THE CANADIAN FORCES
IN THE GREAT WAR 1914 -1919
NOTE

In the writing of this history the author has been given full access to relevant official documents in possession of the Department of National Defence; but the inferences drawn and the opinions expressed are those of the author himself, and the Department is in no way responsible for his reading or presentation of the facts as stated.
OFFICIAL HISTORY

OF

THE CANADIAN FORCES

IN

THE GREAT WAR 1914-1919

GENERAL SERIES VOL. I

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TO THE FORMATION OF THE CANADIAN CORPS

AUGUST 1914–SEPTEMBER 1915

BY

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PREFACE

The general volumes of the Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1910, running in chronological series, are designed to provide a memorial for participants, a source for historians, a manual for soldiers, and a guide for the future. This book is the first of the chronological series.

Even if that war had made an end of all war, men would still be interested in the great experiences of the race. There are other aspects too. The statement of impartial truths in a dispassionate war history may engender healthy gratitude for the blessings of peace, and although it may temper the brightly glowing legends of men hazarding their lives for their convictions, of women not afraid to lose their dearest and suffer agony, yet it cannot impair the tradition of devoted service. There have been peoples who, after the manner of the Zidonians, the Incas, and even the Athenians, became so civilized as to be unable or unwilling to defend themselves and whose protection by others was not worth while. On earth at least such types are doomed; under artificial conditions the unstable and unfit prosper; eventually nature takes its course, more robust or adaptable species reduce and supplant them.

But such themes are not expanded here. Without any introduction as to the earlier development of the Canadian Forces—which when prepared was found to be too voluminous—or to the motives and actions leading to war—which was considered too controversial—this volume opens with events in Canada during the critical week preceding the outbreak of war on the 4th of August, 1914, and carries the reader to the 13th of September, 1915, on which date was formed the Canadian Corps. In this period the First Contingent was raised and proceeded overseas, the 1st Canadian
Division fought at Ypres, Festubert and Givenchy, and the 2nd Canadian Division arrived in France.

In the course of the war Canada gained a wealth of knowledge and experience, which, if judiciously examined and applied, will help to guide both policy and procedure. This vast store was chiefly won by that third of the adult male population which served in the armed forces; their individual deeds and impressions will pass into family tradition, but the record of their combined effort must be drawn from contemporary documents, illuminated by personal experience and presented as a complete whole, if the priceless heritage so hardly won is to be preserved in comprehensible form.

Therefore the subsequent volumes of the series have also been outlined and apportioned to suit the main course of Canadian military action in the field, and will cover well-defined periods: the winter of 1915-1916, including the formation of the 3rd Canadian Division, and the spring and summer of 1916, with the fighting for the St. Eloi Craters and at Mount Sorrel; the arrival in France of the 4th Canadian Division and the operations on the Somme, 1916; the winter of 1916-1917, the capture of Vimy Ridge and of Fresnoy, Avion and Hill 70; the operations culminating in the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge, and the winter of 1917-1918; the spring and summer of 1918 and the fighting on the Amiens front in March and August; the Arras-Cambrai battles, with the breaking of the Drocourt-Quéant Line, the crossing of the Canal du Nord and the capture of Bourlon Wood; the taking of Valenciennes and the advance to and capture of Mons, on 11th November, 1918, followed by the march to the Rhine, and the return home in 1919. To illustrate the operations from Amiens to Mons over 100 maps have been specially compiled; those for St. Eloi and Mount Sorrel are in preparation. Contemporary events in Great Britain, at sea, in Canada, and in other theatres where Canadian forces were employed have been allotted to the
appropriate volume.

To the student of humanity as well as to the student of military history, the study of the effort put forth by Canada in the War of 1914-18 offers a wide and interesting field. There is exemplified the response of a young country, as yet imperfectly knit by bonds of mutual danger, of joint interest or of common origin, to an external impulse. There can be followed, each in its varying phases, the formation, the campaigning and the disbandment of an army raised and sent overseas as the outward expression of a profound reaction: the genesis, action and dissolution of a highly organized body to meet unusual and complicated conditions, in many ways a parallel to the history of other exceptional and specialized living entities.

The impulse was sudden, for the outbreak of war came as a surprise to the community at large; the reaction was immediate on the part of those susceptible to the call of the blood or appreciative of the gravity of the crisis: some inherited the instincts of fighting ancestors, others the dispositions of loyal patriots of past generations, and in some imagination replaced tradition. But for the purposes of this history it matters little whether the response be attributed to the exuberance of youth, to altruistic loyalty bred of time-honoured tradition, or to an acute discernment of threatened subjugation.

As in any crisis, there at first ensued the uncertainty natural in a community not organized to meet such an eventuality, or so constituted that one individual can assume direct personal control, and improvised measures take the place of ordered and predetermined action. But from that uncertainty there emerged a body of 31,000 men, the First Contingent, whose exploits thrilled and whose spirit permeated the country, to the profit and inspiration of those who followed. In all 628,462 served, and 60,661 returned no more.

Hitherto writers of history have usually been handi-
capped by the lack of authentic information: some have been carried away by the prejudices and passions of the time; others, tempted by dubious or partial authorities, have indulged at length in unfruitful speculation. But in dealing with this war so many original and complementary documents are available that the work becomes in the first instance a process of refinement: a great mass of material must be sifted and tested. It is a laborious and intricate process but it yields a simple residue. More may be discovered later and the whole treated again, using methods of selection evolved from increased knowledge, but that possibility does not impair the values now recovered.

Then follows the second task, the complicated operation of fitting every fact into its proper place in the mosaic, so that a rational presentation results. The picture can never be made quite complete, some lights are too pronounced, some shadows too deep and there are places where detail is lacking; but the coming years may fill some of the gaps and the passage of time will soften and correct the perspective. Yet the broad outline of the composition and the grouping of the principal figures will remain unchanged.

The threefold object of the writer, who since May 1921 has directed the work of collecting, sorting, indexing, extracting, and compiling,¹ and who in May 1932 was named historian and made responsible for what is here produced in print,² has therefore been to assemble established facts and figures into a form that can be readily grasped, to reproduce verbatim typical or important documents, and to arrange in pertinent relation a series of significant pictures, so that in the light of ordered testimony the reader, relieved of the speculative drudgery of groping in the dark after elusive facts, may be free to follow the action closely, to draw his own conclusions, and to form his own opinions.

The War Diaries kept by military units and formations

¹ Order in Council, P.C. 1652 of 27. v. 1921.
in the field, their orders, instructions, maps, field messages, returns and reports, state papers, official files, Government publications, and documents and information gathered from participants, are the basic material from which this record has been compiled.

The work of the Historical Section, General Staff, is dealt with annually in the Report of the Department of National Defence. In the preface to the official volume “The Medical Services,” written by Sir Andrew Macphail, special reference was made to Canadian Regimental Histories, official, but written and published privately. Up to date twenty have been published, nineteen of which relate to units mentioned in this volume, and three others have been written and await publication; thirty historians of other units have been sent material or otherwise aided and encouraged. Of other accredited historians assisted, one has written of the C.A.M.C., another of Canadian airmen, another of Canadian horses, dogs and mascots; the first published through the Department, the last two privately.

3 Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War. The Medical Services. (Ottawa: The King’s Printer.) 1925.
5 Militia Order No. 145, 3rd May, 1935.
In 1916, 1917 and 1918, by authority of the Prime Minister and under the direction of the Canadian War Record Officer, a number of publications were issued, including three volumes of contemporary history, covering the battles of Ypres 1915, Festubert, Givenchy, St. Eloi, Mount Sorrel and the Somme 1916. In a preface the C.W.R.O. emphasizes the inevitable lack of material for such a work, but during the war years he set about and accomplished his task of removing that lack, by urging upon units in the field the historical importance of making their own war diaries complete, and by collecting and preserving “abundant material for a grave and adequate work” for the use of “the official historian of Canada (whoever he may be).” This material was not only documentary but extended to a great collection of official paintings, photographs and motion pictures of the Canadian forces overseas. After the war, some of the functions of the Canadian War Records Office, then disbanded, devolved upon the Historical Section (G.S.).

The many departmental duties of the Section have included the composition of inscriptions for war memorials; investigations relating to pension claims; titling of paintings, photographs, and motion pictures; preparation of articles, including the story of the First Gas Attack, for the Encyclopaedia Britannica and of Vimy Ridge for the pilgrimage of 1936, and narratives of battles on the Western Front for the Canadian Battlefield Memorials; research concerning perpetuations, alliances and amalgamations of military units, and on account of the Book of Remembrance. Two additional duties should be described more fully here, as they

7 Lord Beaverbrook, the C.W.R.O., wrote the first two volumes of “Canada in Flanders” (London: Hodder & Stoughton), which he called “the hasty product of one who was an amateur in the art of describing,” although one had run into thirteen editions; Major Charles G. D. (now Sir Charles) Roberts wrote the third.
9 The Canada Year Book, 1937 (Ottawa: The King’s Printer.)
10 Canadian Battlefield Memorials (Ottawa: The King’s Printer.) 1929.
have resulted in important and essentially historical publications: the battle honours awarded to Canadian units, and the historical carving in the Memorial Chamber in the Tower of the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, which together occupied the time of the Section for nearly four years.

For the award of the battle honours, a scheme based on numbers of individuals in each specified battle area—integration of personal effort, territorially, by battalions of original enlistment—was worked out by the Director, adopted and applied.\(^{11}\) This solved the problem which had arisen from the sending of reinforcements overseas in complete battalions which were broken up in England, the personnel being distributed among the fifty fighting battalions at the front. The qualifications of over 300 units for 51 engagements had to be established, and research in this field extended to the campaign in North West Canada 1885 and the South African War, as well as embracing the whole of the Great War. The Battle Honours earned were awarded by His Majesty the King between 1929 and 1933.\(^{12}\)

In 1926 a brief but complete story of Canadian achievement in the Great War was written by the Director and is inscribed on marble panels set in the walls of the Memorial Chamber; he also submitted a plan to illustrate the story on the panels with pictures in low relief, for which he furnished sketches, and to make a harmonious background by weaving ordered significance into the mural decoration “to embody the emblems of all the Regiments which took part in wars, from the commencement of Canada, ending with the Great War of 1914.” This plan was accepted by Privy Council on the recommendation of the Chief Architect, who reported: “The conception seems to me to be a very good one” —and it superseded the original design which

\(^{11}\) General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, 1st February, 1928.

had provided only for conventional ornament of Gothic character.\textsuperscript{13} An explanation of the historical significance and a key to the devices, over 800 in number and interpreted in stone by Mr. Ira Lake, was supplied, by direction, to a private firm for an illustrated booklet published in 1932.\textsuperscript{14}

The spirit and the story of the Memorial Chamber have been carried into the scheme for these volumes, and extended to the chapters, which have been arranged to run for the most part in chronological sequence. While the main topic is the fighting forces and the principal focus is the firing line, appropriate reference is made to collateral subjects, to inform the reader of simultaneous developments and to assist future historians who may seek to specialize in the commercial, industrial, financial, economic, social, personal, constitutional, or political aspects of the war years. The first chapter deals with the steps taken in Canada on the outbreak of war, the second with the mustering of the First Contingent at Valcartier, and the third with the crossing to England in October 1914. The sojourn for the next three months on Salisbury Plain occupies one chapter, the introduction of the 1st Canadian Division into the British line of battle in March another, followed by a group of ten chapters covering the Battles of Ypres in April and May 1915, when there was hard fighting, and heavy casualties. Here is interposed a chapter on the raising of other forces in Canada and their passage overseas to be used as reinforcements or to build up other field formations, first among which was the 2nd Canadian Division. Then follow three chapters on the engagement of the 1st Canadian Division in the desolating operations at Festubert in May 1915, and at Givenchy in June. The final chapter, as already indicated, brings the narrative up to the formation of the Canadian Corps when the 2nd Canadian Division joined the 1st in France in mid-September.

\textsuperscript{13} Order in Council, P.C. 333 of 11.iii.1926.
\textsuperscript{14} The Memorial Chamber. (Ottawa: Photogelatine Engraving Co.) 1932.
In support of the text a selection of widely diversified documents is incorporated so that the reader may get his information at first hand as the action develops. Sketch maps are placed at the end of their chapters and a chart, which is a calendar of employment of divisions, is inserted before the Index.

The appendices, which consist of original documents reproduced, of notes and charts amplifying the text, and of references to authorities, are bound separately. Interlined numbers in the text refer to relevant appendices. To facilitate the relating of Canadian operations to happenings in the world at large, a chronology of events for the period covered by the text is placed at the front of the appendix volume, and at the back, for convenient reference, a list of abbreviations.

In amplification of the sketch maps, bound with the text for the general reader, the more detailed maps on a larger scale will be found in a pocket with the appendices. All have been specially compiled and drawn for this history. For Ypres 1915 the inter-relation and inter-dependence of units were so involved that, in order to find out exactly what happened, the position and occupation of over eighty British and Canadian battalions at three-hour intervals during fourteen days of battle were tabulated. By this means crucial moments of the battle could be more clearly seen and dispositions accurately plotted on the maps illustrating the battle. For Festubert and Givenchy the maps then in use were so distorted that a new base was drawn embodying later surveys, and the trenches were checked against aeroplane photographs taken at the time and obtained from the Imperial War Museum, London.

Concurrently with the preparation of this series of volumes, and the appearance of Canadian regimental histories, the writing of the British Official History, Military Operations, has proceeded. Brig.-General Sir James E. Edmonds, the historian, deals with all the British Armies on the Western Front, including the Canadian forces, and sends for criti-
cism by the Director, and for circulation among Canadian participants, the drafts of chapters relating to their activities; similarly, and besides reciprocal interchange of documents and information, he has kindly read and commented upon the drafts of this book, for all of which grateful acknowledgment is now made. Two of his volumes, “France and Belgium, 1915,”\textsuperscript{15} covering Neuve Chapelle, Ypres 1915, Festubert and Givenchy, have, with permission, been frequently referred to and sometimes quoted in the appendices.\textsuperscript{16}

To bring out the relationship with our French Allies, particularly in the combined engagement at Ypres, free use has been made of the French official account\textsuperscript{17} and of the original documents which appear therein.

For the German side, the official history published by the Reichsarchiv\textsuperscript{18} is the main authority. Histories of German regiments have also been read, and the information supplied by the Reichsarchiv to General Edmonds, and transmitted to me, has been most valuable.

With a view to placing Canadian participation in proper perspective, the general scheme for the British and French forces has been described, and the fortunes of certain British units have occasionally been traced. For the same reason reference has been made to German units, whose actions may be followed in their own histories.

To achieve the brevity necessary for clearness, all


\textsuperscript{16} Drafts of Chapters for “France and Belgium 1918,” published 1937, were read in Canada; in addition to the 1915 material, the chapters on the St. Eloi Craters, Mount Sorrel, the Battles of the Somme 1916 and the Capture of Vimy Ridge, not yet published, have also been read, circulated and comments forwarded.

\textsuperscript{17} Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.)

\textsuperscript{18} Der Weltkrieg, 1914 bis 1918. Bearbeitet im Reichsarchiv. (Berlin: L. S. Mittler & Sohn.) 1932.
moves of all Canadian units have not been recorded, and only a few of the gallant deeds of individuals have been described. During the war over 2,600 units existed in the C.E.F., and 424,589 of all ranks served overseas; the reader will therefore realize that, while this narrative presents the essentials of the undertakings described, many minor aspects have been omitted, and the illustrations are typical rather than exhaustive. Limitations of space have made it necessary to defer to subsequent volumes the more extended treatment of a number of subjects which, although they had their beginnings in this volume, developed during later periods when their importance became more marked.

It will assist the present and future historians if readers who can suggest corrections or additions which would help to make the history more accurate and complete, or who have in their possession contemporary documents of any sort, will forward them to the Director, Historical Section (G.S.), Department of National Defence, Ottawa. Appeals for this have been generously met for several years, resulting in a large quantity of field messages, orders, diaries and maps, previously in private possession of participants, being placed in custody of the Section: within the past nine months one most valuable dossier which had been lost for twenty-two years was recovered through the good offices of a regimental historian and biographer.

In establishing the general aspect of this series, I have been guided by the advice of Sir Robert Borden and Sir George Perley for Canada, and by Lord Warrington and Sir Robert Rait for Great Britain; in presenting the military aspect I have been helped by General Sir Arthur Currie and Lieut.-General Sir Richard Turner, V.C., representing the Canadian forces, and by Field-Marshal Lord Milne the British; in considering the literary aspect I have been aided by Sir Andrew Macphail and Mr. J. A. Stevenson. To the large number of all ranks of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, including officers attached from the British Army, who
have freely given much time and thought to the arduous task of reading drafts and who have supplied information on matters of which they had firsthand knowledge, the sincere thanks of the writer and of all readers are most justly due. A special personal debt to my own friends and family, particularly my brother, Captain Peter Duguid, late Gordon Highlanders, may also be fittingly acknowledged here.

For unremitting help in research, arrangement, and production I thank my able assistant, Major J. F. Cummins, C.M.S.C., whose wide military experience in Canada, England, France, India and South Africa has proved invaluable. In the compilation and drawing of the charts, sketches and maps Captain J. I. P. Neal, R.C.E., has applied his technical skill and knowledge backed by four years on the Western Front, mostly with the mapping section of the Canadian Corps. The maps have been reproduced by the Geographical Section, National Defence Headquarters, and many of the statistical figures and biographical details of individuals have been supplied by the Record Office, N.D.H.Q. Finally, to the remaining personnel of the Historical Section, (G.S.)—Messrs. W. Douglas, W. Davidson, E. Pye, W. Boss, G. Bowen and R. S. Meade, all of whom served in the C.E.F.—my thanks are due: their unfailing support has made possible the production of this book.

A. FORTESCUE DUGUID, Colonel,

Director of the Historical Section, General Staff.

OTTAWA,
January, 1938.
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THE CANADIAN FORCES
IN THE GREAT WAR 1914 -1919
The Minister of Militia and Defence and President of the Militia Council was Colonel the Hon. Sam Hughes, who later became Hon. Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Sam Hughes, K.C.B. He was born in 1852. At first a school teacher and subsequently editor of a newspaper, he had entered Parliament in 1892 and sat as member for North Victoria, or Victoria and Haliburton, until 1921. He had enlisted in the 45th Regiment when sixteen years old and was commissioned in the same unit in 1873; became captain, 1878; major, 1888; lieut.-colonel 1897; colonel, 1902; major-general, 15th May, 1912 (gazetted 22nd Oct. 1914 and antedated); hon. lieutenant-general (British Army), 18th October 1916. His services included the Fenian Raid, 1870, and South Africa, 1899-1900, where he served on the staff independently of the Canadian Contingent and was mentioned in despatches.

On the formation of the Conservative administration in October 1911 he was given the portfolio of Minister of Militia and Defence. Both in and out of Parliament he continually urged the need for preparedness and warned the Canadian public of the grave danger of war with Germany: militia expenditures increased from seven and a half millions in the year 1911-12, to eleven millions in the financial year 1913-14, but not without opposition from those who could foresee no danger. He was a tireless advocate of the principle that the colonies should assist the Mother Country in time of war, a policy which he had advanced on visits to New Zealand and Australia in 1897-98, and he had offered to raise a contingent when the South African War was threatening in the summer of 1899. He attended the Imperial Conference in London, 1911, as an adviser to his predecessor, Sir Frederick Borden.

In August 1912 he made a public speech which expressed his views as to the probability of war with Germany and as to the course which Canada should pursue. In the autumn of 1912 and again in 1913 he conducted a party of
senior officers of the Canadian Militia to Europe, attended
the British, French, German and Swiss manoeuvres, and
toured northwestern France. In 1913 he also led a party of
officers over the battlefields of the American Civil War.

In the summer of 1914 he ordered a concentration of
militia at Petawawa Camp: a mixed force of 10,339 all arms,
with 4,553 horses, carried out combined manoeuvres app-
proximating to war conditions and on a scale never before
attempted in Canada.

At this time, and throughout the war, the Deputy Minis-
ter of Militia and Defence and Vice-President or Militia
Council, was Colonel Eugene Fiset; he had won the Distingui-
shed Service Order while medical officer of the 2/Royal
Canadian Regiment in South Africa; he had held the ap-
pointment of Director General of Medical Services at Ottawa
for over three years, and had been Deputy Minister since
1906. The Chief of the General Staff and First Military
Member of the Militia Council was Colonel Willoughby G.
Gwatkin, an erudite officer of the British Regular Army,
fifty-five years of age, who had served on the staff in Canada
for seven years and had developed a plan for the general
mobilization of the Canadian Militia which would fit in with
the accepted system of defence for the Empire, and also a
separate plan for the mobilization of an infantry division,
plus a mounted brigade, for service in Europe, in accordance
with the common military assumption that Germany in-
tended to attack France, probably by way of Belgium.7 The
other three military members of Council were all Canadian-
born officers of the Canadian Permanent Force: the Adju-
tant-General (Colonel V. A. S. Williams, forty-eight years of
age, with 31 years’ service), the Quartermaster-General (Ma-
ajor-General D. A. Macdonald, C.M.G., I.S.O., sixty-nine
years of age, with 51 years service), and the Master-General
of the Ordnance (Colonel T. Benson, fifty-four years of age,
with 31 years’ service).
CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
28TH JUNE–22ND AUGUST, 1914


PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN CANADA

The motives and moves which caused the Great War of 1914-1918 extend widely in many directions: they can be followed step by step in the published documents of the nations involved. In the summer of 1914, as on previous occasions when the peace of Europe was threatened, the Canadian people received their information and formed their opinions chiefly from reports in the daily press. Meanwhile the British Government communicated officially with the Government of Canada by messages and despatches addressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, His Royal Highness Field-Marshal the Duke of Connaught.

The extraordinary precautions which the Canadian Government would have to take when relations with any foreign power became strained, and on the outbreak of war, had been closely considered earlier in the year. During his visit to England in 1912, the Prime Minister, then the Right Hon. Robert Laird Borden, had been in close touch with the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, who, at his request, sent forward in February, 1913, full information as to the scheme of defence recently prepared by that Committee.
After some delay, a plan of co-ordinated official action had been drafted by an Interdepartmental Committee, and approved in the form of a “war book” by the Prime Minister, now Sir Robert Borden: the details had been drafted to conform with the provisions made by the Overseas Defence Committee (a sub-committee of the C.I.D.); the procedure and the exact steps necessary had been precisely catalogued. The general military defence scheme for the country was elaborated in district defence schemes, which set out by stages the local action to be taken in conformity with the general policy. On 29th July the precautionary stage of the defence scheme was made effective, although the probable belligerents were not named.

Parliament was not in session. The Governor General was at Banff, Alta. An active session of five months had concluded on 12th June, and afterwards many of the ministers had dispersed. The Prime Minister had been occupied with administrative affairs and was detained in Ottawa for two or three weeks by the incidents attending the arrival of the Komagata Maru, but left Ottawa on 24th July for a holiday at Muskoka. On 31st July, the gravity of the situation impelled him to return to the capital where he arrived next morning. With two exceptions the other Ministers who had been absent from Ottawa returned as quickly as possible: Mr. (later Sir George) Perley, Minister without portfolio, then in Europe was instructed to remain in London and to act as Canadian High Commissioner; the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Martin Burrell) remained on the Pacific coast to represent the Government in what appeared to be a threatened area. The Governor General left Banff on his return journey on the morning of the 1st August.

On 30th July, Colonel Hughes presided over an emergency meeting of the Militia Council and anticipatory plans were discussed: the country was informed by a press despatch that preparations were being made for calling out and equipping a first contingent of 20,000 or 25,000 men to join
the Imperial forces without delay. The carefully prepared scheme of mobilization for overseas, issued in 1911-12 and amended to meet recommendations of heads of services and commanders of Districts, also called for 25,000 troops allotted on a provincial basis generally proportionate to population. The Minister of Militia, however, relied upon the psychological factor, and, counting upon results from intensification of mass enthusiasm, he ordered that a letter be sent to District Commanders directing them to consider the best method of raising a contingent but to pay no attention to the quotas and distribution in the 1911 scheme.

As he himself said, the recruiting of the First Contingent was different from anything that had ever occurred before.

If a force is to be mobilized there must be a scheme; the letter, sent on 31st July, voided the mobilization scheme of 1911 but did not provide another in its place. District commanders, having been enjoined not to discuss the matter nor to communicate with Militia Headquarters about it, were thus summarily removed from active participation and the Military District staff organization, designed to operate in every military contingency, had no effective part for the next ten critical days, while Militia Headquarters, by order of the Minister, communicated direct with unit commanders, and embarked upon the formulation of a new plan and took other action conformable with his views.

The precautionary measures of the defence scheme, put into effect on 29th July, required the calling out of militia for the guarding of wireless stations and cable landings, the manning of the fortresses at Halifax, Quebec and Esquimalt, and the establishment of an examination service at these three ports. When this was ordered, details of one regiment of garrison artillery and of two regiments of infantry were called out in each of the two coastal military districts; in addition to these troops of the Non-Permanent Active Militia, all the Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery and the Royal Canadian Regiment, of the Permanent Force, were also placed
Apart from strictly military measures, the control of cables was taken over by the Minister of Militia on 2nd August, and control of wireless telegraphy passed to the Minister of the Naval Service; by the 6th a strict censorship over these channels of communication had been enforced. No restrictions were as yet imposed in respect to mails or land telegraphs and telephones. Leakage of information through the press was only controlled by individual editors to the degree of their response to the earnest entreaty of the Minister of Militia contained in his letter dated 5th August to the press of Canada and a further appeal for caution privately issued on 12th August by the Deputy Chief Censor, Lieut.-Colonel C. F. Hamilton, followed by an official document—"Memorandum on the Duties of the Press in War"—sent confidentially on 17th August to the editors of all daily and weekly newspapers in Canada. For speed and secrecy in transmission of official messages overseas a special direct line, known as the Governor General’s wire, connected Ottawa with the Atlantic cable; this was in operation by 6th August, 1914. The British Government made arrangements with private companies for a clear line across Canada to link up with the Pacific cable and Australia; this circuit was in operation by 8th August, 1914.

The Canadian Attitude

The general opinion throughout the country, as gauged by the Government before the crisis, was that Canada ought to give assistance if the Empire should become involved in war. Plans for increasing the Canadian navy or contributing to the British had lapsed, and the need was now too immediate for material naval aid to be supplied on a large scale; an effective land force might, however, be drawn from the Canadian Militia.

Cabinet Council meetings were held on 30th and 31st July and 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th August. The most important results of these anxious deliberations were a proclamation...
P.C. 2048 of 4. viii. 14) summoning Parliament to meet in emergency session on 18th August, and a cablegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Rt. Hon. Mr. L. Harcourt) on the 1st August:—

Urgent. My Government desire me to send you the following: “My advisers while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved and their strong desire to co-operate in every possible way for that purpose, wish me to convey to His Majesty’s Government the firm assurance that if unhappily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our Empire.”

This was followed next day by another cablegram:

In view of the impending danger of war involving the Empire my advisers are anxiously considering the most effective means of rendering every possible aid and they will welcome any suggestions and advice which Imperial Naval and Military authorities may deem it expedient to offer. They are confident that a considerable force would be available for service abroad. A question has been mooted respecting the status of any Canadian force serving abroad as under section sixty-nine of Canadian Militia Act the active militia can only be placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof. It has been suggested that regiments might enlist as Imperial troops for stated period, Canadian Government undertaking to make all necessary financial provision for their equipment, pay and maintenance. This proposal has not yet been maturely considered here and my advisers would be glad to have views of Imperial Government thereon.

To these Mr. Harcourt replied:—

With reference to your telegram 1st August. His Majesty’s Government gratefully welcome the assurance of your Government that in the present crisis they may rely on wholehearted co-operation of the people of Canada. Publish this with your telegram. I am publishing in tomorrow morning papers here.

and on 3rd August—
With reference to your cypher telegram 2nd August, please inform your Ministers that their patriotic readiness to render every aid is deeply appreciated by His Majesty’s Government, but they would prefer postponing detailed observations on the suggestion put forward, pending further developments. As soon as situation appears to call for further measures I will telegraph you again.

The extent to which these messages from Canada reflected the sentiments of the people is evidenced by the fact that before the outbreak of war forty-eight units of all arms of the militia had offered their services; even before 1st August one field artillery brigade, the 6th (Montreal), and one infantry regiment, the 72nd (Vancouver), had already volunteered to serve overseas. Other units, equally ready to go, considered that, being enrolled in His Majesty’s forces to serve, if necessary, “beyond Canada for the defence thereof,” they need make no further offer but should await orders. Besides these formed bodies there were, both in Canada and the United States, ex-soldiers, militiamen and patriotic civilians, who personally wrote or telegraphed to the Minister of Militia offering to serve in the event of war. The sentiments which prompted these spontaneous offers arose mostly from a sense of duty but sometimes from a desire for adventure, and the Minister in his enthusiasm for Canada held them up as an example, magnified their numbers and released to the press a list of volunteers. Few of those who presently came forward needed exhortation or example, although as yet the great majority of able-bodied male citizens did not habitually appreciate the fact that service in time of war was a duty well established by the Statutes of Canada, which for ten generations had provided that all men between eighteen and sixty were liable for military service.

The Minister of Militia gave vent to his own personal feelings when, on reading in the morning newspaper of 3rd August that the British Cabinet was uncertain as to participation, he ordered that the Union Jack over Militia Headquarters be lowered in immediate protest. A few minutes later,
however, persuaded by the Quartermaster-General that the British policy had not yet been disclosed, he ordered the flag re-hoisted, which was done.

**CANADA AT WAR WITH GERMANY**

At about 7 p.m. (Berlin time) on 4th August the British Government delivered an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of German troops already in Belgium contrary to the treaty of 1839; there was no reply, and from the hour of expiry, 11 p.m. (London time) 4th August 1914, Great Britain was at war with Germany; or as sometimes officially expressed, King George V was at war with the German Emperor.

On the same day at 8.45 p.m. by Ottawa time, the Governor General received the following cable—

See Preface Defence Scheme, war has broken out with Germany.

The Minister of Militia was handed a copy immediately after reviewing the Governor General’s Foot Guards, he mounted a chair and read the message to the assembled officers. As he stepped down the O.C. offered the services of the regiment wherever they might be required.

Long before midnight everyone within reach of telephone or telegraph had the news, which was officially communicated to the public by an Extra Canada Gazette next day:—

4th August 1914.

His Royal Highness the Governor General received a telegraphic despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies at 8.45 this evening, announcing that war has broken out with Germany. The reply of the Governor General to the despatch was sent on the same day:—

Great exhibition of genuine patriotism here. When inevitable fact transpires that considerable period of training will be necessary before Canadian troops will be fit for European war, this ardour is bound to be dampened some-
what. In order to minimize this, I would suggest that any proposal from you should be accompanied by the assurance that Canadian troops will go to the front as soon as they have reached a sufficient standard of training."

**EMERGENCY ENACTMENTS**

The changed conditions suddenly imposed upon Canada by the war in Europe made necessary the formulation of enactments to regulate finance, and trade and commerce, and to preserve good order throughout the country. Without waiting for the meeting of Parliament, emergency measures were therefore taken by the Governor General in Council which provided for advances by the Government to chartered banks (P.C. 2032 of 3.viii.14 and P.C. 2243 of 29.viii.14), for an increased issue of Dominion notes, and for payment in bank notes instead of gold (P.C. 2033 of 3.viii.14 and P.C. 2243 of 29.viii.14); after Britain declared war, the issue of money orders to European countries was suspended (P.C. 2076 of 7.viii.14) – but later resumed with restrictions (P.C. 2252 of 29.viii.14 and P.C. 2315 of 5.ix.14) – and also the payment in gold of Dominion notes (P.C. 2096 of 10.viii.14). On 5th August an order was passed provisionally granting ten days of grace for the departure of German ships (P.C. 2055 of 5.viii.14), later extended to Austro-Hungarian ships also (P.C. 2129 of 14.viii.14). Next day a proclamation prohibited the export of war material and was followed by others prohibiting the export of certain commodities, including coal (P.C. 2087 of 7.viii.14, P.C. 2152 of 15.viii.14 and P.C. 2192 of 22.viii.14). The police measures provided for the protection of public property (P.C. 2041 of 5.viii.14), for which the sum of $100,000 was subsequently placed at the disposal of the Department of Justice (P.C. 2244 of 29.viii.14), and also for the increase of the R.N.W.M.P. from 763 to 1,268 n.c.o’s and constables (P.C. 2093 of 8.viii.14 and P.C. 2215 of 27.viii.14).

The policy with regard to enemy aliens followed mainly, though not altogether, the British; but delays caused
by doubt as to procedure allowed many to go unchallenged to the United States. A suggestion that the Department of Immigration should also control egress, by examining passengers on trains and boats, was vetoed because the maintenance of cordial relations with the United States was deemed more important than the escape of German reservists. The first Dominion enactment was a proclamation on 7th August (P.C. 2086 of 7.viii.14) for the protection of German aliens pursuing their ordinary avocations, extended to Austro-Hungarians on the 15th (P.C. 2150 of 15.viii.14). Alien officers and reservists were, however, combatants: on 3rd August the attitude towards them was that, if war should be declared, naval reservists, only, should be detained; on 7th August this was changed and District Officers Commanding were instructed to arrest, as prisoners of war, all reservists who attempted to leave Canada; on 15th August power of arrest was extended to officers of the Dominion Police and of the Royal North West Mounted Police, and direction was given that enemy aliens suspected of espionage or of intent to assist the enemy were also to be detained, although they might be released on parole after signing a declaration that they would abstain from hostile acts and that they would report to the police authorities as required from time to time.  

235 The Commissioners of these two separate bodies of federal police were Lt.-Col. A. P. Sherwood, C.M.G., M.V.O., A.D.C., responsible to the Minister of Justice, and Commissioner A. B. Perry, C.M.G., directly under the Prime Minister.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES–NAVAL

The Minister of the Naval Service, who also held the portfolio of Marine and Fisheries, was until 1917 the Hon. J. D. Hazen, K.C., LL.D., who after twenty years of almost continuous parliamentary experience, culminating in the premiership of New Brunswick, had joined the Federal Cabinet in 1911. The Deputy Minister and Comptroller of
the Naval Service was Mr. G. J. Desbarats, B.Ap.Sc. Executive direction of the Canadian naval forces was throughout the war exercised by Vice-Admiral C. E. Kingsmill, Director of the Naval Service – a native of Ontario, with forty years’ service in the Royal Navy."\textsuperscript{23b}

In July 1914, H.M.C.S. Rainbow, a 23-year-old 2nd Class cruiser, was preparing at Esquimalt for the Behring Sea sealing patrol; but in view of the threatening aspect of international affairs in the last week of the month she was instructed not to sail but to prepare for sea in all respects.

The Department was kept informed of current developments by the British Admiralty, and on 2nd August the Royal Naval Reserves were called out by order of His Majesty the King. On the same day a corresponding proclamation was issued in Canada, and two days later the Canadian permanent naval forces and the Naval Volunteer Force were placed on active service.\textsuperscript{24} Also on 4th August, the two Canadian warships Niobe – 1st Class cruiser built 1897 – about to be recommissioned at Halifax, and Rainbow, together with their personnel, were “placed at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy” under the provisions of the Canadian Naval Service Act.\textsuperscript{25} From this time the naval establishment came under the orders of the Admiralty with all charges borne by Canada. On the same day the Canadian Government ships Canada (411 tons) and Margaret (756 tons) were transferred from Marine and Fisheries and Customs to the Naval Service (P.C. 2047 of 4.viii.14).

In the first days of August the purchase was arranged of two submarines recently completed at Seattle for the Chilean Government; there being no federal appropriation from which this expenditure could be met and as the transaction was to be on a strictly cash basis, the Government of British Columbia at the instance of the Premier, Sir Richard McBride, made the purchase, and the Dominion repaid the Province three days later.\textsuperscript{26} \textsuperscript{27} After evading U.S. warships
sent to intercept them in anticipation of the neutrality proclamation, the two submarines were inspected and paid for at sea, and arrived unheralded on 5th August at Esquimalt, where the unarmed examining steamer, taking them for German in the morning mist, put into harbour; but the order for the examination battery to open fire had fortunately not been given when their true identity was discovered. They were placed under Admiralty orders two days later (P.C. 2072), and designated C.C. 1 and C.C. 2. Under command of Lieut.-Commander A. St. V. Keyes (R.N. retired) and manned by a few other experts and some naval ratings, but mostly by volunteers, they were based on Esquimalt and exercised and patrolled on the Pacific Coast until transferred to Halifax in October 1917. A Royal Commission, appointed to enquire into the circumstances of their purchase, found in 1917:

It is cause for congratulation to all Canadians that this much-discussed and criticised enterprise was, throughout, of blameless character. The acquisition of these submarines probably saved, as it is believed by many, including high naval authorities, the cities of Victoria and Vancouver, or one or the other of them from attack and enormous tribute.

What Sir Richard McBride did in those days of great anxiety, even distress, and what he accomplished deserves the commendation of his fellow countrymen. For his motives were those of patriotism; and his conduct that of an honourable man.

The Rainbow, at the request of the Admiralty, proceeded to sea on 3rd August “to guard trade routes north of the equator,” and on the 5th was assigned the specific duty of finding and protecting two British sloops, Shearwater and Algerine, both lacking wireless and steering north for San Diego, California. She had been able to complete only up to half her proper complement (121 as against 229) and 44 were newly joined naval volunteers entirely untrained; she had no high explosive shells. The commander, Commander Walter Hose, was cautioned from Ottawa to “remember Nelson and the British Navy. All Canada is watching.” Two
German cruisers were reported to be steaming for San Francisco; actually there was one, the Leipzig, a modern vessel, with six knots greater speed and a fully trained crew, and also superior to the Rainbow in range, though not in weight, of guns. Commander Hose steamed south and waited three days for the Germans, and was then compelled to proceed north for Esquimalt on 10th August to recoal; the questing Leipzig arrived off San Francisco three hours after the Rainbow had left. The consistent refusal of the United States authorities to allow unlimited coal also compelled the German cruiser, after following up to Cape Flattery on the 13th, to abandon the plan of operating along the trade routes on the west coast of North America, with the Canadian Pacific “Empress” liners as the special victims. The two sloops reached Esquimalt safely.

The crews of the Shearwater and Algerine were despatched by rail to Halifax and put aboard the Niobe, whose complement was completed by taking on native Royal Naval Reservists at St. Johns, Newfoundland, and by the engagement of volunteers and old service ratings from all over Canada. In September she took her place on the Atlantic patrol with other cruisers of the Royal Navy.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES – MILITARY

The outbreak of war on 4th August automatically brought into operation a new phase of the defence scheme – independent of the two mobilization schemes – and it demanded the completion of further measures for home defence. Details of certain units, including cavalry, artillery, engineers and infantry, were therefore called out, by the 6th August, in all Districts to perform these duties. In drawing up their plans for local defence, commanders of Districts had been directed in 1913 to assume that Canada was safe from organized invasion on a large scale; but raids and acts of collective hostility were not impossible, and special precautions were taken against individual malevolence.
Authority was issued on 5th August for the calling out, at the discretion of the Minister, of units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia to complete the thirty days training permitted by law. On the same day the establishment of the Royal Canadian Regiment, already at war stations, was increased from 596 to 922 privates. Next day a General Order, implementing another permissive Order in Council, was promulgated placing on active service the Militia Council, the permanent Militia staff, and all corps of the Permanent Force, and enumerating 62 units (in Military Districts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 13) which, in whole or in part, were thereby placed on active service. Certain Militia commanders, ordered to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, were nonplussed: compliance with such an order was impossible unless units were mobilized, for the men comprising the units, until called up, were following their daily civil vocations. At least six hours would be required to muster them armed and in uniform on the local parade ground, and for many rural regiments twenty-four hours or more. Their duties, in accordance with each District defence scheme, included the maintenance of guards, patrols or piquets at vulnerable points: on armouries, military stores and magazines, over prisoners of war, and on harbours, dry-docks, bridges, grain elevators, locks and canals, power-plants, waterworks, wireless stations and railway terminals. By 7th August all were in position; prior to their posting, a measure of protection, as already noted, had been provided at some of the most critical points by the Dominion Police.

The most important public utility to be safeguarded was that part of the canal system under the control of the Dominion Government, which connected the Great Lakes with tide-water– the St. Lawrence river group, embracing the Lachine, Soulanges, Cornwall, Williamsburg, Welland and Sault Ste. Marie canals, and totalling 74 miles with 49 locks. Considerable numbers of troops were employed for the guarding of these waterways; the largest single body was the special
force organized for the protection of the Welland canal, with a length of 27 miles and 26 locks. Its strength in the open season was about 1,000 but, as in the case of other waterways protective bodies, numbers were reduced during the winter months when navigation was closed.

In Military District No. 11, as elsewhere, the provisions of the defence scheme were complied with, but the reported presence of two German light cruisers off the Pacific coast gave rise to popular apprehensions of attack on Vancouver, Victoria or Prince Rupert. For the next three weeks there was widespread alarm, the banks shipped their gold reserves to Seattle or Winnipeg and arranged to burn their paper currency if the Germans landed, and some people fled inland. On 8th August the D.O.C. was ordered to “be ready at a moment’s notice to mobilize all troops on the coast to guard every coal dock.” Two days later the Leipzig was definitely located at San Francisco and it was also reported that the Nürnberg had sailed from Honolulu on the 27th July for an unknown destination: the Minister of Militia directed that the whole of the Active Militia in B.C. be called out and concentrated at Victoria, Vancouver, New Westminster, Nanaimo and Prince Rupert. Major Lipsett, G.S.O., Western Canada, was called upon to consult local commanders and to submit a report. He arrived at the conclusion that in view of the difficulties of the channels, the presence of the two submarines (which received their torpedoes by rail from Halifax on 15th August) and the land forces already stationed, an attack at any point, other than Prince Rupert which was undefended, was unlikely. As a result of this appreciation, detachments totalling 350 of all ranks from two Vancouver infantry regiments were sent on 15th and 22nd August to Prince Rupert, thereby arousing the open chagrin of the citizens, for the local militia unit existed on paper only. For defence by sea the Rainbow, which arrived on 21st August, patrolled the Dixon Entrance and neighbouring waters. Meanwhile the militia units throughout the province were
mobilized at peace strength; to reinforce the artillery, the Cobourg Heavy Battery, which on the 5th had been sent to Quebec, arrived at Vancouver on 14th August and remained until 10th September. Although the British light cruiser *Newcastle*, more powerful than the *Leipzig*, had arrived at Esquimalt on 22nd August, and the Japanese armoured cruiser *Idzumo* was also in the neighbourhood, the local units were held under arms until 12th September, when all but the 30th B.C. Horse – which would neither volunteer to serve dismounted nor disperse – were demobilized. Details maintaining guards and piquets remained on duty as in other Districts.

On the Atlantic coast, a meditated attack by Austrian steamships on the important wireless station at Glace Bay was reported on 4th August in a cable from the Colonial Office, and resulted in the hurried despatch of the maintenance crew of the *Niobe* – “a carpenter, a petty officer, a seaman and a gunner” – followed by special train at 3 a.m. on the 5th by a detachment of naval volunteers, 43 strong with two field guns and two maxim machine guns, from Halifax. A military detachment of 30 was, however, already on the spot, provided under the local defence scheme, and the naval detachment was withdrawn two days later.

The orders for the 9,000 militiamen on guard duty were the same from coast to coast:

Militiamen employed in the protection of public works, buildings, etc. will not hesitate to take effective measures to prevent the perpetration of malicious injury; and should sentries, piquets, or patrols be obliged to use their weapons and open fire, their aim will be directed at and not (to the danger of peaceable citizens) over the heads of offending parties.

**AERIAL NAVIGATION REGULATIONS**

Reports and rumours of strange aircraft flying in the vicinity of areas under military guard led to the immediate consideration of a new military arm, and later to the issue of the first regulations to control aerial navigation over Canada.
Meanwhile, in the absence of restrictive orders and to avoid international complications with the United States, where most of the machines were owned, the guards were instructed not to fire upon them. By Order in Council of 17th September (P.C. 2389) flying within ten miles of thirty-nine wireless stations and nineteen other places in Canada – including most of the cities – was prohibited. Under this Order, also, aircraft might not enter Canada except across the southern boundary. Landing areas for aircraft coming from outside Canada were restricted to eleven, distributed across the breadth of the country. Clearance certificates from officers commanding Military Districts were required before a voyage could be resumed, and the carrying of prohibited goods – explosives, firearms, photographic apparatus, carrier or homing pigeons and mails – was forbidden. The passage of foreign military or naval aircraft, other than Allied, was prohibited. Contravention of these provisions was declared punishable by a fine not exceeding $5,000 and imprisonment up to five years, but the Minister of Militia and Defence might for special reasons grant exemptions to such persons as he might deem expedient. 35

ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICE

Conditions on the North American continent were particularly favourable for the operations of the German secret service system, and passage across the boundary between Canada and the United States was practically unrestricted for the native-born of both countries. In the United States about one-eighth of the population was of German extraction; 2,501,181 had actually been born in Germany. In Canada conditions were similar, there were 393,320 of German extraction, though only 39,577 of German birth. The majority were employees of railway, steamship, construction or commercial companies. Others were in business for themselves; still others had taken up land and there were a number in the direct employ of the Dominion, provincial and
municipal Governments, so that there was no section of the community in which a German agent might not have been planted without exciting the least suspicion.

Of Austro-Hungarian birth there were 190,000 in Canada, sixty thousand of whom had been naturalized. That total, however, included many thousands of Galicians, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Slavs, Ukranians and Ruthenians, from whom there was nothing to fear, for they were opposed to the dominant German-Magyar element then in control of the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the true German-Magyar also very little trouble was experienced.

The widely ramified German system in North America was controlled from New York; the channel of communication with local agents was either through the consular service, or business houses, or direct; and, as in Europe, the identity of agents was carefully concealed each from the other. There were differences between the functioning of the system in Canada and in Europe, on account of the assumption that Canada would not participate in a British war and of her potentialities as a German colony; activities were directed to the furthering of that end.\footnote{36}

At the outbreak of war the North American system was administered by Captain Karl Boy-Ed and Captain Franz von Papen, Naval and Military Attachés, respectively, with offices in New York. They had large funds at their disposal. From New York information collected in Canada and elsewhere was transmitted, largely by wireless, to Germany. From the same offices propaganda was disseminated, including copy for the German newspapers in Canada, and there in New York was also centred the organization for the development of unrest, particularly in factories; there plans were laid for the destruction of materials and buildings and for the interruption of communications, and there, too, armed raids into Canadian territory were planned. Due largely to the vigilance of the United States authorities none of these raids materialized. Aware of the difficulty of gathering sufficient
evidence to bring to trial wary agents who avoided open violation of neutrality laws, the Secret Service of the United States investigated every clue.

There was a political as well as a military reason for active German operations against Canada. On the 5th August the Chief of the German General Staff wrote to the Foreign Office:

The feeling in America is friendly to Germany. American public opinion is indignant at the shameful manner in which we have been treated. Every effort must be made to take advantage of this feeling. Important personages in the German colony must be urged to influence the press still more in our favour. Perhaps the United States can be persuaded to undertake a naval war against England, in return for which Canada beckons to them as the prize of victory.  

THE FIRST CONTINGENT

From Buckingham Palace on the eve of war there came to Canada a message from the King:

I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support, recalled to me the generous self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibilities which rest upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God. GEORGE R.I.  

This was received by the Governor General, who replied in the name of the Dominion of Canada thanking His Majesty for his gracious message of approval, and assuring him that “Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and tradition of our Empire.”

On the fateful 4th of August, 1914, when hope could no longer be entertained in London that war might be averted, the Secretary of State cabled that, though there seemed to be
no immediate necessity for an expeditionary force from Canada, he thought it would be wise to take steps by which such a force could be provided in case it should be required later. Explicit acceptance of a Canadian military force as projected on 2nd August was not long delayed; on 6th August a telegram was received in Ottawa:

His Majesty’s Government gratefully accept your offer to send expeditionary force to this country, and would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

The Cabinet took immediate action and passed an order that:

In view of the state of war now existing between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies of the British Empire on the one side, and Germany on the other side, creating a menace to the well-being and integrity of the Empire and having regard to the duty of the Dominion of Canada as one of those Dominions to provide for its own defence and to assist in maintaining the integrity and honour of the Empire, that it is desirable to mobilize Militia units of the various arms of the service of such effective strength as may from time to time be determined by Your Royal Highness in Council, such units to be composed of officers and men who are willing to volunteer for Overseas service under the British Crown; to organize and equip them for war and to make and perfect all arrangements necessary to enable them to enlist and be enrolled for service under His Majesty’s Government, should that Government so desire.

At the same time the Governor General authorized the raising of units and their concentration at some point to be selected by the Minister of Militia.

THE FIRST CALL

In his turn the Minister of Militia lost no time in putting the order into effect. Contrary to usual military procedure but in conformity with the method he had adopted, he ordered the Adjutant-General to issue a night lettergram direct to the commanders of units of the Canadian Militia – 226 in number – embracing all except cavalry, and repeated the
message to the headquarters of the nine Divisions and Districts as follows:—

For your information the following telegram has been despatched to all Officers Commanding units of the Active Militia, non-permanent, with the exception of Cavalry: Regulations to govern raising of a contingent for Overseas service will be as follows. The force will be Imperial and have the status of British regular troops. Enrolment will be voluntary for all ranks. Physical qualifications will be as follows. Artillery. Height Gunners 5 feet 7 inches and over. Drivers 5 feet 3 inches Chest not less than 34½. Engineers. Height Sappers 5 feet 4 inches and over. Pioneers 5 feet 7 inches and over. Drivers 5 feet 4 inches and over. Chest not less than 34½. Infantry. Height 5 feet 3 inches and over. Chest not less than 33½. Army Service Corps Horse Tran. Drivers 5 feet 3 inches and over. Supply and M.T. Branch 5 feet 3 inches and over. Chest 33½. Army Medical Corps. Height 5 feet 3 inches and over. Chest not less than 33½. The age limit will be 18-45 years. In regard to musketry and general proficiency a high standard will be required. The term of service will be for the duration of the war. Other considerations being equal applicants will be selected in the following order. Unmarried men. Married men without families. Married men with families. Officers on the Reserve and others with military experience who although not belonging to the Active Militia fulfil the foregoing requirements are eligible. The senior officers of units will through officers commanding companies, etc. collect the names of volunteers officers non-commissioned officers and men who should be medically examined by an Army Medical Corps officer where available. When all the names have been received officers commanding units will submit direct to Militia Headquarters descriptive rolls of those who have passed the required medical examination. After the rolls have been received the quota to be found by each unit will be determined and Commanding Officers will be given instructions as to numbers required from their respective units. The individuality of each unit will be preserved as far as possible. Rolls to be prepared without delay so as to reach Militia Headquarters not later than Wednesday 12th instant. The intention is to mobilize a contingent at Val Cartier, P.Q., where to secure the selection of the fittest more men will be assembled than in the first instance will
be required to embark. Acknowledge receipt by wire.  

Prior to receipt of this message early on 7th August, unit commanders, unable to get information from District headquarters, had to rely upon what they could glean from the newspapers; some, in anticipation, had already begun to recruit their units up to war strength and when the message came were in a position to proceed without delay. Artillery and infantry brigade commanders were not informed until the 8th, on which day a message permitted them with their staffs to volunteer. On the same day officers commanding infantry regiments were notified that not more than 125 men with officers would be accepted, either from rural regiments or from city corps of small cities. This message aroused indignation in a number of units; there was no generally accepted definition of a "small city," and in some places more than 125 had been enrolled. The statement that final selection would be made at Valcartier caused men in good paying employment to hesitate before throwing up jobs which would not be held open for them pending a decision as to whether or not they were selected for the contingent.

With the exception of the Divisional Cavalry Squadron of 196 all ranks, which the 19th Alberta Dragoons had been warned to provide on 6th August, no consideration had been given to cavalry units because cavalry was “not required.” Due to representations made, a message similar to that sent to infantry units on the 6th was sent from Ottawa direct to 163 regimental and squadron commanders of cavalry units on the 10th. This provided for the enrolment of cavalry as infantry and on the same conditions: some cavalry units, anticipating this, had meanwhile been recruiting for the other arms and services. The enlistment of volunteers within an area where no militia units existed was provided for next day in a message to Districts that officers were authorized to recruit picked men for service in the First Contingent “or
STATUS OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

As already shown by the message of 2nd August,\textsuperscript{17} the status of the volunteers, and of the force as a whole, early attracted the attention of the authorities at Ottawa, because it was important that all should be legally subject to military law. There was no doubt that corps of the Active Militia placed on active service in Canada could be brought under military law by Order in Council as provided in the Militia Act, but there was doubt whether the overseas expeditionary force contemplated would fulfil the qualification of the said Act as to defence:–

The Governor in Council may place the Militia, or any part thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, and also beyond Canada, for the defence thereof, at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of emergency. (Militia Act, section 69, 4 E. VII, c. 23, s. 70.)

A request was therefore made on 5th August that the King should bring the volunteers under sections 175 and 176 of the Army Act,\textsuperscript{41} which was met when His Majesty on 9th August ordered the Governor General to raise the troops for service as an expeditionary force.\textsuperscript{46} Consequently every recruit for that force, when attested, was cautioned that he would be subject to the Army Act.\textsuperscript{88}

In the first call for volunteers issued on 6th August\textsuperscript{44} it had been declared “the force will be Imperial and have the status of British regular troops,” and the statement was repeated in Militia Order 372 of 17th August.\textsuperscript{60} Not until September 1916 was it realized that the C.E.F. was not, in fact, “Imperial” – i.e. raised by His Majesty beyond the limits of the United Kingdom and of India to form part, for the time being, of the regular forces; and paid and maintained from an annual vote by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It was, \textit{per contra}, a force raised by order of the King in one of His Overseas Dominions, to form part, for the time being, of the Armies of the British Empire, and paid for and main-
ELABORATION AND CHANGES

At Ottawa changes in the form and strength of the Contingent rapidly followed the issue of the first call. The Army Council on 7th August had stated that “one Division would be suitable composition of expeditionary force.” Acting upon this, the Minister of Militia contemplated concentrating at Valcartier a maximum force of one infantry division at British war establishment, minus a howitzer brigade but plus 10 per cent. details to be left at overseas base, plus another 10 per cent. “to serve as a margin for selection and to provide a nucleus for further reinforcements.” The total of all ranks including certain lines of communication units would be about 25,000, and authority for the composition was granted by Order in Council. This number was, however, to be greatly increased. On 7th August a separate offer of four units of a thousand men each was made to His Majesty’s Government: one infantry battalion of ex-regulars raised and equipped by Capt. A. Hamilton Gault and one unit raised and equipped by the province of New Brunswick, one by the province of Manitoba and one by the city of Calgary. A further offer was made of one regular cavalry regiment and two regular horse artillery batteries, which could be sent at short notice. Other lines of communication units, not included in the 25,000, were also added later. In general reply, “His Majesty’s Government gratefully accepted all the additional units offered,” – the total was now over 30,000 – and, having done so, arranged that, to expedite correspondence, all details of a military character relating to contingents should be dealt with direct in communication between the Army Council and the Minister of Militia.

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

Although the rolls of those who had passed the required medical examination were not due from officers command-
ing units until the 12th August, yet by the 10th the Minister of Militia, realizing that the selection of over 25,000 individuals by the perusal of descriptive rolls at Ottawa, as at first intended, would be slow if not impracticable, brought Districts into the scheme through instructions which, by setting out the divisional formations and units each must furnish, established the number and category of all ranks required from each. This was the first appearance of a new plan which, although modified and developed, eventually was not dissimilar to the scheme of 1911, except that on account of the large number of recent British immigrants, particularly in the western provinces, and their readiness to volunteer, the distribution of units was changed. Quotas were now allotted by District headquarters to militia unit commanders, each of whom made his own selection of volunteers and prepared four copies of his nominal roll – one copy each to Ottawa, to District H.Q. and to the Commandant, Valcartier, and one for himself. Three days after the instructions as to distribution were issued, they were modified in the following terms: “the exact allotment will necessarily depend on the numbers volunteering; consequently this statement should be looked upon in the light of a general guide only”, but Districts and units, in no position to appraise the probable extent of modification, could only abide by the original figures. In more than one city quotas were unevenly distributed, some regiments being allowed to supply twice as many recruits as others, and this led to charges of discrimination and augured that certain regiments would proceed overseas as units.

Further directions by telephone, telegraph or letter were sent from Ottawa – sometimes direct to units, sometimes to commanders of Districts, and sometimes to their heads of services or departments, and applied as received. Commanders, accustomed to receiving instructions through the usual channels, repeatedly found during the last three weeks of August that military activities were taking place, by direc-
tion of Militia Headquarters, within their commands but without their knowledge. A protest from a divisional com-
mmander at this period is on record:–

Your attention is invited to the fact that orders have so far been given out not only by wire, but also apparently through the telephone, by Heads of Departments at Head-
quarters to myself as well as to Heads of Departments of this Division. Am I to act on orders received indistinctly from Heads of Services and Departments at Headquarters, other than the Director of Artillery, for which definite instructions have been received and noted?

The Minister of Militia explained in the House of Commons, 29th January 1916, his reasons for departure from the ordinary plan at this time:–

For the first contingent, our recruiting plans were I think different from anything that had ever occurred before. There was really a call to arms, like the fiery cross passing through the Highlands of Scotland or the mountains of Ireland in former days. In place of being forwarded to the district offi-
cers commanding, the word was wired to every officer commanding a unit in any part of Canada to buckle on his harness and get busy. The consequence was that in a short time we had the boys on the way for the first contingent, whereas it would have taken several weeks to have got the word around through the ordinary channels. Under that plan the contingent was practically on the way to Europe before it could have been mobilized under the ordinary plan.12

This is the picture as described by the Minister; but the simile is inept. The majority of volunteers joined through existing military units as in other countries and as previously in Canada. The time required to warn militiamen through the usual military channels would have been a matter of hours, not “several weeks”; even in 1866, when there were few telegraph lines and no telephone, a force of 14,000 Canadian Militia was twice actually under arms within twenty-four hours; it could have been 30,000 in twice the time, and all had received their orders from the proper source.52

From 11th August volunteering was not restricted to members of the Active Militia or the Permanent Force; but
any volunteers not belonging thereto were to be enrolled in the Canadian Militia forthwith. Enlistment into the Canadian Expeditionary Force was to be made at Valcartier. Next day, in view of the non-completion of medical examination in many cases, it was directed that volunteering need not be closed until orders for mobilization at Valcartier were issued. Commanding officers were to assemble all medically fit volunteers for the Overseas Expeditionary Force at local corps headquarters for instructional purposes, commencing 12th August; pay, field allowance, and subsistence to be at militia rates for active service – the first $1.00 per day for privates, the second 10 cents, and the last 75c. Civil servants who might be called out with their militia units or who might be given leave to join the C.E.F. would, in addition to military emoluments, continue to receive their regular salaries, but were subject to recall. Some private firms made a similar generous concession to their employees; others guaranteed re-instatement.

On 14th August the following wire from the Adjutant-General was received by officers commanding Districts, and communicated to all concerned:–

D.G.M.S. urgently advises that volunteers be inoculated for typhoid. Use only vaccine from Ontario Board of Health. Requisition by wire Chief Health Officer Toronto. Make entry on every man’s paper and report daily to Militia Headquarters giving names.

The important restriction, removed a year later, was made on 14th August that no married man should enlist without the consent of his wife: a fruitful source of marital troubles, for hundreds of married men had already volunteered, and some were constrained to feign celibacy, while some wives refused consent.

The quotas allotted through District commanders did not include artillery; the militia units required to supply quotas for that arm were selected by the Director of Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel E. W. B. Morrison, D.S.O. Having called to his assistance Captain C. F. Constantine, Instructor at the
Royal School of Gunnery, Kingston, he communicated direct with battery commanders and informed District commanders of action taken. The field artillery was to be constituted from thirteen militia field batteries, each of which would contribute one or two sections, and the heavy artillery from units of the regiment at Montreal, Saint John, N.B., Charlottetown and Quebec. Brigade, battery and ammunition column headquarters were specifically allotted. The artillery quotas were ordered, on 14th August, to mobilize at war strength at local headquarters; militia equipment – including guns, vehicles and harness – would be made use of, and additional requirements would be requisitioned through Districts; horses to complete establishment were to be purchased locally by batteries. Each unit was called upon to send a fifty-word lettergram every night detailing the progress made “towards arriving at a war footing.”

The Minister of Militia repeatedly insisted that service should be entirely voluntary; in several public pronouncements he disclosed his concept of the magnitude of the coming struggle, and his conjecture of twenty more contingents – preposterous though it then seemed – was eventually almost realized. On 12th August, in addressing 5,000 soldiers in Montreal – the garrison and volunteers for overseas – he referred to the terms of service and also to future contingents, and ten days later in the House of Commons, in reply to a question whether the Militia as a body would be asked to go overseas, he said “I do not read in the law that I have any authority to ask Parliament to allow troops other than volunteers to leave the country.”

For all arms and services recruiting offices were opened at unit headquarters, usually in the local armoury. Medical examination was carried out on the spot, in accordance with militia standards and for the most part by the medical officer of the unit; frequently volunteers were advised that a minor operation would make them fit for active service, and many, availing themselves of free treatment offered by dentists at
this time, had their teeth treated to fulfil requirements. Occa-
sionally premises were rented in a more favourable locality,
and recruiting parties covered not only their own regimental
area but also – with or without authority – entered the terri-
tory of units not called upon to supply a quota. Volunteers
were accommodated locally, sometimes in their own homes,
sometimes in armouries or drill halls, sometimes in rented
buildings and sometimes in tented camps.\textsuperscript{58a} As their mili-
tary experience—or lack of it—appeared to warrant, recruits
were put through squad drill, musketry or section gun drill
by officers or N.C.Os. They paraded in the local armoury
and drilled on the local race track, fair grounds or public
park if consent could be obtained from the civil authorities to
use amusement grounds for military purposes.

A telegram sent by the A.G. to officers commanding
Districts on 15th August exposes the condition then prevail-
ing:–

Report by wire immediately on state of preparedness of
volunteers, medically fit from each unit in your district or
division, and when they will be ready to entrain for Valcartier
Camp. Rural Corps will move first. From what station
will transport rural corps be required. Instructions as to
movement city corps and artillery will be given you later.
The Quartermaster-General will give you instructions as to
transport, but all must be prepared to move at the earliest
possible moment. No delay is permitted. The railways will
accept your telegraphic orders for transport when necessary.
Men will not bring rifles. Those without uniform will pro-
ceed in civilian clothes. Artillery units will mobilize at local
Headquarters. Other arms will be issued with clothing and
equipment at Valcartier Camp.\textsuperscript{59}

Militia units had, as far as possible, supplied uniforms to
volunteers from regimental stores. Two Highland militia
regiments – the 5th and 48th – completed the clothing and
outfitting of their contingents locally, and the expense in-
curred – $51,361.78 – was later made good in full by the
Department of Militia. Another regiment – the 2\textsuperscript{nd} – which
asked for similar local provision, was told “your unit will be
clothed at Valcartier.” On 17th August Districts were instructed by telegram that:—

Militiamen will take with them from regimental stores only the following uniform: Serge jackets, serge trousers or pantaloons with leggings and forage caps. Where Militiamen have drab greatcoats they will bring them along. As to equipment they will bring from regimental stores Oliver Equipment, Water Bottles and Bandoliers where in possession. They will bring neither rifles nor side arms.

On the same day a Militia Order consolidated, under seventeen heads, provisional instructions for general guidance in mobilization: most of these items had already been covered and have already been explained, others were in the nature of a forecast and will be dealt with later.

The progress of recruiting was reported daily to Ottawa. On 18th August the volunteers for the C.E.F. numbered 26,250 contributed as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisional Area</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Divisional Area, Western Ontario, H.Q. London</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Divisional Area, Central Ontario, H.Q. Toronto</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>5,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Divisional Area, Eastern Ontario, H.Q. Kingston</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Divisional Area, Western Quebec, H.Q. Montreal</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Divisional Area, Eastern Quebec, H.Q. Quebec</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Divisional Area, Maritime Provinces, H.Q. Halifax</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.D. No. 10, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, H.Q. Winnipeg</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>5,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.D. No. 11, British Columbia and Yukon, H.Q. Victoria</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>3,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.D. No. 13, Alberta, H.Q. Calgary</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Details</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>24,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the same day commanders of the Eastern Districts – 1st to 6th Divisional Areas – were warned by the Adjutant-General that the forwarding of rural troops, except artillery, would begin on the morning of the 20th. Two days later commanding officers of the Western Districts – Nos. 10, 11 and 13 – were notified to begin forwarding all troops at the earliest possible moment. On 21st August the Eastern Districts were further directed as to the movement of City
Corps, except artillery:–

Arrange for movement to Valcartier at earliest possible moment of all details of City Corps except artillery. All departures to be timed so that troops will arrive at Valcartier by daylight. Wire me and Camp Commandant, Valcartier, names of regiments, their strength and probable hour of arrival at Valcartier. Further instructions concerning artillery will be duly sent you.  

This holding of artillery units at local headquarters for an extra week was caused by the number of infantry volunteers, which exceeded the estimate, making extension of the accommodation at Valcartier necessary.

The British authorities were naturally anxious to know the date on which the Canadian force would be ready to embark; the reply to their first enquiry of the 13th August was deferred for a week until the situation was clearer, then the message was sent: “The C.E.F. expect by the middle of September to be ready to embark”. As will later appear, this expectation was optimistic by ten days.

The figures for enlistment were now 27,842 but in order that the force might benefit by the enthusiasm of the West a personal private wire was sent in clear, at 8.55 a.m., on the 21st, to the commanders of Military Districts 10, 11 and 13:

PRIVATE. First overseas division completed but additional corps are now called for. Please send all extra good men up to five hundred from your district for infantry. Forward with present corps or immediately thereafter.

SAM HUGHES.

This was confirmed in the evening by a code wire from the Adjutant-General to the Districts concerned. At the same time the recruiting of one officer and fifty N.C.Os. and men of the Winnipeg Field Battery was authorized, and one officer and twenty-five men from the Lethbridge Field Battery.

VALCARTIER CAMP

The desirability of acquiring a site for a central training area for the militia of the province of Quebec had attracted
the attention of the Minister of Militia in June 1912, and a departmental committee examined the possibilities of five alternative sites. In November of that year he instructed a land agent – Mr. William McBain, a Quebec-born land and real estate broker, whose great grandfather had fought under Wolfe and who had purchased property in the West for corporations and railways – to obtain options on an area of 4,391 acres on the Canadian Northern Railway about 16 miles northwest of the city of Quebec. Owing to the acquisition of earlier options on some of the property by speculators, these instructions were held in abeyance until June 1913 when the agent, by direction of the Minister, proceeded to purchase lands within the selected area in his own name and to hold them in trust for the Department of Militia and Defence, receiving five per cent. commission on the purchase price ($82,775). Acquisition of the property by the Minister on behalf of the Government – by expropriation if necessary –, and payment of the agent, were authorized by Order in Council (P.C. 1620 of 20.vi.1914). The sum required for the construction of the camp was estimated at $10,000 to $15,000.

The use of the camp for the concentration, organization and training of the Canadian Expeditionary Force of 25,000, instead of for the annual training of some 5,000 Militia, made necessary the immediate acquisition of adjacent lands, and another Order in Council (P.C. 2214 of 27.viii.1914) provided for this acquisition by expropriation or negotiation, of 10,116 arpents, mostly west of the river, at a cost not to exceed $140,000. The 125 owners would be compensated for the immediate vacating of their properties and for damage to crops, upon a fair and just valuation not to exceed 15 per cent. of the purchase price.

The agent was gazetted Honorary Lieut.-Colonel, 10th August 1914, and by 31st March 1915 had received $17,763.95 in commission, and also expenses of $13,617.25 in addition to pay of his rank. The eventual area of the camp
in 1918 was 12,428 acres and the cost of purchase $428,131.67

On 4th August 1914, the Cabinet having already decided that there should be an Overseas Expeditionary Force and the Minister of Militia having chosen Valcartier as the place of muster, the ground was inspected by the Assistant Director of Works and Buildings, Major A. P. Deroche, R.C.E., who reported upon the layout of a camp, the construction of a 400-yard rifle range of 1,500 third-class 4-foot targets, and a water supply. He stated that the only way to complete the range in time was by utilising the plant and labour personnel of the contracting firm then building the new Connaught rifle range ten miles west of Ottawa, and he recommended acceptance of the offer of the contractors, Messrs. Bate & McMahon, to do the work on a cost basis plus 14 per cent. His estimate was $20 per target. The water required, estimated at 500,000 gallons per day, could be obtained by pumping from the Jacques Cartier river into two water mains – one 6-inch, the other 4-inch – laid in ploughed trenches and fitted with thirty hydrants 500 feet apart through which further distribution would be made by hose. His report was approved next day by the Minister.

The site was a sandy terraced plateau, some thirty feet above the level of the river which bordered the area on the west; rocky wooded hills rose a thousand feet above the plain on the northern and eastern boundaries. Along the river was a belt of woodland, the remainder, interspersed with patches of scrub, swamp and standing timber, was farm land, originally settled when grants were made to British soldiers after the capture of Quebec. The Minister inspected the area and it was decided that the cleared parts to the east and south should be reserved for rifle ranges and parade ground, and that the section by the river should be cleared and graded for the camping ground.

The work of construction was begun on 8th August by Messrs. Bate and McMahon who were given the main con-
tract. All the preparations were prosecuted with vigour by the Minister who had said the camp must be ready for occupation by 20th August. The Director General of Engineer Services, Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Maunsell, was responsible for the awarding of contracts and his staff supervised the work; but the water supply and electrical installation were made the responsibility of Mr. William Price, a prominent citizen and former federal member for Quebec, Chairman of the Harbour Commission, and for whom the Minister obtained a commission as lieut.-colonel in the Canadian Militia (27.viii.14); for his services he received no remuneration but was named Knight Bachelor in the next New Year’s honours list. He placed the supervision of construction work in the hands of his business colleague, Mr. James M. McCarthy, B.Sc. (Hon. lieut.-colonel 10.viii.14), a civil engineer of wide experience.

Two electrically driven pumps, one centrifugal, the other plunger, of 500,000 and 1,000,000 gallons capacity per day, were installed on the river bank; the place of intake had to be changed before the water was laid on as the first spot chosen was close to the outlet of a private sewer. Power, taken from the transmission line which ran through the area from the Quebec Light and Power Company’s generating station near St. Gabriel, was transformed from 2,500 to 550 volts. While the pumps were being installed a fire engine, borrowed from the Quebec City Fire Department, was used to supply pressure and later retained for use in emergency. Before entering the cast-iron mains which ran through the camp, all water was treated by injecting a chlorinated mixture from two heavy iron storage tanks of 500 gallons capacity each; this simple, economical and satisfactory system was supervised by Lieut-Colonel G. G. Nasmith, Ph.D, Analytical Chemist, Director of Municipal Laboratories, Toronto, for whom a commission had been obtained to enable him to take “full charge of the sanitation of the water supply at Valcartier Camp.” To the main water system were also
connected two 50,000 gallon tanks of 3-inch pine on 50-foot steel towers; automatic altitude valves were fitted to close off the tanks when extremely high pressure might be required for pumping direct in case of fire. At the distribution end and fed by permanent branches from the mains about 200 ablution tables, 12 feet long, and 80 screened shower baths on concrete bases, were constructed. For drainage of the camp site, and also of a small lake and swampy area at the northern end, 28,000 feet of pipe, ranging in size from 4-inch to 15-inch, was laid with proper fall below frost and with cedar-frame manholes about every 300 feet.

The main avenue, side roads and camping ground were electrically lighted from the transmission line. A telephone system was put in to connect each unit with camp headquarters, and the latter direct with Quebec; two private telegraph companies also installed special wires from camp headquarters to Quebec.

The new railway installation for the camp involved the laying of 20,000 feet of track, including one ambulance and three private car sidings, and the construction of two end-ramps and three loading platforms 244, 320 and 380 feet long. This work, together with the building of a freight shed 100 by 30 feet, was done by the Canadian Northern Railway and paid for by the Government.

Of semi-permanent buildings there were constructed Ordnance buildings of corrugated iron alongside the railway aggregating 800 by 48 feet, and two similar Army Service Corps buildings 200 by 36 feet and 250 by 48 feet for accommodation of the food supply. A permanent building was erected as a residence for the Minister, the pump house and chlorinating building were also permanent. Non-permanent construction included a pay office, transport office and buildings for fumigation of clothing. Suitable farm buildings were altered for office use; others were demolished.

The original proposal for the construction of the rifle range by personnel and plant brought from the Connaught
ranges was carried out; a special train arrived on 7th August with machinery, tools and 125 men headed by the works superintendent, Mr. R. S. Low – a member of the firm, gazetted hon. lieut-colonel, 11th August 1914 – and the first sod was turned next day. Hart Hill, rising abruptly 1,000 feet above the plain, was advantageously used as a natural background and stop-butt. One thousand targets were ready by 13th August; by 22nd August there stretched across the plain a line of 1,500 fibre board targets, over 2½ miles long and complete with target requisites, target houses and danger signs.

The main avenue ran straight through the middle of the camp for a mile; along each side was a 6-foot ditch, bridged at suitable intervals. Twelve car loads of crushed stone, and a steam-roller brought from Petawawa, were used to improve the soft sections, and to surface side roads and the roadways about the railway station where traffic was heavy.

The total expenditure on the engineering construction of Valcartier Camp was $185,436.50; this sum included $3,824.19 maintenance costs to the closing down of the camp for the winter on 9th October 1914.68

THE SPECIAL SESSION

As stated in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Special Session on 18th August, grave events vitally affecting all His Majesty’s Dominions had taken place since prorogation. Reference has been made to the extraordinary measures taken for the defence of Canada and for the maintenance of the honour and integrity of the Empire; some of these required legislative sanction, and other bills authorizing additional measures were to be presented. Estimates to provide for war expenditure would also be laid before the Commons. The Governor General concluded the Speech in the following words:–

The critical period into which we have just entered has aroused to the full the patriotism and loyalty which have always actuated the Canadian people. From every Province
and indeed from every community the response to the call of duty has been all that could be desired. The spirit which thus animates Canada inspires also His Majesty’s Dominions throughout the world; and we may be assured that united action to repel the common danger will not fail to strengthen the ties that bind together those vast Dominions in the possession and enjoyment of the blessings of British liberty. As representative of His Majesty the King, I must add my expression of thanks and admiration for the splendid spirit of patriotism and generosity that has been displayed throughout the length and breadth of the Dominion.

In moving the adoption by the Senate of the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, the Hon. J. Bolduc spoke of responsibility for the war, of the unity of the British peoples and of Canada’s fortunate position as a part of the Empire; he also referred to the attitude of French Canadian citizens. Subsequently, the leader of the Opposition in the Upper House, the Hon. H. Bostock, spoke briefly of the Canadian position; the leader of the Government, the Hon. J. A. Lougheed, spoke at greater length.

In the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the motion for the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, the leaders of both political parties voiced the sentiments not only of Parliament but of the country at large. The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, first recited the circumstances leading up to the war and continued with an explanation of the extraordinary precautions the Government had been obliged to take. He concluded with the words:–

In the awful dawn of the greatest war the world has ever known, in the hour when peril confronts us such as this empire has not faced for a hundred years, every vain or unnecessary word seems a discord. As to our duty, all are agreed; we stand shoulder to shoulder with Britain and the other British dominions in this quarrel. And that duty we shall not fail to fulfil as the honour of Canada demands. Not for love of battle, not for lust of conquest, not for greed of possessions, but for the cause of honour, to maintain solemn pledges, to uphold principles of liberty, to withstand forces that would convert the world into an armed camp; yea, in the very name of the peace that we sought at any cost save that
of dishonour, we have entered into this war; and, while gravely conscious of the tremendous issues involved and of all the sacrifices that they may entail, we do not shrink from them, but with firm hearts we abide the event.  

The goodwill and unanimity which prevailed throughout the short session is manifest in the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in which he gave assurance that party criticism would be suspended “so long as there is danger at the front,” and further declared:

It is our duty, more pressing upon us than all other duties, at once, on this first day of this extraordinary session of the Canadian Parliament, to let Great Britain know, and to let the friends and foes of Great Britain know, that there is in Canada but one mind and one heart, and that all Canadians stand behind the mother country conscious and proud that she has engaged in this war, not from any selfish motive, for any purpose of aggrandisement, but to maintain untarnished the honour of her name, to fulfil her obligations to her allies, to maintain her treaty obligations, and to save civilization from the unbridled lust of conquest and domination.

We are British subjects, and to-day we are face to face with the consequences which are involved in that proud fact. Long we have enjoyed the benefits of our British citizenship; to-day it is our duty to accept its responsibilities and its sacrifices. We have long said that when Great Britain is at war we are at war; to-day we realize that Great Britain is at war and that Canada is at war also.

Before the Orders of the Day were called at the third sitting the Prime Minister addressed to the Speaker a formal announcement to the House:

In view of the urgent conditions confronting Canada, in common with the rest of the Empire, by reason of the outbreak of war, the Government consider it highly important that His Royal Highness Field-Marshal the Duke of Connaught should continue to give to Canada the benefit of his services as Governor General. His knowledge of conditions in Canada and his wide experience in public and military affairs render his services especially valuable at this juncture. It has accordingly been arranged, at the request of the Canadian Government, with the full approval of His Majesty the King and the Imperial Government, that His Royal
Highness’s term of office shall be indefinitely extended during the continuance of the war. His Royal Highness had made all arrangements to leave Canada at the conclusion of his extended term of office on the 22nd October, but, with the high sense of duty which has always actuated him, he has placed himself at the disposal of His Majesty for this purpose.76

Of the eight bills passed, four were emergency legislation necessitated by the war. The most conspicuous was the War Measures Act, corresponding in some respects to the contemporary British Defence of the Realm Act. It ratified all acts done by authority of the Governor in Council on or after 1st August 1914. It authorized the Governor in Council to make orders and regulations for “the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada”: this section embraced censorship, arrest and deportation, control of harbours, territorial waters and the movements of vessels, control of transportation by land, air or water; it extended to trading and manufacture and provided for the complete control of property. Other sections dealt with alien enemies, the Royal North West Mounted Police and immigration. It declared proclamation to be evidence of existence or non-existence of war and, further, that war had existed since 4th August 1914. The War Appropriation Act authorized the expenditure of $50,000,000 for defence and security, for naval and military operations, for promoting trade and industry by insurance against war risks and otherwise, and for any measures deemed necessary by the Governor in Council, who was empowered to raise the money by loan or otherwise. The Finance Act, designed to support commercial and financial interests, provided for advances to Chartered Banks, for the payment by banks in notes instead of gold, and for the issue by banks of excess circulation; it also suspended the redemption in gold of Dominion notes. Finally it authorized the proclamation of a moratorium—a power that was exercised later to a very limited degree. The fourth emergency enactment incorporated “The Canadian Patriotic Fund” to collect,
administer and distribute a fund for the assistance of wives, children and dependent relatives of officers and men, residents of Canada, on active service in British and Allied forces.

Questions asked during the session elicited a variety of information: measures had been taken for the relief of Canadians stranded abroad; there was as yet no plan of recruiting for overseas service beyond the First Contingent, the future course would have to be determined by contingencies which could not then be foreseen; there was nothing definite as to who might take command, and the Minister of Militia said “We have nothing whatever to say as to the destination of the troops once they cross the water”; a gift to the Mother Country of one million bags of flour had been made by the Dominion. The Prime Minister said he had information that Alberta was making a gift of 500,000 bushels of oats, Nova Scotia was contributing 100,000 tons of coal, and Quebec a gift of four million pounds of cheese. He was not at that time aware of the nature of the assistance from the other provinces; which was, within a fortnight, as follows:

Prince Edward Island ........100,000 bushels of oats.
New Brunswick ............100,000 bushels of potatoes.
Ontario ......................$500,000 in money and
                           250,000 bags of flour.
Manitoba .....................50,000 bags of flour.
Saskatchewan ..............1,500 horses.
British Columbia ..........25,000 cases of canned salmon.

The British Government, in accepting with gratitude these timely gifts, stated that the horses would be of great assistance to them in mounting cavalry and yeomanry regiments, and that the supplies would be used for the relief of distress.

Royal Assent to the bills having been duly given in the Senate on the afternoon of 22nd August, Parliament prorogued after a momentous session; the Commons had disposed of their business in seven sittings totalling less than sixteen hours.
EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF EMPIRE FORCES

The British fleets had been ordered to their war bases on 28th July and on the 4th August all were at their stations. Next day, mine-laying by the Germans in the open sea commenced and the minelayer Königin Luise was sunk in the North Sea off Yarmouth. Throughout four years and three months of war the Royal Navy maintained its watch by day and night, and kept the seas.

The first units of the British Expeditionary Force, following a previously prepared plan, arrived in France on 7th August and within ten days one cavalry and four infantry divisions of the Regular Army had landed; by 23rd August they were in action at Mons.

The first of the Dominion forces to go overseas was an expeditionary force, 1,383 strong, which sailed from Wellington, N.Z., on the 15th August 1914, under escort of three British, one French and two Australian warships, and formally hoisted the British flag on Samoa on 21st August. A similar force, 1,500 strong, designated the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, began enlistment on 11th August and embarked a week later. Although delayed for a week awaiting escort, this force, supported by three cruisers, two destroyers and two submarines, all of the Royal Australian Navy, forced the capitulation of German New Guinea on 19th September.

From other parts of the Empire, also, the response was prompt and effective. The Union of South Africa undertook to replace the British garrison and prepared to send an expeditionary force against German South West Africa. The first detachment occupied Lüderitzbucht on 19th September, but the outbreak of rebellion within the Union delayed further operations for four months. Newfoundland, in addition to increasing her naval contribution to 1,000 naval reservists, began the enlistment of a regiment for service overseas, 500 strong. The first Indian troops to leave for a theatre of war sailed on 19th August for East Africa; five days later the La-
hore Division left for France and in a month arrived at Mar-
seilles.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{THE EMPIRE IN ACCORD}

The unanimity of the British Empire astonished the world. His Majesty the King proclaimed it in a message:–

\textit{To the Governments and Peoples of my Self-Governing Do-
minions.}

\textit{During the past few weeks the Peoples of my whole Em-
pire at home and overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind. The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace.}

\textit{My ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which my Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when in defiance of pledges to which my Kingdom was a party, when the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French Nation was threatened with extinction I should have sacrificed my honour and given to destruction the liberties of my Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision.}

\textit{Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Brit-
ain and of the Empire.}

\textit{My peoples in the Self-Governing Dominions have shown beyond all doubt that they whole-heartedly endorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take.}

\textit{My personal knowledge of that loyalty and devotion of my overseas Dominions has led me to expect that they would cheerfully make the great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at my disposal fills me with gratitude, and I am proud to be able to show to the world that my people overseas are as determined as the people of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a successful end.}

\textit{The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at my disposal their naval forces which have already rendered good service for the Empire. Strong expeditionary forces are}
being prepared in Canada, in Australia and in New Zealand for service at the front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British troops, and has undertaken important military responsibilities, the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the Empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the Royal Naval Reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use of both my naval and military forces and for the relief of the distressed in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of my overseas Dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the Empire amidst all its diversity of situation and circumstance.
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST CONTINGENT AT VALCARTIER

Map: Valcartier Camp, 1914 (facing p. 92)


CONCENTRATION AND COMPOSITION

While Valcartier Camp was being constructed, arrangements were also being made for the collection of camp equipment and for the reception of volunteers for the overseas contingent. Camp equipment was required in such large quantities that available stocks in all ordnance stores from Winnipeg east were heavily drawn upon. Requirements included 7,000 tents, picketing gear, three blankets per man, ground sheets and camp kettles on a basis of 25,000 men and 5,000 horses, numbers shortly to be increased by 50 per cent.

On 12th August the Adjutant-General directed Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Burstall, A.D.C., R.C.A., Commandant of the Royal School of Artillery at Quebec, to allot camp areas to the units of the “Expeditionary Force Division” and informed him that the R.C.H.A. Brigade, the Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse would proceed to Valcartier Camp in advance, there to be available for utilitarian and instructional purposes, and in particular to prepare
camp lines for the units of the Force and for the camp staff. An establishment for a camp staff of 19 officers and 94 other ranks was drawn up, and an instructional cadre, by arms and services, to the number of 17 officers and 63 other ranks, was selected from the Permanent Force. Prior to 20th August Lieut.-Colonel Burstall directed the erection of canvas and, on a divisional and district basis, tentatively allocated detachments to expeditionary units.

The camp staff was actually formed on 20th August; Colonel V. A. S. Williams, A.D.C., was named Camp Commandant, and was thus removed from his position as Adjutant-General at a most critical time. He had joined the North West Mounted Police as an Inspector in 1886, transferred to the School of Mounted Infantry as Lieutenant three years later, and served with the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles in South Africa. Subsequently he rose to the command of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, and for five years was simultaneously Inspector of Cavalry. He had held the position of Adjutant-General from December 1912.

The remaining 25 officers posted to the Camp Staff, as well as the other ranks, were drawn from both the permanent and non-permanent Militia. From cadet corps in Ottawa and Toronto, forty cadets were attached – each with his own bicycle – for duty as despatch riders. Some of the officers, being required to fill commands and staffs of C.E.F. formations, were called away after a few days and replaced by others, several of whom were given corresponding appointments in the division when it was formed. Impromptu selections of commanders and staffs by the Minister, long after the troops had arrived in camp, made impossible the continuity which would have resulted if appointees to divisional and brigade commands and staffs had been chosen beforehand, and allowed to remain in their appointments.

FIRST ARRIVALS

The first detachment of the Permanent Force, two offi-
cers and five other ranks of the Ordnance Corps, arrived on 10th August; during the next ten days 54 more ordnance personnel and the cavalry and artillery units arrived. Non-Permanent corps were also posted to Valcartier Camp: a field company, C.E., four companies of the Army Service Corps – two with fifty vehicles each – three field ambulances, C.A.M.C., a section of the C.A.V.C., and a detachment of the Canadian Postal Corps. These units – styled "utilitarian" – were called out on active service for administrative duties at the camp and not to form part of the Expeditionary Force. Some brought vehicles and hired horses as ordered; the first arrived on 13th August.\textsuperscript{82}

The first detachment of volunteers from Non-Permanent Active Militia units for overseas service arrived by rail at the camp siding on the 18th; others followed on the 20th and by next day 4,200 had arrived. By arrangement between the Director of Supplies and Transport and the railway companies, special trains to the number of over 100 had been made available as required,\textsuperscript{59} the troops entrained at local stations or sidings as if going to their annual training camp, and there was but a single accident en route. On detrainment, the commander of each detachment turned in a nominal roll to the Assistant Adjutant-General i/c Administration at camp headquarters; the troops were directed to the lines where they completed the pitching of their tents. The senior officer in each battalion area assumed command of the troops in his area and proceeded to organize them into companies of 3 officers and 116 other ranks. On 22nd August the composition of provisional battalions, twelve in number, was published in Camp Orders,\textsuperscript{83} and thereafter the number of troops increased rapidly; field states for the camp show 20,089 of all ranks on the 27th August, and on 8th September the maximum of 32,665 was reached.\textsuperscript{84}

Contributions of units varied for several reasons. Infantry units as a rule had been called upon by Districts to provide a quota, but some, by the time they received this notifi-
cation, had already recruited over strength and in a number of cases direct appeal to the Minister resulted in exceptions; eight regiments – in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver – raised over 500 each. Except the 19th Alberta Dragoons, which was called upon to furnish the Divisional Cavalry Squadron, there was no quota for cavalry regiments, which sent all who volunteered as infantry, and also contributed men to the Artillery and Army Service Corps. Also among the arrivals were five independent bodies of volunteers the Humboldt Detachment, 21; the East Kootenay Detachment, 156; the West Kootenay Detachment, 151; the Grand Forks Detachment, 15; the Ottawa Detachment, 77.

ORIGIN AND EXPERIENCE

Of approximately two million men of military age in Canada, an average of nearly fifty thousand had trained annually with the Canadian Militia in the preceding five years. There is no record of the total number of volunteers for overseas service; an unknown number was rejected at recruiting offices on physical grounds, others were refused enlistment at Valcartier; the total number enlisted for the first contingent was approximately 36,000. There was no consistency in the response of the provinces: three fell below the quota allotted in the Overseas Expeditionary Force scheme of 1911-12, while one furnished seven times that quota; one province supplied more than one-third of the whole contingent, while six sent fewer than trained with the Militia in 1913-1914, the ratio of men contributed to men of military age ranged from one in thirty to one in one hundred and forty-two: the figures bear no fixed relation to the population or to the numbers supplied throughout the war. From the figures shown in the accompanying maps other comparisons can be made.
The force assembled provides a measure of the capacity of the Canadian Militia system to raise a voluntary force on the outbreak of war; it represented almost every Militia unit then in existence and embraced a variety of races, creeds and classes from coast to coast. The question was raised as to the desirability of enlisting Indians, on the ground that the Germans might not observe the usages of war towards them; a negative answer was given, but a few were enlisted, including three descendants of Joseph Brant; the decision was revised in December 1915. Coloured volunteers were refused.

Practically all the 1,500 officers, of whom over two-thirds were Canadian-born and twenty-nine per cent were other British, had undergone training in the Canadian Militia and had qualified for their ranks at military schools of instruction; one hundred held commissions in the Permanent Force and of these six were graduates of the Staff College, Camberley; forty-two had passed the Militia Staff Course, seven were in possession of “Long Course” certificates and 121 were graduates or ex-Cadets of the Royal Military College, Kingston. Among the officers who volunteered from the Militia were a number who had not qualified for their ranks and there were some who did not belong to the Militia. Two Boards of Officers were appointed at Valcartier Camp, the one to enquire into the records of service of officers who had volunteered, the other to examine provisional officers for the rank of Lieutenant, of whom 28 passed on 22nd September. A number of commissions in C.E.F. units were granted, without examination, to senior n.c.o’s of the Permanent Force, who had special qualifications.

In August 1914 there were twenty-nine officers of the British Regular Army holding temporary commissions in the Canadian Militia. Of these ten were on the instructional cadre of the Royal Military College, Kingston, and the remainder were lent by the War Office or on exchange, and serving on Militia Headquarters or District Staffs, or attached to units of the Canadian Permanent Force. A number
returned to England after the declaration of war; four (Major L. J. Lipsett, Major G. C. W. Gordon-Hall, Major R. J. F. Hayter and Captain A. P. Birchall) joined the First Canadian Contingent and were the first of a distinguished group of officers who were given commands or appointments in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and whose knowledge and experience, freely applied, were largely responsible for the technical excellence of its organization, administration and training, and for the efficiency of its staffs in the field.

Of the 34,500 rank and file less than thirty per cent were Canadian-born; over sixty-five per cent had been born in the British Isles and other British possessions, and of the remainder about one-half, or 26 per cent, were born in the United States of America. Nothing definite can be stated as to the proficiency in arms of the other ranks; some had served in the British Regular Army, some in the Territorials and many in the Canadian Militia, but a large number were men of no military training or experience.

OFFER OF FOREIGN LEGIONS

The formation of Russian, Serbian and American Legions was suggested soon after the outbreak of war; at the end of August the Minister of Militia sent a personal cable to Lord Kitchener stating that he had been offered sixty thousand “good fighting men from neighbouring republic anxious to help Britain and liberty,” followed by another suggesting the formation in Canada of three corps of Russians, Serbians and volunteers from the United States. The British Government to whom this correspondence was referred, cautioned that, in view of the terms of the U.S. Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818 and the traditional policy of the U.S. Government – confirmed by proclamation on 5th August 1914 – no encouragement should be given to offers of enlistment received from American residents in the United States. Individual Russians and Serbians did enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, but no action was ever taken to
form them into distinct “legions” or units.

ATTESTATION

To comply with the stipulation early made by the British authorities that “volunteers should be attested by a magistrate,” forty-six officers in battalions and similar formations assembled at Valcartier Camp were sworn in as temporary Justices of the Peace for the Province of Quebec. As this number was insufficient to cope with the work, and since the Army Act provided for the appointment by the Governor General of any person as a Justice of the Peace for administration of the oath on attestation, all commissioned officers in the Militia of Canada of the rank of captain or superior rank were authorized to take attestations. (P.C. 2425 of 22.ix.1914). Militia Orders consequently named 411 officers of the Contingent, distributed over all arms and services, who performed this magisterial duty.

The most important items in attestation were the declaration that the volunteer was willing to serve, and the oath of allegiance. Although it was laid down that all ranks must be attested, the officers had already sworn allegiance on being granted commissions in the Militia: the other ranks on enlistment into the Canadian Militia at local headquarters had also taken the same oath as set out in the Militia Act:–

I . . . . . . . do sincerely promise and swear (or solemnly declare) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty.

Irrespective of this all other ranks were required, before being appointed to, or enlisted in, the Canadian Expeditionary Force, to subscribe to the following oath, which was administered at Valcartier by the aforementioned Justices of the Peace:–

I . . . do make Oath, that I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to His Majesty King George the Fifth, His Heirs and Successors, and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully defend His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, in Person, Crown and Dignity, against all enemies, and will
observe and obey all Orders of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and of all the Generals and Officers set over me. So help me God.

The above oath and the terms of attestation, embracing those enumerated in Militia Orders of 17th August, and twelve pertinent questions, were set out in a form which, after signature, was a written engagement with the King, binding the subscriber to serve as a soldier in any arm of the service until six months after the termination of the war or until legally discharged.

By enlistment in the Canadian Militia, the individual became subject to the terms of the Militia Act, and whether or not his unit had been placed on active service he was subject to military law while employed in Canada or beyond Canada for defence thereof. But the Canadian Expeditionary Force, although composed of members of the Canadian Militia, was not a part of the Militia until March 1915, when the later units of the C.E.F. were given legal status as units of the Active Militia. There were other considerations provocative of protracted judicial argument: the force had been designated Imperial, with the status of British regular troops, and those enlisting in it had been “enrolled for service under His Majesty’s Government” as distinct from the Government of Canada, which was paying for it. Repetitive and apparently contradictory regulations were consequently framed to overcome all doubts as to whether the militiaman on active service “beyond Canada” in the Great War was engaged in “the defence thereof” – as the Act provided – and to make certain that every individual in the C.E.F. was legally subject to military law.

RANK

Appointments or promotions in the Canadian Expeditionary Force applied only to that force, and established no right to future rank in the Active Militia of Canada. Among the senior officers some accepted positions with ranks lower than those they had held in the Militia, and eventually sen-
iority in the C.E.F. was made to date from 22nd September, but no list of officers with their postings was published at Valcartier; the first such appeared in Militia Orders of 14th October. The intention as to gazetting, carried out for later contingents, was that, to give status equivalent to officers of the British Regular Army, officers of the C.E.F. should be gazetted in England “in the same manner as are Army officers.” The status of officers of all Overseas Contingents was established in 1915 by British Army Orders; they would take rank with officers of the Regular Army from date of appointment. Thus the rank of officers was that to which they were gazetted in the London Gazette; that of other ranks was as shown in Part II Orders of their unit of the C.E.F. Qualified officers of the Non-Permanent Active Militia enlisting in the ranks of the C.E.F., or accepting a commission in a lower rank, were given assurance that they would be seconded from their Militia units and on return to Canada would be reinstated in their corps with such rank as they would have held had their service not been interrupted by service in the C.E.F.

PAY AND ALLOWANCES

Officers and Nursing Sisters on appointment to the Canadian Expeditionary Force were granted $150 towards defraying the expense of outfit. This amount was found in January 1915 to be less than the clothing allowance of £50 paid by the British Government to officers of the New Armies, and the grant was increased by $100.

Prior to 22nd September, the date set as that of the constitution of the Force, all ranks were carried on Militia pay rolls and paid at Militia rates as if called out on active service. The daily rates of pay laid down for the Canadian Expeditionary Force, on 17th August, were those for Canadian Militia on active service; slightly amended, they were confirmed by Order in Council (P.C. 2264 of 3.ix.1914). pay ranged from $20 per diem for a Major-General and $5 for a
Lieut.-Colonel, to $1 for gunners, sappers, drivers and privates; field allowance ranged from $4 per diem to ten cents. The same order provided for command pay at the rate of $1 per diem to officers in immediate command of bodies of troops of 500 or over, and for working pay to non-commissioned officers and men enlisted and employed as farriers, shoeing smiths, smiths, saddlers, fitters, wheelers, motor-car drivers, cooks, bakers and butchers at rates, according to classification, of 50c., 75c. and $1 per diem.

Permission was given to all ranks to assign not more than four-fifths of their monthly pay to relatives. Further to provide for wives and families of soldiers absent on duty, an Order in Council was passed granting a monthly separation allowance, as in the Permanent Force, of $20 per month to the rank and file, scaling upwards to $60 for Colonels. This Order was not applicable to beneficiaries whose husbands or fathers or sons continued to draw the salaries of their civil occupations, a regulation soon restricted to Dominion or Provincial Government employees. (P.C. 2553 of 10.x.1914). With effect from 1st April 1915, all on whose account separation allowance was to be paid were required to assign one-half of their pay to their dependents.

PENSIONS

When the volunteers proceeded to Valcartier, annual pensions for soldiers totally disabled on active service ranged from $150 for privates to $1,200 for lieutenant-colonels, with appropriate reduction for lesser disablement. A widow received three-tenths of her husband’s pay of rank and one-tenth for each child. The above rates were increased by a retroactive Order in Council (P.C. 887 of 29.iv.15), which awarded $264 to the rank and file for complete disablement and proportionate amounts to intervening ranks up to lieutenant-colonel which remained at $1,200; widows of the rank and file received $22 a month and $5 a month for each child; the scale increased by ranks to lieutenant-colonel
at $75 a month for widow and $10 a month for each child; in addition, the widowed mother of a totally disabled soldier, who was her sole support and unmarried, was granted half the rates for a childless widow and, on his decease, full rates.

Numerous orders, changing and always increasing the amounts of pension, were published during the course of the war. From 1919 onwards, rates of pension were authorized by Parliament and not by Order in Council. By 1930 all ranks totally disabled, up to and including the rank of Lieutenant, received $900, a lieutenant-colonel $1,500 and all ranks $300 additional if married, as well as $180 for the first child, $144 for the second and $120 for each subsequent; a widow on a parallel scale received eighty per cent, with the foregoing allowance for children.

SPECIAL PRIVILEGES

Special privileges on joining the C.E.F. were accorded to certain categories of individuals: members of the Permanent Force, personnel in receipt of Government pensions, civil servants, homesteaders and holders of mining rights. Conditional amnesty was also granted to deserters.

At first, officers and men of the Permanent Force accepted for service in the C.E.F. were to be granted leave whilst serving, and would draw C.E.F. pay in addition to Permanent Force pay (P.C. 2164 of 17.viii.14); another Order (P.C. 2264 of 3.ix.14) stipulated that members of the Permanent Force should not receive lower rates than they had been receiving. Subsequently an Order in Council (P.C. 149 of 30.i.15) authorized for Permanent Force personnel in Canada not serving in the C.E.F. certain increases, to make the pay of other ranks commensurate with C.E.F. rates. An Order in Council (P.C. 278 of 9.ii.15), retroactive to 18th August 1914, cancelled previous regulations, and permitted Permanent Force personnel serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force to draw either C.E.F. rates or the consolidated rates of pay and allowances of the Permanent Force, which-
ever happened to be the more advantageous, and in addition to draw the field allowance of the C.E.F.

Following British practice—that pensions of British Army pensioners joining the C.E.F. would be unaffected—an Order in Council (P.C. 2661 of 22.x.14) allowed individuals serving with the C.E.F. to continue to draw their pensions, or superannuation allowance, from public funds.

Civil servants who joined the Force continued to draw regular salaries in addition to military pay (P.C. 2102 of 11.viii.14); this privilege—extended to civil servants of French, Belgian and Russian origin, and also to British reservists, called out on military service by their respective countries (P.C. 2182 of 21.viii.14 and P.C. 2405 of 10.ix.14)—was later modified and finally discontinued from 1st July 1918, but assurance was given that incumbents would be restored to their civil positions on discharge, if still capable of filling them.

Entrants for homesteads on Dominion lands of the Canadian West were permitted by the Dominion Lands Act of 1908 to count the period of service in a military force while “engaged in defence of the British Empire against a foreign power” or while serving in a “contingent of Canadian volunteers enrolled . . . for active service” and three months thereafter, as residence upon the homestead. These prophetically worded provisions were extended (P.C. 2597 of 17.x.14) to Dominion lands within the Railway Belt of the province of British Columbia, and the protection was further extended in January 1916 to a soldier who secured entry after enlistment (P.C. 3093 of 6.i.16). In the event of a soldier becoming incapacitated and prevented by wounds or illness from complying with the requirements, letters patent for a homestead might be issued to him or, in the event of death, to his legal representative. (P.C. 1043 of 8.v.15). This privilege also was extended to soldiers who made entry after enlistment (P.C. 2888 of 9.xii.15) and in March 1917 returned soldiers were given priority of one day in making entry for Dominion
lands (P.C. 561 of 5.iii.17).

The holder of any mining rights from the Crown in Canada was also given special concessions while on active service with the British or Allied forces: he was permitted (P.C. 2713 of 28.x.14) to hold such rights free from the risk of cancellation owing to failure to comply with development requirements “until six months after the final termination of the war and the final declaration of peace in so far as the British Empire is concerned.” This provision was later extended (P.C. 2258 of 25.ix.15) to those who might not have notified the Department of the Interior of their enlistment.

The War Office on 7th August had proclaimed that deserters from the British Regular Forces who enlisted between 5th August and 4th October 1914 would be granted a free pardon. A similar amnesty was granted by an Order in Council (P.C. 2303 of 5.ix.14) to deserters from the Canadian Permanent Force who surrendered or re-enlisted by 31st October 1914; this indulgence did not extend to men undergoing imprisonment for other than military offences.

The voluntary character of the force was preserved to a remarkable degree by the facilities granted for obtaining discharge. Prior to March 1915 discharge for any reason was almost unrestricted; thereafter (P.C. 452 of 3.iii.15) a member of the C.E.F. in Canada or of the Canadian Militia on active service who applied for his discharge or whose parent or wife requested his release, might – if reasons were considered adequate – buy his discharge within his first year of service for $18.00 or less; after August 1915 a flat charge of $50 was substituted. Personal documents contain a wide range of reasons for discharge at Valcartier—medical, marital, military, political and personal; before the First Contingent sailed 5,081 officers and men had been released from service—2,164 as “medically unfit,” 379 on “protest by wife or parent,” 369 “undesirable” and “inefficient,” 28 “not British subjects” and 282 “own request,” as well as others, including 51 under age, 4 over age and 1,530 “reasons not
The outbreak of war demanded the return home of all British and Allied reservists in Canada. A number from the United States also sought transportation from Canadian ports, and some from Canada took passage from U.S. ports.

Of British Army reservists there were 3,232, of whom 153, serving in the Canadian Permanent Force but subject to recall, were allowed to remain. Before the end of August, 2,006 had, under direction of the officer paying British pensions, Ottawa, passed through a special concentration camp at Levis and embarked on passenger steamers bound for England; 36 joined the C.E.F. and a group of 106 sailed in one of the transports of the First Contingent.

The French and Serbian reservists for the most part found their way home through consular agencies independently of the Canadian Government; the total is unknown but some 29 of the former joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and, as a result of correspondence between the Governments concerned, the French military authorities did not insist upon their recall.

The Russian Government had no objection at first to the enlistment of reservists in the Canadian Forces and 36 went overseas in the First Contingent. Objection was, however, raised in November 1914, and those who had enlisted in the Second Contingent were discharged. On 18th June 1915 a special decree of the Tsar removed the disability.

For the smaller nations, Belgium and Montenegro, the Canadian military authorities undertook to collect and transport reservists. Of the Belgians 59 joined the First Contingent and 408 others had been despatched in groups by the end of 1914; 203 in the following year completed the movement. The Montenegrin reservists for the most part came from the United States. The British Government having accepted financial responsibility, a concentration camp
was established at Three Rivers. Small batches sailed from Canada between March and July 1915; in August two thousand embarked in two transports for the Mediterranean; there remained about five hundred who sailed on 8th December 1915 for Naples.

All the belligerent nations, except Great Britain, had undertaken by 19th August 1914 that their subjects or citizens of military age, passing through the United States en route to a port of embarkation, would not become a public charge. On 24th October, although most of the reservists had gone, an arrangement was reached whereby, in the event of a British reservist from Canada becoming a public charge on transit through the United States, he would be permitted to return to Canada without difficulty.

**ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDS: INFANTRY**

The composition of twelve provisional infantry battalions in terms of N.P.A.M. regiments appeared in Valcartier Camp Orders of 22nd August; to a large extent the basis of organization was territorial, but it differed widely from the allotments of 10th August. In the same Order, the first senior appointment was made when Colonel R. E. W. Turner, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., Reserve of Officers, was posted to the temporary command of the then 1st (Provisional) Infantry Brigade which, though not announced, included the then 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Provisional Battalions. Although paymasters, medical officers and instructors were detailed to units, no commanders or staffs were named, so the senior combatant officer in each provisional battalion carried on temporarily with such staff as he could find. On 29th August officers were detailed “to take over the duties and act as Officers Commanding Provisional Infantry Brigades” – Colonel R. E. W. Turner, V.C., 1st Provisional Infantry Brigade; Lieut.-Colonel M. S. Mercer, 2nd Provisional Infantry Brigade; and Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Ruttan, 3rd Provisional Infantry Brigade.
It was already evident that, even after the additional line of communication units had been provided for, the number of volunteers available for the infantry was far in excess of twelve battalions at war strength plus ten per cent first reinforcement, and by 1st September an entirely new infantry organization based on numbers present had been prepared. Camp Orders of that date gave the composition of sixteen provisional battalions in four brigades, and designated by name thirteen battalion commanders “(Provisional)”. The same order appointed three of the four brigade commanders, also “(Provisional)”, as follows:

Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Currie to 1st (Provisional) Brigade; Lieut.-Colonel M. S. Mercer to 3rd (Provisional) Brigade; Colonel R. E. W. Turner, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., to 4th (Provisional) Brigade.

Each of these three officers had long and outstanding militia service to his credit. Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Currie had joined the ranks of the 5th B.C. Regiment, Canadian Garrison Artillery, in 1895, and had risen to the command of that unit in 1909. In 1913 he transferred to the infantry and commanded the recently authorized 50th Regiment in Victoria, B.C. He had passed the Militia Staff Course, and for seven years had been president of the British Columbia Rifle Association. In civil life he was a real estate and insurance broker, and he was thirty-eight years of age. For financial reasons he had not volunteered for active service on the declaration of war, but on being approached by the Minister of Militia he accepted the offer of a brigade command.

Lieut.-Colonel Mercer was a barrister-at-law who had received his first commission in the 2nd Regiment (Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada) at Toronto in 1885, and after 26 years in that unit was gazetted to command. He had passed the Militia Staff Course, and had been adjutant of the Canadian Bisley Team in 1909; at the outbreak of the war he was fifty-five years old and Lieut.-Colonel Commandant of his regiment.

Colonel Turner was a wholesale merchant in Quebec,
forty-three years old. In 1892 he had been gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 10th Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars and commanded that regiment from 1903 to 1905, and thereafter the 3rd Cavalry Brigade for five years. While serving in South Africa with The Royal Canadian Dragoons he had won the Victoria Cross and the Distinguished Service Order: the former in the rearguard action at Lilliefontein for his part in covering, though already twice wounded, two guns of “D” Battery, Royal Canadian Field Artillery; the latter for swimming the Vet River at a critical juncture in the face of the enemy. He was a past president of the Canadian Cavalry Association and was now a colonel on the Reserve of Officers.

The order of 1st September was cancelled next day and a fresh order substituted, by which, while the grouping of Militia units detailed to provisional battalions remained unaltered, the numbering and seniority of brigades and battalions were changed: so that the 1st Brigade was from Ontario and commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Mercer; the 2nd was a western brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Currie; the 4th Brigade—which included three Highland battalions—was commanded by Colonel R. E. W. Turner, V.C. Only on 25th September was command of the 3rd Brigade, comprising three Prairie battalions and one from Quebec and the Maritimes, allotted to Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Cohoe, although he had been acting in that capacity for three weeks; he had joined the Militia in 1888, had passed the Militia Staff Course, and for the past fifteen months had commanded the 5th Infantry Brigade in the Niagara district. An important alteration was also made on the 25th whereby the 3rd and 4th Brigades exchanged places and numbers, because it was intended that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades should be the infantry of the division when formed. This composition and numbering of brigades and battalions was changed in only one particular when units for the 1st Canadian Division were selected at Salisbury Plain in January 1915.
ARTILLERY

As already described the artillery was mobilized separately under the Director of Artillery, and the intention of the Minister had been that it should proceed overseas under his command; but when Lieut.-Colonel Morrison and others demurred, and advanced the claims of a more experienced officer, Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Burstall, the appointment of that officer was made in Camp Orders of 1st September; he had twenty-five years service in the Permanent Force, including South Africa, and was an ex-cadet of the R.M.C., Kingston, and a graduate of the Staff College, Camberley.

The units comprising the artillery, having had the advantage of a week longer at local headquarters during which, by special arrangement, they had obtained serges, breeches, puttees, boots and caps direct from the manufacturers in Montreal, Toronto and Hamilton, and having drawn upon Militia stores for equipment, arrived in camp on 29th and 30th August more completely mobilized. The allotment for field artillery brigades, batteries and ammunition columns as outlined by the Adjutant-General on 10th August and subsequently precised by the Director of Artillery had been followed; horses had been purchased locally, and as sections had been drawn from batteries which had attended annual training camps a few weeks earlier, the organization of these elements was well advanced, although overseas units were not completed until arrival at Valcartier. There were only three field artillery brigades in the Expeditionary Force, each of three 6-gun batteries, all 18-pdr.; the decision not to furnish the fourth, a 4.5-inch howitzer brigade, to complete divisional establishment, had been forced on account of the lack of howitzers—of twenty-seven 4.5-inch howitzers ordered from England in 1911, twenty had not yet been delivered on account of precedence given to War Office orders, and the old 5-inch howitzers, with which two of the Militia batteries were armed, were unfit for service. The heavy battery and ammunition column, originally intended to come
from Montreal, Cobourg and Quebec, finally came from
Montreal, Saint John, N.B., and Quebec, for the Cobourg
Heavy Battery, as already related, had been called out for
service and sent to Vancouver. The commanders of the three
field artillery brigades were appointed provisionally on 24th
August and had Militia experience in that capacity, and each
took his brigade to France.

ENGINEERS AND SIGNALS

Each one of the eleven organized engineer units of the
Militia sent a detachment of volunteers to form the two field
companies in the divisional establishment. The total number
which reached Valcartier was 990, so that when on 25th
September the Minister approved the addition of a third field
comp company to meet the new British 3-company establishment,
there was no difficulty in finding the full complement. The
officer appointed to “Command of the Provisional Divi-
sional Engineers” on 8th September, Lieut-Colonel C. J.
Armstrong, a civil engineer, was a graduate of the Royal
Military College, Kingston, who had served on the railway
staff in South Africa and who for the past nine years had
been an infantry captain on the Corps Reserve of the 5th
Regiment (R.H.C.).

Permanent Force personnel formed the nucleus of the
Divisional Signal Company; volunteers from the four militia
companies and from the skilled personnel of telegraph and
telephone companies completed the unit.

OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES

The Corps of Guides, which had existed in the Canadian
Militia since 1903 and had a detachment in each Military
District, sent contributions totalling 235 to Valcartier. There
being no Guides on the establishment of a British Infantry
Division, the personnel was distributed to various units.

On the other hand there was no cyclist unit in the Cana-
dian Militia, or in the 1914 War Establishment for a Divi-
sion, so that when authority was issued for the organization of a cyclist company on 14th September, to form part of the Divisional Mounted Troops, officers commanding units of all arms and services in the camp were called upon to submit the names of volunteers, from whom the unit was formed.

The four companies of the Divisional Train, as had originally been intended, were chiefly drawn from Ottawa, London, Montreal and Winnipeg. The subsequent increase in the number of A.S.C. units resulted in re-adjustments, whereby the volunteers, who represented most of the nineteen companies of the N.P. Active Militia, were posted to the various C.E.F. units as necessity demanded.

The Director General of Medical Services, Colonel G. Carleton Jones, had complete responsibility for medical supervision of Valcartier Camp and for the organization of medical units to accompany the Contingent. He had joined the Canadian Militia at the age of thirty-two and was now fifty; he had served with a field ambulance in South Africa and had held his present appointment for the past eight years. The areas from which the three field ambulances were to have been drawn were extended and it was arranged that the volunteers from the 21 Militia field ambulances should concentrate as follows: at Valcartier for the 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisional Areas to form No. 1 Field Ambulance, C.E.F.; at Long Branch, Toronto, for the 1st and 2nd Divisional Areas to form No. 2 Field Ambulance, C.E.F.; at Winnipeg for Military Districts Nos. 10, 11 and 13 to form No. 3 Field Ambulance, C.E.F. The volunteers concentrated at Toronto and Winnipeg, after being partly equipped, proceeded to Valcartier, where, owing to an increase in the number of medical units raised to accompany the contingent, all volunteers from Militia medical units,—and there was no lack of qualified officers or men—were taken on a general list and posted to the various C.E.F. units as required.

On 11th September No. 4 Detachment, Canadian Postal Corps, was ordered to proceed from Montreal for postal du-
ties at the camp. The personnel for the C.E.F. detachment – 1 officer and 16 other ranks – were selected from volunteers from the eight detachments in the N.P. Active Militia.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION UNITS

To meet a request of the Army Council contained in a cablegram of 21st August, the organization of certain line of communication units to form part of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was authorized on 3rd September (P.C. 2267). There were four Army Service Corps and five medical units, as follows:

- Divisional Ammunition Park.
- Divisional Supply Column.
- Reserve Park.
- Railway Supply Detachment.
- Clearing Hospital (200 beds).
- Two Stationary Hospitals (400 beds each).
- Two General Hospitals (1,040 beds each).

This increased the establishment by 1,678 officers and men—who were found, as already described, from A.S.C. and medical personnel already in camp—and, in addition, two nursing matrons and 84 nursing sisters were required for the two general hospitals.

In the Permanent Force at this time there were one nursing matron and four nursing sisters, and in the Non-Permanent Active Militia there were eighty nursing sisters. On 17th August Nursing Sister M. C. Macdonald was called to Ottawa and by direction of the D.G.M.S. compiled tentative lists of suitable applicants from the many women – professional and non-professional—who had volunteered their services. Pending orders to mobilize, tentative arrangements were also made for outfitting, and when on 16th September the order to mobilize nursing sisters was issued, all those chosen, including two of the Permanent Army Medical Corps, were ordered to report at Quebec on 23rd September. The sisters were billeted at the Immigration Hospital and during the ensuing week the personnel, numbering 98—ex-
clusive of two, lacking professional qualifications but included by order of the Minister—were medically examined, attested, vaccinated, inoculated and out fitted. Contrary to British Army practice nursing sisters were given the relative rank of Lieutenant, and matrons that of Captain, in the C.E.F.

A belated request from the War Office dated 20th September 97 for more line of communication units—two Veterinary Sections and two Mobile Veterinary Sections, with a total establishment of 258 all ranks—was met by organizing the latter out of veterinary details which accompanied the First Contingent, and from the Remount Depot, an extemporized unit, which sailed independently. (Ausonia 21st October and Iona 2nd November 1914). The two former units—4 officers and 223 other ranks—were organized in Canada and sailed later. (Megantic 7th November 1914).

THE PERMANENT FORCE

The original intention with regard to the Canadian Permanent Force is disclosed by the offer already mentioned of one regular cavalry regiment and two regular horse artillery batteries. Through the personal intervention of the Governor General both cavalry units of the Permanent Force were allowed to go overseas, and not only the two horse batteries but the whole R.C.H.A. Brigade. These units, which had contributed a number of their trained personnel to the instructional cadre at Valcartier Camp, were recruited up to war strength from volunteers already there.

The Royal Canadian Regiment was not included in the original offer; its fate was decided by a cable of 19th August:

It is the wish of the Army Council to withdraw British battalion from Bermuda. Would your Minister be prepared to replace it by battalion of Canadian Militia.

The Commanding Officer of the R.C.R.—the only infantry in the Permanent Force—was asked if the regiment would volunteer for this service; he replied that it was ready to do
so but hoped that it would be actively employed against the enemy as soon as circumstances might permit. Detachments on home defence duty were consequently recalled to Halifax; a draft of 400 volunteers for the regiment from Valcartier Camp embarked in ss. _Canada_ at Quebec on 6th September and also proceeded to Halifax. At noon on 11th September the _Canada_, under escort of H.M.C.S. _Niobe_, sailed, and three days later the regiment – the first troops to serve overseas from Canada in the Great War – relieved the 2/Lincolns at Hamilton, Bermuda. Not until August 1915 was The Royal Canadian Regiment relieved and permitted to proceed, via Halifax, to England for service in the field.

The heavy battery and the four coast defence companies, Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery, were required for home defence, though the personnel of the former performed instructional and utilitarian duties at Valcartier Camp and some served with the overseas heavy battery.

The small cadres of Permanent Force engineer, Army Service Corps, medical, veterinary, ordnance, pay and staff clerk units were allowed to send some officers and a few selected other ranks with the Contingent, but they could ill be spared from their duties in Canada, soon to be immeasurably increased.

**DECISION TO SEND ALL VOLUNTEERS OVERSEAS**

The intention of the Minister of Militia to make the final selection of volunteers at Valcartier had proved to be practicable only within units, and in any case, as the War Office pointed out, reinforcements would be required; the Prime Minister therefore decided on 20th September to despatch to England the entire force under arms at Valcartier, and announced that the decision had been reached because the Cabinet deemed it advisable that the force should be continually kept at full strength by readily available reinforcements. This dispelled the atmosphere of apprehension caused by the threat that those not selected would be left be-
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hind, and equally relieved the mind of the Minister, who was in distress at the prospect of making choice between units. To accommodate the surplus of infantry over the establishment of Expeditionary Force units already existing, authority was issued for the formation of two additional infantry battalions, designated the 17th and 18th Provisional Infantry Battalions. After allowing for twenty per cent surplus in existing battalions, the remainder was in fact only enough to form the 17th Battalion. Existing surplus personnel in other arms and services accompanied their units; but after all establishments with excess percentages had been filled there still remained a large surplus of officers, seventy-five of whom proceeded overseas as “Unattached.”

Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry

Of the four independent infantry battalions offered on 7th August, only the one towards the cost of which Captain Hamilton Gault contributed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars was organized. Recruited from all Canada of ex-soldiers, unconnected with the Canadian Militia, this unit, as it happened, contained representatives of every regiment in the British Army save one. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., was a Guards officer holding the appointment of Military Secretary to the Governor General. The battalion, named Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry after the daughter of the Governor General, was rapidly mobilized in Ottawa and embarked for England on 28th August but, owing to Admiralty orders governing the convoy of troops, was not allowed to proceed; it was therefore disembarked at Levis and trained under canvas there until it subsequently sailed with the First Contingent.

Special Units

The generosity of fifteen public-spirited Canadian citizens and the far-sighted predilection of the Minister of Militia for machine guns combined towards the formation of a
motor machine gun unit (P.C. 2284 of 2.ix.14),\textsuperscript{102} which he had offered to the War Office on 22nd August.\textsuperscript{102a} With the subscription of $150,000, equipment was purchased in the United States: twenty Colt automatic machine guns, eight armoured cars, eight trucks and four automobiles. The establishment of 9 officers and 114 other ranks was recruited by 9th September. The unit mobilized and trained at Ottawa, embarked at Montreal and sailed with the Contingent under the designation “Automobile Machine Gun Brigade No. 1.”

Two other special units associated with the Contingent must also be mentioned here—not because of their strength, as their combined total personnel never exceeded ten, but because both were innovations in the Canadian forces. The first of these, although not regularly established by orders, may be considered as the forerunner of a larger organization which came into being later. In August the Minister had offered to send six aviators with the Contingent, and Lord Kitchener had agreed; early in September the Minister accepted the services of two Ontario-born aviators, “understood to be accomplished and experienced,” and one of them was “appointed provisional Commander of the Canadian Aviation Corps”; but the number remained at two, and the corps itself was not authorized. Although never attested in the C.E.F., the two aviators proceeded to England with the Contingent to qualify for the Royal Flying Corps. Their equipment consisted of one Burgess-Dunne biplane, flown from the factory at Marblehead, Mass., to Valcartier, and thence crated to England, but never again assembled. Of the two aviators one returned to civil life in Canada, January 1915; the other, Lieut. W. F. Sharpe, after undergoing instructional flying in France—the first Canadian aviator to fly there—was killed on 4th February 1915, on his first solo flight in England while attached to the R.F.C.

The other special unit was “The Canadian Army Hydrological Corps and Advisers on Sanitation” a new Militia unit authorized on 21st September, with temporary headquarters
at Valcartier; the establishment provided for seventeen officers, but only two proceeded to England as “Water Experts and Sanitary Advisers” and both were transferred to command newly formed units in January 1915. Organization was never completed, only five other officers were posted to the corps; at Valcartier unit water details were attached for instruction but rejoined their units before sailing. The corps was formally disbanded on 3rd November, 1919.

BANDS

In the War Establishments under which the First Canadian Contingent was organized no provision was made for regimental bands, but battalions which had an authorized peace establishment of pipers were allowed one sergeant piper and five pipers in addition. This, however, did not prevent the formation of bands; three kilted battalions (the 13th, 15th and 16th) had pipe bands from the parent Militia units, and the P.P.C.L.I. took over a civilian pipe band from Edmonton which volunteered as a body; four regimental bands from Militia units – two brass, one bugle, one fife and drum, with the 6th, 11th, 12th and 14th, — accompanied their battalions with authority; two other Militia brass bands accompanied the 7th and 9th without prior authority. On 24th November 1914, by direction of the Minister, who was “a great believer in bands” and wished to see every unit provided with one, the establishment of all C.E.F. battalions was optionally increased by one bandmaster and twenty-four men—an option exercised by seven of the thirteen battalions which fought as units in France, viz: 7th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and P.P.C.L.I. At Valcartier the bands of the R.C.H.A. and R.C.G.A. were also present and played throughout the lines, but both returned to their peace stations when the Contingent sailed.

FEEDING, CARE AND HEALTH OF THE TROOPS

On the outbreak of war steps were immediately taken by
the Director of Supplies and Transport at Ottawa (Colonel J. L. Biggar) to arrange local food supplies for the men and horses collecting at various points. On the announcement that the Contingent would mobilize at Valcartier, two non-permanent companies of the C.A.S.C., later increased to four, were ordered there to take charge of the feeding and transport in camp. Contracts were made with large dealers in Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, and elsewhere for food supplies—bread, meat, vegetables—and for hay and oats. The daily ration was ample and of good quality. Cooking was done on camp ranges set under corrugated iron roofs in the lines. The work of the A.S.C. at Valcartier was under the supervision of Lieut.-Colonel George P. Murphy, Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport for the camp.

Medical examination of volunteers had been carried out at local recruiting offices according to the physical requirement for arms and services set out in the original telegram calling for volunteers; qualifications were lowered for subsequent contingents. Attestation for the C.E.F. was, however, carried out at Valcartier, and this involved another and more exacting examination, employing 30 officers and 100 clerks, which resulted in a six per cent rejection.

One of the questions in the attestation paper was “Are you willing to be vaccinated or re-vaccinated?” and the general acceptance of this prophylactic against smallpox resulted in few negative answers; those unwilling were refused enlistment. Inoculation against typhoid, at this time also referred to as “anti-Typhoid vaccination,” was, to the general public, still something of a novelty, although some commanding officers on the strength of the A.G.’s wire of 14th August, refused recruits who demurred. The Director General of Medical Services strongly urged that anti-typhoid inoculation should be compulsory; but the Minister absolutely objected to all compulsory measures in the force. The offer of the Chief Health Officer of the Ontario Provincial Board of Health, Dr. W. J. S. McCullough, to supply the vaccine
was gratefully accepted; this vaccine exclusively was administered, except to some of the troops in M.D. 10 where a local vaccine was used for the first dose. As a result of example and persuasion the great majority accepted this protection at the place of enlistment, or at Valcartier where the second or both doses were administered by ten officers and 20 other ranks of the C.A.M.C.: but some even reached France without it, and not until March 1916 was agreement to inoculation made a specific condition of enlistment. Eventually an Order in Council (P.C. 2830 of 9. x. 1917) required all soldiers to submit to vaccination and inoculation, not only against smallpox and typhoid, but against cholera, dysentery and other infectious diseases. Refusal was thenceforward accompanied by liability to prosecution under the Army Act.

Sanitary methods at Valcartier were based on those followed at the Petawawa training camp. Disposal of refuse was by garbage cans and incinerators set up in the camp lines. A latrine system on a seven per cent basis, was installed with duplicate buckets changed nightly by contract. As already described, the water supply was chlorinated at the pumping station.

Two improvised hospitals, each of 100 beds, for the treatment of sick and injured were opened under canvas. Of these, No. 1 Camp Hospital, which admitted the first patients on 17th August, was at first staffed by No. IX Field Ambulance (C.M.) ordered out on active service and brought from Charlottetown, P.E.I., and later by No. 1 Stationary Hospital, C.E.F. No. 2 Camp Hospital, opened on 24th August, was run by No. V Field Ambulance (C.M.) Montreal, until 27th August and thereafter by No. 2 Clearing Hospital (C.M.), which became No. 1 Casualty Clearing Station, C.E.F.

The general health of the troops while at Valcartier was excellent. Sick cases, totalling 856, were admitted to hospital, and of these 132 were transported in an improvised two-coach hospital train to the military hospital, Quebec, whose staff had been augmented by a section of No. VII Field Am-
bulance (C.M.), Quebec. Serious and operative cases were transferred from the military hospital to the St. Francis Hospital.

DISCIPLINE

Following the regulations laid down for the Canadian Militia, which had obtained since 1893, alcoholic liquor was prohibited in Valcartier Camp. Leave and passes to Quebec for twenty-four hours were, however, intermittently granted at the discretion of commanding officers; the “regrettable misconduct of a number of men” on these occasions led to temporary suspension of the privilege. In the camp the most important duty of the Military Police was to prevent the bringing of liquor into the lines: otherwise the conduct of the troops as a whole was reasonably good, except when provoked by the overcharging of certain vendors in the camp area whose booths were wrecked with due discrimination, or by a private cinema operator whose marquee was dropped and fired because he failed to vary the programme. The usual punishment of confinement to camp was sufficient for minor offences; more serious breaches of discipline were disposed of by discharge of the culprit; camp records show that 227 men were returned or discharged for misconduct.

MOBILIZATION AT VALCARTIER

Even before the decision was taken that a contingent should be sent overseas, tabulated lists were compiled—by direction of the Quartermaster-General—of the equipment and clothing required for 30,000, and for the supply of stores, vehicles, harness and saddlery. The stores on hand were totally inadequate; the strength of the Contingent was increased, and troops on home defence must be provided for; the first contracts were therefore let to complete clothing for 50,000, of date 10th August, with completion of delivery by 21st September. Such large orders meant that, in the case of clothing, the wool had to be procured and woven before the
articles could be made up; and at least ten days must elapse, while leather was being procured, before manufacture of boots could begin.

This was the first of a series of requisitions approved by the Minister, without reference to Privy Council for authority. He saw that the short time allowable for deliveries, which must be completed before the Contingent could sail, made it absolutely imperative that all orders should be placed at the earliest possible moment. The Auditor General protested against this procedure as being contrary to the provisions of the War Appropriation Act, and to rules laid down on 27th August by an interdepartmental committee, constituted by the Prime Minister and under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of Finance; the Cabinet also disapproved and a subcommittee of the Cabinet was appointed, also by the Prime Minister, early in October, to advise the Minister of Militia in respect to contracts, but in consideration of the exceptional circumstances, purchases made in August and September without prior authority were subsequently authorized. (P.C. 2265 of 3.ix.14; P.C. 2473 of 2.x.14; P.C. 18 of 6.i.15). The Minister of Militia resented the check thus placed on what he considered to be his proper functions, protesting that the intervention of the subcommittee of the Cabinet caused needless delay and avoidable expenditure of public funds.

Other batches of requisitions were passed, as quickly as they could be prepared by the Q.M.G’s staff, for corresponding quantities of hardware, cutlery, harness, saddlery, and leather goods of all kinds, drugs, surgical supplies, electrical supplies, canvas goods, cotton and linen goods, knit goods and blankets. Certain of these were supplied under existing contracts for the Militia, but more were required, and all for delivery by 21st September at latest. On 9th September nineteen clothing firms were informed by the Director of Contracts, on the instructions of the Minister:

Delivery of all supplies ordered from you for Militia Department is required without fail by 18th instant even
though you have to work night and day until then. Some items, such as tarpaulins for wagons, could not be ordered until specifications for the vehicles were framed. Many of the stores hitherto furnished by the War Office had now also to be found or improvised in Canada, and some technical stores could not be improvised.

An unusual article of equipment, which might be classed as armament, was a special type of combination shovel designated “MacAdam,” because recently patented by the Minister’s lady secretary, and sponsored by him. It was made of $\frac{3}{16}$ metal said to be capable of stopping a bullet at 300 yards, the blade was $8\frac{1}{2}''$ by $9\frac{3}{4}''$ long, with a loophole $3\frac{1}{4}''$ by $2''$ in one upper quarter, the handle, integral with the blade, was 4'' long, and the weight was 5 lbs. 4 ozs; the infantryman was to use it either for digging or as a shield. Twenty-five thousand were purchased in Philadelphia at a cost of $1.35$ each (P.C. 2302 of 4.ix.14), and taken to England where they were found unsatisfactory even after a folding handle had been fitted. They were sold as fifty tons of scrap metal for $1,400$ in May 1917. A year before this it was said that “the Russian Government offered the inventor 5 cents a shovel on 1,000,000 shovels, but the offer was declined.” (Hansard. 2.iii.1916).

To save time the usual practice of having all stores delivered to the Inspection Department of the Directorate of Contracts at Ottawa for expert examination before being handed over to the Ordnance Corps for issue, was temporarily discontinued. Inspectors, specially appointed, made their examination at the factories, and the goods after approval were shipped direct to Valcartier Camp, until 16th September. After that date, as requisitions for various articles required by the C.E.F. were filled, the original method was reverted to and efforts were concentrated on complying with a War Office request of 20th September:

Army Council will be glad if you can send as soon as possible first reserve clothing for your Expeditionary Force comprising 100 per cent service jackets, trousers, boots, ser-
vice dress caps, and 50 per cent greatcoats for whole force, which will help present pressing requirements. After this first reserve War Office will supply.

To cope with the work of distribution the strength of the original ordnance detachment—two officers and five other ranks—at Valcartier Camp was gradually increased by withdrawing personnel from the districts as soon as they could be released: a maximum of 71 all ranks was reached on 13th September. Two or three train loads of ordnance stores arrived daily on the Valcartier sidings, and were unloaded by fatigue parties into the Ordnance shed, where consignments were sorted, receipts were checked and the requisitions presented by regimental quartermasters filled by bulk issue as far as possible. The work, carried on by day and night without intermission, was directed by Lieut.-Colonel W. Hallick of the Canadian Ordnance Corps; at the final reckoning a complete accounting for every issue was found in the ledgers—except one small consignment of revolvers which was lost, a feat which the Royal Commissioner who investigated declared to be “highly creditable.”

ARMAMENT

The armament required for the artillery units was brought into camp by the militia quotas from Districts: twelve 13-pdr., fifty-four 18-pdr. and four 60-pdr. guns, with full complement of ammunition wagons and harness.

In August 1914 the 303-inch machine guns on militia charge in Canada were 35 Maxim (obsolescent), three Vickers, three Laird Menteyne Dagaille and two Colt; three others were with the Royal North West Mounted Police. There was an outstanding order of April 1914 for fifty up-to-date Vickers from England, but this was never filled, and the order was cancelled in 1917. Only four guns were sent to Valcartier and used for instructional purposes, for it had been decided that the Contingent should be supplied before leaving with the prescribed complement—two per infantry battalion—of Colt instead of British pattern machine guns. A
verbal order for fifty was placed with the Colt factory at Hartford, Conn., by a special agent of the Minister on 29th August, and later covered by Order in Council (P.C. 2912 of 21.xi.1914). At the end of three weeks only twenty had been delivered and to provide for the deficiency approval was given (P.C. 2424 of 22. ix. 1914) for a contract to be made with Vickers Limited of London (England), for thirty light Vickers guns, delivery to be made to the G.O.C., Canadian Expeditionary Force on arrival in England. This order was never filled, the whole Vickers output being requisitioned by the War Office, which offered to provide thirty Maxim guns in lieu. The Contingent actually took overseas twenty Colts, with the Motor Machine Gun unit, and four Maxims; in November and December, 51 more Colts were shipped from Canada and issued to the C.E.F. in England.

At the end of July, when war seemed imminent, it became evident that something must be done to obtain an additional supply of rifles. Of the 105,665 on hand in Canada, almost all were Ross rifles of various patterns and marks, but only 3,863 were Mark III, sighted for and capable of firing Mark VII ammunition, which was now the standard for the British forces; a further 8,337 had been taken into ordnance storage at Quebec and were awaiting final inspection and sights. These Mark III rifles were deliveries on two orders each for 10,000 placed on 3rd November 1911 and 9th April 1913; another order for 10,000 placed on 30th May 1914 was also outstanding. On 30th July 1914 the Master-General of the Ordnance telegraphed the Ross Rifle Company as follows:–

Increase immediately to your utmost capacity manufacture and delivery of Mark Three rifles and bayonets already ordered. Turn over at once to Inspection Branch all complete Mark Three rifles and bayonets.

To meet increased requirements, a further order of 30,000 Mark III rifles and bayonets was placed on 10th August 1914 (P.C. 2097). Production was speeded up to such an extent that 22,128 Mark III Ross Rifles were issued at Valcar-
tier, which provided for all infantry units, save one battalion (the 15th) which carried a complement of long Ross Mark II as far as England, where they took over the Mark III turned in by the P.P.C.L.I., rearmed with the short Lee-Enfield.\(^{111}\)

**VEHICLES**

For the purchase of the vehicles required for the Contingent the Minister of Militia again departed from the usual procedure, although the Director of Contracts, with his authority, continued to sign all orders. The position the Minister took in the matter, and that of the special agent he employed, may best be described in their own words.

On 31st March 1915 the Minister informed the Public Accounts Committee that:–

> When I took up the transport question I looked around in my mind’s eye all over the country for an honest man in the truck business. . . . I consulted my colleagues, a number of them, and represented to them that there was nobody available in the Department to handle the business; that it would go to seed and that we would have to pay all sorts of prices if we did not employ some competent man to look after it. I explained to them that my plan was to get the best man I could to take this thing up and drive it right through.\(^{112}\)

In explanation of the policy of employing special agents and giving them honorary commissions he said:–

> . . . . . . .if I found any sharp work going on, they, wearing the uniform, would come under the Military law, and I could put them through Court Martial in case it was something we could not reach under the technicalities of the Civil Law. I told . . . . .frankly it was not so much to give him the rank as that I could get a hold on him in case he did not play the game square.\(^{113}\)

In the purchase of vehicles at this time the special agent chosen by the Minister to represent the Department was Mr. T. A. Russell of the Russell Motor Car Company, gazetted Hon. Major, who told a Royal Commission in July 1915 that:–
The Minister stated he was in trouble or in a hurry to get wagons, he asked me if I could get some wagons for him. I said: I didn’t have any experience particularly about wagons, and that I very much preferred not to do it. He said it would not take long, and he wanted me to do it because the department was very busy and he thought I knew the manufacturers and could buy the wagons. . . . On Aug. 18th., I was asked to purchase 428 wagons, of which 170 were what were known in the department as very heavy type, 258 of what were known as a light type.

In further evidence before the same Royal Commission he dealt with specifications for motor vehicles:

I waited until I saw the Minister. He told me that requests had come from England to send what was known as the mechanical transport complete, for the contingent that was to sail; he wanted me to get it ready. . . . I asked the Minister if he had any specifications as to the style of the body of the car this called for, and as to the machines, and so on, and he said he had not. I pointed out that they would all have to be designed and I did not believe it could be done. However he insisted and said he expected the job would be done, that the Canadian Contingent was going complete if it went at all, and that he looked to me to have it done. He was pretty emphatic about it and he confirmed it by letter.

Three separate commissions were executed by Major Russell of which the first resulted in the purchase of 25 motor trucks, of five different makes and mostly of 2-ton capacity, 14 trailers and 11 heavy wagons, for transportation at Valcartier; the second in the purchase of 455 heavy and 398 light farm wagons, of eight different makes, at a cost of $100,217.35, being horsed transport vehicles for the Contingent; and the third of 7 motor cars and 133 motor trucks, chiefly 3-ton, for the Supply Column and Divisional Ammunition Park, with bodies manufactured separately. There were eight different makes of truck, at an average cost of $3,300; the motor cars cost $2,750 each.

A special purchase of the motor transport vehicles for the Automobile Machine Gun Brigade was made on behalf of the donors by Major R. Brutinel, appointed to command
the Brigade. This included 8 armoured cars, 12 other cars and trucks, 17 motor cycles and 16 bicycles.

General purchases by the Department for the Expeditionary Force included 29 motor cars at $647, thirty-two motor cycles at $300 each and 412 bicycles at $62 each. Of the technical vehicles, twelve engineers’ tool carts and three cable wagons were designed, built and purchased. Watercarts were also specially designed, of two types, and 49 were bought at a cost of $21,730.

To complete the remainder, vehicles already on ordnance or unit charge were utilized; the Chief Ordnance Officer withdrew carts and wagons as required from the nearest Militia units at discretion. Some technical horsed vehicles, such as telephone wagons, pontoon and trestle wagons and a few obsolete light ambulance wagons, were available; but G.S. wagons, Maltese carts, travelling kitchens, S.A.A. carts, heavy horsed ambulances and light spring R.E. wagons of British standard pattern were not; Canadian local pattern farm wagons, light or heavy as loads demanded, were therefore substituted. To complete establishment, watercarts of Canadian Militia pattern—a barrel mounted on four wheels—complete with harness, were shipped to Valcartier, from all Districts except M.D. 11 (British Columbia).

HORSES

In August 1912 a Remount Committee had been constituted; the personnel, at first two honorary colonels, supplemented eight months later by two more, was to act as a staff for consultation by the Minister of Militia. In the Mobilization Regulations of 1913, provision was made for obtaining horses partly by units and partly by Districts; in any case responsibility for inspection, purchase, collection and issue would rest, in each District, with a committee of three officers—one Army Service Corps, one Army Veterinary Corps and one other—appointed by the D.O.C. These committees did not, on account of changes in procedure already de-
scribed, participate in the purchase of horses for the First Contingent. Responsibility was removed from Districts on 11th August, when the new Director of Veterinary Services at Militia Headquarters (Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Neill) was designated Remount Officer and entrusted by the Minister with the procuring of all horses required. Between that date and 26th September instructions as to selection and purchase, were issued direct from Ottawa to fifty officers of the Militia and five civilians, who were authorized to issue cheques on a credit established for that purpose; in every case a veterinary surgeon would pass upon the horse and countersign the cheque.

The horse establishment of a division was 5,030; the addition of other units increased this to 7,264 riding, artillery and draught horses, “sound in wind and limb and free from all blemishes.” Their colour might be bay, brown, black, chestnut, blue roan or red roan; ages must be between five and eight years and heights from 15 to 16 hands, weight 1,000 to 1,400 lbs., dependent upon category. The price must average $175, and that sum was paid to any officer who wished to bring his own charger, provided it met the above requirements.

Only artillery units which mobilized at local headquarters purchased their own horses and took them to Valcartier. On 29th August the number of horses in camp was 1,822; by 2nd September, owing to the advent of artillery units, it was 3,767. The horses required for other units, purchased chiefly in the areas about Halifax, Quebec, Sherbrooke, Montreal, Toronto, London and Winnipeg, were shipped to Valcartier from 4th September onwards, and during the following week 3,000 horses were taken on the strength of an inadequate and hurriedly improvised remount depot for issue to units, commencing 9th September.

Where regimental purchase was in force, farmers were informed by advertisement that horses would be purchased at a certain time and place. At that place the horses brought
for sale were inspected for physical fitness by the veterinary officer and for suitability by the purchasing officer; when passed, a cheque was handed to the vendor whose endorsement was accepted as a receipt; a regimental officer then attended to the branding and to the entry of the description of each horse in the ledger, after which the horses, now in the army, were brought to the local mobilization centre. When purchases were made non-regimentally, procedure was similar, but the special agent appointed by the A.D.V.S. might be a civilian – although in all cases a Veterinary Officer, or a civil veterinary surgeon paid at the rate of $10 per day, was required to pass upon fitness and to countersign the cheque.

The purchasing agents quickly secured a number of horses and began shipping them as early as 20th August to Valcartier, where no unit had as yet been detailed to look after them on arrival, and investigations prompted by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals disclosed that two carloads had been left for a time on the sidings without proper attention. On 1st September Valcartier Camp Orders announced the formation of a remount depot at the northern end of the camp, the personnel to be temporarily provided by No. 5 Company, C.A.S.C. Horses were arriving from all parts before this date and accommodation and picketing gear were both lacking; the situation was met by the erection of a system of open corrals fenced with stakes cut from the bush on the camp site. On two occasions, both at night, horses broke from these corrals and stampeded through the camp.

Horses on arrival in camp were inspected for contagious disease and affected animals were isolated; provision was made for inoculation of every horse with a prophylactic streptococcus and particular attention was paid to the detection of influenza. The Militia veterinary section from Winnipeg arrived at Valcartier with a strength of twenty-six on 26th August and immediately set up a veterinary hospital; open air sick lines were laid out by the veterinary officer of
each unit and a sick report of horses rendered daily to the Principal Veterinary Officer.

The total number of horses purchased for the Contingent was 8,150 at an average price of $172.45. By mid-September it was apparent that all were not fit for active service and a Board of Officers decided that 291 were unfit; these, and others which had received injuries, or which had deteriorated, to a total of 481, were sold by auction at Quebec at an average price of $54.

TRAINING, PARADES AND REVIEWS

The training of the troops at Valcartier was based upon the “Memorandum for Camps of Instruction, 1914” issued by the Department of Militia and Defence early in that year. This was the ninth edition of an annual publication, amended and brought up to date. It consisted of two parts: Part I, “Instructions for Training for all Arms and Services” and also Musketry, Signalling and Courses of Instruction; half of its 73 pages was devoted to “Syllabi of Training” in camp for eight to sixteen days. Part II dealing with Administration, provided in 61 pages essential information on staff, dress, equipment, orders, guards, water, shoeing of horses and daily routine.

These instructions were intended for annual Militia camps where units, already organized, had their own officers, n.c.o’s and men, already enrolled, armed, clothed and medically examined. The force assembled at Valcartier on the contrary had, to start with, no comparable unit organization; the composition, location and command of C.E.F. units were repeatedly changed; officers and n.c.o’s being temporary and provisional were on probation; until a few days before departure, one provisional battalion had four lieut.-colonels, another none, and so with the lower ranks; new appointments, promotions, replacements, transfers and reductions were of bewildering frequency in the hectic, alternating processes of shaking up and shaking down. As already
stated, all ranks, concurrently with training, had to be medi-
cally examined, inoculated and attested; complete clothing
and equipment had to be issued to every man as deliveries
were received, and there was a shortage of rifles.

The first reference to training appeared in Camp Orders
of 22nd August: “As regards training so far as circumstances
permit the principles contained in ‘Memorandum for Camps
of Instruction, 1914, Part I Instructions for Training’ will be
adhered to . . . . Copies of this manual will be distributed as
far as available. As a temporary measure training will be car-
rried out under arrangements made by Officers commanding
Provisional Battalions,” who were called upon to submit
daily their programme for the ensuing day. In accordance
with the syllabus, the first days were invariably devoted to
the more elementary squad and foot drill, rifle and musketry
exercises, section gun drill and equitation. Route marches of
increasing length followed, and with daily physical training
served to harden the troops. Some units, having the advan-
tage of a large proportion of personnel from the same militia
unit, progressed rapidly, and engaged in night outpost
schemes.

The instructional staff of eighty, distributed through-out
the force, was kept occupied from morning till night. The
Commandant of the School of Musketry (Lieut.-Colonel R.
A. Helmer) with his staff of eight was sent to the camp, and
later, assisted by five officer musketry instructors, had
charge of target practice, which began on 25th August with
seven battalions on the ranges. The reshuffling of the troops
from twelve battalions into sixteen on 2nd September inter-
rupted the programme of firing, but by 19th September all
sixteen battalions had spent from six to eleven half-days on
the ranges, mostly firing at 100 and 200 yards, with seven
battalions also at 300 yards, and practically all infantrymen
had fired the prescribed allotment of rounds—5 rounds aper-
ture deliberate, 15 rounds battle sight deliberate, 15 rounds
battle sight rapid and 15 rounds attack practice. A large pro-
portion, having had instruction and practice in the British forces or in the Canadian Militia, or familiar with their own sporting rifles, fired this course only; the remainder repeated the course several times. Few units carried out field practices, or combined fire and movement, and none fired at distances beyond 300 yards. The Minister’s recollection was at fault eighteen months later, when he described the practice at 500 yards and claimed that the marksmanship was superlative; he gave it as his opinion that the men had been “trained to handle a rifle as no men had ever handled it before.”

As the days passed so the training carried out in the allotted brigade areas was by larger bodies and progressively more technical. One of the earliest practical applications was the construction by the engineers of two barrel pier bridges across the Jacques Cartier river, one for infantry, the other for artillery; these gave access from the camp to the rough wooded area used for field manoeuvres. Brigade field days, in which all arms participated, were held in fine warm weather on the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th September, when tactical schemes with troops, embracing general and special ideas, were planned and carried out under the infantry brigade commanders, directed and criticised by a staff of qualified officer instructors, acting as umpires. On two occasions H.R.H. Field-Marshal the Duke of Connaught followed the manoeuvres with critical interest.

The “Memorandum” included no syllabus for Sundays, but Camp Orders provided for two being devoted to reviews by the Governor General. On 6th September, under command of Colonel the Hon. S. Hughes instead of the Camp Commandant, the troops in camp—less those not yet in possession of uniform—marched past in quarter column on the wide grassy plateau south of the lines in a downpour of rain, which converted the camp into a sea of mud; other features of this parade were the variety of uniforms, the shortage of rifles, and the excellence of the physique and bearing of the men. The rain continued all next day, and Camp Orders car-
ried a special message:—

His Royal Highness congratulates the Honourable the Minister of Militia and Defence for Canada, on yesterday’s well organized parade, and was very pleased with the appearance of the men under very trying circumstances, and considers that the parade reflected great credit on all ranks.

His Royal Highness regrets that owing to the existing conditions of bad weather the men have been unable to do any training today, and consequently he has been prevented from seeing the troops at their work. He wishes, however, to impress upon all ranks the necessity of devoting their best energies to training during their time in Camp and to the necessity of maintaining a high standard of discipline.

His Royal Highness leaves Camp with the knowledge that a fine spirit pervades those patriotic Canadians who have come forward so splendidly, from all parts of the Dominion, to take their share in the Defence of the Empire at this trying time in her history, and he feels confident that their example will be followed by all Canadians capable of helping the Motherland in the field, should further calls be made upon them.

Five voluntary Divine Service parades, attended by many, were held on Sunday 13th September. Next day a second review by the Governor General was substituted for inspections by the Minister; the weather was fine and improvement in all departments was noticeable. The final review took place on 20th September: all units of the Expeditionary Force were on parade, and led as before by the Minister of Militia in uniform, marched past the saluting point, where the Governor General was accompanied by H.R.H. the Duchess of Connaught and the Princess Patricia. To accommodate civilian visitors special trains were run connecting with trains from Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto: on the 20th September eight carried 9,500 from Quebec to the camp.

At the final review the Prime Minister, who had previously visited the camp, and members of the Cabinet, were also interested spectators. The Minister of Militia was omnipresent. His visits to the camp were frequent and he exer-
cised the closest and most direct control over matters of administration and training; in respect to appointments of officers he was the final authority, though for the junior positions he was willing, in most cases, to accept the recommendations of unit commanders. To representatives of the press he gave nightly interviews and stated his opinions freely and forcibly.

The protests and criticisms directed against him at this time by an increasing number of adversaries—disappointed contractors, unselected or slighted officers, ill-informed or insulted civilians—far from modifying his chosen procedure served rather to encourage him to even more censorious speech and more aggressive action. Officers of the Permanent Force, and others trained in British military procedure, disapproved of his methods as courting confusion; many of the non-permanent volunteers, impressed by his achievements, were his friends and warm admirers; those who did not know him were astonished at his energy and enthusiasm but perplexed by his unrestrained invective, especially when, in haranguing the officers at Valcartier, he held a British regiment up to contempt. His attitude, while it aroused disapproval, yet attracted general attention to the changed conditions arising from a state of war and focussed public interest on the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

COMMAND OF THE CONTINGENT

More than six weeks had now elapsed since the first call for volunteers, and no official announcement had yet been made as to who should command them, beyond that of the Minister in the House of Commons on the 22nd August, when he replied to the accusation that he intended to take command himself:—

I may not express my personal views on the matter, but I think I am safe in saying that whoever commands the volunteers will have the confidence of the volunteers and also of myself.

Three days later a cable from the War Office stated:
Army Council desire to know name of officer selected to command Canadian Expeditionary Force, \(^{118}\) and on the same day the Minister cabled to Lord Kitchener:– Concerning command Overseas Expeditionary Force before submitting names desire to know whether force will be maintained as a division or broken up into brigades. \(^{118}\)

The War Office replied next day that “Canadians will most probably be used as organized and be sent in a complete division,” \(^{119}\) whereupon the Minister suggested to Lord Kitchener the names of three retired British lieutenant-generals prominent in the South African War, including Lord Dun-donald. To none of these was the command assigned, however, and in the private discussions, which lasted for nearly a month and in which the Governor General and the Prime Minister took part, the name of Major-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B., was mentioned. It is on record that the Chief of the Canadian General Staff hoped that General Alderson would be chosen, and a senior Canadian officer who had served under him in South Africa recommended that he be given the appointment “because he would not get his troops into trouble.” Finally the Minister cabled to Lord Kitchener on 25th September “I will be satisfied with your personal selection”; \(^{120}\) on that day Major-General Alderson was selected and interviewed the acting Canadian High Commissioner in London; he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General from 14th October, the date of the Contingent’s arrival. The response of the Minister was: “Many thanks for selecting Alderson. Canadian soldiers’ ideal.”

Meanwhile, and until after the Contingent sailed, its destiny was still as obscure as when the Minister informed the House of Commons, on 21st August, that “We have nothing whatever to say as to the destination of the troops once they cross the water, nor have we been informed as to what their destination may be.” \(^{121}\)
CHAPTER III

ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

PROCURING OF TRANSPORTS—EMBARKATION—PROTECTION—THE CROSSING—CHANGE OF DESTINATION—FURTHER OFFERS—HOME GUARDS—OTHER ASSISTANCE—THE SHELL COMMITTEE—WAR FINANCE.

PROCURING OF TRANSPORTS

In the preliminary negotiations for the hire of transports to carry the First Contingent to Europe the Minister again took direct action. As a result of the War Office enquiry already mentioned, he called representatives of the large shipping companies to meet him at Ottawa on 15th August and explained to them that bottoms would be required to transport a military force of about 25,000 troops from Quebec across the Atlantic before the middle of September. The Q.M.G. Branch selected suitable ships from those which the companies reported could be made available, and by 11th September contracts, approved by the Department of Justice, had been signed by the Deputy Minister of Militia for twenty ships, of which nine were primarily and two partly for horses. The inclusion of extra Line of Communication units required four more vessels, and the decision to send the whole force assembled at Valcartier an additional six, the last of which was engaged at the last moment. Vessels were chartered at Admiralty rates based on speed; amounts varied from 14s.3d. to 18s. 9d. per ton gross register, per month, of which ten shillings was paid in advance. In the charter-party, provision was made that when ships carried private cargo, as was permitted for stiffening, any money derived from this source was to be credited to the Canadian Government, which assumed all war risks on hull, cargo and freight. It
was further agreed that the Canadian Government should adjudicate on claims for rationing the troops and any arising out of earnings for cargo carried, but rates for hire, claims arising from premiums on war risks insurance, from expenditure on additional equipment and refitting ships, etc., were to be adjusted by the Admiralty before payment. Rationing on approved menus was undertaken by the steamship companies at a fixed rate of $1.10 per diem for officers warrant officers and sergeants, and .65c for other ranks. A guarantee was also given that an extra supply of provisions to provide a margin of safety of seven days, over the estimated fourteen, would be carried.

In order to give the instructions necessary for the refitting of the ships at Montreal to make them suitable for carrying troops, and to certify as to their carrying capacity, to ascertain if bunker supplies were ample, and to verify average sea speed, the Militia Department obtained from the Department of Marine and Fisheries the services of Captain H. St. G. Lindsay, who was given the title of Naval Transport Superintendent. As the refitting of each ship was completed it proceeded to Quebec where embarkation was supervised by Lieut.-Colonel W. Price, already mentioned in the construction of Valcartier Camp, whom the Minister now nominated Director General of Embarkation, or alternatively Chief Embarkation Officer.

A proposed distribution of troops, prepared by the Director of Supplies and Transport, was issued on 17th September, but the increase in the number to be sent and the change in capacity and number of vessels, and difficulties and delays encountered in refitting, upset this plan and, although revised, it was summarily rejected by the Minister. Colonel Price was in general charge at Quebec and he employed a civilian, Mr. A. J. Gorrie, as his assistant. The Minister also directed that Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Langton,—the senior non-permanent A.S.C. officer, who had been in charge of railway transportation at the Quebec Tercentenary
in 1908—should assist, and provide the link with the Valcartier Camp staff, on which he had been Railway Transport Officer.

Further difficulties arose with regard to the troopships. It was said that on account of tides and lack of facilities, horses could not be conveniently loaded at Quebec and the alternative seemed to be to send the 7,500 horses by rail to Montreal and load them there. But it was found that use might be made of the Leonard—a transcontinental railway ferry-boat with mechanically adjustable deck, then at Quebec; in the end most of the horses were loaded direct by taking advantage of the three hours when tide served. When discrepancies were noticed in the reported accommodation of certain vessels, two staff officers were sent from Militia Headquarters to Montreal; they found that some of the fourteen chartered ships there assembled had been loaded to the hatches with private freight and 135,275 bags of the gift flour for the Mother Country. To make space for military vehicles and baggage some were partly unloaded, a proceeding which again changed the capacity figures. The motor trucks for the Supply Column and the Divisional Ammunition Park were too large for the hatchways of all but one ship—the Manhattan. Some ships were short of furnishings and the Department of Militia and Defence had to loan 2,855 beds, also bedding, enamelled ware, camp stools and even lifebelts. Discussions arose over the number of officers per cabin and the number of horses per attendant—military regulations prescribed four horses, civil twenty; in the end, owing to lack of passenger accommodation in some of the horse ships, the maximum was sixteen.

EMBARKATION

By the action of the Minister, impatient of precise military procedure and of delays arising from confusion as to capacities, the D. of S. and T., from 25th September had nothing to do with allocation or embarkation, and only three
units went in the ships allotted in his plan—and that by chance. The procedure thereafter was that the Naval Transport Superintendent at Montreal telegraphed the hour of departure, and sometimes the remaining capacity, of each vessel, to the Chief Embarkation Officer at Quebec, who notified the Camp Commandant at Valcartier of the reputed accommodation available and of the time loading would begin. It had been intended that the horse ships, being slower, should be filled first and despatched in advance on 24th September, under escort of H.M.C.S. Niobe, but it was found that they could not all be ready before 27th September, so it was decided that they would accompany the troopships, and the loading of mounted and dismounted units proceeded simultaneously. Another plan, that the vehicles and baggage should be parked in the Exhibition Grounds at Quebec and there await embarkation, was also abandoned, although that place was used as a staging camp for mounted troops. Units were timed to move into Quebec according as a vessel arrived with approximately the requisite amount of accommodation. The first of the mounted units, all of which marched by road to Quebec, began to embark on the 23rd; the first of the dismounted units, which proceeded by rail, two days later.

At Quebec were also loaded guns, stores and ammunition consigned to the D.D.O.S., Woolwich, the major items of which were forty-two 18-pdr. guns, nine 13-pdr., six 60-pdr., fifty-six ammunition wagons and 11,847 rounds of gun ammunition, as a contribution to the common stock from Canada’s reserve supplies. These were in excess of the fifty-four 18-pdr. guns, twelve 13-pdr. and four 60-pdr., with their full complement of 198 ammunition wagons, and 1,500 rounds per gun, which were required for mobilization of the artillery units of the Contingent. In the course of the next twelve months additional guns and howitzers to the number of forty-one were sent overseas from Canada.

In few cases was the sound military principle followed
that each unit should embark complete with men, horses, vehicles and baggage in one ship. The War Office had early made a special request that certain camp equipment—camp cooking kettles, blankets (two per man), waterproof groundsheets, buckets, picketing gear and such, of which there was a shortage in the British Isles—should accompany units in the same vessel so that each might be self-contained. Orders to this effect were issued, and the C.G.S. added “Serious inconvenience will be caused if the foregoing instructions are neglected.” It was not intended that tents or camp furniture should be taken, and the articles designated usually accompanied the Contingent, but—as had to be reluctantly admitted—rarely with the unit. Conditions on the Quebec wharves for a time were almost indescribable: the Assistant Director of Embarkation reported that “chaos reigned supreme.”

In one instance a unit had to be disembarked and replaced because of insufficient accommodation. A number of the ships, not deeply enough laden, had to take on water ballast with the assistance of the civic fire brigade. After the last transport cast off at 5 p.m. on Thursday 1st October, there yet remained a few men, 863 horses, an assortment of vehicles, ammunition and a great quantity of miscellaneous equipment, supplies and stores, totalling 4,512 tons; these were stowed in an extra transport—the Manhattan—which, with forty-five hired civilians to tend the horses, sailed independently four days later. The Chief Embarkation Officer considered that everything possible had been done by the small, inexperienced and changing staff at his disposal, handicapped as they were by failure on the part of many units to comply with instructions especially as to rendering states of strength and of cargo space required for stores. Command of the Contingent was vested in Colonel V. A. S. Williams, the senior military officer present. He and the headquarters staff of the Contingent all embarked in the
Franconia.

After loading, transports anchored in the stream where sealed orders were handed to the captain of the ship and to the commander of the troops on board. The first of these, issued by the Chief Transportation Officer, directed the captain to proceed down river; the second, from the same source and opened after dropping the pilot off Father Point, was to continue the voyage to Gaspé Basin, at the entrance to which the Canadian Government ship Canada would transmit orders for anchorage. The third was a farewell message read to the troops assembled on deck:–

On the eve of your departure from Canada I wish to congratulate you on having the privilege of taking part, with the other forces of the Crown, in fighting for the honour of the King and Empire.

You have nobly responded to the call of duty, and Canada will know how to appreciate the patriotic spirit that animates you.

I have complete confidence that you will do your duty, and that Canada will have every reason to be proud of you.

You leave these shores with the knowledge that all Canadian hearts beat for you, and that our prayers and best wishes will ever attend you. May God bless you and bring you back victorious.

ARTHUR, F.M.
Governor General of Canada.

By order of the Minister of Militia, the Department of Marine and Fisheries and the Department of the Naval Service had been requested to ensure “that every possible precaution may be taken to detect and prevent the laying of mines in the St. Lawrence, or elsewhere on the route to England”: neither had equipment for mine-sweeping, but both issued warnings that careful watch should be kept for mines or suspicious vessels in the river – they did not accept responsibility for the remainder of the route.

Before leaving Quebec strict injunctions had been issued in secret orders to captains of vessels from Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., – the British naval
officer appointed to command the trans-Atlantic escort – for
the covering of lights, which were observed, and for the
closing down of ships’ wireless, which were not always ob-
served at first. Strict regulations forbidding the publication,
without lawful authority, of any naval or military informa-
tion, although passed by Privy Council ten days earlier (P.C.
2358 of 12.ix.1914) were not made public until three months
later; as an immediate precautionary measure, however, the
press had been warned, before the first transport arrived at
Quebec, against giving the names of the ships or making
mention of the embarkation of the force. This was complied
with by almost all Canadian newspapers, but soon the infor-
mation was broadcast to the world at large. On 28th Septem-
ber, in the very midst of the embarkation, the Governor Gen-
eral was reported in the press to have stated at a public meet-
ing in Ottawa:–

Recently I have had the pleasure several times to visit
Valcartier, and also to be present at what is perhaps no
longer a secret, the embarkation of the Canadian troops.
On the same occasion the Prime Minister is reported to have
said:–

Twice I have visited Valcartier Camp. Those of you
who have not had that opportunity may be assured that the
expeditionary force which has just embarked comprises as
splendid a body of men as will be found among the armies of
the Empire.

These pronouncements were calculated to deceive the enemy
and, to further the deception, Admiral Wemyss let the press
understand that the transports were sailing independently.
The War Office was scrupulous to encipher all cables, and
had pressed for details of personnel, horses and material in
each transport; the list was so extensive that the department
warned the War Office that it would be sent in clear,\textsuperscript{138} and
so despatched it. The warning cable drew remonstrances
from the War Office,\textsuperscript{139} and the reply given was: “Your tele-
gram received too late,”\textsuperscript{140} and on the same day: “Unlikely
to do harm . . . . Names of transport and strength of Conti-
gent had already been published." As it happened no harm was done, and although even newspapers with ample information undoubtedly reached Germany before the convoy made port, no effectual interceptive action was taken by the German Admiralty; it is now known that Admiral von Tirpitz believed 20,000 Canadians to be in Le Havre on 8th October.

PROTECTION

The Admiralty had long since made elaborate arrangements to ensure as far as possible that no harm should come to the Contingent. In replying to the enquiry of 13th August as to date of embarkation of the force, the Minister, on 19th August, had said:–

About 25,000 Canadian soldiers will be ready to cross the Atlantic before the middle of September. Escort of cruisers will be necessary. All to cross at same time. What suggestions have you to make.

The above was crossed by an explanatory message from the War Office dated 20th August, repeating the request of the 13th:–

The Army Council would like to be informed of the date when the Contingent will be ready to embark, as the Admiralty are anxious to make in advance the necessary arrangements for convoying the transports.

The circumstances already described delayed the fixing of the date of embarkation: “before the middle of September” was found to be somewhat optimistic but on 9th September the Minister cabled to the War Office:–

Government anxious to be informed whether escort will be available between 22nd and 27th instant.

The reply dated 12th September read:–

Escort can be ready September 24th. Will Canadian Expeditionary Force be ready to sail on that date?

It was already evident that again the date named was too early. Contractors had been given until 21st September to complete deliveries of supplies and it would take a week to
distribute them, and all the necessary ships could not be available until the 26th. The Prime Minister therefore answered:–

Canadian Expeditionary Force will be ready to embark 27th September.

Guarding the western entrance to the English Channel, in co-operation with a French squadron, was the 12th Cruiser Squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss. On 10th September he was ordered to hand over to Admiral Be-thell, commanding the 7th Battle Squadron, and to proceed with his squadron to coal at Plymouth, and thence to Halifax to escort the Canadian convoy, then estimated at fourteen transports and expected to sail on the 24th.

Possible interference with the convoy might come from German warships based on home ports; or from the fourteen armed German liners in harbour at New York and Boston; or from the Karlsruhe in the Pernambuco area, the only independent German cruiser known to be within striking distance. It was arranged that the British Grand Fleet should cover the first of these; Admiral Hornby with a cruiser squadron including the Niobe, would cover North American Atlantic ports; the escort would deal with immediate attacks. When it became known that the convoy would consist of thirty-two instead of fourteen transports, other powerful warships were detailed to accompany it.

The Minister was concerned for the safety of the convoy and enquired on 16th September as to the strength of the escort, pointing out the danger of capture arising from the varying speeds of the transports. The information sought was conveyed, three days later, to the Canadian Government as follows:–

The escort for the Canadian Contingent will consist of four cruisers with H.M.C.S. Niobe and H.M.S. Glory, under the command of a flag officer. This will be reinforced en route by a second battleship of the Glory class. The whole of the Grand Fleet will cover the escort from attack by any of the large forces of the enemy. All arrangements are being
made by the Admiralty for the escort, and the safe conduct of the convoy is receiving the most careful consideration. On 15th September, when Admiral Wemyss was three days out of Plymouth, a cipher message informed the Minister of Militia that the cruisers would assemble in good time and that the Admiral would arrange direct with him the exact time and position at which his squadron would meet the convoy. Although a stiff head wind reduced the speed of the twenty-year old warships – Charybdis (flagship), Eclipse and Talbot – to ten knots, with the Diana, delayed at Plymouth by machinery defects, 300 miles behind, the squadron arrived at Halifax on 22nd September and the Admiral interviewed the Minister at Quebec on the 24th. There he discovered that the convoy would consist of thirty transports, and amplified his plans, prepared on the outward voyage, to meet the increased number; next day he reported to the Admiralty that he would not be able to leave the St. Lawrence till 1st October. In accordance with his instructions troopships on arrival in Gaspé Basin were directed to anchor in the position each would occupy in the convoy when proceeding to sea in fleet formation; three lines ahead, fifteen cables apart and designated, X, Y, Z, each headed by a cruiser, with the fourth in rear.

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But there were further delays and the flotilla did not sail on the 1st, nor on the 2nd, on which day the Minister paid a visit to the Contingent in Gaspé Basin and passed in a launch from ship to ship distributing bundles of his printed valediction to the troops who received it with mixed feelings. On seeing the archaic cruiser escort he telegraphed to Ottawa a message for the Admiralty:—

Escort altogether inadequate, should increase strength. The Governor General, in forwarding the message, enquired whether the Admiralty was thoroughly assured of the adequacy of the escort. The reply, which reiterated the previous explanation of the intended disposition of protective warships, was in the affirmative. But Admiral Wemyss had similar misgivings, and informed the Admiralty after the voyage that under the circumstances he considered the risks taken were unjustifiable.

THE CROSSING

At 2.30 p.m. on Saturday the 3rd October the flagship *Charybdis* signalled all transports:—

Have cables hove short. All ships in Column Z will raise anchors at 3 p.m. and proceed, keeping column formation, steaming at 9 knots following leading cruiser *Eclipse*. Exactly at 3 p.m. the *Eclipse* led the port column out into the Gulf through the narrow exit from Gaspé Basin. As the last ship in Column Z passed the leading cruiser *Diana* of Column Y, all ships of that column hove anchors off bottom and proceeded, also at 9 knots, and similarly as the last transport of Column Y passed the leading cruiser *Charybdis* of Column X that column followed, with H.M.S. *Talbot* as Rear Cruiser. The length of the whole in line astern was about 21½ land miles, and the last ships passed the entrance at about 6.00 p.m. in perfect weather: a light breeze, a clear setting sun and a full bright moon. As soon as the first column was out at sea, speed was reduced and the two other
columns drew abreast in fleet formation. Then the course for all ships was signalled, with the speed—10 knots—and the convoy proceeded on the first leg of the course of 2,504 miles to its final destination. By noon on Sunday the convoy was off Cape Ray. At 6.30 a.m. next day, off St. Pierre-Miquelon, the battleship *Glory*, from Admiral Hornby’s squadron, joined the escort and took station five miles to the south; below the horizon and guarding the southern flank of the route was his flagship, the *Lancaster*, while the *Suffolk, Niobe*, and auxiliary cruiser *Caronia* watched the New York area.

In the middle of the forenoon four short quick blasts from the *Royal Edward*, which suddenly swung out of line, flying the flag signal “Man Overboard,” were noted by the next ship astern, the *Franconia*. In answer to the whistle signal the *Franconia* reversed engines to full speed astern, while from the bridge a ready lifebuoy was thrown within a few yards of the man in passing; meanwhile a boat, the crew in their places, was lowered and dropped in ninety seconds and the man was picked up safely. The boat recovered, the transports resumed their places.

At 11.00 a.m. the transport *Florizel*, with the Newfoundland Contingent on board, joined the convoy and took station as the last transport in the northern column. In the afternoon a strange steamer was chased by the cruiser *Eclipse* and found harmless.

The routine on board the transports was left to the commander of the troops in consultation with the captain of the ship. Reveille as a rule was at 5.30 or 6.30 a.m., followed by physical exercises and breakfast from 7.00 to 8.00 a.m. The forenoon was occupied with sweeping, cleaning, guard mounting and morning parades. The hour of the midday meal varied from 11.45 a.m. to 1.00 p.m., after which the afternoon parade was held. Morning and afternoon parades included rifle exercise, squad and section drill, signalling, physical exercises and fire drill. On all ships boat drill was
carried out at least twice during the voyage and several muster parades were held; on Sundays there were church parades, and on Saturday sports. Lectures for officers were delivered at 5.00 p.m. and 8.00 p.m.; tea for the men was at 6.00 p.m.; dinner for the officers at 7.00 p.m., and although “Lights Out” was sounded at 9.15 p.m. time was found in almost every ship for concerts, when local talent provided entertainment, and the usual collection was made for seamen’s charities. The daily run—from 200 to 250 miles—and the noon position aroused the usual interest, and although the sending of wireless by the transports was forbidden “except in the case of dire necessity,” news of the outside world was picked up by wireless from passing vessels or from the Marconi station at Poldhu. Most of the transports were amply provisioned, but in several there were complaints as to both quantity and quality; in one the troops were called upon to grind cargo wheat for their own subsistence.

Strange steamers were sighted on the 6th and 7th. The two fast transports *Laurentic* and *Royal George* acted as scouts on either flank during the hours of daylight. At midday on the 8th, Admiral Hornby’s flagship *Lancaster* steamed through the convoy from east to west between Columns X and Y, signalling “Good Luck” on leaving the escort at longitude 40° W.—the eastern limit of his station. The *Monmouth*, even in the light winds and moderate sea, could not maintain 10 knots and held back the following ships of the centre column; the Admiral therefore slowed to 8 knots until positions were regained and thereafter sent the *Monmouth* ahead as leading transport to set the pace—about 9½ knots. No lights of any kind, except an oil steering light on the stern of each vessel, were allowed; had there been fog each vessel would have towed a fog buoy at a distance of three cables.

At daylight on Saturday, 10th October at 49° 45’ N.—27° 05’ W. two large ships were sighted ahead; these were the *Princess Royal* and *Majestic* which had been waiting at
this rendezvous for two days. The former, a battle cruiser from the Grand Fleet, took up position on the north wing about six miles distant; the latter, a battleship from Admiral Bethell’s squadron, took station about six miles ahead of the centre column, and both kept position with the convoy. Next day, as an advance squadron, the *Alaunia* and *Montreal* were sent ahead, following the *Diana*, which was replaced by the *Majestic* at the head of Y Column.

The memorable event of the 12th—and of the voyage—was an intimate visit of the *Princess Royal* to the convoy. In the late afternoon as a red sun was setting in a smooth sea, she left her position, steamed back to the rear of the convoy and then, cleared for action and dressed as for a review, thundered up the line at 22 knots between Y and Z Columns. Passing the transports the band played “O Canada” and “The Maple Leaf;” the officers stood on the quarter-deck, the crew gave three cheers, and the crowding troops responded lustily to the welcome.

On the same day the Admiral sent a warning order that next day (Tuesday 13th) the transports would be organized into three squadrons – White (12 knots), Blue (10 knots), Red (8 knots). But next morning the flagship signalled “All ships will keep present fleet formation till further advised.” A northerly gale had sprung up during the night, there was a heavy sea, and the flagship at 8.00 a.m. had picked up strong German wireless telegraph signals, which even yet are not definitely accounted for: on the same day a German submarine was reported off Cherbourg, and another near Culver (Isle of Wight) narrowly escaped being rammed by the British torpedo-boat, *No. 116*.

**CHANGE OF DESTINATION**

The presence of the submarines caused the Admiralty to change the destination of the convoy. The original idea had been that the Contingent should disembark at Liverpool; this was abandoned because of congestion in the Mersey, and the
War Office made plans to take the troops by rail from Southampton to camps on Salisbury Plain; German activity in the Channel had caused a change to Devonport on 30th September; but on account of War Office objection Southampton was again agreed upon on 10th October, and Admiral Wemyss had been so informed. At 6.30 p.m. on the 13th, as the coast was not yet clear of submarines, he was ordered into Plymouth Sound.

Thus at 5.45 a.m. on the 14th, when Bishop Rock light (Scilly Isles) was abeam, all ships, in accordance with the latest order, were steaming through a heavy sea and a northerly gale for Devonport; two hours later, on a signal from the flagship, the White Squadron hauled out of column to starboard, to form in line following the cruiser Eclipse at 15 knots. The first transports to arrive were the Alaunia and the Montreal which, having gone ahead under escort of the Diana, entered Plymouth Sound at 7.00 a.m. The White Squadron, ordered to proceed at full speed to Eddystone Lighthouse and thence to Penlee Point, took pilots aboard and proceeded into Plymouth Sound and thence to H.M. Dockyard, Devonport. The remaining ships, now with the additional protection of cruisers and battleships, and surrounded by a fleet of torpedo-boat destroyers, followed, but had to lie in a choppy sea outside the breakwater waiting their turn to enter as pilots became available. At 4.00 in the afternoon the Charybdis arrived at Devonport, but not until seven o’clock next evening was the Admiralty in a position to report—“All Canadian transports have arrived at Plymouth.”

FURTHER OFFERS

No sooner had the First Contingent left Canadian waters than a second was offered:

6th October 1914.

The Dominion Government offers to place and maintain in the field a second Oversea Contingent of twenty thousand men. If the offer be accepted, what form should that contin-
gent take? Having parted with nearly all our 18-pounder guns, we cannot offer a complete division but besides infantry, we could furnish mounted rifles and units, fighting or administrative, required for special purposes.  

A cordial if cautious acceptance was received three days later.

His Majesty’s Government cordially thank the Government of Canada for the generous offer of a further contingent. As soon as the first contingent arrives and has been examined the details of the organization of the new contingent will be carefully considered and communicated to your Government.

A further message, suggesting a second Canadian Division and other units, was received on 31st October. But these replies had not been awaited: on 7th October, District commanders had been told “A Second Overseas Contingent will be mobilized.” Subsequent discussion in Canada had resulted in the raising of 12 new C.E.F. infantry battalions and in the decision to maintain continuously under arms in Canada not less than 30,000 men, exclusive of members of the Active Militia called out on active service; and from these the units for the successive overseas contingents would be selected, their places in Canada being taken by new units directly they embarked, and so a steady stream of reinforcements would go forward until the end of the war or until the War Office advised that further forces were not needed.

As a first step, provision was made on 7th November (P.C. 2831) for the raising of divisional and L. of C. units to a total of 15,272 for the Second Overseas Contingent, and, in addition, seven battalions of infantry, four regiments of mounted rifles and 4,826 men unallotted. The total in training was increased, on 21st November, from 30,000 to 50,000.

When the Army Council decided on the form which assistance from Canada should take, disappointment had been felt, especially in the West, at the exclusion of cavalry and
mounted rifles. So long as trench fighting continued, mounted troops were not required on the Western front, but when war with Turkey threatened and was finally declared it was evident they would be required in Egypt, and at the time it was also assumed that the tactical situation in Belgium and France would undergo a change and permit of mounted action. Therefore it was decided, in the absence of the Minister of Militia in England, to proceed with the organization of a body of mounted rifles in Canada.

Almost simultaneously with the offer of the Second Canadian Contingent another offer was made on 10th October:

Newspaper reports state that Army Council has called for the services of railwaymen. If this be so Canada can supply the want better probably than any other country. Two offers have already been received to raise construction gangs for rapid temporary repair work, or railway construction. If gangs are required should they be organized military units or civilian gangs? 

It was not until the 22nd October that the Army Council replied:

Army Council highly appreciate patriotic offer regarding railwaymen. At present it is not desired to accept it, but Army Council may be glad to accept offer later on. When accepted a railway corps should be organized on military basis through principal Canadian railways.

Acceptance “with gratitude” of 500 railwaymen came on 6th February 1915, before the end of the war the number had grown to over 22,000.

HOME GUARDS

A patriotic desire to do something urged many who could not volunteer for overseas service, and who did not belong to the Militia, to form independent organizations, collectively termed “Home Guards”. Usually marshalled under the banner of a club, company or other civilian association, they stood in a similar relation to the Department of Militia
as the Rifle Associations but unless authorized as such in Militia General Orders were not under military control. The personnel, largely over military age, drilled enthusiastically after business hours, with no well defined purpose except that in centres near the southern border they anticipated repetition of the Fenian raids. The Minister of Militia commended the movement, but the Chief of the General Staff questioned their utility, saying that 1914 was not 1866 and that there would seldom be less than 40,000 troops under arms. To only a few Home Guard companies could rifles be spared by the Department, neither raids nor internal disorders occurred, and the early enthusiasm subsided from lack of outlet until, by 1916, most if not all had disappeared.

OTHER ASSISTANCE

Even before the last batch of contracts for equipping the First Contingent was placed, the Minister of Militia realized that Canadian manufacturers would be capable of producing large quantities of war material, and it was widely understood that, on completion of existing orders, war contracts would be necessary to keep factories open. On 16th September notification was received that the Government of France required for immediate delivery 800,000 single army blankets and 12,000 complete sets of saddlery. The Department of Militia and Defence acted as agents of the French Government, and orders for all the saddlery—later increased to 20,000 sets—and over half the blankets were placed in Canada by the Director of Contracts. Similarly, British orders for saddlery, harness and saddle blankets to the value of $1,250,000, and orders from Russia for saddlery, traces and water bottles to the value of $2,150,000 were also placed before the end of January, 1915, making a total of $6,373,855. As these occupied only a restricted group of factories, the Governor General on 24th September 1914 informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

My advisers are informed that supplies of many different articles required for war purposes can be procured in
Canada of good quality and at reasonable prices. In view of serious conditions of unemployment they would be glad to have Canadian manufacturers and producers considered as far as practicable.\textsuperscript{168} The reply was that the Canadian High Commissioner was in personal communication with the War Office, and that the possibilities of Canada as a source of supply of materials for war purposes would be carefully borne in mind.\textsuperscript{169} A similar exchange of correspondence took place in December and January.\textsuperscript{170, 171} The extent to which the proclamation of neutrality issued by the President of the United States on 5th August\textsuperscript{28} might interfere with buying war material in that country was at first misjudged, to the extent that motor trucks and machine guns for the First Contingent were brought across the border surreptitiously. As a matter of fact the proclamation did not seek to interfere with the traffic in arms or war material—the two submarines were in a separate specified category—and very soon it was appreciated that the belligerent nations might purchase without restriction.

In October and November the British Ambassador at Washington found that there was considerable confusion in placing orders for war supplies, and stated that the New York market was being spoiled by persons who appeared to be buying stores; he asked if seven persons whom he named were authorized agents.\textsuperscript{172} All were disowned by the Canadian Government,\textsuperscript{173} including one who, on the strength of his interpretation of instructions from the Minister of Militia and Defence,\textsuperscript{174} used a letterhead “Canadian Committee for Supply of Allied Armies with Arms and Ammunition.”\textsuperscript{175, 176} An early contribution to the allied cause was the Canadian Government Steamer the \textit{Earl Grey} – a specially constructed icebreaker of modern type, which had been bought in 1909, at a cost of $501,266, to maintain the winter mail service with Prince Edward Island. Negotiations for sale were already under way when the British Government stressed the importance of keeping communica-
tions open with Archangel, and the sale of the ship to the Russian Government for £100,000 was consummated by Order in Council. (P.C. 2522 of 6.x.14). The vessel sailed next day for Archangel, under the command of Commander Trousdale, R.N. and manned by a naval crew. (P.C. 2608, of 17.x.14).

THE SHELL COMMITTEE

Among the producers whose business was directly affected by the outbreak of war were the manufacturers of iron and steel. The opening cablegram from Lord Kitchener to the Minister of Militia which led to the establishment of a vast new industry in Canada ran as follows:—

24th August, 1914

Can you provide or obtain from American trade shell empty shrapnel Q.F. guns 18-pdr., without cases or fuzes? If so, what rate delivery could you promise?

Four days later the British Government asked for quotations on 100,000 18-pdr. and 100,000 15-pdr. shrapnel shell.

The Minister of Militia, dissatisfied with the propositions advanced by U.S. manufacturers whom he consulted, determined that, if at all possible, Canadian factories should undertake the production of munitions on a large scale. He therefore called upon representatives of Canadian companies willing to experiment in the manufacture of shell to meet him in Ottawa on 2nd September. They appointed a Committee of three, with Colonel (afterwards Major-General Sir) Alexander Bertram, an officer of the Militia since 1872, as chairman, and delegated to him full power to act between them and the Minister through the Master-General of the Ordnance, Colonel T. Benson, “with the idea of working out and formulating some plan of organization for carrying on the work.” The Minister—who on the 2nd had informed the War Office that 4,000 shrapnel could be supplied weekly, delivery to commence within one month—met this manufacturers’ committee at
Valcartier Camp on 7th September and, by adding the M.G.O., the Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition and the Superintendent of the Dominion Arsenal—the only place where at this time shells were being made in Canada—he evolved what became known as the “Shell Committee.”

The status of this committee, whose only charter was a pencilled note of the Minister of Militia, was never defined. The Minister was the agent of the British Government; the Shell Committee advised and reported to him and as a whole performed the functions of his personal agent, while the four manufacturers on it, acting as a group, signed contracts with him for the manufacture and delivery of shells according to specifications, and sub-let contracts for component parts and for assembling. Responsibility for inspection, insurance, shipping and financing was undertaken by the Committee as a whole.

Operations were carried out on this anomalous basis until 29th November 1915, when the Committee was replaced by the larger organization of the Imperial Munitions Board (Canada), which acted on behalf of the British Ministry of Munitions in obtaining all war supplies purchased in Canada. Contracts made by the Shell Committee amounted in fourteen months to $142,435,681.73, a saving of over $16,000,000 on the amount of $158,876,766 paid by the War Office at standard prices; this saving was turned back to the British authorities. Contracts had been placed with 329 factories for 22,000,000 shells, varying from 15-pdr. to 9 2-inch, of which 3,000,000 had been delivered.

The initial energy and far-sighted policy of the Shell Committee laid the foundation for an extensive development whereby the steel production of the country was increased from 800,000 tons in 1914 to 2,500,000 tons in 1918. All the steel works and foundries in Canada were eventually employed in producing steel for munitions, and the story of how they supplied over 66,000,000 shells to the British forces is fully re-
corded elsewhere.\textsuperscript{180}

WAR FINANCE

The enabling legislation brought in during the Special Session through the War Measures Act was applied on 19th September 1914 (P.C. 2401) when the Privy Council approved and confirmed negotiations conducted by the acting Canadian High Commissioner in London with the Bank of England, agents for the British Government. He was specially authorized on behalf of the Government of Canada to conclude arrangements for a loan of seven million pounds sterling on such terms as he deemed proper. On account of increased war expenditure the Dominion Government—doubtful of the success of an internal loan—asked for a further advance of five million pounds, making twelve million pounds altogether, up to 31st March 1915 (P.C. 2771 of 2.xi.14). The amount of the advance was £12,000,000 but the amount of capital debt—£100 for each £95 advanced—was £12,631,578 19s. and the interest was 3½ per cent on each £95 advanced. These terms were the same as for the General War Loan by which the British Government raised funds for war purposes, including advances to Canada and the other Dominions.

The total Militia expenditure to 31st December 1914 chargeable to War Vote amounted to $26,221,980,\textsuperscript{181} and $18,000,000 additional was estimated to 31st March, 1915. The major item paid was $12,386,056 for pay, allowances, rations and forage: clothing cost $3,809,415 and ocean transport $3,363,240.42.\textsuperscript{182} The amounts were in excess of the estimate of $30,000,000 submitted when the War Appropriation Bill was under discussion during the Special Session: that estimate was based on 25,000 men up to 31st March 1915 and provided $1,450,000 for “Return transport to Canada,” although it was considered “not very probable that the troops would return within that time.”\textsuperscript{183}

Only gradually the changed conditions and the vast
scale of expenditures in men, money and material pertaining to a great war were being brought home to the people, who learned of them through the publication of restrictive regulations, parliamentary debates and official statements in the newspapers and from overseas press reports. Informed Canadian opinion at the end of September is exemplified by the words of the Prime Minister:

   With no thought of aggression, with no spirit of pride, with no boast of our might or of our resources, we have engaged in this war as a solemn duty, without which this Empire could not have continued to exist, save with dishonour. We believe that the course which Canada should follow, the course which duty and honour place before her, is absolutely plain and we propose to pursue it.
CHAPTER IV
ON SALISBURY PLAIN
OCTOBER, 1914—FEBRUARY, 1915

Map: Salisbury Plain 1914-15 (facing p. 170)
End Paper: Western Theatre 1915

DISEMBARKATION—CAMPS—RATIONS AND CANTEENS—STATUS AND CONTROL—
TRAINING—INSPECTIONS AND REVIEWS—BAD WEATHER—HUTS—LEAVE—
DISCIPLINE—WELFARE—REDUCTION IN STRENGTH—HEALTH—BILLETS
—HORSES—ARMS AND ARMAMENT—COMPLETION OF EQUIPMENT
—FORMATION OF THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION—EMBARKATION FOR FRANCE—OTHER UNITS—THE WINTER IN
CANADA—THE C.E.F. IN CANADA—CANADIANS IN
OTHER EMPIRE FORCES—THE SPRING SESSION
1915—WAR SUPPLIES—THE CANADIAN CREED.

DISEMBARKATION

As ship after ship of the unexpected Canadian convoy moved up the Sound and dropped anchor in the Hamoaze, the townspeople of Plymouth and Devonport became aware that with the arrival of the first troops from overseas another historic event was taking place at their ancient harbour. Naval cadets dressed ship and cheered, church bells rang out, wondering crowds lined the waterfront and wharves, workmen building battleships dropped tools long enough to chalk “Bravo Canadians!” on the armour plate; women and children hurried aboard excursion steamers to make a tour about the transports. The Mayor of Plymouth, on behalf of the civil population, sent cordial greetings and among many others Lord Kitchener also welcomed the troops to the shores of the Mother Country.

Lieutenant-General Alderson was on the quay ready to take over his new command. Born in 1859 he was first
commissioned in the 97th Foot, now the 2nd Battalion of The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment, and except for attendance at the Staff College and two years as D.A.A.G. he had served entirely with troops. His first active service was against the Boers in 1881; in the following year he was fighting in Egypt, at Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir; in 1884-85 he was on the Nile Expedition with a Camel Corps (Mounted Infantry) at Abu Klea, El Gubat and Mettemmeh. In Mashonaland 1896, the forces under his command broke the rebellion by taking the stronghold of the paramount chief. He served throughout the South African war 1899-1902, being present at the relief of Kimberley, the battle of Paardeberg and many other engagements. In this campaign he came in contact with Canadians for the first time in 1900, when the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles formed part of his Mounted Infantry Column for seven months, an association which led to his present appointment. His chief peace command was the 6th (Poona) Division, 1908-1912, upon completion of which he went on half-pay; but on 5th August 1914 he was called upon to take command of the 1st Mounted Division, a new Home Defence formation comprising four yeomanry brigades and concentrated in the eastern counties of England. For war services he had been mentioned in despatches on a number of occasions, and received the brevets of lieutenant-colonel and colonel. He had been A.D.C. to Queen Victoria and to King Edward VII, and wore the bronze medal of the Royal Humane Society, awarded for diving into the Nile to rescue a man overboard. He was a keen and perspicacious sportsman — yachtsman, horseman, horsemaster and master of hounds—and he held a high reputation as a leader of irregular troops.\textsuperscript{186}

At 10 p.m. on Wednesday 14th October the transfer of command from Colonel Williams to General Alderson took place on board the \textit{Franconia}, and next morning disembarkation began. The Contingent, being destined to camp on
Salisbury Plain, was now in the Southern Command, under Lieut.-General W. Pitcairn Campbell, C.B. A plan for disembarkation at Southampton and transportation by rail to Salisbury Plain, to be completed in three days, had been drawn up by the Southern Command; it ended with a cautionary “Note:—These arrangements are subject to alteration if necessary at the discretion of the Embarkation Commandant.” The discretion of this officer was now to be severely taxed—the docking and railway facilities at Devonport and Plymouth were few compared to Southampton; one ship, the *Royal Edward*, was sent round to her home port, Avonmouth, to unload; the troops, horses and military cargo on board many of the transports were not as supposed; units, not being complete in one ship, would not fit standard trains; all the ingenuity of the railway and military staffs was required to assemble rolling stock and to prevent at Devonport a re-enactment of the chaos at Quebec.

Before going ashore each man, as provided in the charter-party, drew one day’s dry ration from ship’s stores, from which also were issued two feeds of oats per horse. Dismounted units, greeted enthusiastically by the citizens with cheers, cigarettes, kisses, drinks, and presentation copies of the New Testament, marched up the thronged streets direct from the docks to the railway station and entrained; the regimental transport and horses sometimes preceded, rarely accompanied, and sometimes followed. Mounted units usually spent a day in bivouac at the naval parade ground, so that the horses might recuperate from the fatigue of standing for three weeks on board ship; the days in harbour, with no breeze to ventilate between decks, had been hard on them, and more horses died in port than on the voyage—the casualties on shipboard totalled 86, about 1.13 per cent.

From Plymouth the trains carried the force across Devon and Dorset to stations in Wiltshire adjacent to Salisbury Plain—Lavington and Patney in the north, or Amesbury to the east—and the final march of eight or ten miles
into camp was directed by a local policeman, the postman, or a boy scout. The horses, too weak for draught were walked under harness, and after the four days of gentle exercise specified in Camp Orders, were fit to recover the vehicles parked under guard at railhead.

Two of the mechanized units—the Divisional Supply Column and the Automobile Machine Gun Brigade—proceeded the 150 miles by road, staging at Exeter, Taunton and Heytesbury, and arrived in camp in two days. It had been estimated by the Admiralty that the Contingent could be disembarked at Plymouth in six days, but not until the 23rd October, after nine days in harbour, did the last of the units go ashore. By that date the Manhattan, having made the voyage independently four days behind the convoy, had reached Devonport and was discharging her 850 horses, which, as their drivers had crossed in other ships, were looked after temporarily by local Territorials; thence she proceeded to Southampton to unload her heterogeneous cargo, which was reclaimed in part by Canadian detachments sent from Salisbury Plain. The ninety crated motor vehicles of the Divisional Ammunition Park were assembled at Southampton by personnel of that unit, and taken by road to Salisbury Plain where they arrived on 30th October.

In the course of the protracted disembarkation at Devonport it had seldom been practicable to reunite units with their horses, harness, stores, equipment and transport. Trainloads of this detached material were shipped independently and unloaded chiefly at Amesbury, where a large park of unclaimed vehicles was established. All available wheelers, fitters and carpenters were detailed to reassemble vehicles dismantled for the voyage, and teams loaned by units which had both horses and harness hauled the wagons into camp. Eventually the confused mass was disentangled and redistributed as far as possible to the same units as had been in possession at Valcartier.
CAMPS

Before the Contingent embarked, an advance party had sailed from New York (23.ix.1914) for liaison duties in England; it was headed by Colonel John Wallace Carson, a prominent business man of Montreal, who at fifty, after twenty-three years commissioned service in the militia, now commanded the 1st Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards). With him were Lieut.-Colonel F. Strange of the Canadian Ordnance Corps, a major and a captain of the C.A.S.C. and two junior officers to report as A.D.Cs. to General Alderson. At this time there were also with the British forces two officers of the Canadian Permanent Force: Lieut.-Colonel P. E. Thacker, L.S.H. (R.C.) in the Dominions Section at the War Office, and Captain J. H. MacBrien, R.C.D., specially employed on embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force, who later was appointed to the staff of the 1st Canadian Division. The six senior of these officers were all engaged on various liaison duties with the War Office or Southern Command in anticipation of the arrival of the Contingent and of its sojourn in England.

Salisbury Plain, where the force was destined to spend sixteen memorable weeks, is a broad hilly tract of three hundred square miles rising above the closely cultivated farm-lands of southern Wiltshire and drained by the Avon and Wiley and their tributaries; a part of it, six miles by fifteen in extent, was War Department land which for a number of years had been used for field artillery and rifle ranges, and for summer camps and military manoeuvres. The upland area of deep bottoms and rolling downs, rising to over six hundred feet, was bare but for scattered clumps of trees and a few lonely farms; on every side were innumerable prehistoric remains—tumuli, dolmens, barrows and ditches, relics of early Britons, Romans and Danes. A thin turf cropped by grazing sheep grew in the few inches of poor soil overlying impervious chalk. In the narrow sheltered river valleys, embedded in the underlying greensand levels at three hundred
feet, rambling thatched villages clustered among deciduous trees by the clear waters.

While the convoy was crossing the Atlantic, preparation of camps on the Plain had been in progress; units of the Territorial Force furnished fatigue parties to pitch tents and marquees, to lay floor-boards in most of the tents, to stuff palliasses with straw, and to erect cook-house shelters. On the 16th of October General Alderson established his headquarters at Ye Olde Bustard, a wayside inn isolated in the middle of the Plain halfway between Salisbury and Devizes. The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, the Divisional Mounted Troops and the P.P.C.L.I. were detailed to the neighbouring Bustard Camp (Commandant, Lieut.-Colonel M. S. Mercer); the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades to West Down South—two miles north-east (Commandant, Colonel R. E. W. Turner, V.C.); all the artillery and the Divisional Supply Column to West Down North—three miles north-east (Commandant, Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Burstall); the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the two cavalry regiments, the 17th Battalion and the Newfoundland Contingent to Pond Farm Camp—five miles north-east (Commandant, Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Cohoe). Army Service Corps and medical units were distributed appropriately to the troops they served, except that the majority of the nursing sisters proceeded to St. Thomas’ Hospital in London for entertainment and instruction. Veterinary hospitals were opened at the Cavalry School, Netheravon and at Keeper’s Farm, West Down South.

The scanty water supply of the main camps was piped up to open reservoirs from pumping stations at wells or streamlets; as a rule there were but two taps in the lines of each battalion for all purposes. For each unit a marquee was provided for bathing and some used bell tents also, but the ration of fuel—2 pounds wood and 1 pound coal per man until 21st November, with an added pound of wood thereafter—and the lack of boilers allowed little hot water. The
equipment per battalion for the first two months was only six
bucks, one forty gallon cistern, and a stove. The Southern
Command fitted up the Old Corn Store in Salisbury—ten to
fifteen miles from the camps – so that a man might have a
hot bath for fourpence, if he could find his way there be-
tween 5 and 8 p.m. on week days or on Sunday afternoon.
Village washerwomen plied a lively trade, and enterprising
laundry firms in Salisbury and even London made arrange-
ments for collecting washing weekly by motor truck. Wash-
ing and bathing in rivers, streams or mist ponds and the wa-
tering of horses in the last, were strictly forbidden; reservoirs
and pumping stations were out of bounds and under armed
guard. Horse troughs connected to the camp water system
were placed to serve a number of neighbouring units.

RATIONS AND CANTEENS

Supplies of food and forage were arranged for, by or
through the administrative staff of the Southern Command,
and transported and delivered by the A.S.C. units of the
Contingent. Cooking for the troops was carried out as usual,
regimentally; thirty-six n.c.o’s underwent a fourteen-day
cookery course at Aldershot in December and on qualifying
conducted courses in their own units; but cooking for 1,000
men over open fires in the rain—the shelters were altogether
inadequate—taxed even the most experienced battalion
cooks. Officers’ messes in large marquees or corrugated iron
huts were run by contract with Harrod’s Stores, London, on
a flat rate of six shillings and sixpence per day, of which the
individual paid one shilling and the Canadian Government
the balance. Contracts for dry canteens in the camp lines had
also been entered into by the War Office with Richard Dick-
eson & Co., Ltd., and with the Canteen and Mess Co-
operative Society, Ltd., both of London; regimental pur-
chases from these canteens up to fourpence per man were
authorized, at option and in lieu, to vary the standard scale.
At first the daily ration included 1-pound bread, 1-pound
fresh vegetables and 1-pound fresh meat and bacon per man; a request of 13th December for an increase of ½-pound of meat for those employed on special working parties resulted in an increase of ¼-pound throughout the Contingent. In spite of this a solicitous Englishman telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: “Canadian Contingent suffering from slow starvation...”

One of the first decisions General Alderson was called upon to make was in the matter of the supply of liquor to the troops. Even before the Contingent sailed, contracts with private firms for the opening of canteens which would sell beer as well as groceries in the camps on Salisbury Plain had been under consideration. Lord Kitchener, however, knowing the regulations for Canadian militia camps, desired that there should be no wet canteens for the Canadian Contingent. General Alderson had seen the disorderly conduct of some of the troops in Plymouth, continued in the villages of the Plain; he therefore decided that the solution lay in controlled sale—“it is absolutely necessary that there should be canteens for sale of beer in camps”. On 21st October he was greeted with spontaneous cheers when he personally informed his brigades, drawn up in hollow square, that, with War Office sanction, the discrimination against Canadians had been removed; within the next few days canteens, operated by the two firms named, were opened in all the camps, for one hour at noon and three hours in the evening, at which light beer was sold under military supervision. Sales of beer for November and December totalled over $100,000, 7½ per cent of which was rebated and distributed per capita, to units. All villages in the vicinity of Salisbury Plain had already been placed out of bounds, except to men in possession of passes, and the order was enforced by military road patrols and officers’ piquets.

STATUS AND CONTROL

As far as the War Office was concerned, the Canadian
Contingent was a Division, with a large number of attached units and reinforcements, in training on Salisbury Plain. The Divisional Commander (Lieut.-General Alderson) was directly responsible to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command (Lieut.-General Campbell) who in turn was responsible to the War Office; thus in the strictly military sense the chain of responsibility was simple and complete. But the appearance of the Minister of Militia in England complicated matters: he had sailed on a fast liner from New York four days after the convoy and landed before it. He was invited to call at the War Office, and as he wore uniform there was room for doubt as to whether he should be regarded as an officer of the Canadian Militia, or as a Minister representing the Government of Canada. If the former, he was not in the C.E.F.; if the latter his business would overlap that of the Acting High Commissioner for Canada in London, with whom the Prime Minister and General Alderson both communicated upon matters affecting the C.E.F.

Of General Hughes’ meeting with the Secretary of State for War a Canadian officer present gives the following account:—

Sir Sam marched up to Kitchener’s desk. When he arrived at the desk Kitchener spoke up quickly and in a very stern voice said: “Hughes, I see you have brought over a number of men from Canada; they are of course without training and this would apply to their officers; I have decided to divide them up among the British regiments; they will be of very little use to us as they are.” Sir Sam replied: “Sir, do I understand you to say that you are going to break up these Canadian regiments that came over? Why, it will kill recruiting in Canada.” Kitchener answered “You have your orders, carry them out.” Sir Sam replied: “I’ll be damned if I will,” turned on his heel and marched out.

He immediately cabled to Sir Robert Borden the disturbing news of this change in policy, 119 and interviewed the British Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lloyd George). Within a few days the
order was rescinded; it was decided that the Canadian units should not be broken up but should be kept together to operate and fight in Canadian formations in the field.

The breaking up of the division immediately upon arrival in France and distribution by battalions to British formations, was in contemplation by Generals Foch and Wilson on 21st January 1915, the day after a conference between Field-Marshal French and General Joffre at Chantilly, although Lord Kitchener at this time intended to use the Canadian Division as a complete formation.

When the Minister embarked for Canada on the 31st October he left behind as his “special representative” Colonel J. W. Carson. No terms of reference existed for such an office, nor had the incumbent been attested in the C.E.F., but in Salisbury Plain Orders of 7th November it was announced that:

Colonel J. W. Carson is representing the Canadian Government as regards certain financial and other questions in connection with the Canadian Contingent. His address is White Hart Hotel, Salisbury.

He already had an office in the Hotel Cecil, London. Six weeks later he was described in Contingent Orders as “the financial representative of the Canadian Government”. In January 1915 his position was defined by Order in Council (P.C. 107 of 15.i.1915) as representative of the Militia Department in the United Kingdom in connection with equipment and supplies for the C.E.F. there and “at the seat of war” and to act as the agent of the Minister of Militia in these matters. To provide him with a “Consultative Assistant” the rank of Lieut.-Colonel in the Canadian Militia was granted on 14th January 1915 to Lieut.-Colonel C. Lowther, a British yeomanry officer and M.P., but it was not clear to the Army Council that the appointment was absolutely necessary, and the duties were never assumed. Colonel Carson’s duties as to supplies were few, since the War Office had undertaken to equip and feed all Canadians overseas; major financial arrangements had already been made by the accred-
imited representative of the Canadian Government in Lon-
don—the Hon. George H. Perley, a member of the Canadian
Cabinet and acting High Commissioner. But Colonel Carson
crystallized his own conception of his duties in his letterhead
“Canadian General Staff” and “Department of Militia and
Defence, Canada: Special Representative in the British Isles
and at Seat of War”. This definition was not too wide for the
functions which he performed for the next twenty months: as
he explained to the War Office, his responsibility covered
“anything and everything”, and in his assumed rôle of “Act-
ing Minister”, he in fact became omnipotent over the C.E.F.
in England, and later exercised a measure of control over the
Canadian forces in France.\textsuperscript{188}

General Alderson, schooled and experienced as he was
in the procedure and practices of the Regular Army, thus
found that command of the Canadian Contingent differed
from the command of a home division. To expedite action he
frequently cabled to Ottawa, on a wide variety of subjects;
the War Office disapproved, and he was informed in No-
vember “that direct communication between the General Of-
ficer Commanding 1st Canadian Division and the Canadian
Civil or Military Authorities in Canada is not permissible”:
to avoid confusion communications affecting his command
should be exclusively addressed to the G.O.C., Southern
Command, and the War Office must continue to be the sole
channel of communication with the “Colonial authorities.”
In like manner he was taken to task by the Southern Com-
mand for writing direct to the War Office; after he had ex-
plained that he was replying to letters and cables received
direct, some latitude was seen to be necessary.\textsuperscript{8,192}

In addition to appointing the divisional commander, the
War Office, as requested by the Canadian Government\textsuperscript{120}
also appointed the two senior staff officers: for G.S.O.1,
from 10th October, Colonel E. S. Heard, who had served in
the South African war, and had seven years experience at the
Staff College and four on the staff of the New Zealand mili-
tary forces; for A.A. & Q.M.G., from 21st October, Colonel T. Birchall Wood, a Royal Artillery officer of thirty years service, including South Africa, the Staff College, and ten years in staff appointments, of which four years immediately preceding the war were on the staff of the Royal Military College, Kingston. Two other British officers were, however, appointed in England to the divisional staff: owing to the death on 6th January, of Lieut.-Colonel F. Strange, who was the only senior Canadian Ordnance Officer with the Contingent, Lieut.-Colonel J. A. S. Murray, with twenty-five years service, ten of them in the Army Ordnance Corps, was gazetted Assistant Director of Ordnance Services; to assist in the final preparation and training of the Division for the front, Br.-General R. C. B. Lawrence, C.B., recently retired after twenty-eight years service in England, Egypt, India and Ceylon, was posted as “Senior General Staff Officer” on 22nd January.

TRAINING

For training, the whole area of the Plain at the disposal of the Contingent was divided into four parts on 22nd October: Bustard Camp area in the southeast for all troops; West Down South and West Down North camps in the southwest, for all except Divisional Mounted Troops and artillery units; Pond Farm Camp, to the west, for all troops except cavalry; and a larger area to the northeast for cavalry and artillery. These four camp areas were each under an O.C.—the Camp Commandant—who made further subdivision, and who had direction of route marches of progressive length to be carried out by all units three times a week.

The degree of preparedness of the troops having been gauged, a syllabus of training for the ensuing week was issued on 7th November; this was followed a week later by another laid out to occupy thirteen weeks. The whole was carried out under direction of the Southern Command, which issued notes on training; prominence was given to exercises
stressed in War Office comments on the syllabus, and to special features brought out in “Notes from the Front” prepared at G.H.Q. in France. Practically all the instruction was given by officers of the Contingent, but two officers and five n.c.o. instructors were loaned by the War Office for special duty.

A weekly syllabus for each infantry battalion was drawn up by the O.C. and submitted for approval. In these there was little variation: physical training, one hour daily throughout the period; musketry instruction, twenty-seven hours for the first three weeks; drill, fifteen hours per week, and night work, outposts, route marching and entrenching from two to four hours per week. In general, five weeks were allotted to company training, two to battalion training and two to brigade training. For special instruction in musketry, Captain H. R. Sandilands (Northumberland Fusiliers) reported as staff officer and had general charge of range practice and instruction; he delivered to company officers and selected n.c.o’s a series of lectures on fire discipline, direction, control and orders. The only range available from 28th October – a cold day with white frost—was of 64 targets up to 600 yards at Shrewton Folly, and even this was not available from 14th November to 1st December on account of shooting by British units. The Bulford ranges—58 targets—were not allotted until 16th December, and the Durrington ranges – 40 targets—were not ready until 18th January. The allowance of ammunition for each infantryman was 155 rounds. To attain a standard approximating to that of the first seven regular divisions of the B.E.F., whose rapid fire had been mistaken by the Germans for machine gun fire, every infantryman practised charger-loading and rapid fire with dummy cartridges for ten minutes or more daily. In December and January parties totalling 45 field officers and 35 senior n.c.o’s proceeded to Hayling Island to take the musketry course at the Southern Command School. A divisional course for the machine gun officers and one n.c.o. of the
Machine Gun Section of each battalion was held in the third week of December; a special allotment of ammunition was made for subsequent practice on the ranges. The five n.c.o. instructors, attached at the end of December, were experts in bayonet fighting; sacks were used, and it was ordered that “in practising bayonet exercises the men must not be opposed to each other with rifles, either with bayonets fixed or unfixed.” Special areas were set apart for practice in trench digging, and it was stringently enforced that the party which had dug should, before leaving, refill the trench and replace the turf. This may have given rise to the “childish idea,” which the G.O.C. found it necessary to correct, that “trenches round tents were not allowed on Salisbury Plain because they would interfere with the hunting.”

Tactical schemes and exercises, with and without troops, were carried out in November, December and January, but the inclemency of the weather was such that they were, like other essentials of training, repeatedly interrupted. A tactical exercise for 13th November was postponed to the 17th. On the 27th the G.O.C., Southern Command, held a divisional field day and inspection in heavy rain. On 4th December another tactical scheme was cancelled because of a wind-storm with more rain. On the 11th December a divisional parade was dismissed on account of rain, and a tactical exercise arranged for Wednesday the 16th was postponed on account of movement of troops from under canvas into huts. By January training had progressed to battalion and brigade manoeuvres. The G.O.C. inspected the 1st, 3rd and 2nd Infantry Brigades at field manoeuvres on the 21st, 25th and 26th, each of which days is exceptionally recorded as “fine.” For the first week of February divisional exercises were projected, but not practised.

For the programme of training carried out by the artillery the O.C. Divisional Artillery was responsible. It comprised equitation and driving, laying, battery tactics, ranging, distribution and method of fire, entrenching and concealing
guns—which were painted parti-colour, reconnaissance, communications, march discipline, supplemented by lectures on these subjects and also on organization, ammunition and horsemastership. For the months of December and January Lieut.-Colonel G. Gillson, R.H.A., recently returned from the front, was loaned by the War Office to give up-to-date instruction. The presence of so many troops on the Plain restricted the artillery ranges; those in use were required also for the artillery of six British divisions, so that the Canadian batteries only carried out range practice, fifty rounds per battery, from 21st to 28th January, and only four batteries with aeroplane observation. None of the units had time to fire the course of musketry laid down for them on 5th February.

The syllabus for the Divisional Engineers provided for thirty-six hours weekly for thirteen weeks. In addition to physical training, drill and musketry, technical training—entrenching, bridging, wiring and demolitions—was provided for. But practical work occupied a large number of the personnel; specialists were engaged on the erection of huts and camp construction—power plant, road work and water supply. Six officers and twelve n.c.o’s. attended pontooning courses at Brightlingsea and Pangbourne, and musketry practice was carried out on 29th and 30th January.

The maintenance of communication between the widely scattered units on Salisbury Plain brought the Signals personnel face to face with active service conditions. Means of communication practised were by lamp, flag, heliograph, telegraph, telephone and by hand, for the last of which motor bicycles were largely used by despatch riders. In field telephony—the usual means of communication now and throughout the war—courses for unit signallers were carried out by artillery and infantry brigades under their own arrangements. The field telephone sets brought from Canada were found to be too fragile and were subsequently replaced by the British pattern. At this time wireless and visual signalling were being little used at the front.
INSPECTIONS AND REVIEWS

While the business of training as summarized above occupied most of the time, there were a number of inspections, reviews and ceremonial parades, and on two occasions it seemed possible that at least part of the Contingent might be required to meet a hostile landing in England. The first inspection was by the G.O.C. Southern Command, on 21st October. Three days later Field-Marshal Earl Roberts of Kandahar, Pretoria and Waterford, V.C., in his capacity as Colonel-in-Chief of the Colonial Contingents, inspected the troops in their four camp areas; he was accompanied by the Minister of Militia. His kind and sympathetic address to his “brother soldiers of the Canadian Contingent” was published in orders and read to all units on parade.

The Contingent as a whole was, like all other troops under arms in England, given its place in the scheme of home defence; from the 28th October a force of 2,000 of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade was held in readiness to move at short notice to the south coast in case of a German landing. The Motor Machine Gun Brigade had a special rôle in the scheme of defence for London, and when Scarborough was raided from the sea on 16th December the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade lay under arms all night.

The first Royal Inspection took place on 4th November. A rehearsal two days before had been carried out in a downpour of rain—in three days nearly two inches fell—which only ceased shortly before the arrival of the Royal party: Their Majesties King George V and Queen Mary, accompanied by Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener, the acting High Commissioner for Canada, and the Premier of British Columbia. The inspection was held at Bustard, West Down, and Pond Farm Camps; His Majesty dismounted and walked along the parades, and when the Royal party had passed, the troops lined the roads and cheered. His Majesty’s gracious message of welcome, approval and advice ran as follows:
It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity of welcoming to the Mother Country so fine a contingent of troops from the Dominion of Canada.

Their prompt rally to the Empire’s call is of inestimable value both to the fighting strength of my Army and in the evidence which it gives of the solidarity of the Empire.

The general appearance and physical standard of the different units are highly creditable.

I am glad to hear of the serious and earnest spirit which pervades all ranks; for it is only by careful training and leading on the part of officers, and by efficiency, strict discipline, and co-operation on the part of all, that the demands of modern war can be met.

I shall follow with interest the progress and work of my Canadians.

On 9th November a detachment, 350 strong, attended the Lord Mayor’s Show in London and marched in the procession, led by Colonel V. A. S. Williams. A small detachment represented the Canadian forces at the burial of their Colonel-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C., at St. Paul’s Cathedral on 19th November: he had died at the age of 82 while on an inspection tour of the Indian troops in France. Over 400 officers and men attended the simultaneous memorial service held in Salisbury Cathedral, while the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery fired a salute of nineteen guns.

BAD WEATHER

On Salisbury Plain in the 123 days, from mid-October 1914 to mid-February 1915, rain fell on 89 days. The average precipitation for that period, over the preceding thirty-two years was 11.98 inches; this was almost exactly doubled, and there was widespread flooding in the river valleys.

From 21st October, when the weather broke, and a quarter of an inch of rain fell, conditions in all camps grew progressively worse. An inch fell in the next five days; it was cold and raw, with occasional frosts at night, and there were no facilities for drying clothing. On 2nd November more than an inch of rain fell; in the high winds the light tents af-
forded little protection, and the number of blankets per man was increased from three to four. On the 11th a wind-storm blew down most of the marquees and all of the divisional headquarters tents but one. Rain, fog, frost and mud, from which there was no respite, made life miserable for men and horses. On 4th December, a sudden gale once more flattened much of the canvas, scattered beyond recovery correspondence in office tents, and blew away the treasury notes of a pay parade. Next day there was rain, hail and frost.

It had been suggested to Lord Kitchener by Colonel Carson, as representative of the Minister of Militia, that the Contingent should be moved for training to Egypt, where the Australian and New Zealand Contingents on their way to England had, to avoid duplication of the experiences of the Canadian Contingent, been put under canvas near Cairo. Their departure for Europe had been delayed in the first instance by the absence of the greater part of the Australian and New Zealand Naval Squadrons on offensive operations in the Pacific. The units of the First Contingent all over Australia, although they had never paraded together, had been complete and ready to sail by 21st September and the first embarked on the 24th. The total strength was 20,758, under the command of Major-General Sir W. T. Bridges, a graduate of the Royal Military College, Kingston. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force, 8,499 strong, under Major-General Sir A. G. Godley, delayed for twenty-six days by fears of German cruisers, sailed from Wellington on 16th October. The combined convoy of thirty-eight transports, escorted by one British and two Australian cruisers, and one Japanese battle cruiser, eventually left Australian waters on 1st November and arrived at Suez a month later.

Rumours of a possible move to Egypt reached the Canadians on Salisbury Plain and raised visions of dry blankets and cloudless skies, but nothing came of it. Evidently, if serious sick wastage was to be avoided, the troops must be moved.
HUTS

The building of huts to accommodate troops in training on Salisbury Plain had begun early in October; on arrival the Contingent was called upon to furnish carpenters and other artizans for construction work in conjunction with the civil contractor. The first working party of two hundred carpenters, with a due proportion of officers and n.c.o’s, and a senior engineer officer in command, reported for duty on 1st November.

Three hundred carpenters of the New Armies were at work throughout November on construction of huts at Lark Hill; these were replaced on 3rd December by three hundred Canadian carpenters. The numbers were again increased; a hundred bricklayers were called for on 16th December. Others skilled in construction were sent from the Canadian Engineers and by 2nd January 894 Canadian personnel were employed, with working pay—paid by the contractor—and an extra quarter pound of meat per day. For excavating foundations, digging trenches for pipes, road and light railway construction, and unskilled labour, a fatigue party of five hundred was detailed from the Canadian infantry. With effect from 8th January 1915, to facilitate the training of troops in the Division, it was ordered that all personnel on construction should return to duty, except men of the 4th Infantry Brigade, which thenceforward would furnish working parties of 250 men per battalion.

The type of hut was one storey, wooden frame on brick piers, with corrugated iron roof and walls lined with heavy paper, and each hut accommodated forty men. The floor area was about 1,200 square feet. There were six windows on each side, and a door at each end. Furnishings included trestle tables and beds, long wooden forms, cupboards and crockery, two oil lamps and a stove of the Quebec heater type. Bath houses, with showers and tubs were still uncompleted in mid-January, and a scheme for drying uniforms submitted by a laundry firm was approved but not devel-
oped, so wet clothing dried on the wearer.

As huts became available for occupation units were moved in. On 9th November the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade moved from Pond Farm to huts erected under War Office arrangements at Sling Plantation, northeast of Bulford; the Canadian Engineers moved into Lark Hill huts on 14th November and were followed by the 3rd and 2nd Brigades, whose moves were completed by 18th December. In consequence of these changed dispositions, training areas were reallocated; the 1st Infantry Brigade from Bustard Camp to Tilshead and northwards, the 2nd between Lark Hill and Netheravon, the 3rd between Bustard and Lark Hill, and the remaining northern area to the artillery and cavalry. Meanwhile the surface of the Plain in the vicinity of the camps and horse lines had changed from smooth rolling turf to a quagmire of mud. There was no way of draining even the roads, and attempts to plough them clear only resulted in exposing the slippery chalk.

LEAVE

From the time of arrival in England leave not exceeding six days for all ranks up to twenty per cent of the force was granted, with a free ticket to any place in the British Isles. On 6th November the G.O.C., with regret, reduced the percentage “owing to the numerous reports he had had of considerable numbers of men being drunk and disorderly in public places of entertainment in London and other towns.” The restriction was removed in mid-December when half the Contingent was allowed six days leave for Christmas, and the other half a similar period at New Year. On 26th January all leave was cancelled and all on leave were recalled.

DISCIPLINE

Civil offences committed by the troops were few; of military offences more than half were for absence without leave, drunkenness ranked next, and cases of insubordination
were rare. Absence without leave usually meant overstaying pass: a military crime classified in the circumstances as a minor offence, for determination was needed to forsake the bright lights of London or the kindly warmth of home and friends, when the alternative was a tent on a wind-swept waste where darkness lasted fourteen hours a day and all was wetness, mud, and misery.

WELFARE

Three welfare associations contributed to ameliorate the lot of the soldiers on Salisbury Plain. When the Canadian Y.M.C.A. officers who had accompanied the Contingent from Valcartier arrived, they found that the British branch had already four centres in the camps to be occupied by the Canadians; these centres supplied stationery and reading matter and sold refreshments and small necessaries. The Canadian secretaries co-ordinated their activities and did what they could to provide evening entertainments; they also operated as distributors of parcels containing chiefly knitted goods, edible luxuries and tobacco supplied by the Canadian War Contingent Association. This was an organization of Canadians in England and their friends which, with similar societies for each of the Dominions, originated in August 1914 at the instance of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and was under the presidency of the Acting High Commissioner. The third organization was the Canadian Field Comforts Commission, which had operated at Valcartier but now received official recognition when the two ladies in charge were given the honorary rank of Lieutenant in the C.E.F. They also co-operated in the distribution of gifts sent direct or contributed by the War Contingent Association.

In each camp a marquee, with tables and benches, was set up for a field library. The Times Book Club sent 500 books, and a large number of magazines were also contributed.
Whenever the Canadian troops could emerge from the desolation of the Plain they were met with kindness and consideration on every hand. The local villagers, the citizens of Salisbury, and indeed the whole population of the British Isles, extended the warmest hospitality to the men from overseas.

REDUCTION IN STRENGTH

While in England the Contingent was increased by two detached bodies of Canadian volunteers, 40 and 84 strong, which had crossed the Atlantic independently, the second at private expense. Another small increment of less than one hundred arose from the enlistment of Canadian civilians in England, some of whom had come over at their own expense from Canada, the United States, South Africa and elsewhere to join the Contingent; but the policy of the Army Council and of the Canadian Government was that recruiting should be in Canada only. A special case was made of about thirty artificers, farriers, shoeing smiths and saddlers, recruited from non-Canadians to complete establishment.

Reductions of strength in the same period numbered 1,144, of whom 131 were officers. The latter figure comprised 35 who resigned their appointments with the Contingent; 55 recalled to Canada as surplus; four returned on duty; five died; one was medically unfit and 31 were struck off strength on appointment to the British forces, of whom 27 were posted to the New Armies.

The excess of officer material in the Contingent and the shortage in England were recognized by Lord Kitchener. The matter being urgent he, on 5th November, suggested to General Alderson that 300 Canadians might be supplied to the British forces.

The 1,013 other ranks may also be categorized: returned to Canada; deserted; died; transferred to the British forces. Among those discharged and returned to Canada were 287 considered to be physically unfit for war service; 93 unlikely
to become efficient soldiers or unfitted for their duties; 153 undesirable on account of misconduct; of 53 classed “services no longer required,” 46 were enemy aliens culled out with the assistance of special intelligence officers from the War Office. Those thus discharged were given a suit of civilian clothes and transportation to their places of enlistment. Deserters numbered 94; some doubtless had joined British units. Death claimed 63.

The discharge of Canadian other ranks on being given commissions in the British forces accounted for almost one-quarter of the total reduction in the strength. The Canadian Government acceded to the request of the British Government that applicants from the C.E.F. might be given commissions in the Special Reserve or Territorial Force or temporary commissions in the British Regular Army, subject to the commanding officer’s recommendation. Two hundred and sixteen were commissioned in the New Armies, colloquially termed “Kitchener’s Army,” now in course of being raised in the British Isles; twenty-six were commissioned in other British forces, including the Royal Navy and Indian Army. Thus the total number of Canadians, including those already commissioned, who were transferred as officers to the British forces in this period was 273.

HEALTH

The general health of the troops on Salisbury Plain, under the conditions prevailing, was remarkably good. In fourteen weeks four thousand were admitted to hospital—1,249 suffering from venereal disease and the remainder for the most part from affections of the respiratory system or of the intestinal tract. The number of sick increased rapidly after the moves of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Brigades into huts, and some units opened their own emergency hospitals for light cases, but there was no epidemic. Sporadic cases of cerebrospinal meningitis, the first of which had occurred at Valcartier, also increased in number and caused alarm, and the iso-
lation of contacts interrupted training. The total number of cases on Salisbury Plain from October to February was 39, of which 28 were fatal.\textsuperscript{200}

**BILLETs**

At Christmas eleven thousand Canadian troops were still under canvas, including all the cavalry and artillery and the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.\textsuperscript{201} Exposure was beginning to tell upon them and it was arranged that as far as possible they should move into billets in areas adjoining the Plain. The first such move was that of the Supply Column into Shrewton on 16th December. In the first week of the new year the Royal Canadian Dragoons moved into the villages between Wilton and Tilshead, and Lord Strathcona’s Horse to between Upavon and Pewsey. Simultaneously the artillery was accommodated between Lavington, Devizes and Rushall. After this the improvement in physical condition of men and horses was marked and rapid. The 1st Infantry Brigade remained under canvas throughout.

**HORSES**

The horses had soon recovered from the effects of the voyage and for the first six weeks their condition was good, as witnessed by a test reconnaissance ride of fifty-five miles carried out on 17th/18th November in twenty-four hours by an artillery subaltern with a party of six on regimental riding horses, brought home all in good condition. When carpenters for hut construction were called for, one mounted unit spoke for all in suggesting that stables should be built instead, as the men could make themselves comfortable enough in tents, but the plea was disregarded. With the cold winds, incessant rain and frosty nights of early December the horses rapidly became debilitated in spite of an increased forage ration.\textsuperscript{202} On the 9th it was ordered that no artillery horses should go in draught and that none should move faster than a walk. On the 12th permission was obtained for horses to be tethered
between trees in certain plantations, and steps were taken to obtain sheep hurdles for wind-breaks. Horse-blankets, soaked as they were with rain and impregnated with mud, were of little value; grooming was impossible; the mud about the horse troughs was hock deep; cracked heels were universal and did not respond to treatment in the all-pervading wetness. After the move to billets all horses were under cover and on dry standings; in a few days an inspiring change was noticeable: horses, harness and saddlery were soon restored to their proper condition, and the D.D.V.S. was satisfied with what he found on inspection in the third week of January.

ARMS AND ARMAMENT

A full complement of artillery guns and ammunition wagons of standard British pattern had been brought from Canada and no changes were made. The two types of gun were the 18-pdr. for the Field Artillery and the 60-pdr. for the heavy battery. There were no 4.5-inch howitzers because the field howitzer brigade of British divisional establishments was still omitted from the Canadian; an urgent recommendation of General Alderson, in November, that it should be raised in Canada and sent across, had to be answered by the Militia Department on 21st January, as no pieces were yet forthcoming: “Howitzer Brigade will not be included in 1st Canadian Division.”

The representative of the Ross Rifle Company—Hon. Colonel Sir Charles Ross, attached to the divisional staff—made personal inspection of rifles and gave instruction in the mechanism, particularly to battalion and company armourers who, after qualifying at a course he conducted, were posted as armourer sergeants and corporals, nine per battalion. It was found that changes were desirable in the rifle, including enlargement of peepsight aperture, reaming of muzzle, chamfering of magazine retaining springs, and boring of holes in the bottom of magazines: these operations, as well
as necessary repairs and adjustments, were performed on all rifles by the battalion armourers.

On account of its length, the Ross rifle was found unsuitable for cavalry and artillery: General Alderson therefore tried to secure from Canada a short pattern capable of firing standard British ammunition, but as such could not be provided he arranged for the rearment of the Divisional Cavalry Squadron with the standard British pattern of the short Lee-Enfield. For the rest, the Army Council decided that the troops should take the field with the rifle known as “Ross rifle, Mark III,” which had been provided by the Canadian Government, and orders were issued that no exchange was to be effected without sanction of the Army Council.\textsuperscript{111,203}

The Canadian establishment of battalion machine guns was increased from two to four; the Vickers guns ordered in England were, however, not delivered because the whole output was reserved for the War Office, which on 15th October offered thirty Maxim guns temporarily in lieu. It was evident that American manufacturers would have to be relied on, for the present at least, to provide machine guns for the Canadian forces, and an order for 250 Colt guns was placed on 17th October. Fifty Colt guns had already been ordered on 29th August but deliveries were slow; 17 were issued to infantry battalions on Salisbury Plain on 26th November, and the remainder reached there only on 31st January. There were several serious difficulties with the Colt gun, which was not well adapted to fire British ammunition: all the sights required readjustment and were sent to Birmingham; the tripod was found by a board of officers assembled on 4th December to be unsatisfactory, clumsy, heavy and not adjustable as to height; three alternative mountings were tried, one of which, placed on wheels, was manufactured partly by civil contract in Bristol, partly by artizans in the Contingent. Other mechanical defects were reported but could not be remedied before the Division proceeded to France.

The only other firearms in the hands of the Contingent
were the Colt ‘45 automatic pistol, and the Webley or Smith & Wesson revolver of the same calibre. These were carried by officers, warrant officers, certain n.c.o’s., signallers and other specialists.

COMPLETION OF EQUIPMENT

Although the First Contingent had been almost completely equipped at Valcartier, many of the articles were not of British pattern. After examination by War Office experts and selected officers of the Division, it was decided at the end of January that certain of the Canadian issues were unserviceable or unsuitable, and replacement from British Ordnance Stores—already hard pressed to supply the needs of the increasing home divisions—was thereupon necessary.

The change from Canadian to British service dress was made gradually as renewals were required, but a full issue of British “ammunition” boots was immediately necessary as the Canadian pattern was not designed for marching on pavé roads or continual soaking in mud. General Alderson had cabled to Canada for authority to purchase serviceable footwear, and found that 48,000 pairs of overshoes had already been shipped, but on trial these “did not compensate for faulty construction of boots” issued; his call for 40,000 fur-lined jackets was met with an issue of heavy sweaters, rightly considered more serviceable.

Only five battalions had brought web equipment from Canada, the others wore the obsolescent Oliver pattern which had pouches for 80 instead of 150 rounds, but no pack or facilities for carrying the entrenching implement, and cut a man under the arms. General Alderson, after cabling in vain to Ottawa for Web pattern, was not to be put off with “New valise Oliver Equipment” (1915 Model), and obtained an issue for seven battalions from the War Office, together with a full divisional issue of British pattern entrenching implements.

Most of the motor vehicles, although they had stood
well the continuous strain of three months on bad roads, were not of makes for which spare parts could be obtained nearer than America, and many renewals were urgently required; so it was recommended that they be held in England for the use of the Second Contingent: 51 motor trucks and nine motor cars were issued from British ordnance in replacement. The same objection was raised against the transport wagons, with their additional shortcomings as to lock, strength of sides and unsuitability for ride and drive work with British service pattern breast harness. The Canadian bicycles were not considered sturdy enough; the water carts had been fitted with taps but had no provision for cleaning and were without filters; motor ambulances, Maltese carts and travelling kitchens were lacking. The new horsed vehicles were sent by rail to Amesbury and Devizes direct from the factories, one consignment came from Inverness with the paint still wet; distribution of these and of breast harness—all issued from 28th January onwards, without the usual indent and without expense to Canada—was barely completed before departure for France.

These substitutions, of which he was kept informed by his special representative, aroused the lasting resentment of the Minister of Militia. A board assembled by the Department of Militia and Defence had investigated complaints about the boots in December, and a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry subsequently found that while the product of some factories had not been up to standard, the pattern of boot was in itself unsuitable for active service. Purchases of motor trucks, bicycles, trailers and wagons were, as already indicated, examined into by a Royal Commission in 1915 and 1916.

FORMATION OF THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

The structure of the 1st Canadian Division, as eventually arranged between General Alderson and the War Office, was substantially the same as at Valcartier, except that one
transfer of personnel—the West Kootenay Detachment of 113 all ranks from the 12th to the 7th Battalion—was effected; but changes were made towards conformity with the ever-changing British establishments. On 26th January it was finally announced that the Division would adopt the establishment of the 29th (British) Division, and details were worked out from that, with a number of exceptions favouring the Canadian establishments. Discussion centred on the number of regimental and staff officers: General Alderson was insistent that, a large number of the surplus officers being already posted, these should not be left unemployed in England but should accompany the Division to France; he contended that extra officers would compensate for inexperience and lack of training of all ranks, and moreover: “My experience of active service is that a shortage of officers comes all too soon.”

In the first postings to the staff of the Canadian Division before leaving Canada provision was made for an additional G.S.O. (2), an additional G.S.O. (3) and an additional D.A.A.G., as well as one extra interpreter, a field cashier, a postal officer and three extra A.D.C’s. to the commander. The allocation of three additional staff officers, which permitted closer contact between the divisional commander and his troops, was particularly advantageous in prolonged active operations, and though never adopted in the British Army was continued in Canadian formations throughout the war.

The staffs of Canadian infantry brigades were also augmented by one staff captain and two orderly officers. The proposal that each battalion should have an extra major and an assistant adjutant, and that the transport officer and signalling officer should not be drawn from company establishment, was not, however, acceptable to the War Office, in spite of General Alderson’s contention: “This establishment of Officers was fixed by the Canadian Government; the Officers are paid by the Canadian Government, and reinforcements are provided from Canada.”
The number of companies per battalion was another subject of contention and confusion, of postings and repostings, and of general dissatisfaction for eleven weeks. At Valcartier there were eight: on 1st November, Contingent Orders in compliance with War Office instructions directed battalions to reorganize on a 4-company basis in accordance with Expeditionary Force establishments. Five days later the Army Council decided that Overseas Contingents should maintain the existing organization which they understood to be eight companies per battalion; General Alderson explained that his battalions were already organized into four companies, but the War Office instructed that there should be eight, which was implemented in Contingent Orders on 17th November and carried out. On 10th December the War Office informed General Alderson that after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F., the Army Council had decided on a 4-company basis, but four days later reversed the decision. The final change was effected on 16th January, when General Alderson stated that reorganization on the 4-company basis had commenced, and the War Office approved. But the attempt to take supernumerary regimental officers into the field was unsuccessful: six officers per company were allowed, from which the transport and signalling officers were selected.

In the twelve battalions earmarked at Valcartier for the Division one change was made on 15th December and the need of reinforcements for the two cavalry regiments was thereby met: the 6th Battalion (Fort Garry Horse) of the 2nd Brigade was detailed to be the Cavalry Depot. The 10th Canadian Infantry Battalion was simultaneously ordered by the Division to replace the 6th, although, too late, the brigade commander expressed a preference for the 11th. Of the infantry commanders only one was replaced, and he because of illness.

In the artillery the staff continued the same as at Valcartier and as in British establishments. The howitzer brigade
was not formed and the three 18-pdr. brigades remained, but of different composition. The three 6-gun batteries in each were, by Contingent Orders of 17th November, reorganized into four 4-gun batteries: fortunately there were three capable commanders available for the new batteries. The surplus personnel with the extra two guns per brigade were constituted brigade depot batteries for the supply of reinforcements.

Changes in establishments of other arms and services, all in the way of increases, were effected by drawing upon surplus personnel. The 3rd Field Company, partly organized at Valcartier, was now completed. An increase, caused by adding a sanitary section to the divisional medical units and two hundred to the Cyclist Company was disposed of by calling for volunteers who were readily forthcoming. One of the Line of Communication units, the Divisional Supply Column, was greatly strengthened in both personnel and vehicles: as constituted in Canada it had a total personnel of 192, with 44 motor vehicles; before going to France this was increased to a personnel of 311, with 71 motor vehicles. The fact that the Contingent was armed with the Ross rifle—a weapon entirely different from the British Lee-Enfield—demanded a special Canadian organization for replacement and repair; four workshop motor lorries, each in charge of an armourer sergeant-major, were fitted up to carry armourers, lathes, tools and spare parts and attached to the Supply Column. A new divisional A.S.C. unit was the 1st Canadian Motor Ambulance Workshop, for which the personnel—twenty-one all ranks—came from the British service. In addition to the Chief Paymaster and his staff with Contingent Headquarters, each of the larger units, to a total of forty-two, had a paymaster attached when the Contingent left Canada. On the Division proceeding to France there were twenty-six regimental paymasters with the artillery brigades, infantry battalions and certain other formations. Chaplains in both the British and Canadian service were carried surplus to estab-
lishment. Thirty-three had accompanied the Contingent to England; the War Office considered that eleven was a sufficient number for the Canadians in France, eight of whom were detailed to the Division; the remaining twenty-two were considered as available for the next contingent. On no establishment, British or Canadian, was provision made for personnel of welfare agencies; representatives of the British Y.M.C.A. had, however, been allowed to proceed to France in 1914 as civilians attached to the Army. Of the seven Y.M.C.A. officers with the Contingent on Salisbury Plain all had been granted honorary rank of captain, and four remained attached to their divisional units.

EMBARKATION FOR FRANCE

An infallible sign that the period of preparation in England would soon be at an end was the secret despatch of advance and billeting parties to France on 2nd February, and on the same day the news was broadcast, by implication, in Contingent Orders:

ROYAL REVIEW. The Division will parade in drill order, cloaks rolled (unless it is wet when they will be worn), for inspection by His Majesty the King and be in position on Knighton Down at 10 a.m. on the 4th instant.

The inspection was duly carried out; there was a cold stiff breeze, and heavy showers of rain. Afterwards the King wrote a message to be read to all units after embarkation for France:

Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men:

At the beginning of November I had the pleasure of welcoming to the Mother Country this fine contingent from the Dominion of Canada, and now, after three months’ training, I bid you God-speed on your way to assist my Army in the field.

I am well aware of the discomforts that you have experienced from the inclement weather and abnormal rain, and I admire the cheerful spirit displayed by all ranks in facing and overcoming all difficulties.

From all I have heard and from what I have been able
to see at to-day’s inspection and march-past, I am satisfied that you have made good use of the time spent on Salisbury Plain.

By your willing and prompt rally to our common flag, you have already earned the gratitude of the Motherland.

By your deeds and achievements on the field of battle I am confident that you will emulate the example of your fellow-countrymen in the South African Tsar, and thus help to secure the triumph of our arms.

I shall follow with pride and interest all your movements. I pray that God may bless you and watch over you.

The next few days were crowded with final arrangements: to bring battalions up to establishment, including base companies, 1,077 reinforcements were drafted from the 6th, 9th, 11th, 12th and 17th Battalions; issues, adjustments, marking and inspection of clothing and equipment occupied all ranks of the Division; one unit did not receive its new harness until three hours before it had to march out of camp in a rainstorm at 1 a.m., and rear parties, detailed from the Training Depot to take over and to turn in to ordnance all camp equipment, had to collect discarded Canadian issues also. On Sunday 7th February the Sanitary Section moved off en route for France; during the next week the remainder of the Division followed, entraining, in accordance with the move table, at Amesbury, Patney, Bulford and Lavington for an undesignated port, which was Avonmouth. There units speedily and without confusion boarded the waiting troopships which proceeded down the Bristol Channel as soon as tide served. The first to go were fortunate: the City of Benares with Divisional Headquarters on board made the crossing in thirty-six hours and tied up at the dock at St. Nazaire at noon on the 11th; the later units were delayed for a day or more on the passage, and the troops were subjected to extreme discomfort, crowded below decks in the cold dark holds of small cargo boats lashed by the westerly gale and heavy seas which raged on the 12th and 13th in the Bay of Biscay. In spite of this all ranks enjoyed an inward feeling of relief and elation—as when they sailed out of Gaspé Basin.
Few of those who served on the Western Front in the next four years were called upon to suffer such prolonged and unavailing misery as was endured on Salisbury Plain.

The original intention had been to bring the 1st Canadian Division across from Southampton to Havre, but on the 4th of February the German Government had announced that a war zone would be established around the British Isles on the 18th in which all enemy ships would be destroyed while neutrals would navigate at their peril. This was a departure from the rules of war as then understood, and meant that all British merchant ships were to be torpedoed at sight and that mines would be laid wherever the enemy chose. The appearance of submarines off Liverpool Bar in the last days of January had shown that more extensive counter-measures would have to be taken, meanwhile two divisions of destroyers, in course of transfer from the Irish Sea to Harwich, were provided as escort for the Canadian troopships. Some of the destroyers had to turn back on account of the bad weather, and possibly for the same reason no submarines were sighted.

News of the successful completion of the movement reached the Governor General on 16th February:

Your ministers will be glad to learn that the whole of the Canadian Contingent are doing well at the front, having safely crossed over to France. Your ministers are at liberty to make the above public.

HARCOURT.

OTHER UNITS

Of the units which accompanied the Contingent from Canada but which did not form part of the Division some had already crossed to France, others went there at about the same time and a number remained in England for varying periods. Supply and other special units, considered necessary or asked for by the War Office, came into existence on both sides of the Channel and means were initiated for keeping touch – civil, military and political—between Canada and
the overseas forces.

Most of the supply units for the Lines of Communication crossed to France in February, including the Divisional Supply Column, the Divisional Ammunition Park, Railway Supply Detachment and four Depot Units of Supply, one of which had been formed in England. The Reserve Park crossed on 26th April; and a Field Butchery and Field Bakery, both formed in England, crossed in May. The first Canadian unit to serve in France was No. 2 Stationary Hospital which left England on 6th November. No. 1 Stationary Hospital, which had been open at Hampstead for ten weeks, crossed on 2nd February; No. 1 Clearing Station, after operating a general hospital at Taplow for a like period and re-designated 1st Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, crossed on the same date; No. 2 General Hospital on 13th March; No. 1 General on 13th May. Of three newly formed units, No. 2 Advanced Depot Medical Stores crossed on 9th February; the Canadian Base Depot Medical Stores and No. 1 Advanced Depot Medical Stores remained in England, an arrangement having been made for the supply of all medical stores from British base depots in France. Another new medical unit was formed at Salisbury Plain—No. 5 Canadian Mobile Laboratory, formerly Canadian Army Hydrological Corps; it crossed to France on 21st March as a scientific unit for the investigation and control of disease and was attached to the Second Army.

No. 1 Canadian Mobile Veterinary Section crossed to France on 8th February and served the Canadian Division, being supplied through the Base Depot, C.A.V.C. Stores; it was followed on 3rd April by No. 1 Canadian Veterinary Hospital, a L. of C. unit, 195 strong, capable of accommodating five hundred horses and established at Le Havre, doing general duty for the forces in France, British and Canadian.

An organization of a novel type, being rather civil than military, was set up at this time to supply Canada with news
of her overseas troops. Several newspaper correspondents had been with the Contingent on Salisbury Plain—one had been sent home for sending news of possible value to the enemy—but for the first year of the war none were allowed with the British forces in the field; to meet the demand for reports more intimate and detailed than the daily communiqués, a British staff officer had been appointed at British G.H.Q., France, under the title of “Eye Witness”. For a similar purpose—but with authority which infringed upon the duties of the Adjutant-General’s branch—and to collect historical material, Sir Max Aitken, a Canadian-born member of the British Parliament was, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia, appointed official “Canadian Eye Witness” or Record Officer and was given the honorary rank of Lieut.-Colonel (P.C. 29 of 6.i.1915). His rôle, at first that of an accredited press correspondent on both sides of the Channel, became in September 1915, that of “General Representative of Canada at the Front.” Also on the recommendation of the Minister, Hon. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Carrick, M.P., was appointed Intelligence Officer or Official Recorder, with apparently similar functions but altogether unconnected with the “Eye Witness” (P.C. 16 of 7.i.1915); from 18th January 1915 he had as his “Assistant” a highly trained and experienced soldier, Captain F. Manley Sims, D.S.O., late King’s Royal Rifle Corps who had been in business with him in Canada, and who in fact, although variously designated and gradually promoted to brigadier-general, was liaison officer at British G.H.Q. for the C.E.F. until June, 1918. Colonel Carrick functioned at G.H.Q. (St. Omer) from April to August 1915, after which a readjustment and expansion of historical and press activities took place, with consequent revision of establishments and duties.

The special appointment of these and other officers by the Minister of Militia at about this time, most of them with ill-defined spheres of action and responsible only to him, led not infrequently to the confusion and delay which he was
most anxious to avoid. The staff of the Contingent had difficulty in placing them, the War Office could not always see the need for their appointment, and they themselves being as a rule unfamiliar with military procedure, staff work and army organization, were perplexed to find that the regulations had already provided for the carrying out of most of the duties assigned to them: their extraneous appointments did not readily mesh with the mechanism of the British war machine, or with the organization of the Canadian Militia, or with the recognized means of communication between the British and Canadian authorities.  

Pre-war mobilization plans had failed to provide an organization for the compilation and custody of the records of soldiers on active service, and it was not until the Contingent had reached Salisbury Plain that a Record Office was established in London in conjunction with the central Pay Office, which kept an account for each individual in the C.E.F. At the outset the records staff consisted of one officer and four clerks and orderlies; in mid-December a branch office was established at Salisbury to hasten the completion and correction of attestation papers; a work barely finished when the Division crossed to France. The casualty branch, for the recording and notification of casualties, had been established late in December and in February had a staff of eight; a postal branch, to handle insufficiently addressed mail and the letters of casualties, followed. By May 1915 six branches, each in charge of an officer, were in operation: Officers’ Records (R.1), Other Ranks Records (R.2), Medical Records (R.3), Casualties, Enquiries, Postal.

In August 1915 the Pay and Record Office—with a subordinate staff now numbering 748, of whom 339 were civilians—hitherto under the single control of Colonel W. R. Ward (seconded from Asst. Paymaster General, Militia Headquarters, Ottawa), was divided for administrative purposes. By September 1916 the staff of the Pay Office, military and civil, numbered 1,980; the Officer i/c Records was
served by a similar mixed staff of 861.

For the preparation in the field of Part II Orders, containing records of personnel-returns, casualties, appointments, postings, transfers, promotions, awards and discipline—embracing all Canadian officers and soldiers in France, and for the reception of Official War Diaries and other historical documents of units, a Canadian Section of the D.A.G’s office at the Base was opened at Rouen on 28th February 1915, under the title “Canadian Section, G.H.Q., 3rd Echelon.” This section provided an essential link between units in the field and the Pay and Records Office in London. The staff consisted of an A.A.G. with subordinate officers, and one orderly room clerk from each unit. Here states and returns from units were received, and corresponding demands made for reinforcements upon the Canadian Base Depots.

Contrary to usual procedure the Infantry Base Depot and the General Base Depot, comprising the ten per cent First Reinforcements for all arms and services, were retained in England. The surplus personnel of the Contingent in England were organized as a Training Depot to replenish the Base Depots. A plan for reinforcing had been projected by the War Office before the end of November; after discussion with General Alderson and consequent changes, orders were issued on 18th January for the formation of training depots in England. According to these orders, in the infantry, the 4th Brigade would disappear as a formation: the 9th Battalion would supply reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, the 11th Battalion for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, the 12th Battalion for the 14th, the 17th Battalion for the 13th, 15th and 16th Battalions; the 12th Battalion was also detailed to provide reinforcements for the P.P.C.L.I. but for which a special draft of five hundred arrived at the end of January.

The 6th Battalion, as already stated, became a reserve cavalry regiment. The depot batteries, as mentioned above,
supplied reinforcements for the artillery. A C.A.M.C. depot was also formed, and there being a shortage of personnel, due to expansion, cables were sent to Canada for an Engineer depot and an A.S.C. depot which were despatched in February. No. 4 Veterinary Section which had arrived from Canada in November, and had been designated No. 2 Veterinary Section, continued to attend to sick horses of the Training Depot and also supplied C.A.V.C. reinforcements as required in France.

In the estimation of General Alderson there was no Canadian officer available with strong enough personality and sufficient experience to satisfactorily command the Training Depot; he therefore asked of the G.O.C., Southern Command, that a regular officer with strong personality and tact be appointed. On 16th January, Colonel W. R. W. James, Royal Artillery, was gazetted to command the combined Canadian Training Depot; on 2nd February it was announced that first reinforcements would also remain in England; he therefore took command of all Canadian reinforcements, who thereupon were concentrated at Tidworth.

Of the units which accompanied the Contingent to England, the P.P.C.L.I. left General Alderson’s command on 16th November and proceeded to Morn Hill Camp, Winchester, to join the 80th Brigade, 27th (British) Division, then being organized and which proceeded to France on 21st December. The brigade, commanded by Br.-Gen. the Hon. C. G. Fortescue, consisted of five battalions, the other four, as also the remaining eight of the division, being regulars. The Newfoundland Contingent was struck off strength 7th December, and joined the Scottish Command at Fort George; subsequently reinforced to battalion strength it landed on Gallipoli in September 1915 and later served with distinction on the Western Front as a battalion of the 88th Brigade, 29th (British) Division.

The formation of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade appeared in Salisbury Plain Orders of 30th January:
The Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse (R.C.) are to be formed into the Canadian Cavalry Brigade with the addition of the 2nd King Edward’s Light Horse. Colonel the Hon. J. E. B. Seely, D.S.O., will take over the command of this Brigade from the 1st February 1915.

For this, the R.C.H.A. Brigade, which had hitherto consisted of headquarters and two six-gun batteries, was reorganized as two four-gun batteries and an ammunition column. The 2nd King Edward’s Horse, now added, had been formed on 10th August 1914 as the second regiment of a colonial mounted unit of the British Special Reserve. The new brigadier, Colonel J. E. B. Seely, a native of the Isle of Wight, was O.C. the Hampshire Yeomanry, a member of the British House of Commons, an ex-Secretary of State for War, and had won the D.S.O. in South Africa while serving with the Imperial Yeomanry. Shortly after his appointment, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was concentrated at Maresfield Park near Uckfield, Sussex.

The Automobile Machine Gun Brigade on 12th February moved to billets in Wilton as a separate command, on 17th March it moved to Ashford, Kent, and was attached to the South Eastern Mounted Brigade, a part of the Second Army then responsible for the home defence of that part of England.

THE WINTER IN CANADA

During the winter, enactments under the War Measures Act in the form of Proclamations and Orders in Council were issued by the Canadian Government as developments and occurrences dictated. These largely had regard to trading with the enemy, and the prohibition of export of certain commodities. For the registration of enemy aliens, registrars, under the Commissioner of the Dominion Police, were appointed (P.C.2721 of 28.x.1914), and with them rested the decision, after examination of each individual, as to remaining at large or internment as prisoner of war. To take charge
of those interned an O.C. or Director of Internment Operations, Major-General Sir W. D. Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O., was appointed (P.C.2817 of 6.xi.1914): he was responsible at first to the Minister of Militia but subsequently to the Minister of Justice (P.C.388 of 27.ii.1915). Under his direction a total of 8,579 enemy aliens were confined in twenty-four camps or stations. Militiamen for escorts, sentries and guards—averaging one to every five prisoners—were detailed by District Officers Commanding as required. Warnings of raiding parties reported to be mustering below the southern border led to special vigilance on the part of District Commanders: an unannounced test mobilization carried out at Toronto provoked the expressed disapproval of the Minister, and his veto on such measures which might alarm the populace. Meanwhile the number of Militia on home defence duty was maintained, although frost had set in and navigation had closed. Restrictions on publications carrying information helpful to the enemy were tightened by Order in Council (P.C.2821 of 6.xi.1914) published in the Canada Gazette on 6th November, which authorized refusal of the privileges of the mails and made offenders liable to a maximum fine of $5,000 with five years imprisonment. A similar penalty was made effective by the belated publication in the Canada Gazette, 19th December 1914, of an Order in Council (P.C.2358) of 12th September 1914, against persons communicating military information.

THE C.E.F. IN CANADA

In the late autumn, recruiting for the twelve infantry battalions of the Second Contingent, and three added for reinforcing purposes, had proceeded satisfactorily. Numbered 18th to 32nd and distributed from coast to coast, they were recruited and mobilized under District arrangements, and were housed for the winter chiefly in armouries and exhibition buildings; all were up to establishment by the end of the year. While these battalions were being raised, and while
the Minister of Militia was still absent in England, separate
instructions were issued to Military Districts 2, 10, 11 and
13, on 5th November, for the mobilization of the 4th, 1st,
2nd and 3rd Regiments of Canadian Mounted Rifles, each
544 strong, for overseas service, but not to form part of the
Second Contingent. Next day an Order in Council (P.C.
2812) authorized the expenditure of $3,056,811.39 for outfit-
ting 14,000 dismounted and 6,000 mounted men of the Sec-
ond Contingent.240

When on the 21st November the number of troops to be
in training in Canada was increased from 30,000 to
50,000,161 consequent warning was issued to Districts on 1st
December that further units would be raised – nine regi-
ments of mounted rifles, numbered 5th to 13th, and nineteen
infantry battalions, numbered 33rd to 51st. Orders to take
action were sent separately and progressively as officers to
raise and command units were appointed.241 The increase in
mounted rifles arose from an exchange of telegrams. On
24th November, to the War Office from the Minister of Mili-
tia:–

We are mobilizing four regiments Mounted Rifles and
can mobilize more. Will you require all or any of them in the
near future? If so, where?

The War Office replied on the 26th:–

We will be glad to take the four regiments of Mounted
Rifles and use them for service in Egypt. Please inform us
how many more regiments you could mobilize and by what
date.

It was estimated that one mounted rifle brigade of three
regiments would be ready to sail by the 20th January and
another a month later, but there were delays caused by non-
delivery of equipment.

Artillery, and quotas for other arms and services, for the
Second Contingent, were also allotted to Districts for recruit-
ing and mobilization; their training proceeded simultane-
ously with that of the infantry. All training was supervised
by two Inspectors-General appointed on 14th December –
Major-General F. L. Lessard, C.B., for Eastern, and Major-General S. B. Steele, C.B., M.V.O., for Western Canada.

For service on the lines of communication with the Second Contingent, the medical faculty of McGill University offered on 19th October the personnel of a general hospital. The composition of the Contingent being as yet undecided, the offer was not transmitted to the Army Council until 28th November; six days later it was gladly accepted. In the next four months similar offers were received from five other universities, but only two—from Queen’s and Toronto—were accepted before the end of March. Eventually eight Canadian universities were represented in the field by general or stationary hospitals and one other by a casualty clearing station.

On 13th January the Secretary of State for the Colonies asked if the Canadian Government could provide personnel to man guns at St. Lucia, Windward Islands; three days later the Canadian Government replied that the detachment could be furnished, whereupon a request was made for the detachment to be increased to 9 officers and 104 other ranks. They would be required to man two British 6-in. guns from Bermuda and four French 14-cm. guns on loan from Martinique. Detachments of permanent force artillerymen were detailed to form a new unit, No. 6 Company, R.C.G.A., and proceeded from Halifax on 26th March and 9th April, disembarking at Port Castries on 5th and 20th April. The first detachment fired the salute to the Governor-in-Chief of the Windward Islands on his arrival at St. Lucia on 10th April, and all were subsequently employed in manning the batteries and the ss. **Vigilant** of the examination service until May 1919. The average strength, due to gradual increases, was 250 all ranks, including attached engineer, army service, medical and ordnance personnel; the total who served was 439 all ranks. The detachment was paid by the Canadian Government, at C.E.F. rates; all other charges, except trans-
portation, were borne by the War Office.

**CANADIANS IN OTHER EMPIRE FORCES**

At the outbreak of the war a number of Canadians were serving with commissioned rank in the Royal Navy and in the British and Indian Armies; the great majority of the military comprised 136 graduates of the Royal Military College, Kingston. Another group, who had become Canadians by domicile, consisted of the British Naval and Army reservists.

On the eve of war Canada was practically recognized by the British authorities as a likely source for officer material; on 3rd August commissions in the British Army were offered to twenty graduates of the R.M.C. or cadets who had completed not less than two of the three years course. By 12th August twenty such commissions had been granted: twenty more in October, and six in the Indian Army in November. By arrangement with the War Office in March 1915, R.M.C. cadets who had completed not less than one year and were over eighteen became eligible; before the end of the war a total of 201 were commissioned.

Since 1909 a course for qualifying aspirants for commissions in the British Army had been conducted at McGill University, and on 3rd August 1915 the War Office offered five commissions; other offers followed until, in September 1915, temporary commissions up to 50 per month were thrown open to suitable members of Canadian University Contingents, Officers Training Corps. At the outbreak of war these units numbered two, by September 1915 there were 13 and four more were formed before the end of that year. This source produced a total of 457 officers, of whom 423 were from the University of Toronto: most of the other Contingents favoured service in the Canadian forces.

Of the six aviators accepted by the War Office in August 1914 only two were forthcoming to join the First Contingent, and though one was attached to the Royal Flying Corps neither was commissioned in it. On 7th February 1915
the War Office requested that steps be taken to secure certified aviators: they would be enlisted as 1st class air mechanics, sent to England, and would then be eligible for commissions in the Special Reserve of the Royal Flying Corps. In March, there being few volunteers with aviators’ certificates, although the Curtiss School had opened at Long Branch, Toronto, in the same month, this qualification was dropped, and men willing to fly were accepted; by December 1915 sixty-eight, qualified and unqualified, had proceeded overseas.

In January 1917 a branch of the Royal Flying Corps was set up in Canada, and recruited cadets and mechanics directly into the British force. In the whole period of the war 8,250 Canadians were commissioned in the British flying services; Canadian cadets numbered 4,787 and airmen 11,058. In this total of 24,095 are included 3,960 transferred from other arms and services of the C.E.F. In November 1918 over 10,000 were stationed in Canada.

On 28th February 1915, the War Office asked for the services of one hundred Canadian qualified medical practitioners, under forty years of age, for duty with the Royal Army Medical Corps. The number volunteering for overseas far exceeded the numbers required for C.E.F. establishments: before the end of 1915 two hundred and sixty, commissioned in the R.A.M.C., had proceeded overseas for service with the British forces, and the total reached 416 by the end of the war.

Another class of trained and qualified specialists – veterinary surgeons—also came forward in numbers beyond the requirements of the C.E.F. Of these, the War Office on 3rd November accepted twenty-five for temporary commissions in the Army Veterinary Corps, with the B.E.F., and as many more in January. In the next four years the number reached 190.

In view of the grave shortage of labour in armament works in England, the British Board of Trade—a Government department—made official enquiry as to whether suit-
able men in engineering trades were available in Canada, without detriment to local munitions supply. On receiving an affirmative answer, based upon an Order in Council (P.C. 454 of 3.iii.1915), the Board of Trade despatched to Canada in May two officials “to make further enquiries and arrangements on the spot”. The Department of Labour and the Department of Immigration at Ottawa afforded all possible assistance.

Munition workers were engaged on six-month contracts. Transportation to England was arranged by the Board of Trade representatives in Canada and all costs were borne by the British Government, except return transportation, which was paid only if employment continued until the close of the war. Dependents in Canada were granted a separation allowance of $4.25 per week. By the end of the financial year 1915-16, Canadian workmen, mainly machinists or members of allied crafts, to the number of 1,699 had removed to England under the scheme; the final total was somewhat under 2,000.

THE SPRING SESSION, 1915

In a ten-week session, from 4th February to 15th April, Parliament heard a statement by the Minister of Militia embracing estimated war expenditures for the financial year 1915-16—on pay, rations, supplies, armament, equipment, transportation and horses, totalling $95,475,000.\textsuperscript{247} For the Naval Department, expenditures were estimated at $3,000,000.\textsuperscript{248} In the event, militia and C.E.F. expenditures for 1915-16 were $160,433,416.42, and naval amounted to $3,274,019.94.\textsuperscript{249} An appropriation of $100,000,000 for war purposes was voted, to be raised by the Governor General in Council by way of loan, temporary or otherwise.\textsuperscript{250}

The Public Accounts Committee reported upon the purchase of medical supplies, binoculars and Nova Scotian horses for the C.E.F.\textsuperscript{251}

The Prime Minister, in speaking on this report, said that
a loss of less than $6,000 had been disclosed in the six weeks investigation; he admitted that two members of his party, whom he publicly reprimanded, had been irregularly connected with the $50,000,000 worth purchases of war material, he acknowledged that it was the duty of the Government to see that a proper accounting was made of all public funds expended, and announced that steps would be taken to prevent fraudulent purchases for the future and to ensure that every dollar be spent wisely and economically.\textsuperscript{252}

A Special Committee of Inquiry was set up and reported upon boots purchased for the C.E.F.\textsuperscript{223} and a report of the Shell Committee was included in Hansard.\textsuperscript{252a} One bill directly affecting the military forces was passed, a measure which gave the vote to soldiers on active service.\textsuperscript{253} The Prime Minister, speaking to the money bill, made a lengthy explanation to the House of the present state of mobilization and organization of the C.E.F.: overseas—in France, England, Bermuda and St. Lucia—there were 36,502 of all ranks; in Canada the C.E.F. numbered 52,851, the Militia on active service and the Permanent Force together numbered 12,207.\textsuperscript{254}

WAR SUPPLIES

With the sailing of the First Contingent, the armament of the Canadian forces had been seriously depleted, and it was decided that replacements should be made. The purchase of one hundred and fifty 18-pdr., twenty-four 13-pdr. and twelve 60-pdr. guns, with carriages, spare parts, stores and accessories and with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun to a total cost of $5,000,000 was authorised by Order in Council (P.C. 2626 of 3.xi.1914).\textsuperscript{254a} Since supply to the War Office was as usual given precedence, the orders consequently placed were made over or cancelled, as also the outstanding orders for forty-five 4·5-in. howitzers, forty-seven 18-pdr. and fifty machine guns which were unfulfilled at the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{127a}
After prorogation of the Spring Session of Parliament on 15th April 1915, and in accordance with the promise of the Prime Minister, a War Purchasing Commission, responsible to Privy Council, was appointed (P.C.1033 of 8.v.1915) to make, on behalf of the Government, all purchases of clothing, equipment, arms, guns, ammunition, horses, munitions and materials of war and supplies of every kind, and all contracts for such purposes, and all contracts for transportation “payable out of the funds appropriated by the War Appropriation Act 1915.” Direction of purchases of supplies and munitions of war undertaken by the Canadian Government for the British or any other Government was also given to the Commission, except such as fell within the scope of the Shell Committee. Later modifications removed horses, wheat, oats, flour and hay from the list (P.C.1511 of 30.vi.1915 and P.C.160 of 26.i.1916). The Chairman was the Hon. A. E. Kemp, Minister without portfolio.255

Purchasing agents for the British Government had been early in the field, both in Canada and the United States, often without the knowledge of the Canadian authorities and in competition with Canadian buyers. For the Admiralty, agents were making purchases directly in the United States and twenty submarine torpedo boats had been ordered from the Bethlehem Steel Corporation of New York, of which six were being assembled in Montreal under sub-contract with the Vickers Canadian Company256 since the United States Government, on grounds of neutrality, had disallowed the original arrangement for construction.

For the War Office, a Remount Commission to purchase horses for the British Army, and headed by Major-General Sir F. W. Benson, K.C.B., arrived in Canada early in August and, with official Canadian assistance, was buying both in Canada and the United States,257 a War Office purchasing agent for supplies had arrived from England on 19th October but in May 1915 the Canadian Pacific Railway Company were appointed general purchasing agents.
As far as the Government of Canada was concerned, the appointment of the War Purchasing Commission concentrated the control of the purchasing of both raw and manufactured materials required by Canada, Great Britain and the Allies for war purposes. Militia supplies to equip and feed the troops had been so urgently required and so great in quantity that the branches responsible in time of peace—those of the Quarter-Master-General and of the Director of Contracts—were incapable of expanding rapidly enough to carry the suddenly applied load. At the outset the Minister of Militia had taken the matter of war purchases into his own hands, without reference to the Cabinet; his “special agents” had entered into contracts, and private citizens were also placing orders independently for arms, vehicles and equipment—gifts to military units. In the haste to obtain large quantities of unusual articles in deranged markets, there had been some confusion, overlapping, misunderstanding and delay in the placing, payment and delivery of orders.

Charges made during the spring session indicating irregularities in the purchase of war supplies resulted, not only in the constitution of the War Purchasing Commission, but in the appointment on 2nd June 1915 of the Hon. Sir Charles Davidson as a Royal Commissioner (P.C.1287) under the Inquiries Act to investigate on a broad scale; the terms of reference were later extended (P.C.109 of 9.v.1916) to cover the sale or disposal of Government small arms munitions. Between 18th June 1915 and 28th June 1916 the Commission held twenty-seven sessions in widely separated places, including Halifax, Victoria and New York. Separate reports on seventeen items, together with three volumes of evidence, were submitted in 1917.258

To watch for and check irregularities in purchases and deliveries, the Minister of Militia employed two special inspectors in December 1915 who reported directly to him (P.C.433 of 29.ii.1916), independently of the Inspector-General, the Quarter-Master-General or the Director of Con-
tracts; in November 1916 a system of supervision by District Areas was introduced with an inspecting officer in each and two senior inspecting officers, one for Eastern and one for Western Canada, reporting to Militia Headquarters. Except in the early stages, when haste and ignorance were in evidence, few serious or deliberate irregularities occurred; disclosure of dishonesty was followed by appropriate action; the two members of the Commons “read out of the party” had resigned their seats as a result of charges made in the House.  

THE CANADIAN CREED

The Prime Minister, supported by members of the Cabinet, through messages and public speeches which were fully reported in the press, kept the people informed of the part Canada was taking and would take in the war. In December he declared:  

One might as well send untrained men off the street, to contend with an expert hockey, lacrosse or football team as to send untrained and unprepared men to meet the most highly trained military organization in the world.

In treating of war materials, which heretofore had been produced only in sufficient quantities to maintain the Militia, he said:—

To equip the force sent forward and to make some provision for future contingents, 290,000 pairs of boots and shoes have been provided, 100,000 forage caps, 90,000 greatcoats, 240,000 jackets and sweaters of various types, 235,000 pairs of trousers, 70,000 rifles, 70,000 bayonets, 80,000 oil bottles, 70,000 water bottles, 95,000 sets of valise equipment, and so on in like proportion over a list of sixty-six different articles. With the First Expeditionary Force we sent to Great Britain twenty-one 13-pounder quick firing guns, ninety-six 18-pounder quick firing guns, ten breech loader 60-pounder guns, a large number of machine guns, motor lorries, transport wagons and vast quantities of ammunition.

In announcing the Government policy in respect to pro-
vision of troops and war supplies:—

The number of men under training has recently been increased to 50,000 men, and it is arranged that as soon as each Contingent goes forward a corresponding number of men will be enlisted to take its place. This will proceed regularly and continuously until peace is achieved or until we are satisfied that no more men are needed. Our forces under arms in Canada and abroad will soon exceed 100,000 men. That number has frequently been mentioned in the press. In this war which we are waging against the most powerful military organization the world ever knew, I prefer to name no figure. If the preservation of our Empire demands twice or thrice that number we shall ask for them, and I know that Canada will answer the call. But remember that men cannot be sent forward more rapidly than the British authorities are prepared to receive them and to undertake their final training. Moreover we have not in Canada, as in countries organized on a military basis, great stores of equipment, arms, accoutrements, ammunition and guns. These must be provided, and they are being provided with all possible expedition.

At this time also he stated the Canadian creed:—

I believe that our cause is just and that there is an unflinching determination to make it triumphant. I believe that it can have only one conclusion. British reverses may come but if they do they should only inspire us with deeper courage and greater determination. All that our fathers fought for and achieved; all that we have inherited and accomplished, our institutions and liberties, our destiny as a nation, the existence of our Empire, all are at stake in this contest, and I am confident that the resolution, the determination, the self-reliance and resourcefulness that have never failed Canada in the stress and trials of the past will assuredly not fail her now.
THE LANDING AT ST. NAZAIRE

The port of St. Nazaire, on the Bay of Biscay at the mouth of the River Loire, had been used late in August and in September 1914 as the principal sea base of the British Expeditionary Force when Le Havre and Boulogne were threatened by the German advance on land. Equipped primarily as a French naval base, it had comparatively few commercial facilities—a shallow open roadstead and a tidal inner harbour—but the present choice was made on account of the extension of the German submarine campaign.

The first transports carrying the 1st Canadian Division arrived early on 11th February, the remainder at irregular intervals during the next four days. To a great extent the unloading was carried out by the troops, unassisted, and despite the delay of the storm, disembarkation was completed by 15th February. On arrival quartermasters were instructed to draw warm clothing if required—goatskin “waistcoats” (sleeved jerkins), fingerless woollen mittens and mufflers, much needed, for the weather was cold and raw. But the Ca-
nadian troops were, by the kindness of the women at home, well equipped with knitted goods; the waistcoats, however, seemed ideal and were procured and generally worn for several weeks, after which many disappeared – when wet they became heavy and smelled badly, when dry they still harboured vermin.

Pasted in his pay book, which he always carried, each man had a printed message of admonitory counsel from Lord Kitchener:

You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common Enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, your energy, your patience. Remember that the honour of the British Army depends on your individual conduct. It will be your duty not only to set an example of discipline and perfect steadiness under fire but also to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle. The operations in which you are engaged will, for the most part, take place in a friendly country, and you can do your own country no better service than in showing yourself in France and Belgium in the true character of a British soldier.

Be invariably courteous, considerate and kind. Never do anything likely to injure or destroy property, and always look upon looting as a disgraceful act. You are sure to meet with a welcome and to be trusted; your conduct must justify that welcome and that trust. Your duty cannot be done unless your health is sound. So keep constantly on your guard against any excesses. In this new experience you may find temptations both in wine and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and, while treating all women with perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy.

Do your duty bravely.
Fear God.
Honour the King.

* KITCHENER,
* Field-Marshal.
IN SECOND ARMY RESERVE N.E. OF HAZEBROUCK

Standard trains, each made up of French rolling stock to accommodate a unit, were ready at the station a mile distant, on a precise schedule, and quickly loaded: eight horses to a truck or, alternatively, forty men, (8 chevaux, 40 hommes). The route lay up the Loire through Nantes to Angers, and thence northwards through leafless vineyards up the valley of the Sarthe, past Le Mans and Alençon to cross the Seine at Rouen and the Somme at Abbeville; now in the British area, it followed the coast by Etaples, Boulogne and Calais, and thence, turning southwards, through St. Omer to Hazebrouck. This circuitous journey of nearly five hundred miles occupied about forty-three hours, which included several halts of an hour and others shorter, when horses were watered and fed and men stretched their cramped muscles, found water for washing, or enjoyed hot drinks served on the station platform.

The billeting area lay east of Hazebrouck, in the Caestre—Borre—Merris—Meteren area, with divisional headquarters at Pradelles; while there the Division was in reserve to the III Corps (Lieut.-General W. P. Pulteney, C.B., D.S.O.) of the Second Army (General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O.). In the villages and farms of this prosperous and fertile section of French Flanders, the troops were billeted “without subsistence”—that is, following the invariable British method in France and Belgium, they were not rationed by the inhabitants. Each man had his waterproof sheet and one blanket; for bedding the scale of issue on paper, though often not in fact, was five pounds of straw per man per week. The local estaminets were allowed to sell beer, light wines and natural coffee to the troops, but not hard liquors upon pain of closure by the communal authorities.
ATTACHED TO 4TH AND 6TH DIVISIONS FOR
INSTRUCTION

Arrangements made by III Corps for instruction before the Division assumed responsibility for a sector of the line called for three mixed brigades or brigade groups, each consisting of an infantry brigade of four battalions, a field artillery brigade of four batteries and ammunition column, a company of engineers, a brigade signal section, and a train company. In later moves a field ambulance usually accompanied each brigade group; on this occasion attachment of medical units and personnel was arranged independently.

The headquarters staff of each unit and the regimental personnel were attached to and received individual instruction from their opposite numbers in the British 4th and 6th Divisions—the 2nd Canadian Brigade Group with the former from 21st to 28th February; the 1st and 3rd Canadian Brigade Groups with the latter from 17th to 23rd February and from 23rd February to 2nd March respectively. The British 4th Division, with headquarters at Nieppe, was holding a line of trenches and breastworks from northeast of Armentières, across the Lys, and passing just east of Ploegsteert Wood; the 6th was in line on the right covering the town of Armentières on the east, and in touch with the British 7th Division near Bois Grenier, three miles to the south.

Led by an advanced guard of one company, the brigade groups marched independently by day, while motor lorries carried the men’s packs by another route. On the 17th the Army and Corps commanders inspected the 1st Brigade Group on the march; three days later they accompanied the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Sir John French, on his inspection of the remainder of the Division in fields near their billets at Pradelles, Strazeele and Caestre. He was no stranger: Canadian units had served under him in South Africa, and in 1910, when on a requested visit to Canada in connection with imperial defence, he had
seen many regiments on parade or at manoeuvres and had reported on the Militia as a whole. Now, as then, the Canadians found favour, both with inspectors and instructors: the Commander-in-Chief told them that if they fought as well as they looked the enemy would have something to reckon with; the reports from the 4th and 6th Divisions commended their keenness and aptitude. The Canadian Division was pronounced ready to take its place in the British line of battle.

**TRENCH ROUTINE**

The procedure in France, where positions were being held for days and months on end, was developing more and more towards siege warfare and was correspondingly far removed from anything experienced in training camps in Canada or England. All ranks, however, accommodated themselves quickly to the new outlook and readily assimilated the information freely given. The practices in vogue were carefully noted by all those who were attached to the 4th and 6th Divisions and transmitted in detail to those who had remained behind, hence the following notes on the prevailing system of trench routine, made at the time by a company officer in a Canadian battalion:–

*Sentry Posting*

Night sentries (usually 1 man in 4, but varies according to proximity of enemy) should be posted by one of the section commanders of the platoon who will remain on duty for 2 hours and then be relieved by another section commander and so on. Sentries are on for 2 hours.

*Visiting Sentries*

Besides being visited by the section commander they will also be visited by platoon commanders, working in reliefs, and the platoon commander will visit all the sentries of the company.

*Rifle Inspection*

This inspection should be carried out by platoon commanders at “Stand to,” morning and evening.
At night rifles will be laid on the parapet in, or wrapped round with a sand bag, and on frosty nights the sentry will occasionally go round and work the bolts.

Defaulters

These should be given all work possible, such as carrying rations, digging latrines, etc., and so relieve the other men of the company.

Sanitation

Latrines and refuse pits should be arranged by platoons, and the defaulters told off to clean them. (The bucket system when practicable is the best.)

Rations

These are made out behind the lines at some convenient place, and under the supervision of the Company Quartermaster Sergeants are carried up to the trenches by 4 men per platoon and issued by platoon Orderly Corporals by night.

Sick

Sick parade at dusk, in “Marching Order”; their names put on the sick report by the Coy. Sergeant Major and marched to the First Aid Post by the Coy. Orderly Corporal.

Stand to

All “stand to” fully equipped at dusk and ½ hour before dawn. The bolts of the rifles are then worked.

Dress

When in trenches men always wear a bandolier (50 rounds). When men leave the trenches on any duty they wear their bandoliers and carry rifles, after dusk with fixed bayonets.

Day Sentries

By day, 1 man on lookout per section is usually sufficient.

Trench Construction

In this wet climate it was found most necessary to revet the sides of the trench and traverses with hurdles or sandbags, to prevent the trench falling in and widening. Sandbags ¾ filled with broken brick were found most useful for parapets; 1 header was bullet proof.
The number of lookouts was usually 1 per section, but it varied according to nature of ground and proximity of enemy.

Lookout posts for day sentries were made with steel loopholes. At night 2 or 3 listening posts per company were established just inside the wire entanglement. A tub was sunk in the ground and filled with straw for the sentry to stand in. This kept him warm and dry.

The low wire entanglement, with plenty of loose wire in amongst it, was found to be better than the high entanglement which was continually being cut by our own bullets.

Loopholes, except for sniping and lookouts, were prohibited, and each man made his fire position so that he could shoot over the top of the parapet.

_System of Supply to Trenches_

When in the trenches the Company Quartermaster Sergeants do not go with their companies but stay in billets or some convenient place in rear. Their duties are as follows:

To take over their company's rations from the supply wagons, divide them up and supervise their conveyance to the trenches after dark by the ration party. Take battalions orders from the Sergeant Major each morning, look after the company letters, look after any orders for material such as hurdles, wire, dug-outs, etc. received from their Company Commanders and see them conveyed to the trenches after dark.

This system was found to work very well indeed.

It is to be understood that the above description applies to one particular battalion: changes were made to meet local and temporary conditions, but the routine of trench warfare altered little in essentials throughout the war. Apart from the greater risks of death or disablement due to improvement in weapons, and the consequent introduction of measures and equipment to combat them, the British infantry carried on while in the trenches as they had done for centuries.

_EXCHANGE OF G.S.O.1._

On the 20th February Br.-General R. C. B. Lawrence left the Division to take another staff appointment. On the 23rd notification was received from III Corps that Colonel
Cecil F. Romer, G.S.O.1 of the British 5th Division and Colonel E. S. Heard would change places, and next day the exchange was made. The new G.S.O.1 of the Canadian Division was forty-six years of age and had been commissioned in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in 1890; in the South African War, which broke out while he was attending the Staff College, he had been mentioned in despatches and won his brevet majority. During the next ten years he served as adjutant of volunteers, and as intelligence officer, and held both administrative and executive appointments in Army commands and at the War Office. In August 1914 he went to France as G.S.O.1 of the 5th Division of the B.E.F.; he had been present at the retreat from Mons and at the battles of Le Cateau, the Marne and the Aisne, and had earned two mentions in despatches and the C.B.

RELIEF OF BRITISH 7TH DIVISION

Orders to move southwards to take over a section of the front line from the British 7th Division were received on 26th February, and next day officers of the 1st C.I.B. went forward by motor bus to look over the new line. On the 28th the movement began according to Operation Order No. 1 (issued 3.15 p.m. 27th) with the march of the 1st Brigade group to Sailly-sur-la Lys. The 2nd Brigade Group followed next day to Neuf Berquin, and the 3rd on 2nd March to Bac-St-Maur. No time was wasted in getting into the line: the 1st C.I.B. took over the left section on 1st March, with H.Q. in Fleurbaix, the 2nd the center section on 2nd March with H.Q. in the same village, and the 3rd the right on the 3rd, with H.Q. in a farm 2,000 yards to the southwest. Artillery reliefs were carried out independently between the 1st and 3rd March, and on the same days the engineer, medical and army service corps also changed places.

At 11 a.m. on 3rd March 1915 the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division, who had opened his headquarters at Sailly-sur-la Lys, took over responsibility for the 6,400 yards of front line
under the IV Corps (Lieut.-General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bart., K.C.B., C.V.O.) of the First Army (General Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., A.D.C.). General Alderson visited many of the units before they entered the line for the first time, and he cautioned them that ‘to lose your life without military necessity is to deprive the State of good soldiers’; he encouraged them to use the bayonet, and he predicted that before long the Army would say “The Canadians never budge.”

THE FLEURBAIX SECTOR

The Canadian front line ran in a north-easterly direction across the sodden level farmlands bordering the Rivière des Layes, a slow-flowing stream, readily mistaken for a twenty foot irrigation ditch and running parallel to the Lys at a distance of three miles. The point of junction with the British 8th Division on the right was three thousand yards north of Aubers village; on the left the boundary with the British 6th Division was six thousand yards south of Armentières. The sector of the division was divided into three sections—right, centre and left—each of which was subdivided into two subsections. Each section was held by one infantry brigade, with a brigade of field artillery affiliated. The front line was held by two battalions of each brigade, one per subsection, the remainder being in brigade, divisional or corps reserve. A field company of engineers and a field ambulance operated in each section.

The trenches were of necessity shallow, consisting of bays which had for parapet and parados revetted walls of sods, earth or sandbags with loopholed steel plates built in at intervals; the connecting trenches had usually to be negotiated by crawling low to avoid the ready sniper’s bullet. Usually three companies per battalion garrisoned this line, with posts—accessible by night only—pushed out into No Man’s Land; half the remaining company occupied supporting redoubts, of which there were sixteen in all, two or three hun-
dred yards in rear, and the remaining two platoons lay further back as battalion reserve in farms or houses placed in a state of defence.

The forward area was largely featureless, with a rectangular pattern of roads flanked by hedged farms in groups of trees. Places sufficiently commanding to afford observation over other than restricted areas were hard to find, and the identification of points of interest was correspondingly difficult. In the centre sector, for four hundred yards and close to the front line, was the so-called Convent Wall, of brick and nine feet high, once the northern boundary of the garden of an ancient abbey of the expelled Carthusians. Only a fragmentary angle of the main building still stood; from the hanging cornice an artillery observer, having scaled a thirty-foot vertical ladder and peering through a loopholed plate often hit by German snipers, could see far into the German hinterland and trace in the foreground the confused pattern of the defence works threaded among the hedges and ditches and rows of pollard willows. Seven miles to the eastward the factory chimneys of Lille rose above the intervening Aubers ridge. A thousand yards to the right Cordonnerie farm stood broken and isolated in the muddy flats close in rear of the Canadian line. A mile to the left in a group of leafless trees lay a cluster of buildings, Touquet des Maques Femmes, now a fortified locality behind the left sector.

The routine of trench warfare, to be endured for many months, demanded various reports. Most important of these was the situation report, morning and evening, rendered by all units in the line and consolidated at Divisional Headquarters in a field message to the Corps. In addition each company made a daily return of strength as a basis for issue of rations, and also a patrol report, a work report, an ammunition return, a requisition for engineering material and stores, and a return of casualties. These were forwarded to battalion headquarters, whence, after consolidation by the adjutant, they were forwarded to brigade headquarters and thence
distributed by the brigade major or staff captain to the branch concerned.

Three field batteries of each brigade were in action some 2,500 yards from the front line, the fourth being in reserve. Wagon lines were two miles in rear of the gun positions and brigade ammunition columns three miles further back. The guns were usually placed close behind hedges near farm buildings, readily accessible by metalled roads drained by wide ditches: since the late autumn of 1914 the line had remained unchanged and the civilian population had been moved out only from the area within two thousand yards of it; the German batteries fired but a few rounds daily, usually at the trenches, and the farmers were busy with their spring ploughing and seeding even within the evacuated zone.

The cardinal principal of the British defence was to hold the front line, and if the enemy penetrated to counterattack promptly and resolutely to regain it. This “invariable rule” was qualified by the Commander-in-Chief in a memorandum of 23rd February, which explained that the immediate, or any, counter-attack need not be delivered if the tactical position- could be equally well maintained by manning or digging a new entrenchment, but the modification was not applied to the sector of the 1st Canadian Division. If abnormal weather or other causes should, however, render the front line untenable, defended localities in rear would be linked up to form a new front line. Infantry brigades were expected to see that alternative telephone circuits were maintained connecting companies and adjoining battalions, and they were cautioned to keep close touch with the covering artillery detailed to bring quickly effective fire to bear in case of hostile attack. The front trenches must be kept in good repair and be constantly improved according to a definite and closely supervised scheme, with a nightly task for each individual. The engineers would see to the repair and systematic thickening of the wire on dark nights. Bold pa-
trolling, persistent and accurate sniping, and minor enterprises were encouraged, to convince the enemy that he was being besieged by a superior opponent.270

Behind the forward trenches and supporting points a second line had been sited and partly constructed by order of General Headquarters, and hence known as the G.H.Q. 2nd line. Roughly parallel to the front at two thousand yards, it consisted of strong points, fortified localities or posts which would be linked up by wired trenches; suitable battery positions would be selected in rear. Explicit directions were issued as to action and dispositions in case of withdrawal to this line: the right brigade would become responsible for the right half, the left brigade for the left half, and the centre brigade would come into divisional reserve. The C.R.E. was held responsible for maintenance and improvement to be carried out by working parties from reserve battalions: brigadiers, battalion and company commanders were ordered to make themselves familiar with the positions which they were detailed to occupy and the roads allotted to them.271

These preparations were purely precautionary and supplementary to the orders for reserve battalions in case of attack.272 While active operations were not in progress the period in reserve was to be occupied “in cleaning up, shaving and haircutting and tidying clothes and equipment, and generally speaking, pulling the unit together.” Every man must know his alarm post, must sleep with his arms, equipment and boots at his head, so as to minimize delay in turning out in the dark; he must have his full 150 rounds of ammunition and his iron ration of tinned beef and hard biscuit,273 and his field dressing in the skirt of his jacket. Men might not leave their billeting area except by signed pass, they would be steadily drilled, and their equipment, rifles, clothing and feet would be inspected daily.274

TRENCH DEVICES

With the passing of the winter months when the sodden
ground and short hours of daylight caused the suspension of active operations—a tacit truce obtained between the front line garrisons in many places—both sides set about devising means to meet the new conditions of trench warfare, and the Germans were usually in the lead. In the British Army, orders were issued for the formation of mining sections in infantry brigades; these were later superseded by tunnelling companies,—engineer units which usually operated as Army Troops.

The hand grenade had been obsolete in the British army for nearly a century, but its usefulness was evident and the organization in each infantry brigade of a grenade company, 120 strong, made up of powerful throwers drawn from the battalions as in earlier times, was put into effect on 7th March. A thrower was considered to be trained when from a traversed trench he could place 75 per cent of his bombs in the trench 30 yards further along. In action he was covered by a bayonet man and followed by a carrier. Three types of bomb, or hand grenade, were in use at this period: the “Service,” the “Hales,” and “Jam Pot.” The first two were of stick type, a foot long, consisting of a metal cylinder fastened to a wooden handle and filled with explosive fired by a percussion cap and detonator. The Service weighed 2 pounds, the Hales weighed 1 pound and both had tape streamers to act as a tail, which was liable to wrap round the wrist of the thrower. The Jam Pot was made locally by men detailed from the Divisional Engineers; it consisted at first of a jam tin filled with scrap iron and half a pound of gun cotton or ammonal in which a detonator with safety fuze to burn five seconds was embedded. At first the tin was closed by a plug of clay and the fuze lighted with a match, later the explosive was placed in an inner cylinder and a metal cover carrying the detonator, fuze and friction lighter, was provided.

Other devices were also tested: trench mortars and catapults for throwing heavier bombs were experimented with;
THE 1ST CDN. DIV. ENTERS THE LINE

To illuminate No Man’s Land a magnesium rocket or flare fired from a pistol (the “Very” light) was introduced, and the Germans also used searchlights; various chemical combinations to burn and give off smoke for concealment were tried; periscopes of various types through which to see without being seen were in demand for both infantry and field artillery observers, the Canadian Division had 162; telescope sights for marksmen detailed as snipers to shoot the incautious enemy who might expose himself were procured; telescopes were withdrawn from the signallers and issued to front line observers; shields of light armour plate were made for machine guns; the authorized complement of wire cutters per battalion was increased to 96 and supplemented by a special Canadian pattern with wide jaws, so that a man could, in his stride, cut the strands of barbed wire which in an ever thickening tangle were growing nightly all along the death strip between the opposing lines.

THEATRES AND PLANS

From 8th March the Division was transferred to be a separate command under orders of the G.O.C., First Army, and in the afternoon General Alderson held conference with his brigadiers, to tell them of the rôle allotted to the Canadians in the active operations soon to be undertaken.

Towards the end of 1914 it had become known to the Allies that large German forces were being transferred to the eastern front, and the British Government viewed the possibility of a decisive defeat of the ill-equipped Russian armies with grave apprehension. To an extent this anxiety was shared by General Joffre, for the sequel would be a German offensive in Flanders with increased strength.

At the beginning of the new year the British Government was satisfied that, the Allies having failed to penetrate the German lines on the western front, a new theatre should be sought for active operations—the Baltic coast or Turkey was suggested—where the power of the British fleet might
be applied while the western front would be regarded as an invested German fortress. The War Council in London then considered how and where the British New Armies should be employed, and found that an attack on Austria from the south based on Salonika was most promising of favourable results. An appeal from Russia, however, hastened the choice of the Dardanelles as the new theatre: there a successful attack would reopen communications through the Black Sea and also reduce Constantinople. But in anticipation of a southward German drive into Serbia and to influence the Balkan States, it was still held desirable to create a diversion at Salonika; meanwhile Egypt and the Suez Canal must be guarded against a Turkish advance through Palestine.

So long, however, as the main British land forces were required to support the French in Flanders, that would be the main theatre for the British Army, and General Joffre and Sir John French were agreed that there lay the field for immediate action. They both considered that the German line could be broken if sufficient high explosive ammunition were made available to clear a way through the field defences, and both thought that the full weight of the growing French and British land forces should be used without delay to relieve the pressure on Russia by breaking through on the Western front where, owing to the employment of fifty-six divisions in the East, the Germans were defensively holding the line with ninety-eight divisions. Other theatres might be considered after the Rhine had been reached.

The section of the Western front deemed most vulnerable by the French high command was the salient between Reims and Amiens: a successful advance in Champagne northwards from either Reims or Verdun, or both, would cripple the German railway communications through the Ardennes and cut the lateral line, Thionville—Longuyon—Mézières—Hirson—Valenciennes, rendering the salient untenable. In the North, an eastward advance in Artois from Arras would strike the railway centres of Douai, Cambrai,
St. Quentin, Don and Lille. The Allied plan, therefore, which was not essentially changed throughout the war, and which finally succeeded in 1918, was to strike at the enemy’s communications in these three main directions.

In the combined operations planned for March 1915, the French would attack simultaneously in Artois and Champagne, and with success would advance at Verdun to threaten the German line of retreat to the Rhine. The British would meanwhile press forward on the left, and by capturing the Aubers ridge, which runs northwards for twenty miles from near La Bassée to immediately west of Lille, would interrupt the communications of the German forces in Flanders; a further development of this offensive would clear the Belgian coast.

THE BRITISH FRONT

Throughout the winter the British Expeditionary Force, with a strength in mid-February of five cavalry and twelve infantry divisions, had been holding a trench line thirty-one miles long. On the right, the front of the British First Army (General Sir Douglas Haig), in the valley of the Lys and about four miles west of the Aubers ridge, was thirteen miles in length; it extended from Cuinchy across the La Bassée Canal and through Givenchy and Neuve Chapelle to Bois Grenier, where it made junction with the British Second Army (General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien), holding a line of eighteen miles, east of Armentières and passing between Kemmel and Messines to St. Eloi, north of which it joined the right of the French forces holding the Ypres salient. In January it had been arranged between General Joffre and Sir John French that British troops should take over the salient as soon as two promised new divisions—the 29th British and 1st Canadian—arrived in France about mid-February. This redistribution would release two corps to the French Tenth Army, which would attack in March between Arras and Lens to capture the heights of Vimy and dominate the whole
THE 1ST CDN. DIV. ENTERS THE LINE

Douai region. Meanwhile the British First Army would advance at Neuve Chapelle and take possession of the southern end of the Aubers ridge. The combined offensive would push on for ten or fifteen miles to cut the German communications beyond the Douai plain.

But the diversion of the British 29th Division to Gallipoli made it impossible for Sir John French to both mount an attack at Neuve Chapelle and take over the Ypres salient, which latter was the stipulated condition for an offensive by the French Tenth Army. Placed thus in a quandary, the British Commander-in-Chief decided that the attack must be delivered, and after a period of uncertainty General Joffre informed him on 7th March that the French offensive was postponed. The British offensive action which began on 10th March thus became an entirely independent operation.\(^{279, 280, 281, 282, 283}\)

**PLANS FOR NEUVE CHAPELLE**

The Germans had secured possession of the Aubers ridge in their general offensive of 20th October 1914, when the British II Corps (General Smith-Dorrien) had taken up a line from Givenchy to Fauquissart; in the ensuing weeks they had been checked elsewhere, but succeeded in breaking through at Neuve Chapelle, which they retained. This village, in the centre of the front of the British First Army, was selected as the first objective; after its capture by the Indian and IV Corps the gap of two thousand yards in the enemy’s line would be enlarged in a second phase during which Aubers would be captured and the line Illies-Herlies would be occupied. The I Corps on the right would meanwhile assume a vigorous offensive towards Violaines. On the left the 1st Canadian Division would similarly assume a vigorous offensive towards Fromelles covering the left flank of the IV Corps. Further north the Second Army would assist by making active demonstrations on its right front in preparation for an attack on Lille.\(^{284}\)
The rôle of the Canadian Division in the first phase was to assist by making a demonstration by fire along its entire front with a view to preventing the enemy from sending reinforcements from the neighbourhood of Fromelles to Aubers. The Division would also be prepared to take the offensive and advance when ordered by First Army: to this end the reserve field batteries were brought into action and the ammunition echelons of the field artillery were brought up to near the guns; advanced report centres were established by formations and connected with telephone wires which were kept clear of all but operations messages; special instructions were issued to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade to reconnoitre their front and select places of assembly for attack; the support and reserve infantry were moved closer to the line, and each man carried 250 rounds of ammunition, two days’ rations and a full water bottle. The front line units made breaches in the parapet and wire for quick exit, and scouts reconnoitred the area immediately in front where they found an unmapped water-filled ditch eight feet wide and four deep, which would be a serious obstacle to be crossed in the first rush.

The plan of sudden intense bombardmen—the swift capture of Neuve Chapelle by the Meerut and 8th Divisions, the immediately ensuing attack of the Indian and IV Corps on their whole frontage of five miles, and the numerical superiority of the attacking force, are reflected in the Special Order of the Day issued by Sir Douglas Haig on 9th March:

To the 1st Army

We are about to engage the enemy under very favourable conditions. Until now in the present campaign, the British Army has, by its pluck and determination, gained victories against an enemy greatly superior both in men and guns. Reinforcements have made us stronger than the enemy in our front. Our guns are now both more numerous than the enemy’s are, and also larger than any hitherto used by any army in the field. Our Flying Corps has driven the Germans
from the air.

On the Eastern Front, and to the South of us, our Allies have made marked progress and caused enormous losses to the Germans, who are, moreover, harassed by internal troubles and shortage of supplies, so that there is little prospect at present of big reinforcements being sent against us here.

In front of us we have only one German Corps spread out on a front as large as that occupied by the whole of our Army (the First).

We are now about to attack with about 48 battalions a locality in that front which is held by some three German battalions. It seems probable, also, that for the first day of the operations the Germans will not have more than four battalions available as reinforcements for the counterattack. Quickness of movement is therefore of first importance to enable us to forestall the enemy and thereby gain success without severe loss.

At no time in this war has there been a more favourable moment for us, and I feel confident of success. The extent of that success must depend on the rapidity and determination with which we advance.

Although fighting in France, let us remember that we are fighting to preserve the British Empire and to protect our homes against the organized savagery of the German Army. To ensure success, each one of us must play his part, and fight like men for the honour of Old England.

The relative strengths given for the opposing forces on the front of attack, at the time surmised by some to be “more glowing than is true in order to give the men confidence,” were in fact correct. Five hundred copies of the order were received by the 1st Canadian Division, with the instructions of the Army Commander that one should go to each officer and that all ranks should be made acquainted with the contents. With a superiority of sixteen to one the attack could hardly fail, and hopes ran high.

THE BATTLE

At half past seven in the grey frosty dawn of the 10th of March the preparatory bombardment opened, and to deceive the enemy as to the front of attack the Canadian artillery
shelled the German positions opposite. When the bombardment lifted to Neuve Chapelle village at 8.05, the Canadian infantry in the line, three miles to the left, opened bursts of rapid fire and continued to do so at fifteen minute intervals throughout the day; at nightfall they heard that the operation had been successful, and that the intention was to assault again in the morning:

The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief wishes his heartiest congratulations to be conveyed to Corps Commanders and all ranks of First Army for the splendid success which they have gained today. Would you also kindly express my gratitude for the magnificent determination which you and all ranks have displayed in executing my orders issued for today’s battle. The enemy has been completely surprised and I trust that tomorrow the effect of today’s fighting will result in still greater successes.

The fact was that, although Neuve Chapelle had been captured by 10 a.m. and the first phase practically completed shortly after midday, there was such delay in opening the second phase that the Germans had five undisturbed hours in which to bring up reinforcements, to throw up new entrenchments, and to site machine guns for sweeping the ground north and east of the village. When the British advance was finally resumed towards 6 p.m., it was checked by heavy fire; the early darkness of a dull and drizzling day was already falling, and units became confused; the general advance was therefore abandoned for the day, and orders were issued to consolidate the line reached—a maximum advance of 1,200 yards on a front of 4,000.

During the night, the German infantry reinforcements constructed and wired a new line all across the breach, and when the British and Indian infantry assaulted at 7 a.m. on the 11th they were met by rifle and machine gun fire from an unlocated trench and heavily shelled by new batteries in unlocated positions occupied during the hours of darkness. The misty weather had persisted and Canadian action had been the same as on the 10th. For the 12th, the Indian and IV Corps having been ordered to continue the offensive,
General Alderson repeated the order that Operation Order No. 5 issued for the 10th instant would hold good. After a two hours postponement owing to heavy mist, notification of which did not reach some units, attacks were delivered at 10.30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. on the 12th by the 7th and 8th Divisions. The Indian Corps attacked the Bois de Biez from the west at 1 p.m. By mid-afternoon glowing messages of positions captured and Germans surrendering were circulated: the British attack was “rushing on,” and the adjoining Canadian Division was ordered to be prepared to act offensively in co-operation with the movement. Anticipatory orders for the attack were issued to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade: the 14th Canadian Infantry Battalion to make the assault, supported by the fire of the 15th and 16th; the 13th Battalion to assemble at Rue du Bois in readiness to exploit success; all ranks to carry one day’s rations in addition to the iron ration. Two cavalry regiments of the Indian Corps had been moved forward to push on as soon as the Bois de Biez was captured, and harass the enemy’s retreat, and at 6.20 p.m. General Haig asked Sir John French to allow the 46th (North Midland) Division to relieve the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigades, so that the latter might be massed behind the 3rd for a break through.

As darkness fell, however, the tragedy of the true position became known: a German counter-attack by twenty battalions at daybreak had, although repulsed, precluded any material British advance; on the Canadian front the situation was reported as unchanged, with no signs of the enemy evacuating his trench line; the troops of the attacking formations were fatigued, and consolidation of the line reached was ordered, while plans were made for the 1st Canadian Division to deliver a surprise attack at Fauquissart on 22nd March. Meanwhile the Canadian battalions resumed their defensive dispositions; headquarters and battery wagon lines moved back, and the conditions of “normal” trench warfare were resumed: they had, in fact, hardly been disturbed in the
Canadian sector as far as the enemy was concerned; for the bursts of rifle fire could do no harm against the German bullet-proof trenches, and the bombardment by the fifty-two guns of the divisional artillery was less than twenty-five rounds per gun per day.

TRENCH WARFARE RESUMED

On the 13th the British returns of gun ammunition showed that the rate of expenditure had been seventeen times as great as the rate of production and Sir John French wired to Lord Kitchener: “Cessation of the forward movement is necessitated today by the fatigue of the troops and above all, by the want of ammunition.” Two days later the Commander-in-Chief decided that the offensive must be abandoned, so that the battle was already over, although instructions issued to Divisions, on offensive action, indicated otherwise. For the Canadians the battle had never started: Neuve Chapelle for them amounted to nothing more than a valuable tactical exercise with troops, in preparation for active operations which were cancelled.

In the course of the operations much had been learned of the Ross rifle as a fighting weapon. It was admittedly excellent for sniping, but now the first reports of jamming in rapid fire began to come in. At this time the trouble was laid to both overgauge and undergauge ammunition, but there were other causes which were only established later.

Orders for a relief of the Canadian Division by the 6th British Division to be completed by the 17th March were issued on the 14th and initial moves took place, including the relief during the night 15th/16th of the 3rd Brigade C.F.A. by C. G. and K. Batteries, R.H.A. But a German attack at St. Eloi on the night 14th/15th interrupted the divisional relief: the 16th Infantry Brigade of the 6th Division was hurried off by rail to meet the supposed menace, and the relief was first postponed twenty-four hours and subsequently cancelled, upon which the three batteries, R.H.A.
withdrew and the 3rd Brigade C.F.A., three batteries of which had been in action for five hours near Laventie, rejoined from IV Corps at 4 a.m. on the 17th.

For another quiet week the Division continued to hold the Fleurbaix sector, until relieved by the British 8th Division. There was a light snowfall on the 18th and 19th, the next four days were fine, on the 24th and 25th it rained. The field gun ammunition allowance had been reduced on the 17th from fifteen to three rounds per gun per day; even this small allowance was to be reserved for essential tasks, so that in six days the sixteen guns of the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A., fired only twenty-two shells.

RELIEVED BY THE BRITISH 8TH DIVISION

As darkness fell on the 25th the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigades began the march to new billets north of the Lys. During the following night the 3rd C.I.B. followed; General Alderson handed over responsibility for the sector at 10 a.m. on the 27th and opened his headquarters in Estaires. Close billets were found for most of the 2nd and 3rd C.I.B. in that town, which was also occupied by British troops; the 1st C.I.B. was accommodated in the neighbouring village of Neuf Berquin.  

The infantry of the division had held the line for twenty-four days on a schedule of three- or four-day tours, battalions averaging for the period twelve days in front line, six in brigade reserve and six in divisional or corps reserve. The three field companies of engineers and the three field ambulances also went out to rest; the divisional artillery remained in action, covering the same front but now under the British 8th Division.

At the beginning of the tour the strength of the division had been 17,999 all ranks and 5,279 horses; it had been maintained by reinforcements, totalling 18 officers and 957 other ranks, sent up automatically from the base. For the period, battle casualties totalled 278—officers 1 killed, 10
wounded; other ranks 67 killed, 200 wounded. This may be compared with British losses in the battle of Neuve Chapelle: in the four attacking divisions – 7th, 8th, Meerut and Lahore—these amounted to 544 officers and 11,108 other ranks. Although the figures were not generally known at the time, they could be estimated, for before the end of the month casualties of 630 officers were published in the London newspapers, which reached the troops daily, and caused one Canadian to remark that “only a few acres of enemy country have been taken.”

Considering the inclemency of the weather and the condition of the trenches, the health of the troops had been uniformly good, the sick per day for the Division averaging 35, of whom about ten per cent were evacuated. One of the maladies against which special precautions were taken was frostbite or “trench feet,” caused by suspension of circulation brought on by inactivity in cold and wet and accentuated by tight boots or puttees. A daily inspection of feet in the trenches was ordered, dry socks must be carried, and a daily issue of two ounces of whale oil grease per man for rubbing was allowed.

Rubber boots were available for only a small percentage of the trench garrison and General Alderson sent a request to Colonel Carson for 3,500 pairs of rubber stocking waders; these were purchased and sent to Dance, but were lost sight of in the mass of ordnance stores at the base and only discovered after the spring floods had abated and left the trenches comparatively dry.

While in Second Army reserve provision had been made for baths for most of the troops. On 5th March a divisional bath house was opened in a brewery rented at Bac St. Maur, and allotments to units were made on a regular schedule. On the 10th the service was extended to the washing of clothing: a pool of three thousand sets of underwear was established, a building was rented and civilian laundresses engaged, so that a clean suit could be supplied to each man after his bath.
This system was followed in general throughout the war, with the addition, in October 1915, of a disinfector to destroy vermin in clothing and blankets. The recall of fur waistcoats, to be handed into the ordnance stores on 15th March, marked the official end of winter.

THE 118TH (How.) BRIGADE R.F.A. JOINS

Up to this time the brigade of 4.5-inch howitzers was the only unit lacking to complete the establishment of the Canadian Division; on 13th March Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Lake reported with his command, the 118th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A. consisting of the 458th and 459th (How.) Batteries. This unit, destined to serve with distinction as part of the 1st C.D.A. until the reorganization of the Canadian Field Artillery in July 1916, had forthwith come into action, but on 25th March it was placed temporarily at the disposal of the 7th British Division.

On the 28th March the 3rd Brigade C.F.A. was replaced by the 45th Brigade R.F.A. and moved out of action at 7.30 p.m., also on loan to the 7th British Division. On the 31st an order arrived for the withdrawal of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery, which was duly executed on the night 1st/2nd April, when all the units moved to billets in farms about Doulieu, north of the Lys, and rejoined the Canadian Division.

TRANSFER TO SECOND ARMY

Independent active operations having ceased on both the French and British fronts, General Joffre, on 24th March, wrote to Sir John French proposing that combined Allied operations should be resumed about the end of April, by which time the necessary means to produce a decisive result would, in his estimation, have been collected. He reiterated the request that the French IX and XX Corps should be relieved in the Ypres front by British troops with the least possible delay. Sir John French replied on the 1st April that
he hoped to co-operate in the proposed combined offensive with eight divisions of the British First Army, and that he had ordered an extension of the British Second Army front up to the Ypres-Poelcappelle road. He expected the relief of the two French corps would be completed by 20th April, and to that end he had decided that the 1st Canadian Division should be transferred back to the Second Army.

Until informed on 1st April of this coming move, General Alderson had understood that his Division was destined to take part in a renewal of the offensive against the Aubers ridge. On 26th March he caused a message to be sent out stating that "the G.O.C. desires each brigade should pay particular attention to training in charging over cultivated ground, rapid entrenching, getting out of trenches and over parapets, assaulting hostile lines, crossing wire entanglements, etc." The troops, therefore, generally supposed that they were being groomed for an attack in the coming Allied offensive, colloquially termed "the big shove": the Bishop of London, on a visit to the Army, encouraged them with stirring words, and since much was made of the surrender by the Austrians of the fortress of Przemysl in Galicia, they speculated as to whether the Russians or the Franco-British forces would first reach Berlin.

The front of the IV Corps was now entirely held by the 8th Division, the 7th having been withdrawn to refit about Laventie, and a plan was being evolved for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade to assemble south of Fauquissart and deliver an attack down the Laventie-Aubers road through the 8th Division and supported by the 7th. Br.-General Turner, his staff and battalion commanders reconnoitred the approaches to Neuve Chapelle and the Fauquissart district on the 27th and 28th, there were conferences at Divisional and Army Headquarters next day and at night large working parties set to digging the required assembly trenches—two hundred of the 3rd C.I.B. on the 29th, eight hundred of the 2nd C.I.B. on the 30th, nine hundred of the 1st C.I.B. on the 31st,
and nine hundred of the 3rd C.I.B. on 1st April.

The outlook was suddenly and completely changed, however, by an order from First Army on 1st April that “The Canadian Division will form part of the 5th Corps,” which meant joining the Second Army. Next day Sir Douglas Haig visited Canadian Divisional and Brigade Headquarters, and on the 3rd orders were received from Second Army for the northward move. On the 5th the 2nd Canadian Brigade Group marched to a billeting area about Steenvoorde, on the 6th the 1st Brigade Group followed to an area near Winnezeele. On the 7th April the 3rd Brigade Group marched into the Ste. Marie Cappel billeting area east of Cassel, and at 10 a.m. on that day the 1st Canadian Division, with headquarters at Oxelaere, came under the orders of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien commanding the Second Army, and was placed in reserve. There was no longer doubt as to the Division’s future employment: the inexorable finger of fate pointed to the Ypres salient.
CHAPTER VI

THE YPRES SALIENT

Map 9: Ypres 1915. Ridges and Grid
Map 1: Ypres 1915. Dispositions and Moves 5 p.m.-7 p.m. 22nd April

TOPOGRAPHY–RELIEF OF THE FRENCH–THE CANADIAN DIVISION TAKES
OVER–THE NEW SECTOR–SCHEME OF DEFENCE–THE TRENCHES–
CONDITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS–HILL 60 OPERATIONS–WARNINGS
OF ATTACK WITH GAS–COUNTER INSTRUCTIONS–ARTILLERY
AMMUNITION AND RELIEFS–GERMAN DISPOSITIONS
AND PLANS

TOPOGRAPHY

The town of Ypres with its ancient moat and ramparts stands on the Yser Canal at the southern margin of the Flanders plain; from it a network of roads spreads on all sides: raised main roads with pavé centres and deep ditches, running radially to the neighbouring towns; secondary roads joining villages strung out in all directions a mile or two apart; third-class roads and tracks, fit only for broad-hoofed Flemish horses with three-wheeled wagons and leading to the hamlets, hedged farms and outlying barns which form a close pattern over all this fertile and densely populated area. The Canadian troops first saw the town in April, 1915, when the Cloth Hall and St. Martin’s Cathedral, admired for their beauty through five hundred years, stood marred by the German bombardments of 1914; in many streets, however, no shells had fallen and most of the townspeople evidently preferred to live at home rather than leave their property. Similarly the undamaged houses of many of the villages and farms were still tenanted, even within two miles of the firing line, and the red cattle grazed placidly in the green pastures regardless of the guns.
Four thousand yards southeast of the Lille gate is Hill 60, a minor feature of the topographical backbone of Flanders. The main ridge from here runs north-eastwards for four and a half miles, past Sanctuary Wood and through the polygonal Zonnebeke Wood to Molenaarelsthoek, where it turns north through Broodseind five miles east of Ypres, and on by Passchendael for which it is named, and, gradually falling, through Westroosebeke. Throughout its length the Passchendael Ridge does not rise to over 200 feet above sea-level, or about 150 above the town. Branching at right angles from it to the northwest and west is a series of subsidiary ridges, a mile apart and two or three miles long, which merge into the plain and form the watershed of the muddy Steenbeek and its sluggish tributaries. The more important, named generally from the places which have sought drainage on their slopes, are the Zillebeke Ridge, which terminates almost at the Menin Gate, the Bellewaarde Ridge which circles to the north of Bellewaarde Lake, the Frezenberg and Zonnebeke Ridges running towards St. Julien, and the Gravenstafel, Stroombeek and Poelcappelle Ridges, focussing on Langemarck.

A subsidiary detached system of ridges lies north of Ypres between the Steenbeek and the Yser Canal; never more than 50 feet above the plain, it yet proved to be of great tactical importance. The most southerly element is the St. Jean Ridge, 2½ miles long and running eastwards from La Brique, a mile north of Ypres, above St. Jean and Wieltje; a thousand yards north of the St. Jean Ridge and roughly parallel is Hill Top Ridge, a mile long; fifteen hundred yards further north is Mauser Ridge, also running east and west, a mile and a half long. At right angles to these three, and joining their eastern ends, is another which extends northwards from Wieltje by Mouse Trap Farm to Kitchener’s Wood—in French, *Bois des Cuisiniers*. Finally fifteen hundred yards north of Mauser Ridge and roughly parallel to it is Pilckem Ridge, a mile long and the German first objective in the Bat-
These ridges, although neither steep of slope nor high, dominate the town on the northeast, east and southeast. From them there was good observation across wide stretches of open farmland, for in April the view was little interrupted by the budding foliage of roadside trees, small woods and thorn hedges. The roll of the ground was such that there were no concealed approaches to the forward area from the rear, a handicap to the defenders only removed by mist or the fall of night. In the broad valleys willow-lined watercourses cut deep into earth as yet undisturbed by shell craters, and connected with an intricate arrangement of drainage ditches, moats and ponds. The streams themselves, because of their depth and muddy banks, were passable for fully equipped infantry only in their upper courses, or at the frequent road culverts built of brick and stone.

**RELIEF OF THE FRENCH**

After the fighting about Messines and Wytschaete in November and December 1914, the boundary between the British and the French until 6th January was the Kemmel-Wytschaete road; then it was moved left to St. Eloi, and on 2nd February to above Hill 60. The discussions in the spring between General Joffre and Sir John French led in due course to the relief of French troops as British Territorial Divisions began to take the field. Since the autumn of 1914 territorial battalions and other units had been in France and attached as supernumerary to regular establishments; the 46th (North Midland) Division, which crossed the Channel on 24th February—a fortnight after the 1st Canadian Division—was however the first Territorial higher formation to serve in the British Expeditionary Force. In accordance with the orders of the British Commander-in-Chief that the line as far north as the Ypres-Poelcappelle road should be taken over by the V Corps, reliefs began on the 2nd April with the 27th (British) Division replacing the 17th (French) Division...
from Hill 60, exclusive, to Polygon Wood; a week later the 28th (British) Division replaced the 39th (French) Division in the Zonnebeke sector as far as Gravenstafel.

The new British line followed the broken ground of the Flanders Ridge through the closely wooded battlefield of First Ypres as far as Broodseinde; between that place and the intersection with the Ypres-Roulers railway it broke away north-westwards across the eastern end of the Gravenstafel Ridge, and the 11th (French) Division carried it down the valley of the Stroombeek and north of Langemarck across level farm lands to join the Belgians on the west bank of the Yser Canal at Steenstraat. The distance from that place across the base of the Salient to St. Eloi, measured in a straight line through Boesinghe and the western extremity of Ypres, is eight miles; the depth of it was six miles.

THE CANADIAN DIVISION TAKES OVER

The Canadian Division, which for about a week had been training in the area between Cassel and Poperinge and practising the approved method of attack, was warned on 10th April that it would join the V Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Herbert Plumer) on the 12th, and orders duly arrived for the relief of the 11th (French) Division (Gen. Ferry), to begin on the 14th and to be completed at 10 a.m. on the 17th. The new line would be held by the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades, and special arrangements were made for commanders, staffs and company officers to spend 24 hours in the line before the relieving units came in.

The difference between the French and the British way of conducting a war astonished the Canadians: organization, dispositions and defences, employment of arms and services, the interior economy of units,—all seemed to be viewed from another angle. While the field works appeared to be neglected, the compensating measures taken to avoid casualties by allowing no movement in daylight, by holding the line lightly with infantry—who retired if attacked, relying on
field guns to stop the enemy—and even by fencing off areas habitually shelled, were a revelation: it was said that one of the French battalions holding the line at the point of the Salient had suffered less than thirty killed and wounded since Christmas. Such light losses in static trench warfare were chiefly due to the state of semi-truce which obtained in some French sectors when active operations were not in progress. In selective emulation of French practices, orders to adopt similar measures as regards enemy aeroplanes and movement by daylight were issued for the Canadian Division.311, 332

No trouble was too great for the French, no courtesy too small: officers and men alike understood the difficulties of the incoming troops and quickly appreciated the changes required, particularly the field gunners whose technique and knowledge of the front left nothing to be desired.

To ensure liaison during the relief, an advanced headquarters 1st Canadian Division was opened at 10 a.m. on 14th April at the 11th (French) Divisional Headquarters, Château des Trois Tours, near Brielen. By the prescribed hour, 10 a.m. on the 17th Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division, was installed there and had assumed command. The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades were now in line, each with two battalions in the trenches and each with one battalion in brigade support and the fourth in divisional reserve on the Canal north of Ypres. The divisional frontage was, however, still covered by the French artillery which was relieved section for section by batteries of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, C.F.A., during the two following nights, when the five 4-gun 75 mm. batteries were replaced by eight 4-gun 18-pdr. Canadian batteries—a move which entailed the construction of three new positions for the 5th, 10th and 11th and the two 90 mm. batteries by two 4-gun 4.5-inch how. batteries 118th (How.) Bde. R.F.A.

Upon completion of this relief the Allied front was held by the French from the Swiss boundary to Cuinchy (below the La Bassée Canal), with the French Tenth Army—on the
left in the Arras-Vimy-Lens sector; northwards the British First Army (General Haig) carried the line for thirteen miles, by Givenchy, Festubert, Neuve Chapelle and Fleurbaix to Bois Grenier, thence the British Second Army (General Smith-Dorrien) continued east of Armentières and Ploegsteert Wood and Kemmel, through St. Eloi and around two-thirds of the Ypres Salient to the Ypres-Poelcappelle road. The total British line was thirty miles. Between the British left and the sea at Nieuport, a distance of 20 miles, lay the French Détachement d’Armée de Belgique (D.A.B.) commanded by General Putz, with the Belgian Army interposed, on a front of 4½ miles from Steenstraat northwards, between the Groupement d’Elverdinghe and the Groupement de Nieuport. Each of these Groupements consisted of two divisions; the former included first the 45th (Algerian) Division (General Quiquandon)—with 13 infantry battalions and 36 field guns, secondly, the 87th Territorial Division (General Roy)—with 21 battalions, twenty-four 75 mm. and four 120 mm. field guns. In command of the northern French forces, designated “Groupe Provisoire du Nord,” from Berles au Bois (eight miles southwest of Arras), to the sea, was General Foch. He was representative of the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, for the co-ordination of the operations of these Armies with those of the British and Belgians; his headquarters were at Cassel.

THE NEW SECTOR

The sector of the Canadian Division was slightly over 4,000 yards wide at the front line, which ran wholly in the valley of the Stroombeek from the 28th (British) Division left, at Berlin Wood 800 yards east of Gravenstafel, northwesterly across the stream and following it down the valley and across the tributary Lekkerboterbeek to a point on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road 1,000 yards southwest of that village where was the junction with the 45th (Algerian) Division, also newly arrived in line. Nearly parallel to the
Stroombeek, and from 1,000 to 2,000 yards behind the front line, is the Gravenstafel Ridge, with the hamlets of Gravenstafel and Keerselaere—just within the Canadian boundaries—joined by a road along the crest. Parallel to the road and 500 yards south is the Haanebeek which runs westwards to meet the northward flowing stream of the same name and form the Steenbeek; at the junction, 2,500 yards behind the left centre of the Canadian line, is St. Julien, a village of some 700 souls when war broke out. At a distance of 1,000 yards to the west of St. Julien lies Kitchener’s Wood, at this time an oak plantation of irregular shape, six acres in extent, lying inside the Canadian left boundary as marked on the map used by General Plumer, but shown as French in G.H.Q. records and on French maps. Access for vehicles to the forward area was by two roads; that on the right passed through the northern outskirts of Ypres, most of which lay south of the Canadian boundary, and turned north-eastwards for two miles, across the Bellewaardebeek and through St. Jean to Wieltje, where it forked rightwards to Fortuin and Gravenstafel and leftwards to St. Julien, Keerselaere and Poelcappelle. Of these places St. Jean and Wieltje straddled the highway almost continuously for over a mile, and Fortuin was an ill-defined collection of farms and cottages centred half a mile southeast of St. Julien. The northern main artery crossed the canal a mile and a half above Ypres, by a bridge just within the French area, and ran eastwards covered by Hill Top Ridge on the north to join the Poelcappelle road between Wieltje and St. Julien. Besides these a wheeled traffic pontoon bridge across the canal 1,000 yards inside the left boundary carried a second class road forward through La Brique to St. Jean, and there were four foot bridges also within the Canadian area.

**SCHEME OF DEFENCE**

On the day the G.O.C., Canadian Division, took over responsibility he issued the following Scheme of Defence:—
The scheme of defence of the division in the present line will be the same as that laid down in the case of the Sailly line, viz. to hold the front trenches at all costs and in the event of any trench being lost, to counter-attack at once. The subsidiary line acts as a support to the front trenches and as a basis for any required counter-attacks.

Each brigade in the front line will detail one battalion as divisional reserve. The headquarters of battalions in divisional reserve must not be altered without reference to this office.

The G.H.Q. 2nd line which runs just east of WIELTJE is allotted provisionally as follows:

Right Brigade – from where line crosses road in C.29.c. to where it crosses track in C.23.a.

Left Brigade – from above track to where line crosses track in C.10.c.

All regimental officers are to acquaint themselves at once with the details of this line.

In the event of this G.H.Q. 2nd line being taken up, brigades will retire by the following roads:

Right Brigade-All tracks or roads between YPRES-VERLORENHOEK road (exclusive) and WIELTJE-FORTUIN road (inclusive).

Left Brigade – All tracks between WIELTJE-ST. JULIEN road (inclusive) and the tracks running at N. edge of wood in C.10.b.6.1. (i.e. Kitchener’s Wood). 330a

Certain temporary bridges have been built over the YPRES-YSER Canal. These bridges would probably have to be shared with the French and the 28th Division if there was ever any necessity to use them. Meanwhile, the G.O.C. directs that Brigadiers and their Staff Officers and Battalion Commanders make themselves acquainted with the approaches to these bridges.

In conformity with the French method of holding the sector, special dispositions were made for the defence of St. Julien as the village covered the bridge on the Ypres road over the Haanebeek: three companies, one from each of the two line battalions and one from the support battalion of the 3rd C.I.B., were detailed for duty there under the “Commandant, St. Julien,” to man the embryo defences of the village
in case of attack. He retained command of his own battalion, the left, of which two platoons of the St. Julien company were placed in support trenches 700 yards behind the line at the Poelcappelle road, just within the Franco-Canadian boundary.

THE TRENCHES

The front line as taken over from the French consisted of unconnected lengths of untraversed trench, usually but two feet deep with a non-bullet proof breastwork of four feet, cluttered with frail shelters and destitute of parados. Apart from these the defence works in front of the Gravenstafel Ridge were four groups of shelter trenches for supporting platoons three hundred to seven hundred yards behind the line.

On tactical maps handed over by the French, dotted lines indicated field works under construction or projected; from these, and from V Corps instructions as to boundaries and lines of defence, it is evident that the subsidiary line was supposed to run along the crest of the Gravenstafel Ridge. But on the ground there was no “subsidiary line,” and although there were a few disjointed remnants of the hurriedly dug field defences of 1914 there was no organized line of inter-supporting posts.

On the Ridge itself, and in the central fifth of the Canadian area, was marked “Locality C” which included the group of buildings along the road there and a shallow trench north of them with a few strands of wire and commanding a view of the fields and farms of the Stroombeek valley; on the southern slope of the Ridge, also within Locality C, were two strong points or rather shelter trenches, for they were not constructed for defence, nor were they occupied by troops. At the crossroads between Fortuin and Gravenstafel, in the orchard of Boetleer Farm and near the windmill northeast of St. Julien there were also elementary shelter trenches for companies in support; they resembled those near the Poel-
cappelle road and, like them, had apparently been sited to avoid detection rather than to give protection and a field of fire. The water table in this fat alluvial soil was rarely more than two feet from the surface so that breastworks revetted with sods, fascines or sandbags had to be used for deeper cover.

According to the scheme of defence, the projected subsidiary line was not considered to be a first retrenchment, or G.H.Q. 1st line: the first retrenchment as planned was a position, continuous across the Canadian sector and known as the G.H.Q. 2nd line. The G.H.Q. 3rd line was marked on maps as running north and south about four miles west of Ypres.

The G.H.Q. 2nd line at this time began at Zillebeke Lake (Etang de Zillebeke), and ran northwards, east of 27th (British) Divisional Headquarters at Potijze Chateau and following the ridge east of Wietje to include Mouse Trap Farm, and thence north-westwards to Welch Farm on the Franco-Canadian boundary, where it was supposed to connect with a defence line covering the canal bridges at Boesinghe. For the most part this line consisted of a belt of barbed wire, six yards wide and three feet high, protecting a series of redoubts thirty yards square and spaced four or five hundred yards apart; in the section about Wietje and Mouse Trap Farm there were the rudiments of trenches, rain-washed relics of 1914, but no attempt had been made to repair them or to raise parapets to give adequate protection from shells or bullets. Some of the neighbouring buildings used by the French as “postes de commandement” had cellars strengthened by timbering and sandbags; near some of the others were semi-cylindrical shelters of corrugated steel, designed to be built over with a bursting layer and later popular for field guns. In the grounds of Potijze Chateau was the best dugout in the Salient, with three sheeted adits driven into the spoil-mound from the artificial lake and proof against light shells, although later a 5.9-inch destroyed one of the galler-
ies; at this time it was a curiosity and an object of pilgrimage and envy.

CONDITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS

Even before the first Canadian infantry went into the line, instructions had been issued by 1st Canadian Division to strengthen and thicken the parapets of trenches to be taken over. The engineer and staff officers sent to reconnoitre and report soon discovered that the extent of the deficiencies in field works was greater than had been expected, and every available sandbag was sent forward and every available man was put to work first on the construction of a continuous wired and traversed front line, with bullet-proof parapet and splinter-proof parados, and secondly on fire trenches at St. Julien. The field gun positions too were unprotected and of the open warfare type, the muzzle pushed through a hedge with wagon-body and limber on either side to give cover for the detachment, and a few branches stuck in the ground to afford concealment from the air; for the remainder of the battery personnel there was usually a wattle-and-daub stable or a brick house with sandbagged windows, but restriction of movement by day, including the prohibition of football at the gun positions, was relied upon to avoid shelling. Contrary to British practice the gun teams, if roofs were available, were kept at the gun position, the battery wagon lines and Brigade Ammunition Columns were in farms or barns from one to three thousand yards behind the guns. The Divisional Ammunition Column was on the Poperinghe-Elverdinghe Road, railhead for ammunition was Strazeele, fifteen miles southwest of Ypres. For supplies, railhead was at Vlamertinghe; the refilling point was near Brielen, where the Ordnance Depot was established.

A number of reliefs and some minor changes in dispositions took place during the first few days; the 8th Battalion, which had been temporarily holding a part of the line on the front of the 85th Brigade at Berlin Wood, was relieved on
the 16th by the 2/E. Kent; on the 19th there was an inter-battalion relief on the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade front which placed the 5th and 8th in line, the 7th in support and the 10th in reserve; in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade the 15th relieved the 16th in the trenches late on the 20th, and the 13th replaced the 14th at midnight, 21st/22nd, in the extreme left of the Canadian line.

HILL 60 OPERATIONS

Meanwhile the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 1st Brigade C.F.A. moved from Vlamertinghe and Proven to near Poperinghe. The former had been detailed to Second Army Reserve in case it might be needed by the adjoining II Corps for the operation at Hill 60. At the left of the 5th (British) Division front and near the inter-corps boundary, Hill 60 was originally formed from the spoil of the railway cutting through the Wytschaete-Passchendaele section of the ridge; it commanded a good view of the Salient and had fallen into German hands in December 1914. Since relieving the French there in February 1915, the II Corps had been carrying out mining operations with a view to raiding or capturing it, and the 13th Infantry Brigade was specially trained for the task. On the evening of the 17th April five tons of explosive were fired in as many mines under the hill, and the storming troops, covered by a heavy artillery bombardment, assaulted and occupied the craters. From Gravenstafel, five miles distant, a Canadian observer could see the flashing of mines, guns and shells and noted with some apprehension that the whole horizon, except an arc of 70 degrees over Ypres, was alight with German flares. Hill 60 was the scene of furious shelling and bombing for the next four days. Early on 21st April the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade was released from Army Reserve and placed at the disposal of the 5th (British) Division, II Corps, and ordered to be prepared to move at an hour’s notice; the 2nd and 4th Canadian Battalions were warned to support the 13th Brigade if called upon,
and in anticipation the two battalion commanders and a bri-
gade staff officer reconnoitred the routes forward to Hill 60
in the afternoon.

WARNINGS OF ATTACK WITH GAS

These activities distracted the attention of the higher
command from the Canadian front. To regimental officers in
the line the condition implied by the instructions to prepare
plans for offensive action,314 issued on the 13th to the Cana-
dian Infantry Brigades, Divisional Artillery and Divisional
Engineers, did not seem compatible with the impression
made by the words of the Army Commander (General Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien) to the troops when he inspected them
before going into line; he said that the Salient was the most
vulnerable part of the British front and that it must be held at
all costs.

There were, it can now be seen, many signs of impend-
ing attack on the north-eastern face. By night the troops
could hear the beat of drums and the rumbling of many
wheels behind the enemy’s lines, and gun flashes were ob-
served nearer than usual. By day German aeroplanes, unmo-
lested save by an occasional British scout, now that the
French anti-aircraft guns had moved out, flew low and
dropped bombs or signalled targets to their heavy artillery
far beyond British range; in one of these aeroplanes brought
down behind the French line, was found a map showing new
battery positions. Sentries of the 16th (Canadian Scottish)
noticed that pipes of some sort were being installed in the
enemy’s parapet, and an officer investigated and made re-
port.

One reason why these unusual phenomena were not bet-
ter interpreted is that the Canadians were new to the condi-
tions prevailing on this front, where all was in readiness on
the German side for an attack on the evening of the 15th
April; on that day V Corps issued to Divisions a “report re
statement of German prisoner re intended attack with as-
phyxiating gas”, which had been received through the 28th
(British) Division on the night 13th/14th. This prisoner, Au-
gust Jaeger, an automobile driver of the 51st Reserve Di-
vision, XXVI Reserve Corps, had given himself up on the 11th
(French) Division front near Langemarck, and interrogation
revealed that an attack was planned against that sector. Re-
serve machine gun units had been sent into the front line for
the purpose, three aeroplane squadrons—each of eight ma-
chines, one captive balloon and one anti-aircraft battery—
had lately arrived in the area. Besides heavy batteries re-
cently brought in, four special batteries per infantry com-
pany had been placed in position in the German first line
trenches. These special batteries each had twenty gas cylin-
ders buried deeply and fitted with rubber pipes running for-
ward; at a given signal, three red rockets fired by the artil-
lery, the gas would be allowed to escape on a favourable
wind towards the French trenches, asphyxiating the defend-
ers and allowing the Germans to occupy them without loss.
The attacking troops carried a packet of tow steeped in
chemical solution for their protection.320, 329

Contrary to the recollection of many participants, whose
memories are prone to lapse completely and unexpectedly,
there was no concealment of the danger from regimental of-
icers, for the essential part of the prisoner’s statement was
reproduced in the V Corps “Summary of Information”, No.
45 of a series of documents, regarded as confidential but not
secret, issued periodically to formations and units down to
battalions. This particular summary is dated 15th April 1915,
it was distributed that evening; thus while every C.O. in the
Canadian Division received a copy,322 and their adjutants
and many regimental officers must have seen it, they failed
to understand its purport or, in fear of causing panic by a
false alarm, forbad circulation of the news to the troops.
The V Corps Operation Order324 issued because of this
intelligence had an apprehensive ring: it directed the 27th
and 28th Divisions to select places of assembly in anticipa-
tion of the town of Ypres having to be evacuated. The Canadian Division was not yet responsible for any part of the line, for on the 15th the 2nd C.I.B. only was in the trenches and temporarily under orders of the 11th (French) Division, which carried on with the relief and communicated the warning that an attack with poison gas was to be expected. The relief had been completed by the 8th and 10th Battalions in the front line by 12.50 a.m. on the 15th. That whole day was taken up by the men in the trenches trying to keep out of sight of the enemy, and not to step, sit or lie down in filth, and in becoming accustomed to the odour of foul ground and rotting corpses. At night there was work to be done: the wire in front was useless, very little of any kind and most of that little was smooth tripwire so meagre that a Canadian carrying sandbags down the Gravenstafel road walked through it and was challenged by a German sentry. The 5th Battalion stood to arms in their reserve billets at Fortuin from 6 p.m. until midnight when the men were allowed to sleep with boots and puttees on, and rifles to hand. Instructions were also sent to the 3rd C.I.B., which had arrived at Steenwoorde, to be ready to move at short notice on the 15th, for a reliable agent of the Détachement d’Armée de Belgique had independently reported that an attack round Ypres had been arranged for the night 15/16th April, and the British Liaison Officer with the French had so informed Second Army, which passed the information to British G.H.Q., and to V Corps, which passed it to the Canadian Division and made entry in the Corps G.S. War Diary.

Despatch received from II Army directing all precautions to be taken on account of an agent's report, confirmed from other sources, that enemy contemplated an attack on the Ypres salient on night 15th/16th April. Passages have been prepared across old trenches to facilitate bringing up of art. Germans intend making use of tubes with asphyxiating gas. They are placed in batteries of 20 tubes per 40 metres along front of XXIV Corps. A favourable wind necessary. Corps Commander interviewed Divl. Commanders. V Corps Operation Order No. 11 issued.
The Order called upon the two divisions in line, because of certain information which has been communicated to Divl. Commanders, to select places of assembly if Ypres should have to be evacuated: Twenty-seventh to assemble on Menin Road, Twenty-eighth south of Potijze. The only application to the Canadian Division was that the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade at Steenvoorde should be held in readiness to move at half an hour’s notice, as already mentioned.

Another deserter to the French 11th Division on the morning of the 15th, before the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade took over the left sector northeast of St. Julien, said that there were no gas cylinders on that frontage, the medicated cotton waste was for protection in case the Allies used asphyxiating gas. This information was also circulated to those concerned; coming from a former N.C.O., reduced for striking his superior officer and constantly living in the trenches himself, it branded the chauffeur’s evidence as garrulous romancing, and tended to confirm the French opinion that the threatened use of poison gas was a Teutonic myth. Such a conclusion was also supported by the fact that nothing had come of an alarming story told by prisoners taken by the Tenth French Army opposite the Vimy Ridge a fortnight before, how along the whole Zillebeke front there was stored in or near the trenches a large supply of heavy asphyxiating gas compressed in cylinders 1.4 metres long, which would be released on a favourable wind by pioneers wearing special respiratory apparatus, while all the storm troops were protected by an issue of cloth pads to cover the nostrils. But the contrary side was supported by independent information from an entirely different source which was also circulated: the placing in Ghent of a German rush order for 20,000 respirators, of cotton net with a wet pad to cover the mouth, had been reported to Belgian G.H.Q. by an agent, and was recorded in the Belgian Army news bulletin of 16th April under the caption: “Usage de Gaz Asphyxiants”. It was also
published in the intelligence summary of a higher French formation, the Détachement d’Armée de Belgique.

COUNTER INSTRUCTIONS

At a later date, when German methods of conducting war were better known, the French and British staffs would no doubt have paid more attention to these signs and portents and would have deduced and visualized the probable extent and objects of the attacks, but at this time most of those Allied officers who had full information were either incredulous or contemptuous. Contemporary documents seem to indicate that it was not expected that the German Higher Command would ever sanction a flagrant breach of the laws and usages of civilized warfare and that even if they did it was supposed that the amount of noxious gas dischargeable could only be effective over a small area for a short time and the usual counter-measures taken against the blowing of a mine would suffice—the delivery of an immediate counter-attack by local reserves, as prescribed, would drive out any of the enemy who might gain a temporary footing in the front line.325

It was also assumed, through faulty reading of the evidence, that the attack was only planned against the French trenches, whereas the first deserter truthfully said that cylinders were in place on the frontage of one battalion eastwards from the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, that is opposite the left Canadian battalion. Therefore the instructions under which the Canadian troops operated were tactical only and framed to meet the possibility of a break-through on a narrow front; at the same time they were calculated to avoid the spread of unrest or alarm among the troops, and the usually quick dissemination of such news was inadvertently lessened by the publication, earlier on the 15th, of two instructional memoranda issued by Second Army, the first “impressing upon staff and regimental officers the necessity of reticence in dealing with subjects the orders re which are marked ‘se-
cret,’” and the second “forbidding the discussion of confidential matters in the presence of other than those it is essential to consult.” Officers of the Canadian artillery and medical service who knew that poison gas might be used said little and, the Division not being in the line, did nothing about it; the reaction of the only Canadian formation in the line is concisely covered by a junior staff officer of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, who wrote casually on the 16th to a friend at the base: “Last night we got ready to receive a German attack. Divisional Headquarters notified us that the Germans intended to attack with tubes of poisonous gas, but it didn’t materialize.”

On the evening of the 16th, the 3rd C.I.B. had relieved in the left frontage as planned; their headquarters were in Château du Nord a name later changed to “Shell Trap Farm,” which was so fitting that it was soon changed again by Corps order to “Mouse Trap.” They received no special instructions about gas, and if at 11th French Divisional Headquarters there were still any apprehensions of an attack, none were impressed upon the staff officers of the Canadian Division on liaison duty there throughout the reliefs.

After the war was over General Ferry, who commanded the 11th French Division from September, 1914, to April, 1916, stated that he himself, considering the intelligence of the highest importance, interviewed the interpreter who had examined August Jaeger on the 14th and took special and immediate measures to meet a gas discharge; he issued orders that the number of men in the front trenches should be temporarily reduced, that the artillery should try to discover and destroy gas cylinders by fire, and he sent a staff officer to warn the neighbouring 28th (British) Division and the relieving 2nd C.I.B. that they should use the greatest vigilance and improvise means to prevent the inhalation of the gas. General Ferry has also stated that he informed the XX French Corps and the French Grand Quartier Général of the matter and the precautions taken; he adds that as a result he
was told by G.Q.G. that “all this gas business need not be
taken seriously,” that a divisional commander might com-
municate with Allied troops only through his corps com-
mander, and that the density of troops in the front line was
fixed ne varietur by G.Q.G. These statements were pub-
lished in 1930 and reached Germany; investigation followed,
and on 17th December, 1932, August Jaeger, before the
Reich Supreme Court, was sentenced to ten years in the
penitentiary and loss of civil rights for this desertion and be-
trayal.

A later warning of a probable attack, communicated to
Canadian commanders officially on the 18th, in a memoran-
dum from V Corps on German offensive action, makes no
direct mention of the prescribed weapon and suggests either
that those who believed its use possible thought that the op-
eration would be localized and on the French front, or at Hill
60, or that the warnings of gas had been forgotten.

It must be expected that during the next few days the
Germans will endeavour to take some kind of offensive ac-
tion against some part of the line as a reprisal for the suc-
cessful action in the 5th Division area yesterday (i.e. 17th
April).

Such action will probably include a heavy artillery
bombardment and possibly a mine explosion followed by an
attempt to rush one or more of our trenches.

G.O.C. Divisions know the point or points within their
new areas where any such attempt is likely, and should be
prepared accordingly.

This in no way affects the general policy laid down of
making every preparation for local offensive action on our
new front.

Next day the German artillery fire, which had been
steadily increasing, developed into a heavy bombardment of
Ypres; it was connected in the mind of the V Corps staff
with the relief of the French and with the enterprise at Hill
60. To avoid casualties the headquarters of the 28th (British)
Division moved back three miles from Ypres to near
Vlamertinghe, and the eight British battalions which had
been sheltered in the town were brought closer to the line.

That German offensive action was expected on the southern front is shown by the placing, at 5.45 a.m. on the 21st, of the 1st C.I.B. under orders of 5th (British) Division and to be at one hour’s notice to move to Hill 60 if ordered. The attitude of mind of the British command is further disclosed by memoranda of V Corps: one issued on the 20th allotted responsibility to divisions for bridges over the Yser Canal, not only for ordinary maintenance and prompt repair by parties permanently told off for the purpose, but for their demolition “in the unlikely event of their destruction being required”; another was issued respecting artillery action to distract the enemy’s attention from Hill 60 and from the preparations then being made for an attack on the Aubers Ridge by General Haig’s First Army which, in conjunction with the great French offensive being organized on the Arras-Vimy front to draw German forces away from Russia, was to take place at the end of April or early in May.

The memorandum on offensive artillery action which was passed by the Division to the Divisional Artillery was as follows:–

In accordance with instructions from Second Army the Corps Commander wishes each of 28th and Canadian Division to select some part of their front at which they can do most damage to the enemy and distract his attention from the south and concentrate artillery on it with a view to cutting wire, knocking down parapets or other offensive action. But all guns that can bear on useful targets in or near the enemy’s position opposite the 5th Div. line or gun targets in rear of it are to do so. It is understood that 28th Division is already doing this. 4.7 ammunition including lyddite may be used as required within reasonable limits for this purpose.

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION AND RELIEFS

The existing ammunition allotment of three rounds per 18-pdr. and three rounds per 4.5-inch howr. per day permitted but feeble action either against German guns or trenches; the whole weight of projectiles dischargeable by the Cana-
dian Division, thus limited except in emergency to less than half a ton per day, could all be fired within one minute. Such restriction was imposed because British deliveries of ammunition had fallen incredibly far behind contract requirements; by May, 1915, of the 481,000 rounds 18-pdr. H.E. ordered only 52,000 had been received, and daily receipts in France for April of shrapnel and H.E. combined were only 106 rounds per 18-pdr. and 82 rounds per 4.5-inch howitzer. Although in January, 1915, Canada supplied 30,000 unloaded rounds of 18-pdr. shrapnel, the British production for that month was only 93,000 complete rounds. Not until Lord Kitchener in April, 1915, entrusted Colonel Sir Percy Girouard, a Canadian serving in the Royal Engineers, with the immense task of formulating a plan to increase and control the output of British munitions, did the potential productive energy begin to be coherently developed; Mr. Lloyd George approved and made the scheme effective. In the previous three months there had been 131 labour disputes in British munition factories, with a consequent serious reduction in output; the battle of Neuve Chapelle had used up the available surplus of all calibres, and provision must be made to meet large expenditures in the coming operations against the Aubers Ridge and at the Dardanelles.

In accordance with the memorandum quoted above, the field batteries covering the Canadian front fired a special allotment of 528 rounds on the German wire and 1st and 2nd line trenches in the early afternoon of the 21st; they had been warned to look out particularly for resultant explosions, but none were observed. The German retaliatory fire was heavy and searching, it cut telephone lines and set alight the thatch of several farms which blazed high in the brisk breeze. By nightfall five of the eight Canadian 18-pdr. batteries now in action were again in the throes of relief for, with a view to training and resting detachments while retaining a mobile reserve, it had been decided to withdraw the 5th and 11th Batteries and to bring into action the 2nd and 3rd. A direct
relief of the 5th by the 2nd was ordered by sections on the nights 21st/22nd and 22nd/23rd; to improve dispositions the 8th Battery would be relieved by the 3rd and would take over from the 11th, also by sections on the same nights. Thus on the 22nd, the Canadian front was covered by thirty-two 18-pdrs., twenty of them in sections, and eight 4.5-inch howitzers. There were no heavier guns, for the 1st Canadian Heavy Battery had been detached and was in action twenty miles away at La Couture under the Indian Corps, and the 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had replaced it in the V Corps, although in action in Kitchener’s Wood, had been brigaded with the North Midland Heavy Battery—also in action in the Canadian area—and placed under orders of the 28th Divisional Artillery.

GERMAN DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS

The German line about the Ypres Salient was held by four Army Corps. From the Ypres-Comines Canal to Gheuvelt inclusive and facing the 5th and 27th (British) Divisions, was the XV Corps with the 30th and 39th Divisions in line. Northwards opposite Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke, where the 28th (British) Division held the eastern face of 6,000 yards, was the XXVII Reserve Corps with the 54th and 53rd Reserve Divisions, and opposite Gravenstafel the 38th Landwehr Brigade exactly east of the 2nd C.I.B. Opposite the 3rd C.I.B. and westwards was the XXVI Reserve Corps of which the attached 2nd Reserve Ersatz Brigade and a battalion of the 51st Reserve Division lay southeast of the St. Julien-Poelcappelle road; west of that road and opposite the 45th (Algerian) Division (General Quiquandon) was also the 51st Reserve Division to the Ypres-Roulers Railway, and adjoining it the 52nd Reserve opposite the right of the 87th (French) Territorial Division as far as the Steenbeek. At the shoulder of the Salient, opposite the junction of the Belgian 6th Division on the west bank of the Canal above Steenstraat, and the French 87th Territorial Division on the east
bank, was the XXIII Reserve Corps with the 46th and 45th Reserve Divisions in line. These four corps, with the XXII Reserve Corps (less 43rd Reserve Division) along the Yser and the Marine Division guarding the coast, together with the Guard Cavalry Division, the 43rd Reserve Division, the 4th Ersatz Division and the 37th Landwehr Brigade in reserve, comprised the German Fourth Army commanded by General-Colonel Duke Albrecht of Württemberg.

Ever since the close of the First Battle of Ypres, 1914, when its losses were made good, the German Fourth Army had been occupied with plans for the reduction of the Salient; it had been intended that the adjacent German Sixth Army should co-operate on the left by capturing Mont Kemmel and that a combined drive for Calais would follow, but in the event the conduct of the operation was confined to the four left Corps of the Fourth, and the object of it, according to General Falkenhayn, then responsible for the direction and disposal of the German forces, was to cloak the transfer of troops to Galicia. All of the divisions and brigades named were tried troops who knew the ground; they had experienced the fighting here in 1914, their infantry companies were from 180 to 250 strong and for four months, well seasoned, well housed, and well fed, they had been drilling and training for battle. Extensive material preparations were also made, unknown to the Allies, in anticipation of an offensive in the spring; rail and road communications were extended and improved and hutments built to give more accommodation in the forward area.

Also unknown to the Allies, or unheeded by them, German plans laid in October, 1914, for the use of poison gas had matured, and the sector of the XV Corps, between the Ypres-Comines Canal and the Menin Road was chosen for the field trial. Cylinders were dug in and preparations completed by mid-February, then the width of the front was extended and the whole XV Corps sector of 6,000 yards opposite Zillebeke was prepared for a gas attack by the 10th
March. Postponements of the release because the wind did
not blow from the east or southeast caused delay and on the
25th of March Duke Albrecht ordered that cylinders be in-
stalled on the front of the XXVI Reserve Corps and of the
46th Reserve Division (XXIII Reserve Corps) between Poel-
cappelle and Steenstraat; the digging in was completed on
this new frontage by 11th April and a favourable north or
northeast wind was awaited. It is now abundantly clear that
all the informers spoke the truth as they knew it, although at
the time the Allies did not recognize their evidence as au-
thentic.

The general plan of the German Fourth Army was to use
the gas to break in the north-eastern shoulder of the Salient,
then to break through southwards along the east bank of the
Yser Canal and capture Ypres; simultaneously, if the gas
proved effective, the front of attack would be extended east-
wards to roll up the Ypres Salient. For this Duke Albrecht
asked General von Falkenhayn, who, after the Marne, had
succeeded von Moltke as Chief of the General Staff of the
German Forces in the Field, for one extra division; it was not
provided because lack of a favourable wind might detain the
division for weeks and because the success of the gas was in
doubt. The plan of attack as ordered on 8th April had as its
objective the Pilckem Ridge and the ground adjoining it to
the east; on 14th April the objectives were further defined,
the 45th Reserve Division would capture Steenstraat, the
46th Reserve Division would secure the line of the Yser Ca-
nal with bridgeheads at Het Sas and Boesinghe, and both
divisions would co-operate in the capture of Lizerne. The
first objective of the XXVI Reserve Corps would be the ridge
marked by the road Boesinghe, Pilckem, Langemarck, Poel-
cappelle, and the front of attack was divided between the
52nd Reserve Division which would take Pilckem, and the
51st Reserve Division which would be responsible for Langemarck.

There were 180,000 kilograms of chlorine in the cylin-
ders dug in on this front of attack, and orders were issued at midnight of the 21st/22nd for release early on the morning of the 22nd. The discharge would last for five minutes, the infantry would follow ten minutes behind the cloud with bayonets fixed but rifles unloaded, and it was expected that the effect of the gas would be such as to ensure the capture of all objectives and the abandonment of the Ypres Salient.
CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST GAS ATTACK 22ND APRIL, 1915

Map 1: Ypres 1915. Dispositions and Moves, 5 p.m.-7 p.m., 22nd April
Sketch 1: Ypres 1915. Line at Midnight, 22nd/23rd April (facing p. 262)

THE GAS RELEASE ORDERED AND POSTPONED–CONDITIONS ON 22ND PRECEDING
ATTACK–THE GAS CLOUD–IMMEDIATE MOVES IN THE CANADIAN AREA–
SUPPORTS AND RESERVES TO BATTLE POSITIONS–CANAL BRIDGES
PREPARED FOR DEMOLITION–ACTION OF C.F.A.–THE CANADIAN
FLANK EXPOSED–THE SALIENT IN JEOPARDY–ORDERS FOR
MAINTAINING THE POSITION–CONFUSING REPORTS AND
MESSAGES–IMPORTANCE OF LOCALITY C–
WITHDRAWAL OF FIELD BATTERIES

THE GAS RELEASE ORDERED AND POSTPONED

The morning of Thursday the 22nd April, 1915, dawned
fine and fresh in Flanders; the light ground-mist in the
Stroombeek Valley melted away as the sun rose on the op-
posing trenches. The Canadians, after a hard night of labour
on wire and sandbag defences, had been standing to arms
since half past three and were ready for sleep; the Germans,
crowded together and lying low, awaited the order to attack
which was given at 5.20 a.m. Their hour of assault was set
for 5.45 a.m.; fifteen minutes before that time, as there was
no wind, the attack was postponed.

CONDITIONS ON 22ND PRECEDING ATTACK

Both the Canadian infantry brigades in the line re-
reported that the night had passed quietly. At daybreak
the German artillery resumed the preparatory bombardment
begun on the 19th and in expectation of a favourable wind
continued throughout the day to fire a programme which in-
dicated no lack of ammunition. The guns of the four corps
encircling the Salient numbered one hundred and eighty-three, a single salvo from them weighed eight tons; besides one 42 cm. (16.54 inch) mortar, there were twenty-four eight-inch and eighty-four 5.9-inch howitzers, most of them firing on roads and bridges and buildings and battery positions north and east of Ypres. A few concentrations were placed at intervals on the villages in the Canadian area; the lighter guns dropped salvoes of gas shells on the trenches and the fumes were so strong that the men of the 15th Battalion found the effect on eyes and throat almost unbearable and many were violently ill. All day German aeroplanes soared unmolested indicating targets and giving direction. At intervals a 42 cm. shell, five feet long and a ton in weight, went roaring into Ypres to burst and hurl in air beams and tiles and rafters; the first of them had landed in the Grand Place on the afternoon of the 20th and killed a captain and about forty soldiers and civilians; the base blew back more than a mile and buried itself eight feet in the earth. A dark red pall of dust and smoke lay heavy on the town.

Meanwhile behind the Canadian line those who might took advantage of whatever cover they could, and routine continued uninterrupted. Shortly after noon the adjutant of one of the reserve battalions asked Brigade whether the C.O. might give leave to officers to go to Ypres to purchase stores; the answer, not sent until 10.10 p.m., owing to unforeseen interruptions, was “Yes, but in very limited numbers.” Between 2 and 3 p.m., the staff captain of the 3rd C.I.B. inquired of Division Q “Could you supply me with some playing cards and mouth organs for our men in the trenches” and received reply within an hour “There are one hundred mouth organs for you. Please call for them. No cards available just now but will send you some out of next consignment.” The 1st C.I.B. at Vlamertinghe carried on with training. Divisional Headquarters was informed that an air reconnaissance at six in the morning disclosed some activity behind the German lines. This, being nothing un-
usual, was not sufficient to cause apprehension at Corps or Divisional Headquarters, but it disquieted the mind of Br.-General Turner. In the afternoon a brigade staff captain called at Château des Trois Tours to make arrangements with one of the A.D.C’s to conduct a cock-fight, a popular local diversion novel to most Canadians.

As on the two preceding days, a motley crowd of refugees was shuffling along the road from Ypres to Poperinghe. In scattered groups they went, in Sunday black or rags; old men sweating between the shafts of handcarts piled high with household treasures; deep-chested dogs harnessed underneath and straining at the axle with lolling tongue; aged women on wagons stacked with bedding or in wheelbarrows trundled by the family in turn; bewildered children and anxious mothers, all hastening in stricken flight before the breaking storm. The warm spring day passed in this manner; the evening brought the new weapon of attack.

THE GAS CLOUD

Soon after four o’clock in the afternoon the German guns shortened their range to begin a violent bombardment of the French front line, then gradually switched to the Canadian trenches and lengthened to bring intense fire on roads and villages, and Ypres. At five o’clock a rattle of musketry was heard from Langemarck and the 75s opened at a rapid rate; word was passed along from the left company in the Canadian line that the Germans were attacking the French, and the company commander, Major D. R. McCuaig, as he went to investigate, noticed that the sun had a peculiar greenish appearance. This was the first poison gas ever discharged in civilized warfare. General Alderson, who with Br.-General Burstall was visiting the 12th Battery, C.F.A. behind the Gravenstafel ridge 1,000 yards north-east of St. Julien, could see two clouds of yellowish green one on either side of Langemarck; these drifted slowly southwards, close to the ground, and spread laterally until they united into one
long low rolling bank of choking horrible fog. Stumbling and gasping in an agony of terror-stricken flight before it, scattered groups of French African infantrymen with reeking, yellowed clothing and ashen purple faces, staggered across the fields, through hedges, over ditches and down the roads, regardless of everything but this unknown devil which had them by the throat. But some remained to fight it out, for there was a spasmodic firing of rifles and machine guns somewhere behind that impenetrable veil of mist.

The valves of the gas cylinders were opened for five minutes at five o’clock, the cloud moved before the gentle breeze at a rate of five or six miles an hour, so that the zone of concentration at first was half a mile in depth. Pockets remained in low or sheltered places after it had passed, and as it rolled it rose a little and spread, yet at three miles from the cylinders the density was still great enough to induce conjunctivitis, coryza and tachycardia, to hurt the eyes, make noses run and to make men vomit violently. The characteristic pungent odour of chlorine, so unmistakable to anyone who has ever smelled it—and not unknown to the troops because their compulsorily chlorinated drinking water reeked of it and spoiled the taste of their tea—was noticed even at Vlamertinghe, five miles behind the line. There, almost simultaneously, came the stragglers from the 87th French Territorial Division struggling for breath with sobs of “Pauvre France! Pauvre Paris!”

IMMEDIATE MOVES

Thus the rifle fire, the gun fire and the gas itself effectively spread the alarm throughout the Canadian area, and each commander gave appropriate orders to meet this strange menace on the left. The left company commander of the 13th Battalion led one of his platoons across the Poelcappelle road into the contiguous trench of the 1st Tirailleurs, he found them holding a breastwork 100 yards from the road and exchanging brisk fire at 150 yards with Ger-
mans who occupied a hedge. Lack of cover prevented any extension of the French line further to the rear, so half of this platoon took up a position in echelon and along the ditch of the Poelcappelle road where it was soon joined by another platoon and a Colt machine gun of the 13th. There were now mounted in the front line of that battalion seven machine guns, one of them with the supporting platoons and two in each company frontage in sandbagged emplacements; the pair on the right belonged to and were manned from the neighbouring 15th Battalion; one was with the St. Julien Garrison. Seven hundred yards behind the left of the battalion lay the two supporting platoons, they also lined the ditch of the road and swelled their numbers by collecting Algerian riflemen driven out by the gas. For 2,000 yards on their left was a gap, and in it behind the hamlet of Keerselaere was the 10th Battery, C.F.A., in an orchard five hundred yards above St. Julien.

Lt.-Colonel Loomis (O.C. 13th Bn.), as Commandant, St. Julien, at five o’clock ordered his garrison to stand to arms and occupy their battle positions in the trenches under construction north of the village: No. 2 Co. of the 14th and No. 2 Co. of the 15th Battalion manned these defences on the left and right of the Poelcappelle road where they were joined for a time by about 200 Algerian riflemen; the remainder of the garrison, two platoons of No. 3 Co. of the 13th Battalion, were held in reserve in the village, where two Colt machine guns of the 14th were mounted in the ruins.

SUPPORTS AND RESERVES TO BATTLE POSITIONS

The 14th Battalion (less No. 2 Co.) was in 3rd C.I.B. support at St. Jean. It had been ordered to stand to arms when the bombardment became intense and the companies stood waiting by the roadside for a time watching a most alarming spectacle; the terrified villagers mingling with the passing stream of wounded and gassed and panic-stricken Africans, and the ammunition column of the 2nd Brigade,
C.F.A., rattling down the pavé from its billets at Canadian Farm to avoid the rain of shells; a lad of sixteen, a lead driver in this unit, brought his six-horsed wagon safely through four miles of traffic and turmoil after his comrades in centre and wheel had been hit. At six o’clock the battalion was ordered by 3rd C.I.B. to move towards St. Julien; arrived at G.H.Q. line the three companies took up position in it above the Wientje-St. Julien road and northwards past the Brigade Headquarters at Mouse Trap Farm. Into these trenches also came about 500 Zouaves, who extended to the left by Hampshire Farm. North of this farm a patrol of No. 1 Co. of the 14th under C.S.M. Price had a brush with a German patrol and both suffered casualties; these Germans were nearly three miles behind the French line and almost due west of 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters in Mouse Trap Farm. Entrenching along a hedge running eastwards from Mouse Trap Farm was the dismounted portion of the 3rd Field Company, C.E., which had been billeted in Canadian Farm; about 5.30, after the gas which the officers recognized as chlorine reached the farm, the French troops passing to the rear had been mistaken for the supports assembling; by 6 p.m. rifle fire was quite heavy round the billets from Germans to the northwest on Mauser Ridge. The horses were harnessed up and hooked in, the dismounted men moved off under orders of 3rd C.I.B. to man the G.H.Q. line and the transport moved back across the canal to Vlamertinghe. The 16th Canadian Scottish, in divisional reserve on the Yser Canal from Ypres northwards, lined the west side and there dug in along the spoil bank.

The shelling was not confined to the area over which the gas had passed nor to the adjoining area of the 3rd C.I.B. When the German guns switched from the French to the Canadian line the 8th Battalion suffered over forty casualties in a short time; the 5th was more fortunate because the German gunners, evidently thinking that the vacant reserve trenches on the ridge south of Gravenstafel village were occupied,
paid more attention to that area. At half past five when the bombardment was still at its height and the first Algerians began to drift through Wielte, Captain J. W. Warden, who commanded the rearward (No. 1) company of the 7th Battalion billeted there in brigade support, ordered his command to fall in and marched to battalion headquarters 1,200 yards south of St. Julien; there he was ordered by his C.O. to go to the support of the French troops who were falling back. Moving north-westwards in extended order about fifty Turcos were collected, and the line advanced north of Vanheule Farm to about 100 yards across the Wielte-St. Julien road. There the men lay down while the company commander went forward to reconnoitre; meanwhile the remainder of the 7th Battalion was concentrated, two companies at the Bombarded Cross Roads between Fortuin and Gravenstafel and the other at Fortuin.

The ominously heavy bombardment on the left had prompted the O.C. of the 10th Battalion to call a meeting of his officers at battalion headquarters, a house near the canal-basin north of Ypres; two of them had just been riding near Brielen and had seen rising over the French trenches a cloud of peculiar colour (greyish, yellowish, greenish), darker near the ground; as they spoke the windows of the room were shattered by concussion, and at that minute, 5.45 p.m., an orderly delivered a message from 2nd C.I.B.: the battalion would parade at 6.50 p.m., report at Wielte at 7.30 p.m., and at Bombarded Cross Roads at 8 p.m. for work on the trenches.—This order had been written at Fortuin, at 5.15 p.m., but on account of the heavy firing heard towards Langemarck was intercepted at Wielte and the times changed by the Staff Captain to read one hour earlier, by telephoned instructions of the Brigade Major.—The shelling was so heavy along the main road that the men were directed to another parade ground in a field to the north, thence in light marching order they took the road through St. Jean towards Wielte; at first the gas was bad and all the way pro-
gess was delayed by the crowds of French troops and refugees proceeding towards Ypres, not until 7.45 p.m. was the 10th disposed along 400 yards of the G.H.Q. line south of the Wietje-Fortuin road under the Second in Command, for the C.O. had gone forward to Brigade Headquarters at Pond Farm, Fortuin, to report.

CANAL BRIDGES PREPARED FOR DEMOLITION

The 2nd and 3rd Field Companies of the Divisional Engineers were east of the canal, their special task was the construction of a support line across the Canadian front. The 2nd Field Company, C.E. was billeted in Burnt Farm above the Franco-Canadian boundary and near the Ypres-Pilckem road. About 5.30 p.m. while the men were having their evening meal preparatory to continuing the night work on the trenches of the 2nd C.I.B., large numbers of French troops, some wounded and all with red bleary eyes and running noses, came straggling down the road in great disorder, artillerymen galloping on unhooked horses shouting as they clattered past that the Germans were only a short distance behind, and soon the atmosphere was thick with “sulphurous fumes” from the north and bursting shells and chlorine gas. At six o’clock the transport was sent back across the canal and, as directed by the C.R.E., the company commander gave orders to prepare all the bridges for demolition: one party went northwards to the barrel bridge, No. 5, in the French area 400 yards across the inter-Allied boundary, cut it and rigged wire guys so that it could be swung to the west bank on the approach of the enemy; a second party put in three fougasses on the roadside at Bridge No. 4, commonly known as Brielen Bridge, which was at the boundary and supported by a barge. Canadian responsibility did not properly extend to these two bridges, but the French officer in charge reported that he could not look after them. The footbridges Nos. 3 and 3A, half a mile nearer to Ypres, and the horse traffic bridge No. 2 were also charged and manned,
and the remainder of the company entrenched at Brielen Bridge, thereby extending the left of the 16th Battalion along the canal. The remaining foot bridges known as A. and No. 1 were prepared for demolition at about 10.30 p.m. by a party of The 1st Field Company under R.S.M. Ridgewell which was billeted west of the canal and had been building splinter-proof head-cover at Château des Trois Tours.379

ACTION OF C.F.A.

News of the “cloud of green vapour several hundred yards in length between the French trenches to our left and these of the enemy” had reached Canadian Divisional Headquarters at that Château at 5.30 p.m.;342 the situation report rendered to V Corps twenty minutes later343 contains no mention of this ominous cloud, but before six o’clock gassed French troops passing through the grounds gave ample confirmation of the disaster to their line; at 5.55 p.m. a wire was sent to 3rd C.I.B.:—

French 45th Division being heavily attacked. Order your reserve battalion to stand by. Render any help possible by rifle fire on your part. Our artillery has been directed to support the French.

The first part of this order had been carried out before the message was sent; twenty minutes later the Forward Observing Officers of the 5th and 6th Batteries were withdrawn from their Observation Posts on the Gravenstafel Ridge preparatory to switching to cover the left flank of the 3rd C.I.B.;345 they could not cover the trenches of that brigade because the guns could not clear the crest of the Zonnebeke Ridge; the lines of the 7th and 8th Batteries were relaid across the whole of the frontage of the 2nd C.I.B.; all four batteries fired in response to a S.O.S. call at six o’clock and ceased after two hours when the front was reported quiet. In so far as the order applied to the batteries of the 3rd Brigade, C.F.A., the 9th, 11th and 12th maintained a continuous fire from 5 to 8 p.m. on the German trenches in their original zone; they could see no targets on the left and could find out
nothing definite about the situation there; they hesitated to fire blind from the map and took the only action possible. The 10th also, after watching the Turcos and Zouaves stream through the battery and after enduring the gas cloud—the cylinders were but a mile and a half distant—opened fire at 5.45 p.m. on the enemy first line trenches; at 7 p.m. a French sergeant pointed over a hedge on the west side of the road and said “Allemand,” Major W. B. King could see over the hedge the helmets of a large body of Germans marching south at 200 or 300 yards, he reversed one section, and opened gun fire. A shower of leaves cut from the willow trees by the enemy’s bullets fell about the guns; on the higher ground, 700 yards to the east, the 12th Battery also saw the amazing new target but did not engage it, for the 10th was directly in line and making excellent practice. The Germans stopped, lay down, withdrew a little, and dug in. A request to the infantry for a covering party brought 60 men of the 14th and 15th Battalions from the St. Julien garrison under Lieut. G. W. Stairs and a Colt gun from the 13th Battalion in St. Julien; this party entrenched near the battery. The Colt gun was handled with the greatest skill and daring by Corporal F. Fisher, who worked his way forward and brought it into action in an isolated building which commanded the ground to north and west where the Germans were now entrenching; for this he was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was killed next day. As two of the 10th Battery ammunition wagons, their teams killed, were ditched at St. Julien, the N.C.O. in charge sought help from the infantry; two parties responded, Captain S. D. Gardner and thirty men of the 7th Battalion and Captain R. Y. Cory and twenty-five men of No. 2 Company, 15th Battalion; they carried the rounds by hand up the 600 yards to the guns.

THE CANADIAN FLANK EXPOSED

Information as to the extent of the enemy’s penetration filtered back slowly to brigade and divisional headquar-
ters: a message that the left of the 13th had withdrawn—which meant that the platoons in the Algerian trenches had come back to the Poelcappelle road—was misinterpreted and the 3rd C.I.B. sent in a series of reports which, until mended wires made telephone conversations possible, conveyed an entirely wrong impression of the position on the Canadian left.

6.25 p.m. “Left of our left subsection is retiring.”

6.45 p.m. “Your wire to us is down. Our left driven back and apparently whole line forced back towards St. Julien.”

7.10 p.m. “We are forced back on G.H.Q. line. Attack coming from west. No troops left. Need ammunition badly. Have asked 2nd Bde. to support.

The actual position at 7.10 p.m. was that the Canadian front line was intact, with two platoons lining the ditch of the Poelcappelle road and supporting in echelon some of the 1/Tirailleurs who still hung on to about 100 yards of their original line with the enemy 150 yards away; six hundred yards in rear and now also deployed along the ditch were the two supporting platoons of the 13th and a few Algerians who had rallied there; then there was a gap of 1,700 yards to the orchard where the 10th Field Battery was in action covered by part of the St. Julien garrison which continued across the road north of the village to the Haanebeek. Southwest of St. Julien and above the Wielte road, unknown to 3rd C.I.B. and not in touch on either flank, was No. 1 Co., 7th Battalion; then there was another gap of 1,000 yards to the G.H.Q. line where were the 3rd Field Co., C.E., and three companies of the 14th Battalion interspersed with Zouaves and extending northwest of Mouse Trap Farm to Hampshire Farm where they were in touch with the enemy 400 yards to the north. Westwards to the canal, three thousand yards, was a gap unoccupied save for one French machine gun post discovered at 9.30 p.m., to be in distant contact with the German firing line on Mauser Ridge.
THE SALIENT IN JEOPARDY

The Germans on Mauser Ridge were now little more than four miles from the British front line at Hill 60, on the other side of the Salient and directly in rear. Had they followed up their initial success they might well have cut off the whole salient and the three divisions in it with all their guns. But even if the enemy had decided to push on southwards through this gap during the night they would not have found a clear road into Ypres, nor an undisputed passage across the canal above the town. Three reserve battalions of the 28th Division, the 5/King’s Own, the 2/E. Kent and the 3/Middlesex were billeted in St. Jean before the battle began; when Lieut.-Colonel E. W. R. Stephenson of the Middlesex saw the Algerians streaming southwards he took command and deployed the 2/E. Kent and his own battalion on a frontage of 2,000 yards along the St. Jean Ridge covering that village and La Brique, and extending to the canal at No. 2 Bridge 1,000 yards north of Ypres. The 5/King’s Own remained in reserve to this line, which extended at right angles to the 16th Canadian Battalion entrenching on the west bank with the 2nd Field Co., Canadian Engineers, in position on the inter-Allied boundary at Brielen Bridge. In front the French guns were now silent; fifty-seven of them were captured. There was little rifle fire in the centre where the attacking German line, thinned by the widening frontage, had stopped on Mauser Ridge and at Morteldge Farm. Northwards along the canal the situation was obscure; it was later found that a few Zouaves were still on the east bank of the canal above North Zwaanhof Farm, and that the firing heard further to the north for another hour or more was the unsuccessful attempt made by the 52nd and 46th Reserve Divisions to cross the bridges at Boesinghe, and the seizure by the 46th and 45th Reserve Divisions, of the locks and buildings of Het Sas and Steenstraat on the western bank, the latter just below the Franco-Belgian boundary.

All the British troops in the Ypres Salient, numbering
upwards of 50,000 with 150 guns, were in the most imminent danger of being cut off; from the map it looked as if nothing could save them. At 9 o’clock V Corps had a report from 5th Division that the Germans were through St. Julien and that Mouse Trap Farm, the headquarters of the 3rd C.I.B., was in enemy hands. Before 10 o’clock another rumour, equally credible yet equally groundless, said that the Germans were in Wientje. It was not until after this that the Divisional H.Q. received definite information that the 3rd C.I.B. was still holding on to its original trenches and as late as noon next day surprise is indicated in the V Corps War Diary entry: “It appears that the Canadian Div. are still in all their fire trenches.”

Although as we have seen the Germans were four and not three miles from Hill 60 as these erroneous reports indicated, the Canadian Division was in the most critical position and becoming aware of it. The original front of 4,000 yards was intact,\textsuperscript{373, 376, 378} it was held by eleven companies with as many platoons in close support and four companies in reserve; the equivalent of four and a half battalions, and faced by two German brigades. The old left flank, the Franco-British boundary, suddenly transformed into a new front line 8,000 yards long, had in it two platoons north of Keerselaere, three and a half companies at St. Julien, one company near Vanheule Farm, and one Canadian and four Zouave companies at Hampshire Farm; supporting this line, but disposed in the G.H.Q. line at right angles to it, were six companies. Pressing on this new frontage were the 51st and part of the 52nd Reserve Division. The artillery available to cover the whole 12,000 yards from Gravenstafel to the canal was thirty-two 18-pounders and eight 4.5-inch howitzers, at 300 yards per gun, and the enemy’s dispositions unknown. One of the divisional reserve battalions, the 10th, was in the G.H.Q. line,\textsuperscript{367} the other, the 16th, was extended along the canal north of Ypres. It was imperative that every inch of ground should be contested and that the line should be con-
nected up; it was supposed that the French would counterattack immediately to regain their lost line, and it was evident that a simultaneous Canadian attack would help materially in the attainment of that object.

ORDERS FOR MAINTAINING THE POSITION

The messages sent by the Canadian Division were therefore directed at first to maintaining the line until the reserves could be replaced by fresh troops released from Corps or Army control. At 6.30 p.m. an order was sent to the 3rd C.I.B. and Divisional Artillery.

The French are being attacked between Langemarck and Poelcappelle. Bring fire to bear on German trenches opposite this sector and be ready to counter attack if ordered.

Twenty minutes later, but not received until 8 p.m. there followed to 3rd C.I.B.

The Divl. Res. Bn. (i.e. 16th) is placed at your disposal. To be prepared to move at a moment’s notice.

At the same time, 6.55 p.m., the 10th Bn. was sent a similar order; five minutes later the 3rd C.I.B. was told—

You must guard your left, and bring up your bde. reserve bn. so as to prevent being turned. The Divl. Reserve Bn. can take the place of Bde. Reserve. Important to keep high ground near subsidiary line.

CONFUSING REPORTS AND MESSAGES

As already narrated the 3rd Brigade reserve battalion (the 14th less No. 2 Co.) had moved up at 6 p.m., towards Mouse Trap Farm; but the “high ground near subsidiary line”, a general term which no doubt meant the western end of the Gravenstafel Ridge at Keerselaere, was quite unoccupied as yet, for when at 6.08 p.m. the 3rd C.I.B. ordered the Commandant, St. Julien, to send his garrison company of the 14th “towards Keerselaere in support of French” he had already fulfilled the order as far as he considered practicable by extending the company on the outskirts of St. Julien in the trenches covering that village after its unsuccessful at-
tempt to occupy Keerselaere. He informed 3rd C.I.B. at 6.30 p.m.–

No doubt heavy retirement going on on our left. Last report from our firing line by runner they were holding the line. St. Julien Command in position. Left must be supported quickly.

This statement, added to the news that No. 1 Co. of the 14th was in touch with the enemy at Hampshire Farm and that the French infantry had fallen back to that place, and emphasised by the bullets splashing on the bricks of Mouse Trap Farm where the Staff Captain was marshalling cooks and batmen behind improvised defences against a rush by the enemy in the dark, prompted the 7.10 p.m. message to Division quoted on p. 236 and resulted in two others, one from 3rd C.I.B. to 2nd C.I.B. at 7.05 p.m.–

Are back on G.H.Q. line. Attack coming from West. Urgent support necessary. and another from 1st Canadian Division to 2nd C.I.B. sent at 7.25 p.m.

The left of 3rd Brigade has been driven back but right is standing fast. You must hang on and take care of your own left.

The impression conveyed by these words was that the position of the 3rd C.I.B. was desperate, ten minutes after the first message was written Br.-General Currie ordered the 10th Battalion to deviate from Wieltje and deploy along the Wieltje-St. Julien road, the O.C. to report to the G.O.C., 3rd C.I.B. and give assistance; at the same time he ordered the reserve (D) company (Major G. S. T. Pragnell) of the 5th Battalion to take up a position across the St. Julien-Fortuin road, there it entrenched at 8.50 p.m. on a slight rise 200 yards from the outskirts of St. Julien and maintained patrols to Locality C and Kitchener’s Wood, reporting direct to 2nd C.I.B. for the next eighteen hours. The 85th Brigade, holding the adjoining sector from Berlin Wood south to Broodseinde, was informed at 7.25 p.m. of the supposed situation at that time; five minutes later the Staff Captain (Captain R.
P. Clark) at 2nd C.I.B. rear headquarters at Wietje called out the reserve machine gun section, all the transport drivers, cooks and storemen he could find to the number of about 100, manned a hastily dug trench north of Wietje Farm\textsuperscript{372} and found the right of the 2/E. Kent to his left above St. Jean.\textsuperscript{386}

**IMPORTANCE OF LOCALITY C**

At 7.55 p.m. the 3rd C.I.B. sent to the 2nd C.I.B. another call:–

"We have no troops between C. 22. b. (\textit{i.e. Bde. H.Q., Mouse Trap Farm.}) and St. Julien. Can you occupy this line? Please reply."

This was difficult to understand, but the 14th Bn. (less 2 cos.) was being held in G.H.Q. line, the 10th Battalion had not yet reported to G.O.C., 3rd C.I.B., and the presence of the company of the 7th above Vanheule Farm was unknown to him. Br.-General Currie decided that in the circumstances, and as far as he was concerned, "Locality C" on Gravenstafel Ridge was the tactical feature which must be held for the retention of his own front line and for the safety of all the southerly part of the Salient; he therefore at 9 p.m. ordered the whole of the 7th Battalion to "Locality C," where it occupied a supporting position behind the ridge, with No. 1 Co., attached to the 8th Battalion, in the trench along the crest in echelon facing northwards and 1,300 yards in rear of the left front line of that battalion. His only other troops apart from the two line battalions were the reserve machine gun section and the brigade grenade company, both at Wietje, and these he ordered to report for duty to Br.-General Turner.\textsuperscript{386}

**WITHDRAWAL OF FIELD BATTERIES**

At 7.30 p.m. before the Canadian Division had received any definite news from the French as to the situation and disposition on the front of the 45th (Algerian) Division, staff officers were despatched to find out what was happening and
to watch developments, Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Lamb to 2nd C.I.B. Headquarters at Pond Farm, Fortuin, and Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Macdonell, Major J. H. MacBrien and later Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Mitchell to 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters at Mouse Trap Farm. Major MacBrien went on to St. Julien and confirmed the order brought from D.A. to 3rd C.F.A. Brigade Headquarters, by Captain H. F. Wright, for the four field batteries of the 3rd Brigade, C.F.A., to withdraw at 9 p.m. to positions north of St. Jean covering Kitchener's Wood, for all were now within 1,000 yards of the enemy and not sited to cover the open flank. Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Mitchell ordered his batteries to rendezvous at the crossroads near Hill Top Farm and sent his adjutant to get information and direction from 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters. In compliance the 9th and 12th Batteries made their way back successfully amid bursts of rifle and shell fire to take up their new positions 1,000 yards southwest of Mouse Trap Farm by midnight. The teams for the detached section of the 8th, which formed half of the 11th, were misdirected, so that section remained in position throughout the following day; the 11th, less one section, moved out through St. Julien to a position 600 yards south of Hampshire Farm, but rifle, machine gun and shell fire made it advisable to move south 1,300 yards to a less exposed position near Potijze Chateau. The 10th Battery which had kept up an intermittent fire in two directions for four hours was in the most exposed position; the teams of the two ammunition wagons had been killed on the way up by rifle and machine gun fire from west of the St. Julien road and Major King, doubtful whether the gun limbers could get through, made use of two first line wagon teams and these pulled two of his guns to south of St. Julien; three-quarters of an hour later, the gun limbers still not having appeared, the guns were hooked to wagon limbers and manhandled with drag ropes, but by 11 p.m. the anxiously expected teams came up and all the guns and wagons were cleared from the position.
At 10 p.m. as it appeared that the enemy was well behind the Canadian left flank Br.-General Burstall consulted General Alderson as to the withdrawal of the remaining divisional guns. It had been reported that the 3rd C.I.B. was back on the G.H.Q. line and it was supposed that the 2nd C.I.B. was falling back. The 2nd Cdn. Artillery Brigade was therefore ordered to select and occupy gun positions near Wieltje and covering the G.H.Q. 2nd line. The Brigade commander, Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Creelman, whose nearest battery was still 1,500 yards from the enemy, considered that if conditions were fully understood this order would be cancelled or that a withdrawal of the infantry must be contemplated, he therefore sent Major A. G. L. McNaughton to select the necessary positions south of Wieltje but questioned the order. Not having any reply at midnight, he ordered the batteries to withdraw, and rode back through blazing Ypres to Brielen to report personally to the C.R.A. Between 12.50 and 1 a.m. the batteries moved off south-westwards across the fields by a previously reconnoitred track to take up the new positions in observation; an hour later, while still en route, the last battery, the 7th, was met south of Wieltje by Lt.-Colonel Creelman who, having set at rest the fear that the 2nd C.I.B. was falling back, brought the expected order to conform to their movements. Without halting, the battery turned east, the others limbered up and followed, by 3.30 a.m. all guns were again in action in their old positions and covering their original zones.

The two batteries of the 118th (How.) Bde. R.F.A., in action east of Fortuin, where the headquarters billet had been burned out by shell fire on the previous day, also received orders at 11.30 p.m. to withdraw behind the G.H.Q. 2nd line; this was successfully accomplished although the 459th (How.) Battery was short of 35 men and 77 horses, they having been captured in the evening when the Germans overran their wagon lines at a farm southwest of Kitchener’s Wood. The two batteries came into action again in the early morn-
ing, one 800 yards west of La Brique and the other 500 yards north of Brielin.

All through the night the roads were thronged with vehicles, batteries on the move, cyclist orderlies, ammunition column wagons replenishing dumps of S.A.A., battalion transport taking up rations and water, and ambulances clearing the wounded.
CHAPTER VIII

THE MIDNIGHT COUNTER-ATTACK

THURSDAY 22ND/FRIDAY 23RD APRIL

Map 2: Ypres 1915. Counter-Attacks 11.50 p.m. 22nd and 5.26 a.m. 23rd April

Sketch 1: Ypres 1915. Line at Midnight 22nd/23rd April (facing p. 262)


RESERVES MADE AVAILABLE

The headquarters of the Second Army was at Haze­brouck, and reports of the gas attack did not reach there until 6.45 p.m., but General Smith-Dorrien had seen the cloud himself as he was walking towards Ypres after visiting Hill 60. An hour after the first message came news that the French were retiring, and simultaneously the erroneous report that the left of the 3rd C.I.B. had been forced back to Wietje.\(^{358}\) The French staff confirmed that the line had been attacked with asphyxiating gases and said that their right, slightly turned, was at Pilckem.\(^{361}\) A glance at the map showed that this meant a gap of 4,000 yards astride the Franco-British boundary two miles northeast of Ypres through which a further German attack might soon be delivered to cut off the Salient. His immediate action was to release the 1st C.I.B. from Army Reserve and place it at the disposal of General Plumer; other reserves must also be
found, for such a threat might develop quickly and culminate in swift disaster.

**BATTALIONS OF 1ST C.I.B. ORDERED FORWARD**

The headquarters of the V Corps was at Poperinghe, and a report centre was at Goldfish Chateau on the main road, half-way between Ypres and Vlamertinghe and a little more than a mile from Château des Trois Tours. General Plumer, who had paid a visit to the 1st C.I.B. at 8.30 that morning, at 8.00 p.m. sent a message to General Alderson:–

Two battalions of your 1st Infantry Bde. are placed at your disposal. The remainder will form a corps reserve. You must endeavour to make your left secure. Make certain of the second line of defence at any rate. 364

At the same time he put at General Alderson’s disposal, from the 28th Division reserve, the 2/E. Yorks, then in huts a mile north-west of Ypres: this unit, the first of thirty-three British battalions to be placed under the Canadian Division during the battle, was ordered to near Brielen 451 to watch the situation along the canal, in case the enemy broke through the French line at Het Sas or Steenstraat or attempted a crossing nearer Ypres where the 16th Battalion and parties of the 1st and 2nd Field Companies lined the western bank. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, detached from their brigade at Vlamertinghe, were ordered at 8.30 p.m. to move at once, to halt with head on the Brielen-Ypres road and await orders from Br.-General Turner under whom they were now placed. These orders, received en route, directed the two battalions to report at 3rd C.I.B. headquarters, so, as instructed, they crossed the canal at the Brielen bridge, 385 then they were in No Man’s Land; but with mounted patrols of the Divisional Cavalry (19th Alberta Dragoons) ahead and on the flanks, they marched in fours along the road eastwards across the enemy’s front and 1,000 yards from it, to reach their destination at 1.15 a.m. Each battalion was accompanied by a divisional staff officer as guide.
COUNTER-ATTACK BY 3RD C.I.B. ORDERED

Br.-General Turner had been informed by Divisional Headquarters before 8 p.m. that the 10th and 16th Battalions were at his disposal. He had issued immediate orders for one company of the latter to extend to the right towards St. Julien, another to extend the line west of Hampshire Farm, the remainder to lie in reserve at Mouse Trap Farm, but other plans caused these to be cancelled before execution. At 8.52 p.m. he received an order, written at about eight, after the French liaison officer with the Canadian Division had said that the 45th Algerian Division was going to counter-attack towards Pilckem, and had requested Canadian support:

As soon as you get your two battalions together make a counter-attack towards the wood C.10.d (i.e. Kitchener’s Wood) and then on towards U.27. The French are counter-attacking on your left towards Pilckem. A battalion of 28th Division is coming to your support.

This was followed at 8.55 p.m. by another, also from Canadian Division:

The 2nd Bde. is still holding its trenches but is anxious to know where your right is. A bn. of the 28th Div. is being ordered to Wieltje where it will come under your orders. It is important that you gain connection with the French on your left and hold on to G.H.Q. second line at all costs. Report situation by bearer and state if two reserve battalions 2nd Bde. have yet reached you.

The somewhat obscure wording of these messages, particularly the customary omission of the individual designations of detached battalions, was the beginning of a series of misunderstandings between the 1st Canadian Division and 3rd C.I.B. Another message from Division sent at 9.50 p.m.:

Two bns. of 1st Inf. Bde. have been ordered to march to his (sic. “your”) headquarters to come under your orders – made misinterpretation still more likely. It was not clear
which battalions should be used in the counter-attack Division meant the 14th and 16th, but two companies of the former were inextricably committed; there was still time, however, to recall the two of the 16th and so the order to prolong the line was cancelled. As for the two battalions of the 2nd C.I.B., the 10th only had reported, the 7th had been ordered at 7.45 p.m. to Locality C and was not in fact placed at General Turner’s disposal until early on the 24th, although on the 23rd it held part of the 3rd C.I.B. line at Keerselaere. The use to which the two battalions of the 1st C.I.B. were to be put was not defined until 11.50 p.m. when it was stated “they should be used primarily to prolong your left and fill gap between you and French.” Eventually because of subsequent developments they were not so employed.

Br.-General Turner decided that the 10th and 16th must make the counter-attack; apart from the 14th Battalion (less two companies) occupying the G.H.Q. line, they were the only troops under him not deployed or in contact with the enemy or out of reach. The identity of the battalion of the 28th Division caused further complications:—his staff captain sent to find it came upon the 2/E. Kent (of which more later), whereas the 1/York and Lancaster of the 83rd Brigade had been meant,—the latter battalion had not yet reported to him when it was ordered elsewhere. The time of the attack was also debatable; should the arrival of the two battalions of the 1st C.I.B. be awaited? Further and more far reaching, the phrase “hold on to the G.H.Q. second line at all costs” was disconcerting, for the original 4,000 yards of front was still held in its entirety, and such an ominous admonition could but distract attention from the paramount necessity for switch lines linking the old line with the new. This necessity was now being brought home to the commanders in the line.

**EXTENT OF GERMAN PENETRATION**

The first German objectives were, for the *XXIII Reserve Corps*, Steenstraat, Lizerne, Het Sas and Pilckem (exclu-
sive); for the *XXVI Reserve Corps* the line of ridge marked by the road Boesinghe-Pilckem-Langemarck and the ground adjoining on the east. On the front of the *45th Reserve Division*, opposite Steenstraat, for some unexplained reason, a number of the gas cylinders were not discharged, there was stiff fighting and the village was only taken late in the evening. The adjoining *46th Reserve Division* reached the canal, crossed over and captured Het Sas; its left was held up at the Steam Mill east of Boesinghe. As early as 5.30 p.m., the *52nd Reserve Division*, attacking west of Langemarck behind a heavy cloud of gas, had reached Pilckem, and soon after 6 p.m. was directed for the moment not to go beyond the southern slope of Pilckem Ridge; by that time, however, the leading troops were on the east bank of the canal commanding the Boesinghe railway bridge and in occupation of Mauser Ridge, the crossroads at Morteldje, Kitchener’s Wood and the road bridge over the Steenbeek, a thousand yards southwest of Langemarck; on this line the German infantry dug in, and, because the divisional front was thinned by increase in width as well as depth, the *37th Landwehr Brigade* was sent up from reserve to establish a second line on Pilckem Ridge.

The capture of Langemarck was the first task of the *51st Reserve Division*; the assault was made from the northeast behind a gas cloud which cleared the ground southwards of men, birds and hares, but rolled past the garrison of the village; there was a hard fight among the ruins. Towards 6 p.m., however, Langemarck was traversed and the Division was ordered to get possession of the bridgehead over the Haanebeek southeast of Langemarck and if possible to take St. Julien. “The bridgehead” may have meant the road culvert two thousand yards south-southeast, for the Lekkerboterbeek culvert a thousand yards southeast was already won; more probably the important crossing of the Poelcappelle road over the Lekkerboterbeek two thousand yards east-southeast was intended.
ATTACK ON THE NEW CANADIAN APEX

Within an hour fresh German battalions were pushing forward against the flank of the 3rd C.I.B. Their right, meeting little or no resistance on the way, occupied and proceeded to improve the trench south of Kitchener’s Wood; in the centre, as already described, they unexpectedly ran into the fire of the 10th Canadian Field Battery and the supporting infantry and machine gun; nearer the old front line they were stopped by the two supporting platoons of the 13th Canadian Battalion in the ditch of the Poelcappelle road, with a few Algerians rallied by Major E. C. Norsworthy and Lieut. Guy Drummond; and eight hundred yards to the north-east in the same ditch at the Canadian front line were two other platoons supporting the last remnant of the French line which had stood fast against the first advance. Shortly before 9 p.m. a concerted German attack was made and the Algerians were driven from their isolated breastwork; about 200 of them, still willing to fight, reinforced the 13th Battalion along the Poelcappelle road or assisted in pulling down shelters to build a parados for the original front line trench. Two more platoons, withdrawn from the right and centre companies of the 13th, were extended to the left along the road and two French machine guns under their own officer took up positions in the same line. Such was the resistance of these troops that the Germans thought they were faced by strong reinforcements, and they reported that this made an advance on St. Julien difficult. But they were persistent, and before midnight delivered two attacks south-eastwards, which secured both the bridge heads and were then held up by fire. General von Hugel of the XXVI Reserve Corps ordered the 51st Reserve Division to hold the position it had reached and to continue the attack next day.

The 13th Battalion had no Very lights and after the moon went down at 2 a.m. could not see clearly what the Germans were doing beyond that their flares were rising far to the left rear. But machine gun fire from a little cluster of
buildings 750 yards N.E. of Keerselaere and known as Keerselaere cottages, which had been held by the two supporting platoons with Major Norsworthy, convinced Major McCuaig that the detachment, cut off since four o’clock by shell fire, gas and rifle fire, had succumbed to weight of numbers and that there was now a gap behind his company, with the enemy in possession of the Poelcappelle road culvert across the Lekkerboterbeek and of buildings two hundred yards east of it directly in rear of his single trench. He, after consultation with the other two company commanders in the line, Captains Jamieson and Clark-Kennedy, and being the senior officer on the spot, resolved to simulate assurance and to hang on to the whole precarious position, awaiting in hope the arrival of reinforcements and the expected counter-attack which would change the fortune of the day and restore the broken line. But in case such reinforcements did not come, the centre company, commanded by Captain Jamieson, began the construction of a switch line three hundred yards east of the road and parallel to the Lekkerboterbeek for occupation by McCuaig’s company if withdrawal became advisable.

Reinforcements were by this time on the way: Colonel A. D. Geddes, of the 2/E. Kent, deployed along the St. Jean Ridge, in response to an appeal by Br.-General Turner, at 9 p.m. detailed his “B” Company to the Commandant, St. Julien. On the way forward the company commander, Captain F. W. Tomlinson, was directed by Br.-General Turner to suggest to Lieut-Colonel Loomis that the company should be used to safeguard the line between St. Julien and Mouse Trap Farm. When Captain Tomlinson reported at 10.20 p.m., Lieut-Colonel Loomis, considering that the northern gap was the more dangerous, at first intended to make a direct attempt to establish a retrenchment or switch line along the road above the village to protect the open rear of the 13th Battalion fire trenches. As a preliminary measure he sent out the two St. Julien platoons of the 13th to see
whether the road was passable, but these, coming under heavy rifle fire and finding the Germans across it, where the original supporting platoons had been annihilated, returned and so reported.\textsuperscript{387, 397} He then decided to reinforce the left company by the north-easterly route, past the windmill and down the secondary road which cut the front line at the left of the 15th Battalion; Major V. C. Buchanan led the two platoons of his own (No. 3) Coy. of the 13th, “B” Coy 2/E. Kent, and a party of the 3rd Field Company, C.E. forward this way at midnight.\textsuperscript{396} They carried some twenty-five boxes of ammunition.

**THE COUNTER-ATTACK ON KITCHENER’S WOOD**

The order for the counter-attack on Kitchener’s Wood was issued by Br.-General Turner at 9.40 p.m. before the 16th Battalion reported, and it was feared for a time that the 10th would have to go in alone.\textsuperscript{383} The first order was confirmed at 10.47 p.m.:–

10th and 16th Bns. in that order will counter-attack at 11.30 p.m. Bns. will assemble in C. 23.a. north of G.H.Q. line. Clear wood C.10.d. Direction N.W. to U.27. Attack on frontage of two companies. Remaining 6 companies in close support at 30 yards distance on same frontage. Artillery shell C.5.c (\textit{i.e.} 400 yards N. of Kitchener’s Wood) and N.W. of that square.\textsuperscript{388}

The time was set late so that all would be in readiness by the appointed hour. Because the 10th was ready and complete, it was guided by the Staff Captain, 3rd C.I.B. (Captain H. F. MacDonald) into the front of the assembly position, 500 yards northeast of Mouse Trap Farm, and formed up in column of half battalion: two companies with ranks shoulder to shoulder and thirty yards apart formed the two leading waves, thirty yards behind them the two rear companies in double rank formed the third and fourth waves, also at thirty yards distance. The low and cloudy moon shed sufficient light to silhouette the dark mass of the wood looming up half a mile to the north, and to outline the roofs of the
nearer farms against the sky. Before nightfall the Germans had been seen entrenching outside the wood and it was surmised that they might have machine guns in the buildings of Oblong Farm, on the left front, but Lieut.-Colonel Boyle of the 10th did not think that his orders covered any digression in that direction. The 16th formed up also in column of half battalion thirty yards in rear and at distances of twenty yards, so that there were in all eight waves in a depth of 180 yards on a two company frontage: this was the attack formation practised at Estaires. Thirty bombers of the 2nd C.I.B. and seventy of the 3rd accompanied the attack. At 11.45 p.m. the 16th reported in position; the Brigade Major, Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Hughes, who was at the assembly position, gave direction on the Pole Star, and the order to advance was given.\n
Not a sound was audible but the steady tramp of three thousand feet and the slap of empty scabbards against thighs. The 9th and 12th Batteries opened fire on the northern part of the wood and beyond, and also the 149th Battery, R.F.A., (146th Bde., 28th D.A.) which had withdrawn from the Haanebeek bottom near Gravenstafel to come into action five hundred yards south of Mouse Trap Farm. At the farm itself a single gun of the 75th Battery, R.F.A. was in action; it had been undergoing repairs at the Ordnance Workshop in St. Jean and, these completed, it was galloped forward by the energetic subaltern in charge, with 60 rounds. These were the only guns covering the attack, for all the other Canadian batteries in the Salient were on the move.\n
Half the distance to the wood had been traversed in silence when the leading wave ran into a hedge and a wire fence, the noise of breaking through brought a shower of flares, a sudden hail of rifle and machine gun bullets and a momentary pause. Then the two battalions with a wild and furious cheer burst forward at a fast run; the parapet darted fire; many fell, among them Captain John Geddes of the 16th, stalwart leader of many a forward rush on the football field, now on hands and knees mortally wounded, gave his
last shout above the din—“Come on!” The surging waves passed over him; in two minutes the charging mass was through the wire and in the trench; brisk work with bayonet and butt for another minute cleared it and the whole body pressed on into the wood.

Here it was darker, and none could see beyond his immediate neighbourhood; groups of Germans stood up to Canadian bayonets and direction and cohesion were soon lost. The ground was quite unknown; there was no prearranged plan of objectives, consolidation or disposition, and after the guns of the 2nd London Heavy Battery had been unexpectedly recaptured and the resistance met in the wood disposed of, the 10th Battalion set to work entrenching in the open field beyond the irregular northern fringe of the wood. The 16th Battalion had swung more to the right among the trees and, directed by Captain W. Rae, began to dig in along the hedge which ran parallel to the north-eastern face at one hundred yards. Now, however, there was an ominous sound of musketry directly in the rear, and when Major D. M. Ormond, adjutant of the 10th, went to investigate, he discovered that this came from a German redoubt at the south-western extremity of the wood, and fifteen yards from the left end of the captured trench. An organized attempt was made by the thirty-four Canadians there to rush the stronghold; the assault was met with bombs and a heavy fire from rifles and machine guns, half the attacking party fell, and the remainder began to dig a cross trench to cover the flank.

Two-thirds of the officers, all the company commanders, and half of the men of the 10th Battalion had fallen in the charge. Lieut.-Colonel R. W. Boyle was mortally wounded, and the companies were not only intermingled with each other but with the 16th Battalion, which had also suffered casualties of about fifty per cent, including the adjutant and three company commanders. The lack of a preconceived plan, loss of platoon and company cohesion, the darkness and intermingling of units, made consolidation and
control difficult for the officers with the leading troops. The men, excited by the thrill of battle and elated with victory, were reluctant to settle down and dig cover in the dark though under fire; and some of them, disregarding the confusing shouts of “Tenth Battalion here” or “Sixteenth this way,” set out independently in search of someone they knew or of further adventure. Three men of the 16th went on an impromptu patrol north of the wood to a farm two hundred yards away and found a German company in occupation; one of the trio was captured and later attempted a daring escape from the miseries of a German prison camp; another, taking his way through the wood, captured one of the 234th R.I.R. lurking in the underbush, then by chance he met his Colonel who sent him to brigade headquarters with the prisoner, and when he returned at about 3 a.m. his comrades were reversing the parapet of the trench south of the wood and building traverses against enfilade and reverse fire coming from the west.

A LINE ESTABLISHED

It had by this time been discovered that the northwest portion of the wood had not been cleared, and that the enemy occupied in force a trench extending westwards from the southwest corner. Opposite the right of the line, which was also open for 750 yards towards St. Julien, the enemy was found to be in strength, and touch could not be established with the garrison there; so after a consultation of officers on the spot the order was given for all to fall back through the wood and to organize the two hundred yards of captured trench for defence. The movement was completed by 4 a.m.; the 10th Battalion took the left, the 16th Battalion extended beyond the trench northeastswards, and there, lying prone in the open field, each man dug a rifle pit for himself with his entrenching tool. There were now numbered off in a quadrant 750 yards long and about 200 yards from the southern face of the wood, 188 other ranks of the 10th and
263 other ranks of the 16th Battalion, with five officers of each. Both flanks, projecting forward, were open for 750 yards.

Reinforcements were, however, coming up; while the attack on the wood was in progress the 3rd Battalion had reported to Br.-General Turner at 1.15 a.m., the 2nd fifteen minutes later. The former dug in facing northwards along the road three hundred yards south of Mouse Trap Farm; there they suffered from intermittent shelling, a single burst killed an officer, a sergeant, a corporal and two privates, and wounded two sergeants and a corporal. Lieut.-Colonel D. Watson of the 2nd was directed at 2.30 a.m. to take his battalion forward and assist the counterattack, the first report of which had been brought to General Turner by Major Godson-Godson, Adjutant of the 16th Battalion, who, because of a bullet-ripped gullet, conveyed the news in a pencilled note. The line had not yet been withdrawn to the south of the wood and Lieut.-Colonel Watson was ordered to prolong it eastwards; he moved, extended on a two-company frontage, to Juliet Farm and there met Lieut.-Colonel R. G. E. Leckie commanding the 16th who asked him to attack the threatening German position at the southwest corner of the wood. After making a reconnaissance he ordered one company (Major G. W. Bennett) to attack the strong point, another to move up on the right of the 16th, the third to support the left of the 10th and extend the line westwards, and the remaining company to entrench a line northeastwards from Juliet Farm, where he established headquarters with two machine guns in the upper storey. In the grey light of dawn No. 1 Company advanced to the attack diagonally across the rear of the 10th Battalion; at about two hundred yards the ground mist suddenly lifted, the German machine gunners perceived them and opened fire, the company commander and many others fell, but those unhit went on; finally not more than fifteen remained, most of them wounded, they moved half right to seek cover in the trench with the 10th
Battalion. This attack, in itself costly and apparently unfruitful, yet created a diversion sufficient to allow No. 3 Company (Captain G. G. Chrysler) to occupy Oblong Farm, mount a machine gun behind a nearby hedge and dig a trench in echelon on the left rear of the 10th. Meanwhile No. 2 Company (Captain E. G. Culling) had worked northwards, found the right of the 16th, cleared a German post out of a trench with the bayonet, and taken up a position about some hedged farm buildings two hundred yards further to the northeast; at daybreak a platoon under Captain W. H. V. Hooper was sent up to reinforce, he organized a local attack and drove the enemy out of a small group of farm buildings on the right front. Another valuable reinforcement at this time was a machine gun with which Lieut. W. J. Doxsee and his platoon pushed forward into a house nearer the wood. From this commanding position, by an unexpected burst of fire at close range, heavy casualties were inflicted on a body of Germans assembling behind a hedge to renew the attack. The three companies consolidated and strengthened their positions, as did the 10th and 16th, which also sent patrols through the wood, one of them to cover a party of engineers with charges to destroy the guns of the 2nd London Heavy Battery; a despatch rider sent at 3.10 a.m. with a message to the 3rd Brigade, C.F.A. for teams to withdraw them had failed in the darkness to find the new headquarters of that unit (at first on the roadside near Hill Top Farm and later in St. Jean).

As the right of the 2nd Battalion had not found touch with the St. Julien garrison, Br.-General Turner at 4.00 a.m. telephoned to the 3rd Battalion for two companies to be sent to line the gap of five hundred yards between the St. Julien defences and the farm buildings held by the right company of the 2nd Battalion. Major A. J. E. Kirkpatrick moved off at once with “C” Company (Captain J. E. L. Streight) and “D” Company (Captain C. E. H. Morton); they extended, the former on the right, and advanced in double rank to north of
Vanheule Farm where they halted in dead ground to reorganize because of casualties; the final four hundred yards was covered in short rushes across the open and in the face of machine gun fire; by the time the objective was reached at 5.30 a.m., of the right company alone two officers and fifty-five other ranks had fallen, the left suffered equally. The companies set to work on the consolidation of their position; the right flank was now in echelon on the left front of the St. Julien defences, and Captain Streight detailed Lieut. W. D. P. Jarvis to extend his platoon at intervals across the intervening mustard field and get in touch with Lieut.-Colonel Loomis. This channel of communication was opened and maintained intermittently throughout the next twenty-four hours. Thus the intention to secure a continuous line westward from St. Julien was in part accomplished, but no company of the 2nd Battalion had “shoved forward” to Keerselaere along the St. Julien road as Lieut.-Colonel Loomis had been led to expect, and touch had not been established with the French.

RETENTION OF THE APEX

The moon had set before Major Buchanan and his reinforcement reached the front line at the junction of the 15th and 13th Battalions, and the further journey along the trenches to the left was slow and laborious. Major McCuaig, having heard nothing of their despatch, had vacated his line along the road at the last possible moment before dawn and, effectively covered by the machine guns under Lieut. J. G. Ross, was disposing his company in the newly dug switch line when Tomlinson’s company of the 2/E. Kent arrived. Obviously the available forces were not sufficient for a successful local counterattack, but it might be possible to delude the enemy and gain time if the abandoned trench could be reoccupied without detection. Led by Major McCuaig, alternate parties of his company and the 2/E. Kent filed off quietly in the dim light; they reached the road and set to work
again on the sandbag redoubt at the intersection. A number of figures apparently in French uniform now appeared in rear of the old Algerian trenches crying out “We are the French”; this aroused suspicion which was shared by the French machine gun officer who had remained in the Canadian line, and when no satisfactory answer was given, fire was opened on our alleged allies who at once replied in kind. Losses in holding the redoubt were so heavy that at 9 a.m. it was finally abandoned; half an hour later the 6th and 7th Batteries, C.F.A., fired 60 rounds into enemy reported massing on the road between the redoubt and Poelcappelle and no attack developed. The garrison, reduced in numbers but not in determination, withdrew to the trench line proper and held its narrow crumbling length, in spite of incessant bombardment and rifle fire from three directions, for eleven hours longer.

POSITION AND MOVES OF 2ND C.I.B.

It was nearly midnight before Br.-General Currie learned enough about the dispositions of the 3rd C.I.B. to form a considered opinion as to how his three remaining battalions should be distributed. The 5th Battalion, less “D” Company between Fortuin and St. Julien, and the 8th Battalion could take care of the front line, which thus far had not been heavily bombarded, but he was told by Lieut.-Colonel Creelman that all four batteries of the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A., were under orders to move out, seemingly a clear indication that a withdrawal was contemplated because of the threat to his left rear. Neither then knew that anyone thought the 2nd C.I.B. was falling back, or that that was why the 2nd C.F.A. was being ordered back to conform. Locality C was the key to his position and the 7th Battalion was already there with one company deployed facing north-eastwards and the remainder behind the crest ready to strike in any direction; the line battalions reported nothing unusual, they had received all supplies and ammunition; so there was
nothing to be done at the moment but await orders and keep in touch with developments.\textsuperscript{403} He informed Br.-General A. J. Chapman of the adjoining 85th Infantry Brigade of the situation and of his dispositions, and heard from him that the sound of firing to the eastward about 11 p.m., upon which the 5th Battalion stood to arms for two and a half hours, was a German attack between Broodseinde and the railway which the 2/E. Surrey had stopped without assistance. There had also been a simultaneous demonstration against the line of the 27th Division near Hill 60. The second in command of the 7th Battalion, Major V. W. Odium, reconnoitred the western end of the Gravenstafel Ridge, returned through St. Julien to the 2nd C.I.B. Headquarters at Fortuin, and confirmed the situation on the left. At 2 a.m. a telephone message came through from 3rd C.I.B. that the enemy was in strength at Keerselaere and north of it. “Can you assist us in this direction... Active support urgently needed St. Julien ... and U.30.d.” (i.e. \textit{behind the left of the original line}).\textsuperscript{412} In response to this call Br.-General Currie immediately (at 2.08 a.m.) ordered the 7th Battalion (less No. 1 Company) to support the 3rd C.I.B. in the vicinity of Keerselaere,\textsuperscript{413} by 3.20 a.m. the battalion was deployed across the toe of the Gravenstafel Ridge facing north-westwards on a front of seven hundred yards astride the cross-roads east of Keerselaere, with the left in touch with the St. Julien garrison at the old 10th Battery position and the right in touch with, but some distance west of, the supporting platoons of the 15th Battalion which faced northeast.\textsuperscript{455} Two and a half companies were in line, two machine guns in the right centre at the cross-roads and one on the left company front; two platoons lay in support, 500 yards behind and to the left rear of No. 1 Company which continued to man the trench along the sky line at Locality C. The construction of a trench on the new frontage was begun without delay, and an urgent message was sent back for engineers, sandbags, stakes, wire and tools. The return of the field batteries of the 2nd Bde.,
C.F.A., at 3.30 a.m. brightened the outlook, evidently the salient was not to be abandoned without a fight. At daybreak Lieut.-Colonel Hart-McHarg of the 7th reported that he could see the Germans busily entrenching six hundred yards away, he asked permission to assault, provided he had support; but Br.-General Currie, who was near the end of his resources, ordered him to dig well in, find out the exact location of the neighbouring battalions and get in touch with the Commandant, St. Julien. Further reassurance also came at 6.40 a.m. from Br: General Turner:–

Feel situation now well in hand. Buffs have reinforced our left and Middlesex and York and Lancasters are making a counter-attack. Wish to thank you for your assistance. Without it feel our line would have been cut. 10th Bn. led the assault and did splendid work under Col. Boyle despite heavy casualties.

Meanwhile the results of the German thrust were gradually becoming known to Corps and Army Commanders, and more troops, both French and British, were on the move towards the battlefield.
A strong night attack aimed through the breach directly at Ypres might well have resulted in a great disaster; such an attack was foreign to German tactics, however, and was not to be expected. Undoubtedly daylight would bring a renewal of the offensive and the counter measure adopted, effective if costly, was that of vigorous and persistent counter-attack with all forces available.

Throughout the hours of darkness there was no definite information as to the French right; it was known before 9 p.m. on the 22nd that Pilckem had been lost, that the guns had been abandoned, and that there were no formed bodies of French troops east of the canal. At that hour General Smith-Dorrien informed G.H.Q. that the situation appeared somewhat grave, an hour later he suggested that representations should be made to General Foch to induce the latter to restore the French situation. Up to that time General Quiquandon (45th Division) had only been able to organize
a counter-attack from Boesinghe towards Pilckem with six companies from the reserve; an infantry regiment and two field batteries were also on their way to him, and the 186th Territorial Brigade, an extra brigade of the 87th Territorial Division lying in Detachment reserve, was warned to stand by for transport to Woesten (1½ miles west of Elverdinghe) by bus, there to be at his disposal.

Towards midnight General Foch directed General Putz (D.A.B.) to make sure of holding the line occupied, to organize a base of departure for a counter-attack to regain the ground lost, and to deliver a counter-attack. For this he ordered the 153rd Division (XX Corps, Tenth Army) to be sent to General Putz, and he warned the Tenth Army that more troops might be required. Meanwhile a counterattack to establish the French right flank at the inter-Allied boundary was proposed for 4.30 a.m. in conjunction with a Franco-Belgian advance by way of Steenstraat; the French would advance on Pilckem, and it was arranged that Canadian troops would co-operate by attacking northwards from the exposed British flank.400

In appreciating the situation General Foch concluded that, whether or not the initial attack had extended as far as the Canadian front, a re-adjustment of that front had become absolutely necessary and unavoidable since its left flank had been completely uncovered. His opinion, confirmed by the incomplete and misleading information received from Second Army, was that withdrawal was inevitable and he reported to General Joffre that the Canadian line had fallen back on St. Julien and joined the old line in the Stroombeek valley near the inter brigade boundary. This misapprehension on the part of the French General Staff was only corrected eighteen years later, after it had been given publicity in the French Official History.

THE GAP PARTIALLY CLOSED BY GEDDES’ DETACHMENT

A Canadian staff officer in search of information had
motored up the Ypres-Pilckem road before midnight, and had come upon a French machine gun in action near Fusilier Farm; the crew said they were the front line and that the Germans were on the ridge 600 yards away whence an occasional flare in verification shot upwards, blazed and died. There were no other troops between Hampshire Farm and the canal at the inter-Allied boundary, so there was a gap of 3,000 yards. Across this gap the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had marched at midnight; in it and covered by Hill Top Ridge the 9th and 12th Batteries, C.F.A. and half the 11th had come into action just before midnight, unaware that there was nobody between them and the Germans entrenching 1,000 yards to the north; shortly afterwards the 10th Battery on its way back from St. Julien had confidently taken the road along Hill Top Ridge and, on turning south by Irish Farm, had been surprised by a challenge from the British front line along the St. Jean Ridge held by the 2/E. Kent and the 3/Middlesex (85th Bde., 28th Div.). These two battalions were the only troops deployed to cover Ypres; they and the 5/King’s Own Royal Lancaster and the 1/York & Lane. (both 83rd Bde.) were in Corps reserve when the battle began, and General Plumer placed them at the disposal of General Alderson at 12.30 a.m.; in the latter in turn ordered the senior battalion commander, Colonel A. D. Geddes of the 2/E. Kent, to take command and to link up the left of the 3rd C.I.B. with the French right, driving back any enemy that might have penetrated. At the same time the two detached companies of the 3/Middlesex were ordered to guard the canal floating bridges and the foot bridges in the vicinity.

Thus was formed Geddes’ Detachment which for the next six days operated under the Canadian Division as a composite infantry brigade, sometimes with as many as seven battalions and with an improvised headquarters consisting of a captain, a subaltern, and a platoon of 28th Div. Cyclists. Why the obvious course of making Br.-General Mercer responsible for the sector between Hampshire Farm
and the canal was not pursued does not appear; he had only two of his own battalions at this time and a complete headquarters staff, and so could have handled several attached battalions with ease. On the other hand Colonel Geddes was a regular officer, a graduate of the Staff College, and tried in the 1914 campaign. It may be noted that no regular British battalion was in the line under a Canadian brigadier during the battle.

Colonel Geddes decided to close the gap by establishing the two edges and extending to the centre: he therefore ordered the 2/E. Kent to march northwest from Wieltje to connect with the left of the 3rd C.I.B. and deploy to the left; the 3/Middlesex, less two companies, to march by the La Brique-Pilckem road and gain touch with the French right said to be about Pilckem village, and then deploy to the right; the 5/King’s Own to entrench in reserve behind the crest of Hill Top Ridge east and west of the crossroads near View Farm; the 1/York & Lanc. to move to the area between Wieltje and Mouse Trap Farm. He installed his headquarters in St. Jean and established touch with the 2nd C.I.B. rear headquarters (Wieltje) through whose signal section his messages to and from 1st Cdn. Div. passed.

To form a new Corps reserve the G.O.C. 27th Division, previously warned by V Corps that his troops would be required, was ordered at 1.20 a.m. to concentrate three and a half battalions about Potijze. These were the 4/R.B., 2/D.C.L.I., 9/R.S. and 2/K.S.L.I. (less two companies), of which the 2/D.C.L.I. and 9/R.S. were ordered to march at once from the huts in H.6, a mile northwest of Ypres to join the remainder already near Potijze. On arrival all came under command of Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Tuson (2/D.C.L.I.). This composite brigade, formed thus on the instant, was to be held in reserve to the projected Canadian counter-attack towards Pilckem and would only be used after reference to V Corps. The 13th Brigade (5th Div., II Corps), at rest after their costly fighting at Hill 60, lay south of Vlamertinge in
Army reserve. To meet an urgent call from General Putz, the 1st Cavalry Division (Major-General H. de B. de Lisle) was ordered at 2 p.m. from S. of Poperinghe to deploy on a line from Brielen through Elverdinghe and northwestwards; the remainder of the Cavalry Corps, and also the 50th (Northumbrian) Division which had arrived in France on the 18th/20th April and was now in G.H.Q. reserve about Steenvoorde and Cassel, fifteen to twenty miles west of Ypres, were warned to be ready to move.

THE COUNTER-ATTACK OF 1ST C.I.B.

The Canadian participation in the counter-attack was discussed by Generals Plumer and Alderson at Vlamertinghe soon after midnight, when it was decided that the 1st C.I.B. now consisting of the 1st and 4th Bns., and already under orders to move forward, should drive northwards to support the French who had been asked to state the direction and time of their projected movement. On his return to Château des Trois Tours, General Alderson, because the actual position of the French was so doubtful, issued a preliminary order to Br: General Mercer at 1.45 a.m.:--

Take your battalions across pontoon bridge in C.19.c. (Brielen Bridge) and take up a position facing north along track running through C.19 and 20 (i.e. extending for 1500 yards east of Brielen Bridge). Keep your right west of Cross roads in C.20.c.

By 3.15 a.m. the head of the column had reached Brielen Bridge; fifteen minutes later, on the road east of the bridge, the situation was explained by Br: General Mercer to the commanders of the 1st and 4th Battalions, Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Hill and Lieut.-Colonel A. P. Birchall: Geddes’ Detachment was advancing to fill the gap between the 1st and 3rd Brigades, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were with the 3rd Brigade whose left was somewhere to the eastward, the French were on the canal, their dispositions east of it, like those of the enemy, were not definitely known; the Brigade would attack. Touch was soon established with the
3/Middlesex, the left of Geddes’ Detachment, and at 4.15 a.m. the order from the Division for the counter-attack, which made the Pilckem road the inter-Allied boundary, was received:–

At 5 o’clock two French battns. are to make a counter-attack against Pilckem, with their right resting on Pilckem-Ypres road. You will co-operate with this attack by attacking at same time with your left on this road.

The composite battery of the 2nd and 3rd Batteries C.F.A. which had taken up a position on the west bank of the canal 500 yards above Brielen Bridge under command of Captain D. A. White, was notified of the plan of attack by 1st C.I.B. and called upon to provide covering fire; these four 18-pdrs. and the 10th Battery C.F.A., now in action 700 yards northwest of Brielen and acting directly under 1st C.D.A., were however already in close touch with the French and had arranged to support them. Thus the only artillery in liaison with the infantry and available to effectively assist the combined attack were these eight 18-pdrs. and the eight 4 5-inch howitzers of the 458th and 459th (How.) Batteries, R.F.A., 800 yards east of La Brique and 500 yards north of Brielen.

A message to Br.-General Turner and to Colonel Geddes warned them to connect, if possible, with the attack of the French and 1st C.I.B. and co-operate, and at 6.10 a.m. a divisional staff officer (Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Macdonell) carried a further message to Colonel Geddes:–

It is of very great importance that the enemy should not penetrate between left of the 3rd Canadian Bde. And the French or the canal, and if you cannot advance you must dig yourself in on the left of the 3rd Canadian Bde.

On arrival, the 1st and 4th Bns. dug shelter trenches along the road east of Brielen Bridge: at 4.30 a.m. the 4th Battalion, which had been leading in the approach march, deployed in four lines just behind the crest of Hill Top Ridge for the attack on a frontage of 200 yards with the left on the Pilckem-Ypres road. No. 2 and No. 4 Companies of the 1st
Battalion, in two lines, followed the 4th; the other two companies, held as reserve, dug a trench along the transverse road, 200 yards in length and facing north. As the sun rose the enemy could be clearly seen across the valley working on a line of wired trenches along the crest of Mauser Ridge, 437 1,500 yards distant, and this was the first objective. All was in readiness at the prescribed hour; Br.-General Mercer was in communication with the French at the canal, whose right was said to be east of it and in front of South Zwaanhof Farm, but there was no sign of the French attack. However, at 5.25 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel Birchall, presuming that the movement was taking place behind the trees and hedges of the farms a mile away on his left front, gave the order to advance, so B Company began to move forward across the open fields by sections extended to ten yards and leap-frogging, followed by the other five companies. The advancing waves passed Foch Farm, where the farmer’s untouched supper stood cold on the kitchen table and cows lowed in the yard for a milker fled; as they topped the slight rise and cleared the screen of hedges by the farmstead they came into full view of the enemy, a burst of rapid fire from rifles and machine guns met them, and soon shell upon shell was detonating amidst the oncoming lines. From a vantage point near the reserve line the Brigadier could still see “the whole advance being carried out in most perfect order as if on parade,” until the last company disappeared in the dust and smoke. On down the glacis slope they went, officers and men falling at every rush under the heavy German fire; the battalion machine gun crews worked across to the right, seeking some cover from behind which they could bring effective fire to bear; when the O.C. of C. Company, 4th Battalion, was wounded Lieut.-Colonel Birchall himself led the company on; the right, covered by the equally determined advance of the two companies 3/Middlesex, advanced across the dip and up the further slope to a cut-bank within 400 yards of the objective, but the left, where still no sign could
be seen of the French advance, was pinned to the ground along the row of pollard willows which marked the valley bottom.

The two forward companies of the 1st Battalion were in echelon slightly in rear of the 4th; No. 1 on the right lost its commander, Major D. M. Sutherland, wounded; on the left Major A. E. Kimmins, commanding No. 2 made repeated efforts to find the French, who had been seen in small numbers behind Lancashire Farm soon after the attack began; two of his runners were killed in attempting to gain touch across the open fields and finally Major Kimmins himself. The advance came to a standstill.

To press the attack Lieut.-Colonel Birchall at 7.30 asked Lieut.-Colonel Hill for reinforcements: No. 1 Company of the 1st moved up at once, and soon afterwards three platoons of the remaining company. These carried the attack forward another 100 yards on the right, where the Middlesex pushed on to occupy Turco Farm and enabled No. 2 Company of the 1st to extend to the left, so that by 8.30 a.m. the two battalions held a line of 600 yards from Turco Farm to the Ypres-Pilckem road and from 300 yards to 600 yards short of the objective. Further advance was impossible. The 2nd Field Battery could and did shell the enemy out of Turco Farm—the Middlesex entered it unknown to the Canadian gunners, and also were shelled out—but eight 18-pounders could not silence a mile of trench full of riflemen, and the long row of machine guns firing through loopholes could not be destroyed at short notice by eight field howitzers.

Some time before this Br. General Mercer had an optimistic assurance from Colonel Mordacq, the O.C. French attack east of the canal, that he had commenced his attack by successive battalions to throw the enemy back towards the northwest; he explained, “I shall keep till further orders one battalion in reserve, which will march echeloned back on the right of my line to keep close touch with the two Canadian battalions. I have at this moment 6.45 a.m., 3½ battalions of
Zouaves on east of Canal and 2 battalions on west, about to cross. I beg that English artillery may come quickly into action, the German shell fire is diminishing. But as there was still nothing to be seen of any such attack, at 8.30 a.m. Br.-General Mercer, after communicating with Divisional Headquarters, ordered the 1st and 4th Battalions to dig in and maintain the position won in the event of a French advance the battalions would co-operate. This decision was influenced by a report from the liaison officer with the 87th (French) Territorial Division, who reiterated the statement that there were no formed units east of the canal, and added that counter-attacks against Steenstraat and Het Sas had failed, that there were no more reserves and that “the troops are suffering from effects of asphyxiating gas and incapable of much resistance.” To support the Canadian left and make the new line tenable a request was made that the French should fill in the gap between their right and the left of the 1st C.I.B.; at 9.25 a.m. the 2nd Zouaves accomplished this by a local advance, but not until after mid-day was touch established at the front line.

Meanwhile the 186th French Territorial Bde. (Col. Marcieu) was brought up by bus to occupy the G.H.Q. 3rd Line on the French front (Brielen-Pypegaale), and was held there in reserve throughout the battle.

THE LINE AT AND N.E. OF ST. JULIEN

Even yet there was not a continuous line across the seven thousand yards between the old Canadian left and the new French right. To add to the stress of uncertainty as to conditions on the French front there were indications that the Germans were preparing to launch an attack from Kitchener’s Wood towards St. Julien; at 8 a.m. the 2nd Battalion reported that reinforcements estimated at from 500 to 1,000 had entered the line opposite their right company and at 9.30 a.m. a body of 2,500 was seen to be massing north of the wood. Columns of motor lorries carrying infantry were
moving southeastwards from Langemarck and filling the intervening dead ground with fresh troops. The Germans who had penetrated into Keerselaere cottages had evidently been reinforced and were now estimated at 200; pressure and casualties became so heavy that the left company of the 13th, with B Company of the 2/E. Kent, eventually abandoned the redoubt on the road at 9 a.m. as already related. The need for reinforcements was pressing, for the only reserves on the 3rd C.I.B. front were two companies in the G.H.Q. line, and the 2nd C.I.B. had none to spare, General Alderson therefore at 9.20 a.m. asked for two battalions from the Corps reserve at Potijze; within ten minutes his request was granted, the 2/D.C.L.I. and the 9/R.S. (both 27th Div.) were detailed and he ordered them to report to Br.-General Turner at Mouse Trap Farm. In anticipation of a thrust south-eastwards behind the trench line, the reserve of the 15th Battalion was ordered to hold the enemy in rear of the 13th, and at 10.20 a.m. Major Marshall re-disposed three platoons and a machine gun to dig in facing north-westwards near the windmill.

The left of the supporting platoons of the 15th Battalion on the Gravenstafel Ridge was near, but not connected with, the right of the 7th which, with the adjoining companies of the St. Julien garrison, was subjected to heavy shelling all day. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon Lieut. D. M. Mathieson and a party of the 2nd Field Company, C.E., relieved from duty at the canal bridge by the 1st Field Company, C.E., reported to Lieut-Colonel Hart-McHarg to assist in consolidating and wiring a line and to make sure of advantageous siting for a permanent trench. The Colonel and he, with the second-in-command, Major V. W. Odlum, set out to reconnoitre in front. They went forward about 300 yards down the slope to the ruined houses of Keerselaere, and suddenly saw through the western windows that the hedges not a hundred yards distant were lined with Germans. They had been under observation the whole way, and now it was time to
return; the moment they cleared the houses these Germans opened rapid fire, the Major dropped into a shell hole, the Colonel collapsed on top of him shot through the stomach. Leaving Lieut. Mathieson to keep watch, Major Odlum crawled back up the hill, and sent down the battalion M.O., Captain G. H. R. Gibson—accompanied by Sergt. J. Dryden,—who dressed the wound and remained until nightfall when the regimental stretcher bearers carried their Colonel back to die next day at Poperinge, as he had expected. He was a cool, judicious and daring officer; his loss, particularly at such a time, was a heavy blow.

PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE APEX

The Commandant of St. Julien kept the 3rd C.I.B. informed of events on his front; at 10.50 a.m. the enemy was in great force and he was “convinced that something must be done quick,” if he was not to receive support he would have to withdraw his exposed left from the original line into the trenches at St. Julien, failing a strong counterattack—for which he had no troops—retirement was inevitable. He sent Captain Clark-Kennedy, who had come back from the 13th line, to explain the position personally to Br.-General Turner, who discussed the situation with Divisional Headquarters by telephone. The improbability of the re-establishment of the original French line within a reasonable time led the Divisional Commander to suggest at 11.03 a.m. that the 13th Battalion should be withdrawn from the old trenches and a line established from the left of the 15th to link up with the 7th. Because the proposed line would be on the forward slope and exposed to direct artillery fire, Lieut.-Colonel Loomis would have preferred to employ the two companies of the 14th Battalion and two companies 9/Royal Scots, which he was promised, to drive the enemy west of the St. Julien-Poeleappelle road, but the policy was not to counter-attack here; indeed the two companies of Royal Scots had no sooner reported to him (2.30 p.m.) than
he received an order to send them back because they were to be used in another combined Franco-British attack further to the west.

All day St. Julien and the covering trenches were subjected to a heavy artillery bombardment, and it appeared that an attack was imminent; four times the Germans attempted to leave their trenches and assault, each time they were driven back by rifle and machine gun fire, and the bombardment was renewed. Early in the afternoon about sixty of the enemy with a machine gun worked their way into a ruined building directly in rear of the 13th trench; but the fire of a machine gun, skilfully placed, drove them out and preparations were then made to withdraw after dark as General Alderson had suggested. Lt.-Colonel Loomis at 8.10 p.m. submitted a sketch of the proposed retrenchment which, by an extension of the new trench of the 7th Bn., would link his St. Julien Garrison with the left of the 15th Bn. in the old line.

THE LINE TO THE CANAL

Between St. Julien and Kitchener’s Wood the two detached companies of the 3rd Bn. did their best to strengthen and consolidate their position, a slow process under sniping from rifles and field guns and with casualties mounting; No. 2 Company of the 2nd maintained an aggressive defence, unsubdued by bursts of shelling and effectively holding the enemy in check by well directed rifle fire. The 10th and 16th Battalions covered a demolition party which destroyed the ammunition of the abandoned 2nd London Heavy Battery and maintained their patrols in the wood to keep contact with the enemy. No. 3 Company of the 2nd Battalion entrenched between Juliet and Oblong Farms, where it had a machine gun of the 16th Battalion covering the open unsupported left, and the enemy in strength 150 yards away.

After the formation of Geddes’ Detachment, Br.-General Turner was responsible for the flank as far as Kitch-
ener’s Wood inclusive, and this, added to his old front of 2,000 yards, made 6,000 yards. Actually at this time the left unit of the 3rd C.I.B. was in trenches behind the G.H.Q. line, more than a thousand yards south-west of the wood, at Hampshire Farm, where No. 1 Company of the 14th was in touch with the enemy; 500 yards to the right the G.H.Q. line above Mouse Trap Farm was occupied at 8.30 a.m. by the 3rd Battalion less C and D Companies, and where that line bent southwards and across the Wieltje-St. Julien road there lay in reserve Nos. 3 and 4 Companies of the 14th. At 9 a.m. these two companies were placed at the disposal of O.C., 16th Battalion to support and reinforce if necessary during the consolidation of the new line in front of the wood; they moved up towards Juliet Farm, but heavy fire necessitated withdrawal to avoid useless casualties; at nightfall they were sent to St. Julien and arrived there under the second-in-command, Lieut.-Colonel W. W. Burland, at 10 p.m.

No. 1 Company of the 14th, after ten hours in the rudimentary trenches at Hampshire Farm, which some men of the 7th Zouaves still occupied, were overjoyed to see British troops advancing to their support through the morning mist; these were the 2/E. Kent (less Tomlinson’s company) which had been ordered up at 4 a.m. from its position above St. Jean to locate and extend the left of the 3rd C.I.B., after suffering over eighty casualties in advancing across the open and finding that there was a gap on the right towards the wood, the three companies were disposed by Major R. E. Power in the G.H.Q. line between Mouse Trap Farm and No. 1 Company 14th, whose left remained exposed for another twelve precarious hours. The parties of Zouaves and Algerians who had remained in the Canadian line during the night, being now out of ammunition, and rationless, were recalled or sent back to rejoin their units west of the canal at midday. The other units of Geddes’ Detachment also moved up, but did not altogether succeed in closing the gap of 1,000
yards between Hampshire Farm and the attacking 1st C.I.B. The 5/King’s Own advanced along the road running northwards from La Brique and dug in astride it on a frontage of 600 yards at the cross roads behind Hill Top Ridge in touch with the Middlesex on the left, but with nobody on the right; the 3/Middlesex, less two companies, was participating on the right of the attack of the 1st C.I.B. as already recorded; the 1/York and Lanc. were deployed in the open fields 500 yards north of Wieltje at 5 a.m., and lay there in reserve.

BRITISH ATTACK: 13TH BDE. AND GEDDES’ DET.

It was not known at this time that Duke Albrecht had ordered his troops to capture Ypres on the 23rd; but it was gradually becoming apparent from incoming messages that the enemy could not be driven by any hurried counterattack from the seven square miles he had won from the French. Air reconnaissance confirmed the ground reports that his position was being rapidly consolidated; there was already a trench 2,500 yards long from the Lekkerboterbeek culvert on the St. Julien-Poelcappelle road to Kitchener’s Wood, and a wired front line from the wood along Mauser Ridge and thence along the canal, backed by intervening fortified farms; there was also a new support line 2,000 yards in rear encircling Langemarck and following the Pilckem Ridge eastwards. The captured area was full of Germans digging assiduously, and the bombardment all along the Canadian line indicated that batteries had been pushed forward during the night and that there was no lack of guns or ammunition. The orders issued by General Foch made it quite clear that it was his firm intention to recover the lost ground, and as the British reserves in the Salient had practically all been used up in establishing the new flank to the canal, fresh troops must be made available to co-operate with the French advance. The long Canadian flank, however, had not yet been satisfactorily established and the French, having found
the artillery support inadequate, were ordered to stop and make trenches connected with the Canadian trenches; their attack was therefore put off until 3 p.m.\textsuperscript{489}

At 8.30 a.m. Second Army released from Army reserve the 13th Brigade (Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan) and sent it to General Plumer,\textsuperscript{456} and he, on becoming aware of the situation at the junction of the French and Canadians, placed it at the disposal of General Alderson with orders that he should “endeavour to push back the enemy northwards on east side of canal,” working in co-operation with the French.\textsuperscript{476} The postponement of the French attack was fortunate in that the 13th Brigade could not be in position before the afternoon.

Meanwhile there was no other movement of British or Canadian troops in the forward area where all awaited French or German action.\textsuperscript{495} The British Commander-in-Chief visited General Foch at Cassel, who said that he had ordered up large reinforcements to restore the original line, two battalions and three batteries from the coast had already reported to General Putz\textsuperscript{470} and a fresh division was on the way. Sir John French agreed to co-operate, but stipulated that if the position were not re-established within a reasonable time he should be free to withdraw from the Salient. He had grave apprehensions lest a renewed German thrust at Steenstraat might break through between the French and the Belgians.

It has since transpired that his apprehensions were well founded; for it is told in German history how, impressed by the success of the first day of battle, Duke Albrecht thought that the original objective, the Yser Canal, might now be enlarged and how, on the morning of the 23rd of April, he issued instructions for the continuation of the attack in the direction of Poperinge. The \textit{XXIII Reserve Corps} was to cross the canal on the French front at Boesinghe and northward, whilst the \textit{XXVI Reserve Corps}, with its right on the canal, swept southwards into the Canadian flank and cleared
away the British from the front of the XXVII Reserve Corps. In the morning the vigorous Canadian counter-attacks prevented the execution of the movements ordered, and later in the day higher authority interfered and informed Duke Albrecht that for the moment Poperinghe was not in question, the sole object at present was the flattening of the Ypres Salient.

On returning to Hazebrouck, where his advanced headquarters had been established, Sir John French decided to continue to reinforce the Second Army and gave General Smith-Dorrien the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, then near Steenvoorde, to assist the French in holding the enemy or in restoring the line; the York and Durham Brigade of that division was despatched by bus to Vlamertinghe as V Corps reserve. The Cavalry Corps, concentrating near Poperinghe, he also placed under Second Army; the 1st Cavalry Division to keep in touch with events at Boesinghe and Lizerne and cover the left on the line Elverdinghe-Woesten, the remainder to be in mobile reserve. In anticipation of further requirements he ordered the 10th and 11th Brigades (4th British Division), resting at Bailleul after a long winter in the trenches, and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, billeted at Merville, to be ready to move northwards.

The French operation order by the G.O.C. Groupement d’Elverdinghe was issued at 1.20 p.m.:

(i) The Germans seem for the moment to have exhausted their ammunition.
(ii) The hour for the general counter-attack has come.
(iii) In consequence the colonel commanding the 90th Bde. (Col. Mordacq) with all the troops at his disposal will attack on the front Boesinghe-Pilckem to the East of the Canal, with his right on the road Ypres-Pilckem in close touch with the British Army.
(iv) On our right the English, aware of our attack, move on Langemarck.
(v) Col. Fracque’s artillery, consisting of all the artillery on the West Bank of the Canal and the British artillery in action northwest of Ypres, will carry out a thorough preparation of 3 minutes and will place a barrage in front of the in-
fantry to facilitate their advance.

The attack will be launched at 15 hours.

The artillery will lengthen range at that hour.

The British artillery northwest of Ypres which cooperated with the French was the 1st Brigade C.F.A. which now had 3½ batteries in action, for during the forenoon the 1st and 4th Batteries and a section of the 11th had taken up positions near the composite 2nd/3rd Battery and west of the Brielen Bridge. The other British batteries west of the canal—the 459th (How.) Battery, R.F.A., the 75th and 365th Batteries, R.F.A. (28th D.A.), and the 10th Battery, C.F.A., fired on the Canadian front. Colonel Fracque’s artillery, although stated to consist of “all the artillery on the west bank of the Canal,” included but few French batteries for almost all the 45th and 48th Divisional guns had been lost and the three batteries arrived from Nieuport were in action against Steenstraat.

The written orders for the British were issued by General Smith-Dorrien at 2.40 p.m.; a general attack under Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan would be delivered between Kitchener’s Wood and the canal through the existing line towards Pilckem; the detailed instructions for it had been given to him verbally by General Alderson two hours earlier at a conference at Château des Trois Tours in the presence of the Corps and Army Commanders.

The written order for the attack, issued by the Canadian Division at 1.30 p.m., was as follows:

13th Inf. Bde. has been placed under orders of the G.O.C. Canadian Division. It will move to the east of the Canal via the bridge in C.19.c. (Brielen Bridge) and will form up and attack in the direction of Pilckem with its right on the Pilckem-Ypres road. The two reserve battns. of Col. Geddes’ detachment (5/K.O. and 1/Y. & L.) and the two battns. of the 27th Div. (2/D.C.L.I. and 9/R.S.) will form up and attack on the East of the Pilckem-Ypres road with the left on the road. The attack will commence at 3.30 p.m. The two bns. 27th Div. and the two bns. of Colonel Geddes will act in strict conformity with the movements of the 13th Bde.
The troops of the 1st C.I.B. and Colonel Geddes’ detachment holding the trenches made to-day will follow up the above attack so far as is consistent with maintaining proper garrison for the trenches. After the capture of the Pilckem line the attack will be continued and the old French line reoccupied.

That the 13th Brigade was ordered to attack in an area already allotted to the French may be attributed to the determination of the British command to cement the inter-Allied junction. General Alderson had not yet received the French operation order when he wrote his own; but the discrepancy of 30 minutes in the zero hour was deliberately allowed to remain until shortly before that hour, when it was increased to 45 minutes by verbal telephone messages which postponed the time to 3.45 p.m. Br.-General Mercer was ordered to co-operate with the French attack as it developed and later to let the 13th Brigade go through his line.

Colonel Geddes, nominally under Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan, but actually responsible for the eastern frontage, ordered to the attack the 9/Royal Scots, 2/D.C.L.I., 1/Y. & L. and 2/E. York, in that sequence from the right and each on a frontage of 500 yards; they were to operate east of the Pilckem road and in strict conformity with the movements of the 13th Brigade, the 2/E. Kent would maintain touch with the 3rd C.I.B., the 5/King’s Own would follow the attack in reserve, later the 3/ Middlesex would come into reserve. The 3rd C.I.B. was instructed to move forward on the right of the attack if developments justified such action, and the 2nd, 3rd and 14th Battalions were therefore warned to be in readiness. The 4th R.B. was transferred from Corps Reserve to 3rd C.I.B., in replacement of 2/D.C.L.I. and 9/R.S. withdrawn for the attack; thus only the 2/K.S.L.I. (less two companies) remained in corps reserve.

At 3.45 p.m. the 13th Brigade sent a message to 1st Canadian Division that the attack could not possibly start till 4.15 p.m.; having followed a circuitous route for five miles, northwards from Vlamertinghe and then eastwards through the French area to Brielen Bridge, it had been de-
layed by French troops on the road. Although the march had begun at 9 a.m. and the orders to attack had been given before 1 p.m., the Brigadier decided that his men must be fed before fighting and said that the time originally allowed was not sufficient. Presumably in issuing the orders the Canadian staff had been guided by the fact that the time taken by the 1st C.I.B. (less 2 bns.) to do the same thing, fresh but in the dark, was four hours. Inevitably the attack had to be postponed, and not until 4.25 p.m. did the leading battalions move off.

While his brigade was assembling Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan made a personal reconnaissance and he came to the conclusion that a complete gap existed between the left of the 1st C.I.B. and the canal. He disposed his own brigade for the attack with the 2/K.O.S.B. and 1/R.W.K. in the front line and the 2/K.O.Y.L.I. in support facing northwards between the Pilckem road and the canal, and the 9/London he kept in reserve west of the canal. The other battalion of the Brigade, the 2/W. Rid., was not present, having been left in 5th Division reserve at Zillebeke Lake; even with it the Brigade, which had lost 1,300 men and 62 officers in capturing Hill 60, was less than 3,000 strong; but the men, in spite of their recent experiences, were in good heart.

The Germans had ample warning of the impending attack, for at 2.45 p.m. the 11th and 12th Batteries C.F.A. and the 122nd and 123rd Heavy Batteries having been told that the assault would be at 3 p.m., but unaware of the postponement, opened fire. Several batteries of the 27th and 28th Divisional Artillery also fired. When the advance of the 13th Brigade, from the road leading east from Brielen Bridge, began at 4.25 p.m. there was thus little or no artillery support and the Germans opened a heavy fire as soon as the battalions came into view. On the left the 2/K.O.S.B. and 1/R.W.K., in dead ground at first, made good progress until, when they came up to the French right on the canal, a battalion of the 3rd Zouaves, whose zero hour had been set at 5
p.m., suddenly rushed to the attack across the front of the advancing 13th Brigade. Confusion was to a great extent avoided by the two British battalions changing front half right while continuing to move forward. The 1/R.W.K. on the left took up a line with the Zouaves along the road running northwest from Fusilier Farm; the adjoining 2/K.O.S.B. reached the left trenches of the 1st C.I.B. and a few of them, joined by men of the 1st and 4th Battalions made a little progress up the slope. Shortly after this the 2/E. York and 1/Y. & L. moved up to the line of the 1st and 4th Battalions and the added impetus carried them and the survivors of the Middlesex companies forward in spite of the machine gun and rifle fire at close range to within 200 yards of the German trench, and one small detachment of the East Yorkshire fought its way up to within thirty yards. Simultaneously the 9/R.S. (less two companies not yet returned from St. Julien) and the 2/D.C.L.I. joined in the attack; the former advanced past the left of No. 1 Company, 14th Battalion, at Hampshire Farm, but the machine gun fire was so intense, particularly from the right, that they withdrew and took up a position in echelon 300 yards in rear; the D.C.L.I. moved off from near Wielte at 4.15 p.m., crossed Hill Top Ridge and lost touch with the 9/R.S. in making their way down the forward slope, they finally reoccupied Turco Farm, the only cover from the machine gun and rifle fire which swept the valley unceasingly. At sunset, while on his way up to arrange for the relief of his men in the front line, Lieut.-Colonel A. P. Birchall was killed. Not until night fell was it possible to make any move to consolidate a line or disentangle units, casualties among officers had been heavy, on the featureless northern slope of Hill Top Ridge and in the valley were scattered the men of two Canadian and six British battalions, many of them dead, many more lying wounded where they fell, and of the survivors some so confused that daylight found them digging in facing the wrong way.
But the great dread of General Alderson that a road might be opened down the canal to Ypres had been dispelled to a large extent by the advance of the 13th Brigade, which now cemented and guarded the junction with the French. In thanking Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan for their gallant and valuable intervention he was moved to write: “Words cannot express what the Canadians owe the 13th for their splendid attack and the way they restored confidence.” But the Canadians in the line from Kitchener’s Wood to Gravenstafel knew nothing of this; their thoughts were of the coming test on their own front.
CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF ST. JULIEN OPENS

SATURDAY, 24TH APRIL

Map 4: Ypres 1915. German Attacks Forenoon 24th April
Map 5: Ypres 1915. German Attacks Afternoon 24th April
Sketch 3: Ypres 1915. Line at Midnight 24th/25th April (facing p. 336)


THE GERMANS PLAN ANOTHER ATTACK WITH GAS

The British high command had no doubt that the Germans would continue to attack: the next move might be either a blow on the south-eastern face of the Salient near Hill 60, or a thrust across the canal to split the French and Belgians at Steenstraat and Lizerne, or a drive southwards from the breach already made; or a combined operation might be staged. The first possibility forbade the weakening of the line by the withdrawal of more troops from the 5th, 27th and 28th (British) Divisions; the second and more probable demanded the continued presence of the British Cavalry Corps behind the French right, for if successful it would make a precarious position desperate; the third and most likely must be met by sheer hard fighting in the line and by the employ-
ment of all available reserves.\footnote{514}

With three alternative fronts of attack, the enemy, having the initiative and the great preponderance of artillery previously described, might proceed to develop any one of seven plans at will. The British policy, carried forward from 1914, was to disconcert and distract by vigorous countermeasures, and to frustrate co-ordinated and synchronised undertakings by infantry attacks which, even if costly and individually hopeless, were calculated to limit scope and reduce effect.\footnote{555} Hence, for the preservation of the Salient and the men and guns in it, as well as to gain time for the French to re-establish their lost line, one British battalion after another was launched into the battle, sometimes singly, sometimes by twos or by brigades, but always under terrific shell fire and across open fields where grazing bullets swept the ranks away.

The counter-attacks of the 23rd had held Duke Albrecht’s centre to the ground won by the gas on the previous evening, his right centre had suffered from the well-directed fire of the British and Canadian batteries on the western bank, and the southerly drive to capture Ypres had been forestalled. On his left the display of assurance along the Stroombeek valley, where the logical German mind might well have expected a withdrawal for sound tactical reasons, brought the realization that a deliberately prepared attack on a large scale would be necessary to roll up the line. To accomplish this he planned another gas discharge and assembled twenty fresh battalions during the night 23rd/24th. At dawn by convergent attacks they would crush together the old and the new Canadian lines as with a pincers, and by pushing southwards into the heart of the Salient would destroy that bulwark and force the abandonment of Ypres.

The operations westwards across the canal would be continued to enlarge the bridgehead, the first step being the capture of Lizerne by the \textit{XXIII Reserve Corps}, to be fol-
lowed by the seizure of Boesinghe, Zuydschoote and Pypegaale. This object once achieved, the line of retreat might be cut at Vlamertinghe by an encircling movement from the north while the Salient was being driven in. Thus the general plan, although at the start apparently divergent in character, was convergent in object throughout.

On the southerly front the 52nd Reserve Division, the right of the XXVI Reserve Corps, would stand fast on the line along Mauser Ridge to the canal; after a discharge of gas at several places the 51st Reserve Division of thirteen battalions, supplemented by the 2nd Reserve Ersatz Brigade and the 4th Marine Brigade each of six battalions, and three composite regiments each of three battalions drawn from the XXVII Reserve Corps, would attack the Canadian apex in front, flank and rear, and advance through St. Julien and For tuin to occupy the Zonnebeke Ridge. The XXVII Reserve Corps would at first participate only with artillery and de livery local thrusts, it would join in the advance later as the XXVI Reserve Corps swept southwards.

Aside from these offensive operations, all gains on the Pilckem-Langemarck front were to be consolidated and fresh troops were sent up for this purpose.\textsuperscript{537}

A NIGHT OF LABOUR IN THE CANADIAN LINE

The front of attack was held by ten Canadian battalions only partially covered by two field artillery brigades. In and behind it every man was busy, the infantry adjusting dispositions, strengthening parapets, filling sandbags, building traverses and digging cover;\textsuperscript{515} the transport and ration parties carrying supplies and even letters and parcels from home to some of the most exposed trenches; the engineers assisting with material and skill; the field artillery bringing up and unloading ammunition, an arduous task when batteries were firing from six to sixteen tons in twenty-four hours.

There had been no aggressive action by the enemy on the front of the 2nd C.I.B.;\textsuperscript{516} at midnight the 5th Battalion
reported “Perfectly quiet. Perfectly prepared”; the 8th, on its left, set camp kettles of water in the front line and saw that every man had a cotton bandolier and that he understood to wet it and tie it over nose and mouth if a gas cloud approached. They could see the enemy working in the ditch in front of his trench; to make sure of co-ordinated artillery support for breaking up the expected assault the 8th sent a test S.O.S. message to the covering guns of the 2nd C.F.A. Bde., and the response was immediate and satisfactory. Loop telephone circuits were laddered to ensure maintenance of this vital communication under bombardment and the batteries shelled the German trenches at intervals during the night.

On the original frontage of the 3rd C.I.B., the enemy had been unceasingly active, and the Corps and Divisional commanders had both expressed their appreciation of the “magnificent” tenacity of the garrison. The 15th Battalion had suffered from the gas shelling of the two previous days, all the men coughing, eyes and noses running, which wetted handkerchiefs mitigated but could not prevent; they had been warned that the 13th were going to vacate the tenuous peninsula that had been the left front line, and occupy a switch line extending at right angles from the left of the 15th towards St. Julien, so that the left of the 15th would become a pivotal apex in the Canadian position, therefore new traverses were being built of sandbags from wrecked dugouts, and two machine guns were mounted to cover the adjoining switch line occupied in due course by B Company of the 2/E. Kent on the right and the four companies of the 13th Battalion. These, closely followed by the enemy, whose persistent bombing attacks were held off by a devoted rear guard, began to withdraw in file from the right at 8 p.m., on the 23rd—a perilous manoeuvre and slow with so many wounded to carry; the fit, assisted by the sappers of the 3rd Field Coy., C.E., set about digging on the new alignment, covered by patrols in contact with the enemy who kept the countryside illuminated with flares. To their left, towards the
crest of the Gravenstafel Ridge, No. 3 Company of the 14th
(Major Gault McCombe) was similarly employed, and fur-
ther to the west, opposite Keerselaere, facing in the same
direction but not linked up, the 7th Battalion, assisted by the
2nd Field Coy., C.E., was erecting a wire entanglement of
five strands on conspicuously white wooden stakes along its
frontage of 700 yards. The St. Julien garrison, No. 2 Com-
pany of the 15th and No. 2 Company of the 14th, were now
supported in the western outskirts of the village by No. 4
Company of the 14th (Capt. E. Ranger), one of the two com-
panies brought up at 10 p.m. by Lieut.-Colonel Burland. To
him had been entrusted the responsibility of connecting up
the new trenches between the left of the 15th in the old front
line and the 7th Battalion in position above St. Julien and the
command of the firing line from the new apex westwards.520

No changes were made in the infantry dispositions of
the 3rd C.I.B. between St. Julien and Hampshire Farm: the
men in the line worked all night entrenching; telephone lines
were run out connecting the 3rd Battalion Headquarters in
the G.H.Q. line with the two detached companies southwest
of the Steenbeek; the two line companies of the 2nd, on the
outer flanks of the 10th and 16th facing Kitchener’s Wood,
were linked by telephone wire to battalion headquarters at
Juliet Farm, whence a line, often cut by shells and as often
repaired by devoted linemen, ran back to the Brigade
switchboard at Mouse Trap Farm. Patrols from No. 3 Co.
2nd Battalion, working across the gap on their left, found the
2/E. Kent in the G.H.Q. line 500 yards to the southwest.

The withdrawal of the 3rd C.F.A. Bde. behind the
G.H.Q. line brought the frontages of the 15th and 13th Bat-
talions out of range; the position of the 7th Battalion, not yet
under 3rd C.I.B., was unknown to these gunners so that there
was no organized artillery support for the 3,000 most critical
yards at the apex. During the night the 9th Battery, discov-
ered and heavily shelled on the 23rd and only 500 yards be-
hind the British line on Hill Top Ridge, took up a new posi-
tion near Potijze and registered the German line on both sides of Kitchener’s Wood. The 12th, also discovered in a nearby position and again heavily shelled, moved at 11 a.m. and came into action southwest of Potijze against the crossroads north of St. Julien. Covering this sector also, but acting independently, was the 149th Battery, R.F.A. (28th D.A.), effectively placed 500 yards south of Mouse Trap Farm. The 10th Battery remained west of the canal, covering the line south of Pilckem under the direction of 1st C.D.A. Headquarters. The right section of the 11th was also there with the 1st C.F.A. Bde.; the left, in action north of Potijze Chateau and firing northwards, was rejoined after nightfall on the 23rd, by the right section of the 8th which had spent the day in its old position 1,000 yards behind the line at St. Julien firing at targets beyond Kitchener’s Wood as directed by the 2nd C.F.A. Bde.

Between Hampshire Farm and the French, the units of Geddes’ Detachment spent the night in consolidating their front and in collecting and sorting out their men. On the extreme right the 2/E. Kent had not participated in the afternoon attack and the three companies remained in the G.H.Q. line east of Hampshire Farm until 3 a.m. when D. Company was moved southeastwards along the line to command the intersection of the Wieltje St. Julien road. The 9/Royal Scots dug in on Hill Top Ridge between Forward and Cross Roads Farms in echelon behind the left of No. 1 Company, 14th Battalion, at Hampshire Farm; on their left was a gap of 500 yards, and then the 5/King’s Own, back again in their reserve trenches at the cross roads above Irish Farm. Over the crest, 400 yards in front of the cross roads, the 1/York and Lanc. were digging in; and in a crescent along the slope to their left, through Foch Farm and northwards to the French flank, the 2/D.C.L.I. was consolidating on a frontage of 800 yards. In the bottom the remnant of the 3/Middlesex took up a position 300 yards south of Turco Farm until withdrawn to near St. Jean in the early morning with the 2/E.
York; the latter battalion, finding that other units were making a continuous line on their part of the front, had set themselves to the heartrending and backbreaking task of collecting wounded and carrying them to the dressing station at Foch Farm; but at daybreak they too moved back to near St. Jean.

In the evening of the 23rd April, the right attacking battalion of the 13th Brigade, the 2/K.O.S.B., found itself astride the Ypres-Pilckem road in front of Geddes’ left, the right company east of the road with the forward line of the 1st and 4th Canadian Battalions and extending 400 yards eastwards in the direction of Turco Farm. West of the road the other three companies shared their position with the Zouaves, as did the 1/Royal West Kent, from whose left the 2/K.O.Y.L.I. carried the British line to the canal.

These dispositions between the G.H.Q. line and the canal were known only in part to Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan and Colonel Geddes at the time, the former at his headquarters in a farm west of Brielen Bridge, the latter in a house in St. Jean, and they were not in touch with each other for twelve hours after their attack. Units were so mixed in the darkness that their positions could not easily be determined; the confusion was such that one company of the 5/K.O. was found facing in the wrong direction,—it was presently put into the gap on Hill Top Ridge. At 5 a.m. the discovery was made that the line which should have been strongly held was strong in the left only but weak in the right.\textsuperscript{530} Not until the early morning of the 29th April was the line for 100 yards east of Turco Farm satisfactorily consolidated by the 1st C.I.B.

By midnight the 1st Canadian Battalion had been withdrawn to the trenches dug by the support companies while the morning attack was in progress,\textsuperscript{521} and the 4th Battalion had moved out to the cross roads west of Brielen Bridge. In the early hours of the morning the three line battalions of the 13th Brigade were relieved by the 4/R.B., transferred from
the 3rd C.I.B. reserve; the 1/R. West Kent and the 2/K.O.Y.L.I. were withdrawn to a position west of the canal at Brielen Bridge, the 2/K.O.S.B. to a mile southeast of Elverdinghe; the 9/London remained on the canal bank also. At 2.25 a.m. the 13th Brigade was further augmented by the 4/E. York and the 5/York of the 150th York and Durham Brigade (50th Northumbrian Division, T.F.) which had been placed at General Alderson’s disposal: these two detached battalions lined the west bank of the canal, in support of the 2nd Zouaves; the remainder of the brigade took up a position in Divisional Reserve, with the 4/York and 5/D.L.I. behind the low ridge between Brielen and Ypres.

THE DAWN OF A GREAT AND TERRIBLE DAY

Shortly after midnight, anyone sufficiently far from the deafening rumble and clatter of transport on the granite pavé could hear the roar of a bombardment to the north, and all could see the flashes of German guns reflected in the sky. This was the attack on Lizerne which the Germans captured at 1.30 a.m., and it was followed two hours later by a thrust at the Franco-Belgian junction further north which the Belgians countered successfully. The Canadian Battalions in the line, and the field gunners also, stood to arms from 3 to 4 a.m.; at 3.30 two red and one green rocket rose above Pilckem; two German aeroplanes came over and some German batteries opened fire on the trenches; at 4 o’clock three red lights, dropped from a captive balloon near Westroosebeke, signalled the opening of a great and terrible day for Canada. A moment later, amid a sudden torrent of shells of all calibres, the sentries of the 8th and 15th Battalions saw in the half light a number of men wearing mine-rescue helmets appear over the German parapet; they seemed to have hose in their hands, and immediately there was a hissing sound, and a heavy greenish yellow cloud rose slowly like a thick fog across No Man’s Land and obliterated them.

The S.O.S. of the 8th brought a screen of shrapnel
screaming across their front at half a ton a minute, but the
simultaneous call of the 15th met a tragic response from the
willing but helpless 3rd Artillery Brigade—“4.01 a.m. We
have to admit that it is impossible for us to respond to your
S.O.S. and along the entire original front, as the trenches are
out of range from our present positions.”

The men in the line were spared the bitter anguish of reading that message; they only knew that the hour of trial had come, and that the orders were to hold their trenches at all costs. After ten long minutes of intense bombardment and gas the German infantry advanced to the attack. The right company of the 8th Battalion, beyond the edge of the cloud, raked the approaching lines with rifle and machine gun fire; the men of the centre and left companies, protected to some extent by the improvised respirators, helped and encouraged by the accurate shrapnel barrage, grasped their rifles and gasping yet un-daunted dragged themselves dizzily up onto the battered parapet to shoot down the steadily advancing grey figures. Rifle bolts jammed, boot heels and entrenching tool handles opened some of them; one man was killed by a blow-back, many of the wounded acted as loaders handing up charged rifles from where they lay to those who could stand up and shoot. The attackers still came on, they wavered uncertainly, then stopped.

The left company of the 15th, holding the apex and well outside the western edge of the cloud, could give no aid, for the front of the attack was out of their view; No. 12 platoon of the centre, however, also escaped and took the attackers in enfilade, while the two machine guns in their redoubt emptied belt upon belt of ammunition into the advancing enemy. Otherwise unaided, the other platoons of No. 3 and No. 1 company on the right next the 8th Battalion met the full potency of the gas; it penetrated what wet handkerchiefs they had, blinded all eyes with tears and filled lungs as if with cotton batting. Within the cloud shouted orders died on frothing lips, arm signals were unseen at ten yards, or dimly
seen through the gloom might be gestures of agony. The survivors of the right platoon of the centre company moved westwards out of the cloud to a small wood by the Stroombeek with intent to counter-attack according to the instructions; of the right company, the remnant which survived the shelling and gas also dropped back towards the stream and there, paralyzed in body but steadfast in spirit, fought it out to the choking finish.

The simultaneous attack on the northwestern face of the apex met with little success. It seemed to the Canadians between Keerselaere and Kitchener’s Wood that gas was released from the German line west of the village but, apparently because of an air current which would have carried the cloud westwards, the discharge was stopped and none reached the defenders who with rifles and machine guns engaged the crowding Germans as they came within range up the gentle slope. Enfilade fire from the three companies east of Kitchener’s Wood brought the advance up the Steenbeek to a halt, the three companies in garrison at St. Julien fired into the serried ranks of the enemy and drove them back across the Poelcappelle Road, the 7th Battalion denied access to Keerselaere; north of that village in front of the 13th Battalion there was an area of dead ground at the confluence of the Lekkerboterbeek and Stroombeek, and here the enemy mustered in force and crawling close through the high weeds pressed hard but failed to charge. When the first attempt was unsuccessful the attackers paused to allow the guns to do the work, and they blasted the whole line from the apex to St. Julien with another dense and deadly bombardment; the trenches in the valley bottom and up the northeastern face suffered most, for the German observers, having an uninterrupted view of them from the houses of Poelcappelle, had registered accurately and the precision of their guns undisturbed by British counter batteries, there being none, was such that every round seemed to hit.
LOCAL RESERVES MOVE TO REPAIR THE BREAK

The first reserve sent to the stricken front was the 10th Battalion. In its trench south of Kitchener’s Wood at 4.30 a.m. it received the message from Br.-General Turner: “Come out of line and move to Locality C supporting 8th Battalion”; he had an erroneous report that the left of the 2nd C.I.B. had been driven in, and notified Br.-General Currie that the 10th was rejoining and would he send it orders. That battalion, in half an hour, reported to their Brigadier at Fortuin; in and since the midnight charge over twenty officers and 450 men had fallen, and now the muster was but three officers and 171 other ranks. A staff officer guided them up to the Bombarded Cross Roads. Major Ormond, now in command, made a reconnaissance to Locality C and when he returned to lead them up the hill in open order they responded with a spirit and dash that left nothing to be desired. It was 5.30 a.m., the sun was up and a runner brought a message from Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett of the 8th Battalion:

To O.C. 10th Battalion.

Your first duty is to secure Locality C. You may be able to do so and still send help to the Highlanders, you must judge the situation. I cannot find out exactly how it is. But I must impress upon you the necessity of our not allowing the Germans into Locality C.

Ten minutes later the 10th was extended in the miserable trench along the sky line on the left of No. 1 Company, 7th Battalion, in Locality C. The message quoted is explained by the fact that Br.-General Currie, as soon as the direction of the attack was known, transferred to Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett D Company, 5th Battalion, whose right was brought into a breastwork in the orchard of Boetieer Farm, and also No. 1 Company, 7th Battalion, in Locality C, which the 10th was directed to protect. Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett, while the enervating cloud enveloped his headquarters at Boetieer Farm, heard by telephone from the front line that the Germans, driven back
on his front by the excellent artillery barrage and the fire of such men as could still handle their rifles, were advancing unchecked on the trenches of the 3rd C.I.B. He ordered the half company of the 8th in close support near Iser to proceed to the left and assist the 15th Battalion: at 4.50 a.m. Lieut. N. G. M. McLeod took his platoon into the adjacent and now empty trench of the 3rd C.I.B., Captain Morley disposed the other in the extreme left end of the 8th Battalion trench where casualties from gas, trench mortars and enfilading artillery had been particularly heavy, and the enemy had also been attacking from the flank and left rear. To meet German efforts to cross the space of 1,300 yards between his left and Locality C, Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett, who realized that he had a difficult situation to meet, quickly determined that he must send every available man to hold the left of his line, for if that gave way before there was time for reinforcements to come up, the front line for a very considerable distance might be lost. He ordered his last reserve, the half company at Boetleer Farm, to that critical point; while leading them down Lieut. O'Grady was shot, and Company Sergeant-Major F. W. Hall was killed when amid a hail of bullets he went out of the trench a second time to bring in a wounded comrade after two others had fallen in the first attempt—he was awarded the Victoria Cross. The only troops of the 2nd C.I.B. not in line by 5.15 a.m. were C Company of the 5th Battalion in close support on the right at Gravenstafel; at that hour Lieut.-Colonel Tuxford, hearing of the urgent and immediate need, sent three platoons from it to support the 8th. They suffered severely on the way down, their guide, Captain W. R. Bertram of the 8th was shot, two of the company officers and many of the men were hit on reaching the trench, but these reinforcements checked the enemy heavily, prevented the trench being turned, and enabled the position to be held for the next thirty-six most critical hours.
THE APEX OVERWHELMED, THE RIDGE HELD

By their penetration of some 700 yards into the north-eastern face of the Salient the Germans had the Canadian apex at their mercy and could take in reverse the north-western face. At 6 a.m. they attacked southwards, overwhelmed the survivors of the 15th in the little wood by the Stroombeek but were stopped at about 300 yards from Locality C by the garrison, equivalent now to little more than one company. At 6.30 a.m., after renewed artillery preparation, they attacked again and were stopped again, but nearer. Then a concerted attempt was made to reduce the apex; the artillery, after concentrating on this first objective, pounded the right of the 7th at Keerselaere, No. 3 Company of the 14th on the crest and the shallow trench of the 13th on the forward slope while the German infantry prepared to assault from all sides. The defence of such a position was quite impossible; the shelling had caused many casualties and had put out of action all four machine guns of the 13th, not, however, before one of them had fired 1,500 rounds into the advancing enemy. At 8.30 a.m. the order was passed down for the 13th Battalion to retire and it was passed along to B Company of the 2/E. Kent. Retirement seemed equally impossible. The German artillery fire, according to an eye witness, was “absolutely hellish in its accuracy.” The three companies on the left fell back to the top of the ridge, the right company, now reduced to three officers and forty men, at a given signal from Major McCuaig, dashed back towards the nearest cover, a hedge fifty yards in rear; immediately a most intense rifle and machine gun fire opened on them from three sides and only about a dozen reached the ridge; the three officers were hit and disabled; in ten minutes the German firing line passed them and they with the other wounded were prisoners.

Not having received a definite written order to retire, and seeing that any such order could not be carried out, the men of B Company of the 2/E. Kent continued to engage the
enemy until their ammunition was exhausted; then they closed in to their right which rested on the redoubt in the original front line held by No. 4 Company of the 15th Battalion and still marking the apex of the Canadian line, but now entirely cut off. Pressed on every side by the enemy’s infantry, bombarded also by trench mortars close in the rear, there were few who remained unwounded; at 9.10 a.m. all ammunition was exhausted and the survivors of the 2/E. Kent and 15th were captured. The men of the 13th, 14th and 15th who reached the support trenches on the crest of the ridge near the windmill took cover also in the ditch of the Keerselaere-Gravenstafel road and linked up on the right with the 10th Battalion in Locality C; but now their left was in the air for the enemy had placed a particularly heavy artillery concentration on the cross roads east of Keerselaere, the right centre of the 7th Battalion, and a section of field guns brought up to a concealed position behind the houses had the range to a nicety at 200 yards.

The St. Julien garrison, which had been firing consistently on the advancing enemy in spite of the bombardment, and in spite of the jamming of their rifles from the rapid fire, now received a welcome reinforcement, 100 men of the 3rd Battalion under Captain L. S. Morrison sent up from the G.H.Q. line by order of Br.-General Turner to reinforce on the Fortuin road southeast of St. Julien; as the line west and northeast of St. Julien was holding and must be held, the Commandant directed this detachment into the centre to man two trenches between the left of the 7th Battalion and No. 2 Company of the 15th which closed to the left.

The two companies of the 3rd Battalion further to the left were not seriously troubled by the enemy’s guns; at 8.30 a.m. a determined effort to work in between them and St. Julien was frustrated by rifle and machine gun fire, and the German infantry drew off to allow the artillery to subdue the defence. Opposite Kitchener’s Wood the centre of the line was held by No. 4 Company of the 2nd Battalion which had
gone in to relieve when, soon after the 10th Battalion, the 16th had been withdrawn, across the open under the incessant sniping and machine gun fire, to reorganize in the trenches of the 2/E. Kent in the G.H.Q. line about Mouse Trap Farm.

After five hours of hard fighting the Germans had accomplished the first part of their plan, the capture of the Canadian apex; the net result, however, was only the crumpling in of the front to a maximum depth of a thousand yards on a frontage of less than a mile, and that by the expenditure of much ammunition and many men. The tactical achievement of the gas alone was limited to the neutralization of 700 yards of front line trench: to that extent it made a breach in the outer defences. On this occasion it had caused no widespread panic and cleared no pathway through secondary or inner works. Where the line was covered by artillery and the troops in line even slightly protected by makeshift respirators the cloud had accomplished nothing material; the great surprise had been sprung, and while as such it had been at first successful, now however its unknown power had been withstood, and its moral effect was gone; the physical effect upon individuals was to last a lifetime, but for this battle it had ceased to be the dominating factor.

THE FOG OF WAR

The early and contradictory reports as to the location and extent of the German attacks were disconcerting to General Alderson; it was however established by 7 a.m. that although the right face of the 3rd C.I.B. had been penetrated, yet the shoulders at St. Julien and Locality C were being held and the original front of the 2nd C.I.B. was still intact. With the news of the loss of Lizerne and the failure of General Codet’s counter-attack there at 8.30 a.m., the high hopes of relief by the re-occupation of the old French line faded: the prevention of a break through was all that mattered now. Even at 6.45 a.m., the Canadian command under-
stood the situation to be that the 2nd C.I.B. had been attacked, lost a trench, but had finally counterattacked with success. Messages from both Br.-General Turner and Br.-General Currie indicated Kitchener’s Wood to be the centre of danger, and at 6.50 a.m. the former wrote “We do not feel uneasy.” Ten minutes later, however, Lieut.-Colonel Loomis, the Commandant, St. Julien, sent word—

Quite a number of stragglers coming back. Evidently line broken. Just received message from Burland saying breaking through on our right. I will endeavour to collect stragglers and delay retirement quick. If any supports will be available, please let me know.

At 7.05 Br.-General Turner replied—

Our right section has given way. You will counterattack with two companies at once. A company 16th Bn. is being hurried to St. Julien to support you there. St. Julien must be held.

The last sentence was the echo of General Alderson’s 5.30 a.m. admonition: “You of course understand necessity of keeping St. Julien.”

To the 15th Battalion Br.-General Turner at 7.15 a.m. sent the message:

Reported that impression exists in your regiment that they are to retire on G.H.Q. line. This must be corrected at once. You are to hold your front line. If driven out, collect your men, organize counter-attack and regain it. You are on no account to retire on G.H.Q. line.

The first part of this was too late, none of it ever reached the men still in the line on the left, and exactly what happened in the Stroombeek valley behind the right of the 15th will never be known; but it is certain from individual documents that the battalion casualties, most of them suffered on this day, amounted to 647, of whom 249 were killed in action or died of wounds, including 33 recorded as having “died of gas”—and but for the gas many of the helpless wounded would have survived. No other Canadian battalion, and few British battalions, ever suffered so heavily in so
short a time.

Lieut.-Colonel Loomis could not understand the 7.05 a.m. order to counter-attack;\(^{541}\) it certainly could not be carried out literally, for the two companies were even then holding off the enemy at vital parts of the front line, so he collected the signallers, pioneers, orderlies and runners at his headquarters—about 15 in all—loaded them with bandoliers and ammunition and set out for the line. Arrived at the top of the ridge he found his own 13th Battalion and the attached companies on the flanks fighting off the frontal attack from the northwest, but menaced all along the rear by the enemy who had followed the gas cloud; he ran back to Brigade Headquarters and reported the situation in person, explaining the necessity of artillery support. Upon hearing this Br.-General Turner informed 1st Canadian Division:

Our line is broken C.6.c. (i.e. Keerselaere) to right. Organizing at St. Julien and occupying G.H.Q. line. No troops in rear. Support needed. Please give situation on our left, is there any prospect for help.\(^{545}\)

He had no fresh reserves, since 2/D.C.L.I., 9/R.S.\(^{486}\) and 4/R.B.\(^{511}\) had all been transferred to Geddes’ Detachment and 13th Brigade.

BRITISH RESERVES AND REINFORCEMENTS

Sources of help at this juncture were few and distant. On the Canadian right the 28th (British) Division had eight battalions in line on a frontage of 6,000 yards with two attached companies in close support. Two battalions, the 1/Suffolk and 12/London, lay in divisional reserve between Verlorenhoek and Frezenberg; one and a half were in huts a mile northwest of Ypres; the remaining five were with Geddes’ Detachment in the Canadian flank. Further south the 27th (British) Division had a similar frontage held by nine battalions and in immediate reserve two battalions and a detached company; in line astride the Franco-British boundary, under Br.-General Wanless-O’Gowan, were two battalions (2/D.C.L.I. and 4/R.B.), and near 27th Divisional Headquar-
ters, at Potijze Chateau were the 1/Royal Irish Regiment in
divisional and 2/K.S.L.I. (less one company) in corps re-
serve. On the adjoining II Corps front at the southern shoul-
der of the Salient, the 5th Divisional frontage of only 3,500
yards, but including Hill 60, was held by two brigades of
five battalions each; the third brigade, the 13th (less one bat-
talion in divisional reserve), was at Brielen Bridge under the
Canadian Division, with one battalion behind the French
right between Brielen and Elverdinghe.

The infantry force east of the canal at the disposal of
General Alderson at 9 a.m. was eleven Canadian and eight
British battalions; west of the canal the 4th Canadian Battal-
ion and three battalions of the 13th British Infantry Brigade
had already been engaged; of fresh troops he had the 150th
(Y. and D.) Brigade and, since 3.30 a.m., the 2nd Cavalry
Division north of Vlamertinghe. In V Corps reserve west
of the canal were the 10th Brigade, en route from Locre to
Vlamertinghe and promised to the Canadian Division on ar-
rival, and the 149th (North’d.) Brigade on the march from
Poperinghe to Vlamertinghe, an eventual total of four regu-
lar and five territorial battalions, and the 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion since 1.15 a.m. The Cavalry Corps, now reduced to the
3rd Cavalry Division by the detachment of the 1st and 2nd
but augmented by the 151st (D.L.I.) Brigade at
Vlamertinghe, was guarding the northern flank.

When at 7.30 a.m. he learned that the right of the 3rd
C.I.B. had been broken and was again being attacked, Gen-
eral Alderson ordered the 150th Y. and D. Brigade— con-
sisting then of the 4/York and 5/D.L.I.—from the Brielen
area to occupy the G.H.Q. line across the Ypres-
Poelcappelle road and to act as reserve to the 2nd and 3rd
C.I.B. At 8.25 a.m. he received the following message
from 3rd C.I.B. (timed 7.50 a.m., repeated 8.20 a.m.):—

Our line is broken C.6.c. (i.e. Keerselaere) to right. Or-
ganizing at St. Julien and occupying G.H.Q. line. No troops
in rear. Support needed. Please give situation on our left, is
there any prospect for help.
Twenty minutes later as the enemy was still pressing the attack on St. Julien he ordered the 4/E. York and 5/York to leave the 13th Bde. at Brielien Bridge and rejoin the remainder of their own Y. & D. Brigade in G.H.Q. line east of Wietje; these two battalions were replaced in the 13th Brigade by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade (2nd Cavalry Division), and the two companies of 3/Middlesex guarding the bridges were also sent to rejoin their battalion east of St. Jean.

THE FOG THICKENS

During the anxious hours of the forenoon frequent messages were exchanged between Canadian Division and the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades.

8.25 a.m. 2nd C.I.B. to Cdn. Div.

My line still intact. 3rd Brigade front line fallen back. I am holding Locality C with 3 Companies with orders to hang on there and help 3rd Brigade if possible. My 7th Battalion still in position C.6.b. (i.e. Keerselaere). Am collecting stragglers here and sending them to Locality C. Understand 3rd Bde. holding St. Julien they should have 7 companies there in addition to what was in their front line which was 7 companies. Will try and establish new line C.6.D.1.c. and d. D.2.c. and d. (i.e. switch line from original left of 8th Battalion to Keerselaere.)

8.55 a.m. 3rd C.I.B. to 1st Cdn. Div.


9.50 a.m. 3rd C.I.B. to 1st Cdn. Div.

Still holding St. Julien line although being pushed hard.

10.35 a.m. Cdn. Div. to 3rd C.I.B.

If absolutely necessary call on Brigadier York and Durham for assistance of one Bn. but do not do so unless absolutely necessary as it is hoped to use this Bde. to relieve yours this evening.
10.50 a.m. 2nd C.I.B. to 3rd C.I.B.

If the Gravenstafel Ridge is to be preserved, it is imperatively necessary for your G.H.Q. 2nd line garrison, your troops in rear, to reinforce your left flank front. My last message half hour ago was that my 7th Bn. was still holding it. What is your St. Julien garrison doing?558

11.30 a.m. 3rd C.I.B. to 2nd C.I.B.

Have not substantial reinforcements at my disposal to reinforce your left, Gravenstafel Ridge. We are holding G.H.Q. 2nd line with about 700 men, all that are available. My right front is being blown out of successive positions towards St. Julien. Still hold between C.11.c. to C.11.d. (i.e. Kitchener’s Wood to St. Julien).565

General Turner, when he found that the St. Julien garrison was too heavily engaged to deliver a counter-attack, and in anticipation of Divisional action, told the Commandant, Lieut.-Colonel Loomis, that a counter-attack through St. Julien by one battalion would be pressed by troops coming up from Ypres, and that his command was to follow up with it,550 and he so informed the 2nd C.I.B. Shortly before 10 a.m. when he heard that the Y. and D. Brigade had been ordered up to his assistance,554 he sent a staff officer to get in touch with them; but it was noon before the brigadier and the leading battalion appeared.

Meanwhile the German shell fire persisted with such intensity that he came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to continue to hold his front unless some artillery could be brought to bear on the enemy’s guns. But at this time there were no British guns capable of reaching the hostile batteries, even had their positions been known, and although the 3rd Brigade, C.F.A., was in touch and firing by request of the 3rd C.I.B. on the front between Keerselaere and Kitchener’s Wood, there was only one of the four batteries—the 9th—in action on the 3rd C.I.B. front; for the 10th and 11th were both west of the canal, the former supporting the French, the latter on the way to a new position behind Hill Top Ridge. The 12th Battery, in action 500 yards south-
east of Hill Top Farm, fired until 10 a.m. when it was engaged so heavily by enemy batteries with aeroplane observation that one gun was galloped out of action, and the two remaining withdrawn by hand; after midday, from a new position 1,000 yards south of St. Jean, fire was opened on the road north of St. Julien.

The long-awaited orders for the counter-attack came to hand at last:

11.35 a.m. Cdn. Div. to 3rd C.I.B. (received 11.53 a.m.)

Two battalions of York and Durham Bde. are placed at your disposal for a counter-attack to restore situation on your right. This attack must be energetically pushed. The two battalions from 13th Bde. will be sent to G.H.Q. 2nd line in place of the two battalions of York and Durham Bde. 566

At noon Lt.-Colonel A. H. Macdonell of the divisional staff, who had acted as guide for the 5th D.L.I., introduced Br.-General Bush (Y. & D. Bde.) to Br.-General Turner at Mouse Trap Farm; they discussed the counter-attack and Br.-General Bush set out to find his other battalions while the above message was repeated and notification of the proposed action was communicated to the 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. as follows:–

3rd C.I. Bde. to 2nd C.I. Bde. (received 12.30 p.m.)

We are going to counter-attack with two battalions through C.18.a. on D.7.c. (i.e. passing south of St. Julien and directed north-eastwards).

THE FIGHT FOR ST. JULIEN AND LOCALITY C.

The situation on the 3rd C.I.B. frontage after the Germans had gained possession of the exposed northern face of the Gravenstafel Ridge, was that the right, consisting of remnants of the 15th Battalion, rested on Locality C, next were the 13th and No. 3 Company of the 14th, along the Keerselaere-Gravenstafel road; the right two platoons of the 7th north of the road had been practically exterminated by six hours of shelling from guns of all calibres, at ranges down to 200 yards, and the survivors had fallen wounded
into the hands of the advancing enemy.

That swift progress was not made by the Germans at this point is attributable to the valour of Lieut. Edward Donald Bellew, Machine Gun Officer of the 7th Battalion, who had two of his guns in action on the high ground at the cross roads overlooking Keerselaere. His trained gunners had mostly been hit so he handled one gun himself, Sergt. H. N. Peerless the other, and although the outcome was plain they stayed and kept on firing into the enemy at 100 yards. The Germans, finding that their attack was progressing but slowly because of the strong opposition, and particularly galled by the fire of these two guns, redoubled their efforts and worked southwards behind them. The Sergeant was killed, Lieut. Bellew was struck down, nevertheless he got up and kept on firing until the last belt was finished and the enemy rushed in; he seized a rifle, smashed his gun and met them with the bayonet; he was overpowered and taken prisoner. For his action Lieut. Bellew was awarded the Victoria Cross. 560

At 11 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Currie, O.C. 15th Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel W. W. Burland, i/c firing line, and Major V. W. Odlum, now commanding the 7th Battalion, met on the Enfiladed Cross Roads 800 yards east-northeast of St. Julien and decided that the line, being in view of the enemy and enfiladed by machine guns from both flanks, should be withdrawn 300 yards and held until the position could be cleared up, reinforcements received, and the situation re-established. This movement was carried out by the right half of the line which could take some advantage of dead ground behind the crest, but the two left companies of the 7th, in attempting to fight their way back to their rendezvous 300 yards southeast of St. Julien, were so closely pressed by the enemy that few escaped capture and the Germans charging in waves from the west were in their trench shortly after noon. At the finish there was no ammunition and almost every rifle bolt had stuck.
From the captured trench above St. Julien the enemy could now bring fire to bear on the southern slope of the Gravenstafel Ridge. At 12.30 p.m. Lieut.-Colonel Currie, Lieut.-Colonel Burland and Major Ormond met behind Locality C on the Zonnebeke-Keerselaere road near the Haaneebeek culvert and there consulted. The 10th had fallen back from the left of Locality C to conform with the new alignment of the 3rd C.I.B., but No. 1 Company of the 7th was still in position there; that a withdrawal of the 8th from the original line had been ordered was known, it was not known that this had been countermanded because of the promised counter-attack; the enemy was in possession of the trenches north of St. Julien and increasing machine gun fire swept the valley from the northwest; the firing line consisted of the survivors of some fourteen companies belonging to five battalions; a proposal made by Major Ormond to advance and recover the sky line and the toe of the Ridge was judged hopeless, retirement to the G.H.Q. Line was also vetoed; as the present position was untenable it was decided that a withdrawal should be made to an unmarked line a thousand yards in rear, north of and roughly parallel to the Fortuin-Gravenstafel road. Through occasional gaps in the smoke of the bursting shells the men who now formed the front line of the 3rd C.I.B. could be seen fighting their way back from the crest of the ridge by successive retirements, each party on falling back a short distance covering the withdrawal of the next by its fire, and whenever pressure relaxed even advancing up the slope again. So was carried out the closing phase of a continuous infantry fight of ten hours in which the Canadian line, while gradually falling back upwards of a mile, did not break under the strain but so effectively punished the enemy that the troops of the 51st Reserve Division abandoned the attack until reinforced. The line specified was reached: it was that still occupied by the British when withdrawal from the point of the Salient was ordered ten days later, at the end of the battle.
When the right of the St. Julien garrison was exposed shortly after noon the enemy seized the opportunity to attack on every side. Part of No. 4 Company of the 14th managed to withdraw under cover of the houses they occupied on the left; but No. 2 Company of the 14th and No. 2 Company of the 15th, whose only orders were to hold till overwhelmed, fought it out in their shattered trenches to the bloody finish. Field messages tell the story, the last received from No. 2 Company of the 14th reads:

To O.C. 13th Bn.

Enemy have shelled us out and are advancing from our left and front. Will hold every traverse if we have to retire along line to our right. Captain Williamson killed. 11.30 a.m.

This was signed by Captain W. C. Brotherhood who was killed within an hour, and in that hour the rifles of both companies jammed repeatedly.

The German midday attack that forced the right and centre of the 3rd C.I.B. back to the line Locality C—St. Julien contained no element of surprise: for an hour before noon the 8th Battalion had been firing at long range into masses of the enemy passing westwards by Wallemolen; the defenders of Locality C watched a dozen battalions swarm forward across the Stroombeek valley to deploy in the open fields, and some appeared to carry white flags which actually were artillery markers, while others bore frames, mistaken for stretchers, but actually machine guns; other observers reported a dense column of mounted troops and infantry followed by artillery moving southwards along the main road from Poelcappelle; from the dead ground towards Langemarck, line upon line of infantry emerged fresh for the assault upon St. Julien, and as they advanced the companies of the 3rd and 2nd Battalions towards the woods shot them down and drove them back. News of this concentration reached Br.-General Turner, and because of the exposed position of the 2nd Battalion he ordered Lieut.-Colonel Watson by telephone at 1 p.m. to retire, but when in reply the latter
sent back his adjutant, Captain Willis O’Connor, to give personal assurance that he was holding and could continue to hold his portion of the line, the order was cancelled. Neither this order nor its cancellation reached the two line companies of the 3rd; Captain Streight on the right, who witnessed the overwhelming of the St. Julien garrison, saw that the enemy was now directly in his rear at 300 yards and suggested withdrawal to avoid being cut off, but Major Kirkpatrick said the orders were to hold the position at all costs, he had just received a message from his O.C., Lieut.-Colonel R. Rennie, “Do not lose touch with St. Julien. Hang on. A counterattack is being made on your right.”

WITHDRAWAL OF THE 3RD C.I.B. TO THE G.H.Q. LINE

Not only from his own front, but also from the 27th\textsuperscript{571} and the 28th Division,\textsuperscript{576} General Alderson received warnings of the German midday advance; the latter division said that one of their howitzer batteries was firing at Germans moving southwards at the west of Locality C, and that, although there was a concentration of enemy to the north of Broodseinde opposite their own front, they had sent two companies to stop a “contemplated disastrous evacuation” of the exposed left of the 2nd C.I.B.\textsuperscript{577} Even the 5th Division, whose cyclist officer reported from Wielte “enemy of all arms marching south through Keerselaere,” passed on that information and added that the right of the 3rd C.I.B. was giving way a little; another alarming message from the same source contained more partial and deceptive statements—“many Canadians in disorder through Wielte from right and left,” and “Y. & D. Bde. has relieved Canadians and are holding line S.E. of Wielte.”\textsuperscript{592} Just before one o’clock Br.-General Turner discussed the situation by telephone with the G.S.O.1, Colonel C. F. Romer, and a written order followed:

1.00 p.m. 1st Can. Div. to 3rd C.I.B.

As Germans seem massing in C. 6 (\textit{i.e. at Keerselaere}) you must not counter attack but utilize the bns. of York and
Durham Bde. to strengthen your line and hold on.\textsuperscript{580}
This was intended to mean the line of the 3rd C.I.B. from Locality C to Hampshire Farm, but Br.-General Turner, because of the prearranged scheme of parallel defence and repeated references to the G.H.Q. line,\textsuperscript{431} understood it to mean that line and not the frontage eastwards to Locality C. A message from a Divisional staff officer at 1.15 p.m. said that two battalions York and Durham Brigade were then entering G.H.Q. trenches east of Wielte with instructions to push northwards and support the 3rd C.I.B. astride the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, and that a third battalion was following.\textsuperscript{584} He had a further conversation with Colonel Romero at 1.35 p.m. and understood his instructions to be that he should hold St. Julien as long as possible and then occupy the G.H.Q. line; upon this he sent the following message:—

1.40 p.m. 3rd C.I.B. to 5th Durhams, 4th Yorks, 2nd, 3rd, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th Canadian Bns.

You will hold G.H.Q. line from St. Jean-Poelcappelle road south.\textsuperscript{586}

To increase the depth of his formation he also ordered the 3rd Field Company back from its position east of Mouse Trap Farm and directed it to construct, for the accommodation of three battalions, a new support trench running northwards east of Wielte and then west behind the crest of Hill Top Ridge to View Farm. More detailed instructions for the dispositions of the battalions now in the 3rd C.I.B. followed: the 5/Durhams and the 4/York had been ordered to prolong the unoccupied G.H.Q. line below the Wielte-St. Julien road, the remaining two battalions of the York and Durham Brigade, the 4/E. Yorks and 5/York directed to occupy the G.H.Q. line on arrival from the Canal bank, were assigned to the left of the new support trench.\textsuperscript{595} There was some confusion, however, in numerals or seniority whereby the roles of the 4th and 5/York were transposed and subsequently the 5/York were ordered to dig in behind the Buffs west of Mouse Trap Farm and be ready to counter-attack when nec-
The 2nd Canadian Battalion was directed to “occupy G.H.Q. line in C.17.d.” The two forward companies of the 3rd Battalion were to “retire on G.H.Q. line,” and the troops under Lieut.-Colonel Loomis, the “firing line,” consisting of the 13th Battalion and attached companies of the 14th and 15th all to “fall back through G.H.Q. line.” The 16th, which had attempted to reinforce the line at St. Julien, was back again in the G.H.Q. line northwest of Mouse Trap Farm.

In accordance with the 1.40 p.m. order quoted above, Lieut.-Colonel Watson sent word to his companies to withdraw. By crawling low along the shallow ditches to avoid a sniper’s bullet in the spine, and then taking advantage of the cover provided by the buildings and hedges near Juliet Farm to dodge the whistling jets of lead from machine guns at the edge of Kitchener’s Wood, most of the men of the three companies of the 2nd Battalion made their way back as ordered to the G.H.Q. line south of Mouse Trap Farm, the battalion headquarters also, and the Colonel with a wounded private on his back. At the extreme left the little garrison of Oblong Farm which had received the order to retire, but were too closely engaged to execute it, kept on fighting until they had no more ammunition and then succumbed to weight of numbers. Meanwhile the enemy in the centre, moving forward through the wood in strength, outflanked part of No. 2 Company which, although it received the order, as did the two neighbouring companies of the 3rd, was like them incessantly subjected to an intense fire from front and flanks. They had two machine guns mounted in the farm buildings east of the wood, there was no lack of targets and they were killing many Germans by independent rifle fire. They had come from Canada to do this, and so they maintained the unequal fight and held on.

FORTUITOUS BUT TIMELY INTERVENTION OF BRITISH BATTALIONS

The order for the withdrawal of the 3rd C.I.B. line east
of St. Julien was written at 2.10 p.m.; it reached some parts of the front half an hour later, others not for over two hours, and the movement was carried out simultaneously with the advance of British battalions south of Fortuin. The opportune arrival of these reinforcements in the midst of the battle was due in the first instance to the G.O.C. 27th Division (Major-General T. D'O. Snow) to whom General Plumer at 9 a.m. had deputed the control of all troops in Corps Reserve, with power to employ them at his own discretion to meet unexpected local developments. When he heard that the Germans were advancing through St. Julien, rather than send the 2/K.S.L.I. from G.H.Q. line east of Potijze, – for he had the erroneous information that the line was broken between the 85th British and 2nd Canadian Brigade at Berlin Wood – he ordered the 1/Royal Irish Regiment from his own (27th Div.) reserve to make good Fortuin and stop the Germans coming on. This battalion, which at 9 a.m. had arrived about 370 strong at Potijze from Hooge Wood, moved off from near Potijze Chateau at noon and found that although heavy fire was coming from the north, the enemy had not passed the line Locality C St. Julien and that the 7th Battalion with a few men of other units and mustering about 200 in all, were at Fortuin. This situation was unknown to General Snow, who, under the impression that the Germans were in occupation of Fortuin and that there was a gap east of St. Julien, decided that immediate and drastic action was necessary; having no troops of his own division or of Corps Reserve available and telephone communication being broken with V Corps headquarters, he personally issued a verbal order to Br.-General Chapman of the 85th Brigade (28th Div.) that the two battalions of the 84th Brigade in divisional reserve at Verlorenhoek (1/Suffolk and 12/London) must be used to carry out the task of driving the Germans back and closing the presumed gap. Br.-General Chapman had already been in touch with Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Wallace of the 1/Suffolk, and at noon had invited him to take up a position
a thousand yards above his headquarters at Verlorenhoek and facing east and northeast to check the advance of German cavalry. Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, in command of the two battalions, accepted the orders from the 85th Brigade to attack and hold Fortuin.

Having inaugurated these movements the G.O.C. 27th Div. sent a message to Br.-General Turner:

2.15 p.m. 27th Div. to 3rd Bde.

The enemy’s advance from Fortuin must be stopped at all costs. You must move every man you have got to drive him back. I have directed 2 bns. under O.C. Suffolks from Frezenberg against Fortuin. I am also sending you up the R. Irish Regt. from here and have directed them on cross roads in C.23.c. (i.e. 1,000 yards N.E. of Wieltje). You will get in touch with these troops and take command in that part of the field and drive the enemy North Eastwards. I am issuing these orders as I am on the spot and communication appears to be dislocated and time is of the highest importance. Act with vigour.

(Message received 4.05 p.m.)

Receipt of such an order from an unknown divisional commander whose front was three miles away could make little impression on a Brigadier who was in touch with his own divisional commander and fighting his troops according to a preconcerted plan. Satisfied that he was acting in accordance with General Alderson’s designs and having no reason to suppose that the G.O.C. 27th Div. had been invested with the powers of a Corps Commander in the Salient, Br.-General Turner disregarded the message, except that he walked over to Fortuin in the afternoon and ordered the battalion he found there, the 1/Royal Irish Regiment, to withdraw to the G.H.Q. line at dusk. He saw nothing of the 1/Suffolk or of Wallace’s other battalion, the 12/London.

Two other British battalions were however destined to play an important part in the action of the afternoon – the 4/York and the 4/E. York of the Y. and D. Brigade. There is some doubt as to who was responsible for their presence in
The withdrawal of the 3rd C.I.B. to the G.H.Q. line seriously endangered the left rear of the 2nd C.I.B. At 3 p.m. from the original left beyond the Stroombeek to the G.H.Q. line was an exposed flank of two and a half miles defended at three places by the fighting remnants of five Canadian companies and the equivalent of one company in reserve, for by that time the withdrawal of the 13th, 14th and 15th Battalions to behind the G.H.Q. line was in progress. The altogether providential intervention of the five British battalions at this most critical juncture undoubtedly averted a major disaster.

THE 2ND C.I.B. HOPING FOR AID, STANDS FAST

Early in the day one of the German concentrations of artillery had set on fire the headquarters of the 2nd C.I.B., which therefore moved at about 7 a.m. to join the headqua-
ters of the 2nd Bde. C.F.A. at another farm 750 yards to the southwest. From here an artillery telephone line was maintained throughout the forenoon to Lieut. O.C.F. Hague (7th Bty.) at his O.P. on the Gravenstafel Ridge, and thence to 8th Bn. at Boetleer Farm. Br.-General Currie held several conversations over this line with Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett, of whose tactical judgment he had the highest opinion and under whom he had studied for the Militia Staff Course in Victoria, B.C., in the peaceful spring of 1914. Both the commanders were of the opinion that unless a strong counter-attack was delivered through Locality C the brigade trench line would have to be evacuated, and a new position taken up on the Gravenstafel Ridge. For 1,300 yards across the open fields between the left company of the 8th and Locality C was a gap; through it the enemy was threatening to penetrate, and it was only covered by reverse fire from the front line and by D Company of the 5th Battalion in the orchard of Boetleer Farm on the crest. The formation of a retrenchment across the exposed slope in broad daylight and within four hundred yards of a German brigade had proved unfeasible. The whole line on the right had been denuded of reinforcements, and there were none in the 2nd C.I.B., so that unless the pressure on the left was soon relieved by fresh troops the line must be withdrawn, or be abandoned to final destruction.

Anticipating this possible quandary earlier in the day, and having already placed the two companies at Locality C under Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett, Br.-General Currie directed that the trench line should be held as long as possible, but that in case of a forced withdrawal retirement would be by the left: the 8th Battalion would fall back to Locality C and Boetleer Farm, the 5th would conform and maintain touch with the left of the 85th Brigade in the original trench line at Berlin Wood. Of the critical moment to disengage, after the breach was made and occupied in strength, only the commander on the spot could be the judge; it would be fleeting,
and on the decision to go or stand would hang the issue of
the day.

The uncertainty as to relief of the pressure by counter-
attack lasted throughout the forenoon, and as the hours
passed the probability of enforced retirement increased. At
11.05 a.m. Br.-General Currie warned the neighbouring 85th
Brigade on his right:–

Am still holding front line trenches and I think Locality
C but third Bde. has apparently retired. May have to evacu-
ate trenches as left is very much exposed. My right, Section
1, will keep in touch with your left. I will not order a retire-
ment for some time yet.\footnote{560a}

But almost simultaneously the withdrawal by three hun-
dred yards of the line between Locality C and St. Julien was
begun by the 3rd C.I.B., and the enemy a few minutes later
was in a position to sweep with fire the reverse slope of the
Gravenstafel Ridge; Br.-General Turner’s message, that his
troops were being blown out of position after position east of
St. Julien and that he was holding the G.H.Q. line, further
darkened the outlook, and Br.-General Currie at 11.45 a.m.
held a conversation with Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett: “As the 3rd
Brigade are falling back on G.H.Q. 2nd line you will have to
retire on the Gravenstafel Ridge and hold there.”\footnote{565a} At 12
noon he sent to the 85th Bde. the following notification of
the action he was taking:–

Owing to my left flank, Section II, being entirely unpro-
tected and having been informed that no reinforcements are
available I have ordered the 8th Battn., Section II, to retire
by its left on to the GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE, the 5th Bat-
talion Section one to conform to the movements of the 8th
Bn. but to maintain contact with your left. Will endeavour to
establish line from Wood in C.10 & 11 ST. JULIEN—
Locality C—GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE. In order to retain
GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE substantial reinforcements re-
quired on line squares C.12, D.7 and 8 from which counter-
attack might be launched but we have no troops available or
sufficient for this purpose.\footnote{565b}

The Germans found that repeated applications of artil-
lery, trench mortar and rifle fire did not shake the defence, and they made no strong infantry attacks against the old front line trench after their first attempts in the early morning; the bold retention and reinforcement of such a tactically unsound position gave them good reason to suspect a trap, and as Duke Albrecht’s plan did not call for them to intervene and roll up the line until the centre of the attack had progressed through St. Julien and Fortuin and had secured the western end of the Zonnebeke Ridge, the battalions of the XXVII Reserve Corps sat down in the fields north of Locality C and waited. But when Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett learned shortly after noon that the 3rd C.I.B. right had been driven back to behind Locality C he saw that unless a counter-attack came quickly to thwart the enemy’s next and obvious move he must bring his line back to the ridge, and the 5th Battalion would have to conform. As soon as the German attack on Locality C began, he had sought the views of his company commanders in the line, and they, sensible of the temper of their men, said they would rather stay. He accordingly made report to his brigadier:–

12 noon 8th Bn. to 2nd C.I.B.

Situation we hold our trenches and some of 48th (15th Bn.). I have two platoons in hedges in front of Battalion H.Q. to protect my left rear. So we have a bad gap between us and Locality C. In this gap I have only 20 men. I can hold my line providing the Germans do not get round my left rear. But it is a very bad situation unless we can get troops to fill gap from my Batt. H.Q. towards Locality C. If you are sending me reinforcements let them come to just south of Battalion H.Q. (i.e. Boetleer Farm). Please let me have instructions as to whether it is intended to hold this line or not. Just heard German advance against our left seems to have slackened and come to a halt. I am not uneasy about being able to hold my line if the Germans are prevented working round my rear.

To aid in the computation of the last possible moment for withdrawal, he again asked advice of his company commanders in the line; before their replies came in he received
direct over the telephone from Br.-General Currie the message:–

3rd Brigade will counter-attack with 2 battalions through C.18.a. on D.7.e. (i.e. skirting the S. of St. Julien and towards Locality C). Also two battalions York and Durham Bde. will be employed to restore situation on the left of 2nd Inf. Bde. 582

This was accompanied by an order “to hang on to his front trenches as long as possible” instead of carrying out the projected retirement to the crest of the Gravenstafel Ridge, 587a so he resolved that his line must stand 587 and his company commanders, as yet unaware of this definite and promised counter-attack, sent their indefatigable runners,—for telephone lines were now beyond repair—with the resolute message that they would hang on and hold their trenches as long as they had a man to put on the parapet. Lieut.-Colonel Tuxford, two of whose companies were under Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett, one with the left company of the 8th in their most exposed trench and the other at Boetleer Farm and towards Locality C, received the news of the decision to remain “with much delight.”

When Br.-General Currie found that the German attack on Locality C was being heavily pressed, he had called for closer artillery support, and at 10 a.m. one section of the 6th Battery, C.F.A., under Lieut. H. F. Geary was sent forward 1,200 yards to a semi-covered position on Zonnebeke Ridge from which they fired 200 rounds into the enemy west of Locality C. Two hours earlier he had heard that two battalions of the York and Durham Brigade had been ordered to G.H.Q. line as reserve to his own and the 3rd C.L.B. 544a and he had sent his Orderly Officer back to Wielije to meet them and make sure that one battalion at least was detailed to close the gap east of Locality C. To that critical point he directed Lieut. H. F. Hertzberg who with twenty-seven men of the 2nd Field Co., C.E., had reported to dig in a battery; the sappers at once became infantry, pushed on quickly across the stream and up the slope, and arrived just in time to
reinforce Lieut. H. B. Scherschmidt and the thirty-four other survivors of No. 1 Company, 7th Battalion; these men held the trench along the crest against overwhelming odds until ordered back at nightfall, when the combined force numbered forty. But at 11 a.m. when the Germans were on the skyline east of Keerselaere, the Orderly Officer had returned to say that no reinforcements had appeared, he was sent back to watch for them and hurry them along, he returned again to say that the 5/D.L.I. had arrived in the G.H.Q. line and proposed to remain there for further instructions. Urged by his staff and supported by Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett’s opinion, Br.-General Currie risked his military career by going back personally to find some troops wherewith to stop the gap.

He was not successful in his quest: he saw the 5/D.L.I. near Wiertje at 1 p.m. and asked Br.-General Bush to let him take them forward; but that officer, who had just come from discussing with Br.-General Turner the plans for counter-attack, desired to await the arrival of another of his battalions and set off towards Potijze to find them. Br.-General Currie saw the 4/York moving into the G.H.Q. line at 2 p.m., but they would not go forward without orders from their own brigadier, nor would the 5/D.L.I. He was on his way to find Br.-General Bush again when a staff officer of the 3rd C.I.B. met him with the news that the counter-attack had been cancelled; he could see no sense in that, so went on to plead with Br.-General Bush to let him have some troops to take forward, but that officer had his orders that the counterattack was cancelled and Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Mitchell of the Canadian Divisional Staff who was present confirmed them.

Here was an insoluble predicament; apparently plenty of fresh troops held idle in the G.H.Q. trench-line more than three miles behind his own brigade which, as far as he could see, was being left to certain destruction. He was told that a British Divisional Headquarters was at Potijze Chateau, five hundred yards to the southeast: thither he went, assuming that they would be in close communication with Canadian
After a short interview with the G.O.C. 27th Division, he despatched the following message at 3.30 p.m.:–

To 1st Canadian Division.

At 12.30 my left flank was entirely unprotected, the 3rd Brigade having retired to St. Julien. The three companies at Locality C were practically non est. I then ordered 8th Batt. Section II to fall back to Locality C, the 5th Battalion to conform to their movements and hold the Gravenstafel Ridge, notifying the 85 Bde. of what I was doing. I then received notification that two battalions, one the Durhams and the other the Yorks, were being sent to me in order to counter-attack and that the attack was to be pushed with vigor. I came back to G.H.Q. 2nd Line to meet those two battalions. I saw the Durhams at one o’clock and their Brigadier and waited until two when I was told by Staff Officer 3rd Bde. that counter-attack was not to be made by Durham and Yorks and I came to Hdqrs. 27th Division to send report.

A. W. Currie.

As he was in the act of writing, conditions at his Fortuin Headquarters, after having become almost desperate, were beginning to take a decided turn for the better. There since 12.30 p.m. all had been hopefully waiting for the development of the promised counter-attack, until at 2.25 p.m. the message came that it was cancelled, and that Br.-General Turner had ordered his troops to hold the G.H.Q. line. This made it evident that the 2nd C.I.B. was expected to withdraw, and Lieut.-Colonel Creelman of the covering 2nd Bde. C.F.A. estimating that six of his guns could fire all the ammunition available, ordered the others to move out and come into action near Potijze. The 7th and 8th Batteries and the left section of the 6th began to move out at 2.45 p.m. by the cross-country route followed in the previous evacuation. As the guns were clearing the position, a line of skirmishers appeared advancing from the southwest; these must be the promised reinforcements. They were indeed British reinforcements, though not those promised. They were the 1/Suffolk and 12/London, ordered to attack and
The Brigade Major, 2nd C.I.B., Lieut.-Colonel H. Kemmis Betty, found that the battalions had orders to move N.E. and clear out any of the enemy met with. That was enough, the Brigade Major explained the situation, informed Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett and Lieut.-Colonel Tuxford of the movement, and set out at 4 p.m. to guide the battalions forward; he directed the right flank on Boetleer Farm as previously arranged, while another of the 2nd C.I.B. Staff, Major C. J. Mersereau, directed the left, which was bent back in anticipation of enfilade fire from St. Julien. For a time casualties were light, and the advance progressed, but there was no weight behind the attack, field batteries of the 27th and 28th D.A., unaware of the movement and without observation, were shelling the area, and the enemy, now in occupation of Locality C, the ridge to the west, and some of the houses towards St. Julien, opened rifle, machine gun and shrapnel fire, which delayed the companies in support. The adjutant of the 8th Bn., Major A. Kirkcaldy, was wounded on his way from Boetleer Farm to meet the advancing battalions, whose front line almost reached the Haanebeek and there entrenched in a quadrant of 700 yards facing towards Locality C, their right in old trenches four hundred yards west of the Bombarded Cross Roads, occupied by the survivors of the 10th Canadian Battalion, who fell back to Fortuin on the assumption that they were being relieved. In the course of the action the 12/London suffered 59 casualties, including the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Bayliffe; the 1/Suffolk estimated theirs at 154. The left of the 8th Battalion was two thousand yards to the northeast, still holding the original front line trench of the 2nd C.I.B., and still hopeful.

A GERMAN ATTACK DRIVEN BACK

While this advance was in progress the 4/York and 4/E. York, unknown to brigade or divisional commanders, were moving northeastwards from the G.H.Q. line near Potijze;
they received their baptism of rifle and machine gun fire as they approached the Haanebeek and changed front half left to meet it. The leading companies of the 4/York pushed on to five hundred yards south of St. Julien; the 4/E. York in echelon slightly to the left rear faced Kitchener’s Wood, and the captain of the rear company in the ditch of the Wielte-Fortuin road sent a runner to the nearby section of the 6th Battery, C.F.A. below Fortuin, with the written question “Can you tell me where the enemy is?” While these Yorkshire Territorials were still advancing the 1/Royal Irish Regiment moved up through Fortuin and turning northeastwards occupied the trenches on the slight rise half way between Fortuin and St. Julien. They found St. Julien strongly occupied and could make no further progress; on their left they saw the 4/York, of whose mission they had not been informed and who like the 4/E. York, although under heavy fire, did not realize that the Germans were attacking in strength. But the troops of the 3rd C.I.B. in the G.H.Q. line under Lieut.-Colonel F. S. Meighen could see the movement; with rifles and machine guns they were firing into large bodies of Germans moving southeastwards from Oblong Farm and Kitchener’s Wood soon after 4 p.m. For half an hour this continued and, although the German right was forced to take cover behind farm buildings and hedges, the centre, at long range or out of sight, pushed on across the Wielte-St. Julien road, and was met by rifle fire from the Yorkshiremen. The observation officer for the left section of the 6th Battery, which at 12.53 p.m. had been switched left to cover the rendezvous of the 7th Battalion in the trenches between Fortuin and St. Julien and now occupied by the 1/Royal Irish Regiment, heard the rattle of musketry and could see rank upon rank of Germans advancing across the open fields from Kitchener’s Wood, in the level sun rays a perfect target. Lieut.-Colonel Creelman could also see them from his headquarters near the batteries, so he at once ordered the left section of the 5th Battery (i.e., the attached
right section of the 2nd) and the remaining section of the 6th, to engage the right and left halves of the new target, the right section of the 5th to distribute fire across the original brigade frontage in the Stroombeek valley. The gunners laid over open sights; the guns opened at 5.15 p.m., the battery commanders directed the fire, Major Harvey McLeod from a vantage point astride the roof-ridge of Brigade Headquarters. “Range 1600”—then “Drop 200” and again—“Drop 200.” At twenty rounds a minute ammunition would soon be exhausted and the enemy was still advancing. “Four wagons of ammunition, sir,” a subaltern reported as his sweating teams pulled into the farm-yard; he and his drivers had come the long six miles from Vlamertinghe, by burning Ypres and Wieltje mostly at the trot, but halting now and then to let a German salvo burst on the road ahead, then galloping across the target at his signal, and steadying to the trot again. Now the range was 900 and at last the enemy could be seen going back towards the wood. At 6.30 p.m. it was reported “our troops advancing from St. Julien towards Kitchener’s Wood”; in the deceptive light of sunset the German evacuation had been mistaken for the expected British counter thrust, and the report gave substance to the hopeful rumour that there were still Canadians in St. Julien.  

But in fact it was empty all night save for the dead of both sides.  

By their timely advance into the centre of the breach these five British battalions, from Suffolk, London, Yorkshire and Ireland, unwittingly played a major part in stopping the fifth and final German advance for the day, and it is plain from German records that the appearance of 2,500 troops advancing deliberately and in good order, at the very time when the coup de grâce was being aimed so upset the enemy that he withdrew from St. Julien. The fourth German attack, delivered from the north at 3 p.m. had succeeded in entering St. Julien and resulted in the occupation of the deserted village as far as the church. The simultaneous advance of the 102nd Reserve Infantry Brigade up the left bank of the
Steenbeek was checked for some time when it came up against the three stubborn companies C and D of the 3rd Battalion and No. 2 of the 2nd Battalion, and the garrison of Oblong Farm, all of which had been unable to carry out the order to retire. The right rear of the three companies had been exposed shortly after noon when the last of the St. Julien garrison was wiped out, and when their left was opened up two hours later by the withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion they were completely isolated. Attacked again and again they stopped attempts to assault from the front, and knowing that only a counterattack could save them they fought on, trusting that at any moment the promised British battalions would appear. But the advance of the two Yorkshire battalions came just an hour too late; by 3.30 p.m. the only machine gun in the right company had been put out of action, ammunition was running low, the whole line was swept by a concentrated barrage of machine gun fire from the front and the enemy already far in rear on both right and left closed in on the isolated trench. The few unwounded Canadians fought on, finally they were overpowered and taken prisoner. Of the right company which had moved into line at full strength less than thirty-six hours before only forty-three could walk, nearly every one of these was wounded, and two were totally blind.

Fortunately for the troops in the Salient the effect of this desperate stand followed by the appearance of fresh British battalions was lasting enough to prevent the execution of an order from the XXVI Reserve Corps to retake St. Julien village that night, for it happened that in the midst of this action Br.-General Turner, unconscious of the danger and of the tremendous potential consequences, was walking from Mouse Trap Farm to Fortuin and back again to find the battalions said to have been put under his command by G.O.C. 27th Div. As already recorded he only found the Royal Irish and ordered them back to the G.H.Q. line at dusk; they passed the word to the Yorkshire battalions and all three
withdrew at 7 p.m. and the gap was again partly opened.

THE DEFERRED BRITISH ATTACK TO RECOVER ST. JULIEN

After he had heard that the 3rd C.I.B. was driven back to the crest of the Gravenstafel Ridge, and before he received news of the German massed advance on St. Julien, General Alderson was planning to relieve Geddes’ Detachment and the 3rd C.I.B. with the 10th Brigade and the Y & D Bde. respectively. After 1 p.m. when he supposed that part of the Y & D Bde. was being employed to strengthen the line at St. Julien, he still intended that the 10th Bde. should relieve, and gave warning to Br.-General Hull that he would be responsible for Br.-General Turner’s line as far as St. Julien on the right and the Y & D Bde. for the remainder. Having carried out the relief, the 10th Bde. would counter-attack along with such other troops as might be available, probably before midnight.

The 10th Brigade when placed at General Alderson’s disposal at 11.10 a.m. on the 24th was at Ouderdom, less than three miles southwest of Vlamertinghe. It had been ordered to march at once to the G.H.Q. line for the relief, staff officers had been sent to reconnoitre the area, and Br.-General C. P. A. Hull, who reported at Château des Trois Tours in the middle of the afternoon, was taken into consultation when the operation order for the counterattack was being prepared. At 3 p.m. his brigade arrived on the outskirts of Vlamertinghe, but the number, position and condition of the units available in the battle area was indeterminable and, because the action was still in progress, the objectives also.

Of fresh troops in the Ypres area there were the two remaining brigades of the Northumbrian Division. The Northumberland Brigade, at first near Poperinghe, had been ordered up to Vlamertinghe at 11 a.m. on the 24th to replace the D.L.I. Brigade in Army Reserve. At 3.25 p.m. on the 24th it was ordered to move into the salient and directed by V Corps on Potijze where, together with the D.L.I. Brigade transferred from the Cavalry Corps, it would come into
Corps Reserve under General Snow. Command of the Y & D Brigade was still in some doubt, Br.-General Turner thought it was at his disposal as did the 1st Cdn. Div., but General Snow understood that the brigade was under his orders as part of the Corps Reserve.

By late afternoon the G.H.Q. line on the Canadian front was crowded with a medley of troops, belonging to eight or more battalions, all tired, mostly weak or disorganized, and unfit for employment in attack.

On account of the tactical developments already described, and the consequential reaction of higher authority, the tentative plans had to be revised. There were conversations, delays, extensions and readjustments, and eventually the counter-attack was delivered after daybreak on the 25th.

On receipt of the news of the massed German advance the counter-attack of the Y & D Brigade had been cancelled, and the 1st C.I.B. (less 2nd and 3rd Bns.) had been ordered from the canal bank to the G.H.Q. line and to report arrival there to Br.-General Turner; the 4th Bn. moved off at 1.15 p.m. tired and reduced in the fighting of the past thirty-six hours from full strength to four officers and 246 other ranks. But it was not considered advisable to move the 1st Battalion then in support 300 yards behind the firing line of the 2/D.C.L.I. and 4/R.B. because the French attacks on the adjoining frontage were so far meeting with little success; the German trenches opposite were reported from the air to be crowded with troops, and it might be necessary to employ the battalion at any moment. At 7 p.m. the firing had died down and the 1st Battalion, mustering ten officers and 250 other ranks, moved into the G.H.Q. line south of Wieltje.

ON THE FRENCH FRONT

After the loss of Lizerne soon after midnight the French had linked up with the Belgians west of the village, and a renewed German attempt to take Zuydschoote at 3 a.m. was successfully withstood by the timely ad-
vance of two Belgian battalions. At 8.30 a.m. General Co-
det had attacked with the newly arrived 306th Brigade
(153rd French Div.) and failed to enter Lizerne, a second
attempt at 2 p.m. was also unsuccessful; but the Germans
also failed to enlarge the bridgehead to any extent and their
westerly advance, like their southward drive to take the Zon-
nebeke Ridge, finished for the day with only the first objec-
tive attained. At the Franco-British junction, where through-
out the morning there was doubt as to the position of the
line, four battalions of Colonel Mordacq's Zouaves ad-
vanced from the canal bank at about 1.30 p.m. with the ob-
ject of pushing the line forward a thousand yards towards
Pilckem. A call from V Corps to the Canadian Division at
11.37 a.m. for any spare Canadian batteries to be placed un-
der Colonel Duffus to support a French attack against Pil-
ckem resulted in the participation of sixteen 18-pdrs. of
the 1st C.F.A. Bde., four of the 10th Battery C.F.A. and the
eight 4.5-inch hows. of the 118th R.F.A. Bde. The co-
operation was reported to be excellent; but, as on the previ-
ous day, the French had few field guns and no heavies in ac-
tion, so that while the advance of German reinforcements
was prevented, the weight of shell was not enough to break
down the resistance of an enemy now well established in a
strongly entrenched position. Before nightfall the
Zouaves, who had sent patrols into Turco Farm and found it
unoccupied, took up a continuous line between the canal and
the Ypres-Pilckem road. This road, although French units
had orders to take over another thousand yards eastwards to
the Ypres-Langemarck road, was for the present the
boundary between the Allied forces; Turco Farm was design-
ated as the point of junction in the front line, Colonel Ged-
des was held responsible for the sector between the Ypres-
Pilckem road and the 3rd C.I.B. The 13th Infantry Brigade
remained between Geddes’ Detachment and the canal, with
orders to keep in touch with the French advance on Pilckem
and to take advantage of their progress.
ACTION TAKEN TO FILL THE BREACH AT ST. JULIEN

It was shortly after 4 p.m. that General Alderson heard from one of his staff that the whole of the 3rd C.I.B. and attached battalions had been ordered back to the G.H.Q. line. He was at a loss to understand what could have happened, for he had supposed that Br.-General Turner was using the battalions sent forward to strengthen his line between Ob- long Farm and Locality C. He sent the following message:

4.35 p.m. Cdn. Div. to 3rd C.I.B.

There are in and around Wietje 4 bns. Y and D Bde. the Y.L.I. and the Q.V.R. (i.e. 9/London) of 13th Bde. and part of 4th Bn. With these troops you must make head against the Germans. You must push troops up into your front line and prevent at all costs the Germans breaking through between you and the 2nd C.I.B. I have no exact knowledge of your situation at the present moment, but hope that you are still blocking St. Julien and in close touch with 2nd C.I.B.

The action ordered was in accordance with the Divisional Scheme of Defence and also with specific instructions sent twenty minutes earlier by Sir John French to General Smith-Dorrien: “Every effort must be made at once to restore and hold the line about St. Julien or situation of 28th Division will be jeopardised.” Apart from this tactical necessity, the strategic need for maintaining the Salient was emphasized by the continued assurances of General Foch that the French were going to “take a vigorous offensive against the front Steenstraat, Pilckem, Langemarck and east of these places”; he said that a fresh division, the 153rd, was arriving and that he had called up a second infantry division for employment next day. He did not say that the fresh division had only been organized ten days and consisted of new units. The optimism of the French commander is indeed remarkable, for with two fresh and two exhausted divisions covered by a few field batteries he was proposing not only to drive four victorious German divisions, backed by overwhelming artillery, out of an entrenched position three miles
long, but to push them back three miles and so reoccupy the original line. The view of the British commanders was more conservative, and although they underestimated the strength of the German forces it was evident to them that heavy pressure from the north might necessitate withdrawal from the point of the Salient and they were doubtful about the left. The British Cavalry Corps (General Allenby) was placed at the disposal of General Putz to guard the Franco-Belgian junction, for Sir John French was still apprehensive lest a German wedge might be driven in to split the Allied armies at Lizerne.

General Plumer, who had been informed of the decision of the British Commander-in-Chief, sent orders at once to General Alderson directing that a counter-attack should be made without delay and allocating the troops:

6.30 p.m. V Corps to 1st Cdn. Div.

The Corps Commander wishes you to place under a selected Commander the tenth infantry brigade the York and Durham Bde. and the other Battalions including K.O.Y.L.I., 4th Canadian Bn. and Q.R.V. (i.e. 9th London Regt.) and the two Bns. of twenty-eighth div. and one of twenty-seventh (i.e. 1st Royal Irish Regt.) directed on FORTUIN by G.O.C. twenty-seventh Div. or such of them as you can assemble, and use them for the purpose of making the strongest possible counter-attack with the object of retaking ST. JULIEN and driving the enemy in that neighbourhood as far north as possible so as to secure the left flank of twenty-eighth div. and re-establish our trench line as far to the northward as possible. He leaves to you the time at which the counter-attack is to be made with the proviso that it should not be delayed any longer than you consider absolutely necessary for reconnaissance and preparation. The Northumberland Bde. and D.L.I. Bde. of the Northumbrian Div. have orders to move to-night to about POTIJZE in Corps Reserve and you are authorized (or the Commander you nominate) to call upon this reserve for reinforcement or support or to confirm and develop any success. These Bdes. will be temporarily until required under the command of G.O.C. 27th Div. All divisions will render the counter-attack all possible artillery support under arrangements to be made by C.R.A. Canadian
This order necessitated the cancellation of the intended reliefs of the 3rd C.I.B. and Geddes’ Detachment by the York and Durham and 10th Brigades; Br.-General Hull was nominated to command the attack, and since twenty-two battalions and a dozen batteries were concerned it was calculated that the troops could not be ordered and marshalled until after midnight. To put the German artillery at some disadvantage, the hour of assault was set at 3.30 a.m. and a final operation order was issued by General Alderson at 8 p.m.

Meanwhile something had to be done to prevent a further German gain of ground southwards. General Bulfin, appreciating that the greatest danger to his 28th Division lay in this possibility, at 4.45 p.m. ordered the 84th and 85th Brigades to “Collect what troops you can, entrench and hold a general line parallel to Fortuin road”—that is, the Fortuin-Gravenstafel road. He elaborated these instructions at 5.10 p.m. and issued them also to the 83rd Brigade; and to make certain of receipt he sent duplicate messages to each brigade and called for acknowledgment. Again at 7.05 p.m. he ordered “84th and 85th Bdes. with everybody available will continue to dig the line named.” But the plan was “not understood” by Br.-General A. G. Chapman of the 85th Infantry Brigade “as Royal Fusiliers and Canadians on their left are still in their original trench line,” little was done to site a good defensive line and little digging, for all but one of the six companies detailed for the task, as well as the 8/D.L.I. which came up later, were called away or moved further north to help the 2nd C.I.B. In the maintenance of his position Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett had been energetic and indefatigable; the commanders of neighbouring British units met his insistent appeals with generosity and understanding. At about 8 p.m. he secured a party of about a hundred of the 2/Northumberland Fusiliers under Major E. M. Moulton-Barrett and sent two platoons under Lieut. V. C. Hardy to the
left of the left company of the 8th where they dug a short flanking trench and with the aid of a machine gun assisted in repelling three attempts against the exposed left, now known to have been undertaken by two fresh naval battalions; the remainder entrenched in support southwest of Boetleer Farm. When he found at 7.30 p.m. that the 1/Suffolk were entrenching behind Locality C, he asked Lieut.-Colonel Wallace for two companies: his request was granted at once, and he brought them into line on the crest immediately west of Boetleer Farm. Although these two companies had a total strength of but 150 this was a most valuable reinforcement.

In the working party of the 85th Brigade, besides the Northumberland Fusiliers and also under Major Moulton-Barrett, were C Company 1/Monmouth, and No. 2 Company 2/Cheshire. Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett sent the Monmouth Company forward northwestwards from Boetleer Farm and one of the platoons was cut up by machine gun fire in an attempt to drive the enemy out of a farm on the forward slope; the Cheshires took up a position in the Haanebeek valley near the Zonnebeke-Keerselaere road. At 10 p.m. still not satisfied with the strength of the position, he went with Lieut.-Colonel Tuxford to call on Major A. V. Johnson commanding the 3/Royal Fusiliers, the left line battalion of the adjacent 85th Infantry Brigade. There he met Captain H. Mallinson who had been sent forward with three companies of the 83rd Brigade (2/King’s Own, 1/K.O.Y.L.I. and 3/Mons.) carrying tools for the troops of the 84th and 85th Infantry Brigades supposed to be digging the switch line along the Fortuin-Gravenstafel road. He was not successful in securing any of these; Captain Mallinson, finding that nobody was digging the line and “having found the situation sufficiently restored,” led two of his companies back to their billets for they were required to carry rations to the 83rd Bde. front line; the third company followed soon after.

Br.-General Turner, to take stock of his resources, at 7.55 p.m. issued a message calling upon the C.Os. of the
13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Battalions, the 2/E. Kent, 4 and 5/York, 5/D.L.I., 9/London and 2/K.O.Y.L.I. to report at Mouse Trap Farm within an hour, but in the darkness and confusion of units few received the order and no conference took place. At 8.45 p.m. he informed Canadian Division that he was occupying the G.H.Q. line from the St. Jean-Poeilcappelle road northwards to about Hampshire Farm with the remains of the 2nd, 3rd, 14th and 16th Canadians, and 4 and 5/Yorks and 5/Durhams, 2/E. Kent, one and a half companies Q.V.R. (9/London) “possibly 3,500 total.” He added “some of our troops still are in St. Julien, surrounded. This number originally 700 now possibly 200,” but in this he was undoubtedly mistaken for the Germans were in full occupation of the village from 3 p.m. until they abandoned it at 6.30 p.m. He made no mention of any attempt to link up with the 2nd C.I.B. left: apparently he supposed that G.O.C. 27th Div., who had been put in command of the reserves and ordered to use them to stop the German advance southwards, had been made responsible for that essential duty and was directing appropriate counter measures. He had sent a message to G.O.C. 27th Div. saying that he would send out an officer’s patrol at night to reconnoitre the Fortuin area, and in another message at 9.35 p.m. he explained the position. General Snow, realizing that there had been some grave misunderstanding, notified V Corps. The immediate result was a peremptory order:–

11.35 p.m. V Corps to Cdn. Div.

Reference message received from Twenty-seventh Div. and repeated to you by telephone to the effect that all troops of third Canadian Bde. and those from twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth Div. have been ordered by Gen. Turner back to G.H.Q. second line or to their division thus giving up all the ground for which such a struggle has been made to-day and leaving the second bde. in the air Corps Commander directs that instant action be taken to re-establish a line as far forward as possible in the direction of ST. JULIEN and in touch if possible with our troops on right and left. If neces-
sary you are to appoint an officer to take command. He suggests that a staff officer should be sent to deal with the situation on the spot.

Astounded and incredulous, General Alderson sent his senior G.S.O. 2, Lieut.-Colonel Gordon-Hall, forward with full powers to take whatever action he might find necessary and he ordered the Divisional Cyclist Company to occupy Fortuin and report to G.O.C., Y. and D. Brigade. Br.-General Turner at the same time was on his way to see General Alderson; the attitude and orders of G.O.C. 27th Div. seemed to him so inexplicable, inappropriate and incomprehensible that he took the extreme expedient of mounting on a motor cycle behind a despatch rider and setting out for Château des Trois Tours to make certain whether he was supposed to take his orders from General Alderson, his own divisional commander, or from General Snow. This interview only served to develop the unfortunate, but partially correct, conviction in the mind of each commander that the other did not understand what was happening.

Another and more fortunate result of the widespread interruption of telephone communication at this juncture was that the 1/Suffolk and 12/London under Lieut.-Colonel Wallace remained in the gap. Only the 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. which had no control over them, Br.-General L. J. Bols of the 84th Bde. who was more concerned with his own front, and the Germans busy entrenching in Locality C, were aware of their position. They were not under 1st Canadian Division and they did not report to General Snow who had taken them from their own 84th Brigade. Nor was General Bulfin in touch with them. He too was anxious about his own front, and protested vigorously but vainly against the moving of his troops without his knowledge.

5.15 p.m. 28th Div. to First Canadian Division.

Please direct my two battalions first Suffolks and twelfth Londons now at FORTUIN to return to eighty-fourth Infantry brigade headquarters at earliest possible moment as their presence is urgently required there. These battalions
were sent to FORTUIN at three p.m. to-day by General Snow's orders as he was out of touch with me and heard that Germans were occupying FORTUIN.

8.40 p.m. 28th Div. to 27th Div. repeated to V Corps and Cdn. Div.

While I am responsible for holding a line of defence I must protest against troops allotted to its defence being moved without my knowledge.

It was important that these two battalions, in contact with the enemy, should remain in line, so General Snow at midnight ordered Lieut.-Colonel Wallace to withdraw them far enough to form a safe line, and when the 8th D.L.I. arrived at Potijze at 7.30 p.m. he sent that battalion to the 85th Brigade in replacement. Before midnight the remainder of the D.L.I. Brigade (6th, 7th and 9th D.L.I.) came up and he held them at Potijze in corps reserve: by some misunderstanding twelve hours previously, it had been supposed by 28th Div. that two of these battalions had been released from Corps Reserve and they were consequently ordered up to St. Jean to come under 1st Cdn. Div.—but the order was not acted upon.

Providentially the Germans had had enough of fighting for one day and, apart from the attempts in the darkness to envelop and roll up with cold steel the original front line trench of the 2nd C.I.B., had decided not to renew the general attack until the morrow. At nightfall on the 24th April there were immediately opposite the right of the Canadian front, from Gravenstafel to Kitchener's Wood, at least 39 battalions of German infantry. That they did not advance during the night, when for six hours the frontage between Locality C and Mouse Trap Farm only contained two weak British battalions, can only be laid to the reception their repeated attacks had met all along the line throughout the day. They had been fought to a standstill.

The Canadians, most of them exhausted by two long days and nights of fighting, snatched what sleep they could and few of them heard until later of the message to General
Alderson from the Commander-in-Chief;

I wish to express to you and the Canadian troops my admiration of the gallant stand and fight they have made. They have performed a most brilliant and valuable service. Last night and again this morning I reported their splendid behaviour to the Secretary of State for War and I have a reply from him saying how highly their gallantry and determination in a difficult position are appreciated in England.596

These reports reached His Majesty the King, who sent a message of congratulation to his troops;

During the past week I have followed with admiration the splendid achievements of my troops including the capture and retention of Hill 60 after desperate fighting, and the gallant conduct of the Canadian Division in repulsing the enemy and recapturing four heavy guns. I heartily congratulate all units who have taken part in these successful actions.597
CHAPTER XI

THE ATTACK OF HULL’S FORCE AND THE LOSS OF
THE GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE
SUNDAY, 25TH APRIL

Map 6: Ypres 1915. Operations 25th April
Sketch 4: Ypres 1915. Line at Midnight 25th/26th April (facing p. 366)

PLANS TO ESTABLISH A FORWARD SWITCH LINE–TERRITORIALS RELIEVE TWO
COMPANIES AT THE CANADIAN APEX–HULL’S ATTACK ON ST. JULIEN
AND KITCHENER’S WOOD–THE GERMAN ATTACK DEVELOPS AGAINST
THE GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE–BREAKDOWN OF THE GERMAN PLAN
–THE FIGHT AT THE APEX AND ON THE GRAVENSTAFEL
RIDGE–DECISION TO WITHDRAW 2ND C.I.B. AT NIGHT–
FALL–THE APEX, ISOLATED, IS OVERWHELMED–
FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE 2ND C.I.B.–
REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE FRONT

PLANS TO ESTABLISH A FORWARD SWITCH LINE

When darkness fell on the 24th and the German attacks
of the day were spent, the immediate need on the Canadian
front was for the establishment of a continuous line to con-
nect the original left of the 2nd C.I.B. with the 3rd C.I.B.
right, now in the G.H.Q. line east of Wieltje.637 This line
must hold the enemy until the long delayed attack could be
delivered, and thereafter it would be available as an auxiliary
line of defence. Very likely a short occupation of it would
suffice, for according to the operation order twenty-three
battalions were ready to be employed.627 Such a force might
reasonably be expected, even if the French attack proved un-
successful, to recover St. Julien and Kitchener’s Wood; probably it would also secure Keerselaere and the toe of the
Gravenstafel Ridge and so repair the deformation of the Brit-
ish part of the Salient. The staff officer (Lieut.-Colonel
Gordon-Hall) sent forward at midnight by General Alderson
with plenary powers to order troops into the gap as necessary, met the Brigadiers of the 1st C.I.B., 2nd C.I.B. and Y. and D. Brigade at Wiettje; the 3rd C.I.B. was represented by its Brigade Major, as Br.-General Turner was visiting Divisional Headquarters. Finding that the 2nd C.I.B. was still holding its original trenches, he ordered that Brigade to extend to the Haanebeek southwest of Locality C. He ordered the 1st C.I.B. (less 2nd and 3rd Bns.) to carry the line westwards to the road Zonnebeke-Langemarck, and the Y. and D. Brigade to continue as far as the Haanebeek south of St. Julien. He ordered the 3rd C.I.B. to entrench across the remaining section of the gap to the G.H.Q. line. All these orders were confirmed in writing by 2.10 a.m. and received, but subsequent events modified their execution.

Br.-General Currie, in the afternoon of the 24th, had sent up to Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett all the men he could find of the 7th and 10th Battalions; in the moves forward and backward in daylight and in dark, these men had lost their officers and in a vain search to find their own units had drifted back to the nearest formed body of troops; there were about a hundred of them, with Regimental Sergeant-Major Philpot in charge they set out loaded with ammunition, and most of them were now in the front line of the 8th Battalion. At dusk on that day Br.-General Currie, as he was walking from Wiettje to Fortuin with the adjutant of the 5th Battalion, had seen the two Yorkshire battalions and the Royal Irish Regiment withdrawing and found the last six guns of the 5th and 6th Batteries limbering up at his old headquarters, from there he had gone to see Br.-General Chapman (85th Inf. Bde.) at Verlorenhoek and then returned to Wiettje. Here in the G.H.Q. line he found Major Odlum and Captain C. G. Arthur with the 7th and 10th Battalions, about 150 of each, whom to feed they had brought from Fortuin at 9 p.m.—they had been on the move, or entrenching, or fighting, continuously for fifty hours. There were thousands of fresh troops about Wiettje and Potijze, but they had been allotted
to Br.-General Hull for his counterattack; the orders were plain, and Br.-General Currie led the 7th and 10th Battalions, weary but no longer hungry, up the road from the crowded G.H.Q. line, on through empty Fortuin and on for another mile to the Bombarded Cross Roads. There he left a staff officer to guide the expected 1st C.I.B. forward and turned northwards to extend into the allotted line from the culvert on the Zonnebeke-Keerselaere road north-easterly towards Boetleer Farm. On the ridge west of the farm the right made contact with Captain S. Bradley’s two companies of the 1/Suffolk; the enemy had mounted machine guns in the southern houses of Locality C and as the sun rose could be seen entrenching there; behind the left, which rested on the Zonnebeke-Keerselaere road, was No. 2 Company 2/Cheshires, and further to the left rear—some 300 yards distant, and undiscovered by the Canadians in the darkness—was the front line of the 12/London. Br: General Currie now sent his Brigade Major back to report, placed Major Odlum in charge of the new line, and himself went to the Headquarters of the 8th Battalion at Boetleer Farm. There he heard from Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett that the 8/D.L.I. had just relieved the two left companies of the 8th Canadian Battalion in the old front line; then he walked along the ridge to the smithy at Gravenstafel cross roads, where was the Headquarters of the 5th Battalion, and established his advanced Brigade headquarters there for the day.

TERRITORIALS RELIEVE TWO COMPANIES AT THE CANADIAN APEX

When the D.L.I. Brigade, ordered forward by V Corps with the Northumberland Brigade in the late afternoon, reported to General Snow at Potijze towards midnight 24th/25th as Corps reserve, he held three battalions of the brigade in the G.H.Q. line next his headquarters and ordered one, the 8/D.L.I., to report to the 85th Inf. Bde. in replacement of the 12/London. He had already sent the 2/K.S.L.I. to
replace the 1/Suffolk in reserve. Ordered by Br.-General Chapman to combine with the 1/Suffolk and 12/London to close any gap there might be to the north, Lieut.-Colonel J. Turnbull commanding 8/D.L.I., by the time he arrived with his battalion at Boetleer Farm, was doubtful as to whose orders he should accept; but when Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett explained the position he immediately ordered his A and D Companies to relieve the two gassed companies of the 8th Canadian Battalion. It was 4.30 a.m. and becoming too light to relieve the right company. The Canadian machine guns and their crews remained in the line, and were taken over by the 8/D.L.I. whose two remaining companies were disposed in support along the hedges near Boetleer Farm. Thus Lieut.-Colonel Turnbull became responsible for a section in the centre of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, although he finally considered himself responsible to Br.-General Chapman, and not to Br.-General Currie.

The three relieved companies of the 8th Canadians took up a position in reserve a short distance to the southeast and behind the crest of the Ridge; D Company, 5th Battalion, on the northwest of the farm, was also relieved and came into reserve at the Bombarded Cross Roads. In that neighbourhood were also C Company 1/Mon., No. 3 Company 2/Ches., two half companies of the 8/Middlesex and three platoons of the 2/N. Fus., all belonging to the 28th Division, but placed under no commander, and therefore operating on a general order to cover the left as the judgment of each company commander might direct.

HULL’S ATTACK ON ST. JULIEN AND KITCHENER’S WOOD

Although knowledge of the exact position of the line and of the troops about St. Julien, Fortuin and Wietje was lacking at Canadian Divisional Headquarters, it was imperative that orders for a counter-attack as directed by the Corps Commander should be framed without further delay. The Operation Order issued by General Alderson at 8 p.m. on the
ATTACK OF HULL’S FORCE: 25th APRIL

24th was as follows:

1. By orders of the Corps Commander a strong counter-attack will be made early to-morrow morning in the general direction of ST. JULIEN with the object of driving the enemy back as far north as possible and thus securing the left flank of the 28th Div.

2. Brig.-Gen. Hull, Comdg. 10th Bde., will be in charge of this counter-attack.

3. The following troops will be placed at disposal of Brig.-Gen. Hull for this purpose: viz:

4. The Officers Comdg. these units will report for instructions at 9 p.m. to-night to Gen. Hull whose Hd. Qrs. will be at road junction in I.1.c. & d. up till midnight.

5. The Northumberland Bde. & Durham Light Inf. Bde. of Northumbrian Div. forming the Corps Reserve and now at POTIJZE can be called upon for support by Gen. Hull.

6. The first objective of the attack will be FORTUIN (if occupied by enemy), ST. JULIEN and the wood in C.10 & 11. After these points have been gained Gen. Hull will advance astride of the ST. JULIEN-POELCAPPELLE road and drive back the enemy as far north as possible. All units holding the front line of trenches will follow up the attack and help to consolidate the ground gained.

7. The C.R.A. Canadian Div. will arrange for artillery support of the counter-attack and get into touch with C.R.A.s. of 27th & 28th Divs. regarding all possible artillery support from these Divs.

8. The counter-attack will be launched at 3.30 a.m.

9. Divl. Hd. Qrs. will remain at the Chateau de Trois Tours near BRIELEN.

Although four-fifths of the 10th Infantry Brigade consisted of seasoned and highly trained men of the Regular Army, and although the battalions were at war strength, it was well understood that Br.-General Hull had a heavy undertaking on his hands; his request for executive assistance was met by the attachment of Major J. H. MacBrien to his staff, and Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Lamb and Lieut.-Colonel C.
H. Mitchell were detailed as liaison officers. As he had not reconnoitred the area himself, his operation order was based on the information which he could glean from the map, augmented by the knowledge of Canadian officers familiar with the area. They told him that the enemy held Kitchener’s Wood and the trench outside it, and also held Oblong and Juliet Farms, and was probably in possession of St. Julien. Reluctant to trust his brigade on the cross-country route located by the 19th Alberta Dragoons from Brielen Bridge to Wielte, he decided to move by the main road north of Ypres and through St. Jean, and, thinking that his own five battalions, already aware of the general plan and conversant with the situation, would have ample time to move up to the assembly area and deploy, he held the head of the column at the railway crossing on the Brielen-Ypres road until midnight. His temporary headquarters was at the road junction 700 yards to the east and in accordance with the divisional order he called upon the attached subordinate commanders of his force to report there at 9 p.m. This rendezvous was named in some messages “the road junction in I.I.c.,” a description equally applicable to three road junctions 500 yards apart, and he evidently moved his report centre to some undefined point more than 700 yards distant from that precised in the divisional operation order; in any event it was two miles from most of the commanders concerned, even four miles from some, and by congested roads and dark. There had been delay in transmission of orders since units, as already noticed, had been taken from their own formations and indefinitely attached to others: the result was that only one of the attached battalion commanders appeared. The C.R.A. of the Canadian Division and the G.O.C. of the Northumberland Brigade were however present and discussed the operation with Br.-General Hull before he moved off to Wielte at 1 a.m.

This failure to get in touch with the majority of his force prompted Br.-General Hull to postpone the attack to 4.30
a.m. Arrived at Wieltje he halted his brigade on the road and called his own five battalion commanders into conference again; he found that there were only two openings in the wire of the G.H.Q. line, through which his brigade would have to defile, and he decided to postpone the attack for yet another hour. With no time now to find the other units or to formulate a combined plan, he decided that the attack must be made by those he had in hand, and he therefore issued verbal orders as follows:—

Battalions to move through the wire and deploy on the left of the Haanebeek at Fortuin and directed on St. Julien. The Royal Warwick Regiment with the 7th A. & S. Highrs. supporting them to carry out the left attack on Kitchener's Wood under the orders of Colonel A. J. Poole (R. War. Regt.). The 2nd Sea. Highrs. to move on the German trenches between the wood and St. Julien connecting the right and left attacks. The attack to commence at 5.30 a.m.

It was about 3.15 a.m., and half an hour before this the 1st C.I.B. (less 2nd and 3rd Bns.) had marched up to Wieltje from their position in the G.H.Q. line above Potijze. Br.-General Mercer was bent upon the execution of the 1st Canadian Divisional order to move into the gap east of Fortuin and prolong the left of the 2nd C.I.B.; one of his staff officers had accompanied Br.-General Currie and would return to Wieltje as guide for the new position. He had however also received 1st Canadian Division Operation Order No. 10, which placed one of his two remaining battalions, the 4th, under Br.-General Hull, so that when that officer stated that the 10th and Y. & D. Brigades were late and that their deployment before daylight was imperative, he halted until they passed. At 3.45 a.m. however he continued to move forward with his 1st and 4th Battalions in support of the at-
On the right, also at 3.45 a.m. Lieut.-Colonel Wallace heard from the 84th Brigade that his command (1/Suff. and 12/London) had been placed under Br.-General Hull, and that his orders were “to hang on and get touch with the Canadian Brigade on his left.” The two battalions therefore remained in position, but they saw nothing of the 1st C.I.B., which owing to the course of subsequent action never moved east of Fortuin.

Meanwhile the 5/York and 5/D.L.I. of the Y. and D. Bde., which on the 24th had been detailed to support the 3rd C.I.B., were sent the following message; it was apparently based upon the midnight order of the 1st Canadian Division to draw a line across the gap, yet it did not conform to that order, and it was misaddressed:–

3.20 a.m. 3rd Bde., to 4th Yorks and 4th Durhams.

Under instructions from G.O.C. 27th Div. please move your battalions at daybreak 25th and take up a line facing North West D.8.a. to C.18.c. (i.e., Locality C to Fortuin). A counter-attack will take place at 3.30 a.m. under GEN. HULL and he has been notified of your proposed move. Please report when position has been taken up to 3rd Can. Inf. Bde. As soon as your position is reached your battalions will proceed to make themselves secure. 646

Twenty minutes before this was written the two battalions had moved off under direction of their own Brigadier who was unaware of the two hours postponement; they deployed before daylight at and east of Fortuin and found touch with no British troops, nor contact with the enemy.

Another order from 3rd C.I.B. was issued at 4.10 a.m. to complement the above:–

4.10 a.m. 3rd Bde. to 2nd, 3rd, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, Bns. and 3rd F.C.C.E.

You are to advance from the G.H.Q. line and extend on a line Zannebeek (sic Haanebeek) in square C.18.c. (i.e., S.W. of Fortuin) to our present left in C.16.d. (i.e., N.W. of Mouse Trap Farm). Our right will be in touch with the DURHAM AND YORK Brigade and our left in touch with
the BUOFFS (i.e., 2/E. Kent). The 14th Bn. will hold from the left to C.17.c.3. 3rd Bn. from right of 14th to C.17.d.0.3. 2nd Bn. from right of 3rd Bn. to C.17.d.2.3. 16th and 13th Bns. from right of 2nd Bn. to creek in C.18.c. (i.e., the Haanebeek). Line will extend when attacking troops have passed through. Entrench line.\textsuperscript{648}

This order was never executed, it was dependent on the success of Br.-General Hull’s attack and that attack, of which such high hopes had been entertained and although pressed with the greatest gallantry, was destined not to gain enough ground to permit occupation of the proposed reserve line.\textsuperscript{650}

The repeated postponements of the hour of assault had destroyed the possibility of success. At 3.30 a.m. the 2nd and 3rd Brigades C.F.A. and the two batteries of the 118th How. Brigade, R.F.A., opened fire on the southern face of Kitchener’s Wood, they had heard nothing of the two postponements and they had been warned not to fire on St. Julien because of the two hundred Canadian infantry still erroneously supposed to be in that village.\textsuperscript{640} The 146th Bde., R.F.A. (28th D.A.) which had two batteries north of Frezenberg and two north of Ypres, four miles apart, knew nothing of the supposition, and having been called on to support the attack laid their guns on St. Julien by the map and also carried out a bombardment at the original hour, thereby announcing to the enemy that the village was not held by British troops. At 4.35 a.m. the 51st Reserve Division received information that their patrols had found St. Julien evacuated; the plan to take the village and the Zonnebeke Ridge was proceeded with at once, and the information was passed to the XXVII Reserve Corps so that they would in due course join in the rolling up of the British line to the east.

Meanwhile the battalions of the 10th Brigade were making their way through the gaps in the wire of the G.H.Q. line and moving northwards and eastwards to the imaginary jumping-off line. Day was breaking now and the German screen, seeing them deploy, opened a desultory fire. As it
was already 5.30 a.m. before all were aligned, each battalion carried on with the attack independently of the others.

At first all went well enough: Br.-General Hull and the other observers watching anxiously from the commanding buildings of Mouse Trap Farm saw the battalions deploy in excellent order and move forward steadily to the attack. Soon, however, rifle and machine gun fire from the German side broke out and increased in volume; the leading British waves, having gone forward about a mile, now lay prone in regular lines. An inexperienced officer, seeing this through his field glasses, asked “Why do they stop?” He was told “They are dead.” The supporting companies were sent to ground by heavy shelling and by the sweeping fire from machine guns advantageously sited in the upper stories of the isolated farm buildings and in the houses of St. Julien. On the right the Royal Irish Fusiliers were stopped two hundred yards from the village; in the centre the Dublins, after overrunning Vanheule Farm, were also unable to reach the outskirts. The Seaforths, although reinforced at 6 a.m. by the Argylls, were stopped five hundred yards from Kitchener’s Wood by the intervening opposition met at Juliet Farm, and on the left the Warwicks were held as far short of Oblong Farm.

To add impetus on the right, Br.-General Hull at 6.15 a.m. directed the 4th and 7th Northumberland Fusiliers to support the attack on St. Julien, keeping east of the Haanbeek. The latter battalion moved out in echelon on the right rear of the Royal Irish Fusiliers near Fortuin, only to meet with the same reception, for here the Germans, well covered by fire from the houses of St. Julien, were pressing forward. By 7 a.m. the British attack had reached its limit and began to recoil; behind the right the 1st and 4th Canadian Battalions, now extended in support at the Fortuin road-junction, and ready to follow up success, provided a line on which to reform; the Warwickshire left flank dropped back to the G.H.Q. line at Mouse Trap Farm, and simultaneously the
battalions under the 3rd C.I.B. which had moved out to form a reserve line were brought back to behind the G.H.Q. line. The whole line thus fell back and dug in on a front extending from south of Fortuin, round the north of Vanheule Farm and thence south-westwards. Casulties up to now in the five battalions of the 10th Brigade were estimated at 50 per cent, the final total for the 10th Brigade alone was 73 officers and 2,346 other ranks.

Convinced that it would not be possible to carry the enemy’s line under such fire by any repetition of the first attack, Br.-General Hull ordered the ground already gained to be made good. In his report of the action to General Alderson he recommended that it should not be renewed, and his views were endorsed in a message timed 9.45 a.m. 1st Can. Div. to 10th Bde.

If you consider further advance impossible consolidate your ground and hang on. Fill in gap between you and left of 2nd Canadian Bde. at D.7 (i.e. towards Locality C). Utilizing any troops holding G.H.Q. line. If your troops are not in St. Julien order C.R.A. at St. Jean to turn all guns on St. Julien.

Neither during nor before the attack had touch been established with any troops in line on the right; even more disturbing was the news that the 5/York and 5/D.L.I., which were supposed to form the connecting link with the 2nd C.I.B. towards Locality C, had fallen back to Verlorenhoek. Anxious messages to the 85th Brigade to find them and send them back met with ready enough response. The two battalions, new to war, had been told that the counter-attack would take place at 3.50 a.m. and had moved off to Fortuin at 3 a.m. No sign of any counter-attack was to be seen, indeed, in Fortuin and a square mile west of it there was nobody, while to the east the 1/Suffolk lay undiscovered in the darkness some 400 yards away. At 6 a.m., when the right attacking battalion (1/R. Ir. Fus.) was seen to be making good progress, two companies of the 5/York moved up in support; an hour later when the front line fell back in the
face of a German attack from St. Julien, the 5/D.L.I. and part of the 5/York moved southwards to Verlorenhoek. By 9 a.m. they were up in line again, entrenching below Fortuin in front of the 7/N.F. and filling the gap between the 1/Suffolk and the 10th Brigade.

But for the action of the seven batteries of the Canadian Divisional Artillery covering the attack, the fate of the 10th Brigade might have been even harder and the sequel less fortunate. These batteries fired a concerted programme beginning at 3.30 a.m., first on the southern edge of Kitchener’s Wood and the trenches there, and then on to the northern face to meet expected reinforcements. They heard of the new zero hour in time to repeat it at 5.30 a.m. Batteries of the 27th and 28th Divisions carried out a preliminary bombardment from 2.45 to 3.15 a.m., and again opened fire on Kitchener’s Wood at 4.40 a.m., but fire on St. Julien was forbidden on account of the rumour that Canadian troops were still in that village. A forward observing officer of the 3rd C.F.A. Brigade was at Mouse Trap Farm, following the course of the fight, and in touch with Br.-General Hull, who wrote in his report of the engagement, “The artillery fire was good, but there was not enough of it to seriously damage the enemy who were entrenched in a very strong position.” He did not know that the enemy was not entrenched, but was caught in the midst of assembling for the capture of the Zonnebeke Ridge. Against such targets and distributed in areas where the enemy was sure to congregate, the shrapnel and high explosive bursts could not fail to be effective. At 6.58 a.m. a body of enemy advancing into St. Julien was engaged; ten minutes later, fire was opened on Kitchener’s Wood; at 7.55 a.m. and again at 10.40 a.m. a concentration of sixty rounds per gun was placed on St. Julien for fifteen minutes. The only restriction on ammunition expenditure was the amount available and that was adequate only because the British batteries further south generously allowed the diversion to the Canadian guns of a large portion of their supply.
Although the attack could not attain the physical objectives allotted, yet it did effectively buttress the gap at St. Julien and it achieved its vital primary object in that the further advance of the enemy was stayed on this part of the front not only for the day but for ten days. On this day it so disconcerted the German plans that they again failed to accomplish their end.

THE GERMAN ATTACK DEVELOPS AGAINST THE GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE

Finding that the method of divergent attacks westwards and southwards from the breach was not productive of the results expected, Duke Albrecht, after his experience of the 23rd and 24th, had decided to stop the offensive across the canal; he therefore ordered that from the 25th April onwards the weight of the attack should be shifted to the sector of the XXVI Reserve Corps, that is, the front of five miles between Wallemolen and the railway bridge over the canal at Boesinghe. His sole intention now was to cut off the British position in the Ypres Salient; the main attack would be delivered southwards through St. Julien as before, while the right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps would continue to operate southwards against the Gravenstafel Ridge and at the same time strike westwards against the eastern face of the Salient at Broodseinde.

As already explained, the British attack had forestalled the main southerly drive and thrown on the defensive the battalions of the 51st Reserve Division, severely thinned as they were by the fighting of the past three days along the Canadian flank – at the apex, and at Keerselaere, St. Julien and Kitchener’s Wood.

The warning of a German attack at Broodseinde came at nine o’clock on this Sunday morning with the increasing thud, scream and crash of bombardment on the front of the 84th and 85th British Infantry Brigades. Many lengths of parapet were blown away and numbers of men rendered
helpless by poisonous gas from the shells used. At 11 a.m. artillery observers reported that the enemy was moving to the attack from the direction of Passchendaele. Not until two hours later was the assault delivered: the 244th Reserve Infantry Regiment (53rd R.D. XXVII R.C.) not covered by any discharge of cloud gas, crossed the seventy yards of No Man’s Land on a frontage of a quarter of a mile between Broodseinde and the railway, and there was hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches of the 2/E. Surrey. An immediate counter-attack by the battalion supports and an attached company of the Middlesex recovered most of the line and 29 prisoners were taken. Although the Germans suffered heavily they remained in possession of sixty yards of the British front line from which they were not dislodged by two counter-attacks, one eleven hours and the other some fourteen hours after the ground was won.

BREAKDOWN OF THE GERMAN PLAN

Thus on the German front of attack from Kitchener’s Wood to Broodseinde the right made no progress, except for the reoccupation of St. Julien, where all movement was held up after a minor success. In the centre the exposed British trenches in the Stroombeek valley were so heavily engaged by artillery and machine guns, that to maintain or reinforce or link up with the single line of battered breastworks was quite impossible by daylight, and yet the resistance offered was so great that the German formation here engaged (Brigade Schmieden) had to give up the plan of marching southwards, wheeling to the left, and pinching off two miles of the British front line. These trenches, on the Canadian front, ran from Berlin Wood, which was held by the 3/Royal Fusiliers, down the northern slope of the Gravenstafel Ridge and northwestwards along the Stroombeek valley for 2,000 yards. The right half, south of the intersection with the stream, was still held by A and B Companies of the 5th Canadian Battalion; in the left half, close along the northern
bank, No. 4 Company of the 8th Canadian Battalion lay unrelieved and on their left the newly arrived A and D Companies of the 8/D.L.I. were now in the original centre and left trenches, where No. 1 and 2 Companies of the 8th Canadian Battalion had on the morning before stood fast amid the horror of the gas cloud. The coming of daylight before completion of the relief had prevented any systematic clearing of the sector, and the narrow trench and broken shelters were full of the dead and wounded and gassed of four Canadian companies. When the mist rose the two territorial companies could take stock of their position: to the northeast the German front line ran parallel at two hundred yards; to the northwest the breastworks where the 15th Canadian Battalion had been overcome were now in German hands; to the west, down the valley, was an area of dead ground, screened by trees and buildings; to the southwest the Germans were swarming up the slopes, a line of infantrymen was diligently digging a trench towards Locality C on the top of the ridge a thousand yards away, and field-glasses made it plain that these too were Germans. Such a position could not be held for long, it had been held for twenty-four hours, by the 8th Canadian Battalion while Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett was hourly expecting his left rear to be made secure by the promised counter-attack. But by 8 a.m. on the 25th the great British counter-attack of the day was spent, although neither Lieut.-Colonel Turnbull nor his men knew that, nor did they know that pending the arrival of reinforcements the French, after another abortive attempt by a Zouave battalion east of the canal at midday, had suspended offensive action.

When General Alderson heard of the enemy advancing to the attack from Passchendaele, it was quite evident to him that another German attempt to pinch off the northeastern apex was imminent, but the condition of the northern face of the Salient was immeasurably improved now that the 10th Brigade and attached battalions had filled the wide gap which had existed south of St. Julien. The remainder of the
line was apparently being maintained, and he had heard that a renewed French attack east of the canal towards Pilckem was to be launched at 1 p.m.\textsuperscript{661} Although most of the Canadian battalions had been reduced to mere skeletons he still had three battalions of the Northumbrian Division (4, 5 and 6/N.F.) which had not been in the fight; and there were in Corps reserve, available for emergency, three more (6, 7 and 9/D.L.I.) and one regular battalion (1/Welch) since the 2/K.S.L.I. had been given to 85th Brigade at 8.45 a.m. He had been informed by V Corps that both the 11th British Infantry Brigade (4th British Division) and the Lahore Division were on their way north to Vlamertinghe, and by way of encouragement he sent a message to 2nd C.I.B.:–

11.50 a.m.

Please inform Commanders of all Infantry Bdes. you are in touch with, that strong reinforcements are coming up to our assistance.\textsuperscript{659}

He had recent and correct information that the original trenches of the 2nd C.I.B. were still intact and that the 7th and 10th Battalions, still game though nearing exhaustion, were in their allotted position southwestward from Locality C. A report from an airman seemed to indicate that further west the line was almost continuous, and he sent the following order to Br.-General Hull:–

1.05 p.m. 1st Div. to 10th Bde.

Airman reports that he saw this morning trenches occupied by British troops running at the bottom end of C. 12. d. and D.7.c. (\textit{i.e.} outskirts of St. Julien eastwards to Locality C). This is undoubtedly the left of our 1st Bde. which was sent last night to connect with 3rd Canadian Bde. Try to connect with them.\textsuperscript{664}

These were in fact German and not British trenches; as we have seen, the 1st C.I.B. was a mile to the South. All hopeful thoughts were dashed, however, within half an hour: alarming messages from the 28th Division that their front was being attacked and that the enemy were advancing from the North in long columns through Locality C,\textsuperscript{666} were sup-
ported by another from 5th Division:—

Cyclist reports enemy holds wood C.10.d. (i.e. Kitchener’s Wood) and St. Julien, Fortuin doubtful. Enemy close to line of stream running S of D.8. and 9 (i.e. along the Haanebeek 700 yards south of Boetleer Farm and Gravenstafel).

The only possible conclusion to be drawn was that the Gravenstafel Ridge had been lost and that immediate action was necessary. General Alderson therefore sent a message to General Snow commanding the Corps reserve:—

1.45 p.m. 1st Cdn. Div. to 27th Div.

In view of the strong hostile attack being made against left of 28th Div. and my right would you order D.L.I. Brigade to move to the line now being made by the 28th Div. along the Fortuin-Passchendaele road in Squares D.13 and 14. (i.e. between Fortuin and Gravenstafel). If they cannot get as far as the road they should occupy line of the stream in D.24 and 19. (*No doubt C.24 and D.19 was intended i.e. the Haanebeek south and southeast of Fortuin.*)

General Alderson naturally thought that the 2nd C.I.B. had been driven in by the “long columns,” and he passed the news on through Br: General Hull for the information of Br.-General Currie; he also had every reason to suppose that the switch line ordered on the previous afternoon was being dug by the 28th Division; he was confident that the commander of the Corps reserve would comply with such an urgent and obvious request. Yet in all three assumptions he was wrong, although General Snow took partial action as described in his message sent at 3.15 p.m.:—

Canadian Divn. have asked me to assist in repelling attack said to be directed against left of 28th Div. from direction of Passchendaele. Am sending forward G.O.C. D.L.I. Bde. and one battalion (9/D.L.I.) to Verlorenhoek thence to move northwards towards squares C.25 (sic. C.24) and D.19 (area 1,000 yards south of Fortuin and 1,500 yards eastwards). Two remaining battalions (6/ and 7/D.L.I.) ready to follow instantly if required when situation more clear.

Almost simultaneously Br.-General Hull, to further General Alderson’s intention and also supposing that the
D.L.I. Brigade had been released from Corps Reserve and was at his disposal, had issued a collateral order for the three battalions now comprising the D.L.I. Bde. to rendez-vous in square D.20.a, a mile S.S.W. of Gravenstafel at 8.30 p.m. and to come under tactical command of G.O.C. 2nd C.I.B. This order was consequently “held over for the present,” and the arrangements for relief of the 2nd C.I.B. by the D.L.I. were later cancelled. The three battalions were retained by General Snow for the night: the 9th D.L.I. recalled and digging in at Verlorenhoek, the 6th and 7th at Potijze. The role purposed for the D.L.I. Brigade—to occupy the switch line—was subsequently passed to another brigade, the 11th, which was not due at Wieltje until 9 p.m.

THE FIGHT AT THE APEX AND ON THE GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE

From nine in the morning until noon the German artillery had deluged the front line of the 2nd C.I.B. and the ridge from Boetleer Farm to Gravenstafel with a heavy bombardment from all calibres and from all directions. The German machine gunners, their guns mounted in the houses of Locality C and along the road from St. Julien, kept the whole valley under fire and particularly the southern slope of the Gravenstafel Ridge. The German infantry were digging a line south of St. Julien and Locality C and northwards down the slope, and the westerly section of this was the line mistaken for British by the airman. After midday the bombardment increased; to avoid it some of the British supports in the hedged field south of Boetleer Farm moved hurriedly back towards the stream, and these were the troops which the observers of the 5th and 28th Divisions mistook in the distance for Germans.

At 3 p.m. it was seen that the German assault was on the way: north of Locality C infantry were moving southwestwards and large bodies in close order were marching southwards from Poelcappelle. To reinforce his extreme left where the pressure would be greatest, Lieut.-Colonel
Turnbull (8/D.L.I.) ordered his B Company forward from support at Boetleer Farm; it made good progress down the open slope, but as it emerged from the covering hedges near the front line it was met by a blast of fire and was soon driven back again and the enemy pushed on eastwards towards the houses at Iser. The three left companies in the British line were now surrounded on three sides, but the rifles of the Territorials augmented by the machine guns of the 8th Canadian Battalion held the Germans back. They were, however, out of touch with the Ridge, and a Canadian officer reported that the two line companies of the 8/D.L.I. had been overcome; this report was accepted, and the adjutant repeated it to Br.-General Currie at Gravenstafel. Meanwhile the battalions of Brigade Schmieden were pressing hard on Boetleer Farm and secured a footing there; Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett when he saw troops falling back from that place ordered his three companies forward to the crest north and east of it and there, with the companies of the 8/D.L.I., Suffolks, Monmouths, Middlesex, Cheshire's, and Northumberland Fusiliers, they stopped the German infantry by rifle fire. When it seemed likely that more ammunition would be needed, the 5th Battalion responded to an urgent call by sending up 55,000 rounds; already, too, a number of the Canadians had thrown away their jammed Ross rifles and picked up Lee-Enfields dropped by British casualties.

All through the day Br.-General Currie was at Gravenstafel, in touch with events on his own front and flanks, hoping with all others in the Salient for the success of the great attack on St. Julien; the twenty-three battalions at the disposal of Br.-General Hull, fifteen of them fresh, would undoubtedly take and hold Kitchener's Wood and St. Julien and might clear the enemy off the toe of the Gravenstafel Ridge. The line of the 2nd C.I.B., exposed and tactically unsound though it was, must therefore be held as before, pending the success of the advance on the left. The situation on the immediate left towards St. Julien was not reassuring, the
1st C.I.B. had not come up to prolong the line of the 7th and 10th Battalions in that direction and no trace of them could be found; these two battalions were in close touch with the enemy who occupied the higher ground of Locality C in strength and swept the line with machine-gun fire from front and flanks; here a determined assault might overwhelm the thin Canadian line, unsupported by infantry and uncovered by artillery as it was. The efforts of some of the few batteries of the 27th and 28th Divisions might well have been dispensed with, for more than once they mistook friend for foe and fired accordingly, some were even firing from the map without observation and without touch with the troops in the line. Major Odium, who was in charge of the frontage of the 7th and 10th facing Locality C, said it was imperative to arrange an attack to clear the left front, he could see no sign of the 1st C.I.B., and “We can only hang on.” That was at 12.40 p.m.

Shortly before this Br.-General Currie had received word that the Y. and D. Brigade had occupied Fortuin, which he thought “could not have been a hard task as the Germans had never been in it,” then another message showed that the 1st C.I.B. was 1,000 yards south of St. Julien, instead of 1,000 yards east of it, and there was yet another, sent at 10.20 a.m. received after 1 p.m., wherein the 10th Brigade reported that the attack on St. Julien was unsuccessful. The failure of such an effort made his position desperate indeed, but the line still held, it had been heavily shelled but not yet assaulted, and at 2 p.m. Major Odium reported that his men were almost exhausted but would hang on till night. Touch had been obtained with the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A., and the batteries were now engaging machine guns in Locality C where their observation posts had been on the previous day; but the range was now over 5,500 yards.

The course of the action and the reasons for the decisions taken can readily be followed at first hand by a perusal of messages sent and received by Br.-General Currie during
the afternoon:–

Sent 12.45 p.m. to Major Odlum: “. . . . We must hang on at least to nightfall.”

Sent 2.55 p.m. to 10th Bde.: “. . . 5th Battalion and 8th hold original trenches . . . .”

Sent 3.22 p.m. to 1st Cdn. Div.: “. . . . 8th Battalion heavily attacked, hurry reinforcements. Disposition of troops is the same. Will hang on. . . . Troops very tired.”

Sent 3.25 p.m. to O.C. 7th Bn. and O.C. 8th Bn. and O.C. 8th D.L.I. (Repeating information sent 11.50 a.m. by General Alderson): “Strong reinforcements are coming, hang on. Please report situation.” (Received by 8th D.L.I.)

Sent 3.30 p.m. to Staff Captain, 2nd C.I.B. at Wietje, re ammunition: “We have plenty until evening. Send up then four hundred and fifty thousand rounds. Many wounded require immediate attention.”

Sent 4.15 p.m. for transmission to Br.-General Hull through Lieut. L. F. Page, D Company, 5th Bn. at Bombarded Cross Roads: “. . . . tell him that Durhams have left trenches originally occupied by 8th Battalion. Can he send me any support to counter-attack?” – a request anticipated nearly an hour before by Br.-General Hull, but nullified as above recorded.

Received 4.20 p.m. from Adjutant 8/D.L.I. : “D.a.b.c. trench (i.e. left front line) had all men killed or wounded. A reinforcing company was driven out by shell fire which is reported to have destroyed trench. The 8th D.L.I. Canadians and Cheshire (1 Co.) are holding from the Hqrs. Farm (i.e. Boetleer Farm) to the road E. of it. I have a small reserve of about 100 men. Enemy do not appear to be pressing attack except by artillery fire.”

Received 5.05 p.m. from 1st Cdn. Div. (sent 1.55 p.m.) “In view of strong attack made against left of 28th Division and my right am ordering General Snow to move Durham L.I. Brigade to hold line made by 28th Div. along the road in square D. 13 and 14 (i.e. along Fortuin-Gravenstafel Road.) If by any chance they cannot get to this road in time they are to hold line of stream in D.14.”

In the above 1st Cdn. Div. message the last map location was originally written D.24,19. The Brigade Major, 2nd C.I.B., in rewriting it to be relayed by hand, changed the designation to D.14; but evidently C.24, D.19 was intended, the
other branch of the Haanebeek, 2,000 yards nearer Ypres. 669

DEcision TO WITHDRAW 2ND C.I.B. AT NIGHTFALL

In appreciating the situation Br.-General Currie saw that the time had now come for the line in front of and on the Gravenstafel Ridge to be withdrawn. 611 The “strong reinforcements” had not arrived in time and the D.L.I. Brigade, hitherto held ready to support the attack on St. Julien, were evidently not going to deliver any attack, nor even relieve the 2nd C.I.B. on the Gravenstafel Ridge, they were to attempt to reach the new switch line running from 500 to 1,000 yards behind the position which his troops had been holding all day. The telephone line to 5th Battalion Headquarters at Gravenstafel, which had been out since before noon, was repaired at 5 p.m. After a conversation over this line with his Brigade Major at Wietje, where General Hull also had his headquarters, Br.-General Currie concluded that the retention of his exposed position had been judged hopeless, and therefore gave an order for all troops to fall back at dusk and reinforce the D.L.I. Brigade in the new line along the Fortuin-Gravenstafel road. Neither he nor Lieut.-Colonel Tuxford, who concurred in the decision to withdraw, was aware that General Snow, expecting an attack from the east, had not ordered the D.L.I. Brigade nor any other troops into the switch line as General Alderson had requested.

No sooner was the order for evacuation of the front line written than the second-in-command of the 5th Battalion (Major H. M. Dyer) and the Adjutant (Captain E. Hilliam), seeking relief in action after the harrowing days of impotent inactivity as a target for the enemy’s guns, seized copies and dashed off with them to the two line companies; both reached the front line and both were wounded. As the runners for the 7th, 8th and 10th Battalions were setting out with the copies for their units, both Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett and Major Odlum arrived opportunely at Gravenstafel and Br.-General Currie discussed the movement with them. This
occurred between 5.10 p.m. and 5.20 p.m.

The same order was sent to Lieut.-Colonel Turnbull, but he was still in doubt as to which commander he was under, so he decided to remain, holding his position along the road east of Boetleer Farm, as did the commanders of the Monmouth and Middlesex companies to whom Br. General Chapman had given a roving commission to cover his left flank. The original working party of Northumberland Fusiliers and Cheshires at 6 p.m. moved back to a position 250 yards south of the Bombarded Cross Roads and extended eastwards, at the same time Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett also led his three companies down the slope into the Haanebeek valley, all following the intention, as expressed by the 85th Bde. to the 8th D.L.I. “to fall back to the line D.14, 15, 16, 17”—the area due east of Bombarded Cross Roads and south of Gravenstafel, containing the projected switch line.

THE APEX, ISOLATED, IS OVERWHELMED

During the late afternoon the German artillery fire had been increasing along the Gravenstafel Ridge and also on the old front line trenches where, unknown to those on the Ridge, the remnants of A and D Companies, 8/D.L.I. and No. 4 Company of the 8th Battalion were still carrying on their unequal fight. At 5 p.m. the three company commanders consulted behind the broken walls of Supply Farm in the centre of their front line, they agreed that withdrawal to the ridge was advisable and sent a message to ask if they should retire; no answer came. A few parties of wounded and gassed men were first sent back, most of them were caught in the German fire before they reached the crest. Led by a subaltern, a platoon of the left company, 8/D.L.I., attempted to occupy a small house nearby to the west and deny it to the enemy while the retirement proceeded, but on crawling into a beetroot field found it to be planted full of Germans lying amid the foliage who, ready for the assault, sprang up and took them prisoner. Under increasing pressure the rest of the
left company moved eastwards along the trench and covered by those who remained made their way back successfully. At 7 p.m. Captain G. W. Northwood noticed that B Company of the 5th Battalion was moving out of their trench on his right, with the Germans following, he knew that the 5th were under orders to withdraw, but did not expect the move until later; by this time all the machine guns of the 8th Battalion had been silenced, except one which was still being effectively operated by Sergt. W. A. Alldritt; there were some Germans in the trenches on the left, so the last of the D.L.I. companies had been overcome; with a rush of the enemy from all sides it was over.

After moving down from the crest Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett with his three other companies crossed the stream, expecting to find troops in line there, and then went further back to the Zonnebeke arm of the Bombarded Cross Roads. Arrived there, he found out at the nearby headquarters of the 3/R. Fus. that they were not withdrawing, so he led his men forward to advance again up the hill to Gravenstafel; Lieut.-Colonel Tuxford followed with some men of C Company of the 5th. It was now nearly 7 p.m. and soon A and B Companies of the 5th began to take up their positions on either flank covering Gravenstafel on the northwest and extending southeastwards for 700 yards; on this flank they were not in touch with the left of the 3/R. Fus., for their right lay about 300 yards southwest of Berlin Wood, which now became the apex. With thirty-six hours warning of a possible forced withdrawal from the line in the Stroombeek valley, the 3/R. Fus., together with a company of the 8/Middlesex and the Anglesey Company, R.E., sent for the purpose by Br.-General Chapman, had been employed in preparing a defensive position along the northern face of the wood and westwards at right angles to the front trenches, so that when A Company, 5th Battalion, were moving back to Gravenstafel by this way, they passed along a line already manned by 50 men of the Royal Fusiliers who covered the movement with
rifle fire. With machine guns well sited in this flanking trench to cover the ground to the north and northwest, the wood, in spite of heavy bombardments, remained as the apex of the British line until carried by assault on the afternoon of 3rd May.

FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE 2ND C.I.B.

As the left of the 5th Battalion withdrew up the slope towards Gravenstafel in the failing light they fired on the following Germans—one Canadian marksman alone claimed fourteen; with darkness the German artillery fire died down and infantry movement ceased, and in the early hours of Monday morning the 5th and 8th Battalions moved back from the ridge to behind the G.H.Q. line, the former arrived at St. Jean at 4 a.m., the latter reached Wielte at dawn. On the left the 7th and 10th Battalions did not receive the order to fall back, but the two companies of 1/Suff. with which they were in touch on the crest between Boetleer Farm and Locality C had their orders and were preparing to move out. The senior officers in the Canadian line, Captain S. D. Gardner of the 7th and Major P. A. Guthrie of the 10th, decided to remain until the Suffolks had completed their withdrawal. At 3.30 a.m., therefore, they led their men silently back through the grey morning mist, unnoticed by the enemy, and marched to rejoin the remainder of the brigade near St. Jean. The Suffolk companies rejoined their battalion east of For-tuin.

REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE FRONT

The strong reinforcements whose promised advent had for a time buoyed up the hopes of the 2nd C.I.B. were not in time to take their place in the battle line until the 26th. At noon on the 25th the Lahore Division arrived at the huts northeast of Ouderdom (5 miles southwest of Ypres) and the 11th British Brigade was at Vlamertinghe, placed at the disposal of V Corps by Second Army. When General Plumer
heard of the failure of the British attack on St. Julien and of the German advance against the Gravenstafel Ridge and Broodseinde, he decided to reapportion the frontages in the northern face of the Salient, and by rearrangement of units to disentangle the confused brigade commands. For the last three days the Canadian Division had been responsible for a fighting front of over five miles, whereas the usual divisional sector, whether British, French or German, even in static warfare was rarely more than three and averaged two miles. His order issued at 2.30 p.m. directed readjustments to be made at 7 p.m. which would reduce the Canadian sector to the two miles between Turco Farm and the Fortuin-St. Julien road, responsibility east of that road would be assumed by General Bulfin (28th British Division) to whom was given command of all the units already in the area (which included the D.L.I. Brigade) and, in addition, the fresh 11th Infantry Brigade, (4th Brit. Div.). The consequent operation order by General Alderson, issued at 6.15 p.m., gave details of redistribution.

1. The line of trenches held by the Canadian Division will be strengthened as much as possible tonight.

2. The following redistribution of the line will be made:
   - The 13th Inf. Bde. (including 4th Rifle Bde.) will take over the line now held by Colonel Geddes, that is from the Farm in C. 15. d. (Turco Farm) to approximately the farm in C. 16 d. (Mouse Trap Farm). Colonel Geddes will send back the units relieved from the front line to Potijze where they will report to General Snow. Colonel Geddes will himself remain at St. Jean with his present reserve.
   - The K.O.Y.L.I. and Q.V. Rifles will rejoin the 13th Bde.; the 10th Bde. will take over the line on the right of the 13th Bde. to the ST. JULIEN-FORTUIN road where they will connect with General Bulfin’s troops. General Hull will only command his own Bde. and the R. Irish. The Northd. Bde. under its Brigadier will form a divisional reserve south of Wielte.

3. The 1st Canadian Bde. will be assembled on the west bank of the Canal and take over charge of the bridges now held by the 13th Bde.

4. The 3rd Canadian Bde. will be assembled near La
The last two items were timely: each of the two brigades had sustained 1,500 casualties, all the eight battalions had been heavily engaged, and in the late afternoon the headquarters of the 3rd C.I.B. at Mouse Trap farm, where there was also a busy dressing-station, had been the target for a concentration of German howitzers. A dump of over 200 boxes of S.A.A. and some of the buildings were set on fire; Br.-General Turner and most of his staff, all given up for lost, narrowly escaped by wading the moat, and he established a new headquarters 300 yards to the south. For inspired devotion in succouring the wounded on this occasion the M.O. of the 14th Battalion, Captain F. A. C. Scrimger, was awarded the Victoria Cross.

The omission of any mention of the 2nd C.I.B. in the orders for redistribution is accounted for by the fact that they, in accordance with V Corps order, were to be detached from the Canadian Division.

6 p.m. 1st Cdn. Div. to 2nd C.I.B.

Your Bde. will come under the orders of Gen. Bulfin commanding 28th Div. at 7 p.m. and it is hoped that you will be relieved by the 11th Bde. to-night.

Thus the relief was directed by the 28th Division, and the order for it issued at 6.25 p.m. stated that the line held included all the original trenches of the 2nd C.I.B. with a flank running back from near Boetleer Farm to Fortuin. At that hour, when the order had just been written, this description was accurate enough except that it implied Canadian possession of Locality C; within the next hour, as we have seen, the whole of the original line above Berlin Wood was overwhelmed or evacuated, and at 9 p.m. when Br.-General Currie met Br.-General Hasler leading his 11th Brigade through Wieltej, the line was along the crest from Gravenstafel towards Boetleer Farm and then south of Locality C and towards Fortuin. Br.-General Currie could only report that his order to withdraw from the ridge had been issued at 5.10
p.m. and had probably been carried out by this time; he had no definite news as yet that the movement had been executed or of the present dispositions of his battalions.

The western section of the flanking line for about a thousand yards east of Fortuin was held by four of the battalions which had been placed under Br: General Hull for his attack, the 1/Suffolk, 12/London, 5/D.L.I. and 5/York. The first two had, in the first instance, been taken from their own brigade by General Snow’s orders, all four had found their way into the line by some unpremeditated means or other, but they had not been in touch with Br.-General Hull since the morning.

Darkness and doubt about dispositions delayed the battalions of the 11th Brigade; the 1/Hampshire, sent to find the apex and extend westwards, eventually arrived near Berlin Wood and occupied some of the houses at Gravenstafel soon after midnight; they were driven out by a German attack before daylight and held the old trenches on the ridge to the southeast and south. There was some doubt as to whether the road from Fortuin to Gravenstafel was still clear at 9.30 p.m.—actually the Germans were nowhere within 500 yards of it. The other battalions were directed by Br.-General Hasler to extend eastwards along the Zonnebeke Ridge, link up with the 1/Hampshire and advance northwards to a line north of the Fortuin-Gravenstafel road. The Brigade Major of the 2nd C.I.B. was called upon to guide them into their initial alignment on the Zonnebeke Ridge, which he did.

Because of the reported loss of the Gravenstafel Ridge the 2nd Cavalry Division was ordered to be ready till 6 a.m. to move at one hours notice, and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions both to be ready to move at ½ hours notice from 6 a.m. onwards. Their employment was not necessary, however, for the Ridge was not completely occupied by the Germans until daybreak of the 26th, and by that time the 11th Brigade had deployed across the front between Gravenstafel and Fortuin.
CHAPTER XII

AN INTER-ALLIED COUNTER-STROKE

MONDAY, 26TH APRIL

Map 7: Ypres 1915. Allied Attacks 26th April
Sketch 5: Ypres 1915. Line at Midnight 26th/27th April (facing p. 376)


THE ALLIED PLAN

The Allied plan for the 26th April was to press the offensive with the greatest vigour and without intermission. Now that three fresh divisions had arrived, the recovery in its entirety of the ground formerly occupied seemed to be a reasonable objective\(^{680}\) and at an inter-Allied conference on the afternoon of the 25th a combined scheme had been agreed upon. On the right the 27th and 28th (British) Divisions would hold their ground; the newly arrived Lahore Division (Major-General H. d’U. Keary) would attack northwards on Langemarck, through the Canadian Division, with the left on the Ypres-Langemarck road. The adjoining French troops would attack simultaneously on Pilckem under General Joppé and gain the commanding ground on the east of the canal to allow General Quiquandon to cross at Boesinghe and join in the northward drive. On the French left General Curé would clear the Germans from the western bank at Het Sas, Lizerne and Steenstraat, and advance on Bixchoote; the Belgians would join in the attack on Lizerne with one battalion and support the French left with their artillery, and behind the Franco-Belgian junction was the 1st British Cavalry Division whose guns would also cover the French attack.
The Second Army operation order required the Lahore Division to be in position ready to attack with two brigades in line on a frontage of a thousand yards at 2 p.m.; the objective was the German line between Kitchener’s Wood and the Ypres-Langemarck road. The V Corps was called upon to arrange for the co-ordination of the necessary artillery bombardment and support, and also to co-operate by attacking on the immediate right, that is from the frontage of the Canadian Division. To carry this out General Alderson issued orders for one battalion of the 10th Brigade to advance between Kitchener’s Wood and the Wielijke-St. Julien road in co-operation with the Lahore Division, and for the 149th Northumberland Brigade (Br.-General J. F. Riddell) to attack St. Julien and advance astride the Wielijke-St. Julien road at the same time as the Lahore Division moved forward. Three battalions of Geddes’ detachment would move from reserve into the G.H.Q. line east of Wielijke in support of the St. Julien attack and the 3rd C.I.B. would be in divisional reserve south of Wielijke.

The only Canadian troops called upon to participate actively in the operation were the field artillery, of which there were eight 18-pdr. batteries of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, C.F.A. in the vicinity of Potijze and sixteen 18-pdr.s grouped in three batteries of the 1st Brigade, C.F.A. west of the canal near Brielen Bridge. The 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Batteries were complete, the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 11th were still divided in sections; the left of the 3rd with the left of the 2nd, the right of the 2nd with the right of the 5th, the right of the 3rd with the left of the 8th, the left of the 5th forming a six-gun battery with the 4th, the left of the 11th with the right of the 8th, and the right of the 11th forming a six-gun battery with the 1st. The 1st Brigade C.F.A. was detailed to support the French and, with all the British batteries west of the canal, was placed under the general control of V Corps; their action was coordinated by Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Duff us, R.F.A., a graduate of the R.M.C., Kingston, who
had taken a commission in the R.A. and now was O.C. 8th (How.) Bde. (28th D.A.). The Lahore Divisional Artillery, which numbered nine batteries in action north of Brielen, and temporarily under the C.R.A., 28th Div. supported the Lahore attack. (All of these batteries are not shown on the map.) The remainder of the Canadian Divisional Artillery, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, C.F.A. and the 118th (How.) Bde. R.F.A., under Br.-General Burstall and all east of the canal, was detailed to cover the frontage between the Fortuin-St. Julien road and Hampshire Farm, which included St. Julien and Kitchener’s Wood. Late on the 24th Br.-General Burstall had moved his headquarters from Brielen to Potijze where General Keary was also now installed. Batteries of the 27th and 28th Divisions, under the C.R.A. of the former, covered the line east of St. Julien.

ATTACK OF THE LAHORE DIVISION

The infantry brigades of the Lahore Division, each consisting of one British regular, one British territorial and three Indian battalions, passed north and south of Ypres during the forenoon and moved out to deploy at 12.30 p.m. on a front of a thousand yards between Irish and Wielte Farms. The division had left the Neuve Chapelle front on the 24th and had marched the thirty miles on pavé roads slippery with rain, and the transport had been delayed hours on the steep hill at Godewaersvelde. On entering the Salient they were observed and followed by the German artillery which opened a heavy bombardment on the area north of the Ypres-Potijze road, an area of little more than one square mile which contained thirty battalions and ten batteries, an average density of one man in every ten-yard square. The Jullundur (Br.-General E. P. Strickland) and Ferozepore (Br.-General R. G. Egerton) Brigades were in front, each with three battalions in line and two aligned 400 yards in rear. The preliminary bombardment by all the British guns west of the canal began at 1.20 p.m. and continued forty
minutes, then all guns fired rapid on the enemy’s front line trench for five minutes and thereafter lifted to form a barrage 200 yards in rear. For close support three 18-pdr. batteries, two of them Canadian, and two 4.5-inch howitzer batteries were placed under the two infantry brigadiers; but the orders did not reach the Canadian batteries in time and conditions were such that the others “could do little or no good in direct support.” The attacking troops advanced when the bombardment opened, with intent to reach the enemy before it ceased, but from the beginning the attack was fated to fail.

From 7 a.m. reports had been coming in of German movements all along the northern face of the Salient from Pilckem to Gravenstafel; opposite the eastern face scaling ladders were being placed in the enemy trenches and attack seemed imminent. West of St. Julien the Canadian artillery fired on concentrations of the enemy and no attack developed, nor was there any attack delivered on the eastern face. The position seemed such that any determined German effort put forth before the Allied attack began would cut off the Salient. General Smith-Dorrien therefore gave General Plumer the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and at 2.30 p.m. he ordered it to move dismounted at night to occupy the G.H.Q. line between the Ypres-Zonnebeke and Ypres-Menin roads.

Since midday the German airmen had been watching the assembly of the Lahore Division, and as the closely formed battalions moved forward up the gentle slope of Hill Top Ridge the shelling increased in intensity; after five hundred yards the first wave reached the sky line and came under “a perfect inferno of fire of all kinds, machine gun, rifle and every variety of shell, many of which were filled with gas.” Casualties increased, and there was some confusion; the right battalion began to incline westwards at the start and soon lost direction by 45 degrees, becoming mixed up with units supposed to be seven hundred yards to their left. Swept by the scythe of death the attacking waves were thin by the time the valley bottom was reached, and the German front
line on the ridge at Welch Farm was still five hundred yards distant. But the survivors kept pushing on—two of them won the Victoria Cross; some reached Turco Farm with the French, and a party of about 150 further to the west were only stopped when some of them were sixty yards from the enemy. It was 2.20 p.m. and the supports were following. But now a yellowish green cloud of gas was seen slowly rising on the right front, the wind was northeasterly and carried the gas across the centre and left of the Lahore Division and the French right, where the 4th Moroccan Brigade had been making good progress. With the exception of the most advanced British detachment the whole line—British, Indian and French—wavered and then fell back across the valley mixed in hopeless confusion. Seeing that the line had given way, Major G. B. Wright, commanding the 3rd Field Company, C.E., then resting at Cross Roads Farm after the night’s work on the trenches of the 10th Brigade, extended two of his sections across the northern face of the slope and remained there till dark. The mixed units were rallied and sorted under cover on the southern slopes of Hill Top Ridge. At 4.40 p.m. because of a Second Army message that the French were pressing forward again, two battalions of the Sirhind Brigade, in reserve, were sent forward in support. As nothing could be seen of any such advance and as shell and rifle fire were still heavy, the G.O.C. Jullundur Brigade held them behind the ridge until nightfall when they reinforced the line. The six line battalions had lost a total of 1,829 of all ranks, including five battalion commanders. With all this the line had not been advanced appreciably further than that reached by the 1st and 4th Canadian Battalions and the two Middlesex Companies three days before. The French east of the canal went forward again at 3 p.m. but could not advance beyond their positions of the day before, so their dependent attacks on Boesinghe and Het Sas did not develop.

There had been unaccountable delay in the issue of orders: Second Army 0.0. No. 8 was issued at 2.15 a.m. on the
26th, and its substance had been communicated 12 hours earlier; V Corps 0.0. No. 12 was issued at 10.30 a.m., and 1st Cdn. Div. 0.0. No. 12, issued at 12.15 p.m., was not received by the C.R.A. (Br.-General Burstall) until 2.16 p.m.—eleven minutes after the infantry assault was due to take place. Fortunately the C.R.A. had been shown the Corps order by a staff officer of the Lahore Division, and acting upon it had turned his guns onto Kitchener’s Wood and the German trenches southwest of St. Julien: the batteries opened fire at 2.05 p.m.—battery fire 15 seconds—they increased their range 400 yards at 2.20 p.m. and stopped six minutes later. From 3.15 p.m. onwards the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, C.F.A., fired frequently by request of the Lahore Divisional Commander on targets opposite his front—from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. one battery fired 465 rounds. Their proximity was fortunate, for his own divisional guns, massed west of the canal above Briele, could only be reached by communicating through 28th Division H.Q. near Vlamertinghe.

ATTACK OF THE 149TH (NORTHUMBERLAND) BRIGADE

Operation Order No. 12\(^{684}\) issued by General Alderson for the attack on St. Julien was, as far as concerned the assaulting troops, brief:—

The Northumbrian (sic) Brigade will attack St. Julien and advance astride of Wietje-St. Julien road at the same time as the Lahore Division moves forward.

The order was framed in accordance with special instructions from V Corps; it was not issued until 12.15 p.m. and it was received by Br.-General J. F. Riddell an hour and a quarter later, ten minutes after the stated hour for the artillery bombardment and infantry advance to begin. The 5/Northumberland Fusiliers had, at 10.45 a.m., on orders of Br.-General Hull, been moved up to support the line at Fortuin in anticipation of a German attack, there was no time for reconnaissance, so the remaining 4th, 6th and 7th Battalions, Northumberland Fusiliers, hastened to deploy in attacking formation at Wielteije. By 1.50 p.m. they were moving for-
ward on a frontage of six hundred yards astride the Wietlje-St. Julien road, and in a few minutes they came unexpectedly on the G.H.Q. line, with its covering barbed wire only pass-
able at two or three narrow gaps; but in spite of the shell and long range rifle fire they passed through quickly, resumed formation—two lines of platoons in fours at fifty yards interval and two hundred yards distance—and advanced again with great gallantry. At 2.45 p.m. they reached the front line held by the 10th Brigade; the abbreviated artillery pro-
gramme had finished 19 minutes before this; the German machine guns in the houses of St. Julien and on the left in Juliet Farm mowed the waves down as they crossed the open fields—and yet they kept on. The 4/Northumberland Fusil-
iers on the right, now mingled with the supporting 7/N.F., crossed the trench line but could make no progress, parties of the 6/N.F. on the left pushed forward another two hundred yards but further advance was impossible. In optimistic error, at 3.15 p.m. Br.-General Riddell reported that his men had entered St. Julien, but would not be able to hold it for long without help; within the next half hour he was killed, south of Vanheule Farm and almost in the front line. At 4.30 p.m. General Alderson ordered Br: General Hull to give support by moving up troops of Geddes’ Detachment, which could not be done for Colonel Geddes only received Opera-
tion Order No. 12 at that very hour, and so his three battal-
ions were not in the G.H.Q. line as that order demanded. Even at 7 p.m. General Alderson thought that the Lahore Di-
vision and the French had gained the ridge and that St. Julien and Juliet Farm were in our hands; an hour later he sent up the 1st Field Co., C.E., to assist in consolidating the North-
umberland positions.

The casualties of the three attacking battalions amounted to 1,200, and all that the survivors could do was to dig in. Ordered back to Wietlje at 7.30 p.m. they withdrew after midnight; the 10th Brigade continued to hold the line.

The co-operation demanded of the 10th Brigade in the
attack was an advance by one battalion on the immediate right of the Lahore Division. Br.-General Hull did not receive his orders until after the attack had started, as his telephone wires had all been cut by the German bombardment; after informing the Canadian Division that he could not carry out the order he went forward to the trenches of the 7/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at 2.30 p.m. and arranged for them to advance from the G.H.Q. line as soon as the attack of the Lahore Division developed against the wood. But that attack never went forward against the wood; as we have seen, it moved west of north instead of north, so the Argylls did not advance.

PARTICIPATION OF CANADIAN INFANTRY

The Canadian infantry was not called upon to take an active part in these attacks on the 26th April. Of the 1st C.I.B., the 3rd Battalion was in the G.H.Q. line at Mouse Trap Farm all day, and during the night was brought back to Vlamertinghe. The 1st and 4th Battalions lined the west bank of the canal from Brielen Bridge southwards for a mile and guarded the bridges. The 2nd Battalion from 7.30 a.m. onwards, having rejoined from the 3rd C.I.B., was in bivouac at Vlamertinghe.

After the battalions of the 2nd C.I.B. had been reassembled at Wieltje early in the morning, the 28th Division had ordered the brigade to occupy a position south and east of Fortuin to support the left of the 11th Infantry Brigade in the four thousand yards of the northern face as far as Berlin Wood, where the original left of the 85th Brigade was still in position. In the early morning the Germans renewed their southward drive to roll up the Salient. The 2nd C.I.B. ran into the preparatory bombardment; the Brigade Major and many others were hit. Soon after daylight the 8/D.L.I. had been forced to fall back from their exposed position on the Gravenstafel ridge near Boetleer Farm; by 6 p.m. the 5th Matrosen Regiment was in possession of the Bombarded
Cross Roads. It was reported that the enemy had broken through and occupied a line of trenches south of Gravenstafel; this was another case of mistaken identity for these trenches were held by the 1/Hampshire. However, the enemy nearly did break in and but for the stubborn defence by detached companies of the 28th Division might have won through to Zonnebeke and cut off the tip of the Salient. To meet the threat, General Snow sent up one and a half battalions from the Corps reserve under Lieut.-Colonel Bridgford (2/K.S.L.I.), to form a line facing northeastwards behind Zonnebeke, but by this time the battalions of the 11th Brigade were disposed on a switch line south of the Fortuin-Gravenstafel road, Wallace’s Detachment was still in position north of that road and the enemy, because of the Allied attacks between St. Julien and Lizerne, did not press on.

The 3rd C.I.B. upon relief by the 10th Brigade early on the 26th, moved out to assemble at La Brique in accordance with Operation Order No. 11; arrived there they met their transport with rations, but found no staff to direct them further, so marched back across the canal to their transport lines a mile south of Brielen. There a staff officer found them and delivered to Br.-General Turner the order that the Brigade was required to occupy a position at La Brique in reserve to the Lahore attack. Arrived there no trenches or divisional staff officer could be found so the units dug shelter trenches near the hamlet. At 12.30 p.m. the brigade was ordered to move to south of Wieltej, but before the order was executed the report came that the right of the Lahore attack had failed, so Br.-General Turner took up a position along the St. Jean Ridge, on a frontage of a thousand yards, and there his four battalions dug in at 3 p.m.

THE SITUATION AT NIGHT

The only improvement of the Allied line for the day was at Lizerne, where during the afternoon the Franco-Belgian operation recovered most of that village but was held up by
machine guns in buildings on the eastern outskirts. The French staff laid the lack of success largely to difficulties of command caused by the sending forward of brigades as they arrived, with the result that the group commanders were unfamiliar with the ground and with the troops in their command. General Smith-Dorrien in appreciating the situation reported to Sir John French that he was “doubtful if it is worth losing any more men to regain this French ground unless the French do something really big,” and he gave his views as to the best line to be held if a withdrawal became necessary, as now seemed probable.\textsuperscript{685}
CHAPTER XIII
ATTACKS, NEGOTIATIONS AND WITHDRAWAL
27TH APRIL–4TH MAY

Map 8: Ypres 1916. British Withdrawal Night 3rd/4th May

THE ALLIED PLAN OF ATTACK FOR 27TH APRIL–APPRECIATION BY G.O.C.,
SECOND ARMY–ANOTHER LAHORE ATTACK–ORDERS OF SIR JOHN FRENCH:
THEIR RESULTS–WEDNESDAY, 28TH APRIL: A DAY OF DISCUSSION–
CONSOLIDATION OF LAHORE FRONT BY 1ST C.I.B.–PREPARATORY ORDER
OF 29TH APRIL FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL–A DAY OF PROCRASTINATION–30TH APRIL: A DAY OF DISAPPOINTMENT–1ST
MAY: A DAY OF DISILLUSIONMENT–CHANGE OF ALLIED
POLICY: BRITISH WITHDRAWAL ORDERED–A GERMAN
GAS ATTACK FAILS: 2ND MAY–WITHDRAWAL OF
THE BRITISH LINE, NIGHT 3RD/4TH MAY–
RELIEF OF THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION
4TH MAY.

THE ALLIED PLAN OF ATTACK FOR 27TH APRIL

As on the previous day, the general conduct of the operations to recover the lost ground depended on the French, and General Putz issued orders to pursue the offensive on the 27th with the same objectives, the same commanders and the same plan; it was again arranged that the British left would co-operate by attacking north-eastwards simultaneously. On reading General Joppé’s orders for the French right wing, General Smith-Dorrien “was horrified to see” that although fresh troops were to be employed, the weight of this attack, upon which the whole operation hinged, had not been increased, for only three battalions were detailed for employment east of the canal. He pointed this out to General Putz who, agreeing that the British troops available were insufficient in number and also handicapped by position, then ordered General Joppé to employ his whole force of six battalions.
For the British, the Lahore Division would carry out the assault. In the early hours of the morning the Sirhind Brigade had relieved the Jullundur Brigade in the front line, and would attack on a frontage of 800 yards with the 1/4 and 1/1 Gurkhas in line and three battalions in support, the left on the Ypres-Langemarck road, the objective of the centre to be Canadian Farm. The Ferozepore Brigade would move forward in echelon and extend the attack, with the 9/ Bhopals and 4/ Londons in line and one battalion in support, by advancing from an assembly position behind Hill Top Ridge in time to be abreast of Sirhind at zero hour and directed upon Oblong Farm. If the Lahore Division succeeded in gaining ground, the 13th Brigade would join in by advancing with two battalions, and the 10th Brigade by fire.

Artillery support east of the canal would, as before, be mostly supplied by British and Canadian guns. The 13 and 18-pdr. batteries west of the canal, under Lieut.-Colonel Duffus, covered one thousand yards of the French front adjoining the inter-Allied boundary. On the Lahore frontage the seven Canadian field batteries about Potijze would bombard the German position from 12.30 p.m. to 1.15 p.m. and then lift to points in rear while the assault was being delivered.

APPRECIATION BY G.O.C. SECOND ARMY

In the forenoon, while preparations for the attack were going forward, General Smith-Dorrien wrote a lengthy and closely reasoned appreciation of the situation to Lieut.-General Sir William R. Robertson, Chief of the General Staff at British G.H.Q. He did not expect that the operations of the day would advance the line, and pointed out that because of the domination of the German guns which were harassing the whole area as far back as Poperinge, the only line the British could hold permanently would be the partially dug switch connecting with the present line a thousand yards northeast of Hill 60, and running through Sanctuary
Wood and east of Hooge and thence curving north-westerly towards Potijze to join the G.H.Q. line which would form the northern portion. Although preparing for the worst, he did not think the time for withdrawal had yet arrived, and he considered that in any case a preliminary contraction of about 2,500 yards should be made, to a line under construction from the Bombarded Cross Roads to a point a thousand yards west of Zonnebeke and thence due south to the present line. While not in the least pessimistic, he realised that unless the French did something really vigorous the Germans might gain ground west of Lizerne and make it impossible for the British to hold any line east of Ypres. More British troops could restore the situation, but he was averse to losing any more men to regain French ground, and a big offensive elsewhere would do more than anything to relieve the situation at Ypres.

ANOTHER LAHORE ATTACK

On this day the expectations of the Army Commander were fulfilled, for at night the French were back in their positions of the morning, and the Lahore Division succeeded only in making good Canadian Farm. The course of the action was similar to that of the others which had taken place here in this open shallow valley. No sooner did the attacking troops come into view on the canal bridges or over Hill Top Ridge than the German guns opened, in the next five hundred yards the impetus was taken out of the advance by a rain of shells; after that machine gun and rifle fire swept the open ground and the survivors found that, as before, even the highest physical courage was unavailing; few of them ever came within assaulting distance of the German trench on the skyline of Mauser Ridge, and those who did found that the wire was still an effective obstacle in spite of the bombardment. The French right and the Lahore left made no progress; in the centre three officers and thirty men of the 1/4 Gurkhas reached Canadian Farm and recaptured the guns of
a French heavy battery; they were reinforced at 4 p.m. by the 4/King’s Liverpool which advanced by short rushes from support and, at a cost of 383 casualties reached a line within two hundred yards of the German trench. On the right the Ferozepore Brigade went forward from the trenches east of Hampshire Farm but, as elsewhere, the advance was soon held up. The seven attacking battalions of the Lahore Division lost 1,200.

ORDERS OF SIR JOHN FRENCH: THEIR RESULTS

Meanwhile Sir John French had considered the question of withdrawal as raised by General Smith-Dorrien; at 2.15 p.m., stating that he did not regard the situation nearly so unfavourably, and in the belief that there was abundance of troops and large reserves, he gave him orders to act vigorously in conjunction with the French. In due course General Smith-Dorrien ordered the assault to be pressed vigorously, and as all the Lahore Infantry had been engaged General Plumer decided that the V Corps reserve, consisting of the 2/D.C.L.I., 1/Y. and L., 5/King’s Own and 2/W Rid. R., formed into a composite brigade now only 1,290 strong and commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Tuson, (D.C.L.I.) should attack at 6.30 p.m. The Canadian artillery repeated the bombardment of the German trenches from 5.30 to 5.45 p.m.; Tuson’s Brigade went forward but could make no headway in the face of the devastating fire. On the left the French 8th Tirailleurs attacked again at 7 p.m. under a heavy bombardment; ten minutes later, driven back by fire and gas shells, they recoiled beyond their starting line and the position of the morning was only made good again when two battalions of Chausseurs were sent across the canal to re-establish it.

The news of this recoil, but not of the recovery, reached General Alderson, and there were doubts as to the position of the Lahore troops as well as that of the French. At 9.05 p.m. he warned the 1st C.I.B., which had the 1st and 4th Bat-
talions on the canal bank at Brielen Bridge, with the 2nd and 3rd in support and reserve, to be ready to take up a support line behind the French from Turco Farm to the canal. Patrols of the 1st C.I.B. found French troops in occupation of the area, however, and the move was not made. The 2nd C.I.B. remained south of Fortuin all day in close support attached to the 11th Brigade under Br.-General Hasler who was killed in St. Jean at nightfall. At 11 p.m. the 2nd C.I.B., ordered out to bivouac near Vlamertinghe, crossed the canal after thirteen days in the Salient. The 3rd C.I.B., south of the St. Jean-Wieltje road in reserve to the Lahore Division attack, was also ordered to move out to bivouac near Vlamertinghe after dark, and later to relieve the 1st C.I.B. along the canal at 2 a.m.; but when the French line was found to be intact the relief was cancelled.

The move of the Canadian Brigades out of the Salient was contemporary with a change of British policy. Sir John French, although he professed to disagree with the appreciation of General Smith-Dorrien and ordered him at 4.35 p.m. to hand over to General Plumer forthwith the command of all the troops engaged in the operations about Ypres, resolved that for the present British attacks must cease, that gains must be consolidated, and that preparations for a withdrawal must be considered.

The French command was also in a quandary. General Foch was unwilling to disturb his plans for Arras, yet something must be done at Ypres. In the evening he wrote to General Putz that immediate and combined action should be taken and that the forces available were sufficient to carry through the affair. And he made up his mind that he must try to convince Sir John French of the necessity of a violent British effort to re-establish the situation.688

WEDNESDAY, 28TH APRIL: A DAY OF DISCUSSION

Because of the direction of the wind which was still blowing gently from the north and the consequent probabil-
ity of more poison gas, the French plan for this day was changed. The maximum number of troops would be employed and the main attack would be delivered by the French centre, eastwards across the canal from Het Sas and Boesinghe on Pilckem; the left would clear the enemy from the west bank at Steenstraat and gain a footing on the east bank; the right, east of the canal, would attack simultaneously at 2 p.m. and the adjoining Sirhind Brigade, in the event of French progress, would advance in close touch. The bridging train of the IX French Corps was available for the crossing and, as before, the British artillery would supply covering fire on the front between St. Julien and the canal.

To emphasize the change in command of the British forces engaged at Ypres, a G.H.Q. order was issued at 7.50 a.m. which provided that these should be grouped in a formation designated "Plumer's Force." Two hours later a G.H.Q. message to General Plumer directed him, in anticipation of a possible decision by the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw from the Salient, to take preliminary measures. At 11 a.m. Sir John French called upon General Foch at Cassel. He said his troops were tired, their supply was becoming increasingly difficult and he could not continue in the unfavourable position in which he found himself. He did not wish to compromise the forthcoming operations north of Arras by using up his reserves at Ypres, therefore he would withdraw to the line Fortuin-Frezenberg-Westhoek. 690 "We did not succeed yesterday, and there is not the slightest chance of better success to-day." 691

General Foch agreed that the situation was delicate, but a withdrawal would not re-establish it; rather it would, by opening up the Salient, still further increase the domination of the enemy’s guns and, by avowal of impotence, provoke attack on a weaker position. He delivered himself of the maxim: “To resign oneself to losing a first battle with intent to win a second is deplorable tactics”; 691 therefore he urged action to recapture the Gravenstafel Ridge and the Lange-
marck area, both indispensable for the retention of the eastern face. He could not promise that his new drive from west to east would succeed to-day, but with an accession of heavy guns he counted on results tomorrow.

The outcome was that Sir John French said he would wait until the night of the 29th; meanwhile the British would support the French effort with fire, and take advantage of opportunities for local offensives. In reporting the interview, General Foch wrote to General Joffre that by negotiation and procrastination he was trying to keep the British in their forward position so as to reach the period 6th-8th May;—to that end he had painted the picture of the consequences of withdrawal blacker than they appeared to him: “J’ai fait le tableau des conséquences du recul plus noir que je ne le vois.” He added “the fact is that the enemy is not very noxious except with his gas—and we know all about that now.”

The French main attack was timed for 2 p.m. but was postponed until 7 p.m. Plumer’s Force, however, at 1.05 p.m. wired 1st Canadian Division “French have notified that attack begins at 2 p.m. Batteries which can bear on enemy position between C.12 and C.9 (i.e. opposite the frontages of the Canadian and Lahore Divisions) carry on bombardment at moderate rate from 2 p.m. till 2.15 p.m. Attack will also be supported by rifle fire over same front.” A subsequent message read “Bombardment begins 1.15 p.m. attack at 2 p.m. and not as previously stated”; it was duly fired by the Canadian guns. There were no results; in fact east of the canal the French attack was delivered by only two companies of Chasseurs, a force which General Putz considered was ridiculously small. On hearing of their failure he ordered the attack to be repeated, and 7 p.m. was the hour fixed. The preparatory bombardment was also repeated, but again the results were meagre, so that the Staff Officer representing General Foch with the D.A.B. reported “The whole operation will have to be done over again.”

In the Canadian Division the day had opened with a se-
vere loss: Colonel Geddes, who with his hastily formed detachment had done excellent work in the northern face for six strenuous days, was killed by a shell in St. Jean after making final arrangements for the dissolution of his force by the return of battalions to their own brigades. The front line of the Division was now held by the 10th Brigade from Fortuin to Mouse Trap Farm; westwards the 13th Brigade, with the 4/R.B. in the trenches formerly occupied by the 2/E. Kent and No. 1 Coy. 14th Canadian Battalion, extended to Hampshire Farm inclusive, and the Lahore Division carried the line north of Canadian Farm to Turco Farm which was held by the French. The Northumberland Brigade was disposed in support with one battalion in the G.H.Q. line east of Wieltje and the remainder in the village.

CONSOLIDATION OF LAHORE FRONT BY 1ST C.I.B.

As part of the British plan of consolidation, Plumer’s Force at 1.35 p.m. sent a message to 1st Canadian Division “You are to entrench and fortify to-night the line from the farm in C.22.b. (Mouse Trap) following the Rifle Bde. trench and then join up with the French.” At 3 p.m. General Alderson issued the following order to the 1st and 3rd Canadian and 13th Infantry Brigades:

Under instructions from Plumer’s Force the 1st Canadian Bde. will entrench and fortify to-night a line running from farm in 22.a. (sic C.22.a. i.e. Mouse Trap) to the farm in C.15.c. (Turco). This line will start on the right from the trenches at present held by the Rifle Bde. The farm in C.15.c. (Turco) will be prepared by the French, Canadian Divn. finding material. When above line is completed it will be occupied by the 13th Bde. The 3rd Canadian Bde. will take the place of the 1st Canadian Bde. on the west bank of the Canal and be in position by 8.30 p.m. The 1st Canadian Bde. after completion of trenches will return to the west bank of the canal to the billets vacated by 3rd Canadian Bde. 1st Canadian Bde. will report to 13th Bde. when trenches are ready for latter’s occupation and 13th Bde. will report to Divisional Headquarters when they have taken over new trenches.
The 13th Brigade supplied guides to Hampshire Farm: the Lahore Division, ordered to assist in the work, generously offered to put into a state of defence the left half of the line, from Canadian Farm inclusive, if the Canadians would attend to the remainder; but General Alderson replied:—

We have arranged to do the work ourselves, but would like you to send guides to meet 1st Bde. and help them in location of trenches.

At 8 p.m. the 1st C.I.B., relieved by the 3rd C.I.B. on the canal, moved off, having been delayed by enemy shelling of the bridges. The 2nd Battalion acting as a covering party extended east and west after crossing Hill Top Ridge, and lay prone in the open fields north of Canadian Farm and about two hundred yards from the German line. At 10.30 p.m. the 3rd Battalion deployed on the right of the farm, and an hour later the 1st Battalion on the left, and both proceeded to dig. The 4th Battalion, in reserve, also extended and dug in southwest of the farm. The technical direction of the work was in the hands of the 1st Field Co. C.E., commanded by Major W. W. Melville who had also with him two sections of the 2nd Field Co., C.E. He reported “the work of the night was finished in first class condition; the infantry party did excellent work; our N.C.O’s and sappers systematizing the work as never before.” One of the N.C.O’s, Lance-Corporal R. J. Casement, distinguished himself by taking a party of three men forward to carry in an officer wounded while making a reconnaissance towards the German line; this proved to be Captain J. Nosworthy, one of the three officers of the Lahore Division who, having previously made themselves familiar with the German position, gave valuable advice as to dead ground and the best location for the new line. Before daylight the 1st C.I.B. was brought back to Vlamertinghe, having dug a traversed trench a thousand yards long, without casualties, across a most bitterly contested section of the front, and thereby established in a few hours of moonlight a continuous British trench line after a
week of costly daylight fighting. Not only was a trench built, but Canadian Farm was fortified by the Lahore Sappers and Miners and communication trenches were made by the Sikh Pioneers, so that the 2/K.O.S.B. of the 13th Brigade went into permanent occupation on the night of the 30th and the wiring was completed by a party of thirty of the 54th Co. R.E. which, with the 55th, had been attached to the Canadian Division on the 27th.

PREPARATORY ORDER OF 29TH APRIL FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL

At 9.30 a.m. on the 29th a “Preparatory Order for Withdrawal from Tip of Salient” was issued by Plumer’s Force H.Q. “in case it should be considered necessary to shorten our present line east of Ypres.” It provided that the northern front would be maintained while most of the artillery, and all of the Lahore, the Northumbrian and the 2nd Cavalry Divisions would be moved west of Ypres under protection of the guns already west of the canal. The line to be finally occupied had been under construction for some days and was being improved, it consisted of a switch from the present trenches straight north to Hooge Château and thence north-west by Warwick Farm to the G.H.Q. line which would be followed to Mouse Trap Farm and along the present front line to the canal. This would be held by the 27th, 28th and 1st Canadian Divisions, the last named, with attached British infantry in the front line, being responsible for Mouse Trap Farm and westwards as far as Turco Farm which would continue to be the French right. It was proposed to carry out the withdrawal on four successive nights, commencing probably on night 29th/30th, the final move from the present trench to the new line would take place on one night.

A DAY OF PROCRASTINATION

The plan devised by General Foch to postpone the British withdrawal by carrying on negotiations continued to meet with success on this day. When Sir John French again
called on him at 11 a.m. he explained the reasons for delay in the projected attack; the sights of the newly arrived tractor-drawn heavy batteries had become deranged en route, there had been bunglings (“malfaçons”) on the 28th, communications had been interrupted, and regrouping of units and more effective artillery support were necessary; but all would be ready for the 30th. He reviewed his previous arguments and in the end Sir John French, bearing in mind the political, moral and tactical value of the Ypres Salient and moved by the cogent importunings and aggressive spirit of General Foch, deferred to his judgment to the extent that he agreed to attack with him on that day in a final concerted effort to throw the Germans back on their original line. He would carry out the withdrawal if success were not obtained.

The orders issued for the 29th, which called for a French attack at noon, were cancelled by General Putz acting upon the instructions of General Foch, who, in directing him to prosecute the attack, gave permission to hold it up if artillery preparation proved insufficient, provided he warned General Plumer. Sir John French had again instructed General Plumer to support the French action by fire and to attack as opportunity might offer, so that the orders to the 1st C.D.A. were “Slow bombardment to commence at 11.30 a.m. for half an hour. Rate of fire for the last ten minutes not to exceed battery fire 10 seconds. The bombardment is not to commence unless the French guns open fire. French infantry attack is timed to commence 12 noon.”

With the cessation of active Allied operations for the day it seemed likely that the initiative might pass to the Germans; a drive southwards, east of the canal, might yet further jeopardize the already difficult withdrawal of troops from the Salient and unduly complicate plans for deliberate contraction of the perimeter. This contingency was anticipated by moving the 3rd C.I.B. into support behind the French right at nightfall, where a line one mile long north of the road running east from Brielen Bridge and parallel to it,
was dug and occupied by the four battalions. The 2nd C.I.B. moved up to replace the 3rd C.I.B. along the canal, with two battalions guarding the bridges and two in support. For the rest, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was brought up dismounted into the G.H.Q. line behind the right of the 10th Brigade and arrangements were made between the brigadiers for concerted action if the Germans attacked. Of the Lahore Division, the Ferozepore and Jullundur Brigades moved back to Ouderdom.

30TH APRIL: A DAY OF DISAPPOINTMENT

The time set for the renewal of the French operations on this day had been communicated to all concerned before midnight, and Plumer’s Force had been ordered to cooperate. Because the wind had changed to the southwest the main attack would be launched at 7.55 a.m. by General Joppé east of the canal, the right on the Ypres-Langemarck road with Pilckem as final objective, and the Sirhind Brigade was warned to advance in close touch if it made progress. The centre under General Quiquandon would hold itself in readiness to debouch through Boesinghe if the main attack met with success; Curé’s Group on the left would operate against Steenstraat and try to reach the canal.

The Canadian artillery opened fire on the German trenches at a slow rate at 7 a.m. for fifty minutes, then a burst of rapid for five minutes, then a lift to selected points in rear. Six minutes after the burst of rapid the batteries learned that on account of mist the attack had been postponed two hours. They fired the same programme beginning at 9 a.m., but on completion the F.O.O’s reported that they could see no movement of the French. Then a wire from Plumer’s Force was received at 10.35 a.m. stating that the French artillery preparation would commence at 10 a.m. and the infantry attack at 11.15 a.m. At once the guns were put on the German line and fired at a slow rate, with rapid from 11.10 to 11.15. An hour later General Putz informed
Plumer’s Force: “On the right wire not sufficiently cut to admit of advance. Fire recommenced by artillery. In centre wire completely cut and attack progressing. On left first line enemy trenches penetrated and attack progressing.” At 2.20 p.m. Plumer’s Force wired 1st Canadian Division: “French right reported to have advanced and to be uncovered. Sirhind Brigade should press on on right of French.” The 3rd C.I.B. was ordered to support the Sirhind Brigade in the advance on Hill 29 if necessary, and the Lahore Division called on the Canadian guns to cut the German wire on their front. This was attempted, but the batteries were not properly placed, there was no time to change them, and the wire was so irregular that the infantry commanders could not report the result; it was decided that the field guns should engage the strong points in the enemy line and the infantry would take care of the wire. At 4.30 p.m. came the news that the Moroccan Brigade would assault Hill 29 at 4.45, and the enemy’s trenches were again bombarded at a slow rate until 4.40 p.m. when the usual five minutes rapid was fired, followed by a lift and again five minutes rapid, then slow. As the last rounds of rapid were breaking, word was received that the French would not attack and the shoot stopped. In his report General Keary wrote, “The cooperation of the Canadian Artillery was splendid, and the batteries served the guns during the whole day under the heaviest shell fire.”

After dark the 12th Brigade, which had been placed under General Alderson at 6.30 p.m., took over the trenches on the Canadian front between Mouse Trap and Turco Farm; the 10th Brigade continued to hold the right half of their line, running north of Vanheule Farm; the relieved 13th Brigade marched to bivouac north of Vlamertinghe. The three Canadian Infantry Brigades remained in position and the Northumberland Brigade, still attached to the Canadian Division, provided 1,500 men for work on the new switch line to which the 27th and 28th Divisions would retire. Other preparations for withdrawal were also begun. The German harass-
ing fire on roads west of Ypres, and the systematic daily shelling of Vlamertinghe, made it desirable that another traffic route should be provided. A road deviation around the north of Vlamertinghe was laid out by Major T. V. Anderson, R.C.E.; the 2nd and 3rd Field Companies had it ready for traffic by the evening of 3rd May. The canal bridges were also incessantly shelled, and the construction of a new foot-bridge three hundred yards south of Brielen Bridge was ordered. This work was in charge of Captain A. Macphail, who had trestles prepared and brought to the site. The enemy destroyed the material by shell fire before erection and it had to be replaced; although the site continued to receive particular attention, by 10 a.m. on the 3rd May the new bridge was open for traffic.

In the evening General Foch went to see Sir John French at Hazebrouck, and asked him to extend his cooperation with the offensive which he intended to pursue next day. The results of the French effort had been far from encouraging; even Pilckem was still a thousand yards behind the German line, Langemarck more than two miles. Sir John French said no fresh British troops would be committed north of Ypres, but an aggressive attitude, evinced by local attacks, would be maintained.

1ST MAY: A DAY OF DISILLUSIONMENT

During the night the French forces were regrouped but the general plan of action for the day was the same as that of 30th April. General Putz arranged for the assault to be launched at 3.10 p.m. Generals Joppé and Quiquandon would take Pilckem, the Sirhind Brigade would advance, the 12th Brigade would take Kitchener’s Wood and the line to the right would move forward also; General Curé would continue at his task of clearing the western bank. In the end the French offensive was curtailed and although the Sirhind Brigade went forward, the 1/1 and 1/4 Gurkhas in the front line, the German guns as usual broke up the attack before it
reached striking distance.

CHANGE OF ALLIED POLICY: BRITISH WITHDRAWAL
ORDERED

The attacks of 1st May gave no results; Sir John French had had no expectations of them. At 1 p.m. he ordered General Plumer to commence withdrawal preparatory to occupation of the new line; this began at 8 p.m.; half of the Canadian guns in the Salient passed over the canal and joined up with those west of it. At about 3 p.m. he had had a visit from General Foch, and learned that the intention of General Joffre was to attack on the Arras front and act on the defensive at Ypres. It was now admitted that the Allies could not achieve appreciable progress east of the canal without paying a higher price than they thought desirable, and it was agreed that the British should finally withdraw to the line Fortuin-Frezenberg-Veldhoek during the night 3rd/4th May. At this meeting Sir John French suggested that the Festubert attack should be made on the 8th May, and General Joffre agreed.

A GERMAN GAS ATTACK FAILS: 2ND MAY

The German failure to renew pressure during the past five days had been due in large measure to the unfavourable direction of the wind for the projection against the northern face of another gas cloud without which they would not attempt an attack. On the 2nd the wind was from the north, and during the morning the front from the Zonnebeke-Keerselaere road to Turco Farm, as well as the area in rear, was subjected to a heavy bombardment of high explosive and gas shells. The preparation was continued in the afternoon and at 4 p.m. became intense; at 5 p.m. upon a rocket signal from the line, the gas was released. The infantry were moving to the attack: the 52nd Reserve Division west of St. Julien; the 51st Reserve Division at Fortuin; the 38th Landwehr Brigade and the 53rd Reserve Division on the front of the XXVII Reserve Corps further east to Berlin Wood. The
purpose as before was to force a way through and roll up the line southwards.

On the first alarm the allied guns, themselves under a terrific bombardment, opened rapid fire on the German trenches and the area behind the gas, and by cutting communications – according to the German account – prevented synchronization of release. Fortunately for the defenders the cloud was carried unevenly by the fitful wind. In most places too the trenches were from 300 to 500 yards apart, and the density was so reduced that for the most part it gave insufficient protection to the assaulting German infantry and only overcame the defenders of two lengths of trench west of Mouse Trap Farm, although some were wearing respirators. Platoons of the 2/Essex lying in support 150 yards behind the trenches dashed through the cloud into the front line and caught the enemy advancing across the open; the 7/A. & S.H. moved up from reserve and the 4th Hussars and 5th Lancers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, as previously arranged against such an eventuality, advanced dismounted from the G.H.Q. line and helped to drive off the Germans. The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades stood to arms, the 13th British and 1st Canadian Infantry Brigades were moved up to south of Brieelen; but they were not required. In a message of congratulation, sent next day by General Plumer through General Alderson to the 10th and 12th Brigades, the Commander-in-Chief said he thought the supporting artillery, which included all the Canadian field batteries, “deserve great praise.”

WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH LINE, NIGHT 3RD/4TH MAY

Although the British line thus remained unaltered throughout its length, the Germans, owing to reports that Vanheule Farm had been stormed—it was in British hands for another 36 hours—and that Gravenstafel had been captured—it had been German since early on the 26th—immediately set about planning another attack to press the
advantage supposedly gained. A suggestion to further comb
the investing line for troops to make a stronger drive from
Keerselaere on Ypres was not adopted, and the main attack
on the following afternoon was directed on Berlin Wood.
Here the 11th and 85th British Infantry Brigades were only
covered by three field batteries which had not yet with-
drawn. The garrison of 2/E. Kent having been exterminated
by shell fire, the position was carried before dark; the sup-
port line close in rear was held, however, and the British or-
ders to move back were executed in the dark by the 28th,
27th and Canadian Divisions with remarkable success in that
not a man was lost in carrying out the movement, and the
Germans were not aware of it until 6 a.m. on the 4th.

RELIEF OF THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION: 4TH MAY

The withdrawal affected only the right of the line of the
Canadian Division, where the 10th British Infantry Brigade
vacated the line between Fortuin and Mouse Trap Farm
which now marked the boundary with the 28th Division. The
recession here however included the evacuation of Vanheule
Farm, which although it was not stormed appears as a Ger-
man battle honour “Erstürmung von Vanheule-Ferme” 2nd-
3rd May and again 7th-9th May. On completion of the
movement the 12th Infantry Brigade was in the front line,
the 10th in support along Hill Top Ridge, the 2nd Canadian
guarded the canal and the 11th British and 1st and 3rd Cana-
dian Brigades lay in reserve on the line Vlamertinghe-
Elverdinghe. The Canadian Divisional Artillery was west of
the canal except the 118th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A., west of
La Brique; the three engineer companies were in bivouac
near Vlamertinghe; signal communications were established;
the redisposition of the infantry was complete, and all was in
readiness for transfer of command which took place at 10
a.m. 4th May when General Alderson handed over to Gen-
eral H. F. M. Wilson of the 4th British Division. Next day
Divisional Routine Orders carried a number of congratula-
tory messages relating to the fighting of the previous thirteen days. 699a

From the 4th to 7th May there was little activity on the northern face of the Salient; the situation continued to be dominated by the German aeroplanes and heavy guns. The Canadian Divisional Artillery remained in position attached to the 4th British Division and covering the front from Mouse Trap to Turco Farm. On 9th May, after the first day of the Battle of Frezenberg Ridge, Br.-General Burstall handed over to the C.R.A. 4th (British) Division. For the last three days the N. Midland and 2nd London Heavy Batteries (13th Heavy Bde. R.G.A.), as well as a section of the 31st H.B. (R.G.A.) and No. 9 Section Anti-Aircraft (R.A.) had been under his command. Four of his own batteries, the 7th, 8th, 10th and 11th had already been relieved; four, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th, were relieved on the 9th, the other six, 5th, 6th, 9th, 12th and the 458th and 459th (How.) Batteries R.F.A., came out of action on 18th May. Shortage of guns, and the move of the 4th Div. Arty. from Ploegsteert to Ypres caused seven of the batteries to be used for covering the former sector for several days before they could march to rejoin the 1st Canadian Division under First Army at Hinges on 19th May. 700
CHAPTER XIV

FREZENBERG RIDGE

8TH MAY

Map 8: Ypres 1915. British Withdrawal Night 3rd/4th May

THE P.P.C.L.I. IN THE SALIENT—GERMAN PLANS—THE BATTLE OPENS:
8TH MAY—BELLEWAARDE RIDGE HELD—THE P.P.C.L.I. RELIEVED
—ON THE NORTHERN FRONTAGE

THE P.P.C.L.I. IN THE SALIENT

The only Canadian battalion engaged in the later phases of the Battles of Ypres, 1915, was the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. As part of the 80th Infantry Brigade (27th Division—the ninth British division to be sent to France) the regiment on the night 20th/21st December had crossed the channel in the S.S. Cardiganshire from Southampton to Le Havre. After a week near Hazebrouck it was inspected on New Year’s Day by the Commander-in-Chief, who wrote in his despatch of 2nd February, 1915: “They are a magnificent set of men and have since done excellent work in the trenches.” On the night 6th/7th January, trenches were taken over south of St. Eloi from the 53rd (French) Regiment as part of the general relief of the XVI (French) Corps by the II (British) Corps. For the next seven weeks in this water-logged sector, overlooked by the Wytschaete ridge, conditions were similar to those prevailing all along the British front during the first winter. On the night 27th/28th February a party of one hundred, commanded by Major A. Hamilton Gault, successfully raided the German trenches opposite Shelley Farm. Subsequently the battalion was involved in the confused counter-attacks which failed to recover the “Mound” captured by the enemy on 14th March. The com-
manding officer, Lieut.-Colonel F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., was mortally wounded during a relief six days later, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Buller, another officer of the British Regular Army who had also been on the staff of the Duke of Connaught in Ottawa.

With the other four battalions of the 80th Brigade (commanded by Br.-General W. E. B. Smith from 25th March) the Patricias moved up on 23rd March from the St. Eloi front to rest in Poperinghe, and first entered Ypres on 5th April when the 27th Division was again extending the British line, by relieving the French 17th Division (IX Corps). On the 9th April the battalion occupied 700 yards of the front line in Polygon Wood, adjoining the left divisional boundary and facing due south; on the right flank the line curved in a concave arc to Hill 60, a mile distant; on the left it bent sharply northwards to Molenaarelsthoek, a mile to the left rear, and the curvature was such that the right of the 1st Canadian Division at Berlin Wood was three miles directly in rear of the P.P.C.L.I. sector. The fire trenches were revetted with sandbags, they had no traverses and no fire-step; sited on a forward slope they were passably dry. The weather was fine, the enemy artillery quiet, and the lack of dugouts,—one ten by eight splinter-proof per company,—was no hardship. The supports also had no cover but the wood.

After the first tour in this part of the line the Patricias went to rest at Vlamertinghe, and experienced bombing by a Zeppelin on 12th April, but suffered no casualties. Their second tour in line terminated on the 17th and they went back to billets in the Cavalry Barracks in Ypres. On the afternoon of the 20th these barracks, being a target for the German bombardment, were vacated; in the evening the 4/Rifle Brigade was relieved in the section of front line first occupied.

The first discharge of poison gas on the 22nd April took place five to eight miles away to the northwest; but by the
1st May, when the decision was taken to contract the salient, the trenches had been battered by repeated bombardments, some eighty casualties had been suffered, and the British line facing northwest at Fortuin was only three miles distant on the right rear. The orders for withdrawal called for the P.P.C.L.I. to occupy five hundred yards of the partly constructed rearward line running north and south above the easterly point of Bellewaarde Lake; on the right would be the 4/Rifle Brigade, and on the left one company of the 4/K.R.R.C. at the divisional boundary. The main trench here ran along a row of tall elm trees on the crest of Bellewaarde Ridge, among the roots of which the 96th Battery R.F.A., now withdrawn, had been in action, but it was decided to dig and hold a more forward line along the ridge in the open. There was little time; when therefore the Patricias came back—half at 8 p.m. on 3rd May, followed by half the remainder, and the last quarter at 3 a.m. on the 4th—two companies went into the front line, a straight shallow trench 50 to 70 yards in front of the main trench which accommodated the other two companies in support. The position was wired and communication trenches, shallow also, connected the two lines.

At 6 a.m. the first German patrols were seen advancing with machine guns and then the advanced guard came into full view moving at the double, followed by the main body deploying on the open slopes three quarters of a mile away, a magnificent military spectacle which the Canadians cheered. The German machine guns were soon in action within 200 yards, the field guns ranged on the new trenches and opened an accurate bombardment, the scene appeared to be set for an immediate assault but no attack came, and at 10 p.m. the Patricias were relieved by the 2/K.S.L.I. The battalion moved back into reserve in the G.H.Q. line at Hell Fire Corner—the intersection of the Ypres-Menin road with the Ypres-Roulers railway. The losses of the day had been 122, and on the 5th the C.O., Colonel Buller, was severely
wounded; Major A. Hamilton Gault who had rejoined on the previous day, took command. On the evening of the 6th May the P.P.C.L.I., with a strength of 14 officers and less than 600 men, relieved the 2/K.S.L.I. on Bellewaarde Ridge. During the night an inter-company relief was carried out, and the morning of the 8th found the battalion disposed with No. 1 Co. (Capt. H.S. Dennison) in line on the right and No. 2 (Capt. A.S.A.M. Adamson) on the left; in the support trenches No. 3 Co. (Capt. S.H. Hill) was on the right, No. 4 (Lieut. R.G. Crawford) on the left, with posts along the road running westwards from Westhoek. The German guns had prevented much improvement of the position and the German infantry on the right front now enfiladed the ill-placed forward line from the higher ground of the main Passchendaele Ridge at less than a thousand yards.

GERMAN PLANS

Duke Albrecht, because the advance on the 4th May was reported to have been held up by a strongly fortified and heavily manned position, decided that a new and carefully organized attack was necessary. He was eager to drive the Allied forces back across the Yser as soon as possible, and on 6th May he issued orders for his three Corps embracing the Salient: the XXVI Reserve Corps whose right was between Boesinghe and Pilckem to advance southwards and seize the high ground about Wientje; the XXVII Reserve Corps in the centre to carry out the initial and main attack westwards astride the Zonnebeke-Ypres road; the XV Corps to break through north-westwards between Bellewaarde Lake and Zillebeke Lake. The operation would begin on the 8th May.

As a preliminary measure in the elimination of the Salient, Duke Albrecht had ordered the capture of Hill 60. At 8.45 a.m. on 5th May the 30th Division (XV Corps) covered by a cloud of gas, gained a footing on the hill. The British battalions had a hard fight. At 11 a.m. another gas cloud was
released, then the British reserves came up and counter-attacked but could not regain the crest. All day the struggle continued; at 7 p.m. the Germans released more gas, two hours later the 1/R.W.K., 2/K.O.S.B. and 2/K.O.Y.L.I. of the 13th Brigade which had just rejoined tired and depleted from the Canadian Division were ordered to retake the hill, they gained the crest in the darkness but could not hold it. Another attempt at dawn on the 7th by the 2/K.O.Y.L.I. and bombers of the 2/R.I. Rifles and 2/Ches. also failed, and Hill 60 remained in German hands until June 1917.

THE BATTLE OPENS: 8TH MAY

After an ominous silence in the early hours of daylight on the 8th the preparatory bombardment opened and increased in intensity. Shortly after 8 a.m. Major Gault sent a message to the 80th Brigade:—

Have been heavily shelled since 7 a.m. Sections of front line made untenable by enemy’s artillery, but have still about 160 rifles in front line. German infantry has not yet appeared. Should they rush our front trenches will at once counter attack if possible, but do not propose to risk weakening my support lines. Will advise O.C. Rifle Brigade should I require support. In lulls of gun fire there is heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. Please send me two M.Gs. if possible. I have only two left in front line. None in support.

To the Patricias “the whole world seemed alive and rocking with the flashing and crashing of bursting shells.” The minutes passed, and then another hour: still the expected German infantry did not appear. A second message from Major Gault read:—

Should this continue all day, would like support this evening in case of heavy night attack. Most of my wire gone.

At last, after two and a half hours of bombardment, the German infantry were seen swarming out of their lines. There were still enough defenders in the Patricias’ front trench to stop the onrush with rifle fire, but several of the enemy’s machine gun crews worked their way forward to
the hedges and ruined buildings between the opposing lines. After a final burst of the most intense shell fire, which obliterated much of the front line and rendered the rest untenable, there was a sudden silence, and the Germans charged.

They gained a footing on the right where Captain Dennison and a small party had remained to cover withdrawal of No. 1 Co.; No. 2 Co. on the left had a better field of fire and beat off the assault. The German infantry set up their artillery flags, and their field guns in response engaged the main line in rear. Meanwhile Major Gault, wounded early in the day, was hit again so severely that he could not move so he handed over to Captain Hill who carried on until Captain Adamson arrived from the line to take command. No. 2 Co. was now outflanked on the right, and on the left troops of the adjoining division were seen to be falling back, a withdrawal to the support line was therefore ordered and successfully carried out; conspicuous in the handling of this movement were Sergt. L. Scott and Lance Corporal A. G. Pearson. It was now about 10 a.m.; save for a few posts the front line had been abandoned and the main line along the Bellewaarde Ridge was being held. A company of the supporting 4/R.B., laden with welcome ammunition, was brought up during a lull in the bombardment; they set up their machine guns on the parapet whereupon the German snipers picked off the crews and put the guns out of action. Captain Adamson, although wounded, led a party forward and temporarily eased the pressure on the left flank.

All day the battle raged on the front between Bellewaarde Ridge and Mouse Trap Farm. The Germans on their third attempt had taken Frezenberg by 10 a.m., but were held up four hundred yards west of it. Having thus forced an entry on the front of the 83rd Brigade they proceeded to roll up the line of the 84th and 80th Brigades to the north and south. The 12/London counter-attacked below Wielte and delayed their progress. Soon after 11 a.m. the 3/Mon. and 2/King’s Own in the line opposite Frezenberg, mistaking an order for
the advancing reserves to stop at the G.H.Q. trenches, fell back to that line a mile and a half behind their first position and the Germans entered Verlorenhoek. The error was discovered and about noon they went forward again; at nightfall only two officers and 69 men out of six companies answered the roll call. The 2/E. York and the 5/King’s Own, ordered from reserve to counterattack and regain the lost trenches at Frezenberg, were but 550 strong and because of the German shelling could only establish themselves a thousand yards east of the G.H.Q. line. Shortly before 3 p.m. the battalions of the 85th Brigade ordered up to Potijze from divisional reserve were directed to counter-attack astride the Ypres-Roulers railway; the 3/Middlesex and 1/Y. & L., then the 2/E. Surrey and about 5 p.m. the 3/Royal Fusiliers advanced persistently under the heavy shelling until at 8 p.m. they reached a line running southwards from, but not including, Verlorenhoek.

BELLEWAARDE RIDGE HELD

The position from mid-afternoon onwards was that the Germans had opened a two mile breach in the point of the Salient, centering on Verlorenhoek, the 28th British Division was fighting desperately to hold them back; at the northern shoulder of the gap near Mouse Trap Farm the 2/N.F. were still in position, at the southern end the P.P.C.L.I. stood firm on Bellewaarde Ridge. News of the course of the fighting on the left reached the 80th Brigade and the 27th Division, it was meagre and contradictory and confusing, as is usual when telephone wires are cut and the whole forward area is shrouded in smoke and dust and swept by fire. The Patricias reinforced by the 4/R.B. were holding their main trench line with a refused flank running westwards along the Westhoek road; somewhere in front remnants of the 1/K.O.Y.L.I., under Captain H. Mallinson, and B Co. 3/Mon. were still fighting, intermittent touch with the latter was maintained for a time and then lost. For six hours the Patricias endured one
bombardment after another—the C.O. of the 2/K.S.L.I. reported in the heat of the fight that not one man from the Patricias was coming back. By four o’clock the German infantry seemed to have had enough and within an hour were fully occupied with the 85th Brigade counter-attack which effectively turned the tide for the day. When news came that the line to the north was broken, the 2/K.S.L.I. were sent to extend the refused flank northwestwards to the railway; later the 1/A. & S.H. and two companies 9/A. & S.H. reinforced them, and the 3/K.R.R.C. was moved into support at the railway. Here touch was gained with the counter-attacking battalions of the 85th Brigade and a line, tenuous because most of the battalions were reduced to less than 200, and some to under 100, was established across the gap. After sunset the 10th Brigade arrived from 4th Divisional reserve on loan to the 84th Brigade, they were under orders to counter-attack southeastwards from Mouse Trap Farm, but it was too late to do more than make a short advance. This was however sufficient to clear the enemy from the eastern end of the St. Jean Ridge and so shook the Germans that they abandoned their most advanced positions, and falling on the defensive, contented themselves with the gain of the first British line of trenches.

**THE P.P.C.L.I. RELIEVED**

When the Patricias were relieved by the 3/K.R.R.C. at 11.30 p.m. on 8th May, all the senior officers had become casualties: a subaltern, Lieut. H. W. Niven, was in command and the trench strength of the battalion was 4 officers and 150 men. The casualties for the 8th May were 392 including four officers dead, six wounded and 108 other ranks killed. Their Divisional Commander (General Snow) reported of them—“No regiment could have fought with greater determination or endurance, many would have failed where they succeeded.” For the next week they formed a composite unit with the 4/K.R.R.C., but were not called upon to go into the
front line in the fighting which continued until the 24th May; on the 31st they moved with their brigade to a new sector at Armentières.

ON THE NORTHERN FRONTAGE

To the left of the gap the 4th British Division held the line taken over from the 1st Canadian Division from Mouse Trap Farm to Turco Farm. In preparation for their main drive westwards, the Germans on the 6th and 7th May concentrated heavy howitzer batteries on Mouse Trap Farm, now more important than ever as a strong point in the British line. Several attempted surprise attacks against it failed. On the morning of the 8th the 12th Brigade in the trenches was subjected to heavy bombardment and about 9 a.m. the Germans were seen mustering for the assault. The British artillery on the western bank of the canal north of Ypres, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 12th Canadian Batteries, covered this front at about 3,500 yards range; the guns by this time had been registered and the location of the opposing field works established so that effective fire could be brought to bear on request of the infantry or advice of the F.O.O. The trench line dug by the 1st C.I.B. on the night 28th/29th April and since improved was successfully held throughout the day. After these Canadian batteries were withdrawn the Germans continued to attack, and on 24th May captured Mouse Trap Farm and Bellewaarde Ridge. The opposing lines around the Ypres Salient, established at this time, remained practically unchanged for the next two years.
CHAPTER XV
FEATURES AND RESULTS OF YPRES 1915

Map 8: Ypres 1915. British Withdrawal Night 3rd/4th May


CHARACTER OF THE BATTLE

Before turning to recapitulate the aims of the opponents, or to review the sequence of events or to examine the conduct and results of the Second Battle of Ypres, the reader, who may well have become confused by the kaleidoscopic changes of aspect and distraught by the recital of intricate manoeuvres, must be reminded that whereas we are now possessed of almost complete knowledge, yet in this battle nobody knew continuously the relative or exact position or condition of the troops engaged. And he may also remember that each unit was a conglomerate of individuals, who, although moulded and bound together by the training, traditions, and discipline of the army and thereby made capable of enduring the stress of battle, still retained each his own inherent personal character and the officers in particular a large measure of individual responsibility. Thus at one juncture we find correct conceptions followed by almost incredible misunderstandings, and, at another, effective action arising from premises that were quite erroneous. The one constant on the British side was the all-pervading motive “hold the line at all costs” and had it not prevailed the battle would have gone down in history as an appalling disaster to British
arms, instead of a brilliant if costly defensive engagement in
which courage and tenacity triumphed over metal and gas.

THE GERMAN PLAN

The German intention, when the battle began, was to cut
off the Salient by an advance to the canal and then to capture
Ypres. Early news of initial success engendered hopes of an
extensive break-through and expectations of a tactical coup,
a broken enemy and a paramount strategical gain. Later, as
one Allied attack after another had to be met and as the sur-
prise effect wore off, it became evident that there was to be
no quick and easy victory but an arduous and costly fight. In
the end it had to be admitted that the operation was a failure.
The Salient was reduced but not cut off, the town of Ypres
remained in British hands and the use of poison gas as a
weapon was but another terror added to the horrors of war.

POISON GAS

But of far greater significance was the fact that poison
gas had not brought complete success: the paralyzing sur-
prise of its first appearance on the battlefield had passed, and
it was henceforth only another of the known horrors of war.
Never again need soldiers fly, in terror of the vapour that
blinded and strangled them; never again need they be de-
fenceless against this new weapon.

The new menace did require a new set of protective
measures—an alarm system, respirators for all in the for-
ward area, gas-proof dugouts—but these were soon provided
and the danger thereby modified until poison gas, while re-
taining its startling and insidious qualities, became far less
lethiferous to seasoned troops than high explosive shells and
high velocity bullets. The main difference between poison
gas and the other instruments of war lies in the degree of
control applicable by the wielder. By their rash yet premedi-
tated act the Germans, with a deplorable lack of both human-
ity and foresight, adopted for the use of the world at large a
devastating weapon of a kind hitherto discreetly shunned by civilized man—a weapon more destructive than the most deadly plague and less easily controlled than the winds of heaven.

Due to mass production by chemical factories, the danger of war to unprepared civilians and untrained soldiers was to increase incalculably. Earlier missiles could be relied upon to follow a consistent and predictable trajectory. Here was one of variable speed, intensity and range—all unpredictable. When the senses give warning, cover may be sought or armour used; from active diseases some are immune and almost all can be immunised; poisoned food or water can be detected and avoided; but for life breathing must continue and when air is sufficiently poisoned with gas everyone who breathes that air unfiltered must surely die.

Because of the difficulties of control and uncertainty of reaching the intended target, the projection of gas by release from cylinders in or near the front line (known as “gas beam”) is practicable only when the lie of the ground and the position of the trenches are such that there is little chance of a change of wind bringing it back upon the attackers. To avoid dissipation of the cloud and to envelop the defenders in it for the requisite time, a light breeze of from three to seven miles per hour and from the right direction must be awaited, and because troops could not be held indefinitely in assaulting positions the method of projecting thin steel drums filled with gas and a light bursting charge was devised. Electrically fired, a hundred drums or more could be made to burst simultaneously at a range of 250 yards and produce a sudden dense cloud. Vulnerability to artillery fire prior to firing was the chief objection, a hazard reducible only by careful concealment, and there was still the chance of the cloud being blown back. These conditions finally led to the adoption of artillery shells by all belligerents as the usual vehicle for poison gas. Hand grenades, first authorized for British use in May, 1915, produced little volume, and
cylinders to be dropped from aeroplanes were made but never used.  

IMPORTANCE OF YPRES

Retention of Ypres and the encircling salient was important to the Allies for three reasons. Politically and sentimentally it meant that the whole of Belgium had not yet been overrun by the violators of her neutrality, whose precipitate action had caused British intervention. Strategically it maintained the potential threat of a drive towards Lille and Brussels which, combined with naval operations, might force a German withdrawal from the Belgian coast. Defensively it formed the northern bulwark of the Allied position in Flanders and blocked the German line of advance to the Channel ports, the uninterrupted possession of which was so vital for British supplies and consequently for co-operation between the French and British forces.

THE FIRST BLOW

The first German onset fell by chance upon French troops not of the first quality in a weak and ill-fortified position still further enfeebled by uncompleted dispositions and the existence of an inter-Allied boundary on either flank. These boundaries formed natural cleavage lines almost coincident with the flanks of the attack. By chance also, half the defenders were coloured troops, prone to superstition and inclined to panic when faced by agencies beyond their ken—and therefore supernatural. A German military journal of 6th May, 1915, expressed surprise at “the peculiar mixture of races: Senegal Negroes, English, Turcos, Indians, French, Canadians, Zouaves, Algerians” and they might have added Belgians, found in a relatively small area. When the infantry retired on the French front and the covering batteries were lost, a sector of the defence four and a half miles in width disintegrated and one-third of the arch-ring which formed the salient disappeared. The northern abutment, held by the
Belgians, stood firm; but the structure, now in a state of unstable equilibrium, would collapse under another heavy blow if measures were not taken to repair the breach and reduce the next shock by well directed counter-thrusts.

THE FIRST PHASE

The Germans have attributed their failure to the method used for developing the breach: one blow westwards on the right to split the French and Belgians, and simultaneously another southeastwards on the left to crack off the salient from its base. They failed by a narrow margin. It is probable that if their whole weight had been directed against the northern face on the 22nd/23rd they would have broken through. But the steadfast holding of the line by the 13th Battalion, the irresistible midnight attack of the 10th and 16th on Kitchener’s Wood and the vigorous advance of the 1st and 4th at daybreak combined to delay and derange formation and execution of German offensive plans on the 23rd. Of this fighting the Commander-in-Chief reported to the War Office: “The Canadians had many casualties, but their gallantry and determination undoubtedly saved the situation.”

On the 24th when the Canadian line was breached by gas there was no lack of German artillery or of infantry reserves to push through, but again the line was maintained beyond the gap by the 8th and 5th Battalions. Brigade Schmieden was held up at Locality C, and the 51st Reserve Division, although heavily augmented by attached battalions, was fought to a standstill by the four battalions of the 3rd C.I.B. and the attached 2nd, 3rd and 7th Battalions. Of the fighting on this and the following day His Majesty the King cabled to the Governor General of Canada:

*His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, Ottawa.*

_Congratulate you most warmly on the splendid and gallant way in which the Canadian Division fought during the last two days north of Ypres._

_Sir John French says that their conduct was magnificent._
By the 25th the infantry of the 4th and Northumbrian Divisions had come up to Ypres, the Lahore Division and two French Divisions were on the way; Allied attacks on that day and the two following changed the character of the battle from an attempted German break-through to a British withdrawal under pressure. The withdrawal was deliberate and unhurried, German attacks on the 2nd and 3rd May did not disturb the movement which was completed by the 4th.

POSSIBILITIES

Slightly better progress by the Germans on the first three days would have brought an increased allotment of ammunition and an accession of fresh troops from quiet, invulnerable sectors of their line. With a state of flux existing on a widening front, possessed of the initiative, and working on interior lines, the German command might well have decided on a swift change of policy and, profiting by the advantage always conferred by a new weapon before the counteragent has been applied, might have sought an issue in Flanders before France and Britain could develop their full strength in men and munitions. Then there would have been a different tale to tell.

THE DIRECTION OF THE BATTLE

Because of the unusual conditions—a new weapon, a mixed force of defenders of different nationalities, races, creeds and training—exercise of Allied control was hindered; the writing of orders suitable to the troops engaged and to the peculiar circumstances was largely guesswork. The issue of the battle, as usual, depended in the last analysis upon the behaviour of the men in the ranks.

General Smith-Dorrien, however, had a clear grasp of the general situation throughout. By 10 p.m. on the 22nd he had suggested to G.H.Q. that representations should be made...
to General Foch as to the importance of sufficient troops being put in by the French to restore the situation. Next morning he pointed out the necessity for prompt action before the enemy had established himself on the ridge between St. Julien and Boesinghe; his own troops were used promptly enough in that direction, but the French attacks had not sufficient weight, and the Germans held the ridge. He foresaw that the lack of guns capable of coping with the enemy’s artillery would make retention of the narrowed salient impossible; he asked for more—there were none. On the 25th when the Lahore Division came up he was determined not to commit it until he was certain that the French plans had matured and that they intended to employ sufficient troops to drive home an attack. Sufficient troops never were employed. The final direction of the Allied battle lay with General Foch, who had his own plan and followed it.

On the evening of the 22nd General Foch decided that the maintenance of the British salient by local reserves was tactically impossible, and that for the French to attempt it at the expense of the projected Arras offensive was strategically unsound; if that offensive had to be abandoned or seriously restricted by the withdrawal of men and guns, the German pressure in Galicia would not be appreciably reduced, Russia would be discouraged if not defeated, and the war would be prolonged, or even lost for the Allies within a year. He can hardly have expected that the French counter-attacks after the 25th could possibly recover the lost ground. With three days in which to dig the Germans could develop such a complete defensive pattern of machine guns and wired field-works, that a close attack prepared by heavy artillery, as if against a fortress, would be necessary. The French had recognized this after their great offensives of the past four months at Arras, on the Somme, in Champagne and in the Woervre; none of these gained more than 500 metres—usually the German counter-attack reduced the gains to nothing or less—and the French losses had been 175,000.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The British commanders and staff realized that, without sufficient artillery to neutralize small-arm fire from the German line, it was not possible for infantry to reach assaulting distance in daylight. Although assembly in the dark for an attack at dawn was judged difficult, and according to British regulations night assaults presented “undoubted hazards,” three were ordered and carried out with good effect. It had been decided that the Salient should be held while the French restored the shoulder, and therefore the moral effect upon the enemy of direct infantry attacks, even in daylight with only transient hopes of gaining ground, must be relied upon to stop his further encroachment. The cost would be heavy, but there were no heavy guns and the cost must be borne.

True to character, the Germans worked out complete and elaborate plans based on knowledge of existing topography and dispositions. These plans, however, presupposed complete success and made little or no provision for the effect which Allied counter-measures might have in various parts of the field. The coordination seems to have been at once so delicate and so inelastic that any alteration of prevailing conditions in one part so disrupted the working of the whole that everything came to a standstill until a new plan, arranged to meet the new set of circumstances, could be evolved. And for gas the right wind must be awaited.

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

The chief difficulty of the defenders was to obtain early and reliable news of the position of their own and the enemy’s line; there was rarely time or opportunity to enquire into the origin, certainty, extent and accuracy of the information received, so that unknown facts had to be deduced from principles and their signification judged or guessed. The greatest lag between the occurrence of an event and the reporting of it to the rear, where appropriate action could be
taken, usually occurred in front of battalion headquarters.

From within the beaten zone of 500 yards behind the front line while an assault was in progress the advance could be marked by groups and individuals moving forward, but at other times it was impossible to say what was happening 50 yards away, for all were motionless or underground. Reports carried by intrepid runners from sections, platoons and companies must be awaited and plotted on a map, or the coming of darkness when an officer could walk along the line and establish dispositions; meanwhile fragmentary and erratic reports from more distant observers and aeroplanes were often all that filtered through to those conducting the battle.

Some of the battalion commanders considered that the French headquarters they took over, 2,500 yards behind the line, were too far back, similarly brigade and divisional headquarters were thought to be far back when the battle began. The vulnerability of telephone lines in the forward area caused an Army Order to be issued in April that wherever possible communication should be triplicated and that “wires must be buried up to our front trenches.” This method was only effective long after: the installation required months of digging. That the Canadian staff was alive to the advantage of being comparatively near the line is shown by the fact that the Divisional Signal Company was ordered on 17th April to run wires to Hill Top Farm which would be used as battle headquarters. But the attack came so suddenly that no attempt was made to open at Hill Top Farm, which was within a thousand yards of the enemy on the evening of the 22nd, and the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters remained at Château des Trois Tours, beyond the reach of distraction by local events and convenient for the important conversations frequently held with the French at Elverdinghe and V Corps at Goldfish Château. It was shelled several times, but not heavily enough to discompose the staff or warrant destruction of documents or a hurried move as happened to other headquarters nearer the line. As the Army Commander wrote
in his report: “No good purpose would have been served by
endeavouring to move them in the middle of operations to
any place east of the canal.” When Ypres was shelled the
main Canadian telephone lines were repeatedly cut, and staff
officers, despatch riders and orderlies carried a large propor-
tion of the messages; on the 25th April, however, a line was
run from Brielen to La Brique and connected with subordi-
nate and flanking commands. On the 2nd of May a wireless
installation was set up at Verlorenhoek, over which mes-
sages could be sent to Plumer’s Force H.Q. The number and
rate of transmission of messages during the battle is the best
record of the signal corps at both divisional and brigade
headquarters. The despatch riders, operators and linemen
worked unceasingly. The most serious delays in the delivery
of messages are traceable to moves of headquarters without
notification of the new location, to the difficulty of finding
addressees in the dark when their general position only was
known, and to the time spent—amid traffic, darkness and
shellfire—in finding and repairing breaks in telephone lines.
One Brigade commander has recorded that his signal section
repaired more than 100 breaks daily.

To the officers directing the battle—whether French,
British or Canadian—it seemed that the exigencies of the
situation, and particularly the apparent need of hustling fresh
units into the battle upon arrival, made impossible the keep-
ing together of formations. Although the 3rd Canadian
and the 10th and 13th (British) Brigades were increased by
attachment of other battalions to twice their normal strength
or more, yet the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Canadian
and of all three brigades of the Northumbrian Division, were
not fully utilized. Had brigade sectors been clearly defined,
and had fresh brigades as they arrived been put into line by
narrowing the frontages of those already engaged, more
profitable use would have been made of existing organiza-
tions, the exercise of control and passage of orders and in-
formation would have been facilitated, and the distracting
presence of detached battalions, doubtful of their own mission and removed from normal brigade control, would have been avoided. The placing of the corps reserve in the hands of a divisional commander whose front did not adjoin the front of attack, whose presence and functions were at the most critical time unknown to the brigade commanders fighting in the line, and who lacked knowledge of the dispositions and conditions there, was also a marked departure from usual methods. Whether the final result of the battle would have been materially changed by a more orderly if slower procedure is problematic.

STAFFS

The value of the double staffs of Canadian formations—two G.S.0.2s, two D.A.A.G.’s and two G.S.0.3s at division, and two staff captains and two orderly officers at brigades—was made very evident from the beginning of the battle. By a system of reliefs it was possible to function efficiently for 24 hours a day; there was time for sleep, and frequent personal touch was kept with subordinate and adjoining commanders. The double establishment was retained in Canadian formations throughout the war; its value was particularly noticeable in the complicated and continuous operations of 1917 and 1918.

ARTILLERY

The field artillery of the Canadian Division was handicapped from the start by being caught in sections during a relief; because of the consistency of pre-war Militia training in Canada, however, this arm was remarkably homogeneous and the jumbling which lasted for a month was more apparent on paper than in the field. Neither the accuracy nor longevity of the 18-pdr. had been established and its capacity to support was immeasurably lessened by the order not to fire within 200 yards of the assaulting infantry. The gunners’ chief complaint, arising from German skill with the shovel,
was expressed by Lt.-Col. E.W.B. Morrison in his report of 2nd May “What we need is targets, not more batteries,” and an inept attempt was made to compensate for this by ordering raps of fire after the French manner into one 500 yard grid square or another, and mostly in dead ground, on the chance that it might contain troops in the open.

Of heavy guns there were none in or attached to the Canadian Division during its tour in the line, with the exception of “Mother,” one of the two 92-inch Howitzers then in the Second Army; she was attached to the Canadian Divisional Artillery at 8 a.m. on the 24th, but before firing a round on the Canadian front was taken away to shell the bridge at Het Sas and not heard of again. The counter-battery effectiveness of the other heavy guns in the V Corps—twenty-four old 47-inch guns—was negligible against the galaxy of German batteries encircling the Salient, and even if their number had been greater the two squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps (No. 1 and No. 6) employed on artillery observation were overpowered by the German aerial force. Thus even the German field batteries, except the few in close support, could fire without a single shellburst near; of targets they had no lack during the repeated Allied attacks in daylight, and their co-operating aeroplanes, also unmolested, dropped smoke balls or coloured lights on every new target as it appeared. Br.-General Burstall expressed the opinion that if even one 60-pdr. battery had been allotted to the Canadian Division it could have been of the greatest value in breaking up close formations of the enemy which exposed themselves with impunity at long range. The fact is that British counter-battery work could not be attempted for lack of guns and aeroplanes; this is the answer to the message sent by 3rd C.I.B. on April 24th “Is there any artillery that can stop the enemy’s guns?”

INFANTRY AND THEIR WEAPONS

The action of the Canadian infantry and their behaviour
has been dealt with in some detail in the foregoing chapters. Their reputation for steadfastness in defence and audacity in attack was made and established in this battle.

As to their arms, the Ross rifle lived up to its reputation as a target weapon, accurate and effective in the hands of a marksman; but unfortunately it also lived up to and enhanced its record for jamming, and a rifle which jammed in such circumstances was damned. Adverse reports upon it were sent in by a number of battalions; hundreds were thrown away by the men as they found Lee-Enfields dropped by British casualties on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{111}

The Colt Machine Gun was severely tested and although it played a large part in stopping the Germans it was heavy and also prone to jam, and its belts were too tight for the British cartridge. The devoted machine-gun crews, singled out for special attention by German marksmen, suffered particularly heavy casualties in all battalions.

OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES

Versatile and accustomed in peace to the exercise of ready ingenuity, the Canadian Engineers assisted the infantry in consolidation, carried out repair and construction of roads and bridges, and on several occasions fought as infantry.

The Divisional Cavalry Squadron was variously employed in patrolling roads, supplying despatch riders and orderlies and furnishing battle stops. The Divisional Cyclists provided patrols and in particular kept in touch with the French at the boundary and along the west of the canal.

On the 22nd the motor lorries of the 1st Canadian Divisional Supply Column loaded as usual at Vlamertinghe station and made deliveries to a refilling point on the road near Brielen where the convoy parked. Early next morning the convoy was moved to a point on the Poperinghe-Steenvoorde road about a mile from the former, and on the 24th railhead was changed to Godewaersvelde. The refilling point was also moved back to the Poperinghe-Elverdinghe
road. These dispositions continued until 4th May. Supply arrangements, forward of the refilling point, controlled by Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Simson of the 1st Canadian Divisional Train, were never seriously interrupted. The regimental transport, and supply officers and personnel, by ceaseless effort delivered rations, water and mail to their units in spite of unexpected changes of position. Lieutenant R. H. Webb (No. 1 Co. Canadian Divisional Train), whose chief concern was the supply of the field artillery, was awarded the Military Cross for taking convoys daily to the guns in the salient for ten days and bringing back on his returning wagons large numbers of wounded men to the dressing stations in St. Jean, Ypres, Brielen and Potijze.

The C.A.M.C., faced with a heavy and exacting task, met every demand. Under direction of Colonel G. L. Foster, the A.D.M.S., dispositions were made to collect and dispose of casualties: not only Canadian but British, French and Indian also. The personnel behaved throughout with their accustomed disregard of danger, whether clearing the actual battlefield, or operating dressing stations in the forward area, or transporting wounded along crowded roads under a deluge of shells. Conspicuous among them was Captain T. H. McKillip (2nd Canadian Field Ambulance) who on 22nd April was in charge of the advanced dressing station in St. Julien; in the next five days he was forced to move his station first to Wielte and then to St. Jean. Of these retirements it is recorded: “He removed all wounded without losing a case, nor having any wounded men again wounded.”

Carrying out their spiritual duties the Chaplains were to be found both in the field and at the dressing stations giving comfort to the dying. Major (Canon) F. G. Scott on the evening of the 22nd encouraged an advancing battalion with the words “A great day for Canada, boys—great day for Canada,” and he was in their midst when they charged the wood.

Ordnance railhead was also at Vlamertinghe, with a depot at Brielen, until the 23rd when all but the armourers
moved back to Poperinghe and next day to Godewaersvelde. During the battle units only drew stores required for immediate use, such as telephones, cable, Very pistols and tents. Large extra quantities of blankets, greatcoats and waterproof sheets were obtained from the base and issued for the wounded. An extra supply of telephone cable arrived only just in time to enable the artillery to lay out communications when the batteries moved west of the canal.

THE LATER PHASES

On the 8th May the Germans, preparing the way by artillery alone, and not employing gas, tried, as General Foch had expected, to break the new British line. Because the flanks of the breach held and because of the endurance of the British infantry, they did not break through, although at Frezenberg they gained one mile. Another attack on 13th May forced the British line back 500 yards south of Verlorenhoek and an attack with gas on 24th May necessitated the evacuation of Bellewaarde Ridge, Wieltej and Mouse Trap Farm. Both sides were now exhausted and short of artillery ammunition, and the British front stabilized on the line Hooge-Turco Farm where it connected with the French.

CASUALTIES

The battle casualties recorded for the three Canadian Infantry Brigades from 22nd April to 3rd May were almost equal, for the 1st C.I.B., 1,839, for the 2nd C.I.B. 1,829, for the 3rd C.I.B. 1,838. From 15th April to 17th May battle casualties in the Division numbered 6,341 and there were 1,556 evacuated sick. In the P.P.C.L.I., during the period 10th April to 1st June, the killed, wounded and missing amounted to 658. \(^{703a, 851}\)

MORALE

After their diverse experiences in attack and defence the Canadians who had been in this battle were convinced in their own minds that they were equal to the best soldiers in the world. Had they not stood when the French went back? Had
they not seen the best British troops fail even as they them- selves had failed? As for the Germans, but for poison gas and artillery and machine guns their much talked of superiority had not been noticeable, and their infantry had been more willing to use bullets than bayonets. Such was the impression of most of the survivors: during the next forty-two months they found no cause to alter it. In the First Gas Attack the Canadian pace was set for the rest of the war. As fresh reinforcements and divisions joined them in the field the same feeling of superiority pervaded the whole, and the indomitable confidence it engendered was confirmed in every fight—at Mount Sorrel and the Somme, at Vimy, Hill 70 and Passehendaele, at Amiens, in the Arras-Cambrai battles, at Valenciennes and in the Pursuit to Mons.

If the Canadian troops at Ypres in 1915 had been a little more experienced, or a little less, they might not have put up such a tenacious resistance, they might not have taken so literally the orders to hold the line “at all costs,” they might not have counter-attacked with such reckless vigour; the capture of the whole Salient and the destruction of one quarter of the British forces in France would have been the natural result, and the consequences of that can hardly be imagined. The closest examination of all the evidence only serves to corroborate contemporary opinion. General Joffre sent a prompt message of thanks for their ready aid (“la promptitude du concours apporté aux nôtres par la division canadienne”), and expressed the admiration of the French forces (“les armées françaises ont admiré leur belle conduite”). General Smith-Dorrien was “convinced that, with less gallant and determined troops, the disaster which occurred outside the line they were holding might have been converted into a serious defeat for our troops.” The same conviction was held by the British Commander-in-Chief, who reported to the Secretary for War that “the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences.”
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCES

Reference has been made in earlier chapters to the policy adopted and orders thereupon issued for the organization and despatch of further contingents. The 2nd Canadian Division was evolved from the offer of a second contingent which, on 6th October 1914, had been made with the remark “having parted with nearly all our 18-pdr. guns we cannot offer a complete division.”

In the message of final acceptance dated 31st October, the Army Council suggested that the Contingent should be organized to form, with the extra infantry brigade of the First Contingent then in England, a complete infantry division with a proper proportion of Line of Communication units: the total thus required would be 15,272 men, 4,765 horses, 58 guns and 16 machine guns. Two days later Lord Kitchener in a cable to the Governor General repeated and elaborated on the suggestion, which was immediately adopted, and all District Commanders were so informed.

Meanwhile, in the absence of the Minister of Militia, the Government had been considering the possible extent of Canadian participation. The Prime Minister, the Acting Minister of Militia (The Hon. J. D. Hazen) and a subcommittee of
the Privy Council had conferred with the Chief of the General Staff (Major-General W.G. Gwatkin, promoted 21st October) and the acting Adjutant-General (Colonel S. J. A. Denison, C.M.G.). The result of their deliberations was embodied in an Order in Council, passed on 7th November 1914, (P.C. 2831) which included authority to proceed with mobilization to complete the 2nd Division.

In the eleven months which elapsed between the reopening of enlistment for overseas in October 1914 and the entry of the second large Canadian military formation into the British line of battle in Flanders, the character of the war, after undergoing many changes, was becoming more clearly defined. The surface of the sea was swept clear of the enemy, who resorted more and more to submarines and mines in endeavouring to cut off food supplies from Britain, and military forces from the battle fronts. On land also, new weapons were bringing new methods of siege warfare, particularly on the Western Front where, in spite of digressions in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Gallipoli and Salonika, the Allies were concentrating their main strength, for in that theatre the final decision was to be reached. These developments reacted variously upon war activities in Canada, and on the formation and fortunes of the 2nd Canadian Division.

The recruiting and mobilization of the First Contingent by mass methods had convinced the Minister of Militia that local preliminary mobilization and training would, for the future, yield more satisfactory results. In a letter to the Prime Minister, written on 7th October, 1914, on the eve of sailing from New York, he said that the plans for the Second Contingent had been laid with a view to decentralization and that responsibility for raising, quartering, equipping and training specified quotas should be placed upon Commanders of Military Districts. In the same letter he wrote “Our French Canadian country fellowmen would, under this plan, have the opportunity of furnishing a brigade of four regiments.”
RECRUITING AND MOBILIZATION

The Dominion Government, being very desirous that the organization of the Second Contingent should begin with the least possible delay, had not waited for the advice of the British authorities; a warning to Districts had been sent out by the C.G.S. on the 7th October:–

A second overseas contingent will be mobilized. The form it is to take has not yet been decided. Until you are told the exact quota assigned to your command make no definite arrangements but be prepared to act.

This was followed on the 18th by the order to recruit the infantry. Fourteen battalions were provided for and allotted to Districts by numerical seniority—18th to 31st—distributed as follows:–

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military District</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1.............</td>
<td>London........</td>
<td>18th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.................</td>
<td>Toronto........</td>
<td>19th and 20th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.................</td>
<td>Kingston........</td>
<td>21st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.................</td>
<td>Montreal........</td>
<td>22nd, 23rd (half), and 24th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.................</td>
<td>Quebec........</td>
<td>23rd (half)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.................</td>
<td>Halifax........</td>
<td>25th and 26th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10..............</td>
<td>Winnipeg........</td>
<td>27th and 28th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11...............</td>
<td>Victoria........</td>
<td>29th and 30th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13...............</td>
<td>Calgary........</td>
<td>31st</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the battalions was a French Canadian regiment authorized on 20th October to be raised in the Province of Quebec. Numbered 22nd and mobilized at St. Jean, P.Q., it was not a separate and independent unit on the same lines as the P.P.C.L.I., as at first suggested. By drafting recruits from the 23rd and 24th Battalions, and later from the 41st, its establishment was completed. 711

Volunteering was generally keen, and in the fortnight before the word came on 2nd November that a complete 2nd Division would be formed, the infantry quotas of the Maritimes were fifty per cent filled, and for Ontario eighty per
cent. In British Columbia one battalion was complete, the other assembling. The battalion from Military District No. 13, for lack of quarters, had not enlisted any—but in the two following days completed establishment. Such was the response in the Prairie Provinces that a Cabinet Minister from that area suggested that the quota from Western Canada be raised to a division of 22,000 men. The two battalions from M.D. 10 were mustered complete in Winnipeg on 1st November, and the D.O.C. expressed the opinion that he “could mobilize a complete division, if necessary, at short notice with first-class men and good officers.” On the ground that quotas already apportioned for the West were higher than for the East, having regard to population, and since such a sudden increase was not contemplated, the only result was that he was ordered on 3rd November to recruit a third infantry battalion to be numbered 32nd, thus bringing the number of new infantry battalions authorized up to fifteen. To fill up the depleted ranks of the 23rd Battalion, recruits were transferred from the West: one hundred from Winnipeg, two hundred from Calgary and two hundred from Victoria.

Although not published at the time, the intention was that only eight of the original fourteen battalions should remain intact, and—as Districts were informed on 17th December—that they would comprise the 5th Infantry Brigade (21st, 22nd, 24th and 26th Battalions), and the 6th Infantry Brigade (18th, 19th, 27th and 29th Battalions). The remaining six-seven including the 32nd—would provide reinforcements. But by 26th December it was evident that all the men of the 4th Brigade in England would be required for the 1st Division, and that the 6th, 9th, 11th, 12th and 17th Battalions would have to form the Training Depot as already described. The composition of the infantry was therefore established on that date as:—

4th Infantry Brigade. 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Battalions.
5th Infantry Brigade. 22nd, 24th, 25th and 26th Battalions.
6th Infantry Brigade. 27th, 28th, 29th and 31st Battalions.

On account of a call for reinforcements to be held in England for the 1st Canadian Division, the 23rd and 30th Battalions, and also the 32nd, sailed from Halifax on 23rd February in three transports under escort of H.M.S. Essex. When nearing Ireland, just before dark on 3rd March, a message was received that German submarines were in the vicinity, and each ship was ordered to make for Queenstown immediately and independently. All reached that port six hours later, and at noon on the 6th sailed with an escort of destroyers to Avonmouth where all arrived safely. The three battalions were absorbed into the Training Depot at Shorncliffe—to be described later—and were drafted to the 1st Canadian Division as reinforcements in April and May 1915.

The organization and establishments of units for the 2nd Canadian Division were in the main identical with those of the First Contingent. Certain changes were however made: in infantry battalions the eight-company organization was changed to four on 10th December; an assistant adjutant was allowed, and bands were permitted within the existing establishment of 1,031 all ranks, exclusive of 100 “details left at the base.”

For the betterment of the conditions under which men served in the overseas forces, and in contrast with the policy followed for the First Contingent, in whose establishments there was no provision for any dental personnel, arrangements were made that the Second Contingent should have dental treatment available within itself. In the 1st Canadian Division, to meet demands for expert treatment, a few qualified dental surgeons had been found and attached from their units to the Field Ambulances at Salisbury Plain and in France. On 26th April 1915, Militia Orders set out an establishment for the Canadian Army Dental Corps, C.E.F., to consist of a Chief Officer and qualified personnel to be attached to Field Ambulances, military hospitals and also to
combatant formations of the C.E.F.\textsuperscript{715a} Thus the 2nd Canadian Division took the field with 12 Dental Officers and 24 other ranks, but changes in administration and redistribution of personnel occurred later.

Quotas for the other arms and services were, as for infantry units, distributed across Canada from coast to coast, and were also redistributed to Militia units by District Officers Commanding. On 4th November the Militia Council approved of the following allotment, recruiting was ordered to proceed, and names of officers recommended were called for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military District</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr. Batteries, F.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Battery and Amm. Column</td>
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<td>$\frac{1}{4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.S.C. Companies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Ambulances</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{3}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next day orders for the mobilization of the Divisional Engineers were issued. They would be drawn in varying numbers from Militia field companies in all Districts except No. 5, and would be concentrated at Ottawa. There was no lack of men: the Militia field companies had on their rolls the names of 1,131, specially selected and ready to enroll, from whom the 635 required were picked, for Lord Kitchener had specified only two field companies and one signal company.\textsuperscript{710} The addition of a third field company to the First Contingent in September had apparently been forgotten, but on 4th January the Army Council suggested that this increase would be desirable. As before, there were many applicants; in addition, an Engineer Training Depot, 126 strong, was formed which sailed for England on 8th February.

The Divisional Cavalry Squadron was obtained complete on 30th March by withdrawing from the 7th Canadian
Mounted Rifles its “A” Squadron, raised by the 1st Hussars in London, Ontario. The Divisional Cyclists, numbering two hundred, were allotted on 9th November: a platoon was contributed by every District except 1, 5 and 13.

The Line of Communication units already referred to, which were not on the establishment of the 2nd Canadian Division but which were raised as part of the Second Contingent, were chiefly Army Service Corps and medical. The A.S.C. personnel was for the most part recruited and mobilized in Montreal and Toronto, other districts also contributing specified quotas; the eleven units comprised a Divisional Ammunition Park, a Divisional Supply Column, a Reserve Park, a Field Butchery, a Field Bakery, five Depot Units of Supply and a Railway Supply Detachment. The four medical units were a Sanitary Section, No. 2 Casualty Clearing Station, No. 3 (McGill) General Hospital and No. 3 Stationary Hospital. The two remaining Line of Communication units were a Mobile Veterinary Section and an Infantry Base Depot, both formed in England, July and September, 1915.

In excess of divisional establishment, and equipped by private contribution, the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade had crossed to England and later rejoined the Division in France. When the Second Contingent was being raised the idea still appealed to Canadian citizens who wished to give the armed forces their financial aid, and the new arm had the strong support of the Minister of Militia. For these reasons three other machine gun units, two of them motorized, came into existence in 1914, although the War Office had advised against the inclusion of any motor machine gun units with the 2nd Division. All three sailed for England: Borden’s Armoured Battery on 17th May, the Eaton Machine Gun Battery on 4th June, and the Yukon detachment on 12th June 1915. The total strength was 30 officers and 353 other ranks; but none had cars, horses or guns.
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

An Order in Council of 16th March 1915 (P.C. 567) authorized the organization of the units comprising the 2nd Division as temporary corps of the Active Militia of Canada, and placed them on active service as from 7th November 1915. Thus there was no longer question, as there had been ever since the formation of the First Contingent, as to whether or not those attested to the Canadian Expeditionary Force belonged to the Militia and came under the Militia Act.

Rates of pay and conditions of service were as for the First Contingent. A volunteer had still to obtain his wife’s consent; but if a minor, or an only son whose parents were dependent upon him, he must obtain their consent. The Judge Advocate General, however, pointed out that the contract made on attestation was with the volunteer himself, who if he wished to soldier could not be legally restrained by his wife or relations.

In the last week of November, after the greater part of the Second Contingent had been recruited, two policies were officially adopted which had not been consistently applied to the First: the advantage of having men well known to each other serving together was drawn to the attention of commanding officers, who were directed to put chums in the same unit; the desirability of confining enlistment in the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force to those born under the British flag was emphasized.

THE 2ND C.D.A.

As indicated in the cable offering the Second Contingent, the lack of guns was a critical factor. Practically all the 18-pdr. Q.F. pattern fit for service had gone with the First Contingent—54 in the Divisional Artillery, 42 consigned to British Ordnance—and six 60-pdrs. had also been sent overseas. The consequent position is set forth in a message of 20th November 1914 from the Governor General to the Sec-
Referring to your telegram October 31, guns, Minister of Militia represents that of 60 pounders Department has no more than two while of 18 pounders they have only 38, including 32 not yet provided with carriages and limbers, two that are out of order and two at least that are required for inspection purposes. Department can mobilize at once one 47 heavy artillery battery and ammunition column. They expect to be able to mobilize by end of year one 18 pounder brigade, three six gun batteries, but this depends upon contractors’ ability to make deliveries of carriages, etc., and later on a second 18 pounder brigade, three four gun batteries, but ammunition is available for 47 battery only.

On November 6, High Commissioner for Canada informed Minister of Militia that War Office intended to arrange for purchase of guns in United States where, acting on his advice, Militia Department have ceased to negotiate with similar intention, but Minister of Militia desires to be informed whether His Majesty’s Government will be able to complete artillery of Second Canadian Division with material obtained in manner indicated.

The reply received was that the Army Council would provide the equipment but could not say when; not until after “at least 9 months or possibly more.”

The change from six-gun to four-gun batteries and the raising of three additional 18-pdr. Batteries – one each by Nos. 2, 6 and 10 Districts—in December, necessitated a change in quotas: the field artillery of the Division would now consist of the 4th, 5th and 6th Brigades, the batteries being numbered and allotted consecutively from 13th to 24th. Authority to raise the brigade headquarters and ammunition columns was issued on 31st December.

For training, each battery was issued with four 12-pdr. B.L. guns, obsolete, but serving well enough for battery drill and manoeuvre and for teaching the general principles of gunnery and gun drill. These were not taken to England; otherwise equipment was generally complete, harness accompanied units, horses and transport vehicles crossed the Atlantic at the same time but in other ships.
To take the place of the 6th Brigade C.F.A. (18-pdr.) which was sent to England in February to provide reinforcements and so lost its identity, a 7th Brigade was, on 27th February, authorized to be raised: the headquarters, the 25th Battery and the Ammunition Column in Ottawa, the 26th, 27th and 28th Batteries, in Kingston, St. Jean, P.Q., and Fredericton, respectively. All batteries were of 4 guns.

On 2nd November 1914 there had been available in Canada six 4.5-inch howitzers, but like the 18-pdrs. they were not mounted, although carriages were being made for them by the Ottawa Car Company. A howitzer brigade was therefore not raised for the 2nd Canadian Division until the 6th (How.) Brigade was formed from artillery reserves in England in September 1915.

The 2nd Canadian Heavy Battery was armed with 4.7-inch guns, since 60-pdrs. were not available. Gun ammunition also was insufficient; the small reserve supply had been reduced in September by consignments to the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich. In answer to a query as to the quantity available in Canada, the reply dated 11th December 1914, was:—

On 11th January next six thousand rounds of 18-pounder shrapnel without fuses will be available and an additional five hundred rounds per week thereafter.

This rate of production compared with expenditure is remarkable: in the Gas Attack some Canadian 18-pdrs. fired 200 rounds per day. Two years later at Vimy, over 1,000 rounds per gun per day was reached, yet at the outbreak of war the life of an 18-pdr. had been set at 12,000 rounds, or twelve days at that rate. The rate of shell production in Canada rose to 400,000 rounds of 18-pdr, complete per week in 1917.

EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES

On 6th November 1914 an Order in Council (P.C. 2812) authorized the expenditure of $3,056,811.39 for clothing and equipping the 20,000 men of the Second Contingent.
As with the First Contingent, the intention was, if nothing prevented, to arm the Second also with the Mark III Ross rifle. Only a small proportion was in hand and, on 19th November, Districts were ordered to withdraw from Militia units or other sources Short Mark II rifles and Mark I bayonets, sufficient to meet requirements. As Mark III rifles were received from the factory at Quebec, issues were made to units in sequence of probable departure overseas.

The approved scale of 1,500 rounds of service ammunition per rifle overseas, and 500 in Canada, raised total estimated annual requirements to 175,000,000 rounds—more than double—the supply on hand or in sight. The British Government was relied upon to make up the deficiency. To limit expenditure, Districts were advised to carry out musketry practice on indoor ranges with gallery practice ammunition, and in anticipation of training in winter the Director General of Engineer Services had issued instructions early in October that indoor shooting accommodation, particularly at mobilization centres, should be provided to the maximum in drill halls and other suitable buildings, for which extra expenditure was allowed in each District. For training with service ammunition an allowance was made, on 2nd April, of fifty rounds Mark VII 303 ammunition per rifle and one thousand rounds per machine gun.

Issues of necessaries, clothing and equipment to men accepted for the Contingent were made from Ordnance Depots at mobilization points. Two blankets and one waterproof sheet per man were taken overseas.

The parts of 899 wagons and 67 water carts for units of the Division (except those mobilizing in the London and Kingston areas) were sent in boxes and crates direct from the factories to Halifax by the makers. From there they were shipped in one transport on 1st May: 334 Light Bain, 452 Heavy Bain and 8 G.S. Wagons, consigned to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Canadians, Ashford, Kent. At Ashford they were assembled and issued to units on arrival in Eng-
land. The technical engineer vehicles and the cable carts required for the signal company were built in Canada and taken overseas; like the Bain wagons and water carts, these vehicles were subsequently replaced in England or France by the standard British pattern. There were only 64 G.S. wagons in Canada, and the Militia Council decided in March to send all to England.

The establishment of vehicles for a Field Ambulance had been changed from ten horsed ambulance wagons to seven motor ambulance cars and three horsed ambulance wagons. The cars were to have been shipped from Canada, but the standard pattern being made exclusively by an English company, whose output was controlled by the War Office, it was agreed that the twenty-one required would be furnished in England.

The full complement of motor vehicles for the 2nd Division and Line of Communication units, including 150 motor trucks at $3,400 each, had been ordered, mostly in the United States, by the Militia Department, but only a few were sent overseas, largely on account of the difficulty of maintenance in the field of American makes. At the end of August it was arranged that the whole motor transport of the Division except one motor car and twelve 3-ton trucks would be supplied by the War Office, which was done. The horsed and motor vehicles thus discarded had cost over $1,000,000.720, 721

QUARTERING AND SUBSISTENCE

In addition to being responsible for the recruiting of the force, for the selection and qualification of officers, and for the training of units, District Officers Commanding saw to the quartering, subsistence and equipment of all quotas mobilizing within their areas. Thus the District staffs procured additional barracks accommodation in schools, skating rinks, exhibition and other buildings wherever drill halls were inadequate. The necessary structural changes were supervised
by the District Engineer Officers.

Before concentration of units, recruits were paid an allowance of 75 cents per day and procured their own meals. On concentration the subsistence allowance ceased, rations were issued, and meals were served either regimentally or by caterer.

Tenders for food and forage were called for by D.Os.C. from firms on patronage lists and forwarded to the Director of Contracts, Ottawa, who notified D.Os.C. which tenders had been accepted; the D.O.C. then arranged direct with the contractor for delivery of the quantity of supplies required. Even within a Military District prices for staples varied considerably: e.g. in Alberta, bread from 31 to 5 cents per pound, beef from 11 to 13 cents, and mutton from 13 to 15 cents.

TRANSPORTATION TO ENGLAND

The 2nd Canadian Division was never concentrated as such in Canada, in fact owing to the difficulty of obtaining suitable winter quarters and training facilities for large bodies of men, none of the brigades either of artillery or infantry were brought together before going overseas.

On 24th November 1914 the Minister of Militia, who had returned to Ottawa on the 9th, had cabled direct to the War Office:–

When would you like second contingent or any portion of it to embark? Either or both infantry brigades ready at any time.

To this he received reply on 28th November:–

It is preferable that the Second Contingent should not arrive in England until the First Contingent has left, of which we hope to tell you as time approaches.

This will enable you to perfect their organization and training before they are despatched.

At the end of January there was still no word as to when the Second Contingent should sail. The War Office on 28th January had asked for reinforcements for the 1st Canadian
Division, required to meet the wastage for three months and including 500 artillery and 5,400 infantry. By 26th April only three thousand of the infantry asked for had arrived, and the casualties at Ypres brought a call for six thousand infantry immediately and a like number every three months. Similar numbers would be required to maintain the 2nd Division, so that two or three transports would have to cross monthly with reinforcements, apart from those carrying new units.

The War Office pointed out on 12th February that it was very desirable that the medical units of the Second Contingent should reach England fourteen days ahead of the troops, but it still was not known when embarkation should begin. Finally on 11th March the suspense was ended by a message to General Hughes from Lord Kitchener:

Second Contingent should be prepared to arrive about first May. This would give time to complete musketry training and would be more convenient from point of view of accommodation. When despatched they should preferably come in groups of about five thousand for which cruiser can be provided as escort.

The earliest date for which bottoms were procurable for such a large group was 18th April, but the Supply Column—the first unit of the 2nd Division to leave Canada—had sailed from Halifax for Liverpool on 10th April 1915. Before the end of the month several other A.S.C. units, the divisional engineers and the field ambulances had all embarked. During May and June the three infantry brigades and the 4th Brigade, C.F.A., crossed from Halifax, Saint John, Quebec and Montreal, to Plymouth, Devonport or Avonmouth, so that all the infantry and most of the other units were in England by the end of June, except the 5th and 7th Field Artillery Brigades, which both arrived at Plymouth on 18th August 1915. The transports for carrying these troops were chartered by the Department of Militia, at first direct, but after 8th May 1915 under authorization and control of the Canadian
War Purchasing Commission. Dates of sailing were cabled to the Admiralty which detailed cruiser escort from the North American Squadron. The first three transports, *Orduna*,—found on 2nd April not available owing to labour troubles in England—*Northland* and *Grampian*, were due to sail on 18th April. On hearing this the War Office asked on 29th March that the next should not arrive before 7th May. Steamers were difficult to secure but on 2nd April the *Corsican*, *Missanabie*, and possibly the *Adriatic* were said to be available for 23rd April, and the Militia Department therefore urged that the sailing dates—18th and 23rd—be allowed to stand. Four days later it was found that the *Adriatic* was not available. Naval complications also had arisen on 1st April when Admiral Hornby, responsible for the safety of the transports for the first part of the voyage, sent the message:–

Escort will be available when *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* has been dealt with and can accompany convoy to limit of station.

The armed German merchant cruiser mentioned, after four months of raiding on both coasts of South America, was now lying in Newport News, Va.; another, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, reached that port on 11th April, and both had to be watched until interned by the Government of the United States.

Unaware of this the War Office sent word on 6th and again on 8th April that the first and second groups should both leave together on 23rd April; but the *Northland* and *Grampian* had already been engaged for the first group, and the Militia Department eventually obtained acquiescence for them to sail on the 18th with the assurance that the Admiralty was arranging for an escort to accompany them on that date. The two transports sailed from Halifax early on the 18th. Under some misunderstanding as to sailing dates and escort required for the second group, Admiral Hornby ordered them to await further orders in North Lat. 44° 30’, West Long. 55° (four hundred miles east of Halifax) until
the Corsican and Missanabie arrived. After the exchange of many cable and wireless messages the sailing of the last two ships was cancelled, the Northland and Grampian were allowed to proceed, and H.M.S. Cumberland, leaving Halifax late on the 20th, overtook and convoyed them to home waters. Off the Irish coast they were met by an escort of torpedo-boat destroyers on the morning of the 28th—the Foyle, Lance and Boyne—which brought the transports into Avonmouth early next day.

The difficulty of obtaining transports for the remainder of the Contingent led the Militia Department to send the following cable to the War Office on 21st April:

Impossible to secure more than one or two ships per month capable of conveying from one to three thousand troops. Could not Admiralty divert sufficient transport to warrant escort?

Upon this the Admiralty detailed seventeen transports. They were loaded on dates convenient to the Admiral, and they sailed singly, under secret orders and without immediate escort, as soon as embarkation was completed. The secret orders, supplemented by additional confidential instructions dealing with submarines, gave the master the route prescribed by the Admiralty to British home waters, where he would get in wireless communication with Fastnet or any other station and receive further orders from the Admiralty as to place of rendezvous with the warships which would provide anti-submarine escort into port. Details of time of sailing, destination, and troops on board were sent to the War Office to be communicated to the Admiralty and to the G.O.C. Canadians, at Shorncliffe.

This procedure obtained throughout the summer but in August an inter-departmental conference was held at Ottawa to consider how the system of providing and regulating overseas transport might be improved and the mischievous results of dual control and overlapping responsibility avoided. An Order in Council (P.C. 1887 of 12.viii.15) implemented the suggested plan of action; it apportioned duties
so that the Militia Department would be entirely responsible for the embarkation of troops, horses and stores, but would have no responsibility for protection at sea. Under the same authority the Naval Department would henceforth issue all orders to Masters of ships, and would be the medium of communication with the Admiralty.\footnote{724}

**COMMANDS AND STAFFS**

Recommendations for provisional commanders of infantry battalions had been received from Districts and approved by Militia Council within two days after the overseas units had been authorized; appointments of junior officers were also made at the instance of unit commanders. At first the same principle was followed with the other arms and services, except that the commanders of the divisional artillery, divisional engineers and the senior medical officer were provisionally appointed before the end of November. Command of the divisional artillery was given to Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Thacker, an officer who had twenty-one years’ service in the Permanent Force and who was then commanding the coast artillery in Military District No. 6. Command of the divisional engineers was given to Lieut.-Colonel J. Houliston, also of the Permanent Force. The senior medical appointment went to Lieut.-Colonel J. T. Fotheringham, who had served in the non-permanent Active Militia for 22 years. The mobilization and training of units being provided for, these officers did not take up their duties in Canada but joined the division in England.

Commanders of infantry brigades were also considered unnecessary until their commands could be concentrated, and the three chosen were drawn from officers serving in Canada: for the 4th C.I.B., Colonel S. J. A. Denison; for the 5th, Colonel J. P. Landry; for the 6th Lieut.-Colonel H. D. B. Ketchen.

The existence of the 2nd Canadian Division as such begins with the assumption of command at Shorncliffe on 25th
May by Major-General S. B. Steele, transferred from Inspector General for Western Canada. His appointment had been made after the Minister of Militia had exchanged cablegrams with Lord Kitchener, on the understanding, reluctantly accepted by the Minister, that a change would be made before the division took the field.\textsuperscript{725}

General Steele found all his brigadiers and most of his divisional staff already appointed and carrying out their duties. His senior administrative officer (A.A. & Q.M.G.), Lieut.-Colonel P. E. Thacker, had joined the Canadian Permanent Force on 1st April 1895 and prior to this new appointment had been attached to the War Office; he opened the Headquarters office of the 2nd Canadian Division in Shorncliffe on 4th March and was joined by six other staff officers from Canada at the beginning of May. One of the six was appointed D.A.D.O.S. of the Division: Major K. C. Folley of the Canadian Ordnance Corps who had seen active service while in the South African Constabulary 1901-1906 and had thereafter been commissioned in the R.C.D. At this time Major C. A. Ker also joined as G.S.O.2 from the 21st British Division. The second G.S.O.2 was Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Hughes, transferred from the 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.; he was a graduate of the Royal Military College, had passed the Militia Staff Course and was the son of the Minister of Militia and Defence. On the last day of May, Lieut.-Colonel H. D. de Prée was appointed G.S.O.1: an officer of the Royal Artillery who had graduated from the Staff College and had seen active service on the North West Frontier of India, in East Africa and South Africa, he was now transferred from the corresponding appointment with the Lahore Division in France.

Upon arrival, General Steele also found Br.-General J. C. MacDougall in command of the Canadian troops in England. On the departure of the 1st Canadian Division for France, General (then Colonel) MacDougall, who had been Military Secretary to General Alderson, had been given this
undefined appointment. A few days later he was promoted temporary Brigadier-General. An officer of the Permanent Staff in his fifty-second year, he had been gazetted Lieutenant in the Infantry School Corps (now The Royal Canadian Regiment) in October 1885; he had held several staff and regimental appointments and had served with the Canadian troops in South Africa.

Foreseeing possible confusion between the commands of General Steele and General MacDougall, the G.O.C.in-C., Eastern Command, made the request that the Canadian Training Division—the name now applied to General MacDougall’s command—should be kept entirely separate from the 2nd Division, and this was approved by the Minister of Militia.\textsuperscript{726}

THE CANADIAN TRAINING DIVISION

For some time after General MacDougall’s appointment, neither the British nor the Canadian military authorities had any clear views or defined plans as to the status, command, organization or administration of Canadian troops in England. Difficulties immediately arose with respect to the Canadian Training Depot at Tidworth, which did not at first come under Br.-General MacDougall, and that officer’s command, being confined to the ordnance stores, the remount depot and the two general hospitals in the Salisbury area, was described as being “more or less imaginary.” On the 24th March Colonel James, commander of the Training Depot, was given an appointment in France and Br.-General MacDougall then took over command of all Canadian troops in the Southern Command, other than the mounted brigade commanded by Br.-General Seely. Shorncliffe, in the Eastern Command, was selected as the location for Canadian troops (Canadian Mounted Brigade excepted), and some four or five thousand reinforcements from Canada, including the 6th Brigade, C.F.A., and the 23rd, 30th and 32nd Battalions, arrived there on the 6th-8th March while Br.-General Mac-
Dougall was still at Salisbury. Gradually the Canadian troops in the Southern Command—except the Canadian Cavalry Depot sent to Canterbury—were moved to Shorncliffe, where Br.-General MacDougall’s Headquarters were established on 10th March, but not until the middle of April were all the units concentrated there and at Ashford, seventeen miles distant, where the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade and the Ordnance Depot were accommodated.

On the 17th March Br.-General MacDougall’s duties were defined in a cablegram from Ottawa:—

As Officer Commanding all Canadian troops in Great Britain, you are responsible to the Department of Militia and Defence, Canada, for all appointments to the force, and the training and discipline and all other matters pertaining to and including stores and equipment. You will therefore organize to meet these conditions and to carry out these duties.

Adjoint-General.

In a personal message from the Minister of Militia on the same day, General MacDougall was enjoined as under:—

You will please remember that you are in command of the Canadian troops in England and will be held responsible for all appointments. You have a number of Canadian officers yet there who must be utilized. You must assume your responsibilities.

SAM HUGHES.

Two days later the Minister cabled to General Carson:—

Regarding command of Canadians in Britain General MacDougall is in military command of all Canadian units in Britain excepting those under Brigadier-General Seely. You will continue as authorized by Order in Council to represent the Defence Minister for Canada in Britain.

SAM HUGHES.

The only Order in Council concerning General Carson was that of the 15th January defining his duties as: “acting as the agent of the Minister of Militia in maintaining the depots of articles of equipment and other supplies necessary for the upkeep and subsistence of the Canadian Expeditionary Force both in the United Kingdom and at the seat of war”, from
this it seemed clear that Br.-General MacDougall had complete powers, though his responsibility overlapped that of General Carson for the supply of stores and equipment in England. As practically all such material was issued through British Army channels, there was little to do in the way of securing stores, equipment and supplies beyond putting forward the necessary indents—a routine procedure carried out by quartermasters of units. In practice, however, General Carson had already become the representative of the Minister of Militia, by whom he was consulted and instructed on matters pertaining to the force, and, as the Minister’s deputy, continued to pass on any necessary instructions to General MacDougall. The latter freely accepted these inverted relations, and constantly referred matters to General Carson for direction.

The Canadian Training Division, from the time of General MacDougall’s arrival in Shorncliffe on 10th March, came under the G.O.C., Shorncliffe (Major-General J. M. Babington, C.B., C.M.G., until 15th June, then Major-General P. S. Wilkinson, C.B., C.M.G., to 3rd August 1915), who in turn was under the G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command.

CONCENTRATION IN ENGLAND

The unfortunate conditions which the First Contingent encountered on Salisbury Plain had become known throughout Canada and had not aided recruiting. Official messages were exchanged on the subject and the Second Contingent, favoured also by the season of the year, had comparatively slight grounds for complaint.

On 1st March the Militia Department cabled to the War Office:

We would like to save you trouble and cost of providing tents for our Second Contingent and in due course will forward them to England.

The estimated requirements for the 2nd Division were three hundred marquees, five thousand circular tents and fifty for field officers, which the War Office hoped would be sent
before the troops, and on 29th July the War Office, owing to the enormous demands for tentage, cabled that they would be glad if sufficient could be sent for all the Canadian troops. But delays in securing the necessary authority to purchase and in placing contracts in Canada ran all through the summer and into autumn: the first shipment of tents, apart from those sent with hospital units, was not made until 3rd November 1915, so that prior to its receipt all barracks, billets, huts and tents were provided gratis by the War Department.

During the month of June the concentration of the Division, less two artillery brigades, was completed. The Divisional Headquarters, from 25th May, was in hutments on St. Martin’s Plain. The 4th and 5th Infantry Brigades were also in hutments at West and East Sandling respectively. The 4th Canadian Field Artillery Brigade was in huts at Westenhanger (five miles west of Shorncliffe) and the rest of the Divisional Artillery, as well as the 5th and 6th Field Ambulances, under canvas nearby at Otterpool. The Reserve Park and half of the Divisional Train were in tents at New Inn Green. The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade and all the remaining units of the Division were under canvas at Dibgate. All these camps were on land in temporary occupation of the War Department.

TRAINING 2ND CANADIAN DIVISION

A suggestion made by General Alderson at the end of May, that the 2nd Division could train more easily in France than in England, was not endorsed either by General Steele or by General Carson, who considered that removal from England would only delay completion of equipment.

From arrival in England until the end of June the infantry battalions, under ideal conditions, carried out company training in the area about Shorncliffe and musketry on the convenient ranges at Lydd and Hythe; the artillery carried out section training. All units attended lectures on trench warfare framed to inform them of the new technical and tac-
tical ideas being introduced and to make them familiar with new applications of old principles.

An interesting test of the New Improved Valise Oliver Equipment (1915 model) was carried out on the last day of June. This was the pattern, resulting from the conversion of 50,000 sets in Canada at a cost of $187,500, which the Minister of Militia observed was, in his opinion, an improvement on the new (1908) British Web pattern.728 A report on the test tersely records the main faults disclosed:

Yoke not adjustable, canvas valise tears away from leather braces, pouches unsuitable, waist belt too narrow, entrenching tool (MacAdam shovel) too heavy and difficult to carry, chafes thighs and bangs about, not bullet proof, colour of equipment too light.

The improvements, although adding a valise, had not removed the defects found by the men of the First Contingent on Salisbury Plain five months earlier.729

The syllabus for July provided for the completion of infantry company and battalion training, and musketry. The artillery was to carry out battery training, but three field artillery brigades were still entirely lacking to complete divisional establishment and the Divisional Ammunition Column was 130 men under strength, had no ammunition wagons or carts, and had only half its complement of horses—and these unshod for want of shoes and shoeing tools.

In addition to the normal staffs, five Canadian officers who had served in France were employed as special instructors, and for the same purpose ten British officers were attached for various periods, as well as six Staff-Sergeant Instructors of Gymnasia, for physical training and bayonet fighting. Large numbers of all ranks of the Division attended instructional courses for varying periods in many subjects—tactics, artillery, engineer, signals, musketry, grenade and bombing, bayonet fighting, machine gun, pioneer, medical, quartermasters, transport and cooking. For the most part these were held at British military schools, established throughout England for training the rapidly expanding army.
To gain practical experience in the field, staff officers and senior commanders were sent to France in batches for a week; there they were attached to their opposite numbers of the 1st Cdn. Div.

FINANCIAL

When on 2nd August, 1914, Canada made the first tentative offer of a military force, the message concluded: “It has been suggested that regiments might enlist as Imperial troops for stated period, Canadian Government undertaking to make all necessary financial provision for their equipment, pay and maintenance.” From the beginning to the end Canada provided all pay, allowances and pensions of all her troops both at home and overseas, and also met all charges for initial equipment and for maintenance in Canada. On the arrival of the First Contingent in England, the War Office, mindful of the foregoing suggestion, arranged for a system of accounting within the commands, which would enable a record to be kept of all issues, from British Government sources, of clothing, supplies, stores and horses to Canadian troops in England, and of all Canadian soldiers admitted to hospital. Charges on account of travelling could not, however, be so easily determined, nor the multifarious issues made to the troops at the front, where practically all food, clothing, ordnance stores and ammunition were found and distributed by the British service concerned. For accommodation, whether in barracks, tents, hutments or billets, and for barrack and hospital stores, it was decided to make no claim.

Not until 26th April, 1915, were Canadian intentions as to the extent of the liabilities which the Dominion would accept clearly defined; on that date the Governor General cabled:

Your despatch March 5th No. 205, incidence of charges incurred in connection with the Canadian Contingent. Government of Canada desires to defray entire cost in every particular of her own contingents.
The arrangement subsequently arrived at—in 1916—was that Canada would pay the actual cost of supplies, etc., issued in Great Britain; and to cover charges in the field—on account of rations, forage, fuel, clothing, stores of all kinds, ammunition of all kinds, and replacement of guns, horses, mules, mechanical transport, wagons, small arms, etc., stationery, railway transport in France, and sea transport for both men and material between England and France—would pay an inclusive rate of six shillings per capita per diem, a figure based on the average cost (less pay, allowances and pensions) per British soldier in the field.

A similar responsibility was affirmed on 27th August, 1914, for the continuance by Canada of financial responsibility for pay and allowances of naval ranks and ratings, R.C.N. and R.N.C.V.R. and for maintenance costs of H.M. Canadian ships. A separate Order in Council (P.C. 1657 of 16.vii.15) extended the provisions to the pay of all ranks and ratings of the Royal Navy employed on Canadian vessels, including those attached from Algerine and Shearwater, and R.N.V.R. from Newfoundland and elsewhere on board His Majesty’s Canadian Ships.

EXPANSION OF THE C.E.F.

Even before the battalions for the 2nd Canadian Division had recruited up to establishment, authority had been issued to Districts for the raising of still more C.E.F. infantry battalions, so that by 13th June, when the last for the 2nd Division sailed from Canada, twenty-nine additional had been progressively authorized: in December five, in January four, in February six, in March four, in April three and in May seven. The same process continued throughout the summer; twenty-seven more had been authorized by mid-September: in June four, in July ten, in August four, in September nine. The fifty-six new numbers ran consecutively from 33rd to 87th, and also 92nd. Prior to 8th July, the authority for enlisting men for these overseas units had been
the Order in Council passed on 7th November, 1914 (P.C. 2831), which set the number of troops to be continuously under arms in Canada at thirty thousand, in addition to garrisons and guards. A fortnight later the Government had decided to increase the number of men in training for overseas from thirty thousand to fifty thousand; but this was not covered by Order in Council.

On 8th July, 1915, an Order in Council (P.C. 1593) set a new figure on a broader basis: the total of the forces already overseas, in addition to all raised and to be raised for overseas and for garrison and guard duties in Canada, was not to exceed 150,000.

Of the fifty-six new battalions, fifteen were authorized after the passing of this Order, and the allotment to Military Districts was made primarily on probable numbers of volunteers available. When completed the distribution was as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M.D. No.</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>(Western Ontario east of Thunder Bay)</td>
<td>4½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>(Central Ontario)</td>
<td>10½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>(Eastern Ontario and Hull and vicinity, P.Q.)</td>
<td>5⅔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>(Western Quebec)</td>
<td>4½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>(Eastern Quebec)</td>
<td>1⅓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>(Maritime Provinces)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>(Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Ontario west of Thunder Bay)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>(British Columbia)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>(Alberta)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fractions are caused by the partial allotment of four battalions to more than one District. Three independent University companies were also raised and proceeded overseas as reinforcements.

All these battalions reached England, six of them two to three months before the 2nd Canadian Division sailed for France, and some sent large drafts overseas—even to a number exceeding 150 per cent of their establishment—before they themselves, having refilled their ranks, crossed the Atlantic. The total thus despatched in advance amounted to 274 officers and 17,452 other ranks. Twenty eventually served on the Western Front, six with the 3rd Canadian Division,
twelve with the 4th Canadian Division, and two as pioneer battalions. One battalion—the 38th, which joined the 4th Canadian Division—had the unusual experience of proceeding first to Bermuda, where it relieved the R.C.R. in garrison; the latter proceeded to England on 26th August 1915 to join the 2nd Canadian Division, but was held to join the 3rd. Of the remaining thirty-six, five became reserve battalions in England and the rest were broken up to provide reinforcements. In the period covered by this volume another pioneer battalion—1st Canadian Pioneer Battalion—was raised as such in Western Canada in August 1915, reached England in November 1915, and served in France.

The raising of the thirteen regiments of mounted rifles, about which warning had been issued on 1st December, had to proceed simultaneously with that of the infantry. The first six regiments, in two brigades, reached England before the end of July; eventually combined into one infantry brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division, they served in France. The 7th C.M.R. Regiment, broken up in Canada, supplied the 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron and two squadrons formed the C.M.R. Depot in England. The remaining six regiments all reached England later and were depleted to provide reinforcements.\(^534\)

The raising of units of other arms and services also proceeded simultaneously. Three field batteries—numbered 29th, 30th and 31st—were authorized in June, and nine—numbered 32nd to 40th—in August.\(^735\) One Casualty Clearing Station, the 3rd, authorized on 17th June, landed in England on 11th July. No. 4 (University of Toronto) and No. 5 General Hospital, and No. 4 and No. 5 (Queen’s University) Stationary Hospital were raised and sailed for England, where Canadian hospitals—including six convalescent hospitals and the Duchess of Connaught’s Canadian Red Cross Hospital which was staffed by C.A.M.C. personnel—by mid-September were capable of handling 5,570 patients. Smaller units included an Engineer, a Signal and an A.S.C. Training
Depot, Depots Medical Stores, Veterinary Sections and Depots, a Remount Depot and Postal Corps details.

The recruiting, mobilization and training of the forces described in the previous pages was bound to take time. There was no lack of volunteers, particularly after the story of the stand of the 1st Canadian Division at Ypres had been published in the newspapers, and the long list of casualties brought the story home. The supply of arms and equipment in Canada—to a great extent nullified by disregard of the British standard patterns and specifications necessitating replacement before taking the field—was also slow compared with the manufacturing capacity of the country.

A large proportion of the trained personnel having gone overseas, there was dearth of qualified instructors in all departments. Moreover the idea that mounted troops would be required, and the common desire of volunteers to serve in a unit that would go into battle intact, distracted attention from the pressing need of reinforcements for the units already at the front. The wastage at Salisbury Plain, the casualties in the line at Fleurbaix, and the wiping out of whole companies at Ypres had before mid-May caused gaps in the ranks of the 1st Canadian Division that trained reinforcements in England were not numerous enough to fill. Thus it came about that the units in the field were again engaged in active operations and trench warfare for months before their numbers were completed and their proper organization restored.
CHAPTER XVII

FESTUBERT

4TH–22ND MAY, 1915

Map 14: Frontages 1st Canadian Division, 1915
Map 10: Festubert, 1915. British attack 4.30 p.m., 18th May
Map 11: Festubert, 1915. Canadian attack 7.45 p.m., 20th May
Sketch 6: Festubert, 1915. 18th May-1st June (facing p. 500)

IN ARMY RESERVE–SEELEY’S FORCE–PLAN AND PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE–
THE TERRAIN–PROGRESS ON 16TH MAY–A GERMAN WITHDRAWAL–THE
MAP–THE 3RD C.I.B. JOINS IN THE ATTACK 18TH MAY–THE 1ST CANA-
DIAN DIVISION MOVES INTO LINE–GERMAN DISPOSITIONS–ALDERSON’S
FORCE–PLANS AND PREPARATIONS–CAPTURE OF THE ORCHARD–FIRST
ATTACK ON K.5 AT 7.45 P.M., 20TH MAY–THE ATTACK ON K.5
REPEATED, 8.30 P.M., 21ST MAY–A CHANGE OF TACTICS
AND COMMANDS

IN ARMY RESERVE

When the 1st Canadian Division was relieved in the
Ypres Salient on 4th May, its shattered units were seriously
in need of rest, reinforcement and re-equipment. For ten
days reorganization was carried out in the area south of Bail-
leul; then on 15th May the Division, less artillery, moved
into the rear area of the I Corps northwest of Bethune be-
tween St. Floris, Hinges and Busnes, with headquarters
at the last-named place. There it was held in First Army re-
serve because General Alderson was senior to Lieut.-General
Sir C. C. Monro, commander of the I Corps, into which the
Division would normally have been drafted for the continua-
tion of the First Army offensive north of the La Bassée Ca-
 nal—the Battle of Festubert.

The twelve battalions had not suffered equally: six re-
quired adjutants, four C.Os.; in one only two combatant offi-
cers remained. The demands having cleared out the Base
Depots, reinforcing drafts proceeded direct from the Cana-
Canadian Training Division at Shorncliffe. The infantry reinforcements had been augmented there on 8th March by the arrival from Canada of the 23rd, 30th and 32nd Battalions, C.E.F., which in April and May sent 2,337 other ranks out of their total 2,884 to France. The artillery reinforcements were found chiefly from the 6th Brigade, C.F.A., which on reaching England on 6th March had been absorbed by the Reserve Brigade, C.F.A.

Some reinforcements had been received at Ypres while the fighting was in progress; by 28th April 75 officers and 1,840 other ranks had arrived, but the Division was still 5,000 below establishment. By 5th May additional infantry drafts totalling 40 officers and 2,091 other ranks had been taken on strength. Most of the vacancies in the commissioned ranks were filled by posting officers from England, but thirty-five direct commissions, without a preliminary Cadet Course, were granted to other ranks who had proved themselves fitted by service in the field. In May also the first batches of N.C.O.s. and men were sent to Cadet Schools in England and France to qualify for Canadian commissions.

The short time available was fully occupied in the work of restoring the Division to fitness for active operations. Shortages in arms, equipment and vehicles had to be made up and new uniforms issued to replace those worn out. The engineer and medical services were also called upon for special and unusual tasks. The III Corps directed that the engineers should make “a large quantity of jam pot grenades,” the supply “being so very meagre,” and divisional orders required that all empty jam tins be collected by units, cleaned and turned in to the field companies daily. But there was a shortage of the essential black powder, and before the Canadian field companies could enter into production the Army bomb factory at Bethune had increased its output and various types were being shipped from England in large quantity. “The Mills,” which later became universal, had been first tested in March but had not yet superseded the more
erratic patterns.

The urgent need for gas masks was met by the issue to every man in the Division of a nose and mouth pad of cotton waste wrapped in veiling. The supply was made the responsibility of the medical service, which manufactured them with the assistance of fifty women employed locally for the purpose. The issue, made through field ambulances, was completed towards the end of May, and neutralizing solution for impregnating the pads was drawn by units on indent.

SEELY’S FORCE

The heavy engagement at Ypres resulted directly in another considerable increase in the Division; for Lord Kitchener asked Br.-General Seely whether the personnel of the cavalry regiments of his Brigade, still at Maresfield, Sussex, would be willing to volunteer for service in France dismounted. All were ready to meet the emergency, so having donned infantry equipment and put their horses in charge of English yeomanry units, a detachment of 85 officers and 1,427 men—of the Brigade headquarters, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (R.C.) and 2nd King Edward’s Horse—crossed the Channel on 4th May. Designated “Seely’s Detachment,” this force joined the 1st Canadian Division at Merrish three days later and remained with it for the next eighteen weeks.

PLAN AND PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE

On account of the absence of the German main reserves on the Eastern front, and with intent to relieve the pressure on Russia, a renewal of the Allied offensive to drive the Germans out of France had been suggested by General Joffre on the 24th March. In the first three months of the year the execution of the triple plan adopted for 1915—to attack in Artois from above Arras on Douai, in Champagne from Reims on Mezières, and subsequently in the Woëvre northwards from Verdun—
—had progressed so slightly that consideration of the Verdun attack was eliminated for the time. In Champagne the costly French assaults, begun on 16th February and abandoned on 17th March, had occupied German forces but had gained so little ground that renewal before recuperation would mean only repetition, with the same results. In Artois the combined offensive arranged for 9th March had resulted in the British attacking alone at Neuve Chapelle while the French stood fast.

At a conference on 29th March, attended by Lord Kitchener and General Joffre, the Allies agreed to cooperate in another offensive in Artois, to begin on 1st May but later postponed to the 9th on account of wet weather. Sir John French on 9th April had set the extent of British participation at ten divisions and, in spite of the unexpected drain upon his resources caused by the unforeseen battles of Ypres, he contrived to be ready with his promised quota on the appointed day.

When therefore the First French Army of fourteen infantry divisions attacked between the Scarpe and Loos on 9th May, in the hope of capturing the Vimy Ridge and occupying the Douai Plain beyond, a British attack was simultaneously delivered by the First Army (General Sir Douglas Haig) fifteen miles further north. The British plan was to break through the enemy’s line and turn the Aubers Ridge by two convergent attacks three and seven miles north of the La Bassée Canal. The primary intention was to capture Lorgies, Aubers and Fromelles, and gain the La Bassée-Lille road between La Bassée and Fournes. The I, the Indian and the IV Corps, in that order from south to north, each with two divisions, would be engaged and, having broken through, would quickly continue south-eastwards to the second objective seven miles beyond the original line and including La Bassée, Bauvin, Fournes and the railway centre at Don.

On Sunday, 9th May, was fought the battle of Aubers Ridge: the right attack of the British towards La Bassée was
delivered on a front of 2,100 yards by the 1st and 2nd and the Meerut and Lahore Divisions; the left attack was secondary, on a front of 1,500 yards, by the 7th and 8th Divisions in the Fleurbaix sector, towards Aubers and Fromelles. Except for the attachment of a few trench mortars and mountain guns to infantry brigades for covering the assault, the British preparations for artillery bombardment, counter-battery and support were similar to those made for the battle of Neuve Chapelle: the preliminary bombardment, calculated to beat a path through the German forward position, lasted forty minutes; the attacking troops were to pass through the gap and advance as rapidly as possible to the first objective and proceed, without prearranged pause, to the second objective.

Although the Germans in the VII Corps of the Sixth Army, holding the opposite front, were aware of the Allied preparations, they did not, on this occasion, know the hour and plan of attack; by diligent toil their communication system and defensive field works had been so greatly improved, wired and skilfully concealed that the British field guns had little effect, and the trench garrisons, without reinforcement, stopped the repeated and supremely gallant assaults of the British infantry. On this day four British battalions lost more than five hundred each, the three attacking divisions over eleven thousand in all—and not a yard gained. Two German divisions, rushed forward from reserve to hold the British, were diverted to meet the more successful French who had entered Souchez and after a brilliant advance of over two miles in the centre had even reached La Folie Farm on the crest of Vimy Ridge, but could not hold it because their reserves were seven miles away at the critical moment.

Before sunset on the first day of the battle Sir Douglas Haig, realizing that a much greater concentration of force would be necessary to pierce the German defence, decided to give up the northern attack and to press the southern against La Bassée. The method of short intense bombardment having failed, he adopted the French procedure of prolonged and
continuous heavy artillery fire for destruction of works, a process which lasted from two to four days. For the remainder of these operations he abandoned as impracticable the idea of pushing on quickly for miles into the German position, and turned to the French—and German—method of systematic limited exploitation by a timed series of short advances to a predetermined series of precisely defined objectives. To recover a measure of the surprise effect lost by the extended artillery preparation, he discarded the opening assault in broad daylight.

The British tactics hitherto employed were, like their armament, suited to semi-open warfare against hurriedly constructed trenches, with unprotected machine gun emplacements and without wire entanglements; they might still have succeeded if masses of medium or heavy artillery with adequate ammunition had been available. It was now at last realized by commanders and staffs, after the costly experience of the last two months, that this was not semi-open but semi-siege warfare. General directions, haphazard employment of units, indefinite boundaries and wide distant objectives were no longer suitable when the initial stroke must pierce defence works tactically comparable with permanent fortifications.

These changes of plan and procedure involved a reallocation of divisions and a rearrangement of ideas; a lapse of several days must occur before active operations could be resumed. Generals Joffre and Foch were meanwhile making strong representations to Sir John French that the British participation in the joint action fell far short of their expectations, and he, embarrassed by their reproachful attitude, perturbed by the shortage of munitions, and disappointed in his expectation of new divisions from England, could only make use of what force he had. The divisions of the New Armies, retained in England ostensibly to meet apprehended invasion by victorious German divisions released from Russia, were in fact not only deficient in ammunition which should be
taken into the field but in many cases also without artillery, and even without rifles.

After alternatives had been discussed between the Allied commanders, including a French proposal that the British front of attack should be moved south of the La Bassée canal, it was agreed that Sir Douglas Haig’s plan should stand, but that the French 58th Division, on the British right, immediately south of the canal, should be relieved by the 1st Canadian Division. This had to be changed: the French insisted that their artillery should be relieved and the Canadian artillery was still in action at Ploegsteert and Ypres, so the 1st (British) Division was sent instead. For the ensuing operations that division and the 47th (London), coupled to form a temporary Corps under First Army and designated “Barter’s Force,” would hold the line from Loos to Festubert. Northwards to near the Estaires-La Bassée road the I Corps, consisting now of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, both in line, the latter on the right, would attack southeastwards on the 13th of May, on a frontage of three miles. Northwards again the Indian Corps would build up a flank as the attack progressed, and the IV Corps would continue to hold the line as far as the First Army boundary at Bois Grenier. The 1st Canadian Division was in Army reserve in the Busnes area, and Sir John French held the Indian Cavalry Corps and the newly-constituted 51st (Highland) Division in G.H.Q. reserve.

The artillery preparation, ordered at first for thirty-six hours, was continued for sixty hours. The first objective of the I Corps was a mile of the German front and support lines opposite the 2nd Division, to be carried by assault at midnight of the 15th/16th May; the Meerut Division would cover the left. At daybreak the 7th Division would join in by attacking on a frontage of half a mile at Indian Village, simultaneously the 2nd Division would resume the advance to the second objective: la Quinque Rue, from Ferme Cour d’Avoué to La Tourelle inclusive, about 1,500 yards from
the original British line. The third objective was the elbow of Rue d’Ouvert and the whole of Rue du Marais; the fourth included Chapelle St. Roch, Violaines and Beau Puits, making a wedgelike penetration of two miles into the German position on a frontage of three miles.

THE TERRAIN

The two main characteristics of the battlefield of Festubert—the name used to distinguish this renewed British offensive—were flatness and wetness. A mile or more behind the German line the Aubers Ridge runs northeastwards from La Bassée, its highest elevation four miles due west of Lille is ninety feet above the surrounding country, but the opposing forward lines for eight miles north of the La Bassée canal meandered across an alluvial plain drained by sluggish streams, the Lawe, the Loinsne and the Layes, northward-flowing tributaries of the Lys, whose southern watershed behind the British position shows no variation of more than thirty feet. These streams are fed by ditches which vary without apparent reason from mere gutters marked by pollard willows to formidable channels fifteen feet across and five feet deep, and the resulting drainage system stretches in an irregular rhomboidal network, meshed close or wide according as successive generations had reclaimed new lands from the primeval swamp or improved the drainage of established fields.

Most of them farmers, the inhabitants lived in straggling villages strung out along raised main roads. Of these, Rue de l’Epinette followed behind the British line northwards through Windy ‘Corner, le Plantin and Festubert to join Rue du Bois at right angles a mile and a half southwest of Richebourg l’Avoué, another elongated village near the intersection with the Estaires-La Bassée road. The other arterial roads in the area were the towpath along the north of the La Bassée canal, equivalent to a second-class road; a branching road by Windy Corner to Givenchy, and another, also run-
ning eastwards, through Gorre, the Tuning-fork and Festubert, and thence northeastwards, named “la Quinque Rue.” To relieve congestion, farm roads were made use of by infantry and light transport, and there were two auxiliary unsurfaced tracks across the fields to the forward area—Route A and Route B—between the Tuning-fork and Rue du Bois.

PROGRESS OF 16TH MAY

The midnight attack of the 2nd Division was successful on the right where the 6th Infantry Brigade crossed an intervening ditch on portable footbridges and rushed the German front line in sudden silence. On the left it failed: the front line of the adjoining Indian Corps had been ordered to fire four bursts of controlled rifle and machine-gun fire of five minutes’ duration at intervals between 8.45 and 10.35 p.m., but the Germans, far from having their attention diverted by this as had been hoped, were on the alert and ready with searchlights, signal rockets, flares, rifles, bombs and machine guns. One British battalion lost 19 officers and 630 other ranks.

On the front of the 7th Division the field artillery barrage was held on the German front line trench until the infantry, lying ready in No Man’s Land, assaulted at 3.15 a.m. Four 13-pdr.s. and two 18-pdr.s. in the British front breastwork fired high-explosive at the German parapet during the last half hour of the bombardment. The right brigade cleared the German front line and entered the North Breastwork (M.5–M.8) their final objective of the day. But the left brigade, pressing on too hastily, ran into the British barrage. The right assault, however, carried the German front line and the 2/Scots Guards pushed forward to reach the road adjacent to the Orchard between la Quinque Rue and the Rue du Marais. There they again came under the fire of their own artillery. The Germans counter-attacked on the right and kept the whole area under enfilade fire from the “Quadrilateral” (P. 10),—a labyrinth of field works in the unattacked
area southwest of Cour d’Avoué Farm at the boundary between the 2nd and 7th Divisions. Attempts at 10 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. did not improve the position materially: the two divisions could not effect a junction of their inner flanks, and most of the gains on the right had to be given up.

A GERMAN WITHDRAWAL

During the night 16th/17th May the Germans, to improve their position, began a systematic withdrawal of five to eight hundred yards on a frontage of three thousand yards, between Ferme du Bois and the South Breastwork (K.3–L.10), to a new and more favourable line with a good field of fire. This move was noticed by the British, who, however, mistook it for a sign that the enemy’s resistance was breaking down. Soon after midnight Sir Douglas Haig therefore ordered the Canadian Division to be in positions of assembly nearer the line; one infantry brigade to be at le Touret by 8 a.m. and the two others to be at Locon and le Cornet Malo an hour later.743 The I Corps, also, at 11.30 a.m. on the 17th, ordered the divisions in line to press forward towards La Bassée: the 7th Division to advance in the direction of Rue d’Ouvert—Chapelle St. Roch—Canteleux, and the 2nd Division towards Rue du Marais and Violaines.744

THE MAP

Incorrect presentation of topographical features on the 1/10,000 and 1/5,000 trench map used at Festubert, and later at Givenchy, defeated the best efforts of the fighting troops. On this the printing of the standard British 500-yard grid gave an impression of accuracy; yet the discrepancies of location had the effect of irregularly distorting and misplacing the grid squares, until the combined displacement of their origins amounted to anything up to 450 yards: the error at the point K.3 was three hundred yards and at the Orchard four hundred. Although the method used of designating trench intersections and other features by letter and number,
instead of by coordinates, saved time and aided identification to an extent, the advantage was offset by the use of the same symbol to denote a hedge, a ditch or a track. And as if distortion and ambiguity were not enough, the map, by the caprice of someone who should have known better, was printed to be read with the South at the top, which automatically put the East on the left, inverted co-ordinate readings, and destroyed the possibility of memorization and true orientation. In an attempt to rectify the plotting, certain small areas were redrawn from the inferior aerial photographs then available, and prints were issued to be patched on the original; but the margins could not be made to fit, the same features would appear in two places, and confusion was increased. Only long after, with the development of aerial photography, was it possible to redraw the whole of this section of country and to produce maps of accuracy befitting their scale. For the 1915 operations the technical and tactical difficulties, as well as the casualties suffered, were painfully increased by this curiously defective and incredibly fallacious cartographic monstrosity.

With copies of this map in their hands, or with none, Canadian commanders were at this juncture called upon to join in a battle where confusion in topography was only rivalled by confusion in tactics and confusion of troops.

THE 3RD C.I.B. JOINS IN THE ATTACK, 18TH MAY

At 10.35 a.m. on the 17th the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, assembled at le Touret, had been placed at the disposal of I Corps and was first brought into Corps reserve and then detailed as Divisional reserve to the 7th (British) Division (Major-General H. de la P. Gough). There was rain at intervals through the day and, as the line had been unable to advance appreciably, although 350 prisoners had been taken, orders were issued that it should be actively held and that a deliberate attack should be made next day at 9 a.m. At 8.15 a.m. on the 18th, on account of the heavy
morning mist and consequent delay of the bombardment, it was ordered that infantry attacks should not take place until further orders, but that patrols should be pushed forward to gain ground if possible. In anticipation of the attack, First Army ordered I Corps at 12.30 p.m. to move the 3rd C.I.B. to forming up trenches near Indian Village, 1,200 yards behind the front of attack, and at 3.30 p.m. ordered the infantry assault to take place at 4.30 p.m. after a deliberate bombardment of two hours, which was then in progress.

The plan was that the I Corps should secure la Quinque Rue-Ferme Cour d’Avoué and houses in the area P.14, 15, 16, Q.11 and Q.12, and that the Indian Corps should secure Ferme du Bois and the flanking trench Q.15 - Q.16 and subsequently trench Q.16 - Q.14. On the I Corps front the 7th Division, on the right, had as their objective the line of la Quinque Rue from M.3 to the road junction 600 yards N.W. of the Orchard: the 2nd Division, on the left, would gain the line la Quinque Rue Ferme Cour d’Avoué.

The assault was ordered to be carried out at 4.30 p.m. on the front of the 2nd Division by the 4th Guards Brigade and, on the front of the 7th Division, by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. The 2nd Grenadiers and the 1st Irish Guards (4th Gds. Bde.) had already gone forward when the 14th and 16th Canadian Battalions moved from their assembly area west of Indian Village, and by the time the two Canadian Battalions had taken up their jumping off position in the old British line southeast of it, the advance was said to be held up by machine gun fire from Ferme Cour d’Avoué and from the trenches to right and left of it.

There was no time for close reconnaissance, but a tentative plan of action for the 3rd C.I.B. had been arranged and discussed at a conference of battalion commanders called by Br.-General Turner at 9.15 a.m. on the 17th. The assault would be delivered by the 14th Battalion (Lt.-Col. F.S. Meighen) on the left, and the 16th Battalion (Lt.-Col. R.G.E. Leckie) on the right. Two companies of the 14th Battalion,
under Lieut.-Colonel W.W. Burland, would attack eastwards on the right of the 2/Grenadier Guards. A company of the 16th Battalion, holding direction by the German communication trench leading to the Orchard, would attack on the right of the 14th to secure the houses at M.9, while another company of the 16th would make a detour via Festubert village and advance to occupy the North Breastwork (M.5-M.9) from the southwest. The two attacks were timed to converge on the objective at 5 p.m.

No sooner had the three companies begun their frontal attack than the German machine guns in the new and unlocated line opened fire; from the start the advance was difficult, across open marshy fields pitted with waterfilled shell holes and intersected by unexpected ditches sometimes too wide to jump and too deep to wade. The formation adopted by the two attacking companies of the 14th – No. 1 commanded by Major A. C. Shaw, No. 2 commanded by Capt. G. V. Curry—was four waves at fifty yards distance, opened out to five paces between files, as the divisional commander had directed. At first the line moved forward quickly with few casualties. Soon, however, the ditches, which could only be crossed at a few places, broke up the formation; machine gun fire deflected it to the south, the German artillery opened fire, and after an advance of five hundred yards concerted movement ceased. But Major Shaw, who had been shot in the head earlier in the action, persisted in advancing to reconnoitre, accompanied by Pte. A. S. M. Craig; both were again hit, the officer fatally. The private with a broken arm and punctured lung was found seemingly dead by a German patrol near their new line, but he made his way back later and gave a clear report to his Colonel.

The right company in the frontal attack, No. 2 Company of the 16th (Major W. Rae), held direction by the communication trench, and having reached the intersection of la Quinque Rue deployed on both sides. Intermingled with them was the right of the 14th, whose left was in touch with
the 2/Grenadier Guards some three hundred yards to the north. No. 4 Company of the 16th (Capt. V. J. Hastings), detailed to carry out the flank attack, moved back a thousand yards, then south through Festubert and there turned east—two miles at the double and carrying packs. As they entered the old German front line near its intersection with la Quinque Rue a series of German salvoes burst in their midst and put half of the company out of action. The remainder worked their way forward through the maze of trenches and ditches to find the 2/Wilts holding the western end of the North Breastwork, at M.5, and the right of their own No. 2 Company about two hundred yards to the north. By this time there was no impetus left in the attack, casualties had been heavy, and there was no covering artillery or machine gun support available to subdue the enemy’s fire; the commanders in the line, Lieut.-Colonel Burland, Major Rae and Captain Hastings, therefore decided after consultation, to carry out the Divisional Commander’s intention by establishing a continuous line between the 2/Wilts and the Guards. In a downpour of rain the four companies proceeded to dig. News of the conditions prevailing evidently did not reach advanced headquarters of the 7th Division until after 7 p.m., for at that hour an order was issued to 3rd C.I.B. to push a company round the right of the Guards Brigade and from the south attack “Cour d’Avoine”—a misrendering of Cour d’Avoué copied from the upside-down map. Seeing that this would have meant moving a company across the open for three hundred yards enfiladed all the way by the enemy entrenched 250 yards distant, the attempt would probably not have been made even if the order had not been superseded by another from the 7th Division at the same moment. A subsequent order left the forward dispositions to Br.-General Turner, who confirmed the action taken by his regimental officers. Elsewhere the line remained substantially unchanged: the attack on Cour d’Avoué farm by the Guards had not been renewed—in their two assaulting
battalions over 500 had fallen—and the Indian Corps had not succeeded in gaining Ferme du Bois.\textsuperscript{758}

Just before dawn on the 19th Nos. 2 and 4 Companies of the 16th were relieved by Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, and the two companies of the 14th were withdrawn, their sector being filled by an extension of the fronts of the 16th Battalion northwards and of the 2nd Grenadier Guards southwards.

THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION MOVES INTO LINE

Sir Douglas Haig had decided that, after the above operation, relief of the 2nd and 7th British Divisions, less artillery, by the 51st (Highland) and 1st Canadian Divisions should take place, beginning on the evening of the 18th and to be completed by 6 a.m. 20th May.\textsuperscript{759, 760, 761} The I Corps was to arrange the relief of the 2nd by the 51st Division, and was to retain command of the 7th Division, which would go into Army Reserve. The transfers were further complicated by the injunction to carry on hostilities continuously with a view to relentlessly harassing the enemy and wearing down his resistance.

The 3rd C.I.B., already in line under the 7th Division, had, by direction of Major-General Gough, issued orders for two enterprises to take place at 10 p.m. on the 19\textsuperscript{th}: one company of the 16th Battalion would capture the Orchard M.9–N.13, and a company of the 15th with ten bombers would take the farm at L.12. The intention was that the 4th Guards Brigade (2nd Div.) should, during the same night, capture a, group of houses (P.13 and P.14) on the adjoining front, and the I Corps at 3 p.m. called upon the 2nd and 7th Divisions to arrange a plan coordinating this move with the operations of the 3rd Canadian Brigade. But these operations, after having been deferred until after midnight 19th/20th on account of the relief of the 6th Brigade (2nd Div.), were subsequently cancelled, and reconnaissances substituted which confirmed the fact that the enemy was holding his new line strongly. A patrol of the 16th Battalion,
however, overpowered an enemy post in a ruined cottage south of la Quinque Rue and two hundred yards west of the western angle of the Orchard. Here two Colt machine guns were mounted.\textsuperscript{762}

Meanwhile the 2nd C.I.B. proceeded to relieve the 21st Infantry Brigade (7th Div.),\textsuperscript{763} and also three adjoining companies on loan from the 47th (London) Division further south, so that by 11 p.m. on the 19th the frontage was held by the 10th Battalion, with “A,” “B” and “C” Companies in line from K.2 to L.1, and by the 8th Battalion with Nos. 1 and 2 Companies from L.1, through M.3 to M.5. Northwards the line of the 3rd C.I.B., also under 7th Division, was held by No.1 and No.3 Companies, 16th Battalion, in touch with the 3/Coldstream of the 4th Guards Brigade at the house between M.7 and N.10, whence the British front ran, partly in the open and partly in old trenches, by P.11, P.10, Q.7 and R.5, across the flats and about five hundred yards distant from the new German line. In the forward area between the old British trenches and the new German line lay the bodies of many killed in the ten days of battle. In No Man’s Land were also a number of wounded, some of whom were discovered only after they had been lying in the open for a week.

The 1st C.I.B. with headquarters at le Hamel constituted the divisional reserve, the four battalions being billeted as far as possible in the farms along the Rue du Bois between that hamlet and le Touret.

GERMAN DISPOSITIONS

To stem the British attacks between the 9th and 17th the German command had pushed up into the frontage of the \textit{VII Corps} a large number of separate regiments, battalions and companies drawn from as far away as Ypres. On the night 17th/18th a composite Bavarian regiment of three fresh battalions had been sent forward on the front of attack, so that the garrison of the new line from Ferme du Bois to Rue
d’Ouvert was now about seven battalions, nearly double the density on this part of the front when the battle opened on the 9th. These were all under the 14th Division which had been responsible for the line from Ferme du Bois to below the La Bassée canal since the beginning of the battle. But the withdrawal to the new line provided an opportunity for relief, and the 2nd Guard Reserve Division, arrived at Douai from Alsace on the 14th, proceeded to relieve the 13th and 14th Divisions from La Tourelle to K.5 exclusive on the 20th. That evening the 55th Reserve Infantry Regiment took over the front from Cour d’Avoué farm to the Orchard, and subsequently the 77th Reserve Infantry Regiment replaced the composite Bavarian regiment in the adjoining line covering the Rue d’Ouvert, including the South Breastwork. The 91st Reserve Infantry Regiment, belonging also to the 2nd Guard Reserve Division but attached to the 14th, was detailed on the 21st to support the 56th Infantry Regiment in the front from K.5 to opposite Chapelle St. Roch, and was used to dig trenches, to reinforce the line, and to deliver counter-attacks. Thus the subsequent operations of the British First Army were carried out against fresh troops.

ALDERSON’S FORCE

In the midst of the involved British divisional and brigade reliefs, First Army, at 1 p.m. on 19th May, issued an order constituting “Alderson’s Force,” a temporary corps—without a corps staff—consisting of the 1st Canadian and 51st (Highland) Divisions and part of the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions. General Alderson was to take over from General Monro (I Corps) the command of active operations on the front between K.4 and R.4 from 9 a.m. 20th May. To this force was allotted a mixed collection of artillery already in action on the front—thirty-nine batteries, nine of them from the 2nd Divisional Artillery, eight from the 7th Divisional Artillery, and the remainder attached, including eight horse artillery and nine French batteries (75-mm.).
The 51st (Highland) and 1st Canadian Divisional Artilleries, also attached, were still en route from the north to Locon and Hinges. Of heavy artillery support the Canadian Division would have three 6-inch howitzer batteries of the 7th Brigade, R.G.A. To the Highland Division were attached the 1st Canadian Heavy Battery (60-pdr.) and the 12th Brigade, R.G.A. (eight 6-inch hows.) as well as No. 3 Groupe French Artillery with eleven 75-mm. field guns. On account of infantry reliefs these batteries were ordered not to fire between 8 p.m. and midnight, 19th/20th, except to repel attack, after which hour they would fire to break up enemy working parties. All the artillery of Alderson’s Force was placed under Br.-General J. F. N. Birch, C.R.A., 7th Division. The B.G. R.A. I Corps and the C.R.A. 2nd Division were also placed at General Alderson’s disposal.

Command of both Alderson’s Force and the 1st Canadian Division was vested in General Alderson. Colonel Romer (G.S.O. (1) 1st Canadian Division) acted as G.S.O. of the former, Lieut.-Colonel Gordon-Hall temporarily assuming the duties of G.S.O. (1) of the Division. The administration of the Canadian and Highland Divisions was to be undertaken by the Indian Corps.

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

The role assigned by First Army on 19th May to Alderson’s Force, was to secure L.11-12 and M.9 and the group of houses P.13-14-15-16, while the Indian Corps was to secure Q.15-16 and R.8 (Ferme du Bois). The operation was to be completed by the morning of 22nd May, which meant for Alderson’s Force an advance of 500 to 700 yards on a front of 3,000 yards within 48 hours of taking over a strange front.

General Alderson assumed active command of the operations on the front from K.4 to R.4 at 9 a.m. on the 20th. His operation order issued at 11.30 a.m. called upon the two Canadian brigades in line to attack, the 3rd at 9 p.m. on the
20th and the 2nd at 6 a.m. on the 21st; and it stated that the 2nd Division (supposedly under his command until completion of relief by the 51st) would also attack at the former hour.  

The Canadian infantry brigade commanders (Br.-General A. W. Currie, 2nd C.I.B. and Br.-General R. E. W. Turner, 3rd C.I.B.) at 11.30 a.m. held a conference at Le Hamel with the two C.R.A’s (Br.-General J. F. N. Birch and Br.-General H. E. Burstall), and plans were discussed. But the order did not reach the 2nd Division, which first heard of it from the G.O.C. R.A. I Corps, and thereupon sent a staff officer to General Alderson’s headquarters. The B.G. G.S. First Army (Br.-General R. Butler) happened to be there and it was decided that the 2nd Division should not attack, but proceed with the relief; consequently a further important amendment was issued by wire at 1.05 p.m.:–

The attack of the 3rd Inf. Bde. is cancelled.

This reduced the operation to an attack at 6 a.m. on the 21st “by bombs and a substantial bayonet party of about one company” of the 2nd C.I.B. “to secure K.5.” The aspect of affairs was completely changed, however, by the issue of another operation order at 3 p.m. after Sir Douglas Haig had discussed the situation with General Alderson. According to the new plan the 2nd C.I.B. would capture the strong point K.5 (the junction of the new and old German front lines) and simultaneously, but in two separate attacks, the 3rd C.I.B. would take the new German trench L.9 - M. 10 and secure the Orchard and the buildings at M.9 and M.10. The three assaults were to be delivered at 7.45 p.m. on the 20th. There would be no attack on the frontage of the 2nd Division, where relief of the 4th Guards Brigade by the 153rd Brigade (51st Div.) would be deferred until the situation consequent upon the attack of the Canadians became clear; but the Indian Corps would operate to secure Ferme du Bois.

The Army Artillery all along the front was to participate in the operation. To prepare the way for the two compa-
nies of the 10th Battalion, now detailed to capture K.5, the two 9.2-inch howitzers ("Mothers") would fire fifty rounds between 6 and 7 p.m. and would subsequently fire on L.8. The field and heavy artillery would carry out a bombardment of the enemy’s position from 4 p.m. to 7.45 p.m.; on completion the frontal attack would be delivered by the 15th and 16th Battalions with the 13th in support and ready to take over and consolidate the positions won. The 14th Battalion would be brigade reserve.

In detail, the 15th Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Marshall) with Captain G. Musgrove in charge of the operation, would attack with two companies, No. 4 (Captain W. P. Malone) on the right and No. 2 (Captain R. S. Smith) left. Their jumping off position would be the oblique line of the breastwork M.3 - M.5 - M.6, their objectives the breastwork M.6 - M.8, and the trenches and buildings at the elbow of Rue d’Ouvert designated L.11, L.12. The 16th Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel R.G.E. Leckie) with Captain W. Rae in charge of the operation, would also attack with two companies, No. 1 Company (Major C. W. Peck) on the right to capture the house at M.10 by a flank attack from the northwest, and No. 3 Company (Captain F. Morison) to take the Orchard by advancing due east. The two Colt machine guns would supply covering fire.

Before the attack Lieut.-Colonel Marshall reconnoitred the ground over which his companies would pass, and found tall uncut wire covering the German position. He reported this to Br.-General Turner who made personal representations to the Divisional staff that in such circumstances the attack could not succeed. But the orders could not be changed.

**CAPTURE OF THE ORCHARD**

At a quarter to eight it was still broad daylight, the four assaulting companies, as they moved to the frontal attack, were in full view of the enemy whose machine-gun bullets
swept like sleet across the open level fields. The extended waves advanced by short rushes; but the German artillery was now firing also, and both the machine guns of the 16th were put out of action. After each rush the numbers were fewer until, when still a hundred yards short of the German trench, the attack on the right came to an end. On the left, where the Orchard and the breastwork at M.8 afforded some dead ground for the advance, the companies of the 16th Battalion moved quickly forward into and through the Orchard to dig in behind a hedge some fifty yards from the enemy’s line. The flank attack to capture M.10, found to be a fortified house with a nest of machine guns covered by a network of barbed wire, was pressed across the open by two platoons which after suffering heavily were compelled to abandon the enterprise.

As darkness fell a line was organized along the trench M.6 - M.8 to the houses at M.9 and around the Orchard to N.13. To cover the left rear a detachment of twelve of the 1st Field Company with a working party of fifty from the 3rd Battalion built a barricade of sandbags across la Quinque Rue at the junction with the road from the Orchard. The supporting company of the 15th Battalion was moved up to strengthen the line on the right, and during the night the 13th Battalion relieved the two companies of the 16th on the left. Casualties in the four assaulting companies totalled about 250.⁷⁷²

FIRST ATTACK ON K.5

The two companies of the 10th Battalion (Major P. A. Guthrie) detailed for the attack on K.5 were “A,” commanded by Major E. J. Ashton, to which the brigade grenade company was attached, and “B” in close support under Captain A. Day. The intention was to secure the strong point or redoubt at the trench junction marked on the map as K.5,—but unidentified on the ground—and thence to bomb outwards, towards J.1 and L.8.⁷⁷²a
Br.-General Currie, after a reconnaissance of the position in the early afternoon, considered that more time for preparation and closer reconnaissance would be desirable: the battered trench from K.1 to K.4, the only covered approach towards K.5, had been breached in many places by German shells, and a withdrawal of the garrison beyond the danger zone of the heavy howitzer bombardment would be seen by the enemy. He therefore recommended postponement of the attack until the next day, so that adequate communication and assembly trenches could be made, but he also was informed that the attack must proceed as ordered.

Since the trench garrison could not be withdrawn without undue exposure, it was ordered to remain, and therefore the main objective (K.5) was not included as a target in the bombardment by the heavy howitzers. The bombardment by the remaining heavy and field guns continued from 4 p.m. to 7.45 p.m., at which hour the assault began, simultaneously with that on the Orchard, as above recorded.

The attack of the 10th Battalion had to be launched from the trench K.1 - K.4, which ran, exposed on both sides, from the front line towards K.5; there was but one communication trench, shallow, with slight walls built up of revetted sandbags, and the enemy, no doubt observing the infantry movement and surmising that the bombardment would be followed by an assault, shelled the area heavily. The trenches held by the Germans were also built up, but the parapets were from ten to twenty feet thick and the system included several built-up posts where machine guns were mounted. These guns, having high command and having escaped the bombardment, blasted the attack of the 10th Battalion at the outset. The leading company commander was hit, every man who left the cover of the parapet was an open target for the enemy’s rifles and machine guns at two hundred yards: seeing that success by daylight was impossible, the battalion commander ordered the attack to stop and set his men to building cover. Although the first attack on K.5
completely failed, the line had been improved by an advance of about one hundred yards southwards along the trench towards K.4 and a barricade had been built, but touch had not been obtained with the 47th (London) Division supposed to be holding the trenches about J.3. These were later reported to be ditches, not trenches. A junction with the new right of the 3rd C.I.B. at M.6 was effected during the night by extending the front of the 8th Battalion from M.5 along the breastwork, in which two machine guns were mounted.

### THE ATTACK ON K.5 REPEATED

In the early hours of the 21st, arrangements were made for a renewal of the attack on K.5, to take place at 5 a.m., after an artillery bombardment of three hours; but the operation was postponed, as a more deliberate bombardment than it was possible to carry out before that hour was necessary before an attack could be launched with any reasonable chance of success. In view of the difficulty of crossing No Man’s Land, it was further decided to deliver the attack after nightfall and, to ensure contact on the right, the 6th London Battalion (City of London) of the 47th (London) Division was placed at the disposal of Br.-General Currie.

An Army Order issued at 5 p.m. set the hour of attack at 8.30 p.m.; it required Alderson’s Force to secure K.5 to M.10, the German front line 1,500 yards long covering Rue d’Ouvert. According to General Alderson’s order the front of attack would extend on the right to an east and west line through J.1, and on the left as far as L.8. The intention was to break in the tip of the German salient at K.5. No attack was ordered from the Orchard, where as yet there was scant cover for assembly, and the fortified house at M.10 barred the way. Various suggestions were advanced for bringing up trench mortars or field guns to destroy the strong point at M.10. A Hotchkiss motor battery (3-pdr.) was attached from the Indian Corps, and a trench mortar was ordered up to the 13th Battalion in the Orchard “to destroy any houses
or works between your position and M.10, including the latter; but the Hotchkiss H.E. was too light, the trench mortar was prevented from coming into action by enemy fire which killed several of the gunners and the proposal to take a 13-pdr. into the Orchard was shelved.

On the front of the 2nd C.I.B., the same two companies, “A” and “B” of the 10th Battalion, were to deliver the attack, with the grenade company of the 1st C.I.B. attached—with 500 bombs—to bomb along the trenches. Nos. 2 and 4 Companies, 7th Battalion under Captains H. R. Gunning and L. E. Haines, were detailed as engineer working party for consolidation, and the 5th Battalion furnished a carrying party four hundred strong. The artillery preparation was carried out from 5 p.m., at which hour the garrison of the old German communication trench was withdrawn towards the front line as far as K.2, until 8.30 p.m. when the attack was launched; subsequent supporting fire was restricted to the area east of L.8 and south of J.1. One trench mortar only was attached and in action on the front of the 2nd C.I.B. It had been expected that close support would also be provided by a section of No. 7 Mountain Battery, R.G.A., attached to the 10th Bn., but it was transferred to the 3rd C.I.B. at 2.50 p.m.; two 1½-inch trench mortars were substituted, but did not arrive in the forward area until more than an hour after the assault.

The assaulting force was divided into two parties, which were to extend right and left at a point near K.4; “B” Company was to follow close. The left party debouched through gaps opened in the parapet on the N.E. side of the trench leading to K.4, deployed at once and attacked across the open on K.5 about 200 yards distant: it was practically annihilated. The right party debouched from the southwest side of the same trench, entered the trench running south towards J.1, drove the enemy along it for four hundred yards and erected a barricade of sandbags.

When the assault began “D” Company, 10th Battalion,
sent from reserve to replace “A” and “B” Companies in the old front line, was moved up into the captured trench and “A” Company, 5th Battalion (Major D. J. Tenaille) occupied the old front line for a time, and at 10.40 p.m., upon relief by No. 3 Company, 7th Battalion, advanced to reinforce the 10th Battalion about K.4 and to engage the enemy towards J.3 and J.4, with “C” Company, 5th Battalion, in support. During the night the enemy made several attempts to counter-attack but was repulsed by the somewhat mixed garrison; at 2.30 a.m. No. 2 Company, 7th Battalion, was brought up to the angle of Willow Road into close support of the 10th Battalion, and No. 4 Company, 7th Battalion, acted as engineer working party for consolidation towards K.5. As the 7th Battalion, nominally in 2nd C.I.B. reserve, had been thus drawn into the action, the 1st Battalion was ordered at 1.30 a.m. on the 22nd to march from le Touret to Rue de l’Epinette, there to come under 2nd C.I.B.

At daylight on the 22nd the enemy opened a heavy bombardment of the new line, and in the course of the morning completely destroyed the most exposed forward section of fifty yards, together with the garrison of the 10th Battalion. It was decided not to attempt to reoccupy this piece of trench: in the engagement the battalion had sustained casualties of 18 officers and about 250 other ranks. As the bombardment continued to break the parapets and cause casualties, Br.-General Currie decided to withdraw his men from most of the southern part of the captured trench, and a barrier of sandbags was erected about one hundred yards south of K.3.

On the previous day the infantry brigades in line had been told to notify Divisional Headquarters of the direction of the enemy’s artillery fire and the nature of shell, so that the guns might be located and counter-battery fire brought to bear on them. Infantry officers who knew and could recognize K.5 and J.5 were also sought out, to assist the heavy artillery observers in Festubert and Le Plantin; to facilitate
co-operation, a wire was run direct from Infantry Brigade Headquarters to the headquarters of the heavy artillery group. But observation both from the air and from the ground was difficult and the hostile batteries, well concealed by the trees and hedges, particularly about Violaines, were rarely silenced.

A CHANGE OF TACTICS AND COMMANDS

Events had shown that the active offensive movement designed for the Highland and Canadian Divisions comprising Alderson’s Force was impossible. In two days very little had been gained on the southern front, except at the Orchard, and to the north three night assaults by the Indian Corps on Ferme du Bois had been held up by a ditch waist-deep in water. When Sir Douglas Haig, dissatisfied with these consistent failures, interviewed General Alderson at 9 a.m. on the 22nd he was still determined that the enemy must be driven back. But warned by results and impelled by circumstances he made up his mind that a methodical advance, combined with the consolidation of positions as won, seemed to be the best course to pursue.

In furtherance of this policy, First Army orders issued at 11.30 a.m. on the 22nd directed the 51st (Highland) Division to come under the Indian Corps, whose boundary would be the front line at la Quinque Rue. The transfer would take place at 1 p.m. that same day, and at that hour Alderson’s Force would cease to exist.

The grouping of two divisions as a temporary corps for active operations, without a corps staff, had not yielded the results expected.

NEW PLANS AND DISPOSITIONS

The transfers of control and changes in grouping of Divisions, ordered in anticipation of the new offensive planned to reduce the German salient between the Orchard and Givenchy, a mile and a half to the S.S.W. were duly effected. From 1 p.m. on 22nd May the 1st Canadian Division, still in the same sector, operated directly under First Army—and the Army Commander was insistent that, whatever the obstacles, forward progress must speedily be made.

The I Corps, holding the line southwards, had been reconstituted at 6 a.m. on 21st May and now consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 47th (London) Divisions; of these the 2nd and 7th were in Army Reserve, and the 1st had relieved the 47th in the Cuinchy sector south of the La Bassée Canal to enable the latter to narrow its front and take the offensive towards Chapelle St. Roch in conjunction with the Canadian advance against Rue d’Ouvert.

Consequent upon this rearrangement of divisions, a real
lotment of artillery on the Army front was made, the changes affecting Alderson’s Force on dissolution being: A, Q, U, F and T Batteries, R.H.A. to be replaced by the Canadian Divisional Artillery; the 12th Brigade, R.G.A. 6-inch hows. (1st and 4th Batteries) to be placed under I Corps; two batteries 5-inch howl. (47th Div.) to be sent to IV Corps (Fleurbaix front). Thus the guns covering the 1st Canadian Division would be eleven 75-mm. and sixty-six 18-pdr. field guns, fourteen 4.5-inch hows. and twelve 6-inch hows. This number was increased a week later, at the instance of General Alderson by four 5-inch hows. lent by the 47th (London) and four 4.5-inch bows. of the 51st (Highland) Division. Command was to be exercised by Br.-General H. E. Burstall, to whose staff Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Wardrop, R.H.A. was attached as extra staff officer for the forthcoming operations.

Both flanks of the Division were at this time somewhat insecure. On the right, the 47th (London) Division not having been in continuous touch at the front line, it was arranged that the 1/8th London (Post Office Rifles) of the 140th Brigade should take over the trenches cleared by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade up to K.4 exclusive. On the left the 51st (Highland) Division, whose advanced posts were in the marshy ground west of la Quinque Rue, in echelon five hundred yards in rear of the Orchard, had been unable on account of the bullets and flares of the enemy, to link their posts into a continuous line of breastwork. The Orchard itself formed a salient of 90 degrees, both faces of which the Germans could take in reverse at two hundred yards from their trenches towards K.5 and towards Cour d’Avoué farm. In making a reconnaissance of the Orchard with a view to preparing for an attack, the O.C. 3rd Field Company, C.E. (Major G. B. Wright) had been shot by a sniper on the 21st, and a few days later a subaltern of the Canadian Artillery, reporting on the possibility of using field guns run up into the front line to destroy the German works, and particularly the machine gun nest at M. 10, estimated that by sacrificing
the guns and personnel of one battery, fifty rounds might be fired but would probably be ineffective. Only heavy high-explosive shells could destroy such defences.

**INFANTRY BRIGADE RELIEFS**

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade had now been in the line for five days and three of the battalions had been employed in attack; it was therefore ordered that the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade should take over the left sector on the night 22nd/23rd. Relief of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade also was desirable, but was more complicated, as the troops available for the line were the three dismounted regiments of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade whose total trench strength was about one-third that of an infantry brigade. Furthermore, operations were still in progress against K.5 which General Alderson expected the 2nd Brigade to capture before relief. On the night 22nd/23rd the frontage of the 1st C.I.B. was, however, extended by the 1st Battalion about one thousand yards to the right, to include most of the trenches of the 8th Battalion which was in part replaced, from a hundred yards south of M.3 to M.6. The 8th had not participated in any active operations, but in holding the line for three days had lost seven officers, of whom four were killed, and 154 other ranks.

To strengthen the 2nd C.I.B., two of the cavalry regiments, the 2nd King Edward’s Horse and Lord Strathcona’s Horse, were attached. On the night 22nd/23rd the former relieved the right company of the 8th Battalion from L.3 up to the new inter-brigade boundary, the latter took over the remainder of the 2nd C.I.B. front line and manned the machine guns of the Post Office Rifles at K.4, the new right divisional boundary. These two cavalry regiments had been in reserve since arrival and were quite inexperienced in trench warfare; only the R.C.D. had sent “A” Squadron for twenty-four hours instruction with the 13th Battalion on the 21st/22nd.
In the afternoon, before the reliefs began, the enemy was reported to be preparing to counter-attack from J.5 and J.6. “B” Company of the 5th Battalion sent to support the 8th from L.1 to L.2, “C” Company ordered up to reinforce the front line J.4 to K.4, and “D” Company similarly from K.4 to K.3, all moved forward but were not required as the trench garrison and the 36th Brigade R.F.A., warned in time, broke up the movement. The exact position of British, Canadian and German posts on this part of the front was not established until some days later.

**CANADIAN ARTILLERY BROUGHT INTO ACTION**

At 2 p.m. on the 21st orders had been issued for the 1st and 2nd Brigades, C.F.A., in reserve at Hinges, to come into action at 8.30 and 9 p.m. that day, relieving the 14th and 1st Brigades, R.H.A. When all were on the line of march at 7 p.m. in the midst of a violent thunderstorm, the order was cancelled, and the units, reversing their vehicles by hand on the narrow roads, returned to billets. In accordance with the new orders, artillery reliefs began on the evening of the 22nd, when sections of the 118th (How.) Bde., R.F.A., and of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Brigades replaced sections of the 37th (How.) and 35th and 22nd Brigades, R.F.A., respectively. The relief was completed by 10.30 p.m. on the 23rd, at which hour Br.-General Burstall took over the command of the artillery from Br.-General Birch. Meanwhile the 1st Brigade, C.F.A., had selected new forward positions-three of them less than two thousand yards from the line-from which the infantry attack could be closely supported, and came into action northeast and northwest of Festubert village during the night 23rd/24th.

Other artillery attached to the 1st Canadian Division consisted of the 7th Siege Brigade, R.G.A., and the 36th Brigade, R.F.A., under which was placed No. 3 Groupe, 45th French Artillery Regiment. The trench artillery consisted of a section of No. 6 Trench Mortar Battery armed with 1½-
inch trench mortars, transferred from the Indian Corps, a section of No. 3 Mountain Battery operating on the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade front, and No. 2 Trench Mortar Battery with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

The zones allotted to artillery brigades for the night 23rd/24th were: 36th R.F.A.—right front of 2nd C.I.B. (J.11 to K.7); 2nd C.F.A.—centre of divisional front (J.12 by Rue d’Ouvert and along Rue du Marais to the Orchard); 3rd C.F.A.—left flank (L.16 to N.15); 118th (How.) R.F.A.—Rue du Marais; 7th Siege Brigade—Chapelle St. Roch and cross roads northwest of Violaines. The 1st C.F.A. was coming into action and had not yet registered. The allotment of ammunition for night firing was six rounds 18-pdr., two rounds 4.5-inch howitzer, and one round 6-inch howitzer, per battery, per hour, all shrapnel.

THE ATTACK AGAINST RUE D’OUVERT

The day of the 23rd was chiefly occupied with making arrangements for the combined attack: at noon a conference was held at First Army Advanced Headquarters, Hinges, where the advance of the 47th (London) Division towards Chapelle St. Roch and the Canadian advance against the positions along Rue d’Ouvert were discussed. It was decided that the Canadian Division should carry out a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s position before making a plan of attack and that the 47th (London) Division (I Corps) should previously capture the trenches in the neighbourhood of J.1 to cover the left of their main attack. These preliminaries were carried out without delay.

At 2.30 p.m. the following message was sent by the G.S.O.1, 1st Canadian Division:

To Advanced First Army.

I went straight from conference to brigade (1st C.I.B.) concerned with attack on M.10 and after conferring with him (Br.-General Mercer) and in view of necessity of more careful reconnaissance I consider it advisable to postpone operation on M.10 till to-morrow. Brigade to seize tonight small
house between our line and M.10.

C.F. ROMER, Colonel.

Consequently the operation against M.10, planned for the night 23rd/24th, to clear the left front of the Canadian attack, was deferred and First Army directed that a preliminary operation should be carried out at 2.30 a.m. on the 24th by the 47th (London) Division with the object of taking and consolidating J.3 - J.1 - K.3, while the right Canadian brigade (2nd C.I.B.) simultaneously attacked K.5. The consequent order issued by General Alderson at 7.30 p.m. set out the tasks allotted to the two Canadian infantry brigades in line.\footnote{782}

There was some doubt as to whether these intentions could be carried out, for soon after five in the afternoon parties of the enemy, seen moving towards J.4 and J.5, had been engaged by the field artillery. Again at 8.35 p.m. it was reported that the Germans were attacking K.1 and K.3: the guns opened fire and at 9 p.m. 1st Canadian Division informed First Army “German attack has been stopped by our artillery.” Conditions were more satisfactory on the left flank—before midnight the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade reported that the house between M.9 and M.10 had been seized and was being consolidated.

**ANOTHER ATTACK ON K.5**

In the late evening of the 23rd an officer’s patrol reconnoitred the area about K.5. For reasons already given it was found to bear but slight resemblance to the representation on the map; but by this time a number of observers had seen the area, and on the combined knowledge gained the plan of assault was based. General Currie decided that the attack should be carried out by the 5th Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Tuxford) with the 7th Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel V. W. Odium) in support, and after a conference with these and other officers concerned he issued the following instructions,
which were signed by the Brigade Major of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, as the Brigade Major, 2nd C.I.B., had been evacuated sick:—

1. The 5th Battalion will—(a) Attack K.5 at 2.30 a.m. on 24th May. (b) Having done so make good as much of trench as possible towards L.8 and J.5.

2. The attack will be carried out by “A” and “B” Coys. under Major Edgar. Coys. to assemble in trench west of K.4 at 1.30 a.m. 24th May. (“A” Co. commanded by Major D. J. Tenaille, “B” Co. by Major N. S. Edgar.)

3. Carrying parties for bridges. 1 Platoon from “C” Coy., 5th Battalion, under Lieut. Murdee to collect bridges and be distributed as required by Major Edgar by 1.30 a.m. (12 bridges to cross the 10-foot water-filled ditch.)

4. Formation of attack. In 2 lines of section columns – 2 Platoons from each Coy. in front line. Sections on right to provide bayonet men for the Grenade party moving down communication trench.

5. Working parties. 1 Coy. 7th Battn. (No. 4 Co. Captain D. Carleton) to be prepared to follow attack as soon it reaches K.5 and put position in state of defence and carry material – to be at disposal of Capt. Robertson (2nd Field Co., C.E.) and get instructions from him.

6. Machine guns. 5th Battn. to send two machine guns to K.5 as soon as attack succeeds.

7. Supplies, water, etc. Bridging party to carry water and supplies on return from carrying bridging material.

8. Communication with artillery. F.O.Os. to accompany the attack. Division asked to arrange.

9. Communication trench. 1 Platoon from 5th Battn. under Captain Endacott to improve communication trench to K.5.

10. Capture of position to be signalled by setting off 3 flares, advance of party to be shown by blue flags by day.

11. Grenadiers. 30 Grenadiers are available and they are to be divided – 10 to left and back – 10 up middle towards K.5 – report to Major Edgar at Bde. Hq. at midnight 23/24.

12. Time of attack. Artillery bombardment will cease at 2.25 a.m. at which time bombers should be ready to advance up communication trench to K.5. Bridges should be in position and assaulting parties should have crossed ditch if artillery fire allows. Assault to be delivered at 2.30 a.m.
A battalion order notified all ranks that the battle-cry for the day would be “Lusitania!”—the deliberate sinking of which ship by a German submarine seventeen days earlier had cost the lives of 1,198 civilians.

To bring the two attacking companies up to strength, it was found necessary to attach most of the personnel of “C” and “D” Companies; there was some delay in assembling and the assault was five minutes late in starting so the enemy was ready but the attacking troops, moving quickly across the bridges and clearing the beaten zone were, within half an hour, in possession of the trench alongside K.5 on the west, and 130 yards northwards in the direction of L.8. When news of the successful advance, which had cost some 250 casualties, was received, No. 1 Company, 7th Battalion (Major B. Powley), was sent forward at 3.30 a.m. to reinforce on the left, and “C” Squadron, L.S.H., at 4.45 a.m. to strengthen the right. Under heavy shell fire consolidation then proceeded. Three hours later No. 2 Company, 7th Battalion (Captain H. R. Gunning), was on the way forward to re-establish communication which had virtually been broken with the new front line. Since thirteen of the 5th Battalion officers were casualties—leaving only the colonel and four junior subalterns—and as now there were three companies of the 7th Battalion engaged, Br.-General Currie placed Lieut.-Colonel V. W. Odium in charge of consolidation, which made satisfactory progress. At 8 a.m. bodies of the enemy were noticed by artillery observers to be assembling at J.13 and J.10 and were fired on by the batteries of the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A., again at 10.45 a.m. and 3.15 p.m. the brigade responded to calls from the infantry for fire on the area J.4, J.8, J.15, L.8 where movement was observed. In anticipation of a counter-attack from that direction the remaining company of the 7th Battalion was moved into close support, but the troops in line held their position without assistance. The movement observed was in fact the arrival of German reinforcements, the 38th Reserve Brigade (2nd Guard Re-
serve Division) with the 77th and 91st R.I.R. which had been sent up to strengthen the line.\textsuperscript{782e}

The simultaneous operation of the 47th (London) Division ordered for 2.25 a.m. had started half an hour late and had not been successful; the attacking troops had reached the south end of the Breastwork J.3 - J.1 - K.3 but had been held up by fire from south of the former point. An attack after dark on the 24th to secure these points was therefore ordered, and directions were given that communication trenches should be made so that the troops of the 47th Division would not have to pass through the Canadian trenches on their way forward;\textsuperscript{783} later orders deferred the attack until the evening of the 25th.

Now that a foothold had been obtained at K.5, General Alderson issued orders, on the afternoon of the 24th, for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade to consolidate, with a flanking trench running back to J.4 - K.4 and a series of strong posts extended towards the new right of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade at M.4, which the 1st Field Company, C.E., had linked up with M. 6.

**ATTACK ON TRENCH M.10 - N.14**

In further development of the operation an assault by the 1st Infantry Brigade on the German trench M.10 - N.14 was ordered for 11 p.m. on the 24th. The plan was to fire a slow trench bombardment of six hours by four 6-inch, eight 5-inch, and eight 4.5-inch hows., with a simultaneous wire-cutting programme of six hours by the sixteen 18-pdrs. of the 2nd Brigade C.F.A., and of one hour by twelve 18-pdrs. of the 1st Brigade, C.F.A.—which being in exposed positions would not be called upon to fire after dark. Under Br.-General Mercer’s direction the three 1½-inch mortars would bombard the trench M.10 - N.14 and the mountain gun would engage the house M.10. At 11 p.m. the artillery would lift to place a box barrage east and southeast of Rue d’Ouvert, and the infantry, after bombing their way down
the trench running S.W. from M.10, would seize the parallel roadway and occupy the adjoining buildings.783a

The attack was entrusted to the 3rd Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel R. Rennie). In detail, “C” Company (Capt. F. O. W. Tidy) would assault accompanied by ten brigade grenadiers and two machine guns; “A” Company would support and provide working parties; an officer and twenty men of the 1st Field Company would go forward to carry out demolitions and an equal party of engineers would lie in reserve ready to secure captured points. “B” and “D” Companies of the 3rd Battalion would remain in the original front line, and No. 2 Company, 4th Battalion, with two machine guns, was attached to act as support.

At exactly 11 p.m. Br.-General Mercer was asked by 3rd Battalion whether a rumour that the attack had been postponed to 11.30 p.m. was correct. There had been no change in orders, and Lieut.-Colonel Rennie was ordered to assault at once. But it was 11.30 p.m. before this order reached the front line, the artillery programme had been fired, and when the troops crossed the parapet they were met by the fire of four machine guns at from fifty to one hundred yards range. At 11.40 p.m. it was reported that a party had entered the enemy’s trench and was working to the left but that no headway could be made on the right. At 11.50 p.m. it was reported that the attack had failed, and that the enemy had not been surprised. At 12 midnight artillery support for a renewed advance was called for, but there was neither observation nor communication adequate for close firing and the co-operation of the trench mortars could not be obtained, as the mortars could not engage the new targets from their present positions. General Alderson, kept informed of the course of events by one of his staff near the Orchard, found the reports far from reassuring, and a message he received from 1st C.I.B. at 2.50 a.m. made it evident that for the present the plan must be abandoned.784 On the two following days he and Br.-General Mercer examined the possibilities
of successfully renewing the operation: they concluded that “the salient about the Orchard was not a suitable position from which to attack.”

DECISION TO ABANDON THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE

The higher command had already reached a similar conclusion on a correspondingly larger scale. On the 25th Sir John French informed Sir Douglas Haig that he considered it improbable that the First Army operation could be successfully completed owing to the strength of the enemy’s field defences and the natural difficulties of the ground. Ammunition supplies were now very low, and he had decided to abandon the offensive. Therefore the First Army would take steps to hold the enemy on its front in order to prevent the transfer of German troops to meet the new French offensive due to be launched on 16th June against the Vimy Ridge. A change of attacking front to Loos at a later date was suggested; but Sir Douglas Haig pointed out that there the battery positions and assembly trenches would both be on an exposed forward slope, and said he thought that a resumption of the offensive towards La Bassée would be more likely to give results. On 28th May the Commander-in-Chief, in view of the state of ammunition supply, ordered that the First Army should limit operations to “small aggressive threats which will not require much ammunition or many troops.”

DISMOUNTED CANADIAN CAVALRY RELIEVE 2ND C.I.B.

Meanwhile the relief of the infantry on the right brigade front had proceeded. Between 9 p.m. and midnight 24th/25th the 2/K.E.H. (Lieut-Colonel M. Cradock, C.M.G.) took over the right, and the L.S.H. (R.C.) (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Macdonell, D.S.O.), the left, and the 5th and 7th Battalions moved out. The R.C.D. lay in reserve in the old British front line between la Quinque Rue and Willow Road. Under direction of the 3rd Field Company a party of the 10th Battalion...
worked on the communication trench, and the 2nd Field Company with a working party of the 8th Battalion laid out and built a line of redoubts northwestwards to connect with the 1st Battalion at M.4. At noon on the 25th command of the right brigade front passed from Br.-General Currie to Br.-General Seely.

The decision to abandon the main offensive did not immediately affect the troops, for the position of the right flank, as then existing, was still unsatisfactory. Therefore neither the operation of the 47th (London) Division towards Chapelle St. Roch ordered by I Corps for 6.30 p.m. on 25th May was cancelled, nor the correlated attack of Seely’s Force, two and a half hours later, against L.8 and L.10. At 4.20 p.m. the right squadron of Lord Strathcona’s Horse which was detailed to co-operate in the first attack, noticed activity behind the enemy’s line and sent an S.O.S. for artillery support. The guns opened fire and a series of German signal flares—red, green and white—shot into the sky. If the enemy intended to attack, he met with little or no success, but even the trench garrisons were in doubt as to what was happening on the right until, at the appointed hour, the assaulting parties of the 1/23 and 1/24 London battalions could be seen moving forward, their bayonets flashing in the evening sun. Within an hour it was reported that they had captured I.4 - J.6 - J.7 and were close to I.2.

A LOCAL NIGHT ATTACK ON L.8

Orders issued by Br.-General Seely, in conformity with those of General Alderson issued at 3 p.m. on the 25th, were aimed at clearing German snipers out of the area north of K.5 where the new front line would run and also at securing the trench running from K.5 through L.8 and L.10. The attack would be preceded by an artillery bombardment of half an hour on the trench L.8 to L.10, in which a total of thirty rounds would be fired by three 4.5-inch how. batteries (47th, 458th and 459th Batteries, R.F.A.).
light barrages would also be maintained on the German trenches joining from east and south, by two 18-pdr. and three 75-mm. French batteries, and the three 4·5-inch how. batteries would continue a slow bombardment of one round per battery per minute as directed by a Forward Officer in touch with the attacking troops.

The O.C., Lord Strathcona’s Horse, then in line on the front of attack, would arrange to send out a party to dispose of the sniping posts. The assault on the trench would be carried out by a bombing party of the Royal Canadian Dragoons under Lieut. R. S. Timmis; and by direction of G.H.Q. they would use the new gas bombs, of which some two hundred were supplied. 788 This was the first authorization of the use of gas as a weapon by the B.E.F. A bayonet party, a working party and a carrying party to accompany the attack would be detailed from the same regiment. As support, the 8th and 10th Battalions were placed under Br.-General Seely, and a party of four officers and two hundred men from each reported to engineer officers for the construction or consolidation of a new line running from K.5 to L.8, L.6 and M.4. On completion of the operation the Royal Canadian Dragoons would relieve the L.S.H. which would come into support.

At 1.10 a.m. the following message, sent by a staff officer who had gone forward to keep in touch with the action, was received by General Alderson:–

O.C. Strathcona’s reports we have secured trench from K.5 to L.8 inclusive at 11.15. Enemy reported to have been using gas. Enemy reported still in possession of J.3. All secure at K.5 with machine guns and garrison.

This was corroborated in part by a message at 6 a.m. that Seely’s Detachment had secured L.8 and would go on to L.10, and further confirmed by a message at 6.40 a.m. that the trench K.5 to L.8 was in their possession. At noon a report that our troops had been seen at L.12—the elbow of Rue d’Ouvert—caused First Army to direct that, if this were true, the whole brigade was to be pushed forward to hold the Rue
d'Ouvert. At the same time the I and Indian Corps were instructed to be ready to support the Canadian Division in such an eventuality. But it was not true: parties of the enemy could be seen at L.9 and north of L.12 and it was established that no Canadians were in Rue d'Ouvert. It was also found that, misled by the map, the bombing party had taken a wrong turning and had mistaken a Canadian working party for the enemy, which explained a report that the enemy had been using gas.

RELIEFS, RECONNAISSANCE AND CONSOLIDATION

In the afternoon orders dealing with the relief of Seely’s Detachment and the supporting battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade were issued for battalion reliefs to take place on the night 26th/27th, and for Br.-General Turner to take over the sector at noon on the 27th. Meanwhile Br.-General Seely would employ working parties of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in consolidating the line and would also arrange for a bombing attack southwards from K.5 to link up with the left of the 47th (London) Division on the road to Givenchy near J.5.789

But these arrangements were changed by alterations in the orders for the 47th (London) Division operation,790 and further upset by a wire, timed 5.45 p.m., from the O.C., 2nd Field Company, C.E., who stated that three of his officers who were familiar with the front were satisfied that we did not hold L.8.791 This was referred to Br.-General Seely who, as a result of a further reconnaissance by his Staff Captain, the O.C. working party (2nd C.I.B.) and the engineer officer in charge, replied:–

R.C.D. hold K.5 and about 150 yards of trench towards L.8. At the L.8 end of this trench they have erected a strong barricade.

On personal investigation, however, he found that this was incorrect and made a further report explaining how the
bombing party had taken too westerly a direction; however, its action had facilitated completion of the new line L.6, L.5, L.7 which he now held. He also stated that from personal observation there were two adjacent redoubts both of which might be identified as K.5, but one of which was still in German hands. The commander of the heavy artillery brigade, who was familiar with the front and whose guns had been firing on it for a fortnight, stated “there is no doubt whatever we are occupying now the German work known as K.5”; but General Alderson, in a message to First Army, wrote “it is very hard to get the real position of K.5.”

The relief of Seely’s Detachment was completed by 2 a.m. on the 27th; casualties for the tour numbered 199. The 16th Battalion relieved 2nd King Edward’s Horse in the left section. The 14th Battalion which took over the right front line was ordered to secure L.8 by bombing from K.5 and did so. The same battalion also cleared up the situation at K.5, using gas bombs, which took some effect also on the throwers who followed too close. Touch was gained with the 47th (London) Division, which in a second attempt on the 27th had captured J.3, and conditions on the Canadian right were further improved by the establishment of a connected line of posts from a point between K.5 and L.8 for about 250 yards towards J.5, which the London troops occupied. The method followed in establishing this line was, under cover of darkness, to build five short lengths of sandbag parapet (“grouse butts”) held at first by small detachments and later linked up by excavation and by extending the sandbag wall.

OPERATIONS SUSPENDED

With the cessation of active operations part of the artillery, in action since the battle opened and in need of rest, was withdrawn: the 36th Brigade, R.F.A. and the 8th London Brigade, R.F.A. batteries moved out of the Canadian area on the afternoon of the 26th.

The next four days were devoted to consolidation and to
reconnaissance of the enemy’s position. The two brigades in line were busily engaged improving the redoubts and other defence works and in building communication trenches. On the left front work was begun on a support trench behind the Orchard salient and the line was made continuous back to la Quinque Rue. On the 27th the 4th Battalion relieved the 3rd at the Orchard, henceforward known in the B.E.F. as “Canadian Orchard.” Next night the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st, while the 13th and 15th Battalions changed places with the 14th and 16th in the right section.

READJUSTMENT OF COMMANDS

On the evening of the 29th a conference was held at First Army headquarters, and the reorganization and redistribution of the formations in the Army were decided upon.

The Indian Corps to consist of the 8th, 49th and Meerut and Lahore Divisions.

IV Corps to consist of the 7th, 51st (Highland) and Canadian Divisions.

I Corps to consist of the 1st, 2nd and 47th (London) Divisions.

These changes would be completed by the 2nd of June, by which date also the southern part of the army frontage would be reapportioned: the 47th (London) Division would be replaced between le Plantin and Givenchy by the 7th Division and in the Givenchy section by the Canadian Division.793

The redistribution was described as temporary and for operations to be undertaken in the near future south of the La Bassée canal in co-operation with the Tenth French Army. The part to be taken by the 1st Canadian Division was made plain next day in a preliminary order from First Army to IV Corps directing that an attack should be prepared against the line Chapelle St. Roch-Rue d’Ouvert: the date was provisionally fixed for 11th June.

These were the objectives which had been prescribed for the 1st Canadian and 47th (London) Divisions on 23rd May. Now the 7th and the 1st Canadian Divisions were to
attempt the same task, but meanwhile the German defences had been strengthened and the British had less ammunition for destroying them.

RETROSPECT AND RELIEF

The Battle of Festubert takes its place as the most unsatisfactory engagement of the 1st Canadian Division in the War. Great expectations of advancing seven miles had dwindled between the 9th and 18th May to hopes of advancing seven hundred yards: at the beginning Sir John French had looked for a major success quickly achieved by ten divisions with the ammunition in hand; at the end, in writing to Lord Kitchener, he was reduced to the indefinite pronouncement that only “by employing sufficient men and sufficient ammunition” for a longer period would it be possible to break through the enemy’s prepared positions.

Much was demanded of the Canadian Division; it had been put into the battle three weeks after losing half its combatant strength at Second Ypres, and the reinforcements, officers and men alike, although of good quality, were inexperienced and not yet welded into the battalions. Even more was expected of the dismounted cavalry, for only one of the nine squadrons had been attached for instruction in the line and all were untrained in trench warfare—in bombing, trench construction and observation. But no matter how fresh or well trained the troops, satisfactory progress under the conditions obtaining at Festubert was impossible. The artillery, outclassed in weight and handicapped by an unreliable map and faulty or scarce ammunition, was incapable of destroying the enemy’s field works, of silencing his batteries, or of breaking down his defence. While the barbed wire entanglements were negligible yet the ditches, indestructible, served the same purpose and remained to stop, hinder or derange the attack. During the Canadian phase it was never found possible in the time allowed to assemble the infantry within reasonable assaulting distance of the enemy’s
line whenever the attacking troops left their foremost trenches to assault they had to cross two hundred yards or more of open level ground swept by undisturbed machine guns and exposed to observed artillery fire from unmolested batteries, or they had to move in file down a trench or ditch so that the front of attack was reduced to six feet and the enemy’s shells cut off communication with the rear. It is noteworthy that the repeated and hopeless attempts, particularly those by daylight, led to the descriptive use at the time—by a Canadian brigadier in the field and by a bishop in the press—of the word “murder.” A strong sense of frustration fostered similar opinions among the troops in the line who found that the English newspapers, read in the trenches two days after issue, blamed the War Office and the Government for the shortage of munitions. It may be surmised, however, that the reason lies deeper, and that the condition arose from the slowness of everyone—even the Germans—in recognizing the demands and consequences of modern war.

Considering the character of the fighting, Canadian losses had been relatively light: from 18th May to 1st June battle casualties were 93 officers and 2,230 other ranks. The clearing of the wounded from the forward area had been difficult—many had fallen in No Man’s Land and the hand-carry was half a mile or more across the devastated battle-field; but after cases reached the regimental aid posts evacuation was rapid and there was no congestion.

On 30th May General Alderson issued his orders for the move. Artillery reliefs, arranged direct by Br.-General F. N. Birch, whose command was extended to include all the artillery of the IV Corps, were carried out by sections on two successive nights, beginning 30th/31st. The 1st C.I.B. was replaced in the left sector by the 153rd Brigade of the 51st (Highland) Division on the night 31st May/1st June; during the same night the relief of the 3rd C.I.B. by the 153rd Brigade to the left of L.8, and by the 20th Brigade, 7th Division,
to the right, completed the transfer. Thus the Canadian Division at 2 a.m. on 1st June gave up responsibility for the Festubert front, from K.5 to the Canadian Orchard, with no regrets except for the dead.
CHAPTER XIX

GIVENchy
1ST–24TH JUNE, 1915

Map 13: Givenchy, 1915. British Attack 6.00 p.m., 15th June
Map 14: Frontages 1st Canadian Division, 1915

THE SECTOR–DISPOSITIONS AND CONDITIONS–PLANS FOR ATTACK–PRE-
LIMINARIES–POSTPONEMENTS–WIRE CUTTING–FIELD GUNS IN CLOSE
OF THE BATTLE–ENEMY TACTICS–THE WITHDRAWAL–THE
ATTACK RESUMED–FURTHER POSTPONEMENTS–CONSIDERA-
TIONS–DEMONSTRATIONS–THE ROSS RIFLE
REDISTRIBUTION OF DIVISIONS

THE SECTOR

Upon the redisposal of frontages in the First Army, on
31st May, the I Corps held from the French left at Loos to
the La Bassée Canal; the IV Corps from the canal to la
Quinque Rue east of Festubert, and the Indian Corps north-
wards. The dispositions of the IV Corps (Lieut.-General
Sir H. S. Rawlinson) were: the 1st Canadian Division on the
right from the canal to the shrine north of Givenchy (near
1.1) with one brigade in line, the 7th Division (Major-
General H. de la P. Gough) from the shrine to L.8, also with
one brigade in line, and the 51st (Highland) Division (Major-
General R. Bannatine-Allason) from L.8 to the left boundary
of the Corps.

Even on the right, near the canal, the new Canadian
trenches were dry. On the tow-path No Man’s Land was two
hundred yards wide, but for five hundred yards to the north
the enemy had no forward line as a marshy area intervened.
Further to the left, where the ground rises, the Canadian
front ran across the extreme tip of the Aubers Ridge, here
terminating in the low wedge on which La Bassée,
Canteleux, Givenchy and Violaines are built. On this higher ground the gardens and orchards of the northeastern part of Givenchy were traced with a network of trenches, the scene of heavy fighting in the preceding December when the British 1st Division successfully defended the village. Five hundred yards east of the church a semicircular parapet of revetted sandbags, known as the Duck’s Bill, protruded towards the German line, here only seventy-five yards distant. The parapets were mostly 150 to 250 yards apart; the Canadian about seven feet high and two feet thick, mainly regular in form and earth-coloured, the German irregular, protected by a belt of heavy wire and marked by blue, purple, white and red sandbags so laid that the range, strength and direction could not easily be determined. Opposite the Canadian front the trenches were manned by Saxon troops, the 134th Infantry Regiment, then detached from the 40th Division to the 14th Division, VII Corps.

DISPOSITIONS AND CONDITIONS

The 2nd C.I.B. completed the relief of the 141st Brigade (47th Division) in the Givenchy sub-section at 9.30 p.m. on 1st June. As the total strength of the battalions of the 2nd C.I.B. was now under sixty per cent of establishment, special tactical dispositions were made which linked them in pairs. In the front line from the canal northwards for 750 yards were the 5th and 10th Battalions, under Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Tuxford, the latter in the front and support trenches, the former in reserve between the brewery near Pont Fixe and Windy Corner. In the salient about the village of Givenchy to the junction with the 20th Brigade (7th Division), was the 8th Battalion with two companies in the front line and two in supporting defended localities. The 7th Battalion, grouped with the 8th under Lieut.-Colonel L. J. Lipsett, lay in trenches and strong points between Givenchy and Windy Corner.

As brigade reserve, the Royal Canadian Dragoons of
Seely’s Detachment, billeted about le Prélol, were placed at the disposal of Br.-General Currie. The remainder of the Detachment was billeted in le Quesnoy and Beuvry. The 1st C.I.B. was in divisional reserve in Essars and the northeastern part of Bethune, some five miles from the line. The 3rd C.I.B. was in corps reserve northwest of Bethune billeted in Gonnehem, Hinges and Oblinghem. Divisional headquarters was in the schoolhouse at Vendinlez-Bethune.

Although offensive action had been decided upon, defence was not neglected, and commanders were reminded that it was their duty to maintain the rearward defences. They were informed that “in the event of a hostile attack, it is not the intention of the G.O.C. 1st Army to fall back from one line to another line, but to dispute the ground, and for this purpose defended localities and points d’appui have been prepared to facilitate defence and obtain time for counter-attack.” These works were now examined and extended, but were not required at this time. Three years later, manned by British infantry, they prevented a German break-through.

PLANS FOR ATTACK

The task assigned to the First Army was to capture La Bassée, in conjunction with the main French attack through Liévin, by a combined movement of the IV Corps north of the La Bassée Canal on Violaines and of the I Corps to the south against Haisnes. After these places had been taken and after the French had captured Lens, the British advance would be extended to include Loos. In a preliminary order issued to IV Corps the northern front of attack was defined as “the line Chapelle St. Roch - Rue d’Ouvert,” and the date was provisionally fixed for 11th June.

The Army Commander, Sir Douglas Haig, accepted General Rawlinson’s plan and went into unusual detail in explaining to Sir John French his proposals for the capture of Rue d’Ouvert preliminary to taking Violaines, as follows:–
The attack on the Rue d’Ouvert will be made by the 7th, 51st and Canadian Divisions as follows:–

The main attack will be carried out by the 7th Division operating from the vicinity of the Orchard (not the Canadian) east of Givenchy (I.4 - I.2) on a front of about 500 yards. The attack will proceed, making use of the slope of the ridge running east from Givenchy to protect the right of the attack against enfilade fire from the south and will be directed with a view to attacking the moated farm J.15 from the south side, which is not obstructed by the moat, and to seizing Chapelle St. Roch.

To further protect the right flank of this attack and at the same time to extend the opening in the hostile defences, the Canadian Division, operating from Givenchy, will attack the hostile defences about H.3 - I.15 and operate eastwards along the German trenches in the direction of Canteleux.

On the left the attack on the north end of the Rue d’Ouvert will be carried out by the 51st (Highland) Division. The German defences north of L.12 are now very strong with a good field of fire, and on this account the attack of the 51st Division will be made from the vicinity of L.8 against the hostile defences about L.10. The attack, will, however, be combined with a demonstration against L.12 from the vicinity of M.6 to divert attention.

In connection with this attack it is proposed to use gas bombs dropped from aeroplanes on the north end of the Rue d’Ouvert, if the bombs are ready in time and the conditions for their use are favourable.  

Thus, in retaliation, the use of poison gas by the British was now sanctioned, and for this engagement, as for Festubert, IV Corps directed that “stink bombs may be used”; but it may here be noted that aerial gas bombs were not used by any of the participants in the Great War.

The Operation Order issued by Sir Henry Rawlinson on 31st May intimated that the 7th and 51st Divisions would carry out the attack, the Canadian Division “rendering such assistance as may be possible without actually assaulting the enemy’s trench line”, but close examination showed that the lie of the ground and the siting of the trenches which would be required to link up the old line with the new de-
manded an assault from the Canadian left on the enemy’s line from H.2 to H.3 as the Army Commander had indicated. A divisional order of the 8th June provided for this, and for an advance to the German second line H.6 to I.14 and then for the capture and consolidation of the enemy’s main communication trench from I.17 to I.20. The exact tracing of the protective flank would depend upon the progress made by the 7th Division.\textsuperscript{803}

The Corps artillery consisting of No. 1 Heavy Artillery Reserve Group (under Br.-General G. McK. Franks) was to deal with the hostile batteries; all the remaining guns, both field and heavy, supporting the attack, were placed under the orders of Br.-General J. F. N. Birch, who thus had at his disposal some two hundred guns, which for ease of control were brigaded into five “groups.” Of these the group covering the Canadian front was under Br.-General H. E. Burstall and consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, C.F.A. (32—18-pdrs.) the 118th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A. (8—4.5-inch hows.), No. 45 Groupe French Artillery (75-mm.) and the 12th Siege Brigade, R.G.A. (8—6-inch hows.). The 1st Brigade, C.F.A., was placed in the “Nicholson” Group covering the right front of the 7th Division.

PRELIMINARIES

The problem of how to bring the infantry within reasonable distance for assault had not been solved in the battle of Festubert. There the ground was too wet for the construction of communication and assembly trenches in the zone covered by the enemy’s machine guns, which were invulnerable by field artillery. But on the higher slopes about Givenchy the ground was dry, and at I.2 between Givenchy and Chapelle St. Roch, a tunnelling company, R.E., was working. The intention was to secure a better jumping-off position by minor operations; a mine would be blown close to the enemy’s line and the crater, occupied at once by bombers, would be used as the assembly position for the spear-
head of the main assault. Such an operation was successfully carried out at I.2 and I.4 at 9.40 p.m. on 3rd June by the 1/6th Gordons, and, as arranged, No. 4 Company of the 8th Canadian Battalion in the adjoining line set out to assist in consolidation. But by the time the tape marking the new line to link up across No Man’s Land with the Canadian trench had been laid, the enemy’s fire was heavy and eleven men had fallen; Lieut.-Colonel Lipsett therefore moved the company to the left where it helped the Gordons to dig a communication trench. A strong German counter-attack about 4 a.m. found the Gordons so short of bombs that they had to withdraw to their original line. Two hours later the crater was again occupied by the 2/Border Regiment, but again heavy concentrated fire forced a retirement. Information as to the initial success and subsequent failure of this enterprise came over a telephone line run overland by a Canadian artillery subaltern detailed to follow the progress of the attack, which was covered in part by guns of the 2nd Bde., C.F.A.

At an Army conference later in the day it was decided that, owing to the open nature of the country and to the difficulty of getting suitable positions for our artillery and for our infantry to form up, the attack south of the La Bassée Canal should be deferred until the enemy’s dominating artillery concealed among the trees and hedges of Violaines had been neutralized. Thus, for the time being at least, only the IV Corps operation remained, and a renewal of the attack on I.2 and I.4 by the 7th Division was ordered for the night 6th/7th June. Relief of the neighbouring 2nd C.I.B. by the 3rd C.I.B. from reserve, due that night, was put off for twenty-four hours to avoid casualties from probable retaliation on our trenches by the enemy artillery. The British ammunition supply was, however, so limited that, rather than reduce the amount for the main assault, this preliminary attack was cancelled and merged in the general Corps attack. The Canadian brigade relief was therefore carried out on the night 6th/7th
June: the 14th Battalion on the right, the 16th on the left, the 13th in reserve; and the 15th, which was to assault, was billeted for special training in le Préol. Instructions were thereupon issued that all arrangements should be made for the artillery bombardment to commence on 9th June and the infantry attack on 11th June.

There was at this time some doubt as to whether the enemy might not have installed gas cylinders in his front line trenches; in any event there was danger from artillery concentrations of gas shell, so commanders were directed to drill all ranks in the methods of combating asphyxiating gas. The first requisite was speed in putting on the respirator, and training was required, for only after practice was prolonged wearing of it endurable.

POSTPONEMENTS

On 8th June it was found that General Foch had been unable to fix a definite date for the French attack, so the First Army operations were postponed, and were not to commence before the 13th. On the 10th there was another postponement: the operations were not to commence before 14th June.

It had been intended that the Canadian attack should be carried out by the 3rd C.I.B., but the postponements caused this to be altered; and although Br.-General Turner suggested that his troops, knowing the front, might remain in the line, the task was given to the 1st C.I.B., commanded by Br.-General M. S. Mercer, which relieved the 3rd on the night 10th/11th. Two battalions were in the trenches, the 4th next the canal and the 2nd in the left section, joining up with the 2/E.York, which had extended south to opposite H.3—on the Givenchy - Chapelle St. Roch road—to be the right assaulting battalion of the 20th Brigade. The 3rd Canadian Battalion was in support and the 1st in reserve at le Préol. The 3rd C.I.B. was now in divisional reserve in Essars and the north-eastern part of Bethune; the 2nd was in corps reserve, bil-
On the 11th there was yet another postponement: the operations were not to take place before 15th June.\textsuperscript{808}

The weather, fine and clear at the beginning of the month, had become sultry with heavy clouds and mist interfering with observation, so that, although disturbing to the infantry, these postponements gave more time for aerial reconnaissance and registration of the guns and howitzers grouped under the O.C., 1st Heavy Artillery Reserve. He was responsible for the bombardment of the more distant targets on the IV Corps front, of which one hundred and twenty-five were registered from the air and, beginning on the 13th, for the destruction of positions about the Rue d’Ouvert. Under his command were two 15-inch and six 92-inch howitzers, four 6-inch guns and twelve 4.7-inch and 60-pdrs.

WIRE CUTTING

For the wire cutting by the field artillery these postponements were not so fortunate. The wire entanglements covering the enemy’s front line about Givenchy village were high and wide: they must be completely destroyed and repairs prevented or previous experiences would be repeated. Therefore, although the earliest date named for the bombardment had been the 9th, the three C.F.A. brigades responsible for wire cutting had begun special registration on the 5th. The front line trenches were cleared of all but infantry sentries and artillery observers while the 18-pdrs. ranged on the enemy’s wire—a delicate operation for flat trajectory guns firing time shrapnel, as the parapets were high and the wire less than one hundred yards beyond.

A most precise estimate of the ammunition required for the IV Corps operation had been made by First Army. Based on expenditures for the battle of Festubert, calculations showed that in “hard fighting” the guns actually co-operating with the attack would fire from 41 to 54 rounds per gun, per
day—within two years the figure rose to ten times this. The total estimated expenditure up to the end of the first day of the battle was calculated as 26,989 rounds of all calibres, and of this 16,560 was 18-pdr.

The 1st Brigade, C.F.A. (Lieut.-Colonel E. W. B. Morrison) which was detached to Nicholson’s Group was moved into position behind Windy Corner to cover the right of the 7th Division at shorter ranges. Wire cutting began on the 8th and continued on the 9th, 10th and 11th; postponement of zero day caused suspension on the 12th but fire was resumed on the 13th and carried on until the 15th. The allowance for effective wire cutting with 18-pdr. shrapnel had been set at six rounds per yard and tasks were allotted with this figure in mind. The three Canadian brigades were responsible for cutting 900 yards: on 8th June the 3rd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Mitchell) fired 2,686 rounds, on the 13th the 2nd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Maclaren) fired 3,089. Br.-General Burstall, anticipating that after the battle uncut wire might be advanced as a reason for possible failure, insisted that the assaulting infantry should express themselves as satisfied before the assault. The Corps commander was alarmed at such expenditure and demanded an explanation, which was that the full prescribed expenditure had been found necessary to destroy the wire so that it would no longer form an obstacle to the infantry advance. Additional expenditure was also incurred, since it was not safe for the artillery to fire on the wire during darkness when our trenches were manned, and rifle and machine gun fire was not sufficient to prevent the enemy from making some repairs and replacements particularly by pushing coils of wire over the parapet.

FIELD GUNS IN CLOSE SUPPORT

The wire on the Canadian front of attack having been disposed of, the most important consideration was how to get the assault across the last seventy-five yards of No Man’s
Land without annihilation. Several machine gun emplacements could be seen in the German parapet, and it seemed that these might best be neutralized by 18-pdr. field guns firing at close range immediately before the assault. Reconnaissances showed that suitable gun positions were available in or near the front line at ranges of from seventy-five to three hundred yards. Two guns run in immediately north of the Duck's Bill could remain concealed until fifteen minutes before zero, and then by firing through gaps made in the Canadian parapet they would cause damage to the German. It was more difficult to find positions to cover the most important target, H.3, a twin redoubt which evidently contained several machine guns and one half of which was within the Canadian objective. Ruined houses, shell holes and trenches made it impossible to take a gun into the line opposite, but there was one possible position behind the ruins of a farmhouse at three hundred yards, and another in an entrenched supporting point, where a gun might be placed to fire at either H.2 or H.3, over open sights at one thousand yards.

Orders were issued to bring four 18-pdr. forward. They were fitted with extra heavy armour plate shields, and with temporary rubber tires on the wheels were silently dragged over the cobblestones of the village street and placed in position on the night 13th/14th. Three only were placed, however, for the infantry protested that it was too dangerous to allow an 18-pdr. to fire from the most distant position, as the line of fire would cut across their assembly area. Thus H.3 was not specially engaged, except by 6-inch howitzers which, though they did their best, were not effective, due to faulty ammunition and inadequate expenditure.

THE ASSEMBLY

Shelter trenches close behind the Canadian front line were completely lacking, and the front line itself had no parados, so the engineers and large working parties of infantry constructed by night a second assembly trench all across
the front of attack, with dugouts and parados. Advanced depots of engineer stores were established and ammunition was brought forward, the bomb stores being in the front line on right and left. The disposal of the troops was planned with care, for the waves must move forward in proper sequence to their tasks. The assault of the 1st Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Hill) would be delivered by one company, followed on the same frontage by the remaining three in successive waves. First, the leading company would seize the German front line and advance without a check, if possible, to the second line where it was to consolidate its position and then bomb towards I.17 and thence to I.20. The second company would support and assist the first by bombing outwards along the trenches and establishing blocks. Next, working parties conveniently disposed and drawn from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions and the R.C.D., with engineers of the 1st Field Company, of a total strength of 400, would be ready to follow. Their tasks were to consolidate the lines as won, to make a communication trench across No Man’s Land, and to establish the new defensive flank. The third and fourth companies of the 1st Battalion, at first held in reserve, would follow into the German front line as the attack developed.

By 3 p.m. on the 15th the 2nd Battalion had closed to the right and the 1st was in its assembly positions on the front of attack. The 3rd Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel R. Rennie), detailed to support the 1st, was disposed in support trenches from six hundred to fifteen hundred yards behind the line. The R.C.D. in reserve to the 1st C.I.B. were assembled near Vauxhall Bridge. The 3rd C.I.B. formed the divisional and the 2nd C.I.B. the corps reserve, under orders to be ready to move at short notice.813

THE MINES

Since the 1st Canadian Division had taken over the line, No. 2 Section of the 176th Tunnelling Company, R.E., had been mining out from the Duck’s Bill, the intention being to
place a charge under the German front line at H.2. Water encountered before that point was reached made it necessary to stop and charge the mine short of the point intended. To compensate, an extra heavy charge of three thousand pounds of ammonal and a priming charge of thirty of guncotton were placed.

About seven hundred yards to the left, on the front of the 7th Division, night raids by fifteen and thirty men had been made on the 3rd and 4th against the head of the old British mine shaft east of I.4, but both had miscarried. In the midst of the second raid the Germans fired a mine nearby, which broke in the gallery at a point between the mineshaft and the British front line, but the enemy remained in possession of both the old and the new craters at I.4 which they protected with new barbed wire, and from which they could enfilade No Man’s Land to the north.

THE ASSAULT

The artillery bombardment, which had been continued at a slow rate for forty-eight hours, was accelerated at 6 a.m. on the 15th, and at 5.30 p.m. became intense. At 5.45 p.m. the sandbags were thrown down in front: the two field guns near the Duck’s Bill opened fire. The gun of the 6th Battery, C.F.A., behind the farmhouse, did not fire because the officer in charge was doubtful whether his rounds would clear the heads of the infantry in the front line, so the machine guns in H.3 went undamaged. The other two guns, both of the 4th Battery, C.F.A., and commanded by Lieut. C. S. Craig and Lieut. L. St. G. Kelly, gave final warning to the enemy that an attack was soon to be delivered, and a heavy artillery concentration fell upon Givenchy and the Canadian trenches there. Both guns were put out of action, both officers and many of their detachments were hit, but not before one had fired eighty rounds and the other forty rounds. The infantry, crowded in the assembly trenches since 3 p.m., suffered more seriously: at 5.59 p.m. when the blast of the mine
near H.2 was added to the pandemonium of bombardment and counter-bombardment, three officers were dead and several wounded, and a number of men lay buried in a collapse of the parapet. But there was no serious confusion or delay: the leading company, No. 4 (Major G. J. L. Smith) dashed across No Man’s Land promptly at 6.01 p.m., followed a few minutes afterwards by No. 3 (Captain G. L. Wilkinson), and as instructed they went straight through to the German second line. Lieut. G. A. Metcalfe was conspicuous in this advance; while severely wounded he continued to lead his platoon, cheering them on until shot a second time and instantly killed. At 6.10 p.m. No. 2 Company advanced and occupied the German front line.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE

At 7 p.m. reports indicated to General Rawlinson that the German front line had been successfully captured on the front of the IV Corps. The 1st C.I.B. had occupied the hostile trench between H.2 and H.3 and at 6.20 p.m. was bombing along the second line trench towards H.5. The attacking battalions of the 21st Brigade (2/York and 2/Wilts) were also said to be in the enemy’s trench between H.3 and I.4 at 6.21 p.m., and it was observed that the Germans were evacuating the trenches J.15—I.18. On the left the troops of the 51st (Highland) Division were reported to have taken “Z redoubt,” between L.10 and L.9, and to be pushing on.

An hour later the situation was clearer but far less satisfactory: the stronghold H.3 was still in German hands as was the old mine crater near I.4, and from these two localities the whole length of No Man’s Land for a mile from the Duck’s Bill to L.8 was being swept with machine gun fire. The only unexposed way across No Man’s Land was by the collapsed mine gallery leading towards H.2. On the 51st Division front the advance was held up even before the uncut wire was reached.

By this time on the Canadian front, from near H.2,
which had not been destroyed by the mine, and from H.3, German machine gun fire was being directed against anyone who moved in the open between these points. The crater, over forty yards across, had been occupied but the bombers on both the right and left had lost their officers. At about 8 p.m. Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Becher (second-in-command 1st Cdn. Bn.) had been mortally wounded near the Duck’s Bill when mustering a party to carry bombs forward—the right bomb store had been buried by the mine explosion, the left had been blown up by shell fire. No. 2 Company of the 1st Canadian Battalion, with its one surviving officer (Lieut. T. C. Sims) and No. 1 which had moved forward at 7.15 p.m. and which, having lost all its officers, was carrying on under the Company Sergeant-Major (C. Owen), were reversing the parapet of the German front line. The 3rd Battalion occupied the trenches in which the 1st had assembled.

**ENEMY TACTICS**

For at least a week the Germans could have been in no doubt as to the front of attack: the wire cutting operations marked it to a yard. When the preparatory bombardment became heavy, those of their trench garrisons for whom there were no shell-proof shelters withdrew, taking some of the machine guns. Both before and during the assault the machine guns in the shell-proof emplacements were the main defence; but after the rush of the first assault was spent and the covering artillery fire slackened, a concerted re-occupation took place, which was virtually a counter-attack led by bombers and supported by machine guns and trench mortars. Almost everywhere the emplaced machine guns in the front line had made it possible for the enemy to keep his second line intact.

A message from the 7th Division, timed 8.25 p.m., stated that efforts to advance beyond the German front line had not yet been successful, that a fresh bombardment was being ordered, and that a renewed assault would take place
at 9.15 p.m., with the special object of capturing the crater and field works at I.4 which the enemy still occupied. On account of the time considered necessary to warn the artillery and to prepare this assault, it was postponed to 10 p.m., but long before that hour there were signs that the Germans were preparing to counterattack. The Canadian engineer working party which went forward at 8.15 p.m. was driven in. At 8.30 p.m. the fight was renewed at H.1, fifteen minutes later there was heavy rifle fire and bombing. The Canadian bombers who had attempted to take H.3 were met by counter-bombing and their supply of bombs ran low. Major Smith with his men in the German second line were hard pressed; he had been wounded but remained at duty, and now his right rear was threatened by a bombing attack which drove the Canadians back to the crater where the bombers of the 2nd Battalion and two platoons of “B” Company of the 3rd, sent forward to reinforce, sustained the fight. The German machine guns in H.3 dominated the front, the Canadian supply of bombs became exhausted, and without ammunition and reinforcements there was no possibility of successfully maintaining the position H.6 - H.4. Many men carried bombs forward, all fought with determination, Pte. Gledhill showed great courage in opposing the counterattack and in rescuing wounded. Lieut. F. W. Campbell, machine gun officer of the 1st Battalion, brought two of his guns across No Man’s Land with the third company and set them up in the German front line. When the enemy counter-attack began, and bombs ran out, he took one of the guns forward to engage it. The tripod being broken by shell fire, the only other survivor of the detachment, Pte. H. Vincent, held the gun on his back while his officer kept on firing and holding off the attack until mortally wounded. Lieut. Campbell was awarded the Victoria Cross.\textsuperscript{17}

THE WITHDRAWAL

At 10 p.m. the machine gun fired its last shot and Vin-
cent brought it back. By that time most of the survivors had returned to the Canadian line: Major Smith was killed as he reached it; of twenty-three officers of the 1st Battalion twelve were dead and only three unhurt; casualties among the other ranks numbered 346.

Meanwhile another company of the 3rd Battalion had reached the old front line through the German barrage but was held by the machine guns at H.3 which swept No Man’s Land. The assembly position of this company, in reserve trenches six hundred yards south of Givenchy, had been occupied by “B” Squadron, R.C.D.

At 10.01 p.m. a Canadian staff officer reported “we have been driven out of German F.L.T. and are now back in our own.” At the same time the 7th Division was reported to be on the line J.11, J.13, J.10, K.6, but the 51st Division had been unable to get possession of L.11 and L.12, for the enemy’s wire was found to be uncut and the enemy’s shelling had killed officers and buried bomb stores. Plans were however continued for renewed attacks, the 7th Division to begin at 12.15 a.m., the Canadian at 12.30 a.m. On hearing of this the Corps commander directed that both attacks should be postponed until 1.30 a.m.

THE ATTACK RESUMED

Owing to the shortage of ammunition and to the difficulties attending a night bombardment the Army commander approved of the further postponement of the attacks of the 7th and Canadian Divisions to 5.30 a.m.; they would be preceded by a half-hour bombardment. The 51st (Highland) Division was to attack at 1.45 a.m. as already arranged. The duration of the bombardment was later increased to two hours, but by 4 a.m. news came that the line at J.11 - J.13 had been driven back, the ground gained at L.10 - L.9 had been lost in a bombing attack, and that consequently the 1st Grenadier Guards, both their flanks being thus exposed, had withdrawn to the neighbourhood of J.5, the original line.
This made the advisability of resuming the attacks on the fronts of the 7th and Canadian Divisions doubtful, and since the troops operating against L.12 had also been forced back, the British front was practically in its original position. Evidently more time and more ammunition would be required if the attack were to be resumed on a large scale. The morning was misty, and it had not been possible to clear the trenches within 120 yards of H.2 and 1.2 for the bombardment of the machine guns there, so at 11.25 a.m. on the 16th it was decided that the programme of the previous day should be repeated with fresh infantry assaulting at 4.45 p.m. on the 16th. But there was a difference, in that the covering artillery, now firing in a slow continuous bombardment of the enemy’s trenches, was not to lift until the German front line had been consolidated as well as captured.820

On the Canadian front, however, there was now no mine and the vital assistance afforded by the advanced field guns was now completely lacking for when the 6th Battery gun opened fire, although its trajectory cleared the parapet, the second round brought down the floor of the farmhouse through which it was firing and the obstruction could not be cleared. When the barrage lifted from the German front line, the enemy infantry manned the parapet and joined the machine guns in opening so hot a fire that the leading wave of the assaulting troops (two platoons of the 3rd Canadian Battalion) never crossed No Man’s Land.

Half an hour after the 4.45 p.m. assault of 16th June, although some progress at L.10 was reported and also at I.2, the advance was evidently held up and a further bombardment of the line I.7 to H.2 was ordered, with an infantry assault to follow at 5.30 p.m. In this renewed attack the 3rd Canadian Battalion was again stopped by artillery, machine gun and rifle fire; the troops of the 7th Division had reached the craters I.4 to I.2 but were unable to hold them; the 1st Grenadier Guards were, however, reported to be on the line J.10, K.6, and the 51st (Highland) Division was reported—
in error, as was eventually discovered—to have reached L.10 and L.13 on Rue d’Ouvert. Encouraged by these reports General Gough considered the advisability of making a further attack against the line H.2 - H.3 - I.2 - I.4, but as before dearth of ammunition was the main factor. This and a successful German counter-attack resulted in the decision to concentrate efforts on the 17th against L. 12 and the western end of Rue d’Ouvert, and the consequent cancellation of an order that the R.C.D., with infantry bombers attached, should repeat the assault against H.2 - H.3 at 9 p.m. on the 16th. The changed role of the 1st Canadian Division is expressed in the following message sent at 8.30 p.m. on the 16th:

As the 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. is to be now on the passive defensive, steps should be taken to-night to put trenches in proper state of defence and repair all wire in front, at once.

Before the decision was taken, further reports showed that the German line was intact; at only one point near L.9 was the British line advanced, and there also, from lack of support, it had withdrawn at 4 a.m. on the 16th. A relief of the infantry was necessary, so this was carried out on the night 17th/18th and an advance was ordered for 3.05 a.m. on the 18th to occupy and consolidate the line J.9 - K.6 - M.4 as a more forward position from which the 7th Division would launch the assault. During the night it was found that the enemy was holding the line K.6 “Z redoubt,” the artillery programme was altered, and the movement was postponed for two hours and subsequently put off to the morning of the 19th, owing to the discovery that the enemy’s trench from J.10 - K.6 was strongly held and was covered by a heavy belt of wire in which many British wounded must await darkness and aid.

**FURTHER POSTPONEMENTS**

At 4.30 p.m. on the 18th General Haig directed General Rawlinson to operate with his Corps with a view to—
Holding the German forces on his front.
Gaining ground in the direction of Violaines.
Consolidating the line already held.

Again munitions governed, for the instructional memorandum concludes: “The state of the ammunition should be verified daily and should be sparingly used.” Experience had again shown that without a renewed bombardment, requiring more ammunition than was available, only the first and third objects could possibly be achieved. Therefore all efforts were at once bent on strengthening the line, and on preparing feint attacks.

On the night 18th/19th Seely’s Detachment relieved part of the 2nd C.I.B. on the right of the Canadian line from the canal to 450 yards north. On the following night the 2nd C.I.B. relieved in the front line the right of the 7th Division to a point north of I.5.

CONSIDERATIONS

The Action of Givenchy, although not rated as a battle in the long list of British engagements, is of particular interest in that the Canadian preparations, arrangements and action were in many respects the prototype in miniature of successful major engagements later fought by the Canadian Corps. As a whole, the operations of the IV Corps in June gained no ground and were only successful in diverting a part of the enemy’s forces from the French front; the experience gained by the Canadian troops and staffs participating compensated to some extent for the casualties suffered.

First Army made anxious inquiries as to why the attack of the 15th failed—“so far as is known the preparations were most carefully made, the artillery preparation was adequate and accurate.” This question must have been raised before the British heavy artillery estimated that of the sixty-six German batteries they engaged on the 15th only nine had been silenced. The unmolested German batteries accounted for the heavy casualties suffered in the assembly positions,
for the interruption of communications and for the difficulty of bringing reinforcements forward.

On the Canadian front the barbed wire entanglements had been completely destroyed. The forward guns had broken the resistance of the enemy’s front line, and the covering fire of the field guns had been sufficient to enable the infantry to carry the assault onwards. But no S.O.S. had called down the protective barrage when the German counter-attack was delivered—probably the rocket carriers had become casualties—and with the open left flank and no bombs the infantry could not hold the ground gained.

Supply and ammunition railheads were conveniently placed at Lillers and St. Venant, some twelve miles from the line. Aside from the difficulty of carrying stretchers through narrow and crowded trenches, the medical arrangements worked smoothly.

Casualties in the 1st Canadian Division from 14th to 20th June as recorded at the time, were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Hospital wounded</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>758</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The above figures, being contemporary, include among the wounded those who subsequently died of wounds. They do not include wounded who remained at duty. Corrected figures for battle casualties in the Division for the period 15th to 24th June are: 36 officers and 699 other ranks.

DEMONSTRATIONS

From the 18th of June onwards the Givenchy front was comparatively quiet. Artillery bombardments and infantry assaults were simulated against the Rue d’Ouvert before sunrise on the 19th. Between 9 and 10 a.m. on the same day a similar demonstration was carried out on the front of the 2nd C.I.B. opposite the Duck’s Bill. Meanwhile orders were
issued that “ammunition should be strictly economized in order that a sufficient amount may be available within the least possible time for a renewed offensive.” The restriction applied particularly to 18-pdr. high explosive and to howitzer lyddite shells of all calibres. To ensure quick retaliation by our heavy batteries when the enemy shelled our trenches, Infantry Brigade Headquarters in the line were connected by wire to the nearest heavy artillery group. Retaliatory artillery fire was confined to the German trenches opposite, not until 1917 was the system developed so that offending enemy batteries were engaged and silenced.

THE ROSS RIFLE

Two days before the assault at Givenchy the Canadian Division was re-armed with the short Lee-Enfield, and all Ross rifles were withdrawn.

The story of the Ross rifle as a Canadian military arm begins in 1901. At that time the difficulty of obtaining weapons from England when required, and the plans adopted for the defence of the Empire, combined to make the erection of an arms factory in Canada desirable. In 1902 a contract, which proved to be disadvantageous to the Government, was entered into with a private concern for the manufacture of all rifles for the Canadian forces. The first samples of the Ross submitted to a committee appointed by the Minister of Militia, were reported upon as being unsuitable for military use, unless important changes were made and precautions taken to prevent jamming. In fact the Ross, as originally adopted, was not a service rifle but a mechanical project still in the experimental stage. Then for ten years a method of trial and error was followed, and one modification rapidly succeeded another; in addition to official trials by experts, a series of fortuitous tests and unsupervised experiments was, in effect, carried out by every militiaman as soon as he was issued with the Ross rifle; innumerable modifications were
suggested, and each one of the many adopted was of necessity applied to a thousand or more rifles instead of to three or four, for production could not be suspended without infringing the terms of the contract. The Government, constantly expectant of imminent success for the Ross, had no desire to terminate the contract, and the Militia had to have rifles, so between 1906 and 1914 the country was flooded with 100,000 of various types and marks, each advertised as the perfect model, but all unsatisfactory in one way or another until the Mark III was developed — a new pattern which supposedly embodied all the merits and none of the defects of its predecessors. But the Mark III had also in its turn been designed without due regard to the warnings of soldiers and mechanics, and had also been tested primarily as a target rifle. Excellent though the rifle had proved for the sportsman and marksman who never indulged in prolonged rapid fire, the seriousness of its shortcomings as a service arm was only appreciated after trial in the trenches had superseded experimentation on the ranges, or in the laboratory. Incredible encomiums, broadcast to meet indictments, tended to stimulate doubt rather than confidence; elaborate explanations of the transfigurations and performances of the weapon served to breed distrust; the changes made in the field called attention to defects which they did not always remedy; each new attempt to restore confidence instilled only fresh misgivings, and the final test of battle brought blasphemous despair. Sir John French could not disregard the soldiers’ verdict; 3,050 had discarded the Ross and re-armed themselves with the Lee-Enfield on the battlefields of Ypres and Festubert. His orders for re-armament issued on 12th June were carried out forthwith: the infantry in some cases made the exchange when fatigue parties carried up the new weapons even into the front line and brought back the Ross for consignment to England. In each battalion a few, usually fitted with telescope sights, were retained for the use of snipers.
On the afternoon of the 21st, the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade arrived at Vendin from England via Abbeville, with a strength of ten officers and 159 other ranks, twenty Colt machine guns, twenty-one motor cycles, eleven with side cars, sixteen bicycles and twenty-one four-wheeled motor vehicles, of which eight were armoured cars.

On night 22nd/23rd June the 3rd C.I.B. relieved the 2nd C.I.B. in the Givenchy section, and on the following night the 20th Infantry Brigade relieved Seely’s Detachment and the 3rd C.I.B. Command of the divisional front passed from General Alderson to General Gough at 9.45 p.m. on 24th June, 1915, in accordance with orders issued by First Army which also directed the Canadian Division to join the III Corps on the Ploegsteert front seventeen miles to the north.\textsuperscript{824}
CHAPTER XX
PLOEGSTEERT AND HILL 63
26TH JUNE–13TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

Map 14: Frontages 1st Canadian Division, 1915


A NORTHWARD MOVE
Transfer from Givenchy to the Ploegsteert sector marked the beginning of three months of trench warfare for the 1st Canadian Division, a period in which no active operations were undertaken by either side on the British front, except local enterprises which resulted in no major changes. The Germans, bent on defeating Russia first, were using their main forces on the Eastern Front; the British, profiting by their experiences at Ypres and Festubert, were raising and training the new armies and manufacturing the heavy guns and ammunition necessary to break through modern field defences.

The formation for the march of the Division was by three brigade groups, each of which moved on three successive nights by way of staging areas at Neuf Berquin and Noote Boom into the new area between Ploegsteert, Wulverghem and Neuve Eglise, where the Division was to form part of the III Corps (Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Pulteney) in
the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer).

On 24th June staff and regimental officers of the 2nd Brigade Group went ahead by bus to the headquarters of the 48th (South Midland) Division to make themselves familiar with the area and the dispositions for holding the front,—the usual practice, but particularly necessary on this occasion as the 1st Canadian Division was to relieve the right infantry brigade of the 48th and the two left brigades of the 12th. That night the group marched ten miles by road to Neuf Berquin, and on the following night five miles to the Noote Boom billets while the 1st Brigade Group moved into Neuf Berquin. On the night 26th/27th June the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved the 144th Infantry Brigade (48th Division) in the left of the new front: batteries of the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A., came into action and took over the corresponding zone, and all came temporarily under orders of the 12th Division. Meanwhile the 1st Brigade Group moved into the Noote Boom area and the 3rd Brigade Group, including Seely’s Detachment, marched to Neuf Berquin.

On the morning of 27th June the headquarters 1st Canadian Division moved from Vendin to Nieppe; in the afternoon the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade moved by road through St. Venant and Strazeele into the new area, and at night the C.R.A. 1st Canadian Division assumed responsibility for the protection of the new frontage, now covered by the 118th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A., the 1st and 2nd Brigades, C.F.A., and four batteries of the 12th Divisional Artillery not yet relieved.

After nightfall on the 27th the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade moved in to relieve the 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades (12th Division), and this transfer having been completed at 1.10 a.m. on the 28th, the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, assumed command of the front taken over from the 12th and 48th Divisions. On the night 27th/28th the 3rd C.I.B. marched from Neuf Berquin to Noote Boom and Seely’s Detachment to near Merris. The artillery reliefs
ended at 8.30 a.m. when the batteries of the 3rd Brigade, C.F.A., came into action on the extreme right.

THE NEW AREA

The new area was bounded on the right by the Bailleul-Ploegsteert road, and on the left by the Neuve Eglise-Messines road. The Hazebrouck - Armentières railway passed nearby, and the two railheads—for supplies at Steenwerck and for ammunition at Strazeele—were reached by good roads. In sharp contrast to the steamy flats of Festubert this country was varied; an irregular, well-cultivated ridge of hills, rising to one hundred and fifty feet above the plain of the Lys to the south and the Douve valley to the north, ran east and west through the sector, giving good cover to the south. On the ridge, and three miles from the front line on the left, stands the village of Neuve Eglise, from which most of the 2,400 civilian inhabitants had been evacuated although many of the neighbouring farmers and cottagers remained. The chief feature of the forward area was “Hill 63,” the most easterly part of the ridge, from which a good view could be obtained to the east, towards Warneton, and also to the north across the trenches in the Douve valley and up the slope to the partly ruined village of Messines which stands on the southern end of the main Flanders ridge.

The new front line, four thousand yards in length, covered the northeastern corner of Ploegsteert Wood, the southern half of which was now held by the 12th Division. Thence it ran east and north of the ruined hamlet of St. Yves, across the Armentières-Messines road a mile south-southwest of the latter, and in a rough quadrant across and up the Douve river valley to include the village of Wulverghem a mile west-southwest of Messines. Further left the line was held by the 50th (Northumbrian) Division.

DISPOSITIONS AND CONDITIONS
At first the frontage was divided between the 1st and 2nd C.I.B., but on the night 28th/29th Seely’s Detachment (Canadian Cavalry Brigade) came in on the left and the 2nd C.I.B. closed to the right, so that the 1st C.I.B. held from the right boundary to near the Armentières - Messines road and the 2nd C.I.B. 1,200 yards in the centre. The two brigades each had two battalions in line, and one in support about one thousand yards in rear, and one in brigade reserve, quartered in farm buildings 2,500 yards further back, ready to counter-attack immediately. The cavalry dispositions were similar, one regiment being in line, one in support, and one in reserve. The third brigade, in divisional reserve, was billeted in wooden huts – “Aldershot Camp,” “Bulford Camp,” and “R.E. Huts” – built on the lower slopes of the ridge a mile south of Neuve Eglise. As all heavy and siege artillery were now under corps control, the artillery at the disposal of the Division consisted of the Divisional artillery only, of which the 3rd Brigade, C.F.A., covered the right zone east of Ploegsteert Wood and St. Yves, and the 1st covered the left front of the right infantry brigade. The centre infantry brigade and the cavalry on the left were supported by the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A., while the 118th (How.) Bde., R.F.A., in positions two thousand yards from the front line, and sheltered by the steep slopes of “Hill 63,” was well placed to fire on the whole front.

After the batteries had registered, the ammunition allotment for the Division was reduced to three rounds per 18-pdr. per day, and for the last week of July the 18-pdr. allotment was nil, although 300 rounds, 4.5-inch How., were provided. The enemy rarely fired more, confining his attention mostly to registration. But once gas shells “the same as at Gravenstafel” were reported, and several deliberate shoots caused some inconvenience; two of our infantry brigade headquarters were shelled, and in the late afternoon of 15th July accurate shooting by a 5.9-inch howitzer battery behind Messines brought down the clock tower of the church in
Neuve Eglise with the first three rounds, and set the building on fire. On 1st August a shoot on Ration Farm, where 100,000 rounds of S.A.A. and the reserve supply of bombs were stored, set fire to the buildings: by the prompt action of Major J. A. Hesketh, L.S.H., the flames were extinguished before serious damage was done.

In general, however, the report of an observer well expresses the conditions prevailing: “All quiet on this front. Enemy as elsewhere hard at work digging and strengthening defences.” The digging sometimes showed in fresh earth or sandbags making their appearance on the long green slopes of Messines Ridge, occasionally trees and houses would disappear overnight, and if a veil of mist suddenly lifted, working parties might be seen hurriedly going to ground.

CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENCES

On the British side also the improvement of defences was the main occupation. The front line consisted of connected lengths of fire trench, now numbered from 121 on the right at Ploegsteert Wood to 142 on the Wulverghem-Messines road; they were dug from two to four feet deep, the remainder being bullet-proof sandbag parapet, but they were not traversed and rarely had any parados. Low shelters close in rear, with sandbag walls and corrugated iron roofs, gave some shelter from rain but little from shells. There was no support line, and the communication trenches were such that safe access to the front line, except through the woods, was only possible under cover of darkness.

The first undertaking was therefore the improvement of the front line defences. Traverses were built in the fire trenches, and a parados of sandbags. A support line, dug deep since the waters of the Douve were low, was constructed all across the front from fifty to two hundred yards in rear of the fire trench, with bomb-proof shelters and frequent communication to the front line. This method was followed to permit the reduction and the better distri-
bution of the trench garrisons; it was anticipated that casualties in trench warfare would thereby be reduced and that the defences might one day have to withstand a heavy and prolonged artillery bombardment. A subsidiary line or system of trenches was also constructed from 1,500 to 2,000 yards behind the front line along the forward slope of Hill 63, protected by barbed wire and covering a series of inter-supporting strong points in farms or sandbag forts built in the valley below, where eight guns of the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade were mounted in emplacements, all strongly built and some of reinforced concrete.

Almost all this work in the forward defensive zone had to be carried out under cover of darkness and for a time over two thousand men were employed upon it three nights out of four; on the fourth night, as a rule, on account of inter-battalion reliefs, there was no work. After the main construction was completed the working parties were reduced to five hundred nightly.

For more rearward defence works, laid out and constructed by the Corps, the Division was not at first responsible, although it had been allotted a frontage in both the G.H.Q. second and third line to be occupied in case of withdrawal. The Canadian batteries selected and began construction of suitable gun positions to cover these lines. On coming into the area the Division had found a detachment of five hundred from the British 3rd Cavalry Division, digging trenches and emplacements along the saddle between Neuve Eglise and Hill 63 to connect the forward defensive zone with the G.H.Q. second line. Upon this latter, which covered Neuve Eglise on the north and east and ran roughly parallel to the front line at four thousand yards, the Corps employed the recently arrived 37th Division of the New Armies from 8th to 24th August, during which time selected officers and other ranks were attached to units of the 1st Canadian Division for instruction.
ATTITUDE OF THE ENEMY

While conditions on the Canadian front from the end of June to the middle of September may rightly be described as quiet, an incessant watch was kept upon the enemy both from the front line and from the artillery observation posts on the high ground in rear. On the 1st of July an identification had been obtained by a Canadian patrol in No Man’s Land from a recently killed soldier of the 25th Bavarian Regiment, and the presence of this unit in the line was confirmed on the 27th: at 8.30 a.m. a sentry of the 3rd Canadian Battalion noticed an enemy patrol of three men crawling in the long grass a hundred and fifty yards in front of trench 129. Captain F. O. W. Tidy at once went out with three men to cut them off, and in a short bout killed one and captured two. Apart from this there were no hand-to-hand encounters. The trenches, except on the right, were far apart, in some places several hundred yards, and activity was confined almost entirely to sniping. For this, twelve Ross and thirteen Lee-Enfield rifles, fitted with telescopic sights, were in use by the Canadian infantry. A request from a battalion commander that high velocity 280 sporting or match Ross rifles be obtained was not approved.

The prevailing inactivity on the Canadian front was temporarily disturbed by a warning from III Corps on 9th July that a German attack on Armentières from the east was expected: Lille, Comines and Menin were said to be full of troops who had been told that they were moving into the final victorious fight. Next day there were reports of the enemy massing on the Canadian right, and the 3rd C.I.B. stood to arms; on the 11th similar reports came in from the adjoining 12th Division. But on none of these occasions did any attack follow and the movement observed was attributed to reliefs in the German line.

That the enemy was in high heart was shown by the display of a notice board on 25th July opposite our right fire trench (No. 121) on which was written “Warsaw has fallen,
we have taken 100,000 prisoners,” and by cheering heard in
their lines when good news was received,—as on 20th Au-
gust, the day after the *Royal George* and the *Arabic* were
torpedoed and sunk. On the nights of 17th July and 26th Au-
gust, Zeppelins were observed passing over the lines, pre-
sumably on their way to bomb Paris.

MINING

Not only above ground, but also below was vigilance
necessary, for mining and counter-mining was in progress on
the right front at St. Yves before the 1st Canadian Division
arrived. Four hours after the Division took over, the 174th
Company, R.E., of which two sections remained operating
under direction of III Corps, exploded a charge to break in
enemy galleries. Two days later the enemy fired a similar
mine which did little damage. On 9th July two more mines
were fired by the R.E., the first at 9 p.m. and the other later,
upon which the craters were occupied by a party of No. 1
Company, 13th Canadian Battalion, commanded by Captain
K. M. Perry. On the 13th two more mines were fired nearby
and the craters also occupied by the same company. 833, 834
On the 11th August a defensive mine was exploded as part
of the same project, and another on 31st August, the craters
being occupied by a company of the 4th Battalion (1st
C.I.B.).

NEW MEANS AND METHODS

A number of officers of the 2nd Canadian Division—
commanders, staff and regimental—were attached to the 1st
Canadian Division between 19th and 23rd July. They had
been training their units in England on principles gleaned
from periodical “Notes from the Front,” and a few of them
had already served in the line, but new methods and im-
proved practices were developing rapidly in all branches and
there was much to learn. The field artillery tested new fuzes
and used most of the meagre supply of ammunition in the
registration of targets with aeroplane observation by the clock method, the machines being equipped with wireless. Signal communications, particularly between infantry and artillery, were also being improved; the allotment of twenty-six miles of telephone wire per field artillery brigade was increased and the burying of lines to a depth of three feet in exposed sections was begun.\(^{835}\)

The use of pigeons to communicate between the front line and infantry brigade headquarters—twelve birds per brigade—was introduced, and visual systems for times of emergency were tried.

The hand grenade had assumed a new importance – the ammunition establishment of a division now included 21,000 bombs and grenades of various types—and the training of infantrymen was extended with the intention of making every man a bomber and so removing the difficulties of employing and administering the specialists of the brigade bombing companies. Selected officers attended corps demonstrations of new hand and rifle grenades, and a catapult for throwing bombs was tested in the front line, but the control of range was too erratic to warrant its adoption. Portable searchlights were tried and found to be unsatisfactory. On 10th August an expert gave a convincing demonstration of the new pattern gas helmet recently issued to all ranks; this was a decided improvement on the old for it was fitted with a rubber tube valve. Vermorel sprayers charged with an anti-gas solution of hypo and carbonate of soda were installed in every trench as well as bells, sirens or horns with which the sentries would give the alarm. Early in September a divisional machine gun school was opened; the number of guns per battalion remained at four, but casualties had been heavy, and there was no source from which trained personnel could be replaced.

**SPECIAL UNITS**

In the course of the summer two new divisional admin-
istrative units became established: the divisional salvage company and the divisional baths. The salvage company was formed on 12th August. Consisting of one officer and 37 other ranks seconded from the infantry, it was attached to the Divisional Train, and was called upon to search the billeting area occupied by the Division and collect all abandoned arms, ammunition, equipment, supplies and surplus stores of all kinds. Baths were operated at Bailleul and Pont de Nieppe, with a total capacity of 1,500 men per day. A divisional laundry, in conjunction with the baths, employed fifty-five women at four francs per day.

In addition to the 171st and 174th Tunnelling Companies, R.E., already referred to as working on the Canadian front, two other British units were attached to the Division, the 14th and 36th Trench Howitzer Batteries, the former, 12-inch calibre, firing a round 60-lb. bomb, was detailed on 8th July with the remark “at least 20 rounds of ammunition will be sent with the battery.” These weapons were comparatively inaccurate, and their activities were unpopular with the infantry as provoking retaliatory shelling of our line. They, however, fired occasionally into the enemy strong points at la Petite Douve farm, on the Armentieres road two hundred yards from the Canadian line. The same target was also chosen for the 8-inch and 9'2-inch howitzer batteries of the corps heavy artillery, but their ammunition was also restricted and therefore did little damage.

The 118th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A., remained attached to the Divisional Artillery; it was augmented on 11th August by a loan from 12th Division of the A/81st (How.) Battery, R.F.A., which went into action behind Ploegsteert Wood. Another temporary addition to the Divisional Artillery was the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Brigade (A and B Batteries, each 6 — 13-pdrs.), which had been unemployed for nearly eleven months. The Brigade had disembarked at Le Havre on 20th July, and had been in G.H.Q. reserve at Louches, twelve miles northwest of St. Omer. Three of the
officers were attached to the 1st Brigade, C.F.A., for the last week in August, and finally the unit joined the Division on 9th September, being attached to Seely’s Detachment – now renamed Canadian Cavalry Brigade – for administration.

IMPORTANT VISITORS

During these three months the Commander-in-Chief, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander and their staffs paid the usual visits to the Division, but other important visitors also viewed the front from the top of Hill 63 and saw something of the Canadian troops. On 30th June the Italian Military Attaché was shown the baths at Nieppe and the defences of Ploegsteert Wood. The Prime Minister of Canada (Sir Robert Borden), on a six-day visit to France, and Captain Prince Arthur of Connaught, representing H.R.H. the Governor General, accompanied by Colonel Sir Max Aitken, M.P., and Mr. R. B. Bennett, M.P., spent a busy afternoon in the area on 22nd July.

Sir Robert had arrived in England on 8th July, having crossed the Atlantic to join in “full oral discussion of certain important matters” with members of the Government of the United Kingdom, and also to visit the Canadian wounded and the Canadian forces generally. He was received by the King at Buckingham Palace on the 13th and next day attended a meeting of the British Cabinet—the first Dominion representative ever accorded this privilege. In a letter to General Alderson, subsequently issued in orders and read to the troops, the Prime Minister conveyed to them a message of pride and appreciation from the people of Canada; and when presented with the Freedom of the City of London at the Guildhall, in recognition of his own services, of the part taken by the Dominion in the war, and of “the invaluable assistance rendered by the officers and men of the Canadian Contingents on the battlefields of Europe,” he replied in fitting words, concluding “we cannot, because we must not, fail in this war.”
On 7th August the Minister of Militia (Major-General Sam Hughes)—in the course of a nine days’ visit to the front—and H.S.H. Lieut.-Colonel Prince Alexander of Teck witnessed a shoot by the divisional artillery and saw several of the battalions en route for the front line.\footnote{538} On the 18th the British Secretary of State for War (Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener), accompanied by the French Minister of War (M. Millerand), arrived at 4.15 p.m. and inspected two companies of each infantry brigade. On 4th September Br.-General J. W. Carson, representing the Minister of Militia, called on the Divisional commander and visited several of the batteries.

**BRIGADE RELIEFS**

A redistribution of the frontages of the British corps at midnight 14th/15th July, consequent upon a reorganization of the British First and Second Armies, involved the transfer of the Division in line from the III Corps to the II Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Charles Fergusson).\footnote{539} Only temporary changes of divisional frontage resulted but brigade dispositions were considerably altered; on the evening of the 14th the 2nd C.I.B. relieved the 3rd C.I.B. in trenches 129 and 130; before daylight on the 15th, the 1st C.I.B., which had been relieved in the right sector on the 5th by the 3rd C.I.B., took over some five hundred yards of trenches (designated C.1 - C.4) from the 149th Brigade (50th Division) beyond the Canadian left boundary, and at the same time relieved Seely’s Detachment in trenches 140 - 142. Simultaneously Seely’s Detachment extended its right by relieving the 2nd C.I.B. in trenches 135 and 136.\footnote{840} These dispositions obtained until the night 18th/19th July when trenches C.1 to C.4 were taken over by the 85th Brigade (28th Division) now on the immediate Canadian left, and trenches 140 to 142 by Seely’s Detachment, the 1st C.I.B. moving back into reserve. On the same night the 3rd C.I.B. took over trenches 129 and 130 from the 2nd C.I.B. which handed over trenches
135 and 136 again to Seely’s Detachment.  

On 21st July the 1st C.I.B. changed places with the 3rd, and after nightfall on the 29th they again changed places, and again on 6th August, which brought the 3rd into reserve. To equalize the frequency of battalion tours in the line, made uneven by the continuous tour of the 2nd C.I.B. in the centre section, the 1st and 3rd C.I.B., while in reserve, each exchanged two battalions with the 2nd C.I.B. for four days between 2nd and 10th August. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade (late Seely’s Detachment) went into reserve on 15th August on relief by the 3rd C.I.B., which also took over trenches 135 and 136 from the 2nd C.I.B., which in turn took over trenches 128 to 130 from the 1st C.I.B. These dispositions continued for the ensuing month, the front being divided into three approximately equal parts and each brigade arranging for its own battalion reliefs, while the Canadian Cavalry Brigade constituted the Divisional reserve.

CHANGES IN PERSONNEL

In the first five months of service in France no major changes took place in the staff of the Division. On 14th July, however, Colonel C. F. Romer, promoted to B.G.G.S., III Corps, was succeeded in the appointment of G.S.O.1 by Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Kearsley, transferred from the Indian Cavalry Corps Staff. He was a Regular Army officer born in 1880 and commissioned in the 5th Dragoon Guards in 1899, in which he reached the rank of Major in 1912. He had served in the South African war, being awarded the Queen’s and King’s medals. A graduate of the Staff College, he had been employed on the staff in France and Belgium from the outbreak of the war.

Colonel T. B. Wood, who had held the senior administrative staff appointment since the arrival of the Contingent on Salisbury Plain, was recalled to England on 12th July to assist the 2nd Canadian Division in its preparations. He was succeeded as A.A. & Q.M.G. by Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Frith,
Royal Engineers, a Canadian by birth, educated at Upper Canada College and at the R.M.C., Kingston, of which he was a graduate. He had twenty years’ service in the Regular Army and was forty-two years old. A graduate of the Staff College, Lieut.-Colonel Frith had been employed at the War Office since 1911, and though he held the Queen’s and King’s medals for service in South Africa he had not served in France prior to joining the 1st ‘Canadian Division.

Of commanders, the three infantry brigadiers were the same as at Valcartier, but many changes due to death, wounds or sickness had taken place amongst their staffs and among the unit commanders. With the formation of the 2nd Canadian Division and the increase of numbers of the C.E.F., many other changes were made. On 11th August, Br.-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., was informed of his appointment to command the 2nd Canadian Division, and next day was succeeded in the 3rd C.I.B. by Lieut.-Colonel R. G. E. Leckie, 46 years old, a graduate of the R.M.C., Kingston, who had passed the Militia Staff course and had been O.C. 16th Battalion since organization at Valcartier. From 1890 to 1900 he had served in both the infantry and cavalry branches of the Active Militia in the various ranks to Major, inclusive, afterwards transferring to the Reserve of Officers. In 1902 he was on active service with the 2nd C.M.Rs. in South Africa as a captain, being mentioned in despatches and awarded the Queen’s medal with two clasps. He rejoined the Active Militia in 1910 to organize the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders, of which he was still in command at the outbreak of war.

Command of the Divisional Artillery was relinquished by Br.-General H. E. Burstall on 13th September; he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. B. Morrison from the 1st Bde., C.F.A., and he in turn exchanged commands at the end of September with Br.-General H. C. Thacker, C.R.A., 2nd C.D.A. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Creelman returned to command the 2nd Bde., C.F.A., on 19th July, upon which Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Maclaren took over temporary command of
the 1st Bde., C.F.A., until 9th September, and permanent command from 29th September. Major C. F. Constantine, who had been succeeded by Captain E. F. Norton, R.A., as Brigade Major, 1st C.D.A., on 19th June, and who had subsequently commanded the 7th Battery, C.F.A., was posted as Brigade Major, 2nd C.D.A., on 29th July. Twelve artillery subalterns were also transferred from the 1st C.D.A. to the 2nd C.D.A.

The Divisional Engineers had remained under Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Armstrong; the A.D.M S. and the commanders of the three field ambulances were unchanged.

Of the infantry brigade majors, Lieut.-Colonel H. Kemmis-Betty had been wounded at Ypres and succeeded on the staff of the 2nd C.I.B. first by Major G. Meynell (Shrops. L.I.) for a month and subsequently by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Elmsley, R.C.D.; Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Hughes had been recalled to become G.S.O.2 of the 2nd Canadian Division and Capt. P. F. Villiers took his place as Brigade Major, 3rd C.I.B.

Among battalion commanders there had also been many changes by mid-September. The 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 13th Battalions, however, still had their original commanders: Lieut.-Colonels F.W. Hill, R. Rennie, G.S. Tuxford, L.J. Lipsett and F.O.W. Loomis. The remaining battalions were commanded as follows: 2nd Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Swift; 4th Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel M.A. Colquhoun; 7th Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel V.W. Odlum; 10th Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Rattray; 14th Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel W.W. Burland; 15th Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel W.R. Marshall; 16th Bn. by Lieut.-Colonel J.E. Leckie, who succeeded his brother. Of junior infantry officers and other ranks none were transferred to the 2nd Canadian Division, but the wastage of war had greatly altered the personnel of the 1st Canadian Division. After seven months in the field only about one third of the original infantry officers remained although the twelve battalions still contained 42 per cent of the men who
had comprised these units on landing in England.

The supply of reinforcements, as a whole, was not yet working effectively. On arrival in the field the men of some of the drafts were reported to be only partly trained, and few were familiar with the short Lee-Enfield, for the battalions they had served with in Canada and England were armed with the Ross. Although small reinforcing drafts came forward from time to time, and some recovered wounded rejoined, the strength of the Division at the end of July was 16,999 of all ranks, including the dismounted cavalry and the motor machine-gun brigade; the shortage was twenty-five officers and 3,400 other ranks, mostly infantry,—a deficiency of twenty per cent.

NEW APPOINTMENTS, 2ND CANADIAN DIVISION

General Steele, as Lord Kitchener had stipulated, was not to lead the 2nd Canadian Division in the field; on 3rd August he succeeded Major-General P.S. Wilkinson in command of the Shorncliffe Area, under the G.O.C.-in-Chief, Eastern Command.

On the previous day, by instructions of the Minister of Militia, he had submitted a recommendation that the strength of the brigades of the 1st Cdn. Div. in France should be increased to five battalions by sending out the 36th, 42nd and 49th Battalions then in England, and that brigades of the 2nd Cdn. Div. should also be brought up to five battalions by the addition of the 39th, 43rd and 48th Battalions. He also said that nine new reserve battalions would be required from Canada and he recommended the formation in England of four Reserve Brigades of four Battalions each, for training. The first of these recommendations was never put into effect, but the suggestion as to reserve formations was made effective when the Canadian Training Division was reorganized in October, 1915.

On 17th August Major-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., who had returned from France, took over
command of the 2nd Canadian Division.

Only one of the three infantry brigadiers who came from Canada retained his command on proceeding to France: Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. B. Ketchen, chosen by the Minister for the 6th C.I.B., was a Major in Lord Strathcona’s Horse, 43 years old. He was educated at Wellington and Sandhurst, and for two years held a commission as 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. He had served for seven years in the R.N.W.M.P. before being commissioned in the Permanent Force in 1901 after service in South Africa with Lord Strathcona’s Horse.

The two new infantry brigadiers were Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Brooke, appointed to the 4th Brigade on 25th June, and Lieutenant-Colonel D. Watson, appointed to command the 5th Brigade on 30th August.

Brigadier-General Lord Brooke, M.V.O., born in 1882, had risen to the rank of Captain in the 1st Life Guards and was now a lieutenant-colonel in the Territorial Force. He had served in the South African War, and as a newspaper correspondent was present in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1913, at the request of the Minister of Militia, he had come to Canada to command the 2nd Cavalry Brigade in its annual training, and in the summer of 1914 had commanded the troops at Petawawa Camp. In the Great War he had served as A.D.C. to the Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F., had been twice mentioned in despatches and had been wounded. His appointments to command the 4th C.I.B., and subsequently the Training Division at Bramshott, and finally the 12th C.I.B., were made at the instance of the Minister of Militia, who yet was insistent that qualified Canadian officers could be found to fill almost all positions of command.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. Watson, a newspaper proprietor from Quebec, was born in 1869; joining the 8th Royal Rifles in 1899 as a 2nd Lieutenant, he passed through every rank till promoted Lieutenant-Colonel to command the unit in 1912. On the organization of the First Contingent he was
given the command of the 2nd Battalion, C.E.F., which he retained until promoted Brigadier-General to command the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

The new C.R.E. was Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. Hughes, who after two and a half years in the N.P.A.M. had been appointed to the Royal Canadian Engineers in 1904. After the departure of the 1st Canadian Division for France he had been posted to the Training Division, Shorncliffe, where he was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Houliston, transferred from the 2nd Canadian Division.843

THE 2ND CANADIAN DIVISION COMPLETES TRAINING

During July the infantry battalions of the Division completed battalion training and musketry. In the forty-eight hours of work per week the siting, construction, attack and defence of trenches was emphasized, and field work at night was practised.

On 13th July the Minister of Militia arrived from Canada and paid his first visit to Shorncliffe; next day he attended a tactical exercise and saw some of the troops. On the 17th a divisional dismounted parade was held at Beachborough Park for a review by the Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden; the acting High Commissioner for Canada, the Minister of Militia and Mr. R. B. Bennett, M.P., accompanied him. There was also present Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Murray, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff. After a subsequent visit a fortnight later the Deputy C.I.G.S. was of the opinion that the Division, if fully equipped, could, in an emergency, leave for the front in the first week of September but would be the better for a further two weeks’ training.

For the month of August divisional training was prescribed: inter-brigade operations, carefully planned and directed by the General Staff, were carried out on the 10th/11th, and 13th/14th. On the 16th a divisional route march was witnessed by Princess Alexandra of Teck. On the 23rd inter-divisional manoeuvres began which lasted for
four days of ideal weather in the vicinity of Ashford: on the first day, with part of the artillery of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division supporting, an encounter battle was staged against an infantry brigade and the reserve artillery brigade of the Canadian Training Division; and on the 26th a defence against an imaginary hostile landing at Folkestone and Sandgate was observed by the Right Hon. Mr. Winston Churchill. Two other visits may also be recorded: on 4th August the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Right Hon. Mr. Bonar Law) reviewed the Division in a heavy thunderstorm, and on the 21st the Minister of Militia visited Folkestone to say good-bye prior to his return to Canada. Three days later General Hughes was created K.C.B. (Civil Division).

On the 19th of August the 5th and 7th Brigades, C.F.A., arrived from Canada and joined the 2nd C.D.A. at Otterpool under Br.-General H. C. Thacker. But their state of training and lack of horses and equipment made it impossible for them to accompany the Division to France at this time. The divisional artillery was completed by the formation on 1st October of the 8th (How.) Brigade from personnel drafted during September from the Reserve Artillery Brigade, Ross Barracks, Shorncliffe. Eventually the 2nd C.D.A. came into action as a whole when the 5th and 7th Brigades, together with the 8th, renumbered 6th (How.) and consisting of new 21st, 22nd and 23rd Batteries, joined in France on 20th January, 1916.

Another departure from divisional establishment was made when the decision was taken, on the strong recommendation of General Alderson, that the Borden Machine Gun Battery should accompany the Division to France.

THE CHANNEL CROSSING

When orders for the inspection of the Division by H.M. the King on 2nd September were received, there was no longer doubt as to the training period in England coming to
an end. The inspection, at which His Majesty was accompanied by F.M. Earl Kitchener, was carried out at Beachborough Park under a grey sky. In his special message to the Division His Majesty noted the steadiness and discipline which marked the bearing of the troops on parade.\(^4\)

In due course the Channel was crossed from Folkestone to Boulogne, between 13th and 17th September, by night and in hot, humid weather. A hitch occurred in mid-channel when a destroyer of the escort rammed the paddlebox of the leaveboat carrying the H.Q., 4th C.I.B. and the 18th Battalion. For a time it was thought that the ship might founder but there was no panic. In a choppy sea, with the ship out of control, towing cables from the S.S. Queen—with the 2nd Cdn. Div. Headquarters and the 19th Battalion on board—parted, but tugs summoned from Boulogne brought the damaged vessel into that port by daylight with the troops on board.

Owing to this mishap, the sailing of the units of the 6th C.I.B. was postponed. The battalions had been due to cross on the night of the 16th; they had marched from Otterpool to Folkestone, a distance of ten miles, in the sultry afternoon, with new boots, new equipment and carrying full packs for the first time. On cancellation of the sailing they were ordered to bivouac on St. Martin’s Plain; many were exhausted and fell out on the two-mile uphill march. The Medical Officers were busy all the next morning attending to blistered feet. But on the following night units marched to Folkestone docks, embarked and crossed without incident.\(^2\)

SUPPLY OF PERSONNEL

Among matters which were discussed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Militia with Lord Kitchener and other British authorities was the maximum force that Canada might maintain in the field, with due regard to the provision of sufficient reinforcements to keep the units up to strength. There had never been any question about France being the
eventual destination of the 2nd Canadian Division, and the decision to form a Canadian Army Corps as soon as that Division reached the field was the natural outcome.

The decision of 21st November, 1914, increasing from 30,000 to 50,000 the number of troops to be kept in training in Canada, was not embodied in any official order but was acted upon until 8th July, 1915; on that date, as already recorded, an Order in Council (P.C. 1593) was passed authorizing the Minister to “raise, equip and send overseas . . . officers and men not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand, including those who have already been raised and equipped . . . and including also those who have been, or may hereafter be raised for garrison and guard duties in Canada.” By this date the number of infantry battalions mobilized or in course of mobilization totalled 73, of which 39 had been sent overseas, including the 13 in France and the 12 constituting the 2nd Division in England. The practice of sending complete battalions as reinforcements, which had begun with the despatch of the 23rd, 30th and 32nd Battalions in February, was already producing in England an accumulation of surplus senior officers, who could not be provided for when their units were depleted by despatch of personnel to France. On 31st May the War Office asked that no officers above the rank of lieutenant be sent as reinforcements for the artillery and infantry, and that vacancies in the senior ranks be filled by promotions in the field, and Canada accepted the proposal in principle. But as the system of raising complete battalions and sending them intact to England was continued, and could not be changed without risk of giving a serious check to recruiting, the problem of the disposal of surplus senior officers became more and more acute.

At the end of June the monthly supply of reinforcements to maintain the Canadian forces already overseas from Canada was estimated at 150 officers and 4,885 men monthly; of these, 120 and 4,000 were required for the infantry, 15 and
400 for the cavalry, 10 and 325 for the artillery, 3 and 100 for the engineers. While expressing some doubt as to the capacity of Canada to do more than provide these reinforcements, the Army Council suggested the possibility of a third Canadian division. The Department of Militia and Defence considered that the maintenance of the two divisions, the cavalry brigade and the other troops then at the front or about to proceed there, “was as much as Canada should undertake” and that future efforts should be concentrated on the raising and training of reinforcements.

War Office anxiety as to supply of officer personnel—a matter of some concern in their own forces—led to representations being made against the inclusion of the McGill Overseas Company in a battalion which had recently been mobilized in Canada. The men comprising the company were held to be of a class eminently suitable to act as officers, such as might properly be included in an Officers’ Training Corps. The company was withdrawn from the 38th Battalion but was used as a reinforcing draft for the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, to which also five other companies recruited from students at various universities were despatched. The War Office recommendation for the formation of officers’ training companies was not acted upon on the ground that there was no difficulty in obtaining officers for the C.E.F., although contingents of the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps had been established at McGill and Laval Universities prior to the war. Medical students in the C.E.F. who had reached their final year at a university were, however, released from military service after 3rd September, 1915, so that they might complete their medical studies.

WAR EXPENDITURES AND BORROWINGS

By the time the 2nd Cdn. Div. arrived in France, Canadian war expenditure had passed the hundred million dollar mark. To meet this, money had been borrowed in London at the rate of £2,000,000 monthly. A domestic loan, floated
by Canada and guaranteed as to principal and interest by Britain, was suggested by the British Government in July, but rejected by Canada principally on the grounds that guaranteed securities were not regarded with favour in the United States and that the double security would reflect upon the credit of both the British and Canadian Governments; moreover, the Canadian Government was dubious as to money being available to any but a moderate amount—a doubt which subsequent events proved to be unjustified. However, before the end of the month the sum of $25,000,000 was raised in New York on one-year 5 per cent notes at par, and a further $15,000,000 on two-year 5 per cent notes at 99½, with certain optional conversion privileges for longer terms. This was the largest loan so far floated in the history of the Dominion, and its success gave satisfactory evidence of the country’s financial standing; it was not, however, a war loan, in that the money was intended to provide for capital expenditures upon civil undertakings then under construction.

Before the end of 1915 the Canadian Government issued a domestic war loan of $50,000,000 on its own guarantee. The result far exceeded all expectations, for more than twice the amount asked for was subscribed in the eight days before the lists were closed on 1st December, and the opportunity was taken to increase the loan to $100,000,000.

CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS

In the period covered by this volume, apart from first-hand knowledge, there were three chief sources of information about the war available to the Canadian citizen: the pronouncements of statesmen—usually guarded letters from soldiers overseas—all subject to censorship, and the press. Most of what has been recounted in the previous pages was therefore known only to those immediately concerned.

The pleas and admonitions issued to the Press in August, 1914, and the restrictions announced in September, November and December, were only moderately suc-
cessful in curtailing the spread of information about naval and military action which it was held essential not to disclose, and on more than one occasion the British Government drew attention to various statements published in Canadian papers which, if published in British newspapers, would have drawn severe penalties. But Canada’s proximity to a neutral country raised special difficulties; no restrictions could apply to the newspapers of the United States, which naturally published everything they could obtain of interest regardless of the possible effects upon whichever side, and in almost every instance of alleged leakage of information through the Canadian press it was found that the matter had previously appeared in United States newspapers. On 10th June, 1915, an Order in Council (P.C. 1330) was passed giving authority for the appointment of a Press censor, with a staff of assistants, possessed of complete powers to control all matter appearing in any Canadian publication; the same order under certain heads expressly forbade the publication of information calculated to be detrimental to the interests of the Allied Powers, and prescribed severe penalties for infringement.

In the United Kingdom, where a very strict press censorship had been in force since the beginning of the war, the publication of news about troops from the Dominions, subject to certain restrictions as to details, was encouraged, a policy which led indirectly to the complaint that the actions of Canadian and other Dominion troops received a prominence in the British press out of proportion to the space accorded to the more numerous body of British troops.

A YEAR OF WAR

In a year of war Canada had enlisted over 140,000 men for overseas service in the land forces, and by the end of August 84,032 had sailed from her shores. At that date 21,581 were in France and Belgium, 495 in the Mediterranean, and 46,195 in Great Britain, including 20,666 of the
### Employment of Canadian Formations

#### September 1914

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### October 1914

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### November 1914

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### December 1914

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### January 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### February 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### March 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### April 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### May 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### June 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### July 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### August 1915

- **19th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

#### September 1915

- **29th CDN.Div.**
  - Training Area Salisbury Plain
  - Southern Command

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**Note:**

On 8th May 1915, a dismounted detachment of 1,500 all ranks of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade joined 1st Canadian Division. On 4th September, 1st C.M.R. Brigade was attached to 2nd Canadian Division. On 13th September 1915, both became Canadian Corps Troops.

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**Reference**

- **Training**
- **Army Reserve**
- **Corps Reserve**

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*Times denote changes of dispositions or employment.*
2nd Canadian Division. The garrisons of St. Lucia and Bermuda numbered 1,103. In Canada there were under arms 61,777, including 12,912 militia on garrison duty. The Naval Service had also increased greatly in strength. Large numbers of horses and immense quantities of food and war material had been shipped to England, and plans were in hand for further increasing the supply. Yet this was only the beginning, and there were those who thought that more might have been done in the first twelve months, including the Prime Minister, who said, at the end of his visit to England:

Beyond question, great things have been accomplished during that period, although a close experience makes clear that even more might have been achieved if, in the beginning, we had thoroughly comprehended the magnitude of our task. The greatness of our cause and the momentous issues which hang in the balance imperatively command our earnest, united and highest effort. Granted that effort, victory is assured.
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