DND Language Reform:

Staffing the Bilingualism Programs
1967-1977
DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY

Socio-Military Series

* * *

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To be published


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Letellier, Joseph Oscar Armand - 1915

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2. Bilingualism, Canadian Government Policy on
4. Canada, socio-military history

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DND Language Reform:

Staffing the Bilingualism Programs
1967-1977
ARMAND LETELLIER
(Colonel ret.)

DND Language Reform:
Staffing the Bilingualism Programs
1967-1977

Socio-Military Series
No. 3

Directorate of History
NDHQ, Ottawa
1987
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Abbreviations and Definitions

AADM(Per)  Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel)
ADM(Fin)   Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance)
ADM(Mat)   Assistant Deputy Minister (Material)
ADM(Per)   Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel)
ADM(Pol)   Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
AMU       Air Movement Unit
B & B     Bilingualism and Biculturalism (policy of)
B & B     Royal Commission of Inquiry on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
BGen      Brigadier-General
CAF       Canadian Armed Forces
CDEEE     Canadian Defence Education Establishments
CDS       Chief of the Defence Staff
CFLS      Canadian Forces Language School
CG        Comptroller General
CLR       Coordinator of Linguistic Requirements
CMR       Collège militaire royal de St-Jean
COL       Commissioner of Official Languages
CP        Chief of Personnel
CPCO      Chief of Personnel Careers - Officers
CPD       Chief, Personnel Development
C Prog    Chief of Programs
C Res     Chief of Reserves
DBPA      Directorate of Bilingual Programs Assessment
DBPP      Directorate of Bilingual Plans and Programs
DC        Defence Council
DCDS      Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DGBB      Director General (or Directorate General) of Bilingualism and Biculturalism
DGDE      Director General, Dependants’ Education
DG Info   Director General, Information
DGOL      Director General of Official Languages
DGPC      Director General, Postings and Careers
DGRC      Director General, Reserves and Cadets
DLT       Directorate of Language Training
DM        Deputy Minister
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Defence Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Directorate (or Director) of Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTTP</td>
<td>Director of Translation and Terminology Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELU</td>
<td>English-Language Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLU</td>
<td>French-language Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francotrain</td>
<td>French-language Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTD</td>
<td>French-language Training Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer(s) Commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCo1</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGen</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGen</td>
<td>Major-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDEU</td>
<td>National Defence Employees’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMC</td>
<td>National Defence Medical Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>National Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLAO</td>
<td>Official Languages Administrative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLIN</td>
<td>Official Languages Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Public Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAdm</td>
<td>Rear-Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMC</td>
<td>Royal Military College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRMC</td>
<td>Royal Roads Military College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Senior Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SX</td>
<td>Senior executive in the Public Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWF</td>
<td>Unit Working in French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAdm</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCDS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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3. Hon L.A. Cadieux, PC
   E.B. Armstrong

4. Roger Lavergne
   Major Louis Noël de Tilly, CD

5. Brigadier-General M. Richard, CD
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6. Lieutenant-General W. Carr, CMM, DFC, CD
   Lieutenant-General M.E. Pollard, DSO, DFC, AFC, CD

7. Colonel P. Chassé, MBE, CD
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11. Admiral R.H. Falls, CMM, CD
   General R.M. Withers, CMM, CD

12. Major-General J. Hanna, CD
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13. Major-General J.P.R. LaRose, CD
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14. Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis, CMM, CD
   General C.G.E. Thériault, CMM, CD
Foreword

The introduction of official bilingualism, by any yardstick, has been one of the most contentious reforms ever attempted in the Canadian Armed Forces. Even more, perhaps, than unification the Official Languages Act has created deep divisions of opinion about the merits of the concept and the methods by which it should be implemented. Those charged with *Staffing the Bilingualism Programs* were exposed to bitter criticism by people who thought things were moving too fast, yet had to withstand complaints, and resist pressures, by others who thought change was not coming about fast enough. Bridging the gap between these two factions demanded wisdom and administrative skill of a high order.

Armand Letellier wrote this narrative to help Dr. Jean Pariseau and his team of researchers document the history of bilingualism and biculturalism in the armed forces. The insights he provided into people and policies, in this very important aspect of defence administration were so interesting that we decided to share them with others. Whether or not readers agree with the writer’s point of view, they will find in these pages a unique picture of decision-making, during a period of some turmoil in the history of Canadian military institutions.

Underlying the story is the peculiar nature of civil-military relations in this country. Canadians have less awareness of the things that go to make up an effective military force than people who live in countries with large armies, navies and air forces. The military traditions of Canada are well established, but they are not deeply engrained in the national consciousness. Military leaders have not always been able to explain the needs of the service to
their civilian counterparts, partly because they have not, them-
selves, understood the priorities that govern decision-making in
the bureaucracy and Cabinet. By examining how the attempt was
made to resolve such differences in this case, readers may under-
stand better the way in which the civil-military relationship bears
upon the health of our armed forces, and affects the military ca-
pabilities essential to the survival of Canada.

W.A.B. Douglas
Director
Directorate of History
Explanatory Note

It would have been difficult to find a more qualified person than Colonel (ret.) Armand Letellier, to write a monograph on the staffing of the institutional bilingualism policy as applied to the Department of National Defence (DND).

Born in Ottawa, he was commissioned in the *Régiment de Hull* in 1934, while still an undergraduate at the University of Ottawa where he obtained a B.A. At the outbreak of war in 1939 he immediately signed up for active service and eventually served on the staff of HQ First Canadian Army in North West Europe. Back in Canada after the war, he was initiated to bureaucracy in the office of the Defence Secretariat, NDHQ, Ottawa. After serving in Germany with the 27th Infantry Brigade, in 1952-53, he returned to NDHQ. Newly promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1957 he returned to Germany, with his family this time, in command of 3rd Battalion, *Royal 22e Régiment*, for two years. Back in Ottawa, he served as Deputy Director of Infantry. Promoted colonel in 1962, he joined Kingston’s Canadian Army Staff College, as Deputy Director. Appointed Director of Organisation at NDHQ, in 1966, he was tasked by General J.V. Allard with heading the “Bilingual Secretariat” responsible for establishing language reform policies for DND. Colonel Letellier describes, in Part One of this monograph, his ten-month long personal experience in this post, before his retirement in July 1968.

A strong desire to improve his French language skills and that of his student daughters, after their anglicizing experience in Kingston, led him to register at the *Université de Grenoble*, in France. Upon his return to Ottawa he became Deputy Director of Admissions at his *alma mater*. General J.A. Dextraze, newly
promoted Chief of the Defence Staff, asked him to return to the DND where his knowledge and administrative talents would be put to good use.

In Part Two of his monograph Colonel Letellier recounts, in detail, his hard work as Director General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism at NDHQ, from 1971 to 1977.

This monograph, therefore, represents a ten-year period out of the life of a French Canadian field officer and senior civil servant, during which he established bilingualism policies for the Armed Forces, and staffed the programs derived from these policies. We could rightly refer to Colonel Letellier as being the father of the DND’s language reform.

Jean Pariseau
Historien en chef
Preface

I am essentially a man of action, and it is not false modesty when I say that I am neither a historian nor a writer. I have no literary pretensions, and it was only at the prompting of my friend Dr. Jean Pariseau, historien en chef of the francophone section at the Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), that I took up the pen. The purpose of this account is to describe my close involvement in the planning and implementation of official bilingualism at the Department of National Defence. This was an exhilarating if sometimes painful experience.

My intimate involvement with bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces spans a decade. After thirty years honourably spent as an officer in the Forces, I laboured in the cause of bilingualism from September, 1967 to July, 1968 as Director of Organization at NDHQ. As a senior civil servant, I again worked there from August, 1971 to November, 1977 as Director General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Much time has since gone by. The principal events and actors have begun to fade in memory, and it is difficult to write an accurate account, especially of the period 1967-1968, when the NDHQ’s “Bilingual Secretariat” first came into being. I have nevertheless attempted to write such an account in Part One of this study.

As to the second part, it has rather become a very personal retrospective look at the years I spent at the Directorate General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

In this account, I have attempted to bring out the role and con-
tribution of my superiors, the ministers, deputy ministers and generals who succeeded one another at the Department of National Defence during the period from August, 1971 to November, 1977. This is why one will find many details and apparent repetitions in the description of the activities of the DGBB.

I thought it important, especially in the area of discussions, negotiations and consultations, to bring out the different points of view and the motivation of the civilians and the military people with whom we were dealing. On the other hand, I wanted to avoid making judgments on the events of this period, which would have resulted from wisdom acquired after the fact.

Historians who take an interest in my recollections will surely have the objectivity to interpret them honestly. My aim in writing this document is to help the reader to better understand the scope and complexity of the program of bilingualism and biculturalism at the Department of National Defence.

The reader will no doubt notice the lack of references, which is, I think, normal for this kind of account. Nevertheless, I would encourage those who might wish to verify my statements to consult the excellent files on bilingualism at the Directorate of History, which have been examined in depth by Dr. Jean Parisseau. They will realize that I have drawn extensively on them, used them to refresh my memory, and to flesh out my recollections.

In his *Histoire du Régiment de Trois-Rivières, 1871-1978*, Dr. Jean-Yves Gravel says of General Allard: “The General could count on the patient but determined labour of the first coordinator of bilingualism in the Armed Forces, Colonel Armand Letellier, who worked in double quick time in all the key areas.” Eighteen years after my retirement from the Canadian Armed Forces, I have the satisfaction of knowing that my first contribution to the cause of bilingualism has been recognized.

A.L.
Part One

On creating the DND
“Bilingual Secretariat”
September 1967 - July 1968
Formation of the “Bilingual Secretariat”

In the summer of 1966, I became Director of Organization at the recently integrated headquarters of the Canadian Armed Forces in Ottawa. In April of that year, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had made a declaration of principle on bilingualism, and rumours about the repercussions of this declaration were circulating in the Department. I also knew of General Jean Victor Allard’s concerns in this area. Allard, the first French Canadian to be appointed Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), was very concerned about the fact that francophones were leaving the Armed Forces in ever-increasing numbers. He was also worried by the underrepresentation of francophones in technical trades and in the senior officers’ ranks. To make people aware of this unjust and unacceptable situation, Allard set up a task force in October, 1966 with the approval of the Minister, the Honourable Paul Hellyer. Chaired by Colonel Armand Ross, its job was to recommend ways to ensure that francophone military personnel would enjoy the same career opportunities as anglophones.

In the spring of 1967, Colonel Ross spoke to me at length about his report. Ross expected that General Allard, who had received the report in March, would urge his collaborators to study it in depth. Unfortunately, Hellyer had requested that the report be given a security classification that greatly restricted its circulation in the hierarchy, and in the military community in general. In my
opinion, it was largely because of this manoeuvre that some of the report’s recommendations were rather unfavourably received, and the search for real solutions was discouraged. Personnel in the regular military channels were not enthusiastic and dynamic enough, it seemed, to do the analysis, planning and coordination required to implement the recommendations of the Ross Report.

In any case, General Allard told Hellyer that he should be assisted by a small group of people who could advise him on bilingualism, and act as a catalyst. In accordance with Allard’s wishes, Hellyer agreed to set up a “Bilingual Secretariat”, to which I was appointed Director in September, 1967. (See organization chart at Annex A).

I was soon looking for help. One of my first collaborators, whom I remember with particular fondness, was Staff Sergeant Paul Berniquez, who reached the rank of Captain before his retirement. A soldier who was already part of Allard’s circle, Berniquez had long been fluent in both official languages, and was intimately familiar with the workings of military bureaucracy. He was also an excellent secretary, and assisted us by producing briefs and petitions for senior staff, the Minister, the Prime Minister and Cabinet. He produced all this material in flawless form, while I was responsible for its style and content. In this work, I of course followed the instructions of General Allard, who frequently met with me in his office, alone or in the company of his collaborators.
When I became Director of the Secretariat, I had to familiarize myself with every aspect of the Ross Report. I also had to grasp the import of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission’s actions in regard to the Department. In this area, I luckily had help from colleagues assigned to the Deputy Minister, Elgin Armstrong. Among them, I particularly remember Roger Lavergne, Director General of Dependants’ Education, and his two assistants, Lieutenant-Colonel René Morin and Major Louis-Noël de Tilly. They worked on the civilian side of the Department, and I on the military. However, we all agreed that we should promote bilingualism for the good of the Department in general, and of francophones in particular. I regularly consulted them from the beginning of my appointment as Director of the Secretariat, and they helped me greatly. Roger Lavergne had much experience at the decision-making levels of the Department. He thoroughly understood the civilian administration, and the rather special relationship between civilians and the military. Lieutenant-Colonel Morin and Major de Tilly, like myself, were officers who had experienced the injustices and challenges of bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

By early October, 1967 my duty was clear. The main job was to get things rolling somehow, to ensure a follow-up to the conclusions and recommendations of the Ross Report. We certainly couldn’t expect any initiatives from the Chief of Personnel. Ver-
bossity and a do-nothing approach were the order of the day, and it seemed that those who had read the Ross Report, despite its limited distribution, were still in a state of shock over the extent of the problems revealed and the impact of the recommended solutions. General Allard, though aware of this, was becoming impatient. He asked me to prepare draft policy statements, for discussion at the CDS Advisory Committee, as soon as possible. With the General’s approval, three documents were written and presented at the meeting of November 7, 1967. These outlined major problems and proposed solutions.

The first document was a policy statement on resources that the CAF should provide for educating the dependants of francophone military personnel. In particular, it advocated bilingual classes on the major military bases outside Quebec, special allowances to parents for educating their children in French away from home, and the establishment of a boarding school in Quebec. To implement this policy, francophone schools should be planned and set up outside Quebec where justified by the number of students. Adequate funds should also be provided, and a request to this effect made to the Defence Council.

The second document was a policy statement on the establishment of a French-language trades training centre in Quebec. Three steps were proposed: greater use of existing technical training facilities in Quebec; an increase in the number of technical training institutions; and most importantly, the establishment of more French-language units. The statement also recommended that a senior officer be appointed to plan and set up the Quebec centre. This project would first have to be approved by the Defence Council.

The third document outlined a policy for organizing and setting up French-language units in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). This was, in my view, the most important document of the three that I submitted to the CDS Advisory Committee. The principles it contained addressed the major issue facing francophone servicemen:
how to work in their own language and environment, as their anglophone colleagues had always been able to do.

The solution to this problem, though long known, had been ignored through indifference, or through fear of a threat to the supremacy of anglophones in the CAF. As an example of the kind of structure that we wanted to see duplicated throughout the Forces, the statement mentioned the Royal 22ᵉ Régiment. In this highly successful Quebec based unit, French predominated, since officers and men, alike were francophones. The proposed policy advocated that new units like the Royal 22ᵉ be set up. Their members would all be francophones, or predominantly so if a limited number of anglophones were allowed to serve with them.

Regarding the Army, the third policy statement recommended that French services be increased at the Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Valcartier, and that an artillery and an armoured regiment be set up and located there. An airborne regiment with one-third francophone personnel should also be located at Edmonton. The large RCAF base at Bagotville, Quebec, was proposed as the site for a new squadron of CF5 fighters. Bilingual or francophone personnel would be increased at CFB Bagotville, to provide the squadron with French-language services.

Halifax, the cradle of our Navy, was to be the focus for change in this branch of the service; operations on the West Coast were to remain unchanged. What we proposed was a predominantly francophone destroyer crew. This project met with great hostility. The Navy, though Canadian in name, was still British in spirit, and our ship never became more than bilingual. Despite this antagonism we were ambitious and even thought of eventually setting up a mainly francophone naval squadron. Eighteen years later, however, as I write this account, we still have just the one bilingual destroyer.

While preparing and presenting these reform policies, I continued to take a keen interest in our other concerns. Staff in the Deputy Minister’s office reminded me that Cabinet’s special se-
cretariat, urgently in need of information on our bilingual programs, had been waiting for it for months. The Privy Council office with whom we dealt also asked for a copy of the Ross Report.

I knew that the Chief of Personnel would provide the required information on our programs, in his report to the Chief of the Defence Staff. In the meantime Major-General B.F. MacDonald, Deputy Chief of Personnel, decided to take the whole package of statistics and general information prepared by his directors, and dump it in my lap. He wanted me to summarize this material, but still insisted I go back to him for approval before submitting the final summary to the Deputy Minister. This chore was given to me because at NDHQ I was in charge of coordinating projects and planning initiatives in the area of bilingualism. Having no choice in the matter I accepted the job. At least, I thought, this would help me and my comrades keep abreast of developments that concerned us and have more access to files and information that might prove useful in future.

I pried from HQ staff such information as I could on the status of bilingualism in the CAF. On December 29, 1967 I signed my summary and forwarded it to the Deputy Minister. This survey showed that the list of bilingual positions was only 60 per cent filled, and that the list was still based on current identification criteria. This state of affairs, I suggested, reflected the need to reassess CAF guidelines for bilingualism. Such a review might help the Forces to become more receptive to the philosophy and recommendations of the B & B Commission and the Ross Report.

The Department stated that it was planning to make progressive reforms in the area of personnel and recruitment. However, it carefully avoided open commitment to changing the recruitment and trades classification tests for francophones. These inefficient and unjust procedures were perpetuating the lack of francophones in the Forces in general, and in technical positions in particular.

The brief also dealt with the thorny issue of communications.
On paper at least, things looked promising. The Department stated that it was prepared to recommend changes in attitude, so that the choice of working language in various headquarters and bases would reflect their linguistic environment. Much was said about training as well. Statistics showed that while the CAF had made considerable efforts in this area, it had not changed its main focus. The goal was still to make francophones bilingual through intensive language training, at the beginning of their career or in the course of it. A survey of the period September 1966 - October 1967, which was included in the brief, revealed that while 1,112 francophone military personnel had successfully completed English courses, only 38 anglophones had finished courses in French. In my opinion, which I naturally did not include in the brief, this ratio of 1,112 to 38 was clear proof of the illogical and painful imbalance that would continue to impede the progress of bilingualism in the Armed Forces. Major-General MacDonald seemed to have similar concerns, for he distributed copies of the brief to his directors, with his comments. He told them that Colonel Letellier had written some parts of the brief, in particular those dealing with communications and the need for bilingual positions. He also warned them that implementation of the policies described in the brief would have serious repercussions in the Personnel areas that concerned them. MacDonald asked his directors to contact him without delay if they thought that the plan would lead to major problems.

In view of all this, I thought that the Deputy Minister, Mr. Armstrong, would be somewhat apprehensive about his reply to the Cabinet’s special secretariat. I was right. In his letter of January 15, 1968 Armstrong was careful not to point the Department in the direction of equality for the French and English languages, which would have anticipated the Official Languages Act by more than a year. On the other hand, he simply told the secretariat that he had sent a copy of the Ross Report to Cabinet on December 21, 1967, that the publication of the first volume of the B & B Commission report had delayed the survey of bilingual positions, and that the Ross Report’s recommendations had given rise to draft projects, whose principles were being examined by Cabinet.
III

Defence Council Meetings on our Bilingualism Projects and the Petition to Cabinet

The high point of my first appointment to the “Bilingual Secretariat” was undoubtedly my contribution to the 234th and 236th meetings of the Defence Council, which took place on November 27 and on December 18, 1967. I shall therefore describe in detail what went on at these meetings.

At the November 27 meeting, I presented agenda items I, II and III regarding the issues I had laid before the CDS Advisory Committee three weeks before, namely: new French-language units (FLUs); a trades training centre in Quebec; and dependants’ education for francophone personnel.

I began by explaining that items I, II and III, which the CDS had submitted to the Council, flowed from the conclusions and recommendations of the Ross Report. This report, I recalled, had examined and analyzed the problems faced by francophones in the CAF. The chief aim of its noteworthy conclusions and recommendations was to maintain French Canadian participation in the Forces through improved conditions of service, and to increase it if possible. Immediate action should be taken to establish predominantly French-language units and bases, to set up a French language trades training centre, and to improve educa-
tional services for the dependants of francophone military personnel. The rationale and justification of these projects had been explained to the CDS Advisory Committee, and included in this request to the Council. I also reminded the meeting that the proposed French-language bases and units would be similar to the Royal 22e Régiment. Francophones would be able to work in them on an equal footing, and would not have to bear the burden of mastering a second language at the beginning of their career. These structures would provide a setting where anglophones could mingle with their French-speaking colleagues, learn their language and develop an appreciation for their culture. This in turn would foster effective bilingualism, and produce a need for bilingual communications and staff at all levels of the CAF, including NDHQ.

I also noted that in the long term, transfer costs would be reduced by assigning more French-speaking servicemen to Quebec. In the short term, francophones would be spared the complications and problems they faced when serving elsewhere in Canada. I added that to ensure successful adaptation of the new French-language bases and units, we would have to change the adverse social conditions of the past, which had favoured assimilation.

Turning to our second concern, I said I was delighted that a consensus had been reached to teach basic trades in French. However, the proposed solution merely called for more bilingual instructors in existing trades schools, and did not stipulate that a French-language training centre should be located in Quebec. This was, in my view, a purely stopgap measure. It would place an additional burden on the francophones in the service, who already had to pay the price of bilingualism (instructors, translators, etc.). This arrangement would also be particularly hard on their families who would be transplanted into an unfamiliar environment. In the familiar social and physical surroundings of Quebec, and of St. Jean in particular, apprentices would find it easier to learn a trade and a second language at the same time.

General Allard initiated the discussion on the first two items.
He noted that his request to Council was made to establish basic policy on conditions of service for francophone military personnel. Our plans were based on certain specific recommendations of the Ross Report, and while the report contained other recommendations of importance for the Armed Forces, these particular ones were fundamental, and should guide our thinking. Anglophones and francophones should participate in Canada’s defence in proportion to their population, and while they had not always done so in the past, they would in the future. In conclusion, Allard said that our problems could be solved by approving and implementing his recommendations.

The Deputy Minister, Mr. Armstrong, then declared that the establishment of new FLUs in the Forces was a fundamental policy issue, which the Department should bring to the Government’s attention. The Council should approve Allard’s recommendations in principle, and develop an implementation plan for consideration by the Government. This plan should indicate what measures were to be taken, and what costs were involved. Since vital public interests were at stake, the Government should determine what the plan’s monetary and non-monetary consequences would be. Finally, Armstrong noted that the Department should be assured of the Government’s support before trying to put the program into effect.

The Minister, the Honourable Léo Cadieux, said that we should act quickly in submitting our request to the Government. He also noted that the report of the B & B Commission was expected any day now. This report might reflect the letter and spirit of our recommendations, and if it did, the Department should be ready to provide prompt, detailed information.

General Allard saw no immediate difficulty in initiating his program. New quarters were already available at Valcartier, and according to the construction plan, others would be ready within the year. The establishment of the Bagotville squadron would take more than a year, but would not encounter insurmountable problems. On the Navy side, the francophone crew could be ready
to sail seven or eight months after the start-up of the program. However, Allard admitted that unless sailors were immediately readied for the third phase of training, problems would certainly arise after the second phase.

Mr. Cadieux said that he accepted the establishment of FLUs in principle. However, he cautioned Allard against setting up a separate system, which should be avoided at all costs. This problem could be solved by adding bilingual anglophone personnel. Cadieux agreed that the existing situation should be corrected as soon as possible, and that the Government’s support should be obtained as a first step in this direction.

Major-General “Mike” Dare, Deputy Chief of Reserves, also spoke in support of our projects. He noted that CAF policy had endorsed the establishment of FLUs in the past, but time and inaction had consigned this concept to oblivion. The real problem at present was not the establishment, but rather the survival of such units. To ensure survival, we needed a trades training system to produce the required replacement personnel. If this approach were adopted, we would have to deal with certain problems: higher costs, possible duplication of effort, the proportion of trades to be taught in French, the shortage of bilingual instructors. Other problems would arise if more francophone personnel attended trade schools in the English-speaking provinces. The education of their dependants, whether conducted in English or French, would have to be delivered according to the standards of the provinces involved.

General Allard remarked that this problem would be alleviated by a concentration of French-language units in Quebec, with the exception of the destroyer at Halifax. However, Mr. Armstrong said that such a concentration might deprive the personnel involved of full and unfettered career opportunities. In his opinion, the matter deserved careful study.

Mr. Cadieux again intervened to say that francophones should not be segregated in Quebec. There might be some segregation when the
FLUs were first set up, but this should disappear with the addition of bilingual anglophones. The goal in this area should be to repeat, in the Air Force and Navy, the experience of the Army’s Royal 22e Régiment. In Cadieux’s opinion, the success of this program was of national importance; failure would be disastrous.

Mr. Cadieux then asked General Allard about the proposed Airborne Regiment at Edmonton. Allard replied that the Commander of Mobile Command had indeed made a decision to this effect. He himself had approved the decision, after receiving assurance that the appropriate educational services would be provided for the children of the regiment’s military personnel. If these services were inadequate, the francophone commando of the Airborne Regiment would not go to Alberta. Mr. Armstrong remarked that dependants’ education would be a serious problem in Edmonton, and also in Halifax when the francophone destroyer was inaugurated.

The Minister then gave his approval in principle to the CDS’s recommendations on a trades training centre in Quebec and on FLUs. He wanted the Department to be more flexible in planning, and to put off designating Halifax as home port for the proposed French-language squadron. He also wanted to broaden the scope of predominantly FLUs in Quebec by providing for the gradual transfer of francophones to other Air Force bases and units in the Province. Mr. Cadieux realized that to obtain the Government’s support, prompt action was needed. He therefore asked General Allard to prepare a letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson, which he could sign the same day, and which would explain the principles and basic features of the approved program. Mr. Cadieux also asked that a request to Cabinet be prepared as soon as possible, in which our projects, action plans, cost estimates and required funding would be described in detail.

Mr. Cadieux’s comments made me realize how much work I would have to do immediately after the meeting and in the following days. However, I didn’t have time to worry about it, since I still had to make my third presentation, on dependants’ educa-
I began by referring to the memorandum that Lieutenant-General F.R. Sharp, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, had sent to the Minister on November 16, 1967. This memorandum had been requested by General Allard, and written by me. In it, I described the ongoing problems faced by francophones posted outside Quebec who wanted their children educated in French. The Treasury Board had recently granted allowances to help parents defray the additional costs of special courses, transportation, etc., but more remained to be done. One possible solution was to authorize a boarding school plan that would enable children to complete their studies in French, in Quebec, from Grade 8 onward. I also reminded the Council that we would have to plan the expansion of local schools when we finally decided where to locate French-language bases and units.

The Minister, who had listened carefully to my plea, said that a boarding school in Quebec was not a good idea, and that the Department would do better to find some other solution in consultation with provincial authorities.

General Allard, somewhat to my surprise, said that he agreed with Mr. Cadieux. However, we would have to retain an outside agency to investigate the matter objectively and negotiate agreements with the provinces. These agreements would subsequently have to be approved by the Department.

In concluding the 234th meeting of the Defence Council, Mr. Cadieux said that he wished to think about the proposed boarding school before giving his decision on the matter. He seemed reluctant to become involved in such an undertaking, and I don’t know to this day what tactical considerations had led Allard to suggest it.

November 27, 1967 is also memorable for me because I had to turn out Cadieux’s letter to Pearson on my lunch hour. However, I had no trouble summarizing the morning’s discussions and decisions. In this letter, Mr. Cadieux described what the Department had done to implement the principles of bilingualism that
Mr. Pearson had stated on April 6, 1966. He asked for immediate authorization to initiate our programs, and said he was ready to draft a request to Cabinet. He added that another request, based on the recommendations of the Ross and Laurendeau-Dunton reports, would also be sent to Cabinet. The items we asked for would be part of a planned, coordinated program, to be implemented within a reasonable period of time. In my opinion, this letter was a significant attempt to get things moving, and a first step towards better conditions of service for francophones in the Armed Forces.

The next day, November 28, I had to buckle down to writing the first draft of the request to Cabinet. Senior staff agreed on the principles of our bilingual policy, but not on how it should be applied. This was apparent to me as early as December 15, 1967, when the task force met for the first time. At this meeting, chaired by Lieutenant-General Sharp, it seemed as if our colleagues had all worked together to stress what they felt to be the insurmountable problems involved in our undertaking. In particular, personnel managers thought that five-year postings would become the rule in the new FLUs, and would have a detrimental effect on francophones’ career patterns. Some people thought that the application of staffing policies for Army and Air Force units in Quebec would force some 12,000 military personnel, for the most part francophones, to migrate to unfamiliar parts. It was also claimed that initial costs for construction at Valcartier and for dependants’ education would be exorbitant.

Fortunately, moderation and common sense prevailed once my colleagues got over the idea of change and resigned themselves, to some extent, to the inevitable. The second meeting of the task force was much more positive and productive, and made it possible for me to prepare the final draft of the request to Cabinet.

On December 15th, we were also asked to prepare a draft agenda for a special meeting of the Defence Council on the 18th. Senior staff sent me their mediocre suggestions, which they had
only prepared because they were asked to. I had to spend many a weary hour with my co-workers, correcting and rearranging the agenda material.

On the morning of December 18, I again appeared before the Defence Council. I presented and explained, as if for the first time, the principles and details of the implementation of our program. My presentation included estimates of the costs involved and the funding required. When I had finished, the form and content of the request to Cabinet was discussed. Mr. Cadieux began by saying that he wholly accepted our recommendations on the Airborne Regiment, the trades training centre and the FLUs at Valcartier. However, he wanted us to suggest a staffing ratio for the destroyer of 70 per cent francophones to 30 per cent anglophones, and to mention that the Bagotville squadron would have the new CF5 plane. He also felt that unless the recommendation on transferring Air Force personnel to Quebec was amended, people would think that we were planning to concentrate and segregate francophones in Quebec.

General Allard entered the debate by saying that he was disappointed with the draft. He felt that it did not explain the aim of our new programs clearly enough, and would have to be reworked to emphasize that three things were needed: more French-language units; a favourable climate for francophones in the Armed Forces; and greater opportunities for francophones to have their children educated in French. On the last point, Allard again expressed his basic view that Quebec offered the most favourable conditions for francophones in the service and their children. Some 20,000 of them were facing the threat of being educated outside Quebec. This was an expensive process in any case, particularly when the $1,300 Treasury Board grants were taken into account. It should be understood that for reasons of economy and efficiency, it was better to concentrate francophone personnel in Quebec. The General also said that francophone participation in the Armed Forces should be increased from 16 to 28 per cent, to correspond to the proportion of francophones in Canada’s population as a whole. The same representation should be assured in all trades.
The Deputy Minister claimed that the petition as written was confusing. On the one hand, the CDS wanted to concentrate francophone personnel in Quebec, in an environment that would enhance both their children’s education and their own culture. On the other, he was recommending the establishment of an Airborne Regiment at Edmonton and a destroyer at Halifax, both with a large number of francophones. These people were bound to have more problems in educating their children. Armstrong was also worried that francophones in these new programs would think that their career opportunities were limited, and that their normal career pattern would consist exclusively of assignments to Quebec. Like the Minister, he asserted that the request to Cabinet should express our intention to staff the units with francophones and anglophones in a proportion of 70 to 30 per cent.

General Allard interjected to note that what really mattered was not the 70/30 per cent staffing ratio, but rather the increase of francophones in the Forces from 16 to 28 per cent. Half of these could serve in FLUs, and the rest in other units throughout Canada. Such a distribution would avoid segregation and favour bilingualism. However, in discussing staffing objectives, the request to Cabinet should not mention percentages, but should simply state that the new units would be predominantly French-language in character.

Mr. Cadieux returned to the subject of segregation. In his opinion, the real problem was not to recruit francophones into the Armed Forces, but to keep them there. Francophones had a very high attrition rate because of the problems they faced in acquiring trade and career qualifications in English. This difficulty would not be overcome simply by recruiting more francophones and concentrating them in Quebec, in an exclusively French atmosphere. Deterioration, not improvement, would result. On the other hand, the 70/30 per cent proportion of francophones to anglophones in the units would mitigate the impact of segregation, and would help anglophones to become bilingual.

The CDS, in a counter-attack, said that he would not allow a
seasoned and efficient unit of the Royal 22\textsuperscript{e}'s calibre to end up with fewer francophones than it presently had. At this time, 60 per cent of the lads in the Royal 22\textsuperscript{e} were unilingual francophones, and had spent their career there. They knew that they might be passing up opportunities for career advancement by staying in Quebec, and accepted that fact. On the other hand, the General was opposed to any policy designed to limit, to Quebec only, the career opportunities of the people who would be joining FLUs in that province. The major objectives of the program were still to increase francophone participation from 16 to 28 per cent, and to mitigate the problem of francophone dependants’ education.

Commenting on the request as a whole, the Minister said that our proposals would give us what we wanted: the most practical solution to these problems. However, he felt that our request to Cabinet, as written, might lead to misunderstandings. At all costs, we must avoid the slightest suggestion that francophones should be segregated into FLUs. The same caution should be exercised in regard to our guidelines and instructions, when the time came to put our program into effect.

The Deputy Minister, as one might have expected, mentioned the complexities of cost assessment, and suggested that statements on this matter should be confined to generalities. He supported the Comptroller General’s useful comments on the budget. Including the costs of the new programs in the DND’s regular budget was, indeed, out of the question. The Government had to be informed of these costs, and be prepared to accept them in addition to the normal budget.

Lieutenant-General E.M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel, suggested that we remove those parts of the request that dealt with implementation of the program. In his view, a partially developed program such as this would very likely attract embarrassing questions from the press and from members of the House of Commons. The request should be limited to principles only. In order to avoid adverse publicity, it could be modelled on the recent brief
to Mr. Pearson, with some additional explanations. The Department, of course, would be responsible for detailed implementation of the program.

General Allard repeated for the third time that the request should not leave any doubts about the essential items: an increase of francophone participation in all trades to 28 per cent; and a clear indication that the children of francophone personnel could be educated more cheaply if their parents’ units were concentrated in Quebec.

Finally, Mr. Cadieux spelled out how the request process should be modified in the light of discussions at the two Council meetings. The first recommendation should stipulate that the Halifax-based destroyer be staffed with French-speaking personnel. This provision should likewise apply to the operational squadron that would be later developed under the plan, and a second recommendation should be added regarding funding for the new programs. He also asked that the amended request be submitted to him and to the Deputy Minister for approval as soon as possible.

Before concluding the meeting the Minister, at my request, redefined the policy on distribution of the Ross Report. He only authorized directors general, directors, members of the Cabinet and the committee on bilingualism and biculturalism to receive this document, should they request it. The Cabinet committee had indeed asked for this report in October, and Mr. Armstrong sent it a copy with his letter of December 29, 1967.

Since the Christmas holidays were upon us, I did not wait to receive the minutes of this last meeting of the Council, and immediately began to draft the new request. The version that Mr. Cadieux finally signed and sent to Cabinet on January 19, 1968 more clearly and directly stated our objectives and the means to attain them.

I thought at the time that all we had to do was await the deci-
sions of Cabinet. However, I could not have predicted that these decisions would not be made for nearly three months. Prime Minister Pearson, after acknowledging receipt of Mr. Cadieux’s letter of November 27, wrote again on December 7. In this second letter, he described how he felt about our first project, the French-language units. Pearson’s concerns were the same as those that Cadieux had voiced at the first Council meeting. It was important to avoid too great a concentration of FLUs in Quebec. While the majority of these units could be located there, it would be advantageous to spread them out across Canada. Pearson approved the concept of an Edmonton-based Airborne Regiment one third of whose personnel would be francophone, and hoped to see this principle extended to the FLUs. Such a program would further bilingualism in the Armed Forces, and would promote better understanding between Canada’s two major language communities.

These remarks help to clarify what went on at these two important meetings of the Defence Council, which I have described in detail. They also reveal the significance of what was said by the participants, though only the Minister, Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff had known the contents of Mr. Pearson’s letter. The concerns expressed by the Chief of Personnel, Lieutenant-General Reyno, by Vice-Admiral R.L. Hennessy and by Majors-General Dare and MacDonald were based, I think, on their recollection of negative responses to the Ross Report’s recommendations.
Attitude and Behaviour at National Defence Headquarters

Through meetings of the CDS Advisory Committee and the Defence Council, and through all sorts of discussions at NDHQ, we at the “Bilingual Secretariat” had all become very aware of the problems that managers were facing in trying to implement our plans. Personally, I was rather discouraged by the fact that most directors general and directors thought our initiatives stood little chance of success. My first real exposure to this attitude occurred at the CDS Advisory Committee meeting of November 7, 1967. At this meeting, at General Allard’s request, I presented draft versions of our major plans for discussion. Speaking for about thirty minutes, I showed that our plans were both logical and necessary. I then listened as the Chief used all his eloquence and powers of persuasion to try to get his message across. He was respectfully heard, but not really understood. The very lively discussion that followed did not lead to any consensus, and I think that the Chief simply imposed, as his prerogative, the decisions that appear on the official record. At this meeting, as at other deliberations in preparation of the Council meetings and the request to Cabinet, what struck me most was the litany of objections. People claimed, for example, that our projects would be detrimental to the efficiency of the Armed Forces and to individual morale. It was also said that our plans would make servicemen think their career opp-
portunities were diminished, would restrict the range of positions available to francophones, and would divide the Forces internally into two distinct groups - a phenomenon later to be known as polarization. The greatest fear was that the system of promotions would be destabilized. The principle that individual merit and potential are the sole criteria for promotion had to be protected at all costs. This was the much vaunted concept whose rigid interpretation and application devalued linguistic competence, and favoured the anglophone majority. The results of this discrimination were as plain as day. The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission had already pointed out to the Department that only a tiny proportion of francophones occupied high positions in the military hierarchy. Fortunately, political circumstances were such that Mr. Cadieux was Minister of Defence, and supported our efforts.

In reading my account, one might be inclined to think that during this period, General Allard’s projects met with ill-will. It is true that officers at the director’s level, who had neither seen nor become familiar with the Ross Report, knew moments of confusion and uncertainty in the face of rumours that were often malicious. I shall never forget one of these in particular, to the effect that in future, anyone who was francophone and bilingual could get promoted in the Canadian Forces. This rumour persisted, and I encountered it again in the course of my second appointment at the DND, during the struggle for bilingualism in the period 1971-1977. I shall have more to say about this matter when I describe my second term of service. Unfortunately, the superiors of the rumormongers did not think the time had come to set them straight, and they remained hostile or indifferent to our needs. At the time, however, a more widespread view was the resigned attitude of the real military professionals, whose common sense induced them to say; “If we have to move in this direction, let’s do it with caution and patience. Let’s make sure that in the short and long term, our ambitions do not exceed our means”. If their heart wasn’t in it, they at least supported B & B with their heads. An example of such people was Commodore Harry Porter, Director General of Maritime Operations (later Vice-Admiral and Commander of Maritime Command at Halifax). The memorandum
that he sent me at the Secretariat showed him to be a practical man. He told us frankly that if we decided to establish a destroyer at Halifax with a primarily French-speaking crew, we had better make sure we succeeded. He pointed out what had to be done and what problems had to be solved. We would have to identify and select the most competent French-speaking commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Navy. We would also have to set up a system of replacement in the land-sea, sea-land cycle, and provide for the training of technical specialists. The interest, and even enthusiasm, of anglophone sailors for the ship would have to be aroused through an effective publicity campaign on the East Coast. Porter also noted that because of the anglophone environment of Nova Scotia, we would have to set up a school for the dependants of francophone sailors, and a social centre for the francophone community. He advised us that we should seek the support of the local population for the ship and the school, and involve the authorities of Halifax, Dartmouth and the Province.

In the same positive but not unconditional vein, Colonel S.V. Radley-Walters, Director of Training and Instruction, supported the establishment of a trades training centre in Quebec. He recommended a detailed study of this project, so that its scope and costs could be determined. However, he had some doubts about the cost-effectiveness of the project. What Commodore Porter and Colonel Radley-Walters said was encouraging, but Air Commodore “Bill” Carr’s comments were much more so. Carr, Director General of Aviation, was equal to the challenge of our projects. He later rose to the highest position in the air element of the CAF, Commander of Air Command, and was even considered for appointment as CDS before retiring. Carr wrote to me at the Secretariat, saying he hoped that his comments on the Ross Report’s recommendations would help me in drafting the request to Cabinet. Getting right to the point, he declared that it was practical to set up FLUs in Quebec with francophone personnel. French language Unit conversion could be applied to radar stations, and to some bases. Bagotville and No. 101 Squadron would be appropriate candidates. As an experienced airman, Carr touched on the problem of using French in air operations, since by international
agreement, English was virtually the universal language of aviation. His remarks foreshadowed the struggle that air traffic controllers would make in the 1970s, to break the supremacy of English in aviation communications in Quebec. For the time being, however, Carr did not foresee any insurmountable obstacles. Because the range of Air Force positions available in Quebec was fairly narrow, some career problems might arise if francophone aviators were too hastily transferred there. The greater variety of positions to be had in Canada generally included some activities not represented in Quebec, such as transportation, air reconnaissance and pilot training. In view of these constraints, moderation should be exercised in assigning francophones to Quebec, so that their chances for advancement would not be diminished. Carr was a just man, and saw the logic of the principles expressed in the Ross Report. He recognized that improved conditions of service and more extensive, well-structured opportunities for francophones would help to prevent the waste of human resources and promote national unity. The matter of dependants’ education should be settled with the provinces, and despite their reluctance and the costs involved, the necessary schools could be built. As a pilot and a pragmatist, Carr deemed these costs to be insignificant in comparison with those of the CF 104 fighter plane, and he wondered where true values had gone. Finally, Carr advised us to look at our problems as objectively as possible, and to avoid emotion and procrastination. The Government’s policy was clear, the CAF had the authority to act, and the proposed solutions were simple and direct. Bill Carr did not see any really serious problem that needed to be brought to our attention.

As 1968 began, we hoped to see our request submitted to Cabinet as quickly as possible. The Deputy Minister and Minister put the final touches on the request, and it was sent to Cabinet on January 19. In late January Major-General M.E. Pollard, Commander of Air Defence Command, came forward in support of the CDS’s efforts to establish bilingualism in the Forces. Pollard was the first General Officer Commanding (GOC) to make such a gesture. It was courageous of him to do so in the circumstances, and very helpful to us in trying to win the moral and practical
support of senior staff officers for our project. Major-General Pollard wrote a letter, supported by a study, whose open-mindedness and positive conclusions enabled us to initiate a fruitful debate with his colleagues, the other commanders. We now possessed a positive written argument, which was all the more acceptable because it came from an anglophone military source. Pollard’s letter included the following assertions: the Canadian Armed Forces have sound reasons for introducing bilingualism; units must be set up with a majority of French-speaking members; the Department must provide means for educating the dependants of francophone military personnel, in French; a core group of senior officers must be set up at NDHQ, to plan, execute and monitor all aspects of our bilingual program. Pollard also cautioned us that anglophones would learn French only when they felt the need to do so. In my view, we did not take proper advantage of this timely observation. Indeed, a whole chapter of my memoirs would one day be devoted to the disappointments we experienced as we vainly tried to convince anglophones to learn French, and to accept linguistic conditions similar to those that francophones had known.

I prepared a letter for General Allard’s signature, in which Pollard was thanked for his contribution to official bilingualism in the CAF, and told how pleased the Chief was at this gesture. The letter also informed Pollard that his fellow commanders would be invited to look at his study and conclusions, and urged to make their own ideas known.

February had begun and General Allard, whose major projects were now for consideration before Cabinet, was growing impatient at the inaction of some senior officers who were not doing their best to cooperate. He wanted Personnel to produce policies, and at his request, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Sharp, sent a memorandum to Lieutenant-General Reyno, Chief of Personnel. In this memorandum, Sharp reminded Reyno of the situation francophones faced and the plans to correct it, and advised him to devise appropriate policies. General Allard also asked me to write a memorandum to Lieutenant-General Reyno, to inform him of the correspondence exchanged with Ma-
General Pollard. I prepared this document, and also sent Reyno a copy of Pollard’s letter and study. The Chief of Personnel responded vigorously, urgently requesting the GOCs to make an immediate survey of their bilingual resources. Reyno wanted to determine what degree of bilingualism was possessed by various individuals, so that bilingual activities and programs could be logically planned around a reasonable timetable. On February 12, Reyno wrote to the CDS, thanking him for Pollard’s report. He did note, however, that the study had one drawback: it merely defined the problems. These, Reyno noted, included dependants’ education, the puzzling process of moving families from one end of the country to the other, the costs that this entailed, and the difficulties of managing anglophone and francophone careers, particularly in regard to advancement. Reyno wondered how all these necessary objectives could be attained with our limited staff and money, and suggested that a central agency be set up in Personnel, to take charge of staffing measures and activities as of May 1. He added that he wanted to talk to the Chief about where to find managers for this group.

On a more optimistic note, Reyno put a general in charge of the crash program he had initiated to obtain statistics on the language skills of military personnel and their families. He hoped that by about May 1, the survey would be completed. He would then be in a better position to start staffing the new units, and to meet their needs with known resources and a timetable that the CAF could live with. General Allard realized what an enormous job Reyno was contemplating, and wrote him a note of encouragement on February 14. In this note, Allard mentioned how glad he was that some effort was now being made to implement our programs.

At this time, the CDS had many serious concerns. He and his colleagues were grappling with the reorganization of the Armed Forces, and had not been able to agree on the final structure of the commands, Mobile Command especially. The establishment of major bases was also unresolved. This state of uncertainty made it difficult for personnel managers to do their job. Above all, it was
impeding the assignment of francophones to existing units in Quebec, and holding up the process of conversion to FLUs. The Comptroller General, Vice-Admiral R.L. Hennessy, the VCDS, Lieutenant-General Sharp and the CP, Lieutenant-General Reyno were trying to solve these problems and to calm the impatience of their chief. Moreover, damaging rumours were circulating, the most malicious of these being that a French ghetto would be created in Quebec, where francophones - and anglophones unlucky enough to be bilingual - would serve in perpetuity. This rumour forced Vice-Admiral Hennessy to write a confidential memorandum to his branch, in order to calm people’s fears. Hennessy was respected for his service record and open-mindedness. He had been my boss in 1967, when I was Director of Organization, and after I left the Secretariat, he replaced Lieutenant-General Reyno as CP. Knowing the constraints of those days, I have always thought that this was one of Allard’s best appointments. To return to Hennessy’s memorandum, the latter categorically denied the rumour I have just described, and went to great pains to demolish it by logic and common sense. He relied, in particular, on extensive passages from Mr. Cadieux’s request to Cabinet. This request, as we have seen, recommended a reasonable program of weighted projects which would create more equitable conditions of service and bilingualism for both anglophones and francophones in the Armed Forces.

Certain activities in support of the bilingual program began to get under way, especially in the personnel field. A few words of French began to appear here and there in directives, orders, and instructions, on signposts, and in the Department’s whole system of information. However, it was discouraging to note that even where the impact of the changes had no consequences for individuals and their careers, understanding and a will to change were lacking. The slightest initiatives were ignored or deflected on the pretext that they involved prohibitive and non-essential costs. I recall the representations that were made to the Director of Transport, suggesting that French be used in the DND manuals on vehicle safety. To avoid dealing with French in his field of action, the Director alleged that this would involve high costs and a
waste of resources. Initially, we should just survey the number of requests for documents in either language. Once the need was established, we could meet the demand for English copies, and for French copies as well if need be. At this time, French translations of English material were often clumsy, did not match accompanying graphics, and lacked the logic of the original. It was not until the Official Languages Act was passed in September, 1969 that we were able to get the Directorate of Transport, and a number of other directorates that were equally remiss, to accept the equality of the English and French languages. And it was only during my second term of appointment, at the Directorate General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism, that we were able to convince our unilingual anglophone colleagues that francophones should design and prepare the French versions of the Department’s visual and written documentation.

Another problem was the French and English nomenclature of units, formations and institutions. In this area, much more controversy occurred than is on the record. Indeed, it has hardly ended even today. Fortunately, my experience as the former Director of Organization at NDHQ was very useful to me. I knew where to go, in this labyrinth, to get information and decisions. Discussion on this matter began in October, when the Chief of Reserves, Major-General Dare, asked the Comptroller General to set up a guideline for the French nomenclature of such military entities as stores, repair shops, communications, etc. (This nomenclature, in the eyes of our anglophone colleagues, was merely a translation). Dare’s request reached me in November, through the Director of Organization (DO). I hastily consulted the Director of Ceremonial, who said that he was indeed responsible for the design of insignia bearing the titles of units. However, he did not want to get involved in any way in developing policy on the language of these titles. I therefore informed the DO that in my opinion, the responsibility refused by the Director of Ceremonial devolved upon him. I also told him that I would act as a counselor in this matter, since my duties at NDHQ did not include any executive power, and I could neither develop nor enact such policies. The reader should understand that I wanted to convince all my col-
leagues, including the Director of Organization, that the establishment of bilingualism in the CAF should be a responsibility of all NDHQ staff, not merely that of the “Bilingual Secretariat”. The DO agreed to do his share of the work and, after looking into the matter, he asked me to sort out the confusion caused by the fact that in some cases, three or four French versions of unit and corps titles were already on file. He also asked me to send him such official translations as were approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff.

I immediately got down to work on this project. In carrying out my task, I enjoyed the invaluable assistance of Major Paul Clavel, at Quebec Region HQ, where CAF manuals were published. Major Clavel had recently proposed, with abbreviations, after extensive study and research on the part of himself and his colleagues, French versions for the titles of staff headquarters positions. Clavel’s team was aware of the difficult problems involved in this sort of adaptation, where standards of concision, clarity and euphony were essential. On March 19, 1968 I submitted a memorandum to General Allard, in which I asked him to designate Clavel’s versions as official. On the very same day, Allard approved the versions submitted by the Quebec Region HQ. The DO published these official titles on April 3, 1978, three months after the deadline requested by Major-General Dare, who, as we have seen, had hoped to obtain a response by January 11, 1968. Despite my great impatience to solve all our problems, I realized that this delay was not excessive. However, policy on the whole area of names and titles was to be held up for some time, in spite of requests from all over.

It became increasingly clear that we had barely scratched the surface of the translation problem with this first foray into the mass of titles that had to be adapted, translated and abbreviated. French terms had to be thought up for trades, classifications and positions in the staff headquarters, and for civilian and military holders of these positions as well. The task was so great and our resources so limited that, initially, all we could do was to try to make people aware of the problem. I remember that one of my last
acts before retiring was to write a memorandum to Lieutenant-General Sharp, VCDS, to inform him of General Allard’s thoughts on the matter. In future, Allard wanted the language of designations and titles for all Armed Forces units to indicate clearly their linguistic and personnel characteristics. For example, the titles 12ᵉ Régiment blindé du Canada and 5ᵉ Régiment d’artillerie légère du Canada distinctively and indelibly identified these regiments as French-speaking units. Such proper names could no longer be translated as “12th Armoured Regiment of Canada” and “5th Light Artillery Regiment of Canada”. The same principle should apply to English-speaking units. Although I did not write that The Royal Canadian Regiment would never become “Le Régiment royal canadien”, it was clearly in my mind. The Royal Canadian Regiment had been and would remain an English-language unit (ELU), with a predominantly anglophone complement. In my memorandum, I also explained that headquarters, schools and service units that were national in character and served both linguistic communities should have titles in French and English, to reflect their role. “Canadian Forces Headquarters” should be known in French as Quartier-général des Forces canadiennes, and “Training Command” as Commandement de l’instruction. Finally, I expressed hope that I had offered Lieutenant-General Sharp a line of conduct that could serve as a basic principle for development of long-term policy in this area.
Reactions of the General Officers Commanding

I have already described how Lieutenant-General Reyno had sent a copy of Major-General Pollard’s letter and study to the GOCs, presumably with his comments. However, I did not say that shortly before, General Allard had personally written the GOCs on the same subject. In any case Major-General R.C. Stovel, Commander of Training Command in Winnipeg, was the first GOC to respond, and to initiate real debate outside NDHQ on bilingualism in the CAF. Stovel sent two letters to the Chief. In the first, dated February 16, he acknowledged receipt of Pollard’s study, and promised to submit his own within the month. In the second letter, which accompanied the promised study and was dated March 12, Stovel displayed little enthusiasm for a philosophical discussion of our plans to promote bilingualism. No observations were offered on the value of Pollard’s study or the worth of its conclusions. Stovel limited his remarks strictly to the problems that he faced in carrying out his duty to provide technical and professional training for francophones in the service. However, he did make good suggestions, and was already launching his own initiatives to meet, in part, the requirements of the Ross Report.

As I explained to General Allard, my great criticism of Major-General Stovel and his advisors at Training Command was that they had completely failed to grasp the needs of francophones.
who no longer wanted to bear the burden of bilingualism in the training and instruction system. The study showed that staff were still planning to increase English-language courses for francophone servicemen, partly to meet the need for bilingual trades instructors, but mainly because a knowledge of English was deemed essential to career advancement. Stovel had no notion of sharing the burden of bilingualism. Consequently, his study did not contemplate any increase in French-language courses for English-speaking military personnel, but only a procedure to fill vacancies for anglophones at the language school.

General Allard expressed his thanks for Stovel’s contribution, and for the time being said nothing about its shortcomings. We continued to await the responses of the other commanders.

It was now the end of February. Major-General Pollard, Commander of Air Defence Command and the first GOC to come out in support of our policies, felt compelled to object to the choice of Bagotville as the location for the first squadron to be equipped with the new CF5 fighter plane. This squadron was to be predominantly a FLU. Major-General Pollard raised several points. In particular, he noted that Bagotville did not have any air firing range. Since the other squadrons to be equipped with CF5s would be stationed at Chatham, why not locate the French unit there as well? It too could benefit from firing ranges within reach of the base. This argument had weight from an operational point of view. However, Pollard was also worried that the new unit would be detrimental to Bagotville’s so-called bilingual Alouette squadron. Francophone pilots themselves, he claimed, saw the program of FLUs as a threat to their right to serve anywhere in the country, not just in Quebec. Unfortunately, Pollard did not seem inclined to discourage this mistaken attitude, which was harmful to our programs. The General was also wrong to state that Bagotville was a bilingual base. Though 44 per cent of Bagotville’s personnel were so-called French speakers, the working language of the base was English, and its operations unquestionably reflected the predominance of English, which was everywhere to be found in Canadian military aviation at the time.
Pollard’s comments suggested that our programs might be seriously distorted. I therefore sent a memorandum to Lieutenant-General Sharp, VCDS, in which I tried to refute Pollard’s arguments and to advance our own viewpoint. In the first place, I noted that the primary role of the squadron was to support ground units. Since these were stationed at Valcartier, the squadron could operate more effectively from Bagotville than from Chatham. Secondly, the survival of the Alouette squadron was hardly threatened by the establishment of the new FLU, since the former had a very different function, namely all-weather interception. If enough francophone replacements were made available, the new unit would indeed help the Alouette squadron to improve its rather poor image as one that was bilingual in name only. Finally, I reiterated current thinking that to ensure the predominantly French character of a unit, 70 per cent of its personnel had to be francophone. I mentioned that this principle had been endorsed by Mr. Cadieux in his request to the Cabinet, and by the Ross Report. The new French-language units would also help to keep francophones in the service, and to gradually increase their numbers. Tactful staffing would, of course, be necessary to protect the interests of both individuals and the Forces as a whole.

On April 2, 1968, Mr. Cadieux announced the decision to form a French-language squadron at Bagotville, which would be equipped with CF5 fighters. This decision was greeted with satisfaction, at least in the “Bilingual Secretariat”.

The second contribution to reach us came from Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson, Commander of Mobile Command. Anderson was a rather enigmatic figure, and his stance on bilingualism was unclear. What always came to mind for me personally was his wet blanket attitude to the initiatives and enthusiasms of Colonel Marcel Richard, commander of CFB Valcartier, who wanted at all costs to make French the working language of his base. I will have more to say about this conflict later on. Before Anderson left the Armed Forces in August, 1969 he had become much more sympathetic to the cause of bilingualism. He even made a serious attempt to learn French, and in the company of
francophones, he distinguished himself by his efforts to talk to them in their language. Later on, I felt that Anderson, as President of the RMC Club, had not seriously opposed the establishment of bilingualism at the College. However, we still do not know to what extent he supported the highly controversial changes that were introduced at RMC. I hope that historians will study Anderson’s role when they investigate the conversion of RMC into a bilingual institution.

I return to Lieutenant-General Anderson’s letter, which arrived at NDHQ on March 27. Like Major-General Stovel, Anderson was not prepared to go along with Major-General Pollard’s ideas on bilingualism. He claimed that the position of Mobile Command was different from that of the Air Force, because of the concentration of francophones at Valcartier. His comments, observations and conclusions reflected his concept of bilingualism and how he wanted to apply it in his command, especially at Valcartier. Anderson seemed not to grasp the significance of the plan to set up units and bases where French would be the predominant, and hence the working language. For example, he still thought that English-speaking personnel with a meager knowledge of French could be assigned to Valcartier, though this would only maintain the status quo.

General Allard felt that Anderson was confused on this issue. As I drafted Allard’s letter of reply to Anderson, I tried hard to express his thought clearly, defining such terms as “bilingual”, “bilingualism” and “bilingual units”. Allard did not want units or bases to be bilingual. He wanted either French or English to predominate and to be the working language, but he did not want them both to be used in this way at the same time. It would, of course, be necessary to identify positions to be held by people who were bilingual to some extent. Allard hoped Anderson would understand that the Valcartier base had to change its orientation, and clearly demonstrate that it was a French-language entity. Such bilingualism as there was at Valcartier should work in both directions, and involve bilingual anglophones as well. Allard also reminded Anderson that while he supported bilingualism in the
Armed Forces, he would not tolerate any transfer of FLUs into English-speaking regions unless he was assured that these areas could provide adequate educational services in French.

On April 10, we received the response of Vice-Admiral J.C. O’Brien, head of Maritime Command in Halifax. Commander Pierre Simard had laboured effectively as a missionary to his Halifax colleagues, and as a result, O’Brien’s observations and recommendations were generally positive; considering the traditionalist and rigid outlook of personnel in the Navy, they could even be called encouraging. However, O’Brien emphasized that his command was different from the others. None of his units were in Quebec or other French-language areas, and in his view, this meant no shore-based francophone units for his command. In his roundabout way, however, O’Brien was prepared to admit that a bilingual destroyer was possible. He never spoke of a French-language ship. In his conception, a bilingual destroyer would have a crew consisting of 80 per cent bilingual sailors (presumably francophones) and 20 per cent unilingual sailors (presumably anglophones). However, O’Brien stressed that the concept of a French ship raised the spectre of separatism and special status in people’s minds. Sailors would rather serve aboard a bilingual destroyer than on a so-called “French ship”.

Vice-Admiral O’Brien further stated that apart from the bilingual destroyer, Maritime Command could not do much to promote bilingualism in operational terms. However, much could be done to create a climate and atmosphere that would foster bilingualism. For example, sailors could take trades training in French up to a certain level, the right to French-language dependants’ education could be upheld, and social clubs could be organized for the francophone community. O’Brien thought that naval discipline could be administered in English or French, but that if French was used, francophone officers should be present to help the accused make themselves understood. Immersion language courses should be available to all, and especially to anglophone sailors who would serve on the so-called bilingual destroyer.
Vice-Admiral O’Brien’s comments on our plan for bilingualism gave some hope that the designation of destroyer HMCS Ottawa as a FLU was finally going to become a reality in the Canadian Navy. It was commonly known that Allard had already appointed his military aide, Commander Pierre Simard, as the first captain of this ship.

Simard’s missionary work, to which I have already alluded, deserves further comment here. Simard was a career officer with more than twenty years’ experience at sea; he was fluently bilingual, and a highly respectable and respected sailor. He was thus an excellent choice for captain of the Ottawa, a crucial element in our program. Simard had no illusions about his proposed appointment, and was well aware of the difficulties he would have to overcome if his FLU ship were to be accepted and be able to sail with other naval units. He therefore asked General Allard to let him go to Halifax in mid-March. In Halifax, he sounded out the currents and countercurrents on bilingualism, tried to disarm its outright opponents, and pleaded in favour of the FLU destroyer. He met with some success in gaining goodwill and understanding for our project, and even made some allies. This is shown by Vice-Admiral O’Brien’s letter to General Allard, discussed above, and by the official report that Simard made to General Allard when he returned from Halifax.

I was personally encouraged by this episode, which seemed to show that the outlook of naval personnel was beginning to change for the better. Naturally, Simard’s breakthrough at Halifax and Vice-Admiral O’Brien’s blessing were necessary for the naval personnel at NDHQ to adopt a more conciliatory posture. One of these was Commodore D.S. Boyle, Director General of Careers and Postings, who, in my opinion, could have made life very difficult for us, but instead gave us invaluable assistance. He published a directive to the members of his division, in which he declared his support for the bilingualism programs, spelled out realistic and applicable guidelines for his managers, and exhorted them to act with competence to meet the requirements of our plans. Boyle wanted his division to be perceived as a dynamic
“can do” organization. The Commodore and I were to cross paths in future, during my second appointment to NDHQ in the cause of bilingualism. I would never have to complain of his lack of comprehension. Indeed, he would one day become my boss, and we would work together to solve certain problems affecting bilingual personnel at the Department. I shall never forget that it was thanks to Boyle that the system of promotion was structured to ensure a fairer distribution of opportunities for advancement in the Armed Forces. This, however, is a subject that I shall chronicle later on.

On April 11 Major-General R.P. Rothschild, Commander of Materiel Command, let General Allard know what he thought of our plans for bilingualism. “The Baron”, as he was known in military circles, displayed a somewhat ambivalent attitude, in which he unfortunately was not alone. He was very preoccupied with computer systems and their application to information storage, and with the problems of monitoring and distributing the whole range of military equipment. According to Rothschild, the fact that everything had been done in English to date showed that we had very little flexibility for trying to put French into the system. He was not particularly in favour of assigning francophones to Quebec for long periods of time. He thought that people should be transferred to Quebec early in their careers, once their training had been completed. This would enable them to broaden their experience, and would help the CAF to reduce opposition to change among its personnel. For these reasons, Major-General Rothschild did not foresee any possibility of establishing FLUs in his command. However, units in the Montreal region could accommodate more francophones or bilingual anglophones.

In acknowledging receipt of Rothschild’s letter on April 24, General Allard returned to the main themes of our programs and of the problems involved in their implementation. He assured Major-General Rothschild that he was determined to find solutions to our problems, to present these solutions to the Defence Council, and to make sure that our bilingualism programs were gradually introduced as resources became available.
Major-General A.C. Hull’s response to Major-General Pol-
lard’s ideas finally reached us on April 26. Hull, the head of Air
Transport Command, was the last of the GOCs to join in the de-
bate. His comments were also the most negative of all. He began
by admitting that our program objectives were valid, but objected
to the means proposed to attain them. More specifically, he op-
posed the establishment of FLUs. He argued that such a policy
was to ‘be feared, since its effect would be to divide, rather than
unite, the CAF. Francophones assigned to such locations as
Bagotville, Val d’Or, Moisie, Mont Apica, La Macaza and Chi-
bougamau might think such postings typical of the misfortunes
that dogged them for most of their career. This unlucky lot would
befall, in particular, some francophone dependants who, educated
in English, would not always be able to continue their studies in
that language, especially at the secondary level. Unfortunately,
Hull virtually ignored the plight of the many francophones who
were serving outside Quebec, and could not even envisage the
opportunity of providing their children with elementary courses in
French.

Major-General Hull suggested that instead of creating FLUs,
we should maintain the status quo. Bilingual positions should ex-
ist in Quebec-based units, especially at the senior staff level.
These positions should not to be exclusively reserved for franco-
phones, but made available to anglophones as well. Where the
most suitable candidate for such a position was unilingual, he
should be given a chance to learn French before taking up his ap-
pointment. To demonstrate the worth of his theory, Hull referred
to the case of Colonel R.F. Herbert, the bilingual anglophone
commander of Bagotville. He claimed that of all the commanders
at Bagotville, including a French Canadian, Herbert had suc-
cceeded best at promoting a climate of goodwill between the per-
sonnel of his base and the surrounding community. Hull also sug-
gested that all military be given a chance to indicate their posting
preferences on their personnel record. This information should be
computerized and kept up to date.

In conclusion, Hull declared that his suggestions would pro-
mote bilingualism, not unilingualism, and would avoid the political repercussions that would result from the establishment of additional FLUs.

On May 16, General Allard signed a letter that I had prepared in reply to Hull’s comments. I was pleased that my letter was not censored, for I had made a considerable effort to dispel any misunderstandings. I noted that there was no question of setting up so-called bilingual (or as I called them, “hybrid”) units in the CAF. On the other hand, I stated that we were contemplating units where the predominant language, and hence the language of work, would be either English or French, but not both. On the subject of careers, I assured Hull that promotions for both, anglophones and francophones, would be just and equitable and would be granted on the basis of merit. In the same vein, I confirmed that transfers would reflect our concern to balance the interests of the CAF against the need of its personnel to live in an environment where the educational and cultural services they required were available. Political repercussions, I noted, were the responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who had surely considered them before approving our programs.

Everyone, I insisted, should understand that the CAF had an important role to play in promoting national unity, and that because of their discipline and organization, we could count on them to support bilingualism programs. In conclusion, I tried to allay Hull’s fears by having General Allard say that he did not intend to set up FLUs in Hull’s command for the time being. However, the Chief advised Hull to support our programs by getting more French-speaking aviators for the units at CFB Uplands, in the National Capital.

As the reader has no doubt noted, I attached great importance to the GOCs’ attitudes regarding the Chief’s new policies and intentions. I hoped for a favourable consensus, which would make it unnecessary to impose a program as controversial and hotly contested as bilingualism in the CAF. However, this was not my only concern in the spring of 1968. Having reached May 16 in
describing the reply to General Hull, I must now go back in time to recount the other important activities and initiatives in which I was involved in my capacity as coordinator for implementing bilingualism at the Department.
VI

The Cabinet’s Decision and
Mr. Pearson’s Concerns

We have already discussed the request that Mr. Cadieux made to the Cabinet in January, 1968 regarding programs to improve the bilingual character of the CAF. This request, approved in principle on March 12, was reviewed in a letter that Prime Minister Pearson sent Mr. Cadieux on March 21, 1968. Though addressed to a francophone colleague, it was written in English. I think this is proof positive that Pearson had written an important letter, and wanted it to be properly understood by the bulk of the military, since he normally communicated with Cadieux in French. In any case, Pearson got right to the point. He said that the guidelines for implementing the new programs must remain unchanged, at least until one of his successors as Prime Minister should decide to amend them. Pearson recalled the great importance he attached to our program objectives of promoting bilingualism and keeping French Canadians in the Armed Forces. He acknowledged that measures to keep francophones in the Forces, and to set up FLUs for this purpose, would for the most part be implemented in Quebec to start with. Eventually, however, the principle should be extended to Canada as a whole. While operational efficiency would remain the primary criterion for locating bases and units, national political considerations of a socio-economic nature should also be taken into account, as secondary but important factors.
Turning to the subject of how to expand bilingualism, Pearson discussed the language ratios that were appropriate for staffing predominantly anglophone or francophone units. In his view, speakers of the minority language should never comprise less than one fifth of a unit’s personnel. He qualified this remark by saying that 30 per cent would be a reasonable figure for parachute units. He acknowledged that the Armed Forces would have trouble in attaining these standards, and that as long as the number of French-speaking Canadians did not meet established requirements, set proportions of this kind could not be reached. Initially, however, the interests of francophone military personnel could be served by assigning them to English-language units (ELUs) that had the best cultural atmosphere and the finest facilities for education in French.

In conclusion, Pearson insisted on the unique role that the CAF, supported by the new bilingual program, could play in applying the principles of his statement of April 6, 1966. However, this program should not give the impression of fostering the creation of two groups in the CAF that would be distinguished by language and separated by geography. This was, of course, a mistaken interpretation of the Government’s intention. However, I recall that during my second appointment at the DND, I had to make great efforts to reassure people and to dispel the fears of those who foresaw this outcome. For the time being, Mr. Pearson charged the Minister, the Deputy Minister and the CDS to be on guard against any such orientation and vigorously oppose it.

On April 1, 1968, despite Pearson’s warnings, General Allard made public CDS Message 39, which dealt with the new program of bilingualism for the CAF. And on April 2, Mr. Cadieux authorized a press release on the same subject. The CDS’s message is, in my opinion, the most important communication on bilingualism in the CAF to appear in the 1960s, and marks a major turning point. Allard advised all CAF units, wherever located in the world, that the Canadian Government had approved a basic program designed to promote bilingualism and to keep French Canadians in the Forces. He began by saying that the success of this
program would depend on the leadership of senior staff and their subordinates. He then described his conception of CAF responsibilities regarding national unity. The Armed Forces, devoted as they were to the service of their country, should play a worthwhile role in this area. All commanders should support the program, and oversee its implementation. Allard also mentioned some criticisms of the program: a lack of professionally trained people, especially in the higher ranks; the segregation of anglophones and francophones; and the restriction of assignments to the Quebec region. He admitted that there were problems to be faced, and mentioned certain measures to overcome them: balanced staffing in terms of anglophone and francophone personnel, spread out over a longer period; a general increase in the Forces, to allow the use of human resources throughout the country; and guaranteed career advancement for francophones, even if the attainment of our objectives had to be delayed.

Allard’s message also repeated the text of the press release that Cadieux made public the next day, on April 2. In this release, the Government’s decisions were described, and the authorization of the following items was noted: the formation of a predominantly French CF5 squadron at Bagotville; the establishment of a destroyer at Halifax with the same linguistic system; the formation of an airborne regiment, located outside Quebec, whose personnel would be 30 per cent Francophone; and finally, the establishment of a French-language trades training centre at St. Jean, Quebec. Though Cadieux’s statements were generally positive, I could not help but deplore the fact that he felt compelled to set up obstacles to the use of French in the CAF. Perhaps a misguided concern for the efficiency of operational communications had led him to say, in speaking of units where French would predominate: “The Forces will continue to use English above the level of the unit, and Air Force units where French is the predominant language will also use English”. This restriction continued to exist in the Armed Forces even after the promulgation of the Official Languages Act, and I would spend many years trying to eliminate it during my second appointment at the DND.
Cadieux’s press release and Allard’s message to his commanders were the public reflection of a process begun some time ago. I was pleased to have contributed to setting up this first milestone on the road to institutional bilingualism in the Forces. Plans would now be defined and their implementation would follow; at least this is what I believed. In reality, much time would be spent in planning, and even more in implementing.

The month of April got off to a fast start as far as our programs of bilingualism were concerned. The Government’s approval was followed by the public statement of the Minister of Defence and CDS Message 39, which I have just discussed. These events were to be followed by others that were equally important. Allard asked Cadieux to approve the formation of the Airborne Regiment, which he did with a stroke of his pen on April 4, 1967. However, in his request, the General advised the Minister that he had designated Edmonton as the base for this regiment, and that a third of the regiment’s personnel would be temporarily stationed at CFB Valcartier, until such time as francophones in the regiment could be assured that education in French was available for their children. I shall later return to this problem, and to the compromise that resulted from it.

April 4 is also memorable because on this day, General Allard sent the Minister a long memorandum, warning him against the orientation that Mr. Pearson wanted to give to the programs of bilingualism in the Forces. A few days before, the General had received a copy of Pearson’s famous letter of March 21, in which the Prime Minister expressed his thoughts in English. I have never known why General Allard, after speaking to me briefly about this letter, sent it to Brigadier-General Henri Tellier, Director of Planning at NDHQ. Tellier, after analyzing the letter, had a response to the Minister drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Lafrence, of his office. I was called upon to co-author this memorandum, because I knew about the discussions and dealings between the Minister and the General on the one hand, and between the General and his colleagues on the other.
The memorandum was signed by the General on April 4 and reached the Minister the same day. It emphasized the dilemma posed by the contradictions and unworkable conditions of the Pearson concept. In the first place, General Allard stated that he had supported the program presented to Cabinet because it represented a compromise that he thought could be applied with discretion. But now Mr. Pearson was laying down conditions and guidelines that would be an immediate and serious obstacle to this program in practice. Allard, who felt duty bound to mention these obstacles, began by attacking Pearson’s concept that the principle of two working languages, as embodied in the predominantly French-language and English-language units, should be extended to the entire country. Allard viewed this concept as unworkable in 1968. He thought it might be possible later on, if facilities for French-language education were developed across the country, and the cultural climate was right. In the meantime, he thought that only Quebec could meet these requirements. However, the destroyer at Halifax could be an exception, since the Navy only operated on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

In regard to the statement that the criterion of military efficiency should take priority in the location of units and bases, Allard declared that in peacetime, unless there was an emergency, it was not acceptable to transplant a FLU onto English-speaking territory. He remarked that assignments of English-speaking military personnel to ELUs in the Province of Quebec were not particularly sought after, despite a very favourable atmosphere and existing facilities for education in English.

General Allard also challenged the principle of quotas in support of bilingualism, which required that a fifth of the personnel of a unit always be speakers of the minority language. He repeated the arguments about the absence of culture and of facilities for education outside Quebec. He insisted that these facilities should be such as to enable a French-speaking person who made use of them to be admitted unconditionally to a French-language university. He did not want any so-called “French classes”, which in his eyes were a veiled method that the Air Force had used to
anglicize francophone children without too much fuss. In writing this memorandum, I had the impression that Lieutenant-Colonel Lafrance could not be objective, having himself had the experience of “French classes” for his children. Still on the subject of a quota system for minority-language personnel, the General referred to cultural atmosphere, mentioning in particular French newspapers and films. He added that it was most unlikely that this atmosphere could be found outside Quebec.

Finally, Allard discussed implementation priorities, saying that they should be directed towards staffing Quebec units with francophone personnel. For the moment, francophones should not be assigned to units outside Quebec. Allard said he was confident that bilingualism would make headway among anglophones, and would make conditions of service more equitable and acceptable in regard to language, schooling and culture. In conclusion, he stated that to deal with these problems, personnel management procedures would have to be gradually transformed, without hitches if possible. Any other course of action would only result in the dispersal of francophones, and would threaten the success of the program. It was thus necessary to make up for the lack of francophone military personnel, to recruit them in larger numbers, and to ensure their presence in the Forces in the same proportion as that of French Canadians in the country’s population as a whole.

In Mr. Pearson’s letter of March 21, 1968 and in this memorandum, the entire dilemma of the CAF is revealed. The Government feared geographical polarization of the two language groups and, to overcome it, favoured cross country groupings. General Allard feared the dispersion of Francophone resources, with its attendant assimilation, especially if the promise that francophones would be able to educate their children in French was not fulfilled.
VII

Directives of the Chief of the Defence Staff; Preparation of the Implementation Plans

After General Allard’s memorandum had been sent to Mr. Cadieux, we at the “Bilingual Secretariat” felt that serious things were happening at the Cabinet level. We thought that Cadieux must have felt trapped between his Prime Minister and his Chief of Defence, and must surely have discussed Allard’s lack of enthusiasm for the conditions that Pearson wished to impose on the program. I did not dare inquire with the General about the status of our project, and Tellier, with whom I had spoken, had not been able to enlighten me. I nonetheless saw fit to prepare a draft directive, to trigger the process of planning and implementing the program. I must have been inspired, since Cadieux, after a last visit to the “Hill”, sent the CDS a memorandum on April 11, 1968. This memorandum described Cabinet’s decision on the Minister’s projects, which was accompanied by Pearson’s conditions, and authorized the Chief to carry out the program as defined.

On the next day, if I rightly recall, the General summoned me to his office to discuss the program in the presence of the VCDS. It was agreed that a written directive would guide detailed planning of the program, and that the VCDS would sign this docu-
ment. Why Lieutenant-General Sharp? It was a matter, no doubt, of internal strategy, and of placing General Allard in reserve to settle more serious problems.

On April 16, five days after approval was given by Mr. Cadieux, Lieutenant-General Sharp signed the document I had written with, of course, contributions from all members of the Secretariat. This document contained the guidelines of an *avant-garde* program of bilingualism for the Armed Forces. As radical as this program might have appeared when it came on the scene, it remained reasonable and workable. Today, the substance of this program, with some modifications, continues to be applied and carried out with a success proportional to the effort and resources devoted to it. This is why I wish to recall, in some detail, the highlights of the major guidelines in the document, as well as certain considerations relating to them.

**Structure of the Armed Forces:**

The personnel of the Armed Forces was to be 28 per cent bilingual. I should note here that in 1968, a bilingual person was a Canadian whose native language was French and who possessed a certain mastery of English. In fact the statistics, which are admittedly poor, revealed that such people were the only ones, with rare exceptions, who could adequately speak both languages.

**Bilingual Positions:**

New criteria had to be defined to identify bilingual positions on the basis of concepts stated in the Pearson declaration of April, 1966. The contribution required of French Canadians to fill bilingual positions also had to be balanced, seeing that they only accounted for 16 per cent of Armed Forces personnel.

**Linguistic Evaluation of Resources:**

It was necessary to determine the actual language skills of people who spoke French, to make sure that staffing of bilingual positions would be done in accordance with their linguistic requirements. This measure was aimed especially at anglophones in
the service who claimed to have some knowledge of the French language.

**Use of Resources:**

Once the competence of bilingual resources had been established and their quantity determined, they had to be used rationally, in accordance with certain priorities. This step gave rise to misunderstandings, and General Allard had to intervene. The task of Allard and his successors in this area was to become more complicated later on, especially after the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL) came on the scene, and the Minister began to interfere in the face of political repercussions.

**French Courses:**

Servicemen and women who spoke French, but had worked primarily in English throughout their career, had to be given the opportunity to recover their French-language skills. We also had to think about giving French courses to dependants, especially the wives of anglophone military personnel who were serving in French-speaking regions. We were likewise thinking of the wives of francophone servicemen, who had had to face the problem of communication for so many years. However, administrative difficulties, and especially the question of priorities, long prevented us from meeting their needs.

**Language Training in General:**

More anglophones had to be found to fill bilingual positions. It was unjust that francophones should continue to bear, almost alone, the burden of bilingual positions. This situation was harmful to their careers, and would become so for their English-language colleagues. At this moment in the development of bilingualism, it was not possible to make French-language courses compulsory for anglophone military personnel. However, it was essential to motivate them, and to give them the opportunity to learn French in the best possible conditions. The lack of francophone teachers and bilingual instructors, and the inadequacy of our language school, were urgent problems that had to be solved.
Rational promotion of bilingualism in the Armed Forces demanded that we change the direction of language instruction, and put the emphasis on French language courses. While continuing to offer English-language courses, which would always remain essential for most francophones in the service, the Canadian Forces Language School (CFLS) had to be restructured and reoriented to meet its new responsibilities.

**French as a Working Language:**

French would become a working language in the Armed Forces if its use was required for administrative and operational communications. It was thus essential to create functional structures that would provide opportunities for people to use French in a logical and useful manner. This was why the Government’s new program had authorized the establishment of predominantly French-language bases and units. This would ensure a good return on the effort and money invested in them.

**Dependants’ Education:**

Children of Francophones posted outside Quebec had to be given the same educational opportunities as the children of anglophones assigned to Quebec. Generally speaking, the Quebec school system met the needs of the anglophone community. However, if similar advantages were not available to francophones posted to English-speaking areas, provincial authorities in charge of education would have to be approached, so that the situation could be remedied. The objective was to obtain elementary and secondary educational services that would allow unfettered access to the French universities of Quebec.

**Recruiting:**

Because of the difference between the numbers of anglophone and francophone personnel, we had to think of changing recruiting quotas to obtain a better linguistic balance. For example, it seemed perfectly reasonable that priority be given to recruiting francophone sailors for the FLU destroyer at Halifax.
In addition to dealing with the most important elements of our program, the document also mentioned the need for French editors/revisors and for greater translation resources. It referred to the preparation of glossaries of French military terms, which was already underway, and to an English-French dictionary of these terms. Finally, because of the importance and urgency of the bilingual program, the document contemplated cancelling or delaying programs of lesser importance, if budgetary or financial considerations made this necessary. Such were the guidelines that this document, signed by Lieutenant-General Sharp, gave to the heads of the major NDHQ directorates, in regard to the formulation of the implementation plans and directives required by the program.

The document had only just been placed in the hands of senior staff at the Department when Lieutenant-General Sharp appointed Major-General Dare, the Chief of Reserves, as coordinator responsible for preparing a plan to implement the bilingualism program. The first meeting of interested persons was called for April 25, 1968. Unfortunately, I did not attend this meeting, as I had not been invited. This oversight was soon corrected, and Major-General Dare personally asked me to participate in the deliberations of his committee, as an advisor and observer for the CDS.

The first meeting amounted only to an initial contact among the representatives of the senior HQ chiefs. The agenda of the Committee’s activities was explained to them, and their contributions were solicited. Major-General Dare asked each officer to prepare a clear and precise document, setting out the measures to be taken in his area of responsibility. I attended the second meeting, which took place on May 13, and it seemed to me that progress had been made since the first meeting. For one thing, the rank and importance of the members of the group were higher, which I felt was significant. Despite the worries that this commotion aroused in the private preserves of my anglophone colleagues, I had the impression that bilingualism at the Department was really going to get under way at last. Little did I realize that
for some years, our gains in this area were to be largely on paper.

At the second meeting, I found myself in disagreement with important colleagues, namely Commodore F.D. Elcock, representative of the Comptroller General, and Brigadier-General A. Laubman, who represented the Chief of Personnel. I liked Elcock, who had been my boss when I was Director of Organization in the Comptroller General’s office. Laubman I hardly knew, but he was said to be inflexible. At the meeting, he insisted on knowing Elcock’s proposal in detail before presenting his own. I understood his position. Elcock was the guardian of the Forces’ integrity through Establishments Control, the rigid system of rules that governed virtually every aspect of military personnel management. Elcock explained that the Comptroller General saw our program as having two objectives: to promote bilingualism, and to keep francophones in the Forces. The first objective would be attained, he said, by designating bilingual positions in the establishments, according to defined criteria. The second would be reached through personnel management policies governing the recruitment, training and advancement of francophones. I thought Elcock’s position made sense, especially when he spoke of a quota of 28 per cent of francophones to be distributed through all CAF establishments. However, he said nothing about designating specific positions to meet this 28 per cent, which I found unrealistic. I wanted to ensure a 28 per cent francophone participation by means of designated bilingual positions. In contrast, Elcock insisted that a position be designated bilingual only if French and English were both recognized as necessary for carrying out the duties it involved. This difference of opinion, I felt, was creating a deadlock.

Laubman did not want to modify the existing measures and procedures, which allowed personnel managers to exercise broad discretion in making assignments, transfers and especially promotions. He constantly upheld the need to preserve the integrity of the existing merit system. Under this system, positions were supposed to be filled by the best possible candidates. Linguistic requirements were of secondary importance, and were usually ig-
nored in the selection process. An individual’s right to advancement was determined solely on the basis of merit, of which his bilingual capability was a minor component. It was, indeed, obvious why this system had always favoured anglophone supremacy, and had made the Forces so unattractive for francophones who aspired to a career in the military. It was necessary to throw off the shackles of this merit system, and I took pains to emphasize the injustice of the situation. At this and subsequent meetings, I realized that I was caught between Elcock’s position and that of Laubman. However, I was determined to push for the designation of bilingual positions in the establishments up to a level of 28 per cent. This figure represented the proportion of francophones in Canada’s population, according to the most recent census. In addition, I knew that it was very important to give personnel managers precise and prescribed objectives for assignments and promotions. The people who carried out orders in the military bureaucracy, to which I belonged, understood only one thing as always: “go by the book”.

Since our program of bilingualism was generating problems and worries, Major-General Dare was happy to receive these various comments, which he found necessary and useful. However, he insisted that both sides come to grips with measures, methods, quotas, timetables, manpower needs and financial requirements, in short with all the elements essential to a concrete and realistic plan.

The next meeting was to take place on June 10. This would give enough time to the staff who had to draft the proposals of the Chief of Personnel, the Comptroller General and others. But Major-General Dare, who was growing impatient, requested that a first draft of our plan also be prepared and submitted to the Committee at the third meeting.

At the third meeting, which I attended, I managed to gain acceptance for the document containing my detailed comments on the Chief of Personnel’s contribution to the first draft of the plan. Major-General Laubman promised me that his managers would
examine my observations attentively, and I was able to note with satisfaction that my colleagues’ attitude had become slightly less negative. Laubman spoke of making a place for consideration of bilingualism in the definition of merit criteria. Elcock, who represented the Comptroller General, said that he was ready to contemplate broadening the application of the identification criteria for bilingual positions, in order to reach the objective of a 28 per cent participation rate for francophones. Though some goodwill existed on both sides, people still hoped that bilingualism would change nothing in the evaluation and promotion process. Among the aberrations I had noted in my remarks to Laubman, the definition of bilingualism clearly illustrated the situation. The Chief of Personnel wanted this definition to cover individuals who showed a willingness to become bilingual at public expense, within a reasonable period of time. Such persons, he claimed, could be assigned to a bilingual position.

It is obvious that in practice, such an interpretation would have allowed personnel managers to postpone the obligation to find or train qualified candidates for bilingual positions. Unilingual persons could have been assigned to bilingual positions, in complete disregard of language requirements, on all sorts of pretexts: the need for promotion or broader experience, career relevance, etc.

It was now July 5, 1968. In fifteen days, I would leave the Forces to go into retirement. Nevertheless, I seized this last opportunity to further Major-General Dare’s project by offering what I felt was constructive criticism of the second draft plan to implement bilingualism in the Forces. I said that because of the worries and fears that the program had aroused, the plan had been structured with many exceptions to the rule and misinterpretations. These qualifications gave the plan too much flexibility and virtually guaranteed the status quo, despite the need for change and new directions in the management and training of personnel. I noted in particular that we had to define the level of bilingualism for positions in terms of the functions they involved, and set reasonable deadlines for reaching these levels. Terms like “as soon
as possible” and “at the first opportunity”, which were used to qualify deadlines, were not acceptable. They were evasions that revealed a lack of rigour and determination to help bring about a change in attitudes.

I knew what was worrying my anglophone colleagues, who were mostly unilingual. They knew that the obligation to designate 28 per cent of military positions as bilingual would surely favour the advancement of francophones, whose primary qualification, they considered, was precisely bilingualism. To eliminate this perceived danger, the Chief of Personnel had thought of interpreting the 28 per cent rule to mean that bilingual positions would be filled by anglophones in a proportion of 20 per cent, the remaining 8 per cent being attributed to francophones. This reasoning, I said, was unrealistic in view of the fact that most Francophones in the service were bilingual, or were forced to become so. The new program aimed at rectifying this situation by allowing a unilingual francophone to rise to the rank of sergeant among non-commissioned officers, and perhaps that of major among officers.

I also deplored the absence of precise timetables and objectives for our various activities. I recalled that the Public Service had just declared its intention to follow a timetable in the development of its program, and I felt that the Armed Forces should do the same. I emphasized that French and English should be the languages of communication in the various headquarters and other entities that commanded French-language units. I likewise said that our military attachés should be bilingual, to represent the country more effectively and reflect Canadian reality.

Another very important consideration was the training of francophone officers. In the draft plan that I was criticizing, the new policy stated that officers should be trained in French only for service in the infantry, the artillery, and the armoured corps. As for those who were to serve in the Air Force and the Navy, anglicization would be their lot from the beginning to the end of their career. I energetically opposed this major obstacle to the
principle of equality of opportunity for the two linguistic communities, and hastened to add that the Commission’s recommendations required that the Government make the Collège militaire royal de St-Jean a predominantly French-language institution, with university programs in French.

Without saying so in writing, I was delighted to see at last, in this second draft of the plan, that bilingualism was to become a factor in the evaluation of their merit. On the other hand, I was sorry to note that the Comptroller General, the Chief of Personnel and Major-General Dare continued to be confused and indecisive about the concrete means that had to be adopted to reach the two major goals of the program: to keep francophones in the Forces and to promote bilingualism.

In reading this account, the reader might get the impression that in the period that followed the Pearson declaration of April, 1966, only Mr. Cadieux, General Allard and Colonels Ross and Letellier were really concerned about the status of francophones and of bilingualism at the Department of National Defence. Nothing could be more unfair than to omit mention of other colleagues. That is why, without extolling their merits, I shall recall their names and mention their participation. Brigadier-General B.J. Guimond worked to organize training in French for tradespeople and for our young officers. His efforts were to lead eventually to the famous Francotrain program, which I shall discuss in Part Two of this study. Brigadier-General Henri Tellier and Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Lafrance were both involved in operations planning at the Department, and were induced, as I have mentioned, to enter into the discussions on the principles of the program. In Deputy Minister Armstrong’s quarter, Mr. Roger Lavergne and his assistants, Lieutenant-Colonel Morin and Major Louis Noël de Tilly, dealt with policy and problems affecting dependants’ education, and with the organization of language courses outside the Department. In March of 1968, Lavergne also became chairman of an advisory committee on bilingualism at the Department. He was the first person to confront the necessity of coordinating the development and implementation of bilingual
policies applicable to the two major groups in the Department, the civilians and the military. On this committee, I represented the CDS, and acted as bilingual secretary. I only attended a few meetings of this committee before my retirement, and did so without much enthusiasm. I felt that this committee, which reported to the Deputy Minister, was a tool that Mr. Armstrong hoped to use, if not to control, at least to influence the decisions of the Armed Forces in the area of bilingualism. When one got to know Mr. Armstrong, who was a cautious and conservative administrator of the old school, and had held his position for many years, one understood his reluctance to endorse the initiatives of a dynamic and impatient leader like General Allard. However that may be, I conscientiously made my contribution to the deliberations of the committee.

I also wish to mention the contribution of the members of the “Bilingual Secretariat”. One of them in particular, whom I shall always remember, was Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Fournier. At the time, he was the prime mover in the overhaul of the military dictionary. I was to find Jean Fournier at my side again at the beginning of my second appointment to the DND in the service of bilingualism. At the appropriate time, I shall describe the role that he played in convincing me to return to the DND in 1971. There was also Major Paul Clavel, who made his contribution to translation and to military terminology. Before I left the Secretariat, I had to convince General Allard and the Department of the Secretary of State to merge our division of French-language CAF editions and manuals, located at Quebec City, with the translation department there. Paul Clavel was thus able to give the Armed Forces the benefit of his expertise in publishing and military translation long after he had left the service.

Major Paul Tremblay was one of the most useful members of the “Bilingual Secretariat”, because of his tact and diplomacy. Like Jean Fournier and myself, he was an officer of the Royal 22e Régiment. He had the knack of writing memoranda to NDHQ managers in such a way as to encourage positive action and goodwill towards our initiatives. I sent Tremblay to Edmonton
with Mr. C. Régimbal, of Mr. Lavergne’s office, to prepare an evaluation and report on resources available there for providing French-language education to the children of military personnel assigned to the Airborne Regiment. This mission was accomplished, unfortunately with the results I have described above. General Allard decided to keep the francophones of the Regiment and their families at Valcartier. Colonel Morin, who by now had replaced Lavergne as Director General of Dependants’ Education at the Department, has shed some light on this affair in his own study, DND Dependants’ Schools, 1921-1983, published by the Directorate of History in 1986.

These officers, who all held positions at NDHQ in Ottawa, were not the only francophones who worked to encourage initiatives for the promotion of bilingualism, and to favour full participation of francophones in military life. Outside NDHQ, Colonel Marcel Richard, commander at Valcartier, laboured unceasingly to make his base a truly French-language entity. Richard’s zeal even brought him into conflict with his superior, Lieutenant-General Anderson, head of Mobile Command. Anderson, whose ambivalent attitude I have already discussed, and who took a very dim view of the energy and enthusiasm that Richard devoted to promoting French at Valcartier. He reproached Richard for turning this promotion into a real crusade, and I remember hearing that he summoned Richard to his HQ at Montreal to tell him to moderate his campaign, and to remind him that English was the official working language of the Armed Forces. Colonel Richard, whom I had the opportunity to congratulate and encourage in his undertaking, was not intimidated, and did not allow his soldier’s loyalty to blind him to the mission he had made his own. He subsequently acted with greater tact, but still continued to be the pioneer and the pillar that was so greatly needed at Valcartier, a key strategic point in our struggle. I leave it to others to reveal, one day, the full extent of Richard’s contribution and the enormous amount of work that he undertook for our cause. I shall only mention the fact that it was he who gave the first impetus to our program of French military terminology. Many were the times that he presented his pithy solutions to the “Bilingual Secretariat”, in
response to one of our terminological puzzles. In my opinion, it was also in part through his interest and contribution that the first summary version of the English-French military dictionary was published as early as 1969.

On July 20, 1968, the time had come for me to retire. As I left the Canadian Forces and doffed my uniform for the last time, I felt somewhat discouraged, even pessimistic, as I thought about the future of francophones and of bilingualism at the DND. I felt that I had worked very hard to obtain very slim results. I also had a premonition that my successor, Colonel Pierre Chassé, would experience difficult moments in pursuing our aims and in running the “Bilingual Secretariat”.


The Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, PC, CC, OBE, Prime Minister of Canada from 1963 to 1968, opened up the question of bilingualism and biculturalism by appointing a Royal Commission. Its investigations resulted in the passing of the Official Languages Act in 1969. (PAC/57932)

The Hon. Paul Hellyer, PC, Minister of National Defence from 1963 to 1967, pressured his government to adopt integration and unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. These changes allowed for the implementation of the first institutional bilingualism policies in the DND.

General Jean Victor Allard, CC, CBE, DSO, ED, CD, Chief of the Defence Staff from 1966 to 1969, took advantage of the Armed Forces unification program to bring about the organizational changes needed to reflect the equality of the French language with the English. (CFPU/REP 68-758)
As Deputy Minister of National Defence from 1960 to 1971, Elgin B. Armstrong played an important role in the implementation of bilingualism policies and programs in the Canadian Armed Forces and among the DND civil servants (CFPU/RE 69-62).
Major Louis Noël de Tilly, CD, worked hand in hand with Roger Lavergne on the bilingualism issue for the DND’s civil servants. After Lavergne’s death he took over the latter’s responsibilities until the arrival of Colonel Letellier in August 1971.

Roger Lavergne, Administrative Superintendent of Dependants Schools from 1955 to 1964 and Director General of Education Programs from 1964, was also charged with promoting bilingualism within the DND, until his premature death in October 1969. (CFPU/CF 66-605)
Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel Richard, CD, was largely responsible for improving the quality of the French language used in the R22'R, from December 1961 when he was appointed CO of the Third Battalion. He continued along this vein as Commander Camp Valcartier and was later promoted to Brigadier-General and posted to Paris as Defence Attaché. (CFPU/Sh 72-549)

Major Paul Clavel, CD, was one of the rare military linguists in the Canadian Army. After having served with the R22'R, he taught French and worked until his retirement in 1972 on translation and terminology with Francotrain and the CAF Manual Publications Section set up in Quebec City.
Lieutenant-General M.E. Pollard, DSO, DFC, AFC, CD, was another air force general who, as Chief of Technical Services from 1970 to 1971, encouraged the implementation of the bilingualism policies in the CAF, including the translation in French of several technical documents.

Lieutenant-General W. “Bill” Carr, CMM, DFC, CD, first Chief of the unified Air Command, from 1975 to 1978, was the first anglophone air force general to attempt to ensure linguistic equality for francophones in an institution which had been largely anglophone until then. (CFPU/REP 73160)
Also a member of the R22’R, Colonel Jean Fournier, MM, CD, replaced Colonel Chassé at the “Bilingual Secretariat” and directed the editing of the new French-English/English-French military lexicon first published in 1969. (FMC 1-HO)
Part Two

On becoming Director General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism
August 1971 - November 1977
My Return to the Department of National Defence

On September 1968, scarcely three months after I had retired from the CAF, I found myself a student at the Université de Grenoble in France, enrolled in courses of applied linguistics and French linguistics. I had deemed it necessary to immerse myself once again in the French language, after a career of more than thirty years in the unilingual English-language institution of our Armed Forces. Since I had neither the intention nor the means to complete a master’s degree in linguistics, I had decided to be satisfied with obtaining two certificates in French and applied linguistics, and to return to Canada to enter the service of the University of Ottawa, in August 1969. It was there that Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Fournier, of the “Bilingual Secretariat” of the DND, came to find me a year later. Jean, it will be recalled, had been my right arm during my period of service at the “Bilingual Secretariat” in 1967. He came to see me on behalf of Lieutenant-General Jacques Dextraze, who had recently been promoted to the position of Chief of Personnel (Military). According to Jean, the General wanted me to head up a new body that would be made responsible for completing the planning and preparing the implementation of the Department’s program of bilingualism and biculturalism. Jean wanted to hear my reaction and conditions of service, and report them to the General. In the first place, I must say that I was no longer thinking of the DND as a place to undertake a second career in order to supplement my military pension. I found my work as Assistant Director of Admissions at the Uni-
University of Ottawa, in a dynamic student environment, different and rather interesting. I was able to work in French, for which I had re-acquired a taste and some facility, after my year in Grenoble. However, I was enormously attracted by the thought of dealing once again with the challenges of bilingualism, and especially with those concerning the participation of francophones on an equal footing. The prospect of being able to act under better conditions and in more favourable circumstances than in 1967-68 prompted me to think seriously about my future. After consulting with my wife and trusty advisor, Hélène, I again met with Jean Fournier. I came right to the point, and told him my conditions.

In the first place, the new organization that I was to direct would have to have adequate resources in terms of funding and high-quality personnel. For myself, I requested the position of Director General, reporting directly to the Chief of Personnel or to the Assistant Deputy Minister, with the rank of Executive SX I. I demanded the SX 1 rank so that, as a civil servant, I would have a position equivalent to Brigadier-General in the military hierarchy. Those who are familiar with the mentality of military people, and with the importance they attach to the rank of individuals in the Armed Forces, will understand why it was essential that the Director General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism be at least an SX 1 (Brigadier-General). These conditions were accepted, and I assured Lieutenant-Colonel Fournier that I would be pleased to go back to work at the Department.

Jean Fournier and I had several other consultations and information sessions before August 9, 1971, the date on which I took up my duties at NDHQ as Director General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism (DGBB). It must be said that close to twelve months had elapsed between my first conversation with Jean Fournier and my return to the struggle. Toward the end of this period the normal hiring procedures in the Public Service had, of course, taken place: interviews and appearance before a board. My position came under civilian jurisdiction, and it was thus as a civilian employee that I returned to the Department, three years after my retirement from the Armed Forces.
IX

Status of the Program and Plans for Bilingualism at the Department in August, 1971

Although Lieutenant-Colonel Fournier had, to the greatest possible extent, kept me abreast of events in the field of bilingualism before my return to the Department, it was only after I assumed my duties on August 9 that the complete situation was revealed to me.

I shall first speak of the organization and the personalities in place. The integration of the Armed Forces was almost completed, and we had reached the stage of unification, which was making headway and causing some damage. Minister Macdonald had set up a group of consultants under the leadership of Mr. John Harbron, a Toronto journalist. This group was given the task of inquiring into and making recommendations on the organization and structures of NDHQ at Ottawa and the outlying commands. In any case, the organization in which I was about to work is illustrated in Annex B.

Of the people I had known during my first period of service, several had left the Department or had moved to another position. Mr. Cadieux had been replaced as Minister by the Honourable
Donald S. Macdonald, an energetic man of action with some bilingual skills, sympathetic for the objectives of bilingualism and biculturalism in the Armed Forces. Mr. Elgin Armstrong was still Deputy Minister, but he was now supported by an Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for the civilian personnel of the Department, Mr. Thomas Morry. Doctor L.J. L’Heureux had replaced Doctor R.J. Uffen as Chairman of the Defence Research Board. At NDHQ, Lieutenant-General Sharp, promoted to the rank of General, had replaced General Allard in the position of CDS. Major-General Dare had also been promoted and succeeded him in his former position of Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS). Major-General Pollard, formerly of the Air Defence Command, had become a Lieutenant-General and occupied the position of Comptroller-General. Lieutenant-General Dextraze had replaced Vice-Admiral Hennessy, who succeeded Lieutenant General Reyno in the position of Chief of Personnel. At that time, I did not suspect that Mr. Trudeau’s government was soon going to make General Dextraze the second French Canadian to occupy the position of CDS. Nor did I have any idea that Mr. Elgin Armstrong was finally going to leave the Department, to be replaced by Mr. Sylvain Cloutier in the position of Deputy Minister. So I felt immediately at ease with these men whom I had known at work and of whom I had heard good things.

The organization chart of the Directorate General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism (DGBB), as we had designed it upon my arrival at the Department, is given at Annex C. The recently appointed Assistant Deputy Director, Colonel James Hanna, was an Air Force pilot and, fortunately, fluently bilingual as well. He was to stay by my side for three years and support me in all my efforts to promote bilingualism in the Department. During this period, his contribution was all the more invaluable to me because he was, in the eyes of his anglophone compatriots, one of their best qualified senior officers, who carried out his duties with efficiency and integrity. For them, although Hanna was working in the area of bilingualism, he remained entirely acceptable. After leaving the DGBB, Colonel James Hanna was to be promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General and to become military attaché in
Paris. He ended his career in 1981, as a Major-General command-
ing the CAF in Europe. In addition to Colonel Hanna, I also
found Captain Paul Berniquez, who was still at the office of Gen-
eral Allard when I left the Armed Forces. Berniquez had become
administration officer for the Directorate General and its three
directorates.

The Directorate of Terminology and Translation Services was
headed up by Lieutenant-Colonel “Mike” Newell, a young ar-
moured corps officer who was dynamic and efficient. Although
he was fluently bilingual, he had no experience in the fields of
translation and terminology. Nevertheless, he was to carry out his
duties to my entire satisfaction.

The Directorate of Planning and Research on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism was managed by Lieutenant-Colonel Clément
Tousignant. Tousignant had acquired experience in the upper
spheres of management and operations of the Department, which
would be useful to us. Like Colonel Hanna, he was a pilot who
had commanded a fighter squadron with the NATO forces in
Europe. After a most productive period of work in the area of bi-
linguism, Tousignant was to be promoted Colonel and com-
mand the large Air Force base at Bagotville. It was under
the command of Colonel Tousignant that the French language and
culture were established more firmly than ever before, on this
base.

The same Directorate also contained such officers as Major
J.W. Arsenault and Captain Guy Sullivan. Arsenault and Sullivan
were of great help to me during my period of service as DGBB.
They were my general handymen, and I used both for major plan-
ing and for specialized studies, first in the military sector and
later in the civilian sector. Because of the many disruptions and
reorganizations of the senior management system at the Depart-
ment, I was often forced to improvise with my personnel, in order
to get our work done. It was at these critical moments that I most
appreciated the contribution of Arsenault and Sullivan. Arsenault
retired as a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1985, but Sullivan, having left
the service in 1975 and undergone a rapid apprenticeship with me, took up my former post which was renamed Director General of Official Languages (DGOL).

Last but not least was the Directorate of Language Training which I often referred to as “the key Directorate”. It was headed up by Major Alexandre Taschereau, an officer of the Royal 22ᵉ Régiment. I had known Taschereau when I commanded the third battalion of the Royal 22ᵉ in Europe during the years 1957-59. He had been a member of my team, as a captain in an infantry company. His Directorate was later attached to the Individual Training Division in the Chief of Personnel Branch and RearAdmiral D.S. Boyle recognized his contribution to promoting and administering the “second language” courses by recommending him for the Order of Military Merit.

I must also say, however, that I thought it unjust that Taschereau was kept in the position of director in the rank of Major. This, in my opinion, diminished the importance of the language teaching Directorate in the eyes of the military community. It was only close to the end of my term of service that Major Taschereau was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.

In general, I had a very good team of collaborators. The quality was there, but the quantity was lacking. The establishment of 35 military and civilian jobs included some ten vacant positions.

It will be noted that I have not yet spoken of Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Fournier and of his role. I have not done so because Jean was about to leave us after having worked relentlessly for more than three years in the service of bilingualism at NDHQ. During the last year especially, his work load had been very heavy. When Colonel Pierre Chassé, my successor at the “Bilingualism Secretariat” in 1968, left to become Director of Recruiting, Jean Fournier inherited the Secretariat at a time when it was being transformed into the Directorate General of Bilingualism and Biculturalism. He thus became the first DGBB, but on an acting basis only. It was only when Colonel Hanna arrived in July of
1971 that Fournier stepped down from his responsibilities. Before ending his career in 1980, Jean Fournier was promoted Colonel and became our military attaché in Turkey.

I have already said that before my appointment and my return to the Department, Jean Fournier had made it his duty to keep me abreast of what was happening in the area of bilingualism. I was thus informed about the progress, delays and obstacles that the military program was experiencing. There was still no question of a structured civilian program. This was why I had some idea of what to expect when, on August 9, 1971, on the morning of my first day at work, I came to the office of Lieutenant-General Dextraze, Chief of Personnel.

It was normal for me to go to my boss to obtain his instructions, and in a personal capacity, I also wanted to thank him for his confidence in me and to assure him of my loyalty and devotion in carrying out my duties. The General received me warmly, and told me that he himself had chosen my assistant, Colonel James Hanna. He spoke most highly of Hanna, noting also that he wanted to make sure that I was properly supported in carrying out my mandate. He said that he was glad that he had launched the program of language instruction in the Armed Forces bases, and told me that he expected good results and that I should therefore keep a close eye on the situation. He revealed his thoughts on the orientation that our program should take, and reminded me of the necessity of firmly rooting our actions in the reality of the Armed Forces. According to him, logic and common sense required that the realization of our objectives be spread out over a period of 10 to 15 years. In this way, he said, the measures that he would be asked to approve should be evolutionary and not revolutionary, especially those affecting personnel.

Dextraze wanted to see francophone participation in all trades and at all levels, and he foresaw reaching this goal without a hitch, while observing the principles of merit and military professionalism.
Having said this, the General turned to the current situation, and told me that I should get to work immediately. I should re-think, and if necessary touch up, certain aspects of our program of bilingualism and biculturalism, on the basis of the Minister’s remarks about the bicultural aspect. He added that the Department of the Secretary of State was challenging the DND’s quantitative objectives regarding language courses for anglophones and francophones. He also reiterated what I knew already, that the preparation of the presentation to the Defence Council and of our revised plans had been hung up for months, and that Mr. MacDonald was growing impatient with the delays. I therefore had to do what was necessary to get things rolling again as soon as possible. The General also warned me that I would have to confront problems on the civilian side of the Department, as there was no structured program of bilingualism for civilian employees. Nevertheless, I was not to point my efforts in this direction, but to concentrate on the most urgent matter, the military plan and program.

Before dismissing me, the General promised me his complete support in all my undertakings on behalf of bilingualism, and he encouraged me to come back and see him whenever I should feel the need to do so. He then confirmed to me that I would be reporting to the Assistant Chief of Personnel, Commodore R.H. Falls.
X

Review and Approval of the Military Program

1. Discussions and negotiations

Needless to say, I got right down to work after my interview with Lieutenant-General Dextraze. My first act was to settle the question of the presentation to the Defence Council that the DGBB was scheduled to make on September 8, 1971. It was now August 10, and it seemed to me that it would be impossible for the Division to meet its deadlines. I thus made a rapid review of the situation, remembering what Jean Fournier had explained to me. In the first place, in December of 1970, Mr. Macdonald had in principle accepted an implementation program and action plan to increase bilingualism and biculturalism in the Armed Forces. He had, however, attached an important condition to this approval by requesting that the objectives of biculturalism be better defined and stipulated. He was particularly concerned with such aspects of participation as the recruiting of francophones, and the advancement and promotion of French culture through newspapers, libraries, movie theatres, Armed Forces radio programs, etc. Finally, the Minister demanded that the Defence Council examine this whole issue once more. In order to meet these expectations, General Sharp, the CDS, had asked Mr. Macdonald in April, 1971 to approve the designation of 35 units of the Armed Forces as FLUs. Mr. Macdonald had agreed to this at the time, but less than a month later had changed his mind. According to Jean Fournier
things started to take a turn for the worse at the end of June. In fact, on June 25, the Minister sent a memorandum to General Sharp, in which he withdrew his approval of the designation of FLUs. The Treasury Board, having become acquainted with the enormous costs of the massive language teaching programs proposed by the Department, was questioning the logic and necessity of them. It is rather understandable that a certain disarray was apparent in the DND policy.

In confronting the situation that I have just described, I found my position rather critical. I had to get started at all costs. I did so by reading through the draft presentation to the Defence Council, which the Comptroller General (CG) had prepared on the subject of biculturalism. The meeting of the Council was to take place on September 8, and a review of the programs and plans of biculturalism was still on the agenda. In his draft, the CG had developed a plan to distribute anglophone and francophone resources through the structure of the Armed Forces, thinking that in this way, he was meeting the Minister’s request for a definition of the objectives of biculturalism. The CG had drawn up his plan using the levels of national representation that had already been approved, namely 72 per cent anglophones and 28 per cent francophones, and proportions that had also been approved, namely 80 per cent anglophones and 20 per cent francophones in the ELUs, and vice versa in the FLUs. At first glance, this distribution seemed to comply with the principles of the program of biculturalism whose establishment was sought in the Department. However, I was convinced that it would prove to be something completely different in practice. For this reason, I deemed the draft presentation to be unacceptable. In an internal memo of August 16, 1971, I explained my thinking to Colonel Hanna and to Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant, and asked them to prepare for me a memorandum to the Chief of Personnel. I wanted the latter to meet the CG in order to discuss a distribution of francophones that would be more logical and more concerned with the policies of bilingualism and biculturalism as a whole. I explained why I thought that the CG’s draft went against these policies. In the first place, the plan provided that approximately 50 per cent of the
francophones in the Armed Forces would be condemned to serve in the ELUs, and would thus continue to be assimilated (this was my opinion). Then only 2 per cent of anglophones would be given the opportunity to serve in the FLUs and to learn French. Furthermore, the limited number of FLUs created under the plan would prevent francophones from having access to the entire range of positions and ranks. Finally, the possibility of serving in French outside Quebec would remain illusory.

On August 18, thinking of the presentation to be made to the Defence Council on September 8, I sent Commodore Falls the memorandum that Tousignant had prepared, with our diagnosis and recommendations. When Falls summoned me to his office I explained to him in person my objections to the CG’s draft. I was meeting Falls for the first time, and I took advantage of the opportunity to inform him of my philosophy on B & B. I told him what my action priorities were in the face of the situation already mentioned, and I suggested that he support me in my negotiations with the CG to secure amendments to the plan for distributing anglophones and francophones through the Armed Forces. Falls agreed and asked me to prepare a memorandum for Lieutenant-General Dextraze’s signature, bluntly telling the CG what actions had to be taken to acquit ourselves immediately of our responsibilities. He also arranged a meeting with Captain (N) Lynch, of the CG’s office, to give me an entry card and to make communication with the CG’s office easier for me.

Lynch and Falls were both naval officers, and I took it for granted that they understood each other. I also needed this gesture on Fall’s part, since I was new to my job. From this moment, I began to be impressed with the goodwill and open-mindedness of Commodore Falls. General Dextraze had been well aware of this when he had put Falls in charge of the personnel administration and of all that concerned bilingualism and biculturalism. For his part, Falls was now trying to get as much information as possible and to understand our problems. I shall always remember one discussion in particular, where my explanations had not succeeded in convincing him and were becoming shorter and shorter.
Falls quite rightly reproached me, and begged me to curb my impatience in the face of his lack of understanding and inexperience, in this complicated program of bilingualism and biculturalism that we ardently wished to establish in the Armed Forces. He explained to me that, being in the Navy, he had spent most of his career on the high seas or on the Atlantic or Pacific coast, and that he knew virtually nothing of the inequalities and injustices that I was talking about. Having neither known nor experienced these, he asked to be patiently made aware of them, since he wanted to understand and to collaborate to the greatest possible extent. From this moment on, our business relations were fruitful. They continued to be so after Falls was made VCDS in 1976, and I am sure that they would have continued to be so if I had remained longer in my post after 1977, when Falls succeeded General Dextraze as CDS.

The day after this first meeting with Commodore Falls, I returned to him with the internal memorandum. He approved it and assured me that Lieutenant-General Dextraze would sign it without delay. The General did indeed sign the memo on August 24, and on August 26 I again got in touch with Captain (N) Lynch. I didn’t know that his career was drawing to a close, and that he was going to retire a few months later. All the same, as the excellent professional that he was, he became involved in the matter of the distribution of anglophones and francophones. He listened attentively to my observations and comments on the CP’s attitude towards the CG’s draft presentation, and promised to send me his own observations and comments as soon as possible. It was thus that he sent me structured remarks in an internal memo dated September 1. Lynch claimed that the guidelines - he called them parameters on which we had to base the distribution of our human resources - did not allow us any deviation. In his opinion, if we wanted to modify the consequences of their application, we would have to return to the responsible authority and have the terms of the guidelines modified. For example, if francophones represented 20 per cent of the personnel in the ELUs, the result would be that more than 50 per cent of the total number of francophones would serve in these units. That was exactly what I
wanted to avoid at all costs. It was here that what he and I called the “numbers game” came into play. During the course of my second period of service, I had to remember this “numbers game” and use it as a technique of argumentation on several occasions.

For the moment, I was well aware that I could reduce the francophone contribution to the ELUs by lowering the guideline from 20 to 10 per cent. I could likewise obtain the same result by increasing the number of FLUs and francophone positions in the units with national representation. Lynch understood this as well. However, he did not want to change anything until he knew whether or not the guidelines would be modified. According to him, if we wanted more francophones in the FLUs, we would have to triple the number. In the short term, Lynch did not see any merit in taking this route. In the long term, he seriously doubted that one could obtain positive results, because of such imponderables as changes in attitude of the population, and in the proportionate distribution of anglophones and francophones in the Canadian population as a whole. Nevertheless, Lynch thought that in the short term, a period of ten years might suffice to modify structures and to create more FLUs, and thereby draw closer to the objective of distribution that I was asking for.

However, good intentions vanished when we tried to introduce, in the establishments, a distribution of 28 per cent francophones in all ranks and in all the various categories of military occupations. For Lynch, it was logical that the distribution of 28/72 per cent should apply only to the Armed Forces as a whole. Although he conceded that it might be possible to attain a francophone representation of 28 per cent in all ranks by about 1990, he had no intention of setting objectives for each of the trades for the current period. To conclude his observations, Lynch first recommended that we stick to the criterion of representation of 80/20 per cent in order to meet the requirements of the Minister and that we refuse to distribute the 72 per cent of anglophones and 28 per cent of francophones in all the ranks and trades of the establishments. In the event that new parameters were to be taken into consideration, Lynch recommended that we plan to realize the
objective of representation in the long term. In regard to the distribution of resources to increase the number of FLUs, he thought that we should decide together on the way to proceed, without however allowing the new FLUs to be designated in advance. At that time, Captain Lynch knew very well that he was going against the wishes of the Minister.

It was only on September 8, after I had had the Defence Council meeting postponed, that I responded to Lynch. I told him that I did not agree with most of the ideas that he had expressed in his internal memo, that the objectives of the Government in the area of biculturalism were clear and precise, and that a plan that did not seek to attain them was unacceptable. In my memo, I also affirmed that to understand the requirements and consequences of a plan, it had to be worked out in detail. This was why I considered that our plan would be valueless unless it was developed by taking into account the necessity of designating, for francophones, 28 per cent of positions in all the categories of military occupations and in all ranks. At the same time, the plan should guarantee that the distribution of francophone resources between the ELUs and the FLUs would meet these objectives. Nonetheless, I acknowledged that the plan could be carried out over short, medium and long term periods, provided only that the details of the short and medium terms were known to the public. However, regardless of the duration of the plan’s implementation, it was essential that it be worked out in detail for each phase, and that it aim at reaching the objectives of the Government. Finally, I told Lynch that my Directorate General had neither the resources nor the information on the establishments that were necessary to produce a plan such as I conceived it. In these circumstances, I was thus going to recommend that the CP and the CG meet as soon as possible to find a solution to the problem.

Though I had several further exchanges with Captain Lynch, our positions remained unchanged. It was a deadlock. It was now September 28, the deadline for the presentation to the Council had once again been missed, and the meeting had been postponed indefinitely. We thus had to inform General Sharp that we were still
in the process of revising the plans and the system that would make it possible to attain the objectives of francophone participation, and that we would subsequently submit them for the consideration of the CP before going to seek the approval of his committee. The CDS took note of this information, and expressed his impatience with the delays. He requested that the presentation be submitted to his committee as soon as possible. Needless to say, I felt that these remarks were aimed at me personally, and that I was responsible for the most recent delays. I had first convinced Commodore Falls, and then Lieutenant-General Dextraze, to reject the draft presentation of the CG for the distribution and allocation of francophone resources in the Armed Forces. In any case, I was now trying to give a new impetus to the process of preparation, consultations and approval in which we were now involved.

At the beginning of October, the CG and the CP were still grappling with this tricky problem of the distribution of francophones. Although this issue had taken up the largest part of my time, I had nonetheless been involved in other areas. In particular, I recall the issue of information, and also the first attempt of Commodore Falls to inform military personnel about the systems that were planned to ensure a better distribution of ranks among francophones and anglophones. Like ourselves, the Commodore wanted to thwart the rumours that were circulating freely on the bases concerning this particularly sensitive aspect of the program of biculturalism. It was, in fact, being said that to be promoted in the Armed Forces, it was enough to be francophone and bilingual. Our English-speaking military personnel began to be really worried, especially when the rumour began to circulate that the number of francophones would be increased from its current level of 16 to 28 per cent. They thought that this increase would be made overnight and, naturally, at their expense. It is easy to understand why those who enjoyed a majority of 90 per cent of all senior positions, both among officers and non commissioned officers, did not at all appreciate the measures intended to establish a more equitable share of 72/28 per cent of all positions in all ranks. With a view to informing the troops and countering rumours, Commodore Falls had submitted to us the draft of an article that he
wanted to publish in the *Personnel Newsletter*, an organ of information in the Personnel branch. The article confirmed that there was only one list of candidates eligible for promotion, and that it was mistaken to believe that anglophone military personnel had one list, and the francophones another. The article also explained that the order of merit was scrupulously observed for promotions. In exceptional cases, if the first candidate for a position did not meet its linguistic requirements, his staff might move down the list of candidates until one who met them was reached. Falls also explained why it was necessary to attain a francophone representation of 28 per cent in the Armed Forces over a period of several years.

In his internal memorandum, Commodore Falls told me that the publication of this article should await the approval of our policies of biculturalism by the Defence Council, and that the GOCs should be notified of it. I answered the Commodore on August 1, after carefully studying the draft. I told him that we agreed that our military personnel had to be informed of our B & B policies in general, and more particularly in the touchy area of the management of their careers. If we had somewhat revised the text of the article, it was so as not to add to the misunderstandings and confusion in the minds of the military personnel in regard to the importance of reducing the margin of representation in certain ranks between anglophones and francophones. According to us the text, before our modifications, tended to lead people to believe that the essential thing for the time being was to reach the level of 28 per cent francophone participation. In the corrected text, the emphasis was placed on the necessity of first reducing the discrepancy, by increasing francophone representation in some ranks from 8 to 16 per cent, namely to come as close as possible to the current level of participation of francophones in the Armed Forces as a whole.

Finally, I suggested to Commodore Falls that it would perhaps be preferable to proceed with the publication of this article by the shortest route, namely by asking permission from the office of the Minister before having it published. I considered that it
was not necessary to wait until the Defence Council and the
GOCs had been consulted, seeing that the measures described and
explained in the article had already been applied in some circum-
stances. Commodore Falls, who had certainly received my inter-


nal memo, never followed up on it. To this day, I do not know
what became of this article, and I was perhaps wrong in not ask-
ing Falls for it.

I have digressed for a moment to dwell on the incident of the
Falls article; now I return to my  account of the recasting of our
policies.

Lieutenant-General Pollard knew that he was soon going to
leave his position of CG, and he wanted to complete his direct
contribution to the debate on biculturalism before leaving. He
therefore met with Lieutenant-General Dextraze at the end of Oc-
tober. I was present at the meeting, along with Commodore Falls
and Brigadier-General “Stu” Graham, of the CG’s office. Graham
had been a colleague and a friend since the end of the war. He
was to cooperate with us in a very positive way, once our respec-
tive chiefs, Pollard and Dextraze, had agreed on the modifications
to be made to the guidelines.

The discussion did not drag on. It was quickly agreed that the
criterion of representation in the FLUs had to be changed from
80/20 per cent francophones/anglophones to 90/10 per cent, and
vice versa in the ELUs. Agreement was also reached on a rec-

ommendation that at least 50 per cent of francophone resources
be used to create FLUs. These decisions opened the way that en-
abled us to go to the Defence Council to obtain approval of the
amended guidelines, to guide us in the development of new plans
of biculturalism such as the Minister wanted. Before going to the
Defence Council, it was first necessary to appear before the Advi-
sory Committee of the CDS. However, since the arrival of the
new Deputy Minister, Mr. Sylvain Cloutier, who replaced Mr.
Elgin Armstrong, another level had just been created between the
Defence Council and the Chief’s committee. This was the De-
fence Management Committee, a new body recently authorized
by the Minister at the request of Mr. Cloutier who initially chaired it. This Committee was to become the forum _par excellence_ where I would go to present our plans and problems in order to obtain the necessary decisions and directions throughout my second period of service in support of bilingualism.

2. **Sylvain Cloutier becomes the new Deputy Minister**

   Mr. Cloutier came to us from the Department of National Revenue at the beginning of September, 1971, in exchange for Mr. Armstrong who replaced him in his old position. I vaguely knew Mr. Cloutier, and with the establishment of the Management Committee, I thought for a moment that we were perhaps going to have to overcome another obstacle before reaching the Minister with our prescriptions for curing the Department of its lack of bilingualism and biculturalism. Fortunately, this impression was quickly dispelled. Mr. Cloutier showed himself to be a dynamic and exacting Deputy Minister, who was impatient to see the Government’s policies carried out in the area of bilingualism and biculturalism. At the Department of National Revenue, he had already introduced a rigorous and demanding program regarding the official languages. The great military and bureaucratic machine of the National Defence was to present him with a challenge of another order. Nonetheless, he hastened to confront it. On October 25, he sent an internal memorandum to the CP, requesting him to supply certain information concerning our B & B programs. My Division made it its duty to provide Cloutier with a good description of the status of our planning, in a memorandum that Lieutenant-General Dextraze signed on November 1. Mr. Cloutier had asked to be specifically informed in four fields of our activities, and we had first been able to give him an excellent summary of the logic of our objectives. Then we explained to him the difference between these objectives and those of the Public Service. We spoke of the degree of cooperation that already existed between the DND and the Public Service Commission, and of what collaboration we anticipated in the field of language teaching. Finally, we gave him a brief description of the elements which, in our opinion, should be part of an implementation plan.
extending over a period of 15 years.

Mr. Cloutier took very little time to digest the information in Lieutenant-General Dextraze’s memorandum. On November 3, as agreed, he summoned the following people to his office to discuss our plans and programs: Dextraze; his assistant, Major-General Laubman, who had just replaced Commodore Falls; and myself. Also present from the civilian side of the Department were Mr. Thomas Morry, Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel, and Mr. Louis Noël de Tilly, the Department’s advisor on bilingualism. Although today the files do not reveal anything of what happened at that meeting, I remember that the discussion began with observations by the Deputy Minister on the absence of a program of bilingualism and of an implementation plan for the civilian element of the Department. Mr. Cloutier had the intention of changing this situation, and he requested that urgent action be taken.

I was to soon hear the echoes of this request, and to become involved in the matter. As far as the military program was concerned, Mr. Cloutier wanted a petition to the Treasury Board to be prepared before the end of the year. His aim was to seek additional resources in money and person-years, starting at the beginning of December. He had realized that our programs were ambitious, but could be realized if they were supported by sufficient means, though at this time the budget of the Department was not sufficient. Lieutenant-General Dextraze, referring to the objectives of our programs, mentioned that he wanted to see more intensive recruiting of francophones, and was aiming at settling the problem of their distribution through the Armed Forces structures. For his part, Mr. Cloutier mentioned the program that he had himself launched at the Department of Revenue, and emphasized the importance of teaching French to anglophones. On this subject, he spoke of the contribution of the Public Service languages bureau, saying that the Department should increasingly rely on this bureau for the teaching of the official languages. Regarding our translation needs, he reminded us that the Treasury Board had accepted the recommendations of the Department of the Secretary of State to increase the number of translators working for the De-
partment. At the same time, he reminded us that judicious use had to be made of translation. Finally, he reiterated his request for the preparation of the petition to the Treasury Board, and emphasized the necessity of going to the Minister with our military and civilian programs as soon as possible.

On my way out of the office of the Deputy Minister, I said to Lieutenant-General Dextraze that we would have to adjust our priorities of action in the light of Mr. Cloutier’s own priorities. Working with the CG, we would first complete the preparation of the presentation of our programs, and submit it to the Advisory Committee of the CDS by mid-November. Secondly, I would then become more involved in the civilian program issue. I warned the General that I would lack the necessary resources, and perhaps the time, to meet the requirements of Mr. Cloutier’s timetable. This is why I foresaw requesting that our command coordinators of bilingualism come to Ottawa to give us a hand. I would also request that the directorates concerned in the Personnel branch make a contribution. Likewise, for the development of the civilian program, I envisaged counting on the establishment of a task force made up of senior civilian executives. Lieutenant-General Dextraze agreed with my comments, and Major-General Laubman asked me to keep him abreast of developments.

Laubman was the same officer whom I had known during my first period of service, when he held the rank of colonel. Since that time, he had become a Major-General, Assistant Deputy Chief of Personnel, and indirectly my boss, as Commodore Falls had been. Laubman had made great progress since our first discussions on bilingualism and biculturalism. Ever the competent and efficient manager in the personnel area, he had acquired a better understanding of our problems. The Official Languages Act and the Government’s approval of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission’s recommendations had, of course, helped to redirect his thinking and that of several other senior managers in the civilian and military structure of the Department. In any case, with Mr. Cloutier as Deputy Minister and Lieutenant-General Dextraze as CP, we had vigorous and determined support at the
very top of the Department; these persons were devoted to the policies of the Government, and would spare no efforts to help me.

While I was delighted at the excellent support I was receiving from the top, I too frequently had to deplore the lack of cooperation from executives who were lower down in the hierarchy. Too many middle managers were still claiming that they had to deal with urgent matters that were brought to them by their superiors or by circumstances, to the detriment of effective action and gestures in the interests of B & B policy. This is why, at the DGBB, we had no choice but to busy ourselves with the preparation of all the documents required for our projects. We had to postpone the supervision and evaluation of the enforcement of a whole host of measures, both at NDHQ level and at the level of the other HQs and the bases. At this critical period, I was fortunately helped by the DGBB team that I have already mentioned, and especially by Colonel Hanna, my assistant. Indeed, Hanna had to prepare an important document himself, which he personally presented to the senior management task force on November 4, 1971. This was a work of high quality. In some fifty pages of information and explanations, Colonel Hanna had succeeded in summarizing bilingualism as practised at the DND. The main document contained some notions on the history of bilingualism at the Department and on the preparation and planning of future policies, as well as those that were actually being applied at the time of presentation. The document also dealt with different activities in support of B & B programs, such as translation, terminology and language teaching. It described the personnel establishment of the DGBB, its resources and responsibilities, and its problems with excessive workloads. It also briefly analyzed the constraints and obstacles that it confronted. The message on B & B policy, which Colonel Hanna had presented in such masterly fashion, was well received by the task force. The least one can say is that it brought us some sympathy from this group, which was pre-occupied with its own challenge, the restructuring of NDHQ. Apart from the task force, the Hanna document was distributed at NDHQ and in the commands, where the B & B coordinators used it to inform military
The immediate result of the November 3 meeting at the Deputy Minister’s office was to increase the urgency of coming to an agreement with the CG on the contents and preparation of the presentation to the Advisory Committee of the CDS, and possibly of putting the necessary means in place to determine all the elements of our B & B plans and to program their execution.

3. The first step in the process: the CDS Advisory Committee meeting of November 17, 1971

The first of my problems, the presentation to the CDS’ Committee, was solved through a series of meetings with Brigadier-General Graham and Lieutenant-Colonel P.R.M. Laronde, (a francophone in name only) from the CG’s branch. Brigadier-General Graham had already participated in recent discussions between his boss, Lieutenant-General Pollard and mine, Lieutenant-General Dextraze, on the issue of the allocation and distribution of francophones in the Armed Forces, and we easily came to an agreement on the contents of the presentation. We further agreed that the CG would sponsor this presentation, and we decided that Graham would be the presenter. At that time, I was thinking of the positive effects that would result from having an English-speaking senior officer of Graham’s reputation present our projects for amending the guidelines and overhauling the policies of biculturalism. I also hoped that this would serve to counter the attitude found at NDHQ that only the DGBB was responsible for promoting bilingualism and biculturalism. On the contrary, ‘I demanded that the burden of planning and implementing B & B throughout the Armed Forces also be a collective responsibility of the Department. Fortunately, Graham had understood that as the guardian of the integrity of the establishments, structures and organizational system of the Armed Forces, he had a duty to present a logical and feasible model that would take into account the requirements of bilingualism and biculturalism.

With the help of Lieutenant-Colonel Laronde, I defined the development of a program to establish FLUs, which would be
spread out over a period of 15 years. In the draft presentation, we incorporated principles according to which at least 50 per cent of francophones would have access to all trades at all levels, first through FLUs established in the three elements - Naval, Land and Air - in all regions of the country, then in units with national representation. In this way, we distributed and allocated francophone resources and developed a model that we hoped we could possibly get approved by the Minister.

The only obstacle that arose during these discussions was the interpretation to be given to the new guideline to govern the allocation of francophones in the FLUs. It was still understood that the percentages of 80/20 in the FLUs, and vice versa in the ELUs, were unacceptable. Now, however, Graham insisted on first putting the emphasis on a greater number of FLUs and on fewer francophones in the ELUs, seeing that this would ensure that at least 50 per cent of francophones could work in French. I had no objection to this manner of expressing the equation that interested us. I only objected when Graham also insisted on defining the distribution of anglophones in the FLUs at less than 20 per cent, whereas in my opinion this contribution should not be greater than 10 per cent. I shall later describe the intervention of General Allard in this matter. The former CDS, and Lieutenant-General Sharp’s predecessor, did not want to hear about a 20 per cent representation of anglophones in the Royal 22 Régiment; he thought that even 10 per cent was excessive.

The talks with the CG had proved fruitful for the time being, and with the exception of the issue that I have just mentioned, I was pleased to think that we were finally going to appear before the Advisory Committee of the CDS on November 17, 1971. On that day, Lieutenant-General Dextraze was absent, and I found that I was the only francophone present at the deliberations of the Committee, except for the Committee’s clerk, Lieutenant-Colonel C.J. Gauthier. From the first moments of the presentation, when Brigadier-General Graham was explaining why the CG and not the CP was sponsoring the project, I realized that we were off to a good start and that the results were going to be positive. I was de-
lighted to hear Graham repeat the arguments that I had used since my return to the Department, to convince his listeners to approve the guidelines that we were proposing. On the one hand, he told them that when the current program was initiated in 1968, the emphasis had been on bilingualism, but now that the Government had accepted the recommendations of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission and the more recent recommendations of the White Paper on Defence 1970, more importance was being given to biculturalism. Consequently, our planning had to take into account the necessity of providing anglophones and francophones with equal opportunities to work exclusively in their native language. On the other hand, Graham affirmed that the essential guideline remained, namely that the two founding groups should be represented in an equitable and balanced manner in all ranks and at all levels of responsibility in the Armed Forces. This was the firm application of the principle of a 72/28 per cent distribution between anglophones and francophones, which Graham asked the Committee to approve. The same thing happened in the case of the other guidelines that I have already discussed at length, with the exception of one whose presentation caused me some concern. When the opportunity arose during the discussions, I said as much to the Committee. The issue that concerned me was the 20 per cent of anglophones that could have been located, at some time, in a FLU, and of the impact of their presence on the linguistic situation. I knew that it was the age old habit of bilingual French Canadians to speak only English in the presence of and with their unilingual anglophone colleagues, and I declared that I found the presence of 20 per cent anglophones within a FLU too high. General Sharp began by pointing out to me that while some degree of biculturalism was wanted in our programs, English-speaking military personnel had to be encouraged to become bilingual, and that the best way for them to learn French was to rub shoulders with francophones. The members of the Committee were unanimous on this point, and as a result, the guideline that a maximum of 20 per cent of anglophones should serve in the FLUs was accepted.

I recall that during the discussion, Commodore N. Cogdon, a
tough naval officer who was Director General of Maritime Forces, gave his unqualified support to the remarks of General Sharp, although he was opposed to the establishment of FLUs and preferred the so-called bilingual units. Cogdon had, moreover, already expressed these outmoded ideas in an internal memo to the Assistant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.

The Committee heard some other comments about the planning, and especially the implementation, of the new measures. It then decided to recommend approval of the amended guidelines. It stipulated that a petition to this effect would have to be made to the Senior Management Committee, and possibly to the Defence Council. The Committee also recommended that a briefing on these latest developments affecting our programs be presented to the GOCs at their meeting in January, 1972.

When the Committee meeting was over I hastened to congratulate Brigadier-General Graham for his excellent presentation and for the results it had obtained. I then reminded him that on November 29, we were going to confront the Senior Management Committee with the same petition, adding that at the afternoon conference I intended to initiate preparation of the documentation for the petitions to the Minister and the Treasury Board, as requested by Mr. Cloutier. I hoped that to accomplish this, I could count on him to explain to the members the model for distribution of anglophones and francophones that had been approved that very morning by the Committee of the CDS. Graham assured me of his support.

4. Planning ahead to implement the B & B programs

As the preparation of the presentation of November 29 progressed, I was already thinking seriously of how to proceed to initiate the implementation of our amended and refurbished policies, once they were finally approved. After discussing the matter with Major-General Laubman, I submitted a draft directive to him, which he signed on November 12, 1971. This directive stated that since our programs of bilingualism had been deemed too ambitious for our means, in terms of money and personnel, it
was necessary to re-evaluate and revise their objectives, in order to ensure their compatibility with the objectives of the Public Service, especially in the area of language training. The directive likewise stated that it was also necessary to ensure the compatibility of the plans for biculturalism that we were in the process of developing. The directive thus called for the preparation of a long term plan designed to realize the Government’s objectives for the Armed Forces in the area of bilingualism and biculturalism, using available resources. The directive also specified that the plan should be drawn up using the structural model of the Forces that the CP and the CG had approved in regard to the distribution and representation of anglophones and francophones. The plan itself should be spread out over a period of 15 years in three phases of 5 years each, beginning with the fiscal year 1972/73. For each phase, but especially for the first, the plan should define aims and predict results. It should also set up bench-marks in the important stages of the different activities, with a view to predicting their costs in money and personnel. It was to be an omnibus plan, governing all the activities and measures required to attain our B & B objectives. It would thus have to include the following elements: language training; staffing of FLUs and of bilingual positions; recruiting; dependants’ education; communications; professional training of military personnel; translation and terminology, and Cannex services for the military community. The DGBB would be in charge of producing the plan, and would be assisted by the four directors general of the Personnel Branch, acting as designated collaborators. The directive further stated that the plan had to gain acceptance at all levels of the Department up to the Treasury Board, and had to be completed and submitted to the CP by December 15, 1971.

My colleagues at the DGBB perhaps felt that the December 15 deadline, the size of the job and the effort needed to do it had placed us in an impossible situation. Nevertheless, they got right down to work. On the morning of November 17, we presented our amendments of the biculturalism programs to the Senior Management Committee; and that very afternoon, we plunged into the first meeting of the task force. This was attended by Bri-
At a second meeting on November 22, 1971, this same task force was given the necessary information on each person’s tasks and on deadlines. The details of all of these tasks were set forth in a formula which, once completed by the staff officers and returned to the DGBB, would make it possible to write a first draft of the plan.

During this period when the DGBB was carrying on discussions in all areas of our responsibilities, we still had to think about and prepare for the November 29 meeting with the Senior Management Committee. Brigadier-General Graham’s presentation and its supporting documentation were therefore reviewed and
filled out, in order to cover all the points that had been raised by myself or by the members of the Advisory Committee of the CDS at their last meeting. Some days after this meeting, in fact, I telephoned Graham to express my astonishment at seeing the CMR described as an English-language unit in the list of ELUs, and presented as such in the slides that had accompanied his presentation. During the brief discussion that followed, I described the true position of the CMR and its future as I saw it then. Naturally, I mentioned that, for the time being, the CMR was a college with a bilingual orientation. But I also said that the recommendations of the Laurndeau-Dunton Commission aimed at making the CMR a French-language institution, just as RMC was an English-language college. Given the circumstances, I strongly suggested that the presentation be amended along these lines. Graham asked me to confirm our conversation on the nature of the CMR in writing. I did so in an internal memorandum addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Laronde on November 23, 1971, which I later found on file. I shall return to the subject of the nature of the CMR when I discuss the teaching and vocational training institutions as a whole. At that time, I shall also speak of Mr. Cloutier’s attitude in particular on this question, and of the manner in which he communicated it to me.

5. Approval of guidelines at the Senior Management Committee meeting of November 29, 1971

The day of our appointment with the Senior Management Committee finally arrived. On November 29, Brigadier-General Graham and I appeared before the chairman, Mr. Cloutier, and the other members of the Committee: General Sharp, CDS; Doctor L’Heureux, Chairman of the Defence Research Board; Lieutenant-General Dare, VCDS; and the associate members, who included Lieutenant-General Dextraze, CP, and Rear-Admiral Porter, CG. The secretary of the Committee was a man by the name of John Chisholm, a bureaucrat whom I had known for a long time and who showed a certain sympathy for our B & B programs.
In my opinion, this was going to be one of the most significant meetings as far as our programs were concerned. For those who attended it, and for me especially, it was to bring out very clearly the importance that Mr. Cloutier would attach to the realization of the Government’s objectives for the CAF in the area of bilingualism, and the role that he, as Deputy Minister, intended to play in it. Consequently, I shall describe the meeting in detail. Asked by the Deputy Minister to submit his petition, Brigadier-General Graham made a masterly presentation. As he had done on November 17th, Graham began with a preamble and a brief historical sketch of our programs, then went straight to the heart of the problem: the guidelines. With the help of slides, he described the problems that he encountered in planning the old parameters for attaining the objectives of biculturalism, and those that were anticipated in their application. He then unveiled the general shape of a long term plan that would have to be worked out in detail, once the project was approved. Finally, he asked the Committee to approve the new guidelines and the draft plan. He stated that we intended to submit this plan and the principles underlying it to the Defence Council for approval, if the Committee deemed this to be necessary.

Mr. Cloutier thanked Brigadier-General Graham. Leading off the discussion, he immediately attacked the principle of a 20 per cent anglophone presence in the FLUs. In his opinion, this percentage was too high, and would result in a serious disruption of the French linguistic structure of the FLUs. He suggested 10 per cent as a more appropriate and practical level. For his part, General Sharp made the same comments that he had made at the meeting of his own committee of November 17, reiterating that the anglophones who were learning French deplored the lack of positions in the FLUs. Consequently, it was his view that more than 10 per cent of the positions in the FLUs might be required for the anglophones. As far as General Dextraze was concerned, the persistent discussions on the subject of an 80/20 per cent representation of anglophones/francophones and vice versa were only complicating the planning of measures that would enable us to attain major objectives, such as the 28 per cent francophone
representation in the Forces in all trades and at all ranks. In this, of course, he was only reflecting the profound and constant concern that General Allard had entertained.

As I listened to the remarks of Mr. Cloutier, Generals Sharp and Dextraze and the other speakers, I recalled the visit that General Allard had paid to my office in the period immediately preceding the meeting of the Senior Management Committee. On this occasion, the General had told me that he would never agree to the Department assigning anglophones to the FLUs in the proportion of 20 per cent, in particular, he said to the Royal 22e. In his opinion, the presence of anglophones who were unilingual or not fluently bilingual, in a proportion of 1 serviceman in 5, could only be harmful to the linguistic structure of the unit, and would prevent the French language from really becoming an effective working language in it. Allard felt that the FLUs should not be used as language schools, and he reminded me of the origins of the 80/20 per cent principle: Prime Minister Pearson’s famous letter of March 21, 1968. I remembered that letter very well, and in the account of my first period of service, I recounted in detail the struggle that General Allard had undertaken to have Mr. Pearson’s orientations change, before bowing to the directive of Mr. Cadieux, which confirmed the principle of 80/20 per cent. Allard found it intolerable to encounter this principle again, perhaps at a moment when it was about to be ratified once more as part of our programs. In any case, General Allard saw fit to warn me that he was going to go to Deputy Minister Cloutier, and to the Minister if necessary, to get this measure changed. In the face of his determination, I described my lack of success in getting our point of view accepted at the last meeting of the Committee of the CDS. I drew attention to the negative attitude of General Sharp and his colleagues, and to the difficult situation in which the CP, Lieutenant-General Dextraze, now found himself. I have never known whether or not Allard, after taking leave of me, went to express his disapproval and his intentions to Dextraze, but it seems to me, from the way in which Mr. Cloutier attacked this guideline, that Allard had surely spoken to him before the meeting of November 29.
After this digression, I return to the meeting of the Committee where Mr. Cloutier had just expressed his objections to the principle of 80/20 per cent, and had heard the comments of Sharp and Dextraze. Taking the floor again, the Deputy Minister now questioned the logic of dividing up a part of the Armed Forces into FLUs and ELUs. He understood the logic of distributing anglophones and francophones in a proportion of 72/28 per cent in the national units and in the units serving outside the country. However, he reminded the meeting that the major objective was to establish FLUs. The answers that Mr. Cloutier was given by Brigadier-General Graham and by Generals Sharp and Dextraze, and especially the way in which he received them, made me realize that he was not so much expressing his disagreement as seeking clarifications on these precise points. He nonetheless observed that we wanted a presence of francophone military personnel in those areas of the country where there were at least 20 per cent francophones in the community, while the Government was also contemplating a presence of francophone employees when the community only comprised 10 per cent francophones. At this point, Graham said that he agreed that planning could very well be carried out on a basis of 10 per cent.

Mr. Cloutier continued to insist on the importance of a logical approach in our planning, and mentioned the situation of recruits. He felt that if we continued to recruit at the authorized rate of 72/28 per cent, we would only perpetuate the shortage of francophones, or at least delay the realization of the 28 per cent objective. For his part, Lieutenant-General Dextraze hastened to announce that the recruiting of francophones was going to be increased until their rate of participation reached 28 per cent, from the current 17 per cent. Finally, Mr. Cloutier supported the remarks and observations he had made during the discussions, by giving the Committee his own version of what the guideline should be. He declared that his version, except for the change regarding recruits, did not differ substantially from the proposed principles, since the major objectives were the same. General Sharp was the first to respond to the Deputy Minister’s suggestion, saying that the idea of recruiting francophones in a propor-
tion of 50 per cent until the level of 28 per cent of francophones was reached in the Forces as a whole was not a guideline but a means to attain an objective. Mr. Cloutier simply replied that in his view, this statement was a guideline until such time as the 28 per cent level was actually reached. In the somewhat lengthy discussion that ensued, we realized that senior military management had a marked preference for general formulas, which gave them the flexibility of interpretation that they were always looking for in complicated and constraining Government programs. For his part Mr. Cloutier, who was accustomed to the succinct and mathematical formulas of his former department, wanted to make sure that the guidelines were exacting, clear and concise. He wanted action and results, not ambiguity and the status quo. He agreed that the percentages in his alternative version should be verified in terms of their impact on the representation of anglophones and francophones in the Armed Forces. He therefore asked that the conclusions of this examination be incorporated in the overhauled version that he had presented to the Committee. Furthermore, he demanded that the amended version and the supporting documents be presented to the Defence Council at the same meeting at which the CP’s proposal on the objectives of bilingualism and on language teaching was to be presented.

Following this meeting, the decisions of the Senior Management Committee were confirmed to us in a first internal memorandum from the Secretariat of the CDS. After a brief consultation with the interested parties on the response to be made to the Deputy Minister, Rear-Admiral Porter, CG, wrote to Mr. Cloutier on December 10, to provide him with certain explanations and to propose a somewhat modified version of the guidelines. Meanwhile, the Deputy Minister, who had not at all appreciated the interpretation that the Secretariat of the CDS had given to the decisions taken at the Committee’s meeting, had written to General Sharp, asking him to have the internal memo in question withdrawn, and to distribute the full text of the Committee’s decision, as written in the minutes of the meeting of November 29. The General somewhat reluctantly acquiesced in this, and so the “official” version of the decision finally reached us at about the same
time that Porter’s memorandum reached the Deputy Minister. The Deputy Minister quickly replied to the CG, telling him what he wanted to see in the text defining the guidelines.

The Deputy Minister’s memo, which was dated December 14, more or less repeated the arguments that he had used at the meeting. For example, he preferred the use of the generic term “establishment” which, in his opinion, embraced all others and eliminated the term “unit”, in the sense of operational unit, which was admittedly confusing in this context. However, he acknowledged that flexibility in staffing positions would be diminished by increasing the participation of francophone military personnel to 28 per cent in the establishments located in those regions where the community comprised more that 10 per cent francophones. Nevertheless, he considered that this solution was more acceptable than a solution under which only 10 per cent of francophones would be assigned to certain establishments such as the bases in Ottawa, Moncton, etc.. Mr. Cloutier believed that one way or another, the limit of 10 per cent on the contribution of francophones to units other than the FLUs and the national units was certainly going to introduce some flexibility into the staffing process.

To this internal memorandum, the contents of which I have just described, Mr. Cloutier attached his final version of the guidelines that were to be approved by the Minister and used by us in developing plans to implement our B & B programs. I must say that these new guidelines were finally adopted thanks to the decisive intervention of Mr. Cloutier. This is evidenced by the exchange of correspondence between him and Admiral Porter, and by his dealings with the Honourable Edgar J. Benson, who succeeded Mr. Macdonald as Minister at the beginning of 1972.

6. Drafting implementation plans and timetables

I was impatient to expedite the matter that was the most important in my eyes, namely the reshaping of policies, and I could not wait for Mr. Cloutier’s final version of the guidelines. I therefore began to orient the efforts of my colleagues in the direction indicated by the Deputy Minister at the meeting of November 29.
At the third meeting of our task force, which took place in the afternoon on this same date of November 29, I therefore requested that we plan the allocation of anglophones and francophones in the structures of the Forces using two different proportions, namely 80/20 per cent and 90/10 per cent respectively. Unfortunately, the minutes of this meeting, which I did not see before they were distributed, did not mention the proportion of 90/10 per cent; Brigadier-General Graham noticed this omission, and drew it to my attention. The error was soon corrected. However, I had to admit that the change of scale from 80/20 per cent to 90/10 per cent was going to increase the work of the personnel managers, but not their enthusiasm. I therefore confirmed the error in the minutes to Graham in writing, and asked him to have a study done of the impact of the 90/10 per cent scale on the staffing of ELUs and FLUs, so that we could determine whether or not this change would be detrimental to the pursuit of our aim and objectives.

To return to the meeting of the task force in the afternoon of November 29, I remember that the discussions focused primarily on the preparation of two documents that were essential to effective short and long term planning. The activities and measures in support of all our programs were described and arranged in two tables, in an order which indicated their importance and interdependence. The people in charge of these different activities now had to give us their deadlines, and we had to indicate these on the timetable, so that we could constantly evaluate the progress made in realizing our objectives.

This was an enormous job, and we were requiring that it be completed for December 2. This could not possibly be done, especially with the additional task imposed on us by the Senior Management Committee’s decision to change the scale of anglophone/francophone representation from 80/20 per cent to 90/10 per cent. I soon realized this, and while exhorting my staff and other people to outdo themselves, I advised Major-General Laubman of the situation. He also realized that it was no longer possible to stick to our timetable, according to which we would submit
to the CP, on December 15, a detailed plan to implement our B & B programs. It was therefore decided to hold a fourth meeting of the task force on December 17; Laubman himself would come to the meeting, to explain the new situation and to arouse enthusiasm. Meanwhile, at the DGBB, we were redoubling our efforts, all day every day including weekends. We were very aware of the fact that with the arrival of the holiday season, apathy would set in and people would be slacking off. Though we were not planning to meet with the Defence Council until the beginning of February, we realized that the intervening six weeks on the calendar only represented three weeks of real work. We therefore had to speed up our work, not only in the area of reshaping policies, but also in all other fields affected by the promotion and establishment of B & B at the Department of National Defence. Before completing my account of the events which occurred in 1971, I shall provide a retrospective view of our actions and initiatives in these fields during the first five months following my return to the Department.

The December 15 meeting that I mentioned initiated the final phase of the preparation of our plans and the drafting of the voluminous supporting documentation. Major-General Laubman gave us a brief historical sketch of the events that led us to the point we had now reached in our B & B programs. He emphasized the importance of developing an implementation plan that would allow the Department to reach the objectives as amended, and at the same time would be sound enough to be acceptable to the Treasury Board. Laubman said that he was very aware of the fact that we had little time to do all the necessary work. Nevertheless, he thought that it was an urgent matter to prepare the plan on which would be based a petition to the Treasury Board for the fiscal year 1972/1973 and the five following years. For this reason, he requested that the DGBB receive, in accordance with a fixed timetable, all the data required to prepare and present the plans and the petition to the Defence Council.

Following up on the explanations and exhortations of Major-General Laubman, I revealed the new timetable for the jobs that
the task force had to do, with specific deadlines for certain activities planned for February 2, 1972, the date of the presentation to the Defence Council. I also reminded all the staff responsible for various activities that January 25 was to be the target date for sending their data to the DGBB. Having said this, I asked Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant to define the sequence of critical events, and describe them in detail. Having done so, Tousignant insisted on the necessity of estimating the costs of each activity as accurately as possible. In particular, he mentioned the area of language teaching and the project to establish a new language school at St. Jean. This project would involve expenditures of 35 million dollars, which would have to be justified in detail. I shall have more to say later on about this school, which opened its doors after my departure from the DGBB.

This meeting is still memorable for me, not only because of the direct contribution of Major-General Laubman, but also because for the first time, officers in attendance were from all sections of the Department. In the coming weeks, these officers would be grappling with the details and problems of our programs; they would be really responsible for preparing the data that Laubman had referred to. Personally, I was very encouraged by some evidence of good will on the part of these officers, but I also noted some apprehension in the face of the complexity of their task, and the small amount of time allocated to execute them properly. The holidays were approaching rapidly, and I was already thinking of the next meeting, set for February, 1972. I hoped that at that time, it would perhaps be possible to note real progress in the preparation of the plans and the petition to the Treasury Board, at least on the Armed Forces side.

7. The plans are approved by the CDS Advisory Committee, February 7, 1972, and the Senior Management Committee, February 14, 1972

From the first days of January, 1972 work resumed on the plans with even greater intensity. The matter progressed so rapidly that on February 17, I could appear before the CDS’s Advi-
sory Committee with the confidence that I had a logical implementa-
tion plan to present. We had worked hard to bring out the
impact of the guidelines that had been amended and accepted by
the Senior Management Committee on November 29, 1971.

The meeting of the Committee at which I gave my presenta-
tion was chaired by General Sharp. Also in attendance were Lieu-
tenant-Generals Dare (VCDS), Dextraze (CP) and Pollard (Chief
of Technical Services), Vice-Admiral Porter (CG) and a group of
assistants and counsellors. In my presentation, I saw fit to pay
particular attention to some aspects, specifically the logical pro-
gramming of the development of the FLUs in three five-year
phases, with the first phase beginning in 1972 and ending in 1977.

During this period, we wanted to provide francophones with a
broader range of opportunities to work in French. The idea was to
establish new FLUs, such as a DDH destroyer, a tactical helicop-
ter squadron, two radar bases, a squadron of transport aircraft, and
a squadron of all-weather intercepters. I was pleased to describe
this future programming of FLUs in detail, since we had estab-
lished it after long consultations with our colleagues in the Sea
and Air elements. Since FLUs already existed in the Land ele-
ment, it was necessary to make serious efforts to plan FLUs for
the other two elements.

The selection of the FLUs depended on many factors. In par-
ticular, it was necessary to evaluate the possible development of
facilities such as bilingual services and French schools in the se-
lected bases. Furthermore, we had to ensure that transfers of
French-speaking and English-speaking military personnel in sup-
port of the new FLUs would really be in the interests of the pro-
grams and of the individuals involved.

I also took time to describe our needs for bilingual personnel,
in order to justify a capacity of 1600 students at the new language
school that was to be constructed at the St. Jean base. With tables
and words, I showed that we needed 27,000 bilingual military
personnel, including 14,000 anglophones and 13,000 franco-
phones. Since the francophones were already bilingual, the catching up would have to be done on the anglophone side. In my opinion, this reasoning was logical. We had to train 4,000 bilingual people per year, in order to meet our needs over a period of 15 years. Nevertheless, I emphasized that for the first phase, 1972-1977, the major efforts in this area would be made by francophones, who would surely bear almost the entire burden of bilingualism. The same could be said of the second phase, 1977-1982. However, according to our forecasts, a fairer division of the requirements of bilingualism in the Armed Forces would occur in the third phase 1982-1987.

Finally, I spoke of the costs of all the programs. I showed that we had made a distinction between existing activities, paid for out of the Department’s current budget, and the new activities together with the increases in the old, which would have to be subsidized by additional funds from the Treasury Board. These additional funds amounted to 10 million dollars for the year 1972-1973. By adding these to the Department’s contribution of $8 million, we thus arrived at a total cost of our programs for the coming year of $18 million. Unfortunately, my statement of these costs for each year of this first phase, 1972-1977, was made in the form of a table, which did not make the same distinction between the Department’s funds and additional funds, except for 1972-1973. Lieutenant-General Dare criticized this way of proceeding, and we were thus obliged to modify our tables and documentation for the Senior Management Committee meeting on February 14.

In general, the Committee favorably received the presentation of our plans and of the petition to the Treasury Board that formed part of them. General Sharp approved our recommendations as a whole, emphasizing the remarks of Lieutenant-General Dare and adding that the CMR, which had been referred to in the discussions, would remain bilingual, and RMC and Royal Roads would become bilingual.

It was thus on February 14 that the Senior Management Committee listened to me as I once more presented the plans of
the Department, supported by precise programs, and supplemented by a petition to the Treasury Board. As in the past, Mr. Cloutier led the discussion, but this time, I was pleasantly surprised by the sincere and enlightened interest that the members of the Committee took in the proceedings. I congratulated myself for having brought my colleagues, Hanna and Tousignant, along on this occasion. I had, indeed, asked them to clarify my answers when complicated questions required it. I was likewise delighted with the precise directives that we received from the Deputy Minister after he had approved the plans, the programs and our recommendations.

These directives concerning the form and content of the petition to the Treasury Board, flowed from the Deputy Minister’s previous experience. Needless to say, they were scrupulously followed, and I am certain that they helped to make our programs and our requests for additional resources more acceptable. I must add, however, that following the Committee meeting, I only saw one real complication. Mr. Cloutier requested that we prepare ourselves to present our program to the Minister as soon as possible, after we had included the civilian program in it. Unfortunately, the development of plans for this program was behind schedule. However, with a little pressure and much good will on the part of the task force, we were able to submit a program to the Deputy Minister, which he approved around mid March. This program, of which more will be said later, was incorporated in the petition to the Treasury Board.

8. The B & B program is approved by the Minister on April 10, 1972 and the Treasury Board on September 29, 1972

By March 20, we were thus ready to go and inform the new Minister, the Honourable Edgar S. Benson, about our B & B programs. For this occasion, Mr. Cloutier had preferred a more intimate type of discussion with the Minister. There were only about three or four of us in the board room, and I gave my presentation without interruption. When it was over, Mr. Benson asked a few questions, to which Mr. Cloutier replied personally. The same
happened with the key question, which in all likelihood had been brought up for discussion by the opposition, and discussed with the Minister. I refer to the much-disputed guideline that the composition of personnel in our FLUs should be 90 per cent francophone and 10 per cent anglophone. The Minister said that this guideline seemed illogical and unjustified in the context of our plans and programs as a whole. In my opinion, Cloutier should not have waited for Benson to make this observation. In responding to the Minister’s criticism, he made a few halfhearted remarks, and did not even ask me to add my own comments. He simply promised to send to Benson a memorandum that would sum up this problem.

In the days that followed, I drafted this long internal memorandum with the assistance of Major Arsenault. In the memo, I sketched a brief history of the problem, and elaborated on the reasoning behind the guideline of 90/10 per cent. Mr. Cloutier signed the document on March 30, and sent it to the Minister the same day. Our arguments must have been accepted by Mr. Benson for, shortly afterwards, we were advised that we were to appear before the Defence Council on April 10, 1972. I went to this memorable meeting, but was not asked to repeat a presentation which all the members of the Council had already heard. Instead, Mr. Cloutier himself introduced the subject, and the Minister took the floor. The full Defence Council listened attentively to Mr. Benson. Lieutenant-General Dextraze was present for the first time as CDS designate.

The Minister began by asking the members to give their frank opinion on the substance of the program and the concept of implementation. He acknowledged that he had some concerns, and wanted to be sure that our programs would not have any negative consequences. He feared the polarization of the anglophone and francophone groups, which would thus create two Armed Forces. He also saw a certain rigidity in the wish to attain all objectives by 1987, and also in wanting to apply the proportion of 72 per cent anglophones and 28 per cent francophones to all positions in the Armed Forces. Because he was afraid that the programs might
be misunderstood, he thought it undesirable to publicize the issue of the rates of representation and the proportion of participation. He likewise wanted to make sure that our language training system would not in any way conflict with the Secretary of State’s programs for the other Departments, nor duplicate their efforts. Finally, he expressed his opposition to moving the St. Jean language school to CFB St. Hubert, claiming that St. Jean offered more advantages for teaching French to anglophones.

The members of the Council, led by the Deputy Minister, unhesitatingly came to the defence of our plans and programs. Their explanations and apparent sincerity dispelled the doubts and hesitations of the Minister, who approved the programs in their entirety and immediately signed the petition to the Treasury Board that Mr. Cloutier placed before him. I must admit that at that moment, I felt a certain personal satisfaction, in that we had just reached the high point in an arduous process to establish B & B programs at the Department of National Defence. Indeed, the documentation that I brought back to the DGBB on this April 10, 1972 contained the plans and programs of the MND who was personally responsible for introducing and promoting bilingualism and biculturalism in his Department.

For the DGBB, the scene would change, but the script would remain the same. We now had to justify our progress to the Treasury Board, and negotiate additional resources in money and person-years. Through the spring and part of the summer of 1972, the DGBB poured its energies into presentations and arguments before officials of the Treasury Board’s Official Languages Directorate. They examined the plans, the programs and our needs for funds in the smallest detail. During this period, Mr. Cloutier came to the rescue on several occasions, in particular in regard to CMR and RMC. I shall have more to say later about his interventions in this area. Nonetheless, we had to modify our petition somewhat, especially in regard to money and person-years. Finally, in mid-September, the Deputy Minister summoned me to his office to tell me that the Treasury Board was going to approve the petition under which we would receive, for the year 1972-
1973, 6 million dollars in additional funds and 516 person-years. As Mr. Cloutier put it, “we’ll have to make do with that”.

It would have been bad form for us to complain, since for the year 1973-1974, the Treasury Board undertook to grant us an additional 12 million dollars, and also 737 person-years over a period of 18 months.
On the civilian side, the situation had been deplorable. Fortunately, the arrival of Mr. Cloutier was to lead Mr. Morry, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Manpower, to take a completely different interest in the matter; it also resulted in an unblocking, the first effects of which were felt by Major Louis Noël de Tilly, adviser on bilingualism. Alone and unassisted, Major de Tilly had, despite all his good will, found himself overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks in this field. Nonetheless, he had continued to produce a large number of internal memoranda, in an attempt to induce people to take the decisions required to supply the directives and resources needed to study and plan civilian programs. When I arrived at the Department he had kindly informed me of the situation and of his frustrations. I had thus learned that the Treasury Board had already issued a series of management objectives concerning the introduction of bilingualism in the Public Service in general, and in the various Departments in particular. Louis Noël de Tilly told me that, at DND, not much had been done to respond to the Treasury Board’s appeal, except for internal discussions to decide who would be responsible for preparing a plan to implement bilingualism among civilian employees. He showed me the correspondence on this subject that had been exchanged between Mr. Morry and the Deputy Chief of Civilian Personnel. The latter reported to Lieutenant-General Dextraze, and thus was not directly controlled by Morry. This correspondence quite
clearly illustrated the negative climate of relations and the deadlock that existed in the civilian program. I must also say that the Treasury Board was growing impatient at having to wait for many months to receive the Departmental plans, including that of National Defence. Shortly before Mr. Cloutier’s arrival, the Treasury Board requested the Department in writing to produce the plan by September 15. This provided the necessary impetus. Mr. Cloutier became directly involved in the matter. Louis Noël de Tilly obtained a two week extension to respond to the Treasury Board, namely until October 10, 1971. On that date, Mr. Cloutier signed a letter to the Treasury Board, in which he explained the situation in which the Department found itself, and its inability to produce the detailed plan as requested. He emphasized the complexity of the problem, given the presence in the Department of two such elements as the Armed Forces and the very numerous corps of civilian employees who supported them and who, for the most part, were integrated into military structures. Mr. Cloutier asked for additional resources to assist in the examination of all aspects of the introduction of bilingualism among the civilian employees of the Department. To justify his petition, he sketched the main lines of a program for using his resources, and of what he hoped to accomplish with them for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73. In his letter, Mr. Cloutier also declared his intention to pursue the development of military plans and programs, and also those for civilians, under the control of a single organization, so that eventually there would only be one program at the Department, for both civilian and military personnel. I must say here that this was the first indication I had of Mr. Cloutier’s intentions regarding the role that the DGBB would have to play in his future projects for bilingualism at the DND. However, I later learned that Louis Noël de Tilly had supplied Mr. Cloutier with a draft organization chart of the DGBB, which incorporated a civilian section of eleven positions, including a director to administer the civilian programs of the Department. Mr. Cloutier had not accepted de Tilly’s proposal on that occasion.

Although I was concentrating almost all my energies on the military plans and related activities, toward the end of November,
I had to become directly involved in the matter of bilingualism among the civilian employees. Up to that time, this matter had been the sole responsibility of Major Louis Noël de Tilly, from the fact that he was the Department’s adviser on bilingualism, and reported directly to the Deputy Minister. Mr. Cloutier had already indicated that he wanted a petition to the Treasury Board for both the military and civilian programs. The DGBB was working on the petition for the military personnel; but Louis Noël de Tilly, who still did not have any personnel to assist him, found it impossible to accomplish this task for the civilians. On November 3, he thus proposed to Mr. Morry that a task force be set up to prepare the civilian plan. On November 22, Morry sent a letter to the Treasury Board secretary in whose lap he dumped the whole problem and the responsibility for setting up a task force. He also generously offered the services of Major Louis Noël de Tilly, on an occasional basis. Having got wind of what was brewing and would eventually happen at the DGBB, I had notified Major-General Laubman of the precarious situation in which my staff found itself, and our inability to prepare a petition to the Treasury Board before the end of December. On December 9, I wrote to Laubman to say that I agreed that it was necessary to get things moving on the civilian side, and that the DGBB would see to this immediately, with the help of a task force that would have to be organized. At the same time, I was writing an internal memorandum to Morry, in which Major-General Laubman informed him of our intentions, and especially that of using the Deputy Chief of Civilian Personnel to recruit the task force we would need to develop the civilian plan and prepare the petition to the TB. Following this internal memo, I underwent a series of consultations with the Deputy Chief of Civilian Personnel, a unilingual anglophone who was going to retire very shortly, and had no intention of becoming very deeply involved in the matter of bilingualism. Finally, we succeeded in setting up a task force, which reported to me and was soon at work. Preparing the civilian plan to implement a program to attain the Treasury Board’s ten management objectives was to prove to be a laborious and complicated undertaking.
XII

Actions in Support of Bilingualism and Biculturalism

1. Official languages instruction

Before ending my retrospective account of the first months of my second period of service, I must speak of other areas of activity where my staff and I had much to do to orient or renew our programs. In the field of language training, Major Taschereau had organized a course of indoctrination and familiarization for more than 60 language teachers at CFB St. Jean. These men and women, who were all highly qualified, had been recruited by the Languages Bureau of the Public Service (PSC). After the week spent at St. Jean, they were to be spread through our bases, where they would be primarily involved in teaching French to English-speaking military personnel and to some civilian employees of the Department. At the end of August, I had gone to St. Jean with Marcel Caron, of the Treasury Board, and with his successor at the Languages Bureau, Philippe Deane.

On this occasion, I had spoken to the group of teachers and to the program administrators, and had congratulated them on joining the Canadian Forces Language School. At the same time, I told them that they were going to contribute to one of the activities that was most important for our programs of bilingualism,
namely language training. I brought out the importance of their presence on these bases by emphasizing that if French and English were taught to our military personnel and civilian employees in a competent and interesting manner, this would certainly promote good will and understanding for the rest of our bilingualism program.

This week of information and consultation between teachers and administrators was most fruitful, and the teachers enthusiastically went off to their respective bases. In the weeks that followed, Major Taschereau and his team had to deal with a multitude of administrative errors, such as delays in providing supplies, teaching materials, etc., which was only to be expected for an enterprise of this importance. Before the end of 1971, the Directorate of Language Training, in view of the apparent success of this initiative, was already planning to expand its activity to our bases in Europe. The group of teachers assigned to this program was to increase from its current level of 70 to more than 100 by the fall of 1972. Moreover, in regard to the number of students, pressure was already being felt to admit the wives of servicemen and a greater number of civilians to the program. Unfortunately, we had to refuse them and plead compliance with our priority, which was to train military personnel to become bilingual. In our bases and in the different headquarters, this key activity became the practical and tangible result of the implementation of our programs of bilingualism. In the light of this accomplishment, I could state that finally we had succeeded in starting up a very important part of a program that had been approved for a long time.

Meanwhile, again in the area of language training, Major Taschereau and I were working to develop a better relationship with the Languages Bureau of the PSC. Major Taschereau, as his duties required, was more personally and regularly involved in this matter. However, Mr. Cloutier had recently given me a mandate to negotiate a new agreement under which the Languages Bureau of the PSC would assume responsibility for administering and managing educational services for teaching languages at the DND. Material and logistical support for this activity as a whole...
would remain the responsibility of the Department. As a result of discussions and dealings that were closely conducted but never unpleasant, an agreement was signed between the Public Service Commission, represented by Commissioner Charles Lussier, and the DND, represented by Mr. Cloutier. I shall leave it to Lieutenant-Colonel Taschereau, retired as Director of Language Training in 1982, to describe this matter in detail if he thinks it appropriate to do so. Before leaving this subject, I should say that the positive results of my representations to the Commission were due in large part to Mr. Charles Lussier’s understanding of and interest in the Department’s ambitious programs of bilingualism.

2. Translation and terminology

In the area of translation and terminology, I kept abreast of developments and activities as best I could. The Director, Lieutenant-Colonel Newell, regularly kept me informed of his problems and initiatives. He was fully aware of the importance of the contribution of translation and terminology to our programs of bilingualism, especially in enabling the Department to meet the requirements of the Official Languages Act. He also realized that the resources assigned by the Translation Bureau to the Department were unable to supply the translation services required to meet our needs. For this reason, he spared no effort to lobby and make representations so that our petitions would be accepted and our situation would be improved. As a result of his efforts, the Department of the Secretary of State agreed, in September of 1971, to establish new translation positions in our Department.

Some weeks later, the Public Service Commission launched a recruiting campaign to hire other translators, revisors and terminologists. Unfortunately, this process was to be spread out over a period of several years.

In the meantime, Newell’s directorate was grappling with a multitude of problems: translation, revision and terminology. Other problems, which were not always associated with translation, resulted from our efforts to promote the use and the quality of the French language. In particular, I remember the debate that
had preceded the decision to replace the dictionaries officially in use in the CAF. We considered that the concise French and bilingual Larousse dictionaries were somewhat outmoded, and we had opted for the concise Robert and for the Harraps bilingual English-French/French-English dictionaries. Before the controversy petered out, the cultural attaché at the French embassy had become involved in it. I also remember thinly disguised attempts to embarrass us when, as ill luck would have it, a translator had used a French term different from the term that another translator had used for the same English military expression. On both sides, we may have been too sensitive to the shock of change, and it may be that this incident illustrated the urgent need for an approved, published military terminology. I also recall that, generally speaking, the persons in authority in the bases did not make any great effort to appoint coordinators for translation services. These services, like those of language training, had to be coordinated if they were to be effective.

Despite the many difficulties he was encountering in his area, Lieutenant-Colonel Newell managed to secure acceptance for guidelines to implement more extensive translation services for the CAF, and to have these guidelines prepared for publication. I considered that this bilingual document, which was signed by Major-General Laubman on behalf of the CDS, was very important. In the first place, it clearly explained the commitments and responsibilities of the Department and of the Translation Bureau. Secondly, it set forth the steps that would occur in the delivery of translation services, and established a priority of texts to be translated. Finally, this document directly encouraged the use of the French language in the drafting of administrative texts, internal memoranda, letters, etc., for it supported the use of translation when the sole purpose for it was that an employee was unable to read or write a text in French or in English. In my opinion, this constraint could have become, with a little determination and good will, a genuine effort to promote the use of the French language in the DND. However, unfortunately, this did not happen.

Francophones still found themselves in a difficult linguistic
position, and too few of them felt that they could work properly in French. Since they didn’t want to spend all day waiting for their unilingual anglophone colleagues, they continued to write their material in English for the most part. It was also during this period that Lieutenant-Colonel Newell tried to make me aware of the merits of an automated bank of terminology, and of the contribution that the Department could make to such a bank. Newell had read up on the progress that Friedrich Krollmann of West Germany had made in automating a bank of German military terms in three languages: German, English and French. Newell was planning to visit Krollmann in 1972, to see for himself what progress had been made and what problems existed in this area. I strongly supported him in this project, and I suggested that he communicate his intentions to the Language Bureau. I thought that the Bureau had to be encouraged to be open to the possibilities of automated terminology. Unofficially, we were already talking about a contribution by the Department to assist in starting up a project of this kind. We wanted to include in it a stock of 6,000 military terms from a lexicon that was already structured and that was going to be published before the end of 1971.

3. French classes for dependants

At the beginning of September, I had to become familiar once more with the difficult situation that French-speaking military personnel were still experiencing when they wanted to begin or continue the education of their children in French, outside Quebec. I had had this experience with my own five children during a career of more than 30 years in the Armed Forces. At the cost of considerable sacrifices, my wife and I had succeeded in having our three sons educated in French, up to a level above that of the classical baccalaureate. Unfortunately, it was not until my retirement that the education of my daughters could be satisfactorily completed in French. I also remembered the period I had spent at the “Bilingual Secretariat” in 1967-1968, and the efforts and projects of General Allard, who had tried to find solutions to these problems. Moreover, I have already described how General Allard had wanted to set up a boarding school in Quebec for the
children of francophone military personnel assigned outside Quebec, until this idea was rejected by Mr. Cadieux. Three years later, the situation was virtually unchanged. Except for Ontario, which offered some facilities at the elementary level, but very few at the secondary level, the other provinces for the most part offered courses in English only.

With the advent of the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL), the Official Languages Act and our programs of bilingualism and biculturalism, we now had the necessary lobbying tools to try to transform the negative and too conservative aspect of the Department’s policies regarding the education of dependants in French. On October 4, for example, Major Louis Noël de Tilly asked the DGBB to comment on the report concerning the education of dependants that had been recently submitted to Deputy Minister Cloutier by the Associate Deputy Minister, Colonel Paul Mathieu. Since his arrival at the Department at the end of the 1940s, Mathieu had been responsible for policies in this area. This is not the place for me to judge his role and his contribution; others will one day be able to do so more objectively. However, I may say that, during the four years (1948 to 1952) that I spent in the office of the Military Secretary of the Department, I became very familiar with Colonel Mathieu’s difficult position, and I could only deplore the fact that he was powerless to redress the injustice. In 1971, however, I felt that circumstances and conditions were more favourable. I therefore believed that the DGBB, if it were armed with determination and imagination, could stimulate initiatives that would improve the situation of the education of francophone children, especially outside Quebec.

It was in this spirit that on October 25, I responded to Noël de Tilly’s internal memorandum. I began by mentioning the importance that had to be attached to this problem, given the anticipated increase in FLUs and in the numbers of francophone personnel in the Armed Forces. I deplored the fact that our children were being anglicized because of the system of education, and I reminded de Tilly of the B & B Commission’s attitude towards the problem. I referred to the dilemma faced by francophone parents, who often
had no other choice but to begin the education of their children in English. I defined the extent of the problem with statistics and projections showing the number of children who could benefit from educational services in French if these services were established outside Quebec. However, I sounded a note of warning in saying that a certain number of francophones wanted their children to continue their studies in English, since they had not been able to begin them in French. It would be necessary to conduct a survey of the parents. I also proposed certain measures with a view to limiting the assignment of francophones to areas lacking French language educational facilities, and I noted that in these circumstances, one had to accept the loss of a certain flexibility in staffing positions. Finally, I stated that the time factor was critical as far as the capacity to supply educational services in French was concerned. It was essential that facilities be put in place when they were required, and not six months after the formation of a FLU. For this reason, I insisted that the necessary steps be taken immediately with the provincial authorities, so that the teaching of French in the Department’s schools for dependants would be authorized. I also insisted that planning for the organization of these schools be undertaken at the same time.

4. Professional training for officers

I have just spoken of our concerns in regard to the education of dependants in French. At the Department, however, there was also the very important area of professional training. It is for this reason that I mention the problems of bilingualism in the institutions that trained our military personnel. Apart from the CMR, which was recognized as a bilingual military college, the French language was virtually absent from our institutions of military training and instruction. I was indeed personally aware of this, because the second to last position I had held in the Army was that of Director of Studies and Deputy Commander of the Army Staff College at Kingston, from November, 1962 to July, 1966. Today, I admit that my greatest concern had been to ensure the validity and the quality of the courses and exercises offered to our students, the leaders of tomorrow, without being too preoccupied
with the bilingual aspect. Although we accepted work written in French, there was no provision for supplying French course documentation or for organizing discussion groups in French. Consequently, when I became involved and interested in promoting bilingualism at NDHQ, I was also determined to stimulate initiatives to introduce French into our professional studies. Rear-Admiral R.W. Murdoch, Commander of the Canadian Defence Education Establishments (CDEE), wrote to the CP on October 1, 1971, on this subject, to inform him of the progress that had been made or was anticipated for the year 1971-1972. Since Murdoch had been so kind as to send his letter through the DGBB, I sent an internal memo to the CP. I wanted my observations to be positive, for I thought I discerned, in the efforts of our two colleagues and of our staff college, a certain willingness to face the reality of bilingualism, even with very limited means. By the way, I remarked that we would perhaps be deluding ourselves to think that an instructor/director with level 5 (average) bilingual skills would be able to perform his duties properly. I said that a level 6 was essential, and that in practice, the criterion of linguistic competence should be the same for the instructor who led an English group and one who led a French group. Here as elsewhere, I wanted to make our anglophone colleagues understand that the equality of English and French, as enshrined in the law, should become a reality in the day-to-day activities of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, in the years to come, I was to discover just how difficult it was to really change the nature of our traditional institutions and the linguistic behaviour of their personnel, unless one was prepared to commit enormous resources and a great deal of determination. This leads me now to recount what I knew and learned of the struggle to “bilingualize” RMC, the most prestigious institution of the CAF before the advent of the Collège militaire royal de St-Jean. Today, RMC, CMR and RRMC (Royal Roads, in Victoria) continue to train a large number of our young officers who are more bilingual than in the past.

In his briefing on my arrival at the DGBB, Jean Fournier had spoken to me about the CDEE, a new organization set up by General Allard to ensure centralized monitoring of professional train-
ing for military personnel. Major-General W.A. Milroy had, I believe, been the first Commander, having replaced Major-General Roger Rowley who had headed the Officer Development Board. It was during his period of service, in the face of B & B requirements, that some changes of orientation and attitude in the programs of our military colleges were planned and recommended. For example, a first plan concerning RMC and RRMC was submitted by Major-General Milroy in April, 1971 only to be rejected by Lieutenant-General Dextraze in June. Rear-Admiral Murdoch, Milroy’s successor, undertook to have this first plan amended. Murdoch assumed his duties in the summer of 1971, and on September 30, I was to send him a first message signed by Commodore Boyle. I wanted to get things moving in this area, especially in regard to RMC. I saw that the Department was not acting on Recommendation 40 of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, which had been accepted by the Government. The first plan (produced by Milroy) had discussed increasing the degree of bilingualism at RMC and RRMC, above all through a gradual increase in French-language courses. This plan provided for medium-term and long-term stages, but without precise timetables. Despite certain reservations, it had been presented to the CP who, as I have mentioned, had rejected it. Certain persons had doubts about more extensive language instruction, and in particular about French courses at RMC and RRMC. To help resolve these doubts, the Department decided to call in two experts in official languages instruction in Canada. The first was Gerald Blackburn, the former Director General of the PS Language Bureau, and now a professor in the faculty of administration at the University of Ottawa. The other, R.C. Duplantie, was the current Director of the PS Language Bureau. These two men agreed to examine the situation in the military colleges, and to recommend measures to improve official languages instruction and make it more effective.

It was now almost the end of September. The Commander of CDEE had repeatedly warned the CP that changes to the original plan would have to await the Blackburn/Duplantie report, which was slow in coming. I had already asked to meet Rear-Admiral Murdoch to discuss our mutual problems, but without success. It
was only after Commodore Boyle’s reminder, which I have already mentioned above, that I finally met Murdoch on October 21, 1971. A few days later, I wrote to the Deputy Chief of Personnel to assure him that the Commander, CDEE and I had made the necessary survey of the situation, that lines of communication were open and would remain so, and that further meetings were planned. I also told Major-General Laubman that I deplored the circumstances that had prevented a more substantial number of qualified candidates, being accepted at CMR. In my view, the desire to keep the proportion of 60 per cent francophones to 40 per cent anglophones, in the interests of bilingualism, went against the B & B Commissions’s recommendation. Though I didn’t say so at that particular time, I thought, of course, that a proportion of 70/30 would be acceptable. I also declared my support for the proposal that 50 per cent of the Armed Forces’ officer requirements be supplied by the military colleges. I believed that this would enable us to increase francophone representation and justify the organization of a full range of courses at CMR, especially in the engineering field. Finally, I told Laubman that I was interested in contributing to studies in progress on officers’ career development. I wanted to make my ideas known at all costs. Major-General Laubman understood my message, and I was invited to attend the deliberations and discussions of the Director General of Programs and Personnel Requirements.

Henceforth, there was a continual and productive exchange of information and directives between the Commander, CDEE and the CP. During this time, I reiterated my views on the proper proportion of francophones and anglophones at the CMR with a view to the recruitment of students for the academic year beginning September, 1972. The proportion I suggested, namely 70/30, was accepted on condition that the CMR return to a 60/40 ratio in 1973-74. Finally, I said that I agreed with a return to the 60/40 proportion at the CMR, provided that recruitment of francophones for RMC proved successful, and that the participation rate at that institution attained 60 per cent anglophones to 40 per cent francophones.
I have promised to describe the warning that Sylvain Cloutier gave me in his office, regarding my attitude to the bilingualism and biculturalism issue in our military colleges. The nature of my dealings with the Commander, CDEE and other personnel managers had, I think, given Cloutier the impression that I supported the concept of a unilingual French CMR and a unilingual English RMC, in accordance with Recommendation 40 of the B & B Commission. I have to admit that even the memo I sent to Brigadier-General Graham, advising him not to describe CMR as an English-language unit in his Armed Forces model, could have misled people about my real intentions. In alluding to the B & B Commission’s Recommendation 40 and to a college with a predominantly francophone student body, I was merely reminding my anglophone colleagues that we had to show determination in planning and executing a program of bilingualism and biculturalism that would make RMC a mirror image of CMR. Otherwise, we were likely to wind up with something worse, namely parallelism. On the day I met Mr. Cloutier, he did not give me much of a chance to explain myself. He simply said that he expected me to maintain an active interest in the matter, and reminded me that his policy, and the policy of General Dextraze, was that CMR and RMC be bilingual institutions, and not something else. I replied that it was not necessary to give me this warning, since my intention had always been to support the clear and precise policies of my superiors, and my loyalty had never been called in question. Cloutier simply told me not to get worked up, and changed the subject.

I have already referred to the Treasury Board’s decision to approve the Department’s program and request for funds, with the exception of all that concerned the RRMC at Victoria. I return to this subject now, because I would like to try to throw a little more light on this decision. A number of people at the Department, who were unfamiliar with the background, were surprised at the decision. I should point out at the outset that I did not attend the meeting at which the Treasury Board officers raised the problem posed by the fact that, as far as the linguistic character of the military colleges was concerned, the Department’s program did not
conform to that of the Government. However, members of my team told me about the so-called misunderstanding that had occurred at the meeting. In the eyes of the Treasury Board officers, the Department seemed to have ignored Recommendation 40 in wanting to preserve the bilingual academic character of the CMR, while making RMC a bilingual college on the model of the CMR. The Department also wanted to make Royal Roads a bilingual college, but in a second stage. Recommendation 40 had nothing to say about Royal Roads, but proposed that CMR be a unilingual French-language college with an academic program similar to RMC. RMC would remain what it was: a unilingual English-language college. English and French were taught both at CMR and at RMC, in order to train bilingual officers. The Treasury Board officers saw this situation as a departure from the Government’s policy and demanded that the MND go and explain himself to the Cabinet, in order to settle the matter. To this end Mr. Benson, at the request of Mr. Cloutier, signed a long brief in which he asked the Cabinet to confirm that:

a. the Canadian military colleges would continue to exist on three campuses;
b. the concept of keeping CMR as a bilingual college and of transforming RMC and Royal Roads into bilingual colleges was approved by Cabinet; and
c. the implementation plan was approved in principle.

Some time after the brief had been sent to Cabinet, we learned that Cloutier had convinced Mr. Drury, Deputy Minister at the Treasury Board, that the DND could, on its own authority, implement the policies of bilingualism and biculturalism without resorting to Cabinet. The Minister’s brief, which had not yet been studied by Cabinet, was withdrawn on September 15, 1972. And, as we know, the Treasury Board approved the program and the modified request. Before leaving this subject, I must admit that I have not been able to find, in the records, any indication of the real reasons for this change of attitude on the part of the Treasury Board. Was there a conflict between Cloutier and David Morley,
Chief of the Official Languages Program and head of the Treasury Board team, who critically analyzed the Department’s B & B programs? Had Morley claimed that the Department had no authority to change the orientation of Recommendation 40? After having sent the brief to Cabinet, did Cloutier decide to appeal to Drury, Morley’s boss and himself a former Deputy Minister of Defence, a post he had held in the 1950s? I do not know the answer to these questions, and I do not want to lose myself in pointless conjectures. It would, in my opinion, be better to ask Mr. Cloutier to explain this episode.

In any case, as we shall see, problems were soon to arise on all fronts, and the truncated B & B program in the military colleges would prove difficult to initiate, especially at RMC. I will describe some of these developments in my account of the years 1973 to 1977.

5. Information

We were greatly in need of a good program of internal and external information, and we were counting on the Director General of Information (DG Info), Brigadier-General “Lou” Bourgeois, to help us. At the end of 1972, in addition to setting up a program of information, I was thinking of launching an information tour of all the major CAF bases, including a visit to the Command HQs. The tour of the bases was planned in detail, and approved by General Dextraze, who had been CDS since September, 1972. I will describe the details of this tour in my account of the activities of 1973. On the other hand, all sorts of problems prevented the information program as such from getting started. We were preoccupied with the overhaul of our policies, and all our staff resources were committed to this task. It was thus an error on my part not to have insisted that we ask for authority to create a position of information officer at the DGBB. This request would certainly have been granted by the Treasury Board, with the rest of the person-years we had asked for. Fortunately, I had sought help from our DG Info, who agreed to lend me Lieutenant Serge Bernier, an RMC graduate who had just started working for
Bourgeois and came to the DGBB in January, 1972. He was very useful to us, but not as an information officer. I shall have more to say about his rather special contribution at the appropriate time. However, even with Bernier at the DGBB, none of my officers were really designated specifically for information duties. It would thus be fair to say that this aspect of our responsibilities was somewhat neglected in 1972. I also feel that Brigadier-General Bourgeois lacked enthusiasm for the program. Anglophone in culture in spite of his name, he hardly spoke French at all. Given his background and the situation in 1972, it is easy to understand why Bourgeois felt ill at ease or perhaps worried about having to provide information and promotion for our B & B programs. Like many others, he predicted that this program would provoke controversy, and would demoralize some members of the Armed Forces despite any explanation and justification that one might offer.

Nevertheless, except for a few slight differences of opinion, our relations with the information division were quite positive throughout my term of service. As I have done for other activities, I will have more to say about information in connection with our B & B programs.


The first report of the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL) in 1970-1971 had nothing very interesting to say about the Department. The COL had received eleven complaints. He reported four of these complaints to us, but took action only on one complaint concerning CFB Bagotville, which base he promised to visit before the end of 1971. It was not until 1971-1972 and his second report that the COL really got down to work, and to have an effect on the Department’s bilingual programs, and on the development of relations and communications between the DGBB and his office. However, as soon as I had arrived at NDHQ in August 1971 I had got in touch with Lieutenant-Colonel Guy Robitaille at the COL’s office. Robitaille, a veteran of the Royal 22e Régiment, who had been wounded in Italy in the Second World
Guy was very familiar with the Department and the CAF. I think this made him more sympathetic to our concern for enforcing the Official Languages Act at the DND. Throughout my term of service I found that Lieutenant-Colonel Robitaille, while not forgetting his duties and responsibilities at the COL’s office, made sure that our communications were positive, and contributed to the resolution of the Department’s problems. Commissioner Keith Spicer soon advised us of these problems, which we will discuss again in our survey of his 1971-72 report.

7. The Francotrain project

At the time of my first appointment to the “Bilingual Secretariat”, the Francotrain project had not yet come into existence. General Allard had organized it in 1969, while still CDS, to provide francophones with the opportunity of taking classification specialty and trades courses in French. This was an area that concerned Brigadier-General Bernard Guimond who, like Armand Ross and myself, was worried about the careers of French Canadians in the Canadian Forces. In 1971, I found Bernard Guimond dealing with the same old problems: a shortage of bilingual instructors, and the imposition of too heavy a burden on the francophones in this area. There were delays in providing French instruction for some classifications, specialties and trades. There was also the third phase of the Francotrain project, whose original purpose was to group bilingual units of the trades schools at Valcartier, to create a French-language trades training centre. This project had been the great dream of General Allard in 1969. However, it was now 1972, and the third phase of the Francophone project had to be re-examined for a number of reasons: the recent situation in the Armed Forces; changes in policies of bilingualism; and, finally, the approval that the Minister, Mr. Benson, had recently given to the B & B omnibus program. General Sharp gave the order for its re-examination in July, 1972 and the DGBB made its contribution to the process. I gave Hanna, my assistant,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant the responsibility of seeing that B & B interests and objectives were respected.

Working in cooperation with the French-language Training Division (FTD) in Quebec City, we managed to keep abreast of problems and proposed solutions in this area. The outlook of Lieutenant-Colonel Newell, Director of Translation Services and Terminology at DGBB, illustrates what B & B interests and objectives had to be safeguarded. Newell warned us against accepting hasty solutions to the real problems posed by the French-language training of our trades personnel. He wondered if francophone servicemen could really think of pursuing their entire career in French only, and yet aspire to the highest positions, as their anglophone counterparts could. Working solely in French, francophone soldiers could perhaps attain the rank of sergeant as non-commissioned officer, and officers might become captains or majors. However, to move up to higher ranks, they would have to be bilingual, i.e. have an adequate command of English. Given this fact, what was to be done about the principle of equal opportunity and the necessity of meeting the requirements of both linguistic communities in an equitable manner? This was the dilemma. Absolute equality was inconceivable in the context of unified Canadian Forces. If we were too insistent in this area, we would encourage polarization into two solitudes. Within the DGBB, opinions were divided on this issue, some favoured total enforcement of the principle, while others believed compromise in practice was necessary. My staff was a happy mixture of idealists and practical men, and our discussions led us to adopt a compromise approach. This meant that in principle, the DGBB would always advocate complete equality of languages, opportunities, conditions of service etc. in the Forces. But in practice, we would speak of qualified equality, adjusted in accordance with the anglophone/francophone participation factor, set at 72/28 per cent. Our interpretation of the equality principle should never be applied rigidly, but should be adjusted according to circumstances and the nature of the activity involved.

After this brief digression to clarify an aspect of the DGBB’s
philosophy, I return to the subject of Francotrain. In 1972, this project was a major activity of the Forces’ B & B program, and still is today. I will have more to say about Francotrain at the appropriate moment, when I describe how the DGBB intervened to deal with complications and problems arising from our determination to see that all trades, specialties and classifications were taught in French.

8. Promotions and Francophones

One of my concerns, at the time, was to continue to worry me right up to my departure from the DND in 1977. I refer to the policies governing the advancement of officers, non commissioned officers and soldiers. The Ross Report, with the help of statistics, showed that these policies produced unbalanced and inequitable results for francophones. In general, francophone servicemen had often been kept out of the higher ranks. For example, I observed that when I arrived at the Department in September of 1971, there were no francophone officers with a rank higher than colonel in the Navy and the Air Force. I remember my discussions with Commodore Falls, Deputy Chief of Personnel, and his successor, Major-General Laubman, in which I explained our grievances in this regard. As far as I was concerned, the existing system unduly favoured anglophones through an “old boy network” controlled by English-speaking senior officers. Consequently, the advancement system had to be changed to ensure proportional distribution of annual promotions. Francophone service personnel also had to be convinced that they could enjoy more or less equal career opportunities; otherwise, the representation of French Canadians in the Canadian Forces would continue to decline.

The persons with whom I discussed the matter, while admitting that my claims were justified, refused to contemplate any change in the existing system, which they believed to be founded on the inviolable principle of merit. I then argued for two systems of advancement, one for anglophones, and another for francophones but with the same promotion criteria. The francophone
system would be allowed a quota of 28 per cent of promotions at all levels of responsibility and in all classifications, trades and specialties. I reminded people that this was one of the objectives of our programs of biculturalism, and noted that the two systems would observe the merit principle, on which each would be squarely based. The existing system, because it had just one list of anglophone and francophone candidates for advancement, which was drawn up on the basis of merit, would remain inequitable as long as all candidates did not possess the ability to work and pursue a career in the two official languages. To give more weight to my arguments, I added that the numerical order of the merit list was drawn up on the basis of incomplete and unfair information. In too many cases, the professional performance of francophone service personnel was evaluated on the basis of their ability to use English to meet the requirements of a unilingual anglophone superior. The problems of the system would only be aggravated by the fact that it would eventually recognize the advantage of bilingualism, and would allow a bonus for this in the mathematical calculation of an individual’s merit.

In any case, neither Falls nor Laubman dared to recommend that the single existing system be transformed into two parallel systems. They said that they were too concerned about the quality of professionalism in the CAF to venture in a direction that would reduce their credibility and encourage polarization of the Forces into two distinct groups, anglophones and francophones. Falls told me he would make sure that the higher ranks of the Navy soon included a francophone commodore. However, this did not happen until Falls was promoted to Admiral and appointed CDS about the time I left the Department for the second time. Laubman also asked me to be patient, and told me that I would soon be able to salute a francophone Brigadier-General of the Air Force. Shortly after this conversation with Laubman, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and appointed Chief of Personnel. Unfortunately, however, he left the Department almost immediately, to pursue a second career in industry. It was not, indeed, until the Vietnam crisis, in 1974, and the establishment of the Canadian contingent that Colonel “Danny” Gagnon, a pilot and for-
mer commander of CFB Bagotville, was finally promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General and made an assistant to Major-General McAlpine, Commander of the contingent. At last a francophone had achieved general rank in the air element, but here again the personal intervention of General Dextraze had been necessary. Dextraze had promoted Gagnon because he had found it unacceptable that a plan to organize the Vietnam contingent be submitted to him for approval without including a single francophone among the generals.

At this time, my concerns were not limited to the lot of francophone senior officers. I was also interested in the situation of other officers, and on October 14, 1971 I wrote to the Director General of Postings and Careers (DGPC), to ask him for information on promotions granted to francophones in the rank of major. I advised him that 311 promotions in this rank were contemplated, that 231 had been announced, and that of this number 206 promotions were going to anglophones and 25 to francophones. I found this proportion of 206 to 25 incredible, and I asked the Director General to tell me how the other 80 promotions to come would be distributed. I stated that this promotion policy was a disaster, and would do nothing to increase the advancement of francophone officers. Furthermore, it in no way complied with the orientations of our B & B programs and the directives of the CDS and CP, who wanted to see an increase in the number of francophone promotions each year, especially in the basic rank of major. I had to discuss my memorandum with Brigadier-General McAlpine, who at that time occupied the position of DGPC. Unfortunately, I cannot find any record of his official response in the files, and I do not remember what he said. It is, however, quite obvious why I was concerned about this matter, and wished to speak about it to Commodore Falls and to Major-General Laubman as I did.

9. Bilingual services to travellers

I do not want to end this chronicle of major events during my first 18 months as DGBB without mentioning another interven-
tion of Mr. Macdonald in B & B matters. As already noted, the Minister was the person who had really given the impetus for the overhaul of our policies, with his precise requirements regarding the place of biculturalism in the Department’s programs. He produced another shock by intervening directly in regard to the total absence of French in the services to the travelling public of the Armed Forces. I observed the actions of the Minister and the CDS on this occasion, without participating directly. But over the next six years, I had to intervene several times in this matter, to criticize the lack of French in the services offered to travellers by No. 3 Air Movement Unit (AMU). For the moment, I shall merely discuss the incident of September, 1971 that involved our Minister. Macdonald had returned from a trip to Europe aboard a military Boeing, and in an internal memorandum dated September 27, 1971 he complained to the CDS that the loudspeaker announcements in No. 3 AMU’s waiting rooms and on board the airplanes were given in English only. Macdonald requested that the Commander of Air Transport immediately take the necessary measures to ensure that announcements were made in both official languages, as early as possible and in any case not later than January 1, 1972. He also asked to receive, by April 1, a report describing the measures that had been taken. At the DGBB, the Minister’s unequivocal order was approved, and the effects of his intervention were observed with satisfaction. Colonel Hanna, Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant and Major Arsenault responded by telephone to the many requests for information and excuses coming from the air element; personnel of the latter felt attacked and were on the defensive in regard to this breach of the Official Languages Act, uncovered by the Minister. At the end of March, 1972 General Sharp, in the requested report, advised the Minister of the problems that Air Transport Command was encountering in its efforts to serve its clientèle in both official languages. Sharp mentioned the shortage of bilingual persons in the appropriate occupations, and the fact that insufficient staff resources made it impossible to ensure that persons taking French courses could be replaced. He also emphasized the complications arising from the fact that English-speaking flight attendants were obliged to read a message in French, but could not then answer questions put to
them by passengers. Nevertheless, the report stated that in the air AMU’s waiting rooms and in-flight, announcements were being made in French.

General Sharp concluded his report by saying that he hoped that specially structured French courses could be organized for the flight crews who dealt with travellers. I never found out how Mr. Macdonald reacted to this report, since by the time it finally arrived at the Minister’s office, Mr. Benson had been appointed to replace Mr. Macdonald.

When I arrived at the DND in August of 1971, my intention was to make up for the time that had been lost in producing on paper a large number of programs, which had never really got started. To this end, I drew up a plan of action that I intended to follow. However, despite my willingness to execute this plan, my actions were primarily determined by what my superiors wanted and by the course of events. Nonetheless, it is clear that I was involved in many things, which were not all of equal importance. I have attempted to show that these first 18 months were crucial, and that political circumstances and the presence of such personalities as Minister Donald Macdonald, Deputy Minister Sylvain Cloutier and General Dextraze as CDS helped to initiate the Department’s programs of bilingualism and biculturalism.

Such is my account of the first period of my appointment, from August, 1971 to December, 1972. The rest of my memoir will consider only the highlights of our activities, on a year to year basis from 1973 on.
The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, PC, CC, Prime Minister of Canada from 1968 to 1979 and 1980 to 1984, pursued the policy of institutional bilingualism set by his predecessor, the Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, but dropped the biculturalism policy in October 1971, in favour of multiculturalism. (PAC 142647)

As Minister of National Defence from 1969 to 1972, the Hon. Donald S. Macdonald strongly encouraged the implementation of bilingualism and biculturalism policies in the DND and the CAF. (CERI 1/BER 70-284)
Sylvain Cloutier took over from Elgin B. Armstrong as Deputy Minister of National Defence from 1971 to 1975. During this period he worked hard to encourage the use of French as a working language in the DND. (CFPU/REP 73-4)

C.R. Nixon replaced Sylvain Cloutier as Deputy Minister in 1975 and remained there until 1982. Hesitant, at first, to openly side in favour of official bilingualism, he nevertheless mastered his fears and ended up in wholeheartedly supporting the government policy. (CFPU/REP 81-17)
As CDS from 1972 to 1977, General Jacques A. Dextraze, CC, CBE, CMM, DSO, CD, gave his entire support to the bilingualism programs staffed by Colonel Letellier, although his attitude seemed sometimes ambivalent on the equality aspect of French as an operations language in the CAF. (CFPU/REP 72-104)
Similarly, the open-mindedness and ease of General Ramsay M. Withers, CMM, CD, former Signals Officer with the R22e R., helped bring about the equality of French and English in the CAF. (CFPU/REP 82-186)

The conciliatory attitude of Admiral R.H. Falls, CMM, CD, eased the implementation of bilingualism policies and programs for the CAF. From 1972 to 1980 Falls was successively appointed Assistant Associate Deputy Minister (Policies), VCDS and CDS. (CFPU/REP 77-132)
Major-General Donald A. McAlpine, CMM, CD, served as Assistant Associate Deputy Minister (Personnel) taking over as Chief of Personnel Development, from 1972 to 1975. He was thus mainly responsible for the creation of French Languages Units and the implementation of bilingualism policies and programs mostly affecting military personnel. (CFPU/REP 70-163)

After having worked closely with Colonel Letellier as Deputy DGBB, from 1971 to 1973, Colonel Jim Hanna, CD, was promoted Brigadier-General in 1974 and served as Defence Attaché in Paris. He then commanded the Air Defence Group serving with NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and, upon being promoted MajorGeneral, the Canadian Forces in Europe, until retirement in 1981. (CFPU/NB 78-298)
After having served as ADC to General Allard, Commander Pierre Simard, CD, was the first CO of HMCS Ottawa after its designation as a FLU on 6 May 1968. He had much to do to attempt to change attitudes towards the use of the French language in an institution which had remained more British than Canadian since 1910. (CFPU/0-14819)
Lieutenant-General CGE Thériault, CMM, CD, was appointed DCDS and VCDS beginning in 1978. In 1983 he was promoted General and appointed CDS - the third Air Force officer and third French Canadian to fill the highest position in the military hierarchy. (CFPU/REP 80-84)

Major-General Jacques Paradis, CMM, CD, was posted to NDHQ as Chief of Personnel Development, in 1975. He greatly assisted Colonel Letellier in the implementation of bilingual policies and programs at NDHQ. He was promoted Lieutenant-General in 1977 and commanded Mobile Command. (CFPU/REP 77-95)
1973

It looked as if 1973 would be an important and busy year for the DGBB and our B & B programs. The year began with the publication of an enforcement directive, which was prepared by the DGBB and signed by General Dextraze on January 7, 1973.

This directive concerned senior HQ staff, GOCs, the Canadian Forces in Europe and activities under the jurisdiction of the CAF abroad. It contained general instructions on the enforcement of the programs that the Treasury Board had approved on September 29, 1972 and assigned responsibilities for the action and cooperation required in each particular field.

1. The consequences of the Official Languages Act, and the Commissioner

At about the same time, we received the COL’s second report, covering the period from March, 1971 to December, 1972. This report, like the others that were to appear every year thereafter, would become a real working document for us, and one of the barometers we would use to evaluate our progress in making both official languages respected at the Department. Over the years, we would often cite the report in support of our action, and would solicit the Commissioner’s observations on our problems.

The 1971-1972 report noted that the eleven complaints on the record gave no indication of the importance and complexity of our Department, and that serious problems were in fact to be
found there. Members of the Commissioner’s team had visited CFBs Bagotville and Trenton at his request. The special studies prepared by his staff, and the resulting recommendations, enabled us to advise the commanders concerned to add to or change some specific aspects of their B & B program.

In 1973, the COL was not alone in advising us of the significant problems involved in promoting equality of the two official languages and in enforcing the Act. I remember three problems, in particular, that were referred to us in 1973. One came from Major-General M. McLachlan, Commander of Air Transport Command (ATC), a second from Brigadier-General F.R. Cullen, Commander of the National Defence Medical Centre (NDMC) in Ottawa, and the third from the office of the Honourable Jean Marchand, Minister of Transport in the federal government.

General MacLachlan raised the problem posed by the fact that a francophone doctor of CFB Uplands persisted in writing his medical reports in French. MacLachlan recognized that the doctor had a right to write his medical reports in French, but insisted that he then translate them into English, since the base had no translation section, and in any case only the medical department had the expertise and competence required to do the job. We at the DGBB agreed with the General, but I decided to seek advice from the COL anyway. Captain Bernier, who was dealing with the matter at the DGBB, wrote a letter in which he happily took the initiative of broadening the scope of the problem, inviting the Commissioner to provide us with some information on the choice of working language in an Armed Forces context.

The letter referred to certain anomalies in the directives and instructions issued by the PSC or the Treasury Board. For example, the intention seemed to be to allow anglophones in the FLUs to use written English in their work, on a provisional basis. Would the same privilege be granted to a francophone in an ELU? The letter also mentioned the serious problems that would arise if people were given unfettered freedom of choice in their working language, and asked the Commissioner to determine up
to what extent the exercise of this right could be tolerated in the Armed Forces.

The COL recognized the complexity of the problem, which he had already looked into, and had mentioned in his second report. It was perhaps for this reason that he was slow to reply to our letter. Finally, his response was sent to us in mid-November, but not in time to help us formulate a reply to a similar problem submitted by the Surgeon General, Major-General R.H. Roberts.

Roberts asked three questions that had been sent to him by Brigadier-General Cullen of the NDMC, namely:

a. What should be the language of written communication concerning patient care?

b. What level of linguistic competence should be possessed by staff whose job essentially consists of providing patient care?

c. What would be the legal position of persons implicated in a charge of negligence arising from the compulsory use of the two official languages?

Roberts appended his own opinions to these questions. He felt that the use of French for written reports concerning patient care was out of the question. English had to be used because anglophones and their language predominated at the NDMC. For the same reasons, Roberts felt that it was illogical to expect the anglophone staff to acquire even a modest knowledge of the French language. The Department would be guilty of negligence if a wrong interpretation of an order written in the other official language resulted in the serious injury or death of another person. Roberts added that the opinion of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) should be solicited. At the DGBB, we had spent some time studying these issues and their implications. However, given the importance of the subject, we had prepared a provisional response to Major-General Roberts, even before we received the comments of the COL. Lieutenant-General Milroy, Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel (ADM (Per)), said in his letter that, given the
situation at the NDMC, English should continue to be used for written communications concerning patient care. However, before making a conclusive statement on the matter, we wanted to obtain the JAG’s opinion on the issue of possible litigation, and the COL’s views on the right of persons to work in the language of their choice. As far as this right was concerned, we were trying to have people recognize certain realities that existed at the NDMC. We felt that the situation should allow people to make a choice of written language, but in a context that was precise and limited to one individual. On the other hand, in the normal working conditions of the NDMC, English was the predominate language, and individuals who needed to communicate in writing or orally to carry out their duties were not free to choose their language of work. We nonetheless insisted that the linguistic dignity of patients should be respected at all times. Without mentioning it in the letter, I recall that incident involving the NDMC, which had thrown some doubt on their concern to have the linguistic dignity of their patients respected. In January, 1971 the Surgeon General had had to explain how the NDMC, given the requirements of the Official Languages Act, could have allowed a committee of unilingual anglophone psychiatrists to conduct a psychiatric examination of a francophone member of the RCMP. This incident was an embarrassment both to the COL, who had received a complaint about it, and to the Department, which had examined it. Needless to say, such a flagrant infraction of the Act did not recur.

On November 16, we at the DGBB received the COL’s letter about the choice of working language, and on November 26 the JAG’s memorandum on the issue of possible litigation. With the help of these opinions, and after a new examination of the whole issue of language problems at the NDMC, the DGBB and the office of the ADM(Per) agreed that it was not necessary to modify the attitude and decisions that had already been communicated in regard to the working language at the NDMC. We still had to advise Major-General Roberts of our decision, inform him of the JAG’s observations, and deal with the issue of the linguistic competence of NDMC employees. To this end, we had Mr. Morry,
Associate Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel, sign a memorandum dated January 2, 1974. In addition to informing Major General Roberts of the decision to make no changes in the orientation that had already been indicated regarding the problems of the NDMC, Morry told him that the JAG was unable to give an opinion on the issue of possible litigation. However, the JAG qualified his opinion by considerations on the possibility of establishing a presumption of negligence, quite apart from the question of the language used in caring for a patient. Morry also emphasized that the NDMC, an institution of the federal government located in the national capital, should eventually be able to operate and offer services in both official languages. In the meantime, the levels of French language competence that had already been established for the NDMC seemed reasonable, and could be attained over the next five years.

At the DGBB, with the consent of the ADM(Per), we had decided to settle the NDMC matter before dealing with the problem of the working language in the CFB Uplands medical section, which was perhaps less urgent. In any case, I shall have more to say about this matter in my account of the events of 1974, for it was on March 6, 1974 that the ADM(Per) wrote about it to the Commander of ATC.

Another infraction of the Act in 1973 concerned the Navy and the crew of one of its ships. I have already mentioned that the complaint about this matter had been submitted to us by the office of Jean Marchand, Minister of Transport. A man from Quebec had written to Mr. Marchand in May, 1973, to inform him that during a visit aboard HMCS \textit{Protecteur}, which was then anchored at Wolfe’s Cove, near Quebec City, he had found that the crew did not include a single French-speaking officer or sailor, and that he had not been able to have a guided tour of the ship in French. Furthermore, when he asked to have someone who spoke French, he was told that there were no French speakers, and that if he wanted to leave the ship, he was free to do so. At the DGBB, we had hastened to send the contents of this complaint to the Chief of Maritime Operations, and had asked that an inquiry into the mat-
ter be conducted. Before we received the results of this inquiry, we prepared a response that Mr. Marchand sent to his correspondent. However, we were well aware of the shortage of franco-phone sailors in the Navy.

In the letter, we apologized for the fact that a member of the crew of HMCS Protecteur had failed to show elementary courtesy towards the citizen concerned, and we assured him that the attitude that he had encountered during his visit aboard the HMCS Protecteur was not common in the CAF. We explained that the establishment of HMCS Ottawa as a French language unit, and that other demands for microphone resources (which were already slender in the Navy), did not leave us with any flexibility to meet the needs for French services on all ships. We mentioned that in the case of HMCS Protecteur, the few franco-phone sailors in the crew were not available at the time of the citizen’s visit, and that the anglophone sailors who knew a bit of French could not venture to guide him around the ship because of their lack of experience.

The dispatch of this letter was not the end of the matter. In the first place Rear-Admiral Boyle, whom I have already discussed in his earlier capacity as our CP, was now Commander of Maritime Command, and wanted to be clear in his own mind about the incident. When Boyle issued directives to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents in the future, the Commander of HMCS Protecteur, Captain D.N. Mainguy, reacted strongly. Mainguy, who was quite fluently bilingual and generally sympathetic to the cause of bilingualism, said that he was hurt and surprised by the complaint that had been addressed to him. He listed the efforts that had been made to ensure that visitors aboard HMCS Protecteur could be served in French, noted that he had always made sure that sailors were available to answer questions in French, and mentioned the distribution of the French language folder “Bienvenue à bord du HMCS Protecteur” (Welcome aboard HMCS Protecteur). During a visit to Quebec, he had personally contributed to the French program of HMCS Protecteur by granting newspaper and radio interviews in French. He had also spoken in French to two Navy
cadet corps. In short, Mainguy thought that his efforts in support of the principles of B & B were laudable, and wondered if the complaint that had been communicated to him was not a provocation. In order to preserve the prestige of the Navy and to clarify the matter, Rear-Admiral Boyle requested that the Department obtain more information from Mr. Marchand. At the DGBB, we felt that nothing would be gained by prolonging the inquiry through fear of arousing people’s feelings. We therefore notified the DG of Maritime Operations that the Minister was satisfied with the explanations that had been given, and with the letter sent by Jean Marchand. Given the circumstances the matter was closed.

2. Information tours on the B & B programs

The year 1973 had scarcely begun when we felt the effects of the reduction in the numbers of Armed Forces personnel, which had been announced for some years. In fact, the number of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the CAF had dropped from 102,000 to 82,000. This decline, which had occurred solely through attrition, was almost uncontrollable. As a result, there was a surplus of resources in certain ranks, trades or classifications, and serious vacancies in others. This situation complicated recruiting, and made staffing and promotion difficult. The shrinkage of human resources was paralleled by a decline in financial resources. Our programs of bilingualism and multiculturalism thus had to compete for declining resources with other priority programs. In the eyes of our anglophone colleagues, our expenditures to promote bilingualism were always made to the detriment of the need to replace our ships, planes and armament and to increase our personnel. Despite these unfavourable circumstances, we had to continue to ask for a greater share of positions in the upper ranks, at a time when the number of these positions was falling. The distribution of the remaining positions was done to the detriment of the anglophones. Generally speaking, francophone participation in officer ranks improved from year to year. But among the soldiers, and especially the tradesmen who had the best paid positions, much remained to be done. We at the DGBB
thus had to forge ahead with our programs, despite the lack of understanding and the apprehension that were caused by the general situation of the CAF.

When the Treasury Board, in the fall of 1972, approved our program and granted us additional resources, we were finally in a position to contemplate an information program for the Armed Forces as a whole. On February 10, 1973, General Dextraze signed a memorandum informing all GOCs, in Canada and abroad, of the implementation of an important program of information on our B & B programs. We had convinced the Chief that the message had to be taken directly to the servicemen and women, so that the greatest possible number receive it as soon as possible. This is why Dextraze authorized the DGBB to train members of the staff who would be responsible for disseminating this information. They would visit the Commands HQs, bases and various other institutions, would provide all the information available in the form of presentations and discussion periods, and would answer questions.

It was thus that my assistant, Colonel Hanna, and myself visited 18 different places in Canada and Europe in 1973, in the space of 6 months.

I must say that Hanna carried out most of these information tours. I had decided, in fact that if the message were communicated by an officer of his reputation, and an anglophone to boot, it would have a better chance to be listened to and understood than if it came from me. Hanna therefore spoke in places that were predominantly anglophone; Esquimalt, Chilliwack, Calgary, Edmonton, Cold Lake and Winnipeg in the West, and Halifax and Greenwood in the East. He also went to North Bay, Trenton and Petawawa. I dealt with Valcartier, Montreal, Gagetown, Borden, Bagotville and Europe. In all these places, I had to speak in both official languages. Lieutenant-Colonels Tousignant and Newell, Major Arsenault and Sergeant Parent also participated in these tours.
In our travels, Hanna and I stuck pretty much to the same format. Our information sessions began with a film that the COL had been kind enough to lend us. This film, which lasted ten minutes, provided an excellent introduction to our presentation. In the film, the role of the COL and respect for the linguistic dignity of individuals were treated in a way that was both humorous and serious at the same time. We were therefore happy to have this very suitable means of emphasizing the credibility of our presentation. However, we would have been happier if, when our presentation was finished, we had been able to leave with our audiences an information brochure on our programs. Unfortunately, because we had not been able to agree with the NDHQ staff on the contents of such a brochure, our listeners departed with their heads full of our statements, but empty handed and without any written information.

At the DGBB, we had very soon realized the necessity of producing this brochure. With the assistance of the DG Info, Brigadier-General Bourgeois, we had announced our intention to write a brochure in the fall of 1972. Lieutenant-Colonel Tousignant and the officers of his section got to work on the project, and early in 1973 a first draft had been sent for approval to our CP, Rear-Admiral Boyle. Unfortunately, Boyle criticized not only the form, but also the content of our document. He could not resign himself to seeing the reasons for the profound inequities and even injustices that the old system had visited upon francophones set forth in black and white. He felt and said that our document was like a charge for the prosecution that put him and his anglophone colleagues in the prisoner’s dock.

It was true that our document described shocking truths, which they would have preferred to forget, but were the very reason for the existence of the serious programs that the Department was undertaking to change the system. This was a system where, for example, francophones who made up 30 per cent of all officer candidates had access to only 8 per cent of positions at the rank of major and lieutenant-colonel, while the 70 per cent of anglophone candidates had access to 92 per cent of these positions. The con-
ditions and circumstances of service that allowed such a disproportion surely had to be changed. However, Boyle asked us to modify the tenure of our document. I realized that Tousignant and the other officers who had written the document would be completely reluctant to make such changes. I therefore asked Colonel Hanna to supply me with a completely rewritten version of the document, taking Boyle’s observations into consideration. I wanted Hanna to say the same things, but in a manner that would be more acceptable to Boyle. On February 23, 1973 I submitted Hanna’s new version to Boyle. However, Boyle’s response of March 7 was not encouraging, and made me decide to put the project on the back burner. This is why, when Hanna and I were questioned about the lack of information brochures, we replied that we intended to put the production of such a brochure back into gear.

Despite the lack of information brochures, by midsummer of 1973 I felt that our information tours had been beneficial and in general had attained their goal. In our verbal and written reports to the Deputy Minister, General Dextraze and the CP, we emphasized our impressions and conclusions. In the first place, members of the Armed Forces were generally aware of the existence of the program, and of its objectives. However, everyone was worried about the effect that measures taken to reach these objectives would have on their career. They found current promotion policy particularly distasteful because, in certain cases, it allowed for departures from the strict enforcement of the merit principle in order to meet objectives of francophone representation in all ranks, trades and classifications. Some mistakes in applying this policy had unfortunately given rise to such vicious rumours as the following:

—— Promotions in future would be given only to francophones, until the goal of 28 per cent francophone representation was reached.

—— To get promoted in the Canadian Forces, all one had to do was be bilingual and francophone.
These rumours circulated mainly among non-commissioned officers, who had less interest in an understanding of the B & B programs than the officers. Some officers were also implacably opposed to our programs, but they were few in number. I think that, generally speaking, these people were more educated and more motivated than the non-commissioned officers, and while they recognized the problems that afflicted us, they deplored the effects of the prescribed remedies. Some of them experienced delays in promotions, but mostly they were afraid that access to language courses would be difficult for them, or even refused because of a shortage of replacement staff. At that time we were fortunately able to show, with figures at hand, that a tiny increase in promotions for francophones would not prevent the great majority of promotions from going to anglophones as usual. We also insisted on the fact that the program was spread out over a period of 15 years, and that the proposed changes and transformation of the system would not occur overnight.

Though we thought these arguments were perfectly logical, Hanna and I found it a real challenge to get them accepted on our information tours. During the question periods, people would sometimes shout such things at us as “you are shoving French down our throats” and “you have to be francophone and bilingual to be promoted”. I particularly remember a day at CFB St. Hubert, in the course of turbulent sessions, it became obvious that the two military solitudes barely tolerated one another. I spoke to the anglophones in the morning, and their reactions were rather negative. I had to listen to all the objections I have mentioned above and several others as well, and these were often expressed with bitterness. I really thought that my audience was hostile to the official languages program. Perhaps these English speaking servicemen, who were accustomed to the secure feeling of being in the majority, had become apprehensive and less understanding now that they were in Quebec.

In the afternoon, much to my surprise, my experience with the francophone servicemen was just about as negative as what I had encountered in the morning. The anglophones told me that in their
opinion, our programs were going too quickly and were unduly favouring the francophones. On the other hand, the francophones told me straight out that the time had come to do something to correct the injustices of the past. They thought that what we were proposing was too timid, and would really not do anything to change the system. The transformation of the system over 15 years would take too much time for them to enjoy the benefits in their own careers. Although all this was said in a less belligerent tone than the remarks of the morning, some of the remarks were quite sharp. I understood the francophones’ impatience, but I also knew that we couldn’t do much more than we were already doing. I explained as best I could that we had not started a revolution, but rather a process of evolution whose results were already positive. With the help of statistics, I tried to make them see that the presence of francophones had already increased in the command structures of the Armed Forces, and that the effects of their action and contribution were already being felt. On the whole, the day I spent at St. Hubert was a fruitful one. I foresaw that the B & B coordinator would have to undertake his own campaign of information and explanation, in order to continue the process of increasing the awareness of military personnel at Mobile Command HQ, at CFB St. Hubert in general and in the nearby units.

The following visit to CFB Bagotville was almost as difficult as the visit to Montreal. However, Colonel C.G.E. Thériault*, Base Commander, made a point of being present at the presentations and supporting me in the discussions. I am sure that his presence and comments helped calm those people who were irritated at my remarks.

Our information tours finished in mid-June, with Hanna’s trip to Washington and mine to Europe. Our visits to the various bases and headquarters, and our conversations with commanders and managers, had made it clear that they would need much patience and determination to ensure the implementation of our programs. Faced with the lack of comprehension and sometimes of good

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* At the time of writing Thériault is General and CDS.

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will, we had counted on the loyalty and sense of justice of our anglophone colleagues. We realized that we would have to be realistic, and try to obtain additional staff to replace service personnel assigned to language courses. In this way, we would reduce the burden that was invariably imposed on those who remained on the job. In addition to increasing staff resources, we would have to offer more language courses, and make sure that graduates of these courses were transferred to positions where they could make use of their newly acquired skills. We also had to provide clear explanations of the rationale and structure of a promotion system designed to attain a balanced participation of anglophones and francophones.

Fortunately Rear-Admiral Boyle, our CP, though a unilingual anglophone, had dealt successfully with this requirement. He took the initiative of making a statement to the press on this policy. Armed with statistics on promotions and on the so-called departures from the system, Boyle also denounced the pedlars of false rumours, who claimed that promotions were no longer made on the basis of merit, and were given primarily to bilingual francophones. Finally, our information tours had shown that we would need an energetic contribution from commanders at all levels, and that to obtain this assistance we would have to ask them to develop their own system of B & B program, with its own objectives, terms of enforcement and timetables. Unfortunately, during my second term of appointment at the Department, I did not succeed in getting the commanders to move in this direction. Nevertheless, despite the problems we faced, we could say that the new B & B program was already functioning, and had now been presented and explained to most of the senior staff officers in the Canadian Forces.

In early October, 1973 I was looking for the opportunity to give the GOCs some information on the development of our programs and to remind them that we needed their support. I felt that the commanders’ conference, which was scheduled to take place in November, would be an excellent occasion to accomplish this purpose. However, our offer to speak at this conference was not
accepted. No precise reason for this refusal was given; we were simply told that the commanders had more important matters to discuss. Since I did not feel that I had the support of senior management, I did not insist. I should add that the Personnel branch was in a state of some disarray at the time. With the reorganization of the NDHQ, this branch had undergone changes in staff and structure. Rear-Admiral Boyle, our CP, had been promoted to the position of Commander of Maritime Command at Halifax, and the position of CP, now vacant, was abolished. The duties of the CP were now split between two newly created positions: Chief, Personnel Development (CPD) and Chief of Personnel Careers - Officers (CPCO). The CPD reported directly to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel. The DGBB reported to the CPD, which effectively distanced it from the Deputy Minister and, in my opinion, diminished its importance and prestige. From that time onward, I therefore decided to take advantage of every opportunity to have direct access to the Deputy Minister, despite the new organization chart that placed me under the control and supervision of the CPD.

Fortunately Brigadier-General Duncan McAlpine, promoted to the rank of Major-General, was the first person to hold the position of CPD. McAlpine proved to be understanding and tolerant, despite the fact that I sometimes tended to go directly to the Deputy Minister before informing and receiving his direction. In 1966, McAlpine had been a member of Colonel Armand Ross’s team, and had played an active part in producing the Ross report. He had, then, been irrevocably won over to the cause of bilingualism many years ago. As my boss, he was sympathetic and encouraging, and supported the practical development of our programs with logic and common sense. In addition, he directed the deliberations of the Bilingualism Coordinating Committee with great firmness, and was continually active in the field of dependants’ education. His interest in this sensitive area of our programming is reflected in his instructions, abundant advice, and chairmanship of meetings with Colonel René Morin and myself.

Despite a particularly heavy schedule, I became involved in a
number of other matters. In particular, I contributed to a series of presentations that were made to career managers in the personnel branch. Before he left to head up Maritime Command in Halifax, Rear-Admiral Boyle had sensed the need to inform his managers. The requirements and effects of our program were beginning to be felt, and everyone had to get down to business. Detailed planning of assignments and transfers were necessary to ensure that replacements would be available for the people sent to take language courses. It was also necessary to make sure that the graduates of these courses would be assigned to positions where they could make use of their new skills. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that we lacked staff to replace people who would be away taking courses for a long period of time.

Another problem was posed by the fact that the FLUs enjoyed assignment priority at a time when we wanted to increase the number of bilingual instructors in the trades schools. Given the circumstances, the requirements, timetables and objectives of our programs had to be explained to careers managers and other executives in the Personnel branch. This was a necessary and worthwhile step. To help these managers deal with the complications and problems created by our programs, we agreed to contribute some of our additional person-years granted by the Treasury Board. Within the DGPC, a section was thus created to plan the use of bilingual resources, and especially francophone resources. Rear-Admiral Boyle, a very experienced naval officer, directed the activities of the section with great shrewdness. He was the guardian of our anglophone and francophone bilingual resources among the non-commissioned officers, and ensured the best possible use of these resources in the interests both of individuals and our programs. His primary task was to limit the waste that had unfortunately characterized our first efforts in this area.

3. The civilian program gets under way

The situation was quite different for the civilian program, which seemed to be slow in getting started at the Department. Both in Ottawa and elsewhere, civilian employees who had seen
the military program launched by the CDS, and had learned of the Government’s and Treasury Board’s directives, were wondering what was happening with their program. These employees, who numbered about 33,000, were governed by the Public Service Employment Act, but were integrated into the structures of the Department and the Armed Forces. They realized that they were different from both the military personnel and from other employees of the Public Service, for they had their own unions with its own negotiators, the main one being the National Defence Employees’ Union (NDEU). And for the most part, they worked under the supervision of men and women in uniform. Some of their worries had been dispelled by the December, 1972 statement of the Treasury Board’s president, Mr. C.M. Drury, concerning the Government’s policies on bilingualism, and on the principles to be applied in implementing these policies in the Public Service. However, it took the resolution passed by Parliament in June, 1973 to really get things moving. This resolution recognized and approved a series of principles to be applied in reaching the major goals of the bilingualism policy in the Public Service. This resolution established certain deadlines, and in particular stipulated that all positions requiring a knowledge of both official languages be identified before December 31, 1973 and designated bilingual (i.e. held by a bilingual person) before December 31, 1978. Finally, the resolution ordered the Treasury Board to take the necessary measures to implement its contents.

Even before the Treasury Board guidelines were published, Deputy Minister Cloutier requested that the contents of the parliamentary resolution and its consequences for the Department be presented to the Senior Management Committee as soon as possible.

On July 3, I appeared before the Senior Management Committee, accompanied by Ian Dewar, Director of B & B Civilian Programs in my Directorate General. (See organization chart in Annex D.) In about 20 minutes, I accomplished my two tasks. In the first place, I explained the contents of the resolution, and presented general considerations regarding the identification criteria
and designation of positions for the government departments as a whole. In the second place, I discussed the impact and consequences of this resolution for the DND.

Ian Dewar then presented, subject to the approval of the Committee, a detailed plan for identifying the 33,000 civilian positions of the Department before December 31, 1973 and for designating the bilingual positions among them before December 31, 1978. Dewar and his team had done an excellent job of developing a plan that the Department could use to meet the requirements of the Treasury board. Mr. Cloutier and the other members of the Committee quickly realized the size of the job that had to be done, and offered us generous advice and support. For his part, the Deputy Minister recommended that we follow to the letter the Treasury Board’s procedures for relations/negotiations/consultations etc. that we would have to undertake with the NDEU. Mr. Cloutier also brought the Committee up to date on Prime Minister Trudeau’s recent meeting with the deputy ministers of all departments. At this meeting, Trudeau had apparently insisted on the importance that the Government attached to the program of bilingualism. And in a private conversation with Mr. Cloutier, Trudeau had remarked that 70 per cent of supervisory staff at the DND were military people. Although he recognized that the Treasury Board measures could not be applied to these individuals, he nonetheless hoped that the military program could be brought as closely into line as possible with the civilian program. Speaking on this matter to the Senior Management Committee, Cloutier said that he was happy to note that the plan presented by Ian Dewar took these considerations into account. He foresaw that once the civilian program had been launched and achieved, we would have to examine the possibility of bringing the military program into line with it, and of creating the greatest possible harmony between the two programs.

At this very productive meeting, there was only one fly in the ointment, which I feel I should mention. Mr. Cloutier saw fit to rally to the position of Lieutenant-General A.C. Hull, the VCDS, who was co-chairing the meeting in the absence of General Dex-
traze. Hull believed that we should not identify the positions of Brigadier-General and higher ranks in the military hierarchy. He felt that to do so would be detrimental to the flexibility that was essential in selecting people for these positions, especially in the case of unilingual officers who were highly competent and had superior qualifications. Personally, I would have preferred to see Mr. Cloutier insist on the strict observance, for military personnel as well, of the principle that all holders of senior staff positions in the Public Service (SX, equivalent to Brigadier-General) be bilingual, or become so before being confirmed in their appointment. I would also have favoured the principle of exception for major cause and extraordinary circumstances, whose application was contemplated for civilian positions. Finally, I had the impression that Cloutier’s hesitation would leave the door open to excessively vague interpretations, and would perhaps allow the advancement of certain unilingual senior officers who did not fall into the category of exceptions.

I nonetheless felt that the decisions of the Committee were positive. A military supervisor’s position became bilingual whenever a position held by a civilian required that it be bilingual according to Treasury Board criteria. The Committee requested that a plan for identifying military positions be prepared. This plan was to comply as closely as possible with the criteria established by the Treasury Board for civilian positions, and was to be submitted to the Senior Management Committee for approval at the beginning of 1974. The Committee also requested that an information system on military and civilian personnel be set up in the Department. This would be compatible with the Treasury Board’s system, and would readily provide all necessary statistics on the status of bilingualism at the Department. At that time, I was also happy to note that the establishment of a departmental Bilingualism Coordinating Committee was arousing considerable interest. This committee was to become the major tool for properly identifying civilian positions. Mr. Cloutier and General Dextraze reserved the right to approve appointments to this committee, since its makeup had to be carefully determined. However, I had no trouble in ensuring that this committee was continually headed up
by men who were sympathetic to the policy of bilingualism, and who took a realistic interest in its implementation. One of the major collaborators in this area was Major-General Duncan McAlpine, about whom I have already talked.

On July 12, a few days after the Senior Management Committee meeting, General Dextraze and Deputy Minister Cloutier each signed a directive intended to launch the Department’s program to identify and designate civilian positions. In his instruction, which was addressed to all the GOCs, General Dextraze explained the history and scope of the program, the elements that it comprised and the process to be followed and completed before December 1, 1973. He informed them that information sessions would be organized for their benefit, and he warned them that all military and civilian managers and supervisors would have to work very hard to get the job done and meet the deadline. The CDS solicited their support, and asked them to cooperate with the DGBB team.

Mr. Cloutier’s directive, on the other hand, was primarily addressed to the senior staff in Ottawa. It explained the importance of the program; it also described the role and responsibilities of Ian Dewar, formerly the Director of Civilian Programs of Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and now the Coordinator of Linguistic Requirements (CLR). The directive mistakenly identified Dewar as chairman of the Department’s newly formed Bilingualism Coordinating Committee. Cloutier also advised the directors general, directors and personnel managers that a series of conferences would be organized at NDHQ, to inform them of the procedures to be followed in identifying positions. He asked them to begin work by briefly determining the linguistic requirements of positions as soon as possible, as he foresaw that the identification would be checked by experts from the DGBB. Like Dextraze, Cloutier solicited the cooperation of all his colleagues. It was at this time that I had to transform and strengthen Dewar’s organization by creating two new positions from the resources of my own staff. As a result of these changes, Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.L.J. Veilleux and Captain Guy Sullivan moved overnight from the Directorate of Plans and Programs to the CLR (military section),
under Dewar’s supervision.

At the same time the Bilingualism Coordinating Committee, under the chairmanship of Major-General McAlpine, began holding sessions to check positions identified by the managers. This was very hard work, requiring long hours of discussion, explanation and even negotiation. The directors of all the sections of the NDHQ, or their representatives, appeared before the Committee with tables and statistics in hand, to explain and justify the identification that they had attributed to each position under their jurisdiction. The Committee carefully studied the submissions, and confirmed or rejected them. While this enormous task was being carried out at NDHQ, special teams from the DGBB were fanning out through the commands and initiating the same work. In this case also, after the consent of the GOCs had been obtained, the results were taken to Ottawa, where the process I have just described was completed. Things were really moving along at full steam at NDHQ, and our periodic reports to the Treasury Board indicated that unless some misfortune occurred, we were going to meet the deadline of December 31.

4. A new director of translation and terminology, and the question of automation

I had committed almost all my staff to the project of identifying civilian positions, except for those who worked in the Directorate of Translation and Terminology, where important things were happening as well. I had lost the services of the director, Lieutenant-Colonel Newell, who had been transferred to the International Control Commission in Vietnam. I regretted the departure of Newell who, though an anglophone who had recently become bilingual, had directed his group to my entire satisfaction. He had proved dynamic and persistent in an area where ever increasing efforts were required to provide us with the translation services we needed. I welcomed his replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Forest, with great hopes. Forest, a francophone pilot, came to me highly recommended, and indeed had just recently been promoted. After his anglicization experience in the
Air Force, he was firmly resolved to work in French at the DGBB. In the three years he worked for me, Jacques Forest was always equal to the situation, and was able to attain his personal goals. Under his leadership, the Directorate of Translation expanded with the creation of a terminology section, staffed by civilian terminologists from the Translation Bureau. Forest was able to get Major André Gouin to head up this section. Gouin was to be responsible for implementing our projects and meeting our expectations in the fields of terminology and automated translation.

Six months after his arrival, Lieutenant-Colonel Forest initiated a fruitful dialogue with the Director General of the Translation Bureau, Mr. Yves Mayer, and his assistant Suzanne Lacourcière. Thanks to Forest’s initiatives and the pressure he was putting on Mr. P. LeQuellec, Director of the National Defence division of the Secretary of State’s Translation Bureau, we were planning to provide some centres outside Ottawa with translation units. At the same time, André Gouin gave the impetus for the preparation of small French-English, English-French lexicons, designed to help tradesmen and specialists to work in the language of their choice.

I encouraged Forest and Gouin to take every opportunity to inform the Translation Bureau that the Department wanted to cooperate on the development of automated terminology and on research into automated translation. Because of the mass of technical and administrative documents that had to be translated so that our military and civilian technicians could work in French, it was absolutely necessary that these methods be used to assist the translators. Unfortunately, the Translation Bureau was apprehensive about automated translation, and only spoke of automated terminology. Consultation had been initiated with terminologists who worked for the Government of Quebec and at the terminology bank in Montreal, with a view to possible cooperation in this area. The Bureau was not unaware that NASA, the American space agency, had used automated methods to translate, from Russian to English, an abundance of Soviet literature on aero-
space technology. Unfortunately, Mr. Mayer and most of his colleagues were reluctant to innovate in this area, and refused to embark upon an automated translation project, which they deemed a dubious venture. Nevertheless, some positive steps were taken through the initiative of the Treasury Board, which decided to look into recent attempts at automated translation, and to assess the extent to which this new technology could assist in the translation of masses of technical government documents. We at the Department already had some inkling of the magnitude of this problem, and our suspicions were confirmed by the research work of Colonel R.J. Langlois of the Materiel Branch. Langlois was able to show that in the field of military technology alone, hundreds of millions of words would have to be translated into French. As far as I know, this problem still has not been solved today, and the technology of automated translation has not been perfected. The valuable contribution that this tool could make to the translator’s work is still a thing of the future.

Major André Gouin continued to supervise the operations of the Department’s terminology section, and the increasingly automated methods that were used there. However, his greatest concern and interest remained in automated translation, participating in and contributing to the deliberations and other activities of the Treasury Board committee that was studying the question. Unfortunately for our division, Langlois decided, almost without notice, to retire from the Armed Forces and to devote all his time to promoting automated translation.

5. Control and use of person-years

The Department’s request, approved by the TB in September, 1972, had provided us with additional resources to support our various program activities. These substantial resources included 14 million dollars spread over a period of three years, 536 military person years and 160 civilian person-years. Adding what the Department was already committing to programs of bilingualism, we find that total resources for this purpose amounted to $30,302,000 and 2,060 person-years, of which 1619 were military
and 441 civilian.

It is thus understandable why, as of 1973, I began to be worried about the fact that little or no real control was exercised by the DGBB over these resources as a whole, and especially over the additional resources. I was afraid that the money and the personyears would be diverted to purposes other than our B & B programs. I knew that the Department had other priority needs, and I was apprehensive about the schemes of the finance and personnel managers. I also was well aware that the Treasury Board would demand that these resources be accounted for. I therefore asked that a system of internal control be set up to ensure that the resources were used to support our programs, and especially that the additional resources be used in the current and future years to attain our objectives. It was my conviction that the additional resources had to be identifiable as such, apart from other resources allocated to our programs, and I wanted them directly under my control. The discussions to arrive at an agreement on this matter, primarily conducted with the VCDS, Lieutenant-General Hull, were rather difficult. The military bureaucrats working under Rear-Admiral D.L. Hanington, Chief of Programs, were jealous of their prerogatives, and wanted the B & B program to be governed by the same financial control regulations as the other programs of the Department. They did not see any need to take special measures, and said that this was just one small program among others of the same importance, that should be controlled in the normal manner. As examples of similar programs they cited the summer program for students and the special construction program in Quebec. Hull supported the position of Hanington, who advised him not to allow the DGBB to ignore the normal control structures of the Department.

I then tried to make Lieutenant-General Hull understand that it had never been my intention to ignore the system. On the contrary, once our programs were properly launched and progressing normally, I wanted all responsibility for them, including control of resources, to be transferred from the DGBB to the competent organizations within the Department. Hull accepted a compro-
mised, agreeing that some measure of control should be granted to us, but should not be given the status of a system. These measures would enable the DGBB to approve the utilization of additional resources for specific purposes, and to be informed by users of the manner in which these resources were actually employed, so that an accounting could be made to the Treasury Board. This was how we proceeded henceforth. However, despite our rigorous control of these resources, some of them were lost or were diverted from their original purpose. One incident in particular comes to mind. We had a Lieutenant-Colonel’s position added to the military establishment of Air Defence Command, located at North Bay, Ontario. This was one position among 536 allowed by the Treasury Board, and its holder was the Command coordinator of bilingualism. With the reorganization of the air element and the establishment of a single Air Command HQ at Winnipeg, this position was abolished in North Bay and authorized in Winnipeg. Responsibility for coordinating bilingualism in the whole command was assigned to a staff Lieutenant-Colonel whose priority was personnel management. In effect, we had lost the output of two positions, and bilingualism had become a secondary, less important task among the major concerns of Air Command. In all these dealings, the DGBB was neither consulted nor informed. I protested, and raised the matter with senior officers of the Command, but all I got was a promise that the program of bilingualism in the Air Force would not suffer in any way as a result of this new deployment of personnel. Perhaps the reader can understand why I felt the need to exercise control, to redouble my vigilance, and to supervise closely the use of our resources.

Though insufficient to meet all our needs, the person-years controlled by the DGBB enabled us to make significant changes in some operational divisions of the NDHQ. Indeed, the allocation of one person-year could substantially modify the attitude and orientation of a division or Directorate that was trying to cope with a work surplus caused by the implementation of our programs. In the office of the JAG, for example, the revision of orders and regulations, and especially their drafting in French, justified the addition of a few person-years. More particularly, the Di-
rector of the Directorate of History, Dr W.A.B. Douglas, was prepared to create a French-language section if he received the necessary resources to do so. For example, at a meeting of the Bilingualism Coordinating Committee, Douglas explained to Major-General McAlpine and the other members that his office needed qualified francophone historians, who could contribute to the work of his Directorate.

Douglas’s request was timely, for Major-General McAlpine and I had already discussed the problem of francophone participation in the work of the Directorate of History. We were convinced that more than a mere language problem was involved. We felt that a contribution by bilingual anglophone historians, however well disposed they might be, was not a solution. A francophone presence was needed. We were happy to note that Dr Douglas seemed to have understood this, and we were delighted that we could finally hope to find at the Department, interpretations of our military history that would be conceived and worked out by francophone historians. Dr Douglas was granted an additional person-year and various other internal resources. As a result, he was able to restructure the Directorate of History, so that it would be in a better position to meet the requirements of our programs. On December 8, 1974 I thus had the satisfaction of applauding the appointment of ex-major Jean Pariseau as the first Historien en chef of the newly created francophone section at the Directorate of History.

6. The use of French at work

It was also towards the end of 1973 that the Treasury Board began to put pressure on the Department to follow up on its intentions to encourage more use of French in the workplace. NDHQ, one of the bastions of anglophone culture in the national capital, seemed particularly vulnerable to the government’s policy. At the DGBB, we had already hired a small number of bilingual individuals who had greater fluency in French than in English. These persons had to act as a stimulus for others. It was their job to encourage the promotion and use of French, first among anglo-
phones in general, but especially among those who had learned some French. They also had to help assimilated francophones to recognize their linguistic shortcomings, and help them to work in French. With the assistance of the stimulators, a program was launched at NDHQ in Ottawa and at Mobile Command HQ in Montreal. The Montreal program met with some success, no doubt in part because of the dynamism of its leader, but especially because more than 30 per cent of the military personnel at the Montreal HQ and base were francophones.

The Montreal program succeeded as well because some of the anglophone military staff who worked there were carried along irresistibly on the new current. All they needed was a push or some encouragement to begin to work in French. Unfortunately, the program at NDHQ was less successful because the apathy of most anglophone military and civilian staff hindered the efforts of the DGBB and the program leaders. We had to be satisfied with a few expressions of goodwill, such as attending small luncheons in French or showing French films that had been carefully picked to interest the audience. No worthwhile progress was made in the use of French as a working language.

7. The identification and designation of civilian positions - a completed project

In the last days of December, 1973, we at the DGBB were racing against the calendar - and against the clock. We concentrated all our efforts on the December 31 deadline for sending our reports to the Treasury Board on the identification and designation of the Department’s civilian positions. My staff, assisted by some NDHQ managers, worked with a will on the project, putting in overtime during the Christmas holidays. Thanks to their efforts, the job was completed on time. On December 27, I went to see David Kirkwood, acting Deputy Minister in the absence of Mr. Cloutier, who, after asking me a few questions, signed the covering letter for the reports the same day.

In this letter and the attached reports, we stated that in a few months time, we had identified 31,000 civilian positions, and di-
vided them up into the following categories: (1) bilingual, (2) unilingual English, (3) unilingual French, (4) English/French. The Treasury Board officials were aware of the magnitude of the work we had done, for they had been constantly kept informed of our progress by their agents, who advised us and with whom we consulted on a regular basis. Nevertheless, we saw fit to advise the Treasury Board that the completion of this enormous work in the allotted time had required much flexibility in the interpretation and application of the Official Languages Administrative Organization (OLAO) procedures. We thought that we would probably have to agree to some changes in the tables in which our identifications were presented, and that some changes of our designations seemed certain. In this regard, we noted that our consultation with the managers had been somewhat hasty and limited in scope. We also remarked, however, that the system had enough flexibility to make the necessary adjustments.

In our covering letter, we also emphasized that the actual situation of the Department, where 60 per cent of managerial and supervisor positions at NDHQ were held by military personnel, had made it necessary to identify these positions according to OLAO criteria. We had followed the same procedure in dealing with similar posts outside the national capital, since 80 per cent of these were also held by military people.

We further observed that at NDHQ, only $\frac{1}{3}$ of 1 per cent of positions required a unilingual French identification. This deplorable situation meant that the use of French at work was totally out of the question, except for a few individuals. The major cause of the situation was the lack of French-language documents and manuals in all branches of the Department. Translation could reduce this problem in future, especially if the Department used automated terminology and translation to deal with the great mass of manuals available only in English.

I felt the situation in Montreal was even more serious. Most personnel in Montreal were francophones, and we had hoped to find more unilingual French positions there. However, this was
not the case. Application of the OLAO criteria was hampered by the same problems encountered at NDHQ in Ottawa. We had to correct this obviously unjust situation, and above all attain a better balance of francophone participation among civilian employees. The Department proposed the creation of more bilingual civilian positions at NDHQ to encourage the recruitment of francophones. It also planned to increase and speed up translation of manuals, and to insist that they be published in a bilingual format. Finally, the Department wanted NDHQ to examine seriously the possibility of creating other FLUs and special sections where French would be the working language. The military should contribute to these projects, since under its 15-year program, some 20 existing units would be converted to FLUs. This would surely increase the need for working in French, and the opportunities to do so.

At the DGBB, 1973 thus ended on a note of hope. We could look back on an eventful and beneficial year for B & B at the DND, and forward to our projects to come.
In the previous chapter, we have seen that activities at the DGBB ended on a note of hope. To continue in this vein, we decided very early in 1974 to assess what we had accomplished since the approval of the 15-year program in April, 1972. In May, we published a report on the undertakings of the Department in the field of B & B. This report was produced in both official languages, and contained as much detail as possible. It was received with satisfaction by the command coordinators of bilingualism and biculturalism (CCBB), and by the persons who had worked with us at NDHQ. For the first time since 1972-1973, when we had tried unsuccessfully to provide information on the B & B programs, we had managed to issue from NDHQ, with the approval of our chiefs, a rundown of the good and bad news.

1. The project of identifying and designating military positions gets underway

At the very beginning of 1974, the Treasury Board began to put pressure on us to identify and designate military positions, and to account for the use of the additional resources granted by the Department.

The reader will recall that in the summer of 1973, the Directorate of Civilian Programs of B & B, which had been set up in 1972 as part of the DGBB, had been converted into the Office of the Coordinator of Linguistic Requirements (CLR) for the DND. In the process of identifying and designating civilian positions,
which I described in the previous chapter, it was thus the CLR
who directed the implementation of the Treasury Board guide-
lines.

Moreover, an internal restructuring of the DGBB in Decem-
ber, 1973 had given birth to a new Directorate, the Directorate of
Bilingual Programs Assessment (DBPA). The Directorate of
Language Training (DLT) was still under the management of the
Director General of Recruiting and Training. The organization
chart in Annex E shows the structure of the DGBB as it existed in
January, 1974. It was with the assistance of this organization that
I continued to oversee general B & B operations from then on. At
that time, however, I was primarily concerned with an activity
arising from the July, 1973 directives of the Defence Manage-
ment Committee (DMC).

The first directive asked us to define, using Treasury Board
parameters, the language skills that should be possessed by mili-
tary staff responsible for supervising civilian employees. The
DGBB completed a short study, using a sample at the first level
of supervision. This showed that at least 1300 positions held by
military supervisors required bilingualism. Needless to say, these
results were disconcerting to my anglophone colleagues. What
worried them most was the observation that all Lieutenant-
Colonels and higher ranks would have to be bilingual. These con-
cclusions indicated that the language schools would have more
work to do, and that the Department would have to face more
administrative and operational problems.

The second directive ordered the establishment of guidelines
for identifying and designating military positions. These were to
parallel the Treasury Board guidelines, and be compatible with
them.

The third directive demanded that a new statistical system be
organized as part of personnel information services. This new sys-
tem would provide precise data on the linguistic status of civilian
and military positions, and on the status of bilingualism generally.
By mid-November 1973, the first study had been completed as requested by the DMC, and its conclusions were made known. We then had to follow up on the other two directives as soon as possible. To this end, on November 19, I chaired a meeting of representatives of the Personnel, Operations and Materiel branches. At that meeting, a decision was taken to set up a management committee that would direct the planning and implementation of the DMC directives. The DGBB presented, for the guidance of the committee, a concise, logical draft plan in five stages:

a. First stage - *Examine the applicability of the TB guidelines to the CAF.* This job was entrusted to a task force within the management committee, with only one representative of the DGBB. I wanted to be unobtrusive in this process, but be ready to act as a catalyst at the right time. I also wanted to force more NDHQ managers to get involved in planning and implementing B & B at the Department. They had to be made responsible for the conclusions and recommendations of the studies in progress, for they would thus more readily accept the requirements and constraints of the resulting programs. Greater understanding, I felt, would increase goodwill. The man appointed to head the task force was Colonel G.D. Henderson, from the Directorate General of Organization and Manpower in the CG branch. I will soon have more to say about the work of this task force. The first stage of the plan was to be completed by January 31, 1974.

b. Second stage - *Develop the implementation plan and program.* This task was to be undertaken by the DGBB, and completed by mid-February.

c. Third stage - *Determine the duration of the program, and modify the second stage if necessary.* This required an analysis of the impact of the plan on all activities of the current program. This work was to be completed by the end of February.
d. Fourth stage - *Give the DMC the conclusions and recommendations* of the preceding stages, and request authorization to present our project to the Treasury Board. I thought that we could be ready to meet the DMC by the end of March.

e. Fifth stage - *Develop a system of information/statistics* on personnel, that would be compatible with the Treasury Board’s system known as the Official Languages Information Network (OLIN).

Having gone back to November, 1973 to explain more fully the matters that would absorb most of our energies in 1974, I return to the situation in mid-January. At that time, I noted that the task force, no doubt for valid reasons, had not yet gotten down to work. I discussed the situation with Brigadier-General Graham, who had worked well with me in the autumn of 1971 and the spring of 1972, to revise the B & B plans and programs. In particular, I told Graham that the DMC was impatient to know what results had been produced by its directives of July, 1973. Colonel Henderson, who reported to Graham, chaired the first meeting of his task force shortly thereafter. It soon became obvious that our timetable for the project was too optimistic. The deliberation of Henderson’s task force were to be hampered by all sorts of complications arising from reorganizations and the establishment of new organizations in the CAF. Problems would also arise from the fact that people could not agree on what was required for existing and future FLUs. I saw fit to advise Lieutenant-General Milroy, ADM(Per), that progress would unfortunately have to be slow in this matter, otherwise there might be negative consequences for the future of our programs. In these circumstances, I did not plan to go to the DMC before the end of the fall, after we had consulted with interested parties at NDHQ and in the external commands. I also requested that the general advise Mr. Cloutier that I did not foresee completing the identification and designation of military positions, as requested by the DMC, before the end of 1975.
Colonel Henderson and his task force completed their work in late May. On June 18, our steering committee approved the draft guidelines, and on July 11, we presented them to Rear-Admiral C.W. Ross, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance). Though Ross was generally well disposed towards our guidelines, he did have a few objections. In a letter to the ADM(Per), he recommended two amendments that he thought were of major importance. These amendments would cause much ink to flow and would require long consultations with the directors of personnel.

In the first place, Ross attacked the guidelines stipulating that unilingual or partially bilingual military personnel selected for a bilingual position would have to take the time to complete such language courses as were necessary to meet the requirements of their new position. Ross considered that this principle was too rigid and wanted to make it more flexible by saying that military staff affected by the guidelines would attend the language courses unless the requirements of their service prevented them from doing so.

Ross’s other amendment concerned the phrase “significant demand”, a term that he felt was too vague to define the level of bilingual service or to ensure bilingual supervision. He recommended that this expression be redefined, and accompanied by more detailed information, supported by examples. Commanders outside of NDHQ raised the same objections. However, I do not remember anyone who declared as categorically as Ross that the requirements of service should always take precedence over language requirements.

At the DGBB, we were apprehensive about these amendments. We were afraid that personnel managers, in trying to cope with the complex problems of filling bilingual positions, would too frequently opt for the formula of service requirements, to justify assignments, transfers and even promotions of their own devising.
2. Meeting of the Defence Management Committee, December 16, 1974; approval of guidelines

In any case, there was a lack of confidence on both sides. The ensuing polemics did not produce any solutions, and we had to await the directives of the DMC to reach a compromise. On December 16, 1974, we therefore went to the DMC meeting to submit our recommended guidelines for identifying and designating military positions. I decided to provide a practical demonstration of bilingualism in action, for the edification of the DMC. Lieutenant-Colonel Veilleux, acting CLR, gave a masterly presentation, in English, of the guidelines to identify and designate military positions. Then my deputy, Colonel D.J. McLaws, reported in French on the progress of our B & B programs and on the problems they were encountering. To make sure that this demonstration did not make the unilingual members of the DMC too uncomfortable, I told them that all the documentation in support of our presentation was being given to them in both English and French.

This meeting was very productive from our point of view, and the directives that emerged from it were very positive and precise. During the discussions, Mr. Cloutier himself had insisted that the term “service requirement” be defined in such a way as to limit the exceptions permitted in filling bilingual positions. He also accepted our definition, as submitted, of the phrase “significant demand”. The first part of the DMC session ended with the approval of the five-stage identification and designation plan, the first four stages to be completed by the end of 1975. Regarding the fifth and most difficult stage, Cloutier agreed that 1987 would continue to be the target date for its completion. On the other hand, he said that there was nothing immutable about this deadline, and that it could very well be extended.

The purpose of the second part of the session was to give the DMC information on the progress, problems and limitations observed in the gradual implementation of our programs. The members of the Committee listened attentively to what we had
to say. Mr. Cloutier warmly congratulated Colonel McLaws for having made his presentation in excellent French. When I invited the members of the DMC to use French in their deliberations, the Deputy Minister took the opportunity to urge his colleagues to express themselves in the language of their choice, and to make their presentations in either official language. Needless to say, I was happy about this initiative on the part of the DGBB. However, I had no illusions about the extent to which the French language would be used at DMC meetings in the future. How indeed could Mr. Cloutier, Dr. L’Heureux and General Dextraze communicate with their many unilingual colleagues except in English?

I was pleased with Cloutier’s other contributions, in addition to his praise of McLaws’ presentation. In the first place, he asked his colleagues to make sure that official documents coming from their offices be presented in a bilingual format. He emphasized the importance of filling the position of francophone Vice Principal at RMC, and requested that the selection and appointment process be speeded up, in spite of the problems involved. Cloutier also asked the authorities responsible to redouble their efforts to increase the number of francophones in our military colleges. Finally, he deplored the inadequacy of French services for travellers at CFBs Uplands and Trenton. Recalling former minister Macdonald’s directive on the matter, and the many formal requests of the COL, he stated that this deficiency was unacceptable.

I have already mentioned the Treasury Board’s impatience to see the Department’s military positions identified and designated, and I have just described what the DGBB did to comply with this request. At the beginning of 1974, we had also agreed to give the Treasury Board officials an overview of our civilian and military programs. In our presentations, we gave them an assessment of the progress achieved over the last two years, and a prognosis for the next three years. Moreover, our presentation was designed to give them a better understanding of the budgetary aspects of the B & B programs. We had to make them un-
nderstand that the success of our programs would largely depend on the financial and human resources that they would grant us in future. The normal defence budget, under pressure to meet the ever-growing needs of the Armed Forces, was no longer capable of meeting our requests as well. The B & B program, which had been imposed by the government, also had its political dimension. Consequently, we had to make military and civilian personnel realize that the program was in the best interests of the Department, and that being subsidized by the Treasury Board, it was in no way diminishing the budgetary resources allocated to the Armed Forces’ primary responsibilities. On our information tours, we had often been told that the government should take the money allocated to bilingual programs and buy material to replace the CAF’s obsolete arms and equipment. In the face of this misunderstanding, we had to proclaim the validity of our programs. We first tried to do this in our presentation to the Treasury Board in March, 1974. In addition, we brought together all the information used in our presentation and published it in May under the title “An account of progress made in regard to DND’s program of bilingualism and biculturalism / Compte rendu des progrès accomplis dans le cadre du programme de bilinguisme et de biculturalisme au MDN”. This publication was distributed throughout NDHQ and in all the commands. We relied on senior managers to take the initiative in seeing that our information reached the parties concerned. Unfortunately, this initiative was not always taken. During the term of my second appointment at the DND, I had to deplore some cases of ill-will. Sailors in Halifax, for example, told me that the basic document on B & B programs had never emerged from the Admiral’s office.

The program to identify and designate military positions was the major, but not the only, concern of the DGBB in 1974. Of these concerns, I shall discuss the following in particular: the tribulations involved in preparing and writing the draft order on a policy to govern the use of the official languages in the Armed Forces; the disappointments of the Francotrain project; the arrival of Bill 22; and especially the precarious linguistic health of the
FLUs, and the difficulties that had to be dealt with before their number could be increased.

### 3. Information tours to Halifax and Kingston

Throughout 1974, I tried to escape from NDHQ whenever I could, and to go in search of information. However, I had many reasons to remain in Ottawa as well. I have already spoken of the DGBB’s major activities in 1974, but I have not yet said anything about the complications that we had to face because of the many structural reorganizations in the Personnel branch.

In my Directorate General, some ten positions had been eliminated or left vacant in order to save money, or because qualified staff was lacking. I twice had to regroup my resources so that they could be used in critical areas. For example, on the departure of my civilian CLR, Ian Dewar, Lieutenant-Colonel Veilleux, Director of the planning section, had to fill in temporarily. I was lucky to have Captain Guy Sullivan already in place in the CLR’s office, and I could count on him to take the helm during this transition period.

Despite the pressures on my office in 1974, I was able to make two major trips. I went to Halifax in November, where I renewed my contact with Vice-Admiral D.S. Boyle, who had become Commander of Maritime Command. Boyle was more concerned about ageing ships and the lack of sailors than about the problems of implementing B & B measures in his command. Nevertheless, he gave me a friendly welcome and listened while I described my problems. I wanted an increase in the number of basic courses given to sailors in French. Some courses were already delivered in French, and others in English but with the assistance of bilingual tutors. However, in spite of this effort, too many courses, and especially the technical ones, were given only in English.

Boyle understood these problems, for he had come to know them when he was involved in planning at NDHQ, and he was now experiencing them for himself. As a practical man, he seri-
ously wondered whether we were not wasting our energies in wanting to train a handful of sailors in French, just for the principle of the thing, as they would be serving in the strictly anglophone environment of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Boyle was thinking especially of the ratings who were planning to study technical trades. For my part, I told Boyle that I was encouraged by the experience and limited success of HMCS Ottawa, the destroyer designated as a FLU, and its successor HMCS Skeena, though a number of my colleagues thought the Ottawa and the Skeena were pure tokenism.

After visiting CFB Shearwater and the Naval trades school at Stadacona, I returned to Ottawa. I was happy to have heard a bit more French in the naval community of Halifax, and to have perceived some open-mindedness on the part of some senior Navy officers. I was particularly pleased at the thought that we would soon be able to count on the services and devotion of Commander Pierre Simard to promote our projects in Halifax and to ensure their coordination.

My second voyage took me to Kingston. I first visited RMC, then the CAF staff college at Fort Frontenac. The RMC staff was seriously worried about the coming changes. The prospect of becoming a bilingual college, even in the long term, was traumatic to some professors and to some military officers in the administration. Though the proposed changes inspired no enthusiasm, I was well received as always. My conversations with the Commander and the Principal gave me more insight into the problems that would result from the conversion of RMC into a bilingual college on the model of CMR.

In appearance at least, the changes had already begun. For some years, the college had had francophone cadets, who were grouped in a French-language squadron. The activities of the college included a French week, in imitation of CMR, and in the cadets’ and officers’ messes, meals could be served in French. The number of francophone teachers had increased considerably, but 19 more were immediately needed if 40 francophone recruits
were to be properly accommodated in September, 1976. We also
needed a francophone vice-principal or assistant to the civilian
principal. Indeed, the DMC had decided, at the meeting I at-
tended, that such a person should be appointed. However, for a
number of reasons, no suitable candidate could be found. The hir-
ing of francophone professors was also an urgent matter. Every
effort had to be made to conduct a rational, vigorous campaign to
recruit qualified men, especially for science teaching.

I reminded the RMC staff of the considerable amount of
money that the Department had already invested and committed
for the B & B program at the college. This was a program that
had to work out. I noted, for example, that for 1974-1975,
$75,000 had been allocated to provide French cable television
service at the college. I left RMC with the impression that the
Commandant, as a solid professional, would do his best to im-
plement the B & B program. However, the Principal seemed to be
more or less subtly creating problems, and encouraging opposi-
tion among the anglophone professors. I resolved to discuss my
impressions and concerns with Major-General McAlpine who, as
CPD, would be able to take positive action to deal with the situa-
tion at RMC.

At Fort Frontenac, I was once again within the walls that I
had come to know so well in 1962, when I served as Deputy
Commander and Director of Studies at the Staff college there. I
remembered that bilingualism was not one of the commander’s
priorities. We hardly ever discussed the matter, and then only to-
dwards the end of my term of service, after Prime Minister Pear-
son’s declarations in April, 1966. After I left the college, a few
modest efforts were made to meet the least painful requirements
of the Official Languages Act. However, eight years later, Eng-
lish still dominated at Fort Frontenac, and its B & B program was
one of the most anemic. It could hardly have been otherwise in
this Army bastion of anglophone culture.

The Commander of Fort Frontenac in 1974, who had once
been my instructor in this same institution, found nothing reason-
able about the effort and resources that were being used to create bilingual working groups within the staff school course. He not unreasonably attributed the poor state of his B & B program to three factors: the small number of francophone students; the lack of bilingual instructors at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel; and, finally, the deficiency of appropriate documentation in French. It was certainly true that the presence of a translation unit on the campus would have greatly assisted the program by ensuring more rapid distribution of bilingual working instruments.

In leaving Fort Frontenac, I was somewhat discouraged by what I had perceived as a lack of interest and determination in finding solutions to the problem. I decided that when I returned to Ottawa, I would lobby to obtain more francophone students and bilingual Lieutenant-Colonels for the staff school course. I also hoped that I could increase the translation services for Fort Frontenac.

4. Bill 22

On July 31, 1974, Bill 22, an “Act respecting the official language”, came into effect in Quebec. This law, which was passed by Premier Robert Bourassa’s Liberal Government, declared French to be the official language of Quebec. This event inspired much discussion and comment among the military and civilian personnel at NDHQ. They were poorly informed, and believed the rumours that the freedom of our military and civilian employees to choose their children’s language of instruction was going to be abolished. Fortunately, we did not yet have to deal with Bill 101, passed by Premier René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois in August, 1977.

It was thus rather easy for me to comment on the provisions of Bill 22. I gave two talks on the subject, one to the DMC and the other to the CP and his senior staff. In my presentations, I emphasized that the primary intention of the Government of Quebec was to protect and promote the use of French in the province, and that we had no reason to believe that the vested language rights of our military and civilian employees would be affected in any way.
In my opinion, we would continue to enjoy the fair and generous treatment that Quebec had always accorded us.

At that time, I succeeded in reassuring my colleagues and in calming their fears. Unfortunately, I could not do the same when Bill 101 was passed in August, 1977. However, I have left it to Colonel René Morin to describe in detail, in his monograph on DND Dependants’ Schools, the effect of these two Quebec acts on the field of education, and the initiatives he took to mitigate their constraints.

5. Drafting the order on the use of the official languages in the CAF. Discussions and negotiations prior to approval.

Shortly after I began work at the DGBB, I was informed of the preparations that had been made for the approval and publication of an order on the policy that would govern the use of the official languages. The information I received revealed that the undertaking would be costly and difficult. I realized this when I saw how many people were claiming that their field of activity required exceptional treatment. I remember, in particular, the case of air safety, where communication in French was allowed only on the ground, and never in flight. In the Navy, senior officers felt that French could not be used in communications without some sacrifice of efficiency. In the technical field, the application of a policy based on the official languages appeared to be unthinkable. Nevertheless, in late 1971, the DGBB circulated a first draft version of the order, for examination and commentary. This was the version that I came across. It had been discussed at length, and revised by the JAG in November, 1971. In July, 1972 I resubmitted the draft to the JAG. I informed him of the changes that had occurred since his last revision, especially in regard to operations, and I told him that we considered this last change essential, in order to meet the requirements of the B & B Commission and the Official Languages Act. This proved to be a mistake on my part, for the Deputy JAG, Colonel J.P. Wolfe, reminded me of the opinion expressed by the Deputy Minister of Justice, who claimed that the Act in no way required the use of both official languages.
To head off a fruitless discussion with the JAG, I told him that at the DGBB, we were convinced that if the principle of equality of the two official languages were to be implemented in the Armed Forces, French would have to be present and in use at the heart of CAF activities, namely operations. In any case, the draft order had stood up quite well to critical examination by the DND staff, with the exception of the comments of Lieutenant-General S.C. Waters, DCDS (Operations), who deplored the overall orientation of our B & B policy, claiming that it would lead to a polarization of the Armed Forces into two language groups. I therefore decided to incorporate the amendments to the draft that the JAG had recommended, which were quite logical.

I also received suggestions for broadening the application of our policy to other areas that had been forgotten or neglected in the first draft. It was recommended, for example, that directives be issued on the language of work and on the bilingual presentation of documents, in order to give equal importance to both official languages. Another suggestion was that a matrix be used to define a system of communications for the FLUs and the entities they dealt with. At that time, it would have been unrealistic of us to try to cover, in this version, the whole range of linguistic situations that required regulation. However, we at least had to try to deal with the essential, and that is what I intended to do. I should mention that I felt somewhat ill at ease about General Dextraze’s contradictory statements on the language to be used in the CAF. The General had occasionally declared without qualification, in the presence of his anglophone colleagues, that English was the operational language of the CAF. At those moments, I remembered that during my first appointment at the DND, I had deplored the same statement on the part of Mr. Cadieux, who was then Minister of Defence. On the other hand, the draft order as written affirmed that English and French were the operational languages of the Armed Forces, though it stipulated that English would remain the major language of operations, and French would be relegated to the FLUs and to other
exceptional situations. However, I felt that this was a possible and acceptable compromise in these circumstances. The breach had been opened, and we had to take advantage of it. I wondered how we could get this order approved if the CDS was really opposed to it. At the first opportunity, I therefore went to see him. Though I was received amicably as always, the CDS told me that as far as he was concerned, there should only be one language of communication for CAF operations.

I tried to make the necessary distinctions between use and communications, and to brief the CDS on the whole range of arguments on the subject. The CDS said that he respected our wishes to enforce the principle of equality of the two official languages, and encouraged me to pursue my initiatives and our plans in this area. I still had the impression that he would have preferred to avoid the prescriptions of the order. However, he told me that he would approve the order when he was officially requested to do so.

It was now the end of September, 1973. The file, I believe, was with my deputy, and the draft order had been sent for translation. To clarify this point, I should note that two months earlier, Hanna had found the file at the bottom of his in-basket, and I had told him that there were good and sufficient reasons for the fact that it had not been dealt with since January. I have already alluded to what were no doubt the major reasons for this hiatus in the work of preparing the order. All the same, the order was still in draft form in October, 1973. However, now that I knew that the CDS would not oppose the order, I asked Hanna to continue the work and to speed up the final revision of the document.

Meanwhile, at the JAG’s office, Lieutenant-Colonel G.L. Waterfield succeeded Colonel Wolfe as the lawyer responsible for the official languages file. We renewed our consultations with Waterfield on a more regular and productive basis, and finally obtained the JAG’s approval on April 5, 1974. On May 29, I sent the file to my superior, Major-General McAlpine, who
approved the draft and sent it to Lieutenant-General Milroy, the ADM(Per), who approved it in turn.

On August 7, 1974 the CDS gave his approval to order CFAO 2-15, which defined the policy on the use of official languages in the Canadian Armed Forces. The order was published on October 25, 1974. I remember that we learned of General Dextraze’s approval through Colonel A.G. Christie, his executive assistant. Christie informed us that the CDS had approved the CFAO without enthusiasm. Dextraze had said that he was not happy with it, that he anticipated that it would result in problems and complications, and that it should probably be reviewed and amended at a later date.

Of this episode, I remember especially the long process of verification, the many amendments, and the too frequent need to begin again because of changes in the nomenclature of the senior appointments, and the resulting lack of continuity. For example, Vice-Admiral Falls had to approve the draft order twice, once in December, 1972 as ADM(Pol), and again in August, 1974 as VCDs. Fortunately, Falls had already written in December, 1972: “This CFAO makes a good deal of sense”.

6. The Francotrain project and the training in French of francophone airmen and sailors

I have already mentioned the setbacks we experienced with the Francotrain project in 1974. My own disappointment with Francotrain went back to the spring of 1973, when the OLIN sent to the DGBB, for comment, a draft directive to establish a task force on the training of francophones in the Air Force and Navy.

As we examined the draft directive, we soon realized that it would be necessary to correct the false impression it gave about the use of the official languages in relation to the training of aviators and sailors. In the first place, the unqualified statement that English was to remain the language of communications would surely distort the aim of the task force, and influence its orienta-
tion from the outset. While I was away, Colonel Hanna decided to set the record straight. He explained to the DG of OLIN that the DGBB understood the grounds for insisting that English remain the essential language of operational communications. However, he also told the DG not to forget that French could be used as a working language, even in operations. For example, the FLUs worked in French in the course of their own operations, but had to communicate in English when dealing with external ELUs or formation HQs.

This first statement of our position was only the prelude to the discussions in which Colonel Hanna and Lieutenant-Colonel McLaws would participate as members of the task force set up under Brigadier-General D. Gagnon. Hanna would deal with training in the Air Force, and McLaws with the situation in the Navy. I thus had two experienced representatives to look out for our interests, though I would have preferred a naval officer instead of McLaws. In any case, McLaws did the job, and brought me a draft of his subcommittee’s report. I then realized that the subcommittee was getting on the wrong track, and that my fears had been realized. Our purpose in requesting training for francophone naval officers had not been understood. Instead of examining the possibilities of teaching classifications and so on in French, the subcommittee had merely sought to discover cost-effectiveness ways of giving classification training to francophones. In November, 1973, in a memorandum to the DG of Francotrain, I therefore deplored the fact that the purpose of the study had been distorted. The subcommittee examining the Air Force situation took a less rigid approach to the problem, but still arrived at the same conclusions. Generally speaking, pilots and sailors would continue to be trained in English. At the most, the initial selection process would be conducted in French, but the subsequent stages of training would be in English. I was disappointed by these findings, and on January 2, 1974 I declared that the recommendations of the task force were unacceptable. I asked them to meet again, and to find some other solution than maintenance of the status quo.
Vice-Admiral Boyle, Commander of the Maritime Command, now had a new outlook on the problem. He declared himself in favour of the task force’s recommendations, and described my comments as questionable, and even untimely.

Brigadier-General C.G.E. Thériault, Commander of the 1st Air Combat Group in Europe, and Major-General J.J. Paradis, Deputy Commander of Mobile Command, came to the defence of francophone rights. They declared that in all justice and in the interests of the Armed Forces, francophone airmen and sailors should be trained in French. Despite our objections, the report of the task force was published on May 30, 1974, after the DG of OLIN had written a letter to explain the problems he faced in trying to reconcile the various viewpoints of the task force members, and to note that no consensus could be reached. Nevertheless, the DG recommended approval of the solutions proposed by the task force.

Lieutenant-General Milroy, ADM(Per), ordered the implementation of the Gagnon report recommendations, and asked to be informed of the progress accomplished in 1976. In July, 1974, the Armed Forces were thus preparing to improve methods and procedures for training francophones in the Air Force and Navy. In this matter, I had to bide my time until 1976. However, I resolved to assess this project, and to reopen the debate on the matter if necessary.

7. The status of the FLUs in 1974

Apart from a passing concern whenever we received the results of the latest survey on the progress of our FLUs, the past year had left me little time to think seriously about their situation. However, I was aware that a sampling of the FLUs would reveal a number of disturbing trends: the continuing assignment of unilingual anglophones; a linguistic system that gave too much encouragement to the use of English at work; and the excessive use of English in dealing with outside entities. In other words, on the pretext of service requirements, language regulations governing FLUs were still not being rigorously applied. An unhealthy situa-
tion existed in the FLUs, a fact that the Treasury Board realized every time it received a new report.

Despite these negative indications, I was confident that in time and with the necessary resources, the system would eventually adjust, and better serve the interests of our FLUs. I also felt that regardless of the problems involved, we should move ahead with our program as planned and approved. I was thus pleased to receive, in January 1974, Vice-Admiral C.W. Ross’s recommendation that 25 other FLUs be designated. Ross had just been appointed CP to replace Vice-Admiral Boyle, when the latter took over Maritime Command. When I consulted with NDHQ staff officers about the Treasury Board’s observations on the negative results of the FLU surveys, I felt that there was some confusion in the minds of the Board’s officials and of some of our managers. In the first place, some of them expected that a unit, once designated as an FLU, would begin to operate almost immediately in French. In the CAF, it was going to take a long time for francophone and bilingual personnel to transform a linguistic system based on English into a viable French-language system. Indeed, our program contemplated a period of three years for the assignment and transfer of the staff required to produce this transformation. Secondly, others seemed to think that the official designation should only be adopted when the French-language system had been set up and was operating efficiently. In my opinion, what counted the most was the number and broad spectrum of FLUs. I would have liked to see them set up in every area of our activities. I felt that for now quantity was more important than quality, whatever the Treasury Board might think. Even within the DGBB, some of my officers believed that we should consolidate the linguistic set-up of the operating FLUs, and make sure that they were really functioning in French, before thinking of designating further FLUs. Naturally, I understood their concern, which was shared by members of the Treasury Board who were becoming more and more critical of our FLU operations.

In fact, the Treasury Board was questioning the viability of some of our FLUs. In spite of these rather unfavourable circum-
stances, I opted for the 25 new FLUs, especially since ViceAdmi-
ral Ross assured us that the necessary bilingual and francophone
resources had been identified. I realized that Ross’ list did not in-
clude any operational unit in the Air Force or Navy, but I was
sure it would be possible to remedy this shortcoming by negotiat-
ing the FLU program as a whole.

Let me explain the reasons for my choice of quantity over
quality in the designation of FLUs. When the program to estab-
lish FLUs in the CAF was just getting underway, the quality of
the French-language system in these units was less important than
the positive advantages and consequences that would flow from
the designation of new FLUs. I accepted the fact that the proper
functioning of existing FLUs would take longer to achieve be-
cause of the resources diverted to the new FLUs. Among the posi-
tive consequences of this development, I would mention the in-
crease in the number of positions designated as francophone or
bilingual, and the greater opportunities for promotion, which
would help us to attain our francophone participation goals for
each rank and trade. I knew that there would also be negative
consequences. We would have to listen to the same old com-
plaints that the system was continuing to show undue favouritism
to francophones by a too rapid increase in bilingual positions, that
anglophones didn’t have the chance to become bilingual because
the language courses were inadequate, and that the lack of re-
placement staff was preventing people from learning French. I
recognized and deplored these problems, which had to be solved.
And I was determined to ask the Treasury Board to give us the
necessary financial and human resources to organize more
courses, and to allow a greater number of our anglophone col-
leagues to become bilingual.

However, while I wanted to avoid being unfair to anglo-
phones, I especially wanted to correct the unjust situation that
conditions of service had too long inflicted upon francophones. I
felt that my anglophone and francophone superiors understood
and supported me, and at the end of January, I requested that a
project be initiated to designate 25 new FLUs.
Our first step was to have discussions and consultations with the staff managers, in order to amend the list of FLUs proposed by Vice-Admiral Ross. At that time, I enjoyed the support of Brigadier-General Robert LaRose, who was toiling to obtain our objectives in the management of non-officer personnel. His directives were straightforward, and clearly defined the duties and priorities of his career managers in regard to the staffing of FLUs. He required that his managers draw up short and long term plans, and asked to see their proposed actions, which he intended to evaluate on the basis of the success obtained by the FLUs. In the personnel area, I also appreciated the contribution of Lieutenant-Colonel L.J. Durocher, who was developing a logical distribution of all the bilingual, francophone and anglophone resources available for our B & B programs as a whole. For our project in particular, Durocher was working to determine the real staff contribution that each classification and occupational group would have to make to the new FLUs for every rank and trade. On August 26, 1974, thanks to Durocher’s rigorous and objective work, we were able to submit a well-structured plan to Major-General McAlpine, the CPD. McAlpine unhesitatingly approved the plan, which recommended the designation of 22 new FLUs. He then sent it to the ADM(Per), who in turn approved it. At the same time, the ADM(Per) gave us permission to consult with the GOCs.

The consultations at NDHQ and with the GOCs were completed before the end of the year. On the whole, the results of these consultations were positive. There were a few minor alterations, but nothing too serious. I remember, in particular, that Major-General McLachlan, formerly Commander of ATC and currently Chief of Air Operations, did not want 412 Squadron, quartered at CFB Uplands base in Ottawa, to be turned into a FLU. MacLachlan claimed that the choice of 424 Squadron at Trenton should not be changed. Fortunately, Major-General K.E. Lewis, the new Commander of ATC at Trenton, came right out and said that the designation of the 412 Squadron at Uplands was a good choice, particularly since it was located in the National Capital Region.
I should also mention that in February and May of 1974, the Treasury Board saw fit to advise us that it had serious doubts about the functioning and success of some FLUs, in particular HMCS Skeena. Treasury Board officials had previously analyzed data from three samplings of HMCS Ottawa, the predecessor of HMCS Skeena. This analysis clearly showed that HMCS Skeena would never acquire the desired linguistic system as prescribed for a FLU, unless the tendencies that had impeded the progress of the Ottawa for five years were to disappear.

In view of these circumstances, the TB was afraid that within a year, it might be necessary to think of replacing HMCS Skeena by another naval unit more likely to be viable in French. This situation caused me some concern, for I remembered the personal directive of General Dextraze concerning the linguistic regime that ought to prevail on HMCS Skeena. In April of 1973, upon learning that the Navy was planning to replace the destroyer HMCS Ottawa by HMCS Skeena in the fall, I had passed on to the CDS some of my worries about the latter. In the first place, the Captain of HMCS Ottawa, Commander Neil Boivin, was to finish his tour of duty aboard HMCS Skeena. Boivin was a good sailor, but although he had a French name and some knowledge of French, he was very anglicized. Despite his willingness, I was afraid that Boivin would not be able to make a successful FLU of HMCS Skeena, unless NDHQ made a special effort to find the bilingual officers and men needed for the project. The CDS understood me, and in May he requested that the crew of HMCS Skeena take French courses at Montreal, when the ship put into port for repairs. The CDS also demanded that Commander Boivin be informed of his wish that HMCS Skeena be operated as a francophone unit.

As I considered the prospect of setting up other FLUs, I was not forgetting the importance that General Dextraze had attached to the success of HMCS Skeena. Nor was I forgetting the criticisms of the Treasury Board. However, I did not want to give the career managers any excuse for not making up for the deficiencies of HMCS Skeena, even if the proposed new FLUs
would have to suffer as a result.

It was now the end of December, 1974. We had just recently obtained the final approval for our plan to designate 19 new FLUs, and were looking forward to receiving the final authorization of the Minister, so that the plan could be officially promulgated in 1975.
1. Communications and negotiations with the Treasury Board about the guidelines for identifying and designating military positions

The most eventful year of my second appointment at the DND was undoubtedly 1975. As early as November, 1974 I had quickly realized that Mr. Trudeau’s new government, which now had a majority, was determined to implement its program of bilingualism in full. Directives and exhortations from the Treasury Board were soon coming our way. The greatest pressure was being exercised in regard to our draft guidelines for the identification of military positions. The reader will remember that the identification and designation of civilian positions had already been completed by December 31, 1973.

At the DGBB, we began by summoning the Command B & B coordinators to a meeting in Ottawa. For ten days, we presented and discussed our guidelines, and their application to the identification and designation project. We also examined the first draft of a manual of the same directives. In addition, to making sure that we would be initiating a viable, tested project, we picked eight of our most competent people, divided them into two teams of four, and sent them off to try out the new guidelines. Through the efforts of these teams, 83 per cent of positions in Montreal and 25 per cent of positions in North Bay were identified as bilingual. Useful recommendations emerged from this sampling and from
discussions with managers in the field, and the guidelines were amended accordingly. By February 6, 1974 our work was ready for submission to the Treasury Board. However, we had to wait until April 14 to receive the latter’s comments.

Mr. G.F.J. Osbaldeston, Secretary of the Treasury Board, pointed out to the DM in his observations that our guidelines were subject to Cabinet directive, and for that reason could not be amended solely by the DMC. Moreover, the planned completion date for the designation of military positions was 1987, while according to the timetable set by Cabinet for the Public Service as a whole, the designation of civilian positions was to be finished before the end of 1978. Osbaldeston thought that this disparity was too great, and that the Department should move the deadline for the military program up, as close to 1978 as possible.

Osbaldeston also raised the question of the escape clause in the guidelines. In his opinion, the guidelines were not sufficiently constraining to allow us to meet our objectives. In fact, the escape clause would allow a unilingual serviceman to be assigned to a bilingual position when the interests of the service required it. Osbaldeston thought that this provision was allowing too much scope for interpretation. He suggested that, if need be, cases be submitted to the MND where exceptional circumstances justified the exception.

I must say that the letter from the Treasury Board was not received with much enthusiasm at the DGBB. In the first place, I saw it as a bold attempt to bring the military program under the civilian yoke, and to force us to move ahead at the speed imposed upon the Public Service. Secondly, I thought that if the Treasury Board succeeded in getting us to change our timetable, the results for the Armed Forces program would be disastrous. Thirdly, it seemed to me that the Treasury Board officials were ignorant of Prime Minister Trudeau’s reasonable attitude towards the problems that would arise from the implementation of B & B policies in the Armed Forces. I remember that in June of 1970, when he approved the 17 recommendations of the Laurendeau-Dunton
Commission on the CAF, Trudeau had been careful to recognize the complexity of the task, and the nature of the challenge that would have to be met. He had emphasized the magnitude of the changes, saying that they would require much time and effort, and that bilingualism would be gradually introduced to avoid harming the efficiency and morale of the Armed Forces.

For these reasons, I decided to tell Mr. W.R. Green, who as Associate ADM(Per) was my superior, about the dilemma I faced. For one thing, I did not know the contents of the Cabinet directive to which the Treasury Board Secretary had referred. My investigations into the matter had revealed that a Cabinet directive on bilingualism had indeed been received at the Department, but that it was addressed to the Minister and Deputy Minister only. On April 18, I advised Mr. Green that, given the circumstances, I could not respond to the Treasury Board observations.

Some days later, Mr. Cloutier called me into his office, and showed me the Cabinet directive of November, 1974. I quickly realized that only one short paragraph of this directive specifically concerned the Armed Forces and the RCMP. Moreover, I found nothing in the document that would have compelled the Armed Forces, in designating military positions at the DND, to meet the same December 1978 deadline as the Public Service as a whole.

After my visit to the DM, the DGBB got down to work on a response to the Treasury Board’s letter. We used all the arguments that had previously been advanced, and especially those that showed why we needed a flexible program, whose development could be continued to 1987.

Mr. Osbaldeston wrote another letter on May 30, which was addressed to Mr. C.R. Nixon, who had succeeded Mr. Cloutier as Deputy Minister, on May 15, Osbaldeston returned to the attack on the points of contention mentioned above. His persistence made me realize that Ian Dewar, a shrewd and ambitious fellow, had a hand in this affair. Former CLR in my staff, Dewar had moved over to the Treasury Board where he was in charge of su-
pervising the application of the Government’s program of bilingualism. He was no doubt happy to advance the arguments of the Treasury Board. Indeed, I remember that on several occasions during his appointment at the DGBB, Dewar had criticized the military for refusing to conform to the same requirements as the civilian program.

I convinced the new DM not to reply to Mr. Osbaldeston until he had heard my presentation on our programs, which I resolved to give him shortly. This action seemed called for in the circumstances. I thought the debate was going to drag on and, I admit, I didn’t want the Treasury Board to impose its ideas on us. On July 2, 1975, Mr. Nixon wrote to the Board, informing Osbaldeston of his conclusions on the situation he had inherited at the Department. In particular, he said the debate between the Board and the Department should be postponed until identification of military positions was completed. By then, both parties would have all the facts, and would be better able to resolve the issues that concerned us.

Two weeks later, we were pleased to receive a notice from Mr. Osbaldeston, who agreed to postpone the debate for the reasons given by Mr. Nixon. The meetings between Dewar of the TB and myself, which threatened to take up too much of my time, were cancelled to my great satisfaction. As a result, I could now concentrate more on other aspects of our problems.


No sooner had we completed the documentation and manual for initiating the program to identify and designate military positions than the Treasury Board began to press us to follow up on the directives of Parliament’s resolution of June, 1973. I have already described how the first part of this resolution requested that all civilian positions in the Public Service be identified and designated, and that the work be completed before December 31, 1978. At the Department, the task of identifying civilian positions had been completed by December 29, 1973. All that remained to be
done was to continue the work of designation, and to finish it before December 31, 1978.

The second part of the resolution aimed at increasing the use of French and francophone participation in the Public Service. It was important in the eyes of Cabinet, especially since it had been neglected in the rush to get the first part over with. The second part of the resolution thus became the Treasury Board’s great priority, and was to provide us with a real challenge. In the first place, the Board had decided to put on a great show to initiate the process of planning the measures required by the resolution. Pierre Coulombe, Director of the Official Languages Section of the Treasury Board, got the ball rolling by sending all the departments a draft circular which aimed at defining the linguistic policies on working instruments used in the Public Service.

At the Department, we had already begun a study to determine the magnitude of the problem involved in meeting our needs for French-language technical working instruments. Documentation did exist, but 98 per cent of it was in English. This material would have to be translated, then edited and printed. The major hurdle was translation, since millions of words were involved. In the field of general publications, as I have already mentioned, we were making constant progress. We were in the forefront, outdoing the other departments through the substantial number of documents, orders, instruction and operations manuals that we produced. All these were now available in French, and often in a bilingual format.

The problem of technical manuals was so great that in the Spring of 1975, I felt the need to bring it to the attention of the highest possible level of the Department. I therefore approached Major-General M.T. Friedl, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), who agreed to represent the Department in discussions with the Treasury Board on the production of French-language technical manuals. At the DGBB, Lieutenant-Colonel Forest, DTTP, took responsibility for keeping an eye on developments in this area.
Pierre Coulombe’s circular arrived in mid-May, followed by a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Board. In this letter, which gave us some inkling of the Treasury Board’s intentions, Mr. Osbaldeston first reminded our DM of the contents of the November, 1974 Cabinet directive, a copy of which he enclosed. I have already described how upset I was not to have known the contents of this directive in April, 1975. Osbaldeston asked that one of the Department’s senior staff be selected to effect liaison with senior management in the Treasury Board’s Official Languages Directorate. This would ensure that consultation, discussions and decisions regarding the resolution would take place at a high level in our Department. I had the impression that our Department was not a particular target of this Treasury Board request, since all the government departments received it. In any case, our new DM agreed that I should be the representative of the Department and gave the Treasury Board notice to this effect in early June.

We had barely had time to digest the contents of the November, 1974 Cabinet directive that Mr. Osbaldeston had sent to Mr. Nixon, when the former was asking the latter to examine the draft of a new Treasury Board directive intended for study and approval by Cabinet. This draft directive advocated rapid increase in the use of French and in Francophone participation in the Public Service as a whole. Mr. Nixon was invited to meet with Mr. Osbaldeston and the other DMs on June 19, 1975, to discuss measures for implementing the recommendations of the document.

Despite its confidential designation, the draft directive soon reached us, accompanied by a request that we analyze it and present our comments to the DM. We observed that the document contained principles that were just and intentions that were praiseworthy. However, we felt that the measures to ensure the realization of the objectives would require flexible and progressive programs. We also said that the timetable mentioned in the document could not be met, because of the rather particular nature and composition of the Department’s structures. We were
also afraid that the Armed Forces would be polarized into two sections, along cultural and linguistic lines.

Finally, we expressed our view that with sufficient resources, reasonable time, and programs tailored to suit the Armed Forces, the DND could deal successfully with the undertaking and challenge outlined in the document. The DGBB’s final contribution in this matter was to prepare a letter to Mr. Osbaldeston, in which these observations were mentioned. The record shows that Mr. Nixon sent this letter, as written, to the Treasury Board on June 30, 1975. The Board then requested that the original and all copies of its confidential document be returned. This incident, which I remember personally, is also on record. The recovery process turned out to be rather complicated.

3. The three Treasury Board circulars on the second part of the June, 1973 resolution; planning for the implementation of the resolution

About five weeks later, on August 11, the Treasury Board Secretary again wrote to our DM. In this letter, Mr. Osbaldeston informed Mr. Nixon of the measures that had been approved in order to implement the Cabinet directives on the second part of the resolution. He also notified Nixon that the three circulars attached to his letter dealt with the following three matters:

a. Units working in French (UWF);

b. The use of French in the Public Service; and

c. Manuals.

Osbaldeston suggested that these circulars, though in draft form, should enable the Department to begin planning immediately, without waiting for the official publication of these documents in September, 1975. Cabinet had, indeed, established a very tight timetable by requiring that implementation plans be submitted by October 15, 1975, and the Treasury Board was thus obliged to notify the government departments in advance.
Osbaldeston also informed us that information sessions would be held at the Treasury Board Office from August 25 to 29. He invited representatives of the Department to come to these sessions, so that they could make known their observations and answer questions.

In the circumstances, we had to act very quickly at the DGBB. On the very day that the DM received the letter and circulars from the Board, all this documentation was forwarded to the ADMs under the cover of a memorandum, and they were asked to provide their comments on it by August 25.

It was now the turn of David Morley to come on stage. He was Under-secretary at the Treasury Board, and headed up the official languages branch. Morley requested that the person chosen to act as liaison for the Department be accompanied, at the information sessions, by the chairman of the Department’s Bilingualism Coordinating Committee. Mr. Nixon agreed that I should attend these sessions in the company of Major-General J.J. Paradis, the new CPD and chairman of our bilingualism committee, and notified Morley to this effect.

It was my impression, at this time, that Nixon thought the Treasury Board was pushing too hard. Nixon spoke directly to Major-General Paradis, and told him exactly what he thought of our programs of bilingualism. In a handwritten postscript at the bottom of a memorandum I had sent him to inform him of the latter’s attendance at the Board’s deliberations, he said that he had told Paradis about his concerns regarding the difficult position of bilingualism, and particularly francophone participation, at the Department. He added that he had told Paradis that we should devise a plan which, though reasonable, would be compelling in its application within the Department. However, he attacked the lack of logic and realism in the timetable that had been proposed to us, and he insisted that this be frankly stated to the Treasury Board. Finally, he asked to be kept informed of developments in this area.
Mr. Green, our ADM(Per), had read Nixon’s memo and agreed with it, especially since Nixon had said that Green should be the first person to be informed and consulted. I felt that the chain of communication had now been specified with the greatest clarity. I would inform Major-General Paradis, who would inform Mr. Green. Green in turn would inform Deputy Minister Nixon. I thought that the new DM might distance us from the centre of decision-making, but fortunately, this was a false alarm. I soon realized that Nixon was sincere, and wanted the Department’s program to succeed. I definitely found him to be very accessible and open to all our initiatives.

I wish to digress at this point to discuss the changes that had occurred in the Department’s senior management, especially in the Personnel area. Lieutenant-General Milroy, a former armoured corps officer whom I had known for many years, had taken over the duties of ADM(Per). Mr. Green, Chief, Personnel Management, had succeeded Mr. Morry as Associate ADM(Per) responsible for civilian matters. Major-General Paradis had replaced Major-General McAlpine as CPD. Finally, Mr. Cloutier had been appointed DM at the Department of Transport, and Mr. Nixon had taken his place on June 15, 1975. These were the superiors with whom I continued to work assiduously, and who provided me with invaluable assistance right to the end of my appointment.

Because of the military system, Lieutenant-General Milroy had two successors before I left the DGBB. These were Lieutenant-Generals J.W. Quinn and J.C. Smith, who were most generous in the support they gave me. There was, however, one important person in the DND who seemed the very embodiment of silence and incomprehension in regard to our programs of bilingualism. I refer to the Honourable James Richardson, who succeeded Mr. Benson in 1972. As far as I know, this minister never had his department’s B&B programs presented and explained to him in a serious way, as his predecessors and successors did. Apart from a short-lived attempt to learn French at the beginning of his appointment, Richardson showed very little positive interest.
est in bilingualism. I remember that one day, when I was in the office of Major-General J.M.G. Cloutier, Richardson’s executive assistant, I complained about the Minister’s slowness in approving the plans for the new FLUs. I was told that Richardson was in no particular hurry to see new FLUs established, and that in the circumstances, it would be better for me to curb my impatience.

Let us now return to the three circulars that the DGBB had distributed for comment to the different branches of the NDHQ. These circulars were studied promptly, and we soon received the responses of the various ADMs or associate ADMs concerned. When Major-General Paradis and I went to the Treasury Board’s meeting in the week of August 25, we were thus able to bring along a certain stock of objections and suggestions. This was the first time that the General had met the committee members, negotiators and union representatives.

In his report to the meeting, Paradis did not forget the directives of Mr. Nixon. He explained that the Department had serious reservations, though it agreed with the recent proposals for new FLUs and so on, because they would lend support to the official languages policy. Paradis went on to point out our major objections: the timetable was unrealistic; the French-language working instruments were totally insufficient or nonexistent; and the means currently available to teach French were inadequate for our needs. Our consultation at the Treasury Board thus remained what it had been in the past: an exchange of opinions. The union representatives were very unhappy and disappointed about the rigidity of the guidelines. In our case, however, we knew that we could request some flexibility in their application, because of the great complexity of the Department, which employed nearly a third of all federal civil servants, and had to coordinate a military and a civilian section.

At the Department, many information sessions were subsequently held at the Director General level. By the end of September, the plans for our FLUs were beginning to take shape. I had to visit David Kirkwood, the ADM(Pol), Vice-Admiral Falls, the
VCDS, and Mr. T.C. Greig, our ADM(Fin), to ask them to get involved and to assist their subordinates in producing positive results. On a number of occasions, we at the DGBB stood in for these managers, developing what we thought were suitable FLU plans for their respective organizations, and submitting these plans to them in the form of a draft. This was a kind of provocation, but it got results. After all, we were the experts in their eyes, and they expected us to play our role. Nevertheless, they thought that our proposed changes were not likely to be received with goodwill and understanding. The results we obtained came from managers who had resigned themselves to the inevitable. Despite our assurances, a number of them thought that their career and job security were threatened by the necessity of retraining in French or accepting an involuntary transfer.

Many serious objections were raised in regard to technology and specialization. It was said, for example, that a few small units, submerged in a sea of anglophones and struggling to work in French, would have no credibility and no chance of success. Several people thought that the timetable for completing the project was unrealistic, and even ridiculous. Fortunately the Treasury Board, with the consent of Cabinet, gave us some respite by announcing that the deadline for submitting implementation plans had been extended to November 15, 1975. I think that the resistance shown by the bargaining agents had helped the Government to decide on this postponement.

Some time before this announcement, the unions had provoked a small crisis by refusing to attend the deliberations of a subcommittee of the National Joint Council of the Treasury Board and the bargaining agents. This problem was resolved by October 24, when a press release announced the resumption of negotiations, and described the concessions that had been made. In particular, linguistic standards for bilingual positions in the FLUs would be set in such a way that unilingual candidates would not be excluded from competitions, as long as they expressed their intention to become bilingual. It was immediately obvious where this relaxation of standards would take us. We
knew that it might reduce our chances of increasing francophone participation, especially if anglophone employees were also allowed to work in the FLUs in their mother tongue.

The results of the DGBB’s efforts, which were supported by our superiors, were sent to the Treasury Board in a letter dated December 1, 1975 and signed by the acting DM, David Kirkwood. The Department was submitting plans for the implementation, at NDHQ, of 21 FLUs with a total complement of 536 persons, of whom 439 would be civilians and 97 military personnel. In the letter, the DM noted that the number of individuals involved amounted to 9.1 per cent of the categories designated in the Board’s directives, somewhat less than the target figure of 10 per cent. By way of apology, Kirkwood cited the enormous complexity of the Department, whose military personnel had been reduced from 83,000 to 78,000 in the space of a few years. Kirkwood also mentioned the large number of civilian and military employees who would have to take language courses, often without replacements.

4. The status of the FLUs in 1975

In the matter of FLUs, the first thing the DGBB did in 1975 was to send a request to the Directors General of Officers’ and Non-officers’ Careers. We asked them to take the necessary steps for assigning required military personnel to the 17 new FLUs in Quebec, so that these units could be converted into true FLUs during 1977-1978. The same measures were to be applied to two other units: 412 Squadron in Ottawa, and a squadron of CFB Greenwood, which would be selected later.

Discussions and consultations with all interested parties were completed, or so we thought. We therefore began to prepare documentation to obtain Mr. Richardson’s formal approval. On March 10, our acting ADM(Per), Major-General McAlpine, wrote to the ADM(Pol), requesting that the list of FLUs be promulgated in the CFAOs. The aim of this request was to complete the first 1972-1977 phase of the 15-year program, which was designed to create enough FLUs to allow 50 per cent of franco-
phone military personnel to work in French. Such a promulgation, though a bit ahead of schedule, would promptly activate the staffing process, and the new FLUs would acquire the linguistic regime they needed to operate in French, at least before the deadline of summer, 1977.

After this request for action on the FLUs, the DGBB made a presentation to NDHQ on the essential role that the FLUs would play, in the medium and long term, to support our programs. Despite this information and clarification, we had to continue to explain the nature of the units earmarked for conversion to FLUs, and to justify their selection, though the decision on these matters had been taken long ago at the highest level of the Department. In particular, the security and intelligence services located in Quebec, including the special investigations detachments, were to be converted into FLUs.

These decisions provoked incomprehension, apprehension and even resistance. Generally speaking, their work was done in English, except for the interviews with francophones. Managers in Ottawa and Quebec claimed that internal and external communications could only be carried out in English because of the scale of the operations and the need to ensure high efficiency. We had to make them understand that a FLU could communicate in English with outside entities, and still work internally in French. In our opinion, this linguistic system could very well be applied to the security and intelligence services, and would in no way change the nature of the units involved. They would remain FLUs, since if they became merely bilingual, English would continue to predominate.

I had to approach officers of the security and intelligence services at NDHQ, to explain to them that the Department’s FLU policy also applied to their units. I had several meetings with Major-General “Reggie” Weeks, who was somewhat bilingual, and sensitive to our problems. We discussed and examined possible solutions to ensure that, at the very least, the Official Languages Act would be enforced.
The people in communications services followed almost the same script. They were afraid of change, thinking that it would reduce the efficiency of communications, so essential to the proper conduct of operations. Because of this attitude, it was almost impossible to engage them in dialogue. They were prepared to have French used in some messages, but not in the procedures and systems employed to transmit them. Even in Quebec, any encroachment on the hegemony of English was out of the question. Here again, I had to intervene and appeal to the goodwill of senior officers I knew personally, in order to get our message across. Our communications service had to take the necessary measures to ensure that French was present and in use in the operations of its Quebec network.

The DGBB had never really stopped trying to justify the new FLUs. We were thus obliged to repeat all our arguments about the selection of CFBs Montreal and Bagotville, of 405 Squadron at Greenwood and 412 at Uplands in the national capital.

By mid-April, because of these unfortunate problems, we still had not received any authorization from the Chief of Programs, Lieutenant-General Smith. I knew Smith from his days at Mobile Command HQ, before he came to Ottawa, and I remembered that even then, he had disagreed with some aspects of B & B program implementation. Now, in May of 1975, he was becoming involved in the FLU issue. Apologizing for the delay in dealing with this matter (it had been on his desk since March 10), Smith suggested that because the plan for the new FLUs had been amended several times since its first approval in 1972, it should be submitted to the DMC. He also emphasized that the creation of FLUs was a very tricky issue, and sure to have political repercussions. Any releases or public statements on the matter, he warned, should take this factor into account.

I felt impatient and frustrated at the snail’s pace at which things were proceeding. On May 20, I wrote to the ADM(Per). In my letter, I tried to show that the observations of Lieutenant-General Smith were illogical. I also went to see Lieutenant-
General Milroy in person, to try to persuade him to take my side. I succeeded in this, but it was not until June 16 that Milroy reiterated my plea to Smith. At last, Smith said that he was convinced. On June 20, having admitted that his branch had delayed matters too long, he gave written instructions to his officers, and insisted that the request to the Minister be ready by June 25.

I was pleased to learn from Lieutenant-General Smith himself that the documents had finally left his office, and were en route to the CDS. However, we still had to play a waiting game. It was not until October 31 that Vice-Admiral Falls, VCDS, sent the file to General Dextraze. Finally, on November 4, 1975, the CDS forwarded our request to the Minister’s office where it remained in limbo for the duration of Mr. Richardson’s appointment.

In my account of these events, I have noted that Lieutenant-General Smith worried about the political controversies that might result from the establishment of FLUs. One such controversy was the work of Mr. Brian Mulroney, a candidate for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1975. Another, which I remember very well, was initiated by the Right Honourable Gerald Reagan, Premier of Nova Scotia. On December 3, 1975 Reagan wrote to Prime Minister Trudeau to inform him that the DND’s plan to establish a FLU at CFB Greenwood was arousing negative reactions in his province. Greenwood was located in the heart of the Annapolis Valley, a region of tightly-knit, exclusively anglophone farming communities. According to Reagan, the location of a FLU in this area would lead to discord; it would be like setting up an English-language unit in the region of Chicoutimi. Reagan added that in the circumstances, the right-thinking people of Nova Scotia would advise the Government to reject this proposal.

At the DGBB, we responded rapidly, and our reply to Reagan’s arguments was soon in the DM’s office. Trudeau took his time, not answering Reagan’s letter until February 6, 1976. His comments, however, were in line with what we had suggested. Trudeau explained why the FLUs had been set up, cited
the principle of equal treatment, and underlined the fact that more than 300 francophones already worked at CFB Greenwood, in apparent harmony with their anglophone colleagues and the Greenwood community. These francophones, Trudeau added, were bilingual, and the same would be true of those assigned to 405 Squadron.

Trudeau also picked up on Reagan’s comments about the absurdity of locating an English-language unit in Chicoutimi. He noted that two English-language units had been incorporated into the Bagotville base, and that generally speaking, they were in no way suffering from the kind of social experiment that the Department now wanted to conduct at Greenwood. Finally, Trudeau stated that the DND’s program was logical and reasonable, since it met national policies and priorities, and that Greenwood’s FLU would be part of this picture.

Brian Mulroney, in intervening in this matter, was trying to gain some political capital by attacking the Department’s plan to set up a FLU at Greenwood. According to an article I came across in the newspaper *Le Droit*, dated December 10, 1975, Mulroney was claiming that the federal government was moving too quickly in trying to introduce bilingualism. He said that while he favoured the principle of bilingualism, he objected to the DND plan to set up a squadron of francophone pilots at CFB Greenwood, in the Annapolis Valley. This project, he declared, was completely insensitive to the special social characteristics of the region, and was absurd. This article in *Le Droit* quite accurately reflected the mood of the moment regarding bilingualism. It suggested that we would have trouble gaining acceptance for our plan to establish new FLUs, which in fact was now being held up in the office of Mr. Richardson.

5. The French book exhibit at CFB Borden in May, 1975

In 1975, I was involved in two activities that were rewarding for us and beneficial to our programs. The first, which I shall discuss briefly, was the French book exhibit at CFB Borden on May 21. Lieutenant-Colonel Forest and the DTTP team were primarily
responsible for this exhibit. The translation of trades instruction manuals was proving to be an enormous task, and our translation services could not cope with it. We therefore decided to give priority to investigating French books published in Canada or France, with a view to replacing English instructional materials with French-language manuals. With the help of a Montreal firm, we managed to mount a very timely exhibit of more than a thousand French books. Most of these were works on science and technology, and mainly dealt with trades and specialties that were taught in our Armed Forces training schools. Invitations to this exhibit were extended to managers, instructors and all those who were remotely or closely interested in the training of military personnel, in order to familiarize them with publications in French. Our initiative was very successful, since this was the first time that anyone had taken the trouble to determine what bookstores and publishing houses could provide in the way of French-language books and manuals that might meet our needs.

The Borden exhibit revealed the existence of real opportunities, and the Treasury Board, informed of our initiative, decided to follow our lead. In the spring of 1976, it sponsored an exhibit of French books and documents at the Ottawa Convention Centre. The purpose of this exhibit was to help government departments to meet their needs in this area. The Ottawa exhibit, like the one at Borden, was a definite success. These two exhibits enlightened a number of people who had previously been indifferent to, or ignorant of, what the French and Canadian markets offered in the way of French-language manuals, books and magazines that could be used in our B & B programs. I must say that I knew of one case where people thought the material in a French manual was so superior that they decided to have it translated into English and substituted for the English-language manual in use.

6. The Biennial of the French-speaking community of Canada in August, 1975

The second activity that I wish to mention here was the participation of the DGBB in the first Biennial of the French-
speaking community in Canada, which was held in Chicoutimi from August 10 to 17, 1975. On this occasion, we wanted to explain the past, present and future status of French Canadians and their language in the CAF. The document that we exhibited accurately described the DND’s efforts to promote the use of French in its own organization, and gradually to establish a system that would offer francophone Canadians increasing opportunities to pursue a career in French in the CAF. The people who attended the event welcomed our message, which I had the honour to read aloud in French, for seven minutes, to the Biennial’s standing committee. We went to Chicoutimi because I believed, as always, that we had to make our situation known to the general public through forums like the Biennial. Francophones in the military were too often perceived by Quebecers as living on the fringes of society, lost to the French-Canadian race and labouring without hope in a vast English machine. I think that my colleagues and I managed to show, at this Biennial, that the French language was not on the verge of extinction in the CAF, and that francophones who embraced a certain ideal were working to have this ideal recognized, and to win a better place for themselves in the service. The presence of francophones in uniform at the Biennial, enhanced by our contribution, was an excellent form of unofficial propaganda, which in my view justified the expense involved.

I would be remiss if I did not mention Captain Serge Bernier’s contribution to this unique experiment. Bernier, of the Directorate of Bilingual Plans and Programs, took charge of the matter, after convincing me that the DGBB would do well to participate in the Biennial. He later authored our communications and presentations, which were excellent. Unfortunately, Bernier was transferred to the military group involved in managing the Olympic Games of 1976, and could not attend the Biennial himself.

7. Completion of the project to identify military positions, and establishment of the Wenz task force

Before the end of September, 1975, despite the work overload
produced by the compelling directives of the Treasury Board, we at the DGBB thought of planning the crucial stage of designating military positions, since we would soon finish the identification phase.

The identification of military positions had been supervised by our CPD, Major-General Paradis, in his capacity as chairman of the DND’s Bilingualism Coordinating Committee. This work had been done on time, with rigour and determination. However, the results of the identification, at NDHQ to begin with, were frightening to some people. They predicted that the consequences would be detrimental to the efficiency of management and control operations, especially in the areas of materiel services and equipment supply. The ADM(Mat) became the spokesman of those who feared the worst. He particularly deplored the rigidity with which the identification criteria had been applied, especially in regard to supervisory positions. In his opinion, the recruitment and training of bilingual personnel would require such enormous efforts that the performance of the Materiel branch would be seriously affected. Disagreement with the identification program surfaced in other divisions as well, and we had to appeal to the ADM(Per) to re-establish a proper perspective on our program’s objectives.

In any case, the departmental committee agreed to present our assessment of military positions to representatives of the Treasury Board. Our preliminary report indicated that 70,095 positions had been identified according to established guidelines. The distribution of these positions in terms of linguistic requirements was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,916 bilingual positions</td>
<td>17 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49,978 essentially English-language positions</td>
<td>71 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,168 essentially French-language positions</td>
<td>8.8 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,033 positions requiring either French or English</td>
<td>2.9 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On December 9, Mr. Green, the ADM(Per), confirmed these statistics in a letter to the Treasury Board, and announced that the last stage of the process was getting under way.

I must say that well before Mr. Green sent his letter, I had been trying to find a way of absolving the DGBB of responsibility for carrying out the designation of military positions. In the first place, due to lack of resources, I had had to ask for assistance in developing criteria for identifying military positions. Secondly, I had a feeling that my anglophone colleagues would not refuse to take charge of the designation process. In the office of the ADM(Per), people were somewhat apprehensive about the DGBB undertaking a task whose repercussions would seriously affect the management of military personnel, from staffing to advancement! therefore recommended that designation be entrusted to a task force independent of the DGBB, but reporting to the CPD. This proposal was welcomed with ill-concealed satisfaction. My suggestion that Colonel H.F. Wenz be appointed chairman of the group was also accepted forthwith.

In the eyes of anglophones at NDHQ and elsewhere, the appointment of Colonel Wenz by the ADM(Per) offered some guarantee of impartiality, which they felt the DGBB could not bring to the process of designating military positions. My choice of Wenz could not have been better. Before completing his appointment, he was to be promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General responsible for planning and advancement of military careers. He was also a professional airmen, who enjoyed the confidence of his anglophone colleagues. His loyalty and integrity made him attractive to us, and assured us of his objectivity.

In order to provide Wenz with adequate support, I decided to assign Guy Sullivan, Major D.B. Abbott and Captain Berniquez to the task force. Sullivan was to play a major role in Wenz’s group, as coordinator of all its activities and as spokesman of the DGBB. Over a period of six months, he had to integrate the results of analytic work performed by more than 25 officers, divided into working teams. Under the direction of Brigadier-
General Wenz, he accomplished this task with tact and competence. Indeed, Wenz’s task force has become part of the history of bilingualism at the DND.

8. The Department’s uniqueness, the Treasury Board’s lack of understanding and the attitude of the new Deputy Minister

Towards the end of 1975, Mr. Nixon began to show signs of impatience with the Treasury Board. He felt that it did not understand the import of his DND directives, and he criticized it, and even Cabinet, for treating the DND as just another department of government. Since becoming DM in May, 1975 Nixon had noted the particular nature of the Department on several occasions. He had realized that a government department employing, in a single structure, 130,000 civilian and military employees - or more than a third of the Public Service was a unique and complex institution. He also thought that if the measures imposed by Treasury Board to implement bilingualism could be logically applied to the DND, it would surely be easy to apply them to other departments. In his view, the Board should acknowledge this fact, and frame its directives to all departments accordingly.

Nixon saw that the stream of directives from Treasury Board were becoming more and more constraining, and their timetables unreasonable. On December 19, he therefore decided to write to Mr. Osbaldeston, to express his feelings on the matter. Before dispatching this letter, he sent a draft to his colleagues for comment. Mr. Green gave me his copy of the draft letter, and I was thus able to tell him what I thought of Mr. Nixon’s ideas, in a personal and confidential memorandum.

In the first place, I noted that the letter was necessary to make the Board officials aware of the Department’s particular situation. However, I did not endorse the DM’s recommendations and directives for implementing policies of bilingualism that would be developed on the basis of their applicability to the DND. I was afraid that the cause of bilingualism would be harmed if other government departments tried to modify and apply measures that
had been designed to suit the size and uniqueness of the DND. I also felt that if real reforms were to be initiated in these departments, compelling directives and timetables from the Treasury Board were absolutely necessary. In comparison with the DND’s programs, the initiatives in most of them were rather feeble. For this reason, I preferred that our department be treated as an exception, in accordance with its unique situation.

In their comments to the DM, Mr. Green and Vice-Admiral Falls also recommended that the Department be treated as an exception. At the time, I was unaware of what Mr. Nixon’s other colleagues had said to him about this matter, and I still do not know whether he sent his letter to the Treasury Board. In any case, this episode had no effect on our discussions and negotiations with the Treasury Board officials to whom I continued to plead the uniqueness of the Department to justify exceptional treatment.
As 1976 began, we found ourselves having to keep a close watch over our ongoing projects, for the pitfalls were many. From time to time, we also had to give them a new impetus, and more support. In this part of my account, I shall successively describe events relating to the FLUs, our military positions and the Wenz task force. I shall then mention certain activities of 1976 that were particularly memorable for me. Finally, I shall discuss the role of the COL, to whom I have not referred since my account of 1973.

At the beginning of January, I decided to prepare a brief review of various aspects of our ongoing programs, and to anticipate, if possible, the problems and delays that were sure to arise because of the Armed Forces’ immense contribution to the Olympic effort of 1976. I also resolved to visit Air Command HQ at Winnipeg, in an effort to revive the rather flickering flame of bilingualism there. One of the things I wanted to determine was the attitude of its first Commander, Lieutenant-General “Bill” Carr, towards our programs. In the past, Carr had always been sympathetic to our efforts, and had given me useful support. The issues I wished to discuss included FLU designation in Air Transport, and pilot training in French.

While thinking of this trip, I was also worrying about the elimination of OLIN, which had already been decided and announced. The negative consequences of this decision, especially for the Francotrain project, were very much on my mind. I felt
that we were not yet at the point where we could rely on the regular system to ensure proper functioning of French-language trades instruction programs. I was afraid that managers in this field would be unenthusiastic about an increase in their workload, and would be less willing to administer the French-language programs effectively.

1. The status of the Units working in French in 1976

Despite these other preoccupations, I continued to be particularly concerned with the UWFs, and with the designation of military positions. In a press release dated October 24, 1975 the National Joint Council had stated its decision that government departments were not to take any steps to implement units working in French (UWFs). The Council stipulated that before any such action took place, the Treasury Board had to approve the plans, the employees had to be informed of them, and the bargaining agents had to review and discuss them.

Consequently, in January of 1976, the DGBB was impatiently awaiting the verdict of the Treasury Board and Public Service review committee. As soon as we learned of the committee’s decision, we undertook a series of presentations to the managers involved, so that they could give their employees information on the status of the UWFs. At the same time, we began consultations with the bargaining agents. This process continued until the end of May, and was marked by goodwill on both sides, at least at the DND. It was, of course, necessary to make some concessions from the outset, but there was never any question of involving the bargaining agents in the decision-making process. I remember that from the very first meetings of the National Joint Council’s subcommittee at the Treasury Board office, the bargaining agents were never critical of the principles behind the UWFs. They mainly criticized the regulations and systems that were proposed in order to guarantee that the FLUs would operate in French.

The bargaining agents were thus opposed to the first version of the Treasury Board circular, where the linguistic requirements of UWF positions, as defined, eliminated anglophones from all
competitions, except for those few individuals who were highly bilingual. Because of this criticism, it was necessary to modify the level of French required of supervisors, so that anglophones who held or aspired to positions in UWFs could acquire the necessary bilingual capability, by taking Public Service language courses.

Once these problems were overcome, we were able to examine modes of designating positions so that our targeted units, which were 95 per cent anglophone, would be converted into true UWFs. With the help of the managers, we vigorously pursued this task until the end of May. I must admit, however, that our efforts slowed considerably while we awaited confirmation by Cabinet of the policy on FLUs in the national capital. The UWF project was being held up at the Treasury Board, and right up to December of 1976, we repeatedly had to remind NDHQ as a whole that while the UWF project was still alive, its implementation had not yet been authorized.

2. The project to designate military positions, and the work of the Wenz task force

Its own organization having been completed before the end of December, 1975, the Wenz task force was hard at work from the first days of 1976. It had to formulate a plan to designate (staff) 12,771 bilingual positions, as soon as possible and by 1987 at the latest. Holders of these positions would have to be qualified and drawn from a reservoir of 15,854 bilingual military personnel, of whom 98 per cent were francophones. This was a complex and difficult job, because of the Treasury Board parameters, and because a balance had to be struck between anglophone and francophone participation. The simplistic solution was to place the burden of bilingualism on the shoulders of bilingual francophones, who should serve the public, staff the UWFs, teach trades under the Francotrain program, and fill supervisory positions. This approach was certainly not acceptable, especially since it was very detrimental to anglophones. The majority of command positions in the military hierarchy would be almost automatically awarded
to francophones, and the integrity of the merit system of advancement would be undermined. Such a solution seemed unjust to both, anglophones and francophones.

The Wenz group worked on all these problems until the end of March, 1976. It had to plan a system of designation that would meet the objectives of the B & B program as approved in 1972, while respecting the independence and unity of the Armed Forces. The task force began by making a detailed analysis and evaluation of all factors and information that were relevant to the matter. It examined the incidence and distribution of promotions in the staffing process for senior bilingual positions, and the opportunities that anglophones were given to learn French. It also determined the bilingual personnel priorities that should be accorded to FLUs, to ELUs, and to other organizations, in accordance with the requirements of the B & B programs of our own Department and of the Government. The Wenz task force also provided definitions of the priorities to be applied to career needs, such as staff courses, assignments abroad, etc.

Finally, the Wenz group determined the number of bilingual military personnel required in relation to the number of positions to be designated in the various trades, specialties and occupations of military personnel. To facilitate the application of these priorities, the task force defined, for each category mentioned, a maximum ratio of two bilingual military personnel for each position, and a minimum of 1.2.

At the DGBB, we were well aware of the work of the Wenz task force through continual consultation with Mr. Sullivan and Major Abbott. I must say that I personally did not get involved in detailed discussions. I preferred to await the results of various deliberations before making my contribution. In any case, Brigadier-General Wenz had been mandated by the ADM(Per) and, like myself, reported to the CPD, Major-General Paradis. I thus felt completely comfortable about giving him my comments.

As the Wenz task force pursued its activities, it found it nec-
necessary to set up seven information teams. These teams were dis-patched to the various commands and bases, to give information to military and civilian personnel regarding the plan to designate military positions. At the beginning of February, it was the DGBB’s turn to hear a presentation on the draft plan. The plan had various options and a number of different timetables. It was intended as a reasonable compromise in the face of numerous constraints: insufficient bilingual personnel and financial resources; the obligation to avoid, at all times, any impairment of the Armed Forces’ operational efficiency; and, finally, the directives of the Treasury Board. In principle, the Wenz plan was supposed to be a continuation of the 1972 program. However, after I had listened to the presentation and thought about it, I realized that the Wenz task force, fearful that francophones would monopolize bilingual positions because bilingual anglophones were lacking, had developed a designation system that would compromise the measures designed to improve the balance of francophone participation. I became certain of this when I studied the report of the Wenz group before it was submitted, in its final form to the DM and the CDS at the end of March, 1976.

Mr. Sullivan sent me the draft of the Wenz report on March 8, and asked me to send my comments to his superior as soon as possible. I did so on March 17. In my letter to Brigadier-General Wenz, I first attacked the report’s description of the history and current status of the B & B program. I referred, in particular, to a statement that 28 per cent of positions at all levels of the CAF structure had been specifically earmarked for francophones. This statement was false. A decision had in fact been made to set an objective of 28 per cent francophone participation, but without resorting to specific job designation to obtain this goal.

I also objected to exaggerated and negative comments along the lines, such as “unduly favouring francophones” and “despite our determined efforts, we have not been successful”. I emphasized that the statistics used in the report to illustrate francophone representation in the military hierarchy made it impossible to assess the real situation in 1976. I suggested that it would be better
to use a comparative table, showing anglophone and francophone participation in all ranks. In support of my remarks, I submitted a copy of such a table.

I also suggested that the report’s historical section could be filled out and given more weight by incorporating the statement of General Sharp, CDS in the 1969-1972 period. I had always thought that Sharp, in the statement in which he used the words of Prime Minister Trudeau, had clearly grasped the essence of the philosophy of bilingualism and biculturalism, and had managed to apply it to the orientation that should be given to B & B programs in the CAF. I feel that it is appropriate to include Sharp’s statement in this memoir. I should add that I have had occasion to use this statement in the many presentations I made to anglophones in our Armed Forces.

“We are, by constitution, a bicultural country and we wish as a matter of policy to remain a sovereign country. We could not hope to remain sovereign if we split in two, nor could we in the long run remain sovereign if we lost our Canadian identity. This must not be a copy of the British or the American or the French - it must be our own - and it must be an amalgam of our two cultures, not an absorption of one into the other. If it is to be a meaningful amalgam of the two, both cultures should contribute to it and feel part of it. If both are to contribute they must have equal opportunity to do so. We in the military must play our part by very gradually creating armed forces that are uniquely Canadian in terms of policies, customs, methods and organization. Both francophone and anglophone should contribute from a basis of equal opportunity - and creating conditions of equal opportunity is the first step. That is why we must give trades and other training in both languages, and create units which give opportunity to francophones to progress in their social milieu; that is why eventually most officers and even NCOs should be bilingual. We must proceed deliberately with this programme in such a way that opportunity for the francophone is enhanced without unduly penalizing the anglophone.

In the main body of the Wenz report, I found a number of serious omissions. For example, I would have liked something to be said about how the requirement of institutional bilingualism would affect the francophone group, which was to reach 28 per cent of total personnel. The needs of these francophones for internal services were directly related to this factor. Moreover the DND was the only department of the federal government that had set its objective of francophone participation at 28 per cent.

I also wanted the report to mention the presence of anglophone military personnel in Quebec, and their impact on the facts
of institutional bilingualism. Their number was sure to increase, together with their bilingual potential, provided that our programs were designed to give them the opportunity to do so.

I also alluded to the burden of bilingualism that the report’s statistics revealed, but which people were careful not to discuss. In my opinion, this burden was unequally distributed and, as always, unbalanced. Little by little, anglophones would have to shoulder more of the load, if they were to give francophones the hope of having their own burden lightened. It was unacceptable to have people designing a training and staffing plan that invariably pointed bilingual francophones in the direction of bilingual positions, to the detriment of their careers. How could one think otherwise, when the figures indicated that 100 per cent of francophones, but only 23 per cent of anglophones, should be bilingual? A fairer plan, I thought, would be to work towards a situation where anglophones would occupy 72 per cent of bilingual positions, and francophones 28 per cent.

The report also alluded to the problem of determining whether bilingualism or biculturalism should be given the highest priority in the implementation of our programs, and invited the DGBB to resolve the dilemma.

I insisted that this was a false problem. Bilingualism and biculturalism were part of an indissoluble whole, and there could be no question of one without the other. Indeed, the Government’s policy had required that these two elements be incorporated into our programs. In fact, institutional bilingualism in the Armed Forces was justified by the necessity, under the Official Languages Act, to serve members of the public in the language of their choice. As for biculturalism, I said that it was necessary only because of the presence of francophone military personnel and their dependents. In my comments, I was careful not to push my arguments too far, for had I done so, it would have become obvious that the DGBB personally favoured the bicultural aspect. My priorities were accelerated promotion of qualified francophones to key positions in our CAF structures, and increased recruitment to
attain participation objectives.

My last comment on this draft report concerned the bicultural aspect. I was opposed to keeping anglophones or francophones in the Forces who had passed retirement age, in order to replace staff in the language courses. I recommended, instead, that regular personnel be assigned or promoted to the language training program. I especially favoured promotions, and I recall that people had seen fit to use this system in the case of certain anglophones. I could have given examples of unilingual anglophones who had exceptionally been promoted to bilingual positions, but I did not do so, since I did not want to provoke the people who would be reading my remarks.

My comments and observations were well received by the Wenz group, which studied and discussed them. The group agreed to make some changes to its report, particularly in the historical section.

The report was submitted to the DM and to the CDS on March 29, 1976. It presented four different options for designating military positions, each with its own staffing program and timetable. The first option was linked to the 1972 program, and had a completion date of 1987. The second option extended the deadline by five years, to 1992. The third and fourth options added ten years and 15 years to the 1987 deadline, extending the target date for completion to 1997 and 2002 respectively.

Mr. Nixon and General Dextraze discussed the report, and examined its various options. They finally selected the second option, with the 1992 deadline. This allowed approximately 15 years for designating the 14,000 bilingual positions in the CAF, and for keeping them staffed accordingly.

Once this decision was made, the Wenz task force, at the request of the DM, submitted the report and the 1992 option to the Treasury Board on April 6. A summary of the human and financial resources needed to support such a program was included.
The formal request for approval was to be presented later, after the Department had made its final decision.

People listened most attentively to this presentation, which was made by way of a survey, and the observations of the Treasury Board officials were carefully noted. In the opinion of these officials, the Department’s proposal ran counter to the authorization that had been given to the program in 1972. Consequently, the proposal would have to be submitted to Cabinet. It was indeed true that the proposal contemplated completion of the program in 20 years rather than 15, and advocated a deadline of 1992 rather than the target year of 1987 that Cabinet had approved. Despite the efforts of Major-General Paradis to explain the situation and rather special requirements of the Department, Treasury Board officials remained sceptical about the likelihood that such a program would be accepted. In support of their view, they cited the considerable number of bilingual positions to be filled, the magnitude of the need for language courses, and the enormous costs in manpower and money that were involved. They felt that there was little hope of obtaining all the resources asked for.

Notwithstanding the Board’s lack of enthusiasm for our designation plan, the DGBB undertook the preparation of a formal request for approval of the plan and allocation of the necessary resources.

On May 17, 1976, we appeared before the DMC, accompanied by Brigadier-General Wenz and key members of his team. Lieutenant-General Quinn, ADM(Per), who had been invited by Mr. Nixon, briefly outlined the main features of the plan. In a document previously submitted to the Committee, Quinn had described the anticipated costs; 601.3 million dollars over 15 years, 1,352 military person-years and 70 civilian person-years. In this document, Quinn had also recalled how people had reacted, and how we had replied, when the Treasury Board officials had been confronted with this information in the preliminary presentation of the plan. One consideration was the high number of bilingual positions, which was attributable to the Board’s own guidelines.
Then there were the enormous costs, the price that had to be paid to realize the government’s current policies on bilingualism. Finally, there was the issue of the levels of linguistic competence that were required, and the learning time needed to reach them. These were justifiable, in order to meet the communication needs established for each military position.

Mr. Nixon began the discussion by referring to the Treasury Board’s observations and to our arguments in defence of our position. He asked us to clarify our assertions. Brigadier-General Wenz and I managed to assure the DM and the other committee members that our plan complied with the Treasury Board directives, to the extent that these could be applied to the unique situation of the Department, and that our differences with the other government departments in this area were logical and reasonable.

The Committee realized that the Wenz task force had been rigorous and objective in carrying out its work of research, analysis and consultation, and that its conclusions were logical. Mr. Nixon averred that the Department was no doubt the only governmental organization that had undertaken and completed so extensive a study of a bilingual program. General Dextraze and Nixon therefore agreed that the Department should submit its request to the Treasury Board as soon as possible.

On May 30, the Wenz task force was dissolved and its members returned to their regular positions. Our request, in the form of a plan, was awaiting the Minister’s approval. We had many consultations and discussions with Treasury Board officials concerning our request. They suggested a series of approaches and solutions to the problems that our request created for them in terms of financial and human resources. On the one hand, they had to give all departments a fair share of the resources that the government had allocated to the program of bilingualism, and on the other hand they had to meet the DND’s demand, which they felt was excessive.

It was now June, and the discussions were well underway. At
each meeting with Treasury Board officials we provided all kinds of explanations and information on all aspects of our request. At this stage, there was no question of adjustment or compromise. The Board had to accept the fact that the DND was unique, and had unique needs.

3. The Commissioner of Official Languages initiates and completes his special study of the Department of National Defense

On January 26, 1976, Keith Spicer, the COL, wrote to Mr. Nixon to advise him of his intentions to make a special study of the DND. The purpose of this study was to assess the Department’s effort in applying the Official Languages Act. Spicer wanted to look into two areas in particular: contacts with the general public, and the opportunities offered to military and civilian personnel to work in the official language of their choice.

The Commissioner undertook, once his study was completed, to provide useful and constructive recommendations, which would be discussed in detail before being confirmed. In his letter, the COL also asked the DM to appoint a liaison officer to work with Michael Johnson, head of the COL’s team. This officer and Johnson would work out arrangements to ensure that the study was properly carried out.

I had got wind of Mr. Spicer’s intentions some time before his letter arrived at the Department. I thought of the COL’s proposed investigation with some satisfaction, and also apprehension. I was glad that the study would be done, for I hoped that I would finally know just how healthy bilingualism was within the Department. Ever since my arrival at the DGBB, I had deplored the fact that we lacked the time and resources needed to evaluate our programs on the scale envisaged by the Commissioner. I also felt apprehensive, for I knew the mentality of the military, and I wondered how they were going to react to the minute examination and in-depth analysis of the results of our programs after five years of existence. I especially wondered how civilian and military managers would tolerate the many questions and requests for
information that the COL’s civilian agents would be making. At the time, I also felt that I could predict, to some extent, what diagnosis would be made by the Johnson group, and what remedies they were likely to prescribe.

On February 19, Mr. Nixon signed a letter in reply to Mr. Spicer’s. Nixon stated that the Department had made great efforts to enforce the spirit and letter of the Official Languages Act, and that the impartial judgement of the Commissioner would be eagerly awaited. It was hoped that the COL’s study would provide useful suggestions for improving our programs of bilingualism, and would also ensure efficient management of the Armed Forces and of the Department. Nixon also informed Spicer that the DGBB would act as liaison officer, and that he had already been in touch with Mr. Johnson concerning the timetable for the investigation and the information that we would supply him before it began.

Having written to the COL, the DM advised his colleagues of the scope of the study, which would require many meetings and interviews. He solicited their cooperation for these activities, which would soon begin at NDHQ.

On March 2, 1976 the DGBB made a presentation to the COL’s task force on the organization of the Department, the Armed Forces and the major aspects of our programs of bilingualism. The aim of this presentation was to give the members of the study team the benefit of as much information as possible before they began their inquiry.

By mid-June, the team had almost completed its work at NDHQ, and now intended to visit the Canadian bases in Europe, as well as the commands and bases in Canada. The DGBB, which was keeping a close eye on the progress of the inquiry, thought of advising the commanders of this development. Although the sequence of visits had not yet been determined, Vice-Admiral Falls signed a memorandum on June 23, in which he informed the commanders that they would soon be visited by the
COL’s task force, and asked them for their cooperation. The investigation continued, and was completed in accordance with the wishes of the COL and his team.

By the end of December, 1976 I was boiling with impatience to learn the results of this inquiry. I decided to ask our new ADM(Per), Lieutenant-General Quinn, to intervene in the matter. On December 30, Quinn sent a memorandum to Mr. Nixon, asking him to sign a letter to Mr. Spicer. We explained to the DM that the COL’s investigators had completed their work, and that they were soon going to write their report. Mr. Johnson and his team said that they were satisfied with the cooperation they had received from the commanders and other interested parties. However, until their report was completely written, they refused to give us the slightest indication concerning their general conclusions and the means they were proposing for improving our programs.

Mr. Nixon was requesting this information from Mr. Spicer, so that we could plan and implement the necessary modifications without delay. It was not, however, until January of 1977 that we received some information on this matter from Mr. Spicer. I will return to the subject when discussing the events of 1977.

4. Design and publication of guidelines on bilingualism and biculturalism for the IS’ Reserve and the cadets

July 1, 1976 saw the publication of ADM(Per) Instruction 15/76, entitled “Guidelines on bilingualism and biculturalism”. With the publication of this instruction, NDHQ became really serious about subjecting the Reserve and the cadets to its policies for enforcing the Official Languages Act. Generally speaking, our current policies concerned the CAF as a whole. However, they could not be applied as such to the Reserve or to the cadets. The particular characteristics of the Reserve and the cadets had to be examined, and the necessary adjustments and amendments to current measures in the regular Forces had to be made.

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This process was to drag on, partly because of my own shortcomings, but especially because the organizations in charge of the first Reserve and cadets were unenthusiastic about B & B.

I had encountered the problem of the Reserve for the first time on November 17, 1971, at a meeting of the CDS Advisory Committee. We had just made a presentation to the Committee about guidelines for applying B & B policies to the CAF, when a member asked me about B & B for the cadets and the Reserve. I replied that while this was an important aspect of our program planning, action in the area of the regular Forces was a priority. I also explained that we should not try to take on too much at this stage, since the resources we hoped to get from the Treasury Board would only cover programs for the regular forces. This was how I saw the situation, as it affected the Reserve and the cadets. The Committee members did not pass any judgment on my position, and I conclude that they agreed with it.

In 1972, and even in 1973, I therefore did not feel under any pressure to act in this area, until it was pointed out to me that no guidelines had been set for the summer camps of the 1st Reserve and the cadets. In the fall of 1973, however, I definitely committed the DGBB to fill this gap, so that the cadets and the 1st Reserve would comply, as soon as possible, with the directives of the Department. The issues involved here were services offered to the general public, the language of work, and the participation of anglophones and francophones.

The task was not an easy one. In consulting the Director General of Reserves and Cadets (DGRC), command staff officers and even associations, we discovered a number of obstacles to be overcome. For example, in implementing measures to meet the Department’s objectives, we had to consider a number of factors: the sedentary character of the units; the limited number of new recruits available in a given territory; the lack of mobility of the personnel involved; and the fact that the language groups within a unit did not lend themselves to any form of quota system. There was thus no question of requiring a participation of
Despite these difficulties, the DGBB’s efforts led to the publication, in 1976, of the instruction I have mentioned above. The 1st Reserve and the cadets were also able to make use of two recommendations from the COL, which resulted from his special investigation of the Department. The various parts of these recommendations were designed to improve the status of B & B in the neglected area of programs for the Reserve and the cadets.

5. Professor Bibeau’s report on the language training programs of the Public Service

On August 17 the Honourable Jean Chrétien, the chairman of the Treasury Board, published the report of Professor Gilles Bibeau on the language training programs of the Public Service of Canada. Six days later, on August 23, I appeared before the DMC. In a half-hour presentation, I described the highlights of the report, and commented on some of its 23 recommendations.

I first mentioned the newspaper headlines, which were reflecting the controversy aroused by the Bibeau report. I described Professor Bibeau and his colleagues on the task force, and I briefly recounted what they had accomplished in their analysis, evaluation, conclusions and recommendations regarding language training and language policy programs.

The Bibeau task force had been set up in November, 1974. When Bibeau and the members of his team conducted their first fact-finding tours in the government departments, the DGBB had collaborated with them. I myself had received Bibeau at the DGBB, and had informed him about our B & B programs. From Lieutenant-Colonel Taschereau, Bibeau had learned of the extent and characteristics of our system of language training. On several occasions, Taschereau and I also participated in Professor Bibeau’s workshops of specialists. Finally, we saw to the completion of questionnaires, surveys and other working instruments used by Dr. William F. Mackey, of Laval University,
an internationally renowned linguist and a colleague of Professor Bibeau, who wanted to obtain certain information on our programs of bilingualism in general.

To return to my presentation on the Bibeau report, I advised the members of the Committee that in my view, the conclusions of the report were not particularly aimed at our department, nor was the DND affected by its recommendations as a whole. Nevertheless, I referred to some of the defects and shortcomings of bilingualism as revealed in the report. In particular, I allowed myself to make some observations on the levels of linguistic competence recommended by Bibeau.

Bibeau declared that the Public Service’s 4-level system of bilingualism was absurd. He recommended that these four levels be abolished, and replaced by two categories of bilingualism:

a. complete bilingualism or fluent knowledge of the second language; and
b. functional bilingualism, as we conceived of it in the CAF.

I then stated that if the Government accepted this recommendation, grave consequences would result for our programs of bilingualism, in the area of FLUs for example. In the first place, periods of language training would have to be extended, so that students could attain complete or functional bilingualism. Secondly, this change would involve others, such as the modification of criteria for identifying bilingual positions, management of personnel taking language courses, the costs of replacement personnel, deadlines for designating positions, etc..

When he made the Bibeau report public, Mr. Chrétien, had fortunately stated that he was not thinking of abolishing the existing levels of bilingualism. Finally, I informed the Committee that the Treasury Board intended to make a thorough study of the Bibeau report, and to undertake, in consultation with the Public Service and the departments, a review of our language
training policies.

6. The meeting with the Robertson committee, in connection with a review of policy on official languages, November 30, 1976

An important event marked the end of 1976 at the DGBB. This was a meeting with the Robertson committee. Former clerk of the Privy Council, and secretary to the Cabinet for federal-provincial relations, Gordon Robertson had been requested by Prime Minister Trudeau, in mid-June, to chair an *ad hoc* committee of six or seven DMs to examine the Government’s policies on bilingualism, in order to make their implementation more flexible. It had become obvious that the application of the measures flowing from these policies would continue to arouse much misunderstanding and controversy in the Public Service, in the departments of the federal government and in other organizations.

The DND had been summoned to the meeting of the Robertson committee on November 30. I attended this meeting in the company of Mr. Nixon and Lieutenant-General Quinn, the ADM(Per). The DGBB had previously prepared and submitted a document to the Committee, in which we described our programs and the additional resources needed to implement them. The document also requested that the Committee support us in our dealings with the Treasury Board to obtain the money and personyears that we had already demanded.

In a discussion chaired by Mr. Robertson, the members of the Committee asked themselves various questions concerning the scope of our programs and the extent of our needs. I remember, in particular the enlightened observations of Pierre Juneau, DM at the Department of the Secretary of State. However, I remember even more vividly the negative comments of Maurice Leclair, who had recently been appointed Secretary of the Treasury Board. Leclair seemed unwilling to accept the principle of the uniqueness of the DND to justify special treatment in the allocation of resources that the Government would make available for programs of bilingualism. He asked for an explanation of what
this uniqueness consisted of. Mr. Nixon replied by insisting on the major characteristics of the DND, which had been very well described in the documentation submitted to the Committee and which, in our eyes, made our Department unique among the institutions of the federal government.

Lieutenant-General Quinn supported the DM’s arguments, and I made my own contribution along the same lines. Despite our arguments, I had the impression that Leclaire was not convinced that our department was really as special as we would have people believe.

Mr. Robertson thanked us for our contribution to the deliberations of the Committee, and we returned to the DND without really knowing what attitude the Committee would take in regard to our claims. We had to wait until mid-February, 1977 to learn the results of its examination of the programs of bilingualism, later published in a brochure entitled *A National Understanding*, and about which I shall have more to say.
Strangely enough, the first months of 1977 made me think of 1974, when the DGBB had been trying to accustom itself to a recent restructuring. Once more, we were embroiled in a new reorganization. In 1973, General Dextraize had decreed a reduction of HQ personnel on the order of 10 per cent. On this occasion, responsibility for language teaching, which in 1972 had been given to the Directorate General of Recruiting and Training, was given back to the DGBB. The organization chart in Annex F illustrates the new configuration of the DGBB.

In 1977, my second appointment in the service of bilingualism and biculturalism came to a close. I was to leave my position in November, after deciding in March to take an early retirement for health reasons.

When I informed my superiors of my intentions in April, they gave me to understand that an anglophone would probably succeed me. Shortly afterwards, Major-General Herbert Pitts was appointed to replace me at the DGBB. Although he had recently taken an intensive course in French, Pitts was not entirely bilingual. Nevertheless, he was sympathetic to B & B objectives, and senior management thought that he was a suitable person to replace me. I knew that his assignment to the DGBB would be of normal duration for a military person, and that it would in no way be detrimental to the possible appointment of Guy Sullivan to the position of DGBB.
I contemplated this transition without much concern, since I thought that it would be less difficult for an anglophone senior officer of Pitt’s rank to get his compatriots to accept the compelling measures required by the implementation of the recommendations flowing from the COL’s special study. Major-General Pitts, who became available in the spring, was at my side from July on, in order to familiarize himself with the Directorate General and with the management of programs.

In September, I accompanied Pitts on a rapid tour of our major bases, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This was an excellent opportunity for Pitts to become familiar with the reality of B & B in Canadian military life. The tour also enabled me to note, with satisfaction, that generally speaking, the attitude towards our programs had become more tolerant and understanding. However, I realized that my successor would still have much work to do before the Official Languages Act was fully observed in the CAF.

1. Conclusions and recommendations of the Robertson committee; observations of the DGBB.

On January 27 and 31, 1977 the Department received the report of the Robertson committee in the form of two confidential documents. The DGBB rapidly analyzed these documents, and presented its observations to the ADM(Per) on February 17. We realized that the Committee was recommending that policies and programs be arranged in the following ways:

a. Emphasize youth.
b. Employ less coercive measures.
c. Eliminate unnecessary friction.
d. Improve the Official Languages Act.

In our opinion, these changes would affect the civilian and military programs of the Department. Generally speaking, the results for civilians would be positive. In the case of the DND’s military personnel, however, we foresaw that the consequences would be negative, although some aspects of the recommenda-
tions would be positive.

We were struck by the fact that the report made no mention of the DND. It seemed to us that this omission could be interpreted in two ways. Either we were being regarded as a department no different from the others, or we were being treated as an exception, and the Committee was admitting that we were unique.

In our memorandum, we explained the advantages and disadvantages that the Robertson committee’s recommended modifications would have for our programs. Finally, we indicated what attitude the Department should take to the report. It should do nothing and await the decision of Cabinet or, if the report were approved by Cabinet, should take the following measures:

a. develop programs concerning the language of work, the units working in French, and the recruiting and training of francophones, in order to ensure their full participation.

b. continue to cooperate with the provincial authorities to develop the system of dependants’ education.

c. support the policy of decentralization of responsibility for official languages in the departments (a project that was already underway at the DND).

d. oppose the centralization of responsibility for translation operations, in order to protect the quality of translations.

e. preserve ongoing and planned military programs, and request funds to support them.

The ADM(Per) unhesitatingly passed the DGBB’s observations on to the DM. It was my impression that Mr. Nixon subsequently met with his colleagues on the Robertson committee, to discuss the report. In any case, on April 15, I was invited to comment on a new document produced by the Robertson committee. I realized that this document embodied the same philosophy and orientation as the first report. I therefore informed the office
of the DM that the new document contained nothing that should change the DGBB’s observations to Mr. Nixon. I felt that the Department, at this stage, should continue to move in the recommended direction with the programs that were being planned or carried out.

2. Conclusions and recommendations of the special study of the Commissioner of Official Languages

On January 24, 1977, Mr. Spicer responded to the DM’s letter, which was dated January 6. Spicer told Mr. Nixon that it was really too early to comment on the practical value of the programs, since his office had to analyze the mass of information obtained in more than 300 interviews, and in the documents supplied by the Department. However, he felt that we already had the Ross Report, the Coulombe Report (from the B & B commission), and other documents that clearly identified the problems and obstacles to be overcome. Spicer emphasized that his team had realized that some groups of military and civilian officers, especially in the DGBB, were well informed regarding the reforms that had to be made.

Although he was reticent to discuss the conclusions of his forthcoming report, the Commissioner mentioned a problem that had become very evident to his team from the beginning of their research. Since the enactment of the Official Languages Act, little had been done to remedy the shortcomings noted in the above mentioned documents. The team had noted that the Department’s policies had been ignored in certain areas, sometimes involuntarily, but in other cases voluntarily. The team had also detected a serious lack of supervision, and a nearly total absence of means of control in the application of the Act.

At the DGBB, the negative nature of these general observations led us to believe that the Commissioner was going to give the DND a blast in his report. Our impatience to know the extent of these criticisms increased from day to day. We waited six months.
On July 26, Mr. Johnson finally gave me a copy of the conclusions and recommendations of the report, and a letter from Mr. Spicer addressed to Mr. Nixon. In his letter, the Commissioner notified the DM that he was soon going to leave his post, and that he had paid particular attention to the special study on the Department. This study had been a very important undertaking, and Spicer hoped that it would help the Department to better reflect Canada’s linguistic duality, and to promote national unity.

The Commissioner had the habit of submitting his recommendations to the Department concerned before the official presentation of his complete report, so that it could be studied and discussed with the Commissioner if new considerations should justify changes in the recommendations. I remember that at that time, after thanking Mr. Johnson, I immersed myself in the conclusions and recommendations. I soon realized that the Commissioner’s diagnosis was pitiless, and that the prescribed remedies, unless they were mitigated, would destroy the patient. I hurried off to see Mr. Green, to inform him of my fears and of the need to get Mr. Nixon to intervene immediately, even before Spicer left his position. It was agreed that I would immediately prepare a reply, and would also draft a memorandum from the DM to his colleagues, asking them to send him their comments on the Commissioner’s recommendations before August 9. Mr. Green informed the DM that Mr. Jean-Marie Morin, the Assistant Commissioner, would present the report officially on August 19, and told him that the Department had to prepare a position on certain recommendations which seemed, at first glance, to be exaggerated and unacceptable, unless they were amended. To prepare this position, we had to know how the managers at NDHQ felt about the Commissioner’s recommendations. The DM was going to find out.

In his letter, the DM thanked Mr. Spicer for his special study, and deplored his imminent departure, which would prevent him from meeting with the Commissioner to examine the recommendations, and the possibilities of arriving at other solutions. In any case, he wanted to give the Commissioner his first reactions.
The DM said that he agreed with the philosophy embraced by Mr. Spicer and reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of the study: namely respect for Canada’s linguistic duality and the promotion of national unity. However, he disagreed with the way the Commissioner envisaged the application of this philosophy to the DND. He emphasized the magnitude of the challenge that the Department would have to face in trying to harmonize all these elements, so that the Armed Forces could preserve their unity and work together to achieve their objectives, in the interest of Canadian unity.

For this reason, the DM said, he was worried about the recommendations. Although their unqualified implementation would certainly abolish the danger of assimilation, they would create a greater danger: the polarization of the CAF into an anglophone service and a francophone service. The DM felt that this would be even more harmful to Canadian unity. The DM specifically mentioned certain repercussions that were likely to lead to an unacceptable degree of polarization:

a. Concentration of FLUs mainly in Quebec.
b. Two military colleges, one anglophone and one francophone.
c. Two equal but separate courses in the staff colleges, one in English and the other in French.
d. Two separate systems of military training.
e. Two separate systems for dependants’ education.
f. The organization of separate housing environments for married military personnel, to foster the French and English languages and cultures respectively.

Still speaking of what concerned him about the recommendations, the DM mentioned the concept of equality. He deplored the desire to apply equality as an absolute principle, instead of trying to use it to improve the conditions of service of the two language groups, and to create an atmosphere of mutual respect. He
thought that this principle should be applied on the basis of what he called “balanced equality”.

Mr. Nixon illustrated his thinking by noting that the organization of the CAF would require the presence of francophones at Halifax and of anglophones at Valcartier, even though in Halifax, it was not possible to provide francophones with a cultural environment and French services of the kind they had enjoyed at Valcartier. This argument could equally be applied to the anglophones at Valcartier. In Mr. Nixon’s opinion, this was an example of the kind of situation where the principle of equality had a proportional aspect.

Finally, the DM turned to the question of financial and human resources. He explained the difficult position of the Department, which was struggling with cutbacks in money and manpower, and would have to cope with the needs of the bilingual programs as well. He stated that while he had no idea of the costs that would be incurred to implement the recommendations, it was obvious that the DND’s current budget would not suffice.

In concluding his remarks on resources, Mr. Nixon objected to the COL’s claim that people at the DND persisted in believing that linguistic equality could be attained, as long as enough time and money were spent to realize this objective. According to the DM, this obligation was not a mere idea, but an obvious, everyday fact that all federal institutions, and not just DND, would have to face. These projects could, of course, not be realized without sufficient time and money, and a great deal of goodwill. In closing, the DM assured Mr. Spicer that in spite of the serious reservations that he had expressed in his letter, the DND would endeavour to follow up on the letter and the spirit of each of the 73 recommendations.

On August 3, I sent Mr. Nixon’s colleagues a copy of his letter to the COL, so that they could read the DM’s first reactions to the recommendations. I suggested to these colleagues that Nixon’s remarks might assist them in the preparation of their
own. Their comments soon arrived at the DGBB. The record of the August 19 meeting with representatives of the COL’s office reveals a plethora of protests and observations of all kinds. Generally speaking, the DM’s colleagues found that the recommendations were unrealistic, that the proposed timetables were ridiculous for a program designed for a 15-year period, and above all that the recommendations attacked the principle of a single Force.

Lieutenant-General Ramsay Withers, the DCDS, said that he was impressed by the scope and thoroughness of the study conducted by the COL. Nevertheless, he had the feeling that the recommendations had been deliberately exaggerated, or that the team had chosen to ignore the reality of what could be accomplished, given the constraints imposed by the insufficient human and budgetary resources allocated to the Department. People also seemed to be unaware of the reason for the DND’s existence. In the eyes of General Withers, who was to become CDS in 1980, the enforcement of the Official Languages Act was important, but an Armed Forces fit for combat was essential.

Generally speaking, people deplored the fact that the recommendations were discouraging in that they seemed to suggest that nothing had been accomplished, and everything had to be redone. Fortunately, the final version of the report as published in 1978 would somewhat correct this impression. In any case, it should be said that the exchanges of opinion and the discussions with the agents of the Commissioner, which took place under the direction of my successor, Major-General Pitts, resulted in the amendment of some of the recommendations.

As I went into retirement in November, 1977, dialogue was continuing with the COL. However, I left the department feeling that Mr. Nixon and Lieutenant-General Smith, the new ADM(Per), were disappointed that we had not been very successful in convincing the COL to make substantial changes to his exaggerated recommendations.
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All sources consulted are kept at the National Defence Records Management (NDRM) or the Directorate of History (D Hist), National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa.

1. NDRM files (compilation in the J. Pariseau Collection, D Hist)

Official languages

1211-0 Policy
  1 General
  4 Biculturalism
  4-0 Policy
  4-1 General
  6-0 Translation - Policy
  6-1 General
  6-3 Services
  6-4 Publications
  6-5 Simultaneous Issues
  6-6 Films
  6-7 Administrative Revision, Editing and Interpretation
  6-8 Automation
  6-9 Simultaneous
  7-0 Terminology - Policy
  7-1 General
  7-2 Automation
  7-3 International
  7-4 Bilingualism - Terminology - Research
  8 Education of Dependents
  9 Official Language Act
  9-2 Draft CFAO
  11 Bilingual Markings, Signs and Posters
  12 Recruiting, Production and Shortage of Francophones
  13 Reports and Returns
  13-2 Ross Report
  13-3 Surveys
  14 Bilingual Establishments and Units
  14-3 French Language Units/English Language Units/National Units
  14- Coded Files
  15 Bilingual Districts
  17 Conferences and Meetings
  17-2 Command Coordinators
  17-4 Base Coordinators
  20 Complaints
  21 Information Program
  21-2 OLAS Information Letter
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  22-2 Supplementary Resources
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  23-2 Situation Reports

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29     Books, Pamphlets and Brochures
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30-2   Canadian Forces Bases
31     Statistics
32-2   Monitoring - Unilingual Correspondence
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32-4   Visits to Units and Commands
33     French Commercial Books and Periodicals (General and Training)
33-2   Exhibitions
34     Units Working in French (UWF)
35     Training Publications - Coded Files
37     Bilingualism
38     Use of Canada’s Official Languages at Defence Establishment - CDS Instruction P3/65
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14     Personnel Information Verification Report (PIVR)
15     Reports and Data
15-2 Anomaly
15-3 OLIS
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21 Group Co-ordinators
22 OLIS on Line
23 Tests
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1214- Official Languages - Department Official Language Plan

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The following minutes deal with various aspects of bilingualism and DND Dependants Schools. (Copies of the most important are kept in the J. Pariseau Collection, D Hist)

No 20  — French Canadian OTC Candidates
23  — Foreign Language Training
24  — Instruction in French
26  — Foreign Languages
31  — NDC, French-speaking Officers
32  — French-speaking Officers
34  — Foreign Language Training
49  — Bilingual signposts, etc
52  — CSDs, French Language Requirement
53  — Foreign Language Bonus Payment
54  — French version of KR&Os, French-speaking Officers
55  — Increasing numbers of French-speaking Officers
66  — Accommodation at CMR
68  — Leave Center, Paris
89  — Education of children of Catholic military personnel
90  — ibid.
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103  — CSCs, 4-years course at CMR
109  — ibid.
117  — Exchange of Military Officers between France and Canada
136  — Minister’s Manpower Study Group (Officers)
145  — Public relations activities
150  — Projected CAF magazine and professional journal; Participation of R22R in Guard Changing Ceremony
152  — Minister’s Manpower Study Group (Officers) and (Other Ranks)
157  — Mobile Command (Bilingual title)
187  — French and English Language Dependents Education
193  — ibid.
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