


JEAN PARISEAU AND SERGE BERNIER



**French Canadians and
Bilingualism
in the Canadian Armed Forces**



**Volume I
1763-1969:
the Fear of a Parallel Army**

DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
SOCIO-MILITARY SERIES

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- N° 1 Jean-Pierre Gagnon, *The 22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion, 1914-1919: Socio-military history.*
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General Jean Victor Allard, CC, CBE, DSO, ED, CD, was the first French Canadian to become Chief of the Defence Staff (1966-69). He took advantage of the Canadian Armed Forces unification policy to improve language conditions for his compatriots. (UPFC, REP 68.758 photo)

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Glossary

Anglophone

A person whose mother tongue is English.

bilingual person

A person who has been tested in his/her second language and who has achieved one of the degrees of bilingualism defined in CFAO 9-21.

contact level

Secondary language skill requiring a minimum score of A2 (CFAO 9-21).

English language unit

A unit or other element of the CF that uses English as its working language.

Francophone

A person whose mother tongue is French.

Francotrain

Training programs whereby Francophones can learn technical and managerial skills in French during their military formative years.

French language unit

A unit or other element of the CF that uses French as its working language.

functional level

Secondary language skill requiring minimum scores of A3 and B3 with a total profile of 10 or more (CFAO 9-21).

individual bilingualism

The ability of an individual to communicate in both official languages.

institutional bilingualism

The capability of an institution to provide services to the public and its own personnel in the two official languages (CFAO 9-21).

integral level

Secondary language skill requiring minimum scores of A4 and B4 and total profile of 14 or more (CFAO 9-21).

language of instruction

Language used in schools for dependants which is consistent with the official language normally used in the home of the member (CFAO 54-5).

mother tongue

The language first learned in childhood and still understood.

national representational groups (NRG)

Desired proportion of military Francophones and Anglophones which should, under ideal conditions, make up the CF (currently set at 27%F/73%A).

national unit

A unit or other element of the CF in which the Francophone/Anglophone ratio is equal to the national representation of the two linguistic groups.

official languages

The English and French languages.

operational language

The official language in which command is exercised at successive levels in military operations.

primary language

The official language in which an individual is more proficient in communicating with others.

second language

The French language for those whose primary language is English, and the English language for those whose primary language is French.

working language

The official language in which a unit or other element of the CF conducts its normal day-to-day activities, including those related to organization, planning, administration, training, technical activities, operational exercises and operations.

Source: DGOL, *Official Languages Plan (Military)*, 1980, A-AD-102-001/AG-000, p LD 1 to 6.

Abbreviations

A/C/M	Air Chief Marshal
ADC	Aide de camp
Adm	Admiral
ADM (Per)	Associate Deputy Minister for Personnel
AFC	Air Force Cross
Anglo	Anglophone(s)
AOS	Air Observer School
A/V/M	Air Vice-Marshal
B & B	Bilingualism and biculturalism
BCATP	British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
BGen	Brigadier-General
BGS	Bombing and Gunnery School
Bn	Battalion
BNA	British North America
Brig	Brigadier
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
Capt	Captain
CATS	Canadian Army Training School
CB	Companion of the Order of the Bath
CBE	Commander of the Order of the British Empire
CC	Commander of the Order of Canada
CD	Canadian Forces Decoration
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CDSAC	Chief of the Defence Staff Advisory Committee
Cdr	Commander
CEF	Canadian Expeditionary Force
CF	Canadian Forces
CFAO	Canadian Forces Administrative Orders
CFHQ	Canadian Forces Headquarters
CMG	Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
CMM	Commander of the Order of Military Merit
CMR	Canadian Mounted Rifles
<i>CMR</i>	<i>Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean</i>
Col	Colonel
COL	Commissioner of Official Languages

COTC	Canadian Officers Training Corps
CP	Chief of Personnel; command post
CV	Cross of Valour
DC	Defence Council
DCM	Distinguished Conduct Medal
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
DGEP	Director General, Education Programs
DHist	Directorate of History (National Defence)
DIBP	Director(ate) Implementation Bilingual Plans
DMC	Defence Management Committee
DMT	Director(ate) of Military Training
DND	Department of National Defence
DO	Director(ate) of Organization
DRB	Defence Research Board
DSO	Distinguished Service Order
ED	Efficiency Decoration
EFTS	Elementary Flying Training School
elec	electrical
ELU	English-language unit
EPB	Education Programs Branch
<i>ETA</i>	<i>Escadron tactique aérien</i>
<i>ETAH</i>	<i>Escadron tactique aérien d'hélicoptères</i>
FLU	French-language unit
<i>FMR</i>	<i>Fusiliers Mont-Royal</i>
Fr	French or Francophone
Franco	Francophone(s)
Gen	General
GHQ	General Headquarters
GM	George Medal
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HMCS	Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
Hon	Honourable
HQ	Headquarters
KCMG	Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George

LAA	Light anti-aircraft
Lt	Lieutenant
LCdr	Lieutenant-Commander
LCol	Lieutenant-Colonel
LdSH	Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
LGen	Lieutenant-General
Maj	Major
MC	Military Cross
MD	Military District
MG	Machine gun
MGen	Major-General
MID	Midshipman
MM	Military Medal
MP	Member of Parliament
N	Naval
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCR	National Capital Region
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NCSO	Naval control service officer
NDC	National Defence College
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NDRMS	National Defence Records Management System
OBE	Order of the British Empire
OC	Officer of the Order of Canada
off	officer(s)
OL	official languages
OLA	Official Languages Act
OR	other ranks
OTU	operational training unit
PC	Privy Council
PMC	Personnel Members Committee
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PS	Public Service
RAdm	Rear Admiral
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCD	Royal Canadian Dragoons

RCHA	Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCR	Royal Canadian Regiment
RCRI	Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry
<i>R de Chaud</i>	<i>Régiment de la Chaudière</i>
<i>R de Mais</i>	<i>Régiment de Maisonneuve</i>
RE	Royal Engineers
ret	retired
RMC	Royal Military College
RNAS	Royal Naval Air Service
RNCO	Reporting non-commissioned officer
RO	Reporting officer
<i>R22^eR</i>	<i>Royal 22^e Régiment</i>
SFTS	Service Flying Training School
TB	Treasury Board
TSU	Technical Service Unit
UN	United Nations
VAdm	Vice-Admiral
VC	Victoria Cross
VCDS	Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff
VD	Voluntary Service Decoration
VTs	Vocational Training School
WRCNS	Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service
WS	Wireless School

Foreword

This book was begun shortly after the International Military History Colloquium held at Ottawa in August 1978, in which we participated actively. The knowledge and varied talents of many people have gone into it. Our heartfelt thanks go to our co-author, Captain Serge Bernier, CD, Colonel (ret) Armand Letellier, MBE, CD, Colonel (ret) René Morin, CD, Captain (ret) Réal Boissonnault, CD and Lilianne Grantham. By helping to write *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard*, Serge Bernier paved the way for this study of the French-Canadian military and bilingualism. He is also largely responsible for writing Volume II. As for the works of colonels Letellier and Morin, because of their intrinsic value they have been published separately.

We are grateful to all those who have kindly agreed to read our manuscript, and whose comments have enabled us to make necessary corrections. Our thanks are due to Dr W.A.B. Douglas, Director, Directorate of History, who has constantly supported our efforts since 1974; to our Francophone colleagues in the field of history, Jean-Yves Gravel, Pierre Savard and Jean Hamelin; and to the eminent French historians André Corvisier, André Martel and General Jean Delmas. Conceived by Francophones and originally written in French, this study has benefitted from the enlightened criticism of some of the English-speaking historians who are most knowledgeable in Canadian military history, namely the Honourable G.F.G. Stanley, OC, CD, Dr W.A.B. Douglas, CD and Professor Desmond Morton.

Our heartfelt thanks also go to the Honourable Léo Cadieux, OC, former Minister of National Defence, General J.V. Allard, CC, CBE, DSO, ED, CD, General G.C.E. Thériault, CMM, CD, Major-General J.P.R. LaRose, CD, Lieutenant-General R. Evraire, CMM, CD and Brigadier-General M. Richard, CD, whose encouragement and advice were deeply appreciated. We could not fail to mention Colonel E.M.G. Daniel Reichel, former director of the Swiss federal military archives and historical services. His comments as a personal friend and confidant have been especially helpful because his own military career has unfolded under comparable, if not similar, language conditions to those encountered by many French Canadians in the military.

We thank Dr Frances Henderson, who translated this volume for the Secretary of State Translation Bureau, and Dr Norman Hillmer, who kindly revised the text before printing.

We are grateful to William Constable and his assistant Julie Summerville, from the Directorate of History's cartography section, for the maps that adorn our text and help convey its meaning. To our secretary, Noëlla C. Benoit, goes our profound admiration and gratitude for her inexhaustible patience through repeated emendations to our text.

We dedicate this first volume to General Allard, who showed unparalleled leadership in his far-sighted introduction of a more equitable language system for his compatriots. Responsibility for implementing the necessary reforms was entrusted to Colonel Letellier, assisted by loyal and enlightened comrades in arms. He proved himself to be a thinker as well as a man of action, an architect as well as a builder. He had to act resolutely yet without undermining or splitting the traditionally English-speaking structure of the Armed Forces. He did it masterfully. As a token of recognition and friendship, we dedicate the second volume to him. The positive growth in the Department of National Defence through the application of federal bilingualism policy which we have attempted to describe in this study demonstrates the calibre of men such as Allard and Letellier. They have earned our congratulations and thanks.

Finally, we are most grateful to General G.C.E. Thériault, the third French Canadian since 1966 to attain the position of Chief of the Defence Staff, for honouring our work with a preface.

J.P.

Preface

In recent decades, the Canadian Confederation has developed greatly in a number of fields. Changes in language and culture have been rapid and far-reaching.

Relations between Canada's two language groups are a significant dimension of our past and our present. These relations have passed through several phases in which their quality and intensity have varied. They were long clouded by misunderstanding and have often been difficult, especially for Francophones who, after all, formed the majority until the mid-nineteenth century. In the end, many injustices and prejudices that tarnished our past have been overcome, even though there is still ground to be covered. What impresses and even surprises some people is how greatly relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians have improved in recent decades. On balance, relations have generally been good, despite many individual problems, but in any event they have changed, and for the better. Among the many factors that have come into play, no doubt, one has been that our young country has matured, and this has enabled it to develop constitutionally. We must also recognize the fruits of the long and varied labours of many great political leaders and other distinguished people.

The Canadian Armed Forces are an interesting field of study for historians, because they represent a microcosm of Canadian society. They are one of the few great national institutions, if not the only one, that has brought large numbers of Canadians of both languages together in intimacy. In the forefront of Canadian society, the Armed Forces have pioneered understanding between different religious denominations. After very negative periods, as must be admitted, the same understanding was ultimately reached between Anglophones and Francophones in the military. Here again, we must acknowledge the unique contributions by General Allard and General Dextraze, both of whom set objectives and took actions that speeded up and consolidated substantial and essential progress, and also the lengthy and conscientious work of Letellier, Ross and many others.

We may wonder whether collective consciousness of our heritage and determination to make it survive would have persisted

without faithful documentation of French-Canadian history and the pains taken by our ancestors to preserve their language.

It seems clear that, even if French had managed to survive marginally in Quebec, the increasingly bilingual and bicultural society now emerging would not have developed its contemporary character. We would also have been deprived of what more of our compatriots in both groups recognize as not only one of the most significant and important dimensions of Canadian personality and identity but also, as we believe, its greatest asset.

This major work by Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier thus constitutes an addition to this documentation. Jean Pariseau is the first *Historien en chef* of the Francophone Section, Directorate of History, at the Department of National Defence. Since taking on this position in 1974, he has not only encouraged Francophones to research Canadian military history but also contributed a great deal to it himself, especially in twentieth-century history. An earlier study of the use of the Forces in aid of the civil power is an essential reference work on the subject. The first official monograph in the socio-military history series written in French by a Department of National Defence historian, namely Jean-Pierre Gagnon's *The 22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion, 1914-1919: Socio-military history*, was written under Jean Pariseau's direction, and it presents important new aspects of our military history. Captain Serge Bernier, a promising young historian, has drawn attention to himself by the quality of his work on General Allard's memoirs.

In the first volume, Jean Pariseau recounts the history of French-Canadians in the military before turning to the history of bilingualism and biculturalism in the Canadian Forces. Using official documents, he explains the surrounding circumstances and the action taken up to 1969 to implement the new policy. A second volume by Serge Bernier will bring the account up to 1987. The authors reveal a little-known but important dimension of our military history. Let us hope their initiative will encourage others to pursue research into complementary facets of this significant question. We are pleased that this rich and lucid work is being published and we thank its authors.

General G.C.E. Thériault
Chief of the Defence Staff
June 24, 1986

Introduction

The French-Canadian people differs from its neighbours in race, language, qualities of mind, moral aptitudes and historical memories. Our compatriots from England, Scotland and even Ireland, apart from their political ties, melt into the great pan-Saxon mass that makes up the vast majority of the population of North America.... The country we occupy was conquered by our fathers, who colonized it and watered it with their blood. We love it because it is our one and only homeland, and for all the reasons that a homeland is loved. We want it to prosper and we want to contribute to its prosperity, for unless we are idiots, we could not have any other desire. We are ready to defend it, to defend our homes if they are ever attacked, which seems improbable to us, as we defended them in the past. Our title of French Canadians implies no bitterness or hostility toward any race or state. We profess the friendliest of feelings toward those of our compatriots who speak a language different from ours. To sum up, we are faithful to memories of our past. We do not intend to give up anything that we have inherited from our ancestors and that the constitution under which we live has allowed us to preserve.

If English, Scottish and Irish Canadians cherish the same feelings and if we do not succeed in forming a united, progressive and prosperous nation, following the example of countries such as Switzerland, whose people are of three different races, it will be because historical and sociological laws over which we have no control block the achievement of this ambition.

Meanwhile, we are loyal subjects of the English Crown.

Edmond de Nevers
L'avenir du peuple canadien-français
Paris, Henri Jouve, 1896 [translation]

The primary duty assigned to the Francophone Section of the Directorate of History at National Defence, founded in December 1974, was to undertake

“major research projects on the main issues relating to the role of Francophones in Canadian military history.”

Hitherto, official histories produced by the Directorate of History had always been conceived and written in English. Consequently, their French versions never, or at least rarely, reflected the French Canadian viewpoint. Two imperatives emerge from this: to demonstrate how French Canadians have participated in military life and to analyse critically the historiography of their service.

We have done our utmost to carry out our mission as it was entrusted to us. Readers will be able to decide for themselves if our goal has been met, at least in part, after reading the two volumes of this study in conjunction with the works of our colleagues, Jean-Pierre Gagnon, Armand Letellier and René Morin.¹

Concepts

From the outset, certain expressions that will be used throughout this study, in particular “bilingualism” and “biculturalism”, need to be defined. While their definitions may be established and fairly well understood,² the meaning of some expressions has changed over time. Until about the 1960s, “bilingual” usually meant French Canadian. The idea that bilingualism is a special relationship between the two official languages is a very recent one in Canada, both in the Canadian Forces (CF) and in the [federal] Public Service of Canada (PSC).

One may say a book is bilingual if it is in two languages. A city or region is called bilingual if both languages are spoken there. A person who speaks or has mastered two languages perfectly is known as a bilingual.³ Often, as we know, in the PSC or the CF, the expression “bilingual” has been used to denote a French Canadian. A French Canadian public servant or serviceman had to be bilingual, by necessity rather than choice. This will be called “one-way bilingualism” in this study. Following the proclamation of the Official Languages Act (OLA) in 1969, a distinction had to be drawn between “individual bilingualism” and “institutional bilingualism”. The former pertains to individuals, the latter to the organizations in which they work.

With this in mind, we shall look more closely at the main provisions of the OLA and the executorial measures arising out of it.⁴ For the moment, what matters is that institutional bilingualism applies to all the federal government’s departments and agencies, including National Defence, while individual bilingualism is not required of any one person in particular. The purpose of institutional bilingualism is specifically to ensure recognition that the French and English languages are equal and that every citizen has a right to serve his country and be served by public servants in his or her own official language. In concrete terms, “one-way bilingualism” can no longer be demanded of Francophones in the Forces, as was commonly done in the past.

The terms biculturalism and bicultural do not appear in English (or French) dictionaries. They had to be invented in order to describe the juxtaposition of the two main cultures, English and French, which prevail in Canada. As early as October 8, 1971, however, before the federal government had even begun to apply its biculturalism policy at all seriously, it was replaced by a policy of “multiculturalism within a framework of bilingualism”, in Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau’s own words.⁵ In the Department of National Defence (DND), not until October 1978 was the “B & B formula” replaced by the “official languages (OL)” formula, to comply with government policy.⁶

These concepts, however, lie only at the surface of the problem at hand. To measure its depth, let us take the trouble to note how frequently the word “nation” is used, rather than “country” (which has a geographic meaning), “state” (which has a political meaning), or even “homeland” (the place of rest of our forefathers’ remains).

Is there really such a thing as a Canadian nation?

A nation [according to Renan] is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which are really only one come together to form this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the sharing of a rich legacy of memories, the other is a present willingness to live together, a determination to continue to develop the heritage that has been received undivided. Humanity cannot be improvised. A nation, like a person, is the culmination of a long past of effort, sacrifice and dedication.⁷

The word “people” has been defined by Bluntschli in these terms:

A community of mind, feeling and race that has become hereditary in a mass of men of different occupations and classes; a community which, without a political tie, feels united by its culture and origin, in particular by its language and customs, and foreign from other communities of this type.⁸

Renan writes:

To possess shared glories in the past, a shared will in the present; to have done great things together, to want to do more of them — such are the essential conditions for being a people.⁹

Thus we see that “nation” and “people” are synonymous, and

have nothing in common with “country” and “state”, except, of course, that a nation, a people, must live on some tract of land and govern itself.

John Stuart Mill left us a masterpiece on freedom, a freedom that has very often been disregarded or even scorned in Canada, by persons who did not realize the serious consequences of such a gesture.

Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.¹⁰

Less than a decade after these words were published, a somewhat broader vision seemed to come to Canada. A system of federal government similar to that of the United States was approved, rather than a unitarian system modelled on that of Britain or France. In attitudes, however, even more than in deeds, it has often seemed to be assumed that only one nationality existed in the state of Canada. That is why the proclamation of the OLA, considered by some as a very generous action, was perceived by many French Canadians as a legitimate right that came one hundred and two years late.

We have tried to take into account the distinction to be drawn between the history of the minority position of French Canadians in the CF and the development of the concept of bilingualism — a concept which really only appeared after the Second World War — within that institution. An “egalitarian” ideal may well have existed among the minority of French-Canadian servicemen, even if they did not always perceive it clearly. Very few of them, however, have left personal writings that might testify to such a state of mind. Consequently, we have had to rely on what elites have written. It would be quite wrong to assume that all service-men act like automatons because of the discipline to which they are subjected.

True, soldiering produces men of action rather than thinkers, but like

his fellow citizens a soldier instinctively knows the difference between slavery and freedom, racism and tolerance, injustice and fair play. A capacity to formulate concepts is not confined to university professors. "A concept is always true, even though it may be obscure," we have been taught by philosophers.¹¹

The problem

The proclamation of the OLA in 1969 was considered by all French Canadians, supported by a small English Canadian elite, not only as the natural culmination of the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B & B Commission) but, first and foremost, as the answer to their own demands for language equality. In their view, this equality would at last be guaranteed *de jure*, if not yet *de facto*. For we must have no illusions on this score: French Canadians had come to realize over time that Quebec was the only province to carry the weight of official bilingualism imposed on its legislature and judiciary, by virtue of section 133 of the British North America (BNA) Act.¹² The so-called "English" provinces, French Canadians believed, salved their consciences by recalling that the federal government was under the same obligation. They did not, however, as a rule see a need to protect their French-speaking minorities in their own provincial or municipal government structures.

The adoption of a policy of full institutional bilingualism within the federal government was to have far-reaching repercussions in the PSC, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). What we propose to study is the history of this phenomenon within the last-named institution. To our knowledge, no large-scale study of this topic has yet been undertaken. We feel no need to repeat the work of the B & B Commissioners who meticulously examined the "causes of the disease" before recommending to the government the measures required to combat them.¹³ However, many factors have made us want to write not only the history of bilingualism but also the history of French Canadians in the CF since 1763, which we feel is essential to an understanding of this study, even though it has in part been touched on by historians G.F.G. Stanley and Mason Wade.¹⁴

The crucial factor underlying this decision is naturally historiographical. In this connection, we refer to a study of diverging historical perceptions of Canada prepared by professors Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain for the B & B Commission:

In most of our textbooks, there does exist a national awareness... of belonging to one and the same nation, even though two main cultures, English and French, live within it....

(...) The French-language books describe the culture of French-speaking Canadians at length and draw general conclusions that put the emphasis on moral and spiritual values. The English authors, in describing the culture of their own group, perceive a less clearly-defined cultural system.... (...) The authors have a tendency to define their own culture by showing what distinguishes it from the other...

From the very beginning, then, the two cultures, by their very nature, are in positions of extreme opposition to one another, which leads the authors to consider only two possible solutions: one, the assimilation of one culture by the other,... the second, cooperation between the two cultures, each retaining its own essential characteristics... Assimilation is of course rejected completely by the French-speaking authors... It is resistance to assimilation that provides the basis of claims for Quebec provincial autonomy.

On the English-language side, only [Robert Michael] Ballantyne takes the same position, at least implicitly... Assimilation having proven impossible, there remains the other alternative: cooperation. This is the solution to which the English-speaking authors (regretfully, it would seem) and the French Canadian authors all rally. They accept it, but on condition that it be founded on mutual respect and understanding... All authors recognize the success of this cooperation... In all the English-language books, moreover, opposition between the two cultures appears as a major obstacle to effective functioning of the government... because of the “legacy of bitterness” (an important theme to [John] Saywell).¹⁵

Trudel and Jain conclude from this that history books in English seek to give future citizens “political or social training”, while history books in French aim to instil “moral training”. And while English history books express no anxiety as to the survival of Anglophones or Francophones, French history books are constantly preoccupied with the survival of their own group; this is expressed as holding out against a danger. In response to the challenge, they advocate withdrawing into oneself and maintaining traditional structures unchanged.¹⁶

According to historian Mason Wade, who has delved into French Canadian history with detachment but also with sympathy:

No real understanding of French Canada is possible without a realization of what its history — perhaps the most colorful, for its span of years, of any human record — means to the French Canadians, whose most popular historian has made familiar the phrase ‘Notre maître, le passé [Our master, the past] and established it as a principle for action in the present.’¹⁷

We shall see, from the way history unfolds, that military life in Canada has been mainly an Anglophone phenomenon. Yet this is not in keeping with the goals of Confederation. Sir John A. Macdonald stated this categorically at the Quebec Conference in 1865:

I have again and again stated in the House, that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative Union would be preferable. (Hear, hear.) I have always contended that if we could agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could adopt. (Hear, hear.) But, on looking at the subject in the Conference, and discussing the matter as we did, most unreservedly, and with a desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, we found that such a system was impracticable. In the first place, it would not meet the assent of the people of Lower Canada, because they felt that in their peculiar position — being in a minority, with a different language, nationality and religion from the majority, — in case of a junction with the other provinces, their institutions and their laws might be assailed, and their ancestral associations, on which they prided themselves, attacked and prejudiced; it was found that any proposition which involved the absorption of the individuality of Lower Canada — if I may use the expression — would not be received with favour by her people.¹⁸

Hector Langevin, echoed indeed by other Fathers of Confederation, said essentially the same thing:

I may say that the basis of action adopted by the delegates, in preparing the resolutions, was to do justice to all — justice to all races, to all religions, to all nationalities, and to all interests. For this reason the Confederation will be accepted by all, in the Lower Province as well as here. Under Confederation there will no longer be domination of one race over another, and if one section would be desirous of committing an act of injustice against another section, all the others would unite together to prevent it.¹⁹

The purpose of Confederation was to establish a strong central government while respecting the difference in language and culture between the parties. Anyone who has given any attention at all to the question of whether the BNA Act is a law or a compact (agreement) cannot help but acknowledge the differences of opinion

aroused by such a question. According to historian Ramsay Cook:

Francophone Canadians have doubtless been the most consistent exponents of the compact theory in both its provincial and cultural variations.

Nevertheless, it was also a French Canadian prime minister, Mr. St. Laurent, who rejected most forcefully the implications of the compact theory.²⁰

The Honorable G.F.G. Stanley, a former field officer and military historian who was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick in 1982, has also reflected on this subject. The following is one particular side of it:

When thinking of French Canadians or of Anglo-Canadians, it was all too simple to speak of them in geographical terms, as Lower Canada and Upper Canada. It was a confusion of mind and speech of which we in our own day and generation are all too frequently guilty. Almost without thought “Quebec” and “French Canadians”, or “Ontario” and “Anglo-Canadians”, become synonymous terms in the mouths of Canadians of both tongues. It is, of course, a slipshod way of thinking as well as of speaking, for there are French Canadians in Ontario and English Canadians in Quebec: and in many ways it has been unfortunate, for it has limited to Quebec language rights which might, under happier circumstances, have been accorded French Canadians in other parts of the country.²¹

If a subject so crucial to an understanding of the very nature of Canadian federalism lends itself to a host of interpretations, it is scarcely surprising that the question of military service overseas during the two world wars was regarded from such diametrically opposite standpoints and, consequently, aroused so much bitterness.

That, basically, is why we have felt it essential to begin by studying the military service of French Canadians, their proportionate representation, their conditions of service, and especially the language aspect of their conditions of service. In so doing, we shall attempt to formulate an enlightened criticism of our sources, bibliography and statistics, and to comment on their interpretation. Is that not, indeed, one of the first tasks of the historian?²²

Thus what we offer is, in fact, a survey of the social history of these soldiers, rather than a conventional military history or a sociological or linguistic study *per se*. This study should not be considered a mini-history of Canada, although we have tried — to

borrow the well-turned phrase of that French master of social history, Professor Robert Mandrou — to study “l’avènement du collectif”.²³ The last impression we will try to convey in these pages is that we wish to glorify war. On the contrary, we fully concur in what Marshal Ferdinand Foch said about Napoleon:

He forgot that a man cannot be God; that above the individual is the nation; that above men there is morality; and that war is not the supreme goal, for above it is peace.²⁴

The Canadian Forces, whose traditions closely follow those of the British forces, have found themselves, so to speak, confined within government bureaucracy, like a castle within its walls. Since the Public Service was predominantly English-speaking, it should not surprise us that for all practical purposes, apart from the infantry, the Forces were also English-speaking.

Imperialist sentiment among British soldiers and public servants at the time of the Conquest, reinforced by the subsequent arrival of the Loyalists, took time to be transformed into English - Canadian nationalism, while, as a means to survive, Francophones had to fall back swiftly and instinctively on a sense of “French-Canadian” nationalism.

The attitude of French Canadians toward the two Riel crises occurring shortly after Confederation in no way affected that of the English-speaking majority.²⁵ The former’s inability to shake off their minority shackles bred in them a desire to obtain greater provincial independence for Quebec, where they formed the majority.²⁶

At the turn of the century, Henri Bourassa’s hostile reaction to Canada’s contribution to the South African War was no more successful. Although there were a few dissenters, the English-speaking majority endorsed Britain’s jingoistic policy which the French-speaking minority condemned.²⁷ The conscription crises, artificially produced²⁸ during the two world wars, were no more successful, at least in the short term, in changing outlooks.

We have only to compare the findings of some of the Royal commissions of inquiry set up by the federal government to those of

parallel commissions set up by the Quebec government, in particular the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois) and the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems (Tremblay), in order to realize the difference in outlook. While the former was to be “a re-examination of the economic and financial basis of Confederation and of the distribution of legislative powers”, the particular aim of the latter was “to study... the problem of the distribution of taxes between the central power, the provinces, municipalities and school corporations.”²⁹

W.F. O'Connor, Parliamentary Counsel of the Senate, who in 1938 was instructed to inquire on behalf of the Senate into:

differences between the scheme of distribution of legislative powers... as apparently intended at the time of Confederation and as expressed by... the British North America Act, 1867... and pronouncements of Judicial Committee[s]

stated plainly that his research had led him to conclude that the so-called Confederation compact did not exist.³⁰

After the Second World War, the Massey-Lévesque Commission Report on the national development of the arts, letters and sciences offered a series of articles, some in French and others in English, on the various subjects it addressed. Its editor, B.K. Sandwell, actually admitted that French-Canadian culture and English-Canadian culture were “as yet very lightly joined together”, despite the cohabitation of French- and English-speaking Canadians in the same country.³¹

In the fifteen years following the Second World War, according to Gerard Bergeron, Quebec progressed “from provincialism to internationalism without passing by way of nationalism.” On the other hand, J.I. Gow maintains that if Quebecers opened their minds to international questions, they did so in a Canadian national framework.³²

When Jean Lesage came to provincial power in 1960, the people of Quebec, dissatisfied with their place in Canadian society and their own development over the years, demanded radical political change. One manifestation of this, perhaps little known, is to be found in the Glassco Commission Report, published in 1963. It states officially, for the first time, in a “separate statement” by Commissioner of Inquiry F. Eugène

Therrien that unequal conditions of work were offered to French Canadians in the Public Service and the Forces.³³ In our opinion, not only is this key document essential to understanding the problem; it also, as we shall see, prepared the way, at least in part, for the Royal Commission on B & B.³⁴

No one seems to have considered seriously the important impact of the criticisms levelled unfairly at French Canadians during the Second World War in changing the outlook and structures that occurred in Quebec from 1960 onward. We hypothesize that when they returned to their families after being demobilized, most volunteers, and even conscripts, discussed the questions raised by the crisis of conscription for overseas duty. The soldiers in French-Canadian battalions who fought in Normandy were undoubtedly marked by their travel through France.³⁵ We believe, that after the war, spouses, brothers and sisters, parents and children wanted to know more about the country of their ancestors. Indeed, the same thing also seems to have happened to Anglophones in regard to Britain. From the 1950s onward, growing numbers of French-Canadian students enrolled in university studies in France, returning to Canada with a renewed love of the French language and culture, although this did not make them any less “Canadian”.

The credit for taking the initiative in having Quebec represented abroad belongs to Georges-Émile Lapalme. His aim was to “build closer links with France so as to stimulate French-Canadian culture”, a task he felt the Canadian Embassy in Paris was not performing well.³⁶ Early in January 1961, since he had not received any specific mandate as Canadian delegate general from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, he wrote his own terms of reference:

to strengthen relations with France, to develop economic relations and to encourage French-speaking immigration.³⁷

Following the impetus of strong pro-sovereignty feelings in Quebec and demands for changes in the existing structures,³⁸ the federal authorities decided to inquire into the situation of language and culture in Canada as a whole. Created in 1963, the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission (named after its co-chairmen) did not complete its work until December 1969, six months after the Trudeau government had proclaimed the OLA. As we shall see in the second volume, senior officials spent three years drawing up language policies and dictating the necessary measures required by the various federal

departments and agencies, including DND, in order to apply the law.

Until quite recently, French Canadians in the public service worked mainly in English. Since 1969, the federal bilingualism policy has not always been implemented on an “equal to equal” basis, as it should have been. This remark does not mean that we do not recognize the enormous progress in this area. Our aim is simply to place the problem in its historical context.

Comparison of ethnic and linguistic statistics, 1961 and 1971

We have had to refer to demographic statistics, in order to understand fully the language situation of the population of Canada when the Royal Commission on B & B began its work. With this in view, Table 1 consists of three 1961 charts intended to summarize the position regarding ethnic groups, mother tongues and languages spoken,³⁹ and Table 2 compares the salaries of English- and French-speaking public servants in 1868, 1918 and 1946.⁴⁰ These tables should help the reader clarify in his mind the “imbalance”, if not the injustice, faced by Francophones in the early 1960s.

Ten years later, in 1971, before the official languages policy came into force in the Public Service and the Canadian Forces, the situation had changed very little, as demonstrated by the first part of Table 3.⁴¹ The second part clearly shows the language situation of Quebecers.⁴²

A comparison of the three tables reveals that, if any change occurred in attitudes toward fairer recruitment of French-speaking public servants and servicemen, from 1961 to 1971, it had not yet produced results. The situation had thus remained the same, despite the demands made by French-speaking individuals and organizations to the Royal Commission on B & B and its pressing recommendations to government authorities. In brief, seventy-eight per cent of public servants and servicemen spoke English only, and twenty-two per cent were French-speaking; most of the latter were bilingual.

TABLE 1

**Comparison of Ethnic and Language Statistics
1961**

(Population of Canada: 18,238,247)

1. Ethnic groups

British Origin	French Origin	Other Origin
7 996 669	5 540 346	4 701 232
43.8%	30.8%	25.8%

2. Mother tongues

English	French	Other
10 660 534	5 123 151	2454 562
58.45%	28.09%	13.46%

3. Languages spoken

English	English & French*	French	Other
12 284 762	2 231 172	3 489 866	232 447
67.4%	12.2%	19.1%	1.3%

* In reality, the vast majority of bilinguals are French Canadian.

Source: Canada Year Book 1962, p. 1204.

Source: House of Commons, Debates, 1946, p. 3520.

We can assert from the outset that two major events caused the DND to adopt a B & B policy promptly, even before the OLA was passed in 1969:

1° the creation of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean (CMR) in 1952, to train French-Canadian officers; and

2° the appointment of General Jean Victor Allard as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in 1966.⁴³

These events had pre-eminently a psychological effect, for they helped changed mindsets within an institution which is acknowledged to be highly tradition-conscious.

TABLE 2

**Comparison of Salaries of French- and English-Speaking
Public Servants**

	Anglophones	Francophones
1.1868		
Representation	64%	36%
Salaries	80%	20%
2.1918		
Representation	78%	22%
Salaries	75%	25%
3.1946		
Representation	87%	13%
Salaries	90.5%	9.5%

Source: House of Commons, *Debates*, 1946, p. 3519.

Bilingualism in foreign armies

Canada's armed forces are not the only ones where bilingualism is practised. The world's history offers many examples of bilingualism being imposed for social and military reasons.

The Roman Empire, for example, according to Arnold Toynbee, hesitated to impose Latin as the official language in provinces where Greek was the usual mother tongue or had taken root as a *lingua franca*. Even though the Romans used Latin exclusively as the language of command in imperial army units, they gave official status to Greek and used it side by side with Latin in their central administration.⁴⁴

Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II attempted to create more unity in his empire by forcing non-Germanic peoples to use German. This had precisely the opposite effect, at least among the Czechs and the Slovenes who gave free rein to their hitherto repressed nationalism. German was kept only in the imperial army as the language of command, while Italian was the language of command in the imperial navy. This testifies to Italian's vitality as a Mediterranean *lingua franca*.

TABLE 3

Population of Canada by Official Language

(Population of Canada in 1971: 21,568,315)

In absolute numbers (— 000)

Language	Ethnic origin		Mother Tongue at home		Language spoken		Official language	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
French	6 180	28.7	5 793	26.9	5 546	25.7	3 879	18.0
English	9 624	44.6	12 973	60.2	14 446	67.0	14 470	67.0
Other	5 764	26.7	2 800	13.0	1 577	7.3	319	1.4
Bilingual*	—		—		—		2 900	13.4

Population of Quebec by Official Language

(Population of Quebec in 1971: 6,027,765)

In absolute numbers (— 000)

Language	Ethnic origin		Mother Tongue at home		Language spoken		Official language	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
French	4 759	79.0	4 867	80.7	4 870	80.8	3 688	61.2
English	640	10.6	789	13.1	888	14.7	633	10.5
Other	629	10.4	371	6.2	270	4.5	63	1.1
Bilingual*	—		—		—		1 664	27.6

* It can be seen that, in most cases, bilinguals are Francophones.

Source: Statistics Canada 1973, quoted in William F. Mackey, *Le bilinguisme canadien: bibliographie analytique et guide du chercheur*, Québec, CIRB, 1978, pp 49-50.

In the Ottoman Empire, there was never any attempt to impose unilingualism, although Turkish was the official language of administration. In the navy, Italian was also used for the same reason it had been in the Hapsburg Empire.

Even in his empire's short lifespan, Napoleon gave official status to the mother tongues spoken in the countries he conquered, keeping them in use along with French.⁴⁵

In Belgium, use of the two official languages, French and Flemish, depends on location, except in Brussels. Military service is performed in one's regional language. To ensure the effectiveness of this policy of language equality, all officers are required to speak and write both official languages if they aspire to promotion.⁴⁶

Since the federal constitution of 1848, German, French and Italian have been considered Switzerland's three official national languages. In 1939, Rhaeto-Romanic was also recognized as a national language, but it is an official language only in Graubunden. The Swiss population breaks down by mother tongue as follows:

German	74%
French	20%
Italian	4%
Rhaeto-Romanic	<u>1%</u>
	99%

In the army, these languages are used according to the "principle of territoriality";⁴⁷ consequently, their use varies from region to region. As George LUDI has observed, "Peaceful coexistence between the language communities in Switzerland presupposes that each one respects the others' identity and there is an uninterrupted flow of communication between the communities. Bilinguals represent, so to speak, the living link between communities."⁴⁸

We do not claim to have examined all cases where bilingualism has been practised, nor do we claim that all those we have studied have achieved the success that was hoped for, even if they have met the needs of the populations in question. In theory, any Canadian policy should avoid the mistakes made by other countries and learn from their successes. In the second volume, we shall try to determine how far Canada's experience has gone towards meeting this theory.

Methodology, sources and bibliography

Before beginning our research in primary sources, we consulted the main bibliographies on French Canadians, bilingualism and Canadian

military history. William F. Mackey's *magnum opus* on Canadian bilingualism, the selective bibliography of Quebec history by René Durocher and Paul-André Linteau, the guide to Canadian history by A. Beaulieu *et al*, Owen Cooke's military bibliography and the *Bibliographia Canadiana* by Claude Thibault were of considerable assistance, as was the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*.⁴⁹

We drew heavily on the many works (about 75) on military history during the British and post-Confederation periods cited in the study on Quebec and war by Jean-Yves Gravel, and on his doctoral thesis on French Canadians in the military from 1868 to 1900.⁵⁰ On the question of bilingualism, our main sources were H. Bastien, R. Blain, M. Brochu, V. Prince and R. Joy.⁵¹

We have attempted to situate our study of the French-Canadians military in the context of Canadian social and military history. To this end, we have used the main publications on this topic, in both English and French. Three especially useful studies were those of Mason Wade, George Stanley and Desmond Morton.⁵² For the conscription crises and the quiet revolution, we have drawn up a selective bibliography which is presented in our references, and thus need not be reproduced here.

Our research into the period between the world wars is based primarily on the statistics cited in annual militia reports, which are listed in the notes. This period needed to be studied in detail, not only out of general interest but because it was important to determine whether or not the recurrence of the conscription problem in Quebec during the Second World War could be justified, or at least explained, by historical reasons other than emotionalism or absence of patriotism.

For the Second World War period, we delved into the official history of the Canadian Army and the study of Canadian war policies by Colonel C.P. Stacey.⁵³ We found only a sorry few documents on French Canadians during this period. Most of these are statistics on aviators, kept in the C.G. Power collection in the archives of Queen's University, Kingston. Our study up to the post-war period is thus based mainly on secondary sources, except for official statistics collected for the period between the wars, which we believe have been examined from the point of view of language for the first time.

Not until after the war, and specifically after the creation of the review committee on bilingualism, whose secretary was Major Marcellin Lahaie, were proper, on-going files on French Canadians and bilingualism kept at the DND. The first to open the path for these was Jean-Yves Gravel, who gave us the benefit of his own writings on this subject.

To address the question of French-Canadian nationality, we had to consult, in addition to Wade's study, work carried on outside the DND, in particular that of André Siegfried, Edmond de Nevers, Hugh MacLennan and Ronald Wardaugh.⁵⁴ The different perceptions of these authors — one Frenchman, one French Canadian and two English Canadians — were extremely helpful to us.

Our research on French Canadians concludes with the arrival of General Jean Victor Allard, the first French Canadian to become Chief of the Defence Staff, in 1966. The proclamation of the OLA caused Allard's policies at the DND to be taken up on a broader scale throughout the government and the Public Service. The National Defence Records Management System (NDRMS) then opened up a host of new files. We have examined these one by one (over three thousand of them), and then read the minutes of the Defence Council (DC), the Defence Management Committee (DMC), the Chief of the Defence Staff Advisory Committee (CDSAC), and the directives of the CDS and the ADM (Personnel).⁵⁵ Naturally, we had to familiarize ourselves with the House of Commons Debates, the reports of the B & B Commission, including the studies by Harold Forbell and Pierre Coulombe, the annual reports of the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL), and the Secretary of State Department and Treasury Board (TB) directives relating to our research. We also reviewed the annual reports of the commanders of the National Defence College (NDC), the Staff College and the military colleges. Very useful files were given to us by General Allard, Major (ret) Louis Noël de Tilly, LCol (ret) Alexandre Taschereau and Cols (ret) Armand Letellier and René Morin.⁵⁶

Lastly, we reviewed nearly all the DND's publications on B & B. Copies of most of these are available at the Directorate of History.⁵⁷ Armed with these materials, we were able to undertake a series of fourteen studies on B & B at the DND, which are also available at the Directorate of History.⁵⁸

The second volume of this work, which is rather different from the first, deals with new government policies and the adoption of military and civilian structures consistent with these policies. In it we study the Department's response to the challenge of "institutionalizing" bilingualism, in particular in higher education, in the military training system and by means of language training. Two exceptional cases have been given special attention: the Chaplain Corps and schools for military dependants. In the first instance, as we shall see, bilingualism was practised by French-Canadian Roman Catholic chaplains even though no directives ordered them to do so; in schools for dependants, the same was achieved because of an understanding of the problem and the implementation of appropriate structures.

Finally, we attempted to analyse the financial side by drawing up a statement of program costs, and to determine the results of the application of the new language policy up to 1987 in statistical terms.

* * *

While some Anglophones have viewed the policy of bilingualism as infringing upon their established rights, most have accepted it willingly once they have grasped its implications. Until a policy of reform was introduced, the language situation as a whole was distinctly unfavourable to Francophones. After all, they still rightly consider themselves to have been Canadians for longer than their English colleagues.

Just as in the Public Service where French Canadians long played the role of "hewers of wood and drawers of water", they were, for a long time, confined within the CF to the infantry because of the language policy imposed on them. This simple statement in no way means that we are seeking to belittle the value or quality of the infantry. We wish simply to demonstrate that French Canadians were considered fit only to serve in the branch that required the lowest intelligence quotient from recruits. This said, we fully agree with the adage: "The infantry is the Queen of battle"; the distinguished service of the phalanx of foot battalions was always essential to the victories of the other branches.

This study is not an indictment of English Canadians, any more than it is an accusation that French Canadians have been too slow in

standing up for their rights. Rather it is a testimony to the vision and tenacity of those who fought to obtain official recognition of language equality in the Canadian Armed Forces. We consider it a faithful report on a change in outlook, among both Francophones and Anglophones, and among the military and public servants. No genocide has occurred in Canada, as it did elsewhere. No one can deny, however, that in the two centuries following the Conquest, Canadian as well as British authorities were anti-French to varying degrees, or at least indifferent to the lot of French Canadians. This led the most militant of the latter to pursue self-determination. The survival of a united Canada has depended on a change in outlook and in structures, which had long been necessary, and the result of which is that citizens are equal *a mari usque ad mare*.

Part One

A Chronicle of Anglicization (1763-1914)

Soon the destiny of New France would be at stake. The country would be covered with ruins. The people would be beaten to the ground. But the civilization they represented was destined to survive, because it was the product of a slow but sure historic development, because in the thirty years of peace allotted to it between 1713 and 1744, Canada came into its own. It became a spiritual entity, a creature unto itself, a new nation, rooted in a past whose indomitable power propelled it into the future.

Guy Frégault

(La civilisation de la Nouvelle-France, 1712-1744
Montreal, Fides, 1969). [translation]

France's colonial possessions in North America came only gradually under British domination: Nova Scotia in 1713; Cape Breton in 1758; the Quebec district in 1759; and Montreal and the hinterland in 1760.¹ In the same way British institutions were introduced gradually.

In 1760, Montreal was fortified only with a simple wall built in bygone days to protect it against Iroquois forays. Against the 18,000 men in the armies of Amherst, Murray and Haviland, only 3,500 were fielded by Lévis and Vaudreuil.² When the city surrendered, Vaudreuil proposed, among other things, the following terms:

The French Canadians and Acadians who remain in the colony, of whatever estate and condition they may be, shall not and cannot be forced to take up arms against His Most Christian Majesty, nor his allies, either directly or indirectly, for whatsoever occasion. The British Government can only require strict neutrality from them.

The reply given by the British commander-in-chief, General Jeffery Amherst, was succinct and unequivocal: "They become subjects of the King."³ Five years earlier, the British authorities had deported the entire French-speaking population of Acadia for the very reason that, since 1713, they had not succeeded in making that population loyal to the British Crown. Hence there is nothing surprising in Amherst's reply. It is important to note, however, that this difference in attitude was to be characteristic of relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians throughout their history.

Later, as we shall see, primary responsibility for maintaining peace and order in Canada rested with British regulars. The arrival of the Loyalists in 1790 or thereabouts eventually led to the firmer entrenchment of the English language in the Canadian Militia, founded in 1855. The "permanent" force created in 1870 consisted solely of English-speaking units. When the First World War broke out, except for a few infantry battalions in the militia, Anglophones had the entire armed forces to themselves.

Chapter 1

British Rule: Dismantling the French-Canadian Militia

I expected to find a contest between a government and a people: I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state: I found a struggle, not of principles, but of races; and I perceived that it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of laws or institutions until we could first succeed in terminating the deadly animosity that now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada into the hostile divisions of French and English.

Lord Durham
(Report on the Affairs of British North America,
British Parliamentary Papers, 1839)

Has the honourable member forgotten I belong to the nationality so unfairly treated by the Act of Union? He asks me to deliver the first speech I am to make in this House in a language other than my mother tongue. I distrust my skill at speaking the English language; but even were I to speak it as fluently as an Englishman, I would still deliver my first speech in the language of my French-Canadian compatriots, if only to protest solemnly against the cruel injustice of that part of the Act of Union which seeks to proscribe the mother tongue of half the population of Canada. I owe this to my compatriots, I owe it to myself.

Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine
in the House of Assembly in Kingston, September 12, 1842
(*L'Aurore*, September 27, 1842) [translation]

The surrender of Montreal in 1760 ended the military claims of the French in Canada. The French troops re-embarked on board British transport ships bound for France, and the Canadian militiamen were disarmed. For more than a century to come, the country's defence would rest on the shoulders of the British regular army.¹ However, at the request of the commander-in-chief himself, Sir

Jeffery Amherst, the militia captains continued to administer civil justice as justices of the peace in the 108 parishes organized at the time of the Conquest², because they spoke the language of the people.

On March 5, 1764, General Murray, as Governor of Quebec, raised five companies of former militiamen and 400 boatmen to help put down the rebellion of Pontiac, a former French ally. Former militiamen were also called on to carry out *corvées*, such as building roads or bridges, transporting provisions and so forth, under the supervision of militia captains.³ Murray considered the French Canadian militia to belong to “the bravest race on earth”,⁴ belieing the popular myth that persists among many Anglophones that they were cowardly louts.

Who were these former French-Canadian militiamen? First of all, how many of them were there? According to Professor G.F.G. Stanley, shortly before the Seven Years’ War 15,299 men were counted eligible for military service. But a much smaller number of militiamen were called up to serve under Montcalm: 8,500, as follows:

3,800 for the Montreal government
1,100 for the Trois-Rivières government;
3,000 for the Québec government; and
600 to defend the Québec garnison.⁵

French Canadians formed a separate nation from France,⁶ even though they retained the characteristics of the various provinces from which they originated. Traditional in some respects, they were also very adventurous. They had established an entire inland fur-trading network, using the navigable waterways of the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence. Before the Conquest, they had built no fewer than fifty forts which also served as trading depots — about thirty in what is now the north central United States and a score in central western Canada.⁷ Not only were they adventurous, but they were also in excellent physical and mental shape, handling the axe as well as the paddle, the plough and the gun.


Moreover, much as they disliked war, the French Canadians had been compelled to resort to it relentlessly against the Iroquois, from 1641 to 1666, and from 1684 to 1701 — the year of the Great Peace — and then against the British, in particular those of the New

England colonies, from 1689 to 1697, 1703 to 1713, 1744 to 1748 and finally from 1754 to 1760.⁸ In 1665-67, the Carignan-Salières Regiment was called in, and then a dozen regular battalions of land troops were brought over in 1755-60, together with about forty *Compagnies franches de la Marine*, or independent companies of the marine, beginning in 1668.⁹ The Canadian militiamen, however, did most of the work of transporting troops, ammunition and provisions, levelling fields of fire, digging ditches and building revetments.

Often too independent-minded to enlist, the Canadians preferred *la petite guerre* in the Indian style, in which they were highly successful. They nearly wiped out Roger's Rangers, the *élite* fighting force of New England. Incorporating them into battalions of regular troops in Québec, in 1759, was an error by Montcalm, who fought in the European tradition. This can be seen clearly on the plains of Abraham, in the success scored by Captain Dumas and his Indians on the British flank, who accounted for most of the enemy losses. Canadians, indeed, viewed the fall of Québec and Montreal as a military defeat suffered by French regulars at the hands of British regulars. The latter's depredations on property above and below Québec — scenes strongly reminiscent of the English hatred of the Scots at Culloden and, even more, of the Acadians during the 1755 deportation and the extreme rigour with which provisions were commandeered, entrenched the Canadians' aversion to war.


The French defeat, which can be attributed more to Bigot's inept administration and the mutual jealousy of Montcalm and Vaudreuil than to Wolfe's military genius, strengthened the Canadians' wish to live in peace. Even so, the new conquerors had to take them as they were. French and Roman Catholic in origin and severely affected by the war, Canadians agreed to live under the British Crown, which at first proved fairly indulgent, leaving them the right to speak their own language and practise their own religion. They were unaware, however, of the secret instructions received by Murray and Carleton, to Anglicize them as quickly as possible.¹⁰

Carleton, who replaced Murray as civilian Governor in 1766, pressed the British Government to win the friendship of French Canadians. This led to the passing, in 1774, of the Quebec Act whose benefits have been greatly exaggerated.¹¹



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The American Revolutionary War, 1775-76

The restricted role played by French Canadians in defending Quebec during the American War of Independence has unfortunately given rise to various interpretations. Some historians seem to have assumed that French Canadians should have had the same attachment to the Crown as the British themselves. Since scarcely a dozen years had passed between the ratification of the Treaty of Paris (1763) and the American invasion of Quebec, it would be more reasonable to accept as normal the absence of a strong attachment to England. Moreover, knowing that France was helping the revolutionaries, no doubt many French Canadians believed they might be freed from the new British yoke. This is a much better explanation of their shyness or refusal to take up arms to support the Crown of Britain. Not until they had suffered the depredations of the Americans did most of them rally to the British side. At stake, after all, was their country of origin, which was not at issue for either the English or the Americans.¹²

While French Canadians were not allowed to enlist or hold an officer's commission in Canada, several served with distinction and prestige in Napoleon's army.¹³ Others served in the British Army. Among these, to name only a few, were Lieutenant Édouard-Alphonse d'Irumberry de Salaberry, killed in Spain in 1812, in the attack against Badajoz; his brother Major Charles-Michel, who served in the 60th (or Royal American) Regiment of Foot before becoming the "Victor of Chateauguay"; and Major Charles St-Ours of the 132nd Regiment of Foot.¹⁴

Since British regular troops¹⁵ were not equal to the task of maintaining order and defending such extensive territory, regular colonial troops were formed, such as the Royal Highland Emigrants and the Royal Fencible American Regiment, which, according to G.F.G. Stanley, were somewhat similar to the *Compagnies franches de la Marine* under the French Regime,¹⁶ except, of course, that they were made up of Anglophones. Provincial militias were also organized: in Nova Scotia in 1749; in Quebec in 1777; and in New Brunswick, but not until 1794.¹⁷ Only Quebec had French-speaking militia corps.¹⁸ From 1787 onward, the revised law provided for the formation of separate English- and French-speaking companies.¹⁹ Unfortunately, this venture into official bilingualism in the Canadian Militia was to be short-lived.

The arrival of the Loyalists

The Loyalists, who came to Canada to escape the American Revolution, demanded to live under British institutions without delay. The government responded to this by proclaiming the Constitutional Act in 1791. Lower Canada kept its civil law while Upper Canada adopted English common law, as Nova Scotia had done since 1713.

The boundless energy of these new arrivals, their hunger to make good their material losses, the generous welcome given to them by the British administrators in authority and, most of all, their repeated demonstrations of loyalty to the Crown caused them to rise to positions of command much more readily than French Canadians. From their arrival they began calling themselves “old subjects” and referring to Canadians as “new subjects”, notwithstanding that some Canadian families had been established in the country since 1608. These battles of the psyche, and the memories perpetuated by their descendants, became enshrined in Loyalist and Canadian mythology.

Despite his facility in understanding and speaking French, Lieutenant Governor Sir James Craig, who arrived in Québec on October 18, 1807, as Captain General and Governor in Chief of the provinces of Upper- and Lower-Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton, did not further the cause of harmony. In the opinion of historian J. Mackay Hitsman:

That Craig had already strengthened his prejudice against French-speaking Canadians, and considered that Lower Canada was a conquered province to be ruled for the benefit of its English-speaking commercial minority, seems evident from his despatch of August 4 to Lord Castlereagh:

“...whatever may have been the case in former times the Canadian of the present day is not warlike or at all accustomed to arms. Nothing indeed can exceed the prejudices and absurd ideas that prevail among them. The Militia Service is ever in their mouths, they bring it forward as a merit on every occasion and they seem to wish to be thought proud of belonging to it; but they have not the most distant idea of being Soldiers, or the slightest desire of becoming such, they have indeed an invincible abhorrence for the subordination and restraint that would be necessary for training them, and I have strong doubts whether they will ever be brought to submit to them.”²⁰

At the time he was writing these caustic words, an English merchant named Hugh Gray, who came to Canada in 1806, contradicted Craig’s view of the militia while proposing concrete steps to assimilate the Canadians:

Québec, 1808

In Lower Canada there are about 60,000 militia. They are mustered at stated periods; and in the towns, they are clothed and armed, and have learned the business of soldiers so well, that they are fit to be brigaded with the troops of the line. One would naturally have supposed, that the Canadians and the English would have been mixed together, and taught their exercise in *English*, so as to do away, as much as possible [with] the distinction of nations; and that they might all be in the habit of obeying a British officer, and acting under British command. Precisely the reverse of all this has taken place. The English and Canadians are divided into separate corps. The Canadians are *officiered* by their own people; taught their exercise in French; and form a perfectly distinct body from the English. If brigaded with English troops, they could not understand the word of command, nor act with effect.[...]²¹

The War of 1812

Gray's fears were proven unfounded when the War of 1812 broke out. In fact, most of the land engagements occurred in Upper Canada, and British regular troops bore the brunt of the invasion.²² A few naval engagements also took place on the Great Lakes, and a few troops were landed on the Atlantic Coast. Nonetheless, it was a conflict that extended from ocean to ocean, from Halifax to Astoria.²³

According to Fernand Ouellet:

the effect of the war was to stimulate French-Canadian nationalism. The battle of Châteauguay was perceived as a great French-Canadian victory that decisively altered the course of events. It resulted in national pride that made a hero of De Salaberry, despite his past opposition to the nationalists. Chapais, the historian, waxes as lyrical about Châteauguay as did De Salaberry's contemporaries: 'The leader's tactics and his soldiers' bravery rightly made it a glorious date for our race. In essence, it was a French-Canadian victory. It is our own, and no one can take it from us.... Châteauguay was our reply to the slurs of Craig, Ryland and Sewell. Châteauguay was our vengeance. Châteauguay was the affirmation of our undeniable loyalty and our ardent patriotism. Châteauguay was a heroic illustration of our national outlook.... Salaberry and his brave men gave English arms the outstanding glory of a French victory.' No poet of the time could have said it better.²⁴

In that battle, the fighting spirit of some 300 French Canadians in the Select Embodied Militia, the *Voltigeurs canadiens* and a company of Canadian Fencibles (a regular colonial corps), under the vigorous leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles-Michel de Salaberry, defeated 2,000 American regulars who, had they succeeded in capturing Montreal, could have cut off Upper

Canada's military supply line .²⁵ Again, we see that French Canadians did not hesitate to enlist in order to defend themselves against the Americans, as was rightly predicted by the Lieutenant-Governor of Lower Canada, Shore Milnes, ten years earlier.²⁶ This actually contrasts with the situation in Upper Canada, where Lieutenant-Governor Francis Gore observed in 1808:

...there are few People here that would act with Energy were it not for the purpose of defending the lands which they actually possess.²⁷

This situation was confirmed by the administrator and Com-mander-in-Chief, General Isaac Brock, who said he was incapable of rousing the militia of Upper Canada and, worse still, the members of the Legislative Assembly, from their torpor in the summer of 1812.²⁸

Even before the battle of Chateauguay, non-commissioned officers and men of the first and second battalions of the Quebec militia had presented a petition to the House of Assembly of Lower Canada requesting to be commanded and disciplined in French—

the only language understood by the greatest part of Canadian subjects.²⁹

A bill introduced in the British Parliament in 1822 was designed to unite the two provinces and also

to decrease the powers and ultimately to stifle the nationality of the French Canadians. The strenuous opposition offered to its clauses by the French, and its whole-hearted acceptance by Dalhousie, governor of Lower Canada, and the English officials of the province, sufficiently bespeak its purpose.³⁰

The pernicious attitude of Craig and Dalhousie toward French Canadians was not likely as to win them over.

The 1837-38 rebellions and the Durham Report

Dissatisfied with an autocratic colonial government that refused to allow the houses of assembly real power, Louis-Joseph Papineau in Lower Canada and William Lyon Mackenzie in Upper Canada attempted to right wrongs by proclaiming a rebellion. The state of insurrection lasted about two years before being quashed severely by sack, imprisonment, exile and even hanging.³¹

The harshness of the British regulars under “Old Fire-brand” (as their commander, Sir John Colborne, was called) and the hatred of French-Canadians in general felt by most British officials and English-Canadian militiamen put an end to Francophones’ claims to equality. Following the recommendations of Lord Durham, who was sent out in haste from Britain to investigate the situation, French Canadians were forced to become Anglicized within a united Canada.³² As Gerald M. Craig rightly observed:

Durham failed to see that Canadian development would have to be in the other direction: toward mutual respect and tolerance, towards the building of a nation based on dual culture.³³

Two incidents serve to illustrate this comment. Lieutenant-Colonel Baker, of the second battalion of Carleton militia, pointed out to the Adjutant-General:

Bytown embraces 6 companies, of these at least three are composed of French Canadians, and there is not a single French Canadian officer although several are well qualified; a circumstance which appears to be unjust and may be prejudicial to the public interest in the event of war ...³⁴

At the same time, Captain Burke refused to serve under Major Aumond because he was of French Canadian origin.³⁵

The second incident occurred in Montreal in the same year. A certain Thomas Gordon, formerly a clerk in the militia, complained to the Governor General that he had lost his job because he was not “sufficiently acquainted with the french language to translate it into English”. He asked to be re-instated in a similar position in Upper Canada, where he said “a correct knowledge of the french language is not necessary. After Colonel August Guey, Adjutant-General of the Lower Canada Militia, intervened on behalf of the unilingual clerk, Lieutenant-Colonel Taché, Deputy Adjutant-General, replied in French:

and I must furthermore state that, had Mr. Gordon been sufficiently acquainted with the French language to translate it into English, I should never have thought of replacing him by anyone else at all.³⁶

Taché was simply aiming to halt the one-way bilingualism that had been practised more and more openly in the Lower Canada Militia since the 1837-38 rebellions.

The union of the two Canadas

Following the Durham Report, the British Government imposed union on the two Canadas without, however, favouring this united Canada with responsible government.

Prompted by Durham's attack on their culture and the threat of assimilation, French Canadians decided to take control over their destiny. A great national historian and a national poet now emerged from their ranks: respectively, François-Xavier Garneau and Octave Crémazie. Similarly, political leaders emerged, notably Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine and George-Étienne Cartier, who "displayed qualities of statesmanship as yet unrevealed by French Canadians", and whose strength was augmented by their alliance with Robert Baldwin and the Upper Canadian reformers. Canada's cultural dualism was thus recognized and the Canadian tradition given firm grounding.³⁷

The advent of responsible government

After the uphill struggles of Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine and Robert Baldwin to obtain a system of responsible government, French Canadians nevertheless continued to harbour suspicion and rancour toward the "English" — a term they applied indiscriminately to colonial officials, British regular troops, Loyalists and other English-speaking immigrants. From 1855 onward, the majority of the population was English-speaking.³⁸ George Brown, one of the reformers who would soon extol the advent of Confederation as a triumph of Canada West over French Canadians,³⁹ was not long in calling for "Rep by Pop" (representation according to population), a principle he seems not to have mentioned when French Canadians outnumbered English Canadians.⁴⁰ Equality for all subjects of the British Crown was far from being guaranteed by such attitudes.

Chapter 2

The Canadian Militia from 1855 to 1914: Consolidation of an English- Language Institution

I have no accord with the desire expressed in some quarters that, by any mode whatever, there should be an attempt made to oppress the one language or to render it inferior to the other. I believe that would be impossible if it were tried, and it would be foolish and wicked if it were possible. (...) There is no paramount race in this country, there is no conquered race in this country, we are all British subjects, and those who are not English are none the less British subjects on that account.

Sir John A Macdonald
House of Commons *Debates*, February 17, 1890

We are French Canadians, but our country is not confined to the territory overshadowed by the citadel of Quebec; our country is Canada, it is the whole of what is covered by the British flag on the American continent, the fertile lands bordered by the Bay of Fundy, the Valley of the St Lawrence, the region of the Great Lakes, the prairies of the West, the Rocky Mountains, the lands washed by the famous ocean whose breezes are said to be as sweet as the breezes of the Mediterranean. Our fellow-countrymen are not only those in whose veins runs the blood of France. They are all those, whatever their race or whatever their religion, whom the fortunes of war, the chances of fate, or their own choice have brought among us, and who acknowledge the sovereignty of the British Crown... The first place in my heart is for those in whose veins runs the blood of my own veins. Yet I do not hesitate to say that the rights of my fellow-countrymen of different origins are as dear to me, as sacred to me, as the rights of my own race, and if it unfortunately happened that they were ever attacked, I would defend them with just as much energy and vigor as the rights of my own race... What I claim for us is an equal share of the sun, of justice, of liberty; we have that share, and have it amply; and what we claim for ourselves we are anxious to grant to others. I do not want French Canadians to domineer over anyone, nor anyone to domineer over them. Equal justice; equal rights... Cannot we believe that in the supreme battle here on the Plains of Abraham, when the fate of arms turned against us, cannot we believe that it entered into the designs of Providence that the two races, enemies up to that time, should henceforth live

in peace and harmony? Such was the inspiring cause of Confederation.

Wilfrid Laurier
(Ulrich Barthe, *Wilfrid Laurier à la tribune*,
Québec, 1890, pp 527-28) [translation]

Britain, at war with Russia in March 1854, was forced to reduce its overseas garrisons in order to raise an expeditionary force for the Crimea. A mere 3,284 British regulars were left in Canada and the Maritime provinces, including Newfoundland.¹ The British Crown, which had lately allowed Canada to exercise responsible government, considered that Canadians ought to help British taxpayers cover the cost of their own defence.

The Militia Act, 1855

The Sedentary Militia of United Canada, made up of the reserve militia of the two former provinces, numbered 235,000 men, but only on paper. It followed the principle of universal military service, in other words mass call-up in the event of an emergency. But the creation of a volunteer militia in 1855 was especially pleasing to Anglophones, who were only too willing to replace the British regulars who had left for the Crimean War. The volunteers drilled each week. They had to pay for their uniforms, but their weapons were provided. The volunteer corps were truly democratic associations which elected their own officers.²

Canada East (Lower Canada) was divided into eleven military districts, and Canada West (Upper Canada) into ten. The volunteer militia numbered 5,000 men in various corps, as follows:

	16 troops of horse
	12 artillery batteries, and
	<u>50</u> rifle companies
Total:	78 corps

Each company's strength ranged from 43 to 75 men. Companies were independent of each other, and there were no plans to bring them together except in the event of war. In 1856, Canada East had 17 of the 34 corps organized to date. Scarcely a quarter of them were French-speaking. The breakdown was as follows:

	Units		Total
	French-speaking	English-speaking	
Montreal	1	7	8
Trois-Rivières	1	—	1
Québec	1	5	6
Granby	1	—	1
Sherbrooke	—	1	1
Total	4	13	17


In addition, there was one French-speaking company in Ottawa, Canada West. According to Jean-Yves Gravel, the proportion of English Canadians was so high because offers of service from French Canadians were turned down by the military authorities.

In 1858, because of an economic downturn, attempts were made to cut expenditures. The number of corps was reduced from 78 to 50, and six to ten companies were allowed to combine into battalions so as to facilitate and improve administration. Annual pay was also reduced from ten to six days, which made many volunteers leave the militia. Only at the time of the Trent affair, in 1861, did enthusiasm for the militia revive.

John A. Macdonald, who was appointed Minister of Militia Affairs on December 28, 1861, disbanded inefficient corps and launched an appeal to former regular soldiers in order to improve the effectiveness of the new corps which he created. All, or nearly all, these former regular troops, let us recall, were English-speaking. The bulk of volunteers came from towns, while farmers and farm workers were barely represented.

	Canada East	Canada West	Total
Population	1 110 665 *	1 396 098 *	2 506 763
Urban population	153 389	103 884	257 273
Volunteers	5 500	3 025	8 525
Percentage	3.6	2.9	3.3
Rural population	957 275	1 292 204	2 249 479
Volunteers	4 730	11 755	16 485
Percentage	5.0	9.0	7.0
Total Volunteers	10 230	14 780	25 010
Percentage	9.0	11.0	

* These totals, taken from Jean-Yves Gravel's thesis, are not entirely consistent with the figures cited elsewhere.



The countryside of Canada West provided many more volunteers, because it had more small populated centres than Canada East. While there were only 16 towns with over 1,000 people in Canada East, there were 51 of them in Canada West. If this factor is taken into account, it could be maintained that Canada East supplied proportionately more volunteers.

	Agglomerations	Population	Volunteers	%
Canada East	16	37 631	4 630	12.3
Canada West	51	125 847	11 755	9.3

The majority of volunteers from Canada East, however, were English-speaking.

	Companies		
	English	French	Total
Class A	14	2	16
Class B	59	27	86
Total	73	29	102

French Canadians, thus, made up only 29 of the 102 companies, or 28 per cent of volunteers, although they represented 80 per cent of the population. It is important to understand, however, that the system of voluntary service ran contrary to their habits and customs. They were accustomed to defend their homeland when the government compelled them to do so after their lots were drawn, as in 1812, but they did not deliberately seek out danger on dislocation.

The language breakdown in the militia of 1863 gives us a clear insight into the progress of English in the militia in the Province of Canada. While all field officers and storemen in Canada West were Anglophones, barely half of those in Canada East were Francophones. The following list illustrates this point well:

Deputy Adjutant-General	LCol M.A. de Salaberry
Inspector of Militia	(Anglophone)
Brigade Majors	
1 st MD — Gaspé	(vacant)
2 nd — Rivière-du-Loup	H.T. Duchesnay
3 rd — Beauce	L.C.A.L. de Bellefeuille

4 th	— Arthabasca	(Anglophone)
5 th	— Bas-Richelieu	C.T. de Montenach
6 th	— Saint-Jean	(Anglophone)
7 th	— Québec	L.T. Suzor
8 th	— Trois-Rivières	L.R. Masson
9 th	— Argenteuil	(Anglophone)
10 th	— Sherbrooke	(Anglophone)
11 th	— Montreal	(Anglophone)

Storemen

Montreal	(Anglophone)
Québec	Capt. E. Lamontagne

Apart from the Adjutant-General ordering the manual *Instruction for Drill of the Canadian Volunteer Militia Rifle Companies* to be translated into French,³ very little was done officially in French. Only one of the twelve qualified musketry instructors was a Francophone. The dominance of the English language was even reinforced by the presence of some fifty British instructors, scattered throughout the units or serving in the schools. In 1863, for example, the 4th Terrebonne County battalion, according to Jean-Yves Gravel, numbered 694 French Canadians and 29 English Canadians. Yet 14 of its 15 officers were Anglophones, prompting the population to complain to the Minister, John A Macdonald, about this “gross injustice”.⁴ Here, to sum up, is the language of the field officers and captains in the future province of Quebec.⁵

	Anglophones	Francophones	Total
Col	3	—	3
LCol	18	2	20
Major	51	8	59
Captain	<u>47</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>54</u>
	119	17	136

By 1863, French Canadians held only 12.5 per cent of commanding positions in Canada East, even though they made up a large majority of the population there.

Between 1855 and 1867, 74 units were created. Barely four of these, or 5.5 per cent of the total, were French-speaking.⁶

Field artillery battery, (August 31, 1855)
Québec

4th battalion *Chasseurs* (January 2, 1862)
canadiens, Montreal

9th battalion *Voltigeurs*
de Québec

(March 7, 1862)

17th infantry battalion,
Lévis

(February 20, 1863)

As with English-speaking units, companies in these units were called into service during the American Civil War to maintain order on the border following threats from the Fenians — a group of activists of Irish origin who “demonstrated” against the British government from US bases. They kept Canadians on the alert until 1870, when the Fenians attempted a final unsuccessful invasion of Canada across the Manitoba border.⁷

English as language of command

Elinor Kyte Senior attributes the imposition of English as the language of command to two main causes: the need to “regiment” volunteer corps, and the creation of mixed brigades comprising both regular troops and militiamen, in order to fight the Fenians.⁸ If it was quite natural for British troops of the line to use English in military administration and instruction, it was equally natural for French-Canadian militiaman to speak their own language among themselves, as they had commonly done up to that time. During the Fenian crisis, however, Lieutenant-General Sir John Michel, who had been sent to British North America after wandering over the globe for forty years in the service of the Empire, ordered French-speaking units to use English only, because, as he said, “There would have to be uniformity of language of command.”⁹

Thus even before Confederation, the use of French in the Canadian Militia was barely tolerated, and attempts were made to impose English. Nevertheless, French was widely used in the volunteer companies of Military District (MD) N^o 7. Several manuals were translated by Lieutenant-Colonel Louis-Timothée Suzor, and the Québec Military School operated in French.¹⁰ Most of the decline in the use of French occurred after Confederation.

Confederation, 1867

Exclusive legislative authority for “Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence” was allocated by the BNA Act, 1867 to the Parliament of Canada rather than the provincial assemblies.¹¹ The first

Militia and Defence Act of the Dominion of Canada was proclaimed the following year.¹²

Nothing is said in the Militia Act regarding the equality of the French and English languages, a subject relegated to section 133 of the BNA Act. The provisions of this article should, in fact, be presented in full:

Use of English and French Languages

133. Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those languages.¹³

Jean-Charles Bonenfant, a former professor of law at *Université Laval* and chief librarian of the National Assembly Library of Quebec, interpreted the “spirit of 1867” which inspired the Fathers of Confederation and both French and English Canadians at the time of their decision to unite:

The French Canadians of Lower Canada were the only group that, for deep-seated reasons of race, language and religion, might fear the consequences of Confederation; the people of the Maritimes had only to fear for their economy or their vanity. French Canadians could have opposed the new regime effectively or delayed its establishment. They did not do so, or at least their most prominent political and religious leaders did not fear the risk. They did not believe that centralization would go too far, and they sought guarantees whose inadequacy is always easy to point out after the fact. Apart from that, it must be admitted that the genesis of Confederation was essentially an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, a product of English language and thought. At the time, however, it could hardly be otherwise, and we must avoid looking at the events of 1867 with the hindsight of 1963.¹⁴

Bonenfant did not pay special attention to the question of the defence of the country, even though that was one of the main causes leading to Confederation.¹⁵ Yet, as we shall see and as upheld by Bonenfant, “the genesis of Confederation was essentially an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon”.

A unilingual English permanent force

We saw earlier that, at the time of Confederation, a scant four of the 74 militia units were French-speaking. When a permanent force was created with a view to replacing the British regular troops who had been called back to Britain or elsewhere, the “essentially Anglo-Saxon phenomenon” of Confederation resulted in the creation of entirely English-speaking permanent units:¹⁶

- 1871: Artillery A Battery, Québec
 Artillery B Battery, Kingston
- 1874: Royal Military College, Kingston
- 1883: Cavalry School Corps, Québec
 Infantry School, Fredericton
 Infantry School, Saint-Jean
 Infantry School, Toronto
- 1885: Infantry School, London
 Mounted Infantry School, Winnipeg
- 1887: Artillery C Battery, Victoria

Although three of these ten units were located in the province of Québec, the Francophones in them, especially in A Battery in Québec City were commanded in English.¹⁷ To be sure, a bilingual version of the *Regulations And Orders for The Active Militia/Règlements et Ordres pour la Milice Active* existed in 1870, but the 1879 and 1883 versions were issued in English only, as far as we know. Not until 1887 were two separate versions of the new, amended regulations published,¹⁸ and this did not happen again until the Second World War.

Officers and men

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what percentage of soldiers in the permanent force spoke French. There is a simple reason for this: the Active Militia list issued each year contains only the names of officers.¹⁹ In other official documents, other ranks are listed, but no personal files on them were kept, and rarely is there a list of names. In any event, such lists vary from one version to the next as recruits arrived and deserters, undesirables and soldiers whose contract of service had

expired were deleted. While Francophone representation among soldiers cannot be established satisfactorily, the representation among officers speaks volumes :²⁰

<u>Year</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1870	10.0%
1875	10.7
1880	8.0
1885	13.6
1890	12.9
1895	14.2
1900	11.6
1905	10.0
1910	8.4

It is hardly surprising that of the 1,000 cadets who passed through Royal Military College between 1874 and 1914, a scant 39, or 3.9 per cent, were Francophones. R.A. Preston writes of a “French Canadian problem” in his very detailed study of this venerable institution, yet he does not point out that Francophones took all their courses, except French, in English; nor does he add that they were treated exactly as if they had been Anglophones, even on enlistment.²¹ This, rather than a nationalist spirit, was perhaps the primary reason for which more French Canadians did not attend the college, apart from the obvious fact that French Canadians were less inspired by imperial military zeal than English Canadians. Despite the inherent language difficulty, some French-speaking cadets received excellent marks, even in English courses, for studies pursued in their second language.

It is also worth noting that before the Second World War, the DND’s only language courses were given at RMC in Kingston. English courses were not taught at RMC until 1885. “The subject being new to the 3rd and 4th classes, I found them both very deficient in elementary English, especially composition. They have now made considerable progress.” Cadet A. Joly of the 4th class “passed excellent examinations [in English]”, according to Colonel E.O. Hewett, RE, Commandant of RMC.²² In 1890, the professor of English literature awarded the mark of “Distinction” to Company Sergeant-Major L. Amos, adding “which is specially noteworthy in a Frenchman [*sic*] coming to an English [*sic*] college and surpassing in English literature many of those ‘to the manor born’.”²³ French and English courses still appeared in the 1895 curriculum. The annual report of the Commandant of RMC contains no

comments on the teaching of French, but the following remarks appear for English literature courses:

4 th class	(1 st year)	— very promising
3 rd class	(2 nd year)	— fairly satisfactory
2 nd class	(3 rd year)	— satisfactory
1 st class	(4 th year)	— very satisfactory ²⁴

In 1900, optional courses in German appear to have been dropped. Just before the Great War, 264 hours a year of French were taught to students in first, second and third year, while English was taught for 172 hours, and only to first- and second-year students.²⁵

Bilingualism in the Non-Permanent Militia

The situation within the staffs of the twelve military districts (MDs) created shortly after Confederation was roughly similar to that prevailing in the permanent force, except that it reflected French-Canadian demography and geography somewhat more accurately.

1868	MD	1	— London, (Ontario)
		2	— Toronto
		3	— Kingston
		4	— Brockville
		5	— Montreal [English-speaking]
		6	— Montreal [French-speaking]
		7	— Québec
		8	— Fredericton, New Brunswick
		9	— Halifax, Nova Scotia
1891 —		10	— Winnipeg, Manitoba
1874 —		11	— Victoria, British Columbia
1875 —		12	— Charlottetown, PEI

We find French-speaking units in two of these districts, N° 6 MD in Montreal and N° 7 MD in Québec City, but nearly all their external correspondence and administration were in English.²⁶



Colonel P. Robertson-Ross, Adjutant-General of the Militia, presents in his report to the Minister, the Hon G.-E. Cartier, his impressions of an 1871 summer camp at Laprairie, near Montreal, as follows:

“On mustering the force, I found nearly the whole of the 3rd Brigade to be composed of French speaking Canadians, and in the two other brigades, although the great majority of the men were English speaking, being struck with the number of French Canadian names while calling the rolls of the different companies, I obtained an accurate return of the number of French speaking Canadians in the camp, and they exceeded 2000 in number. The appearance and condition of the majority of the infantry corps in this camp, in respect to drill, condition of arms, accoutrements, and soldierlike bearing, was inferior on the whole to the majority of the infantry corps assembled in the Province of Ontario, although there were exceptions; but the men, although generally speaking not so tall, looked at least as hardy and robust, indeed some of the rural companies, of both French and British descent, looked fit to undergo great hardship, and the adaptability of all to camp life was most striking; indeed in this very important part of military instruction, not only have both French and English speaking Canadians little to learn from any army, but they could teach a lesson to many.

Lieutenant-colonel Osborne Smith reports that the general conduct of the troops was excellent, that he believes “so large a number of men was never assembled for the time with such an entire absence of crime, and so little irregularity.”²⁷

The three brigades to which the Adjutant-General refers made up MD N^o 5 of Montreal, which was generally considered English-speaking. In point of fact, the 2,000 French Canadians represented over half of the 3,865 officers and men of MD N^o 5 who took part in training that summer, while the normal total strength of the district was 5,284.²⁸ We note that the three brigades of MD N^o 6 (Montreal) and the two brigades of the MD N^o 7 (Quebec), which comprised French-speaking units, also included a few English-speaking units, mainly cavalry and artillery.

After Confederation, three of the four French-speaking units created before 1868 remained:

the Field artillery battery, in Québec;
the 9th battalion of *Voltigeurs*, in Québec;
the 17th battalion of foot, in Lévis.

The 4th battalion of *Chasseurs canadiens*, in Montreal, was dissolved shortly after the 1871 summer camp.²⁹ However, sixteen new French-

speaking units were created before the turn of the century:³⁰

- the Garrison artillery regiment, Québec and Lévis (1899)
- the 18th battalion of infantry, Saguenay (1890)
- the 61st battalion of infantry, Montmagny and L'Islet (1869)
- the 64th battalion of rifles Voltigeurs de Beauharnois (1869)
- the 65th battalion of Mont-Royal rifles (1869)
- the 76th battalion of rifles Voltigeurs de Châteauguay (1872)
- the 80th battalion of infantry, Nicolet (1875)
- the 81st battalion of infantry, Portneuf (1869)
- the 83rd battalion of infantry, Joliette (1871)
- the 84th battalion of infantry, Saint-Hyacinthe (1871)
- the 85th battalion of infantry (Montreal) (1880)
- the 86th battalion of infantry, Trois-Rivières (1871)
- the 87th battalion of infantry, Québec (1869)
- the 88th battalion of infantry, Kamouraska and Charlevoix (1882)
- the 89th battalion of infantry, Témiscouata and Rimouski (1883)
- the 92nd battalion of infantry, Dorchester (1869)

A summary of the non-permanent Militia organization for the whole of Canada in 1900 shows, however, how under-represented French Canadians were:

Corps	Total	French-Speaking units	%	
Cavalry	8 regiments 5 squadrons	nil nil	}	0
Artillery				
field	12 batteries	1	}	14
garrison	6 regiments	1		
	1 company	nil		
Infantry	89 battalions	17	}	19
and	4 independent			
rifles	companies	nil		

Shortly before the First World War, the proportion of French-speaking infantry battalions would decline to 16 per cent, while the total number of battalions rose to 106.³¹

Attitudes and policies

What attitudes and what policies of concrete action on bilingualism did ministers, deputy ministers and commanding generals adopt from Confederation to the First World War? In other words, what recognition was awarded to the equality of English and French within the Militia, and from 1910 onward, in the Navy?

Ministers

Fifteen Members of Parliament, four of them French-speaking, occupied the position of Minister of Militia and Defence up to the First World War.³²

George-Etienne Cartier (1867-73) was the first. Having taken part in the Charlottetown (1864), Quebec (1865) and London (1866) conferences as defender of the rights of his compatriots in Canada East, he was fully aware of existing and possible ethnic and linguistic problems. According to Jean-Charles Bonenfant:

He obtained for his French-Canadian compatriots living in Quebec rights which he believed essential at the time. He wanted Quebec to be master of its destiny in education, civil law and local institutions. In addition, he wanted to protect the religious rather than the language rights of minorities in the other provinces. We may even wonder whether Cartier believed in a real Canadian duality, which would allow French-speaking Canadians to exercise their rights fully throughout the country, both in the field of education and in the use of their language.³³

Cartier was in fact preoccupied with issues other than the Militia or the defence of the country — in particular the acquisition of Rupert's land, the creation of the province of Manitoba, the entry of British Columbia into Confederation, and the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Except in his speech introducing the Militia Bill, he did not address the issue of language as such. As he stated when presenting his bill, "We are determined to remain under the protection of the British Crown."³⁴

The second French-Canadian minister was Louis-François Rodrigue Masson (1878-80), a former brigade major who had entered politics in 1868, after retiring from the Active Militia. The new minister, who was ill throughout much of the 1879 session, was concerned primarily with encouraging French Canadians to play "their proportionate role in

the Militia".³⁵ Some people, seeking to re-establish the 4th *Chasseurs canadiens*, requested permission to wear the distinctive uniform of the Zouaves (originating in Algeria), the very uniform they had worn when they rushed to defend the Pope in 1869. It was quite as legitimate to have these uniforms as it was for Anglophones to wear those of England or Scotland, they maintained. Masson, who had helped organized the Canadian Zouaves, did his utmost to gain acceptance for this proposal which was rejected outright by the Governor General, the Marquis of Lorne.³⁶ It was in this way, rather than by means of official acceptance of the use of the French language, that Masson sought to gain recognition for the distinctive identity of French Canadians within an Anglicized national institution. Unfortunately, in his fifteen months in office, he did not succeed in overcoming the Governor General's stubborn narrow-mindedness.

In contrast to his predecessors, Adolphe Caron, the third French Canadian minister, remained in office more than eleven years (1880-92). A Quebecer like the others, he had practised law with an English-speaking law firm up to the time of his appointment, and was considered an "*assimilé* — a Frenchman speaking English better than the English".³⁷ Caron has frequently been accused of vanity and patronage. There is no doubt that he was much given to both, but this is largely, according to Professor Desmond Morton, because he left countless documentary sources behind him and did not attempt to cover his tracks, as others did: "he simply played the game by the known rules and without blushing."³⁸ Caron eventually fell victim to a game of influence played against him by Major-General Luard and the Marquis of Lorne. This was understandable; both were much more loyal to the British Government than to a mere colonial minister.

In 1884, General Garnet Wolseley, who commanded the British expeditionary force sent to Egypt and the Sudan to relieve General Gordon at the siege of Khartoum, asked the Government of Canada for permission to recruit volunteers from the Canadian boatmen and voyageurs he had encountered during his expedition to the Red River in 1869. Nearly 400 Canadians recruited in this way, among them 62 Native Canadians and 95 French Canadians, took part in the expedition. It was the first time a British colony with responsible government sent aid to the mother country for an overseas campaign.³⁹

When the Riel Rebellion broke out in 1885, Caron immediately

ordered over 5,000 militiamen to mobilize, encouraging them to travel day and night. "I want to show what [the] Canadian Militia can do".⁴⁰ Only two battalions out of the thirty-odd units mobilized were French Canadian: the 9th *Voltigeurs* (Quebec) and the 65th Mont-Royal Rifles (Montreal). Major-General F. Middleton assigned both of them to Major-General T.B. Strange of Calgary, who commanded the Alberta Field Force, observing, "I did not think it wise to bring them where so many French half-breeds were to be met about here."⁴¹ This implies that Middleton questioned their loyalty. Strange, however, who had become very familiar with the French Canadian character through commanding the Québec artillery school from 1871 to 1882, said he was delighted with the contribution of the 65th,⁴² which fought at the battle of Frenchman's Butte, while the *Voltigeurs* had to content themselves with keeping Calgary and its surrounding area safe. Caron certainly cannot be accused of having lacked zeal in putting down the rebels, nor, when Riel was hanged, of espousing or echoing the prevailing attitude in Quebec, which connected the cause of the Métis with that of the French Canadians. On the contrary, he was decorated with the KCMG by a grateful British Government, which doubtlessly added to his prestige as Minister of Defence in a divided Canadian Parliament.⁴³ He applied the Conservatives' National Policy to everything relating to the Militia, and could proudly assert in 1889 that everything the militiamen wore on their backs was made in Canada.⁴⁴ What he could not boast of, however, was having strongly encouraged his compatriots to enlist in greater numbers, still less to work in French.

The fourth French-speaking minister, Senator Alphonse Desjardins (January 15 — April 30, 1896), was appointed to the post right at the time of the Venezuela crisis. As president of the Jacques Cartier Bank and several other companies he was in Montreal more often than in his ministerial office in Ottawa during his brief mandate of three and a half months.⁴⁵

As we have seen, then, the French Canadians who occupied the position of Minister of Militia and Defence for 17 of the 47 years from Confederation to the First World War — i.e. more than one third of the time — did not attempt to alter the unilingual English character of the Canadian Militia.

George-Etienne Cartier used the British War Office as a model when he organized his new Department. Accordingly, there was a military branch under the Adjutant-General and a civilian branch headed by the deputy minister.

Deputy ministers

Three of the four deputy ministers who served between 1867 and 1914 were French Canadians; their tenure extended over more than 40 of those 47 years.⁴⁶ It might be expected that, by virtue of their responsibility for administering the civilian side of the Department, one or another would have demanded that French-speaking units and the military districts of Quebec and Montreal be administered in French, or at least in both languages. Yet nothing of the sort occurred.⁴⁷ The Militia attempted rather to imitate the British Army, but without taking the necessary steps to become truly effective. Demanding that it be administered, even in part, in a language other than English would have seemed absurd and not conducive to effectiveness and a unified command. The question was never raised. How ill-considered this attitude was would be demonstrated at the time of the South African War and the two World Wars.

Commanding Generals

Now let us turn to the military branch. From 1868 to 1873, the Deputy Adjutant-General — the title then given to the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Canadian Militia — was a British field officer who, in addition to having close links with the Governor General, reported to both the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence *and* to the Lieutenant-General commanding in North America, another British officer. From 1875 onward, although the position of Deputy Adjutant-General was replaced by that of Adjutant-General (Colonel) and was occupied by a Canadian, a new position of General Officer Commanding was created. Up to 1904, it was filled by eight British major-generals and one colonel. The Militia Act was then amended to enable a Canadian to occupy this position, but only one of the four major-generals who rose to the new position of Chief of the General Staff, up to the end of the First World War, was a Canadian, Major-General W.D. Otter.⁴⁸ Our concern here is not to recount the service of these British generals, which has been told very ably by Professor Desmond Morton in

*Ministers and Generals.*⁴⁹ It should be sufficient merely to recall a few incidents of relevance.

Not only was Major-General U.C. Herbert (November 20, 1890 — August 1, 1895) Roman Catholic, he also spoke French fluently. These two assets did not fail to please French Canadians. He conversed with French-speaking militiamen from Laprairie and Rimouski, for example, during the 1891 summer camp.⁵⁰ Yet when, in a speech to the Mont-Royal Rifles, he saw fit to praise their compatriots' contribution to the Zouave recruitment, he was sharply criticized in English newspapers and in the House of Commons by the anti-Catholic, anti-French imperialist Orange-man Sam Hughes, who would later become Minister of Militia in 1911.⁵¹

Major-General E.T.H. Hutton (August 11, 1898 — February 12, 1900), probably the most effective of British GOCs in Canada, also spoke French fluently. An innovative reformer, he was just as concerned as his predecessors, if not more, to stop political patronage in the Militia. As he said to the members of the Toronto Military Institute shortly after arriving in Canada:

...the time is coming, if it has not come, when the military force of Canada, the national army of Canada, should be put upon a national basis, and as a national institution, should in every respect be above party questions of all kinds (applause). A good army, a national army, must be one which is apart from party, and which sinks all individual views, be they political or religious, in the general welfare of the country.⁵²

Hutton then did what no one had dared to do before. With a view to having the importance of the French language recognized in what was meant to be a national institution, he issued orders that staff officers and instructors were to learn French so that they could command and train French-speaking militiamen.⁵³ According to Desmond Morton, "Hutton's concern for bilingualism was not merely a matter of abstract justice; he was also convinced that Quebec would only join his military crusade if the most energetic and professionally educated English-speaking officers should get at the French Canadians."⁵⁴ The latter reacted enthusiastically, but Anglophones less so, as Hutton found when he had to defend his orders in Toronto three weeks later.⁵⁵ Two more orders laying down conditions for language testing were issued that summer.⁵⁶ Then nothing but silence... What happened?



The honourable Sir George-Etienne Cartier, an 1837 “patriote”, Premier of Canada (1858-62), one of the Fathers of Confederation, Minister of Militia and Defence, 1867-73. (Public Archives of Canada /C 14247)



The Honourable Sir Joseph Philippe-René-Adolphe Caron, KCMG, had ministerial responsibility for the North-west campaign, as Minister of Militia and Defence (1880-92). (Public Archives of Canada /PA 25513)

Major-General U.C. Herbert, CB, General Commanding the Canadian Militia from 1890 to 1895, was Roman Catholic and pro-French. His conciliatory attitude was criticized by Orangemen. (Public Archives of Canada/C 96695)



Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, CB, ADC, General Commanding the Militia from 1898 to 1900, attempted to introduce bilingualism in it but was overwhelmed by sending contingents to the Yukon and South Africa. (Public Archives of Canada/C 6359)



MILITIA ORDERS, 1899.

No. 12.

HEAD-QUARTERS, OTTAWA.

Tuesday, 14th February.

Study of the French
Language.

1. The Major General Commanding desires to remind the officers and staff of the Permanent or Instructional Corps, and all others who aspire to high command in the future, or to positions of responsibility upon the General Staff, that a considerable portion of the Military Forces of the Dominion consist of French Canadian Regiments. It is, in the Major General's opinion, essential that all officers who now hold, or aspire to hold in the future, responsible positions on the Staff, should be able to convey their instructions to the French-Canadian troops, in their own language. All Officers of the Staff, of the Permanent Corps, and of the Instructional Staff (including Non-Com. Officers) should more especially acquire a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of the French language, and the Major General suggests that all those who are unable to read or speak French with fair facility should take an early opportunity of making good this defect.

By Order,

M. AYLMER, Colonel,
Adjutant General.

The problem was that, in the meantime, a large contingent of the Permanent Militia was sent to the Yukon to maintain order during the Klondike gold rush.⁵⁷ Worse yet, war had broken out in South Africa between the Boers and the British. The debate on Canada's participation in foreign wars, which had arisen during a series of colonial conferences in London, immediately surfaced again. A few Anglophones and most Francophones disagreed with the "jingoism" of the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, while the majority of Anglophones espoused the imperialist cause. Canadian society was completely divided. The imperialists won — as they were bound to, since there were more of them and that is how democracies work; with doubtless considerable regret, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier authorized the recruitment of volunteers at the Canadian taxpayers' expense, to be transported to the theatre of war in the Transvaal at British cost. Fewer than three per cent of the five contingents were French Canadians, although 5.4 per cent of the first contingent, consisting of infantry, were French-speaking. All were officers or men in the Permanent or the Non-Permanent Active Militia.⁵⁸

As for Hutton, that faithful servant of the Imperial Crown, he had been no more successful in eradicating partisanship from the Canadian Militia than he was able to refrain from attempts to thwart his minister's policy. He had ardently desired upon his arrival to right the language injustice to French Canadians, but was forced to resign a year and a half later.⁵⁹ At any rate, for him as for other persons of lesser stature, British imperialism in the final analysis ran deeper than the pan-Canadian nationalist sentiments extolled by Henri Bourassa or the Prime Minister's lack of enthusiasm for taking up arms in a cause that did not concern Canada.⁶⁰

Comparison of Canadian participation in the Pontifical Zouaves campaign and in the South African War

In a study of this nature, what parallels can be drawn between Canadian participation in the Pontifical Zouaves campaign and in the South African War, and what conclusions can be drawn?

The operational aspect of these two campaigns cannot be compared, for the South African War involved much heavier combat. But differences can be noted in all regards, from the principles at issue to the means employed. The Zouaves expeditionary corps was made up of Roman Catholic French Canadians, the South African one of English-speaking pro-imperialists. The first was funded by collections taken up in churches in the Diocese of Montreal and by a French citizens' committee, the second by Canadian and British public funds and a personal contribution by Lord Strathcona. The goal of one was to defend the pope's "temporal" sovereignty, of the other to conquer two countries rich in diamonds and gold for the benefit of the British Crown.⁶¹

Despite the opposition of some members of the *Institut canadien* — in particular Arthur Buies, who had served for some time under Garibaldi the Zouaves campaign can be said to have been supported by the majority of French-Canadian Roman Catholics and ignored by English Canadians, both Catholic and Protestant.⁶² By contrast, Canadian participation in the South African War was espoused almost wholly by Anglo Canadians, while the majority of French Canadians opposed it, or at best were neutral toward it.

A superficial examination of the question leads us to conclude that French Canadians were as enthusiastic about military service as their English-speaking compatriots when the cause was dear to their hearts. British imperial expeditions, to be sure, did not capture the imagination of French Canadians; indeed, the South African campaign actually aroused strong opposition among them, but no less strong than among some British opponents, such as David Lloyd George. This opposition was to have a negative effect on the formation of the French-speaking officer corps and battalions on the eve of the First World War.

Militia reform, founding of the navy and strengthening of imperial ties

Until the turn of the century, there were no real staffs in the military districts, nor services organized in corps and assigned to support the various cavalry, artillery and infantry units. Shortly after the return of the South African contingents, the first divisional formations were created (1903), and a Militia Council was founded (1904). Similarly, following the British Army model, the following services were incorporated:

1903	Army Service Corps Ordnance Stores Corps Corps of Guides Signalling Corps
1904	Army Medical Corps
1905	Corps of Military Staff Clerks
1906	Canadian Army Pay Corps

English was the only language used officially in these services, although, shortly before the Great War, two out of 18 artillery units and 27 out of 116 infantry regiments (battalions) they administered were French-speaking.⁶³

The imperial bases of Halifax and Esquimalt (Victoria) were transferred to the Dominion in 1905 and, from 1907 onward Canada was represented at the imperial conferences that took the place of the colonial

conferences held at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Finally, in 1910, following a proposal by Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier and after a heated debate, Parliament approved the creation of the Canadian Naval Service which could come to the aid of the Empire if Canada so decided.⁶⁴ The first two ministers in charge of the navy were French Canadian: Louis-Philippe Brodeur (June 3, 1910 — August 10, 1911) and Rodolphe Lemieux (August 11 — October 8, 1911), but their place was taken by Anglo Canadians as soon as Conservative R.L. Borden came to power.⁶⁵

The first of these ministers tried to ensure the use of bilingualism in the newly-founded navy as early as August 1910, although two British officers attached to the Canadian naval staff maintained that “it [was] not desirable that candidates should be permitted to take the [entrance] examinations in French.”⁶⁶ The minister replied through deputy minister Desbarats:

It should not be forgotten that Canada is a bilingual country and that French and English are on the same footing. It follows that the instruction in national establishments should be conducted in both languages. The instructors who are to be appointed should be fairly conversant with French and English. If the rule suggested in the above memo were adopted it would mean that the French speaking young men could not enter the service. I am sure that this is not the end aimed at by the officers who prepared it. I fully realize that the use of two languages is creating inconvenience but that is not sufficient to prevent the true spirit of the constitution being carried out. I would request the Chief of Staff and the Secretary to reconsider the matter with the hope that they will realize themselves the impossibility of carrying out their suggestion.⁶⁷

These words fell on deaf ears, however. The British officers considered that “any attempt to combine the two languages would be detrimental to the service.”⁶⁸ In his account of this incident, Rear Admiral Nigel D. Brodeur, the former minister’s grandson, thought it unfortunate that no one succeeded in resolving the question of bilingualism in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), which from then on was perceived as much more British than Canadian by French Canadians and, from the 1960s onward, by English Canadians as well.⁶⁹

Only one French Canadian field officer played an important role on the Militia staff before the First World War: Colonel François-Louis Lessard, who was Adjutant-General from April 1, 1907 to June 1, 1912. Shortly after Sam Hughes joined the Department on October 11, 1911,

Lessard was replaced by an Anglophone.⁷⁰ In 1899, staff courses has been introduced to train future field officers who could command in the event of war. In 1913, a scant seven out of 58 graduates were French-speaking. This is hardly surprising; the courses were given only in English.⁷¹

Shortly before war was declared, officers in the permanent force broke down as follows:⁷²

Rank	Brit	Canadian		%	Total
		Eng	Fr		
MGen	—	1	1	50	2
Colonel	2	18	2	9.1	22
LCol	5	21	2	7.1	28
Major	17	48	12	15.6	77
Capt	14	68	8	8.8	90
Lt	9	55	4	5.9	68
Other	12	24	1	2.7	37
Nurse	—	5	—	—	5
Total	59	240	30		329
Percentage		90.9	9.1		

Thus 20 per cent of English-speaking officers were British, but only 9.1 per cent of officers were French Canadians, and this despite the fact that 28.5 per cent of the population spoke French. Among captains and lieutenants, the percentages were 8.8 and 5.9 respectively, meaning that policy and promotions to commanding positions in the near future would not be likely to reflect Canada's French fact.

In the first decade of the century, the Canadian Militia underwent far-reaching reforms, following those in the British Army. The newly-created RCN naturally took the Royal Navy as its model. Canada was beginning to have some very small say in the making of imperial defence policy, but it was certainly not yet master of its own foreign and defence policy destiny. All these factors intensified the British aspect of Canadian defence policies and institutions. And except for a few infantry battalions in Quebec, the French fact would continue to be ignored in the Department of Militia and Defence and in the Naval Service.

Part Two

**The Infantry: A refuge for francophones
(1914-1939)**

It is not the Canada I expected it to be. I came back from the war feeling that all the suffering and sacrifice must have meant something. But I found, as others have done, that there was little change. [...] Men were fighting for the dollar in the same persistent way. There seemed to be little difference in the viewpoint towards life, little indication of any growth of national spirit and very little appreciation of the world situation and its attendant problems... But I have every confidence that the good sense of our people will prevail.

General Sir Arthur Currie
(on his return to Canada in 1919)
in H.M. Urquart, *Arthur Currie*
(Toronto, 1950), p. 284

Many Canadians believed briefly that the “war to end all wars” would finally unite English- and French-speaking Canadians. This was certainly the belief of the editor of Montreal’s *La Patrie*.¹ Gone, he hoped, would be the issues — tariff questions, separate schools, language controversies — that had constantly divided the two founding peoples. But this was a myopic view, for it failed to recognize the extent of the division and the far-reaching changes that had occurred in Canada. On the one hand, the question of the equality of the French language outside Quebec had not been resolved.² In 1912, Ontario had proclaimed its “Regulation XVII”, which prohibited the teaching of French in the province, except in the first two years of school. “The new legislation treated the language of one of the greatest modern cultures like an infectious disease and tied a sanitary cordon around the contaminated area.”³

On the other hand, there was no agreement as to the nature of Canada’s participation in the British Empire, nor the responsibilities that went with this ill-defined status. French Canadians had every cause to suspect the Empire, because there was always the possibility that it would draw Canada — and them — into war. Few French Canadians had rallied to the British imperialism that had caused the South African War. Consequently, few of them had fought in that conflict, and thus few had the abilities and training needed to lead their fellow countrymen to another war. In the opinion of Henri Bourassa, the uncontested leader of the French Canadians, the “Great War” was no different from the Boer War: the British Government’s aims were just as imperialistic; and no one could deny that Canada, like Australia, New Zealand and India, was treated as a mere colony.

The petulant Defence Minister, Sam Hughes, was no help. He rejected the mobilization plans drawn up by his staff and indulged in shameless political patronage. He wished to show, once and for all, that militia officers — he was himself one — could be quite as effective as regular officers, whom he openly despised. At the same time, he wanted to make the rebellious French Canadians who insisted on being different from other people see reason. They had to become plain Canadians or become extinct. For his part, Conservative Prime Minister Robert Borden, aware of how traditional French Canadians were, tried to handle them tactfully by appealing to their sense of duty, through the intermediary of the clergy. He to some

extent succeeded, even though many were naturally drawn to the nationalism preached by Henri Bourassa.⁴ The aspect of Borden that most needs to be acknowledged is the determination to excel which he demanded from both French- and English-speaking fellow countrymen, in order that the “Canadian nation” should achieve true independence. He went some distance in this direction, achieving separate signature of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. In the medium term, however, Canada had to wait until 1931 before the Statute of Westminster released it from its legal status as a British colony.

The French Canadians’ struggle to be recognized as an equal partner is comparable to Canada’s fight at the international level. Henri Bourassa, editor of Montreal’s *Le Devoir*, on the one hand, and John W. Dafoe, editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, on the other, represent the opposing views of the question even more clearly than do the political and military leaders.⁵

Chapter 3

The First World War; Fresh insight into the Contribution of French Canadians

Those in the English provinces who oppose the teaching of French in public and separate schools, those are the very people who violate the fundamental spirit of the Canadian constitution. And those of our fellow countrymen who preach the doctrine of debasement to us, who say it is monstrous to demand rights for the French language equal to those of English, they too violate the spirit of the constitution. No, the pact concluded by those two great statesmen, Sir John A Macdonald and Sir George-Étienne Cartier, was not a contract of servitude. On the contrary, it was an honest and honourable treaty, concluded by the sons of the two great nations, who joined hands to end history's divisions and hatreds forever, in order that from this fruitful union should spring a great people, conceived in a desire for justice.

Henri Bourassa

La langue française et l'avenir de notre race

(Québec, Imprimerie de l'Action sociale, 1913) [translation]

A British colony, Canada was automatically a belligerent as soon as Great Britain officially declared war on Germany on September 4, 1914. Two days later, the Government of Canada ordered mobilization. The Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, pushed aside the mobilization plans drawn up by his staff and ordered the recruitment of a separate expeditionary force. The first contingent was mustered and trained in haste at the newly opened Valcartier camp, near Québec.

On October 3, 33,000 men and 7,000 horses — one infantry division and one cavalry brigade — left the Gulf of St Lawrence on board 32 transport vessels escorted by ten British warships, bound for Plymouth, England. They arrived eleven days later. A second division followed in the winter. In January and August 1916, a third and then a fourth division crossed to France. A fifth division, formed in

England, trained for only a few months and was then dissolved; its men were to serve as reinforcements in other divisions.¹

Voluntary service and conscription policy

What policy did the Borden government follow in the mobilization of over 600,000 men in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF)?

Parliament authorized a levy of 25,000 volunteers in August 1914. The number was raised to 50,000 in November, then 150,000 in July 1915, 250,000 in October 1915 and finally 500,000 in January 1916. Following the heavy casualties suffered by the Canadians and, even more, the pressure exerted from various quarters for Quebec to contribute to the war in proportion to its population, but also because the Prime Minister was unwilling to break his promise to the British in 1915 that he would increase Canada's fighting force to half a million and provide the necessary reinforcements in addition, the Conservative government called for conscription.²

The Compulsory Service Act received royal assent on August 29, 1917, after the voluntary service system had already provided 437,387 soldiers (not counting those rejected because of health, physical deformity and so on). If we leave aside the countries where the war was fought, this contribution was unparalleled anywhere in the world, taking into account Canada's total population of 8 1/4 million, the extent of its territory and the large number of people already employed in services and work essential to carrying on the war, in farming, transportation, mining and manufacturing.³

The French-Canadian response

In the light of the situation of French Canadians in the Canadian Militia just before the outbreak of hostilities, what can we say of their contribution? Was it as paltry as the civilian and military authorities led people to believe, the same authorities who had taken no concrete steps, except in a few infantry units of the Non-Permanent Militia, to train prospective commissioned and non-commissioned officers in French with a view to training French-speaking recruits once mobilization would be ordered?⁴



ATTENDRONS-NOUS QUE LES NÔTRES BRÛLENT?

ENRÔLONS-NOUS et tout de suite

Dans Le

178
ième

Bataillon

**CANADIEN
FRANÇAIS**

Commandant

M. Colvillier

Officiers en chef du
32^e bataillon français du
Front.




INFORMATIONS:

AUX QUARTIERS GÉNÉRAUX, SHERBROOKE, P.Q.

OU CON. S'ANDRÉ ET S^{te} CATHERINE

MONTREAL



Canadiens-Francais


A l'heure du plus grand péril
qui ait jamais menacé notre
PAYS et L'HUMANITE
oublierons-nous les Traditions
qui ont fait la

GLOIRE et L'ORGUEIL de
notre **RACE**

CANADIENS

C'EST LE MOMENT D'AGIR

N'ATTENDEZ PAS QUE LES BOCHES
VIENNENT METTRE TOUT A FEU
ET A SANG AU CANADA



CANADIENS SOYEZ HOMMES NE RESTEZ PAS EN ARRIERE
ENROLEZ-VOUS DANS NOS REGIMENTS CANADIENS-FRANÇAIS

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Major-General J.L. Lessard, CB, was refused an operational command during the First World War by the Minister of Defence, Sam Hughes. Appointed inspector for Eastern Canada, he had to come to the aid of General Landry in Quebec during the Easter 1918 riots. CDQ, January 1926



Major-General J.P. Landry, CMG, VD, commanded three infantry brigades in training in England before being called back to Canada to serve in Québec as commander of MD N° 5, beginning March 1, 1918, barely one month before violence broke out following the conscription crisis. CDQ, October 1926.



The Honourable Lieutenant-General Sam Hughes, KCB, Minister of Militia and Defence, 1911-1916. An anti-French Orangeman, he constantly criticized French Canadians, after ignoring their desire to serve in their language. Photograph: Public Archives of Canada/C 20240



Henri Bourassa, MP, editor of *Le Devoir*, which he founded in Montreal in 1910 to enlighten his fellow citizens about political reality, in particular British jingoism and the Canadian Government's complicity. Photograph: Public Archives of Canada/C 27360.

Jean-Pierre Gagnon offers an excellent description in his doctoral thesis of the process by which volunteers were recruited into French-Canadian units in 1915-16.⁵ What can we say of the political manoeuvres that were necessary before government consent was obtained to create a French-speaking unit such as the 22nd French-Canadian battalion? The situation is all the more striking when compared to the ease with which Alexander Hamilton Gault, a Montreal millionaire, obtained official permission to found an entirely new regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI),⁶ which in 1920, together with the 22nd, was included on the permanent force establishment with the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) — the only permanent infantry regiment before the war.

French Canadians raised fifteen infantry battalions in all, fourteen of them in 1915-16. A list of these units appears in Appendix J. All were recruited in Quebec, except for one in Ottawa, two (consisting mainly of Acadians) in New Brunswick and one in Edmonton, Alberta. Only the 22nd battalion fought at the front. All the other units served as reinforcements or were added to reserve battalions in order to serve as reinforcements later. In addition, the 163rd battalion served in Bermuda for six months before being sent to England, where it was disbanded. While some units reached their full complement of over one thousand soldiers, several did not; but this was also the case in some English-speaking battalions. Although the 12th and 14th battalions do not figure on our list, they contained several Francophones. The 14th, in particular, was made up of three companies of Victoria Rifles (of Montreal) and two companies of the 65th Mont-Royal Rifles. Francophones also served in several other units recruited in the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba.⁷

The list of incumbents of senior positions in the CEF given by Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson in the official history of the Canadian Army's involvement in the First World War⁸ constitutes an indictment, so to speak, of the Borden government and its policy of one language only. Professor A.M.J. Hyatt, in a study of Canadian generals in the First World War,⁹ mentions that of the 126 generals who served Canada, 106 were Canadian and the remainder British. Of this number, 69 Canadians (65 per cent) served in operational theatres and 37 (35 per cent) served only in Canada and England. Twenty generals came from Quebec, but only four of them were of French-Canadian origin.

If we leave aside Brigadier-General R. Brutinel, a Frenchman by birth who commanded (in English) the Machine Gun corps (October 28, 1916 to April 18, 1919), the only generals to see operational service were Brigadier-General H.A. Panet, who commanded (in English) the 2nd artillery division from December 18, 1916 to June 25, 1919 and Brigadier-General T.-L. Tremblay, a former lieutenant-colonel of the 22nd and commander of the 5th infantry brigade from August 10, 1918 to May 9, 1919. A third French-Canadian general, Brigadier-General Joseph-Philippe Landry, served in England, where he commanded the 5th, 8th and 11th infantry brigades and five different training areas before being called back to Québec City in 1917 as district commander.¹⁰

Last but certainly not least of the four was Major-General François-Louis Lessard, who was refused an operational command during the war by the Minister. The following is his English-speaking biographer's view:

There are many who hold the opinion that General Lessard was the outstanding man in Canada, qualified by age, rank, experience and efficiency, for the command of the First Contingent and of the 1st Canadian Division that was formed out of it, possessing the confidence of all ranks of the Militia and by reason of his French ancestry certain of being especially acceptable to Quebec. For reasons which imply no reflection upon the General, the Minister thought otherwise.¹¹

Elsewhere in the military hierarchy, we find on operational service a Lieutenant-Colonel of artillery (the already-mentioned H.A. Panet who was promoted to Brigadier-General in 1916) and seven medical officers at the colonel/lieutenant-colonel level. In addition, the infantry had 18 French-speaking lieutenant-colonels, but, as we have seen, only the commanding officers of the 22nd battalion, to whom majors G.P. Vanier and G.E.A. Dupuis should be added, actually served in a theatre of war.¹³

Canadian attitudes during the war

Obviously, the French-Canadian attitude to the war was fundamentally different to that of Canadians of British origin, and this goes far beyond purely political considerations.¹⁴

Although some historians have spoken of Canada as a peaceable kingdom,¹⁵ we discover many violent incidents in our history when we take the trouble to look below the surface. Here are some examples from the period under review:

1907	— anti-Japanese riots	— Vancouver,	BC
1914	— riot on the <i>Komagata Maru</i>	— Vancouver,	BC
1915	— anti-German riot	— Victoria,	BC
1916	— military and civilian disturbances	— Edmonton,	Alta
		— (2) Calgary,	Alta
		— Berlin (Kitchener),	Ont
		— London,	Ont
		— Winnipeg,	Man
		— Waterloo,	Ont
		— Perth,	Ont
	— threatened disturbance, Welland Canal workers	— Thorold,	Ont
	— military mutiny	— Camp Borden,	Ont
	— coalminers' strike	— Minto,	NB
	— miners' strike	— Thetford Mines,	Que
	— anti-recruiting riots	— Montreal,	Que
1917	— threatened coalminers' strike	— Fernie,	BC
	— election riot	— Sherbrooke,	Que
	— anti-conscription demonstration	— Montreal,	Que
	— riot protesting Regulation XVII	— Ford City (Windsor),	Ont
1918	— conscription crisis	— Québec	

Far from being the only ones to occur, these incidents represent only the most noteworthy of those reported in the press or studied subsequently. They are a mixture of cases of racial tensions, pro-war and anti-war demonstrations, and one case of reaction against the language policy adopted by the Ontario Government in 1912-13, which was to prohibit all teaching in French in the province. Inflamed by this flagrant injustice to their Franco-Ontarian blood brothers, Quebecers were all the more apt to oppose compulsory service, which was voted into law on July 24, 1917 — barely two months before the Ford City riot. "How is this militarism different from Prussian militarism, except

that it is yet more pernicious, for it does not even have the excuse of the homeland gratification?” exclaimed their leader, Henri Bourassa.¹⁶

Furthermore, the way in which Dominion Police officers — most of them English-speaking but, as their quarries likely pointed out, Canadian citizens (or British subjects) who were not serving overseas either — sought out and prosecuted draft dodgers inspired a few Quebec dissidents to set fire to the office of the official in charge of the military service bureau in that city and to incite rioting during Holy Week in 1918. The English-speaking conscripts sent by Borden, from Toronto to quell the violence only further inflamed it. Ultimately, action by Judge Choquette and Armand Lavergne was mainly responsible for quieting the rioters, after five citizens had been killed and several others wounded.¹⁷

Our aim in recalling these sorrowful events is not to seek to establish guilt on one side or the other, but rather to show the futility of hatred, meanspiritedness, injustice among peoples who, living side by side, ought to maintain harmony and mutual respect.

Some statistics deserve attention

The total population of Canada in 1911 — the last Census year before the First World War — was 7,206,643, of whom 3,896,985 (54.1 per cent) were of British origin, 2,054,890 (28.5 per cent) were of French origin and 1,254,768 (17.4 per cent) were from other stock. Of this number, 2,003,232 (27.8 per cent) were Quebecers. Nearly one sixth of these were of British origin and 81,790 were of some other origin, while 1,605,339 were of French origin. This last figure does not, however, represent all French Canadians as 449,551 of these lived in other provinces.¹⁸

These statistics distinguish between “Canadians of French origin” on the one hand and “French,” “Belgian (Walloon)” and “Swiss (French)” on the other, the latter being counted as foreigners, while the corresponding expression “Canadians of British origin” includes many subjects born in Great Britain or elsewhere in the British Empire.¹⁹ Frenchmen and Belgians, because of their dual citizenship, were subject to mobilization in their country of origin. Many if not most of them hastened to respond to the call, which reduced the number of Francophones serving in the CEF.

Although there were some similar cases among Anglophones, most Britons living in Canada who enlisted did so directly in the CEF.²⁰ J.L. Granatstein reports that a scant 318,705 (51.43 per cent) of the 619,636 who served in the CEF were of Canadian origin, while 237,605 (38.35 per cent) came from Great Britain or the Empire.²¹

It is also important to note that 370,938 of the 1,488,353 Canadian families, or 24.9 per cent, lived in Quebec, that Quebec had the highest birth rate in Canada, namely 37.18 per 1,000 (compared to Ontario's 22.68) and that its population's natural increase was the second highest in Canada, after Manitoba, at 19.26 per 1,000 persons (compared to 9.07 for Ontario).²²

Origin of the population of Canada, by province

Origin	C-B	Alta	Sask	Man	Ont	Que	NB	PEI	NS	Yukon	NWT	Total
Br	252 683	191 698	251 010	266 415	1 927 099	316 103	229 896	78 949	378 700	2 929	503	3 896 985
Fr	8 907	19 825	23 251	30 944	202 447	1 605 339	98 611	13 117	51 746	482	226	2 054 890
Other	130 890	162 140	218 171	158 255	393 733	81 790	23 382	1 662	61 892	5 101	17 752	1 254 768
Total	392 480	374 663	492 432	455 614	2 523 274	2 003 232	351 889	93 728	492 338	8 512	18 481	7 206 643

Percentages (based on total population)

Br	3,51	2,67	3,48	3,70	26,74	4,39	3,19	1,09	5,25	0,04	—	54,1
Fr	0,12	0,27	0,32	0,43	2,81	22,28	1,37	0,18	0,72	—	—	28,5
Other	1,82	2,25	3,03	2,19	5,46	1,13	0,32	0,02	0,85	0,07	0,25	17,4

By the same token, Quebec's rural population was 106 per cent the size of its urban population, whereas in Ontario the figure was reversed, at 90 per cent. The table that follows clearly illustrates the difference between Ontario and Quebec — the two most populous provinces, whose war efforts have constantly been compared.²³

Province	Rural Population	* %	Urban Population	* %
Ontario	1 194 785	30.4	1 328 489	40.5
Quebec	1 032 618	26.3	970 614	29.6

* These percentages are based on the population of Canada as a whole.

On the basis of data for the male population age 15 to 44, it is easy to demonstrate that Quebec provided fewer soldiers than the other provinces. But when we take into account the surplus of males statistics,²⁴ quite different conclusions may be drawn.

It can be seen that after Ontario (33.9 per cent), Quebec (23.4 per cent) had the highest population of males aged 15 to 44. When we combine these statistics with those for surplus of males, however,

Province	Male Population Age 15-44	%	Surplus of Males	%
British Columbia	162 229	8.6	110 758	25.3
Alberta	129 444	6.9	73 315	16.8
Saskatchewan	167 608	8.9	91 028	20.8
Manitoba	132 571	7.0	44 498	10.2
Ontario	638 079	33.9	75 306	17.2
Quebec	442 703	23.4	19 772	4.5
New Brunswick	77 904	4.1	7 845	1.8
Prince Edward Island	19 715	1.0	410	0.09
Nova Scotia	111 184	5.9	9 700	2.2
Yukon	2 835	0.15	4 504	1.0
Northwest Territories	4 563	0.24	211	0.05
Canada	1 888 825		437 347	

a very different picture emerges. Canada's major pools of males were to be found in British Columbia (25.3 per cent), Saskatchewan (20.8 per cent), Ontario (17.2 per cent), Alberta (16.8 per cent) and Manitoba (10.2 per cent), not in Quebec, which ranked only sixth with 4.5 per cent. Indeed, the overall Canadian disproportion of 1,130 men for every 1,000 women in Canada was probably higher than in any other country in the world, according to the Chief Statistician, who offered the following comparison :²⁵

Country	Women	Men
England	1 068	1 000
France	1 033 (in 1901)	1 000
Germany	1 026	1 000

Evaluation of the French-Canadian response

French Canadians have been taken to task many times for their tiny contribution to the 1914-18 war effort.²⁶ What strikes the reader of so many histories is a flagrant inconsistency of argument. On the one hand, the same anti-Quebec or anti-French-Canadian diatribes are repeated, without any distinction between French- and English-speaking Quebecers, or acknowledgement that not all French Canadians live in Quebec. On the other hand, the point is frequently made that the Militia and the CEF were poorly administered under Sam Hughes, who showed little concern for providing adequate numbers of workers in war industries and essential services, including farms. Was the army badly seen only on the Anglophone's side of the equation? In fact, two English-speaking writers, Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge, have demonstrated very clearly that the shortage of volunteers in 1916 was far from confined to Quebec or French Canadians, but instead resulted from forceful government planning of the farming and war industries sectors, which was just coming into full swing at that time.²⁷

On March 21, 1916, Captain Talbot Mercer Papineau, who was fighting in France with the PPCLI, wrote an open letter to Henri Bourassa and had it published in Canada's leading English and French newspapers. In the letter he reminded his cousin that as a nationalist he should be ready to defend Canadian soil and Canadian freedoms; that he

should support Canada's war effort, not because Canada was part of the Empire but to preserve and perpetuate the spirit that united the diverse peoples within the Empire; and that the war offered French Canadians as well as English Canadians an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate their love of their homeland.

Here is how Henri Bourassa replied to Captain Papineau in the same newspapers:

He takes the French-Canadians to task and challenges their patriotism, because they enlist in lesser number than the other elements of the population of Canada. Much could be said upon that. It is sufficient to [underline] one fact: the number of recruits for the European war, in the various Provinces of Canada and from each component element of the population, is in inverse ratio of the enrootment in the soil and the traditional patriotism arising therefrom. The newcomers from the British Isles have enlisted in much larger proportion than English-speaking Canadians born in this country, while these have enlisted more than the French-Canadians. The Western Provinces have given more recruits (proportionately) than Ontario, and Ontario more than Quebec. In each Province, the floating population of the cities, the students, the labourers and clerks, either unemployed or threatened with dismissal, have supplied more soldiers than the farmers. Does it mean that the city dwellers are more patriotic than the country people? or that the newcomers from England are better Canadians than their fellow-citizens of British origin, born in Canada? No; it simply means that in Canada, as in every other country, at all times, the citizens [who have been here longest] are the least disposed to be stampeded into distant ventures of no direct concern to their native land. It proves also that military service is more repugnant to the rural than to the urban populations.

There is among the French-Canadians a larger proportion of farmers, fathers of large families, than among any other ethnical element in Canada. Above all, the French-Canadians are the only group exclusively Canadian, in its whole and by each of the individuals of which it is composed. They look upon the perturbations of Europe, even those of England or France, as foreign events.

Their sympathies naturally go to France against Germany, in case Germany should attack Canada without threatening France.

English Canada, not counting the [recent British immigrants,] contains a considerable proportion of people still in the first period of national incubation. Under the sway of imperialism, a fair number have not yet decided whether their allegiance is to Canada or to the Empire, whether the United Kingdom or the Canadian Confederacy is their country.

As to the newcomers from the United Kingdom, they are not Canadian in any sense. England or Scotland is their sole fatherland. They have enlisted for the

European war as naturally as Canadians, either French or English, would take arms to defend Canada against an aggression on the American continent.

Thus it is (...) correct to say that recruiting has gone in inverse ratio to the development of Canadian patriotism. If English-speaking Canadians have a right to blame the French-Canadians for the small number of their recruits, the newcomers from the United Kingdom, who have supplied a much larger proportion of recruits than any other element of the population, would be equally justified in branding the Anglo-Canadians with disloyalty and treason. Enlistment for the European war is supposed to be absolutely free and voluntary. This has been stated right and left from beginning to end. If that statement is honest and sincere, all provocations from one part of the population against the other, and exclusive attacks against the French-Canadians, should cease. Instead of reviling unjustly one-third of the Canadian people — a population so remarkably characterised by its constant loyalty to national institutions and its respect for public order — those men who claim a right to enlighten and lead public opinion should have enough good faith and intelligence to see facts as they are and to respect the motives of those who persist in their determination to remain more Canadian than English or French.

In short, English-speaking Canadians enlist in much smaller numbers than the newcomers from England, because they are much more Canadian; French-Canadians enlist less than English-Canadian because they are totally and exclusively Canadian.²⁸

In addition to the dilemma faced by Prime Minister Borden in trying to find a large number of reinforcements in a still small population, account has to be taken of the distribution of that population across an enormous country, not to mention the many other relevant factors already listed.

It is hard to understand why CEF recruiters did not take note of ethnic origin at the time of enlistment, or, if they did, why this information could not be “produced” for researchers or the general public. In 1935 Elizabeth Armstrong received a letter from Major-General L.R. Laflèche, Deputy Minister of National Defence, stating:

there is not nor ever can be, any precise, accurate or authentic statement as to the number of French Canadians who served in the Canadian forces in the World War 1914-1919.²⁹

Armstrong therefore estimated, on the basis of the following figures, that about 35,000 French Canadians had actually served:

15,000 in France, including
6,000 in the 22nd Battalion

4,000 in other foot battalions
5,000 in artillery, cavalry, service corps
and so forth

15,000 conscripts in training in England
and Canada

5,000 in the British Navy or other
Allied forces.

This number represents 11 per cent of servicemen of Canadian origin, which is consistent with the percentage of French-Canadian officers in the Non-Permanent Militia in 1914 and is three times as great as the percentage of French-speaking cadets enrolled in RMC between 1874 and 1914. To compare this, as Armstrong does, to the total number of men who served in the CEF, and assert that it represents only five per cent, gives a false picture of historical reality. Let us also bear in mind that only those who served in the 22nd — calculated to be 5,909 by Colonel Chaballe and 5,584 by J.-P. Gagnon, that is, 16 or 17 per cent of all French Canadians (assuming there were only 35,000 of them) — were allowed to serve in the French language. It is also worth underlining that French Canadians represented 28.5 per cent of the population in Canada in 1911, not 40 per cent, as Armstrong claims.³⁰

A few French Canadians also served in the British Army with great distinction. Particularly noteworthy was Sir Edouard Percy Girouard, who had graduated from RMC in 1888 and first served with the Royal Engineers. Kitchener appointed him director of railways in the Sudan and South Africa, and later made him responsible for producing munitions in England in 1915.³¹

As we have seen, only one French-Canadian officer from the Canadian Permanent Militia of 1914 saw operational service. All his work was performed in English in the artillery.³² The 22nd Battalion, however, working in French, carried out its mission in exemplary fashion. Between September 14, 1915 and November 11, 1918, it took part in most of the major engagements in the war: Saint-Eloi, Ypres, la Somme, Courcellette, Vimy, Lens, Passchendaele, Arras, Amiens, Cherisy and Cambrai.

Two hundred and thirty-six commissioned officers and five thousand six hundred and seventy-three non-commissioned officers and men served with the

Battalion during the First World War. Of these, one hundred and thirty-five commissioned officers and three thousand, four hundred and fourteen other ranks were killed or wounded. The 22nd Battalion never retreated before the enemy. Its men stood their ground to be cut down rather than abandon a position. The Canadian Expeditionary Force won great renown on the battlefields of France and Belgium. The 22nd Battalion is rightly proud to have made a strong contribution to this reputation.³³

The infantry was the most vulnerable arm, especially in the First World War. And the infantry was the only arm open to French Canadians. A cynical conclusion might be that since they did not speak English their only apparent aptitude was to serve as cannon fodder. Can we really blame those who saw the policy of the Borden government and its minister, Sam Hughes, as mis-guided, and attempted to escape its clutches or enlighten their fellow citizens?³⁴

Chapter 4

Between the wars: Failure to learn

The issues raised in Manitoba in 1890 — the use of the French language and separate schools — became national issues and the controversy created helped to solidify views that had already begun to develop in the young journalist's [J.W. Dafoe] mind. He had no doubt at all that abolition of the official use of French in Manitoba was justified. His first experience with life had been in Montreal where such communication as there was between the two solitudes was in English. In Ottawa the French who wished to participate spoke English. Winnipeg was not then, and has never been, particularly conscious of the existence of St. Boniface, and the power of the French community in the legislature had been broken in the 1878 redistribution of seats, which was carried out on a basis of population rather than parish. Moreover, as Dafoe's nationalism grew so did his conviction that there should be only one language in Canada and that it must be English. The question of separate schools became incredibly complex from every point of view — the relationship between religion and education, the exact constitutional protection the religious minority in Manitoba had, and the proper procedure to enforce whatever protections existed. To all of this was added virulent religious bigotry from both Protestant and Catholic. Dafoe's inherited suspicion of Catholicism was given a new focus and direction in Winnipeg in 1890. He accepted the doctrine that the Cathedral in St. Boniface was not just Catholic but was an outpost of French-Canadian control from Quebec. The clerical garb covered not just a man of God and religious leader but a political person whose job it was, in part, to fight for French rights and to protect the language of his parishioners as well as their souls.

(Murray Donnelly, *Dafoe of the Free Press*
Toronto (Macmillan), 1968, p 29)

I have always regretted that I did not apply some of my energies to learning your beautiful language.

John W. Dafoe
(Letter to a French-Canadian friend in Québec,
marking the 60th anniversary of Confederation, 1927)

As we saw in the last chapter, neither the words of Henri Bourassa nor the conscription riots in Quebec stopped Robert Borden's Union government from widening the gulf between French- and English-speaking Canadians. What did the six governments, Conservative and Liberal, that held office alternately in the two decades of peace do to recognize or meet the problem?

Ministers, officials and military leaders

After Alphonse Desjardins' departure as Minister of Militia and Defence in 1896, he was replaced by an Anglophone. The next Francophone minister would not be appointed until 71 years later, in 1967. The deputy minister's office was filled successively by G.J. Desbarats, Major-General Sir Eugène Fiset and Lieutenant-Colonel (later Major-General) L.R. LaFlèche, from 1922 to 1940. Neither of them did much to promote the cause of Francophones. And after Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. DesRosiers' tenure of office from 1942 to 1945, English-speaking deputy ministers occupied the position until 1971. The 14 Canadian generals who followed Major-General W.G. Gwatkin (the "last" Briton) as chief of the general staff between 1919 and 1966 were all English-speaking.¹

Post-war policies: the 22nd is incorporated into the Permanent Force

The armistice of November 11, 1918 brought a return to peace. The CEF was demobilized and the Permanent Militia was reconstituted with a strength of 5,000 officers and men. The first chairman of the reorganizing committee was General Sir William D. Otter. Assisting him were, among others, Brigadier-General A.G.L. McNaughton, and, later, Major-General W.G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, while Brigadier-General E.A. Cruickshank, Director of History, was appointed secretary.

The major problem confronting the committee seemed to be assuring the perpetuation of battle honours given to CEF units, through the intermediary of post-war permanent or non-permanent units. To veterans this problem was more important than the current military need for a particular branch or service, or its level of strength. The committee made its recommendations to the Militia


Council but did not release an official report before being dissolved in June 1920.² It endorsed the 1916 reorganization of military districts, which had been renumbered as follows:

MD N°	1—	London
MD N°	2—	Toronto
MD N°	3—	Kingston
MD N°	4—	Montreal
MD N°	5—	Québec
MD N°	6—	Halifax
MD N°	10—	Winnipeg
MD N°	11—	Victoria
MD N°	12—	Regina
MD N°	13—	Calgary

This reorganization lasted until 1946.

In February 1919, the committee decided that the Permanent Force ought to include a second infantry regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), in addition to The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). In April it had to reconsider this decision following a request by the Québec City Council that the 22nd Battalion of the CEF become "a portion of the permanent Militia Force and be stationed in the City of Quebec."³ In May, Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, Director of Organization, discussed the matter with Hamilton Gault of Montreal, founder of the PPCLI. Brown considered the Quebec militia "has never had a proper chance, as it has never had the proper stimulus, or proper leaders in the Province and, if taken in hand by the proper people, the Militia of Quebec may be second to none."⁴

In June 1919, the committee decided to double the strength of the Permanent Force, in the light of the emergency situation created by the Winnipeg General Strike. The opportunity was seized to give an active role to the 22nd. Not until September, however, when generals Gwatkin and McNaughton had discussed the matter with the Premier of Quebec, Alexandre Taschereau, were they won over to the opinion that a French-Canadian unit must be included in the Permanent Force in order to satisfy Quebecers who, they said, were "ready to make Confederation work."⁵



©Compiled and drawn by the Directorate of History.

Reproduced by Mapping and Charting Establishment.

When Cabinet rejected the Otter Committee's proposal on the grounds that the Citadel of Québec was already occupied by the garrison artillery, the committee reduced the latter unit to nil strength. The Minister then stepped in, observing that the Privy Council was more interested in cutting costs and had no intention of increasing the Permanent Force (the Winnipeg General Strike having ended in the meantime). The committee then suggested taking one company from each of the two regular infantry regiments — the RCR, which had five companies, and the PPCLI, which had four — and having them serve the needs of the 22nd. Strongly supported by General Sir Arthur Currie, the Inspector General, this proposal was finally approved by the Minister and the Militia Council on February 10, 1920.⁶ The new unit was thus incorporated into the Permanent Force of the Active Militia of Canada under the name "22nd Regiment", on April 1, 1920. "Royal" was added on June 1, 1921, in recognition of the war services rendered by the 22nd Battalion of the CEF.⁷ As Captain Robert Reid rightly remarks in his thesis on the Otter Committee: "The establishment of the 22nd Battalion as a Permanent Force unit was the Committee's most important and lasting accomplishment."⁸

This is a fine example, according to Jean-Yves Gravel, of the military seeing the needs more clearly than their political masters.

This was only a beginning, however. We see here not so much a profound attitudinal change as a political compromise. To make it clear that the Royal 22nd Regiment was Canadian first and foremost, it was affiliated to a British regiment, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers even though *Maréchal de France* Ferdinand Foch had agreed to be its first honorary colonel.⁹ Not until 1928 was its title put into French, as it now stands: Royal 22^e Régiment (R22^eR).¹⁰

With a strength of 14 officers and 390 other ranks, the 22nd Regiment represented only 20 per cent of the permanent infantry establishment and a mere 6.4 per cent of the total Permanent Militia Force.¹¹ In 1939, just before the Second World War broke out, because the strength of permanent units had been "restricted" (not brought up to the authorized limit), the R22^eR had only 19 officers (including five supernumerary) and 165 other ranks, representing 19 per cent of the infantry and 4.4 per cent of the total Permanent

Force, which then numbered a scant 4,169 regular officers and other ranks.¹² Inshort, the situation was hardly better than in 1914.

Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM)

The problem of perpetuating the units that had fought was most acute in the infantry. Fifty combat units and 260 reinforcement units had to be accommodated at once. In the end, the Otter Committee established 112 infantry battalions, a number which had increased to 123 by 1933. Not until 1936 was an adequate divisional system reintroduced.¹³

MD N° 4, Montreal, had one English-speaking cavalry brigade and three infantry brigades, of which one was English-speaking, another bilingual and the third French-speaking. The battle order of the last two was as follows:

10th Infantry Brigade (Sherbrooke)

The Sherbrooke Regiment (MG) (English-speaking unit)

The Three Rivers Regiment (Tank) [attached] (English-speaking unit)

Le Régiment de Saint-Hyacinthe

Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke

11th Infantry Brigade (Montreal)

Le Régiment de Châteauguay (MG)

Le Régiment de Maisonneuve

Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal

Le Régiment de Joliette

Only five of the sixteen staff officers, including the commander (Brigadier J.P.U. Archambault), were Francophones.¹⁴

MD N°5, Québec, had only two infantry brigades, one French-speaking and the other bilingual:

13th Infantry Brigade

Le Régiment de la Chaudière (MG)

Le Régiment de Montmagny

Le Régiment du Saguenay

Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent

15th Infantry Brigade

Le Régiment de Québec (MG)

The Royal Rifles of Canada (English-speaking unit)

Le Régiment de Lévis

Les Voltigeurs de Québec

Eight of the twelve staff officers, including the commander (Brigadier E.J. Renaud), were Francophones.¹⁵

The “bilingual” brigades were made up of French- and English-speaking units side by side, mainly or entirely commanded, administered and trained in English. French-speaking brigades, as we have indicated, consisted of mainly French-speaking units, but English was the main language of command and administration, French being used only for instruction and social activities.

There was another French-speaking unit, the Régiment de Hull, attached to the 8th Brigade in MD N°3, Kingston. It, of course, had to be bilingual.¹⁶

Thus, in 1939, there were a scant 14 French-speaking units in the NPAM, all of them infantry battalions. The Régiment de Trois-Rivières, converted into an armoured unit as of December 15, 1936, was retitled Three Rivers Regiment, becoming a primarily English-speaking unit.¹⁷

Comparison of Francophones’ and Anglophones’ service

From 1920 to 1939, in the Permanent Force, only members of the R22^eR received part of their training in French. Even so, all training manuals were in English, all foot drill and arms drill commands were given in English, and nearly all external correspondence was carried on in English.¹⁸

In the NPAM, Quebec supplied an average of 21.2 per cent of officers and men trained “locally” — in other words, in city and town drill halls — and 15.6 per cent of those trained in “summer camps” — that is, in military camps specially organized for a few weeks in the summer, where several units were brought together.¹⁹ These figures are misleading, however, for they represent both English- and French-speaking Quebec Militiamen. If we confine ourselves to French-speaking battalions, the figures decline to 7.1 per cent and 6.4 per cent of all NPAM trained throughout the Dominion.²⁰ This proves yet again that Quebec statistics should not be treated as if they were representative of all French Canadians. What degree of the responsibility for this ought to be laid at the feet of the Quebecers themselves, who represented 30 per cent of the population? One

thing is clear: they certainly did not dictate policy in the Militia Council, since they were only represented sporadically by one French-speaking member, even though that member happened to be the Deputy Minister or his representative.

We have also examined statistics, although incomplete ones, on the number of officers in training enrolled in RMC, Kingston, from 1927 to 1939. An average of 21.3 per cent came from Quebec.²¹ If the proportion of Francophones among these is the same as for the Militia, however, the percentage drops to only six.²² We have no official statistics, but this figure seems high compared to the 3.9 per cent recorded before the war. Of officers in training in the NPAM, an average of 10.9 per cent came from Quebec between 1921 and 1935. Again, the percentage drops to about five if we confine ourselves to French-speaking contingents in the Canadian Officers Training Corps (COTC).²³

Still more revealing, perhaps, than these data on officers and men in the Permanent and Non-Permanent Active Militia are the figures we collected on cadets. Between 1920 and 1939, 50 per cent of cadets trained in Canada came from Quebec. Since we have no official statistics on French-speaking cadet corps, we could assume that they made up about 20 per cent of the Quebec group — which is still nearly four times as great as the percentage of regulars and nearly three times as great as the percentage of trained reserves.²⁴ We believe, however, that the true picture is rather different, for in contrast to the Militia, the Cadet Corps had a free hand in the many “classical” colleges established in Quebec where Francophones were taught in French. We thus find it much likelier that some 60 per cent or more of Quebec cadets were Francophones,²⁵ and, hence, that at least 30 per cent of all cadets in Canada were Francophones, which is proportionate to French Canadian representation in the population.

Other official statistics are also interesting, for they offer reinforcement for our interpretation of the policy followed between the wars. The Militia, like the Navy and the Air Force, tried to qualify its most promising commissioned and non-commissioned officers in England. Between 1920 and 1934, we find an average of 35 Anglophones for every two Francophones taking these courses, which were naturally given in English. Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. Vanier, among others, attended the British Army Staff College while

Lieutenant-Colonel G.E.A. Dupuis qualified as a senior commander. Most Francophones, however, were relegated to small arms and physical training courses.²⁶ In Canada, over the same period, 147 servicemen qualified as interpreters (1st or 2nd class) in French, four in German, and nine in other languages.²⁷ The fact that no qualifications were awarded for English interpreters demonstrates implicitly that military service was to be carried out in English. In fact, from 1921 to 1935, this information was carried in annual reports under the heading “Foreign Languages”; only from 1936 did this read “Interpreters’ Examinations”.

We also examined the funds spent each year by the military engineers in Quebec and the rest of Canada. The Department spent an average of 17.1 per cent of this money in Quebec between 1923 and 1939, if we include the additional sums voted under the *Public Works Act* and special allowances made after 1934.²⁸ Again, if we apply the formula of 37.2 per cent — the figure we used earlier as the average proportion of French-speaking Militia trained in Quebec over the same period — we could state that only 6.4 per cent of the money used on Military Engineering in Canada was spent for Francophones.

Evaluation of Francophones’ service in the Militia

Lieutenant-General Maurice A. Pope, who retired in 1955 after a distinguished military and diplomatic career, has left us a portrait of French Canadians and their attitude to the Militia in the 1930s.²⁹ At first glance, it strikes us as somewhat condescending. It took a second reading to set our mind at rest. General A.G.L. McNaughton, Chief of the General Staff of the Militia, had recently addressed the members of the Conference of Defence Associations at a meeting in Ottawa in November 1933. His intention to reduce the NPAM would have affected many more Ontario units than Quebec ones. There were no Francophones at the meeting, and several Anglophones reacted loudly. This prompted Pope to write an analysis for McNaughton with a view to enlightening not only his chief but “generations yet to come”.³⁰

A certain degree of courage was needed, all the same, to maintain it was proper for French Canadians not to feel at home in a

Militia whose organization and training reflected the standards of the British Empire. While encouraging national unity and recommending that no undue emphasis ought to be placed on the divergence between the two peoples, Pope suggested the Militia be reorganized in order to ensure proportionate participation by all citizens and avoid repeating the follies of the First World War. Nowhere, however, did he raise the point that French Canadians were only allowed the role of foot-soldiers. Although Pope was quite open and sympathetic to the French fact, he did not recommend that Francophones were entitled to receive military training and be administered in French just as Anglophones were in English.

It remains to be proven that classical education was the main reason why French Canadians did not fit in to the Army. We have only to look at the high participation of French-speaking Quebec college students in cadet corps training, or note the recommendations in the report of the commission of inquiry into the mutiny of sailors on board three RCN ships in 1949:

There is growing recognition in the universities that no preparation for a degree in medicine or science can be at all complete unless it includes some knowledge of the humanities, as they are called. That is why we recommend a more thorough education in literature and history, so that our future officers will combine richer experience with mankind and a deeper knowledge of human affairs, a knowledge to be derived from the sources of history and letters, by studying these two subjects. We noted earlier that, in our opinion, young Canadian naval officers are not so well educated as their counterparts in Great Britain and the United States. This state of affairs should not be tolerated any longer.³¹

What is interesting about this recommendation is that French Canadians have often been accused of the opposite: too much metaphysics and not enough physics!

In vain do we look outside the R22^eR and the Militia for French-speaking staff to train recruits when the Forces were mobilized in September 1939. This point is illustrated clearly by the following summary of the proportion of Francophones among officers in the Permanent Force at that time:³²

Rank	Anglo	Franco	Total	%
MGen	7	0	7	0
Colonel	19	2	21	10.5
LCol	54	4	58	7.4
Major	83	10	93	12.0
Captain	68	11	79	16.2
Lieutenant	130	16	146	12.3
2 nd Lieutenant	14	5	19	35.7
Other	78	2*	80	2.6
Nurse	9	2	11	22.2
Total	462	52	514	11.25

* Including Lieutenant J.A. Edwin Bélanger, Musical Director, R22^eR.

Only one of all these French-speaking officers was to receive an operational command at the level of brigadier (general) during the war: Lieutenant J.P.E. Bernatchez, a graduate of RMC. Two officers in the Non-Permanent Militia were also accorded this honour: Captain Jean Victor Allard of the Three Rivers Regiment and Lieutenant J.G. Gauvreau of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal.³³

At RMC, only two of the 43 graduates were Francophones. The list of field officers teaching there shows a large number of future generals — all of them Anglophones.³⁴

Naval and Air Force service

In the Navy and Air Force, French Canadians had the same inferior status as in the Militia.

Only four out of the 73 career officers in the RCN in 1914-18 were Francophones. They were:

Lieutenant Eric Claude Nelligan
 Sub-Lieutenant Victor Gabriel Brodeur
 Midshipman Léon Joseph Maurice Gauvreau
 Lieutenant-Surgeon J.A. Rousseau.

By the outbreak of the Second World War, the number had risen to six. From 6.35 per cent in 1916, however, the proportion of French-speaking officers had actually declined to 4.84 per cent in 1939.

Rear Admiral L.P. Brodeur, VG, CB, CBE, son of the one-time Minister of Naval Services and Fisheries, was the only French-Canadian officer to rise to the upper ranks of the RCN during the Second World War (PMR 80-552).



After serving as a pilot in the RFC during the First World War, Air Vice-Marshal J.L.E.A. de Niverville, CB, was given the task of administering the recruitment of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel during the Second World War. (UPFC 117217).

Brodeur came out of the Second World War a Rear Admiral and Gauvreau a Commander.³⁵

In the interwar Air Force, the number of French Canadians was somewhat higher than in the Navy, although the percentage was lower. Between 1921 and 1938 it ranged from 2.29 to 3.25 per cent. Just before the outbreak of war, there were only nine officers and half a dozen cadets. One of these, J.L.E.A. de Niverville, who had fought in the Royal Flying Corps in 1917-18, was promoted Air Vice-Marshal and received recognition for his excellent administration of the recruiting program.

No other French Canadian officer became an Air Force general in the war. V.H. Patriarche and J.M.W. St-Pierre, who both rose to be group captains and were decorated with the Air Force Cross, had trained as reserve pilots in the Auxiliary Active Air Force, in 1939. As for Group Captain J.E. Fauquier, DSO, DFC, and Squadron Leader F.M. Gobeil, who are considered French Canadians, both came from Toronto and were anglicized.³⁶

Thus there was only room in the Navy and the Air Force for French Canadians who spoke English. Unilingual Francophones were systematically excluded, while unilingual Anglophones had little difficulty serving in their own language and certainly no requirement to speak French.

The First World War might have helped to change profoundly the outlook of a self-absorbed French-Canadian society. As our colleague Jean-Pierre Gagnon has perceptively observed, however, "the struggle to survive, symbolized by the fight for school rights for Franco-Ontarians, drew off much of their attention and energy."³⁷ Even so, despite the fact that most French Canadians found that service in the armed forces left them feeling second class citizens, "the adventure of the thousands of men who served in the 22nd battalion was an opening up to the world."³⁸ This situation did not prevent a renewal of criticism against them, after the world got caught up in a second global conflict in 1939.

Part Three

**French: A Painful Political Necessity
(1939-1962)**

The whole province of Quebec — and I speak with all the responsibility and all the solemnity I can give to my words — will never agree to accept compulsory service or conscription outside Canada. I will go farther than that: When I say the whole province of Quebec I mean that I personally agree with them. I am authorized by my colleagues in the Cabinet from the province of Quebec — the veteran leader of the Senate, my good friend and colleague, the Minister of Public Works [Mr Cardin], my friend and fellow town[s]man and colleague, the Minister of Pensions and National Health [Mr Power] — to say that we will never agree to conscription and will never be members or supporters of a government that will try to enforce it. Is that clear enough?

Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice
House of Commons *Debates*, September 9, 1939

When the Second World War was declared, Canada was still struggling to emerge from the Great Depression, which had seriously afflicted Canadian society and revealed the disparity between federal taxing powers and provincial responsibilities.

In Québec, Abbé Lionel Groulx, who for two decades had been teaching French Canadian nationalism in his history lectures, had put forward the idea of an independent “Laurentie”. Even though French Canadian newspapers unanimously maintained that the conflict was a just one and the democracies had been forced by Hitler to declare war, they were far from believing, as the English-speaking press did, that this was a holy war against the enemies of religion and civilization.¹

The Right Honourable Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice in King’s Liberal government, proclaimed in the House that Canada could not remain neutral because that would favour the enemies of Britain and France. As for sending an expeditionary force, he added, “No government could stay in office if it refused to do what the large majority of Canadians wanted it to do.” He then spoke out against conscription for overseas service, reiterating his support for the policy endorsed by the Liberal Party since the First World War: voluntary service but no coercion.²

Carried off by sickness after serving the public as a federal MP for 37 years, Lapointe died on November 26, 1941. His premature passing left a gap in the ranks of French Canadian representatives and gave their antagonists an opportunity to impose conscription for overseas service, despite Lapointe’s express warnings on this score, thus widening the breach between the two language communities.

After the war, as we shall see, despite the conscription and reinforcement crises of 1942-1944, Francophones and Anglophones moved to some extent, closer together. This was to be evident during the Korean War, in which French Canadians participated in proportion to their demographic representation. Yet it did not prevent a few displays of English-Canadian nationalism, in particular from the chiefs of staff of the three services, notably General G.G. Simonds, who stubbornly refused to apply the bilingualism policies laid down by the Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence. On the other side of the equation,

Marcel Chaput, an employee of the Defence Research Board (DRB), published in 1961 a book, translated into English under the title of *Why I am a Separatist*, with the obvious intent of shocking the English-speaking public but also to open his fellow countrymen's eyes to certain features of the life of a French Canadian public servant.³ He was sharply reprimanded by his superiors, and later actually dismissed, in November 1961, after failing to obtain prior permission to attend a conference at Université Laval on the topic "Canada, failure or successful experiment?"⁴

The basic desire of French Canadians to be treated as equals in their own land, and the gradual acceptance by the most enlightened Anglophones that this quite legitimate desire should be satisfied, would eventually compel English Canada to acknowledge that its outlook had to change.

Chapter 5

The Second World War: Diversity of Service Rests on One-Way Bilingualism

Every French Canadian remembered the only previous experience of a so-called national government, the Union Government of 1917, which did not have a single French-speaking supporter in the House of Commons; and for French Canadians 'National Government' and the conscription the Union Government had imposed in 1917 were the symbols of 'English' ascendancy. Most French Canadians feared, and some English Canadians desired, conscription as the sign of the domination of one race by the other.

No one in Canada understood this better than Mackenzie King, the only prominent English-speaking Liberal politician who had stood with Laurier against Union Government and conscription in 1917. He sincerely believed that Canada could not make an effective contribution to the prosecution of the war if the country was torn by controversy over conscription. He was convinced that the only basis for united public support of the war effort was a compromise in which, provided there was no compulsory military service outside Canada, the minority, which did not believe that the war was Canada's war, would accept the will of the majority.

J.W. Pickersgill

The Mackenzie King Record, Vol 1, 1939-1944

(Toronto: UTP, 1960, pp. 22-23)

Prompted by the sombre occurrences in Europe and an order by the Governor in Council, Army HQ called up about one hundred Militia units for active service, on August 26, 1939. On September 1, learning that German divisions supported by the Luftwaffe had invaded Poland, the government ordered two divisions to be mobilized. On September 7, both houses met, and two days later decided to declare war on Germany. Canada was thus at war as of September 10, 1939.¹ In contrast to 1914, however, the decision was made by its elected leaders rather than by Great Britain.²

French-speaking units of the Active Army overseas

Not until September 19 did the government publicly announce its decision to send troops overseas. AHQ decided to withdraw the R22^eR from the battle order of the 2nd division and include it in the 1st division with the RCR and the PPCLI — the other two regular infantry battalions. The division crossed the Atlantic in December, bound for the United Kingdom. “To have removed the Royal 22^e Régiment from the 1st division,” remarks Colonel Stacey, “would thus not merely have condemned a Permanent Force unit to what might be an inactive role, but would have deprived French Canada of all formal infantry representation in the division likely to be first to see action.”³

During the spring of 1940, a second division was equipped for overseas service. In May, the authorities placed Brigadier P.-E. Leclerc in command of the 5th brigade, with the firm intention of making it an entirely French Canadian formation.⁴ Unfortunately, these plans were frustrated from the outset. The brigade first lost the R22^eR, which was to have been its mainstay but which was replaced by the 1st battalion of the Black Watch. The Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR) was then sent to Iceland and replaced by the Calgary Highlanders. Since only the Regiment de Maisonneuve (R de Mais) was left, plans to form a French-speaking brigade were dropped.⁵ The latter regiment had been the first Canadian unit to reach its full complement of volunteers at mobilization.⁶ After its stay in Iceland (July 1 — October 31, 1940), the FMR was attached to the 6th brigade. Meanwhile, the Regiment de la Chaudière, struggling with recruitment problems, had been attached to the 8th brigade in the 3rd division, after losing its role of machine gun battalion and reverting to the status of a plain infantry battalion.⁷

The 3rd infantry division, sent overseas in 1941, was followed the year after by two armoured divisions, the 4th and 5th, and two armoured brigades, together with the HQs and corps troops of two army corps and the HQ and army troops of the 1st Canadian Army. A few French-speaking or bilingual units in addition to



APPEL AUX ARMES

Attendu Que la Liberté est menacée dans le monde entier par les forces de la Tyrannie,

Attendu Que le Canada, de son propre gré, s'est engagé à combattre pour la liberté aux côtés de la Grande Bretagne,

Attendu Que la sécurité et le bonheur de tout homme, femme et enfant du Canada et des peuples libres dans l'univers dépendent de la Victoire,

Attendu Que la Victoire ne peut être assurée sans l'aide de tous les citoyens loyaux de ce Dominion,

Nous Déclarons

qu'il est urgent que tous les hommes de cœur en état de porter les armes s'enrôlent volontairement dans le service actif de l'Armée canadienne.

En foi de quoi le Canada lance un

Appel aux Armes

et compte que tous les vrais Canadiens y répondront.



Fait et signé aux Quartiers généraux de la Défense Nationale, le vingt-cinquième jour de juin de l'an mil neuf cent quarante-et-un de l'ère chrétienne, et dans la soixante-quinzième année de la Confédération.



Le Ministre de la Défense Nationale du Canada.

DIEU SAUVE LE ROI



Advertisement designed to encourage French-Canadian volunteers to enlist, by presenting well-known heroes. (PMR 85-038)

the four infantry battalions previously named were included in these formations:

- the 4th Regiment of medium artillery
- the 82nd Anti-tank battery
- the 12th Armoured regiment (Three Rivers Regiment)
- the 27th Armoured regiment (Fusiliers de Sherbrooke)
- the 3rd Engineer battalion
- the 18th Field ambulance⁸

There was a high proportion of Anglophones in the two armoured regiments, and all these units, working within larger formations which operated completely in English, necessarily had to do the same operationally. Only in their own time were Francophones able to speak in their own tongue. And even then, there is evidence that they were often forbidden to speak French among themselves.

We see, then, that the die was cast as early as the summer of 1940. The plan to form a French-speaking brigade may have been drawn up in good faith and, as Colonel Stacey maintains, taken seriously by the highest echelons of military authority.⁹ The fact remains that it was quickly abandoned by the general staff responsible for assigning operational tasks to each unit. Thus the four French-speaking infantry battalions that fought in Europe were spread over four separate brigades, so that communications between each command post and its brigade HQ had to be in English. The same was true of the artillery and armoured regiments. And when three French Canadians rose to the rank of brigadier, they had to command their brigades in English since the staffs and units under them spoke English, as did their senior HQs.

French-speaking units of the Active Army in Canada

In addition to the units sent overseas, several French-speaking units were mobilized to defend Canada and neighbouring territories. This is a partial list, drawn up in 1943:

1. ATLANTIC COMMAND (HQ in Halifax, NS) Newfoundland
 - Le Régiment de Joliette
 - Le Régiment de Saint-Hyacinthe
 - Defences of Sydney, Canso, Shelburne and Gaspé*
 - Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent
 - 105th Coastal artillery battery

Defences of Saint John, NB

Le Régiment de Châteauguay (MG)

7th Canadian division (HQ in Debert, NS)

15th Infantry brigade

Le Régiment de Montmagny

Le Régiment de Québec

Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke

17th Infantry brigade

Les Voltigeurs de Québec*

2. 5th MD (Québec)

59th Coastal artillery battery (Lauzon)

21st Infantry brigade (Valcartier)

3rd battalion, les Fusiliers Mont-Royal

3rd battalion, le Régiment de Maisonneuve

Le Régiment de Lévis

19th Field ambulance

3. PACIFIC COMMAND (HQ in Vancouver, BC) Victoria

and Esquimalt *Fortress*

Le Régiment de Hull (armoured)

Several other, smaller, French-speaking units or sub-units were formed, including the following:

7 anti-aircraft batteries

1 light anti-aircraft battery

3 military police companies

23 other sub-units/companies or platoons.

Lastly, about sixty companies of the Veterans Guard of Canada, of which one was 75 per cent and four were 50 per cent Francophone, were formed by First World War veterans to assist the Active Army with maintaining security at military or essential war establishments, and to guard internment and prisoner of war camps.¹⁰

Thus ten of the fifteen major French-speaking units in Canada in 1943 were serving outside Quebec, in a cultural, linguistic and social environment foreign to them, and only two brigades (the 15th and 21st) had French-speaking battalions. However, if one adds up the French-speaking units, as we have done in Appendix T, it is hard to escape the

* This unit was sent to England, in July 1943, where it was dismembered to supply reinforcements for the R22^eR, the R de Chaud, the FMR, the R de Mais and other units (File 145.2V2, D Hist).

conclusion that, with a little initiative and good will, an entirely French-speaking division could have been made up.

French-speaking generals and field officers

In the list of incumbents of, the leading positions in the Canadian Army in Canada, in addition to the two deputy ministers mentioned above (Major-General L.R. LaFlèche and Lieutenant-Colonel H. DesRosiers), we find only one general in command of a territorial defence formation: Major-General P.-E. Leclerc.¹¹ The two French-speaking infantry brigades (the 15th in Debert, NS, and the 21st in Valcartier) were also commanded by Francophones, brigadiers A.R. Roy and G. Francoeur, but orders and instructions came from higher HQs in English. There were no translation units available except the one headed by Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Chaballe at NDHQ in Ottawa.

The summer 1943 list of generals, brigadiers and colonels reflects the French-speaking element as follows:

RANK	Anglophones	Francophones	%	Total
Lieutenant-general	4	—	—	4
Major-general	29	5	14.7	34
Brigadier	114	9	7.3	123
Colonel	195	9	4.4	204 ¹²

All of these Francophones, except for one Medical officer, had fought in the Great War; this was a higher proportion of veterans than existed among English-speaking officers. Consequently, their average age was higher.

As of February 1, 1944, according to Colonel Stacey, there were 4,090 French-speaking officers in the Army, of whom 1,339 were serving overseas. About 84 French-speaking officers were employed at NDHQ,¹³ many of them no doubt in translation or public relations. Following the creation of a French wing at the Officers' Training Centre in Brockville, Ontario, "when French-speaking other-rank reinforcements were in short supply, there was a surplus of French-speaking officers" observes Stacey.¹⁴ If such a shortage existed

in reinforcement centres, we should make clear that it was partly because trained French-speaking soldiers had been used to reinforce English-speaking units rather than being considered strictly as reinforcements for French-speaking units.

At the end of the war, just before demobilization, the proportion of Francophones among generals and field officers (with the rank of lieutenant-colonel or higher) was a scant 8.1 per cent. This is roughly the same proportion as that of French-Canadian officers trained in the Militia before the war.¹⁵

The policy of conscription for overseas service splits Canadian society

The conscription crisis is often treated as if there had been only one issue. In fact, there were two distinct, though related, issues: conscription for overseas service (1942) and the reinforcement crisis (1944).

We need not here go into the details of the entire question, which has been studied in depth.¹⁶ Let us merely recall, as André Laurendeau observed, that participation overseas in the war, without conscription, was a compromise between the total involvement which was largely desired by most English Canadians and the neutrality hoped for by the majority of French Canadians. It was a type of “pact” between the two nationalities.¹⁷

Seeking to avoid the pitfalls that had undone the Conservatives after the First World War, the Liberals constantly reminded the entire population of Canada that their government would not impose conscription for overseas service. However, following the reverses suffered by the Allies and above all the fall of France, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, under pressure from many Canadians who believed it their duty to do more to support Britain, resorted to a plebiscite in 1942 in order to free his government from its moral obligation not to impose conscription for overseas service. In brief, conscription for service in Canada, which had been accepted by French Canadians without too much objection, could in future be extended to overseas service if the Allied military situation demanded it. The plebiscite sparked a controversy that clearly brought out Canada’s dual nature, as is well illustrated by the results:

Conscription for Overseas Service	
Quebec	71 percent opposed
Rest of Canada	63 per cent in favour

If we subtract the areas with an English-speaking majority in Montreal and the Eastern Townships, the percentage of Quebecers opposed rises to 85. Historian Jean-Yves Gravel observes that “This result demonstrates Francophones’ Canadian nationalism and Anglophones’ loyalty to their Anglo-Saxon heritage.”¹⁸ Sixty per cent of French Canadians surveyed by a Gallup poll in 1942 believed Canada was at war because it was part of the British Commonwealth. Poorly informed, they had simply not grasped that this was a “modern crusade for justice and freedom.”¹⁹

The reinforcement crisis, precipitated in 1944 by the heavy losses sustained by units fighting in Normandy and Italy, was largely laid at the doorstep of French Canadians, who were accused of not having “done their bit”. Colonel Stacey’s study of the crisis reveals clearly that the shortage of foot-soldiers had been “clearly seen before D Day”.²⁰ While the *Voltigeurs de Québec* had been disbanded in England to meet the needs of other French-speaking regiments, many French-speaking reinforcements had also been distributed among English-speaking units. In addition, a large number of French Canadians living outside Quebec had enlisted directly in regional regiments because they preferred to identify themselves by geography rather than language.²¹

No one can deny that Quebec did not supply volunteers in numbers proportionate to its population as compared to the other provinces. Colonel Stacey calculated that 25.69 per cent of the male population of Quebec aged 18 to 45 enlisted, as compared to 42.38 to 50.47 per cent in the other provinces.²² These statistics, of course, apply to the entire war, not just the period preceding the 1944 reinforcement crisis, and they do not take into account the excess of males in each province. Implicitly, the unsuspecting reader is led to believe that the Quebec contribution equals that of the French Canadians; the truth is more complex. Many Quebecers are English-speaking and many French Canadians living in other provinces were subjected to nearly total language discrimination. Also, French-speaking civilians made an enormous impact on the war effort.

According to the 1941 Census, the population of Quebec was 3,331,882, or 28.9 per cent of Canada's total population of 11,506,655. Canadians of French origin totalled 3,483,038, or 30.3 per cent, while those of British origin numbered 5,715,904, or 49.7 per cent.²³ The following table depicts the excess of males by province in 1941.^{24*}

Province	Male Population	%	Excess of Males	%
British Columbia	427 191	7.3	45 173	19.6
Alberta	419 773	7.2	51 153	22.1
Saskatchewan	470 798	8.1	53 849	23.3
Manitoba	371 795	6.4	21 143	9.2
Ontario	1 894 794	32.5	32 956	14.3
Quebec	1 661 992	28.5	4 344	1.9
New Brunswick	230 716	4.0	7 055	3.1
Prince Edward Island	48 319	0.8	2 719	1.2
Nova Scotia	291 482	5.0	9 774	4.2
Yukon	3 008	0.05	1 329	0.6
Northwest Territories	6 154	0.1	1 459	0.6
Canada	5 826 022		230 954	16.0

As for the First World War, the reserves of males were in Saskatchewan (23.3 per cent), Alberta (22.1 per cent), British Columbia (19.6 per cent) and Ontario (14.3 per cent). Quebec had a mere 1.9 per cent surplus.

Related to the issue of conscription was that of requests to defer compulsory military training.²⁵ A list of these, based on information received from the Department of Labour, gives at first glance the impression that the number of such requests was much higher in Montreal and Quebec than anywhere else. When reduced to provincial percentages, however, the number of men with deferrals as of May 7, 1945 — 78,621 in Quebec, compared to 262,634 for all of Canada, or 29.9 per cent — can be seen to be only

* In Statistics Canada this figure is used to show the imbalance (surplus) between males and females.

one per cent higher than the percentage of the population living in Quebec (28.9 per cent) and lower than the percentage of Canadians of French origin (30.3 per cent).

Now let us consider the dissatisfaction of volunteers and conscripts, both English- and French-speaking, serving overseas and in Canada. Pressure was generated by certain generals, in particular Major-General George R. Pearkes who encouraged conscripts to enlist as volunteers, or by combattants facing daily the prospect of becoming a casualty, who loudly criticized the “protected” service of conscripts. Many overseas soldiers wrote to their families and MPs demanding “equality of service”. Colonel J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, went to Europe to investigate. On his return to Canada, he tried to convince the Cabinet that the reinforcement crisis could only be resolved by sending 15,000 conscripts overseas. The objection was raised that there were still 120,000 volunteers in Canada and 90,000 in England, but what overseas commanders were calling for was trained infantry. According to Ralston, the government had to look to conscripts.²⁶ The Adjutant-General initiated an inquiry, but none of the conditions of service responsible for the reinforcement situation were really altered.²⁷

Because King refused to change his policy, Ralston resigned on November 1, 1944 and was replaced as Defence Minister by General A.G.L. McNaughton. The latter set up a “recruiting committee” in the hope that a large number of conscripts would volunteer; 42,000 of the 60,000 trained conscripts were judged acceptable for the infantry; of these 37 per cent were “of French origin”. They broke down by region as follows:

Maritimes	2 600
Quebec	16 300
Ontario	10 250
Prairies	10 000
Pacific	2 800

McNaughton called together all the generals in command of military districts and personally encouraged them to “convert” conscripts. Most of the generals, however, thought there was nothing more to be done. Not content with telling him so, a few officers under the command of Pearkes began a press campaign. Eventually, a note dated November 22 from Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, Chief of

the General Staff, to McNaughton stating “In my considered opinion the Voluntary system of recruiting through Army channels cannot meet the immediate problem”²⁸ forced the government’s hand. On November 23, an Order in Council authorized the Army to send 16,000 conscripts overseas. “Chubby” Power, MP for Québec West and Minister of National Defence for Air, faithful to his principles, resigned immediately.²⁹ French Canadians, a minority within Confederation, were again forced to admit that, in a democracy, the minority must give way to the majority.

The split is exacerbated by a campaign to denigrate French Canadians

In his speech to the House following the declaration of war, Ernest Lapointe cautioned: “If my honourable friends who sit in the far corner of the house opposite, if the Ottawa *Citizen*, which just now is waging a campaign for conscription, think they are serving Canada by splitting it at the very outset of war, then I may say they are gravely and seriously wrong.”³⁰ In this spirit, according to Mason Wade, “from the outset of the war, many English and French Canadians labored zealously to prevent the development of the rift between the races [sic] which had been such a tragic feature of the First World War.”³¹

Just as English Canadians felt more solidarity with the British after France collapsed in June 1940, so French Canadians consented without protest to compulsory service in the defence of Canada. But in response to a growing feeling among Anglophones that conscription should extend to overseas duty, especially after the US entered the war on December 8, 1941 and the fall of Hong Kong three weeks later, Quebec dug in its heels.³² Meanwhile, the Wartime Information Board demonstrated a singularly poor grasp of the French Canadian mind by launching appeals such as “Canada stands with England” and by using the Union Jack on war posters. Many English Canadians refused to recognize the double ethnic origin of Canadians: two cultures and two languages. This basic failure to understand persisted throughout the war.³³ This state of mind was compounded, for “the ill-considered official decision to make it impossible to compare the manpower contributions of French and English gave rise to the freely expressed English Canadian suspicion that the French Canadian war record was too bad to be

disclosed, while the French Canadians thought it was better than it really was.... Meanwhile Quebec was constantly complimented for its war effort by its own patriotic leaders and by Ottawa spokesmen. English Canada tended to judge war effort exclusively in terms of volunteers for overseas, while French Canada reckoned in service of Canada, its major contribution in war industry, and its notable support of the war loans.”³⁴

Wade goes on to speak of “Quebec’s resentment against the flood of Ottawa propaganda”; “the *Montreal Gazette*’s attacks on the conscripts, whom it contemptuously called ‘zombies’”; of “English Canadian disdain for the zombies, who were commonly reported to be predominantly French Canadian”; of Quebec’s “revolt against wartime propaganda and against major alterations in its way of life imposed by Ottawa”, which led many Quebecers to minimize the importance of the common danger. In response to the accusations of unequal sacrifice, the newspaper *Le Canada* pointed out that, according to the casualty list, “a large number of French Canadians were serving overseas in English Canadian units, and hence Quebec’s participation should not be judged solely on the basis of French Canadian units.”³⁵

Wade reports that during the session of Parliament that saw Ralston’s resignation as Minister of National Defence in November 1944, Louis-Philippe Picard, MP for Bellechasse, Quebec, protested against the English Canadian habit of making French Canadians “a sort of national scapegoat on which to blame everything that goes wrong.” Walter Tucker, MP for Rosthern, Saskatchewan, a veteran of both world wars, deplored the attacks against French Canadians and those of foreign origin, many of whom came from his province. P.J.A. Cardin, MP for Richelieu-Verchères, roundly attacked those who had accused Quebec of not providing as many soldiers as the other provinces.³⁶ At the same time, W.E. Harris, MP for Grey-Bruce, Ontario, a wounded veteran, denounced “the Ontario campaign to make the home defence army [ie, conscripts], which included 15,000 Ontario men as well as 22,000 from Quebec, a Quebec problem exclusively,” while Léonard-David Tremblay, MP for Dorchester, Quebec, another veteran of both wars, spoke out against the imposition of conscription and the insults levelled at Quebec conscripts by other provinces.³⁷ Frédéric Dorion, MP for Charlevoix-Saguenay, spoke of a malevolent campaign against French Canadians

and a smear campaign aimed at the Province of Quebec.³⁸ H.E. Brunelle, MP for Champlain, quotes in this connection the words of Major David Maclellan of the *Halifax Chronicle*: “English-speaking Canadians have conducted this stupid, shameful campaign of calumnies against Quebec.... The history of relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians has been tarnished many times by pinpricks, rude remarks and stinging insults poured down on Quebec.”³⁹

J.L. Granatstein recounts how Bruce Hutchison, in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, criticized the “racism” of his fellow British Columbians. “The problem in Ottawa is no longer a military one. It has become racial [sic]... whether we should put French Canadians in their place”; Granatstein adds that Anglophones had attempted to seize the opportunity given them by conscription to establish their dominance over Quebec, disavow agreements with Quebec regarding Confederation and abolish the French language in Canada.⁴⁰

Desmond Morton informs us that the Canadian Legion had mobilized five hundred other organizations in its call for total war.⁴¹ Colonel Stacey relates that on January 11, 1945, when he was returning to England on board the SS *Mauretania* in company with officers of 15th Infantry Brigade HQ who were being transferred overseas following mutinies in Terrace, BC, in November 1944, they “emphasized how well organized the ‘dissidents’ were; and they all as one man reported that the prime movers in the affair were not French Canadian soldiers [but] Central Europeans from the prairies, including a certain number of actual Germans.”⁴² Would this have been told to Stacey and would he have reported it so faithfully if it had not been necessary to counter a real and unpleasant campaign of denigration against French Canadians?

Military training

During the Second World War, no official language courses in French or English were given in the Canadian Army. But what of the many military training courses given all across the country?

To begin with, let us distinguish between general or specialized training courses (depending on the various branches and services) and



Newspaper headlines, November 1942



Newspaper headlines, November 1944

trades courses (offered within the various corps). Colonel Stacey has drawn up a complete list of training centres and schools.⁴³ The table in Appendix Z shows us that 20 per cent of all centres and schools were located in Quebec and 40 per cent in Ontario. Nearly 25 per cent of basic training centres were in Quebec, but a scant half of them were bilingual. In New Brunswick, where 34.5 per cent of the population was French-speaking in 1941 (in Fredericton and Edmundston in particular) Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Brooks and Major G.F.G. Stanley, who were responsible for training recruits, did the impossible to have Acadians train and drill in French. This greatly astonished Major-General T.-L. Tremblay, who toured these regions during a general inspection tour.⁴⁴ The table also reveals that 46 per cent of advanced training centres, excluding infantry, and specialized schools were located in Ontario.

In addition to the military training courses designed primarily to train soldiers to fight, the Army had a need for tradesmen of all sorts — in trades which might guide the soldier into a career after demobilization. In MD N° 5 (Québec), an attempt was made from February 1941 on to make good the shortage of tradespeople, as indeed was done in all the other districts. Accordingly, five trade schools administered in French were opened:

School	Course
Technical school, Québec City	— motor mechanic
	— welder
Technical school, Lauzon	— motor mechanic
Trade school, Lauzon	— carpenter
	— mechanic-fitter
École Brillant, Rimouski	— carpenter
	— mechanic-fitter
	— motor mechanic
	— plumber
	— painter
Commercial academy, Québec City	— clerk-secretary

Similar courses were also given in the following locations:

A-13, CITC, Valcartier	— cook
Citadel, Québec	— motor mechanic
International Harvester, Québec	— driver

To simplify the administration of the candidates taking these courses, N° 5 Vocational Training School (VTS) was founded in Quebec City, on January 1, 1942. It was more an administrative centre than a true school. Eleven similar ones were scattered across the country.⁴⁵ After a time, most of the courses offered in MD N° 5 were given in Rimouski or Valcartier. An unpublished documentary source provides us with accurate figures on the number of servicemen who took these courses in MD N° 5:

Mechanic-fitters	306
Brickmakers	140
Carpenters	265
Clerks	450
Electricians	126
Blacksmiths	70
Driver-mechanics	355
Motor mechanics	330
Painters	15
Plumbers	<u>28</u>
Total	2 016 trainees

These ten courses represent only four per cent of the roughly 250 courses then being given in the Canadian Army.⁴⁶

No similar statistics are available for N° 4 VTS in Montreal, but we have good reason to believe that scarcely half the trades courses given there were offered in French.⁴⁷ We can thus conclude that the documented figure of 2,016 tradesmen trained in French in MD N° 5 (Québec) and 2,000 (half of an estimated 4,000) trained in French in MD No 4 (Montreal) represent only four per cent of the 100,000 trained tradesmen in Canada as a whole. In addition to the issue of language, we observe that over 70 per cent of these courses were offered in Ontario, with the resulting implications in terms of economic benefit, job creation and so forth.

We are considering, let us recall, servicemen who took technical courses in the Canadian Army, the same army in which,

according to Colonel Stacey, “a great deal of time and effort were devoted to attempts at solving” the problem of French-speaking representation, and where “no question commanded more urgent attention at National Defence Headquarters than that of French-speaking representation in the Army.”⁴⁸


We have seen, however, that French-speaking officers had to learn English before they could serve their country; that for the infantry a scant 12.5 per cent of basic training centres and 20 per cent of advanced training centres, all located in the province of Quebec, offered informal bilingual services; that advanced training centres other than for infantry and specialized and technical training schools, of which a mere two out of 17 were located in Quebec, operated in English only; and lastly, that Francophones who took trades courses in their language made up, in all, only four per cent of all military personnel, even though 14 per cent of officers and 19.5 per cent of other ranks were French Canadians. Despite the 1920 decision to establish a permanent infantry battalion for Francophones, the Army was still ultimately an English-speaking institution in 1939. When trained soldiers were needed in a brigade of specialists and military tradesmen for operational purposes, the Army did not have the necessary officers or skilled NCOs to train enough Francophones so that their numbers in these specialties would be proportionate to the French-speaking population. Colonel Stacey maintains that attempts were made to remedy this situation, and that these attempts had some success.⁴⁹ But what success? For most Francophones, the plain fact remained that they could only serve their country in their own language if they consented to do so as infantrymen.

The anomaly was even greater in the Navy and Air Force, where everything was done in English. Stacey observes that “It was in the Canadian Army that the problem [of French] presented itself in its most acute form.”⁵⁰ There obviously was no “problem” elsewhere because everything was done in English.

Translation services

It would be appropriate at this stage to praise the enormous effort made by military translators under the direction of Colonel J.H. Chaballe, Director, Major Pierre Daviault, Chief Revisor, and Captain

Army Language Bureau staff in 1944



First row : Capt Dubuc, Capt B. Pelletier, Capt Lamb, Maj Pierre Daviault, Col J.H. Chaballe, Capt L. Lamontagne, Ma) P. Bousquet, Lt-Cdr Valiquette, Lt Brunet

Second row : Miss J. Swanson, Miss R. Desjardins, Miss J. Bolduc, Mrs L. Young, Miss T. Vaillant, Miss F.-A. Lepage, Miss P. Vincent, Miss Bérubé, Miss R Labelle, Miss J. Godin, Lt Workantine, Lt J. Girolami

Third row : Capt P. Desjardins, Lt G. Cliche, P. Guindon, M. Hammerlé, Cpl Marie, unidentified, Lt Henri Charbonneau

Fourth row : Pierre St-Loup, Pte Lacelle, H. Fortin, Sgt C. Dorais, Lt Darveau, Cpl Desjarlais, Sgt C. Poncet.

(P. Clavel collection)

Léopold Lamontagne, to translate training manuals and brochures into French. Early in 1943, this team consisted of 13 officers, 20 privates and 15 civilians.⁵¹ Colonel Stacey gives the surprising number of 359 manuals and books translated by March 1, 1944.⁵² This number includes 35 issues of the *Mémoire sur l'instruction de l'Armée canadienne*,* a monthly series begun in April 1941, which gives us much information on other publications as well as films and specialization and trades courses. If we examine these lists published each month, we realize that the number of manuals translated is paltry compared to the flood published in English. We also realise how little instruction was actually given in French.⁵³

Evaluation of the contribution of French Canadian servicemen

According to a periodic report dated March 1, 1944, Stacey records 19.1 per cent of all servicemen, both conscripts and volunteers, were French-speaking. In other words, they must have numbered 139,550 men and women out of the 730,625 who served as either volunteers or conscripts. J. Mackay Hitsman reminds us that 618,354 service persons were of Canadian origin. This means that Francophones made up 22.6 per cent of servicemen of Canadian origin.⁵⁴

In his study on manpower problems in the Canadian Army, Hitsman provides interesting lists of the origins of those soldiers who enlisted or were conscripted in Canada during the Second World War:

1) British Empire	71 276
2) United States of America	19 068
3) Other American republics	220
4) Belgium	421
5) Denmark	1 150
6) Norway	1 098
7) The Netherlands	574
8) Poland	5 144
9) Czechoslovakia	1 378
10) Yugoslavia	(number not given)
11) USSR	2 580
12) China	225
13) Siberia	10
14) Other Asian countries	64
15) Africa (other than British colonies)	29
16) No place of birth given	1 474

*The translated version of the Canadian Army Manual of Training

Many people born in enemy countries, he points out, also served in the Canadian Army.

1) Germany	938
2) Austria	574
3) Bulgaria	32
4) Finland	485
5) Hungary	1 229
6) Italy	1 003
7) Japan	55
8) Romania	839 ⁵⁵

It seems to us surprising that it was possible to identify these diverse nationalities, but that no similar effort was made to calculate the number of French Canadians overall, or by province, in order to reply to the criticism levelled, fairly or unfairly, against Quebecers and French Canadians in connection with the conscription crisis.⁵⁶

Unilingualism in the Navy

We have attempted to find the number of Francophones who served in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during the war. This was no easy task, for neither the DND nor the Department of Veterans Affairs possesses these statistics. The official history of the Navy only records recruitment by province. The following is a summary for the Province of Quebec and all of Canada:⁵⁷

	Quebec	Canada	%
Officers	1 294	6 621	19.5
Seamen	11 135	93 067	11.96
Total	13 429	99 688	13.47


These figures do not include the 6,781 members of the Women's Service (WRCNS), who are not identified by province, language or ethnic origin.⁵⁸ It is interesting to note the much higher percentage of officers from Quebec than that of seamen. We may conclude that education, including knowledge of the English language, was a factor.

According to a study for the Directorate of History by J.M. Hitsman:

a thorough knowledge of English was essential. Since it was not feasible to operate a two-language Navy, French-speaking recruits could not be utilized unless they possessed an adequate command of the English Language. After Hon. Angus L. Macdonald pointed this out to the Cabinet War Committee on 18 June 43 it was agreed that the Navy should provide facilities for teaching English to French-speaking recruits.⁵⁹

In a study of the RCN's personnel requirements during the Second World War, historian Marc Milner highlights, among other things, the role of naval control over maritime operations, in particular the merchant marine (80 per cent of such operations ended up being controlled by the Navy). Although Milner does not dwell on the matter of language, he demonstrates the importance of this control in the lower St Lawrence and the northeastern coast of New Brunswick, and its ties with the other Atlantic "districts", in particular Saint John, Sydney, Halifax and St John's.⁶⁰ Since the two "districts" in question were fairly large and covered predominantly French-speaking regions of Quebec and New Brunswick, and since most officers and seamen assigned to naval control were reserve personnel domiciled in that region, we are entitled to ask why their first language of communication could not have been French.

Beginning in 1940, eight- to twelve-week English courses were given to French-speaking recruits in Montreal and Québec reserve units before they were sent to Cornwallis, NS, where all training was given in English by inadequately trained instructors. In July 1943, after a Cabinet decision, the RCN opened an English school in London, Ontario, to replace the Québec and Montreal schools. The HMCS *Prevost* school employed qualified teachers, and the course length was standardized to twelve weeks. Finally, in January 1945, the school was transferred to Cornwallis where English courses were given until August 1945.⁶¹ A Francophone thus had to learn English in order to serve his country in the Navy on an equal footing with his English-speaking fellow countrymen. "No attempt was made to man individual vessels with completely French-speaking crews; it was considered that this would have been, administratively speaking, difficult almost to the point of impossibility," observes Colonel Stacey.⁶²



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Directorate of History.

However, those in command learned from this experience that more time should have been spent on basic training for French-speaking recruits to integrate them better into the English-speaking navy. As the Director of Naval Training wrote in 1952, "It was also clear that in the early stage of training it would be wise to have some of the instruction given in the French language."⁶³

These pious afterthoughts, however praiseworthy, still demonstrate a desire to anglicize French-speaking recruits, which ultimately means a mindset bent on one-way bilingualism.

Unilingualism in the Air Force

In the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), 24,768 officers and men, or 11.13 per cent of the total of 222,501 who enlisted, came from Quebec.⁶⁴ Again, we note that this percentage does not necessarily reflect the contribution of French Canadians. Nowhere, however, could we find sources which would have enabled us to exactly determine that contribution.⁶⁵ From the outset, it must be acknowledged that if the RCN had to operate in English with the Royal Navy and the US Navy, the RCAF also had to operate in English with, and within, the RAF. And while the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP) promoted the training of Commonwealth flying personnel, it ensured at the same time the sole use of the English language.

In September 1940, the RCAF opened a school in Quebec with a view to teaching basic English to French-speaking recruits. The following summer, after an intervention by the Honourable Charles Gavan Power, who had been MP for Québec West since 1917 and was appointed Minister of National Defence for Air on May 24, 1940, the RCAF took the necessary steps to recruit more Francophones, especially in Quebec. Bilingual officers toured schools and colleges; a recruiting office was opened in Montreal; a mobile team was formed to recruit all across the province; special courses were even given in Cartierville, near Montreal, to train French-speaking mechanics.⁶⁶

"Chubby" Power applied himself to Canadianizing the RCAF by means of a two-pronged attack: ensuring that personnel administration of Canadian airmen was carried out by Canadians, as

The Right Honourable Ernest Lapointe, PC, Minister of Justice and French Canadian leader at the start of the Second World War, strongly encouraged his fellow countrymen to support the war effort while firmly opposing conscription for overseas service. (Public Archives of Canada /C09796)



The Honourable C.G. (Chubby) Power, MC, PC, Minister of National Defence for Air, 1940-44, had the courage to resign from Cabinet when Prime Minister W.L.M. King resorted to conscription for overseas service, after promising many times that he would not. (PUCF 117212)

as far as possible; and placing Canadian crews in Canadian units and wings whenever possible. Power saw farther, however. To him, "Canadianization" also meant giving French-Canadian airmen an opportunity to serve fully in the RCAF, as was done in the French-speaking battalions of the Army. In the fall of 1941, when the RCAF was expanding, he informed RCAF senior officers that he wanted to form a French-Canadian squadron. Air Vice-Marshal L.F. Stevenson, senior RCAF Air Officer overseas, acknowledged that the scheme had merits, but felt the Minister was passing up "a golden opportunity to melt French and English Canadians into one." He consequently objected to the proposal. Nevertheless, the Minister stuck to his guns.

Shortly after taking Stevenson's place in London, Air Vice-Marshal H. Edwards renewed the counter-attack. He pointed out to the Minister that serious repercussions would ensue if a French-Canadian squadron suffered undue losses on a mission. English Canadian airmen already had enough difficulty understanding radio messages by Englishmen (several of whom had heavy Cockney accents); French Canadians should be spared this trial. The British Air Minister was then informed of the project. Although without enthusiasm, he said that if a squadron had to be formed it should be a bomber rather than a fighter unit. Power agreed to this, provided it could be set up without delay. Edwards received the order to designate N° 425 Squadron as a French-Canadian unit and to assemble teams of airmen, even before finding out the type of airplane with which the squadron would be equipped.

N° 425 Squadron was born on June 25, 1942 in Dishforth, Yorkshire. It became the fifth Canadian heavy bomber squadron to be formed overseas since the start of the war, and was attached to N° 4 Group of the RAF Bomber Command. Equipped with 20 Mark III Wellington aircraft, the squadron had an aircrew establishment of 100 (20 crews of 5), not counting the ground crew. Wing Commander J.M.W. St-Pierre, the first commanding officer, and his small staff had much to do to solve the many administrative problems that inevitably crop up when such a unit is created. In addition to organizing security and assigning accommodation, they had to staff the unit with aircrew personnel and technicians, take charge of the aircraft and outfit them, supply the stores with parts and the depots with ammunition, and organize crews that would then be

arranged into flights. After the compasses, machine guns, engines and controls had been checked, the first test flights were made in August. In October 1942, the unit received as its badge a flying lark with the motto "*Je te plumerai*"*. To identify this group of French Canadians, the ideal choice was made: the lark from the song "*Alouette*", by which they were known the world over.

Although French Canadians were in the majority, there were people of varied ethnic groups and places of origin. All, however, were proud to be "*Alouettes*".⁶⁷



Badge of N° 425 (Alouette) Squadron

* "I will pluck you".

In December 1943, however, just 53.1 per cent of the Squadron's personnel were French-speaking:

Personnel	RCAF		RAF	Total
	French	English		
Officers	24	11	1	36
Airmen	215	188	11	414
Total	239	199	12	450

Francophones were to be found in many other units of both the RAF and the RCAF. In March 1944, there were 471 Francophone officers, 3,623 airmen and 21 airwomen, making up 9.14 per cent of the 44,988 members of the RCAF overseas.⁶⁸ This low figure was still much higher than the percentage of French-Canadian airmen trained between the wars.

As for RCAF facilities in Canada, while the two coasts were favoured at the operational level — 24 bases on the Pacific, 18 on the Atlantic (including Newfoundland) and four in Quebec, — training schools were located mainly in central Canada, in particular the Prairies, which had 66 schools and support units, and Ontario, which had 54. By comparison, Quebec had only nine schools and seven units.⁶⁹ If the Atlantic and the Pacific were favoured with the RCN's port facilities and air defence bases, Ontario benefitted greatly by Army and RCAF schools, while the Prairies were dotted with many airports. In relation to its population, Quebec certainly did not receive its share of military installations and consequently was deprived of the associated economic benefits. The province did, however (as we shall see), receive other economic advantages.

The Department of Munitions and Supply

Until his death, Ernest Lapointe strove tirelessly to encourage more of his French-speaking compatriots to gravitate towards the Public Service. According to the Report of the Royal Commission on B & B,

however, “his efforts came to little in a federal administration that became even more thoroughly Anglophone as a result of its enormous and rapid expansion during World War II.... The Francophones were even more left out in the cold, and the purposes of the [Lacroix] amendment [which recognized the need for both languages in the federal Public Service] were forgotten.”⁷⁰ When Lapointe called for more French-speaking public servants to be hired, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, the Honourable C.D. Howe, gave a distinctly negative reaction. Even though the acting Minister, Angus MacDonald, assured Lapointe that his Department had spared no effort to recruit more bilingual public servants over the past six months, Lapointe discovered by personal inquiry that the Department did not have a single French-speaking public servant as of November 22, 1940, either in Ottawa or in the Province of Quebec. When Lapointe returned to the attack, insisting that Howe hire at least one purchasing agent in Quebec who spoke French, Howe replied that he was quite willing, but that such a person had to be competent.⁷¹ This suggests that competency was an attribute earned only by anglophones.

We have studied the personnel establishment of the Department of Munitions and Supply during the Second World War in order to demonstrate the difficulties encountered by French-speaking civilians in gaining recognition as equals within another department dedicated to “winning” the war. We have a second motive, however: to inform the reader of the truth behind the unpleasant remarks he or she may have read here and there about French Canadians “running away” from the war by working as civilians in war industries or with the Department of Munitions and Supply. We find that only 1,990 of the Department’s 11,006 employees, or 18.1 per cent, were French-speaking. In senior management positions, we find only four Francophones among the 151 officers on the war industries control committee, no Francophones among the 81 officers in the service and finance branches and six Francophones among the 142 officers in various agencies reporting to the Department.⁷²

The percentage of Francophones by region among Canadian employees in war industries is given below. Total strength at July 1, 1944 was 1,049,867.⁷³ Quebecers thus made up one third of Canada’s civilian labour force, while they formed 28.9 per cent of the population. Ontario, with 32.9 per cent of the population supplied 42.7, per cent of the labour force.

Region	Percentage
Atlantic	3.4
Quebec	33.6
Ontario	42.7
Prairies	10.6
Pacific	9.7

Let us next compare the proportion of the total population accounted for by males aged 18 to 45:⁷⁴ According to these percentages, the difference between the regions did not exceed 1.12 per cent, while Quebec is within 1.01 per cent of the Pacific — the region with the highest proportion of men between 18 and 45.

Region	Percentage
Atlantic	20.87
Quebec	20.98
Ontario	21.91
Prairies	21.69
Pacific	21.99

Colonel Stacey attempted to demonstrate the small participation of military personnel from the Province of Quebec (25.69 per cent, compared to 50.47 per cent for British Columbia).⁷⁵ We feel this comparison distorts the picture of Quebec's actual contribution to the war. When we compare Quebec's military and civilian war effort to its population and to other regions' efforts, a completely different picture emerges:⁷⁶

Region	Percentage
Atlantic	13.2
Quebec	15.8
Ontario	22.3
Prairies	14.2
Pacific	23.5

Finally, a comparison between the excess of males and the military contribution for each region appears to confirm a doubt that has haunted us for a long time.⁷⁷

Region	Regional Coefficient
Atlantic	+ 10.4
Quebec	+ 13.9
Ontario	+ 8.0
Prairies	— 4.0
Pacific	+ 3.9

In view of its small excess of males, Quebec's effort was greater than that of the other regions. This situation had little to do with race or language. We must remember its strong base of primary industries — lumber, mining (in particular aluminum and aircraft construction, and iron for shipbuilding) — and secondary industries, especially in manufacturing (munitions, artillery and battleships). The war promoted Quebec's industrial expansion, which had been lagging behind Ontario's. While the Maritime provinces had the benefit of Air Force and Navy coastal defences and served as depots for troops and supplies being sent overseas, Quebec, further inside the continent, received greater industrial benefits. The Prairies was the breadbasket of the Allied countries, and benefitted from the construction of many airfields, but industrial expansion, generally speaking, passed them by.

* * *

Although French Canadians (or Quebecers) had a different attitude to the war — and this difference at least demonstrates that freedom of expression was firmly entrenched in Canadian democracy — they proved to those who would see that they were ready to defend their country and work in war industries, even though they had to function in a language which was as foreign to nearly all of them as French then was to English Canadians. French-speaking units serving overseas also had to serve in English, although the use of French was tolerated, if only in the French-speaking infantry battalions.

We have proved by referring to documentary sources how little the general staff did before the war to prepare Francophones to serve outside the infantry. The latter did, however, succeed in serving in nearly all branches of the Army, even though they had to do so in their second language.⁷⁸ The campaign of slurs against Quebec, and French Canadians in general, is not only regrettable but unjustified in light of all the facts. If it is true, as Colonel Stacey maintains, that fighting side by side brought soldiers of the two ethnic groups together;⁷⁹ it is also true that the politicians' double dealing on conscription for overseas service and on the conditions of service for French Canadians meant a needless recurrence of the split between the two nationalities which had occurred in the First World War.

But was this unavoidable? The conscription crisis was artificial, created not only by the Army general staff which had trained and distributed its reserves improperly, but also by the Air Force, which had monopolized the best recruits to the detriment of the other services, and by the Navy, which had expanded more than was anticipated.⁸⁰ Some historians have even dared to write "that, in the final analysis, Canada's effort was not essential to winning the war."⁸¹ The brunt of the conscription crisis, which was inevitably a political issue, was unfortunately borne by French Canadians, who could not escape it: if they invoked the principle of individual freedom, they were accused of not being prepared to defend that principle with their lives; if they enlisted as volunteers, unless they did so in infantry battalions, they had to serve their homeland as second-class citizens in a language foreign to most of them.

According to historian Donald Creighton, Canada was barred in the Second World War

from all influence on the conduct of the war;... Canadians did not win their desired recognition as an independent national fighting force partly because they themselves did not seek it with sufficient thoroughness and consistency and partly because... Britain and the United States, for their own political purposes, found it hard to concede.⁸²

One might say the relationship between French and English Canadians was like that between Canadians on the one hand and Britons and Americans on the other. Overall, the French Canadian war effort should be considered highly praiseworthy. It could have been greater had French Canadians not been placed in the dilemma outlined above. The one redeeming factor was the vast volume of translation done by Colonel Chaballe's team. It would not be wrong to conclude that the diversity of service by French Canadians, more varied in the Second than the First World War, was based on the one-way bilingualism imposed on them.

Chapter 6

Post-War Policy: The Chiefs of Staff Resist; Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean is founded

Both languages should be treated the same and both ethnic groups (i.e. French and English) given equal opportunities in the Canadian services

Brooke Claxton
Minister of National Defence
(Defence Council minutes,
September 14, 1951)

We have gone as far as it is practicable to go in meeting the desires of French-speaking Canadians.

Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CB, CBE, DSO, CD
Chief of the General Staff of the Canadian Army
(Letter to Brooke Claxton, March 5, 1952)

To the delight of all Canadians, the war in Europe ended on May 8, 1945. The Prime Minister waited until May 16 before launching the election campaign that was to return his party to power on June 11. Although King personally was defeated (he was later returned in a by-election), the Liberal Party won, despite the conscription and reinforcement crises. And while the party took 41.3 per cent of the popular vote, Quebec was still largely responsible for the victory, electing 53 Liberal MPs with 50.8 per cent of the popular vote. Thus it is obvious that Quebec did not hold the Liberal government entirely responsible for the crises.¹

These crises might, however, have been expected to help bring about a change in attitudes once the conflict was over. Nothing of the

sort happened. During demobilization, everyone returned to pre-war occupations as if everything had been normal. The regular and reserve forces were reorganized, but again there was only one French-speaking unit in the 25 000 men regular Army: the Royal 22^e Regiment.² Since there were no French-speaking units in the Navy or Air Force, the strength of the R22^eR represented only 3.2 per cent of the total regular forces.

Liberal policy after the war (1946-1957)

The appointment of the Honourable Brooke Claxton as Minister of National Defence on December 12, 1946 inaugurated a new era.³ He promptly set up a National Defence Council to develop policy for the Department and the three services — the RCN, the Canadian Army and the RCAF. It was to meet once a week, in theory, and initially had about ten members, including the Minister of National Defence himself (as Chairman), his deputy ministers, the three chiefs of staff (Navy, Army and Air), the Chairman of the DRB and a secretary. None of these was a Francophone.⁴ The Minister hurriedly added his parliamentary secretary, Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Hugues Lapointe, and Colonel (ret) Paul Mathieu, who had recently been appointed Assistant Deputy Minister.⁵ Both had served with distinction during the war and were fully bilingual.

Even before the Defence Council was set up, Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez, Assistant Adjutant-General at Army HQ, had raised the question of Francophone representation in the Army. He pointed out to his superiors that only 232 of the 1,897 officers in the regular Army, or 12.2 per cent, were French-speaking. Of these, 131 were infantry; in other words, 23.5 per cent of infantry officers but only 7.5 per cent of officers in other branches were French Canadians. He recommended, among other things, that Francophone representation be raised to 30 per cent in the infantry and 15 per cent in other corps.⁶

Colonel E.F. Schmidlin, Director of Military Training, objected to greater “decentralization” of units than had been planned, citing military effectiveness as the reason. He thought that English should be the only “language of combat”, since in any future war Canada would fight beside Great Britain or the United States.⁷ Colonel L.M. Chesley, Director of Staff Duties, went further in a document which

was signed by Major-General C.C. Mann, Vice Chief of the General Staff. He did not agree that French Canadians should be fairly represented in the regular Army. He felt the solution to the problem lay in their representation in the Reserve, from which the greater part of units were drawn in time of war. In his view, French Canadians were well enough represented in the regular forces by the tactical staffs (in Montreal and Québec) and in the signals and logistics corps. He agreed, however, that there might be some advantage in setting up a basic training school in Quebec for Francophone recruits and make them bilingual before they were integrated into the various units of the regular Army.⁸

Naturally, Bernatchez did not agree with this blinkered thinking. Again, he recommended that the following units be stationed at Valcartier:


- 2 armoured squadrons
- 1 artillery battery
- 1 engineer squadron
- 1 signal squadron

The general staff nevertheless adopted Mann's recommendation and agreed to set up an all arms school at Valcartier, a decision which was confirmed by Order in Council PC 137/444 on February 6, 1947. As the government found it necessary to cut DND establishments, however, the project was dropped.⁹

The list of officers in the Canadian Army is valuable evidence of the lack of concern for Francophone representation in the military. The following are the number of French-speaking field and general officers in 1947:


	Total	French Canadians
Lieutenant-generals	1	—
Major-generals	7	1
Brigadiers	21	2
Colonels	<u>46</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	75	9

French Canadians made up only 12 per cent at this level. The two brigadiers, J.P.E. Bernatchez and J.V. Allard, were the last on their promotion list, although five of the six French-speaking colonel were among the first on theirs.¹⁰



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At Army HQ in Ottawa, the decision centre, senior officers were employed in the following manner:

	Total	French Canadians	%
General staff branch	33	3	9.0
Adjutant General's branch	26	3	11.5
Quartermaster General's branch	<u>28</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Total	87	6	6.9

These duties were assigned to French Canadians:

General staff officers	— 2	lieutenant-colonels
Deputy Adjutant General	— 1	lieutenant-colonel
Director of Infantry	— 1	colonel
Director, Pay	— 1	colonel
Chaplain General (RC)	— 1	honorary lieutenant-colonel

None of these was a key decision-making position except for the Director of Infantry, whose arm had the most numerous personnel in the Army.¹¹

In the Reserve, units were organized according to the established Commands: Eastern, Quebec, Central, Prairies and Western. Even in Quebec Command, only half the main units were commanded by French Canadians in 1948:

	Total	French-Canadian commanding officers
HQ, Infantry brigades	5	3
Armoured units	5	2
Artillery units	10	5
Engineer units	2	—
Signal units	2	—
Infantry battalions	18	13
Medical corps units	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	50	26

Again we find that Francophones were most heavily represented in infantry units.¹²

The Conference of Defence Associations, a lobby group, represented twelve associations, such as infantry, artillery, armoured corps and so on. Each association sent two members who were field officers in the Reserve. In 1948 there was only one French Canadian among these 24 representatives, and he did not sit on the board of directors.¹³

Thus, despite the urgings of Brigadier Bernatchez, who was promptly transferred to Québec, nothing was done throughout the system to improve the situation that had contributed to the conscription crises in the two world wars. The best that can be said is that late, in 1947, when Defence Minister Brooke Claxton favoured 30 per cent French Canadian representation in the Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General C. Foulkes, worked with Université Laval to determine how to improve the English and mathematical skills of prospective French-speaking officer cadets.¹⁴ Conversations between Foulkes and Abbé J. Garneau appear to have been productive, but in an unexpected way. When the Defence Council began its 1948 meetings, the General now asserted that French was not a foreign language and that every English-speaking officer “would find it convenient to be conversant with the French language.”¹⁵ The Defence Council thus approved the teaching of French to English-speaking Army officers. In the RCN and RCAF, however, the chiefs preferred to “discuss the matter further” with their staffs.¹⁶

In March 1948, the Council recommended an additional allowance to servicemen who qualified as interpreters in either French or foreign languages.¹⁷ Outlooks seemed to be broadening. When Army HQ finally authorized grants for studying foreign languages, in 1952, however, these applied only to Reserve personnel learning Russian.¹⁸ We may conclude that French was considered a foreign language when viewed as a language of work or an operational language in the CF, but not where study grants or translation bonuses were concerned.

Yet Claxton, spurred on no doubt by his parliamentary secretary, was genuinely interested in Francophone representation. In the summer of 1948, he pointed out there was not a single French

Canadian listed for the next NDC course.¹⁹ In September, he again urged that the Forces

make every endeavour to increase the number of French-speaking officers
[I]n the matter of promotions there would seem some justification for consideration of officers speaking both languages on the ground that it was an additional qualification and because it is a military advantage.²⁰

However laudable this plea may have been, it obviously did not speak to the military leaders' central concerns. They did not even discuss it.

On August 7, 1948, the Honourable Louis Stephen St-Laurent, who had been MP for Québec East since February 1942, succeeded King as Liberal Party Leader. He became Prime Minister on November 15, 1948 and remained in office until June 21, 1957. A sixty-year-old professional lawyer, he was practising law in Québec when King invited him to replace the Right Honourable Ernest Lapointe as Minister of Justice. In contrast to Lapointe, who had sought to make his English-speaking colleagues — C.D. Howe in particular — recognize French Canadians as equals in the war effort, St-Laurent, who had an Irish mother and was considered by some an "*anglifié*",²¹ never spoke out in public to counter the many injustices against French Canadians in the Public Service and the Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, the R22^eR detachment at Saint-Jean had been giving basic training instruction to French-speaking recruits. Since there was no competent English instructor, complaints were received that recruits made little progress in English before going to trade schools where all instruction was given in English. Major-General R.O.G. Morton, GOC Quebec Command, accordingly recommended that a civilian teacher be hired to teach English, that small groups of recruits be sent outside Quebec to become familiar with the English language and culture, and that French-speaking recruits be sent to (English-language) trade schools as quickly as possible.²²

Colonel F.J. Fleury, Director of Organization at Army HQ, believed that a better solution would be to establish an all arms military school in Quebec, where basic training could be given in French, followed by three months of English training. He believed that the existing trade schools should also have bilingual instructors to help integrate Francophones into the system. A survey showed,

however, that instructors in those schools were not interested in teaching unilingual Francophones. The Chief of the General Staff nevertheless ordered that an all arms school be opened at Saint-Jean, as recommended. The change did not take place until May 10, 1949, and only two English teachers were hired. Not until June 27, 1950 was a special English section set up, with a captain, six lieutenants, four sergeants and three corporals, who were responsible for teaching English to 150 recruits (or one new contingent of 30 recruits each month).²³ On March 9, 1951, Army HQ agreed to expand the teaching staff because of increasing enrolment for Korea and Germany; and that fall, the corporals were replaced by sergeants. The school remained at Saint-Jean until July 1952.²⁴

While the Army had 281 French-speaking officers (15.2 per cent) in 1947, the RCAF had only 95 (4.4 per cent) and the RCN 30 (2.5 per cent).²⁵ Except for its recruiting units in Quebec, the RCAF operated entirely in English. Even then, enlistment forms were in English only. Furthermore, all recruits were required to speak and write English correctly before enlisting.

In the RCN, the maximum establishment authorized for the regular force was 10,375. English was the only official language. Traditions and customs were still so British in 1949 that the Mainguy Commission, set up to investigate mutinies on three ships the previous year, recommended measures to “Canadianize” the RCN.²⁶ Nothing, however, was said about the lack of French-Canadian representation or the possibility that French Canadians might serve their country in their own language.²⁷

The prospect, therefore, of more or less official bilingualism — in other words, recognition of the use of French as well as English — was dim before 1950, despite isolated efforts to move in that direction. It took the Korean War to revive the ideal. The war made it clear once again that deliberate steps had to be taken to encourage and facilitate French Canadian participation.

After sending three ships to the Far East on July 12, 1950 and, eight days later placing N° 426 Air Transport Squadron on United Nations duty, the Government of Canada decided on August 7 to raise a “special contingent” of volunteers comprising one infantry brigade with additional support, to a total strength of 7,490.²⁸ Since the

R22^eR was to be represented by one of the three infantry battalions, one third of the infantry and reinforcements were expected to be French-speaking. The situation had to be orchestrated to secure French-Canadian participation without another conscription crisis in Quebec.

Army HQ set up a Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems, chaired by Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez, who had returned to Ottawa as Director of Military Training. But he was immediately sent to Tokyo to command the Canadian mission in the Far East; consequently, his report was delayed six months. The best summary we have of the Bernatchez Report is in a study of the CMR de Saint-Jean by historian Jean-Yves Gravel.²⁹ Completed in February 1951, the report recommended the setting up of an all arms training camp in Quebec for Francophones.

The report also attempts to explain why French Canadians do not enlist. They believe the Armed Forces are English institutions and their job and career opportunities are determined by their degree of bilingualism. They know it is not easy to become fully bilingual and they consequently think the language barrier will always hinder their promotion, unless they serve in French-speaking units such as the "Van Doos". Some young people would like very much to enlist in something other than the infantry, but that is practically impossible unless they are bilingual.

Their outlook is still regional, and they hesitate to enlist in corps such as artillery and armoured units, where they would have to spend most of their lives away from French-speaking centres. Religious authorities and many family members fear that military service in predominantly English Protestant communities would make them lose their language and their faith. After a few years in the military, this cultural uprooting and assimilation extends to the families of French-speaking servicemen who are forced to live outside Quebec, with the insoluble problem of schooling for their children. Some people also believe there is direct discrimination against Francophones. The ultimate reason for low recruitment is that parents still consider the Armed Forces a place to reform difficult sons, instead of envisaging a real military career. The Air Force, with its technical image, will be the first of the three services to shatter this myth. All these beliefs are made more powerful because military life is almost unknown in Quebec, while remaining unpopular. For most people, National Defence is seen more as a welfare agency than an employer.

When J.A. Stevenson, an English-speaking reporter, denounced the low representation of French Canadians in the special contingent recruited for Korea, in May 1951, the Minister immediately denied his assertions. Far from being under represented, he said, Quebecers, who make up 29 per cent of the population, supplied

3,134 out of 10,587 volunteers, or 30 per cent.³⁰ The minister, however, had skirted the issue: his figures were for the province, not the language or ethnic group.

Léon Balcer, a young Conservative MP from Trois-Rivières, took up the issue. The minister spoke of generosity and national unity, he said, but how could he be taken seriously? We have only to look at French-Canadian representation at Army HQ, in 1951, to answer this question:

	Total	French Canadians	%
Lieutenant-generals	2	—	—
Major-generals	7	—	—
Brigadiers	33	2	6.0
Colonels	43	4	9.3
Lieutenant-colonels	220	18	8.2
Majors	<u>560</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>10.2</u>
Total	865	81	9.4

Balcer next turned to the only corps school in Quebec: the Ordnance Corps School (and the two depots attached to it). Out of 20 lieutenant-colonels there was only one French Canadian, and out of 50 majors, four spoke French. The situation was much the same at Command headquarters in Montreal. And in the Reserve units of Montreal there were four French-speaking regiments compared to nine English-speaking ones. Despite this, Francophone soldiers made up 50 per cent of the latter's strength, while a paltry one per cent of officers were French Canadian. In the RCN, Balcer continued, the situation was even worse. There was not a single officer ranking higher than commander, a rank equivalent to lieutenant-colonel. The Department ought to consider creating French-speaking units in the RCN as it had done in the Army. Balcer concluded by suggesting that a military college be established in Quebec to ensure that adequate numbers of French-speaking officers were trained for the staff and units.³¹

Claxton, unfortunately, fed back to Balcer the arguments put forward by his staff. He would be pleased to see the number of French-Canadian officers increase, but they had difficulty adjusting to the English Protestant environment. The cost of operating the two military colleges (at Kingston and Victoria) was already exorbitant, and 25 per cent of the student officers at RMC and Royal Roads

The Honourable Brooke Claxton, PC, Minister of National Defence, 1946-54, succeeded in founding the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean despite systematic obstruction by his three chiefs of staff, who opposed equal recognition for the French language. (PMR 84-281)



After serving as an officer in the RCN, the Honourable Léon Balcer, PC, was elected Conservative MP for Trois-Rivières, 1949-65. He frequently criticized the Liberal government in the House, pointing out the injustices to which his compatriots were subjected. (Public Archives of Canada /C10205)

then spoke French.³² As for the RCN, whose strength was only 14,000 men, he added that “it is not economically possible to do so [that is, have Francophone units], even if it were desirable.”³³ It was thus crystal clear: for the RCN and the Army — no one seemed concerned about the RCAF — the introduction of bilingualism would have cost too much.

What lay behind the Minister’s reply was the staff’s determination to maintain the unilingual English character of the Armed Forces. It was all very well for the Minister to point to greater representation of Francophones among officer cadets at the military colleges; what he failed to say was that these students would have to become bilingual as well as be prepared to serve in cultural surroundings foreign or even hostile to their own culture if they wanted a career in the Armed Forces. It all too often seemed that bilingualism was only desirable if French Canadians alone had to pay the price. The proof is that in February 1951, Air Vice-Marshal J.L. Plant, Chairman of the Personnel Members Committee (PMC) — the body responsible for planning personnel policy for the three services — had raised the question of having cadets in military colleges study French. The level of French required of Anglophones seemed too high, and the Armed Forces were losing too many potential candidates. Instead of turning down the request for lower standards, the Defence Council left the matter to be decided by the commandants of the colleges.³⁴

Three months later, Plant raised the question of the King’s Regulations and Orders. Only the Army published these in both languages, and it admitted the French translation was always six months late. The Council decided that the Army should continue this policy while the RCN and RCAF should do so “as far as their means permitted.”³⁵ At the same meeting, the Minister again broached the question of French Canadian representation in the CAF, insisting that every endeavour be made to recruit more French Canadian officers.³⁶

Staff officers were apparently cut to the quick by Léon Balcer’s allegations and closed ranks. Major-General H.A. Sparling, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, no doubt forgetting that English was the only language used anywhere in the Army except in Quebec (where French was not used consistently), claimed that French Canadians had the

same opportunities as everyone else, but not enough of them enlisted.³⁷ In the same vein, Air Marshal W.A. Curtis voiced the opinion that discrimination had never been practised against French Canadian officers, but rather the opposite, since as a general rule they received accelerated promotions more often than their English-speaking contemporaries.³⁸ The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, added that French-speaking senior officers were younger than their English-speaking counterparts.³⁹ These gentlemen were much more concerned about maintaining their control over positions and promotions than solving the question of the endemic under representation of French Canadians. The Minister, who had just rejected Brigadier Bernatchez's recommendations, again asked for a statistical report showing the number, average age and length of service of French-Canadian officers from the rank of major up to lieutenant-general, compared to the same data for English-speaking officers.

Although both J.A. Blanchette, the Minister's parliamentary secretary, and Colonel (ret) Paul Mathieu, Assistant Deputy Minister, were present, they did not intervene in this debate which was lost before it even began. Indeed, Mathieu spoke out only once at the forty-five Defence Council meetings he attended; his intervention in August 1950, was on a subject of little importance.⁴⁰ On the other hand, L.P. Picard, Liberal MP for Bellechasse, did not hesitate to state in the House that he agreed with Balcer.⁴¹ Even Conservative MP for Nanaimo, Major-General George R. Pearkes, agreed with Balcer's views.⁴² Little by little, the Minister and his staff had to come to terms with the inevitable. What compelled them was French-Canadian public opinion⁴³ aroused by Balcer, but even more the Army's need to recruit for the 27th Brigade which the government had authorized to be raised on May 7, and to obtain reinforcements for the 25th Brigade in Korea.

Even before recruiting for the Korean War was completed, the Government of Canada had supported a proposal by the United States to set up a multinational deterrent force under NATO to protect Western Europe against USSR expansionism. This time, instead of recruiting volunteers directly for the NATO Special Force, Reserve units were requested to supply sub-units of volunteers for the 27th Infantry Brigade, which was formed specially for this purpose. The following is a list of French-speaking units that contributed to this force of 509 officers and 9,344 men, including reinforcements, over a two-year period:

Armoured	Le Régiment de Trois-Rivières	(2 of 10 sub-units)
	Le Régiment de Hull	
Artillery	6 th field regiment, Lévis	(1 of 6 sub-units)
Signals		(0 of 3 sub-units)
Infantry	Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, Montreal	(1 of 15 sub-units)
Service corps		(nil)
Medical corps	9 th Field Ambulance, Mon- treal	(1 of 2 sub-units)
Ordnance Corps		(nil)
Electrical and mechanical engineers		(nil)
Military police		(nil)
Intelligence		(nil)

Although many troops spoke French, English was the only language of command, and the brigade was placed under the operational command of the British Army of the Rhine.⁴⁴

In mid-September 1951, members of the Defence Council were still discussing the Minister's proposals to improve French-Canadian recruitment. If there was no improvement, he said, French Canadians would take advantage of the Department's failure to act in order to avoid military service. It was not enough to offer them English courses. "Both languages should be treated the same and both ethnic groups given equal opportunities in the Canadian services."⁴⁵

Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, who had been Chief of the General Staff since February 1, 1951, rejected the idea: "If we made an exception for French-speaking Canadians in Quebec all other provinces would ask for similar arrangements."⁴⁶ He did not specify what arrangements the other provinces would demand. He simply claimed that it was difficult to obtain science textbooks in French, and said that they could not be expected to be translated for Canadian needs. The Council did not reject the proposal by Université Laval that a preparatory year be given to French-speaking officer cadets at Laval and the Université de Montréal; instead it commissioned Dr O.M. Solandt, Chairman of the DRB, to seek a compromise with

Abbé Jacques Garneau, Secretary-General of Université Laval.

Like the Army, the RCN had difficulty recruiting French Canadians, and keeping them once they were recruited. All recruits received naval training at HMCS Cornwallis, NS. Francophones took an average of 38 weeks to complete their training, in comparison to 21 weeks for Anglophones. In 1951, a mere 2.2 per cent of officers were French Canadian, compared to 11 per cent of seamen. Representation among the senior officers was as follows:⁴⁷

	Total	French Canadians	%
Vice-Admiral	1	—	—
Rear-Admiral	5	—	—
Commodore	10	—	—
Captain	28	—	—
Commander	125	3	2.4
Lieutenant-Commander	<u>204</u>	<u>6</u>	2.9
Total	373	9	

The Minister's desire to know the reasons for this situation prompted naval authorities to launch an investigation in 1951. Commander Marcel Jetté was asked to chair the inquiry; its findings are summarized by historian Jean-Yves Gravel.⁴⁸

The Jetté Report, one of the most interesting on the outlook of Quebecers after the war, analyses the reasons why they did not enlist in the Royal Canadian Navy, which they indeed confused with the Merchant Marine. Above all, French Canadians considered sailors to be “bums” with a girl in every port. They had the impression the Navy was much more British than Canadian, as had been confirmed by the Mainguy Report published two years earlier, and they believed that Canada fought in wars for which England was more or less responsible. French Canadians also thought they would not be promoted because of their language difficulties. It is a fact that French-speaking seamen had first to learn English very quickly, and then master Navy jargon, which is a language all to itself. Added to this was the obligation to live out one's life in a mindset different from one's aspirations. Moreover, family ties were still strong in Quebec. Mothers in particular did not like to see their sons leave for a “foreign province”, still less for far-off countries whose ports threatened their eternal salvation. If, in spite of everything, a French Canadian let himself be won over by Navy recruiters, he had first to pass the G.F. Test, which was adapted only to an English-speaking mind. That is why 80 per cent of Quebecers failed this test, which had simply been “translated” into French. The failure rate for English Canadians

was 52 per cent. The general impression was that the Navy did not want French Canadians in its ranks, which is not far from the truth if we consider there were only two recruiting centres in the province, compared to seven in Ontario.

Following this inquiry, the RCN opened a school in Québec for French-speaking naval recruits in February 1952. Known as HMCS D'Iberville, it took in recruits for six months before sending them into the culture shock represented by HMCS Cornwallis in N.S.⁴⁹

In the RCAF, the situation faced by French Canadians was hardly better, although there were more of them. In 1951, 4.7 per cent of regular officers and 16.3 per cent of airmen spoke French. The list of senior officers shows how little importance was attached in time of peace to training French-speaking professional airmen.⁵⁰

	Total	French Canadians	%
Air marshal	1	—	—
Air vice-marshal	8	—	—
Air commodore	17	—	—
Group captain	56	2	3.6
Wing commander	97	5	5.2
Squadron leader	<u>254</u>	<u>7</u>	2.8
Total	433	14	

Only one important RCAF headquarters was located in Quebec, at Saint-Hubert. None of the 37 senior positions was occupied by a Francophone and only English was used in Quebec because of the belief that the Air Force, by international convention, had to operate in English.⁵¹

The need for reinforcements for Korea and Germany⁵² and the pressure of French-Canadian public opinion, went a long way towards overcoming Brooke Claxton's hesitations, and then immediate political necessity turned the tide. On June 12, 1952, barely four days before by-elections at Brome-Missisquoi and Roberval, did Claxton announce in the House the creation of a bilingual military college at Saint-Jean, Quebec.⁵³

Influential newspapers in French Canada, while applauding the creation of the College, tended to interpret this as a political move. English newspapers, on the other hand, were indifferent. The *Peterborough Examiner* gave its approval but only if the college taught English to Francophones; the *Victoria Colonist* believed that the new college would enable Quebecers to close the academic gap. Nearly every English-language newspaper took the opportunity to point out that English must remain the only language of work in the Armed Forces.⁵⁴

Colonel Marcellin Lahaie, who had become familiar with the situation as secretary to the Bernatchez Committee, which studied the question of French-speaking servicemen, was appointed first Commandant of the *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean* (CMR), at the suggestion of Major-General Bernatchez. The beginning of the academic year, which was delayed because events had moved so swiftly, was soon upon him. The number of officers in training had been set at 125, of whom only 60 per cent were to be French-speaking. First- and second-year courses were organized while qualified professors and administrative staff personnel were hired. CMR was to be a bilingual institution where courses would be given in either language; a student's second language would be studied in literature courses and learned through social contact. Anglophones had everything to gain, after all, by learning a little French, while Francophones had to master English because they would have to complete their third and fourth years at RMC in Kingston.

The founding of CMR de Saint-Jean was a turning point in the history of bilingualism in the Canadian Forces. As Gravel has written in his study of that institution:

The resistance in the CF to the founding of a military academy in Quebec reflected the mindset of English Canadians. Psychologically they were not ready to accept the bilingualism symbolized by the new college, because bilingualism ran contrary to their shared prejudices and political traditions. English, it was thought, had to remain the only "military" language, an assumption that even French Canadians in the military accepted or tolerated. The college in no way, however, meant recognition of a second language of work, which was considered a real threat to military efficiency.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, as Gravel pointed out, the very existence of the CMR

“would allow more French Canadians to pursue a military career by making it easier for them to enter the existing system through the military colleges.”⁵⁶ The CMR, he concludes, “was to prove one of the few really typical Canadian institutions in both conception and execution, as the Royal Military College never was and as the Canadian Armed Forces are now attempting to become, after a century’s delay.”⁵⁷ We shall see later that the bilingualism policy would also affect RMC.

The all arms school for Francophones known as the Canadian Army Training School (CATS) left Saint-Jean in July to make way for the CMR, and relocated to Valcartier. Army HQ decided to alter its role. In future, it would offer:

1° Basic military training courses lasting eight weeks for French-speaking recruits in corps other than infantry (French-speaking infantry took military training with the R22^eR) — number of trainees: 70

2° French courses of 20 to 24 weeks for English-speaking commissioned and non-commissioned officers — number of trainees: 25

3° Junior NCO courses of eight weeks in French for French-speaking soldiers, and English courses lasting 20 weeks for French-speaking recruits — number of trainees: 100 for both courses.⁵⁸

In January 1953, Army HQ authorized the enlistment of apprentice soldiers aged 16 and 17 for trades corps. Some of them were to be attached to the CATS, but as early as September 1, 1956, French-speaking apprentices were sent to the Ordnance Corps school at Longue Pointe (Montreal).⁵⁹ This school also trained militia and COTC officer cadets, beginning in the summer of 1954. In 1957 it trained Francophones from A Squadron of the 1/8 Canadian Hussars, an armoured unit recently incorporated into the regular forces.⁶⁰

In fact, Army HQ authorized the creation of several French-speaking units during the period of expansion begun in 1950. In August, the 3rd Battalion of the R22^eR had been created with a view to preparing French-speaking reinforcements for the 2nd and 1st battalions

and possibly replacing the latter in Korea. In May 1951, two companies of Fusiliers Mont-Royal, a Militia regiment, were mobilized to join the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which was sent to Germany. The resulting company was incorporated into the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion, which in September 1954 became the 3rd Battalion, Canadian Guards.⁶¹ The following year, GHQ created a divisional unit, the 3rd L.A.A. Battery, consisting entirely of Francophones, which it located at Picton, Ontario.

Further changes in attitudes towards French can also be noted, some with their roots in earlier periods of Canadian History. The 22nd Battalion, as we have seen, had taken the title Royal 22nd Regiment in 1920, and the present French version, *Royal 22^e Régiment*, became official in 1928.⁶² In 1931, the 65th Carabiniers (Mont-Royal) of the NPAM adopted the title of *Fusiliers Mont-Royal*, and its commanding officer applied at the same time for authorization to display its battle honours in French. This request was turned down by the Chief of the General Staff on the grounds that approval of the English version had been signed by His Majesty the King. In 1956, the R22^eR and the *Régiment de la Chaudière* both of which had Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as Colonel-in-Chief, requested that their battle honours be translated into French. The Sovereign gave her consent, which was conveyed to the Minister of National Defence by the Governor General on May 15, 1958.⁶³ This authorization also extended to the *Régiment de Trois-Rivières*, the *Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent*, the *Fusiliers Mont-Royal*, the *Régiment de Maisonneuve*, the *Régiment du Saguenay* and the *Fusiliers de Sherbrooke*.⁶⁴

Returning to the period under consideration, NDHQ set up a Bureau of Current Affairs in January 1951 to improve seamen's, soldiers' and airmen's general knowledge on matters of national and international interest. On February 25, 1952, a dozen French-speaking officers were assembled at Saint-Jean, Quebec, to learn about the goals and techniques of the Bureau, which, since the previous October, had been publishing a series of monthly brochures in French and English.⁶⁵

On July 1, 1954, the Honourable Ralph Osborne Campney, who had been parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence from January 24, 1951 to October 14, 1952 and then Associate Minister from February 12, 1953 to June 30, 1954,

became Minister of National Defence. He held the position until the Liberals were defeated in June 1957.⁶⁶ During his time in office, there was no mention of the question of bilingualism in the Defence Council minutes.⁶⁷ What happened? The HQ staffs approached the problem obliquely by asking the DRB to carry out a series of inquiries. Ultimately, however, these failed to provide the principles upon which an effective program could be built.

Two and a half years after training in French had been implemented at HMCS *D'Iberville*, the Naval staff asked the DRB to conduct an inquiry into the success of the program. A team of three researchers discovered that about 40 per cent of French-speaking RCN recruits were discharged within ten months of coming on strength, in contrast to 15 per cent of Anglophones. Francophones who completed their naval training, however, were as likely as their English-speaking colleagues to remain in the RCN.⁶⁸ The researchers linked the high failure rate to some recruits' wish not to return to school for language courses, rather than lack of motivation for naval training.⁶⁹ HMCS *D'Iberville* officers recognized that newly recruited French-speaking seamen had to make two changes at once: adjust from a civilian to a naval lifestyle, and move from a French-speaking to an English-speaking cultural environment. The researchers even recommended that "a recruit's first experience with the Navy should take place within a group of similar recruits, since they will adjust to military life more easily than if they are immediately thrown in with members of a different ethnic group."⁷⁰ This ought to have been an argument for having one or more vessels manned entirely by Francophones. The researchers did not recommend such a course, however, reminding the Naval staff instead that the French-Canadian officers at HMCS *D'Iberville* were fully agreed on the necessity of an integrated Navy in which English was the language of instruction and work.⁷¹ This ambivalence was reflected in the recruits themselves who did not like language courses although they agreed in principle — at least, according to the researchers — that they had to learn English.⁷² Did they have any choice in a unilingual English Navy?

RCAF staff officers also turned to the DRB in 1955 to evaluate the English courses given at the RCAF School of English. First located at Trenton, Ontario, and commanded by Flight Lieutenant H.P. Lagacé, the school moved to Saint-Jean, Quebec, on

April 2, 1951.⁷³ Its staff of 17 officers, 18 NCOs and airmen and eight civilians was responsible for teaching and administering 30 officers in training, 238 airmen and 42 airwomen. By June 30, numbers at the school had risen to 512 (43 instructors and administrators and 469 students), i.e. more than the other two schools located in Saint-Jean, although it was only commanded by a flight lieutenant.⁷⁴ The station where the school was located was entirely administered in English under Group Captain W.G. Webber.⁷⁵

The deliberate aim was to make French Canadian recruits bilingual. The researchers concluded that although the results (see Appendix JJ) obtained by the language training program in the Air Force were substantial, the failure rates in trades courses for graduates of the School of English were still very much higher than those of the others.⁷⁶ Since they seemed to take for granted that anyone serving in the RCAF had to learn English, they concluded that the policy which had so far been applied to Francophones in the trade schools was at fault. If, however, we consider the high failure rate among Anglophones, should we not rather be surprised by the number of Francophones who succeeded? But such thoughts did not fit the outlook of the times. In any case, only two of the thirteen people who discussed this policy were Francophones: E.J. Brazeau of the DRB and Flight Lieutenant L. Pagé, Chief Instructor of the RCAF School of English, who was the lowest-ranking officer in the group.

In the summer of 1956, the DRB published a study by Brazeau on advertising and recruitment for the RCAF aimed at French Canadians.⁷⁷ The author maintained that advertisements originally composed in English were translated too literally; cultural differences must be taken into account. He also noted there were fewer recruiters in Quebec and Montreal than elsewhere in Canada, that these two districts were the most populous of the 22 recruiting districts, and that recruiters absolutely must be bilingual if they were to carry out their duties. The most important feature of this report, however, was an analysis that went beyond the author's terms of reference and was entitled "Facts and suppositions regarding French-speaking language groups". After comparing the particular situation in Québec as regards public education standards with that of the other provinces, he suggested the RCAF should review its restrictive enlistment policy. Otherwise it would continue to attract

few French-speaking career volunteers, which might have unfortunate consequences in the event of mobilization.

Brazeau carried out another study, this time on the training of groundcrew personnel from 1953 to 1957.⁷⁸ His research demonstrates clearly that the high failure rate among French-speaking airmen in trades courses was because of the nature of their experience during these courses rather than their cultural antecedents:

Members of French-speaking groups had lower status, since in order to be socially acceptable, they had to consent to speak only English.... Conflicts arose because Anglophones were led to believe they could automatically expect English to be the only language used in their presence, and because many French Canadians thought this situation unhealthy and did not agree to follow the rule.⁷⁹

This was a perfect description of the cause of Francophones' "marginalization". The English-speaking senior officers who had devised the RCAF's training policy had made the basic mistake of taking no steps to accommodate two groups of citizens whose languages and cultures were different. Instead, they favoured a policy of assimilation of the French-speaking group as quickly as possible.⁸⁰

The transfer of many French-speaking families to Germany in 1953-54 called for special action regarding the education of military dependants. Because of the farsightedness of Deputy Minister C.M. Drury, the position of Director of [Dependants] Education was created in June 1954.⁸¹ The Ontario curriculum was used for Anglophones and the Quebec curriculum for Francophones, at least at Werl, West Germany, where the 2nd Battalion of the R22^{or} was posted. At Marville, Gros Tenquin and Metz, France, airmen were not so well served, although the Ontario "bilingual" program was used with the addition of conversational French courses.⁸²

The Conservative interlude, 1957-63

After 22 years in power, the Liberals were defeated and replaced by John Diefenbaker's Conservatives. The Honourable George Randolph Pearkes, VC, became Minister of National Defence on June 21, 1957.

Many changes soon took place in the regular Army. The 3rd

Battalion, Canadian Guards, was disbanded and the Francophones who had served in it were transferred either to the R22^eR or to A Squadron of the 1/8 Canadian Hussars at Valcartier. Early in 1958, Battery “X” of the 3rd Regiment RCHA moved from Camp Gagetown to Camp Valcartier.⁸³ Thus in 1958, many of the French-speaking elements that the general staff had refused General Bernatchez twelve years earlier were now located at Valcartier.


In October 1958, a study of French-Canadian representation in the Canadian Army was released.⁸⁴ In the last of three studies commissioned by Claxton,⁸⁵ Marcel Chaput explained that the proportion of French Canadians in the army — 14 per cent of commissioned officers and 21 per cent of non-commissioned officers — was far lower than the proportion of Francophones in the population of Canada, 29 per cent. He demonstrated clearly that over the preceding ten years equal proportions of English and French Canadians had enlisted, concluding that, contrary to popular belief, Francophone under representation was due to a much higher departure rate in the early years of military service. His findings are summarized below:

Average years of service upon taking release		
	Anglophones	Francophones
Officers	21	11
Other ranks	5½	3½

Thus the retention rate of Francophones was 52.4 per cent of that of Anglophones among officers and 63.6 per cent among other ranks. The author recommended that any policy aimed at increasing the representation of French Canadians must address the causes of these losses.

Some months later, J. Mackay Hitsman of the Army’s Directorate of History wrote a study on the “problem” of French-Canadian representation in the Canadian Army after the war.⁸⁶ This project was a sequel to a study he had completed in 1953 on Canadian Army manpower and reinforcements in the Second World War.⁸⁷ Hitsman addressed the question of Francophone representation, the creation of CATS, the CMR, the committee to Study “bilingual problems”,


Major-General J.P.E. Bernatchez, CMM, CBE, DSO, CD, was the first French-Canadian general at NDHQ to fight openly for French rights. (Z-10265)



Roger Lavergne, Director General of Dependants Education Programs, was also responsible for administering bilingualism related problems at DND from 1966. (CF 66-605)



Brigadier C.M. Drury, DSO, Deputy Minister of National Defence, 1949-1955, ensured that the many children of servicemen were educated in either official language, after the Canadian Forces expanded to serve NATO.
(PMR 72-825)



The Honourable J.P.A. Sévigny, PC, a wounded veteran, was the Conservative MP for Longueuil, and Associate Minister of National Defence, 1959-63. He tried with some success to improve the lot of French-Canadian servicemen.
(RE 69-1954)

the formation of new French-speaking units and the translation of battle honours. He recalled the traditional attitude of the English-speaking majority to the question of language, citing General Guy Simonds' words as evidence of this attitude: "We have gone as far as it is practicable to go in meeting the desires of French-speaking Canadians." Simonds felt it would have been impossible to fight a war in both languages; he even claimed not to know of an effective bilingual army. He was convinced that moderate French Canadians appreciated what he was doing for them and that only a minority group of noisy extremists was demanding the creation of a French-speaking army.⁸⁸ Bilingualism policies in the Army were clearly retarded by Simonds; they did not begin to really move until 1966, when General Jean Victor Allard became the first French Canadian to rise to the position of Chief of the Defence Staff.

The forementioned studies remain the only significant attempts to enlighten the politicians and military men responsible for Canadian Army policy until the Forbell Report was released in 1965 for the Royal Commission on B & B, and the Ross Report, in 1967.

Two events occurred during the Conservative tenure that have relevance to our story. The first took place in 1959 on the Plains of Abraham in Québec, on the eve of *St-Jean Baptiste* day,* when Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, as Colonel-in-Chief delivered the new colours to the three battalions of the R22^eR. For the first time in Canada since the French Regime, all commands for arms and foot drill were given in French.⁸⁹ The following January, the 3rd Battalion of the R22^eR provided the guard of honour that accompanied the funeral procession of Quebec Premier Paul Sauvé, who was buried at Saint-Eustache. The commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J.O.A. Letellier, who had taken part in the September parade on the Plains of Abraham, was not pleased at the prospect that members of his battalion would use English in this part of the country, which had such strong associations with the *Patriotes* of 1837-38. Despite orders to the contrary from Major-General J.M. Rockingham, GOC Quebec Command, Letellier ordered his officers to give their commands in French, which they did without repercussions.⁹⁰ Not until the summer

* The day of St John the Baptist, patron saint of the province of Quebec, is celebrated annually on June 24th.

of 1961, however, when Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel Richard took command of the 3rd Battalion of the R22^eR, did French become the regiment's real language of work.

The RCN, meanwhile, had given itself eight years to put into practice the main recommendation of the Mainguy Report (1949), to "Canadianize" the Navy. A mandate to study this question was given to six senior officers — none of them French Canadian — under the chairmanship of Commodore E.P. Tisdall. The 250-page report contained 39 recommendations aimed at changing existing structures in the RCN. Not a word was said about bilingualism or Francophones.⁹¹ Even in 1957, RCN officers seemed quite unaware of the issue. Only two French Canadians (including Captain M.J.A.T. Jetté) were to be found on the list of 217 officers and seamen who provided information to the committee or were interviewed.

If bilingualism was being short-circuited in each of the three services, there was some movement on the part of the Deputy Minister, after the return to power of the Conservatives with a majority of 78.5 per cent on March 31, 1958.⁹²

A survey conducted by the Department, in January 1959, at the request of the Roman Catholic bishops of Canada, showed that the families of Roman Catholic servicemen were very concerned that their children be educated in "separate", or confessional schools. Citing the Quebec system, which allowed Protestants to have their own schools, they demanded similar treatment for Roman Catholics. Although the issue was religious rather than language oriented, its importance stems from the fact that many Roman Catholic servicemen living outside Quebec spoke French; establishing Roman Catholic schools would meet some of their cultural aspirations.

The Defence Council, chaired by George Pearkes, discussed this question four times in early 1959. It gave approval in principle to setting up Roman Catholic schools where provincial laws allowed it, where facilities already existed or could be provided in the long term without additional expense, and where the number of Roman Catholic students so warranted. At the end of April, the Deputy Minister was instructed to draw up a brief to Cabinet on the matter.⁹³ This document, however, was not submitted until October, after a new Associate Minister, the Honourable Pierre Sévigny, had been

appointed.⁹⁴ The proposal, approved by the Governor in Council, authorized the Department to enter into agreements with the ministers of education of the various provinces, since this was an area of provincial jurisdiction.⁹⁵

Next came the question of the CMR de Saint-Jean. This institution, founded in 1952 at the instigation of Brooke Claxton, offered only two years of studies in addition to a preparatory year, and officer cadets had to take their last two years at RMC in Kingston. The *Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean Baptiste du Québec*, either directly or through the newspapers, called on the Minister to authorize the last two years of instruction to be given at the CMR. At the Defence Council, Associate Minister Sévigny resorted to every possible argument to support this request: the number of French-speaking officers in the RCAF and the RCN as well as the Army had to be increased; officer cadets wanted to complete their studies in French just as Anglophones did in English; the change would reduce manpower losses and encourage more Francophones to enlist. Sévigny was the only man to present arguments in favour. All the other Council members preferred the status quo, foreseeing either that academic quality would be likely to decline or that the proposed changes would cost more. The new Minister, D.S. Harkness, after taking office on October 11, 1960, asked that a new study be undertaken to determine the additional expenses and possible results if existing policies were changed. Then, with the obvious aim of appeasing Quebecers, he authorized a press release stating that the Department intended to “study the possibility” of introducing a four-year course at the CMR.⁹⁶ In the event, these courses were not introduced until 1969, nine years later, under a Liberal government.

In the summer of 1960, trouble broke out in the Belgian Congo. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba asked the United Nations (UN) for help, and the Government of Canada agreed to send a signal unit provided each detachment would be commanded by an officer from the combat arms. Canada had earlier contributed to operations of this type, among other places in Lebanon and in Indo-China in 1954, where it had quickly been realized that a knowledge of French was not only useful but essential at some levels. In the Congo, a state where French was the official language, the very reason why the UN had turned to Canada was that it wanted bilingual signallers.⁹⁷ In record time, enough bilingual signallers and combat

officers were identified to make up the numbers of the unit establishment which was then sent to the Congo.

The Canadian public quickly grasped the situation: the policy of unilingualism in the Armed Forces, which had been advocated by General Simonds (among others) until he retired in 1955, was no longer appropriate in a society with an international outlook. More than anything else, the contribution of a bilingual contingent to the UN helped bring about a change in attitude towards bilingualism in Canada. If, for the moment, only the concrete advantage of “individual” bilingualism among servicemen was recognized, it was clear that a move toward “institutional” bilingualism must come. But when?

In October 1960, DND released another study by Marcel Chaput of the DRB, comparing promotion examination results for French-speaking and English-speaking officers.⁹⁸ After determining that the two groups had virtually the same intelligence quotients, Chaput observed that many more Francophones failed. He discovered that the examinations were prepared by Anglophones in the Directorate of Military Training (DMT), that almost all the study material provided to candidates was in English and that examination papers answered in French were translated by intermediaries in the translation section rather than read by the markers, who understood only English. He concluded by suggesting ways of improving the process.

The following year, French-speaking artillerymen asked that one of the four regular artillery regiments be converted into a French-speaking unit. Lieutenant-General S.F. Clark, Chief of the General Staff, turned down this request “in the best interests of the Army, following the advice of Colonel E.G. Brooks, Director of Artillery.”⁹⁹ He persisted in advancing the now well-worn argument that more Francophones should be integrated into existing technical units; in essence, he did not recognize the principle of language equality for French Canadians.

Wishing to promote “efficiency, economy and improved service in the despatch of public business”, the Diefenbaker government set up a royal commission of inquiry in 1960. Chaired by J. Grant Glassco, the commission published its report in July 1962.¹⁰⁰ No reference to bilingualism is to be found in the special studies on DND and the DRB,

whose 120,000 regular Forces personnel made up one quarter of federal employees.¹⁰¹ However, under the heading “personnel management”, the commissioners reported:

Staffing of the federal public service cannot be adequately discussed without some reference to bilingualism and the recruitment of people whose first tongue is French. Valid arguments have been advanced that the public service should be representative of the country as a whole. The special position of French-speaking Canadians, in our history and constitution, in proportion of total population, and in language and cultural character, is of particular importance to the representative character of the public service. Without the confidence and respect of most citizens, it is doubtful whether the public service can be truly effective, and it is highly desirable that French Canadians should share a proper feeling towards the federal public service.... Until a sufficient number of graduates of French-language universities are brought into the federal service and retained, the promotion of French-speaking Canadians to senior ranks in reasonable numbers will be inhibited. Today there is a relatively large proportion of French-speaking personnel in the junior ranks of the public service but a low proportion in the senior ranks, and the fact that French-speaking deputy heads are usually appointed from outside the service may not prudently be ignored. Clearly, the public service must take positive steps to promote a more congenial atmosphere which will attract and hold suitably qualified French-speaking Canadians.

We therefore recommend that:

- 1) The federal government adopt active measures to develop bilingual capacities among its employees on a selective basis.
- 2) The government intensify its efforts to attract and retain more of the highly qualified young people of French Canada capable of advancement to senior rank. 102

A minority report by commissioner F.-Eugène Therrien informed the Canadian public about language anomalies both at the DND and in the federal government as a whole.¹⁰³ There could hardly be a better recapitulation of the situation as it existed in 1960-61.

Some aspects of the situation were to change during the Conservatives' tenure of office — at least in the Army — thanks to the efforts of three men: Majors-General J.-P. Bernatchez (Vice-Chief of the General Staff), W.A.B. Anderson (Adjutant General), and the Honourable Pierre Sévigny (Associate Minister). Sévigny, in a letter of December 19, 1961 to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Air Marshal F.R. Miller, asked the three chiefs of staff to ensure that all signs in DND

buildings in Quebec and wherever else there was a good proportion of Francophones be bilingual. On December 27, Miller sent a copy of this letter to the three military leaders and the Chairman of the DRB. In his memorandum, he suggested that the chiefs gradually replace unilingual signs by bilingual ones at a suitable rate, so that minimum publicity should accompany these changes.¹⁰⁴

In a first set of “instructions” from the Adjutant General, moreover, English-speaking junior officers were encouraged to learn French in a six-month course given at the R22^eR Depot and through a two- or three-year posting to one of that regiment’s battalions. In exchange, an equal number of French-speaking officers from the R22^eR would serve in English-speaking regiments.¹⁰⁵ This initial attempt, although minor in scope, shows a desire for understanding and co-operation.

The following spring, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff issued “instructions” that every French-speaking recruit could learn his trade in French through the establishment of 161 positions as bilingual instructors and assistant instructors in the main trades schools and specialized military training centres.¹⁰⁶

Wishing, furthermore, to encourage both bilingualism and a lower turnover of Francophones, the Adjutant General had a series of tests administered to determine the language knowledge of all military personnel on regular service. These measures, aimed primarily at improving conditions for Francophones, helped change the attitudes of sceptical Anglophones and of many Francophones who had become tired of fighting to be recognized as equals by their English-speaking fellow countrymen.

While these measures were being put into effect, the Minister, Douglas Harkness, resigned his position on February 3, 1963, and his Associate Minister, Sévigny, decided to leave five days later. Shortly thereafter, Gordon Churchill took control of DND, but only briefly. The Conservative team was replaced by the Pearson government on April 22, 1963.

Bilingualism in the Public Service and the Armed Forces — that is to say, recognition of language equality for those wishing to serve their country — had advanced slowly and painfully. Would it really gather momentum one day?

Part Four

**Attitudes must change
(1963-69)**

Throughout the postwar years, but more particularly since 1960, French Canada has been a society in full and rapid evolution in all its aspects as its industrial revolution progresses with great strides. The old isolationism has disappeared, with French Canadians serving in the armed forces and civilian services of Canada and the United Nations in many parts of the world. Radio and television reach into the most remote sections of the province, and keep these once-isolated regions in touch with what is happening in Greater Montreal, which includes more than half the population of that province. The French Canadian now thinks of all Canada as his country, not just the Province of Quebec, though he retains a special fondness for his *pays*. This development has brought an increasing concern in Quebec with the lot of the French minorities in the other provinces and a demand for full equality of the French and English languages throughout Canada. This concern lies at the root of much of the separatism of recent years. If French Canadians could not be *chez eux* throughout Canada and *maîtres chez eux* in Quebec, many of them were inclined to question the viability of Canada as its hundredth anniversary approached.

Mason Wade

The French Canadians 1760-1967

(Toronto: Macmillan, (rev. ed.) 1968, Vol 2, p 1119.)

After the war, relations between French and English Canadians were closer. According to historian Mason Wade, English-Canadian nationalism and the much older French-Canadian nationalism began to come together into a single Canadian nationalism. War service had, in spite of everything, brought the two nations together, and the pan-Canadian nationalism extolled earlier by Henri Bourassa became more and more pronounced. It was essential to resist the cultural, political and economic influence of the United States, which grew as the focus of power shifted from London to Washington and the defence of Canada became integrated into a North American system.¹

Parallel change also occurred in the Canadian Army, but slowly. Montreal and Québec headquarters — known by their new titles as Western and Eastern Quebec Area HQs — were still administered almost wholly in English, although their staffs were in the majority filled by French Canadians.² The first to assert himself in correct, updated French was Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel Richard, commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion of the R22^eR. A fluently bilingual graduate of RMC, the Canadian Army Staff College, the Joint Services Staff College (UK), and the National Defence College, he attacked the “franglais” military jargon commonly used until then by French-speaking servicemen, thereby restoring professional pride not only to his subordinates but to all those he dealt with, even his superiors.³

From 1963 to 1969, the Liberal government, spurred on by such men as Social Credit MP Gilles Grégoire, provided strong leadership in bilingualism. Not until 1966, however, did the DND make any real commitment to the issue, even though there was a growing awareness in the Department of bilingualism as a new factor that had come into play on both the civilian and the military sides.

The Forces insisted that technical work had to be carried out in English. Although they waited for outside pressure before promoting bilingualism, awareness of the problem increased. Nationalist movements in Quebec, the federal government's interest, the Royal Commission on B & B, MPs' questions in and outside the House about French in the Forces — all these contributed to a necessary change in attitudes which made its first tentative appearance in a study on officers by Major-General W.A.B.

Anderson, which was released in the summer of 1965. Consideration was now being given to helping Francophones integrate into the Forces by training them entirely in French. Yet that was far from enough.

Only in September 1966 did real change begin — real change that was sorely needed and long overdue. This was brought about by the leadership of the government and by the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Allard, who ensured that steps were taken quickly to implement the recommendations of the Ross Report. The proclamation of the Official Languages Act on July 9, 1969 not only added to the momentum already created but also crowned the efforts of those who had long fought for equality. Within the Armed Forces, parallel efforts were made to create a thorough going DND policy on official languages and co-ordinate it with that of other federal departments and agencies.

Chapter 7

The Quiet Revolution and The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

“Blizzards, solitude, winter evenings, time passed in my attic — I had to go home, I was homesick for my country,”

wrote Felix Leclerc to a friend from France.

“You’re crazy to go home, when you have everything you need here in France,”

his friend replied after a trip to Canada.

“I give you ten years, and you’ll all be Americanized in Quebec.”

Another friend who had made a sentimental journey and taken Canada to heart expressed a somewhat different view:

“He had felt the steam building up, a young person’s hunger and thirst to create, a strong, restless desire to transcend himself. He felt we were just about to find our voice on the international stage. The primitive, stammering, awkward and healthy country had touched him. He cared little about form, saying that only us, in our own words and reflexes could transpose into poetry Canada’s great pain, which for so long had been kept silent, repressed and hidden. He knew that all this would soon burst open for other nations to see. The French miracle, the presence in a distant land of a people of French origin, one third of the population of Canada, had overwhelmed him.”

Luc Bérinmont

Félix Leclerc (Montreal: Fides, 1964) [translation]

The quiet revolution really began in 1949. The Asbestos workers' strike expressed more than economic grievance; it showed how French-speaking workers in Quebec resented the domination of Quebec's economy by English Canadians and Americans.¹ In another strike, this time in the Murdochville copper mines in 1958, Quebec unions made it clear that in future they would be as militant as international unions in demanding better working conditions and higher wages. They also "united in the demand that wages and working conditions in the province be raised to the level prevailing in Ontario and the rest of English-speaking North America."² After all, as Professor John Porter had revealed in 1951, a mere 6.7 per cent of Canada's "economic elite" — or 51 out of 760 people — were French Canadians.³

Quebec society moves toward the 'quiet revolution'

These economic disturbances went hand in hand with similar changes in culture and politics. In the Spring of 1950, a group of young intellectuals, including Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Gérard Pelletier, founded the journal *Cité libre*, whose avowed purpose was to help Quebecers escape from the vicious circle of clericalism and Duplessism.⁴ A little later, at the request of the Quebec Chamber of Commerce, the Duplessis government brought in a bill to set up a royal commission to inquire into constitutional problems. The bill was passed by the Legislative Assembly on January 22, 1953.⁵

In 1946, Professor Guy Frégault had been appointed director of the new Institute of History at Université de Montréal. He took two years to reorganize and restaff it, bringing in professors Michel Brunet and Maurice Séguin, with whom he constituted what has been called the neo-nationalist school. Brunet, who became director in 1959, was particularly influential with students, highlighting the malaise of a French-Canadian people condemned to be a perpetual minority in an Anglo-Saxon body politic.⁶ His book *Canadians and Canadiens* raised the issue of the fundamental problem of the Canadian Confederation, alleging that English Canadians behaved as "imperialists" toward French Canadians.⁷ At Université Laval, Professor Marcel Trudel taught in the Institute of History and Geography from 1947 onward and in 1955 became its director and the secretary of the Arts Faculty. He held both positions until 1965.⁸ In

1953, Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, o.p., founded the School of Social Sciences, also at Laval, which was strongly to influence Quebec's future leaders.

With the universities thus in ferment, other changes took place. Félix Leclerc, singing his poems, renewed his compatriots' repertory of songs and restored their pride in speaking French.⁹ The *Canadiens* hockey team won the Stanley Cup five years in a row, a "national" triumph. In 1960, Brother Jean-Paul Desbiens shook the entire French-Canadian population with his severe criticism of the spoken language, commonly called "joual".¹⁰ In short, French-speaking Quebecers, in many different ways, displayed a perfectly legitimate unwillingness to remain second-class citizens, a position into which their ancestors had fallen in order to "preserve" their culture, and in which Anglophones had deliberately kept them on a socio-economic level.

The sudden death of Quebec Premier Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis on September 7, 1959 gave young people further hope of shaking off the yoke. Paul Sauvé, who followed Duplessis, governed only three months before his untimely death on January 1, 1960. The reins then passed to Antonio Barrette, but he was beaten at the polls by the Liberals under Jean Lesage in June. By then, Duplessism had been dealt a heavy blow by fathers Gérard Dion and Louis O'Neill, who published a pamphlet on political immorality in the Province of Quebec, denouncing abuses of political power and election irregularities.¹¹ The new Liberal policy caught people's imagination. Injecting new life into culture and the French fact, it also called for far-reaching educational reforms, which were considered even more essential than a general rise in the standard of living.¹² The quiet revolution was at last on the move in Quebec, as the literature arising out of it bears ample witness.¹³

English-Canadian society moves toward recognizing French Canadians as equals

These waves in Quebec were felt both positively and negatively in English Canada, where a new generation of historians had also risen to prominence. Some, in particular Professor Donald G Creighton of University of Toronto, who had won fame before the war now spoke for those who believed French Canadians had no choice but to adopt the

language that predominated in North America. Creighton considered that Confederation had never given French Canadians the right to be at home everywhere in Canada; a policy of bilingualism would weaken Canada.

Although Quebec had elected 50 Conservative MPs in 1958, the Honourable Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce in Diefenbaker's Cabinet and one of his chief lieutenants, said that "English Canada did not need French Canada and that it would be possible to form a federal government without French-Canadian support."¹⁴

Douglas Fisher of the NDP, a unilingual MP from Port Arthur, Ontario, indulged in a caricature of some segments of English Canada by stating at a congress on separatism at *Université Laval* in 1961 that "if French Canadians wanted to leave Confederation, the English would be glad to see them go, since they produced only hockey players and strip-teasers, and their federal representatives were irresponsible do-nothings."¹⁵ That, at least, was how his constituents perceived French Canadians, he said. A few historians, such as George F.G. Stanley, Gordon Rothney, William Morton, Arthur Lower, Frank Scott and Ramsay Cook, were much more conciliatory and maintained that French Canadians were equal in citizenship and had the rights that arise out of it. Their writings and, Churchill notwithstanding, government policies show that attitudes were beginning to change, at least among some politicians and intellectuals.¹⁶ There was, nevertheless, a striking contrast in attitude between John Diefenbaker, a Conservative from western Canada whose grandfather had immigrated from Baden, Germany, and L.B. Pearson, a Liberal of Irish ancestry from Toronto. While Diefenbaker was naturally inclined toward English-Canadian nationalism, Pearson was open to the claims of French Canadians.¹⁷

André Laurendeau, editor in chief of *Le Devoir*, put forward the idea of a national inquiry into bilingualism on January 20, 1962.¹⁸ Six days later, Gérard Pelletier carried it further in an editorial in *La Presse*.¹⁹ Then the Gordon affair broke. On November 20, 1962, at a meeting of the Commons committee on railways, the Chairman of the Canadian National Railways Company, Donald Gordon, replied to Social Credit MP Gilles Grégoire that no French Canadian was qualified to fill any of the 28 executive

positions in his company. This categorical assertion prompted all Quebec MPs from every party to call as one man for fairer participation and immediate representation for French-speaking Canadians in the management and at all levels of the national railway company.²⁰

Meanwhile, a survey by *Le Devoir* revealed that only 12.6 per cent of senior executive positions in the 78 federal agencies were held by French Canadians who, after all, made up 30.4 per cent of the population. The *Fédération des sociétés Saint-Jean Baptiste du Québec* and the *Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices catholiques du Québec* also called for a public inquiry.²¹

Pearson's conciliatory attitude was no doubt partly due to his talents as a diplomat, which he had exercised as Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1948 to 1957 before replacing Louis Saint-Laurent as head of the Liberal Party. As Canada's representative at the UN, he had closely observed the aspirations of former British and French colonies and their advance to independence. Not that this was what he wanted for Quebec — far from it. But he fully recognized that French Canadians were entitled to be full-fledged citizens. Even before he came to power in 1963, he made that a matter of prime importance:

The first and the more important problem the country faced was national unity; more particularly, the relations between the two founding language groups in our federal structure. Strains had been increasing since 1960 as a result of Jean Lesage's 'Quiet Revolution' and the reluctance of much of English-speaking Canada to respond in a constructive and understanding way to that revolution. In a sense this problem was tied in with the general problem of federal-provincial relations. Indeed, it was a very special and vitally important part of those relations. On its successful handling would depend the future of our country.²²

Political will

In May 1963, Pearson's new federal government set up a special cabinet committee chaired by the Honourable Maurice Lamontagne (President of the Privy Council) to study the reforms in administration and bilingualism that Canada must consider.²³ Three months later, the government set up a Royal Commission to

report on the present state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada (B & B Commission) and recommend steps to ensure that the country would develop according to the principle that its two founding peoples were equal, while taking into account the contribution of other ethnic groups to our cultural enrichment. In particular, the ten commissioners were to address the state and practice of bilingualism in all federal services and institutions, including DND.²⁴

After engineering the rejection of the Fulton-Favreau formula for patriating the Constitution, John Diefenbaker, now Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, attacked the Royal Commission on B & B, commonly called the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission after its joint chairmen:

As to Mr. Pearson's Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, I was convinced that its appointment and composition would encourage alienation and separatism. To begin with, the problems of biculturalism and bilingualism were both federal and provincial. This Royal Commission would be able to make recommendations only to the federal government. As I could not conceive of any party attempting to solve the problems of national unity through unilateral federal action, and at the expense of the merit system in the federal civil service, I thought the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission at best a dodge. At worst, I saw it giving rise to a popular false hope that solutions to the problems of Confederation would be achieved through a Commission of socialists and outspoken protagonists of particular constitutional changes. The only legitimate forum was a Dominion-Provincial Conference. Ultimately, whatever the views of the Commission, a Conference would have to be convened before any effective action could be taken, or so I thought. I contended this should be done immediately, so that all major ideological and regional points of view would find appropriate representation.²⁵

He recalls in his memoirs that he wrote the following to a young woman student in Montreal on June 29, 1964:

As to bilingualism and biculturalism, these are two necessary and inescapable facets of Canadian nationality. Canada was conceived of by men of two different but equally rich cultures, of two distinctive communities. Bilingualism and biculturalism are facts of Canadian life that cannot—and should not—be hidden or avoided. They are important, even vital, to Canada as a nation. But they are assets, not liabilities; positive factors, not negative ones.

They should be approached in the spirit of co-operation and mutual appreciation and never used as tools of narrow nationalism. They are too valuable to Canadians to be degraded by being used to further the ends of political expediency or as weapons in factional fending.²⁶

Clearly, the question of equal treatment for French-Canadian citizens had not been settled once and for all by the passing of Diefenbaker's Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960.²⁷ He accepted the principle of B & B, but balked at the concrete means employed by the Liberals to reach that end.

On the government side, the time for making speeches seemed to be past; the moment had come for action. While awaiting the Commission's findings, the government wanted to be active in promoting bilingualism.²⁸ On December 11, 1963, when the Glassco Report on government management was placed before Parliament, the President of the Privy Council declared that Glassco's five recommendations on bilingualism had already been approved and were being implemented.²⁹ In addition, he said, the government committee set up in May had decided to define Cabinet's bilingualism objectives clearly. Its three goals were designed essentially to make English and French equal in all contacts between federal authorities and the public and in internal communications in the Public Service, whether written or oral. More was also to be done to recruit French-speaking public servants.

To help the government achieve these general objectives, Lamontagne reported that an interdepartmental committee had been set up to make recommendations as soon as possible on a number of aspects of the issue of bilingualism. Mr Lamontagne named seven of these, ending with bilingualism in the armed services.³⁰ He concluded by emphasizing that the government reserved the right to accept, amend or reject the committee's recommendations. It had no intention of imposing its views in this matter by force, but would consult with public servants and their representative associations, bearing in mind that it would be wrong to tamper with established rights or create new injustices while attempting to correct old ones. In any event, said Mr Lamontagne, some public servants were already aware — and the rest would come to understand — that this progression towards bilingualism offered them an opportunity for personal cultural enrichment that would enable them to serve all Canadians better.³¹

The Department attunes itself to "B & B"


In November 1964, the Royal Commission put two questions

to the Department. Were there directives as to the optimum percentage of Francophones that should be on strength in the Forces, either among officers or among other ranks? How much is French used at the DND?³² The first question was given a negative reply on February 2, 1965. As to the second, information was said to have been provided already in a letter of April 27, 1964, to another member of the Commission.³³ In brief, this stated that English was the language of work in the Forces because it would be too difficult, and even dangerous in action, to operate the Forces in both languages. In addition, since the majority of recruits spoke English, it would be ridiculous to train them in French. Moreover, the language of technical trades, an aspect of DND activity which was very much on the increase, was English. One result of this, it was added, was that Francophones who had to learn English made up the majority of bilingual military personnel. There had been some attempts by the Department to create a "more bilingual" image and offer some French instruction to French-speaking dependants.³⁴ But the DND was unilingually English for all practical purposes, and there were no serious plans to change this state of affairs. Moreover, the exact terms used in April 1964 were incorporated one year later into section 6.5 of the Department's information manual, entitled "Bilingualism".³⁵ Such, then, was the DND's policy on bilingualism as of April 15, 1965.

The fact remains, however, that the royal commissioners' work sensitized DND to the presence of French Canadians and their language within the Department.³⁶ On November 21, 1966, after completing their study of DND, the commissioners proposed a meeting with interested parties from the Department to discuss various points raised during the enquiry.³⁷ Eight subjects of discussion were put forward, and finally addressed on January 24, 1967. They ranged from the use of French as a language of work in the Forces to Canadian military colleges (in particular Saint-Jean), French-language units (FLUs), the concentration of units including Francophones in Quebec, and dependants' education.³⁸ This meeting, which was attended by senior civilian and military officials, did not bear on the commissioners' conclusions, which were not to follow until nearly three years later. It did, however, enable the upper echelons involved in the discussion to anticipate what the final report would contain and even, as we shall see in the next chapter, to prepare in advance for some of its content.



His Excellency General G.P. Vanier, PC, DSO, MC, CD. After serving his country as a field officer in the 22nd Battalion in the First World War and as a diplomat in the Second World War, he became Canada's first French-Canadian Governor General (1959-67). (CF 67-004)



The Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, PC, MP, Prime Minister of Canada from 1963 to 1968, was the first government leader to take the necessary steps to ensure that French and English were recognized as equal in Canada *de jure* and *de facto*. He introduced a program of bilingualism in the Public Service and the Canadian Armed Forces. (PAC/PA 117612)

Between May 1963 and September 1966, the Department had taken very few effective steps to correct a situation of obvious inequality in the treatment of one of Canada's two major ethnic and language groups. Let us review them briefly.

Since the RMC's reopening in Kingston in 1948, a large French Department had been organized, teaching many courses in grammar, literature and French as a second language. In 1961, the Department of Political Economy hired a French-speaking lecturer to teach some courses to third- and fourth-year officer cadets, increasing numbers of whom had been arriving since 1955 after their second year at the CMR de Saint-Jean. Indeed, the proportion of Francophone cadets at CMR rose from 6.5 per cent in 1953 to 16.4 per cent in 1968.³⁹ Professor G.F.G. Stanley, who had chaired the History Department since 1948, took on the additional responsibilities of Dean of Arts in 1962. Under his aegis, a few history, economics and commerce courses were offered in French.

RMC: Courses taught in French			
Year	Department		
	History	Politics and Economics	
1961-1962		2 (Pol)	
1962-1963		2 (Pol)	
1963-1964	3	2 (Pol)	
1964-1965	5	2 (Pol)	
1965-1966	5	2 (Pol)	2 (Écon)
1966-1967	5	2 (Pol)	2 (Écon) 1 (Commerce)
1967-1968	5	2 (Pol)	2 (Écon) 1 (Commerce)
1968-1969	5	2 (Pol)	2 (Écon) 1 (Commerce)
1969-1970	6	2 (Pol)	2 (Écon) 1 (Commerce)

These innovations must be kept in perspective. When Professor Stanley left the Arts Faculty in 1969, 51 of the 316 courses offered in all faculties were given in French.

	Courses	Department
38	French	French
2	German	French
6	History	History
2	Politics	Politics and Economics
2	Economics	Politics and Economics
<u>1</u>	Commerce	Politics and Economics
Total	51	

Except for the French courses, all courses offered in French were available in English also.

Since the Francophones' right to take certain courses at RMC in their own language has been recognized, Anglophones had tended to become more bilingual. Thus, beginning in the fall of 1965, all officer cadets planning to study engineering had to take a course on military history in French. English-speaking social science majors had to take at least one course a year in French, whether in history, politics, economics or commerce. In both groups, officer cadets whose French was not adequate were required to take courses in French as a second language.⁴⁰

Although Professor Stanley's efforts met with some opposition — "bilingualism was tolerated in the Arts Faculty [at RMC], where it had been introduced in response to directives rather than as a matter of principle or practical application" — the fact remains that "RMC really pioneered the way among English-speaking Canadian colleges by offering courses other than language courses in French."⁴¹

The gradually increasing role of Francophones in the Armed Forces was also felt elsewhere. On May 1, 1964, the *Service d'édition des manuels de l'Armée canadienne* (Canadian Army training manuals publication section) was formed. Based in Québec with a staff of seven, its aim was to offer French-speaking servicemen in the Army training manuals translated into French. The following year, as part of the integration process, this unit was renamed the *Service d'édition des manuels des Forces canadiennes*, and thus extended its mandate to take in the other two services.⁴² It was also decided in 1965 that the Canadian Forces news magazine, which was to replace the three existing publications, (those of the Navy, the Air

Force and the Army, of which only the latter was published in both languages), would be issued in two versions: *The Sentinel* in English and *La Sentinelle* in French.⁴³

On February 25, 1965, Vice-Admiral K. Dyer, Chief of Personnel (CP), issued directive 3/65 under the grandiose title, "Use of Official Languages in Defence Establishments". In fact, the CP addressed himself only to military establishments in Quebec or in other parts of Canada with a predominantly French-speaking population. This included Ottawa, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) emphasized, when he reissued the directive (P3/65) on March 26 with minor amendments. The use of "both official languages", however, continued to be restricted. The directive was not even issued on the initiative of the military, but in response to an order from Associate Minister Lucien Cardin.

On December 16, 1964, Cardin had written the CDS that he was dissatisfied with what had been accomplished at DND to implement bilingualism. He acknowledged that some efforts had been made to make bilingual forms more available (this no doubt referred to a 1962 directive). But that was not enough. The Associate Minister proceeded to outline very explicitly the additional measures he wished to be taken, requesting a report on their implementation.⁴⁴ Cardin's proposals appear almost word for word in the CP's and CDS's directives.

In the regions in question, according to P3/65, forms designed for the general public or for individuals were to be available in both official languages. Personnel who had contact with the public (commissionaires, military police, civilian guards with the Department, receptionists, secretaries and so forth) had to be able to speak and complete forms in both official languages. Incumbents who did not have these skills would not be fired, but would be replaced adequately as they left their present positions in the normal course of affairs, such as for reasons of retirement or transfer. Both official languages would also be used for signs (information, parking and titles on doors) and local orders (security measures and fire fighting instructions, for example). This policy, it was stated, was to be put into practice as soon as possible, and a final report on its implementation was to reach Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) by May 31, 1965.⁴⁵

Today, this directive makes us smile, but it deserves attention nevertheless. First of all, it contains elements that were later to be incorporated into larger bilingualism programs. Secondly, it reflects contemporary attitudes towards bilingualism. In February 1965, the public was beginning to be made aware of the whole scope of the question, either by the hearings that had been held by the B & B Commission across the country for eighteen months, or by the rebirth of Quebec nationalism, which had taken on a political form and significance over several years, and since 1963 had also on occasion erupted into violence.

Beginning in that year, as we have seen, the federal government accepted the idea of an increasingly bilingual administration. For the moment, however, it remained timid. The impetus for such momentum came from the Associate Minister. Soon after Léo Cadieux succeeded Cardin in that office, he sent out an administrative circular to DND civilians on April 1, 1965, essentially repeating the terms of P3/65.⁴⁶ Both men were politicians — French-speaking politicians. They were ahead of their time in their appreciation of the need to move on bilingualism, but they were astute enough not to press a public service that was as yet unprepared for such a massive change. By and large, the need for a French as well as an English fact in government service had not penetrated to the bureaucrats who, for nearly a century, had been running the country almost entirely in English. This was especially true in the Armed Forces. The most they were prepared to do at that stage was to offer service in French to French-speaking Quebecers or Francophones in Ottawa.

Yet when we compare the April 1965 circular to the one dated March 5, 1962, which the former was intended to replace, we cannot help noting an improvement. The 1962 circular was softer on the availability of bilingual forms, and said nothing about unilingual English personnel in Quebec or translating local orders. It did emphasize that forms intended for the general public should be bilingual, but this “public” did not include individuals or corporations that were current or potential suppliers of goods and services. Moreover, forms used for official Departmental or interdepartmental business did not have to be, as they did from 1965, bilingual.⁴⁷

Those at CFHQ like to recall, as we have seen, that the directive

The Honourable Louis-Joseph-Lucien Cardin, PC, MP, served as an officer in the RCN during the Second World War before being elected Liberal MP for Richelieu-Verchères. As Associate Minister of National Defence, 1963-65, he sought to have French and English recognized as equal in the DND. (RNC-14247)



The Honourable Léo Cadieux, OC, Associate Minister, then Minister of National Defence, 1965-70, strongly supported General Allard in assisting French-Canadian military personnel to serve in their own language, and in this way encouraged them to remain in the Armed Forces. (PL-145-150)

owed its existence to the Associate Minister's initiative.⁴⁸ All the same, this initiative led some to discuss on the future of bilingualism. Would P3/65 be expanded one day or should it be confined to its current dimensions? Both options were advocated,⁴⁹ but these questions were no longer to be answered by civilian or military officials, but by the politicians, who were now ready to assume their responsibilities.

To close this matter for the moment, let us note that a report on the implementation of P3/65 was submitted to the Associate Minister on July 14, 1965. It stated that satisfactory progress had been made in the target areas. The persisting problems were as follows: unilingual English personnel remaining in their positions for some time; a lack of translators in units; forms for use in all parts of the country [supplied by CFHQ] in English only; resistance from certain English-speaking Reserve units in Quebec. Overall, however, no additional initiatives had been taken. Efforts went no further than P3/65, except that in some cases additional staff was requested, either for translation purposes or to free units from the additional administration caused by applying the directive.⁵⁰

In the summer of 1965, DND was given another opportunity to discuss bilingualism by the Minister's Manpower Study (Officers), headed by Major-General W.A.B. Anderson, Deputy Chief Reserves. This study was one of many undertaken with a view to the unification of the Forces. Chapter 10 of the study, submitted in May 1965, discusses the need for bilingualism among officers. The authors, who touch on all matters relating to officers' careers, had met with the B & B Commission experts responsible for studying DND. They learned from them that bilingualism in the Forces would be influenced by the system's internal imperatives as much as by those imposed externally on the Department by the government's institutional bilingualism policies. Bilingual officers were necessary because not all Canadians spoke both languages. They had to be able to communicate with their subordinates and with the often unilingual public and to serve overseas with English-and French-speaking foreign troops. The report concluded, on the basis of a study prepared by the land forces only, that at least 1,500 officer positions in the three services would be needed to meet bilingualism requirements.⁵¹ The authors of the report, after noting the strong pressure exerted on Francophones by English, the traditional language of the

Canadian Forces, broached the question of French-language units (FLUs). They seemed to accept the idea of carrying this experiment beyond the R22^eR, on condition that business conducted in French be strictly confined to the unit and not include liaison outside the unit. The members of these units would clearly have to know English, the language of work in the Forces and the operational language in the air.

The report then proceeded to another problem, training in French. Here, the authors displayed an open mind. The report began by recognizing the breadth of the task of recruiting Francophones and training them entirely in French. Despite the innumerable difficulties likely to be encountered, such as training instructors and acquiring French training aids, etc., the report suggested progressively increasing the Forces' capacity to offer French-speaking recruits training in their own language. In bilingual cells, to be formed as soon as possible in various training centres, Francophones could receive help in their language, even if at first courses would be given only in English.⁵² Little by little, basic training and later specialized training would be offered entirely in French. It is noteworthy that even French-speaking officers at the time heavily influenced, it is true, by their English military life over the years — maintained that training Francophones in French would only postpone the inevitable day when they would have to begin studying English.⁵³ The authors of the report replied by pointing out that whether a recruit spoke English or French, he had to adapt to a completely different lifestyle when he joined the Forces. But Francophones had the additional burden of becoming bilingual quickly and being trained in English. This inequality had to be corrected.⁵⁴ Advocates of teaching Francophone recruits English as soon as they joined the Forces may not have been wrong, given the prevailing situation. A unilingual Francophone who, in theory, took all his basic courses in French, in 1965-66, would then have been integrated into an English-speaking unit where he would not have been able to compete on an equal footing with his English-speaking colleagues who naturally worked with greater ease in their own language.⁵⁵ Thus, until such time as Francophones and the French language were fully integrated into the Canadian Forces, partial solutions would not work well.

Anderson made no attempt to deal with the issue of full integration of Francophones. Indeed, he was even very far from accepting the principle that English and French were equal. He

proposed a realistic solution which opened up a brighter future when he advocated training Francophones in their own language, but he gainsaid much of what could have been achieved in the application of his recommendations, when he asserted that all Francophones, even those in FLUs, should know English.

The fact remains that the “bilingualism” chapter of the Anderson report seems to have been well received, despite a few isolated negative comments. One observer wondered whether more FLUs would lead to greater unity or more understanding and *camaraderie*. Another felt 4,000 bilingual positions was a great many. Some pointed out that NATO required a knowledge of English. The prevailing comment, however, came from the Chief of Personnel (CP), who, although he favoured the document on the whole, suggested waiting for the report of the B & B Commission before looking for long-term solutions.⁵⁶

This “wait and see” stance, which was warranted up to a certain point, enabled Commodore R.L. Hennessy in June 1966 to take the opposite view to Anderson’s in a similar study, this time dealing with other ranks. A member of the Anderson review committee, Hennessy conducted his own enquiry from May 17, 1965 to June 6, 1966. Chapter 17 of his report deals with bilingualism. After stating that it was impossible for the present to determine how many men should be bilingual, he advanced the view that there was a sociological necessity in Canada to encourage the use of both official languages, and this required professional instruction. At the same time, the growing complexity of materiel and command and control functions in the army posed two problems relating to bilingualism in the Forces: the materiel came from English-speaking countries and users’ manuals were so many and so voluminous that they were nearly impossible to translate quickly enough to be useful; in addition, the nature of Canada’s and her allies’ military work itself dictated that English should remain the only language of communications in Canadian military operations. Hennessy’s conclusions were narrower than Anderson’s: English should be used in training, although bilingual instructors who could help Francophones should be made available. As to FLUs, the restrictions mentioned earlier on “limited” use of French were to be applied. And, after stating that FLUs as defined would not be a bad idea, the report concluded, “We emphasize the point that efficiency and quick reaction demand a single language which is

readily understood by all concerned. It would appear that we have already gone as far as we can in this direction and therefore should not form any additional French-speaking units.”⁵⁷. General Simonds’ very words still echoed in the corridors of CFHQ, it seems.

Questions may be asked about the resistance to change that emerges from this part of the Hennessy report. On the one hand, we understand that standardization was pursued as the quintessence of military efficiency. On the other hand, Canada’s allies are mentioned as if they all used English. The position was that since operations were conducted in English in Canada, all members of all units should necessarily understand that language. This was forgetting — as Anderson also forgot — the make-up of Allied units in the Second World War and the various countries and language groups that comprise NATO, an organization which had never harboured the belief that all military personnel in the coalition should speak English in the event of war. Two more of Hennessy’s conclusions will not stand up to scrutiny, as we shall see in the next chapter: training French-speaking recruits in English and keeping the same number of FLUs. The latter clearly meant having only one FLU in our Forces: the R22^eR.

On April 6, 1966, the Prime Minister made an important statement in the House. At that time, the outline of the Royal Commission on B & B’s conclusions were becoming visible. The centennial of Canadian Confederation was also approaching, and the Prime Minister wanted 1967 to be a turning point in Canadian history. Accordingly, on that April day, he repeated the basic themes of his December 1962 speech, clarifying certain decisions that had been taken following the recommendations submitted by the interdepartmental committee.⁵⁸

As of 1967, then, reasonable proficiency in both official languages (or a willingness to acquire it) would be an element of merit considered by the Public Service in recruiting university graduates. In Canadian centres where a reasonable knowledge of both languages was needed, rules regarding appointment to executive and administrative positions would be introduced gradually,”so that by about 1970 in the case of appointments from outside the service, and by about 1975 in the case of promotions from within, bilingual proficiency or a willingness to acquire it will

normally be a requirement for positions in such centres.” It was made clear, however, that the foregoing did not apply to some parts of the Public Service, including the entire Canadian Forces. “The appropriate departmental and agency authorities are therefore being asked to submit a long term program of effective action in their respective areas of responsibility which takes these special problems and particular difficulties into account.”

Another decision announced at that time was the establishment of a special secretariat on bilingualism which would operate within the Privy Council Office, reporting to the Prime Minister. Its purpose would be to ensure that the government’s program and policies for bilingualism in the Public Service would be implemented progressively and in a co-ordinated manner.⁵⁹ This office, headed by J.S. Hodgson, would in a few years be called upon to define what exactly should constitute a bilingualism program. In a letter of June 21, 1966 to the DND, Hodgson recalled the content of Pearson’s speech and added that other recommendations had also been approved. Thus funds were allocated to replacing senior public servants who went on language training; in addition, the interdepartmental committee which had been set up in 1963 was converted into a committee to advise the new secretariat. The latter agency’s director would chair the former committee.

Hodgson’s letter goes farther, however. He recognizes that the government’s goals could not be achieved for several years. How quickly the government’s plans would materialize depended on the support they received from senior officials in each department. Hence deputy ministers were asked to appoint an official with the rank of assistant deputy minister, director of personnel (or the equivalent) or higher, who would be responsible for promoting the departments’ individual bilingualism programs and effecting liaison with the secretariat. In addition, Hodgson wanted the Department to submit to the Treasury Board through the secretariat a list of the executive positions in the National Capital Region (NCR) that could figure in Pearson’s program. These positions were to be used to accelerate the development of gifted bilingual officials and to improve the recruitment of bilingual candidates with high potential. He also wanted to have in his possession by September 15, 1966 the DND’s program for applying the general bilingualism policies to scientific, professional and technical positions, which, although

different from the policies for the administrative and executive categories currently focussed on by the government, still required immediate attention. Lastly, Hodgson requested details of the long-term program which the CF component of the Department planned to follow to implement the government policy, regardless of any specific problems that might affect the application of language requirements in the Armed Forces.⁶⁰

On July 7, the Deputy Minister acknowledged the letter and, designated the Department's Director General of Education Programs (DGEP) as the official responsible for bilingualism programs at the DND. The DGEP was charged to effect liaison with the Secretariat,⁶¹ which was logical since his branch had, since 1964, been responsible for co-ordinating everything to do with second language training for civilians in the Department, liaising with the B & B Commission and the interdepartmental committee, advising the Deputy Minister on the steps to be taken to implement government directives designed to promote bilingualism, reviewing questions on this matter brought up in the House and establishing relations between the Chief of Military Personnel and the Chief of Civilian Personnel on the matter of bilingualism.⁶² In short, the DGEP was the office responsible for bilingualism at the DND. Several Francophones worked there, and Mr Roger Lavergne headed it until his premature death in 1969. He was the official who had signed section 6.5 of the Department's Information Manual which, admittedly, was not revolutionary. Its text had been approved by the French-speaking Assistant Deputy Minister, Paul Mathieu.

For several years, the DGEP retained responsibility for co-ordinating programs developed by the Department and advising the Deputy Minister on bilingualism. Several reports were put together by the Branch before being signed by the Deputy Minister and sent to the Special Secretariat on Bilingualism. Little by little, however, this secondary role in the DGEP's mandate was eroded and transferred to units dedicated solely to matters relating to bilingualism. For some time, the civilian side of the Department acted independently from the military side, until both were placed under the Director General Bilingualism and Biculturalism (DGBB), a post which was not created until August 1971.

The Deputy Minister's real reply to Hodgson came on September

28, 1966. Taken as a whole, it testifies to the Department's total disarray (which was undoubtedly paralleled in other departments) in the face of the government's determination to make Canada bilingual. The tone of the Deputy Minister's remarks was set by the statement that from 1939 to 1945 the Armed Forces taught English to French Canadians through "necessity and moral obligation". Later, the Army and then the Air Force introduced six-month French courses for some of their commissioned and non-commissioned officers (these were the courses offered at CATS and the RCAF School of English). After the Armed Forces were integrated, the Individual Training Directorate became responsible for language training and bilingualism for military personnel. Since 1964, great progress had been made in this area, and this was described in an appendix to the letter which also reported on progress toward bilingualism on the civilian side of the Department.

This appendix, unfortunately, did not so much plan as it did repeat past events. On the military side, it discussed the situation before 1964: bilingualism at the CMR de Saint-Jean; English courses for Francophones; French courses for about fifty Anglophones per year; Francophones trained in English with occasional help from bilingual instructors, mainly in the Army. Next, it described what happened after 1964, when integration began. Activities "seemed to be developing". Lengthy paragraphs describe how the various Armed Forces language schools had been combined in a single Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS), and how teachers were to be hired to give courses; mention is made of the program of language training outside working hours that the Forces had set up across Canada. The report went on to state that the Secretary of State's Translation Bureau had begun to translate the Queen's Orders and Regulations. Several military training publications had been translated and revised by the Forces themselves, but translation capability would have to increase, if only to catch up. In addition, officer cadets studying academic subjects at university were encouraged to take second language courses and studies were being conducted on the whole question of language training (consolidation, length and scope, for example). An important development was scheduled for 1967, when basic training for all recruits was to be integrated. From then on, Francophones were to receive this training in French. Immediately after this stage, however, they would have to begin studying their second language. A study of the number of bilingual

military positions considered necessary in the Forces was to be completed in, November 1966.

The second part of the appendix dealt with civilians for whom there were few or no programs before 1964. Since the Public Service Commission of Canada (PSC) set up its Language Bureau in 1964, those who derived most benefit from it were civilians in the National Capital Region. In 1964-65, 132 civilians from DND took language courses. The following year, the total was 257, and about 800 were expected in 1966-67, in Ottawa and elsewhere in Canada, thanks to extramural courses. In Ottawa, the Deputy Minister estimated that the DND monopolized 40 to 45 per cent of places in the Bureau's classes. In all, eight senior officials — including one Francophone, the DGEP⁶³ — were on full-time language training as part of the cultural development program planned for them. Civilians were encouraged to take advantage of extramural courses, especially outside Ottawa.

Let us return to the DM's letter itself, in which he admitted that the DND now had to put forward new programs. He warned, however, that these would have many complex and far-reaching repercussions. Several factors led him not to react too quickly. First was the arrival of a new Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jean Victor Allard, who had a personal interest in bilingualism in the Forces and would wish to have a say. Secondly, the Forces, because of the economic and human restrictions placed on them, and because of their operational mandate, had to react to real needs. The Department was studying how many bilingual positions were necessary among the civilian as well as the military personnel. The integration process and the Classification Review Board program for civilians, which were both in progress, meant that managers at all levels did not know what staff they would have or precisely how the various positions that would change category would be defined. Third, although English and French had the same status, it had to be recognized that the DND used English almost exclusively and that a sudden increase in the use of French might cause confusion and problems that could probably be avoided. Lastly, the final total impact of integration was not yet known. The Department would be in a much better position to plan bilingualism in the long term when the structure of headquarters, commands and bases was properly consolidated.

Armstrong undertook, however, to submit a progress report in about three months (that is, in late December 1966). When final plans for the executive and administrative categories were completed, the Department would be able to advance to the scientific, professional and technical category, which might pose problems that would not be easy to solve. The Deputy Minister said he hoped his correspondent would recognize that in the meantime the DND had an active bilingualism program already in progress. He assured Hodgson that every effort would be made to advance progressively.⁶⁴

The subsequent progress report did document an advance on the civilian side. Dated January 23, 1967, the letter is much shorter than the September one. In general, the appendix giving details of the program goes over the same topics discussed earlier. It points, however, to an intention to base a complete bilingualism program for the civilian side on four propositions: a statement clearly defining the status of both official languages and opportunities for their use; designation of bilingual positions so as not to prejudice current incumbents' rights; the possibility of publications in both official languages; and an intelligent language training plan.⁶⁵ The "total planning" movement, although hesitant at this stage, appeared to have been launched.

At this point it would be well to focus on an event mentioned earlier which, although secondary to this study, deserves brief attention. This is the integration of the Armed Forces, which began in 1964 at the CFHQ level and continued in subsequent years to the command level. Thus, when bilingualism took off, the DND was undergoing great changes that sometimes caused major problems of adjustment and redefinition.

Integration had a few repercussions on bilingualism. Beginning in 1966, language courses offered to the military were rationalized. This included the transferring of language teachers serving in Quebec from provincial to federal control (September 1966 to February 1967), leading to difficulties that will be discussed in a later chapter (Volume II). The opportunity of integration was also seized to centralize language training for all three services in Saint-Jean, Quebec, a process completed on September 1, 1967. According to plan, 1,900 trainees would pass through the CFLS every year from then on; 1,700 of these would be Francophones studying English.

This is noteworthy: although Francophones constituted a minority within the Forces, in 1967 they were the ones who mainly benefitted from second language training. We shall see later how this plan turned out. However, a cynic might say that the Forces, which over the years had made adjusting to Canadian military life synonymous with being assimilated for French-speaking recruits, did not then seem prepared to climb out of this rut in 1966.

When integration is combined with the serious introduction of bilingualism, peculiar results sometimes followed. One instance is a position of clerk typist 2 at 11 Technical Service Unit (TSU) in Montreal, which became vacant on February 15, 1966 and had still not been filled by July 1967. Integration had required an analysis of all positions, which delayed the competition. In July 1966, the position had been reclassified as clerk 3. By that time, however, Pearson's statement of the preceding April had begun to take effect. Ottawa required the unit to have the competition poster specify that knowledge of English and French was required for the position. At 11 TSU, it was asserted that only English was used and the poster should state that a knowledge of English was required, but proficiency in both languages would be an asset. The controversy worked its way up the chain of command to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), who spoke to the Deputy Minister about it. It was relevant, too, that the person chosen would have some supervisory duties, and that at that time the whole policy of bilingualism for civilian managers in all departments was beginning to take shape. In 1966, the government was beginning to require all supervisors working in Quebec or the NCR to be bilingual (although a similar directive, not often applied in practice, had been in effect at the DND since 1948.)⁶⁶ In the end, 11 TSU had to comply with the new requirements.

Late in 1966, the civilian side of the Department, in accordance with PSC directives, prepared a bilingualism plan. Nothing in it was clearly defined, however, especially not the Department's goals nor the steps by which they would be met.

To close this chapter on a positive note, we should report that the drive toward bilingualism at the DND — since we cannot yet speak of a will to integrate the “Francophone personality” (biculturalism) — had begun to produce results in many areas. In 1965, the Department experimented with training some French-speaking recruits in auto

mechanics in French. For this purpose, they were sent to a trades school in Quebec.⁶⁷ In August 1966, a Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO 9-21) on teaching French was issued. Other CFAOs were prepared on studying English and language knowledge examinations. In another area, a seven per cent bonus for bilingual secretaries was approved by an order in Council of February 2, 1967, retroactive to October 1, 1966.

On April 29, 1966, the Deputy Chief Reserves, Major-General W.A.B. Anderson, asked the CDS to make the first paragraph of section 234 of the DND Administrative and Staff Procedures Manual 121(3) (ASPM) more flexible so that French could be used more often. In brief, this document stated that English was the language of work in the Forces, except in French-speaking infantry regiments. According to Anderson, several non infantry Reserve units in Quebec were considered and treated as French-speaking.⁶⁸ Anderson received support from an unexpected quarter a few months later. In July 1966, a French-speaking sergeant at Canadian Forces Base Bagotville wrote an internal memorandum to his section demanding, on the basis of the paragraph of the ASPM in question, that English be used as the only language of work. The memorandum, written in English, eluded the grasp of officials and subsequently appeared in several newspapers in both languages. The *Toronto Star* spoke out against the sergeant's attitude, and even more against the part of Section 234 that had led to his action.⁶⁹ The sergeant's order was quickly countermanded and action was taken to amend the offending part of the ASPM, at the very moment when the newly-appointed CDS was firmly resolved to take in hand the whole question of bilingualism and biculturalism in the Canadian Forces. We shall see that through his efforts, in less than two years, French was to come into its own as a language of work.

Chapter 8

General Allard is Appointed Chief of the Defence Staff

Many thought [the B & B Commission's report] much too pessimistic and much too alarming. I did not. I thought it was exactly right. I wanted people to be shocked, and they were. Some Canadians realized for the first time that there were differences serious enough to destroy our country if no remedial action were taken.

Lester B. Pearson
Prime Minister of Canada

*Mike, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable
Lester B. Pearson, Vol III, 1957-58 (Toronto: UTP, 1975)*

In the middle of July 1966, Lieutenant-General Jean Victor Allard, commander of Mobile Command, at Saint-Hubert (near Montreal), was promoted to the position of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). This appointment was not only a first for French Canadians, but also an important step in the creation of an environment conducive to bilingualism and biculturalism (B & B) at the Department of National Defence and in the Armed Forces in particular. The positive situation developed further by itself, when The Honourable Léo Cadieux became Minister of National Defence on September 19, 1967.¹

For his part, Allard was to say, "What got me the appointment was the situation in which the Department of National Defence was placed, nothing else."² This refers to the fact that he agreed to take the lead in the unification of the Armed Forces. The general's total support for the project exacted a price.³ His acceptance of the position was tied to one condition, agreed to by the Minister, Paul Hellyer, that an investigation into the situation of Francophones in the Forces would be carried out.⁴ Allard's aim is clear, the bringing of the French fact "into the framework of the new Forces."⁵ We feel it fair to point out that Allard took full advantage of the reorganization of the

DND to press for a cause dear to his heart, a cause about which too little note had been taken for too long.⁶ We must add, however, that the psychological moment for change had come, and his leadership was strongly supported by the Ministers, Hellyer and Cadieux, and by Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau.

Francophone Study Group

When Allard submitted a brief to the Defence Council on September 21, 1966 calling for a study group on the recruitment and retention of French-speaking personnel in the Armed Forces, he was only seeking official approval for a decision that had already been taken. The document stated certain facts: Francophones made up only about 10 per cent of the Forces but nearly 30 per cent of the population of Canada; furthermore, this percentage decreased in the higher ranks and in the technical trades. On October 6, the Defence Council gave its support to the establishment of Allard's suggested group, which was to have about six months to do its work. On October 19, the CDS wrote to the GOCs to explain the nature of the study being undertaken and ask for everyone's co-operation.⁷

The Chairman of the Study Group, Colonel Armand Ross, had Allard's full confidence and ample freedom to manoeuvre.⁸ He surrounded himself with military personnel from all three services, whom he formed into teams to carry out investigations in the field or prepare questionnaires for distribution, and then compile the data gathered.

Ross submitted his report in March 1967. It is a summary of the status of the use of the French language and of Francophones in the Canadian Forces. The description of the situation covers 131 pages divided into 19 chapters, ranging across subjects as varied as the results of recruitment from 1961 to 1969, training methods and career organization for French-speaking personnel, their social life, potential Francophone resources, and so forth. The report concludes with 39 recommendations.⁹

The Study Group avoided discussing injustices and contented itself with outlining the situation as it was and suggesting ways of improving it. Thus, the Committee "was not unduly disturbed by unfortunate incidents that came to its attention in the course of the study. These

were treated as isolated cases and are of no real significance in assessing the fundamental situation.”¹⁰ The style of the report is lively and concise. Its authors can only be faulted on quite minor points. For example, in speaking of Francophones, the report seems to mean only Quebecers.

The authors faced certain difficulties in collecting data. No precise figures were available from which to determine the exact percentage of Francophones in the Forces. Records relating to mother tongue needed to be organized, according to the report, so as to fill this gap. Similarly, a classification of the levels of bilingualism required of the military had to be arrived at in order to facilitate management.¹¹

To gain an idea of the paucity of statistics at the time, let us recall that the CDS's letter to the Defence Council mentioned that only 10 per cent of military personnel were French-speaking; the minutes of the October 6 meeting show the same figure. Yet Appendix A to the Ross Report, which is supposed to reproduce the letter of September 21, 1966, mentions “slightly over 15 per cent”. It appears that between September 1966 and March 1967, an error in estimation was corrected or the processing of statistics was improved. When the Council met on October 6, one participant challenged the 10 per cent figure, which he was wrongly told came from the B & B Commission. How could a precise figure be quoted, in any case? Candidates applying for a military career were required to answer a questionnaire which asked whether one was of English, French or other “nationality”. By compiling the results obtained in this way, we can conclude that in October 1966, 16.6 per cent of CF personnel were French Canadians. When the B & B Commission conducted a census of military personnel, it found that 13.4 per cent were descended from French Canadians on the father's side and still spoke French. The difference in percentages depended on the definition, Ross concludes in a letter to Reyno dated October 12, 1966. In his study, Ross planned to focus on French-speaking military personnel whose mother tongue (in other words, first language learned and still understood, according to the definition of mother tongue given at the 1961 Census) was French.¹² This produced another figure: 15.8 per cent according to Appendix BB of the Ross Report, dated November 1966. Following this report, the problem of definition was gradually solved and

statistics became more and more reliable, as we shall have occasion to see in the second volume of this work.

Now let us return to the analysis of the situation and recommendations presented by Ross's group. In carrying out its mandate, it drew on the preliminary report of the B & B Commission, released in 1965. The latter contained certain accusations of unilingualism in the Forces, particularly the Navy and Air Force. Ross came to similar conclusions and he lamented, among other things, the fact that, according to ASPM 121 and CDS directive P3/65, "the use of French is not always acceptable in Quebec and is almost never acceptable outside that province and the Ottawa area."¹³

The study also suggested that the CMR de Saint-Jean ought to grant degrees. It supported the proposals of the Minister's Manpower Study Report (Officers) — discussed in the preceding chapter — regarding the possibilities of training Francophones in French,¹⁴ for that reason, it called for a new "integrated" glossary to replace Chaballe's English-French military dictionary, dating from the Second World War. Mention was also made of setting up units and bases with a French-language majority, on the grounds that this would give Francophones an opportunity to work in French, just as hitherto Anglophones had been able to work in their own language. To require Francophones to learn English as soon as they enlisted — although it was acknowledged that they would have to learn it in the medium term, during their careers — went beyond the intentions of the government.¹⁵ The report suggested that the directives on education for dependants of Francophone military personnel needed revision. Also needed was a review of the designation of bilingual positions; undertaken in July 1966 on the basis of incorrect criteria, it had shown a requirement for 1,351 bilingual positions in the Forces, 1,302 of which were already adequately filled. This was far from the 1965 estimates of the Manpower Study Report.¹⁶ The Ross report's far-reaching recommendations cover every field.¹⁷

One major reason for the small number of French Canadians in technical trades in the Armed Forces, it had long been maintained in the Canadian staffs, was that the Quebec education system was not geared to training technicians and the *collèges classiques* did not provide students with the knowledge required or judged acceptable by the Forces. Ross quickly surveyed the Quebec education system

as it was in 1966-67, when major reforms were beginning to alter it. Even before these disruptions, he pointed out, secondary schools offered specialization in commerce, science-letters and science-mathematics, which took students to university with a solid grounding in their chosen fields. Trade schools had been producing thousands of technicians of all sorts for several years. The report concluded by arguing firmly against the view that the majority of French-speaking young people did not have adequate schooling to be useful to the Armed Forces.¹⁸ The corollary of this was that other reasons must be sought for the shortage of Francophones in the Forces.

Bilingualism Secretariat and Advisory Committee on Bilingualism

There was no question of letting the report rest in limbo. Using what seems to have been his usual method — at least as regards bilingualism — General Allard took the lead. He wanted an action group which would hold exclusive responsibility for duties relating to B & B. Colonel J.O.A. Letellier, Director of Organization at CFHQ, was the ideal field officer to head this group. He helped draft a letter, signed by Allard on May 29, 1967, proposing that a Bilingualism Secretariat be set up within the CDS's office.¹⁹ The duties of the Secretariat's members were included. The reason given for setting up this unit were that it would demonstrate the DND's intention to implement the government B & B policies and solve the many problems relating to Francophone representation in the Forces.²⁰ On July 21, 1967, the request was approved by Paul Hellyer, MND.²¹ The Secretariat officially began operating with a staff of seven officers, on August 31, 1967.

By virtue of the roles assigned to this small body, a start was made on co-ordinating all bilingualism activities in the Forces. The Secretariat advised on the question in general and also on problems encountered by Francophones in the Forces. Its aim was to move out beyond the confines of language training and translation in which bilingualism had always been limited. The Secretariat also served as consulting editor for all French Forces publications except *La Sentinelle*. Among its other responsibilities were preparing and subsequently updating a bilingual dictionary of military terms, solving problems relating to Francophones' dependants, and establishing priorities for the translation of manuals.²²

The Director of the Secretariat also sat on the DND Bilingualism Advisory Committee after it was set up on September 20, 1967, at the suggestion of the DGEP. The latter chaired the Committee, which received its official mandate on October 23: to provide the necessary leadership and co-ordination for the development and implementation of Departmental bilingualism policies. The committee had power only to recommend. The calibre of its work on co-ordinating the civilian and military sides of the Department may be judged from the fact that it met for the first time on October 30, 1968, over a year after it was created.²³

French language units

Let us go back a few months. On November 21, 1966, the B & B Commission suggested a meeting with officials of the DND to discuss the various matters the commissioners would raise in their report.²⁴ Two of these related closely to what would gradually develop into French language units (FLUs): military units in Quebec and the establishment of “units of French Canadians.” In the course of their inquiry, the commissioners received a suggestion that additional military units for the three services (including a naval base) be, installed in Quebec, so that French Canadian servicemen could spend more of their careers in their native province. Arguments were developed in favour of units consisting of French Canadians, following the pattern of the R22^eR, in the Navy and Air Force as well as the Army, or concentrating French Canadians in certain units where they would predominate.²⁵ These data were placed before various authorities at CFHQ, whose comments were then collected in a brief. On January 16, 1967, this document was given to those who were to meet three days later to co-ordinate the Department’s position before the meeting with the Commission, scheduled for January 24, 1967.

In the document dated January 16, the opinions expressed by the Department’s representatives tended to be negative. They ranged from a prediction that such a policy would divide Anglophones and Francophones to the allegation that everyone’s career opportunities would be restricted.²⁶ We also see a range of emotions displayed largely by Anglophones which should give pause to Francophones who are often considered to be Canada’s “emotional” people. A

meeting on January 19 softened some of these positions. The Department's spokesmen presented the following position to the Commission on January 24: the location of units had to be based on military objectives, not on bilingualism; the important factor was bringing Francophones together in units, rather than the location of such units; military personnel could not expect to spend their entire careers in one province, for that would restrict their own career opportunities and the Department's freedom to deploy them.²⁷ This did not prevent the Commission from recommending the creation of FLUs "within Mobile Command" and, progressively, at CFHQ and in commands other than Mobile Command.²⁸

From this we see that the DND was not opposed to the idea of concentrating Francophones in certain units. It was not, however, prepared to change its rationale for locating units, or its career progression system or, of course, its operational efficiency. Except in the Navy, it ought to be noted, Quebec had a wide range of military units in which most Canadian Forces trades were carried on, although for the most part in English.²⁹

The DND's final position on this issue is, without doubt, attributable to General Allard, who chaired the co-ordination meeting on January 19. After allowing his subordinates to speak for several minutes, he intervened rather curtly to recall the unhappy lot of Francophones in the Forces to that date. He then brought the discussion to the conclusion we have seen.³⁰

An incident that involved one of the authors (who was then a staff officer) sheds light on the attitudes of the day to this question. To recount it in brief, among the papers produced for the meeting of January 19 were two very different texts from the Directorate of Land Forces Operational Requirements and Training (DLFORT). The author, at the request of his superior, Lieutenant-Colonel W.B.S. Sutherland, gave his reactions to the B & B Commission's suggestions. Dissatisfied with the conclusions reached by his subordinate, Sutherland submitted his own replies to the proposals put forward by commissioners Laurendeau and Dunton.³¹ Sutherland forwarded to the meeting co-ordinator his subordinate's opinions, which he did not share, and with them he enclosed his own opinions, covering the two with a brief explanatory memorandum. Sutherland presented negative arguments, such as those mentioned briefly above, in a memorandum

entitled “English Canadian Viewpoint”. The author, for his part, held a position (Sutherland called it “French Canadian Viewpoint”) that, although it was to be very quickly outstripped by events, was much closer to the conclusions reached by the meeting. He agreed, for example, with extending FLUs but did not foresee that this system could be expanded to groups of units. Consequently, he concluded, “As it is difficult to visualize an ‘operational’ grouping of French-speaking units above battalion/squadron/ship level, the use of French as an ‘operational’ language above that level is not envisaged.”³² Neither did he insist on applying the principle of equality for both languages. He merely recommended that French might be used at training centres:

but this could be limited to the portion which affects only training except where recruits or officer cadets are concerned, should their proportionate numbers and lack of knowledge of the English language so warrant it.³³


This said, the author was not the only one to appear cautious compared to General Allard. Colonel Armand Ross, who attended the January 19 meeting as an observer, had presented his view in the document of January 16. He wrote that it would no doubt be prudent to designate some operational units in the Forces as “predominantly French-speaking.” He added, however, “I do not consider the possibility of making these units and bases unilingual French.” What seemed certain at that stage was that they ought to include a majority of French-speaking military personnel and a fair number of English-speaking officers and other ranks.³⁴ Nothing at that time in Colonel Ross’s remarks indicates what language could be used in these units, or whether the Anglophones in them ought to be bilingual.

In January 1967, the Ross Committee had not yet completed its work. This was not done until March. In response to the B & B Commission’s letter of November 1966 and the wish expressed by many (definitely including Allard),³⁵ the Committee realized it ought to consider the possibility that certain bases and units might be designated as military elements that should be made up primarily of French-speaking personnel. It did not, however, study the possible establishment of exclusively French-speaking units stationed strictly in the province of Quebec. The author of the document wondered whether it might be appropriate to bring Francophones together and assign them to specific duties, taking into account

After encouraging the use of correct French in the Royal 22^e Régiment, Brigadier-General Marcel Richard, CD, became the first French Canadian general to serve as Defence Attaché at the Canadian Embassy in Paris. (Sh-72-549)



Brigadier-General Armand Ross, DSO, CD, wrote a report on the conditions of service for French-Canadian military personnel, which enabled General Allard to bring about the necessary changes. (REP 70-286)



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* Compiled and drawn by the Directorate of History.

operational requirements and the functional orientation of the Armed Forces.

Thus the Committee considered the advisability of designating bases and units made up mainly of French-speaking officers and other ranks in Francophone or bilingual regions. These servicemen would acquire their first operational experience there and return at various stages in their careers. All these bases and units would include an “appropriate, proportion” of Anglophones so that Francophones could be exposed to English as soon as they joined the Forces and build an environment in which interested Anglophones could make contact with the French Canadian culture and language. In addition, they would enable Francophones to serve from time to time in locations where the French language was predominant and help them overcome the handicap of having to prove themselves professionally and socially in their second language throughout their careers.³⁶

This part of the Ross study, which deals with units consisting mainly of French-speaking military personnel, had the effect of a specific proposal, well prepared and developed by the Bilingualism Secretariat. After being commented upon by various CFHQ bodies, it was submitted to the Defence Council on November 27, 1966 in a memorandum entitled “Reorganization and Relocation of Predominantly French-speaking Bases and Units and Establishment of a French Language Training Centre”. In essence, the proposal was to extend officially beyond the R22^eR — and thus to corps and trades other than infantry — the opportunities which had been enjoyed by members of that regiment, by eventually designating units in all three elements (sea, land and air) to become “predominantly French speaking”. Thus Francophones without a thorough knowledge of English would have an opportunity to compete on an equal footing with their English-speaking colleagues. Since there would be Anglophones in this structure, it would promote bilingualism; in addition, it would justify the presence of bilingual personnel at all other military levels, including CFHQ. Since most of the proposed units would be located in Quebec (except for the French-speaking part of the Airborne Regiment and the ship), it was emphasized to the Council that, in the long term, some of the cost of educating military dependants might decrease and, in the short term, many complications for Francophones obliged to serve outside Quebec would be removed. It was added in closing that if the attitudes prevailing outside Quebec

did not change, there was little chance that such bases or units would succeed there.³⁷

The memorandum was accepted in principle. The Minister asked the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) to make the necessary preparations for the question to be put to Cabinet as soon as possible, with specific details as to execution and the approximate cost of the operation.³⁸ That very day, the Honourable Léo Cadieux wrote to the Prime Minister explaining what was being proposed as regards units with a French-speaking majority. He then asked permission to proceed immediately with implementation.³⁹

On December 7, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson replied, in French. He was interested by the projects being developed at NDHQ. As to French-speaking military bases, however, he warned that the Department should avoid concentrating such units in Quebec; although he recognized that most of the first ones would be on Quebec soil they should be spread all across the country. He then asked whether French-speaking “regiments” ought not to include Anglophones, as that would make for a little more bilingualism and understanding between the two groups.⁴⁰ Those were two considerations that had already been raised by several people in the Department, including Ross. On the latter, the Minister had mentioned twice at the Council meeting on November 27 that a percentage of Anglophones had to be included in the proposed units to ward off the danger of “segregation”. In line with this, there was some satisfaction that the 1st Commando (made up of Francophones) was stationed in Edmonton, Alberta.⁴¹ The problem was far from solved, however.

The Defence Council, at a meeting on December 18, 1967, studied a draft of the memorandum to Cabinet which proposed a ratio of 70 per cent Francophones to 30 per cent Anglophones in predominantly French-speaking units. During the discussion of this matter, it emerged that the CDS insisted that the plan should not include any proportion of Francophones. What he felt needed to be emphasized were the aims of this plan, which were to improve the education in French of French-speaking servicemen’s children and to face up to the fact that one day, Francophones must occupy 28 per cent* of positions in the Forces at all ranks and in all trades.

* The percentage of Francophones in Canada according to the 1961 Census.

Creating units with a 70 to 30 ratio was not the purpose of the program. The Minister, for his part, favoured a proportion, and seemed willing to acquiesce in 70 to 30, again with a view to avoiding segregation, although he still felt that the draft inclined too far in that direction. The discussion resulted in the writing of another draft which was to remove the percentage feature before it reached Cabinet. A few minor changes were also made elsewhere in the document.⁴²

Finally, on January 19, 1968, a memorandum was sent to Cabinet. It covered the usual questions: recruiting Francophones and keeping them in the Forces; the Department's programs to encourage bilingualism; and language of operations, which should still be English, in Allard's opinion. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the memorandum, explicitly proposing to relocate units in the three services and assign them as FLUs, sought the specific approval of Cabinet. While it was stated that Anglophones would belong to these units, the ratios given in the draft of December 18 were not included. The memorandum did, however, explain the benefits of these innovations, among them that Francophones would no doubt remain in the Forces longer and would one day make up 28 per cent of strength.⁴³

To judge from this, the CDS appeared to have carried his point as to the real purpose in view. But the game was not yet over. The press release dated April 2, 1968, officially announcing the creation of FLUs, stated that Anglophones would make up 20 per cent of the strength of FLUs in order to encourage the use of a second language. It was even added that 20 per cent of the positions of English-language units (ELUs) would be filled by Francophones. The press release mentioned all the opinions expressed to date on the issue of FLUs. The program's purposes were to increase bilingualism in the Forces and help cut down the turnover of French-speaking military personnel, since fairly large numbers of them enlisted, according to the Ross Report, but did not stay. With this in view, the Forces were going to create ELUs and FLUs and open a French-language training centre. These ELUs and FLUs might be located anywhere in the country and certainly not in any particular geographic area. The aim was to provide a bilingual cadre in the Forces, not to divide the Department along linguistic and geographic lines.

The press release recalled that the language of operations

outside FLUs would be English, except in the air component, where English, the language of air communications, would be used even within FLUs, because this practice was followed almost all over the world by international agreement.⁴⁴ It also emphasized that the question of education had been partly solved by paying allowances to military personnel whose children had to travel for their education whenever adequate services were not available locally. Finally, the release stated that FLUs would be the first stage in a program that would be introduced gradually, so that military efficiency and career patterns would not be ill-affected.⁴⁵

Nine days later, the Minister sent a memorandum to the CDS officially authorizing him to proceed with FLUs according to the information presented in the memorandum to Cabinet dated January 19 and in the press release of April 2.⁴⁶ At this stage, this meant giving official status to what was virtually a *fait accompli*, since the FLUs in question were already being formed. The Minister's memorandum went over the reasons for setting up FLUs and a number of subjects that had become customary: the danger of segregation; the necessity of having FLUs across Canada; the importance of Francophones in ELUs (20 per cent) and Anglophones in FLUs (20 per cent). The Department was to move toward these goals gradually, without reducing career opportunities for either language group.

This radical, positive change which was intended to benefit French-speaking Canadians in the Forces had been devised too hastily. Later, we shall have occasion to note that there was in fact no international "agreement" compelling the Forces, in particular the air element, to use English. The decision on maintaining 20 per cent Francophones in English-language units and the converse was also taken too quickly. On March 21, 1968, Prime Minister Pearson wrote a long letter to Mr. Cadieux confirming the Cabinet's decision nine days earlier to accept the changes suggested by the Armed Forces. He accompanied this general approval with conditions and advice ably summarized elsewhere by Armand Letellier,⁴⁷ and referred to the 20 per cent mentioned in the April 2 press release. In the minds of the members of Pearson's Cabinet and even in his own, there were doubtless sound political reasons for demanding this 20 per cent (which should be a minimum, he wrote). But if these people had taken the basic principle into

account — a principle they had in fact accepted, which makes their error all the more striking — that the Forces should in future treat Anglophones and Francophones the same and offer them equal opportunities, they would immediately have realized that the mathematics of equality yielded very different results from those of politics. Given that there would inevitably be more English than French units, how would it be possible to reconcile the fact that Francophones could work in French with the insistence that they make up 20 per cent of the strengths of ELUs, where they would inevitably have to work in English? Under these circumstances, a much greater proportion of Francophones in the Forces would have to operate in English compared to the proportion of Anglophones working in French? This inconsistency was realized when the Defence Staff seriously examined the whole question of bilingualism and biculturalism in the Forces in order to draw up a long-term implementation program, and steps were taken accordingly. It is interesting to note that General Allard signed a letter to Mr. Cadieux vigorously attacking it. Again, the Letellier study summarizes this well and recounts the story behind it.⁴⁸ For his part, Allard recorded that Cadieux did not pass the former's objections on to Pearson, and said why.⁴⁹ On the matter of the 20 per cent, Allard was fully aware, Pearson's letter had emphasized that it would be difficult at the moment to include 20 per cent Francophones in every ELU because there were not enough Francophones; consequently, the Forces would have to aim at this percentage only in locations that already had an adequate cultural and educational environment. The CDS's reply was limited to pointing out that such conditions existed only in Quebec and some parts of Ontario.⁵⁰ Nowhere in his letter did he refer to the fact that this 20 per cent criterion could not be reconciled with "equality". Once again, an elementary piece of arithmetic had been omitted. But we should not dramatize this sequence of events unduly, for it did not have any unfortunate consequences.

Let us go back to April 1, 1968. On that day, a long message in English and French was sent to the heads of Commands. It contained not only the text of the news release to be made public the following day, but also spirited words from the CDS. He proclaimed it the Forces' duty to provide leadership in bilingualism. Their disciplined structure suited them to this role better than any other organization. He added that the program being introduced would not interfere with Anglophones' careers and would not mean

segregation. The question of competent personnel to execute the plan, although it would be difficult to answer at first, would be resolved gradually. The Forces had a role to play in national unity and would have a positive attitude to the program. The CDS was confident that every general would play his part by supporting it.⁵¹

The press release and the CDS's message remained vague as to the names of the designated FLUs. Nothing was said about the Airborne Regiment. Nor was it yet known which land units would be stationed at Valcartier. The CDS mentioned, however, that there were plans to redeploy land units within the framework of the unification directives. Allard was trying to bring bilingualism into the CF, rather as his predecessors had done in 1953 with the artillery, and in 1957 with armoured units. Admittedly, he was doing so more vigorously and on a larger scale.⁵²

By June 25, 1968, some units had already been designated FLUs⁵³ and elements of the April press release were beginning to come together. Most FLUs would be land units, but the principle was also applied by the Navy and Air Force, spectacularly in comparison to the wasteland that had prevailed in the past, although the Navy in particular was somewhat hesitant because of its strong British traditions. Let us focus for the time being on the Navy, which was mentioned earlier and will come up again later in this study.

In 1941, when Captain J.O. Cossette, the French-speaking Naval Secretary, was asked whether it would be appropriate for some vessels to have French-speaking crews, he flatly refused to consider it.⁵⁴ In 1964, when the same idea reappeared on the horizon while the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission was in progress, Captain D.L. Hanington, Director of Careers (Navy), informed his superior that he would oppose designating any vessel an FLU.⁵⁵ In 1967, Lieutenant-Commander Pierre Simard, a naval member of Allard's staff, wrote that the climate in the Navy was hostile to plans of this nature.⁵⁶

One important element that came into play at the outset was that the CDS had a definite interest in the Navy. A "feasibility" study submitted to Allard by Simard on October 12, 1967 was prepared on the CDS's initiative. Some of the points in this report deserve to be mentioned. The idea of bilingualism in the Navy had been discussed for decades, but some people were calling for too much all

at once (several French-speaking vessels, for example, operating out of Quebec ports). There were arguments against the concept, most of which Simard considered emotional. It was said that the Navy would be split;* the public, especially in Halifax, was not very receptive, nor was the Navy; French-speaking seamen were opposed, for fear of being singled out; seamen on a French-speaking vessel might encounter deep hostility at their home port.⁵⁷ On the positive side, Simard repeated the broad arguments used in the Ross Report in favour of units with a concentration of Francophones. He voiced the opinion that Francophones trained in the Navy would be loyal Canadians and certainly not “separatists”.⁵⁸ After this overview, Simard concluded that the plan of having at least one FLU vessel would not be easy to carry out, but it had to be tried.

Next came the practical aspect. If the Forces decided to go ahead with the concept of a French ship, a census would have to be conducted. At first count, there seemed to be 132 French-speaking officers and 1,585 other ranks. But would there be the right skills at each level and in each trade? Simard estimated that over the next 12 to 16 months, this problem could be solved. He then studied the following alternatives: a 100 per cent French-speaking crew for a designated FLU vessel, or perhaps an 80 per cent one. In either case, the lead time would be the same: 12 to 16 months. Simard preferred a homogeneous French-speaking crew, in contrast to Ross, who favoured mixing the two language groups. Simard, a member of the Study Group headed by Ross wished to avoid committing the same injustices against Anglophones that the Forces were now trying to end for Francophones. If French were to be used as the first language on board, it would be difficult for Anglophones. In any event, after Anglophones were thrown into this situation, they would no doubt try to obtain transfers elsewhere. The two groups were so different that the commanding officer would have to exercise two types of leadership, one for Francophones and the other for Anglophones.

Simard hoped that, once the decision for a FLU ship was taken, a commanding officer would be chosen immediately so that he could prepare for this enormous change by solving some of the problems

* This fails to take into account that the Navy was already split between the East and West coasts.

before the vessel was launched. The person selected must not be called upon to face the challenges of a new command at the same time as taking on all the anxieties and pressures inherent in this innovation. It would be well to have an officer and an NCO from the French Navy seconded to the commanding officer, to help him get the crew operating in French. From a more general standpoint, Simard hoped that the idea of this vessel with a French-speaking crew would be “sold” to the public subtly rather than “rammed down its throat”.⁵⁹ Although Simard is generally positive, he strikes us as somewhat fearful, particularly in his emphasis on the psychological, intangible aspects of the question.

A second memorandum from Simard to Allard, dated October 16, implies that the CDS agreed verbally to the essence of the former’s proposals. The CDS had already broached the subject to several senior naval officers. Simard’s memorandum concludes with an exhortation to ensure that the policy of not over-publicizing the plan be observed. Simard, apparently, was to command the ship.⁶⁰

Allard continued to consult with senior naval officers. He had to do everything in his power to avoid offending them, as they were still reeling from the anticipated effects of unification.⁶¹ Commodore H.A. Porter wrote a memorandum to Colonel Letellier on December 11, 1967, summarizing the problems that would arise in a vessel whose crew spoke French. He repeated some of the worries raised earlier by Simard as regards the number of available sailors competent to embark on this venture. He added new elements, but he appeared less worried than Simard. In his view, if such an experiment were attempted, its success had to be ensured. To this end, enthusiasm had to be generated in the Navy on the east coast. This meant a strong public relations campaign also aimed at building a positive attitude in the local civilian population. It would also be necessary to set up a French language school for the children of French-speaking sailors, and a community centre for the French-speaking population. In other words, the plan had to be comprehensive and gain the support of provincial and municipal authorities in Halifax and Dartmouth.⁶²

The wheels had already been set in motion at that moment. On November 16, the CDS sent a message to Maritime Command asking for a count of seamen who spoke French fluently.⁶³ On January 17, 1968, a memorandum from Allard to the Chief of

Personnel asked the latter to study the two possibilities mentioned by Simard: a destroyer with an entirely French-speaking crew, and one with an 80 per cent French-speaking crew. He asked how long it would take to assemble the latter.⁶⁴ The first alternative was ruled out in response to the Cabinet's decision on March 12, which Prime Minister Pearson enlarged upon in a subsequent letter. This government decision, which was questionable on several scores, had one damaging effect immediately.

On March 15, 1968, Simard, who had been made responsible for executing the plan, wrote another report for Allard. A study of the files had revealed that the Navy would have sufficient French-speaking resources for a vessel to operate as an FLU sometime between 1968 and 1971. But in view of the government's intentions, 20 to 30 unilingual Anglophones would have to be included. Later, the commander of the *Ottawa* (the chosen vessel) emphasized that in future 340 more Francophones would have to be recruited into the Navy every year so as to ensure that the unit could carry on its special mission as an FLU. A second interesting point is that Simard fully accepted the 80:20 ratio he had objected to the previous October. The reasons he used for this stand were greater flexibility in making up a crew; not having to promote a certain number of Francophones specially to fill vacancies; complying with national objectives and the Ross Report; largely disposing of the "separatist" concept associated with the vessel; and greater acceptance by seamen of serving in a bilingual than a unilingual vessel. Another point that Simard continued to advocate was a "low profile" in bringing the project to the public's attention. That, at least, is the term he applied to the public relations program he thought the Department should use to improve the climate in the Halifax region.⁶⁵

This report was forwarded to the Chief of Personnel on March 18 so he could ensure that action on personnel was taken immediately.⁶⁶ This means that on the naval side, where there was undoubtedly much to fear, the program had finally been launched. We must note, however, in connection with certain failures which shall be described in the second volume, that the project did not start off propitiously. Simard's memorandum of October 1967 had cautioned that, with Anglophones on board, it would be hard for the French language to become established as it should. The intensive French courses that were supposed to be given to unilingual Anglophones, according to the

March 15, 1968 memorandum, were certainly not going to solve the problem. Trying to avoid segregationism, as Cadieux and Pearson wished, allowed a crack in the fabric of FLUs in general and the naval bilingualism program in particular; for the Navy had no operational base in Quebec and its main units operated out of Halifax and Esquimalt, which had next to no French cultural environment, and, in the case of Halifax, Simard was convinced, some hostility to the plan. Moreover, the *Ottawa* was to begin its new career relying on Francophones who for the most part had been serving in the Navy in the English language for over ten years. There was, therefore, a strong temptation to “make haste slowly” in the area of FLUs.

That is what happened. The idea of a vessel with a French-speaking crew was abandoned, and those in Halifax — Simard as well as Vice-Admiral O’Brien, the Admiral commanding Maritime Command — took readily to the notion of a “bilingual vessel”.⁶⁷ A report on the operations of the *Ottawa* by Simard, dated June 26, 1970, openly stated as much, that his vessel was a bilingual unit.⁶⁸ When Major-General J. Dextraze, Deputy Chief of Personnel (Military), received this document through regular channels, he asked that an FLU not be called bilingual.⁶⁹ It is difficult for people (and for systems) to adapt fully to new measures, especially if the latter is not accompanied by the regulations which are unfortunately necessary in order to make fine principles stick.

This confusion between bilingual and French units was not confined to the Navy. In the early months of 1968, at least two other commanding generals believed that the FLUs being discussed would in fact be bilingual units.⁷⁰ Allard had to correct this impression, and was apparently understood, at least in literal terms, as had not been the case in the Navy. In spite of everything, FLUs made headway in the Forces, slow though it might sometimes be, in the general direction towards which their course had been set. In August 1969, Allard succeeded in organizing a huge gathering of land and sea FLUs at Anse-au-Foulon*, Québec, with HMCS *Ottawa* anchored off-shore. Governor General Roland Michener and the Minister, Mr. Cadieux, were present. Mr. Cadieux took the opportunity to announce that 430^e *Escadron tactique aérien d’hélicoptères* (ETAH) and 433^e *Escadron tactique aérien* (ETA) would soon officially

* Commonly known as Wolfe’s Cove.

become FLUs. The French-speaking commando of the Airborne Regiment, then at Valcartier, would join the rest of the regiment in Edmonton.⁷¹

The Forces' bilingualism and biculturalism plan

The aim of creating FLUs and organizing some minimal military training in French was to extend the use of French as much as possible in military units stationed in Quebec and in addition the range of military trades practised in French in the province. Some FLUs were also to be established outside Quebec, and since a certain number of Anglophones would be included in them, these people would have an opportunity to increase their knowledge of French.

Several benefits were anticipated from these measures. Careers for French-speaking military personnel would be on a more solid footing. Doing away with the initial handicap that the learning of English had always imposed on them would probably lengthen their careers. According to Ross, about 27 per cent of recruits enlisted from 1961 to 1966 were Francophones; this percentage was very close to the proportion of Francophones in the population of Canada. But because Francophones often left shortly after enrolment, they made up not quite 16 per cent of the Forces' strength in 1967. The precise goal in view was to retain enough Francophones so as to increase this percentage from 16 to 28 per cent. Incidentally, this percentage increase was not explicitly recommended in the Ross Report; however, the Ross Group was formed to study Francophone participation, and it was understood that this ought to be in proportion to their numbers in Canada. On December 18, 1967, the CDS explained clearly to the Defence Council that one of the aims of the proposed changes was to bring the proportion of Francophones in the Forces up to 28 per cent. He mentioned this again in his directive P6/69 on January 13, 1969, which we shall discuss later. The Minister repeated the figure in his memorandum to Cabinet (cited earlier), and also in his press conference. This objective was maintained in all subsequent expansion programs and included in the 1971 *Defence White Paper*.⁷²

Other advantages were anticipated from the decisions made public on April 2, 1968. Those who were unable to serve outside Quebec for family or education reasons would have better career opportunities.

Those who went outside Quebec would, it was hoped, enjoy a better general atmosphere because cultural affinities would inevitably exist within a homogeneous group (on a vessel or in the Airborne Regiment, for example); educational opportunities in French would also materialize in these centres. We note in this connection that as of April 1, 1968, English- or French-speaking military personnel who could not provide their children with the schooling they needed because of service reasons (for example, because there was no school in the children's language or no facility for special disabilities) were entitled to an annual allowance of up to \$1,300 per child. Colonel (ret) René Morin has studied this whole question in a monograph published by the Directorate of History.⁷³ We shall return to this subject in the second volume.

By their very presence and the new outlook they implied, FLUs were a great force for change. Before more FLUs could be formed, a census had to be carried out to determine the exact number of French-speaking military personnel and their level of proficiency. A message to this effect was sent out to units on February 9, 1968. There was also talk of organizing the communications system so that messages to all CF units could be sent in both languages.⁷⁵

At the same time as French-language units were designated in the course of 1968, it became clear that several official documents — such as Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) — would have to be amended to reflect the new situation. After all, in the future, some units would be known only by their French names, others would keep their English titles and a third group — NDHQ and the various commands, among others — would have bilingual names. These provisions appeared in their essence in a memorandum from Allard's Secretariat to the VCDS on May 14, 1968.⁷⁶ This meant that rapid progress was being made in the infrastructure of a total B & B system for the Forces, even though this had not yet been officially endorsed.⁷⁷

The creation of additional FLUs was a first step, and it had to be taken slowly so that the efficiency of the Forces and the course of career paths did not suffer. Yet, as it became more and more possible, Cadieux wrote to Allard on April 11, 1968, specific recommendations were to be formulated to transform this initial program into a truly comprehensive B & B plan for the Forces.⁷⁸ The

Minister went on to state that Francophones were beginning to find answers to the problems they had encountered upon joining the Canadian Forces. Even if, as the April 2, 1968 press release asserted, English would remain the language of operations outside FLUs and in the air, it was hoped that creating FLUs would be a step toward the ultimate objective of making military personnel at major bases and units, and at headquarters, capable of communicating among themselves in either of the two official languages.⁷⁹

The CDS and his special Secretariat were simply waiting for the arrival of this letter to launch another phase, namely the drawing up a general B & B plan for the Forces. The Letellier Papers, held at the Directorate of History, contain a memorandum which foreshadows such a plan. Although it is unsigned and undated, some of its elements suggest it may have been written between December 15, 1967 and February 15, 1968 or, at least, a few weeks before Cabinet approved FLUs in March 1968. This memorandum draws up a list of activities, each accompanied by a comment, that were to receive attention from the Secretariat. The structure of the Forces would be reviewed in terms of 28 per cent Francophone representation. An inventory of positions which would have to become bilingual would be drawn up; criteria would be set for managers in designating such positions. Bilingual military resources had to be assessed in terms of levels of proficiency, and a policy for using these resources would have to be formulated. A list of requirements for the use of the French language in the Forces had to be planned, or money might be spent needlessly. A number of other requirements were also anticipated: a policy for translating documents and publishing them in French; an English-French glossary and dictionary; The provision of editors to revise all correspondence produced in French by the major branches at NDHQ.⁸⁰

This memorandum which is far from complete, was not intended for wide distribution. A careful reader would note, for example, that bilingualism was viewed as being confined to Francophones; consequently, nothing is said of the need for Anglophones to carry some of the burden. Also noteworthy was a quite understandable lack of confidence in their ability to use French, since plans are made to have all French texts revised by experts.

On April 16, 1968, the VCDS, on behalf of Allard, issued a directive covering detailed planning of the program. While this directive is based on what had been developed to date, in particular the content of Cadieux's letter of April 11, it comes very close to the basic themes stated in the Letellier memorandum.⁸¹ We shall not go very deeply into the immediate aftermath to the April 16 document, since Colonel Letellier offers an excellent summary of it for the period leading up to July 5.⁸² In any case, this planning phase did not go very far; its results were swept away in astonishing circumstances during January 1969.

The CDS's directive of April 16, 1968 was actually signed by the VCDS, Lieutenant-General Fred Sharp, whom Allard had made responsible for co-ordinating the planning process. Sharp immediately chose one of his subordinates, Major-General M.R. Dare, Deputy Chief of Operations and Reserves, to constitute a working group, which he would chair. This poses a problem for the historian. Nearly everything connected with B & B came under the responsibility of the Personnel Branch, and it is surprising that the Chief of Personnel (CP), Air Marshal E.M. Reyno, was not chosen as co-ordinator instead of Sharp. There may be a reason for this: Reyno did not seem very interested in the question of B & B, to judge from his memorandum of April 3, 1968, addressed to the VCDS, which clearly stated the author's position as regards the designation of the *Ottawa* as an FLU. Reyno felt that it would be inappropriate for him to meddle in matters outside the domain of Personnel. Such "other matters" were the affair of the VCDS.⁸³ Yet two days later, on April 5, Reyno was told by Allard's special assistant, Colonel Bob Rayment, that he (Reyno) was responsible for co-ordinating everything that had to do with the *Ottawa*. Then, on April 9, Commander D.E. Samson of Sharp's Secretariat wrote to the responsible officials in his branch that if anything else connected with the *Ottawa* was to be undertaken, it must be done independently of the CP.⁸⁴ The CDS no doubt attempted to circumvent an obstacle by offering bilingualism planning to the VCDS, even though the subjects to be dealt with (postings, language of training, language courses and so forth) were primarily the responsibility of the CP.

Whatever the case, Dare took the affair in hand and, over the summer and fall of 1968, largely on the basis of data provided by the CP's office (as was inevitable), he wrote successive drafts of a plan,

which he circulated around CFHQ for comment. On January 20, 1969, he presented the VCDS with a document containing the basic principles that ought to be adopted by the Defence Council before a plan for applying the policy was drawn up. The proposal was well written and included the essentials: the “structure” of the Forces was revised so as to include 28 per cent Francophones; it was recognized that the rate of retention of Francophones would be related to their career opportunities, and these would have to be equal to those of their English-speaking colleagues. Dare provided for training possibilities in both languages to expand as early as 1970, and for the spread of “bilingualization” of the various commands from over the years 1975 to 1980 (for example, CFHQ would have become bilingual by 1979). He concluded by stating that the timetable which he had provided was optimistic and could be adjusted.⁸⁵

But the document submitted by Dare was rejected by the CDS on February 5. His office reported that directive P6/69 of January 13, 1969 covered the ground General Dare had been working over for several months. Moreover, the CDS’s office added, the CP was dealing with the matter!⁸⁶

Between April 1968 and February 1969, some changes had in fact taken place. First of all, Colonel Letellier, who retired on July 20, 1968, was replaced by Colonel Pierre Chassé as head of the bilingualism Secretariat. Before the end of the year, the Secretariat was transferred from the CDS to the new CP, Vice-Admiral R.L. Hennessy, and its name was changed to Directorate, Implementation of Bilingual Plans (DIBP). The CP also became official co-ordinator of bilingualism affairs in the Forces and, by February 1969, he seemed determined to assert his role in this domain. That is how the misunderstanding that arose in April 1968 was sorted out in February 1969, in a way that must have left Dare somewhat bitter and mystified.

Bilingualism plans were thus to proceed under Hennessy’s direction. What a curious twist of fate that a man who had written negatively about bilingualism in 1966 (as outlined in the preceding chapter) became a major protagonist in this enterprise. Like a true professional, Hennessy performed his task very competently, thereby justifying Allard’s confidence in him.

The other change to note was a new element in the implementation of B & B measures, which appeared in CDS directive P6/69, dated January 13, 1969. Essentially, this document sought to set priorities for utilising Francophones currently in the Forces, for there were not enough of them at the time to meet all the requirements which daily faced the experts on allocation of personnel. These priorities were as follows: (1) FLUs; (2) the French Trades Training Centre (already in existence but not yet operational); (3) training centres for pilots and other Air and Navy specialties; (4) the various staff colleges and schools; (5) CFHQ, especially the Personnel Branch; and (6) Training Command, Mobile Command and Maritime Command. By contrast, lower priority was given to seconding Francophones to the often coveted positions of military attache and to other allied forces. The directive emphasized that this method could not be used to advance Francophones' careers at a time when a significant attempt was being made to improve their opportunities. For Allard the pursuit of the long-range goal of having Francophones constitute 28 per cent of the Forces made concentration on the target of careers and promotions all-important.⁸⁷

Despite all the good things about this directive, it by no means covered all the ground encompassed by Dare's working group in 1968, contrary to what the CDS's office asserted on February 5. The outright rejection of Dare's work is all the more flagrant in light of directive 3/69 from the CP, dated March 24. It asked the DIBP, under the aegis of the Director General, Personnel (Strength), to analyse the structure of the Forces, in order to determine where the 28 per cent Francophones were to be found, and to identify bilingual positions.⁸⁸ In short, this meant largely repeating what had been done already, though with accurate new data.⁸⁹

Colonel Chassé and his assistants set to work quickly. By April 8, a work plan had been drawn up⁹⁰ with firm deadlines that were to be met or even anticipated. By early June the analysis was completed. The survey of bilingual positions had been omitted, however. The data were not, however, to be used to put on paper a plan that would correct the weaknesses that had been discovered. That was not to happen until 1971-72, as we shall see in the second volume. The information included a table, dated April 1, 1969, which broke down the (then current) 86,282 military positions by rank,

classification (officers) and trade (other ranks). In the officers' classifications we find a surplus of French-speaking officers, in relation to the 28 per cent target, in only 8 out of 46 classifications. Furthermore, these surpluses are concentrated at the bottom of the rank scale; in other words, among lieutenants (8 cases out of 46)⁹¹ and captains (2 cases out of 46).⁹² The trades picture was not so bleak, as a general rule, surpluses existing in 49 of the 99 trades. Here again, however, with only few exceptions, these surpluses occur at the base of the pyramid.⁹³ In brief, the situation had changed little since November 1966, when Ross and his group obtained roughly similar information.

The primary task of the DIBP was still to produce a bilingualism plan. A draft of this was prepared for discussion in June 1969.⁹⁴ But a new element now had to be taken into consideration: the Official Languages Bill, C-120.⁹⁵ Priority would be given to this for several months, more or less until Allard left his position as CDS. The summer of 1969 was undoubtedly the busiest in the life of the Advisory Committee on Bilingualism, which had been instructed to study the repercussions this bill would have for the Department. The findings of the committee were forwarded to the Defence Council by Deputy Minister Armstrong on June 13, 1969. When the necessary studies were completed, the Defence Council discussed them at a meeting on July 21. The first item in the sheaf of documents given to members of the Council was the Judge Advocate General's observations on how the Department would be affected. He concluded that the Armed Forces would be subject to the same provisions as the entire federal Public Service. In brief, the bill would establish minimum standards for the use of English and French in the federal government. It would require all departments to project a bilingual image of Canada. French and English were declared the country's official languages, with the same rights and privileges in the federal government and its administration. A Commissioner of Languages would monitor how the law was applied and respond to complaints from the public, but he would have only power to recommend.⁹⁶

Under the law, 60 days after the Royal Assent was given, DND would have to present a bilingual image to the public in the National Capital Region (NCR) (in posters, advertisements, services to the public and so forth). Elsewhere in Canada, a process

had to be set in motion to apply sections 3 to 6 of the bill, which called for statutory instruments, legislation, orders, regulations and judgments to be bilingual. Judicial proceedings, including trials, would have to be allowed in either official language. Outside Canada, the Department was to project a bilingual image.⁹⁷

In addition, the Advisory Committee made the following recommendations: directive 3/65 should be revised to stipulate that all the Department's forms must be bilingual; all posters, in Canada and abroad, would have to be bilingual; local orders must be issued in both languages in the NCR, in Quebec, in locations with significant demand, in bilingual districts and outside Canada; in the same geographic areas, telephone services to the public must be bilingual; use of both languages should be possible in recruiting centres and in contacts with local contractors and suppliers (and if this was not possible everywhere, it should at least be ensured in the NCR within 60 days); and the Department's transport units (offering services to military spouses, dependants, teachers and so forth) should be capable of offering bilingual services. It was also suggested that two subcommittees be set up, one to study the publication of the Queen's Orders and Regulations, Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) and other directives in French and English side by side (these matters having advanced no further between 1966 and 1969), the other to examine the field of language training. All DND vehicles, including planes and ships, were to be identified bilingually. Finally, the Committee asked the CDS to prepare and submit to the Council a basic program on bilingualism⁹⁸ which, as we have seen, was already under way.*

The Minister, Mr Cadieux, accepted what the Advisory Committee submitted to him. He said, however, that the Canadian Forces would continue to apply international agreements regarding the use of English. Finally, the Advisory Committee's services would still be required, since it would have to form the two proposed subcommittees, which would be chaired by the DGEP, in addition to preparing directives on bilingualism for the Department in the NCR.⁹⁹

*The follow-up to bilingual signage, side-by-side publication and language training will be discussed in the second volume.

During the July 21 discussions, the CP's military deputy chief, Major-General J. Dextraze, suggested the issuing of an order that made English the language of command in the Canadian Forces, even if that went against the new law. Of course, he added, French would still be used inside FLUs. We may wonder what prompted this high-ranking Francophone to act in this manner. Whatever his motives, Cadieux was not prepared to agree. The Minister pointed out that in 1968 he had said that English would continue to be the language of command; this statement would be sufficient and, he implied, would not pose problems.¹⁰⁰ In the end the Council decided, as we have just seen, to reaffirm the primacy of English, but once again without specifying precisely which agreements were in question or what articles in them stated that English must be the language of operations.

The question raised by Dextraze did not rest there. On August 13, 1969, the Deputy Minister, Mr Armstrong, put two questions to the Department of Justice. One question was whether Cabinet, the Minister, or the CDS could make regulations or issue instructions that one of the two official languages would be used in the Canadian Forces, either generally or for a specific reason.¹⁰¹ The reply did not come until four months later, and it left the door open to the exclusive use of only one official language, for it stated that while English and French were equal in Parliamentary and government institutions, this did not prevent a public agency from making regulations as to its internal language or languages of communication.¹⁰²

On August 14, 1969, CDS directive 27/69 replaced P3/65. It repeated the justification concerning the need to respect international agreements. Even though several years would be needed, it said, to apply the new bilingualism policy,¹⁰³ this must be done energetically and without temporizing. After summarizing the decisions reached on July 21, the CDS added that the CP was also responsible for preparing and submitting to Council a policy on bilingualism in the Canadian Forces.¹⁰⁴

The summer of 1969 was marked by a feeling of urgency in everything to do with bilingualism, at the most senior levels of government and in departments and agencies. On October 27, 1968, the Cabinet Secretariat had asked deputy ministers to analyse Bill C-120 and to predict its repercussions. Exactly six months later (on May 27, 1969), another letter from the same

office to the same officials reported how far the bill had progressed (the second reading was scheduled for May 29) and emphasized that once the bill was passed, it would come into force in 60 days, except in a few cases that had to be explained to Cabinet and approved by it. In July, departments were reminded they could obtain a dispensation if they considered it warranted. On August 12, it was stated that since the *Official Languages Act* had been passed on July 7, it would come into force on September 7, failing a dispensation. The public had heard so much about it that there was no doubt it would soon be tested. Consequently, departments had to be ready by September 7.¹⁰⁵ The DND did not officially request a dispensation from meeting the September 7 deadline, suggesting that it would be ready to comply with the statute.

On the military side, on August 29, the CP sent all headquarters and bases a long message in English and French summarizing what the *Official Languages Act* (OLA) meant for the DND. He included in detail the minutes of the July Council meeting, again emphasizing that the Forces would continue to comply with international agreements relating to the use of English and that, if bilingual capabilities were not sufficient to provide bilingual services to the public everywhere that was required, the NCR would receive first priority. The CP would be responsible for implementing bilingualism in the Forces.¹⁰⁶

Enforcing these decisions taxed to the utmost the small resources of the DIBP, which was responsible for setting up programs for the entire Armed Forces, in the middle of a summer when transfers and leave were in full swing. D27/69, like the August 29 message, culminated a series of meetings, discussions, drafts, contacts by message with commands to obtain information for Ottawa about particular situations¹⁰⁷ and, of course, petty conflicts over internal jurisdiction.¹⁰⁸

In addition, the highest authorities had to be kept informed. Cabinet's Priorities Committee wanted to be provided with an inventory of what had been accomplished or was in progress in various sectors relating to bilingualism (the number of students in language courses and the number of bilingual persons, the general bilingualism plan, the roles of the two official languages, translation requirements, and so forth). This request was transmitted on June 13,

1969 by Jules Léger, Under Secretary of State, to deputy ministers, who were to reply to him by July 15.¹⁰⁹

The unavoidable slips that normally accompany major changes also had to be corrected. For example, in the document submitted by the Advisory Committee and accepted by the Defence Council on July 21, it is clear that, as far as DND was concerned, all of Quebec was to become a bilingual district. Meanwhile, on August 9, Mobile Command HQ took the initiative of sending a message to its units that interpreted sections 9 and 10 of the OLA in exactly the same way as the Council. In short, even though no bilingual district had been officially designated, the intention had been formed to treat Quebec Command as if it were such a district. The August 26 issue of *Le Devoir* questioned the logic of this message. The same day, a DND spokesman told *Le Devoir* that this was a mistake which would be corrected. This was done at all levels, including the Mobile Command message, D27/69 and the minutes of the July 21 meeting.¹¹⁰

In August, one of the first difficulties with applying the OLA occurred. The Canadian mission in Kinshasa, Zaïre, sent Air Transport Command a routine message in French. It was returned immediately with a request that the text be translated into English. The case was forwarded through the chain of command to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. The DIBP was then instructed to explain to the Command its new duties as regards service "to the public" in the official language of the client's choice.¹¹¹

At the same time, two major activities were also occupying the DIBP's energies. The first had to do with the message of August 29 asking addressees for their reactions by September 7. As usual, some were late in sending in their replies; the files show answers dated in November. By September 15, however, Colonel Chassé was able to deliver the CP a memorandum summarizing the comments passed on in 80 per cent of the anticipated 445 reports. As a general rule, he wrote, the message had been received positively, and valid observations had been returned. The most significant points related to four areas: financial implications (among other things, for bilingual signs and posters);¹¹² the need for a standardization directive for posters; the lack of bilingual personnel resources; and limited or non-existent translation facilities.¹¹³ The attention given to each of

these points will be discussed later. For the moment, however, we note that these comments had been anticipated and certain corrective action had already been considered. Often responses from units required the DIBP to prepare replies, and in many cases to step in and provide translation to assist units that had no qualified personnel.¹¹⁴

The second activity, which for the time being was more theoretical but in the medium and long term was more important, was the drawing up of a comprehensive bilingualism plan for the Armed Forces. Between June and August 1969, several drafts were written,¹¹⁵ discussed and heavily revised. Then on September 9, at his last appearance at the Defence Council as CDS, General Allard presented directive CDS 28/69, entitled “Long Term Bilingualism Program for the Canadian Forces”. This directive summarized what the Forces had already accomplished, especially since 1968, and emphasized that under subsection 36(3) of the OLA, the Forces were subject to this statute. Accordingly, steps had to be taken to implement the entire statute in the long term, and to arrange for steps, along the way.

The plan’s basic principles were these: no injustice was to take place against military personnel serving in the Forces; and the Forces were to include, at all ranks and in all classifications and trades, a percentage of Francophones proportionate to their demographic representation in Canada. In order that in the 1980s, military personnel could compete for the highest civilian and military positions — which, it was assumed, would be bilingual — the Department had to ensure that Anglophones in particular could take French courses and, in addition, would have an opportunity to work in French. By 1980, all officers, warrant officers and sergeants would have to be functionally bilingual as defined in CFAO 9-21.¹¹⁶ The plan was thus intended to cover ten years and include intermediate stages for which certain objectives were set. The hope was that a gradual phasing-in process would avoid injustices.¹¹⁷

One parameter of the proposed directive also deserves mention. The requirements laid down in the OLA increased the number of positions in which bilingualism was necessary. Most bilinguals in the Forces were Francophones. Until a fair proportion of Anglophones became bilingual, it was important to protect the essential core, namely FLUs; for by attempting to comply with the Act as

quickly as possible, the Forces were liable to siphon off Francophones to all sorts of bilingual positions. This would have jeopardized the implementation of Ross's recommendations, the FLUs themselves, and perhaps also the objective of 28 percent in all ranks, trades and classifications. The CDS had to some extent anticipated this in his directive P6/69, which stated posting priorities for Francophones. In his draft of the CDS Directive 28/69, Allard mentioned the P6/69 Directive and stated that it was still in force.

In 28/69, stages in the implementation of the long-term bilingualism program in the Canadian Armed Forces were identified. The following goals were stated: in 1970, Anglophones assigned to FLUs were to have taken French courses before assignment to their duties; in 1971, the CMR de Saint-Jean was to comply with Quebec standards as regards conditions of acceptance; in 1974, new FLUs were to be created in Bagotville; in 1975, graduates of all CF colleges were to be "functionally" bilingual; in 1978, trainees selected for staff colleges were to have the same rating; in 1980 — , that is, at the end of the plan, — functional bilingualism was to be required from all officers, warrant officers and sergeants, administrative and military procedures were to be available in both languages, and bilingual services offered to dependants of members of the Forces.¹¹⁸

This outline is not, of course, complete. It does give some idea of the CDS's fiery spirit, especially where matters relating to Francophones are concerned. It also shows certain goals derived from the OLA on the one hand and, on the other, the Forces' bilingual future and the directives that set their path. General Allard was very keen to see the cause of his French-speaking compatriots advance during his term as CDS. Having already won great success, however, he wanted to go farther. This was difficult. It was undoubtedly unrealistic to propose throwing out overnight a system that had prevailed for over a century; and Anglophones would obviously be mainly responsible for negotiating this important turning-point. Thus caution would be understandable, as would some obstruction. For this reason and for many others that will be explained later, not all the objectives proposed by the General in 1969 were achieved by 1987. But his vision was clear.

At the meeting of September 9, 1969, the Minister approved the Allard document's two basic principles: the prescription against injustice and the achievement of 28 per cent Francophone representation throughout. He believed, however, that the possibilities of applying these principles ought to be studied, together with the phasing-in period, in relation to similar objectives then being developed by the Public Service. He therefore asked for a plan to be submitted to the Defence Council after the Staff had consulted the Department's Advisory Committee and contacted the government's Bilingualism Secretariat, recently transferred from the Prime Minister's Office to the Secretary of State Department.¹¹⁹ Accordingly, the officials returned to work.

* * *

DND, like the society from which it drew its military personnel, was only beginning its slow progress¹²⁰ toward accepting the principle of institutional bilingualism that had been introduced by the Government of Canada after one hundred and two years of federalism. We shall see in the second volume how this principle was applied in an attempt to lay to rest once and for all the fear of a parallel army.

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APPENDIX A

FRENCH REGIMENTS IN NEW FRANCE 1665-1760

Regular land troops

1. Le régiment de Carignan-Salières (reinforced by elements from the regiments of Allier, Chambellé, Orléans and Poitou)	1665-1667
2. Le régiment d'Artois	1755-1758
3. Le régiment de Béarn	1755-1760
4. Le régiment de Bourgogne	1755-1758
5. Le régiment de Cambrésis	1755-1758
6. Le régiment de Guyenne	1755-1760
7. Le régiment de Languedoc	1755-1760
8. Le régiment de la Reine	1755-1760
9. Le régiment des Volontaires étrangers	1755-1758
10. Le régiment de la Sarre	1756-1760
11. Le régiment du Royal Roussillon	1756-1760
12. Le régiment de Berry	1757-1760

Naval troops

1. About 40 infantry companies, known as “Compagnies franches de la Marine”, served in Canada between 1668 and 1760.
2. One company of gunners and bombers served in Canada between 1750 and 1760, and another served between 1756 and 1760.

APPENDIX B

BRITISH REGIMENTS SERVING IN CANADA, NOVA SCOTIA AND NEWFOUNDLAND 1705-1907

Cavalry

- | | |
|---|------------|
| 1. The First (the King's) Dragoon Guards | 1839, 1842 |
| 2. The Seventh (the Queen's Own) Hussars | 1838, 1842 |
| 3. The Thirteenth Hussars | 1866-1869 |
| 4. The Nineteenth (Princess of Wales's Own) Hussars | 1813-1816 |

Artillery

Various detachments and companies of the Royal Regiment of Artillery served in Canada from 1724 onward. Companies were called batteries from 1859 onward. The last to leave Canada were two batteries in Halifax, NS, in 1905, and a company of the Royal Marine Artillery in Esquimalt, BC, in 1907.

Engineers

1. Various officers in the Corps of Royal Engineers and a few subunits served between 1783 and 1900.
2. A few units of the Royal Sappers and Miners served between 1794 and 1856, when this corps was amalgamated into the Corps of Royal
3. Detachments of the Royal Staff Corps also served in 1815-16 and 1829-33.

Infantry

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Grenadier Guards | 1838-1842, 1862-1864 |
| 2. Coldstream Guards | 1838-1842 |
| 3. Scots Guards | 1862-1864 |
| 4. First Regiment of Foot — Royal Scots | 1757-1763, 1812-1815 and 1838-1851 |
| 5. 2 nd Regiment of Foot — The Royal West Surrey Regiment | 1699, 1711, 1864-1865 |
| 6. 3 rd Regiment of Foot — East Kent Regiment (The Buffs) | 1814-1815 |
| 7. 4 th or King's Own Regiment of Foot (Royal Lancaster) | 1711, 1757, 1787-1799, and 1866, 1868 |
| 8. 5 th Regiment of Foot — North-umberland Fusiliers | 1787-1797, 1814-1815 |
| 9. 6 th Regiment of Foot — Royal Warwickshire | 1705-1786, 1793, 1799-1806, 1814-1815 and 1846-1848 |
| 10. 7 th Regiment of Foot — Royal Fusiliers | 1733-1783, 1791-1802, 1808-1810, 1848-1850 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 11. | 8 th Regiment of Foot — King's
Liverpool Regiment | 1768-1785, 1809-1815,
1830-1833, 1839-1841
and 1893-1895 |
| 12. | 9 th Regiment of Foot — Norfolk
Regiment | 1776-1881, 1814-1815
and 1856-57 |
| 13. | 11 th Regiment of Foot — Devon-
shire Regiment | 1711 and 1838-1840 |
| 14. | 13 th Regiment of Foot — Somer-
setshire Light Infantry | 1813-1815 |
| 15. | 14 th Regiment of Foot — Prince
of Wales Own West Yorkshire
Regiment | 1766-1771, 1841-1845 |
| 16. | 15 th Regiment of Foot — East
Yorkshire | 1758-1761, 1763-1768,
1817-1821, 1827-1840,
and 1862-1868 |
| 17. | 16 th Regiment of Foot — Bedford-
shire and Hertfordshire | 1790-1791, 1814-1815, and 1861-
1870 |
| 18. | 17 th Regiment of Foot — Leices-
tershire Regiment | 1757-1758, 1760, 1783-1786,
1856-1868, and 1891-1893 |
| 19. | 19 th Regiment of Foot — Princess
of Wales Own Yorkshire Green
Howards | 1848-1851, 1880-1884 |
| 20. | 20 th Regiment of Foot — Lanca-
shire Fusiliers | 1776-1777, 1789-1792,
1847-1850, 1876-1878 |
| 21. | 21 st Regiment of Foot — Royal
Scots Fusiliers | 1770-1773, 1776-1777, and
1789-1792 |
| 22. | 22 nd Regiment of Foot — Che-
shire Regiment | 1756-1761, 1866-1869 |
| 23. | 23 rd Regiment of Foot — Royal
Welsh Fusiliers | 1808-1810, 1838-1853,
and 1866-1867 |
| 24. | 24 th Regiment of Foot — South
Wales Borderers | 1776-1781, 1789-1800 and
1829-1840 |
| 25. | 25 th Regiment of Foot — The
King's Own Scottish Borderers | 1864-1868 |
| 26. | 26 th Regiment of Foot — The
Cameronians | 1772-1776, 1787-1800, 1814-
1815, 1853-1854 |
| 27. | 27 th Regiment of Foot — Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers | 1756-1761, 1814-1815 |
| 28. | 28 th Regiment of Foot — Glouces-
tershire Regiment | 1694-1698, 1758-1762 |
| 29. | 29 th Regiment of Foot — Worces-
tershire Regiment | 1746-1750, 1765-1768 |
| 30. | 30 th Regiment of Foot — East
Lancashire | 1710-1711, 1841-1842 and
1861-1869 |
| 31. | 31 st Regiment of Foot — East
Surreys | 1709-1710, 1779-1787 |
| 32. | 32 nd Regiment of Foot — Duke of
Cornwall's Light Infantry | 1709-1710, 1830-1841 |

33. 33rd Regiment of Foot — Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) 1831 and 1843-48
34. 34th Regiment of Foot — Border Regiment 1766 and 1829-1841
35. 35th Regiment of Foot — Royal Sussex 1756 and 1758-1760
36. 36th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Worcestershire Regiment 1711 and 1838-1842
37. 37th Regiment of Foot — Hampshire 1710, 1783-1789, 1814-1825, 1839-1841
38. 38th Regiment of Foot — South Staffordshire 1775, 1848-1851
39. 39th Regiment of Foot — Dorsetshire Regiment 1814-1815, 1856-1859
40. 40th Regiment of Foot — Prince of Wales Volunteers South Lancashire 1717-1764, and 1776
41. 41st Regiment of Foot — Welsh Regiment 1799-1815
42. 42nd Regiment of Foot — Royal Highland Regiment (Black Watch) 1756-1760, 1782-1789 and 1851-1852
43. 43rd Regiment of Foot — Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry 1757-1761, 1835-1846
44. 44th Regiment of Foot — Essex Regiment 1755-1765, 1780-1786
45. 45th Regiment of Foot — Nottinghamshire (The Sherwood Foresters) 1746-1765
46. 46th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 1757-1761, 1845-1848
47. 47th Regiment of Foot — Loyal North Lancashire 1750-1763, 1790-1791 and 1861-1868
48. 48th Regiment of Foot — Northamptonshire 1755-1761
49. 49th Regiment of Foot — Royal Berkshire Regiment 1802-1814, 1895-1897
50. 50th Foot — Cape Breton Regiment (Col Wm Shirley's Regiment) 1746-1749, 1755-1756
51. 51st Foot — American Provincials, Sir William Pepperel's 1746-1749
52. 52rd Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry 1765-1774, 1823-1831 and 1842-1845
53. 53rd Regiment of Foot — King's Shropshire Light Infantry 1776-1789, 1866-1869

54. 54th Regiment of Foot — West Norfolk Regiment 1783-1791, 1851-1854
55. 55th Regiment of Foot — Westmoreland Regiment 1756-1760, 1838-1839
56. 56th Regiment of Foot — West Essex Regiment 1840-1842
57. 57th (West Middlesex) Regiment of Foot 1783-1791, 1814-1815
58. 58th Regiment of Foot — Rutlandshire 1757-1760, 1814-1815
59. 59th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Nottinghamshire 1771 and 1814
60. 60th Regiment of Foot — King's Royal Rifle Corps (founded in 1755 in America as the 62nd Loyal American Provincial, then in 1757 renamed 60th Royal Americans) 1758-1763, 1786
1st Battalion 1817-1824, 1867-1876
61. 60th Regiment of Foot — King's Royal Rifle Corps (founded in 1755 in America as the 62nd Loyal American Provincial, then in 1757 renamed 60th Royal Americans) 1758-1772, 1787-1803, 1817 and
2nd Battalion 1844-1847
62. 60th Regiment of Foot — King's Royal Rifle Corps (founded in 1755 in America as the 62nd Loyal American Provincial, then in 1757 renamed 60th Royal Americans) 1757-1760, 1816-1824
3rd Battalion
63. 60th Regiment of Foot — King's Royal Rifle Corps (founded in 1755 in America as the 62nd Loyal American Provincial, then in 1757 renamed 60th Royal Americans) 1758-1763, 1858-1868
4st Battalion
64. 60th Regiment of Foot — King's Royal Rifle Corps (founded in 1755 in America as the 62nd Loyal American Provincial, then in 1757 renamed 60th Royal Americans) 1803-1805
5st Battalion
65. 60th Regiment of Foot — King's Royal Rifle Corps (founded in 1755 in America as the 62nd Loyal American Provincial, then in 1757 renamed 60st Royal Americans) 1814-1817
7th Battalion

66. 61st Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Gloucester Regiment 1870-1872
67. 62nd Regiment of Foot — Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's) 1758-1759, 1776-1778, 1814-1823, 1856-1864
68. 63rd Regiment of Foot — Manchester Regiment 1856-1865
69. 64th Regiment of Foot — North Staffordshire Regiment 1770-1773, 1813-1815 and 1840-1843
70. 65th Regiment of Foot — York and Lancashire Regiment 1785 and 1838-1841
71. 66th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment 1799-1802, 1827-1840 and 1851-54
72. 67th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, The Hampshire Regiment 1840-1842
73. 68th Regiment of Foot — Durham Light Infantry 1818-1829, 1841-1844
74. 69th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Welsh Regiment 1867-1870
75. 70th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, The East Surrey Regiment 1841-1843
76. 71st Regiment of Foot — Highland Light Infantry 1824-1831, 1838-1852
77. 72nd Regiment of Foot — Seaforth Highlanders 1841-1854
78. 73rd Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Black Watch 1838-1841
79. 74th Regiment of Foot — Argyll Highlanders 1778-1779
80. 75th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry 1818-1828, 1841-1845
81. 76th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington's West Riding 1814-1827, 1841-1842, 1850-1857, 1877 and 1888-1891
82. 77th Regiment of Foot — Montgomery's Highlanders 1758-1759, 1761
83. 77th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment 1846-1848
84. 78th Regiment of Foot — Fraser's Highlanders 1757-1763
85. 78th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders 1867-1871
86. 79th Regiment of Foot — Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders 1825-1836, 1848-1851
87. 80th Regiment of Foot — (Light Armed) 1758-1763
88. 81th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment 1814-1815, 1822-1829 and 1843-1847

89. 82nd Regiment of Foot — Duke of Hamilton's 1778-1780, 1783
90. 82nd Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Prince of Wales Volunteers, South Lancashire 1814-1815, 1843-1848
91. 83rd Regiment of Foot — Royal Irish Rifles 1834-1843
92. 84th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment 1870-1871, 1886-1888
93. 84th Regiment of Foot — Royal Highland Emigrants 1775-1784
94. 85th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry 1836-1843
95. 86th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 1883-1886
96. 87th Regiment of Foot — Royal Irish Fusiliers 1872-1876
97. 88th Regiment of Foot — Connaught Rangers 1814-1815, 1850-1851
98. 89th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers) 1812-1815, 1841-1847
99. 90th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1814-1815
100. 93rd Regiment of Foot — Sutherland Highlanders 1814-1815, 1838-1848
101. 95th Regiment of Foot 1760-1761
102. 96th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, The Manchester Regiment 1824-1835, 1862-1863
103. 97th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, Queen's Own West Kent Regiment 1848-1853, 1876-1880
104. 99th Regiment of Foot — 2nd Battalion, The Wiltshire Regiment 1818
105. 100th Regiment of Foot — Prince Regent's County of Dublin, later Prince of Wales' Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians) 1805-1818, 1866-1868 and 1898-1900
106. 101st Regiment of Foot — Royal Munster Fusiliers 1813-1814, 1878-1883
107. 103rd Regiment of Foot 1812-1815
108. 104th Regiment of Foot — New Brunswick Regiment of Fencible Infantry 1803-1817

109.	109 th Regiment of Foot — 2 nd Battalion, Prince of Wales' Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)	1897-1898
110.	4 th Battalion, King's Royal Veterans	1812
111.	10 th Royal Veteran Battalion	1813-1815
112.	Corps of Enrolled Pensioners	1851-1859
113.	Royal York Rangers	1819
114.	The Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment	1840-1870
115.	The Rifle Brigade	1825-1836, 1843-1852 and 1861-1918
116.	Royal Garrison Battalion	1783
117.	The Royal Newfoundland Regiment	1775-1776, 1805-1816 and 1862-1918
118.	The Glengarry Fencibles	1812-1814, 1837-1838
119.	York Chasseur	1819

Marines

Royal Marines 1709-1711, 1745-1746, 1758-1759, 1814-1815, and 1838

Royal Marine Artillery 1813-1816, 1893-1899

Service Corps

The Military Train and Commissariat Staff Corps 1859-1864

Army Service Corps 1870

Foreign regiments serving the British Crown

I	Brunswick Dragoon Regiment	1776-1783
1	Brunswick Grenadier Regiment	1776-1783
1	Infantry Regiment (Prince Frederick's)	1776-1783
1	Infantry Regiment (von Riedesel's)	1776-1783
1	Hesse-Hainault Infantry Battalion	1777-1783
1	Infantry Regiment (von Rhetz)	1777-1783
1	Infantry Regiment (von Specht)	1777-1783
4	Hesse Jäger Companies	1777-1783
1	Hesse Infantry Battalion (von Seitz)	1778-1783
1	Anhalt-Zerbst Infantry Regiment	1778-1783
1	reformed Brunswick Infantry Regiment (Ehrenbrook)	1778-1783
1	reformed Brunswick Infantry Regiment (Beerner)	1778-1783
1	Hesse Infantry Battalion (Losberg)	1779-1783

1	Hesse Infantry Battalion (Knyphausen)	1779-1783
	De Meuron Regiment (Swiss)	1813-1816
	De Watteville Regiment (Swiss)	1813-1816

Source: C.H. Stewart, *The Service of British Regiments in Canada and North America: A Résumé*, DND Library Publication #1, 1964.

APPENDIX C

MINISTERS OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE 1867-1922

(Fr)	The Hon Sir George E. Cartier, KB	1867 to 1873
	The Hon Hugh McDonald	1873
	LCol the Hon William Ross	1873 to 1874
	The Hon William B. Vail	1874 to 1878
	The Hon Alfred G. Jones	1878
(Fr)	LCol the Hon Louis F.R. Masson	1878 to 1880
	The Hon Sir Alexander Campbell, KCMG	1880
(Fr)	The Hon Sir J.P.R. Adolphe Caron, KCMG	1880 to 1892
	LCol the Hon Mackenzie Bowell	1892
	The Hon James Patterson	1892 to 1895
	The Hon Arthur R. Dickey	1895 to 1896
(Fr)	The Hon Alphonse Desjardins	1896
	LCol the Hon David Tisdale	1896
	The Hon Sir Frederick W. Borden, KCMG	1897 to 1911
	LGen the Hon Sir Samuel Hughes, KCB	1911 to 1916
	The Hon Sir Albert E. Kemp, KCMG	1916 to 1917
	MGen the Hon Sydney C. Mewburn, CMG	1917 to 1920
	The Hon Hugh Guthrie	1920 to 1921
	The Hon George P. Graham	1921 to 1922

MINISTERS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 1922-83

	The Hon George P. Graham	1923
	The Hon Edward M. Macdonald	1923 to 1926
	The Hon Hugh Guthrie	1926
	Col the Hon James L. Ralston, CMG, DSO, ED	1926 to 1930
	LCol the Hon Donald M. Sutherland, DSO, VD	1930 to 1934
	The Hon Grote Stirling	1934 to 1935
	The Hon Ian A. Mackenzie	1935 to 1939
	The Hon Norman McL. Rogers	1939 to 1940
	Col the Hon James L. Ralston, CMG, DSO, ED	1940 to 1944
	Gen the Hon Andrew G.L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO, ED	1944 to 1945
	The Hon Douglas C. Abbott	1945 to 1946
	The Hon Brooke Claxton, DCM	1946 to 1954
	The Hon Ralph O. Campney	1954 to 1957
	MGen the Hon George R. Pearkes, VC, CB, DSO, MC	1957 to 1959
	LCol the Hon Douglas S. Harkness, GM, ED	1960 to 1963
	LCol the Hon Gordon M. Churchill, DSO, ED	1963
	The Hon Paul T. Hellyer	1963 to 1967
(Fr)	The Hon Léo Cadieux	1967 to 1970

	The Hon Charles M. Drury (acting)	1970
	The Hon Donald S. Macdonald	1970 to 1972
	The Hon Edgar J. Benson	1972
(Fr)	The Hon Jean-Eudes Dubé (acting)	1972
	The Hon James C. Richardson	1972 to 1976
	The Hon Barnett J. Danson	1976 to 1979
	The Hon Allan B. McKinnon, MC, CD	1979 to 1980
(Fr)	The Hon Gilles Lamontagne, CD	1980 to 1983
(Fr)	The Hon Jean-Jacques Blais	1983

MINISTERS OF THE NAVAL SERVICE FOR CANADA 1910-22 AND 1940-46

Ministers of Fisheries and Naval Services

(Fr)	The Hon Louis Philippe Brodeur	1910 to 1911
(Fr)	The Hon Rodolphe Lemieux	1911
	The Hon John Douglas Hazen	1911 to 1917
	The Hon Charles Colquhoun Ballantyne	1917 to 1921

Ministers of National Defence for Naval Services

	The Hon Angus Lewis Macdonald	1940 to 1945
	The Hon Douglas Charles Abbott	1945 to 1946

MINISTERS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR 1940-46

	The Hon Charles Gavan Power	1940 to 1944
	The Hon Angus Lewis Macdonald (acting)	1944 to 1945
	The Hon Colin William George Gibson	1945 to 1946

APPENDIX D

DEPUTY MINISTERS OF DEFENCE 1867-1983

Name	From	To	Remarks
Major G. Futvoye	29 05 68	10 01 75	Militia and Defence
LCol C.E. Panet (promoted to Col)	04 02 75	22 11 98	Militia and Defence
Major L.F. Pineault (promoted to Col)	07 12 98	10 12 06	Militia and Defence
Col E. Fiset (promoted to MGen)	22 12 06	31 12 22	Militia and Defence
G.J. Desbarats	08 06 10	31 12 11	Navy
	01 11 22	31 12 22*	Militia and Defence
	01 01 23	31 03 24*	National Defence
	01 04 24	02 11 32	National Defence
MGen Sir E. Fiset	01 01 23	31 03 24	National Defence
LCol L.R. LaFlèche (promoted to MGen)	03 11 32	16 10 40	National Defence
LCol H.S. DesRosiers	08 09 30	31 08 42	Army
	01 09 42	31 08 45	Militia/Defence
LCol K.S. MacLachlan	08 09 39	03 11 41	Navy
	08 09 39	10 04 40	Air
J.S. Duncan	11 04 40	31 01 41	Air
S.L. DeCarteret	01 02 41	21 04 44	Air
W.G. Mills	04 11 41	13 01 47	Navy
	15 01 47	18 01 49	Militia and Defence
LCol C.S. Currie	01 09 42	30 09 44	Army
H.F. Gordon	22 04 44	01 08 46	Air
A. Ross	01 10 44	13 01 47	Army
Brigadier C.M. Drury	19 01 49	25 07 55	National Defence
A/V/M F.R. Miller	15 08 55	31 05 60	National Defence
E.B. Armstrong	01 09 60	31 08 71	National Defence
Sylvain Cloutier	01 09 71	30 04 75	National Defence
C.R. Nixon	15 05 75	31 10 82	National Defence
D.B. Dewar	01 11 82		National Defence

* acting

APPENDIX E

BRITISH GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING IN NORTH AMERICA 1867-1905

Name	From	To	Remarks
LGen Sir John Michel, KCG	04 06 1865	02 10 1867	
LGen C. Ash Windham	03 10 1867	09 01 1870	
LGen Sir Charles Hastings Doyle, KCMG	10 01 1870	05 05 1873	Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia
LGen William O'Grady- Haly, C.B.	06 05 1873	23 04 1878	General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, 1900-02
LGen Sir P.L. McDougall	24 04 1878	23 05 1883	
Lord A.G. Russell, CB	24 05 1883	23 05 1888	
LGen Sir John Ross, GCB	24 05 1888	31 05 1893	
LGen A.G. Montgomery Moore	01 06 1893	01 06 1898	
Lord William F.E. Seymour	02 06 1898	1899	*
MGen C.S. Parsons, KCMG	10 04 1902	1907	**

* Position vacant from 1899 to April 9, 1902

** Position abolished when British troops left the imperial fortress at Halifax and Esquimalt.

Source: *Hart's Annual Army List and The Monthly Army List*, London, from 1867 to 1907, and C.S. MacKinnon, "The Imperial Fortress in Canada: Halifax and Esquimalt, 1871-1906", PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1965, pp 131-43.

APPENDIX F

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING THE CANADIAN MILITIA 1875-1904

(Br)	LGen Sir Edward Selby Smyth	1875 to 1880
(Br)	MGen R.G.A. Luard	1880 to 1884
(Br)	MGen F.D. Middleton	1884 to 1890
(Br)	MGen I.J.C. Herbert	1890 to 1895
(Br)	MGen W.J. Gascoigne	1895 to 1898
(Br)	MGen E.T.H. Hutton	1898 to 1900
(Br)	MGen R.H. O'Grady-Haly	1900 to 1902
(Br)	MGen the Rt Hon the Earl of Dundonald	1902 to 1904
(Br)	Col the Rt Hon Matthew, Lord Aylmer	1904

CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFF 1904-64

(Br)	MGen P.H.N. Lake, CB, CMG	1904 to 1908
	MGen W.D. Otter, CVO, CB	1908 to 1910
(Br)	MGen C.J. MacKenzie, CB	1910 to 1913
(Br)	MGen W.G. Gwatkin, CB, CMG	1913 to 1919
	Gen Sir A.W. Currie, GCMG, KCB (Inspector-General)	1919 to 1920
	MGen J.H. MacBrien, CB, CMG, DSO (Chief of Staff, DND)	1920 to 1927
	MGen H.C. Thacker, CB, CMG, DSO	1927 to 1928
	MGen A.G.L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO	1929 to 1935
	MGen E.C. Ashton, CB, CMG, VD	1935 to 1938
	Gen T.V. Anderson, DSO	1938 to 1940
	LGen H.D.G. Crerar, DSO	1940 to 1941
	LGen K. Stuart, CB, DSO, MC	1941 to 1943
	LGen J.C. Murchie, CB, CBE	1944 to 1945
	LGen C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD	1945 to 1951
	LGen G.G. Simonds, CB, CBE, DSO, CD	1951 to 1955
	LGen H.D. Graham, CBE, DSO, ED, CD, QC	1955 to 1958
	LGen S.F. Clark, CBE, CD	1958 to 1961
	LGen G. Walsh, CBE, DSO, CD	1961 to 1964

DIRECTORS OF THE NAVAL SERVICE 1910-28

Adm Sir Charles E. Kingsmill, Kt, RN	1910 to 1920
Cdre Walter Hose, CBE	1921 to 1928

CHIEFS OF THE NAVAL STAFF 1928-64

RAdm Walter Hose, CBE	1928 to 1934
VAdm P.W. Nelles, CB	1934 to 1944
VAdm G.C. Jones, CB	1944 to 1946
VAdm H.E. Reid, CB	1946 to 1947
VAdm H.T.W. Grant, CBE, DSO, CD	1947 to 1951
VAdm E.R. Mainguy, OBE, CD	1951 to 1956
VAdm H.G. DeWolf, CBE, DSO, DSC, CD	1956 to 1960
VAdm H.S. Rayner, DSC and bar, CD	1960 to 1964
RAdm K.L. Dyer, DSC, CD	1964

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, CANADIAN AIR FORCE 1920-21

A/Cdre A.K. Tylee, OBE	1920-1921
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OFFICERS COMMANDING, CANADIAN AIR FORCE 1921-22

W/C R.F. Redpath	1921
W/C J.S. Scott, MC, AFC	1921 to 1922

DIRECTORS, ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE 1922-32

W/C J.L. Gordon, DFC (CAF until March 1923)	1922 to 1924
W/C W.G. Barker, VC, DSO, MC	1924
G/C J.S. Scott, MC, AFC	1924 to 1928
G/C L.S. Breadner, DSC	1928 to 1932
S/L A.A.L. Cuffe	1932

SENIOR AIR OFFICERS 1932-38

G/C J.L. Gordon, DFC	1932 to 1933
G/C G.O. Johnson, MC	1933
A/V/M G.M. Croil, AFC	1933 to 1938

CHIEFS OF THE AIR STAFF 1938-64

A/V/M G.M. Croil, AFC	1938 to 1940
A/M L.S. Breadner, CB, DSC	1940 to 1943
A/M R. Leckie, CB, DSO, DSC, DFC	1944 to 1947
A/M W.A. Curtis, CB, CBE, DSC, ED	1947 to 1953

A/M C.R. Slemon, CB, CBE, CD	1953 to 1957
A/M H.L. Campbell, CBE, CD	1957 to 1962
A/V/M C.R. Dunlap, CBE, CD	1962 to 1964

CHAIRMEN, CHIEFS OF STAFF 1951-64

Gen Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD	1951 to 1960
A/C/M F.R. Miller, CBE, CD	1960 to 1964

CHIEFS OF THE DEFENCE STAFF 1964 TO 1983

	A/C/M F.R. Miller, CBE, CD	1964 to 1966
(Fr)	Gen J.V. Allard, CC, CBE, DSO, ED, CD	1966 to 1969
	Gen F.R. Sharp, DFC, CD	1969 to 1972
(Fr)	Gen J.A. Dextraze, CC, CBE, CMM, DSO, CD	1972 to 1977
	Adm R.H. Falls, CMM, CD	1977 to 1980
	Gen R.M. Withers, CMM, CD	1980 to 1983
(Fr)	Gen G.C.E. Thériault, CMM, CD	1983

**CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE ZOUAVES CAMPAIGN AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN WAR**

Table 1

**COMPARISON OF THE ZOUAVES CAMPAIGN AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN WAR**

Factor	Zouaves Campaign 1869-70	South African War 1899-1902
1 Remote cause	The desire to unify Italy inspired King Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and Garibaldi to conquer the Papal States. This attack the Pope's temporal power caused several battalions of Zouaves to be raised all over the world, starting in 1859.	Queen Victoria's jubilee renewed British imperialism. Diamonds were discovered in the Transvaal in 1867-70 and on gold in the Rand in 1886. The British were defeated at Majuba in 1881. Cecil Rhodes led the Jameson Raid in 1896. Uitlanders were discontented with being inferior to Boers.
2 Immediate cause of recruitment	Recruiting did not begin in Canada until 1868. Bishop Bourget, the ultramontane Bishop of Montreal, believed Canada should do what it could to try to stop Garibaldi.	Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier was reluctantly compelled by strong imperialist sentiment among English Canadians to authorize recruitment.
3 Recruiting method	Parish priests were recruiting officers under Mgr Bourget, but only in Quebec, for the Bishop of Toronto declined to be involved.	MGen Hutton submitted a plan prepared in advance to F Borden, Minister of Defence. Governor General Minto gave his strong support.
4 Financing	Private gifts were collected in churches. The French Pontifical Zouaves committee paid for transportation between Le Havre and Rome.	Canadian taxpayers paid for recruiting and outfitting (\$3 million), except for the 3 rd contingent, which was raised at Lord Strathcona's expense. England provided transportation to Africa and pay.

5 Troops and contingents	<u>Zouaves</u>		<u>South African War</u>	
	1 st	— 135 men	1 st — RCR	— 1,040 men
	2 nd	— 22 men	2 nd — RCD]	
	3 rd	— 28 men	1 CMR]	— 1,302 men
	4 th	— 48 men	Artillery]	
	5 th	— 95 men	3 rd LdSH and reinforcements	
	6 th	— 38 men		— 717 men
	7 th	— 115 men	4 th SA Cons]	
	misc	— 24 men	2 CMR]	— 2,153 men
			hospital]	
	Total	— 505 men	5 th 4 mounted]	
			regiment]	— 2,036 men
	The 7th contingent turned			
	For home at Brest. Only		Total	— 7,248 men
	390 Zouaves reached Italy.			
			The 5 th contingent reached	
			Africa after the war was over.	
			Only 3,802 men saw active	
			service.	
6 Troop quality	Volunteers		Volunteers	
	High moral character		Physical ability and good	
	Good education		health	
	Physical ability			
	* *		* *	
	Many came from classical		Many regular soldiers and	
	colleges and the Militia.		militia volunteered. Imperial	
	Religious fervour ran high.		fervour ran high. Canadian	
	In Italy, several Canadians		units were incorporated into	
	trained other contingents		British forces. Four Canadi-	
	because they were bilingual.		ans earned the VC for her-	
			oism.	
7 Operations	Victory of Mentana. Villettri		Training along communica-	
	raid. Battle of Rome.		tions lines. Victory of Paar-	
	Canadians defending the		deberg. Capture of Bloemfon-	
	Pia Gate were ordered by		tein. Relief of Ladysmith and	
	the Pope to raise the white		Kimberley. March on Pre-	
	flag rather than resort to		toria and relief of Mafeking.	
	artillery for defence.		Retreat from Leliefontein.	
			Defensive action at Boshbult.	

8 Results	The Zouaves were defeated and the Papal States occupied (except the Vatican). The Pope constituted himself a prisoner until the Lateran Treaty. Canadian Zouaves were evacuated to Civita Vecchia.	The British were victorious. Orange Free State and Transvaal were annexed to the British Crown with a promise of self-determination. Promise of 3 million pounds to restore devastated farms.
9 National repercussions	Zouaves receive a hero's welcome in Montreal. They were considered as builders of Canadian unity by Roman Catholics and as schemers by Orangemen.	Canadian soldiers were welcomed home as heroes by Anglophones, but the majority of French Canadians were either hostile or indifferent to them.
10 International repercussions	Zouaves were considered excellent instructors and ambassadors by other contingents and warmly received in France, England and New York. This was the first overseas campaign by Canadians. Their good behaviour encouraged many Italians to emigrate to Quebec.	This marked the beginning of English-Canadian aspirations to play an international role. The English-speaking majority approved this precedent. From 1907 on, colonial conferences were called imperial. Jingoism declined. The Canadian Militia received early preparation for the First World War, thanks to the reforms instigated by field officers on their return.

APPENDIX G

Table 2

RECORD OF SERVICE — SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

First Contingent 2nd (Special Service) Bn, RCRI and Canadian Contingent Staff

	Anglo	Franco	Total
Officers:			
Lieutenant-colonels	1*	0*	1
Majors	4	1	5
Captains	11	1	12
Lieutenants	18	3	21
Civilians	1	0	1
Majors (Medical)	1	1	2
Nurses	4	0	4
Chaplains	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
	43	6	49
Other ranks:			
Staff	6	1	7
A Coy (West)	123	0	123
B Coy (Ontario)	124	0	124
C Coy (Ontario)	122	0	122
D Coy (Ontario)	123	3	126
E Coy (Montreal)	123	2	125
F Coy (Quebec)	79	38	117
G Coy (NB, PEI)	117	5	122
H Coy (NS)	<u>125</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>125</u>
	942	49	991
Total	985	55	1040
	94.6%	5.4%	

Second Contingent 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles

Officers:			
Lieutenant-colonels	2	1	3
Majors	5	1	6
Captains	11	0	11
Lieutenants	22	0	22
Lieutenant-colonels (Medical)	1	0	1
Majors (Medical)	2	0	2

* This number does not include one English- and one French-speaking lieutenant-colonel seconded from the 2nd and 3rd contingents.

	Anglo	Franco	Total
Majors (Veterinary)	1	0	1
Lieutenants (Veterinary)	1	0	1
Nurses	4	0	4
Chaplains	3	0	3
Lieutenant (Postal)	1	0	1
Civilians	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
	58	2	60
Other ranks:			
Staff	8	0	8
Squadrons	<u>689</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>699</u>
	697	10	707
Total	755	12	767
	98.6%	1.4%	

Field Artillery Brigade

Officers:			
Lieutenant-colonels	1	0	1
Majors	3	0	3
Captains	5	1	6
Lieutenants	9	0	9
Majors (Medical)	1	0	1
Lieutenants (Medical)	1	0	1
Majors (Veterinary)	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	21	1	22
Other ranks:			
C Battery	167	2	169
D Battery	171	2	174
E Battery	<u>162</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>170</u>
	500	13	513
Total	521	14	535
	97.4%	2.6%	

Third Contingent Strathcona's Horse

Officers:			
Lieutenant-colonels	1	0	1
Majors	4	0	4
Captains	5	0	5
Lieutenants	16	0	16
Majors (Medical)	1	0	1
Majors (Veterinary)	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
	28	0	28

	Anglo	Franco	Total
Other ranks:			
A Squadron	165	0	165
B Squadron	187	1	188
C Squadron	<u>154</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>156</u>
	506	3	509
Total	534	3	537
	99.4%	0.6%	

Reinforcements

Officers:			
Captains	3	0	3
Lieutenants	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
	4	1	5
Other ranks:			
RCRI	109	2	111
LdSH	50	0	50
Artillery	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
	172	3	175
Total	176	4	180
	97.8%	2.2%	

Fourth Contingent

South African Constabulary	Total	1208
2 nd CMR	Total	900
10 th Field Hospital	Total	<u>45</u>
		2153

Fifth Contingent

3 rd CMR	Total	509
4 th CMR	Total	509
5 th CMR	Total	509
6 th CMR	Total	<u>509</u>
		2036

SUMMARY

	Anglo	Franco	Total
1 st Cont — RCRI and Staff	985	55	1040
2 nd Cont — 1 CMR (RCD)	755	12	767
Artillery	521	14	535
3 rd Cont — LdSH	534	3	537
Reinforcements	<u>176</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>180</u>
Subtotal	2971	88	3059
	97.1%	2.9%	
4 th Cont — South African Constabulary			1208
2 CMR			900
10th Field Hospital			45
5 th Cont — 3 CMR			509
4 CMR			509
5 CMR			509
6 CMR			<u>509</u>
Total sent to South Africa			7248

NB: Only 3,802 of this number fought or saw active service. One battalion of the RCRI, not shown here, with a strength of 1,005, was also raised to replace a British battalion but served only in Halifax.

French Canadians made up 5.4 per cent of the first (infantry) contingent but only 2.9 per cent of the first three contingents. All were officers or men of the Permanent Force or the Non-Permanent Active Militia. We have reason to believe their numbers declined in the last two contingents, which were mainly cavalry, except for the field hospital.

**FRENCH-CANADIAN OFFICERS
IN THE PERMANENT MILITIA
1914**

Major-General	F.L. Lessard
Colonel	A. Roy J.-P. Landry
Lieutenant-Colonel	J.A. Morin H.A. Panet
Major	J.D. Brousseau A.H. Panet A. de Lotbinière-Panet E. de Lotbinière-Panet C.N. Perreau L. LeDuc E. Tellier L.A.G.O. Roy A.P. Deroche P.S. Benoit A.O. Lambert T.J. de Montarville-Taschereau
Captain	D.B. Papineau J.A. Gilbert G.A. Taschereau E.L. Dumaine J.T.E. Gagnon J.O.D. Lacroix M.M.L. Caron L.S. Vien
Lieutenant	R. Duhault E.J. Renaud M.J.R.P.E.B. LeBlanc G.R. Bouchard
Honorary Lieutenant	T.J. Turpin

**TABLE OF FRENCH-CANADIAN AND ACADIAN VOLUNTEER BATTALIONS
1914-17**

Battalion	Region	Authority	Canada		England		France		Commanding Officers
			from	to	from	to			
22 nd (French-Canadian)	Quebec	GO 36,	15 03 15	21 10 14	20 05 15	29 05 15	15 09 15	08 04 19	Col F. M. Gaudet LCol T.L Tremblay (twice) LCol A.E. Dubuc Maj G.P. Vanier Maj G.E.A. Dupuis LCol M. DesRosiers
41 st	Quebec, Ottawa	GO 86,	01 07 15	11 03 15	18 10 15	29 10 15	13 07 16	Inc in 10 th Reserve Battalion	Lcol L.H. Archambault
57 th	Quebec City	GO 103a,	15 08 15	28 04 15	02 06 16	08 06 16	Inc in 69 th & 10 th Reserve Battalion		Maj A.L.H. Renaud LCol E.T. Paquet
69 th	Quebec	GO 103a,	15 08 15	03 07 15	17 04 16	27 04 16	04 01 17	Inc in 10 th Reserve Bn	Lcol J.A. Dansereau
132 nd (Acadian)	New-Brunswick (north shore)	GO 151,	22 12 15	13 11 15	26 10 16	05 11 16	28 01 17	Inc in 13 th Reserve Bn	LCol G.W. Mersereau
150 th (Carabiniers Mont-Royal)	Montreal	GO 151,	22 12 15	26 11 15	27 09 16	06 10 16	15 02 18	Reinf 14 th , 22 nd , 24 th & 97 th BN 5 CMR	LCol H. Barre

163 rd	Québec	GO 151,	22 12 15	10 12 15	24 05 16	<u>Bermuda</u>	27 11 16	Inc in 10 th reserve Bn	L Col H. Des Rosiers
165 th (Acadian)	Moncton, NB and Maritimes	GO 515,	22 12 15	13 12 15	28 03 17	07 04 17	Inc in 13 th	Reserve Battalion	LCol L.C. D'Aigle
167 th	Quebec City	GO 151,	22 12 15	17 12 15	15 01 17	Became Quebec recruiting depot			LCol O. Readman
178 th (French- Canadian)	Victoriaville, Quebec	GO 151,	22 12 15	12 01 16	04 03 17	Inc in 10 th Reserve Battalion			LCol L. de la B. Girouard
189 th	Fraserville (Eastern Townships)	GO 69,	15 07 16	10 01 16	27 09 16	06 09 16	Inc in 69 th Battalion (Anglo)		LCol P.A. Piuze
206 th	Beauharnois La Prairie Terrebonne	GO 69,	15 07 16	07 02 16	17 08 16	Inc in 15 th Battalion (Anglo)			LCol T. Pagnuelo
230 th	Ottawa, Ontario	GO 69,	15 07 16	09 03 16	25 10 16	Became 230 th Forestry Battalion			LCol R. De Salaberry
233 rd	Edmonton, Alberta	GO 69,	15 07 16	14 03 16	02 03 17	Inc in 178 th Battalion			LCol E. Leprohon
258 th	Quebec	GO 69,	15 07 16	02 04 17	06 10 17	17 10 17	Inc in 10 th Reserve Battalion		LCol P.E. Blondin

APPENDIX K

LIST OF OTHER FRENCH-CANADIAN FIELD OFFICERS (LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND ABOVE) WHO SERVED OVERSEAS 1914-18

Unit or corps	Name	From	To
10 th Res Bn	LCol H. DesRosiers	02 01 17	—
<i>CMR</i>	—		
(Cavalry) <i>RCHA</i>	LCol H.A. Panet, DSO	22 09 14 (promoted BGen)	17 12 16
Artillery	—		
Engineers	—		
Signals	—		
Service Corps	—		
Medical	Col H.M. Jacques, DSO LCol A.T. Bazin, DSO LCol R.J. Blanchard Col H.R. Casgrain Col A. Mignault Col G.E. Beauchamp Col A.E. Lebel		
Forestry	—		
Railway	—		

Remarks

1. All these officers unavoidably served in English most of the time, because their colleagues spoke only English.
2. This list does not include generals, who are mentioned in the text.

Extract from
**REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY
SERVICE BRANCH
to the Honourable the Minister of Justice on the Operation of the
Military Service Act, 1917**
(LCol H A C Machin)

XII — The Special Dominion Police

As soon as the registration of Class 1 was well over it became increasingly clear that throughout the Dominion there was a considerable number of men who had defaulted their obligation to register. Many of these men were lurking in the back districts and in the north country and it was evident that the existing police force were unequal to the task of enforcing the law in the emergency caused by the sudden creation of a large group of defaulters under the Act. In fact in most districts the local police force was only sufficient for the usual duties and in districts where the largest number of defaulters were known to be[,] the local police could not be trusted to perform the new duties that would necessarily be imposed upon them.

Moreover in all districts the regular military police were and must of necessity continue to be unsuited to the task of apprehending defaulters. News of the presence of men in uniform spreads quickly in districts frequented by men trying to escape military obligations and is apt to defeat the best efforts of the police.

It was decided, therefore, in order properly and evenly to enforce the Act in every district, which was perhaps the most important object of the Government, that it was necessary to provide a special plain clothes body of police whose main *raison d'être* should be the uniform enforcement of the Military Service Act and in particular the apprehension and prosecution of defaulters under the Act. Consequently on January 8, 1918, an Order in Council P.C. 54 was passed authorizing the Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police under the direction of the Minister of Justice to organize such a force and on January 17, 1918, Capt. Douglas Kerr was appointed a Commissioner of Police and to him was entrusted the charge of organizing and leading this new body of men.

It may properly be said here that the formation of this special force was most difficult on account of the material available, and the very special duties for which it was formed, and it is not to be wondered at that in some few instances certain individual members were the means of giving the entire force in the district where they operated an undeserved notoriety. In those districts where there was most work to be done reliable constables could not be secured and it was necessary to despatch to these districts men unfamiliar with the people and their manners, and to this fact is largely attributable, augmented in some cases to be sure by the ignorance and folly of constables in doing their duty as they saw it, whatever failure this police force may be charged with.

Throughout its operation in spite of occasional local jealousies and the inclination of each force to belittle the activities of the other, fairly close co-operation existed between the Military Police and this special body of Dominion Police and I would herewith express my appreciation of the advice given and the unfailing readiness to co-operate shown by the Provost Marshal for Canada, Col. Godson-Godson, DSO.

By the end of April, 1918, at which time the Dominion Police had become a well organized, trained and efficient force the number of unregistered defaulters remaining unapprehended had become apparently small and entirely overshadowed by the number of registered defaulters, who, having disobeyed their orders to report for duty were consequently soldiers absent without leave from the army, and for this or other reasons it was considered by the Government desirable to place the whole police service dealing with the Military Service Act under the Department of Militia and Defence, and consequently on June 5, 1918, Order in Council P.C. 1305 provided that the special Dominion Police Force should be transferred to the Department of Militia and Defence to be administered by the Provost Marshal as a civil branch of the Military Police.

When it is considered that this special police force was created in general from men unskilled in the technical duties of a police officer and was in existence not over four months, its record seems most commendable. Altogether the force investigated 152,841 cases, made 14,542 arrests, and turned over 7,756 defaulters to the Military authorities.

The actual cost to the Government of this special force is difficult to estimate because of the fact that whereas all expenditures, amounting to \$319,642.59, were paid through the Military Service Branch, its large receipts from fines collected were by regulation turned in direct to the Receiver General and it is impossible to distinguish those pertaining simply to the work of the Special Dominion Police or to determine the exact sum resulting from this service. In certain western districts, however, independent account was kept and shows the gratifying fact that the fines collected from apprehended defaulters were actually in excess of the cost of the local organization. In general it can be said with assurance that the cost per soldier made available by the Special Dominion Police is relatively very small.

The large measure of success accruing to the efforts of the Police Force ably led by Capt. Kerr and seconded by LCol. V.V. Harvey, DSO, must be in large measure attributed to its Chief Inspectors, and without any invidious comparisons I feel I should not let the opportunity pass to pay tribute to the intelligent and courageous efforts of Major Desrochers in the district of Quebec.

Although the Dominion Police severed its official connection with the Military Service Branch on June 5, 1918, I am quite sure the report on the operation of the Military Police will indicate that its civil section has been most efficient in the performance of its duties and that without its plain clothes service the Military would have been severely handicapped in the apprehension of defaulters.

It may be pointed out finally that shortly after the signing of the Armistice and before the Government had finally completed plans as to the future treatment of

defaulters the civil section of the Military Police was disbanded. In view of later developments this was most unfortunate as upon the decision being arrived at that steps should be taken by the Department of Justice towards the apprehension and prosecution of defaulters, it was necessary once again to reconstruct and reorganize the special Dominion Police Force, which body is now under the Acting Chief Commissioner of Police, Mr. A.J. Cawdron, in all districts excepting the four Western Provinces, where the work is carried on by the newly enlarged Royal Northwest Mounted Police, proceeding in a businesslike manner to keep the Government's faith with the men now overseas.

XIV — Defaulters under the Military Service Act

In order properly to rate the defaulter situation of the country, under the Military Service Act, it must never be forgotten that at the time that Act was passed 437,387 men had volunteered for Military Service, and that among the young men who perhaps properly had seen their duty to remain at home, rather than to proceed overseas, were to be found also the very dregs of our young manhood, and every single young slacker to whom the country had given a livelihood. It is, therefore, grossly misleading to say that 194 out of every thousand men called out for duty under the Military Service Act, defaulted that obligation. In fact a much truer criterion of the country, under compulsory military service would be furnished by saying that only 48 out of every thousand men had defaulted their military obligations, because it is surely safe to say that not one of the four hundred thousand, odd, volunteers would have refused to obey an order to report for duty issued to him.

Although the prosecution of defaulters, as contemplated by the Act and Regulations, was formally not within the province of this Branch, it soon developed that the closest co-operation between the registrars and Police was not only advisable but absolutely necessary, and this branch of our work grew to such proportions that it is advisable to comment on it briefly at this point.

Among men within Class 1, as defined by the Military Service Act, were six groups of prime defaulters, viz: (I) men who failed to register, (II) men who registered but defaulted an order to report for medical examination, (III) men who registered but defaulted an order to report for military duty, (IV) deserters, (V) soldiers defaulting the conditions of their leave of absence, and (VI) men of the 19 Class who failed to register.

Defaulters in Groups IV and V above, had passed entirely beyond registrars' jurisdiction, and although their apprehension was carried out in part by the Dominion Police associated with this branch, all procedure in connection with their punishment rested entirely with the Military Authorities and their courts martial. Group VI defaulters caused very little difficulty, and that fact tends to show that by the time men of 19 years were called upon to register, the country had become almost universally convinced of its obligations or of the consequences which would ensue on breach of them. Consequently all late registrations of these young men, where no intent at default was shown, were in general accepted and only in aggravated cases were prosecutions entered and the offenders eventually handed over to the Military Authorities for in very fact compulsory service.

Defaulters of Groups I, II and III have furnished the main offenders against the Military Service Act, and all work in connection with their arrest and prosecution has necessitated constant reference to registrars' records; in fact, throughout the operation of the Military Service Act an enormous amount of work has been done, chiefly by the public representative's department of the registrar's organization, where a considerable part of the information relative to individual defaulters was received, in helping the police to apprehend and secure convictions against these defaulters, and a large number of regulations designed to strengthen the enforcement of the Act against defaulters were passed through the instrumentality of this Branch.

Mention should not be omitted at this point of the fact that in certain districts and in too many instances long, arduous and co-ordinated labours of the police and district public representatives were brought to naught by the refusal of [the] magistrate to render convictions for offences committed against the Law.

Group I defaulters, who had in fact refused to perform the simplest obligations under the Act, were not only the most reprehensible of all, but they were most difficult to locate, as the police had to proceed without so much as the names of the culprits. Unquestionably before the enactment of legislation preventing men of Class I age and description from leaving the country without a registrar's certificate of good standing, many of those men got out of the country, and still more secreted themselves in the heavily timbered districts of the north and the Pacific coast, where their apprehension was very costly and extremely slow. However[,] many alarming statements concerning these Group I defaulters in the province of Quebec[,] who failed to register[,] evidence at our disposal tends to prove false. Registrars in this province have in recent months received many letters purporting to give information concerning unregistered defaulters, but investigation of all these letters has failed to disclose an actual case. Moreover it must not be forgotten that the period of registration under the first proclamation preceded the last Dominion election, and as it was unquestionably felt in the province of Quebec that the Military Service Act would be repealed by the resulting Parliament there was little to be gained by failure to register.

Although figures are not available among the records of this Branch to show precisely how many unregistered defaulters were actually apprehended, the fact that on November 11, 1918, 10,044 of these men were on military strength, the components of which number varied from 67 in Prince Edward Island to 2,781 in Ontario, shows that the work of the police has been well done and civil life fairly well purged of this particularly obnoxious type of defaulter.

Groups II and III defaulters are discussed in section XXII of this report in connection with the final cessation of our activities and the work to be carried on by the Police with the aid of documents prepared by registrars, and now on their records. It may, however, suffice to state at this point that only 3,492 of the total 27,631 Group III defaulters, who are in fact soldiers absent without leave, have been apprehended by the Military Police. The only consolation one can obtain from this situation is gleaned from the fact that, on account of the system of permitting voluntary enlistments in all districts and into Imperial as well as Canadian units, all our efforts at accuracy, covering a period of several months' investigation, checks with military, and circulation of innumerable nominal rolls have probably failed entirely to eliminate the volunteers, and we may rest assured that many a lad classed on our records and those of the military as a Group III defaulter, that is as one who

had disobeyed his order for duty, has long since heard the bugle call with our troops in France.

Realizing the fact that many draftees under the Military Service Act had failed to register or to obey orders to report for duty, or had deserted or become absentees without leave, through ignorance and misunderstanding of their duties and obligations, or because they had been misled by the advice of ill disposed, disloyal or seditious persons, and judging moreover that at this time a more intelligent understanding of the ideals underlying the Military Service Act was prevalent in even the most refractory parts of the country, the Government decided by order in Council of August 1 to issue a Royal Proclamation granting a general amnesty to all deserters and defaulters enumerated above who should report themselves voluntarily on or before August 24, 1918. This proclamation appeared at once and resulted in 5,477 defaulters and deserters availing themselves of these lenient provisions. Although it has been rumoured that many of these men who surrendered themselves were lame, halt and blind, there is no question that a very large percentage of them was made available as reinforcements with very little trouble and expense. I am informed by the Department of Militia and Defence that men reporting under this amnesty are as follows, viz.: from the London district, 66; Toronto, 187; Kingston and Hull, 762; Montreal, 2,275; Quebec, 1,556; Halifax and Charlottetown, 99; St. John, 272; Winnipeg and Kenora, 68; Vancouver, 64; Regina, 77; and Calgary, 51.

To clear up the defaulter situation in Quebec a well co-ordinated campaign was put into effect during the late summer months by the military police and the registrars. A special protecting certificate was drawn up at this Branch to be sent to every man under the registrar's jurisdiction, who, though perfectly regular in his status, did not and could not properly possess a regular exemption certificate. The province of Quebec was then divided into districts, the certificates sent out by districts and followed immediately into each individual district by the police, who saw to it that every man showed cause why he was not in possession of proper documents. This and all other attempts to apprehend defaulters was of course greatly aided by the regulations compelling everyone of military age and description to carry documents defining his status under the Military Service Act.

To illustrate finally the extent of prosecution work made necessary by the enforcement of the Military Service Act, it is only necessary to state that no less than thirty-four district offences against the Act, with innumerable variants, have been proceeded against. To indicate the nature of these prosecutions one might mention, in addition to those of the above six groups, the following, viz., prosecution of employers for failure to make enquiry as to the status under the Military Service Act of their employees; of employers who failed to furnish registrars with lists of their employees; of employers for failing to notify registrars of the taking on or off their employ of Class I men; of employers for retaining in service, or harbouring, concealing, or assisting defaulters; for advising contravention of the Act or regulations; for resisting or impeding the operations of the Act; of registrants for failing to return registrar's questionnaires, and also for returning false or misleading answers to such questionnaires; for carrying false certificates supposedly emanating from the registrars' office; and prosecution for failure to notify registrars of change of address or employment.

XV — Hostility to the Military Service Act

The last Dominion election campaign proved very conclusively that a large percentage of the province of Quebec was energetically opposed to compulsory military service, and events during the past year have shown that many sections of that province were hostile to the enforcement of the law itself as expressed in the Military Service Act, and in one notable instance, which constitutes a single exception throughout the Dominion, this hostility broke forth in open riotous defiance of law and order.

In justice to the average citizen of Quebec it is only fair to point out that all the evidence which has reached this Branch, including many police reports and results of investigations, have shown conclusively that whatever defiance to the law has been encountered in that province was caused, not so much by any premeditated and well-thought-out intent to default on the part of the common people, as by the evil teachings or influences to which they were unfortunately subject. It is inconceivable that a people of such splendid personal morality as the French-Canadians should fail to take proper issue when a question of international morality was gripping the entire world, if the campaign of educ[a]tion as to the real issues of the war had been generally supported by the educated or popular leaders of that province.

In the district centring on Quebec city the work of the opponents to the enforcement of the Act bore especially poisonous fruit. The anti-conscription election campaign, in which passive resistance had been advocated and the people quite thoroughly informed as to the means of such resistance, gave very immediate results after the passing of the Act, and on March 28, 1918, and subsequent days open riots and violence ensued in which the rioters practically destroyed the office of the deputy registrar under the Military Service Act for that district, burned and ruined the majority of the files and valuable official documents of that office, and eventually made necessary the very exceptional act of calling upon the military authorities for the protection of property and the restoration of the King's peace, and for the purpose of historical record, it may be well to review this resort to military force and subsequent legislation pertaining thereto.

It is provided by the Militia Act that the active militia of Canada may be called out on active service in aid of the civil power upon requisition of the civil authorities, and the King's Regulations and Orders for the Militia contain directions for the exercise of command and disposition of troops upon such occasions; but notwithstanding that the rioters soon got beyond all civil police control the civil authorities of Quebec made no requisition for calling out of the military, and the Officer Commanding, by direction of the Honourable the Minister of Militia and Defence, and acting manifestly in the general interest and for the protection of the public, assumed the responsibility to command and direct the operations of the troops for the protection of life and property and the restoration of peace.

In order that the legality of such intervention and the proceedings of the military authorities consequent thereon should be affirmed and that provision should be made for such future action by the military force as might be necessary for the preservation

of law and order, an Order in Council (P.C. 834) was enacted on April 4, 1918. This order not only affirmed the legality of the intervention, operation and proceedings of the Officer Commanding the troops in suppressing the riots and disturbances in the city of Quebec on and subsequent to March 28, 1918, but also provided that if in the opinion of the General Officer or the Officer Commanding the Military District in which any riot, insurrection or civil disturbances takes place, the circumstances be such as to demand the intervention of the military power, it shall be within the authority of that officer to issue orders for such intervention and to use such force as he may deem reasonably necessary to restore the peace, whether or not any requisition has been made to such officer or to any military authority by the civil authorities of the district.

The order in council also provides that in the case of any riot or civil disturbance taking place while the Military Service Act, 1917, is in operation, if the General Officer or the Officer Commanding in any district of Canada shall call out any troops for the maintenance of public order or for preventing obstruction to the Military Service Act, 1917, the Governor in Council may within the affected area supersede the jurisdiction and powers of the civil courts and declare that within such area the civil population shall obey the authority of the General Officer Commanding the troops, and that offenders against the law shall be tried and punished by courts martial.

There seems no question that this order in council had the effect of making certain leaders in Quebec realize to what state of lawless disorder their teachings had brought their falsely guided disciples, and not only were there no further open disturbances against the enforcement of the Act in this province, but our statistical formulation of results obtained under the Act shows conclusively that the province of Quebec [h]as done reasonably well in furnishing men under the compulsory draft, while many accounts of the heroic deeds of the [C]anadian Armies on the Western Front are inseparably associated with the linked names of Jean-Baptiste and Johnny Canuck.

Source: Extract from the *Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch to the Honourable The Minister of Justice on the Operation of the Military Service Act, 1917*, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1919, pp 21-26.

APPENDIX M

Table 1

COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF FRANCOPHONES AND ANGLOPHONES IN THE PERMANENT ACTIVE MILITIA 1920-39

Year	R22°R			Permanent Force			
	Offrs	ORs	Total	Offrs	ORs	Total	%
1920-21	12	198	210	381	3744	4145	5.1
1921-22	10	189	199	341	3837	3978	5.0
1922-23	13	182	195	340	3135	3475	5.6
1923-24	13	176	189	413	2185	3598	5.3
1924-25	13	146	159	326	3004	3330	4.8
1925-26	14	147	161	328	3088	3416	4.7
1926-27	14	155	169	329	3189	3518	4.8
1927-28	15	149	164	411	3175	3586	4.6
1928-29	18	127	145	412	2852	3264	4.1
1929-30	18	139	157	401	3109	3510	4.5
1930-31	18	156	174	398	3290	3703	4.6
1931-32	19	153	172	403	3300	3570	4.5
1932-33	20	142	162	406	3164	3570	4.5
1933-34	20	142	162	416	3112	3528	4.6
1934-35	21	142	163	411	3098	3509	4.6
1935-36	20	176	196	417	3585	4002	4.9
1936-37	21	173	194	422	3612	4034	4.8
1937-38	20	168	188	440	3655	4095	4.6
1938-39	19	165	184	455	3714	4169	4.4
Average %	16.7	159.2		392.1	3297.3		4.7

Source: These figures are taken from the Militia Annual Reports for 1921 to 1939. The percentages shown are based on both totals, those of the R22°R and of the entire Permanent Force.

Table 2

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF NON-PERMANENT
MILITIAMEN TRAINED IN QUEBEC AND CANADA—1925-39**

Year	MD4		MD5		Total Que- bec		Total Canada		%
	Off	ORs	Off	ORs	Off	ORs			
1925-26	432	3 274	161	1 078	4 945	3 097	21 481	24 578	20.1
	* 148	558	89	289	1 084	1 303	6 108	7 411	14.6
1926-27	467	3 620	158	1 046	5 291	3 091	20 469	23 560	22.5
	* 131	430	109	325	995	1 341	5 793	7 134	13.9
1927-28	433	4 054	161	1 136	5 784	2 573	19 754	22 327	25.9
	* 131	882	74	498	1 585	1 610	10 248	11 858	13.4
1928-29	496	4 246	183	1 097	6 022	3 047	21 047	24 094	25.0
	* 202	1 262	230	1 442	3 146	2 356	14 615	16 971	21.5
1929-30	534	3 906	174	1 130	5 744	3 062	19 568	22 630	25.4
	* 312	1 754	203	1 116	3 385	2 472	15 637	18 109	18.7
1930-31	603	3 742	166	988	5 499	3 191	19 439	22 630	24.3
	* 133	847	198	1 028	2 206	2 454	15 408	17 862	12.4
1931-32	580	5 044	219	1 119	6 962	4 436	30 813	35 249	19.8
	* 2	12	85	39	138	396	1 291	1 687	8.2
1932-33	564	4 452	181	989	6 186	4 097	28 442	32 539	19.0
	* 177	737	169	483	1 566	1 834	7 601	9 435	16.6
1933-34	538	4 260	206	951	5 955	4 409	29 585	33 994	17.5
	* 159	853	155	479	1 646	1 961	10 257	12 218	13.5
1934-35	601	4 552	195	1 070	6 418	4 271	29 825	34 096	18.8
	* 189	917	151	477	1 734	2 062	10 721	12 783	13.6
1935-36	594	4 785	208	1 070	6 657	4 513	31 138	35 651	18.7
	* 369	2 192	170	761	3 492	2 184	12 426	14 610	23.9
1936-37	599	4 753	208	1 321	6 881	4 412	29 959	34 371	20.0
	* 144	854	163	1 061	2 222	1 924	11 891	13 815	16.1
1937-38	682	4 856	198	1 347	7 083	4 289	31 016	35 305	20.1
	* 166	958	147	1 122	2 393	2 349	15 648	17 997	13.3
1938-39	794	5 368	227	1 735	8 124	4 672	36 014	40 686	20.0
	* 447	3 084	251	1 780	5 562	3 479	25 624	29 103	19.1
Average									21.2
Average*									15.6
Overall average									18.4

Source: These figures are taken from the Militia Annual Reports for 1926 to 1939. The first row each year shows the number of militiamen trained at the unit, while the second (*) shows the number of militiamen trained at summer camp. The same person may be included in both statistics.

Table 3

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF NON-PERMANENT
FRANCOPHONE MILITIAMEN TRAINED IN QUEBEC AND CANADA
1923-39**

Year	Francophones			Quebec	%	Canada	%
	MD 4	MD 5	Total				
1923-24		809	574	1 383			
	*	280	339	619			
1924-25		607	307	914			
	*	231	84	315			
1925-26		884	533	1 417	4 945	28.7	24 578
	*	284	69	353	1 084	32.6	7 411
1926-27		1 056	604	1 660	5 291	31.4	23 560
	*	112	112	224	995	22.5	7 134
1927-28		1 316	762	2 078	5 784	35.9	22 327
	*	357	214	571	1 585	36.0	11 858
1928-29		1 230	640	1 870	6 022	31.1	24 094
	*	335	1 197	1 532	3 146	48.7	16 971
1929-30		1 264	680	1 944	5 744	33.8	22 630
	*	483	654	1 137	3 385	33.6	18 109
1930-31		1 316	600	1 916	5 499	34.8	22 630
	*	155	680	835	2 206	37.9	17 862
1931-32		1 692	662	2 354	6 962	33.8	35 249
	*	—	85	85	138	61.6	1 687
1932-33		1 385	490	1 875	6 186	30.3	32 539
	*	381	408	789	1 566	50.4	9 435
1933-34		1 232	526	1 758	5 955	29.5	33 994
	*	481	289	770	1 646	46.8	12 218
1934-35		1 400	637	2 037	6 418	31.7	34 096
	*	431	268	699	1 734	40.3	12 783
1935-36		1 525	636	2 161	6 657	32.5	35 651
	*	892	434	1 326	3 492	38.0	14 610
1936-37		1 652	772	2 424	6 881	35.2	34 371
		321	668	989	2 222	44.5	13 815
1937-38		1 435	775	2 210	7 083	31.2	35 305
	*	474	741	1 215	2 393	50.8	17 997
1938-39		1 616	1 040	2 656	8 124	32.7	40 686
	*	1 344	1 245	2 589	5 562	46.5	29 103
Average					37.2		7.1
Average*							6.4

Source: These figures are taken from the Militia Annual Reports for 1923 to 1939. They include COTC training.

The first row of each year represents the number of militiamen trained in summer camp. The most numerous units are the *Voltigeurs de Québec* and the *Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent*. The second row, preceded by an asterisk, represents the number of militiamen trained locally, that is, in drill halls and other facilities.

The totals for Quebec and Canada are drawn from Table 2.

Table 4

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF OFFICER CADETS
FROM QUEBEC AND CANADA ENROLLED IN RMC KINGSTON
1919-39**

Year	Quebec	Canada	Percentage
1919-20	—	—	—
1920-21	—	—	—
1921-22	—	—	—
1922-23	—	—	—
1923-24	—	—	—
1924-25	—	—	—
1925-26	—	—	—
1926-27	—	—	—
1927-28	42	201	20.9
1928-29	47	200	23.5
1929-30	50	200	25.0
1930-31	48	201	23.9
1931-32	44	200	22.0
1932-33	46	200	23.0
1933-34	48	200	24.0
1934-35	39	197	19.8
1935-36	34	191	17.8
1936-37	39	196	19.9
1937-38	35	201	17.4
1938-39	37	200	18.5
Average			21.3

Source: These figures are taken from the Militia Annual Reports for 1927 to 1939. All the teaching staff seem to be Anglophones except for the teachers of French. The Advisory Board includes 19 Anglophones and two Francophones (Canon A Sylvestre and Mgr F Couturier).

Table 5

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF OFFICER CADETS OF THE
NON-PERMANENT MILITIA IN THE
CANADIAN OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS
1921-35**

Year	Quebec		Canada	Percentage
	Franco	Anglo		
1921-22	54	32	248	23.6
1922-23	—	—	—	—
1923-24	184	259	1 659	11.1
1924-25	98	246	1 864	5.3
1925-26	60	313	1 849	3.2
1926-27	199	333	1 889	10.5
1927-28	115	231	1 765	6.5
1928-29	142	260	2 161	6.6
1929-30	160	237	2 127	7.5
1930-31	231	286	2 372	9.7
1931-32	300	298	2 577	11.8
1932-33	320	294	2 535	12.6
1933-34	351	304	2 387	14.7
1934-35	455	393	2 371	19.2
Average	205.3	268.2		10.9
%	43.4	56.6		

Source: These figures are taken from Militia and Defence Annual Reports for 1921 to 1935. After 1935, numbers of cadets are not broken down by MD, and hence it was impossible to extend the comparison to 1939. Francophones belong to the *Université Laval*, *Université LaSalle* and *Université de Montréal* contingents, while Anglophones belong to the McGill University, Loyola College and University of Bishop's College contingents.

Table 6

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF CADETS TRAINED
IN QUEBEC AND CANADA
1920-39**

Year	Quebec	Canada	Percentage
1920-21	26 637	81 493	32.7
1921-22	40 651	101 432	40.1
1922-23	47 116	109 395	43.1
1923-24	50 266	110 120	45.7
1924-25	52 791	115 677	45.6
1925-26	54 725	112 463	48.7
1926-27	—	118 000	—
1927-28	64 111	130 298	49.2
1928-29	64 070	129 758	49.4
1929-30	66 499	130 307	51.0
1930-31	66 245	131 985	50.2
1931-32	66 015	134 088	49.2
1932-33	64 402	140 846	45.7
1933-34	68 539	134 331	51.0
1934-35	51 340	87 448	58.7
1935-36	48 735	82 373	59.0
1936-37	50 385	82 554	61.0
1937-38	49 866	80 339	62.1
1938-39	42 290	73 163	57.8
Average			50.0

Source: These figures are taken from Militia and Defence Annual Reports for 1921 to 1939.

Table 7

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS
IN THE PERMANENT FORCE TAKING COURSES OR
SECONDED FOR SERVICE IN ENGLAND
1920-39**

Year	RCN	Militia		RCAF
		Anglo	Franco	
1920-21	—	21	—	—
1921-22	—	31	—	—
1922-23	—	17	1	—
1923-24	—	23	2	—
1924-25	—	20	3	—
1925-26	—	35	4	—
1926-27	—	40	2	—
1927-28	—	41	—	—
1928-29	—	—	—	—
1929-30	—	36	1	—
1930-31	—	41	2	—
1931-32	—	38	3	—
1932-33	30	33	2	—
1933-34	16	26	—	—
1934-35	24	26	—	—
1935-36	77	37	4	—
1936-37	77	59	3	—
1937-38	174	41	3	—
1938-39	143	62	2	26
Average		34.8	1.8	

Source: These figures are taken from Militia and Defence Annual Reports for 1921 to 1939. We were unable to determine whether any of the RCN and RCAF personnel were Francophones.

Table 8

**NUMBER OF MILITARY TRANSLATORS AND INTERPRETERS
TRAINED BETWEEN THE WARS
1921-39**

Year	French		German	Other
	1 st class	2 nd class		
1921-22	7	4	1	1 (Dutch)
1922-23	1	7	—	—
1923-24	—	—	—	—
1924-25	—	—	—	—
1925-26	3	2	—	—
1926-27	—	—	—	—
1927-28	1	4	1	1 (Russian)
1928-29	1	3	—	—
1929-30	1	5	—	—
1930-31		3	1	—
1931-32		2	1	—
1932-33	—	—	—	—
1933-34	—	—	—	—
1934-35	—	—	—	—
1935-36		6	—	2 (Italian) (Ukrainian)
1936-37		30	—	1 (Italian)
1937-38		15	—	3 (Danish) (Russian / 2)
1938-39		22	—	1 (Russian)
Total	147		4	9

Source: These figures are taken from Militia and Defence Annual Reports for 1921 to 1939.

Table 9

**COMPARATIVE AMOUNTS SPENT ANNUALLY BY THE ENGINEERS
ON MILITIA FACILITIES IN QUEBEC AND CANADA
1923-39**

Year	MD 4 (Montreal)		MD 5 (Quebec)		Canada	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
1923-24	—	6.0	—	14.5	—	20.5
1924-25	36 538	6.9	74 273	14.0	528 717	20.9
1925-26	37 586	8.0	76 200	16.3	468.271	24.3
1926-27	35 558	6.9	69 100	13.5	512 149.64	20.4
1927-28	44 664	6.4	79 605	11.3	702 440.57	17.7
1928-29	74 485	9.3	78 000	9.8	799 488.29	19.1
1929-30	46 868	5.9	81 277	10.2	796 632	16.1
1930-31	45 328	5.7	85 531	10.8	790 451	16.5
1931-32	40 167	9.3	43 823	10.2	430 852	19.5
1932-33	25 907	8.4	30 527	9.9	306 991	18.3
1933-34	33 823	9.1	37 397.47	12.7	295 004.17	21.8
1934-35	33 208	10.6	29 702	9.4	311 610.54	20.1
	* 18 322.45	4.0	25 121.40	5.5	453 104.28	9.5
1935-36	48 259.70	7.9	31 954.51	5.3	608 241.05	13.2
	* 244 108.81	10.3	36 402.04	1.5	2 360 956.42	11.8
1936-37	39 408.64	4.7	82 997.97	9.9	841 540.01	14.6
	* 48 373.77	3.1	279 734.03	17.7	1 578 975.04	20.8
1937-38	56 350.44	7.0	81 632.37	10.1	808 277.22	17.1
	* 159 699.19	6.2	162 647.27	6.3	2 586 033.71	12.5
1938-39	51 491.70	6.1	96 684.51	11.4	846 908.09	17.5
	* 96 203.41	5.1	52 388.27	2.8	1 898 488.97	7.9
Overall average for Quebec						17.1

Source: These figures are taken from Militia and Defence Annual Reports for 1923-39. The asterisked amounts are additional sums voted under the *Public Works Act* or specially allocated to preparing for war.

**EXTRACT FROM THE MEMOIRS OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
MAURICE A POPE**

FRENCH CANADIANS AND THE N.P.A.M.

I. HISTORICAL

1. Establishment of the Colony

French Canada dates from 1608. It is, therefore, well into the fourth century of its existence, and no longer may French Canadians be regarded as a youthful people.

The history of the French régime is one of a long struggle against adversity. The small handful of colonists had to contend against a hard climate and their still harder Indian enemies, whilst the assistance of which they were in need during the greater part of this period was but spasmodically granted by a forgetful Court at Versailles almost entirely preoccupied with European affairs and, perhaps, too intent on the pursuit of pleasure. Added to this, the story is one of continued conflict between Church and State for while the primary object of the new settlement was the foundation of a Christian colony in the New World, the desire for private gain induced many of the laity, official and otherwise, to undo by their trading activities the beneficial work of the missionaries. It was only by overcoming many difficulties that the French colonists succeeded in subjecting rude nature to their bare necessities and, in the process, they laid the foundation of that sturdy character which distinguishes them today.

2. Growth of the French Canadian Race

The extraordinary growth of the French on this continent is also to be noted. During the French régime not more than 6,000 emigrants came out from Old France. In 1759, when the colony passed under British rule, the population did not exceed 60,000. They numbered some 400,000 in 1840, when Lord Durham, in his admirable report, stated his opinion that under the influence of a judicious flow of immigration from Great Britain one might confidently look forward to a day when the French Canadians would have been absorbed by the predominating English-speaking population, and as a separate people would have ceased to exist. Today, the French population is

upwards of 3,000,000 and a considerable number of their offspring have settled in the New England states. In temperament and general philosophy of life these people remain as French as were their forefathers who first came to this country.

3. From the Conquest to the Present Day

It is frequently said, and with good reason, that Great Britain treated her new subjects with wise generosity. They were granted religious freedom, the privilege to continue the use of their own law, and, from the very beginning, they were called upon to take their part in the government of the colony. But this does not complete the picture. After the conquest many, perhaps most, of the upper classes returned to the Old World and France forgot her former subjects who had passed under an alien rule. The lot of those who remained was not altogether enviable. Under a strange form of government, without capital, deprived of contact with *la mère patrie*, they were impotent to prevent the direction and control of commerce from passing into the hands of the English merchant who appear to have been actuated by a belief that to the victor belongs the spoils. In these circumstances, they were forced to rely entirely upon themselves and, prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, the object they set themselves was to remain French, to retain their individuality, their language, their customs, their religion, in short — their traditions.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this object was kept steadily in view. Without capital they were thrown back on such outlets as could be found in the liberal professions, the Church, and the cultivation of the soil; in this latter occupation, through hard labour and a copious flow of honest sweat they could create and accumulate wealth by the only means then open to them. And to this end they were exhorted by the clergy. In fact, it is perhaps not too much to say that without the unceasing encouragement of the clergy, the French Canadians' effort might have been in vain.

Today, the French Canadian is serenely conscious of having achieved his object. This realization began to dawn upon him towards the beginning of the present century and, curiously enough, it appears to have been conclusively brought home to him during the local troubles which arose during the Great War. On this score, his mind is now at rest. He is confident that his race occupies an almost

unassailable position and, with the accumulated savings of 150 years, he feels that in all security he may branch out into the wider domains of commerce and assume in the business world that position which, from the beginning, he has enjoyed in the political sphere.

4. Education

As has been indicated, the campaign for the preservation of the racial characteristics of the French Canadian was largely directed by the clergy who made as much use of the teacher's rostrum as they did of the pulpit, for the Church has ever been solicitous of education. The system has undergone little change with the passage of time. Secondary education is still based on the centuries-old *cours classique* which, up to a generation or so ago, was considered in all countries to be essential to a sound education. In other parts of Canada particular attention is paid to mathematics and to subjects specifically related to commerce. In French Canada the situation is otherwise, and students almost without exception are grounded in Latin and Greek, logic, rhetoric, and philosophy; the study of higher mathematics is reserved for those destined for the engineering profession who proceed to the *École Polytechnique* after the completion of their arts course. It is to be noted that there are no less than 22 classical colleges dotted here and there throughout French Canada.

5. Characteristics

To complete this section there remains to attempt a short summary of the French Canadian's character. As has been indicated, he has throughout his history been largely under clerical influence and it is but natural that he should possess a large measure of those virtues which of their nature constitute the very basis of a Christian community. The French Canadian is a docile subject. He has an inherent respect for constituted authority, both civil and religious. He is law-abiding as a rule, generally thrifty, hard working and self-reliant to such an extent that he is able, on a farm of moderate size, to raise and educate a large family and, at the same time, to put by a reasonable competence against old age. He is a good neighbour in that he minds his business, but it may be observed that he has a weakness for litigation and a strong predilection for party politics.

On the other hand, it is perhaps not inappropriate to say that he suffers from the defects of his qualities. The preceding paragraph reads

almost as if it were the description of a feudal people. And this, precisely, is the reason why the French Canadian has been able to develop and retain these virtues: he has made no attempt to keep abreast of what is termed modern thought and modern progress. Throughout his history he has concentrated on the preservation of his individuality and, in consequence, his outlook is somewhat more local that is perhaps desirable. In any event, he does not seem to be greatly interested in international affairs; to him Europe is a far-off world with which he does not feel directly concerned. An estimable citizen in his own community, he does not speculate on the implications which result from his country's membership in the association of nations known as the British Empire. Nor should this occasion surprise. The Imperial tie derives its strength largely from sentiment. It is a blood tie, and the French Canadian is not an Anglo-Saxon.

II. THE NON-PERMANENT ACTIVE MILITIA

6. The N.P.A.M. Generally

The Non-Permanent Active Militia is an organization evolved by Anglo-Saxons and is peculiarly well suited to the genius of that people. It is basically a voluntary system, the members of which enlist for a term of years and undergo annually a stated period of training, either at camp or at local headquarters. In a happily situated country such as Canada, the Militia system is adequate to her needs — primarily for the reason that her needs are small. But the point to be noted is that should a unit aspire to a really satisfying standard of efficiency, much more is necessary than the 10 or 12 days of annual training for which Parliament makes provision. Now the curious thing is that among English-speaking city corps this additional training is freely given and in generous measure. Thus without additional expense to itself the State obtains more than it demands; it has capitalized on the enthusiasm of the individual.

This extraordinary condition is probably unparalleled in any other civilized nation not forming part of the British Empire. It is not easy to assess the underlying reasons which made such a state of affairs possible. In the first place, many persons join the Militia in the belief that they are thereby discharging a public duty. Others see in it an agreeable hobby. Another class may be attracted by the display of

uniform, the satisfaction derived from public parades and by the enhanced position in the community to which they may arise through their associations with the Militia. Whatever the reasons may be, it would be invidious as well as unnecessary for the purpose of this present inquiry to endeavour to ascertain the part played by each of these motives. It is sufficient to say that each, or a combination of all, at times is noticeable.

7. The N.P.A.M. and the French Canadian

The French Canadian by reason of his upbringing and his tradition is fully seized of the fact that the duty of bearing arms in the defence of the State is one of the first duties of citizenship. But he is of the opinion that the provision of the means, as well as the enactment of the necessary legislation to this end, is one of the primary duties of statesmanship. As Canadians generally are unaware of any menace to their security, how much more so is this true in the case of the French Canadian who, by reason of his restricted outlook, is not conscious of, and would perhaps be unwilling to admit, any obligation arising from Canada's position as a member of the British Empire.

The motives for joining the Militia enumerated above, with possibly one exception, appeal to the French Canadian as much as they do to his English compatriot. The exception is, of course, that the French Canadian is unable to visualize the possibility of the use of armed force in Canada; with its use elsewhere he does not feel concerned. And so, being a realist, his reasoning appears to be as follows: "The Government in fulfilling its responsibility of providing for national security has done so through the medium of a volunteer army and has laid down that the members thereof shall train for, say twelve days each year. For one reason or another, the militia movement appeals to me and I am quite prepared to engage myself for a term of years and to carry out whatever may be required of me in a loyal manner. But you say that I should not content myself with doing only what is laid down, but that I should exceed this two-fold. My reply is simply that the Government, through its military advisers, must well know what is required to produce a force of the desired degree of efficiency, and if twenty or thirty days' training each year is necessary, why let them say so and make the necessary provision." It is difficult to perceive any flaw or gap in this reasoning on the part of a Frenchman, who, be it remembered, is *not* an Anglo-Saxon. The

foregoing applies to city corps *only*, for throughout Canada, so far as is known, rural units do not do more than the usual period of training.

8. The Hope for a Higher Efficiency

It is now pertinent to inquire whether or not city units in French Canada may be induced to attain a higher degree of efficiency by means of additional training without pay. An answer to this question is not easily found. Nothing is impossible provided a determination to succeed exists. But, on the other hand, the conditions described have existed without change over a period of many years. It is quite possible that the continued example of sister English-speaking units may, in future, exert some influence. But the superiority of English units lies mostly in the direction of smartness and excellence in close order drill, neither of which particularly appeals to the French mind. Improvement might be obtained were it possible in the future to widen the range of the selection of officers for the command of French districts so as to include officers who had had experience of command elsewhere in Canada. But it is felt that the time must be awaited when all city corps will be required to carry out training in central camps where comparisons must unavoidably be made, where the spirit of emulation will be developed, and where training of a nature designed to lead towards a real efficiency can be demanded.

If and when this important step has been taken the future of the Militia can be faced with confidence. Unfamiliarity with Anglo-Saxon ways is not necessarily indicative of inefficiency. In June of 1930, after a lapse of ten years, a district camp which included a brigade of rural infantry was held at Valcartier. During its progress the camp was visited by a senior officer who had formerly held the command of districts in Ontario and elsewhere. The officer in question spent a full day watching the troops at their work. He appeared to be quite pleased with what he had seen, and it was reliably reported that when he took his departure he observed that what had astounded him the most was that the rural infantry he had seen were better than rural infantry of MD N° 2 (Toronto).

9. The Future

At a time when a general reorganization of the Non-Permanent Active Militia is under consideration, a forecast of the future

usefulness and the availability of the French Canadian militia in the event of an emergency arising is unavoidable. The appreciation on which the proposed reorganization has been based rules out the probability of the Militia being required to fight in Canada. Rather does the plan contemplate the organization of a force capable, on mobilization, of producing the maximum expeditionary force which this country is ever likely to dispatch overseas in the event of war.

Now it may be stated quite simply that the writer, for reasons that have already been indicated, is of the opinion that the availability of the French Canadian militia units for service overseas, either today or in the fairly remote future, will not be as high as will that of units located in other parts of Canada. But this conclusion, which may or may not be well founded, appears clearly to indicate the lines on which the proposed militia reorganization should be established. The proposition may be put forward that Canadians are one people composed of two distinct races. If this is not strictly true in every sense it is surely the ideal to which we should devote our best efforts. Consequently, the cardinal principle which should govern Canadian statesmanship should be to avoid any action which might tend to accentuate the natural divergence between the two racial points of view. It then indubitably follows that the policy of wisdom, and anything to the contrary would be little short of disastrous, will be to distribute the incidence of the proposed militia organization over the entire country proportionally to the population of its various parts. It is to be remembered that the dispatch of the entire force overseas would require many months to accomplish. There would, therefore, be ample time for the more backward units to complete mobilization before they would be required to proceed abroad. And in the event of a lack of response in certain quarters then, and then only, should the raising of units of which the country is deficient be directed elsewhere.

A generation has elapsed since Canada was last involved in war, but the mistakes then committed are still vividly remembered. If the experience of 1914-1918 is of any value it should surely point to the necessity of avoiding anything which not only might divide the country into two camps, but which might gratuitously provide one part or the other with some hurt, real or imaginary, the effect of which would be to impair the strength of the national effort.

Source: *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, C.B., M.C.*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).

APPENDIX O

LIST OF FRENCH-SPEAKING OFFICERS IN THE PERMANENT MILITIA 1939

Colonel E.J. Renaud, OBE	(acting Brigadier)
Colonel J.P.U. Archambeault, DSO, MC	(acting Brigadier)
LCol J.R.J. Duhault, OBE	
LCol G.P. Vanier, DSO, MC	
LCol M.M.L. Garon	
LCol G.E.A. Dupuis, MC	
Major A. Thériault, BSc	
Major L. Lacroix, OBE	
Major G.A.H. Trudeau	
Major J.E.A. Tessier, BA, MB, CM	
Major V.A. Curmi	
Major A.G. Routier, MC	
Major A.E. Routier, MC	
Major G. Guimond	
Major P.-E. Bélanger	
Major J.P.-E. Poirier, MM	
Capt H.M. de Lotbinière Panet	
Capt R. Girard	(acting Major)
Capt C. Chauveau	
Capt C.E. Bélanger	
Capt P. Tremblay, BA, MD	
Capt A.A. Larue, BA	
Capt P.A. Millette	
Capt L.-A. Gagnon, BSc	
Capt B. Laurin	
Capt J.A.G. Roberge	
Lt J.P.-E. Bernatchez	
Lt F. Trudeau	
Lt J.G.G. Charleboix, PhB, BA	
Lt D. Ménard	
Lt L.F. Trudeau	
Lt A.E.T. Paquet	
Lt J.E.R. Roberge	
Lt F.J. Auclair	
Lt G. de Montigny Belleau	
Lt G.O. Taschereau	
Lt M.E.P. Garneau	
Lt P.E. Amyot, BSc	
Lt G.A. Turcot	
Lt J.L.G. Poulin, BA	
Lt J.N. Labelle	
Lt A.L. Brassard	
2Lt J.G.A.D. de Grandpré	

2Lt L.G.B. Lavoie
2Lt R. de la Bruère Girouard
2Lt J.E.L. Castonguay
2Lt J.A.A.G. Vallée

APPENDIX P

**PROPORTION OF FRENCH-SPEAKING
REGULAR OFFICERS IN THE RCN
1914-39**

Year	Rank	Executive Branch	Other Branches	%
1914	VAdm	0/1		
	RAdm	0/1		
	Capt	0/1		
	Cdr	0/5		
	LCdr			
	Lt	1/17	1/8	
	Sub Lt	1/3	0/6	
	MID	1/21		
		3/49	1/14	6.35
1918	Capt	0/1		
	Cdr	0/6		
	LCdr	0/5	1/1	
	Lt	2/23	0/14	
	Sub Lt	0/13	0/2	
	MID	1/8		
		3/56	1/17	5.48
1919	Capt	0/2		
	Cdr	0/5		
	LCdr	0/4	1/3	
	Lt	2/36	0/12	
	Sub Lt	1/4	0/1	
	MID	0/12	0/1	
		3/63	1/17	5.00
1939	RAdm	0/1		
	Capt	1/3		
	Cdr	0/15	1/8	
	LCdr	2/18	0/5	
	Lt	0/15	0/6	
	Sub Lt	0/8	0/8	
	MID	1/15	1/10	
	Cadets	0/11	0/1	
		4/86	2/38	4.84

APPENDIX Q

LIST OF FRENCH-SPEAKING REGULAR OFFICERS IN THE RCN 1939

Captain	V.C. Brodeur
Commander	M.J.R.O. Cosette (pay)
Lieutenant-Commander	L.J.M. Gauvreau
Midshipman	C. Savard J.O. Cosette (pay)

APPENDIX R

PROPORTION OF FRENCH-SPEAKING OFFICERS IN THE AIR FORCE 1921-38

Year	Rank	Permanent Force		Non-Permanent Force		%
		Air Crew	Ground Crew	Air Crew	Ground Crew	
1921	Group Captain	0/1				
	Wing Commander	0/2				
	Squadron Leader	0/21				
	Flight Lieutenant	3/150				
	Flying Officer	8/387				
	Pilot Officer	27/619				
		38/1180				3.22
1929	Group Captain	0/1				
	Wing Commander	0/5				
	Squadron Leader	0/11	0/1			
	Flight Lieutenant	1/28	0/5			
	Flying Officer	0/21	0/5	1/32	0/5	
	Pilot Officer	0/8		1/8	0/1	
		1/74	0/11	2/40	0/6	2.29
1923	Group Captain	0/2		0/2		
	Wing Commander	0/5		0/1		
	Squadron Leader	0/17	0/2	0/1		
	Flight Lieutenant	3/36	0/8	0/4		
	Flying Officer	0/25	0/3	0/10	0/1	
	Pilot Officer	0/5		2/32		
		3/90	0/13	2/50	0/1	3.25
1935	Air Commodore	0/1				
	Group Captain	0/2				
	Wing Commander	0/5		0/1		
	Squadron Leader	0/17	0/3	1/5		
	Flight Lieutenant	1/37	0/12	1/10		
	Flying Officer	0/34	0/2	1/11		
	Pilot Officer	0/7	0/2	1/14		
		1/103	0/19	3/41		2.45

APPENDIX R

PROPORTION OF FRENCH-SPEAKING OFFICERS IN THE AIR FORCE 1921-38

Year	Rank	Permanent Force		Non-Permanent Force		%
		Air Crew	Ground Crew	Air Crew	Ground Crew	
1938	A/V/M	0/2				
	Air Commodore	0/2				
	Group Captain	0/4				
	Wing Commander	0/8		0/1		
	Squadron Leader	2/28		0/7		
	Flight Lieutenant	0/46		0/8		
	Flying Officer	1/50		0/6		
	Pilot Officer	2/11		0/17		
		5/151		0/39		2.63
AVERAGE						2.77

APPENDIX S

LIST OF FRENCH-SPEAKING REGULAR OFFICERS IN THE RCAF 1939

Squadron Leader	A. Ferrier, MC J.L.E.A. de Niverville
Flying Officer	J.A.D.B. Richer J.P.J. Desloges R.J. Beaumont (ground crew)
Pilot Officer	F.M. Martin (?) J.R.A.E. Emond J.A.J. Chevrier J.J.E. Desrochers (ground crew)
Cadet (under training)	J.H.U. Leblanc H.C. Ledoux J.V.G.A. Bourbonnais J.J.A.V. Lalonde A.P.W. Richer J.E.R.P. Bussière

APPENDIX T

HYPOTHETICAL FRENCH-SPEAKING DIVISION

STRENGTH OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION		FRENCH-SPEAKING UNITS FORMED DURING THE WAR
Divisional HQ		
Canadian armoured corps	Reconnaissance regiment	Three armoured regiments (12th, 27th and Régiment de Hull)
Royal Canadian Artillery	HQ Canadian Artillery	
		4 th Medium Artillery Regiment (50 th , 58 th and 72 nd batteries)
	One anti-tank regiment	82 nd Anti-tank Battery
	One light AA regiment	Eight AA batteries
	Counter-battery section	Two coastal artillery batteries (59 nd and 105 nd)
Royal Canadian Corps of Engineers	Engineer HQ	
	One field park company	
	One divisional bridging platoon	
	Three field companies	3 rd Engineer Battalion
Royal Canadian Signal Corps	Divisional signaling	
Infantry corps	One machine gun battalion	Régiment de Châteauguay (MG)
	One defence and labour platoon	
	Three brigade HQs	Three brigade HQs (5 nd , 15 nd and 21 st)
	Three land defence Platoons	

STRENGTH OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

FRENCH-SPEAKING UNITS FORMED DURING THE WAR

	Nine infantry battalions (three per brigade)	Fifteen battalions (R22 ^e R, FMR, Régiment de la Chaudière, Régiment de Maisonneuve, Régiment de Joliette, Régiment de St-Hyacinthe, Fusiliers du St-Laurent, Régiment de Montmagny, Régiment de Québec, Fusiliers de Sherbrooke, Voltigeurs de Québec, Régiment de Lévis, 3 rd Battalion FMR, 3 rd Battalion Régiment de Maisonneuve)
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps	Service Corps HQ Three companies (one per infantry brigade) One divisional troop company	
Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps	Three field ambulances Two field dressing stations One field sanitary section	19 th Field Ambulance, 17 th General Hospital
Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps	One field park	(23 miscellaneous sub- units)
Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	Electrical and Mechanical Engineering HQ Three infantry brigade workshops Eleven light aid detachments	
Canadian Army Postal Corps	One divisional postal unit	

STRENGTH OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION**FRENCH-SPEAKING
UNITS FORMED
DURING THE WAR**

Canadian Provost Corps	One military police company	Three military police companies
Canadian Intelligence Corps	One field security section	

Divisional increases in addition to corps troops

Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps	One advanced park One mobile laundry and bath unit
Royal Canadian Army Pay Corps	One field pay unit

APPENDIX U

LIST OF FRENCH-SPEAKING GENERALS, BRIGADIERS AND COLONELS IN THE CANADIAN ARMY (ACTIVE)

1943

Major-General T.L. Tremblay, CMG, DSO, ED
Inspector-General, Eastern Canada

Major-General P.E. Leclerc, CBE, MM, ED
General Officer Commanding, Newfoundland

Major-General G.P. Vanier, DSO, MC
Seconded to the Department of External Affairs

Major-General E. de B. Panet, CMG, DSO
On retirement leave

Major-General E.J. Renaud, CBE
General Officer Commanding MD 4 (Montreal)

Brigadier J.P.U. Archambault, DSO, MC
Co-Chairman, Officer Selection Board

Brigadier H. Lefebvre, MC, VD
Commander, Reinforcement Unit, Group 'R'

Brigadier G.A.H. Trudeau
Commander MD 12 (Regina, Saskatchewan)

Brigadier J.E. Genest, CBE, MC
Chief of Signals, 1st Canadian Army

Brigadier A. Thériault, CBE
Seconded to the Department of Munitions and Supply

Brigadier M. Noël, ED
Deputy Adjutant-General, NDHQ (Ottawa)

Brigadier E.A. Blais, MC
Commander MD 5 (Québec City)

Brigadier G. Francoeur, OBE, VD
Commander, 21st Infantry Brigade (Valcartier)

Brigadier J.A. De Lalanne, MC
Deputy Adjutant-General (Administration), NDHQ (Ottawa)

Colonel P.C. Gaboury
Commandant, 17th General Hospital

Colonel P. Grenier, ED
Commander, 34th Reserve Brigade

Colonel G.E.A. Dupuis, MC
Commander, 31st Reserve Brigade

Colonel A.R. St-Louis
Chief of Signals, Pacific Region

Colonel F.J.G. Garneau, ED
Commandant, Ottawa Area

Colonel J.P.J. Godreau
Commandant, Camp Valcartier

Colonel J.P.E. Poirier, MM
Commandant, Infantry Training Centre N° A13, Valcartier

Colonel L. Lacroix, OBE
Deputy Provost Marshal, MD 4

Colonel JR. Roche, ED
Vice President, Officer Cadets Selection Board

Source: This list was drawn up according to the order of precedence given in the
DND Gradation List, Canadian Army Active, Ottawa, June 1943.

APPENDIX V

PROPORTION OF FRENCH-SPEAKING GENERALS AND FIELD OFFICERS IN THE CANADIAN ARMY (ACTIVE) SEPTEMBER 1945

Rank	Anglo	Franco	%	Total
General	1	—	—	1
Lieutenant-General	5	—	—	5
Major-general	24	3	12.5	27
Brigadier	83	11	13.3	94
Colonel	182	12	6.6	194
Lieutenant-Colonel	1009	80	7.9	1089
TOTAL	1304	106		1410
Average			8.21	

Source: This information was taken from *DND Gradation List, Canadian Army Active*, Ottawa, DND, 1945.

INTAKE INTO THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES SECOND WORLD WAR (BY PROVINCE)

Officers, other ranks, ratings and airmen excluding WRCNS, CWAC and RCAF (WD)

320

Permanent Residence at Enrolment	Male Population ¹ 18 to 45	RNC	Army ²			ARC	Total in 3 services	Total Enlistment as % of males 18 to 45
			GS ³ (Volun- teens)	NRMA (Con- scripts)	Total			
PEI	19,000	1,448	5,961	372	6,333	1,528	9,309	48.18
NS	123,000	6,837	42,462	2,558	45,020	7,498	59,355	48.31
NB	94,000	2,737	32,326	3,621	35,947	6,453	45,137	48.17
Quebec	699,000	2,404	94,446	43,823	138,269	24,768	175,441	25.69
Ontario	830,000	0,353	243,615	23,322	266,937	90,518	397,808	47.77
Manitoba	159,000	7,782	42,627	5,915	48,542	20,120	76,444	48.12
Saskatchewan	191,000	6,472	44,223 ⁴	8,093 ⁴	52,306	21,827	80,605	42.38
Alberta	178,000	7,360	44,775	6,069	50,844	19,499	77,703	43.11
BC	181,000	1,925	52,620 ⁵	5,626 ⁵	58,246	20,805 ⁶	90,976	50.47
Outside Canada		893	5,892	8	5,900	9,485	16,278	
Not specified		263	191		191		454	
Total	2,474,000	98,474	609,128	99,407	708,535	222,501	1,029,510	41.15

Notes ¹ Estimated figures taken from 1941 Census summaries.² 22,046 volunteers and conscripts transferred to the RCN or RCAF, included in Army intake.³ 58,434 conscripts volunteered for GS, and were included among the latter.⁴ Including Northwest Territories.⁵ Including Yukon.⁶ Including Northwest Territories and Yukon.

**POSTPONEMENTS OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING
REQUESTED AND GRANTED BETWEEN
MARCH 20, 1941 AND MAY 7, 1945**

Administrative Division	Applications to May 7, 1945		Number on Postponement at May 7**
	Requested*	Granted*	
"A"			
London	86 629	81 542	17 687
"B"			
Toronto	146 827	128 872	31 354
"C"			
Kingston	44 386	42 002	19 543
"D"			
Port Arthur	5 959	5 388	1 043
"E"			
Montreal	130 918	117 904	46 595
"F"			
Quebec	76 232	62 883	32 026
"G"			
Halifax	25 226	20 649	11 225
"H"			
Saint John, NB	20 234	18 375	11 857
"I"			
Charlottetown	5 246	4 515	2 900
"J"			
Winnipeg	37 457	33 236	17 318
"K"			
Vancouver	49 176	42 669	13 985
"M"			
Regina	69 183	59 153	31 937
"N"			
Edmonton	49 005	47 337	25 164
CANADA	746 478	664 525	262 634

* These figures contain all original requests for postponement and all subsequent requests for one or more extensions.

** These figures are not cumulative. They do not include a number of requests for postponement under study by Boards.

Source: Taken from C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, Appendix "Q".

**SURVEY OF THE ROLE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN THE CANADIAN ARMY
NOVEMBER 15, 1944**

(Form prepared by the Research and Information Section,
Adjutant-General's Branch)

SECTION A

Question: Do the troops feel they are being given a chance to fit into the place in the Army where they are best suited?

<i>Answer:</i>	YES	NO
a) Comparison between volunteers and conscripts		
Volunteers	40%	34%
Conscripts	23%	45%
b) Comparison by type of unit		
Basic training centres-		
Volunteers	41%	30%
Conscripts	35%	38%
Corps training centres		
Volunteers	33%	40%
Conscripts	20%	47%
Vocational training schools		
Volunteers	63%	21%
Conscripts	48%	24%
Depots		
Volunteers	53%	36%
Conscripts	21%	38%
Operational troops		
Volunteers	41%	33%
Conscripts	19%	49%

— More soldiers in vocational training schools than in other units were satisfied.

— More soldiers in corps training centres than in other units were dissatisfied.

— More conscripts in operational troops were also dissatisfied.

	Yes	No	Not sure	Not Answered
c) Comparison by language spoken				
Anglophones	35%	35%	22%	7%
Francophones	27%	45%	20%	8%
d) Comparison by language and type of unit				
Basic training centres				
Anglophones	40%	30%	25%	5%
Francophones	37%	37%	21%	5%
Corps training centres				
Anglophones	33%	40%	22%	5%
Francophones	27%	49%	29%	7%
Vocation training schools				
Anglophones	59%	22%	16%	3%
Francophones	?	?	?	?
Depots				
Anglophones	31%	35%	17%	17%
Francophones	26%	43%	18%	13%
Operational troops				
Anglophones	20%	28%	23%	14%
Francophones	46%	48%	11%	10%

— More Anglophones in vocational training schools and fewer Anglophones in operational troops were satisfied.

— More Francophones in basic training centres were satisfied.

— A large number of soldiers in depots did not answer, which suggests the problem was probably not taken seriously.

SECTION B

Question: Why do dissatisfied soldiers believe they are not given a chance to fit in where they are best suited?

Answer:

- a) The reasons most often given by the 36 per cent of Anglophones and 45 per cent of Francophones who were dissatisfied with their role in the Army were as follows:
 - 1) occupational maladjustment: 35 per cent of Anglophones and 34 per cent of Francophones believed that, because of their civilian or military training or physical reasons, they were more suited to some other work or unit;
 - 2) job preference: 29 per cent of Anglophones and 18 per cent of Francophones said they were not allowed to choose their job, and would prefer some other work or unit;
 - 3) a few believe they would be more useful in farming or industry (2 per cent of Anglophones, 9 per cent of Francophones).
- b) A very few (0 to 3 per cent) said they were dissatisfied because they should have been promoted; they believed conscripts were given precedence over volunteers in taking courses; they preferred the Air Force or Navy; they would prefer to be overseas instead of being kept in Canada; they believed favouritism or unfairness affected the selection of candidates for particular courses.
- c) The following differences between Anglophones and Francophones emerged:
 - 1) a higher proportion of Francophones than Anglophones believed they were not physically suited to their present work (except among operational troops) and they would be more useful in farming or industry;
 - 2) more Anglophones than Francophones believed they would be better suited to some other work or unit in the Army but they were not given a choice.
- d) The following differences between volunteers and conscripts emerged:
 - 1) eight times as many English-speaking volunteers as conscripts in corps training centres believed soldiers were not given an opportunity to choose the work (or trade) they wanted;
 - 2) among Francophones, a higher percentage of conscripts than of volunteers believed they were not physically suited to the work assigned to them.

SECTION C

Question: What relationship is there between a soldier's education and his satisfaction with his place in the Army?

Answer: For purposes of this survey, soldiers were divided into four groups:

	Yes	No	Not sure	Not Answered
Elementary school				
Anglophones	36%	34%	22%	8%
Francophones	26%	46%	19%	9%
Secondary school (not completed)				
Anglophones	33%	39%	22%	6%
Francophones	27%	50%	18%	5%
Secondary school (completed)				
Anglophones	45%	38%	12%	6%
Francophones	33%	66%	—	—
University				
Anglophones	40%	41%	13%	5%
Francophones	27%	49%	18%	7%

- b) Anglophones' replies were divided almost equally between YES and NO:
- 1) a higher percentage of those who had completed secondary school were satisfied with their role;
 - 2) more of those who had not completed secondary school were dissatisfied;
 - 3) those who had attended university were evenly divided on the question.
- c) Among Francophones:
- 1) a higher proportion than of Anglophones were dissatisfied at all levels, but the difference was especially marked among those who completed secondary school;
 - 2) there was no significant difference in reaction among the four groups.

APPENDIX Z

CANADIAN ARMY TRAINING CENTRES AND SCHOOLS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

	BC	Alta	Sask	Man	Ont	Que	NB	PEI	NS	Total
1 Officer training unit (OUT)	1				2	2 ^a				5
2 Basic training centres	2	4	3	2	15	10 ^b	2	1	1	40
3 Infantry (advanced) training centres		1		1	3	2 ^c	1		1	9
4 Advanced training centres, other corps	1	1	1	2	9	2 ^d			1	17
5 Other specialized training schools	4	1		1	4	1 ^e				11
Total	8	7	4	6	33	17	3	1	3	82

Four trades schools and eleven vocational training schools (cited by Stacey) are not included here.

^a OJC#3 Trois-Rivières 01 Nov 42 — 30 Sept 43
COCBTC #44 St-Jérôme 26 Nov 42 — 27 July 43

All courses were given in English, except at Saint-Jérôme, where French-speaking officer cadets were taught English before going on to Brockville, Ontario.

^b CA(B)TC	#41	Huntingdon		15 Feb	41 — 30 Nov 43
	#42	Joliette	(B)	15 Feb	41 — 31 Aug 42
	#43	Sherbrooke		15 Nov	41 —
	#45	Sorel		15 Nov	43 —
	#47	Valleyfield		15 Feb	41 — 30 Nov 43
	#48	St-Jean		01 Aug	42 —
	#51	Chicoutimi	(B)	15 Feb	41 — 01 Sept 43
	#53	Lauzon	(B)	15 Feb	41 — 01 Sept 43
	#54	Montmagny	(B)	15 Nov	43
	#55	Rimouski	(B)	15 Feb	41 — 01 Sept 43

Only five of these centres (marked B) can be considered bilingual; the others were English only.

^c CITC	A12	Farnham	•(B)	15 Feb	41 —
	A13	Valcartier	(B)	15 Feb	41 —

Both these centres may be considered bilingual.

^d CWAC#1	Ste-Anne	(E)	01 Oct	42 —
17 MGSc	Trois-Rivières	(E)	15 Feb	42 — 30 Sept 43

All courses were given in English only.

^e S25/S6	Mégantic	(B)	20 Aug	41 —
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This is the NCO School in Mégantic, where 1,566 French-speaking corporals were trained in either French or English. As in other bilingual centres, French was used for internal administration but all outside correspondence was in English.

Source: C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War*, Appendix "D".

**CANADIAN ARMY TRADE COURSES
1940-44**

Units	Location	Instructors	Potential No of Candidates	Number Trained
N° 1 VTS	London	61	113	2,784
N° 2 VTS	Toronto & Hamilton	94 47	584 141	} 5,006
N° 3 VTS	Kingston	49	232	
N° 4 VTS	Montreal	78	463	4,000*
N° 5 VTS	Québec City	107	293	2,016
N° 6 VTS	Halifax	67	151	1,215
N° 7 VTS	Saint John, NB	102	396	4,703
N° 10 VTS	Winnipeg	—	—	—
N° 11 VTS	Vancouver	123	235	} 8,276
N° 12 VTS	Saskatoon	112	589	
N° 13 VTS	Edmonton	69	248	
Total				30,000

* Estimated figure. There is good reason to believe that barely half the 4,000 trained at N° 4 VTS in Montreal were trained in French.

To these figures should be added those of the technical schools.

Unit	Location	Number Trained
CAOE METC	Petawawa, Ont	25,949
CRTC	Barrie, Ont	1,100
CD&MS	Woodstock, Ont	16,395
CATS (S-8)	Hamilton, Ont	15,393
CAMMS	London, Ont	6,500
CMMS	Barrie, Ont	838
Total		66,175

Large numbers of military personnel also furthered their technical knowledge in English in other military, private and commercial institutions in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and even elsewhere — a possibility not offered to Francophones in French.

Source: "Outline History of Trades Training, 1940-44", D Hist.

APPENDIX BB

NAVAL CONTROL OVER MARITIME OPERATIONS IN QUEBEC AND NEW BRUNSWICK 1944

NCSO QUÉBEC

RO Port Alfred N	RNCO	La Malbaie Chicoutimi Tadoussac
RO Baie Comeau N	RNCO	Franklin Godbout Chelsea Bay
RO Rimouski N	RNCO	Rivière-du-Loup Green Point Matane Mont-Joli
RO Gaspé N	RNCO	Ste-Anne-des-Monts Rivière-de-la-Marte Mont-Louis Cape Magdalen Petite-Vallée Douglastown
NCSO Québec N	RNCO	Port-Cartier Sept-Îles Clarke City Pointe-Noire

NCSO SAINT JOHN

RO Campbellton N	RNCO	Carleton Chandler Paspébiac New Richmond
RO Bathurst N	RNCO	Caraquet Shippegan
RO Chatham N	RNCO	Burnt Church Newcastle Richibucto Buctouche
RO Shediac N	RNCO	Baie-Verte (Tidnish) Moncton Hillsborough Riverside Albert Dorchester Alma

RO Charlottetown N	RNCO	Tignish Summerside Souris Montague Georgetown Murray Harbour Îles-de-la-Madeleine
NCSO Saint John N	RNCO	St Martin's Spencer Dipper Harbour St Stephen
NCSO	—	Naval Control Service Officer
RO	—	Reporting Officer
N	—	Naval

Source: M. Milner, *Canadian Naval Force Requirements in the Second World War*, Ottawa, DND (ORAE), 1981.

APPENDIX CC

FRENCH-CANADIAN RCAF OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS OVERSEAS MARCH 1944

	Air Crew	Ground Crew	Total
1. <u>OFFICERS</u>			
425 Squadron	21	3	24
Other RCAF squadrons	159	31	190
RAF	240	17	257
Subtotal	421	51	471
2. <u>AIRMEN</u>			
425 Squadron	50	165	215
425 Echelon	—	70	70
Other RCAF squadrons	307	2 349	2 256
RAF	437	245	682
Subtotal	794	2 829	3 623
3. <u>WOMEN</u>			
RCAF	1	19	20
RAF	1	—	1
Subtotal	2	19	21
TOTAL	1 217	2999	4 115

CANADIAN OFFICERS AND AIRMEN OVERSEAS MARCH 1944

	Men	Women	Total
Officers	11403	35	11 438
Airmen	32 904	646	33 550
TOTAL	44 307	681	44 988

APPENDIX DD

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RCAF ESTABLISHMENTS 1939-44

Province	Types of Establishment		
	Operational Centres	BCAPT Air Training Centres	Ground Support Establishments and units
British Columbia	24	9	—
Alberta	—	19	5
Saskatchewan	—	19	4
Manitoba	—	15	4
Ontario	—	35	19
Quebec	4	9 ^a	7 ^b
New Brunswick	4	5	2
Prince Edward Island	2	6	—
Nova Scotia	8	5	1
Newfoundland/Labrador	4	—	—

Notes: These figures include all locations with schools and other major facilities.

^a including one SFTS in St-Hubert (transferred September 1, 1941), one OTU in Bagotville, one WS in Montreal, one BGS in Mont-Joli, two AOSs in Ancienne-Lorette and Saint-Jean and three EFTSs in Windsor Mills, Cap-de-la-Madeleine and Ancienne-Lorette;

^b including a functional command HQ in Montreal, two personnel depots in Québec and Lachine, one ITS in Victoriaville, one equipment depot in Montreal, one repair depot in Saint-Jean and a school of aero engineering in Montreal.

Source: F.J. Hatch, *Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 1939-1945*, Ottawa, DND, 1983, appendices C and D.

APPENDIX EE

Table 1

FRENCH-SPEAKING CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY JULY 31, 1943

1. Wartime Industries Control Board	No of Positions	Francophones	Total Strength
Wartime Industries Control Board	8	—	18
Secretary's Branch	12	—	12
Aircraft Control	2	—	—
Chemicals Control	29	1	5
Coal Control	53	—	24
Construction Control	55	—	—
Emergency Coal Production Board	15	—	8
Machine Tools Control	7	—	4
Metals Control	96	1	6
Motor Vehicle Control	16	1	3
Oil Control	447	—	12
	—	—	7
Power Control	2	—	3
Priorities Officer	181	—	—
Rubber Control	38	—	3
	—	—	6
Ship Repairs and Salvage	21	—	4
Steel Control	82	—	8
Timber Control	127	—	24
Transit Control	99	1	4
Wood Fuel Control	58	—	—
Total	1 353	4	151
2. Service and Finance Branches		Francophones	Total
Controller's Branch		—	16
Economics and Statistics Branch		—	8
Legal Branch		—	34
Financial Adviser's Office		—	13
Labour Liaison Office		—	6
Transit Control		—	34
Total		—	81

3. Units associated with the Department		Senior Officers	
		Francophones	Total
Organization and Personnel Branch		—	8
Publicity		1	6
Secretary's Branch		—	13
Auditor-General's Office		—	23
Cost Inspection Division		2	32
Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada		—	23
Treasury Office (attached)		1	14
War Assets Corporation		1	15
War Contracts Depreciation Board		1	8
Total		6	142
4. Department Employees by Language*	Total	Francophones	%
	11 006	1 990	18.1

* These are approximate figures, based on a study of a list of the Department's employees. They do, however, give a good idea of the unilingual English conditions under which Francophones had to work.

Table 2

**NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN WAR INDUSTRIES BY PROVINCE
AS OF JULY 1, 1944**

Region	Province	City	Number	%	% Regional
Atlantic	NS	Halifax	24 385	2.3	3.4
	NB	Saint John	11 469	1.1	
East	Quebec	Montreal*	292 660	27.8	33.6
		Quebec	27 356	3.6	
		Trois-Rivières	9 984	0.9	
		Sherbrooke	8 335	0.8	
		Hull	4 022	0.4	
Central	Ontario	Toronto	254 362	24.2	42.7
		Hamilton	55 827	5.3	
		Ottawa	24 816	2.4	
		Windsor	38 617	3.7	
		London	19 784	1.8	
		Kitchener	11 191	1.1	
		Sudbury	1 896	0.2	
		Brantford	12 456	1.2	
		Fort William	10 627	1.0	
		St Catharines	10 763	1.0	
		Kingston	7 890	0.8	
Prairies	Manitoba	Winnipeg	62 544	6.0	10.6
	Saskatchewan	Regina	9 886	0.9	
		Saskatoon	5 628	0.5	
	Alberta	Edmonton	16 612	1.6	
		Calgary	16 485	1.6	
Pacific	British Columbia	Vancouver	88 938	8.5	9.7
		Victoria	13 332	1.3	
Total			1 049 867		100.0

NB: * Including Outremont and Verdun.

Source: These tables are based on information in J. de N. Kennedy, *The History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Canada in the Second World War*, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1950, vol II.

**COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES
IN WAR INDUSTRIES BY REGION AND PROVINCE
1939-45**

(a) Region	(b) Province	(c) Population ¹ 1941	(d) Male Population ² 18-45	(e) % (d/c)	(f) Military ³	(g) War ⁴ Industry Workers	(h) Total (f+g)	(j) % (h/c)
Atlantic	NS	577 962	123 000		59 355	24 387	83 742	14.5
	N B	457 401	94 000		45 137	11 469	56 606	12.4
	PEI	95 047	19 000		9 309		9 309	9.8
		1 130 410	236 000	20.87	113 801	35 856	149 657	13.2
Quebec		3 331 882	699 000	20.98	175 441	352 357	527 798	15.8
Ontario		3 787 655	830 000	21.91	397 808	448 229	846 037	22.3
Prairies	Manitoba	729 744	159 000		76 444	62 544	138 988	19.0
	Saskatchewan	895 992	191 000		80 605 ⁵	15 514	96 119	10.7
	Alberta	796 169	178 000		77 703	33 097	110 800	13.9
	NWT	12 028						
		2 433 933	528 000	21.69	234 752	111 155	345 907	14.2
Pacific	BC	817 861	181 000		90 976 ⁶	102 270	193 246	23.5
	Yukon	4 914						
		822 765	181 000	21.99	90 976	102 270	193 246	23.5
Total for Canada		11 506 655	2 474 000		1 029 510 ⁷	1 049 867 ⁸	2 079 377	

Notes: ¹ These figures are taken from *The Canada Year Book, 1943-44*, pp 79-121.

² These are the estimates of the male population 18 to 45 given by Col C.P. Stacey in *Arms, Men and Governments* and repeated in Appendix W.

³ These figures include volunteers and conscripts from 1939 to 1945, as given in Appendix W.

⁴ Valid as at July 1, 1944, these figures are extrapolated from J. deN. Kennedy, *The History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Canada in the Second World War*, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1950, vol 11.

⁵ Including Northwest Territories.

⁶ Including Yukon.

⁷ This figure includes 16,732 volunteers or conscripts who came from outside Canada or gave no place of residence at intake.

⁸ This figure also includes a few military personnel who served with this Department; some volunteered or were conscripted afterward

**EXCESS OF MALES AND A COMPARISON OF THE WAR EFFORT
BY REGION AND PROVINCE
1939-45**

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Region and province	% Excess of Males ¹	% Military and War Industry Workers ²	Regional Coefficient (c-b)
ATLANTIC			
Nova Scotia	4.2	14.5	
New Brunswick	3.1	12.4	
Prince Edward Island	1.2	9.8	
	2.8	13.2	+ 10.4
QUEBEC	1.9	15.8	+ 13.9
ONTARIO	14.3	22.3	+ 8.0
PRAIRIES			
Manitoba	9.2	19.0	
Saskatchewan	23.3	10.7	
Alberta	22.1	13.9	
	18.2	14.2	- 4.0
PACIFIC			
British Columbia	19.6	23.5	+ 3.9

Notes: ¹ These percentages, incorporated into the text of Chapter 5, are based on figures in *The Canada Year Book, 1943-44*, p 1004. We have omitted figures for the Northwest Territories and Yukon, which were only 0.6 per cent, in order not to distort the situation in the Prairies and Pacific.

² These percentages are taken from column (j) of Appendix FF above.

APPENDIX HH

EXAMPLE OF THE VARIETY OF SERVICE PERFORMED BY RESIDENTS OF A NORTHERN ALBERTA HAMLET 1939-1945

	FRANCOPHONES						ANGLOPHONES				T O T A L
	CANADA			OVERSEAS			CANADA		OVERSEAS		
	CONSCRIPTS	VOLUNTEERS	VOLUNTEERS				VOLUNTEERS	VOLUNTEERS			
	ORS	ORS	OFFICERS	ORS	K	W	ORS	ORS	K	W	
NAVY				1	x						1
ARMY											
Armoured				2			1	1			4
Artillery								1	x		1
Engineers	2										2
Signals				2							2
Infantry	2	2		5		x					9
Service		1				x					1
Elec & mech engineering		1		2							3
Women		1									1
AIR FORCE											
Air		2	3		xx						5
Ground		2					2				4
SUBTOTAL	4	8*	3	11*	xxx	xx	3	2	x		31*

Note: K = Killed, W = Wounded

* These totals are adjusted to reflect two transfers to different corps. Only two infantrymen out of the 26 Francophones were able to serve in French in the R22^oR.

Source: J. Pariseau, "La participation des Canadiens français à l'effort des deux guerres mondiales: demarche de ré-interpretation" in CDQ/RCD, Fall 1983, pp 43-48

APPENDIX JJ

WASTAGE AT THE RCAF SCHOOL OF ENGLISH COMPARED TO OTHER TRADE SCHOOLS JANUARY 1953 AND SEPTEMBER 1954

Year	TRADES			Total
	Administration Aylmer (Ontario)	Electronic Clinton (Ontario)	Technical Camp Borden (Ontario)	
1953				
SCHOOL OF ENGLISH				
Pass	143	149	137	429
Fail	85	115	182	382
% failures	37%	44%	57%	47%
OTHER				
Pass	1348	1961	2526	5835
Fail	366	501	492	1359
% failures	21%	20%	16%	19%
1954				
SCHOOL OF ENGLISH				
Pass	136	49	143	328
Fail	73	20	170	263
% failures	35%	29%	54%	45%
OTHER				
Pass	1138	799	1918	3855
Fail	249	156	185	590
% failures	18%	16%	9%	13%

Source: E.J. Brazeau and D.N. Solomon, *Interim report on survey of RCAF procedures for training French-speaking recruits*, Ottawa, DRB (DND), September 1955, Appendix B.

APPENDIX KK

SEPARATE STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER F.-EUGÈNE THERRIEN (GLASSCO COMMISSION) EXTRACTS

[...] In the public service, as in the Army, the value of an officer or an official, in recruitment and promotion, is too often and wrongly considered to be in proportion to his knowledge of the English language....

[...] In the federal administration, and markedly in the Armed Forces, there is little or no understanding of French Canada's claim to certain rights, especially with regard to the co-existence of the French language in Canada, nor of the way in which bilingualism bears upon efficiency in the administration.

In the Army, certain so-called bilingual courses given in Quebec (for instance, courses on civil defence) are not only an instrument of assimilation but also, to an even greater extent, a means of debasing the French language....

[...] NATIONAL DEFENCE: The general use of the French language everywhere and by all French Canadian members of the Armed Services is recognized neither in theory nor in fact.

The bilingual educational system in use at the Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean is not found in the other Service colleges in Canada.

One does not find in the Armed Services a proportionate number of capable senior French Canadian officers.

Units with French as the language of instruction and technical training have not been organized nor planned in the three Services.

Against all logic and contrary to principles of efficiency and economy, in sorting, handling, stocking and printing documents, forms and information bulletins in the three Armed Services, bilingualism is not recognized.

In the present state of world affairs, our Armed Forces are coming increasingly into contact with French-speaking peoples. There are no appropriate French language training courses in the Armed Services.

Imperfect mastery of the English language is an obstacle to recruitment and to the promotion of competent senior French Canadian officers. So-called bilingual instruction in the Armed Services (a word in French, and a word in English) are instruments of assimilation and destruction of the French language and culture in Canada.

EDUCATION: *Military Camps in Canada*: Schools subsidized by the federal government do not offer equal facilities to English-speaking and to French-speaking children. However, it must be noted that the Department of National Defence in each province follows the educational system of that province. In eight of the ten provinces, official teaching is exclusively in English, while in Quebec and Ontario instruction is in both languages.

In the Province of Quebec, the children of servicemen at military camps may attend English or French schools. But the same does not apply with the military camps in Ontario where teaching is exclusively in English, even where there are large groups of French-speaking children; French-speaking servicemen who wish their children to be taught in French must bear the cost of education from their own pocket.

The Department of National Defence has not so far authorized the setting up, at any military camp in Ontario, of a single class with French the teaching language, in spite of the fact that in some such camps there are important groups of French-speaking children of school age.

Except at the camp at Rockcliffe, Ontario, the Department of National Defence makes no grants to French-speaking children of school age at military camps outside Quebec, to enable them to obtain an education in a French school in Quebec or in one of Ontario's bilingual schools.

Military Camps, Overseas: The minimum figure of 25 pupils, required for setting up a class in which French is the teaching language appears excessive for two reasons:

There need be only ten children of school age to secure permission to establish a school at a military camp in Canada.

In 1961, the average number of pupils per teacher in National Defence schools in Europe was only 19.1, and as low as 9.4 in secondary school.

When the number of pupils does not justify the organization of separate classes, a grant for tuition fees (and another for travel expenses) is not available for French-speaking children of school age, to enable them to pursue their studies in a French-speaking country or in Canada.

Source: *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization*, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962-64, vol 1, pp 69-76.

APPENDIX LL

STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE L.B. PEARSON MP FOR ALGOMA EAST AND LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 17, 1962

During the autumn of 1962 I decided to make a speech, entirely non-partisan in character, advocating a formal and comprehensive investigation through a Royal Commission, of the whole question of bilingualism and biculturalism as the official recognized basis for our national development. I believed that the problems emerging could not be solved unless they were understood throughout Canada. The first step toward general understanding was to reveal the problems, to examine them, and make them known in a way which would ensure maximum attention. Maurice Lamontagne, wise and broad-minded in his understanding of the issues, had drafted my speech when I first publicly broached the problem in Quebec in November 1961. He now undertook to write a draft which became the basis for the speech I made in the House on 17 December 1962. The very good reception I got from both sides in a sense inspired and initiated my later activities in the area of national unity. I include a portion of that speech here:

... Confederation was our declaration of faith in the destiny of a united Canada. It was also our declaration of independence from the United States. We would go it on our own on this continent from coast to coast, first as part of the British Empire and later as an independent nation of the Commonwealth of Nations. We knew at that time that such a declaration, based on such a faith, would involve an economic price. We were ready then in Canada to pay that price — and I hope and believe we are still ready to do so — namely, the price of being Canadians.

Confederation, however, also involved another price which too many of us either forget or do not wish to pay because perhaps it is inconvenient for us to pay it. Confederation meant the rejection not only of political and economic annexation by the United States but also of the American melting-pot concept of national unity. Confederation may not have been technically a treaty or a compact between states, but it was an understanding or a settlement between the two founding races of Canada made on the basis of an acceptable and equal partnership....

Outside Quebec, and as Canada grew from coast to coast, this understanding was more often honoured in the breach than in the observance and for reasons which any of us who know about the development of Canada can understand. As a result, there has grown up in this country two different interpretations of Confederation....

To French-speaking Canadians Confederation created a bilingual and bicultural nation....

English-speaking Canadians agree, of course, that the Confederation arrangements protected the rights of French Canadians in Quebec, in parliament and in federal courts; but most felt — and I think it is fair to say this — that it did not go beyond those limits, at least until recently. This

meant that, for all practical purposes, there would be an English-speaking Canada with a bilingual Quebec. What is called the 'French fact' was to be provincial only....

Perhaps we needed shock treatment to make us appreciate the full significance of what had happened, of Quebec's social revolution. That shock was given in recent years by separatism, by the agitation in some quarters, which got so much publicity, for what was called political liberation....

It is now clear to all of us, I think, that French-speaking Canadians are determined to become directors of their economic and cultural destiny in their own changed and changing society... they also ask for equal and full opportunity to participate in all federal government services, in which their own language will be fully recognized. This right flows from the equal partnership of Confederation.

...This means, I believe, that we have now reached a stage when we should seriously and collectively in this country review the bicultural and bilingual situation in our country, our experiences in the teaching of English and French, and in the relations existing generally between our two founding racial groups. In this review there should also be, in my view, every opportunity and every encouragement for Canadians, individually or in their associations and organizations, to express their ideas on this situation. If they find it unsatisfactory they should suggest concrete measures to meet it and to reach a better, more balanced participation of our two founding groups in our national affairs.

Are we ready, for instance, to give to all young Canadians a real opportunity to become truly bilingual? If the answer is yes, as I am sure it would be, what concrete steps should be taken at the different levels of our educational system to bring about this opportunity, having regard to the fact that constitutional responsibility for education is, and must remain, exclusively provincial? What further contribution to this end have we the right to expect from radio, from television and from films in both languages? How can we encourage more frequent contacts between young Canadians?

Then, there is the question which has already been mentioned in this debate, one of specific and inescapable federal responsibility. What are the reasons why there are relatively few French-speaking Canadians in the professional and administrative jobs of the federal civil service, including Crown corporations and federal agencies? How can that situation be improved as it must be improved? Would it be desirable, for instance, to have a bilingual school of public administration operated by the federal government in Ottawa?

There are a great many more questions that we might ask ourselves. These questions are now very much in the minds of Canadians, more so I believe than ever before in our history. They deserve concrete answers because they are vital to our future as a united country. They should be thoroughly examined and Canadians should be given an

opportunity of expressing their views about them. There could not be any better preparation for the celebration of the centenary of Confederation than to seek and find these answers. The federal government, as I have already stated and as is obvious to us, has a special and exclusive responsibility to do something about the federal service and the Crown companies. But an inquiry here, Mr Chairman, and even necessary changes, will not in my view go far enough. Many of the most important problems to be solved fall within provincial jurisdiction, especially those arising out of the teaching of both languages. Therefore, if this wider inquiry into the means of developing the bicultural character of Canadian Confederation is to be undertaken, the provincial governments would have to be associated with it.

I suggest that to this end the federal government should consult with the provincial governments without delay. If these consultations — I hope this would not happen and I cannot see any reason why it should — do not result in a positive response or if they are delayed, then of course any federal government would have an obligation to go ahead with the inquiry into matters which fall within its own jurisdiction. One additional advantage, Mr Chairman, of the joint inquiry, that is with the provinces, is that it would show the importance of the contribution to our national development made by Canadians other than the founding races, which has been of special and indeed exciting value since World War II. This contribution of new Canadians from old races has added strength, colour and vitality to the pattern of our national life. It has enriched Canadianism by qualities inherited from old and noble traditions and cultures of other lands.

What better way could we prepare for our centenary than by taking effective steps now to deepen and strengthen the reality and the hopes of Confederation so that all Canadians, without regard to race or language or cultural backgrounds, may feel with confidence that within this nation they can realize, without discrimination and in full partnership, a good destiny for themselves and for those who follow them? In that spirit of hope and confidence we can all work together and build a greater and more united Canada.

Source: *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, Toronto, UTP, Volume III, pp 69-72. House of Commons *Debates*, December 17, 1962.

APPENDIX MM

REPRESENTATION OF FRENCH-SPEAKING OFFICER CADETS AT ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA, KINGSTON 1953-1969

Year	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Sub- total	Total	%
1953-54	7	5	6	5	23	356	6.5
1954-55	1	8	4	4	17	397	4.3
1955-56	1	1	20	2	24	413	5.8
1956-57	—	1	26	12	39	401	9.7
1957-58	—	—	29	19	48	394	12.2
1958-59*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1959-60	—	1	34	21	56	426	13.1
1960-61	3	—	31	26	60	429	14.3
1961-62	4	—	24	15	43	451	9.5
1962-63	5	2	43	11	61	491	12.4
1963-64	2	2	36	31	71	518	13.7
1964-65	2	1	34	28	65	518	12.5
1965-66	2	1	33	33	69	521	13.2
1966-67	4	1	48	29	82	559	14.7
1967-68	1	2	41	42	86	565	15.2
1968-69	1	—	38	34	73	446	16.4
AVERAGE							11.6

* Information not included in the documents consulted.

Source: *RMC of Canada Commandant's Annual Report*, 1953 to 1969 inclusive.

APPENDIX NN

STATEMENT BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE L.B. PEARSON, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS APRIL 6, 1966

Mr. Speaker, I should like also at this time to make a statement on the government's policy on bilingualism in the public service. I hope the house will agree that the importance of this subject justifies the fact that the statement is a little longer than would normally be acceptable.

It is the objective of the government to make the public service of maximum benefit to the people of Canada by attracting to it the most competent and qualified Canadians available in all parts of Canada. To this end, and having regard to the character of our country, the government for several years has been taking practical steps to encourage bilingualism in the federal public service as part of its fundamental objective of promoting and strengthening national unity on the basis of the equality of rights and opportunities for both English speaking and French speaking Canadians.

In a diverse federal state such as Canada it is important that all citizens should have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the national administration and to identify themselves with, and feel at home in, their own national capital. The government hopes and expects that, within a reasonable period of years, a state of affairs in the public service will be reached whereby

a) it will be normal practice for oral or written communications within the service to be made in either official language at the option of the person making them, in the knowledge that they will be understood by those directly concerned;

b) communications with the public will normally be in either official language having regard to the person being served;

c) the linguistic and cultural values of both English speaking and French speaking Canadians will be reflected through civil service recruitment and training; and

d) a climate will be created in which public servants from both language groups will work together toward common goals, using their own language and applying their respective cultural values, but each fully understanding and appreciating those of the other.

In developing measures to assist those now in the public service more effectively to achieve a reasonable proficiency in both official languages and to improve the recruitment of civil servants with this proficiency, the government has been guided by the following principles:

a) The achievement of bilingualism is in itself a desirable objective for any Canadian citizen. Where the need for bilingualism clearly exists in practice, above all in the national capital, it should be recognized as an element of merit in selection for civil service positions.

b) In conformity with the merit system, which must remain unimpaired, the requirement for bilingualism should relate to positions, and not only to individuals.

c) Bilingualism must be introduced gradually over a period of years in a manner which will not lead to injustice or misunderstanding. The various measures should be integrated into a well defined, long term program.

d) It must therefore be a requirement of any program that, in areas where a need for bilingualism exists, civil servants and prospective recruits must be provided with adequate time and opportunity to adapt themselves to new conditions in the service in a way that will increase their own possibilities for a successful and satisfying career.

e) For similar reasons of equity, the careers of civil servants who are not bilingual and who have devoted many years of their lives to the service of their country must not be prejudiced in any way by measures to develop bilingualism.

f) The government will consult from time to time with civil service associations concerning its policy on bilingualism in order to obtain their point of view, and to provide them with all reasonable assurances and remove any possible misunderstandings in regard to measures being proposed.

On the basis of the above objectives of policy and principles of action the government has approved the following measures:

I. In respect of civil service positions requiring prior university training

1. a) Beginning in 1967, reasonable proficiency in the two official languages or willingness to acquire it within a prescribed period of time through appropriate training at public expense will be an element of merit in the selection of university graduates recruited for administrative trainee positions where the need for bilingualism exists, as is already being done in the case of candidates for foreign service positions.

b) In those centres where a need exists for reasonable proficiency in both languages, procedures will progressively be established for the filling of executive and administrative positions, so that by about 1970, in the case of appointments from outside the service and by about 1975 in the case of promotions from within, bilingual proficiency or willingness to acquire it will normally be a requirement for the positions in such centres; that is, where a need exists for reasonable proficiency in both languages.

c) These procedures will not cover at this time the technical, professional and scientific positions in the civil service, the armed forces or federal Crown agencies as these categories present special problems. The appropriate departmental and agency authorities are therefore being asked to submit a long term program of effective action in their respective areas of responsibility which takes these special problems and particular difficulties into account.

2. A special pool of positions will be established in the national capital to be used to facilitate the recruitment and to accelerate the development of candidates of high potential who are proficient in both languages.

II. In respect of senior executive officers

A special program for improving bilingualism among senior executive officers serving in the national capital will be undertaken. It is envisaged that each year some 20 English speaking civil servants from the most senior categories, plus their families, will spend a 12 month period in a mainly French speaking city, while some 10 French speaking civil servants and their families will spend a similar period in a mainly English speaking city, to study the other official language and gain an understanding of the cultural values of the group they are visiting.

In respect of bilingual clerical and secretarial positions, it has been agreed in principle that a higher rate of pay will be paid in future in respect of clerical and secretarial positions in which there is the requirement for a knowledge of both languages and where both are used in the performance of duties, providing the incumbents of such positions meet standards of competence established by the Civil Service Commission.

The present program of language training will be strengthened and expanded to make the most effective contribution to the development of proficiency in both languages in the public service in those centres where the need for such proficiency exists.

The federal government will undertake discussions with the Ontario and Quebec governments concerning the early establishment of a secondary school in the Ottawa area in which the language of instruction will be French, in order to meet the requirements of those who wish to provide their children with secondary education in French, and concerning other joint measures that would directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of the bicultural character of the civil service in the national capital.

A special secretariat on bilingualism is being established within the privy council office under my direction. Working in close consultation and co-operation with the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury Board and all deputy ministers and heads of agencies, it will be responsible for ensuring the co-ordinated and progressive implementation of the government's policy and program regarding bilingualism in the public service.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I should like to express the sincere hope that on the eve of our centennial, all Canadians will share my deep conviction that the policy and program of the government on bilingualism in the public service will be to make a very important, indeed an essential, contribution to the promotion of national unity and to a greater and stronger Canada.

Source: House of Commons *Debates*, April 6, 1966.

APPENDIX OO

B & B COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LANGUAGE POLICY

The following are the B & B Commission's conclusions as regards the disparity in the use of French and English in the federal administration, the underrepresentation of French-speaking public servants and the almost total absence of Francophones in decision-making positions.

297. The history of language use and participation in the federal Public Service, especially in the 30 years up to 1962, has been strongly influenced by a particular interpretation of the concept of efficiency.

298. Both Francophone and Anglophone federal politicians and public servants accepted the prevailing orthodoxies linking unilingualism with rationality and efficiency. For Anglophones, the concept of efficiency was an article of faith in a movement that, after 1918, reformed the federal administration on progressive principles. But the idea that language ability in French alone — or even in both French and English — might be a component of merit and efficiency rarely made an impression. Perceptive Anglophones could see that capable Francophone public servants were being held back by gross inequities, but this understanding in no way affected the dominant interpretation of merit and efficiency. They still assumed that English would be the main and, practically, the only working language of the federal administration. As late as in the time of the Jean Committee, lack of French-language services in Quebec and discrimination against Francophones in the Public Service — especially at the top of the hierarchy — were viewed as unfortunate grievances which in no way challenged the guiding principles of the Service.

299. The failure of such pioneers as Lapointe might be attributed to the prevailing climate during World War II, bad tactics, or poor propaganda. French-speaking Canada's complaints could always be interpreted as a "political" appeal to return to the bad old days of patronage and, therefore, to inefficiency if not corruption, and the French-language partisans were put in the position of appearing to be opposed to efficiency as an administrative aim. At the time, it was not argued that use of the French language and increased participation by Francophones would make the Public Service more efficient. Partisans of reform probably did not press this vital point in the 1930's because of the Depression, in the 1940's because of the War, and at other times because they feared the intensity of the Anglophones' spontaneous resistance would prevent any gains from being secured. In any event, most Francophone politicians and officials probably accepted the dominant Anglophone definition of the situation.

300. Anglophones enjoyed the benefits of a unilingual Public Service, but generally did so unconsciously, for consciousness implies some element of choice, and no alternatives were seriously debated. What we can consider today as effective discrimination against the French language and Francophones, earlier generations took

to be the natural order of things. The situation was accepted, for the most part unquestioningly, by Francophones and Anglophones alike, although for different reasons. The Anglophones did not see that such one-sidedness corroded Anglo-French harmony and the continued existence of Canada; the Francophones were lulled into quiescence by patronage and honorific positions. All in all, the history of the Public Service from the two standpoints of language use and Francophone participation represents a tragic failure of Canadian political imagination.

Source: *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, Ottawa, September 19, 1969, Volume IIIa, The Work World, Part 1, Chapter VI, The Federal Public Service: History of Language Use and Participation, pp 111-12.

ROSS REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

The Study Group recommends that:

1. CFP 121 Volume 3, Article 234 be amended to read as follows:

“Service correspondence within the Canadian Forces shall be prepared in one of the two official languages in Canada, i.e. English or French, whichever is appropriate. Units predominantly composed of personnel of one official language group may therefore use that language for the conduct of internal correspondence and also for correspondence with the next senior headquarters subject to the policy of that headquarters. All units will develop and maintain the capability of conducting external correspondence in English in order to operate within an English speaking formation in Canada and abroad when the occasion warrants”.
2. An order be published with regard to the use of English and French concerning internal and external communications to include the following:

“Communications within a base or unit should be in the language of the majority of servicemen stationed at that base or unit while ensuring complete freedom of expression in their mother tongue for those of the minority group. External communications with the Canadian public, Canadian larger formations and air traffic control agencies should be in the appropriate language as required by them”.
3. Recruiting advertising for the French language media be conceived in the French language.
4. Specifications for Armed Forces educational requirements for the various trades, specialties and career fields to include definitions in terms of Quebec’s standards of educational achievements.
5. The practice of staffing with bilingual personnel recruiting centres and detachments serving bilingual or predominantly unilingual French speaking areas be strictly adhered to; adequate provision be made for bilingual recruiting personnel at the Ottawa Recruiting Centre.
6. Arrangements be made to ensure that there is always a qualified French speaking officer on the Staff of the Personnel Applied Research Unit (PARU).
7. Validation studies be carried out on the selection and classification tests for French speaking applicants.
8. Proper record-keeping procedures be instituted to allow the ready identification of French speaking personnel at all stages of selection, training and career management.
9. Provision be made for an adequate number of French speaking personnel on the staff at Aircrew Selection Centre (ASC).

10. All selection boards dealing with French speaking applicants be composed of bilingual members.
11. Procedures be instituted to properly evaluate and record the English language fluency of all French speaking officer candidates and recruits, on enrolment.
12. The Forces Language School be co-located, in a bilingual environment, with the French speaking recruit training establishment.
13. English language training facilities be increased so as to provide instruction for all French speaking officers and men who require it.
14. English language course content be expanded to include a comprehensive range of military technical terminology.
15. The English language course be given to all French speaking candidates of the Officer Cadet Training Programme (OCTP), who require it, before commencement of their military training.
16. The English language course be given to all French speaking other ranks, who require it, after attaining Pay Level 3 standards or equivalent.
17. Advanced English language courses including programmed learning be given to personnel in the following categories who require it:
 - a. French speaking officers selected for staff schools and Colleges.
 - b. Warrant Officers and non-commissioned officers designated for advanced trades training.
18. Advanced French language refresher courses be provided for selected French speaking officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers who, after extended periods of duty in an English speaking milieu, are appointed to key bilingual positions.
19. Every assistance be given to formation and unit commanders in their efforts to facilitate the attendance of English speaking personnel at French language courses, subsequent to their selection for such courses.
20. A CFAO be published requiring that English language proficiency for serving French speaking officers and men be established through approved testing procedures.
21. ROTP University Cadets, who so require it due to a language difficulty, undertake all phases of summer training in the French language and attend an English language course on graduation from university, prior to posting on their first assignment.
22. *Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean* (CMR) be accorded the status of a degree granting institution; the additional accommodation requirement to be met by locating the Preparatory Year at an existing military establishment such as *La Citadelle*.

23. Phase One of OCTP training be given in the French language for French speaking officer candidates who require it; subsequent phases to provide a gradual shift of emphasis from initial instruction given largely in the French language, to later instruction given largely in the English language.
24. French speaking OCTP candidates be kept in homogeneous classes.
25. All recruit training for French speaking recruits be given in the French language.
26. Basic trades training to Pay Level 3 standards or equivalent for French speaking recruits be given in the French language.
27. Any environmental training conducted by means of a formal course of instruction, be given to French speaking men in their own language.
28. Study material, including tests and examinations, be available in the French language for French speaking officers and men, until such time as they have demonstrated an adequate proficiency in the use of the English language.
29. Full advantage be taken of governmental and civilian technical training resources, for the basic trades training in the French language of French speaking men, until such times as the Armed Forces can provide this training in the French language in service schools.
30. A modern tri-service English-French, French-English dictionary and glossary of military terms, be prepared.
31. Bilingual visual training aids be provided.
32. Purely as an interim measure, qualified French speaking officers in specified lists and branches who have passed the normal age limits for advancement in rank, be considered for promotion.
33. Designated bases, and Naval, Army and Air Force units, be manned predominantly by French speaking officers and men.
34. The requirement for bilingual positions within the Armed Forces be reviewed in the light of Government policy.
35. As a matter of policy, one of the following four positions be filled by a French speaking officer: Chief of Personnel, Deputy Chief of Personnel, Director General of Senior Appointments, or Director General Postings and Careers.
36. The practice within the Army of appointing French speaking officers to promotion boards be adopted as an Armed Forces policy.
37. Planning commence forthwith for the provision of a comprehensive programme of dependent children education in the French language, on the principle that education in either official language is a fundamental right.

38. A school with boarding facilities be established to meet the needs of dependents of officers and men who, due to military exigencies, cannot avail themselves of local facilities.

39. Arrangements be made to ensure that there is always a senior French speaking officer on the staff of the Directorate of Service Conditions and Welfare.

Source: *Report of the Study Group on the Recruitment and Retention of French Speaking Personnel in the Armed Forces*, March 1967, pp 119-22.

APPENDIX QQ

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT JULY 9, 1969

DECLARATION OF STATUS OF LANGUAGES

2. The English and French languages are the official languages of Canada for all purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada, and possess and enjoy equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all the institutions of the Parliament and Government of Canada.

DUTIES OF DEPARTMENTS, ETC., IN RELATION TO OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

9. (1) Every department and agency of the Government of Canada and every judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body or Crown corporation established by or pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada has the duty to ensure that within the National Capital Region, at the place of its head or central office in Canada if outside the National Capital Region, and at each of its principal offices in a federal bilingual district established under this Act, members of the public can obtain available services from and can communicate with it in both official languages.

(2) Every department and agency of the Government of Canada and every judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body or Crown corporation established by or pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada has, in addition to but without derogating from the duty imposed upon it by subsection (1), the duty to ensure, to the extent that it is feasible for it to do so, that members of the public in locations other than those referred to in that subsection, where there is a significant demand therefore by such persons, can obtain available services from and can communicate with it in both official languages. 1968-69, c. 54, s.9.

10. (1) Every department and agency of the Government of Canada and every Crown corporation established by or pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada has the duty to ensure that, at any office, location or facility in Canada or elsewhere at which any services to the travelling public are provided or made available by it, or by any other person pursuant to a contract for the provision of such services entered into by it or on its behalf on and after the 7th day of September 1969, such services can be provided or made available in both official languages.

(2) Every department and agency described in subsection (1), and every Crown corporation described therein that is not expressly exempted by order of the Governor in Council from the application of this subsection in respect of any services provided or made available by it, has the duty to ensure that any services to which subsection (1) does not apply that are provided or made available by it at any place elsewhere than in Canada can be so provided or made available in both official languages.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to require that services to the travelling public be provided or made available at any office, location or facility in both official languages if, at that office, location or facility, there is no significant demand for such services in both official languages by members of the travelling public or the demand therefor is so irregular as not to warrant the application of subsection (1) to that office, location or facility. 1968-69, c. 54, s.10.

COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

19. (1) There shall be a Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada, hereinafter in this Act called the Commissioner.

(2) The Commissioner shall be appointed by commission under the Great Seal after approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate and House of Commons.

(3) Subject to this section, the Commissioner holds office during good behaviour for a term of seven years, but may be removed by the Governor in Council at any time on address of the Senate and House of Commons.

(4) The Commissioner, upon the expiration of his first or any subsequent term of office, is eligible to be re-appointed for a further term not exceeding seven years.

(5) The term of office of the Commissioner ceases upon his attaining sixty-five years of age, but he shall continue in office thereafter until his successor is appointed notwithstanding the expiration of such term.

(6) In the event of the death or resignation of the Commissioner while Parliament is not sitting or if he is unable or neglects to perform the duties of his office, the Governor in Council, after consultation by the Prime Minister with the Speaker of the House of Commons, may appoint a temporary Commissioner, to hold office for a term not exceeding six months, who shall, while holding such office, have all of the powers and duties of the Commissioner under this Act and be paid such salary or other remuneration and expenses as may be fixed by the Governor in Council. 1968-69, c. 54, s. 19.

25. It is the duty of the Commissioner to take all actions and measures within his authority with a view to ensuring recognition of the status of each of the official languages and compliance with the spirit and intent of this Act in the administration of the affairs of the institutions of the Parliament and Government of Canada and, for that purpose, to conduct and carry out investigations either on his own initiative or pursuant to any complaint made to him and to report and make recommendations with respect thereto as provided in this Act. 1968-69, c. 54, s. 25.

26. (1) Subject to this Act, the Commissioner shall investigate any complaint made to him to the effect that, in any particular instance or case,

- a) the status of an official language was not or is not being recognized, or

b) b) the spirit and intent of this Act was not or is not being complied with in the administration of the affairs of any of the institutions of the Parliament or Government of Canada.

(2) A complaint may be made to the Commissioner by any person or group of persons, whether or not they speak or represent a group speaking the official language the status or use of which is at issue.

(3) If in the course of investigating any complaint it appears to the Commissioner that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, any further investigation is unnecessary, he may in his discretion refuse to investigate the matter further.

(4) The Commissioner may, in his discretion, refuse to investigate or cease to investigate any complaint if in his opinion

- a) the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial,
- b) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith, or
- c) the subject-matter of the complaint does not involve a contravention or failure to comply with the spirit and intent of this Act, or does not for any other reason come within his authority under this Act.

(5) Where the Commissioner decides to refuse to investigate or cease to investigate any complaint, he shall inform the complainant of his decision and shall give his reasons therefor. 1968-69, c. 54, s. 26.

27. Before carrying out any investigation under this Act, the Commissioner shall inform the deputy head or other administrative head of any department or other institution concerned of his intention to carry out the investigation. 1968-69, c. 54, s. 27.

30. The Commissioner has, in relation to the carrying out of any investigation under this Act, power

- a) to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath, and to produce such documents and things as the Commissioner deems requisite to the full investigation and consideration of any matter within his authority under this Act, in the same manner and to the same extent as a superior court of record;
- b) to administer oaths;
- c) to receive and accept such evidence and other information whether on oath or by affidavit or otherwise as in his discretion he sees fit, whether or not such evidence or information is or would be admissible in a court of law; and
- d) subject to such limitations as the Governor in Council in the interests of defence or security may prescribe, to enter any premises occupied by any

department or other institution of the Parliament or Government of Canada and carry out therein such inquiries within his authority under this Act as he sees fit. 1968-69, c. 54, s. 30.

36. (3) For the purposes of this Act, a reference to the institutions or any of the institutions of the Parliament or Government of Canada shall be deemed to include the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

38. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as derogating from or diminishing in any way any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after the 7th day of September 1969 with respect to any language that is not an official language. 1968-69, c. 54, s. 38.

**SUMMARY TABLE OF THE MAIN EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF B & B AT DND
1962-1972**

(a) Date	(b) Departmental statements, com- missions, review committees, study groups	(c) Reports produced	(d) Broad or narrow measures aimed at B and B in the Public Service — DND civilian component	(e) Measures and directives aimed at bilingualism, spe- cific to the CF and DND civilian component	(f) Notes
05 03 1962				Administrative circular	Bilingualism for civilians at DND
18 07 1962	Minority report by Commissioner Eugène Ther- rien	Glassco Report, Volume I			
12 1962	Speech by L.B. Pearson				
05 1963	Cabinet Committee				On reforms to administration and bilingualism in Canada.
08 1963	Royal Commission on B & B				On the state of B & B in Canada. Power to recommend to the gov- ernment. CF also to be studied.
12 1963		Glassco Report on govern- ment adminis- tration			5 general recommendations to improve bilingualism in the PS.

**SUMMARY TABLE OF THE MAIN EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF B & B AT DND
1962-1972**

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
12 1963	Interdepartmental committee on B & B				To study 7 aspects of B & B including “bilingualism in our armed services”.
Spring 1964				Creation of the “Service d’édition des manuels de l’armée canadienne”	To produce brochures, manuals, etc, in French for Army training. The next year (1965), the unit became the “Service d’édition des manuels des Forces canadiennes”, and the Navy and Air Force had access to it.
1964			Language Bureau created		
16 12 1964					Letter to the CDS from Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of Defence, voicing dissatisfaction with bilingualism at DND

1964		DGEP Branch co-ordinates application of bilingualism measures in the Department.
01 02 1965	Preliminary report of the Royal Commission on B&B	
25 02 1965		Directive 3/65 (CP)
01 04 1965		Administrative circular
Summer 1965	Minister's Manpower Study (Officers)	Use of official languages in Defence establishments. On March 26, 1965, became CDS P3/65.
14 07 1965	On implementing P3/65	Largely repeats P3/65 (above), but for civilians at DND.
		Chap. 10 on bilingualism. Openness to the use of French and to Franco-pones in some areas.
		Positive as to application, but no initiative taken by the various parties to go farther than the letter of the circular.

**SUMMARY TABLE OF THE MAIN EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF B & B AT DND
1962-1972**

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1965				<i>Sentinel/La Sentinelle</i>	CF Magazine
06 04 1966	Pearson's statement in the House of Commons		Privy Council Special Secretariat on Bilingualism		Statement announces several important measures, including the Secretariat. All are aimed at improving B & B in the PS in general. Some sectors omitted, among them the CF.
06 1966		Minister's Manpower Study (Other Ranks)			Chap. 17 on bilingualism. Rejects any new initiative in this field for the CF.
15 07 1966					General Allard becomes the first Francophone promoted CDS.
08 1966				CFAO 9-21	On French language courses for CF personnel.
01 10 1966			Bilingual bonus		7 per cent for bilingual secretaries

06 10 1966	Study Group on the Recruitment and Retention of French Speaking Personnel in the Armed Forces		Headed by Colonel Armand Ross
23 01 1967			Letter from the Deputy Minister, DND to the Special Secretariat on Bilingualism, laying the groundwork for a program for civilians at DND.
03 1967	Ross Report		39 recommendations on B & B in the CF
31 08 1967		Bilingualism Secretariat	In the CDS's office
19 09 1967			Léo Cadieux appointed Minister of National Defence.
02 04 1968		Minister's press release	First part of an ultimate B & B plan for the CF; for the moment, creation of FLUs, some Franco-phones to be trained in French. Further measures to be introduced over the years.

**SUMMARY TABLE OF THE MAIN EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF B & B AT DND
1962-1972**

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
16 04 1968				CDS memoran- dum	Asking various branches at NDHQ to work with his bilingualism secretariat to implement an expanded plan.
07 1968				Creation of FLUs	
13 01 1969				CDS Directive P6/69	On Francophone posting priorities
14 02 1969				CDS Directive D6/69	Announces the introduction of FRANCOTRAIN the following summer.
09 07 1969			Official Languages Act		Entrenches equality of French and English throughout the Public Service, including the CF (coming into force September 7).
14 08 1969				CDS Directive 27/69	Replaces P3/65

09 09 1969			Defence Council accepts two principles on which the CF B & B program is to be based: no fresh injustices; 28 per cent Francophones throughout.
19 09 1969	Vol III of the B & B Commission Report		Recommendations 25 to 41 aimed at the CF.
17 12 1969		Policy on bilingualism in the CF	Submitted to the Defence Council Oct 17, 1969; approved Dec 17; published February 27, 1970 under cover of CDS Directive P3/70.
21 12 1970			Defence Council agrees to the creation of a Directorate General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
12 02 1971		Program to increase B & B in the CF	To be tabled in the House February 26, 1972. Directives still to come on 28 per cent Francophones.
10 04 1972		Program to increase B & B in the CF	Essentially a much more elaborate and structured version of the February 1971 program.
29 09 1972			Treasury Board approves DND's request for funds for this program.

Notes

Introduction

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17. Mason Wade, *op. cit.*, p 13.

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19. Hector Langevin, *Ibid*, pp 367-68.

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32. J.I. Gow, "The Opinions of French Canadians in Québec on the Problems of War and Peace, 1945-1960," Doctoral Dissertation, Univ. Laval 1969. See also Gow's "Les Québécois, la guerre et la paix, 1945-1960" in *Revue canadienne de Science politique*, May 1970, pp 88-122.

33. Canada, *Royal Commission on Government Organization* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963), vol 1, pp 67-77.

34. *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), Book III: The Work World, Part 1, Socio-economic status and ethnic origin, Chap VI, The Federal Public Service: History of Language Use Policy and Francophone Participation, pp 99-112. See also Dorval Brunelle, *Les trois colombes*, essai (Montreal: VLB, 1985), p 191ff.

35. Jean Pariseau, "Normandie 1944: les Canadiens dans la bataille", *Actes du colloque international Normandie 1944 — Libération de l'Europe*, held in Caen, France, October 1 to 3, 1984.

36. Dale C. Thomson, *Jean Lesage et la Révolution tranquille* (Montreal: Trécarré, 1984), p 510; also published in English as *Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution*.

37. *Ibid.*, p 512.

38. Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution, Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1985), gives a very good description of the complex factors leading up to the Quiet Revolution.

39. *Canada Year Book*, 1962, p 1204.

40. *B & B Report*, Book III, p 100, note 2. House of Commons *Debates*, 1946, second session, Vol IV, p 3520. The second and third charts represent salaries above \$6,000 (Table 2).

41. *Statistics Canada*, 1973.

42. It may be worth recalling that in the early days of the French colony in North America, settlers in the Quebec-Montreal region identified themselves as "Canadiens". The English, who arrived after 1759, called their children who were born in the country "Canadians". Thus it was natural for them to speak of Francophones as French Canadians, which the latter considered a sign of colonization. When the Quiet Revolution took place, Francophones living in Quebec acquired a preference for the name *Québécois* rather than *Canadiens-français*. Some Anglophones born or living in Quebec also adopted the name "Québécois".

43. In this connection see Jean-Yves Gravel, "La fondation du Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean", in *Le Québec et la Guerre* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1974), pp 109-32, and *Mémoires du Général Jean V. Allard* written in co-operation with Serge Bernier (Boucherville: Ed de Mortagne, 1985), Chap

14, pp 407-30 (henceforth *Mémoires Allard*); recently published as *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1988).

44. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Toronto: Oxford, 1954), Vol VII, pp 245-

45. *Ibid.*, pp 243-44.

46. The author became acquainted with the situation of Belgians in the military while staying in Neheim-Husten, West Germany, in 1954. Since then, he has been in contact with some Belgians, in particular historians Jean Van Welken-huyzen, Albert Duchesne and Jean Lorette, who have confirmed to him that the situation has not changed since. In 1983, he visited Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Mathen in Vielsalm, a Walloon who speaks French, Flemish and German fluently as well as some English. He was commanding the 3rd Battalion of Chasseurs Ardennais in German, in this border region. This demonstrates a very open mind to the acquisition and use of several languages.

47. Roland Ris, "L'évolution linguistique en Suisse alémanique et son impact sur la Suisse romande" in *Union et Division des Suisses, Les relations entre Alémaniques, Romands et Tessinois aux XIX^e and XX^e siècles*, ed Pierre Du Bois (Lausanne: Aire, 1983), p 165.

48. George Lddi, "Qu'advient-il de la langue maternelle" in *Le Journal de Genève*, August 25, 1985 (Education special).

49. W.F. Mackey, *Le bilinguisme canadien: Bibliographie analytique et guide du chercheur* (Québec: CIRB, 1978), 603 p; R. Durocher and P.-A. Linteau, *Histoire du Québec, Bibliographie sélective (1867-1970)* (Trois-Rivières: Boréal Express, 1970), 189p; A. Beaulieu, J. Hamelin, B. Bernier, *Guide d'histoire du Canada* (Québec: PUL, 1969), 540 p; O.A. Cooke, *Bibliographie de la vie militaire au Canada, 1867-1983* (Ottawa: DND, D Hist, 1984), 330 p; Claude Thibault, *Bibliographia canadiana* (Don Mills: Longmans, 1973), 795 p; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto: U of T, 1966ff; incomplete).

50. Jean-Yves Gravel, *Le Québec et la guerre* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1974), pp 5-22; *L'armée au Québec (1868-1900): un portrait social* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1974), 160 p.

51. H. Bastien, *Le bilinguisme au Canada* (Montreal, 1938), 206 p; Robert Blain, "Le bilinguisme comme indice d'adaptation socio-ethnique," MA Diss (psychology), Univ. de Montréal 1958; Michel Brochu, "La réalité du bilinguisme au Canada" (Québec: Action catholique, nd), 38 p; Vincent Prince, "Progrès du bilinguisme en 1968 au Canada" in *Vie française* XXIII, 1969, pp 159-67; Richard J. Joy, *Languages in Conflict*, Carleton Library N° 61 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1972).

52. M. Wade, *Les Canadiens français, op. cit*; G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers, op. cit*; D. Morton, "Le Canada français et la milice canadienne, 1868-1914" in *Social History*, April 1969.

53. C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); *The Victory Campaign* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960); *Arms, Men and Government* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).

54. André Siegfried, *Le Canada, les deux races: problèmes politiques contemporains* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1906); Edmond de Nevers, *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* (Montreal: Fides, 1964), 333 p; Hugh MacLennan's novel *Two Solitudes* (Toronto: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944); Ronald Wardaugh, *Language & Nationhood: The Canadian Experience* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983).

55. Our comments on an analysis of files 1211-0 to 1213-6 (Official languages), 4706-6 (Language training) and 5570-20-7 (Bilingual officer training), together with extracts from Defence Council (1946-72), Defence Management Committee (1971-79) and Defence Staff Advisory Committee (1968-71) minutes and CDS directives, are kept in binders at D Hist in the J. Pariseau collection (84/391). This collection also contains about one hundred files on various aspects of bilingualism.

56. D Hist, J.V. Allard collection (84/126), L.N. de Tilly collection (84/157), A Taschereau collection (84/267), R. Boissonnault collection (84/331), J.O.A. Letellier collection (85/391) and R. Morin collection (86/154).

57. D Hist, File 84/331 (J. Pariseau collection), including DGOL civilian and military official languages plans for 1979 and 1980.

58. These studies are listed below.

No.	Author	Title	Year
1.	J. Pariseau	Le B et B au MDN, 1946-1963	1980
2.	S. Bernier	Le B et B au MDN, 1963-1972	1982
3.	(1) J.O.A. Letellier	Mon passage au secrétariat bilingue du MDN, sept 1967 — juillet 1968	1981
	(2) J.O.A. Letellier	Mon passage à la Direction générale du B et B au MDN, août 1971 — novembre 1977	1982
4.	R. Morin	Les écoles pour les enfants de militaires, 1921-1983	1983
6.	S. Bernier	Les ULF à la Défense nationale	1982
7.	R. Boissonnault	Les services de traduction, de terminologie et de publication, 1766-1983	1983
9.	J. Pariseau	Le B et B au sein des institutions d'enseignement supérieur du MDN	1983
10.	S. Bernier	Les coordonnateurs des commandements pour les langues officielles	1984
11.	R. Boissonnault	Service d'information, 1939-1983	1985

No.	Author	Title	Year
14.	J. Pariseau	Le service de l'aumônerie militaire et le bilinguisme	1981
18.	R. Boissonnault	Le B et B et les économats, 1916-1983	1984
19.	J. Pariseau	L'instruction militaire et les cours de langue	1982
24.	J. Pariseau	Le CLO et le MDN, 1970-1980 (mis à jour jusqu'à 1983)	1981
26.	J. Pariseau	B & B at the Defence Research Board, 1947-1975	1982

Part One

Introduction

1. W.P.M. Kennedy, *The Constitution of Canada* (London: Oxford, 1937), p 25.
2. This situation was largely due to the fact that many of the militia had deserted, ostensibly in order to care for their families, after realizing the French cause was lost. See also G. Frégault, *La Guerre de la conquête, 1754-1760* (Montreal: Fides, 1962), p 387; and W. Eccles, "The French forces in North America during the Seven Years' War" in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography (DCB)* (Toronto: UTP, 1974), Vol 3, pp xv-xxiii.
3. Article 41, Montreal capitulation, quoted in M. Ollivier, *British North America Acts and Selected Statutes, 1867-1962* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), p 12.

Chapter 1

1. J.M. Hitsman, *Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871* (Toronto: UTP, 1968), 240p. As D. Morton observes in *Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904* (Toronto: UTP, 1970), p 3, "The defence of British North America [now] depended on regular army garrisons provided by the British government, paid for by British taxpayers, and commanded by British generals."
2. A.L. Burt, "Who was the 'Com[man]d[ant] de la Troupe dans chaque cote'?" in CHR VII, 3 (September 1926), 227-30.
3. G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, pp 98-101.
4. *Op. cit.*, pp 101-2.
5. *Op. cit.*, p 84.
6. G. Frégault, *La civilisation de la Nouvelle-France, 1713-1744* (Montreal: Fides, 1969), p 219.
7. Ernest Voorhis, "Historic Forts and Trading Posts of the French regime and of the English Fur Trading Companies" (Ottawa: Department of the Interior, 1930, MS), 188p; Jacques Donat Casanova, *Une Amérique française* (Paris/Quebec: Documentation française et Editeur officiel du Quebec, 1975), 160 p.
8. Guy Frégault, *La Guerre de la conquête, 1754-1760* (Montreal: Fides, 1955), p 387.
9. See Appendix A for a list of French troops.
10. A.L. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, (Toronto: Ryerson, 1933), p 86 and p 432; Mason Wade, *The French Canadians 1760-1945* (Toronto: MacMillan, 1955), Chap 2 "The Legacy of Conquest".

11. M. Elizabeth Arthur, "French Canadian Participation in the Government of Canada," *CHR*, 32, 4 (December 1951), pp 303-14.

12. A.L. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec*, op. cit., p 205ff; G.M. Wrong, *Canada and the American Revolution* (New York: Cooper Square, 1968), p 282ff (originally published 1935); Hilda Neatby, *Quebec, The Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791*, Canadian Centenary series (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1966), p 146. A similar view was expressed by Pierre Tousignant in "Les Canadiens et la réforme constitutionnelle, 1783-1791," a paper presented at the 51st annual meeting of the CHA at McGill University, Montreal, in 1972, MS in D Hist. See also Gustave Lanctot, *Le Canada et la Révolution américaine* (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1965), pp 243-52 for a more detailed explanation, and Jean-Pierre Wallot, "La pensée révolutionnaire et réformiste dans le Bas-Canada (1773-1815)," in *Un Québec qui bougeait* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1973), p 257.

13. In particular, Captain Joseph Allary, Rear Admiral Jacques Bedout, Admiral Jean-Amable Lelarge, Baron François-Joseph Chaussegros de Lery and Count Pierre Martin, Admiral of France. See Robert Hollier, *Canadiens dans la Grande Armée de Napoléon* (Montreal: Musée militaire de Montréal, nd). DCB, 5. To these names might be added Celoron de Blainville, Mathieu Herbin, Philippe Denys de la Roule, René Vareil and Etienne d'Hastrel de Rivedoux. All but the last-named served in France's republican armies (*Ibid*).

14. *Army List*, 1812. DCB, 5, p 94; F.-J. Audet, "Officiers canadiens dans l'Armée anglaise," *BRH*, 29, 2-9 (1923) mentions about thirty such Canadians. See also Roch Legault, "Les aléas d'une carrière militaire pour les membres de la petite noblesse seigneuriale canadienne, de la Révolution américaine à la Guerre de 1812-1815," MA Diss (Hist) Univ. de Montréal, 1986.

15. See Appendix B for a list of British troops serving in Canada, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

16. Stanley, op. cit., p 134.

17. *Ibid.*, p 117, 135, 137.

18. Hilda Neatby, op. cit., p 148-49. See also Fernand Ouellet, "Officiers de la Milice et structure sociale au Québec (1660-1815)," *Social History*, 12, 23 (May 1979), 37-65, for an analysis of the social makeup of the French-speaking militia that period.

19. Stanley, op. cit., p 202.

20. C.O. 42/136, Craig to Castlereagh, August 4, 1808, in J.M. Hitsman, "Defence of Canada, 1763-1871, A Study of British Strategy," Diss, Univ. of Ottawa, 1964, p 100.

21. Hugh Gray, *Letters from Canada written during a residence there in the years 1806, 1807 and 1808* (London, 1809), pp 341-43. See *DCB*, 5, 230 (Craig) for additional information on Gray, and Jean-Pierre Wallot, "La crise

sous Craig (1807-1811): nature des conflits et historiographie,” in *Un Québec qui bougeait*, pp 143-67.

22. C.P. Stacey, “The Defence of Upper Canada, 1812,” *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*, 5th ed, 2nd rev (Ottawa: CFHQ, 1963), pp 65-74.

23. G.F.G. Stanley, *The War of 1812 — Land Operations* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1983), p xviii.

24. Fernand Ouellet, *Le Bas Canada, 1791-1840, Changements structuraux et crise* (Ottawa: U of O Press, 1976), p 172; quotation from Thomas Chapais, *Cours d'histoire du Canada* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1972), vol II, p 268.

25. Michelle Guitard, *The militia of the battle of the Chateauguay: a social history* (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1983), p 102. These numbers reflect only the troops in action, not the reserves nor the reinforcements.

26. C.O. 42/122, Milnes to Hobart, June 24, 1803, in J.M. Hitsman, p 82. See also what Hitsman wrote about French Canadians in *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History* (Toronto: UTP, 1965), pp 10, 27-28, 34, 35, 103, 110, 121 and 162-64, and Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Une émeute à Lachine contre la ‘Conscription’ (1812),” in *Un Québec qui bougeait*, pp 107-41.

27. C.O. 42/136, Gore to Craig, January 5, 1808, in Hitsman, *op. cit.*, p 93.

28. Craig Brown, *Upper Canada, The Formative Years, 1784-1841* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), pp 68-71.

29. Petition of NCOs and privates of 1st and 2nd battalions of Quebec Militia, February 2, 1813, *Journals of the House of Assembly of Lower Canada from 29th December 1812 to 15th February 1813* (Québec, 1813), p 223.

30. Aileen Dunham, *Political Unrest in Upper Canada, 1818-1836*, Carleton Library N° 18 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), p 68.

31. See the various interpretations of this incident in Jean-Paul Bernard, *Les Rébellions de 1837-1838* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1983). A recent study by Elinor Senior, *Redcoats and Patriotes: The Rebellions in Lower Canada, 1837-38*, Canadian War Museum Historical Publication N° 20, (Stittsville, Ont., Canada's Wings Inc., 1985), offers a very good description of military organization and action in both camps.

32. Chester New, *Lord Durham's Mission to Canada*, Carleton Library N° 8 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), p 134.

33. Gerald M. Craig, ed, *Lord Durham's Report*, Carleton Library N° 1 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), p x.

34. LCol Baker to the AG, Bytown, January 3, 1846, in PAC, RG9, ICI, vol 41.

35. *Ibid*, March 16, 1846.

36. Thomas Gordon to the Honourable D. Daly, Provincial Secretary, Montreal,

September 14, 1846; A. Guly to the AG, Montreal, July 6, 1846; LCol Taché to the AG, Montreal, September 8, 1846, in PAC, ICI, vol 119. LaFontaine often accused Guly of not appointing enough French Canadians to senior ranks in the Militia. *DCB*, 10, p 321.

37. M. Wade, *The French Canadians*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

38. See Jacques Monet, sj, *The Last Cannon Shot: A Study of French-Canadian Nationalism, 1837-1850* (Toronto: UTP, 1969), translated into French by R. Bastien as *La première révolution tranquille: le nationalisme canadien français (1837-1850)* (Montreal: Fides, 1981), and J.M. Careless, *The Union of the Canadas: The Growth of Canadian Institutions, 1841-1857*, Canadian Centenary series (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1967).

39. P.B. Waite, *The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867* (Toronto: UTP, 1962), p 102.

40. J.M.S. Careless, *Brown of the Globe* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1959), vol 1 — The Voice of Upper Canada, 1818-1859, pp 166-67.

Chapter 2

1. G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, p 211ff.

2. Jean-Yves Gravel, "Les Voltigeurs de Québec dans la Milice canadienne, 1862-1898," *Diss*, Univ. Laval, 1970, pp 11-88, *passim*. We thank Mr Gravel for permission to quote extracts from this part of his thesis that were not published in *L'Armée au Québec (1668-1900); un portrait social* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1974).

3. AG to Desbarats and Derbishire, Queen's Printers, Toronto, August 13, 1857, in PAC, RG9, ICI, vol 282.

4. J.-Y. Gravel, thesis, p 18.

5. *Militia List*, 1863.

6. *Ibid*; G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, Appendix B. The 4th Chasseurs canadiens seems to have been omitted from this list; see *Militia List*, 1863.

7. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p 236-39.

8. E.K. Senior, *Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District, 1846-1870* (Montreal: Société du Musée militaire et maritime, 1981), p 91.

9. *Ibid*; H.G. Hart, *The New Army List and Militia List* (London: J. Murray, 1866), p 397.

10. See J.-Y. Gravel, *op. cit.*, and *DCB*, 9, 772.

11. 30 Victoria, c III, March 29, 1867.

12. 31 Victoria, c XL, May 22, 1868, s 91. The word "Dominion", taken from the Bible, certainly does not have the connotation of "domination" which was ascribed to it.

13. Maurice Ollivier, *op. cit.*, p 96.
14. J.-C. Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867," *RHAF* (June 1963), p 34.
15. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p 233.
16. *Ibid.*, p 248. We define English-speaking units as those in which administration and training were carried out in English only. We acknowledge, however, that it is possible (and even probable) that Francophones served in these units.
17. Lieutenant-Colonel T.B. Strange, a British officer commanding "A" Battery from 1870 to 1880 spoke French fluently; he did not hesitate in his memoirs to praise his French-Canadian "lumberjacks". T.B. Strange, *Gunner Jingo's Jubilee* (London: John MacQueen, 1896, rpt Edmonton, U of Alberta Press, 1988) *passim*.
18. *Regulations and Orders for the Militia of the Dominion of Canada* (Ottawa, 1887).
19. See the *Militia Lists* for 1868 to 1914. J.-Y. Gravel encountered the same difficulty with militia, as stated in his doctoral thesis, p 58. See also Sylvia R. Frey, "The British Soldier in America," Diss, Univ. of Texas, Austin, 1981, p xi.
20. *Ibid.*
21. R.A. Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto: UTP, 1969), pp 59-70.
22. *Ibid.*, p 194.
23. *Ibid.*, for 1890, p 160.
24. *Ibid.*, for 1895, p 55.
25. *Ibid.*, for 1913, pp 68 and 71.
26. See Militia annual reports for 1868 onward.
27. *Militia Report*, 1871, p 24.
28. *Ibid.*, pp 21-22. For a brief summary of the situation of French Canadians as a nationality within the new federation, see P.B. Waite, *Canada 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny*, Canadian Centenary series (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971), pp 8-9.
29. The 4th Chasseurs canadiens are not mentioned in the *Militia List* or in any *Militia Report* after 1871.
30. *Militia List*, 1900.
31. *Militia List*, 1914.
32. See the list of ministers in Appendix C.
33. Biography of G.-E. Cartier, *DCB*, 10, p 148.
34. *Ibid.*, p 149; Joseph Tasse, *Discours de Sir Georges Cartier, Baronnet, accompagnes de notices* (Montreal, 1893), p 566.

35. D. Morton, *Ministers and Generals*, pp 49-50.
36. *Loc. cit.*
37. *Ibid.*, p 58.
38. *Loc. cit.*
39. C.P. Stacey, "Canada and the Nile Expedition of 1884-1885," *CHR* (December 1952), pp 319-40; *idem*, "John A. Macdonald on raising troops in Canada for imperial service, 1885," *CHR* (March 1957), pp 37-40; *idem*, "Canadian Voyageurs in the Sudan, 1884-1885," *Canadian Army Journal*, 5, 7-9 (Oct-Dec 1951); and *idem*, *Records of the Nile Voyageurs, 1884-1885* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1959), list of names, pp 255-68.
40. D. Morton, *op. cit.*, p 77.
41. PAC, Caron File, vol 192, p 4932-3, Middleton to Caron, April 27, 1885, quoted in D. Morton, *The Last War Drum, The North West Campaign of 1885* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972), p 112.
42. *Ibid.*, p 118.
43. *Ministers and Generals*, pp 82-85.
44. *Ibid.*, p 87; Militia Report, 1889, p xii.
45. *Ministers and Generals*, p 115. J.K. Johnson, ed, *The Canadian Directory of Parliament* (Ottawa: PAC, 1968), p 162.
46. See the list of Deputy Ministers in Appendix D.
47. This observation is based on all the records for this period we have consulted, either at the Public Archives of Canada or at D Hist. Nearly all of these are in English. Examples are the following documents in the DHist Kardex: 112-3H1.009(D1) "Panet Family" and 324.009(D455) "Personal file on MGen Sir Eugène Fiset," which we consulted during our research.
48. See the list of General Officers Commanding in North America in Appendix E and the list of General Officers Commanding the Canadian Militia in Appendix F.
49. *Ministers and Generals*, *op. cit.*
50. *Ibid.*, p 97.
51. *Witness* (Montreal), March 10, 1894; *Mail* (Toronto), May 8, 10, 12 and 14, 1894; House of Commons *Debates*, May 14, 1894, quoted in *Ministers and Generals*, p 108.
52. *Ministers and Generals*, pp 136 and 161.
53. *Ibid.*, p 137. See copy of Militia Order No 12, February 14, 1899.
54. D. Morton, "Le Canada français et la Milice canadienne, 1868-1914," in *Le Québec et la guerre*, ed J.-Y. Gravel (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1974), p 40.

55. *Globe* (Toronto), March 4, 1899; *Witness* (Montreal), March 7, 1899; *Evening Telegram* (Toronto), March 8, 1899, quoted in Morton, *op. cit.*

56. Militia Order No 77, May 5, 1899, and N° 143, July 25, 1899.

57. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, pp 275-76.

58. The author personally checked the lists of men in the first three contingents. See Appendix G. Carmen Miller, "Who went, When and Why: A Preliminary Report on the Socio-Economic Composition of Canada's South African War Contingents, 1899-1902," Montpellier (France), Colloque d'histoire militaire sur le recrutement et les mentalités, Sept 19-21, 1974, MS in D Hist. See also Henri Bourassa, *Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, 1915), pp 114-44; and G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, pp 276-89.

59. D. Morton, "Le Canada français et la Milice," p 41.

60. J.W. Corcoran, "Henri Bourassa et la guerre sud-africaine," *RHAF* (Dec 1964-Dec 1965). We should perhaps mention the quarrel between Laurier and Bourassa over the South African War. Henri Bourassa resigned from his seat in the House of Commons when Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier announced that the Cabinet had decided, without consulting Parliament, to recruit and equip volunteers for Imperial purposes at the Canadian taxpayer's expense. A great deal has been written on this subject. See in particular J. Schull, *Laurier: The First Canadian* (Toronto: MacMillan, 1965), Chap 18 for the period 1899-1900; R. Rumilly, *Henri Bourassa: la vie publique d'un grand Canadien* (Montreal: Fides, 1953); A. Bergevin, A.C. Nish and A. Bourassa, *Henri Bourassa, index des écrits et index de la correspondance publique, 1895-1924* (Montreal, 1966); Goldwin Smith, *In the Court of History* (Toronto: William Tyrrel, 1903), 71 p; J. Levitt, *Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Biculturalism, 1908-1918*, Issues in Canadian History (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970); and J. Swettenham, "The Military Policies of Canada: Reaction to the South African War," Report No 100, Historical Section, Army Headquarters, April 17, 1964, 38 p, unpublished, D Hist.

61. See our brief analysis in Appendix G. Most of this information is taken from René Hardy, *Les Zouaves: une stratégie du clergé québécois au XIX siècle* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1980), 312 p; Léopold Lamontagne, "The Ninth Crusade," *CHR* (Sept 1951), pp 220-35; *idem*, "Habits gris et chemise rouge," *CHAR* (1950), pp 20-29; and C.P. Stacey, "Canada and the South African War," *Canadian Army Journal*, May-October 1950. The question of imperialism is examined in Henri Bourassa, *Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?*, pp 93-155; *idem*, *Grande-Bretagne et Canada* (Montreal: Pionnier, 1902), *passim* (lecture at the Théâtre national français, Montreal, October 20, 1901); *idem*, *Patriotisme, Nationalisme, Impérialisme* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, 1923), 63 p; Norman Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism, 1896-99* (Toronto: UTP, 1965, pp 53-66; Richard A. Preston, *Canada and "Imperial Defense"* (Toronto, UTP, 1967), pp 160-282; Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power, Studies in the ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto: UTP, 1970), pp 233-258; R.C. Brown and R. Cook, *Canada 1896-1921, A Nation Transformed*, Canadian Centenary series (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), pp 127-43 and 162-79. See also the British perception Arthur Lower had of himself during the South African War in "Notes and Comments—Nationalism and the Canadian Historian," *CHR*, 66, 4 (1985), pp 541-49.

62. See Arthur Buies, *Lettres sur le Canada, Étude sociale 1864-1867* (Montreal: l'Étincelle, rpt 1978), which defends the Liberal viewpoint. It is a little-known fact that a thousand British subjects volunteered for the Pope's cause, and the British government even offered the Pope refuge as its guest on the Island of Malta. L. Lamontagne, "The Ninth Crusade," p 223.

63. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, pp 290-305; we have mentioned these troops earlier. For an overview of how the transformations brought about by industrialization changed the lot of French Canadians, see R.C. Brown and R. Cook, *Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed*, Chap 7, and P.-A. Linteau, R. Durocher and J.-C. Robert, *Histoire du Québec contemporain, de la Confédération à la crise (1867-1929)* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1975), 660 p.

64. 9-10 Edward VII, c 43. See G.N. Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), p 140ff. For a French-Canadian nationalist view, see Henri Bourassa, *Le projet de loi navale; sa nature, ses conséquences; discours prononcé au monument national le 20 janvier 1910* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, [1910]), and Réal Bélanger, "Albert Sévigny et la participation des Canadiens français à la Grande Guerre," *Revue internationale d'Histoire militaire*, 54 (Canadian edition), (Ottawa: Canadian Commission of Military History, 1982), pp 82-86.

65. *Guide to Canadian Ministries since Confederation, July 1, 1867 — February 1, 1982*, Privy Council Office, PAC, 1983.

66. PAC, L.P. Brodeur File, Roper and Ling to Desbarats, July 25, 1910, quoted in Nigel D. Brodeur, "L.P. Brodeur and the origins of the Royal Canadian Navy," in *The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968*, ed James A. Boutilier (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982), p 30.

67. *Ibid.*, Brodeur to Desbarats, August 7, 1910.

68. *Ibid.*, Roper and Ling to Desbarats, August 11, 1910.

69. Nigel D. Brodeur, op. cit., p 31.

70. *Militia List*, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912. The circumstances of Lessard's dismissal are explained in J.F. C[ummins], "A Distinguished Canadian Cavalry Officer Major-General F.L. Lessard, C.B.," *CDQ*, 3, 2 (1926), pp 128-131.

71. D. Morton, "French Canada and War, 1868-1917: The Military Background to the Conscription Crisis of 1917," in J.L. Granatstein & R.D. Cuff, eds, *War and Society in North America* (Toronto: Nelson, 1971), p 93; see also "French Canada and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1914," in *Social History* (April 1969), pp 32-50.

72. *Militia List*, 1914. We have omitted from this number the Minister and the Deputy Minister, who ranked as colonels.

Part Two

Introduction

1. *La Patrie*, August 5, 1914.
2. R.C. Brown and R. Cook, *Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed*, pp 250-51.
3. A. Lévesque, *La dualité culturelle au Canada, hier, aujourd'hui, demain* (Montreal: A. Lévesque, 1959), p 156; J. English, *The Decline of Politics; The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-20* (Toronto: UTP, 1977), pp 114-17.
4. R. Durocher, "Henri Bourassa, les évêques et la guerre de 1914-1918," in *Le Québec et la guerre*, ed J.-Y. Gravel, p 47-75.
5. See R. Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, *La vie politique d'un grand Canadien* (Montreal: Ed. de l'Homme, 1953), 792 p; and M. Donnelly, *Dafoe of the Free Press* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), 207 p.

Chapter 3

1. G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), p 18ff.
2. D. Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), p 153.
3. *Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch (...) on the Operations of the Military Service Act, 1917* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1919), p 1.
4. See Appendix H for a list of French-speaking regular officers in 1914.
5. J.-P. Gagnon, *Le 22^e bataillon (canadien français) 1914-1919: une étude socio-militaire* (Québec: PUL and Department of National Defence, 1986), ppl39-237; forthcoming as *The 22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion, 1914-1919: Socio-military history*. Few serious studies of this period were undertaken before Gagnon's excellent work, but see Gérard Filteau, *Le Québec, le Canada et la guerre, 1914-1918* (Montreal: Aurore, 1977).
6. R. Hodder-Williams, *Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923), I, pp 1-7.
7. A list of French-speaking units appears in Appendix J. J. Chaballe, *Histoire du 22^e bataillon canadien-français, Tome 1, 1914-1919* (Montreal: Chanteclerc, 1952). D. Morton, "The Short, Unhappy Life of the 41st Battalion, CEF," *Queen's Quarterly*, 81, 1 (Spring 1974), pp 70-80. To these two studies of the best and the worst French-Canadian units should be added those of Jean-Pierre Gagnon, *op. cit.*, and "Canadian Soldiers in Bermuda during World War One," *Acta Bermuda/Canada 1609-1984*, International Conference, Bermuda College, 1985.
8. G.W.L. Nicholson, *op. cit.*

9. A.M.J. Hyatt, "Canadian Generals of the First World War and the Popular View of Military Leadership," *Social History* (Nov 1979), pp 418-30.

10. "Major-General Joseph Philippe Landry (1870-1926)," *CDQ* (Oct 1926), pp 56-61.

11. J.F. C[ummins], "A Distinguished Canadian Cavalry Officer Major-General F.L. Lessard, C.B." in *CDQ* (Jan 1926), pp 128-31.

12. See list in Appendix K.

13. The names of battalion commanders are given in Appendix J. Note that Lieutenant-Colonel T.L. Tremblay commanded the 22nd twice before being promoted to Brigadier-General when the War was nearly over.

14. See, in particular, Réal Bélanger, "Albert Sévigny", *op. cit.*, pp 80-108, for evidence that the outlook of one French-Canadian MP altered during the War.

15. We addressed this topic in "Forces armées et maintien de l'ordre au Canada, 1867-1967: un siècle d'aide au pouvoir civil," Doctoral Dissertation, Université Paul Valéry III, Montpellier, France, 1981, and "Les mouvements sociaux, la violence et les interventions armées au Québec, 1867-1967," *RHAF* (June 1983), pp 67-79. Some of the cases cited below are not documented in the above, however, we have opened a file for each, kept at D Hist.

16. Quoted in R. Rumilly, *Henri Bourassa*, p 572. See House of Commons *Debates*, April 5, 1918 on the disturbances in Québec, which shed much light on the question of conscription, discussed below.

17. See J. Pariseau, *Forces armées et maintien de l'ordre au Canada, interventions APC* 107 and 108. Jean Provencher, in *Québec sous la loi des mesures de guerre, 1918* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1971), 147 p, also studies this question, but ascribes to the Quebecers in question separatist attitudes they did not have in 1918. For more information on the role of the Dominion Police, see the extract from the report of the Director of the Military Service Branch (Ottawa, 1919) in Appendix L.

18. *The Canada Year Book, 1912* (Ottawa: King's Printer), pp 23-25.

19. *Loc. cit.*

20. Some 9,600 Canadians and British subjects also enlisted in the Royal Navy and 24,095 in the Royal Air Force. See G.N. Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, I, 221; and S.F. Wise, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, I. Canadian Airmen and the First World War* (Toronto: UTP, 1980), Appendix C.

21. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 1977), p 23. These numbers differ from those cited by MGen Mewburn in the House of Commons *Debates*, 1919, p 614. See also Elizabeth Armstrong, *The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918*, Carleton Library (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), pp 247-50. According to G.F.G. Stanley, 628,462 men were in service, 424,589 of whom served overseas (p 313).

22. *The Canada Year Book*, 1912, p 21 and 39.

23. *Ibid.*, p 14.

24. *Ibid.*, p 20. The percentages are our own. Note that statistics for the excess of males are not confined to those aged 15 to 44, but represent the difference between persons of the two sexes regardless of age.

25. *Ibid.*, p 19.

26. The bibliographical list that follows will give the reader a good idea of how attractive this subject has been for scholars. It must not be assumed that all French-Canadian authors opposed conscription nor that all English-Canadian authors favoured it.

François Albert Angers, "Pourquoi nous n'accepterons 'jamais' la conscription pour service outre-mer," *Actualité*, N° 8 Montreal: Action nationale, [1942]), 22 p.

Elizabeth H. Armstrong, *The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-18* (New York: Columbia Univ Press, 1927), 270 p; rpt with an introduction by J. Levitt in the Carleton Library series (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974).

Olivar Asselin, *Pourquoi je m'enrôle* (Montreal, np, 1916), 50 p.

W.H. Atherton, *Rapport de la première Convention de l'unité nationale et pour gagner la guerre, tenue à Montréal, du 21 au 25 mai 1917* (Montreal: Canadian Unity and Win the War League, nd), 49 p.

Réal Bélanger, "Albert Sévigny et la participation des Canadiens français à la Grande Guerre," *Revue internationale d'Histoire militaire*, No 54 (1982), pp 80-108.

Henri Bourassa, *Canadian Nationalism and the War* (Montreal, np, 1916), 31p; *La conscription* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, 1917), 46p; and *Le Devoir et la guerre; le conflit des races* discours prononcé au banquet des amis du Devoir le 12 janvier 1916 (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, [1916]), 45 p; *Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain, Problèmes nationaux* (Montreal: [*Le Devoir*], 1916), 182 p, *passim*.

"Conscription 1917," essay by A.M. Willms et al, in *Canadian Historical Readings*, N° 8 (Toronto: UTP, nd), 77 p.

L.G. Desjardins, *L'Angleterre, le Canada et la Grande Guerre* (Québec, np, 1917), 460 p.

John English, *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-20* (Toronto: UTP, 1977), pp 123-35.

J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: a History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford, 1977), 281 p.

J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff, eds, *War and Society in North America* (Toronto: Nelson, 1971), 199 p.

Jean-Yves Gravel, ed, *Le Québec et la guerre, 1867-1960* (Montreal: Boréal

Express, 1974), 173 p.

Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), 305 p.

Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official history of the Canadian Army's participation in the First World War* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963), pp 368-90.

[Camille Poisson], *La participation des Canadiens français à la grande guerre; réponse à un livre récent de M. André Siegfried: "Le Canada, puissance internationale"*, by Jacques Michel [pseud] (Montreal: AC-F, [1938]), 188 p.

Jean Provencher, *Québec sous la loi des mesures de guerre, 1918* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1971), 147 p.

Ferdinand Roy, *L'appel aux armes et la réponse canadienne-française: étude sur le conflit de races* (Québec: J.P. Garneau, 1917), 3rd ed, 84 p.

R. Rumilly, "La conscription," *Histoire de la Province de Québec*, 23 (Montreal: Montreal-Editions, nd), 256 p.

Mason Wade, *The French Canadians, 1760-1945* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), pp 708-780.

27. Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge, "Unrequited faith: recruiting the CEF, 1914-1918," *Revue internationale d'Histoire militaire*, N° 54, Canadian edition (Ottawa: Canadian Commission of Military History, 1982), pp 61-65.

28. Papineau's letter was only published on July 28, 1916 in leading English and French papers in Montreal, Québec, Ottawa and Toronto. Bourassa received a copy in English from w R. McMaster, a Montreal lawyer, and replied in English through McMaster. The letter, the reply and a few introductory comments by a *Toronto Star* journalist were published in English in the brochure *Canadian nationalism and the War* (Montreal: [Le Devoir], 1916). This extract is taken from pp 27-29.

29. Elizabeth Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p 248.

30. *Ibid.*, p 249-50.

31. Col G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Gunners of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1967), I, p 215.

32. This was H.A. Panet. The evidence derives from a comparison of appendices H, J and K. Moreover, Panet was fairly Anglicized, as was General Lessard (of the cavalry), who retired near Toronto after the war. See Jacques Gouin and Lucien Brault, *Legacy of Honour, The Panets, Canada's Foremost Military Family* (Toronto: Methuen, 1985).

33. C.-M. Boissonnault and L. Lamontagne, *Histoire du Royal 22^e Régiment* (Québec: Pélican, 1964), p 17. See also J. Chaballe, *Histoire du 22^e Bataillon canadien-français, 1914-1915*, vol I (Montreal: Chantecler, 1952), 415 p.

34. To see how well Henri Bourassa understood this issue, we must read his editorials and articles right through. The salient features of these are in J. Levitt's

Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Biculturalism, 1900-1918, op. cit., and in Granatstein and Hitsman's Broken Promises. See also Georges Vattier, *Essai sur la mentalité canadienne-française* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1928), 384 p.

Chapter 4

1. See the lists in Appendices C, D and F. In 1937, when Laurent Beaudry, acting Under Secretary for External Affairs, attempted to run his office in French, Prime Minister Mackenzie King considered him "unstable". J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men* (Toronto: Oxford, 1982), p 6.

2. Capt R.S. Reid, "The Otter Committee: The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia, 1919-1920," MA thesis in military science, RMC, Kingston, 1970, pp 60-61.

3. *Ibid.*, p 62.

4. *Ibid.*, p 63. This quotation comes from a letter from Col Sutherland Brown to the AG, dated May 26, 1919. Gen C. Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff in 1947, refused Col J.H. Chaballe access to it when he was writing the first volume of the regimental history; *loc. cit.*

5. *Ibid.*, p 63-64.

6. J. Swettenham, *McNaughton* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1969), I, pp 185-86.

7. General Order (GO) 37, April 1, 1920, and GO 149, June 1, 1921.

8. Reid, *op. cit.*, p 67.

9. GO 92, November 1, 1927. C.-M. Boissonnault and L. Lamontagne, *Histoire du Royal 22^e Régiment* (Québec), Pélican, 1964), pp 42-43. This affiliation inspired the regiment's dress uniform.

10. GO 98, June 15, 1928.

11. See the permanent force table appended to GO 90, November 3, 1919.

12. *Report of the DND*, 1939, p 70.

13. Reid, *op. cit.*, pp 42-49. The other arms and services are studied on pp 49-59.

14. *Defence Forces List Canada*, Part I (November 1939) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939), pp 30-32.

15. *Ibid.*, pp 33-34.

16. *Ibid.*, p 28.

17. See Jean-Yves Gravel, *Histoire du Régiment de Trois-Rivières, 1871-1978* (Trois-Rivières: Bien Public, 1981), p 28ff.

18. See Appendix M, Table 1. The article by Major E. Légaré, "Le français dans l'Armée canadienne," *CDQ* (1929-30), pp 228-234, although it contains its share of misinterpretations, gives an excellent idea of the language problem faced by Francophones.

19. Appendix M, Table 2.

20. Table 3.

21. Table 4.

22. This new percentage is calculated by dividing the average of 21.3 per cent by 37.2, the figure derived from Table 3, the average percentage of French-speaking non-permanent militia trained in Quebec.

23. Appendix M, Table 5. This percentage is calculated by dividing 10.9 by 43.4 per cent, which is the average of French-speaking cadets in Quebec.

24. Appendix M, Table 6. Again, we divide 50 by the average of French-speaking militia in Quebec, 37.2, which gives 18.6 per cent.

25. This hypothesis is based on the figure of 43.4 per cent for the proportion of French-speaking officer cadets in the COTC in Table 5. The author recalls a Francophone cadet corps at the Jesuit College in Edmonton, Alberta, when King George VI visited just before the War. It is not included in the statistics for Francophones.

26. Appendix M, Table 7.

27. Table 8.

28. Table 9.

29. Born in Rivière-du-Loup in 1889 and raised in Quebec, Pope knew the province well. He married a Belgian countess. *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of LGen Maurice A. Pope, CB, MC* (Toronto: UTP, 1962), pp 83-89. See Appendix N.

30. *Ibid.*

31. "Report on certain 'incidents' which occurred on board H.M.C. Ships... and other matters concerning the Royal Canadian Navy [Mainguy Report]" (Ottawa: DND, 1949), pp 33 and 53.

32. This table is derived from the *Militia List*, 1939. Note that the percentage of 11.25 does not agree with the 4.4 per cent in Appendix M, Table 1, because many Francophone officers served in English outside the R22°R in the Permanent Active Militia. A list of French-speaking regular officers just before the Second World War appears in Appendix O.

33. *Loc. cit.*

34. *The RMC of Canada Review*, 1939.

35. *The Canadian Navy List*, 1914, 1918, 1919 and 1939. See the table showing the proportion of French-speaking officers in the RCN from 1914 to 1939 in Appendix P and the list of French-speaking officers in the RCN in 1939 in Appendix Q.

36. *The Canadian Air Force List*, 1921; The RCAF List, 1924-1938 and 1946. Biographical files at DHist. See the table in Appendix R showing the proportion of French-speaking officers in the Air Force from 1921 to 1938 and Appendix S for a list of French-speaking regular officers in the RCAF in 1939.

37. J.-P. Gagnon, *Le 22^e bataillon*, *op. cit.*, p 384.

38. *Ibid.*

Part Three

Introduction

1. M. Wade, *The French Canadians*, pp 922-23.
2. House of Commons, *Debates*, September 9, 1939, pp 71-72 (F). See what Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King said about Lapointe in *ibid*, January 21, 1942.
3. Marcel Chaput, *Why I am a Separatist* (Montreal: Ed du Jour, 1961).
4. John T. Saywell, ed, *Canadian Annual Review for 1961* (Toronto: UTP, 1962), pp 44-46. See also Congress on Canadian Affairs, *Le Canada, expérience ratée... ou réussie?/The Canadian Experiment, Success or Failure?* (Québec: PUL, 1962).

Chapter 5

1. C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War*, vol I, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), pp 46-49.
2. 22 George V, c 4.
3. C.P. Stacey, *ibid*, p 45.
4. *Ibid*.
5. *Ibid.*; *Cents ans d'histoire d'un Régiment canadien-français: Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 1869-1969* (Montreal: Ed du Jour, 1971), pp 95-106.
6. J. Gouin et al, *Bon coeur et bon bras, Histoire du Régiment de Maisonneuve, 1880-1980* (Montreal: R de Mais, 1980), p 71.
7. J. Castonguay and A. Ross, *Le Régiment de la Chaudière* (Lévis: R de Chaud, 1983), pp 133-34.
8. C.P. Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, Appendix F. See also J. Gouin, *Par la bouche de nos canons: histoire du 4^e Régiment d'artillerie moyenne, 1941-1945* (Montreal: Gasparo, 1970); J.-Y. Gravel, *Les soldats-citoyens: Histoire du Régiment de Trois-Rivières, 1871-1978* (Trois-Rivières: Bien Public, 1981), p 35ff; H.M. Jackson, *The Sherbrooke Regiment (12th Armoured Regiment)* (np, 1958).
9. C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War*, p 45.
10. *Ibid.*, Appendix "E". A. Sorby, "French Canadian Participation in War," File 112.3 H1.003(D22) (January 1965), D Hist.
11. *Six Years of War*, Appendix "F". Leclerc commanded the 7th Division (May 20, 1942 to October 15, 1943), then the Canadian and Newfoundland forces in Newfoundland (October 16, 1943 to December 15, 1944).
12. Information taken from *DND Gradation List, Canadian Army Active* (Ottawa: DND, 1943). See the list in Appendix U.

13. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 422. In the public relations service there were only 11 Francophones among the 138 military employees in Canada, and 21 among the 337 overseas, or 6.7 per cent. Among war correspondents we find only 11 Francophones out of 130, or 8.5 per cent. Two Anglophones and all the Francophones were bilingual. Capt J.R. Boissonnault, "Etude No 11: Service d'information, 1939-1983," DHist, January 1985.

14. *Loc. cit.*

15. See the table in Appendix V for the proportion of Francophones among generals and field officers.

16. As in the First World War, the conscription crisis in the Second World War caused much ink to flow. The main studies are listed below.

Elizabeth H. Armstrong, "French Canadian Opinion on the War, January 1940-June 1941," in *Contemporary Affairs*, 12 (Toronto: Ryerson, 1942), 44 p.

R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944* (Toronto: UTP, 1961), 136 p.

W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, *Out of the Shadows; Canada in the Second World War* (Toronto: Oxford, 1977), p 235 *passim*.

[L.L.L. Golden], "Conscription," by Politicus [pseud], in Macmillan War Pamphlets, Canadian Series (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941), 32 p.

J.L. Granatstein, "Conscription in the Second World War 1939-1945; a Study in Political Management," Frontenac Library No 1 (Toronto: Ryerson, 1969), 85 p.

J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises; a History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford, 1977), 281 p.

Jean-Yves Gravel, ed, *Le Québec et la Guerre, 1867-1960* (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1974), 173 p.

André Laurendeau, *La crise de la conscription, 1942* (Montreal: Ed du Jour, 1962), 157 p.

Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985), 305 p.

R. Rumilly, "La guerre de 1939-1945," *Histoire de la Province de Québec, XXXVIII-XLI* (Montreal: Fides, 1968-69), 4 vols.

C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments; Canada's War Policies, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp 397-484.

Mason Wade, *The French Canadians, 1760-1945* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), pp 916-1106.

17. André Laurendeau, *La crise de la conscription*, p 32.

18. Jean-Yves Gravel, "Le Canada français et la guerre, 1939-1945," p 34. See also P.B. Waite, "French-Canadian Isolationism and English Canada: An Elliptical Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," in *Revue d'études canadiennes* (summer 1983), pp 132-48.

19. *Loc. cit.*
20. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 439.
21. J. Pariseau, "La participation des Canadiens français à l'effort des deux guerres mondiales: démarche de réinterprétation," *CDQ/RCD* (fall 1983), pp 43-48.
22. See Appendix W.
23. *The Canada Year Book 1943-44*, pp 40 and 103.
24. *The Canada Year Book 1952*, p 1004. These numbers were altered slightly in the 1943-44 edition. See Appendix W for the table of intake into the Canadian Forces repeated from Appendix "R" of C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*.
25. See Appendix X for a list of applications for postponement of compulsory military training.
26. This entire question is examined thoroughly in *Arms, Men and Governments*, pp 434-81.
27. See the copy of the survey in Appendix Y, and R.H. Roy, "Morale in the Canadian Army in Canada during the Second World War," *CDQ/RCD* (fall 1986), pp 40-45. Roy mentions the "attitude" of French Canadians without, however, raising the question of how little French was used. We consider that was a major factor underlying the difference in attitudes between Anglophones and Francophones.
28. *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 471.
29. *Ibid.*, p 472.
30. House of Commons, *Debates*, September 9, 1939, pp 69-72.
31. M. Wade, *The French Canadians*, p 940.
32. *Ibid.*, p 934. 33. *Ibid.*, p 953.
34. *Ibid.*, p 954.
35. *Ibid.*, pp 955, 960 and 990.
36. House of Commons, *Debates*, November 30, 1944, p 6692ff (F).
37. M. Wade, *op. cit.*, p 1054-55.
38. House of Commons, *Debates*, December 4, 1944, pp 7015-16 (F).
39. *Ibid.*, December 7, 1944, p 6843-44.
40. *Journal* (Ottawa), November 27, 1944; *Winnipeg Free Press*, December 7 and 9, 1944; *Saturday Night*, December 2, 1944, quoted in *Broken Promises*, p 125.
41. D. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p 188.
42. C.P. Stacey, *A Date with History, Memoirs of a Canadian Historian* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1983), p 158:

43. A list of 98 Canadian Army training centres and schools operating as of July 1, 1943 appears in C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War*, Appendix "D". This list includes 17 centres and schools in Quebec. None of these units was officially designated French-speaking or bilingual. See the table in Appendix Z.

44. Letter from G.F.G. Stanley to J. Pariseau, February 14, 1986.

45. "Outline History of Trades Training, 1940-44," Directorate of Trades Training, D Hist, Kardex 112.3 T 1(D 1).

46. We were unable to determine precisely how many courses were offered during the Second World War. See *Canadian Army Manual of Trades and Specialties*, in Kardex 000.2083(D316).

47. See the table in Appendix AA.

48. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 421.

49. *Ibid.*, p 421-3.

50. *Ibid.* p 420.

51. Capt J.R. Boissonnault, "Etude N° 7: Les services de traduction, de terminologie et de publication," D Hist, December 1983, p 12.

52. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 422.

53. Our aim here is not to criticize the translators' work but to demonstrate how small it was in comparison to the number of English publications. In all, Army GHQ published 72 issues of *CATM/MIAC* up to March 1947. A nearly complete set in French and English is preserved at D Hist.

54. Stacey, *op. cit.*

55. [J. Mackay Hitsman], "Manpower Problems in the Canadian Army," DHist Report N° 63, vol 2, Appendix B, pp 299-300.

56. Obviously, this could be done by studying the roughly six million files at the Personnel Records Centre in the National Archives of Canada, but the reader will understand that we did not have the time or manpower to undertake such a project.

57. G.N. Tucker, *The Naval History of Canada: Its Official History* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), vol II, Activities on shore during the Second World War, p 275. The total number given by Tucker is slightly higher than that cited by Stacey and reproduced in the table in Appendix W.

58. Report N° 68, Historical Section (GS), "Manpower Problems of the Women's Services during the Second World War," June 17, 1954, p 22.

59. Report N° 71, Historical Section (GS), "Manpower problems of the Royal Canadian Navy during the Second World War," July 20, 1954, p 10.

60. See Appendix BB for an extract from Marc Milner's study of naval control over maritime operations in Quebec and New Brunswick in 1944. M. Milner, *Canadian Naval Force Requirements in the Second World War*, ORAE extra-mural paper N° 20 (Ottawa: DND, 1981), pp 67-70.

61. "Effects of Language Difference on Organization and Training," Cdr K.L. Miller, D Nav Educ, to Dr T.W. Cook, DRB, Nov 17, 1952, in the *Hochelaga III* file, D Hist.

62. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 420.

63. "Effects of Language Difference on Organization and Training", *op. cit.*

64. *Arms, Men and Governments*, table reproduced in Appendix W. According to J.M. Hitsman, the total number of officers and airmen taken in during the war was 223,974; Report N° 67, Historical Section (GS), "Manpower Problems of the Royal Canadian Air Force During the Second World War," January 15, 1954, p 74. This number does not include the 17,017 women who enlisted in the Women's Division; Report No 68, *op. cit.*

65. *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 462. [Harold C. Forbell], "Armed Forces Historical Study," Part III, The RCAF, Royal Commission on B & B, August 30, 1965, MS, Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages.

66. *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 420. J.M. Hitsman, "Manpower Problems of the RCAF during the Second World War," p 15.

67. J. Pariseau, "Alouette, je te plumerai," *CDQ/RCD* (summer 1981), pp 31-40. Fulgence Charpentier of the board of censors is reported to have suggested the name "Alouette" to A/V/M De Niverville.

68. H.C. Forbell, *op. cit.*, pp 19-22. See the table in Appendix CC.

69. See the table in Appendix DD.

70. *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Ottawa, 1969), Book III, The Work World, p 105.

71. *Ibid.*, pp 106-7.

72. See the tables in Appendix EE.

73. *Loc. cit.*

74. See the table in Appendix FF.

75. See Appendix W.

76. See Appendix FF.

77. See Appendix GG.

78. See the table in Appendix HH. Obviously, this is only one isolated case, but we believe it represents fairly well the experience of many other French-speaking groups all over Canada.

79. *Arms, Men and Governments*, p 424.

80. W.A.B. Douglas and B. Greenhous, *Out of the Shadows*, p 246; N. Hillmer and R. Sarty, "The Mythology of Canada's War," in *The History and Social Science Teacher*, 20, 2 (winter 1985), p. 73; J. Pariseau, "My BCATP experience," MS, 1981, D Hist.

81. Douglas and Greenhous, *op. cit.*, p 269.
82. D. Creighton,, *The Forked Road, Canada 1929-1957*, Canadian Centennial Series (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), p 66.

Chapter 6

1. J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War; The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford, 1955), pp 402-410. J.M. Beck, *Pendulum of Power, Canada's Federal Elections* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp 241-55.
2. D Hist, file 400-045(D5).
3. For a brief explanation of the duties of ministers, associate ministers and so forth during the War, *see Guide to Canadian Ministries since Confederation, July 1, 1867-February 1, 1982* (Ottawa: PAC, 1983), pp 95-107.
4. "Minutes of the [2nd] Meeting of the Defence Council," January 3, 1947. (Hereinafter cited as DCM, followed by a number and date.)
5. DCM 5 and 6, January 15 and 29, 1947. J.A. Blanchette replaced Hughes Lapointe on January 19, 1949 and remained Parliamentary Assistant until February 8, 1956.
6. D Hist, Report N° 81, February 20, 1959, pp 1-6.
7. HQS 8641, vol 5 (Trg), June 8, 1946, Schmidlin to DCGS(A) in D Hist file 112-21009(D23).
8. HQS 8841, vol 5, June 20, 1946, Mann to AG in *ibid*.
9. DHist, Report N° 81, February 20, 1959, pp 1-6.
10. Army (Active Force) List, Ottawa, DND, 1947.
11. *Ibid*.
12. Army (Reserve Force) List, Ottawa, DND, 1948.
13. *Ibid*.
14. "Special Measures to qualify French-Canadian candidates for Officer training courses," DCM 20, November 7, 1947.
15. "Training of Personnel in Foreign Languages," DCM 23, January 16, 1948. This subtitle indicates that General Foulkes did not succeed in raising the Defence Council Secretary's consciousness.
16. "Institution in French," DCM 24, January 23, 1948.
17. "Language Training," DCM 26, March 18, 1948.
18. "Payment of Foreign Language Bonuses to Reserve Force Personnel," DCM 53, March 29, 1951. See also CAO 212-45, March 10, 1952. This order appears under the heading "Foreign language Training". Language questions do not appear under the headings "French" and "Languages" until 1962.

19. "NDC French Canadian Representation," DCM 31, July 2, 1948.
20. "French-speaking officers," DCM 32, September 17, 1948. Claxton, House of Commons, *Debates*, May 10, 1941.
21. M. Wade, *The French Canadians*, p 954.
22. D Hist, Report N° 81, pp 6-7.
23. *Ibid.*, pp 7-10.
24. *Ibid.*, p 11-14.
25. Jean-Yves Gravel, *Le Québec et la Guerre*, p 170.
26. "Mainguy" Report (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949), pp 33 and 53. L.C. Audette, a French-Canadian former senior officer in the RCN, served as commissioner. The report was published in both languages.
27. *Loc. cit.* See also J. Eayres, *In Defence of Canada* (Toronto: UTP), III, 126, and J.-Y. Gravel, "La fondation du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean," *Le Québec et la Guerre*, pp 112-13.
28. For any further information on the Korean War, the reader is referred to Army HQ Historical Section, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), 108p and H.F. Wood, *Strange Battleground* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 354 p.
29. J.-Y. Gravel, "La fondation du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean," pp 111-12. This analysis is based on sources in the Claxton Papers, vol 94:B, PAC. See also the study by J. Mackay Hitsman in D Hist, Report N° 81, February 20, 1959, pp 23-28.
30. House of Commons, *Debates*, May 8, 1951.
31. Balcer, House of Commons, *Debates*, May 9, 1951.
32. Claxton, House of Commons, *Debates*, May 10, 1951.
33. *Ibid.*, p 2884 (F).
34. "Canadian Service Colleges — French Language Requirement," DCM 52, February 12, 1951.
35. "French Version of King's Regulations," DCM 54, May 31, 1951.
36. "French-Speaking Officers," DCM 54, May 31, 1951.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. Colonel Mathieu obtained the Defence Council's consent to ensuring that letters written in French by the Minister would be on French (or bilingual) letterhead, and that signposts, posters and programs for military units in Quebec and northern New Brunswick would be in English and French. "Bilingual signposts, letterheads and pamphlets," DCM 49, August 9, 1950.

41. Picard, House of Commons, *Debates*, June 27, 1951.
42. Pearkes, *ibid.*
43. See, among others, Lorenzo Paré, *Les Canadiens français et l'organisation militaire* (Montreal: L'oeuvre des Tracts, October 1951), 16 p (Tract N° 282).
44. Major R.B. Oglesby, "Report N° 51, Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters. The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, February 1951-May 1952," MS, D Hist, May 6, 1952.
45. "Proposals for increasing number of French-speaking Officers," DCM 55, September 14, 1951.
46. *Ibid.* See also "Canadian Army Policy Statement N° 98 (DMT). Training of French Speaking Soldiers — Active Force," August 14, 1952, signed by General Simonds but not followed up. This policy was to be held back ten years, surfacing again in GSI 63/3 and 63/4 under the hand of General Bernatchez. DHist, Kardex 410B27.009(D42), vol 1.
47. *The Canadian Navy List* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, January 1951).
48. J.-Y. Gravel, "La fondation du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean," pp 112-13. J. Eayres, *In Defence of Canada*, III, pp 132-33.
49. D Hist, naval file *HMCS D'Iberville*.
50. J.-Y. Gravel, "La fondation du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean," p 113. *The Royal Canadian Air Force List* (Ottawa: RCAF HQ, January 1, 1951).
51. J.-Y. Gravel, *op. cit.*
52. H.F. Wood, *Strange Battlefield*, p 180ff. J. Eayres, *op. cit.*, III, p 69.
53. House of Commons, *Debates*, June 12, 1952, p 3356 (F).
54. J.-Y. Gravel, "La fondation du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean," pp 109-32.
55. *Ibid.* See also DHist, Report N° 81, February 20, 1959, pp 19-23 and J. Castonguay, "La raison d'être des collèges militaires," *CDQ/RCD*, 6, 2 (fall 1976), pp 30-33.
56. Gravel, *op. cit.*
57. *Ibid.*
58. DHist, Report N° 81, p 14.
59. Training of Apprentices, HQ 3201-A8 (Trg 1a), December 2, 1952 in Kardex 112.3M3(D13). DHist, Report N° 81, p 14.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*, p 28.

62. GO 37, April 1, 1920; GO 149, June 1, 1921; and GO 98, June 15, 1928.
63. DHist, Report N° 81, p 30.
64. Jacques Castonguay, *Les Bataillons et le Dépôt du Royal 22^e Régiment, Vingt ans d'histoire, 1945-65* (Québec: Régie du R22^eR, 1974), p 198.
65. DHist, file 003.033(D1) and RCAF diaries 18-8 (RCAF Station Saint-Jean).
66. J.K. Johnson, ed, *The Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967* (Ottawa: PAC, 1968).
67. DCM 70, July 14, 1954 to DCM 82, May 5, 1958.
68. E.J. Brazeau, "Interim Report on survey of RCN procedures for training French-speaking recruits," DND (DRB), 1955, p 2.
69. *Ibid.*, p 4.
70. *Ibid.*, p 6.
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.*, p 4.
73. DHist, RCAF diaries 18-8 (RCAF Station Saint-Jean). The departure of the School of English caused so little disruption in Trenton that mention of it was simply omitted in the station journal, signed by the officer commanding the station, Group Captain G.P. Dunlap, RCAF diaries 21-3 (RCAF Station Trenton).
74. *Ibid.*
75. Not only were "permanent" and "routine" orders issued only in English, but only one or two pages of French are to be found in the 36-page magazine *Début*, published by an officer at the station.
76. E.J. Brazeau and D.N. Solomon, "Interim report on survey of RCAF procedures for training French-speaking recruits," Ottawa, DND (DRB), September 1955, Appendix "B", p iii.
77. E.J. Brazeau, "RCAF Advertising and Recruiting Procedures as they apply to French-speaking Canadians," Ottawa, DND (DRB), DRML Report N° 152-4, June 1976, 18 p. In January and February 1956, Brazeau, the only French Canadian among ten Canadian representatives, attended the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science Meeting of Service Psychologists in Toronto. At that meeting, the Canadian delegation presented a paper recognizing the need to study the experience of French-speaking recruits during their training courses, rather than evaluate the cultural difficulties of the two language groups.
78. E.J. Brazeau, "The Training of French-Canadian Groundcrew personnel in the Royal Canadian Air Force (1953-1957)," Ottawa, DND (DRB), DRML Report N° 152-5, January 1961, 9 p.

79. *Ibid.*, p 5.
80. *Ibid.*, p 7. A third study by E.J. Brazeau, "Interim Report on Canadian Armed Forces Procedures for Training French-Speaking Recruits," Ottawa, DND (DRB), 1955, 7 p, adds nothing to our knowledge.
81. NDRMS 5300-0, vol 1, Drury to Bland, June 22, 1954.
82. NDRMS 5400-8-6, vol 1, Morgan to Smith, May 9, 1957. The subject of military dependants' schools will be covered extensively in Volume II.
83. D Hist, Report N° 81, p 14.
84. Dr Marcel Chaput, "The Proportion of French-Canadian Soldiers in the Canadian Army," Ottawa, Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment (CAORE) memorandum N° 58/12, October 1958.
85. See the studies by Brazeau cited above.
86. J. Mackay Hitsman, "Problems Affecting French-Speaking Representation in the Post-War Canadian Army," Ottawa, AHQ, Historical Section (GS) Report N° 81, February 20, 1959, 36 p.
87. *Idem*, "Manpower problems of the Canadian Army in the Second World War," Ottawa, AHQ, Historical Section (GS) Report No 63, August 17, 1953, 2 vol.
88. HQTS 1435-2, Claxton to Simonds, February 29, 1952 and Simonds to Claxton, March 5, 1952, quoted in J. Mackay Hitsman, Report N° 81, pp 27-38. Claxton could have pointed out that the allied forces who won at Waterloo and in France in 1918 were bilingual, and suggested that unilingualism had never guaranteed victory.
89. DHist 75/586, Royal Visit Report, 1959; Jacques Castonguay, *Les Bataillons et le Dépôt du Royal 2nd Régiment*, p 201. Note that when Lieutenant-Colonel J.O.A. Letellier and the vanguard of his unit, the 3rd battalion of the R22^eR, were preparing to leave West Germany, after serving there since 1957, they received permission from the Minister, Pearkes, to return by military aircraft to take part in these highly symbolic ceremonies.
90. Conversation between Letellier and Pariseau, January 16, 1986.
91. "The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on RCN Personnel Structure," Ottawa, Naval HQ [1957], commonly known as the Tisdall Report.
92. J.M. Beck, *Pendulum of Power*, p 311ff.
93. DCM 89, 90, 91 and 92, February 9 to April 27, 1959.
94. NDRMS 5300-0, vol 1, Sévigny to CP, October 2, 1959.
95. NDRMS 5300-0, vol 1, PC 1959-7/1480.
96. DCM 103, June 6, 1960 and 109, February 3, 1961.
97. J.S. Moir, ed, *History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1903-1961* (Ottawa: RCCS, 1962), p 315.

98. Dr Marcel Chaput, "A Study of Promotion Examination Results for French-Speaking and English-Speaking Canadian Army Infantry Officers," Ottawa, DND, CAORE Report N° 110, October 1960, 21 p.

99. DHist, 73/1316, SF Clark to VCGS, September 21, 1961.

100. *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Government Organization* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962-64), 4 vols.

101. *Ibid.*, Vol 1, p 20 and vol 4, parts 20 and 23.

102. *Ibid.*, Vol 1, pp 147-49.

103. See Appendix KK.

104. S.M. Armstrong to the three chiefs of staff and the DRB Chairman, March 8, 1962, in the Letellier collection, box 7, pp 1211-3-2.

105. AGI 62/3, March 9, 1962.

106. GSI 63/3 and 63/4, March 28, 1963; J. Pariseau filled one of these positions, which already existed unofficially, at the Royal Canadian Infantry School, from 1955 to 1958.

Part Four

Introduction

1. M. Wade, *The French Canadians*, p 1116.
2. Memorandum from Colonel R.E. Nourse, Director, Careers (Army), to his Director General, November 26, 1964, in NDRMS 1211-0, vol 1. J. Pariseau, one of the authors, became personally familiar with this situation while serving on the Quebec staff from 1961 to 1965.
3. Brigadier-General Marcel Richard, who retired December 30, 1975, gave an interview in Quebec on April 12, 1983. A transcript is kept in the Pariseau collection at D Hist.

Chapter 7

1. Richard J. Ossenburg, "Social Pluralism in Quebec: Continuity, Change and Conflict", *Canadian Society, Pluralism, Change and Conflict* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1971), p 117. See also P.E. Trudeau, *The Asbestos Strike* (Montreal, 1974).
2. M. Wade, *op. cit.*, p 1110.
3. J. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic, An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: UTP, 1965), p 286. P. Desbarats, *The State of Quebec* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965), p 43 and J. Brazeau, "L'émergence d'une nouvelle classe moyenne au Québec," in M. Rioux and Y. Martin, eds, *La société canadienne-française* (Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 1971), pp 325-333.
4. Jacques Tremblay, "Pour une cité libre," *Cahiers de Cité Libre 1* (Sept-Oct 1966), p 4.
5. See *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems*, Province of Quebec, 1956, 5 vols and special studies. As the commissioners admitted, this inquiry went over the same ground as the *Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p 3. The excellent bibliography in vol 5 shows that the majority of authors who had studied the subject to date wrote in English.
6. L. Campeau, sj, "Notes sur le département d'histoire de l'Université de Montréal," paper presented at the annual IHAF conference on May 6, 1972 in Montreal and published in *Aspects de la civilisation canadienn-française* (Ottawa: UOP, 1983), pp 319-23.
7. M. Brunet, *Canadians et Canadiens, Études sur l'histoire et la pensée des deux Canada* (Montreal: Fides, 1954).
8. *Mélanges d'histoire du Canada français offerts au professeur Marcel Trudel, cahier N°14*, CRCCF (Ottawa: UOP), p 7. The list of Trudel's publications, which covers six pages (8-13), testifies to his learning and influence over the teaching of French-Canadian history.

9. We identified in *La Bonne Chanson*, a collection of 500 songs published by Abbé Charles-Émile Gadbois of the Saint-Hyacinthe seminary in 1938, no fewer than one hundred songs in which French Canadians sing of their attachment to Canada and their willingness to defend it. This repertoire was replaced in the mid-fifties by less “Canadian” and more “Quebec” songs.

10. *Les insolences du Frère Untel* (Montreal: Ed de l’Homme, 1960), 158 p.

11. Gérard Bergeron, *Du Duplessisme au Johnsonism, 1956-1966* (Montreal: Parti Pris, 1967), p 178. See the text of the letter from abbés Dion and O’Neill, appended to *Le Chrétien et les élections* (Montreal: Ed de l’Homme, 1960), and H.F. Quinn, *The Union Nationale, A Study in Quebec Nationalism* (Toronto: UTP, 1963), p 165.

12. See Jean-Louis Roy, *Les programmes électoraux du Québec*, vol II, 1931-1966 (Montreal: Leméac, 1971), pp 378-88.

13. Esdras Minville opened up the path with his *Invitation à l’étude* (Montreal: Fides, 1943), and *Le Citoyen canadien-français* (Montreal: Fides, 1946), 2 vols.

Father Richard Arès, sj, followed closely with his first three volumes on *Notre Question nationale*: vol I, *Les faits* (Montreal, 1943), vol II, *Positions de principes* (Montreal, 1945) and vol III, *Positions patriotiques et nationales*, Montreal, 1947. The fourth volume in the series did not follow until 25 years later: *Nos grandes options politiques et constitutionnelles* (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1972).

Jean Bruchési, *Canada, réalités d’hier et d’aujourd’hui* (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1948; revised ed 1954).

Michel Brunet, *Canadiens et Canadiens* (Montreal: Fides, 1954), and *La présence anglaise et les Canadiens* (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1958).

Maurice Lamontagne, *Le Fédéralisme canadien* (Québec, 1954).

Léon Dion, “Le nationalisme pessimiste: sa source, sa signification, sa validité” in *Cité Libre* (November 1957), pp 3-18; *Le bill 60 et la société québécoise* (Montreal: HMH, 1967).

Albert Lévesque, *La dualité culturelle au Canada* (Montreal, 1959).

R. Rumilly, *Le problème national des Canadiens français* (Montreal: Fides, 1961).

Marcel Chaput, *Why I am a Separatist* (Montreal, 1961).

Raymond Barbeau, *J’ai choisi l’indépendance* (Montreal, 1961); *Le Québec est-il une colonie?* (Montreal, 1962); *La libération économique du Québec* (Montreal, 1963); and *Le Québec bientôt unilingue?* (Montreal, 1963).

Jean-Charles Bonenfant, “Le Fédéralisme et la constitution canadienne” in *L’État du Québec* (Saint-Hyacinthe, 1962).

Bernard Bissonnette (Judge), *Essai sur la constitution du Canada* (Montreal: Ed du Jour, 1963).

Jean-Charles Harvey, *Pourquoi je suis antiséparatiste* (Montreal, 1962).

“Le séparatisme” in *Cité Libre*, special issue (April 1962).

Fernand Ouellet, “Les fondements historiques de l’option séparatiste dans le Québec” in *Liberté* (March 1962), pp 20-112.

André Raynauld, “Les conséquences économiques du séparatisme,” *Cité Libre* (Oct 1962), pp 6-9.

La Société Saint-Jean Baptiste, *L’État du Québec* (Saint-Hyacinthe, 1962); *Le fédéralisme, l’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord et les Canadiens français* (Montreal, 1964); *Le devenir politique du Québec* (Québec, 1965); and *Le bilinguisme et l’Union canadienne* (Montreal, 1965).

Philippe Garigue, *L’Option politique du Canada français* (Montreal, 1963); “La sécurité sociale, épreuve critique du fédéralisme canadien” in *Le Québec dans le Canada de demain* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, 1967), II, pp 52-58.

Conseil de la Vie française, *Bilinguisme et biculturalisme au Canada* (Québec, 1964); *L’avenir du peuple canadien-français* (Québec, 1965); and *Un Québec français* (Québec, 1969).

Jean Drapeau, “Bâtir” in *l’Action nationale* (Sept 1964), pp 23-43.

Jean-Marc Léger, “Le néo-nationalisme, où conduit-il?” *Les Nouveaux Québécois* (Québec, 1964), pp 41-58; and “Un essai de solution” in *l’Action nationale* (June 1965), pp 999-1004.

Jacques Parizeau, “La planification économique” in *Les Nouveaux Québécois* (Québec, 1964), pp 89-108.

Jean-Luc Pépin, “Le fédéralisme coopératif” in *Le Canada face à l’avenir* (Montreal, 1964), pp 113-24.

Marcel Faribault and Robert M. Fowler, *Ten to one: The Confederation Wager* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965); *Vers une nouvelle constitution* (Montreal, 1967).

Canada, Department of Justice, *The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1965).

Le club Fleur de Lys, *L’État du Québec* (Montreal, 1965).

M.-B. Fontaine, *Une femme face à la Confédération* (Montreal, 1965).

Jean Genest, “La querelle des nationalismes: Québec ou Ottawa” in *l’Action nationale* (May 1965), pp 862-94; and “Si la majorité veut l’indépendance?” *ibid* (May 1970), pp 807-16.

René Jutras, *Québec libre* (Montreal, 1965).

Jean Lesage, *Un Québec fort dans une nouvelle Confédération* (Québec, 1965).

"Pour le Québec: Indépendance" in *Monde nouveau*, special issue (June-July 1965).

Jacques-Yvan Morin, "The Need for a New Canadian Federation" in *The Canadian Forum* (June 1964), pp 64-66; "In Defence of a Modest Proposal" in *ibid* (Feb 1965), pp 256-58; "Vers un nouvel équilibre constitutionnel au Canada" in *L'Avenir du fédéralisme canadien* (Toronto and Montreal, 1965), pp 141-56; "Un nouveau rôle pour un Sénat moribond" in *Cité Libre* (June-July 1964), pp 3-7; "Liberté nationale et fédéralisme" in *Thémis* (May 1964), pp 91-130; "Quel est le minimum de changements constitutionnels nécessaires à l'épanouissement de la nation?" in *Le devenir politique du Québec* (Québec, 1965), pp 26-35; "A Constitutional Court for Canada" in *Canadian Bar Review* (December 1965), pp 545-52; "La conclusion d'accords internationaux par les provinces canadiennes à la lumière du droit comparé" in *The Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, 1965, pp 127-86; "L'Éveil de la conscience nationale et ses conséquences politiques" in *l'Action nationale* (June 1965), pp 1005-14; "Le Québec et l'arbitrage constitutionnel: de Charybde en Scylla" in *Canadian Bar Review* (September 1967), pp 608-26; "Le fédéralisme canadien après cent ans" in *Thémis* (March 1967), pp 13-30; and "L'idée du statut particulier, hier et aujourd'hui" in *Le Québec dans le Canada de demain* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, 1967), 1, pp 39-49.

Pierre Renaud, "Il nous faut tous les pouvoirs" in *l'Action nationale* (Oct 1965), pp 153-61.

Jean-Noël Tremblay, "Les États associés: une formule incomplète de souveraineté politique du Québec" in *Le devenir politique du Québec* (Québec, 1965), pp 57-72; and *Québec ou Ottawa? Avons-nous encore le choix?* (Québec, 1967).

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968); and *The Constitution and the People of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

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"Le Québec dans le Canada de demain" in *Le Devoir*, special edition, June 30, 1967.

Laurier LaPierre, *Québec: hier et aujourd'hui* (Toronto, 1967); and "Cent ans d'histoire, 1867-1967," *RHAF*, 21, 3a (special issue), 1967.

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Maurice Séguin, *L'idée d'indépendance au Québec, genèse et historique* (Trois-Rivières: Boréal Express, 1968).

Jean Pellerin, *Lettre aux nationalistes québécois*, cahiers de *Cité Libre* (Montreal: Ed du Jour, 1969).

Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1969).

14. M. Wade, *The French Canadian*, p 1112.

15. First Congress on Canadian Affairs, *The Canadian Experiment, Success or Failure?* (Québec: PUL, 1962), pp 154-59.

16. Professor A.R.M. Lower was one of the first to take an interest in the question. See "Two Nations or Two Nationalities" in *Culture* (Dec 1943), pp 470-81. Over twenty years elapsed before he published another article, "Would Canada be better off without Québec?" *Macleans* (December 14, 1964), pp 27 and 51-52.

Professor W.L. Morton skims over the problem in *The Canadian Identity* (Toronto: UTP, 1961), as does George Grant in *Lament for a Nation: the defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, Carleton Library N° 50 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965).

After an initial article, "The Future of Canada: separatism, integration, or ...?" in *The Canadian Experiment*, pp 133-41, Professor Michael Oliver joined Professor F.R. Scott, his former colleague at McGill University, Montreal, in editing *Quebec states her case* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964).

Meanwhile, Professor Eugène Forsey also published several articles: "Canada, one Nation or Two?" in *The Canadian Experiment*, pp 55-70; "Canada: Two Nations or One?" in *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (Nov 1962), pp 485-510; "The British North America Act and Biculturalism" in *Queen's Quarterly* (summer 1964), pp 141-49; "Professor Morin's Modest Proposal" in *The Canadian Forum* (Sept 1964), pp 121-25; "A Bi-National Second Chamber" in *ibid* (Feb 1965), pp 253-55; "The Legislatures and Executives of the Federation", "Constitutional Monarchy and the Provinces," "Memorandum on the Associate States", Background Papers and Reports, Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation (Toronto, 1967); and "Special Status for Quebec" in *The Round Table* (April 1967), pp 198-203.

Trevor Lloyd's study, "A Bi-National Second Chamber" in *The Canadian Forum* (June 1964), pp 69-70 was followed up by two Quebec sociologists, Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, who published 25 studies aimed at Anglophones under the title *French-Canadian Society* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1964). Not until 1971 were these published in French as *La société canadienne-française* (Montreal: Hurtubise, HMH, 1971). While Montreal constitutional expert Edward McWhinney studied the legal aspect of the problem in "Federalism, Constitutionalism, and Legal Change: Legal implications of the 'Revolution' in Quebec" in *The Future of Canadian Federalism* (Toronto and Montreal, 1965), pp 157-68, Peter Desbarats, an English-speaking journalist from Montreal, analysed the situation in Quebec during the reign of Jean Lesage in *The State of Quebec* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965).

After publishing Quebec, the *Not-so-quiet Revolution* (Toronto, 1965), Thomas Sloan offered a French translation entitled *Une révolution tranquille?* (Montreal: HMH, 1965).

At about the same time, Professor Ramsay Cook addressed the problem by publishing several books and articles, the most important of which are "Quebec and

Confederation. Past and Present” in *Queen’s Quarterly* (winter 1965), pp 468-84; *Canada and the French-Canadian Question* (Toronto, 1966); *Le Sphinx parle français*, a translation of the latter (Montreal, 1968); *French-Canadian Nationalism. An Anthology* (Toronto, 1969); *L’autonomie provinciale, les droits des minorités et la théorie du pacte, 1867-1921* (Ottawa, 1969).

Not until 1966 did Professor Donald G. Creighton react in an article entitled “The Myth of Biculturalism” in *Saturday Night* (September 1966), pp 35-39. In 1970, he published *Canada’s First Century* (Toronto, 1970), which in a clear, mordant and ironic style renews his profession of faith in a unilingual English Canada whose mission is to preserve its British heritage from both US infringements on Canadian sovereignty and French-Canadian subversion.

Journalist Blair Fraser considers the economic side in “A hard nose appraisal of the costs of separation” in *Macleans* (December 1967).

Professor Gad Horowitz, a labour historian, published “Le statut particulier, formule libératrice pour les deux communautés” in *Le Québec dans le Canada de demain* (Montreal: *Le Devoir*, 1967), I, pp 88-93.

Professor R.J. Joy of Carleton University published *Languages in Conflict. The Canadian Experience* (Ottawa, 1967).

We cannot conclude our multifarious parade of studies without mentioning Professor Hilda Neatby’s masterful work, *So little for the mind. An indictment of Canadian education* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co, 1953), which has helped us understand how badly Canada’s education system has failed in its task, and consequently how right Quebec was to endeavour to set its own education system right.

17. See Peter C. Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963) and *The Distemper of Our Times* (Winnipeg: Greywood, 1968). The Prime Minister gives a clear intimation of his concern in the title of his three-volume autobiography, *One Canada, Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker* (Scarborough: Macmillan, 1975). Most revealing is p 148-49 of the second volume (1978 Signet edition), which shows he thought the French fact in Canada was being reduced to nothing under a multiculturalism policy.

18. Denis Monière, *André Laurendeau et le destin d’un peuple* (Montreal: Québec/Amérique, 1983), pp 278-79.

19. *La Presse* (January 25, 1962), p 4.

20. Marcel Huguét, *Réal Caouette, l’homme et le phénomène* (Montreal: Ed de l’Homme, 1981), pp 202-03.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Mike, *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson* (Toronto: UTP, 1972). The quotation is taken from the 1976 Signet edition, vol III, pp 69-72. See the statement in Appendix LL.

23. Speech by Maurice Lamontagne, Dec 11, 1963, House of Commons, *Debates*, VI, pp 6039-41 (F) (hereinafter Lamontagne).

24. The Commission's mandate appears in *Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), p 13.

25. J.G. Diefenbaker, *One Canada, vol III The Tumultuous Years, 1962 to 1967*, p 216 (Signet ed).

26. *Ibid.*, pp 217-218.

27. See *Statutes of Canada* 1960, c 44, and Edward McWhinney, "The Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court, and Civil Liberties in Canada" in J.T. Saywell, ed, *Canadian Annual Review for 1960* (Toronto: UTP, 1961), pp 261-62.

28. Note in particular Harold J. Forbell, who wrote "Armed Forces History Study," a three-part overview of the RCN, the Canadian Army and the RCAF (B & B Commission, 1965). We also recall the detailed study by sociologist Pierre E. Coulombe, in co-operation with Lise Courcelles, "Carrière militaire et dynamique culturelle" (B & B Commission, 1966). This was partially integrated into "Social and culture composition of the Canadian Armed Forces" in H.J. Massey, ed, *The Canadian Military, A Profile* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972), pp 138-68. We are already addressing some of the phases in the evolution of the question of bilingualism and biculturalism. Many others will come under our scrutiny before the end of the study. To enable the reader to scan these quickly, we have placed them in chronological order in a "Table of the main events in the history of B & B at DND, 1962-72" in Appendix RR.

29. *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963-64), 4 vols. These recommendations are very general, as noted in Chapter 6. They deal with:

- a. selectively increasing the bilingual capabilities of public sector employees;
- b. increasing government efforts to attract and retain more young French Canadians suitable to fill the most senior positions;
- c. reviewing working conditions for federal translators;
- d. attracting more bilingual public relations officers into the Public Service;
- e. ensuring that each department has one fully bilingual person among the two with primary responsibility for information services.

30. Lamontagne, p 6040. The other six subjects of study and recommendations are: French and English courses in the Public Service (the committee had already made recommendations on this matter which were to be implemented experimentally in 1964, Lamontagne reported); appropriate measures to enable employees to meet Public Service bilingualism requirements better at the recruiting, training, promotion and designation stages; payment of a

bonus to public servants required to work in both languages; creation of a section in each department to co-ordinate and monitor the progress of measures to ensure bilingualism; and use of bilingual forms, handbooks and so forth in all departments and Crown corporations.

31. Lamontagne, p 6041. The hope that English-speaking public servants would understand deserves to be studied in depth, by itself. Was it fulfilled?

32. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 1, H.C. Forbell, B & B Commission investigator, to Deputy Minister E. Armstrong, Nov 3, 1964.

33. *Ibid*, Armstrong to Forbell, Feb 2, 1965. The essential points in this reply were provided by VAdm K.L. Dyer (CP) to Armstrong, *ibid*, Dec 31, 1964.

34. This letter is in vol 1 (1961 to 1968) of the CDS files on B & B, under an orange cover (hereinafter CDS-orange) in Colonel RL Raymont's papers, D Hist. See also in this connection a letter from the Chief of Personnel, VAdm K.C. Dyer, to Armstrong, Dec 31, 1964 (NDRMS 1211-0, vol 1).

35. NDRMS 1211-1, vol 1 (appendix to the letter of Aug 30, 1966 from the Secretary Defence Staff to the Minister's Military Secretary).

36. The first four volumes of series 1211-0 NDHQ, which cover 1964 to 1966, consist almost wholly of exchanges between the Commission and the Department and internal Departmental correspondence generated by these exchanges. The *Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* was released February 1, 1965.

37. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 3, Forbell to Armstrong, Nov 21, 1966.

38. Vol 4 (voluminous correspondence within the Department in preparation for the January 24 meeting).

39. "RMC of Canada Commandant's Annual Reports," 1949 to 1969. The numbers of officer cadets at RMC Kingston are compiled in Appendix MM.

40. RMC *Yearbooks* and Commandant's Annual Reports, 1953 to 1969.

41. Letter from G.F.G. Stanley to J. Pariseau, Feb 14, 1986. See also George Stanley, "Military Education in Canada, 1867-1970" in Hector J. Massey, ed, *The Canadian Military* ([Toronto]: Copp Clark, 1972), pp 169-96. It is interesting to find in the same book the following comments by Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds: "During [their academic training], all officer cadets should have a thorough schooling in both English and French, so that on graduation they are completely bilingual." Extracted from "Commentary and Observations," in H.L. Massey, p 283, the General's views had obviously evolved over the years.

42. NDRMS 1895-3, vol 1, project approved by Major-General P. Bernatchez, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

43. DCM 150, June 14, 1965. As readers may be aware, the Orangemen's

magazine, founded in 1876, was also called Sentinel. The magazines replaced were *Crowsnest*, *Canadian Army Journal* and *The Roundel*.

44. CDS-orange, Associate Minister Lucien Cardin to CDS, A/M F.R. Miller, Dec 16, 1964.

45. Both directives are in NDRMS 1211-1, vol 1.

46. See the administrative circular in NDRMS 1211-1, vol 1.

47. *Ibid*.

48. *Ibid*. Several documents in this file emphasize that the CAF were practically forced to bow to Cardin's will.

49. See, for example, the note from D Sec DS(A) to Sec DS on July 9, 1965 (against extending bilingualism) and the accompanying minute (illegible signature) which states the opposite view and anticipates expansion after the B & B Commission releases its report in *ibid*.

50. *Ibid*. Scattered through this file are many implementation reports by units in the three services in Quebec, before the consolidated reply was written on July 14, 1965 by the Chief of Personnel for the Associate Minister.

51. The reporters estimated that to fill these positions at all times, 4,000 bilingual officers would be needed, mainly because of the transfers that are part of a military career.

52. This situation was already quite prevalent in the Army. The challenge was to extend the method to the Navy and Air Force.

53. See the comments on the "Minister's Manpower Study Report" S/L de Tilly, July 1965, in the Louis Noël de Tilly Collection, Section B, vol 1 (April 1966 to April 1968) (hereinafter LN de T).

54. DCM 152, July 6, 1965.

55. LN de T, *op. cit*; see memo P4705-1 (DT) 10.1.66, from DT4-4 (de Tilly) to DT4, entitled "English Language Training for French Speaking Officer candidates of the Three Services".

56. NDRMS 5787-5 "NDHQ Comments on Minister's Manpower Study (Officers), 1965" pp 22 and 145-48.

57. *Ibid*, 5788-5, p 159 (Chap 17, pp 156-58). Some parts of this position appear verbatim in the Minister's Briefing Book (see p 1 and note 5).

58. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 3, J.S. Hodgson, Director, Special Secretariat on Bilingualism, Privy Council to E. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of National Defence.

59. Statement by Prime Minister Pearson on April 6, 1966, House of Commons, *Debates*, vol 6 (1966), pp 3915-17; see Appendix NN. This statement was foreshadowed by his reply to the Speech from the Throne, in House of Commons, *Debates*, January 20, 1966, vol 1 (1966), pp 72-74.

60. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 2, Hodgson to Armstrong, June 21, 1966.

61. *Ibid*, Armstrong to Hodgson, July 7, 1966.

62. *Ibid*, vol 1 (document outlining the role of the DGEP as regards bilingualism, Dec 1, 1964).

63. The DGEP, Roger Lavergne, had been serving for years in the Public Service in Ottawa. He had to be bilingual in 1966, when he was sent on course to Toronto. Those who knew him well at the time confirm this supposition. What, then, was the point of spending tens of thousands of dollars — his salary, the cost of the courses, the cost of moving his family to Toronto and back to Ottawa — to teach him English, except for the sole purpose of demonstrating that some Francophones could enjoy a privilege that had recently been granted to Anglophones?

64. *Ibid*, Armstrong to Hodgson, Sept 28, 1966.

65. NDRMS D 1211-13-2, vol 1, Armstrong to Hodgson, Jan 23, 1967. The foundations of this program appear in the third part of a document written by Col J.G.R. Morin, acting DGEP, to ADM (Po1), Note D1210-2, Dec 15, 1966.

66. Letter from the Assistant Deputy Minister to the Chief of the General Staff (HQ 3150-1 TD 186, August 21, 1952), in NDRMS 1211-0, vol 3.

67. NDRMS 1211-1, vol 1, CP Position Paper, Vocational Training — French Canadian Servicemen, March 15, 1966.

68. D/Chief Reserves to CDS, April 29, 1966 in blue-bound CDS files on B & B, hereinafter CDS-blue, Colonel Raymont Papers, D Hist, NDRMS 1211-1, vol 1, we find the comments of Reserve units that considered themselves “Francophone” in response to P3/65.

69. This affair can be followed in *ibid*.

Chapter 8

1. Transcript of an interview granted by the Honourable Léo Cadieux on July 1, 1982 (hereinafter, Cadieux Interview), p 3, Jean Pariseau collection, DHist. What brought two Francophones together at DND’s most senior positions does not seem to have been premeditation. See Appendix 00 for the B & B Commission’s conclusions regarding the Public Service and the development of its language policy.

2. Transcript of an interview granted by General J.V. Allard on April 25, 1982 (hereinafter, Allard Interview), p 25, Jean Pariseau collection, D Hist.

3. He did not waver in this support, as evinced by his participation in CBC’s “Cross Country Checkup” two years after he retired (January 6, 1971). The many detractors of unification were refuted by Allard.

4. *Mémoires Allard*, p 373. During the above-mentioned radio program, only three of the 30 callers mentioned B & B in the Forces, and only one of those three spoke against it.

5. Allard Interview, p 8.

6. See *Mémoires Allard*, which outlines in nearly every chapter action taken by Allard to improve the lot of Francophones. See in particular chapters 7, 9, 11, 12 and most of all 14, entitled “Francophones”.

7. The documents from September 21 and October 6 and 19 are in NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 1, or with DCM 199, October 6, 1966. The above-mentioned letter from Armstrong to Hodgson (September 28, 1966) speaks of the study group as if it were already in existence (NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 1). Several other documents in this file demonstrate that the decision to strike this committee was reached well before official approval was granted.

8. *Mémoires Allard*, pp 408-09. See also the transcript of our interview with Brigadier-General Armand Ross, March 28, 1983 (16p), which contains details of work methods and the atmosphere in which the study was carried out (Jean Pariseau collection, D Hist).

9. See Appendix PP for the recommendations in the *Report of the Study Group on the Recruitment and Retention of French Speaking Personnel in the Armed Forces* (hereinafter *Ross Report*). General Allard remarked that the Minister wanted everything relating to this report to be kept confidential, and this concern caused him certain minor inconveniences (*Mémoires Allard*, pp 416-17). The Letellier collection contains the distribution file for the 202 copies of the report (*Reports and Returns — General*, vols 1 and 2). A note from the head of Allard’s secretariat, Commodore F.B. Caldwell, stated that since Mr Hellyer had reservations regarding the distribution of the report and what might result from it, clearly the CDS should be consulted every time consideration was given to distributing a copy (*ibid*, vol 1, Caldwell to Sec CP, October 6, 1967). As of that date, responsibility for controlling dissemination was transferred from the CP to the Bilingualism Secretariat. But this created an almost ridiculous situation. The B & B Commission only received its duly numbered copy on December 21, 1967, in response to a request made on October 25. In November 1967, Ross requested and obtained permission from the CDS to send a copy to each member of his former study group. One of them was then serving in Europe. He was informed in December that, until notice to the contrary was given, though it was hoped he would receive the *Ross Report* soon, it could not go out of the country (Capt P. Dupuis, Bilingualism Secretariat, to Commanding Officer J.M.G. Demers — *ibid*). The problem was soon solved, fortunately for Demers, who was not scheduled to return to Canada until September — 1969. On May 18, 1972, after lengthy consideration, it was decided to destroy the 72 copies that had not been distributed (manuscript note from Captain P Berniquez, administrative officer, DGBB, in *ibid*, vol 2). Since then, archival copies have had to be photocopied many times for interested military personnel.

10. *Ross Report*, p 6, in NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 1. Many injustices and several cases of Francophobia came to light during this study, as in all previous reports on this question. By the way, not all confirmed Francophobes were necessarily in the military; some of them were in English-speaking civilian communities where Canadian military personnel had to settle with their families when they were transferred.

11. *Ross Report*, p 23.

12. Ross to CP, October 12, 1966 in NDRMS 1211-1, vol 1.
13. *Ross Report*, p 58.
14. *Ibid.*, Chap 14, pp 79-86.
15. *Ibid.*, p 113.
16. Armstrong foresaw a need for this review in his letter to Hodgson on January 23, 1967 (D1211-13-2, vol 1). This letter and the views put forward by Colonel Ross when the position to be presented by the Department at the conference with the B & B Commission scheduled for January 24 was being developed (see NDRMS 1211-0, vol 4) lead us to conclude that by late December 1966, the essentials that would appear in the March 1967 report had already been assembled. The Ross group acted with remarkable speed.
17. *Ross Report*, pp 119-22.
18. *Ibid.*, p 20 (chapter 5 of the report, pp 17 to 21, is wholly devoted to education in Quebec).
19. CDS-orange, letter from Allard to the Minister. The Bilingual Secretariat was known in French as the *S cretariat bilingue*. This literal translation is unacceptable. We have chosen to call it *S cretariat au bilinguisme*, even though it functioned rather as a secretariat for bilingualism and biculturalism.
20. The Minister of Defence wrote to the Prime Minister in November 1967 that the purpose of the Secretariat was to pave the way for implementing the *Ross Report* (Cadieux to Pearson, November 27, 1967, D1211-13-2, vol 1).
21. In a letter of July 17 to the Minister, Allard stated that the Minister had approved the Bilingual Secretariat (*ibid*).
22. Allard to Hellyer, May 29, 1967, *op. cit*.
23. The Committee's career can be followed in LN de T, section A, vols 2 to 7 on B & B, and also CDS-blue. In particular, for the beginnings of the co-ordination committee, see a letter from the VCDS to the DM dated September 27, 1967 and another from the DGEP to the DM dated October 23.
24. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 3 (or 1211-17, vol 1).
25. *Ibid*.
26. *Ibid*.
27. *Ibid*.
28. Recommendations 32 to 37 provide for the Anglophones serving in these FLUs to be bilingual; Mobile Command bases and units to be designated English- and French-language; a protocol for the use of French between Mobile Command HQ and units, and so forth. This question will be examined in detail in volume II.

29. Several contributors to the January 16, 1967 document highlight this.
30. Interview with Brigadier-General Armand Ross on March 28, 1983, pp 9 to 11. *Mémoires Allard*, pp 412-13.
31. Recalled by Jean Pariseau.
32. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 3, p 2 of “French Canadian Viewpoint.”
33. *Ibid.*
34. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 3.
35. *Mémoires Allard* makes clear that he had had the idea of FLUs outside the infantry since the early fifties (see Chapter 7ff).
36. *Ross Report*, pp 13-15.
37. DCM 234, Nov 27, 1967. Another change was proposed at the same time to improve the provision of French education to Francophone military personnel’s dependants, but it was not approved. How this turned out will be studied in the second volume.
38. *Ibid.* See also a memo from R.L. Raymont, assistant to the CDS, to the VCDS, dated Nov 28, 1967, in Letellier collection, file P1211-1-1.
39. NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 1, Nov 27, 1967, Cadieux to Pearson.
40. *Ibid.*, Dec 7, 1967, Pearson to Cadieux.
41. DCM 234, Nov 27, 1967.
42. DCM 236, Dec 18, 1967. On December 7, the VCDS was circulating a draft of the memo through CFHQ for comment. Essentially the same version was discussed by the Defence Council on the 18th (Letellier collection, *op. cit.*, memo of Dec 11, 1967 from Rear Admiral R.W. Timbrell, Deputy Chief Plans to the VCDS — in point of fact, this document was written by Brigadier Henri Tellier).
43. Memo of January 19, 1968, in NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 2.
44. The part of the press release dealing with this point does not appear to have been challenged immediately. Such would not be the case today, for the myth that English is the language of aviation has been debunked by *Les Gens de l’air in Quebec*. See Sandford F. Borins, *The Language of the Skies: the Bilingual Air Traffic Control Conflict in Canada* (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1983).
45. Press release in 1211-13-2, vol 2.
46. *Ibid.*, letter from Cadieux to Allard, April 11, 1968.
47. Letellier, “Mon passage au Secrétariat bilingue du MDN,” Study N° 3, French Section, DHist, p 52-54 (*Mon passage*). The March 21, 1968 letter from Pearson to Cadieux is in CDS-orange. Concerning this letter, see also *Mémoires Allard*, p 423.

48. Letellier, *Mon passage*, pp 58-59.

49. *Mémoires Allard*, p 423.

50. The letter from Allard to Cadieux dated April 4, 1968 is in CDS-orange and NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 2.

51. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 5 (Message CDS 39, April 1, 1968).

52. We base this assertion on the official interview granted to us by General Allard on April 25, 1982 and on subsequent conversations whose content was published in *Mémoires Allard*. We might add that in the land element, the aim was to train four combat groups from the three Mobile Command brigades. The uncertainties generated by the reorganization process in early 1968 made work difficult for managers at all levels (Letellier, *Mon passage*, p 34).

53. The 12^e RBC, 5^e RALC, 5^e Escadron de génie royal du Canada, 5^e Escadron des transmissions royal du Canada, one of the three Airborne Regiment commandos and support troops were to be designated later in the summer in addition to the R22^eR.

54. Naval Secretary to Deputy Chief Naval Staff, Oct 29, 1941 (PAC, RG24, vol 5589, NSSIO-1-6).

55. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 1. Memo from Hanington, Director Careers (Navy), to his Director General, November 25, 1964.

56. Letellier collection, file P1211-16, Simard to Allard, Oct 12, 1967.

57. Other arguments put forward in this report are as follows: differences would be accentuated instead of similarities being developed; bringing 250 Francophones from other locations together on one ship might interfere with the Canadian Navy's cyclical system; Francophones' careers might be affected in branches where they were few; the squadron to which such a ship belonged would be "seriously" divided; since French would only be used on this one ship, would it be worth disrupting the existing system so much?

58. This argument is no more valid than some of those advanced by opponents.

59. Letellier collection, op. cit, Simard to Allard, Oct 12, 1967.

60. *Ibid*, Simard to Allard, Oct 16, 1967.

61. The Navy's difficulties in adjusting to the new Armed Forces enabled Allard to use his natural talents as a leader as soon as he took up the duties of CDS in 1966. See *Mémoires Allard*, p 382ff.

62. Letellier collection, Reports and Returns-General, vol 1, Porter, Director General of Maritime Forces, to Letellier, Dec 11, 1967.

63. *Ibid*, vol 2 (P1211-16), Message CDS 158, Nov 26, 1967.

64. *Ibid*, CDS to CP, Jan 17, 1968.
65. *Ibid*, Simard to Allard, March 15, 1968. This long memo also contains other details concerning the organization of this unit and how its future was to be assured, especially in terms of personnel.
66. NDRMS 1211-14-3, vol 1.
67. See also file NDRMS 1211-14-2, vol 1, for the birth of the Ottawa, the first French-language ship in our Navy. This is also recounted in Letellier, *Mon passage*, pp 45-47.
68. NDRMS 1211-14-2, vol 1.
69. *Ibid*, comment dated July 24, 1970.
70. On March 25, 1968, Anderson, who had become a Lieutenant-General and Commander of the Mobile Command, wrote to the CDS about FLUs. He conceived of them as bilingual. Major-General M.E. Pollard expressed the same view on February 24, 1968. Both were informed of the true state of affairs on April 4, 1968 (NDRMS 1211-0, vol 5 and Letellier, *Mon passage*, pp 41-44). Anderson was very open to some aspects of bilingualism but less so to others, which is no doubt what made Letellier call him ambivalent.
71. Gravel, *op. cit*, p 111. Serious problems about arranging adequate education in French in Alberta caused the Francophones to be separated from the regiment for several months (see *Mémoires Allard*, pp 481-82).
72. *White Paper on Defence*, 1971, p 50F. This document was made public August 24.
73. R. Morin, *DND Dependants' Schools*, 1921-1983 (Ottawa: DND, 1986).
74. DGPR 300, Feb 9, 1968 in CDS-orange.
75. CDS-orange. On February 2, the CDS wanted to schedule a meeting for February 16 to discuss this.
76. Letellier collection, file P1211-16, memo 51210-3, Sec DS to VCDS, May 14, 1968. The same document is in *ibid*, file 1180-1.
77. Everything began to come together in the field of B & B. Appendix A to Armstrong's report to Forbell (September 1966) states that the principles in the second paragraph opening the Prime Minister's statement will be the foundation for the Armed Forces' bilingualism policy. These principles are equal rights and opportunities for Canadians of both language groups in order to strengthen national unity, and an optimum public service achieved through the contribution of the most competent Canadians available from all over the country (NDRMS D1211-13-2, vol 1, Armstrong to Hodgson, Sept 28, 1966). This is, of course, the direction Allard took, as we have seen.
78. Cadieux to Allard, April 11, 1968, NDRMS 1211-13-2, vol 2.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Letellier collection, file P1211-1-1. The annotations on all the activities are of uneven value, for they were made before reorganization was completed. For example, the priorities for the use of Francophones (a rare commodity) are very different from those that were to be set by the CDS in January 1969 in his directive P6/69.

81. Letellier collection, Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces file, Memo S1210-3 (CDS), April 16, 1968, signed by Sharp for Allard and addressed, among others, to the VCDS (Sharp).

82. Letellier, *Mon passage*, pp 59-71. We shall allow ourselves to correct Mr Letellier on some minor points that escaped him, no doubt because when he was preparing his work he did not have access to his archival collection, which had unfortunately been mislaid. The planning group held its first meeting April 26, not 25, 1968, and its third meeting June 12, not 10. The comings and goings summarized by Letellier may be followed in the Letellier collection, file 1180-1, Coordinating Conference on Bilingualism (Dare Study).

83. NDRMS 1211-14-3, vol 1, Reyno to VCDS, April 3, 1968.

84. *Ibid.*, Samson to directorates in VCDS branch, April 9, 1968.

85. CDS-blue, vol 2, DCOPR to VCDS, January 20, 1969.

86. NDRMS 1211-13-2, vol 2.

87. Letellier collection, file P5320-7, S1210-3, CDS Policy Directive P6/69, January 13, 1969.

88. NDRMS D1211-0, vol 5, CDS Policy Directive 3/69, March 24, 1969.

89. According to the terms of a memo from Colonel Chassé to Deputy Chief Personnel — Policy and Resource Management (P1210-3, DBPI to DCPRM, April 3, 1969 in Letellier collection, file P4320-7).

90. *Ibid.*, memo from Chassé to Laubman, P5320-7 (DBPI), April 8, 1969.

91. In the following classifications: general duty (+24 lieutenants); dentists (+1); education (+1); military engineers-EME (+5); food (+2); physicians (+26); nurses (+14); and telecommunications (+2).

92. Physicians (+2 captains); nurses (+10).

93. The exceptions were infantry: +2 master warrant officers; radio technicians: +1 warrant officer and +2 sergeants; aircraft motor technicians: +1 sergeant; radar systems technicians: +1 sergeant; machinists: +1 warrant officer; (medical) operating room assistants: +1 warrant officer; laboratory technicians: +2 master warrant officers; dental assistants: +1 warrant officer.

94. NDRMS 1211-0, vol 6 (DABP to CDS, June 10, 1969).

95. CDS-blue, vol 2, CDS to CP, June 27, 1969. After going through first reading on October 17, 1968 and second reading on May 29, 1969, the bill was finally passed on July 7 and received royal assent on July 9, 1969; House of Commons, *Debates*, July 7, 1969, p 10925. See Appendix RR for extracts from the *Official Languages Act*.

96. DCM 269, July 21, 1969.

97. At the time, it was expected that bilingual signage and services to the public in both languages would be extended to bilingual districts (s 7 of the Act) which were to be designated within twelve months. This did not happen until 1977, and was on a small scale.

98. DCM 269, July 21, 1969.

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Ibid.*

101. Letellier collection, file 1211-2, D1211-1 (DJAG), Armstrong to the Department of Justice, August 13, 1969.

102. *Ibid.*, DM of Justice to DM of Defence, December 23, 1969.

103. At the July 21 Council meeting the CDS actually spoke of ten to fifteen years, saying that the Forces were oriented toward defence, not bilingualism.

104. NDRMS D1211-0, vol 6. The directive adds that the CP is to appoint representatives to the two subcommittees chaired by the DGEP.

105. Letellier collection, file 1211-0, vol 1, Prime Minister to his ministers, August 12, 1969.

106. Message DAPB-25, in NDRMS B121 1-0, vol 6.

107. For example, on July 7, 1969, Ottawa asked Commands to provide a list of commissionaire positions by July 21, stating whether each of those serving in Quebec and the NCR could provide bilingual services. If not, could the problem be solved locally by September 7? Letellier collection, *op. cit.*, message from DGMPC, E.D. Ellcock, July 7, 1969 — 565.

108. The chairman of the Advisory Committee, Roger Lavergne, sent a memo to Colonel Chassé on July 16, 1969, stressing all the changes that would no doubt occur very quickly after the Defence Council meeting on July 21. He wondered whether it would be a good idea to begin drafting a message to the units, summarizing the decisions that would be made. He suggested setting up a subcommittee immediately to oversee everything that would have to be done by September 7, especially in the NCR. In Chassé's view, however sound these ideas were, they should be presented to him, not by the DGEP but by the DCPRM (Major-General Dextraze), to whom he sent Lavergne's memo. This stymie on July 18 ended with a terse note: in future, the DGEP should follow proper channels (Letellier collection, file P1211-1, vol 2, Lavergne to DAPB, July 16,

1969 and Chassé to DCPRM, July 18, 1969). Chassé showed himself prone to guard his authority jealously. He brushed Dare's work aside in February 1969, and here we find him putting the DGEP in his place. In the first chapter of the next volume, we shall see some of his bittersweet comments on the intervention of a military assistant to the DGEP. He wrote a note on Ellcock's message (note 105) on August 27, stating (quite rightly) that this type of document should be submitted to him before distribution.

109. Letellier collection, file P1211-1, vol 2, Léger to Armstrong, July 13, 1969 and Chassé to Lavergne, July 7, 1969 (this is the reply for the Forces, which was later to be combined with that for civilians before being forwarded to Léger).

110. Letellier collection, file 1211-2. Two interesting points to note: 1. The spokesman was Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Labrosse, who had written the incriminating message, which the journalist writing in *Le Devoir* on August 27 seems not to have known. This did not, however, escape Chassé, who had shared Labrosse's adventures in the Second World War, when both were parachuted into France as secret agents, in different areas. He sent Labrosse one of his notes... 2 It became necessary to amend the minutes of the Defence Council meeting which made Quebec a bilingual district. This was done at the September 9 meeting. But on September 3, Roger Lavergne sent the Defence Council a long letter explaining how he had reached the conclusion mentioned earlier. The DGEP was more than ever on the defensive and provided a fine example of someone who believed he had been right to be wrong. He maintained that all his recommendations were based on the spirit and intent of the Act, the Prime Minister's statements, the decisions and principles approved by Cabinet, the Minister of National Defence and the CDS and the program of bilingualism in the Forces (see DCM 274, September 9, 1969).

111. For this case see the Letellier collection, box 2, file 1211-2, message from CANLIFTCOM, August 25, 1969, in reply to a message from Kinshasa on the same date.

112. Mobile Command is the only command that set aside \$35,000 for this purpose for the 1969-70 fiscal year (Letellier collection, file 1211-0, vol 1, DAPB to CP, September 15, 1969).

113. *Ibid.*

114. This whole affair (the August 25, 1969 message, the troops' reactions, the DAPB's counterreactions, internal memorandums at HQ and so forth) may be followed in *ibid* and in the Letellier collection, file 1211-0, vol 2.

115. The process may be followed in *Ibid*, vol 1 or in CDS-blue, and also in NDRMS D1211-0, vol 6. Enormous differences may be noted between the first two drafts (June 10 and July 7, 1969) and the directive as written in September. It was hard for Chassé and his team to feel their way.

116. CFAO 9-21 was issued in August 1966. It describes the four basic functions to be addressed by second-language courses (listening, reading, speaking and writing) and gives ratings from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 6

to be assigned to each serviceman for each of these functions. As of January 1, 1972, the ratings were from 1 to 5 (message DGBB 78, December 13, 1971, in CDS-blue, vol 4).

117. DCM 274, September 9, 1969.

118. *Ibid.*

119. On July 31, 1969, Cabinet decided the Secretary of State Department would “administer” the OLA. It was to help departments and institutions in this area and co-ordinate all their efforts so that the Act would be implemented quickly and effectively throughout the federal administration. See the Letellier collection for a series of Cabinet decisions made on that date and transmitted to departments on August 13; file 1211-2.

120. See Appendix RR for a summary table of the main events in the history of B & B at DND, 1962-72.

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