardment. The landing was therefore planned for soon after dawn. It was necessary that it should take place at a period of relatively low but rising tide, so that the beach obstacles would be exposed and the landing craft would not become stranded; and for the airborne operations during the night before the assault moonlight was desirable. The necessary combination of conditions would exist on 5 June and the two following days, and the 5th was accordingly designated D Day.

D Day: The Assault

As 5 June approached everything seemed ready. The Allied Expeditionary Force had 37 divisions available - and others would move direct from the United States to France once ports had been captured. Under General Montgomery's Headquarters, the First U.S. Army was to assault on the right and the Second British Army on the left. The 5th U.S. Corps planned to use a regimental combat team of each of its two divisions on "OMAHA" Beach, while the 7th U.S. Corps attacked "UTAH" Beach with one division. In the British sector, the 30th Corps was on the right, with one division assaulting; on the left was the 1st Corps with two divisions. One of these was the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, on "JUNO" Beach; though the First Canadian Army had been designated

a "follow-up" formation, Canada would be represented in the first landing by this division, supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. On its right was the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, on "GOLD" Beach, and on its left the 3rd British Division on "SWORD." British Commandos and American Rangers were given subsidiary objectives along the coast. The 6th British Airborne Division had the airborne task on the eastern flank and the 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne Divisions those in the west.

Everything was ready - except the weather. On 4 June the meteorological report was so discouraging that General Eisenhower decided to postpone the operation for 24 hours. Next day, although conditions were still very far from ideal, the meteorologists predicted a temporary improvement; and on this basis the Supreme Commander took the heavy responsibility of deciding that the operation would proceed on the morning of the 6th.

Operation "Neptune," began shortly before midnight, when the R.A.F. commenced to pound the coastal batteries. Soon after midnight the men of the three airborne divisions began to land in Normandy. All were much more widely scattered than had been planned, but were nevertheless able to carry out their essential tasks, protecting the flanks of the seaborne landings and spreading confusion among the en-

emy. On the British side the 6th Airborne Division (which included a Canadian battalion) seized bridges over the Orne and the nearby canal intact, captured a coastal battery and carried out demolitions to cover this flank. With the coming of daylight the great bombardment of the beach defences began. Clouds forced the U.S. heavy bombers to do without direct observation, and their anxiety to avoid hitting the Allied landing craft resulted in many bombs coming down too far inland. The naval bombardment likewise scored direct hits on only a small proportion of the enemy positions. Yet this terrific pounding of the whole defence area had a powerful moral effect on the Germans, and there is no doubt that it went far to enable the Allied troops to breach the Atlantic Wall at a much lower cost in casualties than had been expected. At many points Allied units got ashore without coming under really heavy fire, although fierce fighting was required afterwards to reduce strongpoints which the bombardment had not destroyed.

The roughness of the sea somewhat upset the timetable. Some of the craft carrying the special armour were late, some of the D.D. tanks could not be launched, and the infantry themselves were delayed in landing. Yet in general the attack went well, and before the morning was far advanced the Allied troops were pushing inland, bypassing the

strongpoints that still held out. Nevertheless, stubborn German resistance kept them from attaining their final D Day objectives before evening at any point, except for a few Canadian tanks that reached them and then withdrew. The situation was worst in the "OMAHA" area, where there were German field troops and a steep coast. For two days the Americans had to fight desperately to keep a foothold, and casualties here were three times what they were elsewhere. The Canadian Division had 335 fatal casualties on D Day, somewhat fewer than had been expected.

The Allies had achieved strategic and even tactical surprise; that is, not only had the German high command had no time to reinforce the threatened area, but even the units holding it had no warning until our bombardment opened. However, the German reaction was rapid, even though there was delay in getting Hitler's permission to move some of the reserve panzer divisions. A tank counter-attack on D Day, although beaten back, helped to prevent the 3rd British Division from getting Caen. The next morning the 50th Division took Bayeux, and the 3rd Canadian Division got its right brigade on to the final objective* - the first brigade in the Second Army to

do so; but the left brigade was struck by one of the reserve panzer divisions and driven back. The Germans regarded the Caen area from the beginning as the point of greatest danger and the pivot of their defence in Normandy. By throwing their reserves in piecemeal in that area as they came up, they temporarily stabilized the situation there; but they were never able to build up a striking force equal to delivering a large-scale counteroffensive and really threatening the Allied bridgehead. The movement of their reserves was most seriously hampered by the havoc which the air forces had wrought upon their communications, and by continuing air attacks; while the Allies, their sea communications protected by their navies and air forces, poured men and material into the bridgehead, hampered only by unseasonable bad weather. Above all, the Germans had been deceived into the belief that the main Allied attack was still to come in the Pas de Calais; and there the Fifteenth Army, whose infantry divisions might have turned the scale in Normandy, sat idle while the British and American bridgehead was steadily built up.

Consolidation of the Bridgehead

The days following D Day were spent in linking the various Allied footholds into a continuous and secure lodgement area. With good

*In this case, the Caen-Bayeux road and railway.

naval and air support, the hard pressed Americans on "OMAHA" gradually deepened their penetration and on 9 June they were able to take the offensive effectively. By that time the bridgeheads were linked up all along the front of assault except for a gap between the two American sectors near Carentan. Contact was made across this the next day, and after stiff fighting Carentan itself was captured on 12-13 June. On the British front the Germans went on throwing in fierce local armoured attacks; on 8 June, for instance, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade beat off a serious threat and continued to hold its position on the final D Day objective. Caen remained in German hands, but the eastern flank of the bridgehead, though much more contracted than had been planned, was secure.

By 12 June the first phase of Operation "Overlord" had been successfully completed. The Allies had established a firm foothold on the Continent. Some 325,000 men, 55,000 vehicles and 105,000 tons of stores had already been brought ashore. The construction of the artificial harbours, on a more elaborate plan than that projected by COSSAC, was well advanced. The Germans' plan of defence had failed; they had not driven the invaders into the sea, and had now to prepare for their inevitable attempt to break out from the bridgehead.

Comments

By 1944 the western democracies, unprepared when war broke out, had built up their strength to the point where they could challenge the enemy with confidence. It seemed clear, however, that the only way of obtaining a rapid decision was by defeating the main German armies on a European battlefield. The necessary preliminary to this was the crossing of the Channel and the establishment of a bridgehead, carried out in the teeth of strong defences and an experienced and determined enemy. This was such a hazardous operation that many good judges on the Allied side felt very uncertain about the outcome. That the invasion succeeded was due to the fact that the Allies were able to mobilize Sea, land and air power on a vast scale, but even more to the fact that as a result of remarkably skillful and thorough planning they were able to use that power to the best advantage.

Every one of the accepted Principles of War is illustrated in Operation "Neptune." Eisenhower was told to enter Europe and "undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." The special aim in the assault phase was "to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed." These great simple objects were never lost sight

of and formed the foundation of the whole plan, a good example of sound *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*. The ultimate object was achieved eleven months after D Day.

It is clear that the achievement of *Surprise* played a very great part in the initial success. The enemy was completely deceived as to the Allied intentions, and continued to grope in the dark long after D Day. This helped the Allies to effect a destructive *Concentration of Force* at the decisive point, while great German forces elsewhere waited for attacks that never came. The related principle of *Economy of Effort*, the result of "balanced employment of forces" and "judicious expenditure of all resources," is equally clearly illustrated.

Where could a better example of *Co-operation* be found than in "Neptune?" The victory won on the coast of Lower Normandy was the result of the efforts of the three fighting services of three different nations, working smoothly in combination under a Supreme Commander acknowledged to have a special genius for co-ordination. The point does not require to be laboured. "Goodwill and the desire to co-operate" paid their usual dividends, on this as on lesser occasions.

Similarly, it is clear that the Allied victory was largely a triumph of

Administration. To get the invading force to France, and to maintain it when there, required, as we have seen, extraordinarily thorough administrative planning and a tremendous mobilization of human and material resources. The prefabricated harbours, brought across the Channel and assembled on the invasion coast, may stand as symbols of the administrative ingenuity which made such a great contribution to this epoch-making victory.

Other principles can be briefly dealt with. *Offensive Action* speaks for itself. "Neptune" is the very embodiment of it. As for *Maintenance of Morale*, only troops of high morale could have carried out the task, for it was actually more formidable in prospect than it turned out to be in reality; on the other hand, the famous Atlantic Wall once broken, success, as always, encouraged the Allied troops to push on to further victories. *Security* of the base and the lines of communication was well provided for by the navy, the air forces and the anti-aircraft gunners; however, as it turned out, the enemy was in no state to threaten them. Similarly, *Flexibility* was less important in this operation in that the plan as written succeeded so well; it appears chiefly in the use of those very flexible weapons, naval and air power, to support the troops ashore at any point during the

bridgehead campaign where they found themselves hard pressed.

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THE BATTLE OF THE SCHELDT

1944

The Scheldt Estuary operations made a vital contribution to Allied victory in the Second World War. They provided logistical facilities essential to the final assault on Germany. By the early autumn of 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Force in North-West Europe was in serious administrative difficulties. Following its victory in Normandy and rapid pursuit of the enemy across France and Belgium, its lines of communication were stretched to the breaking point. It was still dependent on supplies landed in the original bridge-head in Normandy, and the long haul from the beaches there almost to the German frontier placed such a strain on transport resources that not enough fuel was reaching the front to keep all the Allied armies moving.

The problem could only be solved by acquiring large port facilities closer to the front. Antwerp, the greatest port in North-West Europe, capable of bringing in 30,000 tons a day, was captured undamaged by the Second British Army on 4 September; but the Germans still held both banks of the River Scheldt between

Antwerp and the sea, and the port could not be used until they were dislodged. They fully realized how important their positions were to the security of the Fatherland, and the First Canadian Army's task in evicting them turned out to be a very hard one.

The clearing of the Estuary was carried out by the 2nd Canadian Corps, employing four divisions, one of which was armoured, and a commando brigade. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force both played vital parts. Five water-borne assault landings were made. For the first time in history large-scale inundations produced by aerial bombing were used to harass an enemy's troops in battle.

Background of the Battle

Although the administrative significance of Antwerp was fully recognized, operations to open the port were postponed while Field-Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group made a bold attempt to thrust across the lower Rhine before the Germans could recover themselves after the Normandy defeat. But the great

combined airborne-ground operation called "Market-Garden" failed of its main object, and on the night of 25-26 September the remnants of the 1st British Airborne Division were withdrawn across the Neder Rijn from their precarious foothold near Arnhem. Thereafter the opening of Antwerp was given first priority. While the Arnhem fighting was in progress, General Eisenhower and Field-Marshal Montgomery had been arguing over strategy, the latter emphasizing strongly what he considered the importance of concentrating the available administrative resources on his own front in the north for a blow at the great German industrial area of the Ruhr. On 22 September the Supreme Commander sent Montgomery a letter which concluded:

No one is more anxious than I to get to the Ruhr quickly. It is for the campaign from there onward deep into the heart of Germany for which I insist all other troops must be in position to support the main drive. The main drive must logically go by the North. It is because I am anxious to organize that final drive quickly upon the capture of the Ruhr that I insist upon the importance of Antwerp. As I have told you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture of the approaches to Antwerp, including all the air forces and anything else you can support. Warm regard, IKE.

During September Lieut.-General H. D. G. Crerar's First Canadian Army was occupied with clearing the Channel Ports. By 1 October it had captured Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais and Ostend. All these

ports were so badly damaged that it took weeks to get them to work, and then their capacity was limited. The importance of Antwerp was more and more evident.

The task of opening the Scheldt was formally assigned to First Canadian Army on 14 September. On the 15th General Crerar allotted the operation to the 2nd Canadian Corps, commanded by Lieut.-General G. G. Simonds. The task before the Corps Commander was formidable. The West Scheldt, a winding channel, extends some 50 miles from Antwerp to the sea. It was heavily mined throughout its length. Along the south side the enemy still held a large bridgehead, protected on most of its land front by the Leopold Canal. On the north stood the fortified island of Walcheren, joined by a causeway to the long peninsula of South Beveland, above which the right bank of the Scheldt was also in enemy hands almost to Antwerp. Most of the land about the estuary was reclaimed ("polder") ground, low-lying tilled fields, cut by ditches and dykes and easily flooded. Nearly all of Walcheren and much of South Beveland lay so low that, if the seaward dykes were broken, inundation would result.

General Simonds' appreciation of 21 September envisaged airborne and waterborne attacks upon Walcheren following heavy air bombardment. He recommended that Walcheren be

flooded by bomber attacks upon the sea dykes. He proposed that the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division should push northward from Antwerp to cut off South Beveland and exploit the land approach to Walcheren via South Beveland as far as possible. The clearing of the bridgehead south of the Scheldt he assigned to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.

The Army Commander agreed that the Walcheren dykes should be breached, provided that this was technically feasible and the higher authorities concurred. Army engineers expressed the view that breaching the dykes was impracticable, and an officer from the R.A.F. Bomber Command who attended a conference at Army Headquarters on 23 September was not prepared to commit himself on the question. General Simonds, after considering the matter again, was still of the opinion that the attempt should be made; and Army Headquarters recommended the plan to the 21st Army Group, which supported it. The R.A.F., while not guaranteeing success, was willing to try. At this point illness forced General Crerar to hand over the Army temporarily to General Simonds. Major General Charles Foulkes took over the 2nd Canadian Corps.

Supreme Headquarters had refused an airborne operation against Walcheren, the terrain being considered unsuitable. But the Supreme

Commander now authorized the flooding operation. On 3 October Bomber Command made the experiment at Westkapelle, and the dyke was successfully breached. The previous day General Simonds had issued his directive. It required the 1st British Corps (now in the Antwerp area) to use the 2nd Canadian Division to close the eastern end of the South Beveland isthmus. The 2nd Canadian Corps would clear the area south of the Scheldt and subsequently capture South Beveland and Walcheren.

The 2nd Division-Pushes North

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division moved northward from the Antwerp area on 2 October, crossing the Dutch border on the 5th. On the 7th the division reverted to the control of the 2nd Canadian Corps. As the 1st British Corps had directed its main thrust north-eastward from Antwerp, the division's right flank was exposed. It now encountered fierce enemy opposition in the area of Woensdrecht, a village blocking the entrance to the isthmus of South Beveland, and the advance was checked. Very bitter fighting followed. On the 10th the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade temporarily cut the isthmus; on the 16th an attack by the same Brigade secured a tenuous hold on Woensdrecht; but the situation was still very insecure. The Germans had committed here on 12 October

one of their "fire brigades", "Battle Group Chill" (also known as the 85th Infantry Division), whose backbone was a regiment of hard-fighting paratroopers.

At the same time, the operation against the bridgehead south of the Scheldt was also meeting heavy opposition and moving slowly (see below). There was now a change of policy on the part of the high command. So far, it would seem, both General Eisenhower and Field-Marshal Montgomery had hoped that the 21st Army Group could open the Scheldt without abandoning operations which the Second British Army was conducting against the enemy bridgehead remaining west of the Maas - i.e., east of the salient created by "Market Garden". It was now evident that this could not be done. On 10 and 13 October Eisenhower sent strong directives to Montgomery emphasizing the extreme importance of being able to use Antwerp soon, and offering assistance in troops and supplies for the purpose. On 16 October Montgomery himself issued a new directive to his Army Commanders, closing down all operations except those directed towards the Scheldt. The Second Army was to take over the right portion of the Canadian Army's line and push westward; the Canadian Army, with more troops available, was to clear the country north

of the South Beveland isthmus.

These new orders soon transformed the situation. The 1st British Corps was now given the whole of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division (of which some elements had already been operating on the right of the 2nd Division) and also the 104th U.S. Infantry Division; and it proceeded to push northward. On the 22nd the Armoured Division captured Esschen and attacked toward Bergen-op-Zoom, which fell on the 27th. With the capture of Esschen the right flank was secure. On the 23rd the 2nd Division attacked north of Woensdrecht, making only limited advances, but next day operations went better; the vigorous action of the 4th Armoured Division to the east had caused the enemy to retire. The way into South Beveland was open.

On 20 October Field-Marshal Montgomery sent a personal note to General Simonds acknowledging a copy of his latest directive. He wrote:

I think everything you are doing is excellent. And your troops are doing wonders under the most appalling conditions of ground and weather. I doubt if any other troops would do it so well, and I am very glad the Canadians are on the business. Please tell all your chaps how pleased I am with their good work.

*Operation "Switchback":
The Breskens Pocket*

On 6 October the 3rd Canadian Division commenced Operation "Switchback", attacking the German pocket south of the West Scheldt at the point where the Leopold Canal diverges from the Canal de Dérivation de la Lys. The Leopold Canal was a formidable obstacle, about 60 feet wide and with steep banks. Inundations to the north of the canal left only a narrow strip of land where we could develop our bridgehead. The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade made a sudden assault supported by Wasps, flame-throwing carriers. The attack was made through the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which put in two diversionary attacks, one on either side of the bridgehead. After acquiring a shallow foothold the attack bogged down in the face of strong opposition. General von Zangen, commanding the German Fifteenth Army in the Netherlands, had allotted an efficient formation, the 64th Infantry Division, to the defence of what the Germans called "Scheldt Fortress South". This formation now held the 7th Brigade's bridgehead to narrow limits.

An amphibious attack was now made against the rear of the pocket. The 9th Brigade's assault force embarked at Ghent in Buffaloes (Landing Vehicles, Tracked) and sailed down the canal leading to Terneuzen. At 2:00 a.m. on 9 Octo-

ber they set off across the Braakman inlet,* supported by fire from the artillery of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Both attacking battalions got ashore near Biervliet quickly and reorganized against slight opposition. By 9:00 a.m. a bridgehead 1500 yards deep had been established and soon the reserve battalion was landed, advancing to Hoofdplaat.

The attack over the Braakman had met with so much success that it was now decided to reinforce there instead of on the Leopold Canal as previously planned. The 3rd Division's reconnaissance regiment was sent over on the 11th, followed by the 8th Brigade. The enemy had now moved up forces to face this threat at his left rear; the going became tougher. On the 14th troops of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division succeeded in crossing the Leopold near Watervliet and near the head of the Braakman, making it possible to send supplies and artillery by road into Scheldt Fortress South. The 8th and 9th Brigades advanced slowly westward against opposition.

On the 16th resistance before the 7th Brigade suddenly slackened. At last light on the 18th the brigade

* *The Braakman was mistakenly called the Savojaards Plaats at the time of the operation. Savojaards Plaats was actually the name of the extensive mud-flat at the entrance to the Braakman.*

was relieved by the 157th Brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Division. The 157th pushed forward and on the 19th made contact with the force that had crossed the Braakman.

The 3rd Division now moved to cut the German forces off from the Scheldt. The 9th Brigade captured Breskens on the 22nd in the face of heavy enemy artillery fire, particularly from Flushing. The Germans' communications with Walcheren were virtually severed. Next day the 9th Brigade swung southwestward and captured Schoondijke. After taking Fort Frederik Hendrik this formation was withdrawn into reserve and the 7th Brigade struck out westward, capturing Cadzand on the 29th. The 8th Brigade meanwhile had shifted southward, relieving the 157th. Sluis fell on 1 November. On the same day the German divisional commander was captured near Knocke-sur-Mer. The 8th Brigade cleared westward along the Leopold Canal and on 3 November opposition was at an end in, Scheldt Fortress South. Operation "Switchback" was over.

*Operation "Vitality":
South Beveland*

Meanwhile, on 24 October the 4th Brigade had led the advance west down the isthmus of South Beveland, thus beginning Operation "Vitality". The entire German force west of the isthmus consisted of the weak 70th

Infantry Division,* less one grenadier regiment, with some other troops and naval coast artillery units.

To dislodge enemy rearguards from the line of the Beveland Canal, General Simonds mounted another amphibious operation. Carried in some 120 tracked landing craft, the 156th Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division crossed from Terneuzen on the night of 25-26 October, landing in South Beveland. A good bridgehead was immediately established. On the 26th the 6th Brigade attacked towards the Beveland Canal. One battalion reached the canal late on the 27th after wading in waist-deep water, and seized a bridgehead on the far side. Another gained a crossing in the middle of the isthmus. By the 29th the 2nd Division had two brigades over the canal. The 157th Brigade, which had landed in the 156th Brigade's bridgehead on the West Scheldt, moved on the southern flank. Goes fell on the 29th, and by the 30th the 5th Brigade had a battalion within two miles of the causeway leading to Walcheren.

The 4th Brigade now put in a night attack, clearing the eastern end of the causeway. The Lowland Division came up on the left and by morning of

* *Many of the troops in this division, particularly in the infantry components, were ill men; the 70th was the famous "stomach" division, formed of units made up of men suffering front gastric ailments. It nevertheless fought hard.*

31 October the enemy hold on South Beveland was ended. The causeway, however, was strongly defended. On the afternoon of the 31st the 5th Brigade took over from the 4th and attempted to cross the 1100-yard cratered, fire-swept roadway to Walcheren. The leading troops finally forced their way across and gained a precarious bridgehead, which was lost and then restored. The decision was now made to relieve the brigade with the 157th Brigade, and the 2nd Canadian Division was withdrawn for rest. Meanwhile, troops of the 2nd Division's reconnaissance regiment captured the island of North Beveland on 2 November. The attack on Walcheren had already begun.

*Operation "Infatuate":
Walcheren*

The island of Walcheren is roughly rectangular in shape, about ten miles long by eight miles broad. The village of Westkapelle lies at the westerly corner, the port of Flushing at the southerly one. The island is low-lying, most of it being below mean sea-level. Only the coastal strip of dunes on the northwest and southwest sides, and the eastern-most section of the island, are higher than the sea.

The island was heavily fortified. There were coast-defence guns up to 8.7-inch, including a dozen 5.9s. Counter-battery fire, aerial bombardment and flooding took care of

many of these weapons, particularly in the Flushing area. In the period 3-17 October the heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force made four heavy attacks on the sea-dykes of Walcheren, breaching them and allowing the sea to pour in. The island was now like an immersed saucer with only the rim showing.

The first waterborne attack in Operation "Infatuate", the assault on Walcheren, went in against Flushing before daylight on 1 November, when a commando of the 4th Special Service Brigade crossed the West Scheldt from Breskens following a bombing attack by the R.A.F. Three hundred guns, including those of two Canadian Army Groups Royal Artillery, hammered German defences in the town from across the West Scheldt. The commando was soon ashore and in possession of a bridgehead. The 155th Infantry Brigade now sent a battalion across to assist in clearing Flushing. Next morning the rest of the Brigade crossed over and one battalion advanced toward Middelburg. On the 3rd the headquarters of the Flushing garrison was captured, after an advance through deep flood-waters; and by nightfall the city was clear.

The climax of the Walcheren operation came at Westkapelle. Soon after first light on 1 November a seaborne attack was delivered at that point. The assault force, consisting of the 4th Special Service Brigade

under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps, a naval bombarding force and a support squadron, approached the island from the west. When the support squadron, made up of twenty-seven landing craft armed with guns, rockets and smoke-projectors, deployed five miles from shore it was immediately engaged by every German battery within range and began to suffer heavy losses. Four hours later nine craft had been lost and eleven were more or less badly damaged by gunfire. There were 372 casualties among the crews. Their gallantry and their sacrifice had purchased victory. British tactical investigators later came to the conclusion that the landing would have failed but for two facts: the German batteries fired at the craft that were firing at them, not at the personnel carriers; and one of the 5.9-inch batteries ran out of ammunition at a critical moment.

It had been planned that close air support would be given by fighter-bombers and rocket-firing Typhoons immediately before and after H Hour. Bad flying weather however prevented the fighter-bombers from taking off. It also interfered with air spotting for the naval bombardment ships, the aircraft being fogbound in England. Fortunately, the Typhoons were able to come into action against the enemy defences just as the first assault landing craft touched down on each side of the gap in the dyke.

One Commando landed, seized the town and nearby battery and advanced northeastwards. Another Commando, landing south of the gap, went on to the southeast along the dunes. During the next two days good progress was made in both directions.

The last landing on Walcheren was made on the eastern side south of the causeway, where the 156th Brigade sent a battalion across on the night of 2-3 November. Using assault boats and wading in the salt marshes, this unit established a secure bridgehead by nightfall. Next day another battalion followed and the troops at the west end of the causeway began to advance. On 6 November Middelburg fell to troops advancing from Flushing and the German general surrendered. By the 7th only the northern coast remained to be cleared. On the morning of the 8th German resistance on Walcheren came to an end.*

Both naval and army authorities blamed the heavy losses in the Westkapelle assault on the limited scale of bomber effort employed against the German batteries. It is true that many Allied air officers were reluctant to divert forces to these targets from the offensive against German communications and oil; but a considerable

* *The fighting on Walcheren was done by British units, but medical service was provided by the R.C.A.M.C. See J. B. Hillsman, *Eleven Men and a Scalpel* (Winnipeg, 1948).*

number of attacks were actually made on Walcheren. It was particularly unfortunate that bad weather compelled the air force to cancel the attacks which had been planned for 31 October (D minus one).

The effect of the flooding - which of course meant much misery for the population of Walcheren - merits a word. Most of the German coastal batteries were on the higher ground and were not directly affected (though many of the anti-aircraft positions were put out of action); but they were isolated by the waters, their communications were seriously interfered with and the German defence generally was greatly harassed. The attackers on the other hand were offered the advantage of being able to use amphibious vehicles, and thanks in part to these the operations on Walcheren went faster than those south of the Scheldt.

During the operations of the First Canadian Army from 1 October to 8 November 41,043 German prisoners were taken, and the enemy suffered correspondingly heavy losses in killed and wounded. Our own casualties, including British and Allied, were reported by General Simonds as 703 officers and 12,170 other ranks killed, wounded and missing. Of these, 355 officers and 6012 other ranks were Canadians.

With the clearing of Walcheren the Germans no longer commanded the sea approach to Antwerp. How-

ever, the West Scheldt was thickly sown with mines which the navy had to clear. Not until 28 November did the first Allied convoy arrive in the port. But with cargo ships unloading at Antwerp a firm logistical foundation at last existed for the final advance into Germany.

Comments

The Scheldt operations serve to remind us once more of the vital importance of *Administration* in modern war. It was the urgency of ensuring good administrative arrangements for the Allied armies directed on North-West Germany that produced the hard campaign in the water-girt lands of the estuary; and the casualties which the campaign occasioned were the price of facilities essential to the defeat of Hitlerism.

Flexibility is a principle that stands out strongly in this series of operations. The possession of naval superiority and excellent amphibious equipment enabled the Allies to exploit this principle, striking the enemy both on his land and sea fronts. A particular example of flexibility is the change of plan by which the 8th Brigade, originally intended to support the 7th on the Leopold Canal, was instead moved in by water to reinforce the attack of the 9th against the rear of the Breskens pocket.

Flexibility contributes to *Surprise*. The latter was achieved when Buffaloes were moved up from Ghent to

Terneuzen to launch the 9th Brigade over the Braakman. The flooding of Walcheren by means never employed before also illustrates the principle.

Economy of Effort is perhaps best illustrated by the enemy's defence of the Scheldt Estuary. Using in the later stages just two weak divisions at a vital point, he denied us the use

of the port facilities of Antwerp for six weeks, thereby forcing us to limit our operations on other parts of the front and delaying our full-scale assault on Germany. Finally, like all amphibious operations, these demonstrate the fundamental importance to success of the fullest *Co-operation* between the three fighting services.

BOOKS ON THE CAMPAIGN

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APPENDICES

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Attempts have often been made to reduce the military experience of the past to the form of rules of action the observance of which may help to produce success in war. These rules have become known as the "Principles of War." Representing the distilled result of many men's study of many campaigns, they have been expressed in various forms in modern times. But while different writers may phrase and arrange them in different ways, there has been general agreement on the essentials.

The Principles of War, properly considered, are permanent and universal elements in warfare. Though their application alters with changes in weapons and tactics, the Principles themselves are as applicable to ancient as to modern campaigns. Moreover, although these Principles are often thought of as primarily strategic, they apply equally well in the field of tactics. Broadly speaking, these general rules are as applicable, or nearly as applicable, to the operations of an infantry section as they are to those of an Army Group.

All intelligent men will realize, of course, that it is out of the question to provide set rules whose observance will inevitably result in victory. Every student and every soldier will do well to keep before him the wise word of caution offered by the

authors of *Field Service Regulations*, 1935, in presenting an official version of these principles: "Certain ideas as to strategical planning and conduct can be deduced from the experience of the past: they are often defined and expressed in the form of 'principles.' But it must be clearly understood that the principles that guide action in war, whether strategical or tactical, are not laws, such as the laws of natural science, where the observance of certain conditions produces an inevitable result, nor rules, such as the rules of a game, the breach of which entails a definite fixed penalty: they simply indicate a course of action that has been successful in the past and serve as a warning that disregard of them involves risk and has often brought failure. Many plans have, however, succeeded in war, although not made in accordance with text-book principles."

The Principles of War are printed below in the form adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for the use and guidance of the Canadian Armed Services.

* * *

Defining a principle as a guide to conduct, the following are the principles which must always influence a Commander in war:

1. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

In the conduct of war as a whole and in every operation of war it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. The ultimate aim is to break the enemy's will to fight. Each phase of the war and each separate operation must be directed towards this supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim is decided, all efforts must be directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for a re-appreciation and consequently a new aim. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim.

The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim must be regarded as the "Master" Principle. It has therefore been placed first. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order, since their relative importance will vary according to the nature of the operation in question.

2. Maintenance of Morale

Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, skill and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are, therefore, essential to success in war.

3. Offensive Action

Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of victory; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken victory is impossible.

4. Security

A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate defence of vulnerable bases and other interests which are vital to the nation or the armed forces. Security does not imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success in war; on the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive.

5. Surprise

Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence in war, and its moral effect is very great. Every endeavour must be made to surprise the enemy, and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the effort expended can be obtained, and in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, tactically or by exploiting new material. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and rapidity.

6. Concentration of Force

To achieve success in war, it is essential to concentrate superior force, moral or material, to that of the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter the enemy's threats. Concentration is a matter more of time than of space.

7. Economy of Effort

Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces, and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.

8. Flexibility

Modern war demands a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. This entails good training, organization, discipline and staff work, and, above all, that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision on the part of both the Commander and his sub-ordinates which ensures that time is never lost. It calls also for physical mobility of a high order, both strategically and tactically, so that our forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive places and times.

9. Co-operation

Co-operation is based on team spirit and entails the co-ordination of all units so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Above all, goodwill and the desire-to co-operate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the services on one another and on the civilian war effort has made co-operation between them of vital importance in modern war.

10. Administration

The administrative arrangements must be designed to give the Commander the maximum freedom of action in carrying out any plan. Every administrative organization must be simple. Every operational Commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan within his sphere of command corresponding to the scope of his responsibilities for the operational plan.

GLOSSARY OF SOME BASIC TERMS COMMONLY USED
IN MILITARY HISTORY

ADMINISTRATION: "The organization, discipline and well-being of men and the movement and maintenance of men and materials".

BASE: A group of depots from which an army in the field is supplied with personnel and material. An army operating overseas maintains an *advanced base* (in or near the theatre of operations) as well as a *home base* in its own country.

COMBINED OPERATIONS: In British usage, 1939-45, operations involving more than one of the three fighting services. Often used with special application to **AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS** (operations involving the landing or embarkation of troops).

COMMUNICATIONS: Roads, railways, inland waterways, air routes, or any other facility in a theatre of operations suitable as a route for the movement of men, animals or material. The word is sometimes loosely used in place of

INTERCOMMUNICATION: The military term for the various means of transmitting orders and information.

INTELLIGENCE: In military usage, primarily information *about the enemy*.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION: All routes, land, water and air, which connect an operating military force with its support areas, and along which materials and reinforcements move.

LOGISTICS: Traditionally, the "art of moving and quartering troops" (Oxford Dictionary). The official British definition is now, "The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces".

MAINTENANCE: The process of supplying the requirements of armed forces.

STRATEGY: The art of moving or disposing forces so as to impose upon the enemy the place, time and conditions for fighting preferred by oneself. The object of strategy is to ensure that when one's forces meet the enemy on the battlefield they will do so at an advantage.

GRAND STRATEGY: The art of applying the whole power of a nation (or a coalition of nations) in the most effective manner towards attaining the aim. It thus includes the use of diplomacy, economic pressure, arrangements with allies, the mobilization of industry and the distribution of manpower, as well as the employment of the three fighting services in combination. The term is conveniently used in connection with planning affecting operations in more than one theatre.

TACTICS: The art of directing forces in contact with the enemy; the conduct of operations on the actual battlefield.

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING

Books dealing with the particular episodes described in this pamphlet have been listed following the accounts of the campaigns and in general are not repeated here. The list below is designed to call attention to a few other books dealing with various subjects and campaigns which any Canadian student can read with profit.

This list is, of course, very far from exhaustive; there are many good books not included in it. But all the volumes in it might usefully find a place in every Canadian military library, and

most large libraries will have them. Some are out of print, but can be obtained with a little trouble in the second-hand market. Specialized books on naval and air subjects have been omitted, in the interest of keeping the list short. With a few distinguished exceptions, both regimental and corps histories, and the reminiscences of individuals, have been left out.

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* Canadian official histories are available in French and English.

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* Canadian official histories are available in French and English.

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