

**THE CANADIAN FORCES
IN THE GREAT WAR 1914 -1919**

NOTE

In the preparation of this appendix volume the historian has been given full access to relevant official documents in possession of the Department of National Defence; but inferences drawn and opinions expressed in the notes and monographs are those of the author himself, and the Department is in no way responsible either for them or for his selection or presentation of the material.

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OFFICIAL HISTORY

OF

THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE GREAT WAR 1914-1919

GENERAL SERIES VOL. I

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TO THE FORMATION OF THE CANADIAN CORPS
AUGUST 1914-SEPTEMBER 1915

CHRONOLOGY, APPENDICES AND MAPS

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COMPILATION

The material in this volume has been selected, or written, and arranged with a view to reinforcing and elaborating upon the text. It consists of a chronology, a collection of appendices, a list of abbreviations, and maps in a pocket at the end. The appendices include copies of original documents, references to authorities, and notes and monographs specially written to supplement and expand, and also to disburden, the text.

The original documents here reproduced in support of the text have been selected primarily to place on record the actual orders issued and the circumstances in which they were framed, but also to enable the reader to follow the course of events as presented to participants at the time, especially in battle. Cross-references in italics have been inserted to make it possible to trace interrelated series. The interpolation of some forty additional appendices in the numbered sequence is chiefly due to the discovery of new material after what was intended to be the final compilation had been set up in type.

The field messages preserved are sometimes the sender's copy, sometimes the addressee's. Frequently they are not complete as to times of writing and receipt. Wherever known, particulars of method of sending, and times, are shown, but the omission of these does not necessarily mean that the message was not delivered. Few of the many verbal communications, direct or by telephone, were recorded; these usually preceded or amplified the written messages, but occasionally modified them.

January, 1938.

A. F. D.

ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA
OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES
IN THE GREAT WAR 1914-19


THE MEDICAL SERVICES

- Page 18, line 19. For "letter" read "telegram".
- Page 34, last para, line 2. For "84 trains" read "90 trains".
- Page 41, line 16. After "St. John's" insert "*(sic* Halifax)".
- Page 96, last two lines. For "No. 8 was clearing the field" substitute "No. 8, with an advanced station at Neuville St. Vaast, was clearing the field".
- Page 97, lines 1 and 2. Delete "and an advanced station at Neuville St. Vaast".
- Page 101, lines 7 and 8. For "E. R. Selby" read "J. N. Gunn".
- Page 152, line 11 from bottom. For "November 1" read "October 31".
- Page 155, footnote 4. For "letter" read "cablegram".
- Page 216, line 9 from bottom. For "3-3-15" read "13-3-15".
- Page 217, line 4. After "London", insert "Ont."
- Page 217, line 12. For "19-9-15" read "19-11-15", and for "20-9-15" read "20-11-15".
- Page 222, line 2. For "No. 5 General Hospital" read "No. 15 General Hospital".
- Page 223, lines 8 and 9. For "Parentisen Born" read "Parentis-en-Born".
- Page 243, second para., last sentence. Delete and substitute "No. 1 General Hospital was installed May 31, 1915; No. 7 (late No. 5 Stationary) followed; then No. 9 Stationary completed the complement, but there were also many English hospitals in the area".
- Page 244, lines 9 to 12. Delete and substitute: "No. 1 General Hospital suffered most casualties. Forty-three of the personnel were killed and 51 wounded; six of the patients were killed and 33 wounded".
- Page 244, lines 6 and 5 from bottom. For "a sister" read "two sisters".
- Page 316, line 10. For "May" read "June".
- Page 332, lines 9 and 8 from bottom. For "Shaughnessy Convalescent Home and Vernon Convalescent Hospital, Vancouver"; read "Shaughnessy Convalescent Home, Vancouver; Vernon Convalescent Hospital, Vernon"; For "Columbia" read "Columbian".
- Page 419. For "Nasmith, Lt.-Col. G. S." read "Nasmith, Lt.-Col. G.G."

GENERAL SERIES, Vol. I.
(TEXT)

- Page 215, line 21. After "XXIV Corps" insert "*(sic* XXVI Reserve Corps)."
- Page 466, line 7. For "Capt. G. V. Curry" read "Capt. V. G. Curry".
- Page 532, line 18. For "*Royal George*" read "*Royal Edward*".
- Page 535, line 18. For "(A and B Batteries, each 6--13-pdrs.)" read "(A and B. Batteries, each 4—13-pdrs.)"

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
July			July
	29. Precautionary stage Defence Scheme ordered.		29.
	30. Special Meeting Militia Council. Tentative preparations for a first contingent of 20,000 or 25,000 men discussed.		30.
	31. All Districts called upon to make plans for raising troops for possible Expeditionary Force and to disregard mobilization scheme.		31.
Aug.			Aug.
	1. Britain given assurance that in the event of war Canada will make every sacrifice for the Empire. H.M.C.S. <i>Rainbow</i> made available for trade protection.		1.
	2. Proposal made to British Government to render aid in event of war by sending Canadian units overseas.	Hostilities commence on French frontier.	2.
	3. Banks authorized to pay in notes instead of gold.		3.
	4. H.M.C.S. <i>Niobe</i> and <i>Rainbow</i> placed at disposal of Admiralty. 8.45 p.m. Cable received that war had broken out with Germany.	German troops cross Belgian frontier and attack Liege.	4.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915*

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
July			July
23.		Austro-Hungarian Government send ultimatum to Serbia.	23.
24.		Belgian Govt. declare that in the event of war, Belgium will uphold her neutrality "whatever the consequences."	24.
25.		Serbian Government order mobilization. Austria-Hungary severs diplomatic relations with Serbia.	25.
26.	British Admiralty countermand orders for dispersal of Fleets.	Austro-Hungarian Government order partial mobilization against Serbia. Montenegrin Govt. order mobilization.	26.
27.	German High Seas Fleet recalled from Norway to war bases.		27.
28.	British Fleets ordered to war bases.	Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.	28.
29.	Hostilities commence between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Belgrade bombarded.	Russian Government order partial mobilization as against Austria. (Evening) Russian Minister for War orders general mobilization without knowledge of the Tsar. British Government reject German proposals for British neutrality.	29.
30.	Australian Government place Australian Navy at disposal of British Admiralty.	The Tsar signs order at 4 p.m. for mobilization of Russian Army.	30.
31.		Belgian Government order mobilization. Russian Govt, order general mobilization. Austro-Hungarian Government order general mobilization. German Govt. send ultimatum to Russia (presented at midnight 31st/1st).	31.
Aug.			Aug.
1.	British Government order naval mobilization. Hostilities commence on Polish frontier.	German Government order general mobilization and declare war on Russia. French Government order general mobilization.	1.
2.	British Government guarantee naval protection of French coasts against German aggression <i>by way</i> of the North Sea or English Channel.	German Government send ultimatum to Belgium Belgium demanding passage through Belgian territory.	2.
3.		Belgian Govt. refuse German demand. Germany declares war on France. British Govt. order general mobilization. Italy declares neutrality. British Government guarantee armed support to Belgium should Germany violate Belgian neutrality. Turkey signs secret treaty of alliance with Germany.	3.
4.		British Government send ultimatum to Germany.	4.

* Except for entries under "Canada and Canadian Forces" this Chronology chiefly contains a selection of items from "Principal Events 1914-1918" (London. H. M. Stationery Office, 1922).

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Aug.			Aug.
	<p>4. Message from H.M. the King." I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recalled to me the generous self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibilities which rest upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God. George R.I"</p> <p>Naval Volunteer Force placed on active service.</p> <p>H.R.H. the Governor General to H.M. the King—" Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and tradition of our Empire."</p>		
	<p>5. Proclamation calling special War Session of Parliament.</p> <p>Authority given to call out Militia to complete balance of 30 days' training.</p>		5.
	<p>6. Calling out of Active Militia as required for active service and mobilization of volunteers for overseas service authorized.</p>	"Battle of the Frontiers" begins in France.	6.
	<p>7. Two submarines purchased and placed at disposal of Admiralty.</p>	First units of the British Expeditionary Force land in France.	7.
	<p>10. Payment in gold of Dominion notes suspended.</p>		10.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Aug. 4.		The German Chancellor says that "just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." (As reported by British Ambassador at Berlin.) Great Britain declares war on Germany at 11 p.m. Germany declares war on Belgium. The Prime Minister of France states: "What is being attacked is the freedom of Europe of which France and her Allies are proud to be the defenders."	Aug. 4.
5.	German minelayer <i>Konigin Luise</i> sunk by gunfire off Yarmouth.	Montenegro declares war on Austria-Hungary.	5.
6.	Naval convention between France and Great Britain concluded in London. French Admiral to command Allied Naval forces in the Mediterranean.	Serbia declares war on Germany. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.	6.
8.	Hostilities commence in East Africa and in Togoland. H.M.S. <i>Amphion</i> sunk by mine off Yarmouth.	State of war commences between Montenegro and Germany. Portugal declares herself an Ally.	8.
11.	German warships <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> enter the Dardanelles.		11.
12.		Great Britain and France declare war on Austria-Hungary.	12.
13.	Austrian forces cross river Drina and begin first invasion of Serbia (ends 25th). Four squadrons Royal Flying Corps fly from Dover to France: first units to cross by air.		13.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Aug.			Aug.
14.		Battles of Morhange and Sarrebourg begin (end on 20th).	14.
16.		Landing of the original British Expeditionary Force (4 Divisions and 1 Cavalry Division) in France completed.	16.
17.	First Canadian Contingent authorized, to consist of one Infantry Division and Army troops; subsequently increased by one Cavalry Brigade and other units. This and all later contingents were equipped and maintained at the expense of Canada.		17.
18.	Special War Session of Parliament opened. "As to our duty, all are agreed; we stand shoulder to shoulder with Britain and the other British Dominions in this quarrel. And that duty we shall not fail to fulfil as the honour of Canada demands" (Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister).		18.
19.	Term of H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught as Governor General indefinitely extended during the continuance of the War.		19.
20.		Brussels occupied by German forces. (Re-occupied 19th Nov. 1918.)	20.
21.		German forces begin attack on Namur (captured 25th). Battle of Charleroi begins (ends 24th).	21.
22.	Special War Session of Parliament prorogued, having passed: (i) War Appropriation Act, 1914 authorizing payment of \$50,000,000 for war purposes: (ii) War Measures Act, 1914, authorizing (<i>inter alia</i>) making of regulations for security and welfare of Canada. (iii) Finance Act, 1914 confirming financial measures already taken and providing for moratorium. (iv) Canadian Patriotic Fund Act, 1914 to assist families of Canadians on active service.		22.
23.		Battle of Mons begins.	23.
24.		British Army begins retreat from Mons (ends 5th September).	24.
25.		Namur and Valenciennes captured by German forces. (The former reoccupied 21st November 1918, the latter recaptured 2nd November 1918.)	25.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Aug.		Aug.	
15.		Japanese Government send ultimatum to Germany demanding evacuation of Tsingtau.	15.
17.	Battle of the Tser and Jadar (Serbia) begins (ends 21st).	Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.	17.
19.	Battle of Gawaiten-Gumbinnen (E. Prussia), (19th/20th).		19.
20.			20.
21.		British Government issue orders for the raising of the first New Army of six divisions.	21.
22.		Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium. (Received by Belgian Government 28th).	22.
23.	Battle of Tannenberg (E. Prussia) begins (ends 31st).	Japan declares war on Germany.	23.
24.		First units of Indian Expeditionary Force leave India for France.	24.
25.	First use of aircraft for patrol purposes (over retreating British forces in France).	Japan declares state of war with Austria-Hungary.	25.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Aug. 26.		Battle of Le Cateau. Longwy capitulates to German forces. Louvain sacked, Noyon, Cambrai and Douai occupied by German forces. (Retaken 9th and 17th October, 1918.)	Aug. 26.
27.		British Marines land at Ostend accompanied by R.N.A.S. unit.	27.
29.		First Battle of Guise begins (ends 30th). Arras evacuated by the French forces. (Re-occupied 30th September).	29.
31.		Amiens entered by German forces (Re-occupied 13th September).	31.
Sept. 4.		Battle of the Grand Couronné (Nancy) begins (ends 12th).	Sept. 4.
5.		End of the retreat from Mons. Battle of the Ourcq begins. German forces reach Clays, 10 miles from Paris (nearest point during the war).	5.
6.		Battle of the Marne begins (ends 10th).	6.
8.	Shell Committee appointed by Minister of Militia. 32,449 all ranks on parade at Valcartier Camp on this date.		8.
9.	The Royal Canadian Regiment sails from Halifax under escort of H.M.C.S. <i>Niobe</i> , to relieve 2nd Bn. Lincolnshire Regiment on garrison duty, Bermuda.	German retreat from the Marne begins	9.
12.		Battle of the Aisne 1914 begins (ends 15 th).	12.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Aug.			Aug.
26.	First battle of Lemberg (Galicia) begins (ends 30th). Battle of Zamosc-Komarow (Russian Poland) begins (ends 2 nd September). German forces in Togoland capitulate to the Allied forces.		26.
28.	Naval action off Heligoland.		28.
30.	Samoa occupied by New Zealand Expeditionary Force.		30.
Sept.			Sept.
2.	Japanese forces land in Shantung to attack Tsingtau. (Capitulates 7th November).	French Government transferred from Paris to Bordeaux. (Re-transferred Bordeaux to Paris 18th November).	2.
3.	Lemberg (Galicia) captured by Russian forces.		3.
5.	Battle of the Masurian Lakes (E. Prussia) begins (ends 15th). German forces cross frontier of Northern Rhodesia.	British, French and Russian Governments sign the " Pact of London." (Decision not to make separate peace).	5.
8.	Austrian forces begin second invasion of Serbia (ends 15th December). Battle of the Drina (Serbia) begins (ends 17th). Second Battle of Lemberg (Galicia) begins (ends 11th).		8.
11.	Austrian forces in Galicia retreat (ends 3rd October). An Australian Expeditionary Force lands on the Bismarck Archipelago (German New Guinea)	British Government issue orders for the raising of the Second New Army of six divisions.	11.
13.		British Government issue orders for the raising of the Third New Army of six divisions.	13.
15.		Rebellion in South Africa begins.	15.
17.	German New Guinea and surrounding colonies capitulate to Australian Expeditionary Force.		17.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Sept.			Sept.
22.		First Battle of Picardy . begins (ends 26 th).	22.
23.	Embarkation of <i>C.E.F.</i> at Quebec begins.		23.
24.		Péronne taken by German forces. (Retaken 18th March 1917).	24.
26.		Bapaume occupied by the Germans. (Retaken 17th March 1917).	26.
27.		First battle of Artois begins (ends 12th October).	27.
Oct.			Oct.
1.	Colonel J. W. Carson "Agent of the Minister of Militia in the United Kingdom" establishes his office in London.		1.
3.	First Contingent (the entire C.E.F.) 30,621 strong, sails from Gaspas Bay, Colonel V. A. S. Williams in command.	Ypres occupied by German cavalry. (Re-occupied by Allied forces 13th). First units of Royal Naval Division arrive at Antwerp.	3.
4.		Lens and Bailleul occupied by German forces. (The latter re-occupied on 14th Oct. 1914; the former on 3rd Sept. 1918).	4.
5.	Newfoundland Contingent in se. <i>Florizel</i> joins Canadian Convoy off Cape Race.		5.
6.	Dominion Government offer to place and maintain in the field a second overseas contingent of 20,000 men. Minister of Militia and Defence leaves Ottawa for England.	Units of British 7th Division disembark at Ostend and Zeebrugge to cooperate with Belgian Army.	6.
8.	Loan negotiated with British Government for £7,000,000 for war expenditure.		8.
9.		Merville, Estaires, Armentières and Hazebrouck taken by German forces. (Re-occupied 11th, 10th, 17th and 10th respectively.)	9.
10.		Battle of La Bassée (ends 2nd Nov.) Antwerp capitulates to German forces.	10.
12.		Lille capitulates to German forces. Battle of Messines begins (ends 2 nd Nov.) Ostend, Zeebrugge and Ghent evacuated by Belgian forces.	12.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Sept.			Sept.
19.	Luderitzbucht (German S. W. Africa) occupied by South African forces.	British and French Governments guarantee to Belgium the integrity of her colonies.	19.
22.	H.M.S. <i>Aboukir</i> , <i>Hogue</i> and <i>Cressy</i> sunk by German submarine U. 9. First British Air Raid on Germany. Dusseldorf and Cologne airship sheds attacked. First use of wireless telegraphy from aeroplane to artillery. (By British Royal Flying Corps).		22.
24.	Przemysl isolated by Russian forces. First siege begins (Relieved by Austrians 9th October).		24.
Oct.			Oct.
4.	Austro-Hungarian counter-offensive in Galicia begins.		4.
7.		Belgian Government transferred from Antwerp to Ostend.	7.
9.	First German offensive against Warsaw (Poland). Battles of Warsaw and Ivangorod begin (end 19th and 20th).		9.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Oct.			Oct.
13.		Battle of Armentières begins (ends 2 nd Nov.)	13.
14.	First Contingent, diverted from Southampton, arrives at Plymouth. Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson assumes command. Minister of Militia arrives in England.	British Divisions now on Western Front: 3 Cavalry and 10 Infantry (including one R.N. and two Indian) holding 20 miles of line.	14.
15.		Ostend and Zeebrugge occupied by German forces. (Retaken 17 th and 19 th Oct. 1918)	15.
16.	Headquarters, First Contingent, established at "The Bustard," Salisbury Plain.	Battle of the Yser begins (ends 10 th Nov.).	16.
17.	Loan from British Government increased to £12,000,000. (See 8th Oct.)		17.
19.		Battles of Ypres 1914 begin (end 22 nd Nov.). First Indian units reach the Flanders front.	19.
21.		Battle of Langemarck, 1914 (Ypres) begins (ends 24 th).	21.
24.	Field Marshal Lord Roberts inspects First Contingent on Salisbury Plain.		24.
29.		Battle of Gheluvelt (Ypres) begins (ends 31 st).	29.
31.		British casualties to date on Western front, killed, died, wounded and prisoners, total 59,790.	31.
Nov.			Nov.
1.	First battle casualties in the Canadian Forces: four midshipmen R.C.N. lost in Battle of Coronel.	Messines taken by German forces (Recaptured 7 th June 1917).	1.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Oct.			Oct.
13.	Battle of Chyrow (Galicia) begins (ends 2nd Nov.). First appearance of a German submarine on the Southampton-Havre troop transport route reported.	Belgian Government set up at Havre.	13.
16.		New Zealand Expeditionary Force leaves New Zealand for France. (Arrives Suez 1st December).	16.
17.		First units of Australian Imperial Force embark. (Arrive Suez 1st December).	17.
18.	First bombardment of Ostend by British warships.		18.
20.	First merchant vessel (British) ss. <i>Glitra</i> sunk by German submarine.		20.
22.		United States Government issues circular note to belligerent Governments stating that they will insist on existing rules of International Law.	22.
27.	H.M.S. <i>Audacious</i> sunk by mine off the coast of Donegal.		27.
29.	Turkey commences hostilities against Russia.		29.
30.	Serbian forces begin retreat from the line of the Drina. Allied Governments present ultimatum to Turkey.		30.
Nov.			Nov.
1.	Great Britain and Turkey commence hostilities. Naval action off Coronel. H.M.S. <i>Good Hope</i> and <i>Monmouth</i> sunk by Admiral von Spee's squadron.		1.
2.	British force begins attack on Tanga (German E. Africa). British force repulsed 5th.	State of War commences between Serbia and Turkey. Russia declares war on Turkey. British Admiralty declare the North Sea a military zone.	2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Nov.			Nov.
4.	T.M. The King and Queen, accompanied by Lord Kitchener, inspect First Contingent.		4.
6.	Major-General Sir William Otter appointed O.C. Internment Operations.		6.
7.	Mobilization of 30,000 additional overseas troops, including Second Contingent ordered.		7.
8.	No. 2 Canadian Stationary Hospital arrives Boulogne from Salisbury Plain: the first Canadian unit in France.		8.
9.	Minister of Militia and Defence returns to Ottawa from England.		9.
11.		Battle of Nonne Boschen (Ypres).	11.
16.	P.P.C.L.I. moves from Bustard Camp to join 27th (British) Division at Winchester.		16.
17.	Reorganization of the nine 6-gun field batteries of the Divisional Artillery into twelve 4-gun batteries ordered.		17.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Nov.			Nov.
3.	Allied squadrons bombard forts at entrance of Dardanelles. First German naval raid on British coast near Gorleston and Yarmouth.		3.
4.	German light cruiser <i>Karlsruhe</i> sunk in the Atlantic, by internal explosion.		
5.		Great Britain and France formally declare war on Turkey. Great Britain annexes Cyprus. Belgian Government reject Papal mediation.	5.
6.	Advance troops of Indian Expeditionary Force effect landing in Mesopotamia.		6.
9.	German cruiser <i>Emden</i> destroyed by H.M.A.S. <i>Sydney</i> at Cocos Island.	The British Prime Minister declares: "We shall never sheathe the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed."	9.
10.	Przemysl again isolated by Russian forces. Second siege begins. Capitulates 22nd March 1915.		10.
15.	Battle of Cracow (Galicia) begins (ends 2nd Dec.)		15.
16.	Second German offensive against Warsaw. Battle of Lodz begins (ends 15th Dec.).		16.
22.	Basra (Mesopotamia) occupied by British forces.		22.
26.	H.M.S. <i>Bulwark</i> destroyed by internal explosion in Sheerness Harbour.		26.
30.	Battle of Lowicz-Sanniki (Russian Poland) begins (ends 17th Dec.) Belgrade evacuated by Serbian forces. (Occupied by Austrians 2nd Dec.).		30.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1914	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1914
Dec.			Dec.
7.	Temporary loan of £2,000,000 arranged through Bank of Montreal.		7.
14.		December fighting in Flanders begins (ends 20th).	14.
20.	The Newfoundland Regiment leaves the Contingent for Fort George, Scotland.	First Battle of Champagne begins (ends 17th March). British defence of Givenchy, 1914. (20th/21st).	20.
21.	P.P.C.L.I. lands Le Havre : the first Canadian combatant unit in France.		21.
26.	11,133 of First Contingent still under canvas on Salisbury Plain; remaining 19,204 in huts and billets.		26.
1915.			1915
Jan.			Jan.
3.	By Proclamation, observed as a day of Humble Prayer and Intercession.		3.
8.		Battle of Soissons begins (ends 14th) .	8.
15.	Colonel J. W. Carson appointed agent of the Minister of Militia in England for maintenance of supplies for C. E. F.		15.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1914	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1914
Dec.			Dec.
1.	Battle of Limanova-Lapanow (Galicia) begins (ends 17th Dec.).	General de Wet, the leader of the South African rebellion, captured.	1.
3.	Battle of the Kolubara (Serbia) begins (ends 6th).	British Government agree to Japanese request that Australia should not occupy German islands north of the equator.	3.
5.		Serbian Government declare that Serbia will never make peace without allied consent.	5.
8.	Battle of the Falklands. Admiral von Spee's squadron destroyed. <i>Scharnhorst</i> , <i>Gneisenau</i> , <i>Leipzig</i> and <i>Nurn-berg</i> sunk. <i>Dresden</i> escapes.		8.
13.	Turkish battleship <i>Messudiyeh</i> sunk by British submarine <i>B. 11.</i> in the Dardanelles.		13.
16.	Scarborough and Hartlepool bombarded by German battle cruiser squadron.		16.
17.	Turkish offensive in Caucasus begins.		17.
18.		British protectorate over Egypt proclaimed.	18.
21.	First German air raid on England.		21.
28.		End of organized rebellion in South Africa.	28.
29.	Battle of Sarikamish (Caucasus) begins (ends 2nd Jan. 1915).		29.
1915			1915
Jan.			Jan.
1.	H.M.S. <i>Formidable</i> sunk by submarine in the English Channel.		1.
11.	Last rebels in the Transvaal captured.		11.
13.		British War Council resolve that the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February against the Dardanelles.	13.
14.	Swakopmund (German S.W. Africa) occupied.		14.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
Jan.			Jan.
18.	Infantry battalions converted from 8 companies to 4 double companies. Canadian Training Depot established at Tidworth.		18.
20.	Selection made of units and personnel of the First Canadian Contingent to form 1st Canadian Division.		20.
25.		First Action of Givenchy.	25.
30.	Canadian Cavalry Brigade formed to consist of R.C.D., L.S.H., 2nd King Edward's Horse and R.C.H.A. Bde. Brig. General J. E. B. Seely to command.		30.
Feb.			Feb.
4.	H.M. The King, accompanied by Lord Kitchener, inspects 1st Canadian Division on Salisbury Plain. Parliament opens. (Prorogued 15th April 1915).		4.
7.	Movement of 1st Canadian Division by rail to Avonmouth for embarkation to France begins.		7.
12.	H.Q., 1st Canadian Division lands at St. Nazaire.		12.
15.	Disembarkation 1st Canadian Division at St. Nazaire completed. Division under III Corps, Second Army, H.Q. at Pradelles.	British Army holds 25 miles of line on Western front. Strength: 5 Cav. Divs. (including 2 Indian) and 13 Inf. Divs. (including 1 Cdn. and 2 Indian).	15.
20.	Inspection of 1st Canadian Division by the C-in-C., F.M. Sir John French. Feb. to 2nd March. Detachments from 1st Canadian Division under instruction in line near Armentières.		20.
22.	First unit of Canadian Railway Troops authorized.		22.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
Jan.			Jan.
19.	First Zeppelin raid on England.		19.
24.	Action of the Dogger Bank. German cruiser <i>Blucher</i> sunk.		24.
28.		British Government definitely decide to make naval attack on the Dardanelles.	28.
30.		British Admiralty warn British vessels to fly neutral or no ensigns in vicinity of British Isles.	30.
Feb.			Feb.
3.	Turkish attack on the Suez Canal begins (ends 4th).		3.
4.	The winter battle in Masuria (East Prussia) begins (ends 22nd).		4.
5.		British, French and Russian Governments agree to pool their financial resources.	5.
11.		United States Government send Note to British Government deprecating use of neutral flag.	11.
12.	1 British, 2 Anzac and 2 Indian Infantry Divisions now in Egypt. 1 Indian Infantry Division now in Mesopotamia.		12.
16.	British Government decide to send a division (the 29th) to the Dardanelles.		16.
18.	German submarine blockade of Great Britain begins.		18.
19.	Allied naval attack on the Dardanelles Forts commences.		19.
20.	Orders issued for employment at the Dardanelles of the Australian and New Zealand troops in Egypt.		20.
22.	First Battle of Przasnysz begins (ends 27th). Jan. 19. 24.		22.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
Feb.			Feb.
24.		The first British Territorial Division (the North Midland) leaves England for France.	24.
26.		Liquid fire first used by Germans on the Western front.	26.
28.		British casualties to date on Western front, killed, died, wounded and prisoners, total 111,391.	28.
March			March
3.	1 st Canadian Division under IV Corps, First Army, takes over Fleurbaix sector. H.Q. at Sully-sur-la-Lys.		3.
9.	£500,000 4 per cent Dominion stock sold at 95¼.		9.
10.	Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 1st Canadian Division co-operates on the flank by a fire attack during the first assault.	Battle of Neuve Chapelle begins (ends 13 th).	10.
11.	Canadian Training Division established at Shorncliffe. Brig.-General J. C. MacDougall in command.		11.
26.	No. 6 Company R.C.G.A. sails from Halifax to man batteries at St. Lucia, B.W.I.		26.
27.	1 st Canadian Division withdrawn into Reserve. H.Q. at Estaires.		27.
April			April
7.	1 st Canadian Division transferred to Second Army and proceeds by march route to area between Cassel and Poperinghe. H.Q. at Oxelaere.		7.
8.	Special War Revenue Act, 1915, assented to.		8.
12.	1 st Canadian Division comes under orders of V. Corps.		12.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
Feb.			Feb.
March			March
1.		Joint declaration signed by Britain and France to prevent trade by or with Germany.	1.
5.	Bombardment of Smyrna by British squadron begins (ends 9th).		5.
14.	Light cruiser <i>Dresden</i> , the last German cruiser left at sea, sunk by British warships off Juan Fernandez.		14.
18.	Second Allied naval attack on the Dardanelles repulsed. Battleships <i>Bouvet (Fr.)</i> and H.M.S. <i>Ocean</i> and <i>Irresistible</i> sunk.		18.
28.	The first passenger ship British SS. <i>Falaba</i> sunk by a German submarine.		28.
April.			April
8.	German armed merchant cruiser <i>Prinz Eitel Friedrich</i> interned at Newport News, U.S.A.	Deportations and massacres of the Armenians by order of the Turkish Government commence.	8.
12.	Battle of Shaiba (Mesopotamia) begins (ends 14th). First advance on Yaunde (Cameroon), begins (ends 28th June).		12.
14.		Germans accuse French of using poison gas near Verdun. British Secretary for the Colonies states that the Dominions will be consulted as to peace terms. Japanese Government informs British Government of German overtures for a separate peace.	14.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
April			April
15.	Criminal Code Amendment Act, 1915, relating to alien enemies and military stores assented to. Act to enable Canadian soldiers on active service to exercise electoral franchise, 1915, assented to.		15.
16.	War Appropriation Act, 1915, assented to. Authorizes payment of \$100,000,000 for war purposes.		16.
17.	1 st Canadian Division takes over line in northern face of Ypres salient. H.Q. near Brielen.	Fighting at Hill 60 begins (ends 22nd).	17.
20.		British Divisions now on Western front: 5 Cavalry (including two Indian) and 18 Infantry (including one Canadian and two Indian), holding 36 miles of line.	20.
22.	Battles of Ypres, 1915, begin.	Battles of Ypres, 1915, begin (end 25th May). The Gas Attack.	22.
22-23.	Battle of Gravenstafel Ridge: first gas attack, German.	Battle of Gravenstafel Ridge (Ypres). (ends 23rd).	
24-30.	Battle of St. Julien.	Battle of St. Julien. (Ypres) begins (ends 4th May).	24-30.
29.	P.C. Order provides pensions for officers and men disabled on active service.		29.
May			May
1-4.	Battle of St. Julien (continued).		1.
4.	1 st Canadian Division (less 2 F.A. Bdes.) withdrawn to G.H.Q. Reserve in area between Merris, Bailleul and Nieppe. H.Q. Nieppe.		4.
8.	Dismounted detachment Cdn. Cav. Bde., 1,500 strong, joins 1st Canadian Division. Appointment of War Purchasing Commission. To make all purchases of war supplies of every kind.	Battle of Frezenberg Ridge (Ypres) begins (ends 13th May).	8.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
April			April
20.	1 British, 1 R.N. and 2 Anzac Infantry Divisions now at the Dardanelles. (Mudros). 1 British and 2 Indian Infantry Divisions now in Egypt. 2 Indian Infantry Divisions now in Mesopotamia.	Armenian revolt begins at Van.	20.
25.	Allied forces effect landing at the Dardanelles. (25th/26th).		25.
26.	The last German raider overseas, <i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i> , interned at Newport News, USA,	Secret agreement signed in London between Italian Government and the Entente for Italian co-operation in the war and declaration by which Italy adheres to the Pact of London.	26.
28.	First battle of Krithia (Dardanelles).		28.
May			May
1.	Austro-German spring offensive in Galicia: Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow begins (ends 5th).		1.
4.		Italy denounces the Triple Alliance.	4.
6.	Second Battle of Krithia begins (ends 8th).		6.
7.	SS. <i>Lusitania</i> sunk by German submarine, <i>U. 20</i> , off Queenstown.		7.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
May			May
8.	Department of Trade and Commerce and Department of Agriculture to purchase in Canada, wheat, oats, flour and hay for the British and Allied Governments.		
8-13.	Battle of Frezenberg Ridge. 1st Cdn. Div. Artillery and P.P.C.L.I. participated.		8-13.
9.		Allied spring offensive begins: Battle of Aubers Ridge. Second Battle of Artois begins (ends 18th June). The leading division of the British New Armies leaves England for France.	9.
11.		French take fort and chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette.	11.
12.		French capture Carency.	12.
14.	Canadian Field Artillery withdrawn from Ypres front.		14.
15.	1 st Canadian Division marches to area N.W. of Bethune. H.Q., Bushes. At disposal of First Army. 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade H.Q. disembarked Devonport and proceed to West Sandling.	Battle of Festubert begins (ends 25th).	15.
17-25.	Battle of Festubert. (Up to 19th, 3rd C.I. Bde. only).		17.
19.	1 st Canadian Division takes over Festubert sector, as part of Alderson's Force. H.Q. Locon.		19.
22.	1 st Canadian Division transferred in line to I Corps.		22.
23.	1 st Canadian Division Headquarters at Halts, 5,000 ^x W. of Festubert.		23.
24.		Battle of Bellewaarde Ridge. (Ypres). (24th/25th).	24.
25.	2nd Canadian Division formed in England. Major-General Sam Steele takes command.		25.
28.	8th Canadian Infantry Brigade disembarks Devonport and proceeds to Shorncliffe.		28.
31.	1 st Canadian Division transferred in line to IV Corps.	French take Souchez Refinery and advance in "the Labyrinth."	31.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915 Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events 1915
May	May
10. <i>H.M.S. Goliath</i> sunk by Turkish destroyer in the Dardanelles.	10.
13. Windhoek (German S.W. Africa), occupied.	13.
19-21. Defence of Anzac, Dardanelles.	19.
21. Russian Expeditionary Force to West Persia lands at Enzeli.	21.
23.	23.
24. Battle of Przemysl begins (ends 11th June).	24.
25. Italian forces cross Austrian frontier (midnight 24th/25th). <i>H.M.S. Triumph</i> sunk by submarine off the Dardanelles.	25.
27. British squadron joins Italian fleet in the Adriatic. <i>H.M.S. Majestic</i> sunk by submarine off the Dardanelles.	27.
31. Second Action of Qurna (Mesopotamia): advance up the Tigris begins (ends 5th October).	31.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
June			June
1.	1 st Canadian Division sideslips to occupy Givenchy sector. H.Q., Vendin-lezBethune.		1.
2.	Commission of Inquiry into war purchases appointed.	Germans capture Hooge Chateau.	2.
6.		French action near Quennevières begins (ends 18th).	6.
7.		French action near Hebuterne begins (ends 1ath).	7.
8.		French hold all Neuville St. Vaast and make progress in "the Labyrinth."	8.
13.	1 st Canadian Division re-armed with Short Magazine Lee-Enfield. Ross rifle discarded.		13.
15.	Army Council suggests that the two Canadian divisions be formed into an Army Corps.	Second Action of Givenchy begins (ends 18 th)	15.
15-16.	Second Action of Givenchy.		
16.		First attack on Bellewaarde.	16.
20.		German attacks in the Argonne begin (end 24th July).	20.
21.	1 st C.M.M.G. Brigade from England attached to 1st Canadian Division.		21.
23.		French Armies organized into three groups.	23.
24.	1 st Cdn. Div. withdrawn into First Army Reserve. Army Council suggests the raising of a third division.		24.
28.	1 st Cdn. Div. under III Corps, Second Army, takes over frontage opposite Messines. H.Q., Nieppe.		28.
30.	Hospital Commission appointed for the care of the sick and wounded in Canada. Prime Minister sails for England for personal conference with British Government.		30.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915 Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
June		June
3. Przemyśl retaken by Austro-German forces. Amara (Mesopotamia) captured.	First meeting of Allied Conference on economic war (in Paris).	3.
4. Third Battle of Krithia. (Dardanelles).		4.
5.	First Conference of British and French Ministers to co-ordinate war policy and strategy, held at Calais.	5.
7. German Zeppelin destroyed in mid-air near Ghent: the first successfully attacked by aeroplane.	First meeting of the Dardanelles Committee of the Cabinet.	7.
9.	Ministry of Munitions Act (British) passed.	9.
10. Garua (Cameroons) capitulates.		10.
17. Third Battle of Lemberg begins (ends 22nd).		17.
19. Advance on Otavifontein (German S.W. Africa) begins. (Captured by South African forces 1st July).		19.
22. Lemberg retaken by Austrian forces.		22.
27. British advance up the Euphrates begins.		27.
28. Action of Gully Ravine (Dardanelles).		28.
29. First battle of the Isonzo begins (ends 7th July).		29.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
July			July
	1. Minister of Militia and Defence leaves Ottawa for overseas.		1.
	8. Further mobilization of overseas forces authorized: not to exceed 150,000, including those already raised and garrisons and guards in Canada.		8.
	15. 1 st Cdn. Div. transferred in line to II Corps.		15.
	16. H.M.C.S. <i>Niobe</i> and <i>Rainbow</i> to be maintained at the expense of the Canadian Government.		16.
	17. 2 nd Cdn. Div. reviewed at Beachborough Park, Kent, by the Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of Militia and Defence.		17.
	19.	First Action of Hooge.	19.
	20. R.C.H.A. Bde. arrives France from England. Employed as GHQ. Troops until 8th Sept.		20.
	20-27. Prime Minister visiting Canadian troops in France.		
	30.	Second Action of Hooge: Germans attack with liquid fire.	30.
Aug.			Aug.
	4. Review of 2nd Canadian Division at Shorncliffe by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Minister of Militia and Defence.		4.
	5-14. Minister of Militia and Defence in France.		
	9.	Third Action of Hooge.	9.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
July			July
2.		Ministry of Munitions formed in Great Britain.	2.
7.		First inter-allied military conference at Chantilly.	7.
9.	German S.W. Africa capitulates to General Botha.		9.
11.	German light cruiser <i>Konigsberg</i> destroyed in Rufiji River by British monitors.		11.
13.	Great Austro-German offensive on Eastern front begins.		13.
14.		A Dominion Premier (Sir Robert Borden, Canada) for the first time attends meeting of the British Cabinet.	14.
15.		National Registration Act (British) becomes law.	15.
17.		Treaty of Alliance signed between Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey.	17.
18.	Second Battle of the Isonzo begins (ends 10th Aug.).		18.
21.	Ivangorod (Russian Poland) invested.		21.
25.		British Government guarantees cession of Mitylene to Greece.	25.
30.		The Pope sends appeal for peace to belligerent Governments.	30.
Aug.			Aug.
5.	Warsaw occupied by German forces.		5.
6.	The landing at Suvla (Dardanelles) begins (ends 15th). Battle of Sari Bair (Dardanelles) begins (ends 10th).		6.
8.	Turkish battleship <i>Barbarousse-Haired-dine</i> sunk by British submarine, <i>E. 11</i> .		8.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
Aug.			Aug.
12.	Br.-Gen. R. E. W. Turner, V.C., recalled from 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde. to take over command of 2nd Cdn. Div. in England.		12.
14.	No. 5 Cdn. Stationary Hospital arrives Cairo.		14.
16.	No. 1 Cdn. Stationary Hospital arrives Lemnos.		16.
17.	No. 3 Cdn. Stationary Hospital arrives Lemnos.		17.
31.	Canadian troops in France 21,581; in England 46,195; in Canada 61,777.		31.
Sept			Sept.
2.	H.M. The King, accompanied by Lord Kitchener, inspects 2nd Cdn. Div. at Beachborough Park, Shorncliffe.		2.
3.	Prime Minister and Minister of Militia and Defence arrive Ottawa from England.		3.
9.	R.C.H.A. Bde. joins Canadian Cavalry Brigade under 1st Cdn. Div.		9.
13.	Cdn. Corps formed, consisting of 1st and 2nd Cdn. Divisions and Corps Troops, including Cdn. Cav. Bde. Corps H.Q. at Bailleul. Lieut-General E. A. H. Alderson, Corps Commander, MajorGeneral A. W. Currie commanding 1st Cdn. Div.		13.
14-17	Movement of 2nd Cdn. Div. to France (Folkestone-Boulogne).		14-17.
15.	H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Div. disembarks at Boulogne and moves to Caestre.	Lord Kitchener announces 11 New Army Divisions sent to France.	15.
17-27	3 rd Bde., C.F.A., detached to 8th (British) Div. for action of Bois Grenier.		17-27.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
Aug.			Aug.
12.	First ship sunk by torpedo from British seaplane.		12.
13.	H.M.T. <i>Royal Edward</i> sunk in Aegean by German submarine. Loss of 865 <i>officers</i> and men, and 132 crew.		
15.		National Register taken in Great Britain.	15.
17.	Kowno stormed by German forces.		17.
21.	Battle of Scimitar Hill (Dardanelles).	Italy declares war on Turkey.	21.
25.	Brest-Litovsk (Russian Poland) captured by the Germans.		25.
30.		Offer made to Serbia that the Allies would guarantee the eventual freedom and self-determination of Bosnia, Herzegovina, South Dalmatia, Slavonia and Croatia.	30.
Sept.			Sept.
3.	Grodno (Russia) captured by the Germans.		3.
7.	Russian counter-attack in Galicia: Battle of Tarnopol begins (ends 16th).		7.
9.	Battle of Dvinsk (Russia) begins (ends 1st Nov.) Battle of Vilna (Russia) begins (ends 2nd Oct.).	U.S.A. requests recall of Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.	9.
11.		Calais Conference re sending troops to Salonika.	11.
18.	Vilna (Russia) taken by German forces.		18.
21.		Greek Premier asks for guarantee of 150,000 British and French troops as condition of Greek intervention.	21.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR

1915	Canada and Canadian Forces	Western Front	1915
Sept.			Sept.
23.	2 nd Cdn. Div. takes over sector in front of Kemmel. H.Q., Westoutre.		23.
25.		Allied Autumn offensive begins:— Battle of Loos begins (ends 8th Oct.). Actions of Piètre and Bois Grenier and second attack on Bellewaarde. Third Battle of Artois begins (ends 15 th Oct.). Second Battle of Champagne begins (ends 6th Nov.). British Divisions now on Western front: 5 Cavalry (including two Indian) and 36 Infantry (including two Canadian and two Indian), holding 70 miles of line.	25.
28.		The French attack reaches La Folie Wood and Hill 145, the highest point of Vimy Ridge; line subsequently withdrawn.	28.
30.		British casualties to date on Western front: killed, died, wounded and prisoners, total 331,262, of which 11,779 Canadian.	30.

23RD JULY, 1914, TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

1915	Other Fronts and Naval and Air	General Events	1915
Sept.			Sept.
22.	Second advance on Yaunde (Cameroons) begins (ends 31st Dec.).	Dede Agatch Agreement concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria rectifying Turkey's frontier in favour of Bulgaria. Bulgarian Government order general mobilization for 25th.	22.
24.		French and British Governments agree to Greek request of the 21st.	24.
25.	1 British Mounted Division (dismounted) 8 British, 1 R.N. and 3 Anzac Infantry Divisions now at the Dardanelles. 2 Indian Infantry Divisions now in Egypt. 2 Indian Infantry Divisions now in Mesopotamia. 3 British and 6 Indian Infantry Divisions now garrisoning India.		25.
27.		King Constantine consents to proposed Entente expedition to Salonika.	27.
28.	Battle of Kut (Mesopotamia).	Greek Government formally refuse guarantee of the 24th.	28.
30.		Lord Derby assumes control of British recruiting.	30.

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APPENDICES

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OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE GREAT WAR
1914-1919

VOLUME I
1914-1915

APPENDICES

1

See also Chronology of the Great War, 23rd July, 1914 to 30th September, 1915 at front of this volume.

2

NOTE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE
SCHEMES AND WAR BOOK

In 1908, Major-General Sir William Otter, then a Brigadier-General and Chief of the General Staff, recommended the constitution of an Interdepartmental Committee on the lines of that which had already been established with the best results, by the Admiralty and War Office, for the purpose of dealing with questions of common interest to the Department of Marine and Fisheries and the Department of Militia and Defence. Such questions, it was explained, would relate to the presence of armed vessels on the lakes, water transport, the regulation of traffic of defended ports, methods of communicating with His Majesty's Ships, war signal stations, vessels and anchorages employed in the examination service, harbour lights, the obstruction of channels, the defence of dock gates, the construction of dolphins and booms, floating defences, naval and hydrographical intelligence, wireless telegraphy and so forth. This committee, enlarged by the addition of a naval member when the Naval Department was constituted, met on many occasions between 1908 and 1914 and considered defensive measures as enumerated.

The horizon was, however, widened to embrace civil defensive action when, on 28th July 1912, Lieutenant R. M. Stephens, R.N., of the naval staff at Ottawa, brought to the attention of Lieutenant-Colonel G. Paley, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, the necessity for providing a plan for co-ordination of action between the several

departments of the Government in case of war and suggested a more comprehensive interdepartmental committee. A memorandum was prepared by the Chief of the General Staff some months later, and submitted to the Hon. the Minister of Militia and Defence.

Action had not been taken on the General Staff memorandum when, in February 1913, the Secretary of State for the Colonies forwarded to Ottawa the promised secret memorandum of the Overseas Defence Committee (a branch of the Committee of Imperial Defence) reporting that there had recently been compiled for the United Kingdom a "War Book" showing the precise steps to be taken in time of emergency by each Department of State. It was strongly recommended that similar action be taken in the Dominions and in India " in order that the Dominion or Indian Government may have before them a clear and convenient record of the action to be taken in time of emergency by every official at the seat of Government".

According to the same memorandum: "The detailed action to be taken by the naval and military authorities when relations are strained, or on the outbreak of war, is laid down in the existing Overseas Defence Schemes". Thus the War Book was intended to cover only measures which were not strictly military; such essentially military steps as the manning of defence works, or the protection of canals, locks and bridges, had been provided for under the local defence schemes, and fell within the duties assigned to District Officers Commanding.

No definite step was immediately taken to carry out the proposals thus put forward; one reason for delay was the battle in the House of Commons during the session of 1912-13 over the Naval Aid Bill, in which were embodied the proposals of the Government to assist in the naval defence of the Empire.

(See H. of C. Debates, 5th Dec. 1912 to 5th May 1913 and Senate Debates 20th-29th May 1913). Late in 1913 the Duke of Connaught became interested, and on 12th January 1914, by direction of the Prime Minister, the first meeting of an Inter-Departmental Conference took place to which the following were summoned:

Sir Joseph Pope, Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Chairman,
The Governor General's Secretary,
The Deputy Minister, Militia and Defence,
The Deputy Minister of Justice (represented by the
Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police),
The Deputy Minister of the Naval Service,
The Commissioner of Customs,
The a/Deputy Minister, Marine and Fisheries,
The Deputy Postmaster General,
The Deputy Minister of Railways and Canals,

with Major Gordon-Hall, Yorkshire Light Infantry, Director of Military Operations (representing the Department of Militia and Defence), and Lieutenant R. M. Stephens, R.N., Director of Gunnery (representing the Department of the Naval Service), as Joint Secretaries.

According to the report of the Chairman of the Conference:—

At this meeting it was decided that the secretaries should acquaint each member of the conference of the various contingencies which might arise in the event of which the co-operation of his department would be required; thus enabling him to decide what steps would be necessary to give effect to the decisions of the conference, and to detail an officer of his department to confer with the secretaries in the actual compilation of the War Book.

Meetings of sub-committees were subsequently held from time to time at which the necessary action to be taken by the various departments in the event of certain contingencies arising was carefully considered and determined. Each Department then proceeded to develop its own line of action in detail, the whole being subsequently co-ordinated and incorporated in one scheme, indicating the course to be followed by the Government as a whole on an emergency arising. This scheme was then submitted to and approved by the Prime Minister.

Provision was made for action to be taken in the "Precautionary Stage", when relations with any Power or Powers had become so strained that it was deemed necessary to adopt measures against possible surprise attack, and for the further measures to be

taken immediately war was declared. The division of responsibility between the different Departments was defined and the precise steps to be taken by each responsible official determined. Proclamations, Orders in Council, warrants and telegrams were prepared in advance, ready for signature; blanks were left for the name or names of the Power or Powers against which the protective measures were to be taken.

Among the measures thus provided for were:—

- Enforcement of examination service at the various ports, in respect to all incoming vessels.
- Detention of enemy shipping.
- Examination of outward bound shipping to prevent export of contraband of war.
- Control of all, and closing of certain, wireless stations.
- Enforcement of censorship on wireless and cable messages.

The unavoidable delay in commencing the preparation of the War Book was compensated for by the energy with which the Inter-Departmental Conference worked after its establishment on 12th January, 1914. Without exact foreknowledge of the conflict so soon to come, the Conference pushed forward with all speed, and in less than six months the War Book—a work of no little magnitude—was completed just in time: it happened that the message announcing that the precautionary stage should be adopted was received as the representatives were assembling for the final meeting.

The Prime Minister expressed in the House of Commons his appreciation of the work of the Commission:—

I cannot overestimate the great advantage which resulted to the Government from having these matters considered, determined and arranged in advance in conjunction with the Imperial Government. The arrangements which were instantly necessary, and to which I shall allude more in detail in a moment, were made without the slightest confusion. All communications from the Imperial authorities were acted upon promptly and with, as I say, an entire absence of confusion. Every detail had been previously worked out with precision, and I am informed by the chairman of the conference that specially are the thanks of the people of this country due to Major Gordon-Hall and Mr. Stephens upon whom a very large part of the work in making these arrangements necessarily devolved. (*Debates House of Commons, Special Session 1914, p. 17, 19th August.*)

3

*From the Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs to the Department of Militia
and Defence*

Secret and Immediate.

OTTAWA, 29th July, 1914.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that His Royal Highness the Governor General has received this afternoon the following secret cypher telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

"See Preface Defence Scheme. Adopt precautionary stage. Names of Powers will be communicated later if necessary."

The meaning of this *warning* telegram is that relations with (the powers whose names are to be communicated later if necessary) have become so strained that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is expedient to adopt such precautions against possible surprise attack and such limited preparations in anticipation of war as are laid down for the precautionary stage of defence schemes.

I have, etc.,

JOSEPH POPE,

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
The Deputy Minister,

Department of Militia and Defence,
Ottawa.

(Similar letters to Deputy Minister Naval Service; Deputy Minister Marine and Fisheries; the Clerk of the Privy Council; the Hon. J. D. Hazen (Minister of the Naval Service); the Commissioner of Customs; the Commissioner of Dominion Police.)

4

NOTE ON THE *KOMAGATA MARU*

The arrival at Victoria, B.C., on 21st May 1914 of the Japanese steamship *Komagata Maru*, with 400 Hindu immigrants on board, led to court proceedings to interpret regulations governing entrance. Landing was refused at Victoria and subsequently at Vancouver, where Japanese cruisers were present. By 24th July the question was settled and the ship, provisioned by the Canadian Government, and with her passengers still on board, steamed out of Vancouver, under escort of H.M.C.S. *Rainbow*, on her way back to the Orient.

5

*Debates House of Commons Session 1914,
1st June, Vol. V, col. 4580*

There is no danger in sight; why then raise the Militia of this country to the
15135—1½

enormous figure of between 75,000 and 80,000 men? There is no reason for it; there is no emergency in sight, and there will be none in our day and generation.

6

*Debates House of Commons Session 1912-13,
4th December, 1912, Vol. I. Col. 591*

Mr. LEMIEUX:

1. Did the Minister of Militia and Defence make the following statement attributed to him by the press of the Dominion, in a speech delivered at Vancouver, B.C., on 6th August 1912, and reported as follows by the Associated Press:—

"Gentlemen, we are not more than half civilized today, and war is closer than you dream; the great peril is from Germany. Why? Because Germany must have colonies within a generation or she will begin to go down. She is building ships on borrowed money and must seek new territory. She has large numbers of citizens in the South American countries, and there are only two fields where she can find the needed outlet for her surplus population. One is along the South American seaboard, the other is the British colonies.

"It is well known that Germany is establishing herself at Agadir, a port in Morocco. She meant to establish a naval base there, but Britain told her to get out. For two days war was very near. Germany has to be taught a lesson, and the lesson to be taught her is that Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand are behind the Mother Country. We know that Germany was behind Kruger, and that there was a definite scheme to oust Great Britain from South Africa, but the fact that the colonies sprang to arms and sailed from all quarters of the globe to the assistance of Great Britain caused the scheme to be frustrated.

"Now gentlemen, the time has come when a definite plan of Empire defence must be adopted. Let it take the form of a full partnership with the Mother Country."

2. Was the hon. minister authorized to make the above statement? If so, by whom?

Mr. SAM HUGHES:

1. The Minister of Militia and Defence did not give any notes of his speech on this occasion to any person, and he is not responsible for the report, which is evidently from hasty and disjointed transcription, and consequently is not in all respects literally accurate.

2. The Minister of Militia and Defence did not need any such authority, and is alone responsible for what he uttered on that occasion.

7

*Debates House of Commons Session 1918,
10th April, Vol. I. p. 690*

Major-General MEWBURN: In the first place there is my deputy minister who is present now. I shall not say what I think of him at the present time, but certainly his long experience of both military and administrative work, his military services in South Africa, and his faithful and unceasing work, not only before the war but since, are wonderful, and he is deserving of the greatest possible credit. There is another officer of whom I should like to speak, and I do so with the greatest admiration and respect. I refer to the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General W. G. Gwatkin, who has been directly responsible for all the training and military operations of the troops. He has also had numerous other responsibilities thrust upon his shoulders. The public do not and probably never will realise the magnificent work that has been performed by this hard-working, patient and faithful officer. He has been responsible for all the confidential correspondence and cables with the War Office and has been directly in touch with the Admiralty on naval matters in connection with the war, as far as my department is concerned. The country owes a heavy debt to both General Fiset and General Gwatkin for their faithful and efficient work performed since the war started.

Note on Colonel Eugene Fiset, D.S.O. Born in 1874; joined the Active Militia as a 2nd Lieutenant in 1890; became Major in 1898, Lieutenant-Colonel in 1901 and Colonel in 1903. He was appointed to the newly organized Army Medical Staff in 1900, and in 1903 became Director General of the Medical Service. He was appointed Deputy Minister of the Department of Militia and Defence in July 1906.

He was gazetted Major-General 19th November 1914.

Note on Colonel Willoughby Garnons Gwatkin. Born in 1859 and commissioned from Cambridge University as a Lieutenant in the British Regular Army in 1882; he became Captain in 1890, Major in 1900, Lieutenant-Colonel in 1904 and Colonel in 1907. Having held various staff appointments, first in Egypt and latterly in England, connected with mobilization, he was specially selected for duty in Canada as Director of Operations and Staff Duties, an appointment which he held from 1905 to 1909. He returned again to Canada in 1911 as General Staff Officer for

Mobilization and was appointed Chief of the General Staff and 1st Military Member of the Militia Council on 1st November 1913.

He was gazetted Major-General in the Canadian Militia 21st October 1914.

8

THE GROWTH AND CONTROL OF THE
OVERSEAS MILITARY FORCES OF
CANADA

Although at intervals for over a hundred and fifty years Canadian troops had served in and with the British Army both at home and abroad, the extent and manner of Canadian military support in the event of a great war was undetermined in August 1914; yet certain clauses of the Militia Act of 1904 indicate vague provisions of large Canadian military forces serving overseas under British high command. Between 1911 and 1913 a scheme was worked out whereby Canada would furnish one complete infantry division and a cavalry brigade for service in the British forces when the expected storm broke on the continent of Europe; but no estimate had been made, before that event, of her ultimate potential fighting strength, nor had any *system* of administrative or political control of these forces been projected, for Canada, in name and in law a British Dominion, was still commonly supposed to have acquired few characters and developed few qualities distinct from those of a Crown Colony.

From the outset, on 1st August, when the first offer of help was made by Canada, until the end, advice was constantly sought as to the most acceptable form and formations in which aid could be rendered. The suggestion was made by Britain that an infantry division should be the first, contingent, and later also the advisability of forming a Canadian Army Corps was pointed out; *but the two* general principles mutually accepted were that Canada should authorize the raising of as many men for military service as the country could supply—at first 25,000 (P.C. 2067 of 6.viii.1914) then a further 30,000 to provide for the 2nd Canadian Division (P.C. 2831 of 7.xi.1914); in July 1915 a total of 150,000 (P.C. 1698 of 8.vii. 1915), including those already recruited and equipped; in October 1915 a total for overseas service of 250,000 (P.C. 2559 of 80x1916), expanded in January 1916 to half a million—(P.C. 36 of 12.11916) and that the formations in which they should be sent to the front could safely be left to the Dominion Government.

In Canada, at the beginning of the war, there was marked variation in conception, if not wide misapprehension, of the legal situation in respect to the project of affording

military aid; to this may be attributed the doubt, still existing on 25th August, as to whether the infantry division, specified by the British authorities on the 7th, would be maintained as a fighting formation or broken up into brigades and scattered. Further manifestations of uncertainty lie in the divergent interpretations of a Militia Order issued on 17th August, which declared, on the authority of the War Office, that "The Canadian Expeditionary Force will be Imperial* and have the status of British Regular Troops." This paradoxical order was apparently contradicted, on the one hand, by enlisting all men in the Militia as well as in the C.E.F., and implemented on the other, by giving to officers, in addition to their commissions in the Militia, temporary "Imperial" commissions in His Majesty's Land Forces, to enable them to take rank with officers of the British regular army. At the War Office too, experienced soldiers had grave misgivings concerning the military desirability of employing an exclusively Canadian division, and would not *say* whether the Second Contingent should also be an infantry division until after they had seen the first; then they asked for another of the same.

That the Canadian Expeditionary Force was a force offered by Canada, and raised by the Governor General by order of His Majesty the King, had been plain enough since August 1914; not until September 1916 was the status understood to be that of Canadian volunteer Militia on active service, employed in defending their country abroad. Every member of the force had been previously enrolled in a unit of the Militia, a term defined ever since 1904 in the Militia Act as embracing all the military forces of Canada. Each was separately attested in the C.E.F., and was equipped and paid by the Canadian Government in fulfilment of the implications of the simple two-party agreement then made between each man and King George the Fifth. On these

*At the outbreak of war, the term "Imperial" was used by the War Office to designate troops raised by direct order of His Majesty beyond the limits of the United Kingdom and of India to form part, for the time being, of the regular forces; serving under the command of an officer of the regular forces; and paid and maintained from an annual vote by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. During the war Canadians, recognizing themselves to be congenitally and concordantly, though not politically, British, used the word to indicate troops from the British Isles; but in the British army it signified troops of the Empire from overseas Dominions or Colonies. Australia, in using the title "Australian Imperial Force," endorse the British interpretation. A suggestion made in September 1916 that Canada should conform was rejected by the Minister of Militia.

M.M.L. 1914, Ch. xi and cf. AA. 175 (4) and 176 (3). (*See App. 41.*)

grounds, although all ranks of the first contingent of the C.E.F. had enlisted with the understanding that they were to serve under the British Government, and had been allotted to units never declared either in the Canada Gazette or in General Orders—the later practice—to be temporary corps of the Active Militia of Canada on active service, the force was found to be subject to Canadian legislation; such parts as were serving conjointly with His Majesty's regular forces were subject—equally with those serving in Canada—to the Army Act and other laws* applicable to His Majesty's troops only so far as Dominion law did not provide for government and discipline. Responsibility for all appointments and promotions rested with the executive authority of Canada, one of His Majesty's self-governing, Dominions.

These discoveries, and the principles involved, promoted the inauguration of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, at the end of October, 1916, and resulted in the installation of a system which enabled Canada to exercise a proper control over her own troops. The transition was necessarily a slow, laborious and gradual process; even after six months the Prime Minister, the Minister of Militia and the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa had to be severally reminded by the Overseas Minister that no part of the C.E.F. was now being administered by the War

**See Militia Act, Canada 4.E.VII. C. 28, 8. 74.*

"74. The Army Act for the time being in force in the United Kingdom, the King's regulations, and all other laws applicable to His Majesty's troops in Canada and not in consistent with this Act or the regulations made thereunder shall have force and effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of Canada for the Government of the Militia.

2. Every officer and man of the Militia shall be subject to such Acts, regulations and laws,

- (a) from the time of being called out for active service;
- (b) during the period of annual drill or training under the provisions of this Act;
- (c) at any time while upon military duty or in the uniform of his corps or within any rifle range or any armoury or other place where arms, guns, ammunition or other military stores are kept, or within any drill shed or other building or place used for militia purposes.
- (d) during any drill or parade of his corps at which he is present in the ranks.
- (e) when going to or from the place of drill or parade; and
- (f) at any drill or parade of his corps at which he is present as a spectator whether in uniform or not.

3. Officers and men of the Permanent Force and members of the Permanent Staff of the Militia shall at all times be subject to military law."

Office.* It was almost six months after the armistice when the Army Council concurredxxx in the view that the issuance by the British authorities of the additional commission to officers was both repetitious and superfluous.

As to the tactical command of Canadian units and formations after they joined the British Expeditionary Forces on the Western Front or elsewhere, there was never any question; they were integral elements of the British Armies in the Field, but it soon became apparent that the Canadian Commander, although under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, was not disburdened of responsibility to Canada.

The first G.O.C. of the Canadian Division, Lieutenant-General Alderson, appointed 14th October, 1914, was chosen by Lord Kitchener, when the Minister of Militia* asked him to name a commander; the other eight Major-Generals, Turner, Currie, Mercer, Watson, Lipsett, Burstall, Macdonell and Loomis, who commanded Canadian divisions in France, and Major-Generals Morrison and Lindsay, the G.O.C., RA. and the C.E., had all been brigade or unit commanders in the First Contingent; their appointments were agreed upon by the War Office and Canada, as were promotions to Brigadier-General in France. General Alderson took command of the Canadian Corps on its formation on 13th September, 1915; he was succeeded on 29th May, 1916, by Sir Julian Byng, chosen by the Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in France.

At first General Alderson was ostensibly a British General Officer commanding one of the infantry divisions of the British Expeditionary Force, but he was compelled by circumstances to assume a more extensive role, for although during his tenure the Canadian forces were on the same footing as regular troops of the British Army, yet it was evident that his command differed from similar British formations to the extent of the obvious but undefined responsibility of the Government of Canada. The realization of this bewildering incertitude, the absence of authorized liaison

* On 15th March, 1917, General Order 28, getting out the composition of the C.E.F. referred to the Canadian troops overseas as serving "under the Government of the United Kingdom," on 22nd August, 1917, a special Order in Council (P.C. 2291) was passed deleting these words "which might be construed as an abrogation of the right of Your Excellency's Government (i.e. *Canada*) to control and administer (save only in matters of military operations) the Canadian Military Forces serving overseas."

† W.O. letter 18/Gen. No. 2560 (M54K) dated 30.iv.19.

‡ The Hon. Sir Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence, 19th October, 1911, to 14th November, 1916.

facilities and the lack of any one Canadian representative possessed of sufficient powers, constrained him to reply as best he might to all correspondence, appropriate or otherwise, addressed to him under a semblance of authority.

General Byng profited by the experience of his predecessor; on taking over command he stopped all communications other than those through the regular military channels; having decided to make the Canadian Corps a homogenous and united fighting formation he reverted to strict military procedure so that he might accomplish the work undisturbed. Before he had completed his task the political atmosphere had cleared; the fact that Dominion Forces were neither "Colonial" nor "Imperial" troops had emerged, and caused the projection of a scheme of control appropriate to the interests and responsibilities of the parties concerned. This scheme provided for an authorized and direct channel of communication between the Government of Canada and the Canadian forces in the field, and its extended application led to the establishment of recognized procedure at points where the Canadian and British organizations were interlocked, and where hitherto the only infallible guide had been the abiding spirit of mutual trust and goodwill. When the time came on 9th June 1917 for General Byng to leave the Corps on promotion, the next senior officer, Major-General Sir Arthur Currie, who had been G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division since September 1915, was placed temporarily in command. The occasion seemed opportune for the Canadian Government to present the view, concurred in by the War Office, that by this time suitable Canadian officers should be available for every position in the Canadian forces.

The procedure, since 24th April 1917, had been that the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces nominated officers to fill vacancies and the Minister O.M.F.C. made the appointments on behalf of the Canadian Government. Sir Douglas Haig was therefore informed that if he would recommend a Canadian his nominee would be appointed. He recommended General Currie, and Sir George Perley, on behalf of the Canadian Government, made the appointment on 14th June, to date from 9th June.

The new appointment ensured continuity and consistency of policy and resulted in the Canadian force becoming more autonomous; and it was immediately followed by acceleration in the replacement of British by Canadian Staff Officers, and by the substitution of Canadians for the Lahore Artillery in the 4th Canadian Division, thereby removing the last of the extraneous units from the divisions.

The earliest known mention of a Canadian Army Corps occurs in a letter of 1st April, 1915 to the Minister of Militia, from his special representative in London, in which the suggestion is made that an Army Corps should be formed consisting of two divisions, the 1st then in the field, and the 2nd still in process of crossing from Canada. Under date 27th April, 1915, is a reference to a recommendation, made by Sir John French and approved by Lord Kitchener, that if a Canadian Army Corps were to be formed General Alderson should command it; discussions with the various Canadian overseas representatives followed. On 15th June, 1915, Canada was informed that the Army Council thought it would be advantageous, when the 2nd Canadian Division took the field, to join the two divisions into an Army Corps. The matter was taken up in July when the Prime Minister and the Minister of Militia were in England; by the end of August notification reached Canada that a Canadian Army Corps would be formed; on 13th September, 1915, the new organization came into being.

The raising of a third Canadian division had also been suggested by the War Office on 24th June, 1915; early in September, on his return to Canada, the Minister of Militia publicly referred to such a possibility; he had already spoken privately of a fourth, fifth and sixth division; but many, including his own special representative in the British Isles, the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, the Acting Canadian High Commissioner in London and the Prime Minister, were doubtful whether Canada could find and train enough men to maintain a corps of three divisions at full strength. Action was expedited by the suggestion of General Alderson, made at the end of October, put forward by the Commander-in-Chief on 19th November, and duly concurred in by the Canadian authorities, that some of the many units then serving in France as Canadian Corps troops, extra to establishment, should be so utilized. Most of the units necessary to complete, including one infantry brigade, were drawn from depots in England, others were brought from Canada, the P.P.C.L.I. was withdrawn from the British 27th Division in France, and the 3rd Canadian Division was formed within the Canadian Corps on 28th December, 1915. The two cavalry regiments and the R.C.H.A. Brigade, units of the Permanent Force, which had also been serving dismounted since May and September respectively as extra Canadian divisional or corps troops, were joined in January, 1916, by another Canadian cavalry regiment from England and withdrawn from the Corps to be again organized into a Cavalry Brigade; as such they formed part of the British Cavalry Corps until the end.

Early in December, 1915, the War Office had asked whether Canada would be prepared to provide twelve battalions of infantry for service in Egypt, in addition to completing the 3rd Canadian Division, or alternatively, to defer the formation of the 3rd Canadian Division until these battalions returned in the spring; this resulted in the further development of the principle that it would be well to hold all the Canadian formations together, and provoked the offer, on 19th January, 1916, of a fourth division for service overseas. The Army Council undertook the formation of the infantry brigades from battalions then in England, with the reservation that some of the personnel might be required as reinforcements for the three divisions in France, where the policy then being pursued, but soon to be abandoned, was to have an Army Corps of three divisions, one always being kept in reserve.

In February, 1916, General Alderson called the attention of the Minister of Militia to the necessity for better organization and control of the Canadian system of training and supply of reinforcements. He pointed out that *there* was quadruple control in England, and gave as his opinion that the right sort of men were not in command, and that the essential function of the Canadian Training Division, to feed the Army Corps, was not appreciated.

As a result of this, a conference between representatives of the Canadian Training Centre and of the War Office was held on 28th April, 1916*, thirteen battalions were selected for the 4th Canadian Division and important conclusions were reached: there should be in England about 60,000 men in training and draft-finding units; the Canadian Training Division should have a total strength of some 78,000, and therefore Training Battalions should be accepted from Canada until there were 52 in England, after which drafts only should be sent; but this course was not followed, for battalions continued to arrive from Canada until March, 1918. A total of twenty battalions was immediately available in the two Canadian Training Divisions, nine at Shorncliffe and eleven at Bramshott; of these, on the basis then effective, eighteen were necessary to provide reinforcements; to complete the 4th Division and maintain four divisions in the field at least sixteen more battalions would be required; divisional troops and detached units had also to be found and kept up to strength. In April a commander was brought back from the field to take over the new division; 38 new battalions arrived within the next three months, and in August,

* W.O. 121/Overseas/1938 S.D.2 dated 29/4/1916.

1916, the 4th Canadian Division crossed the Channel to join the Canadian Corps, lacking only divisional artillery which was formed in June of the following year by a redistribution of units already in France.

Throughout the summer of 1916 it became increasingly evident that the existing condition of affairs must be remedied: it was found that unfit men were being sent from Canada; that reinforcements were being neither sufficiently nor uniformly trained in England; that the methods of caring for convalescent wounded, and of returning casualties to the front when fit, were unsatisfactory; that recommendations for promotion in the field were being unduly delayed; and that there was a growing number of senior officers in England, stranded there when the juniors and other ranks of their units were sent as reinforcements to France. These failings could only be rectified by establishing an organization through which direct and efficient control, both military and governmental, would be exercised. The need for such an arrangement had long been foreseen by some, but the insistence of the Minister of Militia on devoting his personal interest to adjustment of arms and equipment and the destinies of individuals, rather than to the co-ordination of general policies, imposed an unreckoned indeterminate stress upon the machinery of the War Office, and precluded the effective employment of a responsible intermediary. Early in August, 1914, it had been agreed that the Minister should deal with details of a military character in direct communication with the Army Council, but the sphere of his influence was not in fact limited by the English Channel; he maintained continual touch unofficially with the front line troops, and his enthusiasm impelled him to comment frequently and freely on the tactics and strategy employed.

Sir Sam Hughes was sent to England in July, 1916, to make more effective arrangements for the organization of the C.E.F.; he returned to Canada early in October; he was requested by the Prime Minister to resign, and ceased to be Minister of Militia early in November. Thereafter the duties of that office were divided: the Hon. A. E. Kemp became Minister of Militia in Canada (*23.xi.1916*); the Hon. Sir George Perley, a member of the Cabinet, who had been acting as High Commissioner for the Dominion in London since May, 1914, was appointed Minister, Overseas Military Forces of Canada. (*P.C. 2656 of 31.x.1918*).

The order passed by the Privy Council of Canada (*P.C. 2651 of 23.x.1916*), which instituted the new portfolio for the duration of

the war, vested in the holder full powers relating to military matters in the United Kingdom and on the continent of Europe. Not only was he called upon to undertake the duties of a Minister of Militia, but he was authorized to give immediate provisional decisions on behalf of the Governor in Council whenever urgency demanded, and he was moreover "charged with the negotiations on the part of the Government of Canada as occasion might require with His Majesty's Government in all matters connected with the government, command and disposition of the Overseas Forces of Canada and such arrangements as might be advisable for co-ordinating their operations and services with those of His Majesty's troops and generally for utilizing the Overseas Forces of Canada in the most effective manner for the purposes of the war." In accordance with the consequent terms of the Order, Sir George Perley forthwith set up a separate Department of the Canadian Government in London. He appointed a Deputy Minister, and, for the technical side, recalled Major-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., from the 2nd Canadian Division, gave him command, and made him responsible for the training and administration of all Canadian troops in England without any intermedial British commanders or staffs. This resulted in the construction of a miniature War Office: with an ample establishment of officers a complete reorganization was effected and each branch was conformably readjusted on the fundamental basis of maintaining an Army Corps of four divisions in the field at full strength and maximum efficiency.

The finding of fighting troops was not, however, the only consideration, for two large special corps were now in process of evolution. In October, 1914, Canada had offered to provide railway men for construction work overseas; early in 1915 the War Office requested that two Railway Construction Companies should be raised in Canada, these proceeded to France in August; in May, 1916, another railway construction unit, 1,000 strong, was asked for and supplied. After the battles of the Somme it was agreed that five battalions of Canadian railway troops should be raised and placed in the field; the number was later increased to ten, and all were operating behind the Western Front by the end of June, 1917. In 1918 three more battalions were added and the whole, with five hitherto detached railway units in France, was placed under Major-General J. W. Stewart who had raised and commanded the original battalion. The new corps was designated The Corps of Canadian Railway Troops; it eventually had a strength of 15,000, all trained

as infantry. The other large accretion originated when the necessity for exploiting timber resources prompted the British Government in February, 1916, to ask for a battalion of lumbermen from Canada; three months later a further call for assistance resulted in the formation of the Canadian Forestry Corps, which had finally a strength of 10,000 operating in Great Britain and over 12,000 in France, exclusive of some 9,000 of other nationalities attached; the G.O.C. was Major-General A. McDougall, who had been O.C. of the first battalion.

But the primal task of the new Overseas Minister was to clear up a question of policy, and to reach a decision as to whether or not a fifth Canadian division should be formed. The ex-Minister of Militia, when on his final mission in England, had committed Canada to furnish this fifth division; he had earmarked battalions for it, and even for a sixth division, and on 31st October confidently arranged with Sir Max Aitken, then one of the Canadian representatives in London, that Sir William Robertson should be asked to select a commander; but he subsequently failed to secure the indorsement of the Government to his recommendation, although he quoted an urgent personal plea from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the Governor General that mobilization of the 5th Division should be authorized.

Discussions and correspondence between the War Office and Canadian representatives were frequent and prolific from November until 12th January 1917, when it was decided at a joint meeting that the 5th Canadian Division should be formed. On account of a probable shortage of reinforcements from Canada during the ensuing nine months, brought to light by exhaustive study of returns and elaborate estimating of future enlistments, the stipulation was made by the Overseas Minister that the division should be held in Great Britain for home defence. The formation of the 5th Division proceeded in England under Canadian authority; the War Cabinet and the Army Council directed their unremitting efforts towards obtaining permission for its transfer to the front; the aid of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was invoked: on 17th February he sent a hortatory appeal to the Governor General for the despatch of more Canadians to the firing line.

Increased pressure exerted by the War Office led to an admission, early in March, by Sir Robert Borden* that he quite understood that the moment might come when, to secure a decisive victory, the 5th Division might be

needed in France; but he did not think that the moment had arrived; simultaneously the Minister of Militia in Canada expressed the opinion that "Voluntary enlistment had about reached its limit"; in May figures showed that, even by breaking up the 5th Division, reinforcements then in sight would only suffice to maintain the four divisions in France at full establishment until the end of November 1917, a forecast which renewed examination of National Service cards and deliberations in June and July could only confirm. As a concession to the War Office, and because the situation as regards artillery reinforcements was not so critical, the 5th Canadian Divisional Artillery was sent to France in August, thus also compensating the deficiency there existing in Canadian army field artillery brigades; meanwhile the remainder of the division was retained in England and kept up to strength.

On the redistribution of portfolios when the Union Government was formed in Canada on the 12th October 1917, the Hon. Sir George Perley ceased to be a member of the Cabinet on appointment as High Commissioner in London-an office which he had been administering for over three years. He was succeeded in the Overseas Ministry by the Hon. Sir Edward Kemp, who in turn was replaced in Canada by Major-General the Hon. S. C. Mewburn; the policy, however, remained unchanged and the new Overseas Minister, after his year at the head of the Militia Department, was in a position to exercise the closest supervision and to enter deeply into the ramifications of administrative detail. On 11th January 1918 the Army Council, forced to sacrifice tactical advantages in an effort to meet reinforcement difficulties, informed the Headquarters, O.M.F.C., that it had been decided to reorganize British divisions on a basis of three infantry brigades, each of three battalions, and asked whether the Canadian military authorities would expand the C.E.F. in France from four to six divisions on that basis.

The proposal was referred to the Canadian Corps commander for advice; he expressed the opinion that a greater effect on the enemy could be produced by the existing organization, well maintained in strength, than by the increased number of weaker divisions under consideration; more particularly he pointed out that the existing staffs were well balanced and experienced, but that with the new formations time must elapse before they could be equally battle-worthy. After taking further counsel the Government of Canada found that the conditions necessitating such a change did not exist with regard to the Canadian forces; nothing could compensate for splitting the united

*Prime Minister of Canada, 10th October 1911 to 10th July 1920.

Corps in France into two, an action which the Hon. Sir Sam Hughes had still advocated in Parliament as a private member on 30th January 1917 when he thought that Canada could maintain eight divisions in the field; the increase in staff required by the addition of the fifth and sixth divisions, a second corps and the implicit army headquarters would be out of just proportion to the increase in bayonet strength; and most important of all, the provisions of the Military Service Act, which introduced compulsory service from October 1917 and was framed with vast expenditure of thought and labour to develop the man-power resources of the country to the utmost, would supply only enough men to make good the heavy wastage of battle and sickness inevitably suffered by an active Corps of four full divisions on the Western Front.

After this decision was arrived at, and when it came to be realized that Canada was determined to hold fast to the policy of keeping her fighting forces efficient and at full strength, her right and capacity to administer these forces and to make the most effective disposition of available man-power were both generally recognized. The 5th Division was broken up in February, and the Engineer and Machine Gun Companies and 4,800 of the infantry were despatched to bring the units of the Corps up to the new increased establishments, which in June reached a total of 103,530 of all ranks. The staff of the Headquarters, O.M.F.C., was readjusted in April, Lieutenant-General Turner, V.C., became Chief of the General Staff, a new Overseas Military Council was constituted, and a Canadian Section at British G.H.Q. was formed in July as a branch of the Ministry O.M.F.C., to deal with matters of organization and administration affecting Canadian units and formations in France. Apart from the Canadian Corps, these had an effective strength of 35,991, of whom 19,410 were in detached units including among others the Cavalry Brigade, Tunnelling Companies and Railway Troops; the remainder were in the Forestry Corps and Lines of Communication units. The maximum effective strength of the C.E.F. in France, attained in July, 1918, was just under 150,000.

But now the O.M.F.C. was universally conceded to be the portion of the Canadian Military Forces organized, equipped and sent overseas to cooperate with troops from other parts of the Empire in defeating the common enemy." In four years of war it had developed -from a possible to a real entity: at the beginning a vague conception, at the last

a powerful united force, under the immediate control of the Dominion Government in all matters except military operations in the field; there, as ever, it was entrusted to the British Commander-in-Chief.

9

NOTE ON MILITARY DIVISIONAL
AREAS AND DISTRICTS

In July 1914 Canada was divided for militia purposes into 6 Divisional Areas and 3 Districts numbered and distributed as under:

1st Divisional Area, Western Ontario, H.Q. London.

2nd Divisional Area, Central Ontario, H.Q. Toronto.

3rd Divisional Area, Eastern Ontario, H.Q. Kingston.

4th Divisional Area, Western Quebec, H.Q. Montreal.

5th Divisional Area, Eastern Quebec, H.Q. Quebec.

6th Divisional Area, Maritime Provinces, H.Q. Halifax.

Military District No. 10, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, H.Q. Winnipeg.

Military District No. 11, British Columbia and Yukon, H.Q. Victoria.

Military District No. 13, Alberta, H.Q. Calgary.

On 1st April 1916 the six "Divisional Areas" were renamed " Military Districts ", which common term is used in the text to avoid confusion with combatant formations named Divisions.

10

SECRET

C. 1209

31st July 1914.

From:—The Adjutant-General,
Canadian Militia.

To:—The Officer Commanding,
1st Division,
London, Ont.

and to G.O.C., 2nd Divn.; Os.C. 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th
Divns. Os.C. M.Ds. No. 10, 11 and 13.

MOBILIZATION FOR SERVICE OVERSEAS.

Sir,

I have the honour, by direction, to request that you will consider what procedure you would adopt on receiving orders that troops were to be raised in your command for service overseas.

2. No attention is to be paid to the tables attached to Memorandum C. 1209, dated 1st October, 1911; and the scheme outlined in that document is to be regarded as purely tentative.

* This definition was published in an Appendix to O.M.F.C. Routine Order No. 1962 of 11th July, 1917.

3. This letter need not be acknowledged; its contents are not to be discussed; and nothing is required from you in the nature of a report.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

V. A. S. WILLIAMS,

Colonel,

Adjutant-General.

II

NOTE ON THE OVERSEAS MOBILIZATION SCHEME 1911-1912

Prior to 1910 there had neither been funds nor trained staff to draw up a scheme of mobilization for the Canadian Militia. In January of that year, however, at the instance of Brigadier-General W. D. Otter, CB., C.V.O., Chief of the General Staff, a mobilization committee was appointed under his presidency.

Upon the recommendation of the Inspector-General of the Imperial Forces, General Sir John French, a selected General Staff Officer, Colonel W. G. Gwatkin, was appointed from the War Office in July 1911; under the orders of the Chief of the General Staff (Canada), Major-General C. J. Mackenzie, CB., he worked upon two plans (i) for the transfer from a peace to a war footing of the six divisions, and (ii) another for the mobilization of an overseas force in case "one day the Dominion Government might decide to mobilize for active service for oversea a Canadian contingent, consisting of a division and a mounted brigade, organized as nearly as possible on the lines laid down in War Establishments for the Expeditionary Force" (i.e. the British Expeditionary Force).

Work on the second of these schemes commenced at the end of July 1911 and was pushed with great vigour; by 3rd October it was ready in its main essentials, and copies were issued to General Officers and Officers Commanding Divisional Areas and Districts under strict injunctions as to secrecy, because "knowledge of its existence might lead to false inferences and cause much mischief". This was the last important act of Sir Frederick Borden's long regime of fifteen years as Minister of Militia, for eight days later a new Government came into office; Colonel Sam Hughes succeeded him.

This mobilization plan for an overseas contingent provided for one infantry division and one mounted brigade, with "its war outfit adapted to meet the requirements of active service in a civilized country in a temperate climate". The personnel, including ten per

cent first reinforcements, totalled 24,352, of whom 22,154 would belong to the division, and 2,198 to the mounted brigade, but recruiting to twenty per cent above these figures was authorized to provide a nucleus for further reinforcements. With the exception of 2,123 *officers* and men, almost entirely for the Divisional Ammunition Column, Transport and Supply Column and Transport and Supply Park, who were to be found from no specified area, allotment of troops to compose the units (less one field battery and one battalion of infantry from the West) was made from the six divisional areas in Eastern Canada, and to compose the mounted brigade (less horse artillery battery and ammunition column from the R.C.H.A. Brigade in the 3rd Divisional Area) from the three western military districts, "each divisional area and district area contributing a quota proportionate to its military resources". In deciding upon the quotas, regard was had to two factors: authorized establishment of militia; militia actually trained in 1910. Except in respect to the one western battalion (three companies from MD. 11 and five from M.D. 13) and the cavalry field ambulance for the mounted brigade (one section each from M.Ds. 10 and 13), divisions and districts were expected to provide complete units.

"Places of assembly", where men, horses and material would be collected, were selected by divisional and district commanders, and approved by Militia Headquarters. If mobilization took place in the camping season the plan provided for transfer, after partial mobilization, from the place of assembly to Petawawa, as the "place of concentration", where mobilization would be completed under the supervision of the general officer appointed to command the contingent. In the event of mobilization taking place at a time when climatic conditions made it inexpedient to put men under canvas, units would be fully mobilized at their places of assembly and thence proceed direct to port of embarkation.

Decentralization was the keynote of the plan, much responsibility being placed upon divisional and district commanders. On receipt from Militia Headquarters of a telegram "Mobilize Contingent. The is the first day of mobilization", the action to be taken in districts and divisions was prescribed Central recruiting *offices* were forthwith to be established at divisional or district head. quarters, and outlying offices in convenient localities; these localities were determined upon by the nine local commanders and reported to Militia Headquarters. Upon the same commanders rested the duty of purchasing remounts, subject to veterinary examination and limitation as to price; mounted

officers were expected, and men of mounted corps were to be encouraged, to bring in their own horses for purchase by the Government, if satisfactory, and issue to the former owners. For the transport, wagons and carts, except watercarts, were to be procured locally; watercarts were to be issued at Petawawa. Equipment, clothing and necessaries would be issued from local stocks to the extent available, but no withdrawals were to be made from militia units. Daily progress returns from the divisions and districts would acquaint Militia Headquarters with the situation, and deficiencies in material would be made good by the Department without the necessity of indent.

Service in the contingent was, of course, to be voluntary. Enlistment was to be for the duration of the war. Men were to be between the ages of twenty and thirty-five and unmarried. Preference was to be given to men who had previously served or who had undergone some form of military training.

Officers to command the division, mounted brigade, infantry brigades, column, park and the three field ambulances, and all staff officers, would be selected by the Militia Council; officers to command other regimental units, including artillery brigades, were also to be appointed by the Militia Council "but not until they have been recommended by divisional or district commanders"; squadron, battery and company commanders and all other regimental officers were to be selected and appointed by the divisional or district commanders, subject only to confirmation by the Militia Council. The names of officers recommended for the senior regimental commands were duly submitted to headquarters and recorded there without the knowledge of the officers in question.

Partly as the result of reports which were called for from divisional and district commanders upon the practicability of the scheme, in the drafting of which they had not been consulted, some changes and amplifications were made by March 1912. The principal change concerned a reduction in the number of troops from the 5th Divisional Area—eastern Quebec. The divisional quota was a heavy battery and ammunition column (both from the permanent force), a field company of engineers and two battalions of infantry. The divisional commander, Colonel O. C. C. Pelletier, "with a full knowledge of the local conditions and sentiment", advised that not more than one battalion of infantry could be raised, in addition to the artillery and engineers. The department naturally accepted this view and the quota was reduced by one battalion, and that required from the 2nd Divisional Area (Central Ontario) was increased correspondingly: a suggestion that

Military District No. 10 (Manitoba and Saskatchewan) should be called upon was not approved by the C.G.S., General Mackenzie, on the ground that the western infantry "had had no training to speak of," and because the quota would, as a result, have exceeded the total number of troops who had trained in the previous year. Because of changes in British organization, a divisional train was substituted for the divisional transport and supply column and the divisional transport and supply park. Though only two howitzer batteries existed in Canada, a howitzer brigade was included in the division in the hope that, should the scheme ever become operative the equipment would by then be available. In 1914, however, that condition was still unrealized.

It cannot be claimed for this scheme that it attained to any great degree of perfection. A serious shortage of clothing and equipment would have undoubtedly delayed completion of mobilization, for adequate reserve stocks did not exist in the country, and it was definitely ruled that no accumulation of reserve supplies for the use of an entirely problematical overseas force would be undertaken. No provision was made for lines of communication units, it being assumed that the L. of C. of the British force with which the Canadians would be operating would serve the contingent. The establishment of a remount depot in Canada would have been necessary. Forms of attestation were not available, though their preparation would have proved no great task. No system of personal records, which involves a chain of reports from the field to the home base and the compilation of many documents, nor any organization for maintaining them, had been provided for, though the system was laid down in British regulations. An organization for pay services, which the scheme also ignored, would have been necessary, but it does not appear that the Accountant and Paymaster General, who was also Finance Member of the Militia Council, was even consulted.

The C.G.S. (Major-General C. J. Mackenzie), under whose direction it was prepared, placed little value upon the plan; he regarded it rather as a "project" than a scheme. He held that a pre-requisite was exact knowledge of the force to be employed, and that even with such knowledge, under a voluntary system of recruiting, it would be quite uncertain where the troops would be obtained. Notwithstanding, the scheme did supply a considered plan for the provision of troops on a fair ratio throughout the Dominion and for a force of the same composition as that called for in August 1914—an infantry division and a mounted brigade.

While the plan was prepared and issued under the authority of Sir Frederick Borden, the revisions of the next five months were made by the C.G.S. under the new Minister, Colonel Sam Hughes, though apparently not with his authority. The plan then rested for a year, until some consideration was given by the C.G.S. to the provision of a proportion of lines of communication troops sufficient for the force contemplated; the War Office was unofficially consulted, with the definite intimation that such consultation in no way committed Canada to providing a contingent. At this stage General Mackenzie resigned, for reasons unconnected with the plan, and had proceeded on leave pending the resignation becoming effective, when on 5th May 1913 the Minister informed the acting Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Gwatkin, that while he had spoken with the C.G.S. "a score of times" in general terms of an overseas force, he had just learned, by accident, that there was in existence a definite plan; when inspecting some troops in Hamilton, he found that "one corps had its men all *ready*". The C.G.S., on being referred to, maintained, however, that he had definitely informed Colonel Hughes of the project. It is clear that there had been a misunderstanding as to the import of the C.G.S.'s remarks.

The Minister at first accepted the desirability of a scheme and gave instructions to the new C.G.S., Colonel Gwatkin, for further consideration with a view to revisions and the addition of lines of communication units. The latter, as approved by him, would have provided for a clearing hospital, two general hospitals, an ambulance train, a hospital ship, two supply columns (one for the mounted brigade), two parks (one for the mounted brigade), a reserve park, a few smaller units, such as a field bakery, and ordnance, veterinary, pay and postal services-nearly all included in the First Contingent in 1914. But after two or three weeks preliminary work, all action was abandoned-without doubt on the Minister's instructions-until the papers were brought to light again on 30th July 1914, and then only in order that the divisional and district commanders might be told to ignore the plan.

12

*Debates House of Commons, Session 1916,
26th January, Vol. 1, p. 292*

Hon. Sir SAM HUGHES (*Minister of Militia and Defence*)... For the first contingent, our recruiting plans were, I think, different from anything that had ever occurred before. There was really a call to arms, like the fiery cross passing through the Highlands

of Scotland or the mountains of Ireland in former days. In place of being forwarded to the district officers commanding, the word was wired to every officer commanding a unit in any part of Canada to buckle on his harness and get busy. The consequence was that in a short time we had the boys on the way for the first contingent, whereas it would have taken several weeks to have got the word around through the ordinary channels. Under that plan the contingent was practically on the way to Europe before it could have been mobilized under the ordinary plan.

13

NOTE ON CABLE AND WIRELESS CENSORSHIP

The operation of wireless stations in Canada was governed by the Radio Telegraph Act and by consequent regulations laid down by Order in Council, P.C. 1836 of 20th May, 1914, which gave power to the Minister of the Naval Service to close down any or all stations when he considered an emergency had arisen.

An Order in Council (P.C. 2029) of 2nd August 1914 authorized the Minister of Militia or his delegate to take possession in the King's name of the property, offices or works of any cable company in Canada and to exercise control of the transmission of all cablegrams and messages.

The Officers Commanding 5th Division at Quebec; 6th Division at Halifax; and Military District No. 11 at Victoria, B.C., were instructed by telegram at 11 p.m. 2nd August 1914 to establish censorship control over cable and radiotelegraph stations in the areas of their commands. The warrants authorizing Militia Officers concerned to take possession of all radiotelegraph stations, and to exercise censorship over the reception and transmission of messages at these stations, were forwarded from Ottawa on 3rd August.

By 6th August a censorship staff had been installed at 5 cable and 8 wireless stations--four on the Atlantic seaboard and four on the Pacific-authorized to remain open for commercial purposes. Of the other 17 coastal wireless stations the first was closed on 3rd August; the last on 10th September. Staffs on the stations remaining open were doubled. The station at Newcastle, N.B., which was powerful enough to communicate with Ballybunnion and English stations, was closed on 3rd August; it was owned by a British firm, the manager was a U.S. citizen, the operators were German. All private wireless stations, 92 in number, were ordered on 10th August to close at once. The working of wireless stations on merchant ships in Canadian coastal

waters, except by special licence, was prohibited. No control was exercised over wireless stations on the Great Lakes, which were chiefly used for shipping.

Control of wireless stations in the United States was taken over by the U.S. Navy Department 8th August 1914, after representations had been made by the British Ambassador against two powerful stations under the control of the German Government and in direct communication with Germany.

14

NOTE ON CONTROL OF LAND TELEGRAPHS
AND TELEPHONES

The control of land telegraph and telephone lines within Canada was governed by an Order in Council (P.C. 2409) dated 24th September 1914. In addition to the check afforded by the Censor's staff, the Minister was empowered to require employees of the companies to subscribe to a sworn declaration that they would examine all messages and intercept any, for delivery outside of Canada, containing information directly or indirectly useful to the enemy. Contraventions of the provisions of this Order involved a fine up to \$5,000 or imprisonment up to five years. But which Minister was not specified, at this time; the companies established a species of censorship of their own and for the first six months of the war it was considered unnecessary to invoke the Order in Council. Thereafter subscription to the declaration was required for the legal protection of the companies.

From 28th January 1915 (P.C. 202) the Minister of Justice (from 1st November 1915 (P.C. 2073) the Secretary of State for External Affairs) was authorized to take possession in the King's Name, of the property, offices or works, of any company operating telegraph or telephone lines in Canada and to use the same for the public service. The necessity for this step did not arise.

15

PUBLICATION OF NEWS

LETTER FROM COLONEL SAM HUGHES,
MINISTER OF MILITIA, TO THE
PRESS OF CANADA

OTTAWA, August 5, 1914.

In the grave circumstances with which the Dominion as a part of the British Empire is faced today, I venture to appeal to patriotic Canadian newspapers, their proprietors and their staffs alike, to exercise wise reticence upon matters affecting military operations.

Enormous assistance can be given to a belligerent nation by the newspapers of its opponents if those newspapers are unguarded; and conversely great advantages can be gained by the armed forces of a nation if its press exercises a patriotic restraint.

In 1870, the French newspapers, with no unpatriotic intent, had for the lack of warning published much news which was of great service to their country's foes, and which had its share in bringing many thousands of Frenchmen to their deaths.

In 1904-5 the Japanese press by its reticence greatly aided the Japanese Army and Navy. In the South African war the publication of war news caused the unnecessary loss of many valuable lives. The responsibilities resting upon the Press are very great; the publication of a single item of news might mean the unnecessary death of British subjects, and might mean untold damage to our interests.

I earnestly entreat you to abstain from publishing unauthorised statements as to military happenings in Canada, such as the assembling or moving of regiments, the purchase of remounts, stores or supplies, the erection of fortifications, etc.. We may be certain that the agents of hostile powers are searching your pages eagerly for statements as to the movements of our military forces, the nature and disposition of our defences, and other facts bearing upon the prosecution of war. Such information as to steps to be taken by Canada will be supplied by the Government Departments concerned, which will bear in mind the restraint to which the Press will be subjecting itself.

(Halifax Herald, 6 August 1914)

16

*Telegram from the Governor General to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies*

OTTAWA, 1st August, 1914.

Urgent. My Government desire me to send you the following: "My advisers while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved and their strong desire to cooperate in every possible way for that purpose, wish me to convey to His Majesty's Government the firm assurance that if unhappily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our Empire".

ARTHUR.

17

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 2nd August, 1914.

In view of the impending danger of war involving the Empire my advisers are anxiously considering the most effective means of rendering every possible aid and they will welcome any suggestions and advice which Imperial Naval and Military authorities may deem it expedient to offer. They are confident that a considerable force would be available for service abroad. A question has been mooted respecting the status of any Canadian force serving abroad as under section sixty nine of Canadian Militia Act the active militia can only be placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof. It has been suggested that regiments might enlist as Imperial troops for stated period, Canadian Government undertaking to make all necessary financial provision for their equipment, pay and maintenance. This proposal has not yet been maturely considered here and my advisers would be glad to have views of Imperial Government thereon.

ARTHUR.

(See 19, 40)

18

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 2nd August, 1914.

With reference to your telegram 1st August, His Majesty's Government gratefully welcome the assurance of your Government that in the present crisis they may rely on wholehearted co-operation of the people of Canada. Publish this with your telegram. I am publishing in to-morrow morning papers here.

HARCOURT.

19

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 3rd August, 1914.

With reference to your cypher telegram 2nd August, please inform your ministers that their patriotic readiness to render every aid is deeply appreciated by His Majesty's Government, but they would prefer postponing detailed observations on the suggestion put forward, pending further developments. As soon as situation appears to call for further measures I will telegraph you again.

HARCOURT.

(See 17, 40)

20

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND BELGIUM ON THE OTHER

Signed at London, April 19, 1839

(Extract)

ARTICLE 1

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare, that the Articles hereunto annexed, and forming the tenour of the Treaty, concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.

ANNEX TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TREATY

(Extract)

ARTICLE 7

BELGIUM, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV,* shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State (*un Etat Indépendant et perpétuellement neutre*). It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

* *These articles lay down the geographical boundaries of Belgium.*

21

Report of late British Ambassador in Berlin, rendered on his return to London. (British Blue Book Cd. 7860, Document No. 160)

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

Sir:

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow* at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of

* German Secretary of State.

the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passport and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his

answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word-"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded-just for a scrap of paper Great Britain ' was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained

from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered,

and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government, in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential" "Tageblatt," which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials at the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports-which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing -and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police were posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedeln met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired Colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying

circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two young attaches buckled to their work, and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, etc.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.

For discussion on the meaning of the phrase "a scrap of paper" see statement of the German Chancellor (The Times Documentary History of the War Volume II, Part L, pp. 888888) and consequent observations of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (ibid. pp. 382-392).

*U.S. Ambassador in Berlin.

22

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 4th August, 1914.

See Preface Defence Scheme, war has broken out with Germany.

HARCOURT.

(Communicated to Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police, Militia and Defence, Commissioner of Customs, Deputy Minister of the Naval Service, Clerk of the Privy Council, Under Secretary of State of Canada.)

23

ANNOUNCEMENT OF WAR

OTTAWA, 4th August, 1914.

His Royal Highness the Governor General received a telegraphic despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies at 8.45 this evening announcing that war has broken out with Germany.

(Published in CANADA GAZETTE (EXTRA) 5th Aug. 1914, amplified for purposes of Prize Court Act in Canada Gazette (Extra) of 19th August 1914, as follows):—

PROCLAMATION
CANADA

By Field Marshal His Royal Highness Prince Arthur William Patrick Albert, Duke of Connaught and of Strathearn, Earl of Sussex (in the Peerage of the United Kingdom); Prince of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Duke of Saxony, Prince of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha; Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter; Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle; Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of St. Patrick; one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council; Great Master of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India; Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George; Knight Grand Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire; Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order; Personal Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the King; Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of the Dominion of Canada, and ViceAdmiral of the same.

To all to whom these Presents shall come,
Greeting:

A PROCLAMATION

I, Arthur William Patrick Albert, Governor General and Vice-Admiral of Canada as aforesaid, being satisfied thereof by information received by me do hereby proclaim that war has broken out between His Majesty and the German Empire and between His Majesty and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

At Government House in the City of Ottawa, this nineteenth day of August, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen.

ARTHUR.

15135—2½

23a

NOTE ON CONFERENCE BETWEEN
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND
HIS MINISTERS

On August 4th and on several other occasions during that month the Governor General, on the Prime Minister's invitation, joined the Ministers in conference, when the benefit of his experience was sought upon military

23b

NOTE ON ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES
EDMUND KINGSMILL

Born in Guelph, Ontario, 7th July, 1855, he joined the *Britannia* training ship and became a Midshipman in the Royal Navy in 1870. His successive promotions were: Sub-Lieutenant 1875, Lieutenant 1877, Commander 1891, Captain 1898 and Rear-Admiral 1908, in which year he retired from the Royal Navy. He served on the Pacific, Australia, China and Japan, East and West Indies, North America and South Atlantic stations, and commanded in sequence the *Goldfinch*, *Blenheim*, *Archer*, *Gibraltar*, *Mildura*, *Resolution*, *Majestic* and *Dominion*. He saw service in Somaliland 1884, and received the bronze medal and Khedive's Star for service in Egypt in 1892. He was an officer of the Legion of Honour (France) and a Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy.

From 15th May, 1908, to 31st December, 1920, Admiral Kingsmill was executive head of the Canadian Naval Service and attended the Imperial Defence Conferences of 1909 and 1911. He became Vice-Admiral on the Retired List (Royal Navy) in 1913, Admiral in 1917, and was knighted on 1st January 1918. He died on 15th July, 1935.

24

P.C. 2050
ORDER IN COUNCIL
AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT
OTTAWA

Tuesday, the 4th day of August, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL IN COUNCIL

Whereas Sections 22 and 31 of the Naval Service Act, Chapter 43 of the Statutes of 1910, provide that:

22. The Governor in Council may place the Naval Forces; or any part thereof, on active service at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of an emergency.

31. In an emergency the Governor in Council may order and direct that the Naval Volunteer Force, or such part thereof as may be deemed necessary, shall be called into active service, and the naval volunteers so called out shall be liable to serve under, such regulations as may be prescribed.

2. If a naval volunteer's period of service expires while he is employed on active service, he shall be liable to serve for a further period of not more than six months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any increased remuneration, unless in the opinion of the Governor in Council the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned merits it.

The Governor General in Council is pleased to Order and it is hereby Ordered, as an emergency exists at the present time, that the Naval Forces and the Naval Volunteer Forces be placed immediately on Active Service.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

Published in CANADA GAZETTE (Extra), Aug. 5, 1914.

25

P.C. 2049

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 4th August.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 4th August, 1914, from the Minister of the Naval Service, submitting that section 23 of the Naval Service Act, chapter 43 of the Statutes of 1910, provides that:

23. In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships, or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

An emergency having arisen, the Minister recommends that H.M.C.S. *Niobe* and H.M.C.S. *Rainbow*, together with the *officers* and seamen serving in such vessels, be placed at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

26

P.C. 2071

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 7th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated August 6, 1914, from the Minister of the Naval Service, submitting that, in view of the existing emergency, it is necessary to provide some additional means of Naval Defence on the Pacific Coast of Canada.

The Minister states that two submarine boats have been offered to the Dominion Government; that these boats were originally built for the Chilean Government, which was unable to receive them, and that their dimensions are as follows:—

Displacement	313 tons.
Length	144 feet and
	152 feet, respectively.
Beam	15 feet.
Speed	13 knots.

The Technical Officers of the Department of the Naval Service report that these boats are very suitable, and recommend their purchase.

The Minister concurs and recommends, therefore, that these boats be purchased for the sum of One Million and Fifty Thousand (\$1,050,000) Dollars and that as the necessity is urgent, a Governor General's Warrant be issued covering this expenditure, the Minister of Finance having reported that there is no Parliamentary Appropriation from which this expenditure can be defrayed.

The Committee advise that a Governor General's Warrant do issue as recommended accordingly.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Honourable,
The Minister of the
Naval Service.

(See also 27)

27

ORDER IN COUNCIL

P.C. 2249

29th AUGUST 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 27th August, 1914, from the Minister of the Naval Service, stating that authority was recently given him by Order in Council, P.C. No. 2071 of the 7th August, 1914, (*bee App. 28*) to purchase two submarine boats.

The Minister further states that owing to a clerical error, the purchase price was shown as One Million and Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$1,050,000) whereas the actual price should have been One Million, One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$1,150,000).

The Minister, therefore, recommends that Order in Council P.C. No. 2071 of the 7th August, 1914, be cancelled, and that he be given authority to purchase the two submarine boats for the sum of One Million, One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$1,150,000), to be charged to war appropriation.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,

Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Honourable

The Minister of the Naval Service.

28

(NEUTRALITY — AUSTRIA — HUNGARY AND
SERVIA, GERMANY AND RUSSIA, AND
GERMANY AND FRANCE)
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION*

WHEREAS a state of war unhappily exists between Austria-Hungary and Servia and between Germany and Russia and between Germany and France; And Whereas the United States is on terms of friendship and amity with the contending powers, and with the persons inhabiting their several dominions;

And Whereas there are citizens of the United States residing within the territories or dominions of each of the said belligerents and carrying on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein;

And Whereas there are subjects of each of the said belligerents residing within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, and carrying on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein;

And Whereas the laws and treaties of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within

their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest;

And Whereas it is the duty of a neutral government not to permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the purposes of war;

Now, Therefore, I, WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States of America, in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States and of its citizens and of persons within its territory and jurisdiction, and to enforce its laws and treaties, and in order that all persons, being warned of the general tenor of the laws and treaties of the United States in this behalf, and of the law of nations, may thus be prevented from any violation of the same, do hereby declare and proclaim that by certain provisions of the act approved on the 4th day of March, A.D. 1909, commonly known as the "Penal Code of the United States" the following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, to wit:

1. Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents by land or by sea against the other belligerent.

2. Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

3. Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

4. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

5. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid.

6. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

7. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid. (But the said act is not to be construed to extend to a citizen or subject of either belligerents who, being transiently within the United States, shall, on board of any vessel of war, which, at the time of its arrival within the United States, was fitted and equipped as such vessel of war, enlist or enter himself or hire or retain another subject or citizen of the same belligerent, who is transiently within the United States, to enlist or enter himself to serve such belligerent on board such vessel of war, if the United States shall then be at peace with such belligerent.)

*Identical Proclamations were issued in respect to the following belligerents:

Germany and Great Britain, signed August 5, 1914.

Austria-Hungary and Russia, signed August 7, 1914.

Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, signed August 13, 1914.

France and Austria-Hungary, signed August 14, 1914.

8. Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents.

9. Issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for any ship or vessel to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid.

10. Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or augmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting, the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States was a ship of war, cruiser, or armed vessel in the service of either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects of either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessels, or by changing those on board of her for guns of a larger calibre, or by the addition thereto of any equipment solely applicable to war.

11. Beginning or setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions of either of the said belligerents.

And I do hereby further declare and proclaim that any frequenting and use of the waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States by the armed vessels of a belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations, or as posts of observation upon the ships of war or privateers or merchant vessels of a belligerent lying within or being about to enter the jurisdiction of the United States, must be regarded as unfriendly and offensive, and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this government to observe; and to the end that the hazard and inconvenience of such apprehended practices may be avoided, I further proclaim and declare that from and after the fifth day of August instant, and during the continuance of the present hostilities between AustriaHungary and Servia, and Germany and Russia and Germany and France, no. ship of war or privateer of any belligerent shall be permitted to make use of any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from which a vessel of an opposing belligerent (whether the same shall be a ship of war, a privateer, or a merchant ship) shall have previously departed, until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from the departure of such last-mentioned vessel beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.

If any ship of war or privateer of a belligerent shall, after the time this notification takes effect, enter any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the United States, such vessel shall be required to depart and put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters, except in case of stress of weather or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or for repairs; in any of which cases the authorities of the port or of the nearest port (as the case may be) shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twentyfour hours, without permitting her to take in supplies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use; and no such vessel which may have been permitted to remain within the waters of the United States for the purpose of repair shall continue within such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed, unless within such twenty-four hours a vessel whether ship of war, privateer, or merchant ship of an opposing belligerent, shall have departed therefrom, in which case the time limited for the departure of such ship of war or privateer shall be extended so far as may be necessary to secure an interval of not less than twentyfour hours between such departure and that of any ship of war, privateer, or merchant ship of an opposing belligerent which may have previously quit the same port, harbor, roadstead, or waters. No ship of war or privateer of a belligerent shall be detained in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the United States more than twenty-four hours, by reason of the successive departures from such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of more than one vessel of an opposing belligerent. But if there be several vessels of opposing belligerents in the same port, harbor, roadstead, or waters, the order of their departure therefrom shall be so arranged as to afford the opportunity of leaving alternately to the vessels of the opposing belligerents, and to cause the least detention consistent with the objects of this proclamation. No ship of war or privateer of a belligerent shall be permitted, while in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States, to take in any supplies except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel, if without any sail power, to the nearest port of her own country; or in case the vessel is rigged to go under sail, and may also be propelled by steam power, then with half the quantity of coal which she

would be entitled to receive, if dependent upon steam alone, and no coal shall be again supplied to any such ship of war or privateer in the same or any other port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the United States, without special permission, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal may have been last supplied to her within the waters of the United States, unless such ship of war or privateer shall, since last thus supplied, have entered a port of the government to which she belongs.

And I do further declare and proclaim that the statutes and the treaties of the United States and the law of nations alike require that no person, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, shall take part, directly or indirectly, in the said wars, but shall remain at peace with all of the said belligerents, and shall maintain a strict and impartial neutrality.

And I do hereby enjoin all citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States to observe the laws thereof, and to commit no act contrary to the provisions of the said statutes or treaties or in violation of the law of nations in that behalf.

And I do hereby warn all citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within its territory or jurisdiction that, while the free and full expression of sympathies in public and private is not restricted by the laws of the United States, military forces in aid of a belligerent cannot lawfully be originated or organized within its jurisdiction; and that, while all persons may lawfully and without restriction by reason of the aforesaid state of war manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war, and other articles ordinarily known as "contraband of war", yet they cannot carry such articles upon the high seas for the use or service of a belligerent, nor can they transport soldiers and officers of a belligerent, or attempt to break any blockade which may be lawfully established and maintained during the said wars without incurring the risk of hostile capture and the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf.

And I do hereby give notice that all citizens of the United States and others who may claim the protection of this government, who may misconduct themselves in the premises, will do so at their peril, and that they can in no wise obtain any protection from the government of the United States against the consequences of their misconduct.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

(SEAL)

Done at the city of Washington this fourth day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and thirty-ninth.

By the President:

WILLIAM
JENNINGS BRYAN.

Secretary of State.

(No. 1271)

WOODROW WILSON.

29

Telegram, sent 1.55 a.m., 5.viii.14. From The Department of the Naval Service, addressed to The Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. *Rainbow*, via Pachena Wireless Telegraph Station. Received 6.00 a.m. 5.viii.14.

30

NOTE ON THE ROYAL CANADIAN
NAVY TO 30th SEPTEMBER, 1915

The Naval Service Act, under which the Royal Canadian Navy was authorized, received the Royal Assent on 4th May, 1910.

At the outbreak of the Great War the naval establishment consisted of:—

(i) Personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy.

(ii) Personnel of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, authorized only as recently as the 18th May, 1914 (P.C. 1313). Members undertook to carry out the prescribed annual training and to serve in the Naval Service when called out.

(iii) The naval stations and dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt.

(iv) The Royal Naval College of Canada at Halifax, established in January, 1911, for imparting a complete education in naval science in a course recently extended from two to three years. At the outbreak of the War twenty-one cadets were in attendance.

(v) The first class armoured cruiser H.M.C.S. *Niobe*, 11,000 tons, built in 1897 and purchased from the British Government in 1910 for \$1,046,333. The complement, when in full commission, numbered 691. The designed speed was 2025 knots; the armament consisted of sixteen 6-in. guns, thirteen 12-pdr. guns and two submerged torpedo tubes.

(vi) The second class cruiser H.M.C.S. *Rainbow*, 3,600 tons, built in 1891 and purchased from the British Government in 1910 for \$243,333. The designed speed was

20 knots; the armament consisted of two 6-in. guns, six 4.7-in. guns, eight 6-pdr., and four above-water torpedo tubes. She was unarmoured except for a 2-in. deck plating.

(vii) Two small submarines; delivery of these vessels was made at sea on the night of the 4th/5th August, some hours after war had been declared. (See App. 26 and 27.)

(viii) Eleven small vessels employed on the Fisheries Protection Service, most of them on the Atlantic seaboard or the St. Lawrence waterways; one or two had light armament, but none were of any fighting value.

Since November, 1912, the policy of the Government had been to make no new appointments in the Royal Canadian Navy, to make no enlistments, to allow of no re-engagements of time-expired men and to permit of the free discharge of those who wished to leave before completion of their term of engagement. As a result, the strength on 3rd August, 1914, had sunk to 71 officers (including midshipmen), 203 ratings and 21 naval cadets. In addition, there were on loan from the Royal Navy 21 officers and 20 ratings. The newly formed Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Force had reached only a strength of 12 officers and 45 ratings. This gives a grand total of 393.

During the course of the war, including those already serving on 3rd August, 1914, the numbers appointed to, or enlisted in, the Royal Canadian Navy reached a total of 391 officers, 1,080 ratings and 156 naval cadets; the numbers in the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve reached a total of 745 officers and 6,613 ratings; the numbers on loan from the Royal Navy, paid from Canadian funds, increased to 90 officers and 583 ratings, a grand total of 9,658 all ranks.

The Naval Service Act provided that in an emergency the Canadian Naval Forces might be placed "at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy," which meant, in effect, bringing the Royal Canadian Navy under the Admiralty for tactical purposes. By P.C. 2049 of 4th August this provision was acted upon. (See Appendix 25.)

As a consequence of the new policy, adopted in 1912, the two ships, H.M.C.S. *Niobe* on the east coast, and H.M.C.S. *Rainbow* on the west coast, had been out of commission, with no more than care and maintenance crews aboard. Once or twice the *Rainbow* had lighted her boilers, raised steam and put out for a few hours in order to turn over her engines; but the last occasion had been in March, 1913.

For the pelagic seal fisheries protection service the practice was for the Admiralty to provide Royal Naval vessels. Accordingly, in the summer of 1914 two sloops, the *Algerine* and *Shearwater*, were being sent via Cape Horn, but it was decided by the Canadian Government to detail also the *Rainbow*. In July orders were issued for her to be prepared for sea, whereupon, as her crew of 47 ratings was quite insufficient, the small crew of the *Niobe* was despatched from Halifax. At this time the *Komagata Maru* incident arose (see Appendix 4) and the *Rainbow* was directed to proceed from Esquimalt to Vancouver, to enforce the departure of that vessel with her troublesome passengers; the *Niobe's* contingent arrived on the 20th July, just in time to enable the *Rainbow* to carry out the duty, after which she resumed her preparations for the seal patrol.

In view of the threatening situation in Europe, the Admiralty asked on 1st August that the *Rainbow* be kept available for trade protection, more particularly the protection of grain ships going south from British Columbia, as it was reported that there was a German cruiser "somewhere on west coast of United States or Mexico." These orders were repeated to Commander Walter Hose, R.C.N., the Commanding Officer of the *Rainbow*, at 6 p.m. the same day. On the 2nd he received the following order direct from the Admiralty:

Leipzig reported left Mazatlan Mex. 10 a.m. 30th July. *Rainbow* should proceed south at once in order to get in touch with her and generally guard trade routes north of the equator.

The *Leipzig* was a fast modern light cruiser, 3,250 tons, capable of 23 knots and armed with guns which outranged the *Rainbow's*.

On the same day the *Rainbow* reported herself as "ready for sea." The term was relative only: for her class in the Royal Navy the authorized complement was 273, though under Canadian naval regulations the reduced figure of 229 had been fixed. But after securing every available man, including the *Niobe's* detachment, she had only 121. Of these, 44 were members of the newly organized R.N.C.V.R., many of whom had had no sea experience and knew nothing of naval work. Important essentials in the equipment of a fighting ship were also lacking; she had no high explosive ammunition, and her wireless equipment was limited to a night range of two hundred miles. Her sea speed was about 16 knots, considerably below that of any hostile vessel she was likely to meet.

At midnight 2nd/3rd August, the *Rainbow* received further orders:

You are to proceed to sea forthwith to guard trade routes north of equator, keeping in touch with Pachena (*wireless station*) until war has been declared. Obtain information from north-bound steamers. Have arranged for 500 tons of coal at San Diego. United States does not prohibit belligerents from coaling in her ports. Will arrange for credits at San Diego and San Francisco. No further news of *Leipzig*.

The Commanding Officer of the *Rainbow* had submitted that that vessel should remain in the vicinity of Cape Flattery until more accurate information was received, as otherwise, if the *Leipzig* slipped by unobserved when the *Rainbow* was far to the south, ships entering the Strait of Juan de Fuca would be at her mercy. But this was not approved. At 1.00 a.m., one hour after the receipt of the above instructions, the *Rainbow* weighed and proceeded to sea. She kept in touch with Pachena wireless station, continued her preparations and carried out firing practice for calibration of guns. Having received a message at 8.30 p.m. that the very necessary high explosive shell was available at Vancouver, course was altered with a view to making that port; but when abreast of Race Rocks at 6.00 a.m. on the 5th the following message from Naval Headquarters at Ottawa was taken in:

Received from Admiralty. Begins *Nurnburg* and *Leipzig* reported August 4th off Magdalena Bay steering north. Ends. Do your utmost to protect *Algerine* and *Shearwater* steering north from San Diego. Remember Nelson and the British Navy. All Canada is watching.

The *Algerine* and *Shearwater* were two small sloops of 980 and 1,050 tons respectively, unequipped with wireless, with designed maximum speed of 13 knots, but against the head winds encountered on this voyage they were at times unable to make more than a single knot.

In consequence, the *Rainbow* altered course again to carry out her orders. She was making 15 knots but was having trouble with leaky steam joints. On the morning of the 7th San Francisco was reached, but the optimistic assurances from Ottawa respecting coal were not realized. The United States authorities acted under the neutrality regulations, which limit a belligerent ship's stay, under ordinary circumstances, to twenty-four hours, and restrict fuel supply to sufficient to make the nearest home port; the *Rainbow* received fifty tons of coal. (See App. 28.)

Directly refuelling was completed, at 1.15 a.m. on the 8th, the *Rainbow* put to sea again in search of the two German cruisers *Leipzig* and *Nurnberg*, which had been reported as having been sighted thirteen hours earlier, 300 miles south of San Francisco and steering north at high speed.

In so far as concerned the *Nurnberg* the report was inaccurate, for, as was learned some time later, that vessel had left the west coast to join Admiral von Spee's squadron. But the report was correct as to the *Leipzig*, for that vessel entered San Francisco harbour three hours after the *Rainbow* had left.

On the 8th and 9th the *Rainbow* cruised off San Francisco to the southward of the Farralone Islands, and although the *Leipzig* must have intercepted messages sent out from Farralone Islands wireless station reporting the *Rainbow's* position *en clair*, which the *Rainbow* herself picked up, the two vessels never met. For two days they cannot have been far apart; doubtless the patches of fog, which prevailed at the time, accounted for their not sighting each other.

At 9.30 a.m. on the 10th August, the *Rainbow* having sighted neither the *Leipzig* nor the sloops, turned homewards to replenish her coal supply. Early in the morning of the 13th, when twenty miles off Esquimalt, the *Shearwater* was sighted, and escorted into harbour. Her first signal was: "Has war been declared?"

At Esquimalt the *Rainbow* coaled and took on a supply of high explosive ammunition; but as no fuzes were available the ammunition was of no use. In twelve hours the *ship* was at sea again.

In the meantime the Grand Trunk Pacific Steamship *Prince George* had been fitted up on the 9th as a hospital ship, and she kept in touch with the *Rainbow* in order to be available in case of an action. On the afternoon of the 14th the *Algerine* was sighted. Her coal supply being exhausted, she had stopped a passing collier and was refuelling. The *Rainbow* escorted her into Esquimalt harbour on the 15th and thereby fulfilled her first war mission successfully.

On the 18th August the following telegram was received by the Naval Department from the Admiralty:

Your telegram of to-day approved. Send *Rainbow* to cruise off San Francisco to inspire confidence in the trade, to engage or drive off *Leipzig* if still there, but not to follow her up.

In anticipation of Admiralty authority, instructions had already been given on the 17th to this effect, and the *Rainbow* was

actually at sea searching for the *Leipzig* when the Admiralty instructions came to hand. On the 18th August, however, both German cruisers being reported off San Francisco (erroneously in respect to the *Nurnberg*) the *Rainbow* was recalled. It was probably considered unfair to ask the old Canadian cruiser to fight two modern ships, each fully manned, better equipped, more powerfully armed and much speedier.

At 700 p.m. on the 19th, while the *Rainbow* was coaling, a report was received of a threefunnelled cruiser having been seen near Prince Rupert; this might have been either the *Leipzig* or the *Nurnberg* and an attack on Prince Rupert was a contingency which had been exercising the naval and military authorities. The *Rainbow* was ordered to proceed there, with the hospital ship *Prince George* in attendance; Submarine O.O.1 also remained in company for part of the way. The *Rainbow* arrived at Prince Rupert on the 21st and received further reports of the suspicious vessel having been seen, but she was never identified. It is now known, from a German source, that the special object of the *Leipzig* was the Canadian Pacific "Empress" Liners; but the plan broke down for lack of coal. The *Rainbow* remained on the Prince Rupert Station, patrolling the Dixon Entrance, until she turned south for Esquimalt on the 30th August.

In the meantime the Admiralty had recognized the necessity for strengthening the naval forces on the west coast of America, and H.M.S. *Newcastle*, a speedier and more powerful cruiser, was detached from the China Station on the 11th August and arrived at Esquimalt on the 22nd. On that day Japan declared war on Germany, and the first-class armoured cruiser *Idzumo*, already on the North American coast, was placed at the disposal of the Admiralty. Other powerful Japanese vessels were detailed, including a battleship, and also, for a short time, the battle cruiser H.M.A.S. *Australia* of the Royal Australian Navy.

The *Rainbow* now operated in consort with Japanese, British and Australian warships, and her role became a subsidiary one.

For six months the tension on the west coast did not completely relax. Admiral von Spee's squadron, which then included the *Leipzig* and *Nurnberg*, had been destroyed on the 8th December at the battle of Falkland Islands, but the cruiser *Dresden* had escaped. She remained at large until sunk on 14th March, 1915, off Juan Fernandez by the *Kent* and *Glasgow*. A week later information reached the Admiralty of the destruction as far back as 4th November, 1914, of yet

another German cruiser, the *Karlsruhe*, by an internal explosion three hundred miles off Bermuda. Previously for some time she had operated on the west coast of South America. As the armed merchant cruisers *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Kronprinz Wilhelm* had by now been definitely located on the east coast of South America, the menace to the west coast was at last definitely removed. The *Rainbow* continued, however, to be active, patrolling between Esquimalt and South American waters, and picked up several German supply ships as prizes. She had as tender a merchant ship, the *Protesilaus*, from which she frequently refuelled and reprovisioned at sea.

Besides the *Rainbow* the Canadian naval force on the west coast included the two submarines, *C.C.1* and *C.C.2*, which were added to the Royal Canadian Navy after the outbreak of war. They had been constructed by a private firm at Seattle for the Chilean Government, but falling short of specifications in respect to radius of action, their acceptance had been refused. They were each of 313 tons surface displacement and 421 tons submerged; the surface speed was 13 knots and submerged speed 10.25 knots; one vessel had five torpedo tubes and was designed to carry five 18-in. torpedoes; the other, three torpedo tubes and provision for six 18-in. torpedoes.

On the morning of 3rd August, 1914, when the entry of the British Empire into the European war seemed imminent, the immediate purchase of these two vessels was recommended by the Commander, Esquimalt Dockyard; the Provincial Government offered to advance the money—\$1,150,000. While the Government was still awaiting reply to a cable to the Admiralty, the Provincial Government and the local naval authorities, with the concurrence of the Minister of Agriculture, then on the west coast, took definite steps. An officer was sent out to a rendezvous off Trial Island, and at 10.00 p.m. On 4th August, without clearance papers, the boats left Seattle, under cover of a fog, with a navigating staff and engineers provided by the builders. At the rendezvous the submarines were accepted after a four-hour inspection, a cheque for the full amount was handed over in payment, and they continued to Esquimalt, arriving on the morning of the 5th.

Only prompt action and the co-operation of the provincial and local naval authorities made possible the acquisition of the vessels. When they left Seattle it was known that war had been declared, and under the President's neutrality proclamation the sale of warships to belligerents had thereupon become

illegal. (See App. 28.) The United States authorities must have obtained some inkling of the negotiations, for a cruiser was despatched to try to intercept the submarines before they reached Canadian waters. The circumstances, in fact, bore a striking resemblance to those connected with the delivery of the famous *Alabama*.

The services of an experienced submarine officer were, fortunately, available, and in two weeks one boat had a complete trained crew, and by the end of August both had full complements, made up almost entirely of naval volunteers from Victoria and Vancouver. There being no 18-in. torpedoes available at Esquimalt--those of the *Rainbow* were 14-in. -the torpedoes of the *Niobe*, complete with war-heads, were despatched by rail from Halifax; they reached Esquimalt on the 15th August. The O.O.2 had to go into drydock at the beginning of September for repairs as the result of some damage which had been suffered by striking an obstruction on the voyage from Seattle, but the repairs were speedily effected. A report by the Officer in charge, dated 4th December, 1914, stated that "the vessels were well constructed, seaworthy, steer well, can be kept under excellent control when submerged, and can be very easily manipulated." In September the *Shearwater* was recommissioned with naval volunteers and continued to serve throughout the war as mothership to the two submarines.

From the moment that crews were available the submarines patrolled constantly in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and vicinity, and prior to that plausible reports of their movements were circulated and widely published in the American newspapers. It may have been on account of the activities, or supposed activities, of these submarines that no attempt was made by the *Leipzig* or any other German vessel to enter the narrow waters of the Juan de Fuca Strait with a view to shelling Victoria or Vancouver. Such, indeed was the opinion of the Director of the Canadian Naval Service, Vice-Admiral Kingsmill, and many other naval officers with whom he discussed the matter: he had little doubt that the submarines, once they were in commission, would have been able to sink any hostile vessel entering Canadian waters.

The condition of the *Niobe* was still more deplorable than that of the *Rainbow*. She had stranded on Cape Sable on 30th July, 1911, for two hours, and had been towed to Halifax a week later, but it was December, 1912, before complete repairs had been

effected; the new naval policy had by then been instituted, with the result that the *Niobe* did not go to sea again, even to try out her engines. As a consequence, when orders for her commissioning were issued on 1st August there was much to be done before she could leave harbour. While the ship was being fitted up, and engines and boilers overhauled, efforts were devoted to securing sufficient men to man her, for even the small care and maintenance crew was not available, having been sent to the west coast to join the *Rainbow*. Mr. Aemilius Jarvis, a prominent member of the Canadian Navy League, undertook a recruiting campaign, chiefly along the Great Lakes, and, as they were useless for fighting purposes, the British *sloops*, *Shearwater* and *Algerine*, were placed out of commission and their crews rushed to Halifax, where they joined the *Niobe*. The overhauling of the ship was completed by the end of August; a supply of ammunition had by then arrived from England and it was possible to carry out a trial run, which was reported upon as quite satisfactory. On that date (1st September), the *Niobe* came under the orders of the Admiral commanding the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, responsible for the North Atlantic. But she was still short of a full complement and proceeded first to St. John's, Newfoundland, to take on men of the Royal Naval Newfoundland Reserve. Thereafter, of her complement of 691, only twenty-one belonged to the Royal Canadian Navy; the Royal Navy furnished 164, the Royal Naval Newfoundland Reserve 107, and temporary service volunteers of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, newly enlisted, numbered 366; of the thirty-three remaining, twenty-two were Royal Marines.

On 11th September the *Niobe*, under the command of Captain R. G. Corbett, R.N., sailed from Halifax for Bermuda, escorting the transport SS. *Canada* conveying The Royal Canadian Regiment, and convoyed back to Halifax the same transport carrying the 2nd Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, which the R.C.R. had relieved. On her return she was again in dockyard hands for a week, due to engine trouble, and afterwards took her place on the North Atlantic patrol with the Fourth Cruiser Squadron. She continued on active service for a full year, steaming over 30,000 nautical miles on patrol duty. By that time, however, her boilers and engines required very extensive refitting and her funnels were collapsing; it was decided in view of her age, and having regard to the

employment of her crew to the best advantage, to convert her into a depot ship at Halifax. This was done on 6th September, 1915.

The two dockyards of Halifax and Esquimalt became extremely busy centres. Halifax, in conjunction with Bermuda, was the base for the fleets operating in the North Atlantic, and a constant succession of warships refuelled and reprovisioned there, while the ship-repair facilities were utilized to the fullest extent. Into Halifax were brought neutral merchant vessels, stopped at sea, for the purpose of examination of their cargoes for contraband. Here, and also at Montreal and Saint John, N.B., the defensive armament and necessary structural alteration of Canadian and British merchant ships was undertaken on a large scale by a special staff.

The Atlantic Coast Patrol was a subsidiary formation consisting of smaller vessels - trawlers, drifters and motor boats. It developed extensively as the war progressed. The area patrolled extended from Belle Isle to Shelburne, and from Point des Monts (St. Lawrence) to the Virgin Rocks, including the Nova Scotia Banks and the Grand Banks. Constant patrols along the coast were made and also of certain positions of strategic importance, and daily mine-sweeping of the approaches to Halifax, Sydney and St. John's (Newfoundland) was carried out. Anti-submarine nets were stretched across the entrances to Halifax and Sydney harbours and maintained throughout the war. The maintenance of these flotillas necessitated the establishment of a large depot at Sydney, which, during the course of the war, became an important naval port.

At Esquimalt refits of British and Allied ships were undertaken which involved large operations. H.M.S. Kent proceeded there to repair the extensive damage suffered in the battle of the Falkland Islands. The large Japanese cruiser *Asama* having stranded off the lower California coast on 3rd February, 1915, the salvage operations carried out by Japanese personnel were based on Esquimalt; when, six months later, the *Asama* was refloated she was towed to Esquimalt and there more completely repaired and refitted for return to Japan under her own steam. In addition to coaling and re-equipping warships which came into Esquimalt, the dockyard also sent out supply ships to Canadian, British and Japanese warships at sea.

31

P.C. 2040

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 5th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise, with regard to the existing situation, that the Minister of Militia and Defence be permitted to call out units of the Active (non-permanent) Militia, as circumstances may demand, to complete the unexpired portion of the thirty (30) days' training authorized by section 52 of the Militia Act.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

32

GENERAL ORDERS
1914

HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA, 6th August, 1914.

G.O. 142.—CALLING OUT OF TROOPS ON
ACTIVE SERVICE

In virtue of an order by His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, numbered P.C. 2068, dated the 6th day of August, 1914, and made under the authority of section 69 of the Militia Act, the corps and parts of the Militia hereinafter mentioned are placed on Active Service, namely:

1. The President, Vice-President and Military Members of the Militia Council.
2. The Permanent Staff employed at Militia Headquarters, Ottawa, Ont., and in the several Divisional Areas and Districts. 3. All Corps of the Permanent Force.
4. 1st Division.
 - 24th Regiment (Grey's Horse). Details.
 - 7th Regiment (Fusiliers). Details. 21st Regiment (Essex Fusiliers). Details.
5. 2nd Division.
 - 2nd Dragoons. Details. 19th (Lincoln) Regiment.
 - 23rd Regiment (The Northern Pioneers). Details.
 - 35th Regiment (Simcoe Foresters). Details.
 - 44th Regiment (Lincoln and Welland Regiment).
 - 51st Regiment (Soo Rifles). Details.

6. 3rd Division.
 4th Hussars. Details.
 Cobourg Heavy Battery, C.G.A.
 5th Field Company, Canadian Engineers.
 14th Regiment (The Princess of Wales' Own Rifles). Details.
 56th Grenville Regiment (Lisgar Rifles). Details.
 59th Stormont and Glengarry Regiment. Details.
7. 4th Division.
 17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars (Argenteuil Rangers). Details.
 15th (Shefford) Battery, C.F.A. Details.
 21st (Westmount) Battery, C.F.A. Details.
 22nd (Sherbrooke) Battery, C.F.A. Details.
 The Montreal Heavy Brigade, C.G.A. Details.
 4th Field Company, C.E. Details.
 Laval Contingent, C.O.T.C. Details.
 1st Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards). Details.
 3rd Regiment (Victoria Rifles of Canada). Details.
 5th Regiment (Royal Highlanders of Canada). Details.
 53rd Sherbrooke Regiment. Details.
 54th Regiment (Carabiniers de Sherbrooke). Details.
 64th Chateauguay and Beauharnois Regiment. Details.
 65th Carabiniers (Mont-Royal). Details.
 85th Regiment. Details.
8. 5th Division.
 6th (Quebec and Levis) Regiment C.G.A. Details.
 8th Regiment (Royal Rifles). Details.
 9th Regiment (Voltigeurs de Quebec).
 89th Temiscouata and Rimouski Regiment. Details.
 No. 10 Company, C.A.S.C.
 No. 7 Field Ambulance. Details.
9. 6th Division.
 1st Halifax Regiment, C.G.A.
 3rd (New Brunswick) Regiment, C.G.A.
 Prince Edward Island Heavy Brigade, C.G.A.
 63rd Regiment (Halifax Rifles).
 66th Regiment (Princess Louise Fusiliers).
 73rd Northumberland Regiment. Details.
 94th Victoria Regiment (Argyll Highlanders).
 8th Company, C.A.S.C.
 No. IX Field Ambulance. Details.
10. Military District No. 10.
 16th Light Horse. Details.
 27th Light Horse. Details.
 29th Light Horse. Details.
 34th Fort Garry Horse. Details.
 26th Battery, C.F.A. Details.
 36th Battery, C.F.A. Details.
 52nd Regiment (Prince Albert Volunteers). Details.
 60th Rifles of Canada. Details.
 95th Saskatchewan Rifles. Details.
 96th Lake Superior Regiment. Details.
 99th Manitoba Rangers. Details.
 105th Regiment (Saskatoon Fusiliers). Details.
 No. 18 Company, C.A.S.C. Details.
11. Military District No. 13.
 19th Alberta Dragoons. Details.
 21st Alberta Hussars. Details.
 23rd Alberta Rangers. Details.
 103rd Regiment (Calgary Rifles). Details.
 (H.Q. 54-21-4).
 By Command,
 J. C. MACDOUGALL, Colonel,
 for Adjutant-General,
 (absent on duty.)
 (P.C. 2198)

33

OTTAWA, 10th August, 1914.

Memo to-Adjutant General.

The Minister desires that you wire to Colonel Roy to mobilize entire force in his District at *once—full* strength.

Concentrate same at Victoria, Vancouver, New Westminster, Nanaimo and Prince Rupert.

ENA MACADAM,
 Private Secretary.

**STRENGTH, MILITIA UNITS CALLED OUT FOR ACTIVE SERVICE (OTHER THAN
UTILITARIAN UNITS AT VALCARTIER CAMP 1914) AND NOT FORMING
PART OF THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
31st AUGUST 1914 TO 31st AUGUST 1915**

Unit	31st August 1914		30th November 1914		28th February 1915		31st May 1915		31st August 1915	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
<i>Military District No. 1.—</i>										
24th Horse.....		11		10		11		12		12
1st (How.) Bde. C.A.....		8								
7th Regt.....	1	49	1	50	1	52	2	61	3	173
21st Regt.....		16	1	16	1	44	2	74	2	95
22nd Regt.....		8	2	1					2	
25th Regt.....		8							2	1
27th Regt.....	1	14	1	23	1	46	1	48	1	46
28th Regt.....		8							2	1
32nd Regt.....	1	23	1	24	1	28	1	29	1	29
Mil. Dist. No. 1—TOTAL.....	3	145	6	124	4	181	6	224	13	357
<i>Military District No. 2.—</i>										
The G.G.B.G.....			3	103	1	23	1	17	1	28
2nd Dragoons.....		9		15		18		18		18
9th Horse.....					1	26	1	16	1	22
2nd Regt.....	1	25	7	213	7	209	6	154	7	163
10th Regt.....	3	54			1	56	6	146	6	151
12th Regt.....					2		2		3	30
13th Regt.....			1	28	1	34	1	31		
19th Regt.....	9	258	14	344	17	392	16	440	16	448
20th Regt.....		10				9		5		7
23rd Regt.....		1			10	126	6	17	4	36
31st Regt.....		9		7		2				
34th Regt.....						2				2
35th Regt.....		3		3		1		1		1
36th Regt.....		26		26				19		9
44th Regt.....	14	241	22	468	29	482	36	531	33	464
48th Regt.....			4	136	1	60	9	203	9	214
51st Regt.....	15	179	12	192	13	207	15	207	12	212
77th Regt.....	4	81	4	93	4	88	3	89	2	89
91st Regt.....			1	28	1	34	1	31		
C.A.S.C.....					1	16	1	15	1	20
C.A.M.C.....					1	5	1	8	1	8
C.A.V.C.....				3	1	24	1	24	1	20
Mil. Dist. No. 2—TOTAL.....	46	896	68	1,659	91	1,814	106	1,972	97	1,942
<i>Military District No. 3.—</i>										
4th Hussars.....	4	68	3	73	4	69	6	70	6	70
5th Fd. Coy., C.E.....			2	60	2	62	4	32	4	29
G.G.F.G.....				4						
14th Regt.....	7	191	6	173	8	181	7	173	6	197
42nd Regt.....					5	157	4	158	5	155
43rd Regt.....	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	15	1	15
56th Regt.....	5	68	5	50	4	56	5	66	6	64
59th Regt.....	12	95	14	150	12	153	15	180	17	193
Mil. Dist. No. 3—TOTAL.....	29	434	31	522	36	600	42	694	45	723
<i>Military District No. 4.—</i>										
6th Hussars.....			2	1		9	8	12		
17th Hussars.....	1	16	2	19		17	2	19		
Montreal Hy. Bty. C.A.....		8		8		8		8		8
4th Fd. Coy., C.E.....		8		10		10		10		10
C.O.T.C. (Laval).....		4		4		4		4		
1st Regt.....	3	45	4	105		70	5	165		7
3rd Regt.....	4	110	4	101		117	3	165		6
5th Regt.....	3	88	4	112	3	96	1	100		4
53rd Regt.....		4		4		4		4		7
54th Regt.....		4		4		7		7		7
55th Regt.....							2	127		
64th Regt.....	2	43	2	56	3	42	4	81		

**STRENGTH, MILITIA UNITS CALLED OUT FOR ACTIVE SERVICE (OTHER THAN
UTILITARIAN UNITS AT VALCARTIER CAMP 1914) AND NOT FORMING
PART OF THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
31st AUGUST 1914 TO 31st AUGUST 1915—Continued**

Unit	31st August 1914		30th November 1914		28th February 1915		21st May 1915		31st August 1915	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
<i>Military District No. 4.—Conc.</i>										
65th Carabiniens.....	2	56	2	115	135	3	214	8
85th Regt.....	1	33	1	8
Composite Regt.....	18	370	24	799	31	912
C.A.S.C.....	4	4	1	3	7
C.A.M.C.....	6	5	1	7
C.P.C.....	2	4
Mil. Dist. No. 4—TOTAL.	16	419	21	557	24	900	54	1,729	31	976
<i>Military District No. 5.—</i>										
6th Regt. C.G.A.....	16	274	13	162	1	47	14	150	13	154
8th Regt.....	4	102	5	140	5	138	8	231	11	356
9th Regt.....	33	452	15	286	17	256	15	302	19	453
17th Regt.....	2	31
87th Regt.....	4	55	2	26	3	44	3	55
C.S.C.....	22	16	1	21	21
C.A.S.C.....	2	2
C.A.M.C.....	3	40	14	1	4	1	3
C.A.V.C.....	1	3	1
C.P.C.....	3	3	3
Mil. Dist No. 5—TOTAL..	56	890	38	662	25	486	41	757	49	1,078
<i>Military District No. 6.—</i>										
3rd Hy. Bty. C.A.....	3	49	4	59	3	51	1	27	1	25
4th Hy. Bty. C.A.....	4	54	3	57	3	53	3	48	3	30
1st Regt. C.G.A.....	16	230	19	267	22	262	21	263	23	323
3rd Regt. C.G.A.....	10	105	10	109	10	103	6	99	10	117
Composite Coy. C.A.....	4	60	4	60
1st Fd. Coy. C.E.....	16	19	12	93
62nd Regt.....	3	56	3	48	3	58	3	58	3	59
63rd Regt.....	21	403	33	495	32	485	32	472	29	507
66th Regt.....	29	473	34	490	34	480	31	439	33	487
67th Regt.....	1	26	1	26
73rd Regt.....	10	186	4	58	4	59	4	59	4	68
78th Regt.....	3	61	3	56	3	56	3	56	3	56
94th Regt.....	34	483	33	458	31	427	28	417	28	417
Composite Battn.....	29	432	28	470	32	617	28	464
C.A.S.C.....	1	23	1	15	3	23	9	16
C.A.M.C.....	20	39
Mil. Dist. No. 6—TOTAL.	133	2,116	176	2,571	174	2,519	172	2,714	211	2,787
<i>Military District No. 10.—</i>										
16th L. Horse.....	12	11	8
18th Mtd. Rifles.....	2	6	6	6	6
20th Border Horse.....	6	6	6
27th L. Horse.....	1
29th L. Horse.....	4	6	13	13	12
32nd Man. Horse.....	6	7	8	8	8
34th F. G. Horse.....	1	22	6	94	6	52	4	53	5	66
36th Bty. C.A.....	7	7	7	7	7
C. of Guides.....	2	13	2	14	1	15
52nd Regt.....	3	4	4	4	4
60th Rifles.....	1	3	3	3	3	1	15
79th Highlanders.....	4	5	5	5	5
90th Regt.....	7	7	7	7	7
95th Rifles.....	7	7	8	7	7
96th Regt.....	16	196	12	258	13	258	13	314	11	348
98th Regt.....	6	4	91	2	58	2	60

**STRENGTH, MILITIA UNITS CALLED OUT FOR ACTIVE SERVICE (OTHER THAN
UTILITARIAN UNITS AT VALCARTIER CAMP 1914) AND NOT FORMING
PART OF THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
31st AUGUST 1914 TO 31st AUGUST 1915—Concluded**

Unit	31st August 1914		30th November 1914		28th February 1915		31st May 1915		31st August 1915	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
<i>Military District No. 10.—Conc.</i>										
90th Rangers.....		3		10		10		10		10
100th Grenadiers.....		3		4		4		4		4
105th Regt.....		3		8		8		8		8
106th Regt.....		4		4		4	1	30	1	30
C.A.S.C.....		5		8		3		1		2
Mil. Dist. No. 10—TOTAL	18	280	18	444	25	524	22	571	21	630
<i>Military District No. 11.—</i>										
30th B.C. Horse.....	28	317	25	389	7	77	10	161	20	313
31st B.C. Horse.....	4	26								
Victoria Sqdn.....	6	92	6	126					6	115
5th Regt. C.G.A.....	16	302	21	392	22	326	14	286	19	248
6th Fd. Coy. C.E.....	4	130	4	57	4	96	4	104	4	121
C. of Guides.....	1	10	2	11	4	19	4	10	2	49
6th Regt.....	20	299	10	261	16	303	12	265	15	295
11th Regt.....	17	327	13	150	18	423	17	263	16	249
50th Regt.....	20	312	18	221	16	257	20	288	17	576
72nd Regt.....	13	239	11	161	17	355	17	282	26	335
88th Regt.....	21	341	14	241	18	512	18	282	24	379
102nd Regt.....	21	267	8	145	14	185	10	175	19	384
104th Regt.....	24	416	12	192	13	494	14	254	16	245
107th Regt.....									6	52
Indpt. Coy. of Rifles.....	3	56	2	56	3	56	3	55	2	34
Indpt. Coy. of Inf.....					1	25	1	25	1	24
C.A.S.C.....	2	101	2	71	3	84	5	116	4	130
C.A.M.C.....	8	91	2	27	3	70	3	42	4	49
Mil. Dist. No. 11—TOTAL	208	3,326	150	2,500	159	3,282	152	2,608	201	3,648
<i>Military District No. 13.—</i>										
19th Dragoons.....		4		4		4		8		8
21st Hussars.....		4		5						
23rd Rangers.....		4		4						
25th Bty. C.A.....		5	2	15	1	15	1	43	2	34
101st Fusiliers.....				5		1		1		1
103rd Rifles.....		17		22		11		8	6	52
Mil. Dist. No. 13—TOTAL		34	2	55	1	31	1	60	8	95
GRAND TOTAL.....	509	8,540	510	9,094	539	10,427	596	11,329	676	12,236

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P.C. 2389

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT
OTTAWA

Thursday, the 17th day of September, 1914.

PRESENT:

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL IN COUNCIL

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS the Governor General in Council, under and in virtue of the provisions of section 6 of The War Measures Act, 1914, is pleased to make and doth hereby make the following Orders and Regulations respecting Aerial Navigation.

1. No person shall navigate or be carried in aircraft of any class or description over or within ten miles of any of the following places, namely:—

Halifax and Sydney, in the Province of Nova Scotia;
St. John and Fredericton, in the Province of New Brunswick;
Quebec, St. Jean, Valcartier and Montreal, in the Province of Quebec;
Ottawa, Kingston, London and Toronto, in the Province of Ontario;
Winnipeg, in the Province of Manitoba;
Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan;
Calgary and Edmonton, in the Province of Alberta;

Victoria and Vancouver, in the Province of British Columbia;

Charlottetown, in the Province of Prince Edward Island;

The following Wireless Telegraph Stations in Canada:—

Partridge Island (St. John, New Brunswick).

Cape Sable, Nova Scotia.

Sable Island, Nova Scotia.

Camperdown, (Halifax), Nova Scotia.

Glace Bay, Nova Scotia.

North Sydney, Nova Scotia.

Pictou, Nova Scotia.

Cape Bear, Prince Edward Island.

Harrington, Province of Quebec.

Heath Point, Province of Quebec.

Grindstone Island, (Magdalen Islands).

Fame Point, Province of Quebec.

Clarke City, Province of Quebec.

Father Point, Province of Quebec.

Grosse Isle, Province of Quebec.

Newcastle, New Brunswick.

Quebec, Province of Quebec.

Three Rivers, Province of Quebec.

Montreal, Province of Quebec.

Kingston, Ontario.

Toronto, Ontario.

Port Burwell, Ontario.

Point Edward (Sarnia), Ontario.

Midland, Ontario.

Tobermory, Ontario.

Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario.

Port Arthur, Ontario.

Le Pas, Manitoba.

Port Nelson, Manitoba.

Point Grey (Vancouver), British Columbia.

Gonzales Hill (Victoria), British Columbia.

Pachena Point, British Columbia.

Estevan Point, British Columbia.

Triangle Island, British Columbia.

Cape Lazo, British Columbia.

Alert Bay, British Columbia.

Ikeda Head, British Columbia.

Dead Tree Point, British Columbia.

Prince Rupert, British Columbia.

2. No person shall navigate or be carried in aircraft coming from any place outside of Canada over any portion of the boundary or coast line of Canada or the territorial waters adjacent to such coast line, except such portions of the boundary and coast line and the territorial waters adjacent thereto as are described as follows:—

The Boundary Line south of Canada between Canada and the United States.

3. No person navigating or being carried in aircraft coming from any place outside of Canada shall land at any place in Canada except within the areas following and no person shall navigate or be carried in aircraft

over any part of Canada until after such person has landed in one of the said landing areas and has complied with the conditions set forth in paragraph 4, of these orders and regulations.

The said landing areas are numbered, and described as follows:—

No. 1.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Annapolis, in the Province of *Nova Scotia*, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 2.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Woodstock, in the Province of New Brunswick, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 3.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Lake Megantic, in the Province of Quebec, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 4.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Hemmingford, in the Province of Quebec, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 5.—A circular area having the Village Hall of the Village of Athens, in the Province of Ontario, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 6.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Welland, in the Province of Ontario, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 7.—A circular area having the Village Hall of the Village of Essex, in the Province of Ontario, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 8.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Morris in the Province of Manitoba, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 9.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Estevan, in the Province of Saskatchewan, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 10.—A circular area having the City Hall of the City of Lethbridge, in the *Province* of Alberta, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

No. 11.—A circular area having the Town Hall of the Town of Chilliwack, in the Province of British Columbia, as its centre, and having a radius of three miles.

4. Every person navigating or being carried in aircraft coming from any place outside of Canada, shall comply with the following conditions:—

(1) He shall before commencing a voyage in Canada, apply for a clearance to such officer named in this paragraph as the officer for the landing area on which such person lands, and such person shall immediately after

reaching Canada, make a landing at the nearest landing place, and shall not continue a voyage in Canada until at least twelve hours after such officer has issued the clearance to him.

In the application (of which three copies must be supplied) he shall state the following particulars:—

- (a) The name and registered number (if any) of aircraft.
- (b) Type of aircraft.
- (c) Name, nationality, and place of residence of the owner, or the person in charge, and of every member of the crew, and name, profession, nationality, and place of residence of every passenger (if any).
- (d) Nature of cargo (if any).
- (e) Proposed points to be visited and destination.
- (f) Object of voyage.

No change shall be made in the arrangements stated in the application unless with the consent in writing of the officer applied to.

(2) No person in any aircraft entering Canada shall carry or allow to be carried,

- (a) Any goods the importation of which is prohibited by law.
- (b) Any explosives or firearms, photographic apparatus, carrier or homing pigeons.
- (c) Any mails.

(3) He shall in his subsequent voyage unless exempted by the terms of the clearance, comply with the following conditions:

- (a) In the case of an airship, at least one Canadian representative approved by the clearance officer, shall be carried in the aircraft.
- (b) No photographic or wireless apparatus, carrier or homing pigeons, explosives or firearms shall be carried.
- (c) No mails shall be carried.
- (d) The journey shall be effected within the time and by the route specified in the clearance.
- (e) The aircraft before quitting Canada, shall descend in one of the prescribed landing areas and report to the clearance officer.

The clearance officers for the landing areas are as follows:—

The Areas Nos. 1 and 2—The officer for the time being commanding No. 6 Military Division, at Halifax.

For Area No. 3—The officer for the time being commanding the 5th Military Division at Quebec.

For Area No. 4—The officer for the time being commanding the 4th Military Division, at Montreal.

For Area No. 5—The officer for the time being commanding the 3rd Military Division, at Kingston.

For Area No. 6—The officer for the time being commanding the 2nd Military Division, at Toronto.

For Area No. 7—The officer for the time being commanding the 1st Military Division, at London.

For Areas Nos. 8 and 9—The officer for the time being commanding Military District No. 10, at Winnipeg.

For Area No. 10—The officer for the time being commanding Military District No. 13, at Calgary.

For Area No. 11—The *officer* for the time being commanding Military District No. 11, at Victoria.

5. Foreign naval or military aircraft shall not pass over any part of Canada, but these regulations shall not apply to naval or military aircraft belonging to or employed in the service of His Majesty or of any of his Allies.

6. The Minister of Militia and Defence may for special reasons grant exemptions from any or all of the foregoing orders, to such persons as he may deem expedient.

7. Any person contravening any of the provisions of the foregoing orders and regulations, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding Five Thousand Dollars or imprisonment for any term not exceeding five years, or to both fine and imprisonment and such penalty may be recovered or enforced by summary proceedings and conviction under the provisions of Part 15 of The Criminal Code.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

36

NOTE ON THE, GERMAN SECRET
SERVICE IN CANADA

Owing to counter-measures the system operated with comparatively little success in Canada. In August the main effort was to terrify Canadians so that most of the *C.E.F.* would be retained by fear at home: as early as 6th August there was a rumour of a raid through the Maine and Vermont woods; in September Germans were said to be drilling in Michigan; in November another raid via Malone and Buffalo was threatened, and prominent Germans in New York were understood to be negotiating for a ship to sow the mouth of the St. Lawrence with mines sent from Antwerp and marked with "diamond with star in centre"; in January a raid upon

Canada by 8,000 or 9,000 Germans collected in Chicago and Buffalo was said to be imminent, a like body was reported at Boston preparing to move against Halifax and Saint John, and others against Winnipeg, Port Arthur and Fort William; in March 80,000 trained Germans were said to be ready to muster at Buffalo, where they would be armed for an invasion of Canada. A plan to invade British Columbia with the support of German cruisers in 1914 was said to have been vetoed by the German Ambassador to the United States (Count von Bernstorff), and there was evidence that raids against Canadian towns by armed motor boats on the Great Lakes had been considered.

These rumours met with various degrees of credence and, although the United States authorities were on the alert, the Fenian raids were cited to show that invasion on a small scale was possible, and the commanders of districts were warned in each case to take reasonable precautions without attracting too much attention. In general, it was decided that there would always be sufficient troops in Canada to deal with any such attempts without holding back overseas contingents.

The counter-measures taken by Canada to restrict the campaign of destruction were in the main successful. The personnel employed as telegraph operators, customs and immigration officials, and local police were enlisted as members of a general preventive, protective and intelligence system centred on Lt-Col. Percy Sherwood, Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police. In addition to the military guards on public property, special constables and watchmen employed by private firms made sabotage difficult.

Legislation was passed to restrict the issue of arms and the transportation of explosives, and regulations were instituted by proclamation setting forth in detail what a law-abiding citizen might not do. In spite of these precautions a number of attempts were made and some of them were successful. On 8th August 1914 an attempt was made to blow up the Montreal Light, Heat and Power works. On the 12th a grain elevator at Saint John was burnt. On the 16th an attempt to injure the wireless station at Sault Ste. Marie was unsuccessful. On the 24th a sentry fired on three men who were laying a charge in the canal embankment at Cornwall, Ont.; they escaped to the United States by boat. On 2nd February 1915 the central span of the C.P.R. bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, was blown up by a German reservist who was caught; traffic was only delayed six hours. On 21st February an attempt was made to blow the powder magazine of the Nipissing Mine. On 29th April the Granville Street bridge and the Con

naught bridge in Vancouver were simultaneously damaged by fire of unknown origin. In June seventeen obstructions were placed on railway tracks in Manitoba within a week. On the 21st a sentry on the armouries at Windsor, Ont., found a suitcase containing 26 sticks of dynamite with a clock fuse connected and ready to fire; on the same day the building of the Peabody Overall Company in Walkerville, Ont., was partly wrecked by an infernal machine. The German agent, responsible for the last two operations, was caught and tried at Windsor, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Other plans included the burning of ripe crops, a plot to damage the locks on the Welland canal and to dynamite the St. Clair tunnel near Sarnia; none of these materialised. Not all the projects related above were definitely traced to German agency; subsequently the cheque book of Captain von Papen was cited as evidence that he had acted as paymaster to certain agents and had paid for fuses and dynamite to destroy Canadian property. Six culprits (one a woman) were caught and tried, convicted, and given sentences ranging from two to four years imprisonment with fines from \$15,000 to \$20,000. One such agent, who had earlier imposed upon the Canadian Minister of Militia but not on the Governor General and who later declared that he had a plan for invading Canada with 150,000 German reservists, was frustrated by arrest, trial and imprisonment for bigamy by U.S.A. authorities.

37

*The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army
to the Foreign Office*

BERLIN, 5th August, 1914.

England's declaration of war, which, according to reliable information, was planned from the very beginning of the conflict, compels us to exhaust every means that may contribute to victory. The grave situation in which the Fatherland finds itself makes it our duty to adopt every means calculated to injure the enemy. The unscrupulous policy directed against us by our opponents justifies us in proceeding ruthlessly.

An insurrection has been initiated in Poland. This seed has fallen on fruitful ground, for already our troops are being greeted by the Poles almost like friends. At Wlozlawek, for instance, they were received with bread and salt.

The feeling in America is friendly to Germany. American public opinion is indignant, at the shameful manner in which we have been treated. Every effort must be made to take advantage of this feeling. Important personalities in the German colony must be

urged to influence the press still more in our favour. Perhaps the United States can be persuaded to undertake a naval war against England, in return for which Canada beckons to them as the prize of victory.

It is of the greatest importance, as I have already pointed out in my communication of the second instant, No. 1 P, to start insurrections in India and Egypt, also in the Caucasus. By means of the treaty with Turkey, the Foreign Office will be in a position to bring this idea to realization and to excite the fanaticism of Islam.

v. MOLTKE.

("Outbreak of the World War". *German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky. Oxford University Press, 1924.*)

38

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 4th August, 1914.

Please communicate to your Ministers following message from His Majesty the King and publish:

"I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recalled to me the generous self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibilities which rest upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God. George R. I."

HARCOURT.

39

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 4th August, 1914.

Following for the King:

"In the name of the Dominion of Canada I humbly thank your Majesty for your gracious message of approval. Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and tradition of our Empire."

ARTHUR.

40

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 4th August, 1914.

Though there seems to be no immediate necessity for any request on our part for an expeditionary force from Canada, I think, in view of their generous offer, your ministers

would be wise to take all legislative and other steps by which they would be enabled without delay to provide such a force in case it should be required later.

HARCOURT.

(See 17)

41

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 5th August, 1914.

My Government being desirous of putting beyond doubt status of Canadian volunteers, request that His Majesty may be pleased to issue an order bringing these volunteers under Sections 175 and 176 of the Army Act.

ARTHUR.

The pertinent Sections read in part as follows:—

175. The persons in this section mentioned are persons subject to military law as officers, and this Act shall apply accordingly to all the persons so specified; that is to say,

.

- (4) All *such* persons not otherwise subject to military law as may be serving in the position of officers of any troops or portion of troops raised by order of His Majesty beyond the limits of the United Kingdom and of India, and serving under the command of an officer of the regular forces:

Provided that nothing in this Act shall affect the application to such persons of any Act passed by the legislature of a colony:

.

176. The persons in this section mentioned are persons subject to military law as soldiers, and this Act shall apply accordingly to all the persons so specified; that is to say,

- (3) All non-commissioned officers and men serving in a force raised by order of His Majesty beyond the limits of the United Kingdom and of India, and serving under the command of an officer of regular forces:

Provided that nothing in this Act shall affect the application to such non-commissioned officers and men of any Act passed by the legislature of a colony.

42

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 6th August, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of August 4, His Majesty's Government gratefully accept your offer to send expeditionary force to this

country, and would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible. Suggested composition follows.

HARCOURT.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 7th August, 1914.

My telegram of 6th August Army Council consider one division would be suitable composition of expeditionary force.

HARCOURT.

43

P.C. 2067

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 6th August, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 6th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, representing, in view of the state of war now existing between the United Kingdom, and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies of the British Empire on the one side and Germany on the other side, creating a menace to the well-being and integrity of the Empire, and having regard to the duty of the Dominion of Canada as one of those Dominions to provide for its own defence and to assist in maintaining the integrity and honour of the Empire, that it is desirable to mobilize Militia units of the various arms of the service of such effective strength *as may* from time to time be determined by Your Royal Highness in Council, such units to be composed of officers and men who are willing to volunteer for Overseas service under the British Crown; to organize and equip them for war and to make and perfect all arrangements necessary to enable them to enlist and be enrolled for service under His Majesty's Government, should that Government so desire.

The Minister recommends, in order that this purpose may be carried out, that Your Royal Highness authorize the raising and equipment of such units of such effective strength as aforesaid, the concentrating of them at some point to be selected by the Minister of Militia, with Your Highness's approval, and to make and perfect all arrangements necessary to enable them to enlist and be enrolled for service under His Majesty's Government should that Government so desire, upon such terms of engagement and for such service as may be deemed advisable.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for Your Royal Highness's approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

(See 717a)

44

Night lettergram.

To: Officers Commanding Divisions and Districts.

6th August, 1914.

For your information the following telegram has been despatched to all Officers Commanding units of the Active Militia, nonpermanent, with the exception of Cavalry. Regulations to govern raising of a contingent for Overseas Service will be as follows Stop The force will be Imperial and have the status of British regular troops Stop Enrolment will be voluntary for all ranks Stop Physical qualifications will be as follows Stop Artillery Stop Height Gunners 5 feet 7 inches and over Drivers 5 feet 3 inches Chest not less than 341 Stop Engineers Stop Height Sappers 5 feet 4 inches and over Pioneers 5 feet 7 inches and over Drivers 5 feet 4 inches and over Chest not less than 341 Stop Infantry Stop Height 5 feet 3 inches and over Chest not less than 331 Stop Army Service Corps Stop Horse Trans. Drivers 5 feet 3 inches and over Supply and M.T. Branch 5 feet 3 inches and over Chest 33J Stop Army Medical Corps Stop Height 5 feet 3 inches and over Chest not less than 331 Stop The age limit will be 18-45 years Stop In regard to musketry and general proficiency a high standard will be required Stop The term of service will be for the duration of the war Stop Other considerations being equal applicants will be selected in the following order Stop Unmarried men Stop Married men without families Stop Married men with families Stop Officers on the Reserve and others with military experience who although not belonging to the active militia fulfil the foregoing requirements are eligible Stop The senior officers of units will through officers commanding companies etc. collect the names of volunteers officers non-commissioned officers and men who should be medically examined by an Army Medical Corps officer where available Stop When all the names have been received officers commanding units will submit direct to Militia Headquarters descriptive rolls of those who have passed the required medical examination Stop After the rolls have been received the quota to be found by each unit will be determined and Commanding Officers will be given instructions as to numbers required from their respective units Stop The individuality of each Unit will be preserved as far as possible Stop Rolls to be prepared without delay so as to reach Militia Headquarters not later than Wednesday, 12th instant Stop The intention is to mobilize a contingent at Valcartier, P.Q. where to secure the selection of the fittest more men will be assembled than in the first instance will be required to embark Stop Acknowledge receipt by wire Stop.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Telegram to all Officers Commanding Infantry Regiments.

8th August, 1914.

It is notified for information that not more than 125 men with officers will be accepted from each rural regiment etc. and also from . city corps of small cities stop Also that officers selected must be prepared to accept rank in the contingent junior to that at present held by them in the Active Militia.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

46

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 7th August, 1914.

Status of Canadian volunteers. My Government most anxious for reply to my telegram of August 5th, asking for publication of Order by His Majesty to settle the question.

ARTHUR.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 9th August, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of August 7, His Majesty is graciously pleased to order that the Troops offered by Canada shall be raised by your Royal Highness for service as expeditionary force. It is suggested that terms of attestation should be as follows: (a) for a term. of one year unless war lasts longer than one year in which case they will be retained until war

over. If employed with hospital depots of mounted units and as clerks, etcetera, they may be retained after termination of hostilities until services can be dispensed with but such retention shall in *no* case exceed six months. (b) To be attached to any arm of service should it be required of them. Men should be attested by magistrate.

HARCOURT.

(See 41.)

47

Telegram to all Divisions and Districts

11th August 1914.

Officers who have not been notified to recruit men by Officers Commanding Regiments, or officers in localities where no corps exist or where recruiting has not been carried on, are authorized to recruit picked men in their localities for service on Overseas Expeditionary Force now or in another to follow, if required.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

48

P. C. 2080

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 10th August 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that authority be granted for the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force to be composed in accordance with the accompanying table.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT

STATEMENT showing by arms, etc., the strength (all ranks) of the force which it is proposed to assemble at VALCARTIER, P.Q., prior to the embarkation of a Division, with a quota of L. of C. (administrative units)

Arms, etc.	Division		L. of C. (administrative) units	Total embarking strength	Surplus to provide a margin for selection and to serve as a nucleus for reinforcements	Total force assembling at VALCARTIER, P.Q.
	In the field	Details at the oversea base				
Commanders, staffs, special appointments, police, etc	90	90	12	102
Cavalry	157	14	171	25	196
Artillery	3,888	376	60	4,324	500	4,824
Engineers	442	42	484	50	534
Signal Service.....	160	14	174	25	199
Infantry	12,025	1,200	13,225	2,000	15,225
Army Service Corps.....	567	50	1,161	1,778	60	1,838
Army Medical Service	698	54	692	1,444	60	1,504
Army Veterinary Service	11	115	126	10	136
Ordnance Corps.....	18	167	185	20	205
Army Pay Corps.....	2	100	102	10	112
Postal Corps	15	100	115	10	125
Total	18,073	1,750	2,395	22,218	2,782	25,000

N.B.—Chaplains and nursing sisters not included.

49

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 10th August, 1914.

With reference to offers of military contingents His Majesty's Government propose now that offer of forces has been accepted by His Majesty's Government that details of a military character relating to contingents should be dealt with in direct communication between the Army Council and the Minister of Militia so that correspondence can be expedited.

HARCOURT.

50

OTTAWA, 10th August 1914.

From—
The Adjutant-General,
Canadian Militia.

To—
O.Cs. Divisions and Districts.

Preliminary Instructions for Mobn. War 1914.

Sir:

1. With reference to telegraphic instructions dated 6th instant, I have the honour, by direction to inform you that it has been decided to mobilize a Division (with the possible addition of other troops) for service overseas; and the accompanying table is intended to show the areas whence units, &c., will be drawn.

2. Expeditionary Force War Establishments, 1914, will be followed as closely as possible; but

(a) Infantry Battalions will be organized on the 8-company system (as laid down in Expeditionary Force War Establishments, 1913), and will include Machine Gun Sections.

(b) A Howitzer Brigade of Field Artillery will not be included in the Divisional Artillery, but its exclusion will not affect the normal war establishment either of the Divisional Ammunition Column or of the Divisional Train.

(c) Field Ambulances will follow Canadian War Establishments, 1914. They will provide their own transport with A.M.C. drivers. This addition will entail in the Divisional Train a corresponding reduction in the A.S.C.

3. It is to be noted that the number of guns in a Field (18 pr.) Battery will be six (not four).

4. Units will mobilize with a surplus (about 10%) of waiting men as a margin for selection and a nucleus for reinforcements in addition to the "Details to be left at the base" which embark with and accompany units to the oversea base, and whose numbers are given in Expeditionary Force War Establishments 1914.

5. Further details will be communicated in due course.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

1. Canadian Division

Statement showing its composition and areas whence it is intended units should be drawn

(1) Divisional Headquarters and Infantry Brigades

Formations and Units	Area whence drawn	Remarks
Divisional Headquarters..	(a)	(a) Drawn from
1st Canadian Infantry BA	2nd Div'n.	no specified area.
gade	"	
Headquarters.....	"	
lot Battalion	1st Div'n.	
2nd Battalion	3rd Div'n.	
3rd Battalion	4th Div'n.	
4th Battalion	"	
2nd Canadian Infantry	5th Div'n.	
Brigade	6th Div'n.	
Headquarters.....	M.D. No.10	
5th Battalion	"	
8th Battalion	M.D. No.1	
7th Battalion	"	
8th Battalion	"	
3rd Canadian Infantry	M.D. No. 13	
Brigade	M.D. No. 1	
Headquarters.....		
0th Battalion		
10th Battalion		
11th Battalion		
Headquarters.....		
Machine Gun Section..		
A.. to "D" Corn_		
panes		
..H"" Corn.		
panics.....		
12th Battalion.....		

(2) Divisional Troops

Formations and Units	Area whence drawn	Remarks
Divisional Mounted Troops Cavalry Squadron.....	M.D. No. 13	
Divisional Artillery— Headquarters.....	(a)	(a) Drawn from no specified area.
1st Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters.....	3rd Div'n.	
1st Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	"	
2nd Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	3rd Div'n.	
3rd Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	3rd Div'n.	
Ammunition Column:— Hd. Qrs. and 1 Section 1 "..... 1 ".....	3rd Div'n. " "	
2nd Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters.....	4th Div'n.	
4th Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	4th Div'n. "	
5th Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	4th Div'n. 6th Div'n.	
6th Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	6th Div'n. "	
Ammunition Column:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section..... 1 ".....	4th Div'n. " 6th Div'n.	
3rd Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters.....	2nd Div'n.	
7th Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	2nd Div'n. "	
8th Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	2nd Div'n. 1st Div'n.	
9th Field Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 2 Sections 1 Section.....	3rd Div'n. 2nd Div'n.	
Ammunition Column:— Hd. Qrs. and 1 Section 1 Section..... 1 "..... 1 ".....	2nd Div'n. 1st Div'n. 2nd Div'n. 2nd Div'n.	
4th F.A. (Howitzer) Brigade.....		Not available.
Heavy Artillery Battery:— Hd. Qrs. and 1 Section... 1 Section..... Ammunition Column....	4th Div'n. 3rd Div'n. 6th Div'n.	
Divisional Ammunition Column:— Headquarters..... No. 1 Section..... No. 2 Section..... No. 3 Section..... No. 4 Section.....	5th Div'n. 4th Div'n. 3rd Div'n. 6th Div'n. 6th Div'n.	
Divisional Engineers:— Headquarters..... 1st Field Company..... 2nd Field Company.....	(a) 3rd Div'n. 2nd Div'n.	(a) Drawn from no specified area.
Divisional Signal Company	(a)	(a) Drawn from no specified area.
Divisional Train:— Headquarters..... Headquarters Company... No. 2 Company..... No. 3 Company..... No. 4 Company.....	(a) 3rd Div'n. 1st Div'n. 4th Div'n. M.D. No. 10	(a) " "
Medical Units:— No. 1 Field Ambulance... No. 2 Field Ambulance... No. 3 Field Ambulance...	2nd Div'n. 4th Div'n. M.D. No. 10	

51

From the Adjutant-General to O's.C. Divisions and Districts, Heads of Branches and Lt.-Col. H. E. Burstall, R.C.A.

OTTAWA, 13th August, 1914.

Expeditionary Force, 1914

Preliminary Instructions for Mohn.

Sir:

Adverting to H.Q. 593-1-5, dated 11th (*sic.*) of August, 1914, Preliminary Instructions for Mohn., I have the honour by direction, to inform you that the statement showing the composition and areas whence it is intended units should be drawn, cannot be strictly adhered to, as the exact allotment will necessarily depend on the numbers volunteering; consequently this statement should be looked upon in the light of a general guide only.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

(See 50)

52

Extract from Report on the State of the Militia of the Province of Canada for 1865-66

On the 7th March, 1866, the Adjutant-General, on his way from Ottawa to Montreal, received at Kemptville, at four o'clock p.m., a telegraphic message from the Honourable the Minister of Militia, as follows:

Message

OTTAWA, March 7th, 1866.

To Colonel MacDougall.

Call out ten thousand (10,000) men of Volunteer Force. Send me by telegraph names of Corps. They must be out in twenty-four (24) hours, and for three (3) weeks and whatever further time may be required. Telegraph direct this evening from Prescott to Brigade Majors and Officers Commanding such Corps as you think most desirable to be in readiness to move on your orders to-morrow.

JOHN A. MACDONALD.

By making use of the Post Office van, the Adjutant General was enabled in the course of the journey to despatch messages and letters to the Militia Staff Officers of the several districts, prescribing the quota to be furnished in each district. On the arrival of the train in Montreal at midnight, answers were received

from all the districts announcing that arrangements were in progress; and by 4 o'clock p.m., on the following day (8th), it was reported to the Adjutant General that the total number of 10,000 men were assembled at their respective headquarters, awaiting further orders.

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It is quite certain that in place of the 10,000 men called for, 30,000 could have been mustered within 48 hours; and indeed when the Returns were received a few days after of the strength of the Companies on service, it was found that the number called for by the Governor General had been exceeded by 4,000 men; and that in place of 10,000 men, there were actually 14,000 doing duty with the Service Force.

This excess was occasioned by the fact that the Staff Officers, in view of the limited time allowed for the muster of the force, were obliged to call out the different Companies at their actual strength; but the eagerness to share in the defence of the country was such that the Companies were increased to the full strength by men coming to join from distances which could not be anticipated. There were many instances of Volunteers coming in from distant parts of the United States, having given up lucrative employment at the call of duty which they owed to Canada.

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On the 31st May the Adjutant General received instructions to call out for actual service Volunteer companies numbering 14,000 men. These were all ready within 24 hours, and many of them had moved to the stations assigned to them. On the 2nd June the whole of the Volunteer force not already called out was placed on actual service, and on the 3rd June the Province had more than 20,000 men under arms. The whole force has turned out not only willingly but eagerly, although the sacrifice involved at the present season on all merchants and other men of business, as well as on tradesmen, mechanics and farmers, is enormous.

53

Telegram to all Officers Commanding Divisions and Districts

11th August, 1914.

Instruct immediately all Officers Commanding units in your Division (or District) that all volunteers for Overseas Contingent must be enlisted immediately in the Canadian Militia Stop Enlistment in the Contingent will be carried out at Valcartier.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

54

NOTE ON CONDITIONS OF SERVICE,
CIVIL SERVANTS

Order in Council, P.C. 2102, dated 11th August 1914, prescribed that any civil servant being a member of the Active Militia, called out on active service, might, "with the consent of the Minister of Militia", be recalled to his civil duties, if so required, by the head of his Department. A civil servant so called out on active service, and any civil servant who, with the consent of the head of his Department, enlisted in the Expeditionary Force, would continue to receive his regular salary in addition to military pay.

Order in Council, P.C. 298, dated 10th February 1915, specifically cancelled the privilege of payment of civil salary to those civil servants who might in future enlist for service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force without the consent of the head of their Department, but allowed the privilege to those who might already have enlisted without first having obtained such consent. Civil servants whose salaries continued to be paid during military service would be restored to their civil positions on termination of such military service provided they remained qualified to discharge the duties appertaining to their positions. The Minister was empowered to pay the salary of a civil servant absent on military service to his dependents.

Order in Council, P.C. 2553, dated 1st November 1915, restricted power of the head of a department to grant leave of absence, with salary, to the cases of those civil servants whose positions would not require to be filled during their absence; in such cases civil salary would be subject to deduction of the amount received as military pay. In cases where replacement of a civil servant would be necessary, leave would only be granted on the authority of the Governor in Council. The privilege of leave with full or partial pay was only to be granted to those employed as civil servants at the outbreak of the war.

Order in Council, P.C. 811, dated 5th April 1918, cancelled, with effect from 1st July 1918, all orders authorizing payment of pay or salary, or any proportion thereof, to civil servants on active service.

55

Telegram to Officers Commanding Divisions and Districts

14th August, 1914.

You will please notify all concerned that upon receipt of the orders to proceed to Valcartier, all officers and men who have volunteered and who have passed the medical

examination, may be assembled at Valcartier, where a selection will be made and those selected will compose the Division for Oversea Service.

No married man will be authorized to proceed to Valcartier without the written consent of his wife.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Note: The provision that a married volunteer for the C.E.F. must produce the written consent of his wife was cancelled by G.O. of 13th Aug. 1915.

56

Telegram from Director of Artillery to O.C. 84th, 8th, 6th, 81st, 3rd, 17th, 19th, 22nd, 9th, 7th, 4th, 6th, and 14th Batteries, CPA. and O.C. Montreal Heavy Brigade.

OTTAWA, 14th August, 1914.

Your artillery unit Overseas Division will go into camp or barracks at local headquarters and mobilize to war strength in men, horses and equipment, and will not proceed to Valcartier until mobilization completed. Detailed orders sent by mail.

DIRECTOR OF ARTILLERY.

57

Extract from Montreal Gazette, 16th August, 1914.

WAR MINISTER'S STIRRING WAR
SPEECH TO MONTREAL GARRISON
AND VOLUNTEERS

I call for volunteers-volunteers, mark you. I have insisted that it shall be a purely volunteer contingent. Not a man will be accepted or leave Canada on this service but of his own free will, and, if I know it, not a married man shall go without the consent of his wife and family.

And when the Canadian men meet the enemy-as they are going to do-and vanquish them-as they are going to vanquish them-they are going to do it fighting as free men, as free subjects of His Majesty.

Canada is sending 20,000 men to the front, and it would realize the dearest ambition of my life, could I lead the boys-I may do that yet, I am not sure. If I can possibly manage it I shall cast politics to the winds and go to the front. . . .

. . . I have no fear as to the results of this war. If the millions in Germany cannot be driven back by the first, I feel sure I voice the sentiments of Canada and the Empire when I say that if necessary, *ten*, yes

twenty, more contingents will succeed it, in order that the liberties of the British people may be preserved-we are determined that the tyrant's heel shall never grind down the people of Canada.

(See 78.)

58

Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, p. 95, 22nd August

Mr. A. K. MACLEAN: In the event of further Canadian troops going to the front, will the system of volunteering be continued, or will the Militia be asked to go in a body?

Mr. SAM HUGHES: I might point out that upwards of 100,000 men have already volunteered, but we are only able to take 22,000, although I am told 27,000 have got on the trains. They simply climbed on and we couldn't keep them off. So far as my own personal views are concerned, I am absolutely opposed to anything that is not voluntary in every sense, and I do not read in the law that I have any authority to ask Parliament to allow troops other than volunteers to leave the country.

58a

Circular Telegram from the Adjutant-General to All Officers Commanding Brigade., Regiments, Batteries and Squadrons, and Departmental Corps.

OTTAWA, 12th August, 1914.

In view of non-completion of medical examination in many places, volunteering need not be closed until orders for mobilization at Valcartier are issued stop Commanding Officers will assemble all volunteers for Overseas Expeditionary Force at local corps headquarters for instructional purposes from this date stop Pay and subsistence allowance will be allowed at authorized militia rates stop Issue necessary instructions acknowledging receipt.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Telegram from the Adjutant-General to All Officers Commanding Brigades, Regiments, Batteries and Squadrons, and Departmental Corps.

12th August, 1914.

Reference my telegram 12th instant re continuation of recruiting for expeditionary force, it is to be understood that only volunteers who are medically fit are to be assembled at local corps headquarters stop Issue necessary instructions to all concerned.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

*Telegram from the Adjutant-General to the Officers
Commanding Divisions and Districts.*

15th August, 1914.

Reference telegraphic instructions dated 12th August re assembly at local headquarters stop This means Battalion and Squadron Headquarters stop You will furnish to all officers commanding units necessary transport for their personnel to move to their local headquarters stop Please despatch daily at 4 p.m. Progress report showing number volunteers officers other ranks assembled.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

59

*Telegram from Adjutant-General to Officers
Commanding Divisions and Districts*

15th August, 1914.

Report by wire immediately on state of preparedness of volunteers, medically fit from each unit in your district or division and when they will be ready to entrain for Valcartier Camp. Rural Corps will move first. From what station will transport rural corps be required. Instructions as to movement city corps and artillery will be given you later. The Quartermaster-General will give you instructions as to transport, but all must be prepared to move at the earliest possible moment. No delay is permitted. The railways will accept your telegraphic orders for transport when necessary. Men will not bring rifles. Those without uniform will proceed in civilian clothes. Artillery units will mobilize at local Headquarters. Other arms will be issued with clothing and equipment at Valcartier Camp.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

60

MILITIA ORDERS

Headquarters,

OTTAWA, 17th August, 1914.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
No. 372-MOBILIZATION FOR SERVICE
OVERSEAS

The following instructions (provisional) are issued for general guidance:-

1. It has been decided to mobilize for service Overseas a "Canadian Expeditionary Force" consisting of:-

- (a) One Division (less a brigade of howitzer artillery); and
- (b) Army Troops-i.e. certain units (such as the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) in excess of divisional requirements.

2. The Division and the units described as Army Troops will be organized as closely as possible on the lines indicated in Expeditionary Force War Establishments, 1914; and the Force will be equipped in a manner similar to that of the British Regular Army.

3. The Canadian Expeditionary Force will be Imperial and have the status of British regular troops.

4. (a) An officer before being appointed as such, and a man before being enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, will be required to sign a declaration (copies of which will be issued from Militia Headquarters) to the effect that he accepts the conditions therein set forth, and that he engages to serve for a term of one year, unless the war lasts longer, in which case his services will be retained until the conclusion of the war; provided that if employed with a hospital, depot, or a mounted unit, or as a clerk, etc., he may be retained after hostilities until his services can be dispensed with, but in no case for a period exceeding six months. Officers or men may be attached to any arm of the service as required.

(b) Subject to authority and with their consent officers of the Permanent Staff and Force may be appointed for general service, such service will count towards promotion and pension in the Permanent Staff and Force after the conclusion of the war, subject to authority and with their consent men of the Permanent Force may be enlisted for general service. Only in special cases will it be possible to accept the service of men who belong to the Permanent Garrisons of Halifax, Quebec, or Esquimalt.

5. Men must be physically fit for service in the field; minimum height 5' 3"; minimum chest measurement 33"; under 45 years and over 18 years of age; preference will be given to men who have previously served; or, who have undergone some form of military training. In regard to musketry and general proficiency a high standard will be required.

6. Enrolment is voluntary for all ranks, applicants will be selected in the following order:-

Unmarried men.

Married men without families.

Married men with families.

The senior officers of units, will, through officers commanding companies, etc., collect the names of volunteers who should be medically examined by an Army Medical Corps Officer, where available. When all the names have been received officers commanding units will submit direct to Militia Headquarters, descriptive rolls of those who have passed the

required medical examination and such volunteers as do not already belong to the Active Militia will be enlisted therein forthwith.

Commanding Officers will assemble at regimental headquarters, for instructional purposes, all volunteers who have passed the medical examination and have been enlisted in the active Militia. Officers and men so assembled will receive pay and allowances at rates laid down in Article 620, as amended by G.O. 189 of 1913, and Article 822 Pay and Allowance Regulations, together with subsistence allowances at the rate of \$1.50 per diem for officers, and .75e. per diem for non-commissioned officers and men. This is to take effect from date of assembly, but not prior to 12th August.

8. Division and Army Troops will concentrate at Valcartier, P.Q., where mobilization will be completed; except the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, which will concentrate and mobilize at Ottawa. In accordance with detailed instructions which will be issued separately to all concerned, Divisional and District Commanders will take the necessary steps for the entrainment of volunteers ordered to proceed to Valcartier.

9. For purposes of discipline all ranks will be subject to the Army Act, to King's Regulations, and to such other ordinances as apply, or may be made to apply to the British Regular Army.

10. The rates of pay and allowance will be as laid down in Appendix II (*not reproduced but see Appendix 91*). Officers on appointment to the Canadian Expeditionary Force will be granted \$150.00 towards defraying expenses of their outfit, and an advance of \$60.00. These amounts will be paid at Valcartier Camp, Quebec.

11. *Officers*, non-commissioned officers and men will be permitted to assign a portion of their pay, not exceeding four fifths of the monthly amount, to their relatives. The amount assigned must be in dollars only (no cents), and the maximum amount which may

be assigned by a private soldier will be \$25.00. Militia Form D 902 will be supplied to the commanding officer of each unit on arrival at Valcartier by the Camp Paymaster. On these forms *officers* commanding squadrons, batteries, companies will enter the nominal rolls of all officers, non-commissioned officers and men in their units, stating in each case the name and address of the next-of-kin, and, in addition, in the case of those desiring to assign a portion of their pay, each individual is to sign the form, giving the name and full postal address of the person to whom the assignment is made, with the monthly amount assigned. When these forms are completed

and certified by the Commanding Officer they are to be returned to the camp paymaster in triplicate. One copy will be retained by the Camp Paymaster, and that officer will forward the duplicate copy to the Accountant and Paymaster General, Militia Headquarters, and the triplicate copy to the Camp Commandant. Arrangements will be made at Militia Headquarters for the payment of assigned pay at the beginning of each month direct to the person to whom the assignment has been made.

12. As the number proceeding to Valcartier will exceed the numbers required to embark, final selection and acceptance for service will be determined at Valcartier, at which place enlistment in the Expeditionary Force will be carried out. Men will be enlisted in all cases as private soldiers on a special form of attestation (to be issued from Militia Headquarters). Men will be posted whenever possible to the units for which they express preference.

13. All ranks of the Canadian Expeditionary Force will be clothed and equipped on the scales given in Appendix 1 (*not reproduced*). Officers will provide all articles at their own expense.

14. Instructions regarding the purchase of horses will be issued to purchasing agents; and units which do not receive their horses at places of assembly will receive them at Valcartier.

15. With a view to the provision of technical vehicles special instructions will be issued from Militia Headquarters. Vehicles of a nontechnical nature will be provided at Valcartier.

16. Medical and veterinary equipment will be issued at Valcartier.

17. Concurrently with the mobilization of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, arrangements will be made for its upkeep in the field; recruiting and remount depots will be organized and reserves of stores will be accumulated.

VICTOR A. S. WILLIAMS,
Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

61
FIRST CONTINGENT, C.E.F.
PROGRESSIVE RETURN OF RECRUITING

1914	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
18th August.....	1,435	24,815	26,250
19th August.....	1,441	26,354	26,795
20th August.....	1,440	25,604	27,044
21st August.....	1,378	26,404	27,842
22nd August.....	1,389	27,044	28,433
23rd August.....	1,271	26,736	28,006
25th August.....	1,250	27,803	28,553

62

*Telegram from the Adjutant-General to
Officers Commanding Divisions and Lt:
Col. Burstall, Valcartier Camp*
OTTAWA, 18th August, 1914.

The forwarding of the rural troops of your Division to Valcartier Camp will begin on Thursday morning (30th Aug.). Wire me immediately Regiments etc. and numbers. Artillery excepted. You will arrange hours of departure so that the trains will reach Valcartier by daylight. Men to provide their own subsistence en route.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

62a

*Telegram from the Adjutant-General to the District
Officers Commanding, Military Districts Nos. 10,
11 and 13.*

20th August, 1914.

The forwarding of all troops your District to Valcartier Camp will begin at the earliest possible moment for which you can arrange transport stop Hours of departure should be such as to ensure troops arriving Valcartier by daylight stop Wire me and Camp Commandant Valcartier, regiments, their strength and probable time of arrival Valcartier stop You will make the usual necessary subsistence arrangements en route.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

63

*Telegram from Adjutant-General to Officers
Commanding Divisions*

21st August 1914.

Reference H.Q. telegram five ninetythree dash one dash sixteen dated fifteenth instant please now arrange for movement to Valcartier at earliest possible moment of all details of City Corps except artillery Stop All departures to be timed so that troops will arrive at Valcartier by daylight Stop Wire me and Camp Commandant, Valcartier, names of regiments, their strength and probable hour of arrival at Valcartier Stop Further instructions concerning artillery will be duly sent you.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

(See 58a for telegram of 15th.)

64

*Telegram from the Secretary of State for the
Colonies to the Governor General*

LONDON, 13th August, 1914.

Following from Army Council for Minister of Militia:-With reference to Canadian Government's offer of Expeditionary Force of one

Division, one regiment of Cavalry, two Horse Artillery Batteries, and four battalions of infantry, assuming transport is available on what date would this force be ready to embark?

HARCOURT.

(See 65)

65

*Telegram from the Governor General to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies*

OTTAWA, 21st August, 1914.

Following from Minister of Militia for Army Council:-The Canadian Expeditionary Force expect by the middle of September to be ready to embark.

ARTHUR.

(See 64, 113)

66

*Telegram from Minister of Militia and Defence
to Colonel S. B. Steele, M.D. No. 10,
Winnipeg, Man.*

21st August, 1914.

Private. First overseas division completed but additional Corps are now called for. Please send all extra good men up to five hundred from your district for infantry. Forward with present corps or immediately thereafter.

SAM HUGHES.

*Identical telegram sent simultaneously also to
Colonel A. Roy, M.D. No. 11, Victoria, B.C., and to
Colonel E. A. Cruikshank, M.D. No. 13, Calgary, Alta.*

*Confirmed by the following code telegram sent at
5.28 p.m. same date.*

The D.O.C., MD. No. 10,
Winnipeg, Man.

21st August, 1914.

Overseas division now complete but additional troops called for. Send from your district to Valcartier for infantry all men very good up to five hundred. Such are to go forward to Valcartier with present corps or else immediately after.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

*Identical telegram sent simultaneously also to
D.O.C. M.D. 11, Victoria, B.C., and to D.O.C., M.D.
13, Calgary, Alta.*

67

For items of cost, see Memoranda respecting the work of the Department of Militia and Defence-European War 1914-15, p. 26, and Report of the Auditor General, 1915, Vol. III, part ZZ, pp. 39-43.

68

For debate on purchase and construction of Valcartier Camp, see Debates House of Commons, Session 1915, 1st March, pp. 522-526.

69

Debates of the Senate, Extra Session 1914,
18th August, p. 1.

70

*Debates of the Senate, Extra Session 1914,
19th August, pp. 3-4*

Hon. Mr. BOLDUC . . . However, before concluding, I may ask what should be the attitude of Canada under the circumstances, and especially of its French-Canadian citizens?

Our beautiful country is England's most important colony, and is treated with the utmost generosity.

Under England's protection Canada has enjoyed free commerce, over all the seas of the world, assisted by the most powerful fleet that has ever existed, and by English diplomacy, which has always endeavoured to assure the peace of the world, and unite under the broad folds of the flag of Albion, those who might assist her in the hour of need. Our status of British subjects is a guarantee that we may go straight ahead without fear of foreign oppression. On the other hand, we cannot forget that we are descendants of the French of Old France, and when we behold the English standard flying next to the French colours, there is an irresistible feeling which stirs the hearts of those who are the children of France as well as those of England.

We cannot imagine the defeat of the Triple Entente without feeling deeply anxious as to what would be our future should Germany be victorious. But I feel sure that Divine Providence will favour our powerful protectors, and the lesson taught to our enemies will deter them from further oppression.

I have no doubt the armies belonging to the Entente Cordiale will triumph over German arrogance, and that when peace will be again established the allies of the Triple Entente will take the necessary steps to insure the world's peace for a century to come.

Allow me to heartily congratulate the brave Canadians who do not hesitate to leave their families and their interests and expose themselves to the dangers of war for the defence of the mother country. They furnish England the proof that they have their hearts in the right place.

If, God forbid, our beautiful Canada should be invaded by foreign hordes, I am convinced that all Canadians would rise and march as a unit to repulse the enemy and prove that Canadians may die, but shall never consent to become slaves.

71

*Debates of the Senate, Extra Session 1914,
19th August, p. 6*

Hon. Mr. BOSTOCK . . . In considering the position in which Canada is placed to-day, we know that we are supporting the right, that we are helping in a fight, not only to maintain the honour and position of the United Kingdom, but to preserve the whole basis of civilization for which we, as a part of His Majesty's dominions, stand; and here I would like to refer to the words used by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as quoted in the London Times, where he says:

'I am entitled to say, and I do say on behalf of this country I speak not for a party but for the country as a whole—we made every effort that a government could possibly make for peace. This war has been forced upon us.'

72

*Debates of the Senate, Extra Session 1914,
19th August, pp. 7-8*

Hon. Mr. LOUGHEED . . . In view of the extraordinary events which have happened during the present month, involving the Empire in war with two of the great powers of Europe, it is but commonplace to say that seriously as Canada has regarded the European situation for some four or five years past yet we were startled into a sense of reality upon facing an actual declaration of war between England and Germany . . . Parliament could not have more clearly defined the duty that was cast upon Canada as was so clearly and emphatically done by the voice of the public will throughout the whole Dominion. Canada's manifest course was to contribute men and arms and food supplies . . . Such a situation not having before arisen in our history our statute book is therefore destitute of what I might term war legislation; consequently measures will be submitted to cover the extraordinary powers which the Government has been called upon and will be called upon to exercise at this critical period...

Much has been said and written upon the inexpediency of Canada in any way being involved in the complexities and conflicts of European diplomacy . . . While the situation which faces the Empire has been brought about without Canada having had a constitutional voice therein, yet we accept the situation as freely and as loyally as if the responsibility had been entirely our own. We, therefore, approach the duty cast upon the Government in meeting this national crisis, this state of was in which the Empire is placed, as a duty pointed out not by the Government itself nor by any political party, but by the people themselves . . .

May I say in conclusion that we realise the gravity of our duty at this time. It is not in the spirit of martial display that Canada has answered the call of Empire but from a deep sense of loyalty and devotion to those great national institutions that so long have stood for the highest and best interests of the human race.

73

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 19th August, p. 17*

Rt. Hon. Sir ROBERT BORDEN . . . In connection with the outbreak of hostilities, the Government have been obliged to take some extraordinary steps and certain of these steps will require ratification by Parliament. We realized, and I hope every member of this House and every man of this country will realize, that there was a tremendous responsibility upon us, and I can assure all the members of the House that in so far as we took any action which might require the ratification and approval of Parliament we took it only because we believed that in the exercise of our duty we were bound to do so before Parliament could possibly assemble.

74

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 19th August, p. 19*

75

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 19th August, pp. 8-9*

76

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 20th August, pp. 22-23*

77

NOTE ON CANADIANS STRANDED
ABROAD

The war-cloud had gathered and burst so suddenly that some 18,000 Canadian citizens travelling in Europe at the height of the tourist season found themselves stranded. Those in allied or neutral countries were greatly inconvenienced by temporary curtailment of credit facilities and even more so by the drastic restrictions on civilian railway travel. The fate of Canadians in Germany and Austria was more uncertain; their cheques were valueless and they were penniless; moreover, as "enemies", they were subject to internment, and in Germany this right was exercised in respect to adult males; among

those who became inmates of the huge concentration camp at Ruhleben was an ex-Cabinet Minister, the Hon. H. S. Beland. A sum of £20,000, placed by the Canadian Government, early in August, at the disposal of the High Commissioner in London, was applied to the relief of distressed Canadians; the good offices of the American authorities were sought and freely given, but it was some weeks before all those who were not retained as prisoners of war were able to reach the United Kingdom and return to Canada.

*(See Debates House of Commons, Special
Session, 20th Aug., 1914, p. 26)*

78

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 22nd August, pp. 95-96*

Mr. A. K. MACLEAN: About the beginning of the war it was stated in the press that probably our Minister of Militia would go to Europe in command of the Canadian Volunteers. I should like to hear whether that is the intention of the Minister.

Mr. SAM HUGHES: I may not express my personal views on the matter, but I think I am safe in saying that whoever commands the volunteers will have the confidence of the volunteers and also of myself.

(See 57)

79

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 21st August, p. 66*

Mr. MACDONALD: I would ask the Minister of Militia to make a statement of authoritative character in regard to the destination of the troops who are now gathering at Valcartier. There seems to be in some portions of Canada some misunderstanding as to the nature of that gathering. It has been stated that the first 20,000 men are to go direct to Belgium, to enter immediately into active service, and that my hon. friend has so communicated to the War Office. I do not want to get any information which might in any way conflict with the very proper secrecy of military operations, but from the standpoint of volunteering, and from that of those who are interested in the volunteers who are offering their services, I think the Minister ought, so far as he possibly can, to take the House and the country into his confidence, so that we would know exactly what the position is in regard to these men who are volunteering to go to the war.

Mr. SAM HUGHES: The hon. gentleman will observe by the Order in Council and by the reports from the other side, which I be-

ieve have been laid before the House and published, that the British authorities have accepted the offer of assistance.

When we asked what the nature of that assistance should be, they stated they would like a division. We are simply preparing to send a division forward. We have nothing whatever to say as to the destination of the troops once they cross the water, nor have we been informed as to what their destination may be. A great many troops will always be required, not in the immediate fighting line but leading up to it, and I presume that in due time our boys will take their turn with the rest of them. We have no information on the subject whatever.

80

British Official History of the War. Naval Operations. Vol. I. Longmans, Green & Co., London.

British Official History of the War. Military Operations. Vol. 1. France and Belgium, 1914.⁴¹ Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London.

The War Effort of New Zealand, Vol. IV. Minor Campaigns. Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd., Auckland.

Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18. Vol. X. The Australians at Rabaul. Angus & Robertson Ltd., Sydney.

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The First Five Hundred. (The Newfoundland Regiment). C. F. Williams & Son, Inc., Albany and New York.

The Indian Corps in France. By J. W. B. Merewether and Sir F. Smith. John Murray, London.

81

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 8th September, 1914, communicating Message from H.M. The King, published in the Canada Gazette of 12th September, 1914, p. 833.

82

FIRST ARRIVALS, VALCARTIER CAMP, 1914

CORPS	OFF.	O.R's.	TOTAL	HORSES	DATE
C.O.C.....	2	5	7	10th Aug.
C.O.C.....	18	18	11th "
C.P.A.S.C.....	2	5	7	12th "
No. 10 Coy. C.A.S.C.....	2	40	42	20	13th "
No. 10 Coy. C.A.S.C.....	3	45	48	33	14th "
No. 4 Coy. C.A.S.C.....	7	140	147	131	15th "
R.C.H.A.....	15	221	236	178	15th "
No. IX Fd. Amb.	7	66	73	5	16th "
C.P.A.S.C.....	6	6	16th "
No. V Fd. Amb.	10	230	240	23	17th "
R.C.D.	16	185	201	127	17th "
No. II Fd. Amb.	1	42	43	18th "
No. 6 Coy. C.A.S.C.	5	89	94	41	18th "
L.S.H.(R.C.).....	18	108	116	78	19th "
R.C.H.A.....	1	12	13	19th "
R.C.G.A.....	4	65	69	18	19th "
5th Fd. Coy. C.E.	8	144	152	19th "
Details, P.F.	5	11	16	1	11th/18th Aug.
Details, N.P.A.M.	7	6	18	4	11th/19th "
Total.....	108	1,433	1,541	659	

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COMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL BATTALIONS OF FIRST CONTINGENT AS NOTIFIED IN VALCARTIER CAMP ORDER No. 28 OF 22ND AUGUST, 1914.

1st Battalion.

3rd Dragoons (Peterborough, Ont.)
13th Dragoons (Waterloo, P.Q.)
26th Dragoons (Coaticook, P.Q.)

9th Mississauga Horse (*Toronto, Ont.*)
Governor General's Foot Guards (*Ottawa, Ont.*)
14th Infantry Regt. (*Kingston, Ont.*)
45th " " (*Lindsay, Ont.*)
46th " " (*Port Hope, Ont.*)
47th " " (*Kingston, Ont.*)
53rd " " (*Sherbrooke, P.Q.*)
54th " " (*Sherbrooke, P.Q.*)
57th " " (*Peterborough, Ont.*)
96th " " (*Port Arthur, Ont.*)
98th " " (*Kenora, Ont.*)

2nd Battalion.

1st Infantry Regt.	(Montreal, P.Q.)
3rd " "	(Montreal, P.Q.)
4th " "	(Ste. Anne de la Perade, P.Q.)
8th " "	(Quebec, P.Q.)
9th " "	(Quebec, P.Q.)
17th " "	(Levis, P.Q.)
18th " "	(Chicoutimi, P.Q.)
61st " "	(Montmagny, P.Q.)
64th " "	(Beauharnois, P.Q.)
65th " "	(Montreal, P.Q.)
80th " "	(Nicolet, P.Q.)
83rd " "	(Town of Joliette, P.Q.)
84th " "	(St. Hyacinthe, P.Q.)
85th " "	(Montreal, P.Q.)
89th " "	(Saint Germain de Rimouski, P.Q.)
92nd " "	(St. Isidore, P.Q.)

3rd Battalion.

14th Hussars	(Middleton, N.S.)
28th Dragoons	(Saint John, N.B.)
5th Infantry Regt.	(Montreal, P.Q.)
62nd " "	(Saint John, N.B.)
63rd " "	(Halifax, N.S.)
67th " "	(Woodstock, N.B.)
71st " "	(Fredericton, NB.)
81st " "	(Windsor, N.S.)
69th " "	(Middleton, N.S.)
73rd " "	(Chatham, NB.)
74th " "	(Sussex, NB.)
75th " "	(Lunenburg, N.S.)
76th " "	(Truro, N.S.)
78th " "	(Pictou, N.S.)
82nd " "	(Charlottetown, P.E.I.)
93rd " "	(Spring Hill, N.S.)
94th " "	(Baddeck, N.S.)

4th Battalion.

21st Hussars	(Medicine Hat, Alta.)
23rd Alberta Rangers	(Pincher Creek, Alta.)
27th Horse	(Moose Jaw, Sask.)
29th Horse	(Saskatoon, Sask.)
31st Horse	(Merritt, B.C.)
35th Horse	(Red Deer, Alta.)
102nd Infantry Regt.	(Kamloops, B.C.)
Independent Infantry Coy.	(Nanaimo, B.C.)

5th Battalion.

1st Hussars	(London, Ont.)
24th Horse	(Ingersoll, Ont.)
7th Infantry Regt.	(London, Ont.) 21st " (Windsor, Ont.)
22nd " "	(Woodstock, Ont.)
23rd " "	(Parry Sound, Ont.)
24th " "	(Chatham, Ont.)
25th " "	(St. Thomas, Ont.),
26th " "	(Strathroy, Ont.)
27th " "	(Sarnia, Ont.)
28th " "	(Stratford, Ont.)
29th " "	(Galt, Ont.)
30th " "	(Guelph, Ont.)
31st " "	(Owen Sound, Ont.)
32nd " "	(Walkerton, Ont.)
33rd " "	(Goderich, Ont.)

6th Battalion.

2nd Infantry Regt.	(Toronto, Ont.)
20th " "	(Milton, Ont.)
37th " "	(York, Ont.)
38th " "	(Brantford, Ont.)
39th " "	(Simcoe, Ont.)
43rd " "	(Ottawa, Ont.)
51st " "	(Sault Ste. Marie, Ont.)
Governor General's Body Guard	(Toronto, Ont.)
25th Dragoons	(Brantford, Ont.)

7th Battalion.

10th Infantry Regt.	(Toronto, Ont.)
12th " "	(Aurora, Ont.)
13th " "	(Hamilton, Ont.)
19th " "	(St. Catharines, Ont.)
34th " "	(Whitby, Ont.)
35th " "	(Barrie, Ont.)
36th " "	(Brampton, Ont.)
44th " "	(Niagara Falls, Ont.)

8th Battalion.

2nd Dragoons	(St. Catharines, Ont.)
15th Infantry Regt.	(Belleville, Ont.)
16th " "	(Picton, Ont.)
42nd " "	(Perth, Ont.)
40th " "	(Cobourg, Ont.)
41st " "	(Brockville, Ont.)
48th " "	(Toronto, Ont.)
59th " "	(Alexandria, Ont.)
65th (sic) " "	(Montreal, P.Q.)*
77th " "	(Dundas, Ont.)
91st " "	(Hamilton, Ont.)
49th " "	(Belleville, Ont.)
97th " "	(Sudbury, Ont.)

9th Battalion.

6th Infantry Regt.	(Vancouver, B.C.)
50th " "	(Victoria, B.C.)
72nd " "	(Vancouver, B.C.)
79th " "	(Winnipeg, Man.)

10th Battalion.

60th Infantry Regt.	(Moose Jaw, Sask.)
90th " "	(Winnipeg, Man.)
95th " "	(Regina, Sask.)
99th " "	(Brandon, Man.)

11th Battalion.

12th Dragoons	(Brandon, Man.)
16th Horse	(Regina, Sask.)
18th Mounted Rifles	(Portage la Prairie, Man.)
20th Horse	(Pipestone, Man.)
22nd Horse	(Lloydminster, Sask.)
32nd Horse	(Roblin, Man.)
100th Infantry Regt.	(Winnipeg, Man.)
105th " "	(Saskatoon, Sask.)
106th " "	(Winnipeg, Man.)

12th Battalion.

11th Infantry Regt.	(Vancouver, B.C.)
88th " "	(Victoria, B.C.)
101st " "	(Edmonton, Alta.)
103rd " "	(Calgary, Alta.)
104th " "	(New Westminster, B.C.)

* See 2nd Battalion.

CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY
STRENGTHS, AUGUST

Unit	24th August		31st August		7th September	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
H.Q. Staff.....						
Camp H.Q., Instructional Staff, P.F.(*)						
Details and Utilitarian Units.....	166	2,980	154	2,580	148	1,935
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....			15	282	14	323
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.).....			12	109	10	212
Royal Can. Horse Artillery.....			15	363	14	399
No. 3 Coy., (Hvy. Batty) R.C.A.....			4	65	4	65
Div. Mtd. Troops, Cav. Squadron.....					7	195
Div. Mtd. Troops Cyclist Coy.....						
Divisional Artillery H.Q.....					5	40
1st Artillery Brigade H.Q.....					5	37
1st Field Artillery Brigade.....			33	897	20	707
Ammunition Column.....					4	124
2nd Artillery Brigade H.Q.....					6	34
2nd Field Artillery Brigade.....			26	815	14	591
Ammunition Column.....					3	143
3rd Artillery Brigade H.Q.....					5	36
3rd Field Artillery Brigade.....			35	1,069	16	603
Ammunition Column.....					5	355
Heavy Artillery and Amm. Col.....			9	241	7	167
Divisional Ammunition Col.....			11	326	26	581
Artillery left at Base.....						
Artillery unallotted.....			4	73		
Divisional Engineers.....					28	855
Engineers unallotted.....			42	1,083		
Divisional Signalling Coy.....			10	154		197
1st Infantry Brigade H.Q.....					3	13
1st Battalion.....	29	852	69	1,676	48	1,463
2nd Battalion.....	34	703	91	1,677	69	1,505
3rd Battalion.....	62	972	93	1,985	47	1,404
4th Battalion.....			26	591	52	1,384
2nd Infantry Brigade H.Q.....					4	5
5th Battalion.....	55	1,473	58	1,562	46	1,249
6th Battalion.....	49	1,603	61	1,826	29	1,129
7th Battalion.....	26	1,456	72	2,055	56	1,481
8th Battalion.....	38	972	94	1,807	40	1,299
3rd Infantry Brigade H.Q.(*).....					3	10
13th Battalion.....					48	1,270
14th Battalion.....					48	1,299
15th Battalion.....					58	1,255
16th Battalion.....					51	1,180
17th Battalion (Attached)(*).....						
4th Infantry Brigade H.Q.(*).....					6	12
9th Battalion.....			54	1,099	34	1,293
10th Battalion.....			53	1,528	30	1,473
11th Battalion.....			70	1,782	47	1,340
12th Battalion.....			47	1,686	87	1,360
18th Battalion (Attached)(*).....						
Divisional Train.....					29	936
Div. Ammunition Sub Park.....						
Divisional Supply Column.....						
Depot Units of Supply.....						
Reserve Park.....						
Railway Supply Detachment.....						
No. 1 Field Ambulance.....					8	257
No. 2 Field Ambulance.....					12	274
No. 3 Field Ambulance.....					13	289

FORCE. FIRST CONTINGENT
AND SEPTEMBER, 1914

17th September		22nd September		Sailing Strength		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	
				31	82	
129	767	103	667			(*) Utilitarian Units consisted chiefly of Militia, Engineer, C.A.S.C. and C.A.M.C. Coys. called out on active service for employment at Valcartier Camp. They were not part of the Expeditionary Force, though many of their personnel joined C.E.F. Units.
16	391	23	523	34	541	
11	220	11	220	32	571	
17	518	18	535	18	490	
7	194	7	175	9	172	
7	45	6	41	5	23	(2) The Brigade composed of the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Battalions was originally known as the 3rd, and the Brigade composed of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Battalions was originally known as the 4th. On 25th September these two Brigades (but not the units composing them) exchanged numbers; the final nomenclature is here employed throughout.
8	36	7	35	8	138	
18	712	18	676	16	609	
3	131	3	156	4	155	
6	46	6	39	6	39	
17	595	16	570	17	593	
4	182	3	155	3	210	
7	41	7	43	7	43	
18	622	19	592	18	592	
4	257	3	216	4	245	
8	222	10	213	10	213	
31	589	9	627	7	594	
1	41	4	139			
28	818	27	762	38	721	
	191		190	12	191	(*) Disbanded on 27th September. Personnel absorbed by other Units.
5	22	7	22	7	26	
35	1,359	55	1,205	45	1,121	
64	1,266	41	1,000	45	1,096	
49	1,338	39	1,073	45	1,117	
33	1,312	56	1,159	44	1,121	
5	14	6	14	7	27	
56	1,114	44	1,151	44	1,120	
49	1,107	47	1,113	45	1,119	
59	1,240	53	1,113	49	1,094	
48	1,271	47	1,267	47	1,131	
5	18	7	19	8	21	
52	1,379	45	1,115	45	1,122	
46	1,162	38	1,164	46	1,119	
58	1,263	44	1,197	44	1,116	
46	1,193	33	1,032	47	1,111	
				44	624	
7	13	8	18	7	22	
43	1,194	41	1,129	49	1,168	
40	1,423	50	1,267	46	1,076	
46	1,333	47	1,118	45	1,134	
86	1,228	92	1,307	53	1,117	
		10	356			
28	492	28	436	29	449	
				11	469	
5	233	6	258	7	258	
				4	99	
7	266	5	291	7	283	
	134	6	225	1	84	
10	252	11	255	11	255	
11	271	11	252	11	252	
11	263	13	254	11	258	

CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
STRENGTHS, AUGUST AND

Unit	24th August		31st August		7th September	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
No. 1 General Hospital (*)					4	125
No. 2 General Hospital						
No. 1 Stationary Hospital						
No. 2 Stationary Hospital						
No. 1 Clearing Station						
Depot Company, A.M.C.						
Nursing Sisters						
Hydrological Corps (*)					3	283
C.A.V.C. Section			3	24	3	24
Remount Depot						
Canadian Postal Corps			2	17	2	17
Details (Mil. Police, Base Pay Office, etc., etc.)						
TOTAL, VALCARTIER CAMP	459	11,011	1,163	27,372	1,221	31,228
P.P.C.L. Infantry (*)	32	1,054	32	1,050	33	1,058
Auto M.G. Brigade No. 1 (*)			3	88	5	99
TOTAL, C.E.F.	491	12,065	1,198	28,510	1,259	32,385
		12,556		29,708		33,644

FIRST CONTINGENT—Continued

SEPTEMBER, 1914—Continued

17th September		22nd September		Sailing Strength		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	
4	136	12	142	24	156	(5) Moved to Quebec on 17th September but continued to be carried on Valcartier Camp Strength.
8	142	12	147	24	133	
8	84	6	85	10	84	
.....	11	107	9	92	(6) Includes unit water details under instruction. Did not sail as a Unit. Personnel are included in sailing strengths of Battalions and other Units.
.....	9	80	9	79	
.....	7	42	
.....	99	
3	170	3	58	(7) Mobilized at Ottawa. Trained at Levis from 30th August until embarkation
3	24	4	24	3	24	
9	39	11	55	
4	28	4	28	1	12	
.....	8	71	(8) Mobilized and trained at Ottawa.
1,283	29,451	1,262	28,110	1,382	28,012	
33	1,067	33	1,069	33	1,071	
9	108	10	120	9	114	
1,325	30,626	1,305	29,299	1,424	29,197	
31,951		30,604		30,621		

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COMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL INFANTRY BRIGADES AND BATTALIONS.
VALCARTIER CAMP. 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1914.

(Compiled from Valcartier Camp Order No. 241 of 2nd September, 1914, Valcartier Camp Field State of 3rd September, 1914, with figures in italics for subsequent arrivals.)

	OFFRS.	O.R.	TOTAL
1st PROVISIONAL BRIGADE			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Lieut.-Colonel M. S. Mercer, 2nd Regiment.....			
<u>1st Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Hill, 44th Regiment.....	1		1
1st Hussars..... London, Ont.....	3	63	66
24th Regt. (Grey's Horse)..... Ingersoll, Ont.....	2	37	39
7th Regt. (Fusiliers)..... London, Ont.....	7	139	146
21st Regt. (Essex Fusiliers)..... Windsor, Ont.....	6	223	229
22nd Regt. (The Oxford Rifles)..... Woodstock, Ont.....	1	68	69
23rd Regt. (The Northern Pioneers)..... Parry Sound, Ont.....	6	146	152
24th Kent Regt..... Chatham, Ont.....	3	95	98
25th Regt..... St. Thomas, Ont.....	1	96	97
26th Regt. (Middlesex Light Inf.)..... Strathroy, Ont.....	3	23	26
27th Lambton Regt. (St. Clair Borderers)..... Sarnia, Ont.....	5	131	136
28th Perth Regt..... Stratford, Ont.....	4	142	146
29th Waterloo Regt..... Galt, Ont.....	3	115	118
30th Regt. (Wellington Rifles)..... Guelph, Ont.....	4	57	61
32nd Bruce Regt..... Walkerton, Ont.....	4	68	72
33rd Huron Regt..... Goderich, Ont.....	2	66	68
77th Wentworth Regt..... Dundas, Ont.....	6	72	78
Total.....	61	1,541	1,602
<u>2nd Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Worthington, 3rd E.T. Mtd. Bde.....	1		1
3rd The Prince of Wales' Canadian Dragoons, Peterborough, Ont.....	6	19	25
9th Mississauga Horse..... Toronto, Ont.....	6	155	161
Governor General's Foot Guards..... Ottawa, Ont.....	7	124	131
14th Regt. (The Princess of Wales' Own Rifles)..... Kingston, Ont.....	2	74	76
15th Regt. (Argyll Light Infantry)..... Belleville, Ont.....	2	52	54
16th Prince Edward Regt..... Picton, Ont.....	3	38	41
34th Ontario Regt..... Whitby, Ont.....	5	128	133
40th Northumberland Regt..... Cobourg, Ont.....	6	75	81
41st Regt. (Brockville Rifles)..... Brockville, Ont.....	4	79	83
42nd Lanark and Renfrew Regt..... Perth, Ont.....	2	126	128
43rd Regt. (The Duke of Cornwall's Own Rifles)..... Ottawa, Ont.....	3	111	114
45th Victoria Regt..... Lindsay, Ont.....	4	64	68
46th Durham Regt..... Port Hope, Ont.....	2	48	50
47th Frontenac Regt..... Kingston, Ont.....	2	47	49
49th Regt. (Hastings Rifles)..... Belleville, Ont.....	2	49	51
51st Regt. (The Soo Rifles)..... S. Ste. Marie, Ont.....	3	123	126
56th Grenville Regt. (Lisgar Rifles)..... Prescott, Ont.....	4	35	39
57th Regt. (Peterborough Rangers)..... Peterborough, Ont.....	4	63	67
59th Stormont and Glengarry Regt..... Alexandria, Ont.....		15	15
Total.....	68	1,425	1,493
<u>3rd Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Lieut.-Colonel R. Rennie, M.V.O., 2nd Regt.....	1		1
The Governor General's Body Guard..... Toronto, Ont.....	3	39	42
2nd Regt. (Queen's Own Rifles of Canada)..... Toronto, Ont.....	30	945	975
10th Regt. (Royal Grenadiers)..... Toronto, Ont.....	15	386	401
Total.....	49	1,370	1,419

COMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL INFANTRY BRIGADES AND BATTALIONS,
VALCARTIER CAMP, 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1914.—*Continued*

	OFFRS.	O.R.	TOTAL
<u>4th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel W. S. Buell, 41st Regt.....	1	1
25th Brant Dragoons..... Brantford, Ont.....	3	57	60
12th Regt. (York Rangers)..... Aurora, Ont.....	11	262	273
13th Royal Regt..... Hamilton, Ont.....	7	174	181
19th Lincoln Regt..... St. Catharines, Ont.....	3	71	74
20th Regt. (Halton Rifles)..... Milton, Ont.....	6	165	171
35th Regt. (Simcoe Foresters)..... Barrie, Ont.....	10	114	124
36th Peel Regt..... Brampton, Ont.....	10	220	230
37th Regt. (Haldimand Rifles)..... York, Ont.....	7	69	76
38th Regt. (Dufferin Rifles of Canada)..... Brantford, Ont.....	4	190	194
39th Regt. (Norfolk Rifles)..... Simcoe, Ont.....	30	30
44th Lincoln and Welland Regt..... Niagara Falls, Ont.....	6	196	202
Total.....	68	1,548	1,616
<u>2ND PROVISIONAL BRIGADE</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Currie, 50th Regt.....			
<u>5th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Tuxford, 27th Light Horse.....	1		1
12th Manitoba Dragoons..... Brandon, Man.....	6	195	201
16th Light Horse..... Regina, Sask.....	290	290
27th Light Horse..... Moosejaw, Sask.....	9	234	243
29th Light Horse..... Saskatoon, Sask.....	5	195	200
30th Regt. (British Columbia Horse)..... Vernon, B.C.....	2	24	26
31st Regt. (British Columbia Horse)..... Merritt, B.C.....	23	464	487
35th Central Alberta Horse..... Red Deer, Alta.....	6	110	116
Total.....	52	1,512	1,564
<u>6th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Rattray, 20th Border Horse.....	1		1
18th Mounted Rifles..... Portage la Prairie, Man.....	9	151	160
20th Border Horse..... Pipestone, Man.....	2	121	123
22nd Saskatchewan Light Horse..... Lloydminster, Sask.....	8	167	175
23rd Alberta Rangers†..... Pincher Creek, Alta.....	6	72	78
32nd Manitoba Horse..... Roblin, Man.....	1	43	44
34th Fort Garry Horse..... Winnipeg Man.....	10	224	234
Total.....	37	778	815
<u>7th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— (To be detailed).....			
6th Regt. (The Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles)..... Vancouver, B.C.....	18	335	353
11th Regt. (Irish Fusiliers of Canada)..... Vancouver, B.C.....	13	342	355
88th Regt. (Victoria Fusiliers)..... Victoria, B.C.....	11	336	347
102nd Regt. (Rocky Mountain Rangers)..... Kamloops, B.C.....	5	120	125
104th Regt. (Westminster Fusiliers of Canada)..... New Westminster, B.C.....	5	148	153
Kootenay Detachment.....	7	303	310
Total.....	57	1,484	1,541

†Includes 21st Alberta Hussars, Medicine Hat, Alta., and 15th Light Horse, Calgary, Alta.

COMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL INFANTRY BRIGADES AND BATTALIONS,
VALCARTIER CAMP, 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1914—Continued

	OFFRS.	O.R.	TOTAL
8th Provisional Battalion			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Major L. J. Lipsett, General Staff.....	1		1
90th Regt. (Winnipeg Rifles).....	29	747	776
96th Lake Superior Regt.....	5	311	316
98th Regt.....	2	78	80
99th Manitoba Rangers.....	5	181	186
Total.....	42	1,317	1,359
3RD PROVISIONAL BRIGADE			
Commander (Provisional):—			
(To be detailed).....			
9th Provisional Battalion			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Lieut.-Colonel S. M. Rogers, R.O.....	1		1
101st Regt. (Edmonton Fusiliers).....	30	1,217	1,247
Ottawa Detachment.....	1	76	77
Total.....	32	1,293	1,325
10th Provisional Battalion			
Commander (Provisional):—			
(To be detailed).....			
103rd Regt. (Calgary Rifles).....	9	837	846
106th Regt. (Winnipeg Light Infantry).....	22	643	665
Total.....	31	1,480	1,511
11th Provisional Battalion			
Commander (Provisional):—			
(To be detailed).....			
52nd Regt. (Prince Albert Volunteers).....	9	141	150
60th Rifles of Canada.....	10	284	294
95th Saskatchewan Rifles.....	4	167	171
100th Winnipeg Grenadiers.....	18	453	471
105th Regt. (Saskatoon Fusiliers).....	7	248	255
Humboldt Detachment.....		21	21
Total.....	48	1,314	1,362
12th Provisional Battalion			
Commander (Provisional):—			
Lieut.-Colonel H. McLeod, 71st Regt.....	1		1
28th New Brunswick Dragoons.....	1	16	17
36th Prince Edward Island Light Horse.....	1	10	11
4th Regt. (Chasseurs Canadiens).....	5	36	41
8th Regt. (Royal Rifles).....	23	345	368
9th Regt. (Voltigeurs de Quebec).....	1	28	29
17th Regt.....	2	5	7
18th Regt. (Franc-Tireurs du Saguenay).....	1	2	3
53rd Sherbrooke Regt.....	2	105	107
54th Regt. (Carabiniers de Sherbrooke).....	2	111	113
61st Regt. de Montmagny.....	4	2	6
62nd Regt. (St. John Fusiliers).....	4	136	140
64th Chateauguay and Beauharnois Regt.....	5	18	23
67th Regt. (Carleton Light Infantry).....	3	27	30
71st York Regt.....	14	146	160
73rd Northumberland Regt.....	2	74	76
74th Regt. (The Brunswick Rangers).....	2	71	73
80th Nicolet Regt.....	1		1

COMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL INFANTRY BRIGADES AND BATTALIONS,
VALCARTIER CAMP, 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1914.—*Concluded*

	OFFRS.	O.R.	TOTAL
<u>12th Provisional Battalion—Continued</u>			
82nd (Abegweit Light Infantry).....Charlottetown, P.E.I.....	4	27	31
83rd Joliette Regt.....Joliette, P.Q.....	4	22	26
84th St. Hyacinthe Regt.....St. Hyacinthe, P.Q.....	1	11	12
85th Regt.....Montreal, P.Q.....	6	137	143
89th Temiscouata and Rimouski Regt.....St. Germain de Rimouski, P.Q.....	2	13	15
92nd Dorchester Regt.....St. Isidore, P.Q.....	5	4	9
Total.....	96	1,346	1,442
<u>4TH PROVISIONAL BRIGADE</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Colonel R. E. W. Turner, V.C., D.S.O., R.O.....			
<u>13th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel F. O. W. Loomis, 5th Regt.....			
5th Regt. (Royal Highlanders of Canada)....Montreal, P.Q.....	30	966	996
75th Pictou Regt. (Highlanders).....Pictou, N.S.....	10	117	127
93rd Cumberland Regt.....Spring Hill, N.S.....	7	126	133
Total.....	48	1,209	1,257
<u>14th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel F. S. Meighen, 1st Regt.....			
14th King's Canadian Hussars.....Middleton, N.S.....	1	6	7
1st Regt. (Canadian Grenadier Guards)....Montreal, P.Q.....	8	342	350
3rd Regt. (Victoria Rifles of Canada)....Montreal, P.Q.....	13	338	351
63rd Regt. (Halifax Rifles).....Halifax, N.S.....	2	24	26
65th Carabiniers (Mont-Royal).....Montreal, P.Q.....	8	329	337
66th Regt. (Princess Louise Fusiliers)....Halifax, N.S.....	3	29	32
69th Annapolis Regt.....Middleton, N.S.....	3	32	35
75th Lunenburg Regt.....Lunenburg, N.S.....	3	25	28
76th Colchester and Hants Rifles.....Truro, N.S.....	2	94	96
81st Hants Regt.....Windsor, N.S.....		20	20
Total.....	44	1,239	1,283
<u>15th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Currie, 48th Regt.....			
2nd Dragoons.....St. Catharines, Ont.....	3	29	32
13th Scottish Light Dragoons.....Waterloo, P.Q.....	3	40	43
26th Stanstead Dragoons.....Coaticook, P.Q.....	2	23	25
31st Grey Regt.....Owen Sound, Ont.....	4	79	83
48th Regt. (Highlanders).....Toronto, Ont.....	34	802	836
97th Regt. (Algonquin Rifles).....Sudbury, Ont.....	12	251	263
Total.....	59	1,224	1,283
<u>16th Provisional Battalion</u>			
Commander (Provisional):— Lieut.-Colonel R. G. E. Leekie, 72nd Regt.....			
50th Regt.....Victoria, B.C.....	11	251	262
72nd Regt. (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada).....Vancouver, B.C.....	25	517	542
79th Cameron Highlanders of Canada.....Winnipeg, Man.....	10	253	263
91st Regt. (Canadian Highlanders).....Hamilton, Ont.....	5	149	154
Total.....	52	1,170	1,222

86
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
PERTAINING TO FIRST CONTINGENT

Statement furnished 12th May 1916 in compliance with an Order of the House of Commons dated 3rd February, 1918

First Contingent

—	Officers	Other Ranks	Nurses	Total
The number of troops sailing:—	1,519	20,184	105	30,808
29th September, 1914.....	22	168	1	191
To 31st December, 1914.....	35	509	544
" 31st January, 1915.....	131	4,061	69	4,311
" 28th February, 1915.....	54	354	5	413
" 31st March, 1915.....	1,811	34,276	180	36,267

Total 36,267 All Ranks.

During April, 1915, the first units of the Second Contingent proceeded overseas.

2. Nationalities of officers, non-commissioned officers and men attested for service with the First Contingent, Canadian Expeditionary Force, and Reinforcements who proceeded overseas prior to March 31, 1915.

<i>Nationality:—</i>	Total All Ranks
Canadian (includes everyone born in Canada, except French Canadians).....	9,635
French Canadian.....	1,245
English.....	15,232
Scotch.....	5,440
Irish.....	2,176
Welsh.....	363
American.....	130
Russian.....	36
All other countries.....	<u>2,010</u>
	<u>36,267</u>

NOTE.—Nationalities are based on replies given to the question "What is your Country of Birth".

Beyond this, the attestation papers contain no information on which the "descent" of a man may be based.

French Canadians are credited with the full strength of French Canadian units, and all men bearing French names and born in Canada are called French Canadians.

Figures are taken from attestation papers on file at Record Office, Militia Headquarters.

3. Religions of officers, non-commissioned officers and men attested for overseas service with First Contingent, Canadian Expeditionary Force, and Reinforcements who proceeded overseas prior to March 31, 1915.

<i>Religious Denominations:—</i>	Total All Ranks
Church of England.....	17,187
Methodist.....	2,539
Presbyterian.....	8,704
Roman Catholic.....	4,626
Baptist and Congregationalist.....	1,451
Jewish.....	47
Other denominations.....	<u>1,813</u>
	<u>36,267*</u>

No yearly return is available.

Figures are taken from attestation papers on file at Record Office, Militia Headquarters.

* The discrepancy of 100 in addition is as in original.

DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH
FIRST CONTINGENT

The following figures compiled 1988 modify earlier statements, particularly in respect to U.S. born.

<i>Born in</i>	
Canada.....	9,159
British Isles.....	18,495
Other British possessions.....	662
U.S.A.....	756
Other foreign countries.....	523
Country of birth not stated.....	<u>1,032</u>
Total.....	30,617

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*Telegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to the Secretary of State for War*

OTTAWA, 29th August, 1914.

LORD KITCHENER, LONDON.

Private and personal. Am offered sixty thousand good fighting men from neighbouring Republic anxious to help Britain and liberty. They would make a splendid legion; believe this would be a splendid move, no one would be enlisted outside of Canada. Imperial Government to bear cost.

HUGHES.

*Telegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to the War Office*

OTTAWA, 11 September, 1914,

No. 125. With reference to volunteers from the neighbourhood of the American Republic. and Russia and Servia, I have a plan whereby they may reach Canada voluntarily and be sent across to France. Thousands are offering themselves. We cannot either arm or clothe them. They would make splendid fighters. If my plans meet with approval I would recommend that three corps be formed, of the three classes named. When you reply you may refer to them as A. R. and S.

88

ATTESTATION PAPER

No.

Folio

CANADIAN OVER-SEAS EXPEDITION-ARY FORCE

QUESTIONS TO BE PUT BEFORE ATTESTATION

(Answers).

1. What is your name?
2. In what Town, Township or Parish, and in what Country were you born?
3. What is the name of your next-of-kin?
4. What is the address of your next-of-kin?
5. What is the date of your birth?
6. What is your Trade or Calling?
7. Are you married?
8. Are you willing to be vaccinated or re-vaccinated?
9. Do you now belong to the Active Militia?
10. Have you ever served in any Military Force?
If so, state particulars of former service.
11. Do you understand the nature and terms of your engagement?
12. Are you willing to be attested to serve in the CANADIAN OVER-SEAS EXPEDITION-ARY FORCE?

.....
(Signature of Man)

.....
(Signature of Witness)

DECLARATION TO BE MADE BY MAN ON ATTESTATION

I,, do solemnly declare that the above answers made by me to the above questions are true, and that I am willing to fulfil the engagements by me now made, and I hereby engage and agree to serve in the CANADIAN OVER-SEAS EXPEDITION-ARY FORCE, and to be attached to any arm of the service therein, for the term of one year, or during the war now existing between Great Britain and Germany should that war last longer than one year, and for six

months after the termination of that war provided His Majesty should so long require my services, or until legally discharged.

.....(Signature of Recruit)
Date....1914.....(Signature of Witness)

OATH TO BE TAKEN BY MAN ON ATTESTATION

I,, do make Oath, that I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to His Majesty KING GEORGE THE FIFTH, His Heirs and Successors, and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully defend His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, in Person, Crown and Dignity, against all enemies, and will observe and obey all orders of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and of all the Generals and Officers set over me. So help me God.

.....(Signature of Recruit)
.....(Signature of Witness)
Date.....1914.

CERTIFICATE OF MAGISTRATE

The Recruit above-named was cautioned by me that if he made any false answer to any of the above questions he would be liable to be punished as provided in the Army Act.

The above questions were then read to the Recruit in my presence.

I have taken care that he understands each question, and that his answer to each question has been duly entered as replied to, and the said Recruit has made and signed the declaration and taken the oath before me, at.....this.....day of.....1914.

.....(Signature of Justice)

I certify that the above is a true copy of the Attestation of the above-named Recruit.
.....(Approving Officer)

DESCRIPTION OF...ON ENLISTMENT

Apparent Ageyears.....months Distinctive marks
(To be determined according to the and marks indicating
instructions given in the Regulations congenital
for Army Medical Services.) peculiarities or
Heightft.....ins. previous disease.

Chest measurement.	{ Girth when fully expandedins. (Should the Medical Officer be of opinion that the recruit has served before, he will, unless the man acknowledges to any previous services, attach a slip to that effect, for the information of the Approving Officer.) Range of expansion.....ins.
Complexion	
Eyes	
Hair	
Religious denominations.	{ Church of England
	{ Presbyterian
	{ Wesleyan
	{ Baptist or Congregationalist...
	{ Other Protestants (Denominations to be stated.)
	{ Roman Catholic
	{ Jewish

CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL
EXAMINATION

I have examined the above-named Recruit and find that he does not present any of the causes of rejection specified in the Regulations for Army Medical Services.

He can see at the required distance with either eye; his heart and lungs are healthy; he has the free use of his joints and limbs, and he declares that he is not subject to fits of any description.

I consider him* for the CANADIAN OVER-SEAS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

Date 1914

Place

Medical Officer.

NOTE: Should the Medical Officer consider the Recruit unfit, he will fill in the foregoing Certificate only in the case of those who have been attested, and will briefly state below the cause of unfitness:—

.....
.....
.....

*Insert here "fit" or "unfit."

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER COM
MANDING UNIT

..... having been finally approved and inspected by me this day, and his Name, Age, Date of Attestation, and every prescribed particular having been recorded, I certify that I am satisfied with the correctness of this Attestation.

..... (Signature of Officer).

Date 1914.

89

Army Order No. 86 of January 1915

ROYAL WARRANT

Rank of Officers

GEORGE R. I.

Whereas We deem it expedient to provide for the manner in which officers holding *temporary* commissions in Our Army, and, during the present embodiment, officers of Our Special Reserve and officers of Our Territorial Force, shall take rank with officers of Our Regular Army;

OUR WILL AND PLEASURE is that officers holding temporary commissions in Our Regular Army shall take rank with officers

of Our Regular Army of the same rank according to the dates of their appointment to the rank:

IT IS OUR FURTHER WILL AND PLEASURE that for the above purpose and during the present period of embodiment officers holding commissions in Our Special Reserve or Territorial Force shall take rank as though they held temporary commissions in Our Regular Army, subject to the limitation that the relative positions held on the date of embodiment shall not be disturbed except by subsequent promotion.

This Our Warrant shall take effect from the 5th August, 1914.

Our Warrant of the 1st April 1910, as amended by Our Warrant of the 13th July, 1911, contained in paragraph 217 of the King's Regulations and Orders for the Army shall be amended accordingly.

Given at Our Court at St. James's, this 19th day of December, 1914, in the fifth year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command.

KITCHENER.

*Extract from London Gazette dated
1st May, 1916*

MEMORANDA

With reference to Army Order No. 86 of January, 1915, officers of Overseas Contingents, and of the Royal Malta Artillery, take rank as though they hold temporary Commissions in the Army, with effect from the 5th August, 1914, or date of subsequent appointment, and take rank with officers of the Regular Army from such date. (Substituted for the notice which appeared in the Gazette of 26th January, 1915.)

90

CAMP ORDERS

Valcartier Camp,

27th September, 1914.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

No. 809

Officers-Rank.

Qualified Officers of the Active non-permanent Militia enlisting in the ranks of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, or accepting therein a commission with lower rank, will, on return to Canada be reinstated in their present corps with such rank as they would have had had their services in the Militia not been interrupted by service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

A. H. MACDONELL,

Lt.-Colonel,

for A.A.G., i/c Administration.

P.C. 2264

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 3rd September, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 27th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending that the following daily rates of pay be authorized for the troops of the Overseas Contingents, these rates being in most cases the same as those now in force for annual training.

	Pay	Field Allowance
	\$ c.	\$ c.
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS		
Commander, Major General.....	20.00	4.00
General Staff Officer—1st Grade	10.00	3.00
Asst. Adjutant and Quartermaster General.....	9.00	3.00
General Staff Officer—2nd Grade	8.00	3.00
Asst. Director of Medical Services.....	8.00	3.00
Deputy Asst. Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.....	7.00	3.00
Deputy Asst. Adjutant General.	7.00	3.00
Deputy Asst. Quartermaster General.....	7.00	3.00
Chief Paymaster.....	8.00	3.00
Deputy Asst. Director of Veterinary Services.....	8.00	3.00
General Staff Officer—3rd Grade	5.00	3.00
Deputy Asst. Director of Medical Services.....	5.00	3.00
Deputy Asst. Director of Ordnance Services.....	5.00	3.00
Asst. Provost Marshal.....	5.00	3.00
Divisional Paymaster.....	5.00	3.00
Asst. Divisional Paymaster.....	3.00	3.00
A.D.C. to Commander.....	3.00	3.00
Superintending Clerk.....	2.00	1.00
Other Clerks.....	1.50	0.50
Staff Sergeants and Sergeants....	Pay of Rank	0.50
Other non-commissioned officers and men.....	"	0.25
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEAD- QUARTERS AND INFANTRY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS		
Commander.....	9.00	3.00
Brigade Major.....	6.00	3.00
Staff Captains.....	4.00	3.00
Intelligence Staff Officer.....	3.00	3.00
Veterinary Officer.....	Pay of Rank	3.00
Clerks.....	1.50	0.50
Staff Sergeants and Sergeants....	Pay of Rank	0.50
Other non-commissioned officers and men.....	"	0.25

	Pay	Field Allowance
	\$ c.	\$ c.
REGIMENTAL RATES—ALL ARMS		
Colonel.....	6.00	1.50
Lieut.-Colonel.....	5.00	1.25
Majors.....	4.00	1.00
Captains.....	3.00	0.75
Lieutenants.....	2.00	0.60
Adjutants, in addition to pay of rank.....	0.50
Paymasters.....	3.00	0.75
Quartermasters.....	3.00	0.75
Warrant Officers.....	2.00	0.30
Quartermaster-Sergeants.....	1.80	0.20
Orderly Room Clerks.....	1.50	0.20
Pay Sergeants.....	1.50	0.20
Squadron, Battery or Company Sergeant-Major.....	1.60	0.20
Squadron, Battery or Company Quartermaster-Sergeant.....	1.50	0.20
Colour Sergeant or Staff Sergeant	1.60	0.20
Sergeants.....	1.35	0.15
Corporals.....	1.10	0.10
Bombardiers or 2nd Corporals..	1.05	0.10
Trumpeters, Buglers and Drummers.....	1.00	0.10
Privates, Gunners, Drivers, Sappers, Batmen, Cooks, etc.....	1.00	0.10

The Minister further recommends that in addition to the foregoing regimental rates, Officers in command of regiments of Cavalry or Battalions of Infantry, brigades of Artillery, or other bodies of troops numbering 500 men or over, including Divisional Engineers, shall receive command pay at the rate of \$1 per day. This, however, shall not be paid to Divisional or Brigade commanders or other officers in receipt of a special rate of staff pay.

The Minister also recommends that in addition to pay of rank, non-commissioned officers and men enlisted and employed as Farriers, Shoeing-smiths, Smiths, Saddlers, Fitters, Wheelers, Motor-car Drivers, Cooks, Bakers and Butchers shall, if qualified and recommended by the Officer Commanding the unit to which they belong, receive working pay at following scale:—

- If recommended by Officer Commanding:—
- as 1st class.. . . . \$1.00 a day
- as 2nd class..75 a day
- as 3rd class..50 a day

The number drawing Working Pay must not, however, exceed the number shown on the establishment for these services.

Armament Artificers and Armourers, etc., of the Permanent Force, if in receipt of a special rate of pay as such, will not be eligible for this special rate of working pay.

Officers, Warrant-Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the Permanent Staff or Permanent Force shall not receive a lower rate of pay than they are entitled to in that Force.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

92

P.C. 2553

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 10th October, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 7th October, 1914, from the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence, stating, with reference to the Order in Council of the 4th September, 1914, No. 2266, respecting Separation Allowance to the wives and families of members of the Overseas Contingent, that many applications for this allowance have been received from widows whose sons, their sole support, have gone to the front.

The Minister is of the opinion that these women should be granted the allowance and he recommends that the expression "families" be considered to include such.

The Minister also recommends that the last paragraph of the Order restricting the allowance be made to apply to those beneficiaries only whose husbands or fathers or sons are in receipt of a salary, from the Dominion or any of the Provincial Governments during their service with the contingent.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

93

P.C. 452

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 3rd March, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that authority be given that Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force, in Canada, and of the Canadian Militia called out for active Service in Canada, who apply for their discharge, or whose parents or wives request that they be discharged, shall have to pay the following amounts before being discharged, viz:—

- (a) If the discharge is asked for within the first three months of their service, \$15.
- (b) If after three months, then \$2 per month for the unexpired period of one year's service.

The Minister observes that in this way the public will be reimbursed in a small degree for the cost of equipping and feeding these men.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

94

STRUCK OFF STRENGTH,
FIRST CONTINGENT,
VALCARTIER CAMP

—	Officers	Other Ranks
Medically unfit	5	2,159
Under age.....		51
Over age.....		4
Refused inoculation.....		15
Deceased.....	1	6
Protest by wife or parent	7	372
Own request.....	13	269
Reservist		8
Not British subject.....		28
Undesirable.....	1	309
Inefficient		59
Misconduct		227
Deserted.....		17
Reasons not stated	109	1,421
	136	4,945

96

P.C. 2267

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 3rd September, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 27th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, submitting that he has received from the War Office the cypher telegram of which a paraphrase (marked A) is attached.

The Minister states that in said telegram the Army Council ask for certain units which are needed for administrative purposes on lines of communication, in rear of the fighting troops.

That the total personnel required amounts to 1,678 officers and men, with 86 nursing sisters, horses number 378, vehicles (for the most part mechanically propelled) total 321.

That the estimated cost of provision and maintenance (for six months) amounts, approximately, to \$1,750,000:

The Minister recommends that the units in question namely,

- 1 Supply column (mechanical transport).
- 1 Reserve park (two-horsed wagons).
- 1 Ammunition park (mechanical transport).
- 2 General hospitals.
- 2 Stationary hospitals.
- 1 Clearing hospital.
- 1 Railway supply detachment, and
- 2 Depot units of supply.

be mobilized forthwith, complete with equipment and transport, as part of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

A

PARAPHRASE of cypher telegram received at Ottawa, on the 21st August, 1914.

Minister of Defence, Ottawa.

No. 570. The Army Council will be glad if you can furnish some or all of the following units, complete with equipment and transport:

- Supply column (mechanical transport).
- Reserve park (two-horsed wagons).
- Ammunition park (mechanical transport).
- Two general hospitals.
- Two stationary hospitals.

One clearing hospital.
One railway supply detachment.
Army Pay Corps details†.
Two depot units of supply.

The organization and number of these units being in accordance with War Establishments, Part I, Expeditionary Force, 1914.

SECRETARY OF THE WAR OFFICE.

† Already included in Canadian Expeditionary Force.

97

Telegram from the War Office to the Minister of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 20th September, 1914.

No. 1124—Cipher. Army Council will be glad to know if you can provide following line of communication units. Two sections Army Veterinary Corps, two mobile Veterinary sections also. Cable what reserve veterinary stores and equipment is being brought.

TROOPERS.

98

Statement issued to the Press by the Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden and published 23rd September, 1914.

In company with Sir George E. Foster and Mr. Rogers I have spent three days at Valcartier Camp where we met Colonel Hughes and had the opportunity of seeing nearly 25,000 men in review. During the past fortnight the men have improved wonderfully in appearance and I have no doubt in efficiency. The organization of the Camp seems excellent in every way. Everywhere I found most intense anxiety and even impatience to get to the front as soon as possible.

After careful consideration it was determined yesterday to send forward all the effective men in Camp, that is, all those who have passed the necessary medical examination. The Expeditionary Force, including the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, will number approximately 31,200 and 7,500 horses. It will comprise eleven batteries of horse and field artillery of six guns each. These are of the most modern type and are the same as those used in the British army. In addition, four heavy guns known as sixty pounders will also go forward as well as a number of machine guns many of which have been generously donated by patriotic citizens, whose gifts have already been acknowledged and to whom the very sincere thanks of the Government and of the people of Canada are due.

The news that the entire force assembled would go forward was received with loud demonstrations of the keenest delight and satisfaction. Yesterday I visited every brigade, shook hands with every officer of the force who was available and addressed the assembled officers of each brigade. In speaking to the officers I said that Canada: was proud of the splendid response to the call of duty; that the Canadian people bade them God-speed in the fullest assurance that when the Canadian force was called upon to perform the soldier's sternest duty in meeting the foe, we were confident that officers and men would so bear themselves as to bring pride to the hearts of all Canadians.

I said also that while Canada was proud of the response that had been evoked by the call to arms for the defence of our institutions and liberties, the officers and men inspired by the duty of service to the State should also be proud that the occasion gave them the opportunity and privilege of performing that duty.

The reasons for sending the entire force are obvious. These men have come forward with great earnestness and enthusiasm and have spent some weeks at Valcartier in training and in preparation. The numbers assembled, while greatly exceeding the strength of the force at first proposed to be sent forward, will to a considerable extent be necessary for the purpose of reinforcements which from time to time will be required.

The total reinforcements for the first year of a great war are estimated at from 60 to 70 per cent. If the reserve depots necessary for supplying such reinforcements were established in Canada, eight or ten weeks might elapse before they could reach the front through difficulties of transport, convoy, etc. If, on the other hand, such reserve depots of men are established in Great Britain, the expeditionary force could be reinforced to its full strength within four or five days. For this reason as well as others of a like character we deemed it advisable that the reserves should be kept on hand in Great Britain as the force at the front must continuously be kept at its full strength and that without the least unnecessary delay.

The great demands upon the British Government in supplying guns and rifles have made it essential that Canada should assist in every possible way.

Therefore in addition to the 70 field guns and the machine guns with which the Canadian Expeditionary Force is equipped, we are arranging to supply the British Government with the following:—

15135—5

1. Forty-seven eighteen pounders of the most modern type, which had been ordered by the Canadian Government in Great Britain before the outbreak of the war, are to be handed over to the British Government.

2. Fifty-one guns of the same type which the Department of Militia has on hand will go forward on the transports.

3. Six sixty-pounders will also be sent forward at the same time.

4. About thirty machine guns ordered in England before the outbreak of the war.

All this is being done at the request of the British War Office to assist in equipping the great army which is being assembled in the Mother Country. It is also expected that a considerable number of rifles will be supplied from Canada to the War Office.

The recent delay in forwarding troops has been altogether due to the requirements of the transport, which it is very difficult to meet. The force must be in convoy, and the steamers, numbering twenty-eight or more, must sail at the same time. It will be generally understood that the provision of so large a number of steamers suitably equipped for the transportation of men, horses, guns, lorries, field transport and the very numerous articles necessary for the equipment of a modern army is no light task. The services of Captain Lindsay of the Marine and Fisheries Department, who is an expert in such matters, have been engaged for many weeks past in assisting the transportation department in this matter. A Committee of prominent gentlemen experienced in transportation across the Atlantic has also volunteered its services to the Government and these gentlemen have been of great assistance for which the thanks of the Government are tendered.

The decision to send to England the entire force assembled at Valcartier was confirmed by Order in Council as under:

P.C. 2448.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 26th September, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 24th September, 1914, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs (i.e., *the Prime Minister*) to whom was referred a secret despatch from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 1st September 1914 on the subject of the composition of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. (*See below.*)

The Minister states that it has been decided to despatch to England the entire force now under arms at Valcartier, namely, one division with army troops, line of communication units, and a surplus over war establishment of about forty per cent, making a total in round numbers of 31,200 all ranks and 7,500 horses. Additional transports will of course be required, but the entire force, it is hoped will embark next week under the escort already promised.

The Minister observes that it has not been overlooked that further reinforcements may be required by the time the force has been twelve months in the field; and provision will be made accordingly.

The Minister further observes that the advisability of sending reinforcements to England, there to be trained and held ready for immediate despatch to the front, is fully recognized; and steps will be taken in the direction indicated.

The Committee on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs advise that Your Royal Highness may be pleased to inform the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies in this sense.

All of which is respectfully submitted for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

*Letter from the Secretary of State for the
Colonies to the Governor General*
DOWNING STREET, 1st September 1914.

Sir,—

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Royal Highness's Secret despatch of the 14th August, giving the composition of the proposed Canadian Expeditionary Force.

2. In reply I have to request you to inform your Ministers that the Army Council assume that the ten per cent "First Reinforcement" of the Expeditionary force will proceed to England at the same time as the main body, but they will be glad to receive information as to the method proposed to be adopted for the supply of further reinforcements to replace casualties. The further reinforcements required, are calculated to be some sixty per cent of the original strength for the first twelve months of the war, and the Army Council suggest that your Government might make such arrangements as would ensure the necessary flow of officers and other ranks to replace wastage.

3. I have to add that the Army Council observe that these reinforcements would most probably benefit by some training in England

under European conditions, while at the same time their presence so near the theatre of operations would ensure the speedy replacement of wastage.

I have, etc.,

L. HARCOURT.

Governor General
His Royal Highness
The Duke of Connaught and Strathearn,
etc., etc.

99

*Telegram from the Governor General to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies*
OTTAWA, 26th August, 1914.

Following for War Office—

Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, one battalion leaves Montreal on *Megantic* August 29th, 80 per cent old soldiers, most of whom have seen service—splendid body of men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Farquhar. Majority of officers ex-regulars. After 2 or 3 weeks training should be ready for service.

ARTHUR.

(See 100)

100

*Telegram from War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*
LONDON, 26th August, 1914.

No. 658. Re your telegram dated August 26th Canadian Expeditionary Force must not embark without previous instructions from War Department. Admiralty must arrange question of escort.

TROOPERS.

(See 99)

*Telegram from War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*
LONDON, 29th August, 1914.

719. With reference to your telegram regarding the sailing of the *Megantic* the Admiralty are of the opinion that units should not cross the ocean without an escort. At present no escort is available for convoying single regiments. Therefore until the necessary arrangements have been completed by the Admiralty all units of the Expeditionary Force should wait in Canada.

TROOPERS.

101

For further particulars see "Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 1914-1919" by Ralph Hodder-Williams. Published by Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., London and Toronto. 2 vols.

102

P.C. 2284

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 2nd September, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report dated 29th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, representing that it is advisable immediately to organize a Machine Gun Corps as part of the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force, and that several public spirited citizens of Canada have volunteered that at their own sole costs, charges and expenses, they will provide and deliver immediately to the Canadian Government:

- 16 machine guns.
- 8 armoured motor cars.
- 6 trucks.
- 4 automobile cars for the use of officers.

The said cars, guns and trucks, to be of such style, pattern, construction and quality as the Minister of Militia and Defence may approve and accept.

The Minister recommends that this offer be accepted, and that he be authorized to receive and take over the said guns, cars, and trucks, after they have been duly inspected and approved by him.

The Minister further recommends that, contingent on his approval and acceptance of the same guns, cars, and trucks, authority be granted for the organization of a unit of the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force, under the style and title of "The Automobile Machine Gun Brigade No. 1," and that the establishment of its personnel be:-

- 1 major.
- 3 captains.
- 5 subalterns.
- 4 sergeants.
- 2 sergeant artificers.
- 4 corporals.
- 3 corporal artificers.
- 101 privates.

The Minister further recommends that all costs and charges of arming, clothing, equipping, paying, subsisting and transporting the Brigade, and every other expense connected with its formation, training and maintenance, whether in or out of Canada (save and except the provision of cars and machine guns aforesaid) be borne by the Government of Canada.

It is further recommended that authority be granted to the Minister to issue the small arms, accoutrements, ammunition, clothing, equipment, stationery, and other articles which may be necessary for the Brigade, to provide the necessary horses, riding and draught, and

15135—5½

to issue such stores and supplies as may be required during the process of organization in Canada, and during service in the field.

Also it is recommended that, to enable officers, non-commissioned officers and men to join the Brigade, transportation requisitions be supplied to them by Officers Commanding Divisions and Districts, and that the Quartermaster-General be authorized to issue the necessary orders to that end.

Also it is recommended that the pay and allowance of all ranks be at the same rates as those approved for other officers and men of the "Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force," and that the Accountant and Paymaster-General be authorized to issue such pay and allowance to each officer from the date on which he is gazetted, and to each man from the day on which he is attested.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

102a

OTTAWA, August 22, 1914.

Troopers,
London.

Have offer from several wealthy gentlemen of about ten or twelve batteries of four guns each 303 Mark VII Machine guns mounted on armour (*sic armoured*) trucks for service abroad. Ready some in a month all at an early date thereafter stop Will your Government accept them for active service to join the Canadian Division stop Splendid gunners and outfit will accompany them.

HUGHES.

103

FOOD AND FORAGE-VALCARTIER
CAMP, 1914

Scale of rations

<u>Articles</u>	<u>Daily ration per man</u>
Bread.....	1½ lbs.
Meat.....	1 lb.
Potatoes.....	1 lb.
Bacon.....	2 ozs.
Beans.....	2 "
Jam.....	2 "
Butter.....	2 "
White Sugar.....	2 "
Vegetables, Fresh.....	6 "
Cheese.....	1 oz.
Split Peas.....	½ "
Salt.....	½ "
Pepper.....	1/36 "
<u>Forage</u>	<u>Daily ration per horse</u>
Hay.....	19 lbs.
Oats.....	10 "

104
AUDITOR GENERAL'S OFFICE
December 4, 1914.

The Deputy Minister of Finance:

Sir:—I wish to call your attention to the expenditure made by the Department of Militia and Defence under the War Appropriation Act, 1914.

At a conference, on 27th August, 1914, (*see App. 105*) at which were present Officers of the Departments of Militia and Defence, Naval Affairs and Finance and the Auditor General, held for the purpose of arriving at a working arrangement to facilitate the purchase and payment of supplies, etc., for the overseas contingent, it was agreed to issue a Letter of Credit to the Department of Militia and Defence, on condition that no payments would be made out of the Credit until the approval of the Governor in Council was obtained for the purchase.

This arrangement was agreed to by the officials of the Department of Militia and, Defence and Letters of Credit have been issued from time to time as required.

The vouchers for payments made have been received in the Auditor General's Office for a portion of the expenditure up to the latter part of September.

An examination of these vouchers shows that the agreement referred to above has not been adhered to. Large expenditures have been made for which the approval of Council has not been obtained, at least no copies of the Orders in Council have reached me.

For auto-trucks, motors and motor supplies over half a million dollars has been expended, for drugs, surgical supplies, etc., over \$90,000, field glasses over \$50,000 and various other items—the whole amounting to over \$1,000,000. No Orders in Council have been received for these articles.

This is only up to the end of September. Since that time large expenditures have been made in October and November but as I have not received the vouchers I cannot say what proportion has been spent without authority.

This is a clear violation of the War Appropriation Act and also of the understanding on which I consented to the issue of a Letter of Credit. I have, therefore, to request that you will inform the Department of Militia and Defence that their Letter of Credit is no longer available for payments on account of War Appropriation Account and no further cheques may be drawn for that purpose until the provisions of the Act are complied with.

I regret the necessity for this action but I have no other course open to me. I know it is a very serious matter to place any obstacle in the way of the Militia Department when the country is at war and with this in view I consented to an arrangement which could not, in any degree, hamper the Department. In return I had every right to expect that the Minister of Militia and Defence would carry out, not only the agreement of his officials but that he would also respect the directions of Parliament.

I am, sir,
Your obedient servant,
J. FRASER,
Auditor General.

From "Evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee during the Session 1915," p. 15.

105
MEMORANDUM RESPECTING WAR
EXPENDITURE

Under instructions from the Minister of Finance, a meeting was convened in the office of the Minister of Finance at 4 p.m. August 27, 1914, at which the following were present:—

The Auditor General.
The Deputy Minister of Militia.
The Deputy Minister of Naval Affairs.
The Paymaster General, Department of Militia and Defence.
The Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.
The Deputy Minister of Finance (Chairman).

It was explained by the chairman that the meeting was convened under instructions from the Prime Minister to consider the mode of authorizing and making expenditure out of the special war appropriation.

The War Appropriation Act was laid before the meeting.

After a general discussion of the matter the following method of dealing with the war expenditure was adopted:—

1. All expenditure coming within the terms of the Act and paid out of the war appropriation to be kept in the accounts separate and apart from the accounts of appropriations granted by Parliament for the ordinary and useful services of the Departments concerned.

2. The principle of audit after payment to be adopted in regard to the expenditures in order that the business might be carried on as expeditiously as possible. The Auditor General expressed himself as satisfied with the accounting machinery of the Departments concerned.

3. Payments to be made by cheques against letters of credit in the ordinary course.

4. Special reference was made to sections 2 and 3 of the War Appropriation Act respecting the necessity of action by the Governor in Council before any expenditure under the Act could be defrayed, and also as to the establishment of rates of pay and allowances by Order in Council, especially in their relation to the suggested setting aside of \$30,000, 000 for the use of the Department of Militia and Defence. The Orders in Council of the 6th August (No. 2067), 10th August (No. 2080), 14th August (No. 2112) were submitted and, with a draft order which the Paymaster General has under way as to Pay and Allowances, were regarded as sufficient authority without further action for the pay and rations of the 26,000 men being mobilized at Valcartier; also for the 6,000 horses required, as well as necessary forage; also for the subsistence of the troops prior to arriving at Quebec and for their transport thither; for their transport abroad and for the return transport.

It was not deemed necessary that an estimated amount should be specifically sanctioned by Order in Council. The Orders referred to are the authority for incurring the expenditure necessary to produce the results to be arrived at.

5. An Order in Council should be obtained to cover - the expenditures for Ocean Transport; for the Engineer Services at Halifax, Quebec and elsewhere; for equipment, including carts, wagons, etc.; clothing; and Dominion Arsenal. The Orders in these cases should give as much detail as can conveniently be furnished.

6. Expenditure for censorship is authorized already by Order in Council.

7. Payments of detachments of troops on guard at various places in Canada is covered by the Militia Act and by Regulations and Orders.

8. For the movement of troops, ammunition, etc., in Canada it is not considered that an Order in Council is necessary as it is covered by the Militia Act and Regulations.

9. No Order in Council is needed as yet for the additional troops or unforeseen expenses. In such cases, as necessity arises, the action (*sic sanction*) of the Governor General in Council should be obtained.

II. DEPARTMENT OF NAVAL AFFAIRS

10. With regard to the requirements of the Naval Department, an Order in Council was passed placing the *Niobe* and *Rainbow* at the disposal of the Imperial Government.

Any expenditures necessary to carry out this offer is accordingly authorized. The pay and allowances are also covered by Order in Council.

11. For the purchase of Stores, Wireless Stations and Aeroplanes, and for the hire of vessels, or outlays on any of the services apart from those already authorized in connection with the *Niobe*, *Rainbow*, two submarines, and pay and allowances, the authority by an Order in Council will be obtained with as much detail as conveniently can be given.

12. Some arrangement should be made with officers of the service and others who are now doing special duty, e.g., Major C. F. Hamilton, Captain Chambers, and F. Cook, who are employed as censors, as to the rate of remuneration.. These officers are now serving in a dual capacity.

13. If deemed necessary any expenditure in connection with secret service, following the plan adopted some years ago might be vised by some Privy Council representative of the Opposition.

III. GENERALLY

As the War Appropriation Act provides for an extensive expenditure, is general in character and is being administered by several Departments, it is necessary that there should be more than ordinary care taken in the control of any outlay made thereunder. To this end it is desirable, that the Government even in cases where the expenditure is authorized generally, should in the public interest exercise special supervision over not only the nature but the extent also of the obligations incurred under the provisions of the Act. So far as it is possible the same safeguards should be thrown around the War Expenditure as are employed in connection with the operations of the larger spending Departments.

The principle of public tender should be adopted as far as practicable in the construction of works or the purchase of materials and supplies; orders involving the outlay of sums say of \$5,000 or over should receive the sanction of Council before issue or in case of orders given under the pressure of urgency they should be reported and confirmed later by Order in Council.

T. C. BOVILLE,
Deputy Minister of Finance.

For additional documents and evidence see "Evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee during the Session 1915," p. 18. Sessional Papers 1915.

106

(i) Extract from Order in Council, P.C. 2265 of 3rd September, 1914, authorizing charges against war appropriations of \$5,400,717:—

Recapitulation of Clothing and Equipment Requirements

Wagons, Carts, Motor Lorries & Engineer Equipment.....	\$ 250,000
Military Engineering Works.....	415,000
Camp Equipment.....	271,150
Saddlery, Harness, etc.....	238,570
Personal Equipment.....	725,997
Clothing.....	3,500,000
Total.....	\$5,400,717

(ii) Order in Council, P.C. 2473 of 2nd October, 1914, authorizing additional charges against war appropriations of \$1,815,004 for clothing and equipment for 20,000 additional troops:

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report dated 30th September, 1914, from the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence, stating, with reference to the Order in Council of 3rd August (*sic 3rd September*), 1914, that the schedule of clothing and equipment attached thereto was for 22,000 troops and that owing to an additional 10,000 having been authorized for the Overseas Contingent and another 10,000 kept on duty in various parts of Canada the quantity of clothing and equipment shown in the schedule was not sufficient, and that demands totalling \$1,815,000 (*sic \$1,815,004*) as per schedule attached hereto, have been made which the Minister recommends for approval.

The Minister further recommends that as the matter is urgent authority be granted the Department of Militia and Defence to order these articles at once from contractors at prices not exceeding those set forth in the schedule, to be approved by Order in Council.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Items	Re-quired	Average Price	Cost
SADDLERY, HARNESS, ETC.			
Saddlery, Universal sets.....	2,000	\$42.50	\$85,000
Harness, single sets.....	1,200	30.50	36,600
Bags, nose.....	5,000	.85	4,250
Bags, corn.....	5,000	.14	700
Buckets, water.....	2,500	.55	1,375
Brushes, horse.....	3,500	.75	2,625
Ropes, head.....	5,000	.25	1,250
Ropes, heel.....	5,000	.65	3,250
Ropes, picketing 4 ft. 9 in.....	6,500	.50	3,250
Pegs, picketing.....	5,000	.45	2,250

Items	Re-quired	Average Price	Cost
CAMP EQUIPMENT			
Blankets, G.S.....	50,000	2.60	130,000
Sheets, Ground.....	10,000	1.64	16,400
Tents.....		27.51	
Kettles, camp.....	2,500	2.00	5,000

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT, Section 1			
Bandoliers.....	6,000	3.75	22,500
Bottles, water.....	20,000	.50	10,000
Carriers, water bottle.....	20,000	.61	12,200
Bugles and strings.....	200	7.00	1,400
Frogs, sword.....	1,000	1.00	1,000
Haversacks.....	20,000	.77	15,400
Slings, rifle.....	20,000	.48	9,600
Spurs.....	10,000	.70	7,000
Straps, Mess tin, Mounted Services.....	2,500	.25	625
Mess tins, Mounted Services.....	5,000	.45	2,250
Mess tins, Dismounted Services.....	15,000	.45	6,750
Trumpets and strings.....	50	7.00	350
Knots, sword, brown, Mounted Services.....	1,000	.50	500
Lanyards, whistle, cavalry.....	1,000	.05	50

VALISE EQUIPMENT, OLIVER PATTERN			
Sets, complete.....	20,000	8.00	160,000
Whistles.....	1,300	.38	494

CLOTHING			
Boots, ankle, brown, prs.....	30,000	3.85	115,000
Caps, forage, drab.....	20,000	1.27	25,400
Cloaks, Cavalry.....	5,000	13.23	66,150
Great Coats, Infantry.....	20,000	9.64	192,800
Jackets, drab.....	40,000	5.91	236,400
Puttees, drab.....	20,000	1.10	22,000
Pantaloon, Bedford Cord, prs.....	20,000	7.12	142,400
Pantaloon, service, prs.....	25,000	2.05	51,250
Shirts, service.....	25,000	1.15	28,750
Shoes, canvas.....	25,000	2.00	50,000
Trousers, drab, prs.....	25,000	3.93	98,250
Trousers, service, prs.....	25,000	1.20	30,000
Jackets, Sweater.....	20,000	22.50	450,000
Caps, winter, rank and file.....	12,000	4.00	48,000
Overshoes.....	25,000	1.75	43,750

NECESSARIES			
Bootlaces, prs.....	70,000	1.00 gross	975
Drawers, woollen.....	50,000	10.00 doz.	41,667
Braces.....	20,000	3.60 doz.	6,000
Combs, hair.....	10,000	7.00 gross	486
Forks, table.....	10,000	.10 ea.	1,000
Housewives.....	10,000	.54 ea.	5,400
Holdalls.....	10,000	.25	2,500
Knives, clasp.....	10,000	.50	5,000
Knives, table.....	10,000	.10	1,000
Lanyards, clasp knife.....	10,000	.05	500
Razors.....	20,000	.65	13,000
Shirts, flannel, grey.....	40,000	16.00 doz.	53,333
Shirts, under, woollen.....	50,000	10.00 "	41,667
Socks, prs.....	70,000	2.60	15,166
Spoons, table.....	10,000	.10 ea.	1,000
Towels, hand.....	40,000	2.50 doz.	8,333
Brushes, hair.....	10,000	.48	4,800
Brushes, shaving.....	10,000	2.75 doz.	2,292
Brushes, cloth.....	10,000	.39 ea.	3,900
Caps, comforter.....	20,000	5.00 doz.	8,333
Gloves, woollen, prs.....	20,000	4.25 "	7,083
Badges, cap.....		.10 ea.	
Badges, collar.....		.10 pr.	
Badges, shoulder.....	15,000	.12 pr.	1,800
Dubbing, 1 lb. tins.....	20,000	.06	1,200
Pullthroughs, Mark IV, (Complete).....	40,000	.20	8,000
Bottles, oil, Mark IV.....	20,000	.15	3,000
Total.....			\$1,815,004

ETG. FISER, D.M.
J. W. BORDEN, A. & P.M.G.

(iii) Order in Council, P.C. 1/18 of 6th January, 1915, approving placing of orders for clothing, equipment, vehicles, harness and stores to amount to \$4,775,902.62.

The Board had under consideration, and recommend to the favourable consideration of Council, the report from the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence of the 22nd September, 1914, relative to the making of contracts for supplies for the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

1. General statement of conditions under which contract for clothing and equipment, etc., were made.

2. A list of the orders placed and contracts made for clothing and necessaries, equipment and warlike stores, etc.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

OTTAWA, 22nd September, 1914.

To His Royal Highness The Governor General in Council.

The undersigned has the honour to submit, for the information and approval of Your Royal Highness in Council, the following papers relative to the making of contracts for supplies for the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

1. General statement of conditions under which contracts for clothing and equipment, etc., were made. This is signed by the Quartermaster General and the Director of Contracts.

2. A list of the orders placed and contracts made for clothing and necessaries, equipment and warlike stores, etc., giving contractor's name, contract prices and quantities, and the aggregate amount of each contract or order.

The whole respectfully submitted.

R. L. BORDEN,
Acting Minister of Militia and Defence.

(1) GENERAL STATEMENT OF CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CONTRACTS FOR CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT, ETC., FOR THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE WERE MADE.

War was declared on the evening of August 4th last.

The Canadian Expeditionary Force was authorized by Order in Council of August 10th, to be despatched as early as possible.

Before it could be sent, clothing, warlike and other stores and equipment of all kinds had to be found for a Force of 22,000 to 25,000 men.

Six weeks from August 10th was the date set for delivery of supplies of all kinds.

The Quartermaster General is charged with the responsibility for storing and issuing to the Militia, Clothing Equipment and stores; and contracts for these are made upon his requisition.

The stocks on hand were, of course, totally inadequate to meet the requirements; more especially as the non-permanent Militia had never been supplied with underwear, shirts, boots or personal necessaries generally; and drab uniform clothing had not been issued to many non-permanent regiments.

The Quartermaster General was, therefore, called upon, at very short notice, to provide clothing and necessaries of all kinds, equipment, ammunition, harness, saddlery, vehicles, tents, food for men, and forage for horses, in quantities which could only be estimated approximately; since the numbers of the troops to be called out for the defence of different points throughout Canada could not be determined beforehand; and the exact numbers to be encamped at Valcartier were also uncertain.

As a matter of fact, the numbers called out locally and the total encamped at Valcartier were both considerably in excess of the original estimate.

The first batch of requisitions was made on the 10th August—for clothing generally—uniforms, etc.

These called for—

65,000	prs.	Ankle Boots
35,000		Caps
3,000		Cloaks
15,000		Great Coats
40,000		Jackets
33,000	prs.	Puttees
6,500	prs.	Pantaloon
50,000		Suits, service clothing
100,000	suits	Under Clothing
100,000		Flannel Shirts
150,000	prs.	Socks

and supplies of more than twenty other different descriptions.

These quantities may seem large; but a considerable excess of the quantities actually required is essential to fill demand for sizes.

Each man requires two suits of underwear; at least three pairs socks, two flannel shirts, two pairs of boots; and so on.

In the case of the uniform clothing, underwear, shirts, socks, puttees, etc., the wool had to be procured and woven before the articles could be made up.

In the case of the boots, at least ten days or two weeks must elapse before the manufacturer could begin the actual work of manufacture.

Another cause of delay was that owing to the very large quantities required, it was necessary to deal with many concerns unfamiliar with Militia requirements; and this meant considerable loss of time in every case.

All these considerations, and especially the very short time allowed for delivery, made it absolutely imperative to place all orders at the very earliest possible moment.

These requisitions could not be taken up in turn. They were all equally pressing and must therefore be all dealt with at once. This made the work immensely harder.

If an Order in Council had been necessary in each case the difficulty of procuring the supplies in time would have been insurmountable.

Under present circumstances, it has been difficult and in some cases impossible to meet all demands as they were made. For instance, the boots contracted for were actually delivered well within the specified six weeks; but notwithstanding this complaints were received daily that they were not being issued fast enough. This applies to the underwear also; 50,000 suits were soon available, but not early enough to forestall complaints.

Had it been necessary in these and all other cases to refer the proposed contracts to Council for authority, presumably this would not have been merely for registration there, but for serious consideration of the facts; involving probably the furnishing of additional data, answers to enquiries, etc., all of which would have resulted in a disastrous loss of time.

The prompt despatch of the Contingent depended, for the most part, upon the readiness with which supplies were forthcoming; and the date of departure would have been postponed weeks and possibly months by the proposed procedure.

The longer the Contingent remains in Canada, the greater the cost of subsistence.

The batch of requisitions mentioned above covered clothing alone and not all of that. Later on, but as quickly as they could be prepared by the Q.M.G.'s staff, requisitions were made for stores and equipment of all kinds, embracing a very wide range of supplies,—hardware, cutlery, leather goods of all kinds, drugs and medicines, surgical instruments and appliances, electric supplies, cordage, tents, canvas goods, cotton and linen goods, blankets, and knit goods, wood and steel work, etc., and each item in considerable quantities.

In many cases, these stores were of a highly technical character and had hitherto been supplied by the War Office; but had now to be found or improvised in Canada; and this entailed additional delay and trouble.

The time limit for delivery remained the same, namely, six weeks from say, August 10th,—and as these requisitions were submitted later than the first batch, the time allowed to fill them was correspondingly shorter and the pressing urgency for action more immediate in each succeeding case.

Unforeseen circumstances delayed other batches of requisitions still later.

The patterns of transport wagons and other vehicles were under consideration for some time. Until these were settled, nothing could be done towards buying. This also delayed the contracts for harness, tarpaulins, etc.

From time to time, even up to the present, changes and additions to the establishment were found necessary or advisable; and each of these invariably resulted in a fresh batch of requisitions for clothing and stores, supplementary to the earlier ones, to meet the new requirements.

For instance, since August 10th, arrangements have been made for a postal service and pay office at the base, two field hospitals and other services on the line of communications; additional cavalry and artillery, the R.C.D., L.S.H., and R.C.H.A.; the automobile gun brigade (*sic*); Princess Patricia's Regiment; each of these additions at different times meant supplementary requisitions and contracts, for a wide variety of supplies, repeated again and again. The time set for delivery remained the same—on or before September 21st, so that if at first a reference to Council was difficult or impracticable, in the later case it was quite obviously impossible.

Some two or three hundred requisitions have been made since September 12th—requiring delivery without fail before September 21st, as a consequence of the decision to send two field hospitals—a decision only very lately reached.

Certain of the supplies required were procured under contracts which are now in force and have been for some years past. These cover the supply of uniform clothing of all kinds; cloths, serges, frieze and denim for clothing; cordite, rifles and tents. Such supplies were therefore ordered as a matter of routine from regular departmental contractors.

In the case of clothes, serges, etc., the regular contractors, the Rosamond Woollen Mills, the Paton Mills and the Trent Valley Mills could not supply us fast enough and hence the Forbes Mill of Hespeler and the Auburn Mill of Peterboro were given supplementary contracts. Other Mills were tried but without success.

This was a matter of the most extreme urgency, since the clothing had to be made after the mill had made up the material—and all within six weeks' time.

Another cause of delay was that owing to the very large quantities required, it was necessary to deal with many concerns unfamiliar with Militia requirements; and this meant considerable loss of time in every case.

All these considerations, and especially the very short time allowed for delivery, made it absolutely imperative to place all orders at the very earliest possible moment.

These requisitions could not be taken up in turn. They were all equally pressing and must therefore be all dealt with at once. This made the work immensely harder.

If an Order in Council had been necessary in each case the difficulty of procuring the supplies in time would have been insurmountable.

Under present circumstances, it has been *difficult* and in some cases impossible to meet all demands as they were made. For instance, the boots contracted for were actually delivered well within the specified six weeks; but notwithstanding this complaints were received daily that they were not being issued fast enough. This applies to the underwear also; 50,000 suits were soon available, but not early enough to forestall complaints.

Had it been necessary in these and all other cases to refer the proposed contracts to Council for authority, presumably this would not have been merely for registration there, but for serious consideration of the facts; involving probably the furnishing of additional data, answers to enquiries, etc., all of which would have resulted in a disastrous loss of time.

The prompt despatch of the Contingent depended, for the most part, upon the readiness with which supplies were forthcoming; and the date of departure would have been postponed weeks and possibly months by the proposed procedure.

The longer the Contingent remains in Canada, the greater the cost of subsistence.

The batch of requisitions mentioned above covered clothing alone and not all of that. Later on, but as quickly as they could be prepared by the Q.M.G.'s staff, requisitions were made for stores and equipment of all kinds, embracing a very wide range of supplies, hardware, cutlery, leather goods of all kinds, drugs and medicines, surgical instruments and appliances, electric supplies, cordage, tents, canvas goods, cotton and linen goods, blankets, and knit goods, wood and steel work, etc., and each item in considerable quantities.

In many cases, these stores were of a highly technical character and had hitherto been supplied by the War Office; but had now to be found or improvised in Canada; and this entailed additional delay and trouble.

The time limit for delivery remained the same, namely, six weeks from say, August 10th—and as these requisitions were submitted later than the first batch, the time allowed to fill them was correspondingly shorter and the pressing urgency for action more immediate in each succeeding case.

Unforeseen circumstances delayed other batches of requisitions still later.

The patterns of transport wagons and other vehicles were under consideration for some time. Until these were settled, nothing could be done towards buying. This also delayed the contracts for harness, tarpaulins, etc.

From time to time, even up to the present, changes and additions to the establishment were found necessary or advisable; and each of these invariably resulted in a fresh batch of requisitions for clothing and stores, supplementary to the earlier ones, to meet the new requirements.

For instance, since August 10th, arrangements have been made for a postal service and pay office at the base, two field hospitals and other services on the line of communications; additional cavalry and artillery, the R.C.D., L.S.H., and R.C.H.A.; the automobile gun brigade (*sic*); Princess Patricia's Regiment; each of these additions at different times meant supplementary requisitions and contracts, for a wide variety of supplies, repeated again and again. The time set for delivery remained the same—on or before September 21st, so that if at first a reference to Council was difficult or impracticable, in the later case it was quite obviously impossible.

Some two or three hundred requisitions have been made since September 12th—requiring delivery without fail before September 21st, as a consequence of the decision to send two field hospitals—a decision only very lately reached.

Certain of the supplies required were procured under contracts which are now in force and have been for some years past. These cover the supply of uniform clothing of all kinds; cloths, serges, frieze and denim for clothing; cordite, rifles and tents. Such supplies were therefore ordered as a matter of routine from regular departmental contractors.

In the case of clothes, serges, etc., the regular contractors, the Rosamond Woollen Mills, the Paton Mills and the Trent Valley Mills could not supply us fast enough and hence the Forbes Mill of Hespeler and the Auburn Mill of Peterboro were given supplementary contracts. Other Mills were tried but without success.

This was a matter of the most extreme urgency, since the clothing had to be made after the mill had made up the material—and all within six weeks' time.

The coffee and tea for the Militia in Quebec Province were under contract since April 1st, with Montreal firms. A supplementary contract was also found necessary in this case; Messrs. S. & H. Ewing & Co., Montreal, being the new contractors.

The food for men and horses was contracted for only after competitive tenders had been obtained. Contracts went to the lowest tenderer.

Contracts for vehicles of all kinds were made by an extra-departmental agent, Mr. T. A. Russell of the Russell Motor *Car Coy.*; employed by the Minister. Mr. Russell's expert knowledge of the subject was of great advantage to the Department, and the arrangement was certainly in the public interest. All his transactions were authorized by the Minister, in writing, upon Mr. Russell's report; and orders in writing given the contractors by the D. of C. to confirm.

The procuring of raw material for the manufacture of small arm ammunition required the greatest promptitude. Large supplies of steel, copper, nickel, lead, spelter and other metals were required; and the specifications, especially for steel and copper, were very exacting and hard to meet.

It was of the utmost importance to get this material with the least possible delay; not only to speed manufacture but to forestall other bids and a certain advance in the market price. Moreover, quotations for copper, at least, are always subject to immediate acceptance.

The steel was ordered from the last contractor, the Crucible Steel Coy.-probably the only concern available, since the British supply was temporarily cut off.

Tenders for lead and copper were obtained by telegram and telephone, and contracts made with the lowest tenderer. The spelter was ordered from the last contractor.

The nickel had hitherto been procured direct from the Mond Nickel Co. of England; and as this source was temporarily cut off, much difficulty was experienced in getting the necessary supply. Eventually, this was procured.

The prices in all these cases were fair and reasonable taking into account the market rates and the special requirements of the departmental specifications.

The procedure followed in the case of all supplies of clothing and stores not already specifically dealt with, was to obtain tenders if possible; or give repeat orders at prices fixed by competitive tender within the last twelve months; or to fix a price for the contractors acceptance. In certain cases the contractor submitted his quotations. In every

case, however, prices were subjected to careful scrutiny by experts who have been buying supplies of the kind for years past.

All contracts or orders for supplies of any kind have been authorized, in writing, either by the Minister or the Deputy Minister-excepting in the cases of purchases under \$100.00 in value.

The system adopted and followed has resulted in good and satisfactory service in respect of deliveries, and at fair and reasonable prices throughout.

D. A. MACDONALD,
Maj.-Gen., Q.M.G.
H. W. BROWN,
D. of C.

(2) STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS MADE FOR STORES, CLOTHING, ETC., FOR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CHARGEABLE TO WAR APPROPRIATION.

RECAPITULATION	
Clothing.....	\$2,432,927.54
Personal and Camp Equip ment.....	1,057,881.06
Wagons, Carts, Motors &c.....	629,832.00
Harness, Saddlery & Horse Equipment.....	250,241.65
Engineer and Sundry Stores.....	187,127.25
Medical Equipment Stores.....	<u>217,893.12</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>\$4,775,902.62</u>

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P.C. 2302

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 4th September, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated the 3rd September, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending that an order be given to the Midvale Steel Company, Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A., for 25,000 shovels of special pattern, at \$1.35 each, these shovels to be made to the following specifications approved by the Minister of Militia and Defence:—

The spade to be—8½" wide, with a curvature of 1½" below a line from point to point; 9¾" long in the middle and cut away to 7 1/16" at the side. There are two holes in each shovel, one at the right hand of the convex, or left hand of the concave, this hole to be ¾" with a maximum width of 2", flanged on the concave side of the hole. When the spade is inverted, that is the point up, the bottom of the hole to be at least 1½ from the base, and 1 3/8" from the side. When the shovel is inverted the hole

will taper from a point about half way up its length towards the top. This hole to be flanged. The handle will be integral with the shovel, tapering from 2" to 5/8" in its length of 4", and to be the same thickness as the shovel. There should also be a hole in the blade of shovel 5/8" x 5/16". The shovels to be sharpened. The metal to be A" in thickness, sufficient to resist, at three hundred (300) yards, at least three shots from a United States Springfield and Ross Mark VII ammunition.

Tests to be one out of every hundred (100) shovels made.

The Minister states that these shovels are required for the Troops now mobilized at Valcartier Camp, and the above mentioned firm has agreed that, if given an order, they will have 20,000 of the shovels ready for shipment from their factory by the 20th instant.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council

P.C. 269

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 2nd March, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that authority be given for the purchase of 25,000 handles for the 25,000 steel shovels of a special pattern, purchased from the Midvale Steel Company of Philadelphia, by authority of an Order in Council dated 4th September, 1914.

These handles are of a special pattern and can be procured from the Nova Scotia Steel Company, at a total cost of about \$3,800.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council

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Extract from evidence given before the Royal Commission concerning Purchase of War Supplies and Sale of Small Arms Ammunition, p. 2246.

SIR CHARLES DAVIDSON (*Royal Commissioner*): Having regard to these express receipts, have you any belief or suspicion that these pistols were stolen or misappropriated?

The WITNESS: (*Lt. Colonel W. Hallick, Senior Ordnance Officer at Valcartier Camp August-October 1914*): Not at all, no. Knowing the condition of affairs at the time and the conditions on the docks at Quebec, and the

awful haste there was all through, I am quite of the opinion that these things have got to England as ships' baggage.

Sir CHARLES DAVIDSON: How many ships were being loaded then?

The WITNESS: Something over thirty, in between the 26th of September-I am speaking from memory-and the 10th of October. I think they loaded something like 35 vessels with about 35,000 men and all the stores and baggage and horses.

Sir CHARLES DAVIDSON: How many horses?

The WITNESS: 7,000 horses, I dare say. There was an enormous quantity of stores; some of the ships took horses alone.

Sir CHARLES DAVIDSON: In one sense it does show how closely these goods were looked after, in view of the fact that this small shipment was noticed.

Mr. BROWN (*Director of Contracts, Department of Militia and Defence*): Yes, sir. These bills could not pass without some voucher for the receipt.

Colonel HALLICK: I was responsible, and I would like to speak with regard to that. I was responsible at that time and we received an enormous lot of stores at Valcartier camp, as many as two or three trainloads per day, with as many cars as the engines could draw. I would have to unship them in and then ship them out to the troops and from the 1st to the 8th of October I transhipped back again to ordnance depots all over the country, besides seven or eight thousand tents standing in Valcartier camp, and I think this is about the only questionable account we have. We were able to trace up everything else, these we never got any trace of.

Sir CHARLES DAVIDSON: And I suppose the details of each shipment would run into the thousands?

Colonel HALLICK: Yes, sir, into tens of thousands, and this was the only thing there was at all a question about.

Sir CHARLES DAVIDSON: It is highly creditable to you.

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P.C. 2912

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 21st November, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 17th November, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and

Defence, stating that on the 29th August, 1914, an order was given the Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company of Hartford, Connecticut, for 50 Colt's -303 Calibre Automatic Guns, complete with tripods and mounts, spare parts and accessories;

That these Guns were required for the equipment of the 1st Canadian Expeditionary Force, and were ordered without previously obtaining authority from Your Royal Highness in Council, because it was necessary to order them immediately if they were to become available before the contingent sailed:

That these Guns were shipped in three lots: fifteen on the 12th September, five on the 18th September, and thirty on the 20th October, 1914; and have all been duly received. Only the first twenty were received in time to be shipped with the 1st Contingent.

The Minister further states that the complete equipment ordered with each gun was as follows:—

1	.303 Automatic Gun, complete with tripod and mount, also with four feed boxes and four feed belts, and a leather tool bag containing a set of spare parts and accessories.....	\$600.00	each
2	Extra Barrels with each gun, at	25.00	"
36	Extra Feed Belts with each gun, at.....	3.00	"
1	Pair Asbestos Gloves or Mittens with each gun, at	3.00	pair
1	Belt Loading Machine with each gun,, at	50.00	each

These prices are fair and just.

The Minister states that the following stores have not been supplied:—

600	Feed Belts at \$3 each.....	\$1,800.00
15	Extra Barrels at \$25 each.....	375.00
3	Loading Machines, at \$50 each	150.00

The Minister recommends that authority be given for the payment of the Company's accounts for fifty guns, spare parts and accessories, delivered, amounting in all to the sum of \$38,225.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council

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P.C. 2424

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 22nd September, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that a contract be made with Messrs. Vickers, Limited, of

London, for the supply of 30 Vickers Light Automatic R.C. Guns, each complete with tripod, belt, belt filler and proportionate supply of spare parts; upon the following conditions:—

The prices to be as follows:—

30	Guns.....	£ 127	each
30	Sets of spare parts	56	per set
30	Non-telescopic tripods.....	30s.	each
120	Belts for 250 rounds, each.....	11s. 6d.	each
30	Belt fillers	£ 14.10.0	
120	Boxes ammunition.....	16s. 6d.	

these being the current War Office contract prices with Messrs. Vickers, Limited.

Delivery to be made at London to the Officer Commanding the Canadian Expeditionary Force, or his representative, on its arrival there.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council

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THE ROSS RIFLE

Prior to the advent of the Ross rifle the arms and equipment for the Canadian forces had usually been obtained from surplus British ordnance stores, partly by purchase and partly as gifts. Orders for clothing, necessaries, boots, harness and vehicles (often not of British pattern), had frequently been placed in Canada; the Government Arsenal at Quebec had been manufacturing small arm ammunition since 1882, but there was no arms factory in the country, and all the weapons in the hands of the Militia were of English manufacture. Direct purchase had however been made of 40,000 Lee-Enfield, Mk. I rifles in 1896 at the time of the Venezuelan difficulty with the U.S.A., and with these up-to-date weapons, supplemented by "converted" but obsolete Snider rifles, the Militia was armed. Two or three years later the Hon. Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia, when in England, tried to get the Birmingham Small Arms Co. to manufacture the Lee-Enfield rifle in Canada, but failed. He was in a quandary; there was difficulty in placing orders with the War Office for delivery within a reasonable time, to deal directly with English armament firms meant increase in cost; and on the other hand there was a strong feeling that, although prices might be better, orders should not be placed with foreign manufacturers. In 1900 he tried to place an order in England for 15,000 rifles but failed to secure a single rifle, for all the factories were working at capacity to equip the British Army and make good the wastage in South Africa. The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Deakin, at the Imperial Conference of 1907, protested

against this intolerable predicament of the Dominions when he told the Secretary for War, Mr. Haldane, "You are always ready to execute orders when neither of us is under pressure. That is what has driven us outside. We know the value of War Office criticism, but we also know that the War Office looks after itself before it looks after us, and when it is eager for arms or ammunition we have to wait." A remedy was sought in the installation of factories in the overseas dominions.

In such circumstances the policy was adopted, and generally approved by the whole country, that Canada should make its own rifles, "assuming of course that the rifle to be manufactured is a satisfactory rifle and is worth the money paid."

At this critical time Sir Charles Ross, 9th Baronet of Balnagown, an Etonian and a Light Blue, who had seen service in South Africa and was a Major of Lovat's Scouts, had a rifle breech mechanism which he said he had invented, and Ross sporting rifles with this straight bold action were being manufactured at Hartford, Conn., by his agent Joseph A. Bennett. Early in 1901 he brought several .303 rifles so manufactured to Ottawa and submitted them to the Minister of Militia. These rifles were in fact modifications of the Austrian Mannlicher (Model 1890) the principle of the mechanism being identical, and the defects subsequently found in them were the same as those recorded against the Mannlicher in the Report of the U.S. Chief of Ordnance for 1892; but the Minister was so impressed that by 28th June 1901 an agreement with Sir Charles Ross had been drafted for the manufacture in Canada of 12,000 rifles during the calendar year 1902 and 10,000 more per annum for the next five years at a cost of \$30.00 per rifle. On that same day a departmental committee, appointed by the Minister of Militia, met to "enquire into and report upon the merits of a rifle invented and submitted by Sir Charles L. Ross." The president was Colonel W. D. Otter, C.M.G., and the members Colonel the Hon. J. M. Gibson, M.P.P., Chairman of the Dominion Rifle Association, Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Anderson, Chief Engineer of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, Lieut.Colonel Sam Hughes, M.P., already a dominating politico-military figure, and Major F. M. Gaudet, R.C.A., the Superintendent of the Government Cartridge Factory. It was remarked that Lieut.-Colonel R. Cartwright, C.M.G. (R.C.R.) Inspector of Musketry, and Commandant of the School of Musketry, was not named as a member.

At their first meeting, after the inventor had explained the action and parts of his rifle, the committee proposed six changes, in the extractor, backlight, magazine and bolt, and agreed with him that a series of twelve comprehensive tests should be carried out on three new rifles made up on the lines suggested, simultaneously with the same tests on the Lee-Enfield rifle, Mk. I. The trial took place in August 1901. The results, as reported, show that in ten of the tests the performance of the two rifles was similar. The report on one of these, the dust test, may be quoted in part: "both rifles were heavily sanded Sir Charles Ross oiled Lee-Enfield bolt under cover, but this was objected to by the Committee, and both rifles were fired dry." In the test for excessive charges the Ross rifle, after firing a charge calculated to produce a pressure of 22 tons/sq. inch in the chamber, had to be hammered with heel to open breech, and after two rounds had been fired the inventor declined to allow the rifle to fire further excessive charges; the Lee-Enfield, not designed for pressure over 20 tons, fired the cartridges officially specified without any casualty. In the endurance test, when 1,000 rounds were fired from each rifle, the Lee-Enfield worked easily and satisfactorily throughout, whereas the Ross worked very stiffly at the conclusion of each 60 rounds and misfed and jammed repeatedly; "After the 300th round the heat of firing melted away foresight, which was fastened with common solder" The inventor explained that the stiffness was due to his having carried out all previous experiments with cartridges of Austrian or American manufacture, and that "the standard called for in the manufacture of British .303 cartridges is not of the same precision and quality of material hence greater limits have to be allowed" His statement that "the trouble is only a small detail of manufacturing owing to the difference in the shells" was accepted by the Committee who recorded the finding, later proved to be erroneous, that the objection was not inherent but dependent upon details of mechanism, and assumed that, in the event of the Ross being adopted, due "precaution and provision" would be taken with reference to this objection. They concluded, after discussion with expert machinists and experienced marksmen, that on the whole the Ross had features which afforded advantages over the Lee-Enfield, and drew attention to the straight pull and lightness of the former, to the strength of the breech mechanism which was built to withstand a higher chamber pressure, and to the fact that it could be taken apart and put together again with a pocket knife.

Although the committee was stated to be unanimous in the opinions expressed, Major Gaudet, immediately after signing the report, wrote a letter to the president protesting against the slight upon Canadian ammunition and pointing out that, although he had refrained from expressing any opinion, the Ross action had been found at the trial to be decidedly stiff when hot; he quoted a report by the U.S. Chief of Ordnance in 1892 which recorded similar stiffness in operation.

The Canadian Government, considering that it was in the general interests of Canada that the rifles required for purposes of Militia and Defence should be manufactured in Canada, adopted the rifle on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia, and on 27th March 1902 entered into a contract with Sir Charles Ross, who undertook to establish and operate a factory near Quebec for the manufacture of such rifles and to supply, during the calendar year 1903, twelve thousand rifles there manufactured and equal to a standard sample to be approved by the Minister, at a cost not greater than that of similar rifles in the English market. This cost was placed at \$25.00 at the time, and increased to \$28.00 after December 1912. The price paid by the War Office for the Long Lee-Enfield in 1901 was £3.15.2 or \$1827; that of the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield in 1907 was \$19.44, reduced in 1915 to \$17.46. The Government was bound and entitled to purchase from Sir Charles Ross all rifles required for the use of the Government during the continuation of this contract. The pattern might be changed on 12 months notice. Among other stipulations pertaining to rate of production in times of peace or war, Government protection against actions for infringement of patent, rates of payment, subsequent readjustment of price in the event of modifications of pattern or the adoption of "a new rifle to be invented," was the proviso that "no member of the House of Commons shall be admitted to any share or part of such contract or to any benefit to be derived therefrom." The party of the first part was "Sir Charles Ross, Bart. of Balnagown hereinafter called the contractor," for such he was and continued to be. There was in fact no Ross Rifle Company; although The Ross Rifle Company Act (2 Ed. VII Cap. 96), passed in 1902, authorized the incorporation of a limited company of that name with a number of eminent Canadians as directors, incorporation was never effected. In April 1906 the Minister of Militia told the House that he did not know who were the directors of the Ross Rifle Company, or who were its shareholders. The contractor, who had privately found \$1,000,000 for the project and was also sole proprietor and

general manager, elucidated this himself in a letter to the press on 4th Jan. 1917: "there is no joint stock company, there are no shares, nor has anyone in Canada any interest in my business."

Although the proceedings of the Committee were signed in September 1901, it was not until 24th April 1902 that a copy was sent for report to the Major-General Commanding the Militia, Major-General O'Grady Haly, who had been present during a considerable part of the trials carried out at Quebec in August. He noted that only two of the members had any experience of a rifle on active service, that two of the members had been absent from all the official tests, and that "the Committee was practically composed of only two members, Colonel Otter and Major Gaudet." He said that the straight pull was a feature which, by sacrificing mechanical advantage, conduced to the great difficulty in extracting the cartridge when the rifle became heated after continuous rapid fire; he said that the feature of being able to take the breech mechanism apart with a pocket knife was "a direct incentive to tamper with the breech action;" he advised that the contractor should be called upon to prove his contention that the difficulty of extraction was "a small detail of manufacturing," and not a defect inherent in the mechanism, by submitting rifles of an improved type which should be subjected to the same "endurance" test as the former ones in competition with the Service Arm. He had no doubt that the Ross was a very good rifle, but he thought that the superiority of the untried Ross should be conclusively demonstrated before discarding the Lee-Enfield, a proved weapon. He strongly endorsed the recommendation that the contract should be "under a strict specification, detail drawings, as well as a sealed pattern." But the contract had been signed a month ago.

Two months after the signing of the contract, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, at the instance of the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Brodrick, to whose notice it had been brought by the Director-General of Ordnance, expressed by cable to the Governor-General the misgivings of the British Government. He submitted "the very great importance of adhering to absolute uniformity of pattern in the weapons with *which* the forces of the Empire are armed," and that "it is only by maintaining such uniformity that in time of war, when Imperial and Colonial troops are fighting side by side, as at present in South Africa, the efficient maintenance of supply in the field can be guaranteed. This is a principle of such importance that it is hoped the Canadian Government will accept it, and arrange

that whatever arms are made for them in Canada shall be identical with the arm with which the Imperial troops are equipped." At the Colonial Conference held later in the year there was general agreement on this subject, but no formal resolution was passed. Lord Dundonald, General Officer Commanding the Militia of Canada from July 1902 until relieved of his appointment two years later, also thought that there was a great advantage in Canadian and British troops having their arms similar in every respect; Sir Percy Lake, who became C.G.S. in 1904, held the same opinion.

Particular reference was made in subsequent correspondence between the Governments and also in the Canadian Parliament, to a trial of two Ross rifles on Mayday 1900, at Hythe, in comparison with two Lee-Enfield rifles, the result of which was reported to be that "the inferiority of the Ross rifle was very marked"; but Sir Charles Ross' London agent swore that the alleged trial was carried out on two carbines, not on the Canadian Sealed Pattern Ross, and that "no trial or test was ever asked for nor had the rifle ever been submitted to any test or trial, official or unofficial, of any kind whatsoever." The shooting was hurried, on a bad day, and did not consist of a proper series of tests; he treated the whole affair as informal, although it was carried out for the information of Lord Roberts, the British Commander-in-Chief. When Sir Charles Ross in October 1901 had submitted to the War Office for competitive trial "a -303 Magazine Rifle fitted with my patent Straight Pull Breech Mechanism, which has successfully passed the severest and most exhaustive tests a military rifle has ever been subjected to by a Government," he received immediate reply that "the principle of the rifle was understood but the question of adopting a new type of magazine rifle for His Majesty's Service was not under consideration at present, and therefore no useful purpose would be served by submitting the rifle to firing trials."

The basic reason for not adopting and manufacturing the British arm was given by the Minister of Militia in the House of Commons on 14th January 1907. "Now I may say here without any hesitation that I would have been very glad if we could have secured the manufacture in Canada of the Lee-Enfield rifle. There are many reasons why it would have been desirable. It is a good rifle and has stood the test of many years. It was the rifle which was in the hands of the Militia and it was the service rifle of the British *Army*. In that view I took the trouble to approach some of the Birmingham people to see whether they would not establish a factory

in Canada. As long ago as 1811 or 1812 I had some conversation with leading proprietors of the Birmingham Small Arms Company. They took the matter up but after giving it consideration they said they could not and would not do it, and I received an answer in the negative."

The construction of the Ross Rifle Factory proceeded in 1903 on a portion of the Cove Fields, adjoining the historic Plains of Abraham, leased by the Canadian Government for ninety-nine years at a nominal rent of one dollar a year subject to renewal, and this in spite of the protests of the Major-General Commanding the Canadian Militia that a site which obstructed part of the glacis of the Citadel was dangerous for tactical reasons, and that every consideration of military prudence pointed to a more central locality, e.g., Hull. Others interested in the site of the factory had been the Mayor of Ottawa, who had offered & site of twenty acres tax-free, and the manager of a Quebec power company who would have provided an unlimited acreage near the Montmorency Falls for ninety-nine years at five dollars a year.

It is recorded that the machinery was in operation five weeks after the first sod was turned; but the first completed delivery to the Militia did not take place until August 1905, when 1,000 rifles were accepted. The delay was attributed to "difficulties in manufacture," some of which are traceable to the prudence of the Inspector of Small Arms, Lieut.-Colonel F. M. Gaudet, whose duty included analysing and testing materials and gauging and proving the weapons produced, others were due to the insistence of the Master-General of the Ordnance, Colonel W. H. Cotton, on having some reliable check on the quality of the work; the difficulty of finding skilled operatives in Quebec could not be altogether overcome by importing expert mechanics from England or the United States.

The hasty condemnation by the War Office in 1902 marks the beginning of a controversy which lasted for a quarter of a century; in Canada few topics received so much attention in the press, in Parliament, on the ranges and in the Militia throughout the country. The inventor, who was at the time negotiating with the Australian Government -to manufacture 100,000 Ross rifles for the Commonwealth forces at \$20 each, and half that number for New Zealand, could not afford to allow such a "grave and serious libel" to pass unchallenged and took steps to set the matter right. He pointed out that the British forces were armed with five different patterns of magazine rifle, and proposed that the simplest way to achieve "absolute uniformity" would be to adopt the Canadian mechanism throughout

the forces of the Empire. These facts, or interpretations of them, found their way into the newspapers, and by 1906 anything relating to the Ross rifle was read with avidity.

MANUFACTURE AND MARKS

1902-1914

In April 1902 the sealed pattern approved for the Militia was handed to Sir Charles Ross, and the Mk. I Ross was made according to it, except that in 1903 the leaf of the backsight was shortened to range up to 2,200 instead of 2,500 yards, although the War Office had advised the adoption of the Modified L.E. sight. In June and July 1902 Boards were appointed from the Royal North West Mounted Police to test the accuracy of the rifle and to report upon its adaptability for service in that force, and in February 1903 another board investigated the working of the bolt action after exposure to extreme cold. The members were Asst. Commissioner J. H. McIlree, Superintendent W. S. Morris, and Inspectors A. C. Macdonell and E. Gilpin-Brown. A number of tests were made, in one of which Commissioner A. Bowen Perry, in two minutes firing, scored 26 hits in 30 rounds at 200 yards. The findings were that there was no recoil or fouling, the sights were readily picked up, action worked smoothly and well, even after exposure to a temperature of 47 degrees below zero, the general feel was all that could be desired, it balanced well when carried on the horn of the saddle, and was "a decided improvement upon the Lee-Metford." Rifles with 25 inch and 28 inch barrels were tested, the former went out of action when the receiver fractured because it was of cast instead of wrought steel; the long barrel was preferred, and it was recommended that an arrangement should be fitted to secure the leaf of the backsight when down and that the butt should be strengthened at the small.

The first delivery of Ross Mark I, 1,000 in number, was made to the R.N.W.M.P. in the summer of 1904 and delivery of another 500 for the Department of Marine and Fisheries was taken on 9th July 1904 after all had been inspected by a board consisting of Lieut-Colonel R. Cartwright, R.C.R. and Commander O. G. V. Spain, R.N. who although they found 113 defects warranting rejection (14 in bolts and 11 in barrels), were of the opinion "that the rifles had borne the inspection remarkably well."

The Department of the Naval Service, which was formed in May 1910, found on taking stock that it had on hand in January 1911 "about 350 Ross Rifles, Mk. I for which the Department has no use at present" and offered

them to the Department of Militia and Defence, but the latter replied that all the Mk. I rifles required were already in possession, and the supply referred to could not be taken over.

The earliest complaint recorded is in February 1906, when the Commissioner of the R.N.W.M.P. reported that the piling swivels were unsatisfactory, in March a number of the small springs were breaking, and he found one as soft as stove-pipe wire, defective bolt stop springs caused bolts to be lost on the prairie, the stock was weak at the small, the sight delicate and easily put out of repair; many weak points were found in both design and manufacture, and be expected many complaints as soon as target practice began. Assistant Commissioner McIlree wrote of the annual practice that the rifles were very unsatisfactory, particularly the magazine action, extractors failed to work, in rapid fire jams were frequent even in the hands of experienced men, and he did not think they were safe for rapid fire. One marksman had his eye injured by the bolt flying back. As a result rapid fire was eliminated *pro tem* from the regulations; and in the autumn of 1906 the use of the rifle was discontinued by the police, who resumed their Winchesters, Lee-Enfields and Lee-Metfords, pending the supply of serviceable rifles by the Ross Rifle Company.

The early experience of the Militia, who received their first issue in June 1906, was equally disconcerting: before he fired a shot from his new rifle the man in the ranks found that on squad drill with arms the unchamfered edges of wood or metal tore his clothing and cut his hands, so he disliked it from the beginning. Adverse reports upon it came from the O.C., Western Ontario, from Sussex Camp, N.B., and from the O.C., The Royal Canadian Regiment, Halifax. But long before this it had become evident that all was not well with the Mk. I rifle; a Militia order of 10th November, 1904 authorized the appointment of a committee to report upon a modification of the sealed pattern of the present (Mk. I) Ross rifle; the Chairman was Colonel W. H. Cotton, Quartermaster-General, the members were Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Anderson, Lieut.-Colonel R. Cartwright, C.M.G., A.A.G. Musketry, Lieut.-Colonel A. P. Sherwood, C.M.G., A.D.C., and Captain T. E. Naish, R.E., on loan from England.

The Mark I rifle, of which 10,500 were manufactured up to 1st January, 1906, cocked on the front stroke, the cartridge was extracted by means of a hammer blow imparted to the extractor by the smart withdrawal of the bolt sleeve, the barrel was 28 inches long with four grooves, the rifling was right hand, the total weight of the rifle was approximately 7J pounds. No provision was made for a bayonet.

The modifications, which produced the Mk. II rifle included, among others, cocking on the back stroke, an enlarged chamber which made it dangerous for gallery practice, a different back sight, extraction by camming action of the bolt on being opened, and increase in weight of nearly a pound due to thickening the barrel which remained the same length. A short knife bayonet was also provided; it was designed after examination of models manufactured in Ottawa and consideration was given to achieving interchangeability, to reducing lost motion, and to developing a method of attachment which would hold the bayonet parallel to the line of the barrel without subjecting the muzzle and small to undue strain. Colonel Sam Hughes, who participated in these deliberations, had "little use for a bayonet; that is for practical purposes; but it serves a useful sentimental object."

The Mk. II pattern was not sealed until 18th February, 1905, although 3,000 of them had been delivered on the original contract for 12,000 rifles, and a new order for 20,000 was placed with the Company on 27th March, 1904. This pattern was not yet perfect, so many defects showed themselves that the Company was asked to submit a rifle containing "all the small changes lately effected"; and on 28th March, 1906, a board composed of General Otter, Colonels Gibson, Hughes, Anderson and Major R. A. Helmer, D.A.A.G., Musketry, was assembled "to report how far such modifications are in their opinion improvements on previous patterns and to submit any recommendations which may seem to them desirable in a military rifle" The findings did not go far enough to satisfy the Militia Council, so the Board was ordered to reassemble on 7th May, 1906, and called upon "to report as to whether the Ross rifle Mk. II is in all respects a suitable weapon for the Canadian Militia" To aid in the deliberations four other experts were detailed in an advisory capacity, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, Major J. B. Pym of the Royal Marines, on loan as Inspector of Small Arms from the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield, Captain A. E. Swift and Mr. H. L. Bock, Manager of the Ross Rifle Factory. Within a month they recommended eleven alterations or modifications to the ejector, mainspring, firing pin, cocking piece, extractor, trigger-guard, nose cap, centre band, swivels, butt plate and backsight-which the Militia Council considered. These recommendations, added to reports of defects from the Maritime Provinces and Toronto, led to the decision that some radical changes must be introduced into the system of inspection, and that pending an investigation no more rifles of either mark would be accepted by the Department. This suspension

was effective for two months, until 10th September, 1906, when the Company was notified that the restriction was removed provided that the Inspector of Small Arms was satisfied that defects reported on rifles then on trial were "in minor detail only and not such as to endanger life or limb," and that he should have free passage to all parts of the factory and be permitted to examine during manufacture. At this time the first reference is made to a proposed Mk. III pattern, but the designation Mk. II persisted until five stars had been added and over eighty changes had been made which altered the weapon almost beyond recognition.

It was the Mark II**, which had a long and heavy barrel, that brought fame to the Ross as 'target rifle in both Canada and England. The Canadian Bisley team of 1906 had been issued, on the day of sailing, with the Mk. H rifle; it carried a eight (Ross Mk. II) which was provided with a wind gauge, a device not legitimized by the National Rifle Association until 1907. Thus it was in vain that Sir Charles Ross had offered to duplicate any prize won with the Ross, for the Canadians at the 1906 meeting of necessity used their old Long Lee-Enfields, and they were successful in retaining the Kolapore Cup.

In 1909 the Canadian Bisley team was armed for the first time with the Ross rifle Mk. II** fitted with BSA. (Martin) aperture sights and, although given the alternative, eighteen of the twenty marksmen used the Long Roes throughout in preference to the Short Lee-Enfield. This year, as it had been in 1905 and 1906, the Kolapore Cup was brought back to Canada and the MacKinnon and Jubilee Cups were also won. A Canadian, using a Lee Enfield, won the Prince of Wales' prize, which led the Minister of Militia to admit that "it was the men and not the rifle which did the work." The Adjutant of the team was Major M. S. Mercer, who seven years later was killed while commanding the 3rd Canadian Division in the Battle of Mount Sorrel.

There was, at this time, warm discussion in shooting circles about "match" or "target" rifles and their advantage over "service rifles," both Ross and Lee-Enfield, and it was asked whether the Ross Mk. II** was a service arm and within the terms of the N.R.A. regulations. While the Minister of Militia, who fortunately happened to be in England, would have had to admit that only 35 of this pattern had been issued before the team sailed, yet he was justified in insisting that the rifle was "in every respect of the same pattern as the rifle of same mark, duly and previously authorized by G.O. and being manufactured for and issued by the Department." His words prevailed, and the Ross was admitted, -but a new rule

was framed to cover any such borderline cases in future. Canadian success was equally noticeable in 1910, when the Mk. II** rifle with B.S.A. (Martin) sight was again used by the team; the Kolapore was lost by two points to the Mother Country for a record score of 798 and the MacKinnon was won with 729 points.

In 1911 the King's Prize was won with a Ross rifle for the first time, at this meet Canadians also won the Prince of Wales' Prize and the MacKinnon Cup. In 1912 at Bisley the Ross match rifle was used by many marksmen other than Canadians, and in Canada the Canadian Palma Team equalled the previous record of 1912 but was beaten by 8 points by the United States team armed with Springfields of M.V. 2,800 f.s. In 1913 the King's Prize again was won by a Canadian with a Ross.

At all rifle meetings, for eight years before the War, the major topic was sights, particularly the position of the backsight and the complexity of scales and settings. The aim of soldiers interested was to provide a sight of accuracy commensurate with that of the barrel and yet simple and sturdy enough for a soldier to use in battle, but such a sight was never seen.

Early in 1907 the great interest taken in the Ross rifle led to a flood of questions and extravagant statements in Parliament. In the course of the diffuse debates the Minister of Militia protested against reckless, unfair, unjust and foundationless perversion of the facts. The wide publicity given to many contradictory statements increased the disposition among the public to believe that there was "something mysterious about this whole business." A member of the original committee, who had served in South Africa and who was also a member of the House of Commons, astonished some of the Hon. Members by asserting that he possessed a rifle whose bullet, strange to say, sometimes found its billet although it had not been cleaned once in four years, and he further tested their credulity by offering to swallow any Lee-Enfield rifle which did not jam when he fired it. The Minister of Militia argued that the Lee-Enfield was also defective in some respects because several barrels had burst or bulged due to obstructions in the bore, one of them when "endeavouring to blow out a pullthrough." A member of the Opposition said of the Mk. I Ross "it kills as much behind as in front sometimes," and his statement was supported by another, but there is only one authentic case of fatal casualty to the firer of a Ross military rifle. Another member, who had served in three campaigns, in two of which the Lee-Enfield was used entirely,

advised the Minister not to take the opinion of sappers, gunners and marines but to "submit the rifle to a thorough practical test that will forever silence the adverse criticism of the public and will so far perfect this rifle that there will be no further subject for criticism." This advice was given in 1907. But Sir Frederick Borden needed no such advice, for by the time it was given twenty of the men best qualified in Canada to advise upon rifles had been so employed and the Master-General of the Ordnance, who was guided by the reports of Lieut.-Colonel Gaudet and Major Pym, warned him that "the rifle is not yet entirely suitable as a perfect military arm."

"The searchlight of Canada," operated by the Opposition, was directed on the contract as well as on the rifle; a letter from the Auditor-General declaring that the Ross Rifle Company had failed in the fulfilment of the contract was quoted but this charge was not upheld by the Department of Justice. The contract was neither cancelled nor amended at this time, and production continued at the rate of about 1,000 rifles monthly, with manufacture, experiments and modifications proceeding *pari passu* for upwards of four years.

The manufacture of Mk. III began in November, 1911, by which time the weight of the Mk. II rifle had increased to 91 pounds, the length of barrel to 301 inches and the rifling had been changed from right to left hand. The Military Members of Council, Major-General Sir Percy Lake, K.C.M.G., C.B., Major-General W. D. Otter, C.B., C.V.O., Colonel F. L. Lessard, C.B., A.D.C., Br. General D. A. Macdonald, C.M.G., I.S.O., and Colonel R. W. Rutherford, had consistently pressed for a lighter and handier rifle, they had pointed out that the Ross was a pound or more heavier and seven or eight inches longer than the British Short L.E. or the U.S. Springfield rifle, and they thought an attempt should be made to produce a serviceable campaign weapon of equivalent performance without increase in length or weight. Such attempts were made, and, as expressed in a Departmental Report, the defects and shortcomings which developed were "the subject of much thought and earnest endeavour to rectify."

A cavalry rifle with 26" barrel and 45" over all, the maximum length recommended by the Inspector of Cavalry, was built with the Ross mechanism and tested in the autumn of 1910; it weighed about 81 pounds and developed a muzzle velocity slightly greater than the S.M.L.E. Major-General C. J. MacKenzie, Chief of the General Staff, suggested that it should be adopted as the service rifle.

for all arms in Canada, and 600 were to be ordered from the factory; but Colonel Hughes had not endorsed the recommendation, because he had no use for a short barrel, the Ross Rifle Company experts advised against it, the Master-General of Ordnance objected that the chamber was too small for standard service ammunition, and the model was discarded. Thus the advocates of a target rifle again triumphed and the man in the ranks already burdened with a heavy kit - was doomed to carry a heavier and less handy weapon.

The body chiefly concerned with the many modifications was the Standing Small Arms Committee, authorized 2nd March, 1908, and then consisting of Colonel S. Hughes, Lieut. Colonels W. P. Anderson, J. H. Burland, C. Greville-Harston, Majors R. A. Helmer, A. O. Fages (R.C.R.), J. B. Pym, W. H. Davidson, J. E. Hutcheson, and as technical advisers or Associate Members, Lieut.-Colonels Gaudet (R.C.A.), J. W. Harkom, and two scientists, Mr. A. E. McIntyre, Ph.D., and Mr. A. H. Walters, MA. This committee reported to the Master-General of the Ordnance, Colonel W. H. Cotton, succeeded by Colonel R. W. Rutherford, R.C.A., 1st April, 1908. It was soon found to be somewhat unwieldy, and in June 1909 a sub-committee was constituted consisting of Lieut.-Colonel Greville-Harston, Majors Helmer and Hutcheson and Captain Swift, with Major Pym as adviser; they were entrusted with the task of finding and investigating alleged defects and of devising remedies; they reported to the Chairman of the S.S.A.C., who passed on their findings with his own comments but without reference to the main committee, some of whom were decidedly adverse to the Ross, so the main committee was abolished at the end of 1910. The sub-committee now became the S.S.A.C., and the original chairman became Minister of Militia with the accession of the Conservative Government in 1911; others who served on it prior to the Great War were Lieut. Colonel E. W. B. Morrison, D.S.O., Major S. S. Weatherbie and Captain J. A. Peters. Voluminous and exhaustive reports and investigations testify to the diligence and difficulties attending the production of a serviceable arm. Further evidence is to be found in the minutes and in the two unofficial mottoes of the S.S.A.C. "Bricks without straw" and "New wine in old bottles."

Because the large number of marks and stars continually brought to notice the many modifications which it had been necessary to make in the rifle, the Minister ordered an epitomised redesignation to blot out the stars and cover up the changes. This was a practical impossibility, but it was done on paper

in July 1912 and thereafter each rifle was, for ordnance and technical purposes, referred to only by its serial number. The original designation of each pattern is shown below, followed by the revised nomenclature which apparently reduced the number of patterns from nine to six in 1912, and from six to three in 1918.

The new Minister continued to be the ardent and active champion of the Ross. He had been on the original committee of 1901 whose report caused its adoption and he had followed every change in it; in 1907, when Mk. III was under searching investigation he wrote that with the proposed modifications it would be "the most perfect military rifle in every sense in the World today"; he declared "I condemn the Lee-Enfield from start to finish," and in 1908 he considered the proposed Mk. III "unequaled in the world"; he retained these views until the end of his career. The other members of the committee were not so easily satisfied: Major Pym thought the possibility of jamming too great and the weight and balance not equally suitable for service purposes, and at least one of the committee appreciated the importance of "holding the Contractors up to the mark." As a result of prolonged efforts to achieve perfection in specifications, particularly as to gauge limits and tolerances, the pattern, -although Sir

Charles Ross was unofficially authorized in 1908, on the advice of Colonel Hughes, to apply some of the changes, and although the Committee, after experiments on - different parts in Toronto, reached agreement as to the main features of the design - was not yet sealed when war broke out. In spite of this the Mk. III pattern was ordered to be manufactured in November 1911 and officially introduced to the Militia in February 1913; in the same month Sir Charles Ross was given the honorary rank of Colonel in the Canadian Militia as "Consulting Officer, Small Arms, Ammunition and Ballistics"

The new pattern differed in many respects from the Long Ross Mk. II; it had a triple threaded interrupted screw double bearing cairn bolt head which travelled horizontally instead of vertically and locked in corresponding lugs in the receiver, but the hinged bolt stop which had superseded the plunger type in December 1910, and which engaged the bolt head instead of a lug on the sleeve, was retained; a double pull trigger mechanism had been introduced, the magazine had been altered to admit of charger loading, and the entrance cuts were modified to accommodate the pointed bullet of the Mk. VII ammunition.

The sights had also been changed; the original Mk. I sight was fitted to the 10,500

NUMBERS AND NOMENCLATURE

Delivery		Designation on issue, or prior to 1911	Reported on charge M. & D. March 1911	Epitomized Nomenclature July 1912	No. on charge M. & D. August 1914	Nomenclature 1918
Number	Date					
10,500	Feb., 1906	Rifles, Ross Mk. I	10,000	Rifles G.P. Ross		
	July 1909 to Nov. 1911	converted to Rifles, Ross Mk. I*				
19,300	1905 to Aug., 1907	Rifles, Ross Mk. II (with sight Ross Mk. II)	21,300	Rifles, Cadet Ross		
	1910-1912	converted to Rifles Ross Mk. II*				
44,700	Oct., 1907 to July, 1909	Rifles, Ross Mk. II (with sight Ross Mk. III)	38,300	Rifles, short Ross Mk. I	19,000	Rifles, Ross -303" Cadet D.P.
26,000	April, 1910 to Mar., 1912	Rifles, Ross Mk. II** (with Sutherland sight Mk. II) converted from Mk. II (with Mk. III sight)	7,700	Rifles, Short Ross Mk. II	40,000	
4,000	June, 1910	Rifles, Ross Mk. II** converted to Mk. II**				
15,000	August, 1910	Rifles, Ross Mk. II** (with Sutherland sight Mk. I)	11,500			
700	May, 1909	Rifles, Ross Mk. II** (with new H sight) converted from Mk. II with Mk. III sight	700	Rifles, Long Ross Mk. II	13,000	Rifles, Long Ross Mk. II.
13,000	1911-1912	Rifles, Ross Mk. II**				
3,863	1914	Rifles, Ross Mk. III		Rifles, Long Ross Mk. III	3,863	Rifles, Long Ross Mk. III.

Mk. I rifles, which were later fitted with Mk. II sight, as supplied with the first 19,300 Mk. II rifles manufactured; the Mk. III Ross sight of the "Dutch" type popularised by the Boers in the South African war was fitted to the next 44,700 Mk. II rifles issued in 1907 and 1908; the Mk. II** pattern of rifle was issued from the factory without sights, then 8,650 were temporarily equipped with L.E. "ladder" sights; in May 1909, the new H. sight was fitted to 700 of the Mk. II** rifles which had been converted from Mk. II; the Sutherland sight, Mk. I, was fitted to the 15,000 Mk. II 5 * rifles, manufactured in 1910; and, between 1910 and 1912, the replacement of the Mk. III Ross sight by the Sutherland sight Mk. II on 15,000 of the Mk. II rifles produced the Mk. II*** rifle. After extensive trials, over a long period, of the Swift, Improved Swift, Parker, Improved Parker and Negative Angle sights, a new pattern screw elevating rear aperture back sight with wind gauge, vernier and battle-sight mounted on a charger guide sight base was finally adopted in February 1914 for the Mk. III rifle. This was the pattern involved in the warning that War Office support of the Bisley Meeting 1913 would be withdrawn if aperture sights were permitted in the major competitions, a threat emphasized by the counter-threat of the Minister of Militia to withdraw support from the Dominion Rifle Association unless the Canadian Bisley team was equipped with Ross rifles and aperture sights. It was the pattern used, with modifications, during the Great War, and the principle was adopted by the War Office in the aperture sight of the Enfield rifle of 1917.

The Snider rifle had been finally withdrawn from the Militia in April 1907, on replacement by the Ross Mk. II. Instructions were issued in January 1912 for final withdrawal of the Long Lee-Enfield on replacement by the Ross. In the autumn of 1913 Canada sold to New Zealand 15,000 Lee-Enfield rifles Mk. I for the sum of £3,125; or \$1.00 per rifle. The Ross having been found an unsuitable weapon for active service, one thousand Lee-Enfield carbines were bought in August 1914 from the Militia Department by the R.N.W.M.P., also at \$1.00 each. These replaced the Mk. II Ross rifles with which the force had been re-armed in 1909 and 800 of which had been destroyed in a fire at the Regina barracks.

The Ross Rifle Factory operated at an increased rate after 30th July, 1914 when the M.G.O. sent a telegram to the Company

Increase immediately to your utmost capacity manufacture and delivery of Mark three rifles and bayonets already ordered. Turn over at once to Inspection Branch all complete Mark three rifles and bayonets.

The total deliveries of Ross rifles up to this date were 112,000 of which only 3,863 were Mark III on the order of 10,000 placed on 3rd November 1911, although a further 8,337 had been taken into Ordnance storage and were awaiting final inspection and sights. Another order for 10,000 had been placed on 9th April 1913, and a third, also for 10,000, on 30th May, 1914. So that the First Contingent could be armed with this pattern, an order for 30,000 was placed on 10th August, 1914.

Two days before this, on 8th August, a Privy Council order was passed confirming the terms of a contract with the Canada Tool and Specialty Company Ltd. of New Glasgow, N.S., for the conversion of 10,000 Rifles, Long Ross, Mk. II (originally designated Rifles, Ross, Mk. II**) by removing the sight bases and hand guards etc. from the rifles and fitting them with the new screw elevating rear aperture back sights and new charger guide bridges, placed on the rear position, and also new hand guards of a proper pattern—all to be manufactured by the company in their factory at New Glasgow to drawings and specifications furnished by the Minister. The cost of conversion would be \$3.30 for each rifle, and the work would be carried out between 1st October, 1914 and 1st April, 1915. None of these rifles were designed to fire Mk. VII ammunition, and none were carried to France.

In September 1914 the British Government placed an order with Sir Charles Ross for 100,000 Mark III rifles; after thirty months only two-thirds of these had been delivered, because of the stringent inspection and free rejection of rifles by the British representatives responsible for acceptance at Quebec. Deliveries for the Canadian Government were made more quickly: by 31st January, 1915, acceptance had been made of 32,537 out of 36,400 inspected. The demand was urgent and incessant. The details of transactions in Canada involving the sale in 1915 to the British Admiralty of 500 Mk. III Ross rifles through Hon. Colonel J. Wesley Allison-whom the Minister of Militia, in the belief that he was "an absolutely disinterested and straightforward business man," had chosen as his "adviser, counsellor and guide in connection with this war"—together with 3,000,000 rounds of S.A.A., were not published because in May, 1916, Sir Charles Davidson, Chairman of the Royal Commission on the purchase of War Supplies and Sale of Small Arms Ammunition, thought it was in furtherance of the public interest that the information should be treated as confidential. A Privy Council Order of 112th August, 1916, quoted the finding of the Shell Commission of Inquiry with regard to complicity in a certain contract for fuses and

finally declared that, having regard to all the circumstances, it was considered "undesirable that Col. J. Wesley Allison should be retained on the list of Honorary Colonels of the Canadian Militia"; on that day his name was removed from the list of officers of the Active Militia.

VALCARTIER AND SALISBURY PLAIN

The troops mustered at Valcartier for the Canadian Contingent were armed with the Ross: 22,128 Mk. III were in use there; target practice, for which 4,138,700 rounds of Mk. VI and 450,340 rounds of Mk. VII ammunition were issued, was carried out; only one minor casualty is recorded—from a blow-back. An expert and 6 armourers from the Ross Rifle Factory were present in the camp to correct the lead for Mk. VI ammunition in rifles requiring such attention. The P.P.C.L.I. went into camp at Levis on 5th August and there they spent much time on the ranges in thoroughly testing the Ross rifle. Many of them repeated the experience of the Minister who had confessed to eight consecutive misses with the Ross in 1906. The aggregate results were such that Lieut.-Colonel Farquhar in an exchange of cablegrams with Lord Roberts, urged a change to the Lee-Enfield, because all his men, except fifty, were used to it and because their experiences could hardly fail to have shaken the confidence of the men in the Ross. For these reasons, and because the regiment prior to going to France was brigaded with British troops as Lord Roberts had arranged, the change was authorized in November, 1914, and the Ross rifles Mk. III thus released were issued to the 15th Bn. which had carried the long Mk. II.

An urgent request from the Governor of Newfoundland for 500 rifles of the latest pattern was met by the shipment on 28th September of that number of Ross rifles Mk. III by S.O.O. Quebec, and the Newfoundland Contingent received them in England.

Complaints about the Ross from the Contingent on Salisbury Plain were soon forthcoming. Back sights were being damaged by catching on equipment and broken during bayonet instruction; bayonets were found to jump off during firing and there were many weak striker and magazine springs. The rifle was too long for the L.E. rifle clips fitted to artillery field carriages, so General Alderson cabled to Canada in November for 1,400 Short Mk. III, only to find that, as none had been made, 1,400 Short Mk. II had been shipped in lieu. He cabled to cancel the shipment, as the Short Mk. II was not sighted or magazined for Mk. VII ammunition, and requested that the 1,400 Short Mk. III required should be ordered from the factory, and 1,200 more for

the two cavalry regiments; he was informed by Ottawa "cannot be provided," although Sir Charles Ross, who was sponsoring his weapon by lectures and personal examination of every Ross rifle on Salisbury Plain, stated that they could be supplied from his factory at the minimum rate of 100 per day. General Alderson then applied to the War Office for an issue of S.M.L.E. for the cavalry and artillery of the Contingent, but the Army Council decided, on 5th February, that the change should not be made, that the troops should take the field with the Ross rifle which had been provided by the Canadian Government, and orders were issued to the Corps and Army concerned that the change was not to be effected in France without the sanction of the Army Council.

During the period at Salisbury Plain the armourers, of whom there were nine in each battalion, reamed the muzzles, enlarged the peep sight apertures, chamfered the magazine retaining springs, bored holes in the bottom of magazines, and made repairs and adjustments; and when the Division crossed to France the only unit not armed with the Ross rifle was the Divisional Cavalry Squadron, which contrary to the Army Council decision recorded above, had been issued with 175 Short Lee-Enfield rifles by War Office authority. Of the various patterns of Ross rifle, only the Mk. III was allowed to be taken to the front, and after the necessary redistribution there remained but 500 of that mark serviceable at the base depot in England, so a hurried order for 2,000 more for issue to reinforcements was cabled to Ottawa for immediate attention.

The news that the Divisional Cavalry had discarded the Ross reached the ears of the Minister of Militia as a "rumour that Canadian cavalry are to discard Long Ross." He having "for thousands of miles in the saddle, often in brush, carried a Long Lee-Enfield without any trouble," was satisfied that a short rifle had no advantages, and he cabled to Lord Kitchener on 22nd February "We are preparing a new rifle carrier which is most perfect and removes any inconvenience to rider carrying a long rifle. I respectfully request that Long Ross rifle should not be discarded"; next day he received reply "Your telegram about Canadian Cavalry rifles. There is no such intention." But Lord Kitchener no doubt thought that "Canadian Cavalry" meant the R.C.D. and L.S.H., and he could not have guessed that the commanders of these two regiments, while he was writing that reply, were in the act of preparing reports "regarding irregularities of the Ross rifle" on instructions of their brigadier, Br.-General J. E. B.

Seely, who had taken command of the new Canadian Cavalry Brigade on 1st February. Finding that the Ross was not a suitable weapon for cavalry, and that the regiment had not proper means for carrying it, Br, General Seely took steps to secure an issue of S.M.L.E. by communicating with the War Office, through the G.O.C. Eastern Command, under whom he was then serving, without reference to the Canadian authorities. The re-arming was carried out at Maresfield in March and April, and the discarded Ross rifles were turned in to Canadian Ordnance, Ashford.

This was the time when units were being raised for the 2nd Division and 3rd Contingent—fifty infantry battalions and thirteen regiments of mounted rifles had been authorized for overseas service by 1st March—but the Ross Rifle Company was undismayed by the large number of rifles required.

An enquiry received by the Department of Militia and Defence from the War Office on 1st February, 10115, broadened the possibilities for -the manufacture of rifles in Canada; it was made on behalf of the Russian Government Could '1,500,000 rifles be supplied by Canada? The Ross Rifle Co. made an offer for the supply of rifles through the Russian Military Attache at Washington, his Government accepted-through the War Office-for one million rifles with bayonets and scabbards complete on condition that they take Russian ammunition, that the price complete would not exceed \$29.85 and that they be produced within thirteen months at an initial rate of 600 per day and a final rate of 6,000 per day., The War Office cautioned that "Ross should be informed that order can only be accepted on condition that it would not interfere with War Office deliveries."

That this information did not damp the ardour of Sir Charles Ross is evidenced in his correspondence; on 7th May, 1916, he suggested that it would be prudent to work out a scheme for moving the factory, which he estimated could be done within the space of fortyeight hours and with a suspension of production for only about two months. MajorGeneral Gwatkin, the C.G.S., in replying said that, although he had always thought and often said that the factory was not in the right place, he doubted the practicability of interrupting the supply of arms for two whole months "while this war is on," so the factory was never moved.

The conditions submitted by the Ross Rifle Company, however, were not satisfactory to the Russian Government chiefly because it was not commercially feasible to secure and

install machinery capable of turning out so many rifles within a year and with no guarantee that more would be required; agreement could not be reached; the capacity of the factory would have had to be increased twenty-fold; the contract went to the United States.

FRANCE

February-July, 1916

The supply and maintenance of a rifle not of British pattern became more serious when the Division took its place in the line. There were only 500 available in England for reinforcements, but the provision of four workshop motor lorries-one to serve each infantry brigade, and all attached to the Divisional Supply Column, and specially fitted to carry artificers and spare parts for the repair of machine guns, Ross rifles, bayonets and pistols -disposed of that difficulty. Before the troops had been long in the line some of the old troubles became more important; a man could not now recover his bayonet dislodged while firing without going over the parapet, he must wait for darkness and search for it in the mud and wire of No Man's Land. The Divisional Commander, being doubtful of the performance of the Ross with the various makes of S.A.A. then on general issue or taken over as trench stores, called on his brigadiers early in March to make report. That of Br.-General A. W. Currie was prophetic of what was to happen to the troops within six weeks: "They find, after firing a few rounds, that the shells seem to stick in the bore and are not easily extracted, in fact, more than the ordinary pressure must be applied This seems to me to be a point where the most rigid investigation is necessary, as a serious interference with rapid firing may prove fatal on occasions."

By this time every infantryman in the 1st Canadian Division had had six months experience of the Ross; he had fired over 200 rounds from it on the ranges at Valcartier and Salisbury Plain, he had carried it on the march and in the trenches, he had tested its capacity when delivering rapid fire on the left flank at Neuve Chapelle, he had taken advantage of many opportunities to compare it with the S.M.L.E. of his comrades in the British line; and on the 14th March the Divisional Commander found it necessary to publish the following Routine Order-"Rifles-It is to be noted that with the exception of the Divl. Mtd. Troops men are not permitted to be in possession of M.L.E. rifles" The sum of the experience and trials up to date were at the same time summarized by the Division in the statement "Ross rifles-these are giving good satisfaction;" a list of the modifications al-

ready applied and others recommended, including strengthening of the stock and shortening of extractor cut to prevent sticking of the bolt head, was forwarded to Ottawa and passed to the Standing Small Arms Committee for report and to the Ross Rifle Co. for their opinion.

The first gas attack was delivered on 22nd April, 1915, the 1st Canadian Division was relieved on 4th May, and two days later the Divisional Commander called upon all brigades and battalions to report at once on the behaviour of the Ross rifle in the operations, and on the number of S.M.L.E. rifles and bayonets in possession. Twenty-six replies are on record. For the 1st C.I. Bde., Br-General M. S. Mercer reported at once " I consider the Ross Rifle a satisfactory weapon," a week later he recommended " that the rifles be chambered out to exactly the same dimensions as the Lee-Enfield;" Lieut.-Colonel D. Watson of the 2nd Battalion, reported " Majority of opinion strongly in favour of Ross rifle." Br.General A. W. Currie said "The rifle is not as satisfactory as it should be;" Lieut.-Colonel L. J. Lipsett of the 8th said "Difficulty has been experienced in extracting" and one of his men had been killed by the blowing back of a bolt, the only such casualty recorded for the battle. Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Hughes, then brigade-major of General Turner's 3rd Brigade, signed the statement that " Enquiry seems to develop the fact that the Ross rifle is not a perfect mechanism," but that in British units "complaints of the working of the Lee-Enfield are just as serious as those now made of the Ross;" (a statement corroborated, as regards the Long L.E. by a report on rifles in II Corps dated 6th April, 1915, in which it is stated that "with the majority of the rifles it is impossible to fire rapid," " the extractor does not work when the bolt lever has been raised," the breach not fitted to Mk. VII S.A.A. " the extractor is too weak and fails to grip the rim of the cartridge "; the backsight put out of order by the slightest jar and not suitable for rifle grenades.) Lieut.-Colonel F. O. W. Loomis of the 13th Battalion was more specific: "after firing 15 to 30 rounds rapid fire, the rifles jam. To loosen the bolt it was necessary to use the boot heel or the handle of an entrenching tool. The men have lost confidence in the Ross rifle as a service arm." Another commander strongly objected to taking his men into action again unless the jamming was rectified, and still another respectfully submitted that "it is nothing short of murder to send our men against the enemy with such a weapon."

These reports were rendered by officers who had been in the battle, they were prepared in

consultation with junior officers who spoke for their own companies. The Minister of Militia had two reports made independently by Hon. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Carrick and Major J. E. Mills, R.C.A., who explained that much of the trouble was due to British ammunition, a fact corroborated by tests carried out by the infantry brigadiers. The direct verdict of the men is contained in the fact that 1,452 of the 5,000 Canadian infantrymen who survived the ordeal at Ypres had picked up the Lee-Enfield, having thrown away the Ross.

General Alderson enumerated the complaints received, twelve in number, which applied to the mechanism, the bolt, the sights, the magazine and the chamber, and forwarded a statement with copies of the twenty-six replies which duly reached the Commander-in-Chief through the Quartermaster-General, G.H.Q. In a personal letter he wrote "This matter is as delicate as it is important You will see that the reports, as such reports always do, vary considerably ...Canada will no doubt be extremely annoyed if fault is found with the rifle., this, however, cannot be allowed to stand in the way when the question may be of life or death, and of victory and defeat."

Action followed immediately. G.H.Q. decided that it was quite out of the question to replace the Ross at that time for although the Ross with bayonet and scabbard cost \$3325 and the S.M.L.E. complete cost \$2022 the supply of the latter was far short of the demand for the New Armies then being raised. A committee of seven officers, headed by Colonel C. M. Mathew, D.D.O.S., "the best small-arm expert we have in this country," and containing two Canadian representatives, was assembled by order of the Commander-in-Chief, at the St. Omer rifle range on 5th June to test the performance of both Ross and S.M.L.E. with various makes of ammunition. They dealt with each of the twelve complaints and arrived at the unanimous finding that of those tried only D.A. 1914 Mk. VII ammunition was suitable for rapid fire with the Ross rifle, and they recommended that " the Ross rifles should be employed on the Lines of Communication and that if possible the Canadian troops should be armed with the British rifle." The Q.M.G., G.H.Q. endorsed the finding on 7th June and submitted it to the Commander-in-Chief, remarking that "The Canadian Government will be greatly disturbed if the Dominion rifle is taken from the Canadian troops" and that a supply of Canadian ammunition, if made available, could be arranged for the Canadian Division but not for the L, of C.

The Commander-in-Chief ordered the Ross rifles of the 1st Canadian Division to be exchanged for S.M.L.E. forthwith, and notified the Secretary of the War Office of his action:

From: The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief,
British Army in the Field.

To: The Secretary,
War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

12th June, 1915.

SIR:

In continuation of my telegram No. Q/37 dated 11th instant I have the honour to transmit for the information of the Army Council a copy of a report submitted by a Committee appointed to make certain tests in order to ascertain whether repeated complaints which had reached me regarding the Ross rifle were justified.

It will be seen from the Report of the Committee that while this rifle works smoothly and well with ammunition of Canadian manufacture it is liable to jam when using ammunition of English make.

I intend shortly to employ the Canadian Division in offensive operations and, as there is no supply of Canadian ammunition immediately available, I have decided that, in view of the definite statements made by the Committee and of the reports I have received of a want- of confidence in their rifles on the part of the Infantry of this formation, it is necessary immediately to re-arm the Canadian Division with the Lee-Enfield rifle. Instructions have been issued for this to be done at once: utilizing for the purpose the rifles referred to in my letter No. O.A. 2-99 G. dated 8th June, 1915.

It will not be necessary to re-arm the 2nd Canadian Division if the necessary supplies of Small Arms Ammunition of Canadian manufacture become available by the time this Division is sent to France.

It is understood that the trouble with the English ammunition is due to the fact that the cartridge case fills the chamber so tightly as to cause a jam. It is possible that by a slight alteration in the chamber it may be found possible to remedy this defect.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. D. P. FRENCH,

Field-Marshal.

Commanding-in-Chief,

British Army in the Field.

On the same day Hon. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Carrick cabled to the Minister as follows:—

Owing to the lack of ammunition of Canadian manufacture and to the fact that the rifle jams when fired with British made ammunition, the Ross rifle is being temporarily withdrawn from the Canadian Division. I was informed that this step was absolutely necessary for above reasons, when I protested strenuously on your behalf. Have discussed matter fully with Sir John French. Leave of absence has been granted to me to proceed home and lay matter before you, and I return next Tuesday or Wednesday by first boat. This question is entirely within jurisdiction of Military authorities in France, so wire me here until my departure. Please acknowledge receipt.

Two days later the 1st Canadian Division reported "The infantry and engineers of this Division are now completely rearmed with S.M.L.E. rifles;" two battalions of the 1st Brigade had actually been rearmed in the front line trenches, their comrades of the cavalry, then in reserve, having furnished fatigue parties to carry the Lee-Enfields to the front and the Rosses to the rear. By the time the division had been engaged in the Battle of Festubert and, by the day before Sir John French wrote his letter, the men had already - possessed themselves of 3,050 Lee-Enfield rifles on the battlefield; the number of Ross rifles turned in was 5,372.

Next day one of the infantry brigadiers and an infantry officer both wrote secretly to inform the Minister's Special Representative in London, Br-General J. W. Carson, but he had already heard the news both from Colonel Carrick and from Lord Brooke, whom Sir John French had sent to see Major-General S. B. Steele, then commanding the Canadian troops in England. He had been warned by the Army Council through the Eastern Command that drafts for the 1st Canadian Division should be armed with the Short Lee-Enfield, but that no alteration was contemplated in the arming of the 2nd Canadian Division.

The Army Council was evidently surprised by the high-handed action of the Commander-in-Chief, and took him to task at once, informing him "that the Army Council had carefully considered his report and that they were not of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to justify the sweeping condemnation passed on the Ross rifle," and in pardonable ignorance of the history of the previous fourteen years added "In view of the very favourable character attached to the Ross rifle by the Canadian Government the Army Council would be glad to have some independent opinion of a few selected Canadian officers on the general serviceability of this rifle as compared with the Lee-Enfield." The Commander-in-Chief replied as follows:—

Confidential

From: The Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief,
British Army in the Field.

To: The Secretary,

War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

19th June, 1915.

SIR:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of War Office letter No. 77/15/5209 (A.5) dated 16.6.1915, regarding the action taken by me in the matter of the Ross rifles of the Canadian Division.

2. The circumstances are as follows:

I had heard rumours that there was a growing want of confidence in this rifle, as evidenced by the fact that the Infantry of the

Canadian Division were taking every opportunity of exchanging their rifles with those of the Lee-Enfield pattern from casualties on the battlefield.

3. To satisfy myself whether there was any real justification for this state of affairs, without at the same time lending encouragement to the idea that the Ross rifle was unsatisfactory, such as might have resulted from an investigation by the Divisional authorities, I gave instructions for the assembly of a small Committee at my General Headquarters to test the rifle with the various natures of ammunition in use, including ammunition of Canadian manufacture, of which a small supply was obtained from England for the purpose, none having been sent out to this country for use with the rifle.

4. The proceedings of this Committee were laid before me on the eve of a serious offensive operation in which the Canadian Division was to take part, and I was at the same time informed that over 3,000, or more than one third, of the Infantry of this Division had already succeeded in re-arming themselves with the Lee-Enfield rifle without any authority having been given for them to do so.

- (i) Looking to the unanimous opinion of my Committee that the Ross rifle could not be relied upon to work smoothly and efficiently in rapid fire with any ammunition other than that of Canadian manufacture.
- (ii) to the fact that no ammunition of this nature was available in this country, and that sufficient supplies could not be obtained from England, and
- (iii) to the want of confidence in the rifle which a large number of the infantry evidently felt, as evidenced by the fact that over 3,000 had without authority, exchanged their rifles for those used by their British comrades and taken from casualties on the battlefield.

I did not feel justified in sending this Division into battle with the Ross rifle, and ordered the re-arming of the Infantry of the Division with the Lee-Enfield rifle, which was carried out before they went into action on 15th instant.

5. As regards the suggestion made by the Army Council that the opinion of one or two selected Canadian Officers should be obtained I submit that this is a difficult and complicated question which can only be satisfactorily settled by the best expert opinion, and that the views of a few selected Canadian Officers, who may or may not be prejudiced in the matter, will not be of any material assistance.

6. I would therefore suggest that the Army Council should send to this country one or more of the most highly qualified experts obtainable to make the necessary tests under service conditions and report whether ammunition of British manufacture is or is not suitable for use with the Ross rifle. For this purpose a supply of ammunition of Canadian manufacture should be brought out for comparison.

The Army Council can then decide whether, looking to all the circumstances, it is advisable to restore the Ross rifle to Canadian Division.

7. In conclusion I would observe that in my reports I have never condemned the Ross rifle, nor have I any sufficient data to justify me in doing so.

I have expressed and acted on my opinion that so far as I can judge, the ammunition of British manufacture is not suitable for use with the Ross rifle, and that there is a large and growing feeling of want of confidence in their rifle on the part of the men in the Canadian Division, which is amply justified by the Report of the Committee.

8. Owing to the difficulty at present experienced in turning out rifles in sufficient numbers for our requirements, I shall most heartily welcome an authoritative statement which will carry conviction to the men that their apprehensions are unfounded, or what may possibly be found more easy of attainment, viz. a slight alteration to the chamber of the rifle which will better adapt it for use with our British ammunition.

I have, etc.,

J. D. P. FRENCH.

This correspondence was forwarded to the Minister of Militia by the War Office on 6th July, with the explanation that "in deference to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief the Army Council have had no alternative but to confirm his action," and with the request that further supplies of ammunition of Canadian manufacture be despatched so that the necessity for rearming the 2nd Canadian Division might not arise.

By this time the Minister, "a warm admirer and defendant of the Canadian Arm" —but now disturbed by the personal endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief's opinion by casualties returning home from the front was on his way to England and shortly after his arrival there he appointed Lieut. Colonel J. W. Harkom, a rifle expert, and Sir Charles Ross, who proceeded to England on 3rd July, "to look into this matter and fix it up." Sir Charles Ross, as late as 30th June, 1915, was still of the opinion that the jamming even the shearing of cartridge rims was caused by the mud, compacted dried and hardened in the chamber, and he recommended to the C.G.S. that "breech sticks" (presumably "Sticks, cleaning chamber -303-in. arms") should be issued to the troops as well as to armourers. His detailed explanation of the use of the implement began by stating: "A breech stick is issued for the purpose of keeping the chamber of a rifle clean," and concluded: "Provided the interior of the barrel is kept free from rust the rifles issued should run for months without oil."

The public was informed of the trouble through reports of a question asked in the British House of Commons on 8th July "Whether the Canadian Division had been armed with Lee-Enfields and whether the Canadian Government had been asked to discontinue the manufacture of the Ross rifle?" Because these matters were of very considerable delicacy as between the Dominion Government

and the British Government, the Under Secretary for War did not think it desirable to make direct reply, and the public was not reassured by the unchallenged statement of his question, that "all the Canadian soldiers say the Ross rifle is a first class target rifle, but that the sights are very delicate, and that the rifle jams." The Dominion Parliament was not then in session, having risen in mid April, and before it met again in January, 1916, the condition of affairs was common knowledge.

RECHAMBERING OF ROSS Mk. III

July August, 1916

On 4th February, 1911, when the chamber of the new Mk. III Ross rifle was under discussion by the reduced Standing Small Arms Committee, they had finally agreed with the M.G.O. that it was more important to have a chamber suited to standard British Mk. VII ammunition than to gain muzzle velocity by reducing it, and in May they recommended that the dimensions of the short L.E. chamber (.462", .404", .343", .339") should be adopted; but because the Long Ross Mk. H chamber (.460", .4005", .3429", .338") gave higher muzzle velocity in tests, the Committee in August changed their recommendation of May and this chamber was authorized for Mk. III with the alleged concurrence of the M.G.O. This change did not directly nullify the recent report of Sir John French upon the Canadian military forces, dated 5th July, 1910, in which he wrote "the most important essential is assured in the similarity of the ammunition used by the Ross rifle and that used in other parts of the Empire"; but it did necessitate the qualification that the converse did not hold with this reduced chamber the Ross rifle could not be relied upon to fire other than Canadian ammunition.

When the Minister called for "a thorough and immediate inspection into the question" of the chamber, Sir Charles Ross admitted reducing the dimensions and erroneously blamed Lt. Colonel Harkom. Colonel Greville Harston was also questioned, he had evidently forgotten having signed his committee's amended recommendation of 4th August, 1911, and referred to that of May; he said that the Long Ross Mk. II chamber was authorized at the urgent request of Sir Charles Ross and explained that the change was unknown to him at the time, because the Ross Rifle Co. had supplied the chamber gauges but had failed to meet repeated requests for dimensioned drawings; he did not explain why he had not taken the precaution of obtaining a set of L.E. chamber gauges from the War Office. The Mk. II chamber therefore continued to be used until 9th July, 1915, when the Ross Rifle Co., because of the failure of the

rifle in the field, was ordered by the M.G.O., as instructed by the Militia Council, to adopt the dimensions of the S.M.L.E. chamber as above, which accommodated the high limit Mk. VII cartridge measuring .460", .401", .340", .338".

The Minister of Militia, then in England, cabled on 16th July direct to the Ross Rifle Co. to "try enlarging chamber by two thousandths at neck, increasing to four thousandths at base, and report result by cable. Try maximum cartridge." On the same day he also cabled to the Acting Minister in Ottawa that the chamber "must be enlarged four thousandths at base, tapering to two thousandths at neck. This is imperative. This size will be .464" at base to .341" at small end." When the order was communicated to the Ross representatives, they recommended .463" and there was much investigating, testing and gauging at Ottawa, at the Rockcliffe Ranges, and at Quebec, of rifles chambered .460", .482", .463" and .464". In one test 36,000 rounds were fired from 72 rifles; the results of all the trials confirmed those found at the front, even to kicking open the breech. Minor distortion was detected in some chambers, and attributed to nipping in the vice during breeching up, that is, after final gauging. The behaviour of D.A. and D.C. ammunition was tested and compared, and also that of the famous "B," specially obtained for the purpose, although that make had been withdrawn from the field by order of the Commander-in-Chief several months before.

The Ross Rifle Co. objected that it was impossible to make the chamber as ordered by the Minister because it would be bell mouthed-so their manager said-but they would do their best; ammunition manufacturers protested that cartridges of L.E. dimensions would split because of inadequate support to the shell, ballistic experts showed that the escape of gas allowed would reduce muzzle velocity. Later the first objection was put down to a misunderstanding and the two last were shown to be negligible. But it was brought to light that the Ross Rifle Co. had always assumed that their chamber would not be required to accommodate the high limit cartridge; in 1908 they had announced that the contract permitted them to decide what tolerances should be allowed; and the simple result, though hitherto unexpressed, was that a high limit cartridge introduced into a low limit chamber would inevitably give a driving fit, which the straight pull mechanism could not extract. Prior to rechambering, about 15 per cent of properly gauged ammunition caused properly gauged Ross rifles to jam.

The reason why D.A. ammunition did not jam to the same extent as other makes was because the M.G.O., knowing that the contour of the Ross chamber was unsuited to standard gauged L.E. ammunition and appreciating that the Minister would hear no evil of the rifle, gave orders that .303 ammunition made in the Dominion Arsenal should only be passed if within the dimension limits of low tolerance; thus high limit cartridges were eliminated from the D.A. product, while commercial factories continued to manufacture within the less stringent limits of variation prescribed by the Woolwich standards.

Eventually the chamber dimensions .464", .4025", .343", .341" were adopted on 14th August, 1915; all rifles already made were reamed out to this, and all subsequent rifles were so manufactured. At that time the War Office contemplated no changes in the chamber of the S.M.L.E., but on 4th January, 1916, an increase was made to .464".

On the day after the dimensions of the new chamber had been agreed upon, the Minister of Militia cabled to his Deputy in Ottawa that Long Ross Mk. II chamber and present Mk. III is .459", .401", .341" and .338"; L.E. chamber is .462", .404", .343", .339"; proposed new Ross chamber .464", .406", .345", .341"; that "these are British dimensions, therefore it appears more than probable a change has been made in recent years in the Lee-Enfield chamber without the Canadian Government being aware of it." This surmise and the figures he gave for the Ross chambers were wrong; the dimensions of the L.E. chamber and cartridge had remained unchanged throughout the previous fourteen years.

With a view to restoring confidence the Minister ordered that the troops should be instructed "that the Lee-Enfield jams even worse with bad ammunition than does ours" (i.e. the Ross) ; but it is doubtful whether this had the desired result, for all ranks in England, including the 2nd Canadian Division, then preparing to go to France, had been consistently forbidden to use the vernier, the wind-gauge or the battle aperture of the somewhat complicated rear sight, and no amount of argument, illustration or instruction could obliterate experience or adjust faulty balance or reduce dead weight.

By 5th August, 1915, Lieut.-Colonel Harkom had begun to take the necessary steps to adapt the chambers. There was delay in procuring 40 reamers and other necessary tools from the Royal Small Arms factory at Enfield Lock, but between 24th August and 9th September he with his staff of 50 "Ross Rifle Details" rechambered all the rifles of the 2nd Canadian

Division, and so the transfer of the Division to France had to be postponed for only one week. The rechambering was continued, over 44,000 rifles were so treated in less than ten weeks and 7,280 rifles had also been fitted with the improved pattern of magazine. This workshop at West Sandling was also called upon to make other adjustments. On account, it was later presumed, of the erroneous use of .8 carbon steel in lieu of the .2 carbon steel specified, badly tempered bolt heads made their appearance, even to 80 per cent of receipts from Canada, and an extemporaneous method of case hardening was introduced in 1916 which was not altogether successful; cracking, shearing and chipping of locking threads was not uncommon; the Minister was "utterly amazed" that the Ross Rifle Details had been permitted/ to interfere with the bolts. As with the peep-sights of the First Contingent it was found desirable to enlarge the aperture to 1/10" diameter, screws were working loose and had to be rim punched, it was decided that the unnecessary trigger guard swivel should be removed, and a number of foresight sleeves and single trigger pulls required attention. The work at first was carried on under the Director of Supplies and Transport at Shorncliffe (Lieut.-Colonel A. D. McRae), who reported to the Minister's Special Representative, and from November, 1915, under the Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, Canadians, at Ashford, (Lieut. Colonel B. C. White). The Corps Troops, which went to form the 3rd Canadian Division in December, also went to France with rechambered Mk. III. Subsequently the rifles turned in by the 1st Canadian Division were returned to England and similarly treated. All rifles rechambered in England were marked "L.C." which distinguished them not only from the original Mark III rifles with the .460" chamber, but also from those rechambered in Canada to .462" between 9th July and 26th August, 1915, marked "N." Those received direct from the factory with the larger chamber .464", were marked "E."

In January, 1916, because of chipping and shearing of the locking cam of bolt lugs, it was assumed that these were improperly tempered. and case hardening with cyanide of potassium and yellow prussiate of potash was undertaken by the Ross Rifle Details in England. Simultaneously the investigations of a C.E.F. officer, Major R. M. Blair-who was appointed Assistant Inspector of Small Arms in Quebec, and who later won the King's Prize at Bisleys-led to the disclosure that this trouble, the most fruitful cause of jams, was attributable to the fact that only the thin and extreme outer edge of the locking cam came

into sharp hammer blow contact with the unyielding steel bolt-stop as each cartridge case was ejected; that is, the body of the boltstop became a swaging block, which produced a burring, bending or cracking of the cam until it finally reached a deformation sufficient to cause the bolt head to jam when closed against the resisting shoulders of the receiver. The temper of bolt heads varied from glass hard to dead soft, and in extreme cases the cam would break or bend after a few rounds, but no matter what the temper, the point of permanent strain was eventually reached. In violent ejection during rapid fire, or when cartridges were sticky in extraction, the impact between cam and stop was increased, deformation was accelerated, and jamming quickened. The remedy recommended by the S.S.A.C. in June, 1916, and immediately applied, was to increase the diameter of the bolt-stop and so enlarge the surface of impact, i.e. the area of engagement, from .010070 sq. in. to .021607 sq. in., and thereby cut in half the stress per square inch of each blow. This modification was effective, but it had been discovered too late; it was, however, applied to the rifles withdrawn from France and exchanged for S.M.L.E.

The Minister, in touch as ever with all modifications, gave authority under his own hand in September, 1916, to an optimistic if obscure Canadian engineer employed as an ammunition expert with the Admiralty, to look into the matter and if in his opinion the changes being carried out were not necessary and essential, to "request Colonel Murphy or Colonel Neill, A/Q.M.G., to ask GrevilleHarston to discontinue his operations." This expert had undertaken if given expenses and pay "not less than those allowed a Lieut.Colonel detailed for special duty," to show that enlargement of the bolt-stop was unnecessary. The Minister's Representative questioned the wisdom of such a blind bargain and although the D. of S. and T. (Shorncliffe) expressed the view that half a million dollars had already been needlessly expended in this work, neither the gazette nor the demonstration materialized. The process proposed was subsequently characterized by a rival expert as an entirely chimerical theoretical chemical treatment.

Sir Charles Ross, by special permission, had visited France in August, 1915, but at that time the only Ross rifles in the Canadian line were a few retained for the use of snipers, for the 2nd Canadian Division had not yet arrived in France. On his return to London he discussed with Auckland Geddes whether there was any objection to reopening negotiations for Russian orders for rifles; the reply was that neither Russia nor any of the Allies

should negotiate for the output of the Ross Rifle Factory. There was a serious shortage of rifles in the autumn and winter of 1915. So many were required to arm the new Canadian battalions then being raised that none could be sent direct to England for the maintenance of a proper supply in France; it became necessary to arm them in the Training Division with Mk. II, although the return of that mark to Canada had been urgently demanded, some were reamed and adapted to Mk. VII ammunition; one battalion, the 73rd, arrived unarmed in England in April, 1916, and this was six months after the Minister's Special Representative in London had feelingly written to the G.O.C. Canadians "How the devil they expect us to get along without rifles rather beats me, but the whole Ottawa situation is enough to drive anybody crazy." The situation in England was not above criticism, for there were approximately 7,000 unserviceable rifles lying in Canadian Ordnance stores at Ashford which, after reconditioning, furnished some 6,000 "perfectly good rifles," although the feature of interchangeability of parts had practically disappeared.

TESTS AND TRIALS

In Canada, after the size of chamber had been settled, the most important discussion arose in December, 1915, when the Master General of the Ordnance laid the question of further provision of rifles for the C.E.F. before the Militia Council and submitted the following proposals:-

- (i) To compel the Ross Rifle Co. to increase their output to comply with the rates of delivery stipulated in the orders placed with them, and to inquire whether -the War Office was willing to transfer their contract for rifles to the Department of Militia and Defence.
- (ii) Failing (i) to expropriate the Ross Rifle Factory.
- (iii) As a last resource, purchase rifles from Great Britain or United States.

At the end of March, 1916, the Prime Minister cabled to ask Sir George Perley whether Lee-Enfield or some other improved rifle could not be obtained for the troops, and received the reply that the British Government could not spare any at that juncture.

In France there were occasional cases of jams in the rechambered rifles of the 2nd Canadian Division. As early as 21st October, 1915, a test of rapid fire with the Ross rifle was carried out by the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade which convinced the brigadier that they were caused by defective or over gauge ammunition; the makes tested were B,N,G,K and E, the last two of which, like the D.A. ammunition, did not jam; to eject the "B14"

and "G14" makes it was "necessary to use the foot on the bolt." Within a week another test of the same makes of ammunition was fired by men of the Corps Troops from both the Ross and S.M.L.E. in the presence of Major-General Carson, Hon. Colonel Sir W. M. Aitken, and the Corps Commander. The "B" ammunition caused the bolt of the S.M.L.E. to stick slightly in 3 rounds out of 125; on the 26th round the firer of the Ross "had to use his foot to open it," and on the 40th the bolt jammed and his rifle was out of action. The "E" and "K" makes caused no trouble in either the Ross or S.M.L.E. The "N" and "G" makes fired without jam or misfires in the S.M.L.E.; with the former from the 45th to 50th the Ross bolt had to be forced open with a stick and the series was discontinued; with the "G" make after the 29th round the firer of the Ross had to use his foot to force the bolt open.

In consequence of these tests, which gave results similar to those found at St. Omer in June, 1915, great care was taken to see that only makes of ammunition which were suited to the Ross were accepted by the 2nd Canadian Division. Even when unsuitable makes found their way into the divisional ammunition dumps, the Q. staff had no difficulty in exchanging it with flanking British divisions who were satisfied that the L.E. would "smoke up anything." This precaution made it possible for the G.O.C. of the Division to report confidentially in February to the Minister's Special Representative that he "had absolutely no complaints," but in the same letter he asked for a set of reamers, he noted that all rifles were not uniformly marked, he suggested larger numerals on the sight, he commented on soft bolt heads being received and enquired "Would it affect the shooting of the rifle very much if the barrel was cut down two inches?" An even greater shortening of the barrel to 28" (the S.M.L.E. was 26") had been successfully carried out in tests in 1910 without loss of accuracy and with very little reduction in muzzle velocity; independent tests in June, 1916, with 26" barrels verified the earlier results, but the preference of the Minister for a long rifle prevailed, so this defect was never remedied.

The results of the tests in the field and experiences in the unfortunate fighting at the St. Eloi Craters became known to the troops, and to meet their reaction it was considered advisable to publish 2nd Cdn. Div. R.O. 2052 of 17th April, 1916, which reads as follows:

For the future, Company Commanders of Infantry and Officers Commanding other Units of the 2nd Canadian Division will be held personally responsible that there are no

unauthorized Lee-Enfield rifles in the possession of their units. All salvaged Lee-Enfield rifles will be immediately returned to Ordnance Stores.

Neglect of this order will be treated as a direct breach of discipline.

This order was repeated by Brigades, but the risk of court martial did not deter men from making the exchange when opportunity offered.

The Armament Officer of the 2nd Canadian Division, who frequently corresponded with the Minister's Special Representative, and also with the Minister himself, made known in March his discovery that in the 3rd Canadian Division a number of the men were in possession of S.M.L.E. rifles and that some had exchanged their Ross with the approval of company officers. When this was brought to the attention of the Minister of Militia he directed one of his representatives, Colonel G. P. Murphy, to demand a full report. Major-General Mercer replied that a large number of L.E. were rightly in possession of certain specialists - in the line, including machine gunners and grenade throwers, and that all men rejoining from hospital in France brought L.E. rifles with them; he assumed that all concerned knew the P.P.C.L.I., one of the battalions of his division, to be armed with the S.M.L.E.; for the rest he declared that his men had little or no confidence in the Ross, his regimental officers had reported overwhelmingly against it, even with the best ammunition in the field it jammed to such an extent as to weaken offensive and defensive power, and the only conclusion he could arrive at was that "to longer withhold the issue of the L.E. rifle and compel the men of this Division to use the Ross rifle, would be criminal in the extreme." Within three weeks after this reply his two-mile front at Mount Sorrel was heavily attacked and they had ample occasion to find out what the rifle could do. The men, who had complained that the sights were fragile and that the long barrel struck the overhead struts of the revetting frames as they moved along the trenches, had been assured that the Ross was their best friend and would show its worth in the face of the enemy.

It is noteworthy that on 6th June a company of the 28th Battalion, which was heavily engaged at Hooze, when a German mine was blown under the front line, experienced no jamming, and their rifles worked perfectly; this may be attributed to the instruction given by the company commander, a marksman who later commanded the Canadian team at Bisley.

Meanwhile three letters on the subject of the Ross rifle had been written and their contents widely circulated. The first, which

rekindled the matter, set out the position as seen by a United States citizen, an "amateur expert" then serving as a subaltern in the Canadian Ordnance Corps at Shorncliffe; the original letter is not now available, and it is not known to whom it was addressed, but it was written in, December, 1915; a copy found its way into the hands of Major-General W. G. Gwatkin the Chief of the General Staff at Ottawa, and he forwarded an extract to Lieut. General Alderson commanding the Canadian Corps in France as a document which he ought to see. General Alderson replied, and extracts from his letter, reproduced in full below, were printed, to the embarrassment of the Government, in an Ottawa newspaper of 17th May, 1916. The Minister of Public Works was so moved by these mysterious extracts that he would have cast the publisher into the tower of the Victoria Museum, where the Commons were sitting because the Parliament Buildings had been burned down, and, when informed that there was no tower, he promised "to provide a suitable tower for the individual who wrote that letter, if we can locate him."

6th February, 1916.

My Dear GWATKIN:

Many thanks for sending me those extracts from a letter regarding the Ross rifle. Presumably the writer is, or was, at Shorncliffe? Apparently, too, he has some knowledge of the manufacture, etc., of rifles.

I will not go into any of the details, as regards soft bolt-heads, faulty sights, rifles, being rebuilt at Ashford, etc., etc., as he does, except to say that all these things seem to me to be against, and not for the Ross rifle?

The two main points in this letter seem to be:—

- (a) The writer says that 85 per cent of the men do not like the Ross.
- (b) He says that the Enfield rifle jams with "B," "G" and "N" ammunition after 15 rounds!

In (a) he is right, in (b) he is very wrong indeed.

I will now take these points in detail.

- (a) The men like the Lee-Enfield for the following reasons.
 1. It is lighter.
 2. It is shorter.

This means:—

Firstly, it is more suitable for trench work.

Secondly, it comes up and is on the target at once, like a shot gun.

The advantage of this for rapid firing and snapehooting, and most of the shooting at present is that, is obvious?
3. It has a longer bayonet, which the men like.
4. The magazine holds 10 rounds instead of 5.
5. The magazine is much easier to charge than is the case with the Ross, as the clips go in straight and at once. Hence the Enfield rifle will fire any given number of rounds over 5, a good deal quicker than the Ross will.
6. The magazine of the Enfield is much stronger than that of the Ross. It has two grooves in it. This means that you may dent the magazine to the depth of the grooves and it will still allow the cartridges to pass up. The Ross has no grooves in its magazine and a small dent puts it out of order.

7. There is no doubt that the Ross is much more sensitive to dirt, mud, or dust in its mechanism, than is the Lee-Enfield. In the trenches both men and rifles are often covered with mud. It is natural, therefore, for the men to prefer the rifle which is least sensitive to dirt.
8. The sights of the Lee-Enfield are more simple, and stronger, and less liable to damage than those of the Ross.
9. There seems no doubt that the turn Oven by the striking up of the bolt in the case of the Lee-Enfield favours the easy extraction of a fired cartridge more than does the straight pull of the Ross.
10. And this accounts for the whole thing? The Lee-Enfield is an old experienced man as a service rifle, while the Ross is a baby.

To put it in other words, the Lee-Enfield is the outcome of years of experience with rifles on active service, while the Ross has not (as far as I know) been on active service before.

It is small wonder that the men, who are good judges in these matters, should prefer the Lee-Enfield.

I may say that, very soon after we got out here with the lot Division, I found that the men were picking up Lee-Enfields whenever they could and throwing away the Rosses. I issued an order that this was not to be allowed and, prior to the 2nd Battle of Ypres, that order was carried out. The experience of the battle showed that the Ross jammed so badly that I was obliged to let this order die a natural death. When the Division was rearmed with the Lee-Enfield the men cheered loudly on hearing the news, and it was found that there were already over 3,000 of the rifles in the Division.

I hold no brief for the Lee-Enfield (the Martini was still the rifle when I commanded a company) and I did, and still do, as regards the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, discourage any crying down of the Ross, although I know, as does everyone else, that the Lee-Enfield is out and out the best active service rifle.

I believe the Ross to be a closer shooting rifle and I think, and I often say so, that, with teams of equal shots on the range, and using the rifles as single loaders, the Ross would win.

Now I take the second main point in the letter you sent me.

- (b) "... with the same ammunition (i.e. 'B,' 'G' and 'N') the Lee-Enfield cannot be relied upon to fire 15 rounds."

This is an absolute invention.

I attach a copy of a report on a test of ammunition we had when Carson and Max Aitken were last here together. From this you will see that the Lee-Enfield fired from

100 to 125 rounds, as rapidly as possible, with all the three marks of ammunition named, while the Ross jammed from the 25th to the 50th round.

This report (which, as you will see, was signed by both Carson and Aitken) does not state as it should that the Lee-Enfield, although handled by men not trained to it fired (owing to it being, as I have before said, much easier to charge the magazine) its 100 rounds in about one third less time than the Ross. Nor does the report state, as was the case, that the hands of the men using the Ross were cut and bleeding owing to the difficulty they had in knocking back the bolt.

None of those present, and there were many Commanding and other officers there, could have failed to notice these important points.

As regards what the writer of the letter says about "B," "G" and "N" ammunition having "again in some mysterious way found its way to the Canadian trenches." That, too, is against the Ross moreover it emphasizes what we have been told officially, viz. that, while we are stationary it will be possible to keep this ammunition away from units armed with the Ross, but that when we get on the move it may not be possible.

I should be glad to know where the "here," referred to by the writer as where there is, "more or less organized attempt to discredit the Ross rifle," is? I have heard nothing of any such attempts in France and if I did I should stop them.

What I shall not stop, however, is a bonafide report against the Ross should it come in after any future serious action that any part of the Corps may take part in.

I should not be fit for my position if I passed over anything which endangered men's lives or the success of our arms.

I have no more to say, except that, all through this letter I have merely stated facts and nothing else. I do not, therefore, mind to whom you show it.

Yours sincerely,

E. A. H. ALDERSON.

Major-General W. G. GWATKIN,

Chief of the General Staff,

Department of Militia and Defence,

OTTAWA.

The Minister of Militia having been shown this letter by the C.G.S., wrote on 7th March to the Corps Commander as follows:—

MINISTER'S OFFICE,

OTTAWA, March 7th, 1916.

DEAR GENERAL ALDERSON:

General Gwatkin has shown me a copy of a letter from you of recent date on the question of the Ross rifle.

I had hoped that this matter had long ago been settled, but from the tenor of your remarks it seems that "the music is still in the air." I am well aware that very few Officers, British or Canadian, know much about any rifle, especially a new one like the Roes. Each naturally gets accustomed to the one he new, and after a time seems wedded to it. I, therefore, fully appreciate the liking that all those who have never before used the Ross rifle have for the old Lee-Enfield.

It is also appreciated that those who have never used the Ross excepting, casually in practice, will not readily understand the manner in which the bolt should be opened. The L.E., as you know, for loading has four motions, an upward pull, a backward pull, a forward drive and a downward push. The Ross has but two.

Let us suppose the two rifles jammed, and that it will require a direct pressure to say two hundred pounds each to extract the jammed cartridge case. With a slow heavy pull the Lee-Enfield may be opened, but the Ross requires a smart snap with the fingers and the hand, combined with a quick action of the elbow, to exert the necessary pressure.

The Lee-Enfield chamber, proof charge—I enclose herewith a diagram (*not reproduced*)—was -459 at the base, or practically -460. The chamber, after proof charge and when finished, was -462, etc. The Ross being much stronger steel, and having proof chamber of -459, resisted fifty-one thousand pounds proof charge, and was finished at about -460.

It is true that the Ross rifle, with certain ammunition jammed. It is doubly true that the Lee-Enfield also jammed. The 1st Colonel Farquhar warned me, after his first action, about the jamming of the L.E., and begged me to instruct all the Canadians to carry of oiled rags to clean the bolt every time, etc., or it would jam. The Gordons, the 42nd, the Munster Fusiliers—in fact every battalion in the British Service—was, from time to time more or less cut to pieces by the jamming of the Lee-Enfield, due to bad ammunition, to dirt, to rust, etc. As an observing Officer you must have known this, or at least you should have known it.

At St. Julien, two British battalions sent in to reinforce on the left of the Second Brigade—I think they were the Durhams and Yorks—had their L.E. rifles jam so badly with bad ammunition that the poor fellows were shot to pieces and retired in confusion and disorder. The same held true of other Battalions armed with the L.E. at St. Julien, at Festubert, and at Givenchy.

You seem to be strangely familiar, judging from your letter with the list of ten suggestions intended to prejudice the Ross rifle in the minds of the Canadians. These suggestions were first worked out at Salisbury. The insidious whispering went on in France. The questions took definite form just before St. Julien, and were continued till after Festubert. At Givenchy our fellows had the L.E. and got a most infernal trimming, whereas at both the other places where they carried the Ross rifle, they had been very successful.

It is not worth while, with men who know little or nothing about rifles, to take up these ten points in detail, but some of them are so absolutely absurd and ridiculous that no one excepting a novice or for an excuse, would be found seriously advancing them. For example: The question of the open, as against the hooded foresight protector; the ten-round magazine versus the five; the lightness, etc. In fact, each and every one, to anyone informed on the expert aspect of rifles, carries its own condemnation on the face.

However, to meet the conditions of bad ammunition, mud dirt, etc., we enlarged the chamber of the (toss to -464, etc. I am assured by Official Authorities that the British Government have followed suit and have adopted our size.

But the aspect, which borders on criminality, is the permitting of soft case ammunition, abnormally large ammunition, in short, bad ammunition, being placed in the hands of soldiers who are risking their lives in defence of the liberties we all hold so dear.

There might have been an excuse at the beginning that some routine Officer had passed the ammunition without detecting its faults, but over and over again, in spite of the loss of thousands of the boys, this defective ammunition was placed in their hands.

To have one round of any defective ammunition again found with a soldier will be regarded as criminal, not only on the part of the authorities issuing it but on the part of the Officers in immediate command.

I shall not here refer to the "it is and it is not" aspect of the case, nor shall I produce hundreds of documents in the form of letters, etc., to show that, from the very outset, the expert British soldier, whenever he found an opportunity invariably slipped off with the Ross rifle leaving the L.E. instead. This occurred long before St. Julien, as well as since.

So far as concerns your amateur test with experts like yourself, Sir Max Aitken, Sir George Perley and General Carson, I have to pen to have the records of this test and of official tests both in England and at the Front, and with the exception of this instance of yours, in every other case the advantage with the bad ammunition was considerably in favour of the Ross. I am, of course, speaking of the enlarged chamber.

You are, of course, familiar with the superiority of the Ross in the rifle grenade tests, in which the range of the Lee-Enfield with the same length of barrel, and the same charge, was considerably less than the range of the Ross.

I have before me at the present moment a report from one of the best experts in the British Empire, Captain Ackerman, late of the First Division, Canadians, and he states:—

"Since the enlargement of the chamber I consider the Ross rifle the most perfect of the four rifles that I had the opportunity of trying, viz.: Mauser (German, with no protection for foresight and with open back sight); Lebel (French, with same sighting apparatus), and Lee-Enfield British, with partially protected foresight."

Will you kindly permit me to suggest to you that it would be advisable that the Canadian Force should not find any of the bad ammunition in their pouches or on their persons?

With good ammunition the Ross rifle has never been known to jam, and I presume to be absolutely fair, that the jamming of the Lee-Enfield rifle in the early periods of the war and up to the present time is, also, due almost entirely to bad ammunition.

Your emphatic energy concerning what your intentions are, if you will pardon me might better be directed to having your officers of every grade responsible in the premises to make sure that none of the defective ammunition again finds its way into the Canadian ranks.

Thanking you for your frankness in the memorandum to General Gwatkin, and wishing every success to the forces.

Faithfully,
SAM HUGHES.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR E. A. ALDERSON,
General Headquarters, Canadians,
France.

On his instructions, copies of the Minister's letter were

sent direct by his Special Representative in London to all Major-Generals, Br.-Generals and Os.C. units both in England and France. A number of the 281 addressees acknowledged receipt: one, whose battalion was armed with the S.M.L.E. volunteered the opinion that the Ross with the enlarged chamber "is now the best rifle in the world today"; another hoped that something would be done to restore confidence in the Ross before rearming the 1st Canadian Division with it, another who held a staff appointment in England, thought he "could work out a dandy case that will be fine ammunition for the Minister."

General Alderson did not make direct reply, but on 2nd May, soon after the action of the St. Eloi Craters, two cases having been officially reported wherein a number of Ross rifles jammed in rapid firing against an advancing enemy, directed "that a definite and independent opinion be obtained from every Brigade, Battalion and Company Commander" in the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions as to whether—

- (a) Any similar instances have occurred, giving particulars.
- (b) The men under their command have every confidence in the rifle in their possession.
- (c) The rifle works well when delivering or repelling an attack when men are excited.

Although the questionnaire was marked "Strictly Confidential," two senior officers sent copies by "reliable messenger" to the Minister's Special Representative in London, one offered to furnish direct his personal experiences "if capital is to be made for this"; the other advised that the men's replies should not be considered, and feared that "action is being delayed too long as regards Alderson." The blow fell on the 28th May, when General Alderson, to his surprise and intense regret, was appointed Inspector-General of Canadian Forces in England. His successor, Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng, shared the common view of British officers that the subject was entirely a Canadian one and declined to enter into the discussion of a question already settled as far as the troops were concerned. The answers to the questionnaire were laid before the Commander-in-Chief, who thereupon wrote as follows to the War Office:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
BRITISH ARMY IN THE FIELD.
28th May, 1916.

SIR:—

I have the honour to inform you that I have satisfied myself, after extensive enquiries carried out throughout the Canadian Corps, that as a Service Rifle, the Ross is less trustworthy than the Lee-Enfield, and that the

majority of the men armed with the Ross rifle have not the confidence in it that is so essential they should possess. The enquiry on which these conclusions are based, was the outcome of an urgent application from a battalion of the 3rd Canadian Division for re-arming with the short Lee-Enfield, in consequence of a high percentage of jams experienced with their Ross rifles during a hostile attack on the 1st May, 1916.

2. I am accordingly of opinion that the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions should be re-armed with the short Lee-Enfield rifle. It will be remembered that the 1st Canadian Division was so re-armed on 12th June, 1915.

3. I am not in a position to effect this with the means at my disposal in France. I have the honour to enquire therefore, whether the necessary number of rifles can be supplied from home sources, without interfering with, or delaying the arrival and arming of the Divisions due from England and Egypt on which I am relying.

I have, etc.,
D. HAIG,
General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
British Armies in the Field.

The Canadian Government was duly informed, and the Duke of Connaught sent the following message:—

Secret June 6th. Following from Prime Minister for Chief of General Staff, War Office.

Begins: On account of rumoured dissatisfaction with Ross rifle I held a consultation on May 15th with General Hughes and sent unofficial message to Commander-in-Chief saying that we were prepared to Leave the matter to his judgment after making all necessary tests of both rifles under such conditions as are experienced at the front. We suggested that the men carrying out the tests should be of equal experience. The Ross rifle is the only arm we are at present equipped to produce in Canada and we believe it to be efficient if properly handled but are content to abide by the Commander-in-Chief's judgment after thorough investigations and adequate tests. We realize the absolute necessity of two conditions, viz. (1) that our men shall be armed with thoroughly efficient rifles, and (2) that their confidence in such rifles shall be unshaken. Please favour me with your judgment as to the proper course of action to take.

ARTHUR.

Two days later a Privy Council order was passed authorizing Br: General C. Greville-Harston, C.I.A.A. to proceed overseas to organize an Inspection and Repairs Department for small arms and machine guns in possession of the Canadian troops both in Britain and in France, and to report to the Minister of Militia and Defence directly, and also the M.G.O. (Canada). Simultaneously the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, through Sir Max Aitken and the Canadian Representative at G.H.Q. asked for information from Canadian Corps concerning the behaviour of the Ross rifle in the recent

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fighting. The call for report reached the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions while the Battle of Mount Sorrel was still in progress. Simultaneously, too, the Army Council asked the Commander-in-Chief for his opinion on the points raised in the Governor General's cable, and asked that, if the tests already carried out were not sufficient, further tests should be at once made in order that there might be no delay in dealing with the question.

There was no delay. As soon as the battle of Mount Sorrel was over the Corps Commander informed Second Army that the G.O. C., 2nd Canadian Division reported in favour of the Ross rifle. It was known to the troops that many of his regimental officers did not agree with the arguments advanced in favour of retaining the Ross, viz. that the experience of several units in close fighting showed that defects had been exaggerated, that jamming was due to bad ammunition, and that until the few remaining defects in the rifle itself were proved to be irremediable the Canadian troops should be loyal to the only weapon Canada was equipped to produce. The reports expressing the "definite and independent opinion" of 63 officers of the 2nd Canadian Division as forwarded to the Corps Commander on 5th May, 1916, in response to his demand of 2nd May, may be analysed as follows: 25 favourable, 13 undetermined, 25 adverse; every unit and formation of the 3rd Canadian Division reported adversely, particularly the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Br: General A. C. Macdonell, whose battalion commanders were clear and emphatic in stating that the Ross was a serious danger to the troops and that they absolutely lacked confidence in it. Sir Douglas Haig replied to the War Office as follows:—

SECRET.

From: The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

To: The Secretary,
War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
21st June, 1916.

SIR,

In reply to your letter No. 77/15/5307 (M.G.O.) of 10th June, 1916, forwarding copy of a telegram dated 6th June, from the Governor General of Canada, I have the honour to inform you that the efficiency of the Ross rifle has been thoroughly tested by actual fighting in the field, and the application conveyed in my O.B./174 of 28th May, 1916, was made after very careful consideration of all the evidence available.

2. I have again consulted the General Officer Commanding Second Army in case any fresh points have come to light during the recent heavy fighting by the Canadians near YPRES. He tells me that his experience of the working of the Ross rifle during the last fight has only

confirmed him in his opinion that the Canadians in the 3rd Division at all events, have lost confidence in their rifle and he recommends that the rifles in this Division be exchanged.

3. Although the reports from the 2nd Division are not to the same effect, I am of opinion that the Lee-Enfield rifle should be issued to all three Divisions of the Canadian Corps.

I must therefore adhere to my recommendation that the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions should be re-armed with the short Lee-Enfield, and I would urge that the necessary steps to give effect thereto be taken without delay.

I have, etc.,
D. HAIG,
General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
British Armies in France.

The decision of the Army Council was conveyed to the Governor General in the following cablegram:

Mr. BONAR Law to the Governor General.

LONDON, July 11, 1916.

With reference to my telegram June 10th. Report from General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in France has now been received by Army Council recommending that Second and Third Canadian Divisions should be re-armed with short Lee-Enfield rifles and Army Council have approved this. They hope to be able to utilize Ross rifles released and also those now in possession of Canadian troops in England for other purposes connected with the war but ask that no more Ross rifles should be brought to England. Army Council will be responsible for supplying necessary rifles to Canadian troops on arrival in England. If your Government desire to undertake manufacture of different rifles suitable for use during war, Army Council think that rifles now being produced in America for British Army on lines of Lee-Enfield Mark III but with improvements would be best.

Despatch follows by mail.

No objection to publication of all the above information after 15th July.

BONAR Law.

The correspondence was presented to both the British Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty later in the year. (Cd. 8429. Price *1d.*)

The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions were re-armed with Lee-Enfield rifles in August, 1916; the 4th Canadian Division, although handicapped by a great shortage of serviceable rifles, could not be re-armed until after arrival in France where the exchange was effected in September, 1916; the 5th Canadian Division, then in England, was issued with 300 S.M.L.E. per battalion in November and subsequently all Canadians in France carried the Lee-Enfield, except a few snipers who used the Ross as a marksman's rifle. The Ross rifles returned from France,

together with those in England, numbered about 100,000 and after 60,000 of these had been reconditioned by the 393 men employed in the Greenwich shops of the Canadian Arms Inspection and Repair Department, they were handed over to the British Government in exchange for the Lee-Enfield issued; the terms of exchange were, as pithily expressed by the Minister's Representative in a letter to the War Office, "a straight swap"; Lee Enfield rifles required in excess of Bosses available for exchange were paid for. These Canadian rifles were subsequently issued to *British* units not leaving England, and to the Royal Navy.

CANADA

The position in Canada is reflected in the decisions taken by the Militia Council in September, 1916, while the Minister was in England; that there should be a service rifle, of universal pattern for use throughout the Empire, and that the production of rifles for the Canadian Government should be in a federally owned plant, that the present contract with the Ross Rifle Company should be terminated "if same can be legally terminated," that arrangements should be made at -once for the production of the new Enfield pattern in place of the Ross Mk III and that approval should be given to the proposal to transfer 100,000 Enfield rifles as a loan to Canada from an existing British order in the United States.

The first of these decisions is an echo of the recommendation of the British Government in May, 1902. The acquisition of the factory by the Canadian Government had been proposed in December, 1915, it was effected when a Privy Council order authorizing expropriation was assented to on 23rd March, 1917. By that time only 16,170 of the 100,000 rifles contracted for by the Canadian Government on 17th February, 1916, had been delivered, whereas 96,000 should have been completed.

After *July*, 1916, when the shipment of Ross rifles to the Canadian forces in England ceased, strenuous efforts were made by the Department of Militia and Defence to find an outlet for the 100,000 surplus rifles; however in no instance did such efforts materialize, for the delegates of Allied Governments in London stated they did not require rifles of this type, and the suggestion that China might make use of them led to nothing. The United States purchased 20,000 Mk. II short pattern complete at \$12.50 each with bayonets and scabbards, and 4,629,470 rounds of ammunition in November, 1917, for training purposes.

On the British contract, dated 15th September, 1914, for 100,000 Mk. III rifles, there had been greater delay and to the expressed dissatisfaction of Mr. Lloyd George, who was

then Minister of Munitions, only 66,590 had been delivered; the contract was subsequently cancelled and the pattern was declared obsolete for the British service in November, 1921.

The manufacture of the new Enfield pattern instead of the Ross was projected in 1917, machinery was to be sent from Enfield, and five selected rifles, examined at Enfield, were received in January, 1917, and two of them were delivered to the Ross company as a sealed pattern and sealed sample. It was not proceeded with, however, as manufacturing drawings and specifications were not received until 11th April, 1917, after the expropriation of the factory, and so were not delivered to the company. The declaration of war at this time by the United States, coupled with the fact that sufficient LeeEnfield rifles for the Canadian forces could now be had in England and the probability that two years must elapse before completed rifles of the new pattern could be produced in Canada, led to the abandonment of the plan.

The settlement of the compensation to be paid on expropriation was complicated by the fact that \$15.06 per rifle had been paid to the company when the order for 100,000 rifles was placed in February, 1916; a total sum of \$1,728,680.76, inclusive of progress estimates, had been advanced to the company and it was difficult to appraise the value of the buildings, rifle parts, uncompleted rifles and materials on hand and on order. Under the direction of the Hon. Arthur Meighen, Solicitor General of Canada and representing the Crown, all contracts and engagements of the company were taken over by the Government, a financial adjustment was made, and the ill-conceived, burdensome and disadvantageous contract of 1902 was finally disposed of when the Ross Rifle Company accepted \$2,000,000 in settlement on 22nd January, 1920.

The Ross Factory became the Dominion Rifle Factory at noon 28th March, 1917, and for six months the assembly of unfinished rifles to the number of 9,890 was continued under the direction of the Master-General of the Ordnance, Br.-General H. M. Elliot. The Canada Gazette of 25th October announced that Hon. Colonel (temp. Colonel) Sir Charles Ross, relinquished his appointment as "Consulting Officer, Small Arms, Ammunition and Ballistics" as well as the temporary rank of Colonel, held by virtue of that appointment. By Order in Council passed in November the disposal of all surplus machinery and material, except that required for producing 100 rifles per day, was

authorized; and another order on 4th March, 1918, gave authorization for entirely dismantling the factory and disposing of all the machinery and material therein. From October, 1917, the buildings were for a time used as a barracks; meanwhile schemes were in hand for renting the factory to various companies manufacturing arms, and on 1st September, 1918, a lease was granted to the North American Arms Company, Limited, for 18 months at a rental of \$450,000; thereafter they were used to house the Ordnance Depot of Military District No. 5; finally in 1931 they were razed to the ground and the site was transformed into a municipal reservoir and public park.

The total number of Ross rifles purchased by the Canadian Government was 342,040; during the War 129,780 were in use overseas by the Canadian Expeditionary Force, of which 22,871 were returned to Canada and 95,674 were taken over by the British Government. The Ross was introduced as a military arm in 1906, for twelve years it was used by the Militia and found to be an excellent target rifle, on active service it was found to be defective either in design, material, manufacture or inspection, or all four; it was superseded in the Canadian Militia by the S.M.L.E. brought back from overseas after the war, and since 1927, primarily because of inherent defects in design which made it unsuitable as a service weapon, it has been held for emergency use only.

112

Evidence Taken Before The Public Accounts Committee During the Session 1915, pp. 484-485.

113

Evidence Taken Before The Public Accounts Committee During the Session 1915, page 483.

114

Royal Commission Concerning Purchase of War Supplies and Sale of Small Arms Ammunition. Evidence, Vol. 1, page 311.

115

Royal Commission Concerning Purchase of War Supplies and Sale of Small Arms Ammunition. Evidence, Vol. 1, page 316.

116

Debates House of Commons Session 1913,
p. 302. 26th January

Sir SAM HUGHES: The men were trained in marching, manoeuvring, and shooting. The men would fire five rounds in 40 seconds at the targets from five hundred yards, then they would run to the next range and fire five more rounds, and so on to the next range, and down to one hundred yards. The result was that when troops marched out, some of the regiments scored over seventy per cent of hits on these targets, and the lowest was fifty-two per cent of hits; whereas the average number of hits in the service of any other nation is about twenty per cent. When our boys marched away from Valcartier they were an army of free men, trained to handle a rifle as no men had ever handled it before.

117

*Telegram from War Office to Minister of
Militia and Defence*

LONDON, 25th August 1914.

Army Council desire to know name of officer selected to command Canadian Expeditionary Force.

TROOPERS.

118

*Telegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to Lord Kitchener, War Office*

OTTAWA, 25th August, 1914.

Concerning command Overseas Expeditionary Force before submitting names desire to know whether force will be maintained as a division or broken up into brigades.

HUGHES

(See 119)

119

*Telegram from the War Office to the Min-
ister of Militia and Defence*

LONDON, 26th August, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of 26th the Canadians will most probably be used as organized and be sent in a complete division.

TROOPERS

(See 118)

120

*Telegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to Lord Kitchener*

OTTAWA, 25th September, 1914.

You have not answered my inquiries concerning Officer for Command. We want one Commander, one General Staff Officer first grade and an Assistant-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General for Divisional Staff. I will be satisfied with your personal selection.

SAM HUGHES

121

*Debates House of Commons Special Session
1914, p. 56. 21st August*

Mr. SAM HUGHES: The hon. gentleman will observe by the Order in Council and by the reports from the other side, which I believe have been laid before the House, and published, that the British authorities have accepted the offer of assistance.

When we asked what the nature of that assistance should be, they stated they would like a division. We are simply preparing to send a division forward. We have nothing whatever to say as to the destination of the troops once they cross the water, nor have we been informed as to what their destination may be. A great many troops will always be required, not in the immediate fighting line but leading up to it, and I presume that in due time our boys will take their turn with the rest of them. We have no information on the subject whatever.

122

ORIGINAL PLAN OF D. OF S. AND T. FOR EMBARKATION OF FIRST CONTINGENT

17th Sept. 1914.

Unit	Ship	Numbers					Total	Horses
		Ofrs.	W.O's.	S. Sgts. & Sgts.	R. & F.			
Divisional H.Q. including Pay Office Details.....	LAPLAND..... SAXONIA.....	22		26	58	106	63	
Infantry Brigades (3)—								
1st Battalion.....	LAPLAND..... MANTOU.....	35	1	56	1040 3	1132 3		
2nd Battalion.....	RUTHENIA..... MANTOU.....	34 1	1	55 1	1039 4	1129 6		
3rd Battalion.....	TYROLIAN..... MANTOU.....	34 1	1	55 1	1039 4	1129 6		
4th Battalion.....	SCANDINAVIAN..... MANTOU.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
5th Battalion.....	CASSANDRA..... MANTOU.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
6th Battalion.....	TUNISIAN..... MANTOU.....	35	1	56	1040 3	1132 3		
7th Battalion.....	VIRGINIAN..... MANTOU.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
8th Battalion.....	LAURENTIC..... MANTOU.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
9th Battalion.....	MEGANTIC..... LAKONIA.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
10th Battalion.....	ANDANIA..... LAKONIA.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
11th Battalion.....	ALAUNIA..... LAKONIA.....	35	1	56	1039 4	1131 4		
12th Battalion (1).....	ALAUNIA..... LAKONIA.....	22	1	36	509 3	568 3		
12th Battalion (2).....	LAURENTIC.....	13		20	531	564		
P.P.C.L.I.....	ROYAL GEORGE..... MANTOU..... ATHENIA.....	32	1	55	1027 2 10	1115 2 10	34 56	
3rd Infantry Brigade Staff	CORINTHIAN.....	5		4	22	31		
2nd " " "	CASSANDRA.....	5		4	22	31		
1st " " "	LAPLAND.....	5		4	22	31		
1st & 2nd Infantry Bde.	MANTOU.....						558	
3rd Infantry Brigade.....	LAKONIA.....						273	
Divisional Cavalry.....	SAXONIA.....	6		10	161	177	191	
Divisional Artillery H.Q.....	ANDANIA..... ATHENIA.....	4		1	17	22	20	
1st Fd. Artillery Bde.....	ANDANIA..... MONTEZUMA.....	23 2	1	34 2	754 57	812 61	748	
2nd Fd. Artillery Bde.....	BERMUDIAN..... MOUNT ROYAL.....	23 2	1	34 2	773 38	831 42	748	
3rd Fd. Artillery Bde.....	IVERNIA..... MONTREAL.....	24 1	1	35 1	801 10	861 12	530 218	

ORIGINAL PLAN OF D. OF S. AND T. FOR EMBARKATION OF FIRST CONTINGENT

—Continued

17th Sept. 1914

Unit	Ship	Numbers					
		Ofrs.	W.O's.	S. Sgts. & Sgts.	R. & F.	Total	Horses
Hvy. Arty. Bty. & Amm. Col.	CORINTHIAN	6		9	192	207	
	MONTREAL				10	10	144
Div. Ammunition Column	CORINTHIAN	15	1	14	543	573	
	MONMOUTH	2		2	50	54	709
Div. Engineers H.Q.	VIRGINIAN	4		1	10	15	
	MONTEZUMA						8
1st Fd. Coy. C.E.	VIRGINIAN	6		8	220	234	
	MONTEZUMA				4	4	76
2nd Fd. Coy., C.E.	TUNISIAN	6		8	220	234	
	MONTEZUMA				4	4	76
Div. Sig. Coy.	CORINTHIAN	5		13	153	171	
	MONTEZUMA				5	5	80
Divisional Train	SAXONIA	27	4	34	380	445	
	MONTREAL	1		1	13	15	378
	SCANDINAVIAN				20	20	
Field Ambulance (3)	MEGANTIC	30	3	51	714	798	
	SAXONIA						210
1st Cavalry Regt., R.C.D.	GRAMPIAN	28	1	41	434	604	656
Horse Arty. Btys. (3) & H.Q.	ATHENIA	12		16	417	445	242
	SAXONIA						80
	MOUNT ROYAL			2	10	12	145
	LAKONIA						15
Div. Amm. Park (M.T.)	BERMUDIAN	2		5	109	116	
	ALAUZIA	5	1	9	340	355	
Clearing Hospital	LAPLAND	8	1	8	68	85	
	LAKONIA						8
Stationary Hospital (2)	LAPLAND	16	2	16	154	198	
	LAKONIA						6
General Hospital (2)	LAPLAND	128	4	26	256	414	
	LAKONIA						6
Div. Supply Col. (M.T.)	SAXONIA	5	1	8	256	270	
Reserve Park	ANDANIA	1		1	73	75	
	CORINTHIAN	1		1	59	61	
	LAURENTIC	4	1	3	122	130	
	LAKONIA	1		1	28	30	358
Rly. Supply Det.	BERMUDIAN	1		5	56	62	
Depot Units of Supplies	SCANDINAVIAN	2	2	4	20	28	
Auto Mach. Gun. Brigade	LAPLAND	9		4	110	123	
Cyclist Company	ATHENIA	4		5	102	111	
2nd Cav. Regiment, L.S.H.	SCANDINAVIAN	8		13	200	221	
	MONTREAL			1	18	19	121
	SICILIAN	20	1	27	249	297	535
	GRAMPIAN				67	67	

123

From The Quartermaster-General,
Canadian Militia.
To The High Commissioner Canada,
Gt. Victoria Street,
London, S.W., England.
OTTAWA, October 16, 1914.

Sir:

I have the honour to confirm my telegram of this date which read as follows:

Please inform Lt. Col. Strange that Militia Department supplied transports carrying troops with following equipment which he should take over:—
Bermudian—1,100 each, beds, bedding, messing kit and campstools. *Royal George*—100 life belts, 195 mattresses, 20 spring beds, pails and basins. *Royal Edward*—80 mattresses, 35 beds, pails and basins.

Caribbean—377 life belts, 700 sets mess equipment, beds, pillows, sheets, slips, blankets, 600 campstools.

Arcadian—500 life belts, 1,000 sets mess equipment, beds, pillows, sheets, slips, blankets, 900 camp stools. When done report to Colonel Smith, Judge-Advocate-General.

Ordnance.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
D. A. MACDONALD,
Major-General,
Quartermaster-General.

124

Telegram from War Office to the Minister of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 12th September, 1914.

995 Cipher. Escort can be ready Sept. 24th. Will Canadian Expeditionary Force be ready to sail on that date. Quebec, it is understood, is definitely settled as the port of embarkation. Arrangements can be made on the 19th for *Niobe* in command to escort slower ships with horses. Cable if the arrangements suit and whether horse ships will be also ready to sail on 24th of September, if not what date?

TsooPaas.

(See 125)

125

Telegram from Minister of Militia and Defence to War Office

OTTAWA, 12th September, 1914.

127 Cipher. Reference your 995, Sept. 12. Canadian Expeditionary Force will be ready to embark 27th September. Quebec is the port

of embarkation. Of the ten horse ships four could be ready to sail by the 21st September but the remainder not before 27th September.

HUGHES.

A note on the copy of the above in Militia Headquarters file reads: "Answer sent by direction of Sir Robert Borden."

(See 124)

126

Telegram from the War Office to the Minister of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 15th September, 1914.

1048 Cipher. Referring your cable of 13th* of September re voyage of Canadian Contingent, arrangements have been made by the Admiralty as follows—

H.M.S. *Niobe* with steamship *Canada* carrying 2/Lincoins will return from Bermuda to Halifax where the cruisers under Rear Admiral Wemyss will assemble in good time. The Admiral will arrange with the Canadian Minister of Militia direct as to the exact time and position his squadron will meet the convoy.

It is not intended that the four horse ships or the *Canada* shall proceed in advance of the main convoy. Naval authorities being advised have instructed in this sense.

Telegraph date of sailing and names of the transports with details by units which are embarked on each vessel.

TROOPERS.

* *Sic 12th; see 125.*

127

Extract from

"Memoranda (No. 1) respecting Work of the Department of Militia and Defence,

European War, 1914-15," p. 11

EQUIPMENT ISSUED FROM ORDNANCE STORES TO THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF ORDNANCE STORES, WOOLWICH ARSENAL, ENGLAND. (Sept. 1914.)

Subject	Number	Approximate cost
Guns and Carriages, Q.F., 18-pdr	42	\$336,000.00
Wagons, Ammunition, Q.F., 18-pdr	38	139,300.00
Cartridges, Q.F., 18-pdr., Shrapnel, foxed	5,865	64,515.00
Fuzes, T. & P. No. 80	19,205	57,615.00
B.L. 15-pdr. Shrapnel and Cartridges	5,000	22,500.00
Guns and Carriages, Q.F., 13-pdr	9	67,500.00
Wagons, Ammunition, Q.F., 13-pdr	18	63,000.00
Guns and Carriages, B.L., 60-pdr	6	120,000.00
6-inch Howitzer Lyddite Shell and Cartridges with fuzes	962	19,640.00
Fuzes, T. & P. No 62	2,000	5,000.00
Fuzes, D. A. with plug No. 3	1,675	1,256.00
Total		\$

NOTE—All Canadian orders placed in England prior to outbreak of war have been placed at the disposal of the War Office.

127a

GUNS AND HOWITZERS SUPPLIED FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE--TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

	GUNS						HOWITZERS					Total
	12-pdr.	13-pdr.	15-pdr.	18-pdr.	4-7"	60-pdr.	4-5"	5"	6"			
(1) Furnished by Canada for C.E.F.		12		70	4	4						90
(2) Supplied by War Office for C.E.F.				8				3				11
(3) Supplied by Canada to War Office.	5	9	8	42		6			4		4	78
OUTSTANDING CANADIAN ORDERS DIVERTED TO WAR OFFICE												
(a) Contracted for, in England, prior to 4th August, 1914.		12		48							45	105
(b) Contracted for, in England, November, 1914.		24		150		12						186

128

From
Director General of Embarkation.
To
Officer Commanding,
Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force.
*(Undated, but probably from
Quebec, 2nd October, 1914).*

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose detailed statements showing:—

- (a) Units on board the several steamships. *(Not reproduced: See App. 184.)*
- (b) Statement of Military Cargo, as to guns, wagons, material, etc. *(Not reproduced: See App. 184.)*

As explained to you prior to your embarkation, these details are necessarily incomplete for the following reasons: 1. Notwithstanding instructions contained in Camp Orders, commanding officers invariably neglected to furnish embarkation parade states, and in consequence, ships' masters were requisitioned to procure and forward information as to the units on board their respective ships. As you are aware, no staff was furnished from Valcartier Camp to carry out the embarkation of these forces, and while a few Officers were furnished from time to time, it was not possible, on account of the short notice given to those charged with the duties of embarkation, to organize a staff sufficient for these requirements. Particulars could not, in many cases, be obtained of the regimental baggage and equipment placed by the units on their respective ships, but wherever possible, the brigade transport wagons were placed on some of the vessels carrying units of each brigade.

Vessels arrived here from Montreal loaded with vehicles of different descriptions, and in no case was information furnished as to the contents, and in some cases, vessels arrived so loaded as to render it impossible to store guns and wagons belonging to their respective units.

Horse boats were furnished on which the accommodation for men was gauged by the agricultural requirements of one man to about twenty horses, so that it was impossible to adhere to the military regulations of one man to every four horses. This made, unavoidably, the placing of the "personnel" of mounted units and horses on different ships, and in this connection, such ships have been regarded as sister ships, having regard to the same berthing arrangements at the Port of Disembarkation.

The S.S. *Manhattan* which does not form part of the convoy, carries wagons belonging

to the A.M.C., Divisional Engineers and Ammunition Column, and includes 863 horses of which 25 have been drawn from the Remount Depot.

Particulars of this steamer will be sent you by later mail.

A duplicate of this letter is being sent.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

WM. PRICE,

Lieut.-Col.,

Director-General of Embarkation,

129

*Telegram from the War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*

LONDON, 1st September, 1914.

During temporary stay of contingent in England tents will be provided but camp kettles, water-proof sheets, blankets, picketing gear and other camp equipment should be taken if possible so as to be immediately available on arrival, as there is a shortage of these in England.

TROOPERS.

*Telegram from the War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*

LONDON, 19th September, 1914.

1115 Cipher. It is desirable that the camp equipment of each unit should be embarked on the same troopship as the unit, and should be so stowed that it could be disembarked with its unit.

TROOPERS.

*Telegram from the War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*

LONDON, 29th September, 1914.

1258 Cipher. Please cable details of number of officers, other ranks, guns, horses and weight of baggage of units embarked in each vessel conveying the Canadian Contingent. Also cable if you have arranged for camp equipment for each unit to be shipped in the same transport as its unit.

TROOPERS.

*Telegram from the War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*

LONDON, 5th October, 1914.

1352 Cipher. With reference to your telegram of October 5th. It is important that we should be informed at once which units had their camp equipment shipped with them.

TROOPERS.

*Telegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to the War Office*

OTTAWA, 9th October, 1914.

162 Cipher. Reference to my telegram of October 7th Field Ambulance horses apparently in *Manhattan* see my telegram 161. Engineers much over establishment especially in Officers. Cannot make certain but fear few units have camp equipment in same transports as themselves.

HUGHES.

130

Letter from A. J. Gorrie

QUEBEC, October 6th, 1914.

Lieut-Col. William Price,
Quebec.

Sir,

In connection with the Embarkation of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, I beg to report as follows:—

Shortly after noon Tuesday, 22nd of September, you requested me to assist you in loading of the ships, and I started to work at 7 A.M., on the morning of the 23rd and worked practically continuously until the last Transport sailed at 5.00 P.M., Thursday, 1st October.

When we took hold, chaos reigned supreme.

In the first place, no one had any idea of what was to be loaded on the vessels, and we had to exercise our own judgment in a great measure, taking into consideration the space in the holds of the vessels in port, and the advice we had of the available space in vessels arriving, which in nearly every instance was incorrect.

Take the *Laplant* for instance, she arrived here on the 16th September at 7 A.M., and so far as I can learn, not a pound of freight was put into her hold until we loaded the four 60-pr. guns and limbers on the 23rd of September. We also loaded in this boat in addition to the equipment in the shape of wagons, etc., belonging to the Contingent on board, the equipment as shown in my statement of cargoes in the different Transports. The *Laplant* was originally intended for the Headquarters Staff, etc., but as the Headquarters Staff were supposed to be the last to leave, another unit had to be loaded on this boat in order to get berthing accommodation for other transports arriving.

It was not until Saturday, 26th September, that we were advised of the ammunition that was to be shipped, and as most of this ammunition had been in Shed No. 25 several days previous to loading the guns and limbers, and other articles taking up a great deal of

unnecessary space which could have been used to excellent advantage, and thus have saved considerable delay in shipping same on the *Manhattan* after all the transports had gone.

It must not be forgotten that all guns and limbers were shipped with the wheels on the axles, and anyone who knows anything at all can have an idea of the amount of unnecessary space that was occupied on this account, and had we had the ammunition to . put between the guns when being loaded you can imagine the amount of space we could have saved.

Take the *Saxonia*; she arrived on the 15th of September.

We commenced loading her on the 23rd and she was only finished at noon on the 27th. She, took Col. _____'s Artillery Brigade, and the handling of same was done in a most incompetent manner. My instructions were to ship on this boat 21 18-pr. guns and limbers for the D.E.O.S., Woolwich, and approximately 400 tons of 18-pr. ammunition. We hauled a number of the guns to the shed where the *Saxonia* was located, No. 19, in addition to 50 or 60 tons of 18-pr. ammunition, and discontinued hauling any more as we found this vessel could take no more than the outfit belonging to Col. Morrison's Brigade. She only took in addition one 18-pr. gun and limber, and 25 cases of 18-pr. ammunition, with the result that the guns and limbers had to be moved to shed No. 25, and loaded on the *Franconia* and the ammunition was loaded on the *Royal Edward* which arrived at the last moment, and as far as I can find out, no one knew this boat was to be used as a Transport. In fact several transports left the harbour short of their full complement of troops on account of this boat being used.

Again take the *Athenia*. This transport took the R.C.H.A., Col. Panet, and I must congratulate Col. Panet for the able assistance he gave me in the loading and stowing of this vessel.

His efforts were indefatigable, with the result that in addition to all the equipment of guns, limbers and ammunition wagons, we were able to stow in the hold of this transport the amount as shown on my statement of contents.

Again, take the *Grampian*. My instructions were that this transport was to take 42 18-pr. Guns and 6 60-pr. guns, while all we were actually able to get into her hold was baggage and transport wagons of the unit loaded on the transport.

Again, take the *Laurentic*. After all the equipment was supposed to be loaded on the vessel, we loaded four Gramm Motor Trucks

and Trailers, and half of the wagons belonging to the Divisional Ammunition Column and their contents.

Then we had the *Bermudian*, which was shown to have a capacity of 1,100 troops. The 8th Battalion was loaded on this boat along with their wagons and baggage, and on account of insufficient accommodation they had to be transferred to another transport.

We only received Col. Morin's list of stores to be shipped after half the transports had sailed. No advice was given us of so many rounds of ammunition having to be placed on each transport until half of them had left the wharves, with the result that the ammunition had to be sent down the river to them by tugs.

The raves or covers of the Hospital wagons had all to be taken off and loaded separately in the holds of the vessels, but in some cases the covers were built permanently on the wagons, and could not be taken off, and those had to be loaded on the deck of the *Manhattan*.

I would also call your attention to the fact that there was great scarcity of skilled labour for the stevedoring of the vessels, resulting in our having to work the same men continuously, but this was to a certain extent overcome by fatigue parties obtained from the different corps on board the transports.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Yours respectfully,

A. J. GORRIE.

131

Report of Chief Embarkation Officer

QUEBEC, 10th October, 1914.

From the Chief Embarkation Officer,

Quebec.

To the Secretary Militia Council,

Ottawa.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report for the information of the Honourable the Minister, covering the embarkation of the First Contingent Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force.

On the morning of Monday, 21st September, I received orders to proceed to Valcartier Camp to meet the Premier, Sir Robert Borden, and the Honourable the Minister of Militia and at a meeting at the Minister's Headquarter's, at which were present Sir Robert Borden, the Minister of Militia, Hon. R. Rogers, the Camp Commandant and other officers, it was decided to send all effective men in camp, approximately 31,200 all ranks

and 7,500 horses. It was also decided that the force should sail on the date already fixed (viz. 27th inst. or following day at latest).

In this connection the following telegram was sent

Commander Lindsay at Montreal:—

To Capt. Lindsay,

Montreal.

Decided this morning to send all effective men in Camp. Total force for which transport required will number thirty-one thousand two hundred (31,200) approximately and 7,500 horses.

Please make careful estimate for purpose of determining how many additional ships will be required. Utilize transports already engaged to greatest extent possible consistent with health and safety of men and horses. Hammocks may be used. Engage if possible additional transport required on same terms as those already engaged. **It is** absolutely essential that force shall sail on date already fixed or following day at latest. Please reply confirming receipt and stating prospects. You are authorized to take all necessary steps to accomplish this without reference to Headquarters or to previous schedule.

SAM HUGHES.

I was instructed to see that these orders were carried out and to take charge of the embarkation and during the evening communicated by telephone with Commander Lindsay and repeated instructions.

On Tuesday, 22nd September, I requisitioned on Valcartier Camp Staff for assistance and beyond obtaining the services of Major F. Homer Dixon and Major H. F. Hughes was unable to secure the services of experienced officers. No provision had been made for an Embarkation Staff. For a task of this magnitude there was an entire absence in Camp of any information as to the transports chartered, allotment of units, etc., and apparently the embarkation of this force was considered a matter of little importance and of much ease.

My Staff at the commencement of embarkation consisted of Lt.-Col. J. G. Langton, C.A.S.C., Major F. Homer Dixon, Major H. T. Hughes and Captain J. A. Murray, Harbor Master, without a staff clerk none being available from Camp, and while an organization had to be improvised immediately, it will readily be understood that such an organization must naturally be defective and many essential points be either entirely overlooked or incomplete in execution.

Arrangements had to be made hurriedly for the movement of troops, and their apportionment to the transports then in harbour, the establishment of a rendezvous camp, the

closing of the docks to the public and placing the area under military control, issuing passes only to those authorized, etc., and I made the following disposition of the officers available and at my service:

I appointed Lt. Col. J. G. Langton, Assistant Director of Embarkation, charged with the arrangements for movement of troops from Camp, working in conjunction with Lt. Col. Gordon-Hall, the regulating of their movements en route, and arrival in Quebec, and the apportionment of the same to the different transports as the arrival of same are advised.

Major Dixon was charged with the duties of Chief Military Embarkation Officer, embracing the collection of embarkation parade states, and lists of guns, wagons, etc., loaded in each ship.

Major Hughes was specially employed to aid Major Dixon and see that proper order was kept on the docks, etc.

Having regard to Para. 1284 S.R. & O. application was made to Camp for the services of Major Butcher to act as Provost Marshal, but was informed that he could not be spared until musketry returns were complete. This officer reported for duty Thursday evening.

Captain J. A. Murray, as Harbour Master, was charged with the duties of regulating the arrival and departure of transports, and inspecting the same and combining his duties of Harbour Master with those of a Naval Embarkation Officer.

On Tuesday evening a Company of the 12th Battalion was placed in charge of the docks, and the public excluded. As a later precaution all telegraph and telephone wires were disconnected.

The following transports were in port on the evening of 22nd September viz:

Sazonia arrived 15th September 9.00 a.m.

Ivernia arrived 15th September 10.00 a.m.

Lapland arrived 16th September 7.00 p.m.

Sicilian arrived 22nd September 8.00 p.m.

Montezuma arrived 22nd September 9.00 p.m.

Arrangements were made whereby the use of the Exhibition Grounds and Buildings were secured from the Mayor and Corporation of the City of Quebec, and Major A. G. O. Roy, R.C.A. was appointed Camp Commandant, it being deemed necessary to establish a rendezvous camp at this point and instruct all Mounted Units and Transport Trains to report there for further orders.

This Camp was established so as to prevent congestion on the Docks, but as will be seen by the report of the Rendezvous Camp Commandant, the orders were disregarded by the 1st and 2nd Artillery Brigades, with the result that the docks were needlessly congested and serious delay ensued.

Both *Sazonia* and *Ivernia* were delayed by the Contractors engaged in fitting stalls, their defence being that their men would not work after 6 p.m.

Representations having been made by shipping interests that there would be difficulty in loading horses at Quebec precautions were taken as to number ordered for embarking, but beyond a couple of hours lost at times of high and low tide no difficulty was experienced in this respect.

As no schedule or other information had been received up to Wednesday, 23rd inst., I instructed Lt.-Col. Langton to co-operate with Lt.-Col. Gordon-Hall on a new schedule.

Additional troops being required for protection purposes another Company of 12th Battalion was requisitioned.

The docks and approaches were congested through failure of 1st and 2nd Artillery Brigades to carry out instructions to await at Rendezvous Camp for orders, and while the C.O.'s return-portsions of their Commands, needless delay and confusion was caused. (*Sic.*)

I appointed Mr. A. J. Gorrie to take charge of loading guns, wagons, etc., and in these duties he was ably assisted by Mr. McCarthy, who volunteered his services during his spare time.

The Rendezvous Camp was opened at the Exhibition Grounds and a supply of forage and rations sent out by Lt.-Col. Dodge, A.D. of S. & T. 5th Division.

Staff Sergt. H. J. Middleton, C.M.S.C. 2nd Division arrived from Toronto as Staff Clerk to Lt.-Col. Langton, but being the only staff clerk obtainable his services were requisitioned by the whole of the Staff, and his duties were well and ably performed.

Mr. Thorn joined Mr. A. J. Gorrie as assistant on Thursday, 24th inst., and on evening of same date Major Butcher reported and was assigned duty as Provost Marshal. These duties, while onerous, were exceedingly well performed.

The embarkation of the Infantry commenced on Friday 25th September, the troops being moved from Camp by train, and detrained at the Breakwater, the baggage cars being spotted opposite the transport of each unit.

On Friday and Saturday, in response to request for assistance some seven officers were detailed from Divisional Staff, and while the duties assigned to Lt. Col. Rattray, Lt. Col. Reid, Capt. Brown and Capt. Weeks were very satisfactorily performed no material assistance was secured from the remainder.

The embarkation proceeded without any undue delay and by 5.30 p.m. Thursday, 1st October, the last transport, viz. as *Arcadian*, left the dock.

The embarkation of the horses was, as previously noted, accomplished without any difficulty and with the exception of the loading of the *Saxonia* and *Grampian* speedily and without confusion.

I would note the admirable manner in which the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery embarked their horses, guns, etc. Nothing could have been smarter, and the officers took a keen interest in their duties, looking after their men and the shipment of baggage, guns, etc. Some of the infantry battalions deserve great credit for the very smart way in which they embarked, but I regret to say that in some units the Officers were careless and neglected to look after their baggage, etc.

Owing to the number of motor lorries that were loaded in some of the ships at Montreal the available space on some was not sufficient to take the wagons of the units embarked thereon and accordingly had to be loaded on other ships. A letter from Mr. Gorrie (*see App. 130*) accompanying this report will explain this more fully, but I would note that Capt. Lindsay is in no way to blame for this.

Practically no serious delay occurred in the loading of any of the transports and had all been here on Sunday, the 27th, they could have got away on the 28th. The delay was caused by the late arrival of certain ships, especially the *Caribbean* and the *Arcadian*, the latter not being ready to take cargo on arrival, having to take coal, etc.

I desire to draw attention to the following: In many cases no attention was paid to Camp Orders requiring Parade States to be furnished prior to embarkation, the result being that no complete return could be obtained and recourse had to be made to Ships Masters reports, which did not always give detail of each unit on board, but totals only.

Owing to lack of care on part of some C.O's mounted units reached here without rations for man or horse. Local arrangements had to be made, accounts for which will be submitted in due course.

The regulations regarding policing gangways were not observed in many cases, not only were too many allowed on shore when the transports were lying at the docks, but after the transports pulled out and anchored in the river a great number of Officers were allowed ashore and in several instances Officers and men were unable to rejoin their ships and were given transport on another vessel.

Very excellent work was done by the Boy Scouts of Quebec, who acted as orderlies throughout the embarkation. Their work was well done and of material assistance.

Complaints were received from units with regard to the small number of men for whom accommodation was provided on horse boats,

and fears were expressed that horses would suffer from lack of attention. It must be admitted that there were not enough men for the number of horses and while every effort was made to arrange more accommodation much dissatisfaction was caused. The Military regulations were apparently overlooked and it was not possible to remedy the defect.

In conclusion I would like to express my appreciation of the services of Col. Langton, whose unremitting labour and excellent work are beyond all praise. I cannot sufficiently recommend him. To Col. Gordon-Hall I am particularly indebted for the valuable aid which he gave so ungrudgingly and his experience was of the greatest use. I may say Col. Gordon-Hall put himself out in doing what he did, as it was in addition to his duties at Camp, and I feel sure that without him we could not have pulled through so successfully. Great credit is due to Mr. Gorrie, Major Clarke, and their assistants, for their splendid work, and also to Capt. Murray, who ably fulfilled his duties.

Captain Lindsay rendered invaluable services in connection with the chartering and examination of the transports and ably superintended the loading of such cargo as was taken by transports in Montreal. Much of Capt. Lindsay's work was done under exceptional difficulties and speaking as one who knows something of this work I consider he is deserving of great praise for the way in which he has filled his duties.

The agents and employees of the shipping companies vied with each other in doing their utmost to facilitate embarkation and helped in every way possible, and great credit is due to them for their invaluable work.

Most of my staff were obliged to leave before the end of the embarkation, which left us so reduced in number that we were unable to have full information prepared until the commencement of this week.

A statement of detail of units and cargo on board each transport was sent to you by Major Clark and I now enclose the following reports:—

- (a) From Camp Commandant, Rendezvous Camp. (*Not reproduced.*)
- (b) From A. J. Gorrie, as to loading of ships, etc. (*See App. 130.*)
- (c) Ship Masters' reports. (*Not reproduced.*)
- (d) Report of arrival and departure of each ship. (*Not reproduced.*)

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient servant,

WM. PRICE,
Lt: Col.,
Chief Embarkation Officer.
(*See* 134)

132

TRANSPORT OF CANADIAN CONVOY

Order of "Ready to sail"	Ship, and year built	Steamship Line	Tonnage	Speed	Crew	Troops			Horses	Guns	Vehicles	
						Off.	O.R.	Total			Motor	Horsed
1	LAKONIA.....(1899)	Donaldson.....	4,686	11	47	5	49	54	641	Nil.....	12	17
2	SICILIAN.....(1899)	Allan.....	7,328	12	153	9	332	341	518	Nil.....	5	74
3	MONTEZUMA....(1899)	C.P.R.....	8,360	12	97	9	145	154	976	Nil.....		99
4	IVERNIA.....(1900)	Cunard.....	14,278	14	233	30	887	917	634	18 18-pdr. 4 60-pdr.		78
5	TUNISIAN.....(1900)	Allan.....	10,576	15	274	60	1,352	1,412		Nil.....		1
6	LAURENTIC....(1908)	White Star....	14,892	18	335	83	1,733	1,816		Nil.....		19
7	CASSANDRA....(1906)	Donaldson.....	8,135	13	148	48	1,153	1,199		Nil.....		71
8	TYROLIA.....(1900)	C.P.R.....	7,535	13	160	44	1,121	1,165		Nil.....		
9	MONTREAL....(1900)	C.P.R.....	8,644	12	103	6	86	92	815	Nil.....		
10	ALAUNIA.....(1913)	Cunard.....	13,405	15	321	101	1,961	2,062	19	Nil.....		40
11	SAKONIA.....(1900)	Cunard.....	14,297	14	283	27	836	863	633	19 18-pdr.		91
12	GRAMPIAN....(1907)	Allan.....	10,946	15	89	22	612	634	660	Nil.....	16	153
13	VIRGINIAN....(1905)	Allan.....	10,757	17	334	71	1,323	1,394		Nil.....		
14	MANITOU.....(1898)	Atlantic Trans- port.	6,849	12	87	9	163	172	634	7 18-pdr.	12	12
15	MONMOUTH....(1900)	C.P.R.....	4,075	11	50	6	52	58	646	Nil.....		
16	ANDANIA.....(1913)	Cunard.....	13,405	15	296	80	1,800	1,880		Nil.....	4	13
17	LAPLAND.....(1908)	Red Star.....	18,694	17	379	95	2,233	2,328		2 60-pdr.. 41 18-pdr. 9 13-pdr.		23
18	SCANDINAVIAN.(1898)	Allan.....	12,099	15	156	68	1,209	1,277		Nil.....		31
19	CORINTHIAN... (1900)	Allan.....	7,332	12	141	22	365	387	298	4 60-pdr.	20	14
20	ROYAL GEORGE(1907)	Cdn. Northern	11,146	18	356	36	1,139	1,175	11	Nil.....		9
21	BERMUDIAN....(1904)	Canada.....	5,530	17	338	29	533	562		Nil.....		38

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TRANSPORT OF CANADIAN CONVOY

Small arms and ammunition	Military cargo	Ready to sail (Quebec)	General cargo	Date of Disembarkation (Plymouth)	
17 cases rifles; 2 boxes S.A.A.		24th Sept.	Wheat, flour, grain, lumber.	17th Oct.	1
21 boxes S.A.A.		4.00 p.m. 24th Sept.	Grain, lumber.....	18th Oct.	2
		7.30 p.m. 24th Sept.	6,600 sacks flour; hay, oats, straw.		3
17 boxes S.A.A.; 1,940 rds. 18-pdr. (Shrap.)	123 cases Artillery and Ordnance stores.	5.30 a.m. 26th Sept.	Nil.....	20th Oct....	4
		5.45 a.m. 26th Sept.	37,086 sacks flour...	19th Oct....	5
		6.00 a.m. 26th Sept.	15,209 sacks flour; lumber.	17-18th Oct..	6
90 cases rifles; 81 boxes S.A.A.	118 boxes saddlery.	8.40 a.m. 26th Sept.	Wheat, barley, flour.	25th Oct....	7
		26th Sept.	Grain.....	23rd Oct....	8
	Stores and equipment.	9.20 a.m. 26th Sept.	Grain, wheat, flour, lumber.	15th Oct....	9
88 boxes S.A.A.	40 tons baggage..	6.15 a.m. 27th Sept.	2,000 tons grain, 50 tons lumber.	15th Oct....	10
3 boxes S.A.A.; 100 rds. 18-pdr.		1.00 p.m. 27th Sept.	1,000 tons coal.....	17th Oct.	11
54 boxes S.A.A.		11.45 a.m. 28th Sept.	General.....	20th Oct....	12
48 boxes S.A.A., and other ammunition, details not known.	16 car loads medical stores and equipment.	4.45 p.m. 28th Sept.	130 sacks flour; lumber.	16th Oct....	13
23 boxes S.A.A.; 9,192 rds. 18-pdr.; 360 boxes 13-pdr. fuses.	Stores and equipment.	6.20 p.m. 28th Sept.	Grain, flour, cheese, lumber.		14
20 boxes S.A.A.		8.00 a.m. 29th Sept.	1,886 sacks flour; grain, lumber.	16th Oct....	15
115 cases rifles; 45 boxes S.A.A.		12.30 p.m. 29th Sept.	1,700 tons grain, 227 tons cheese, 50 tons lumber.	17-19th Oct..	16
61 cases rifles; 600 boxes S.A.A.	463 packages Cdn. Red Cross Society's stores.	1.20 p.m. 29th Sept.	13,550 sacks flour...	20th Oct....	17
89 cases rifles; 45 boxes S.A.A.		6.30 p.m. 29th Sept.	21,109 sacks flour....	19th Oct....	18
20 Colt M.G.'s; 360 boxes S.A.A.; 258 rds. and 243 cases 60-pdr.		6.45 a.m. 30th Sept.	Grain, cheese, lumber	20th Oct....	19
1,000 boxes S.A.A.		2.00 p.m. 30th Sept. (Levis).	5,602 sacks flour.....	17th Oct.	20
300 boxes S.A.A.; 3,120 rds. 18-pdr.; 125 cases 18-pdr. fuses.		3.45 p.m. 30th Sept.	Nil.....	16th Oct. ...	21

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TRANSPORT OF CANADIAN CONVOY—Continued

Order of "Ready to sail"	Ship, and year built	Steamship Line	Tonnage	Speed	Crew	Troops			Horses	Guns	Vehicles	
						Off.	O.R.	Total			Motor	Horsed
22	RUTHENIA.....(1900)	C.P.R.....	7,394	13	150	79	807	886	5 18-pdr.	5	46
						(Includes 3 Off., 103 O.R. British Reservists.)						
23	ATHENIA.....(1904)	Donaldson.....	8,668	14	148	24	529	553	331	12 13-pdr.	23	29
24	SOOTIAN.....(1898)	Allan.....	10,322	15	266	63	1,246	1,309	Nil.....		41
25	MEGANTIC.....(1909)	White Star.....	14,878	17	344	90	1,863	1,953	Nil.....	4	38
26	ROYAL EDWARD(1908)	Cdn. Northern	11,117	18	357	51	1,146	1,197	Nil.....		18
27	FRANCONIA.....(1911)	Cunard.....	18,150	17	333	218	2,092	2,310	Nil.....		
28	ZEEFLAND.....(1901)	Internat. Nav.	11,905	15	311	82	1,495	1,577	6 18-pdr.		91
29	ARCADIAN.....(1899)	R.M.S.P.....	8,939	15	237	50	551	601	Nil.....		4
30	CARIBBEAN.....(1890)	R.M.S.P.....	5,824	14	89	33	349	382	Nil.....		17
31	CANADA.....(1896)	Dominion.....	9,415	15	185	30	1,039	1,069	(Carried 2nd Bn. Lin voy at Gaspé Bay.)		
32	FLOREEL.....(1909)	N.Y., Nfld., & Halifax Com- pany.	3,081	14	148	20	519	539	(Carried Newfound		
		TOTAL CONVOY	322,662	6,948	1,598	30,720	32,318	6,816	127		101 1,057
33	MANHATTAN....(1898)	National S.S. Co. (Sailed independently, Quebec- Southampton)	8,094	10½	63	3	9	12	863	Nil.....	90	130
		GRAND TOTAL.	330,666	7,011	1,601	30,729	32,330	7,679	127	191	1,187

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TRANSPORT OF CANADIAN CONVOY—*Concluded*

Small arms and ammunition	Military cargo	Ready to sail (Quebec)	General cargo	Date of Disembarkation (Plymouth)	
18 boxes S.A.A.....		4.30 p.m. 30th Sept.	7,916 sacks flour; lumber, wheat.	21st Oct.....	22
500 cases rifles; 2 boxes S.A.A.; 25,896 rds. 18-pdr. (Shrap.); 8,828 rds. 13-pdr.; 1,291 cases 18-pdr. fuses; 361 boxes 13-pdr. fuses.	1 aeroplane, 72 cases harness and stores.	5.00 p.m. 30th Sept.	Grain, flour, forage...	17th Oct.....	23
41 boxes S.A.A.....		8.00 p.m. 30th Sept.	22,708 sacks flour; grain, cheese, lumber, silver.	22nd Oct.....	24
112 boxes S.A.A.....		10.30 p.m. 30th Sept.	Grain, cheese, lumber.	16th Oct.....	25
2,340 rds. 18-pdr.....	Engineer stores and equipment.	11.59 p.m. 30th Sept.	3,479 sacks flour.....	18th Oct..... (Avonmouth)	26
2,510 boxes S.A.A.; 2,436 rds. 18-pdr.	Saddlery and 425 cases hospital supplies.	12.50 a.m. 1st Oct.	Grain.....	15-16th Oct..	27
2,124 boxes S.A.A.; 1,000 rds 18-pdr.; 1,726 60-pdr. (Shrap.) 699 cases 60 pdr.; 41 boxes 60-pdr. fuses.	Stores (details not known).	6.15 a.m. 1st Oct.	Nil.....	19th Oct.....	28
4 Maxim M.G'S; 50 boxes S.A.A.; 2,453 rds. 18-pdr.; 288 boxes 18-pdr. fuses.	31 cases harness, hospital stores etc.	5.30 p.m. 1st Oct.	Nil.....	15th Oct.....	29
11 cases rifles; 20 boxes S.A.A.	Ordnance and regimental stores. 1st Oct.	Nil.....	16th Oct.....	30
coin Regt. from Bermuda. Left Halifax 26th Sept., joined con-			Bacon, ham, cheese..		31
land contingent. Joined convoy off Cape Race 11.00 a.m. 5th Oct.)			Nil.....		32
4,162 boxes S.A.A.; 13,796 rds. 18-pdr.; 1,802 rds. 60-pdr.; 576 cases 60-pdr.; 1,553 boxes 18-pdr. fuses; 44 boxes 60-pdr. fuses.	565 bundles wagon parts; 3,554 cases, cans, bundles and bales of stores and equipment.	8.00 p.m. 5th Oct.	4,512 tons miscellaneous.	22nd Oct..... (Southampton).	33

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FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT—DETAIL OF UNITS IN VESSELS

Unit	Vessel	Personnel		
		Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Contingent Headquarters.....	FRANCONIA.....	31	56	87
“ “	CORINTHIAN.....	1	25	26
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....	LAURENTIC.....	29	492	521
“ “	LAKONIA.....	5	49	54
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.).....	BERMUDIEN.....	26	523	549
“ “	MONMOUTH.....	6	48	54
Royal Cdn. Horse Arty.:—				
Headquarters.....	ATHENIA.....	4	14	18
A Battery.....	“	7	235	242
B “	“	3	189	192
B “	MANITOU.....	2	42	44
Divisional Mounted Troops:—				
Cavalry Squadron.....	ARCADIAN.....	7	152	159
“ “	MONTREAL.....	2	19	21
Cyclist Company.....	RUTHENIA.....	5	78	83
Artillery:—				
Div. Artillery H.Q.....	FRANCONIA.....	4	23	27
“ “	CORINTHIAN.....	1	1	2
1st Brigade C.F.A.:—				
Headquarters.....	SAXONIA.....	6	31	37
1st Battery.....	“	6	236	242
2nd “	“	6	213	219
3rd “	“	6	218	224
Ammunition Column.....	“	3	140	143
“ “	MANITOU.....	1	16	17
“ “	SICILIAN.....	1	15	16
2nd Brigade C.F.A.—				
Headquarters.....	IVERNIA.....	7	42	49
4th Battery.....	“	6	190	196
5th “	“	5	199	204
6th “	“	6	190	196
Ammunition Column.....	“	4	198	202
Details.....	SICILIAN.....	1	27	28
3rd Brigade C.F.A.:—				
Headquarters.....	GRAMPIAN.....	6	39	45
7th Battery.....	“	5	182	187
7th “	MANITOU.....			
8th “	GRAMPIAN.....	5	191	196
8th “	ZEELAND.....			
9th “	GRAMPIAN.....	5	175	180
9th “	CARIBBEAN.....	1	20	21
9th “	RUTHENIA.....			
9th “	MANITOU.....			
Ammunition Column.....	CARIBBEAN.....	4	140	144
“ “	GRAMPIAN.....	1	20	21
“ “	IVERNIA.....	2	68	70
Heavy Battery and Ammunition Column.....	CORINTHIAN.....	10	205	215
Divisional Ammunition Column.....	MEGANTIC.....	24	442	466
“ “	MONTEZUMA.....	7	118	125
Divisional Engineers:—				
Headquarters.....				
1st Field Company.....	ZEELAND.....	29	376	405
2nd “				
3rd “	ARCADIAN.....	9	328	337
Headquarters.....	MONMOUTH.....			

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FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT—DETAIL OF UNITS IN VESSELS

Horses	Guns	Vehicles			Remarks
		Motor	Horsed	Bicycles	
72					4 motor cars in ANDANIA.
641			17		
606			13		
10					
249	6—13 pdr.		15		
69	6—13 pdr.		14		
179					
			4		
190					Bicycles in ZEELAND.
22			2		
41			6	1	
175	6—18 pdr.		17	1	
174	6—18 pdr.		16	1	
176	6—18 pdr.		17	1	
67			35	1	
47			12		
61					
40			4		
150	6—18 pdr.		15		
150	6—18 pdr.		15		
150	6—18 pdr.		15		
144			29		
100					
40			3		
176			2		12 vehicles in SCANDINAVIAN.
	6—18 pdr.		12		
175					
	6—18 pdr.		14		
177			1		
			12		
	5—18 pdr.				
	1—18 pdr.			1	26 vehicles in RUTHENIA; 6 in ZEELAND.
88			2		Balance of horses in MANHATTAN.
148	4—60 pdr.		12	1	
688			99		10 vehicles in CASSANDRA.
					Horses in MANHATTAN, less 17 in MONMOUTH.
17					Vehicles, 39 in MANHATTAN.

FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT—DETAIL OF UNITS IN VESSELS—Continued

Unit	Vessel	Personnel		
		Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Divisional Signal Company.....	ANDANIA.....	10	160	170
“ “ “.....	CORINTHIAN.....	1	20	21
“ “ “.....	MEGANTIC.....	1	25	26
“ “ “.....	ALAUNIA.....	1	9	10
“ “ “.....	ARCADIAN.....	9	9
“ “ “.....	ATHENIA.....	8	8
“ “ “.....	FRANCONIA.....	1	5	6
“ “ “.....	MANITOU.....	4	4
“ “ “.....	MONMOUTH.....	4	4
“ “ “.....	MONTREAL.....	4	4
“ “ “.....	SICILIAN.....	4	4
1st Canadian Infy. Bde.:—				
Headquarters.....	TUNISIAN.....	7	25	32
1st Battalion.....	LAURENTIC.....	45	1,121	1,166
2nd “.....	CASSANDRA.....	44	1,083	1,127
3rd “.....	TUNISIAN.....	42	1,123	1,165
4th “.....	TYROLIA.....	44	1,121	1,165
1st C.I. Bde. Transport.....	MONTEZUMA.....	1	27	28
2nd Canadian Infy. Bde.:—				
Headquarters.....	LAPLAND.....	6	20	26
5th Battalion.....	“.....	44	1,094	1,138
6th “.....	“.....	45	1,119	1,164
7th “.....	VIRGINIAN.....	49	1,083	1,132
8th “.....	FRANCONIA.....	47	1,106	1,153
8th “.....	BERMUDIEN.....	8	8
2nd C.I. Bde. Transport.....	MANITOU.....	5	83	88
3rd Canadian Infy. Bde.:—				
Headquarters.....	ALAUNIA.....	5	16	21
13th Battalion.....	“.....	45	1,110	1,155
14th “.....	“.....	26	572	598
14th “.....	ANDANIA.....	20	529	549
15th “.....	MEGANTIC.....	46	1,109	1,155
16th “.....	ANDANIA.....	47	1,111	1,158
3rd C.I. Bde. Transport.....	MONTREAL.....	2	26	28
4th Canadian Infy. Bde.:—				
Headquarters.....	ROYAL EDWARD.....	6	12	18
9th Battalion.....	ZEBLAND.....	49	1,118	1,167
10th “.....	SCANDINAVIAN.....	43	1,051	1,094
11th “.....	ROYAL EDWARD.....	45	1,134	1,179
12th “.....	SCOTIAN.....	54	1,156	1,210
4th C.I. Bde. Transport.....	CARIBBEAN.....	1	45	46
4th “.....	MANITOU.....
17th Battalion.....	RUTHENIA.....	44	624	668
P.P.C.L.I.....	ROYAL GEORGE.....	33	1,054	1,087
“.....	MANITOU.....	1	15	16
Automobile M.M.G. Bde.....	CORINTHIAN.....	9	114	123
Divisional Train.....	ALAUNIA.....	24	254	278
“ “.....	VIRGINIAN.....	2	149	151
“ “.....	MONTREAL.....	2	37	39
Divisional Supply Column.....	FRANCONIA.....	7	258	265
Depot Unit of Supply.....	“.....	1	14	15
C.A.S.C. Details.....	ROYAL GEORGE.....	3	85	88
Reserve Park.....	SICILIAN.....	7	286	293

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FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT—DETAIL OF UNITS IN VESSELS—*Continued*

Horses	Guns	Vehicles			Remarks
		Motor	Horsed	Bicycles	
56					10 vehicles in ZEELAND.
23					
			19		1 wagon in CASSANDRA.
			9		
			1		1 wagon in CASSANDRA.
288					
			1	1	
			12	9	
			10	8	3 vehicles in ZEELAND, 12 in MANHATTAN.
			15		
288					
10			4	1	
9			15	9	
			11		
				9	
267			13	9	
			2		4 vehicles in SCOTIAN.
			9		1 vehicle in CARIBBEAN.
					8 vehicles in ZEELAND, 10 in MEGANTIC, 11 in MANHATTAN.
			15		
			13		
38					Balance of horses in MANHATTAN.
			9		4 vehicles in SCOTIAN.
11			9		Embarked at Levis.
72					
		20		(Motor)24	Embarked at Montreal.
				5	Vehicles in GRAMPIAN, less 9 in MANHATTAN.
358					2 Motor cars in GRAMPIAN.
					Motor trucks in GRAMPIAN (14), LAKONIA (12), MANITOU (12), MEGANTIC (4), RUTHENIA (5).
357			2		

133

FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT—DETAIL OF UNITS IN VESSELS—*Concluded*

Unit	Vessel	Personnel		
		Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Divisional Ammn. Park.....	FRANCONIA.....	11	481	492
Railway Supply Det.....	VIRGINIAN.....	1	84	85
No. 1 Field Ambulance.....	MEGANTIC.....	10	209	219
No. 2 " ".....	LAURENTIC.....	9	120	129
No. 2 " ".....	CASSANDRA.....	2	70	72
No. 2 " ".....	ARCADIAN.....	2	62	64
No. 3 " ".....	TUNISIAN.....	11	204	215
No. 3 " ".....	CARIBBEAN.....	1	54	55
No. 1 Clearing Hospital.....	MEGANTIC.....	9	78	87
No. 1 Stationary Hospital.....	ATHENIA.....	10	80	90
No. 1 " ".....	GRAMPAN.....	5	5
No. 2 " ".....	SCOTIAN.....	9	90	99
No. 1 General Hospital.....	SCANDINAVIAN.....	24	151	175
No. 2 " ".....	FRANCONIA.....	6	127	133
No. 2 " ".....	VIRGINIAN.....	18	6	24
Depot Coy. A.M.C.....	CARIBBEAN.....	7	42	49
Details, A.M.C.....	BERMUDIAN.....	3	2	5
Nursing Sisters.....	FRANCONIA.....	101	101
Details, C.A.V.C.....	CARIBBEAN.....	3	24	27
C.A.P.C.....	FRANCONIA.....	6	14	20
Postal Corps.....	".....	1	8	9
C.O.C.....	RUTHENIA.....	2	2
M.P.P.....	MANTOU.....	3	3
".....	SCANDINAVIAN.....	1	7	8
".....	VIRGINIAN.....	1	1	2
Surplus Officers.....	ARCADIAN.....	32	32
" ".....	CARIBBEAN.....	16	16
" ".....	RUTHENIA.....	27	27
Cdn. Field Comforts Commn.....	FRANCONIA.....	2	2
Details and Stragglers.....	(Various).....	7	28	35
Total in Convoy.....	1,544	29,061	30,605
Details, L.S.H.(R.C.), C.A.M.C., and C.A.V.C.....	MANHATTAN.....	3	9	12
Total, First Canadian Contingent.....	1,547	29,070	30,617

133

FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT—DETAIL OF UNITS IN VESSELS—*Concluded*

Horses	Guns	Vehicles			Remarks
		Motor	Horsed	Bicycles	
					5 Motor cars in SICILIAN, 90 Motor trucks in MANHATTAN.
			3		Horses and 8 vehicles in MANHATTAN.
					Horses and 24 vehicles in MANHATTAN.
					Horses and 23 vehicles in MANHATTAN.
3					
4					
					20 vehicles in SCOTIAN.
10					
6,816	70	20	575	82	
863		90	130		Sailed independently, Quebec-Southampton.
7,679	70	110	705	82	

Particulars of "Details and Stragglers" on p. 118

	Off.	O.R.	Total
ANDANIA..... 15th Battn.....	3		3
ATHENIA..... C.A.S.C.....		3	3
CARIBBEAN..... Div. Cyclists.....		3	3
..... 17th Battn.....		5	5
..... C.A.S.C. M.T.....		4	4
..... Stragglers.....		12	12
ZEEBLAND..... Details.....	4	1	5
Total.....	7	28	35

134

NOTE ON TRANSPORTS OF CANADIAN CONVOY

The information in Appendices 132 and 133 is a composite of various reports, states, rolls and returns, no two of which agree in all respects and none of which is altogether correct. These sources include the following: Valcartier Camp parade states, telegrams from Quebec, reports of embarkation officers, nominal rolls, manifests of cargo, D. of S. & T. returns, information supplied by ship's masters, returns rendered by O.C. troops on board en route, returns of victualling *officers*, payrolls, disembarkation reports, war diaries of units, and strength returns at Salisbury Plain. Figures of troops in transports vary because some 140 who were supposed to embark did not do so for one reason or another; the returns rendered en voyage are inaccurate because small detachments were frequently omitted; payrolls are not complete because a number of men embarked without authority, and the nominal rolls subsequently completed include 489 who followed in independent transports later in the year and also Canadians enlisted in England.

The quantity of small arms, ammunition, bicycles and other military cargo shown is also incomplete, due to the fact that returns from some ships fail to show the military cargo and in some other returns, due partly to loadings at Montreal, the military cargo is inaccurate or incomplete. Adjustments and additions have been made wherever definite information could be secured, but in the case of bicycles, of which there were over 400, returns are so fragmentary that only 82 are accounted for.

Some of these totals were as under:—

Gun ammunition complete rds.:—	
B.L. 60 pdr	6,982
Q.F. 18 pdr. shrapnel.....	86,865
Q.F. 13 pdr. shrapnel.....	18,017
Cartridges, S A A. ball .303....	20,000,000
Rifles, Ross	25,737
Wagons, transport	853
Motor trucks	142

135

Quebec, October 7th, 1914.

Lieut. Col. Wm. Price,
Quebec.

Sir,

With further reference to my letter of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that on Monday, October 5th, at 8.00 p.m., we completed the loading of the transport *Manhattan*. *She* took whatever balance was remaining of the equipment, supplies, etc., of

the Expeditionary Force, in addition to a large quantity of other, stores from the Ordnance Department, which kept arriving continually until the Transport was loaded to her full capacity.

I would further call your attention to the fact that shipments of ordnance are being delivered daily at Shed No. 25, which I presume are to be loaded as space offers in vessels for the other side.

Not a single package of any kind belonging to the Expeditionary Force was left on hand when the *Manhattan* sailed.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
A. J. Goasre.

136

To the Commander,
H.M. Troop Ship

You will proceed down river and after dropping pilot and still proceeding you will ask the senior military *officer* on board for a sealed letter of instructions which will give you further orders.

WM. PRICE,
Lt.-Col.,
Chief Transportation Officer.

137

To the Commander,
H.M. Troop Ship

You will continue your voyage to Gaspé Basin timing to arrive there during daylight of October 1st or at latest October 2nd. On arrival at entrance of harbour you will be met by a Canadian Government ship and receive orders for anchorage, etc.

WM. PRICE,
Lt.-Col.,
Chief Transportation Officer.

138

*Telegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to the War Office*

OTTAWA, 2nd October, 1914.

149 Cipher. Reference your cipher 1258 September 29th am sending in clear the details required regarding personnel, horses and material on each transport, except that weight of baggage is not to hand.

HUGHES.

(See 129)

139

Telegram from the War Office to the Minister of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 3rd October, 1914.

1301 Cipher. Your cipher message No. 149 of the 2nd (See App. 138)-On no account must the details of the Contingent be cabled in clear.

TROOPERS.

Telegram from the War Office to the Chief of the General Staff, Department of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 3rd October, 1914.

1302 Cipher. With reference to your telegram of the 2nd, the information asked for in my cipher No. 1258 (see App. 129) is urgently required and must be telegraphed in cipher at once.

We have not as yet received any report by cable that the Contingent has embarked and great inconvenience will be caused to it (Contingent) by instructions not being complied with.

TROOPERS.

140

Telegram from the Minister of Militia and Defence to the War Office

OTTAWA, 3rd October, 1914.

150 Cipher. Your telegram 1301 October 3rd received too late.

HUGHES.

(See 139)

141

Telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, Department of Militia and Defence, to the War Office

OTTAWA, 3rd October, 1914.

No. 151 Cipher. Reference your 1302 October 3rd embarkation return in clear unlikely to do harm because names of transport and strength of Contingent had already been published.

The return is very inaccurate, but if I can obtain corrected figures I will cable them.

C.G.S.
Canada.

(See 139)

142

. . . Japanese are not coming over, that report was rubbish—but 20,000 Indians are in Marseilles, and amidst the acclamation of the populace marched up the Rue Cannibière. In Harvey 20,000 Canadians; Portuguese may be coming too. That isn't bad, but

the general mingling of British cold-bloodedness with fiery French blood is very effective on the battlefield.

(Extract from letter dated 8th October 1914 written by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and quoted in his book *My Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 475. Hurst & Blackett, Ltd. London.*)

143

Telegram from Minister of Militia and Defence to War Office

LONDON, 19th August, 1914.

About twenty-five thousand Canadian soldiers will be ready to cross the Atlantic before middle of September. Escort of cruisers will be necessary, all to cross at same time. What suggestions have you to make?

HUGHES.

(See 65)

144

Telegram from War Office to the Minister, of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 20th August, 1914.

The Army Council would like to be informed of the date when the contingent will be ready to embark, as the Admiralty are anxious to make in advance the necessary arrangements for conveying the transports. The two batteries of Horse Artillery and the regiment of cavalry should embark at the same time as the Division.

TROOPERS.

(This message crossed 143. See also 99, 100)

145

Telegram from Minister of Militia and Defence to War Office

OTTAWA, 9th September, 1914.

118 Cipher. Re sea transport Canadian Expeditionary Force. Government anxious to be informed whether escort will be available between 22nd and 27th instant. Important to know so that necessary arrangement can be made in regard to provision of troop ships.

HUGHES.

146

Telegram from Camp Commandant, Valcartier Camp to Quartermaster General

VALCARTIER CAMP,

5th September, 1914.

156 After arrival of additional assistance requested for ordnance services division will be ready to start from Valcartier camp seven days after last deliveries of ordnance stores come to hand.

CAMP COMMANDANT.

147
NAVAL Escort FOR TRANSPORTS CARRYING
THE
FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT TO
ENGLAND, OCTOBER, 1914

—	Type	Tonnage	Speed	Crew
	Light Cruiser			
	do do			
	do do			
	do do			
	Battleship			
	Battle Cruiser			
	Battleship			
	Cruiser			

*Torpedoed off Cape Belies 27th May, 1916.

148
*Telegram from the War Office to the Minister
of Militia and Defence*
LONDON, 19th September, 1914.

1122 Cipher. With reference to your telegram of September 16th. The Escort for the Canadian Contingent will consist of four cruisers with H.M.C.S. *Niobe* and H.M.S. *Glory* under the command of a flag officer. This will be reinforced en route by a second battleship of the *Glory* class. The whole of the Grand Fleet will cover the escort from attack by any large forces of the enemy. All arrangements are being made by the Admiralty for the escort, and the safe conduct of the convoy is receiving the most careful consideration.

TROOPERS.

149
WHERE DUTY LEADS
FELLOW SOLDIERS:

Six weeks ago, when the call came to Arms, inspired by that love of freedom from tyranny dominant in the British race; actuated by the knowledge that, under British Constitutional Responsible Government, you enjoyed the utmost of human liberty, you loyally and promptly responded in overwhelming numbers to that call.

Twenty-two thousand men were accepted by the Motherland. Today upwards of thirtythree thousand are en route to do duty on the historic fields of France, Belgium, and Germany for the preservation of the British Empire and the rights and liberties of humanity.

Lust of power; the subjugation of inoffensive and law abiding neighbors; autocratic aggrandizement, have caused this war. In its cause the Allies are guiltless.

Belgium and Holland have long excited Prussian ambition for ownership. Austria has desired extension towards the Euxine and Aegean seas- Insane lust of conquest bringing ruin, rapine and misery in the train.

It has long been predicted that when the Kiel Canal would be completed, Germany would begin the long dreaded war. The Kiel Canal was completed early in July. War was begun before the end of that month. Germany was found absolutely ready and waiting. Great Britain, Belgium and France were unprepared. Three weeks elapsed before the regular armies of the latter countries could take the field.

Soldiers! The world regards you as a marvel. Within six weeks you were at your homes, peaceful Canadian citizens. Since then your training camp has been secured; three and a half miles of rifle ranges—twice as long as any other in the world—were constructed; fences were removed; water of the purest quality was laid in miles of pipes; drainage was perfected; electric light was installed—crops were harvested; roads and bridges were built; Ordnance and Army Service Corps buildings were erected; railway sidings were laid down; woods were cleared; sanitation was perfected so that illness was practically unknown, and thirty-three thousand men were assembled from points some of them upwards of four thousand miles apart. You have been perfected in rifle shooting and today are as fine a body—Officers and Men as ever faced a foe. The same spirit as accomplished that great work is what you will display on the war fields of Europe. There will be no faltering, no temporizing—The work must be done. The task before us six weeks ago seemed Herculean—but it has been successfully accomplished. So following the same indomitable spirit, you will triumph over the common enemy of humanity.

That you will render a splendid account of yourselves for King and Country is certain. You come of the right breed—English, Scotch, Irish, French, Welch, German and American—your courage and steadfastness are proverbial. In South Africa, your presence was a guarantee of success. So in this most righteous struggle on the part of Britain. When side by side with soldiers from the Motherland stand the freemen from the Dominions beyond the seas; when Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Hindu, Newfoundlanders and Canadians tread the soil of Europe, then will the Prussian autocracy realize the gigantic power of liberty.

And amid it all you will never forget that you war not on the innocent and lovely people of Germany. Your aim is the overthrow of tyranny and aggrandizement.

Every man among you is a free will volunteer. Not one has been invited. No more typical army of free men ever marched to meet an enemy.

Soldiers! Behind you are loved ones, home, country, with all the traditions of Liberty,

and loyalty; love of King and constitution. You bid adieu to those near and dear to you.

You sing;

I go then sweet lass to win honour and fame, And if I should chance to come gloriously hame

I'll bring a heart to thee with love running o'er

And then I'll leave thee and the Homeland no more.

That you will so bear yourselves, individually and collectively wherever duty may call you, as to win the respect of the foe in the field; the admiration and regard of the good citizens of all lands in which your lot may be cast; and the love and regard of those near and dear at home, is the conviction of all Canadians.

And when with years and honour crowned,

You sit some homeward hearth around

And hear no more the stirring sound

That spoke the trumpet's warning

You'll sing and give one Hip Hurrah

And pledge the memory of the day

When to do and dare you all were there

And met the foe in the morning.

Some may not return—and pray God they be few—For such, not only will their memory ever be cherished by loved ones near and dear, and by a grateful country; but throughout the ages freemen of all lands will revere and honour the heroes who sacrificed themselves in preserving unimpaired the Priceless Gem of Liberty. But the soldier going down in the cause of freedom never dies—Immortality is his. What reeks he whether his resting place may be bedecked with the golden lilies of France or amid the vine clad hills of the Rhine. The principles for which you strive are Eternal.

May success ever attend you, and when you return rest assured a crowning triumph will await you.

SAM HUGHES,

Colonel.

Minister of Militia and Defence for Canada.

150

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

MONTREAL, 2nd October, 1914.

Following for Admiralty; Prime Minister informs me that he has just received following telegram from Minister of Militia who is at Gasp., rendezvous for the transports:—

Escort altogether inadequate, should increase strength.

My Government inquire whether Admiralty is thoroughly assured that escort is adequate.

ARTHUR

151

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 3rd October, 1914.

Your telegram October 2, Minister of Militia is aware I believe that escort which consists of a squadron of four cruisers with His Majesty's Canadian ship *Niobe* and His Majesty's ship *Glory* will be reinforced by second battleship *Glory* class on passage, and that the whole of Grand Fleet covers escort from all attack by any large force of enemy. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are satisfied that every reasonable precaution has been taken, and they consider escort safe. They do not think it necessary to increase the number of ships accompanying the expedition across the Atlantic, being satisfied as to the adequacy of the arrangements made to protect it.

HARCOURT

(See 160)

152

Extract from

"The Life and Letters of Lord Wester

Wemyss," by Lady Wester Wemyss:

Eyre & Spottiswoode, London,

pp. 181-182.

Their arrival at Plymouth was a glorious sight. On that beautiful autumn day an apparently endless line of huge ships slowly steaming in, many of them decorated with maple, foliage and all filled with cheering and singing troops, who would have probably rejoiced even more had they realized the situation, for

my own feelings on the subject were that the Admiralty were taking too great risks in transporting these troops in such a manner. A fast enemy's cruiser—and it should be remembered that there were still then several loose and unlocated—well and daringly handled could have created an enormous amount of damage. There really was nothing to prevent such a ship if she had once sighted the convoy from getting ahead of it during the daytime and getting right into the middle of it during the night. Once there she could have easily sunk many ships before she herself was sunk, for the difficulty of our own ships in firing upon her, closely surrounded as she would have been by transports full of troops, without doing incalculable damage, would have been enormous. None of my old tubs had sufficient speed to chase off such an enemy, and had such a catastrophe happened the effect upon the whole of Canada and of all the other Dominions and Colonies which were gallantly pouring troops into the theatre of war would have been deplorable.

He (Admiral Wemyss) hurried up to London the day after his arrival to lay these views before the First Lord. "Oh, you must take risks in war-time," was his smiling reply. "Only justifiable risks," Wemyss said; "and I consider that under the circumstances the risks were not justifiable." His own opinion was that

it would have been a better plan to sail each transport separately, causing her to pass through stated rendezvous with ships guarding the route.

153

Extract from

"History of the Great War, Naval Operations."
Vol. 1. by Sir Julian S. Corbett: Longmans,
Green and Co., London, 1960

. By the end of the month the Canadian Contingent was to be ready to sail, and to provide it with escort Admiral Wemyss on September 10—that is, as soon as the VIth Division had been passed to St. Nazaire—had been ordered to leave the Western Patrol and proceed with his four cruisers to the St. Lawrence. Their place had to be taken by Admiral Bethell with the 7th Battle Squadron, so that he was not available as he had been during the Ostend landing

. For another reason—and again a military reason—the security of the western area was specially important at the moment. A further development of the great Imperial Concentration was on foot, and this was the sailing of the first Canadian contingent. We have seen how, as early as September 12, Admiral Wemyss had taken his four light cruisers from the Western Patrol to fetch it, and how Admiral Bethell had replaced him with his reduced battle squadron. The convoy was expected to sail on September 23, but from various causes it was delayed till October 3, and by that time the Canadian Government had become seriously apprehensive for its safe transit. The convoy in the St. Lawrence consisted of thirty-one ships, and was to be joined off Cape Race by two more—one with the Newfoundland contingent and one with the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolns from Bermuda, where it was being replaced by the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry. For such a force, when it came to the point of sailing, the escort provided seemed to the Canadian authorities wholly inadequate, and on October 2 the Admiralty, in the height of their preoccupation with Antwerp and the Flanders gap, found themselves being urgently pressed to increase it.

The demand, it would seem, was made under a misapprehension as regards both the strength of the escort, which had been already arranged,

and the principle of covering squadrons on which the Admiralty was mainly relying. Of these covering squadrons there were two—the Grand Fleet that lay between the line of passage and the German Home ports, and the North-American Squadron (now under Admiral Hornby) which was watching the German liners in New York and the adjacent ports. It was from one of these two points that attack was alone possible, except, perhaps, from the Karlsruhe, which at the time was operating in the Pernambuco focal area. It was but natural that a Government unfamiliar with the methods of naval warfare should ignore these two important elements and fix its anxious attention on the comparatively slender escort in sight. But this had, in fact, been materially increased. At first, when it was understood that the convoy would consist of no more than fourteen ships, Admiral Wemyss's squadron was considered by the Admiralty as sufficient, but later, when owing to the splendid response which Canada made to the Imperial call, it was known that double the number of transports would not suffice, important additions to the escort had been made. From Admiral Hornby's squadron his battleship the *Glory*, was taken, and the *Majestic* from Admiral Bethell's was ordered to meet the convoy at a certain rendezvous on the secret route which had been given far out of ken of the usual track. At the same rendezvous the convoy would also be met by one of the best battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet, and for this purpose Admiral Jellicoe had been ordered to detach the *Princess Royal*. All this had been explained to the Canadian Government as early as September 19—that is, all but the last item. Had this been known there would probably have been no complaint, but it could not be revealed. In view of what the functions of the Grand Fleet were, its battle cruisers were all important—so important, indeed, that the detaching of one of them was dictated not so much by military considerations as to afford testimony of how highly the Canadian effort was appreciated by the Mother Country. It was much to ask of Admiral Jellicoe, 'but it was in accordance with the old principle that such detachments from the Main Fleet were within its normal action and involved little risk if they could be kept secret from the enemy while they lasted. Secrecy, in fact, was the essence of the expedient, and the value of secrecy was as yet scarcely realised by the Canadian Press. Details of the convoy and the force it carried had been published in the papers and telegraphed home en clair. It was necessary, therefore, to keep the secret of the *Princess Royal* between the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief; even Admiral Wemyss was not informed. Naturally, the conduct of the Admiralty was misunderstood, but it was

only one more of the many misunderstandings which they were content to suffer patiently, so long as additional safety was secured for all it was their hard duty to protect. They were content, in fact, to know that when, on October 3, Admiral Wemyss led the convoy out of the St. Lawrence its passage was as secure as skill and force could make it.

As a covering force for the New York Area were told off the *Suffolk*, the *Caronia* and the Canadian cruiser *Niobe*. Admiral Hornby himself in the *Lancaster*, accompanied the convoy, guarding the southern flank of the route as far as longitude 40° W., the limit of his station. On October 5 they met the *Glory* and the *Lincolns* off Cape Race; (sic. *The 2/Lincolns in S.S. Canada joined the convoy in GaspsBasin*), the Newfoundland contingent also joined, and together they proceeded on their secret route. On the 8th Admiral Hornby turned back, and next day they were in touch with the *Princess Royal* and *Majestic*, which for over two days had been waiting for them at the mid-Atlantic rendezvous. So, with ample escort, they carried on for the defended area off the mouth of the Channel.

With the Grand Fleet Admiral Jellicoe had made a disposition which rendered it almost impossible for any force equal to the Canadian escort to reach the convoy route from German ports. On September 30 he had returned to Scapa after a three-days' sweep to the Skagerrak in support of a submarine reconnaissance that was being made inside the Skaw. He then issued his new scheme of operation, which was to begin on October 2 and last a week while the Canadian Convoy was passing. Its main feature was the occupation of the cruiser areas, which he had established between Peterhead and the Norwegian Coast, by the 2nd, 3rd and most of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, as well as the light cruisers with the four battle squadrons in support.

In addition, however, there was a second line so placed as to sight in the morning anything that passed the main line in the night. It was in three sections on the line of the islands. The Pentland Firth was declared closed to all ships of war passing from east to west, and the destroyer patrol had orders to fire on any attempting to do so. West of Fair Island, to watch the passage between the Orkneys and Shetlands, was the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, without, of course, the *Princess Royal*, who parted company for her escort duty the day the scheme started. North of the Shetlands and extended towards the Faeroes was the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron (*Invincible* and *Inflexible*), with the *Sappho*

* These cruiser areas were established by the Commander-in-Chief by Fleet Order 84, August 1, and were subsequently modified by orders of August 8 and September 14.

and the three minelayers. The cover was thus stronger than it had been at any time during the war, and it was maintained in full strength till October 10, the day on which the convoy continued its voyage with the *Princess Royal* and *Majestic* in company

In the Channel Area the policy the Germans were pursuing required no less attention. Here there were unmistakable indications that they were trying to use their submarines against our communications with Flanders, and we have already seen the trouble they caused upon the new line of passage to Dunkirk; but the effect upon the Canadian Convoy was still greater. From the first the Admiralty felt the danger of bringing it up Channel, and the port they originally wished to use was Liverpool. Inquiry, however, showed that the dislocation of traffic in the Mersey would be too great, and Plymouth was substituted. Preparations to receive the convoy there were actually set on foot, but the War Office had objections. Southampton was the port for which all their arrangements had been made, and they pressed for its adoption. Again the Admiralty were at their wits' end how to meet the wishes of the General Staff. At the moment—it was the end of the first week in October—the Admiralty, at their request, were absorbed with arrangements for a sudden re-embarkation of the VIIth and IIIrd Cavalry Divisions, should the pressure on them in Flanders prove too great. To protect the eastern half of the Channel was, therefore, a serious task, and, to add to the difficulty, St. Nazaire was just being closed and Havre substituted with Boulogne as a subsidiary base. Nevertheless they once more gave way, and on October 10—the day the Canadian Convoy met the *Princess Royal* and *Majestic-Southampton* was settled as the port of disembarkation. That the concession was not an easy one to make was proved next day by a French Patrol reporting a submarine off Cape Gris Nez, which was the actual landfall which the Flanders Transports had been ordered to make to avoid the new danger. It all meant increased vigilance in the eastern part of the Channel, while what the War Office wanted called for equal vigilance in the western part.

Admiral Wemyss fully appreciated the difficulty of his task, and in order to minimise the danger he organized the convoy into three batches, and these, when it reached a certain point, were to come in separately, each with its own escort. The arrangement, however, could not be adhered to. On October 13 call signs which appeared to come from German ships were taken in. They were never accounted for, but Admiral Wemyss felt he must now keep the convoy and its escort concentrated till he reached Admiral Bethell's area, and the Admiralty approved the decision.

Even so, the position was not as satisfactory as could be wished, since the withdrawal of the French cruisers for escort work to Dunkirk had seriously reduced the efficiency of the Western Patrol; and as for Admiral Burney, seeing how heavy our responsibilities were in the Eastern Channel, he had to keep a central position at Portland.

As the convoy approached the difficulties only increased. Directly after Admiral Wemyss had adopted his altered scheme, the French reported that a submarine had been seen off Cherbourg that morning, and a few hours later our own torpedo boat No. 116, of the Portsmouth Defence Flotilla, sighted one off Culver Cliff in the Isle of Wight. She was only 1,200 yards away, and the torpedo boat steamed for her at full speed, firing as the submarine dived, but she just missed ramming her by a few seconds. This incident settled the question of what the convoy was to do. Within an hour the Admiralty had decided their duty was to override all military exigencies—the safety of the convoy, for which they were responsible, was the paramount consideration. It was clearly a case where the Navy must assert its time-honoured claim to the last word when troops were on the sea, and without more ado the convoy was ordered into Plymouth. Accordingly, as soon as Admiral Wemyss was inside Scilly he began to send forward the batches in succession. At 7 a.m. October 14 the first transports entered the Sound, and in due course all of them followed without further adventure. There was still a question whether the diversion to Plymouth was only temporary, but the Admiralty did not feel justified in taking any further risk. This same day they ordered the Admiral to proceed with the disembarkation of the troops at Devonport till the Channel was free from danger, and informed the War Office they had done so.

Extract from "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development and Work." By Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.: George H. Doran Company, New York, 1919.

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until 5 P.M. on October 2nd, and then proceeded into the North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron sailed at daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, with the *Sappho* and three minelayers, left at 2 p.m. on October 3rd.

On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took up pre-arranged positions designed to secure a close watch over the northern portion of the North Sea, partly with a view to

an interception of all traffic, and partly to ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the North Sea during the ensuing week. The main object was the protection of an important convoy of Canadian troops, which was crossing from Halifax, (sic) and which the battle cruiser *Princess Royal* and the battleship *Majestic* had been sent to meet and to protect. The *Princess Royal* arrived at the rendezvous at 8 p.m. on October 7th, and waited for the convoy, which was two and a half days late.

The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during the period Oct. 3rd/11th approximately as follows:

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island Channel (*between Orkney and Shetland*) from the western side.

The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruisers, the *Sappho* and three mine-layers, was stationed to the northward and eastward of the Shetland Islands.

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion of Area No. 4. (*Off Aberdeen and half way to Stavanger, Norway*).

The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5. (*From Stavanger to The Naze, Norway, and half way across to Scotland*).

The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5.

The minesweepers patrolled to the westward of the Fair Island Channel.

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread, worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle Squadron to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle Squadron was utilized to watch the waters between the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and Norwegian territorial waters.

The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern approaches of the Pentland Firth (*between Scotland and Orkney*), some to work off the Norwegian coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to the bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and for shelter when the weather necessitated this.

These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3. (*Not reproduced*).

The *Princess Royal* met the Canadian convoy in Lat. 49:45 N., Long. 27:5W., at 8 p.m. (sic a.m.) on October 10th. On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet passed to the westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until daylight on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with

the *Teutonic*, being withdrawn from the patrol north of the Shetlands to a patrol line northwest from Sule Skerry lighthouse, Lat. 59°6' N., Long. 424' W., during the night of the 11th and remaining there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged in this operation returned to their bases for fuel, except the 3rd Battle Squadron (the ships of which had coaled two at a time during the operation) and the cruiser squadrons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel.

154*Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.*

OTTAWA, 6th October, 1914.

The Dominion Government offers to place and maintain in the field a second over-sea contingent of twenty thousand men. If the offer be accepted, what form should that contingent take? Having parted with nearly all our 18-pounder guns, we cannot offer a complete division but besides infantry, we could furnish mounted rifles and units fighting or administrative required for special purposes.

ARTHUR.

*(See 156)***155***Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General*

LONDON, 9th October, 1914.

His Majesty's Government cordially thank the Government of Canada for the generous offer of a further contingent. As soon as the first contingent arrives and has been examined the details of the organization of the new contingent will be carefully considered and communicated to your Government.

HARCOURT.

156*Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.*

OTTAWA, 16th October, 1914.

My advisers very desirous that organization Second Contingent shall begin with least possible delay, and they hope therefore that suggested composition can be cabled immediately.

ARTHUR.

*(See 154)***157***Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies*

OTTAWA, 18th October, 1914.

Pending the arrival of advices from the War Office as to the composition of the second contingent, my advisers have thought it desirable to issue the following statement which has been given to the press this evening:—

As to the organization and despatch of further contingents the following conclusions have been reached:

1. From the present time until the end of the war, or so long as the War Office shall deem it advisable, Canada will keep continuously in training and under arms (in addition to the eight thousand men above mentioned) thirty thousand men.

2. As soon as arms, guns and equipment can be provided for a force of ten thousand men, that force will be despatched to Great Britain, as the first instalment of a second expeditionary force. Thereupon additional men will be enlisted so as to keep the number under training continuously at thirty thousand. This process will continue from time to time; that is to say, as soon as each force of ten thousand men is armed, equipped and despatched another force of ten thousand will be enlisted to take its place and to bring the number in training up to thirty thousand.

3. It is anticipated that the first force of ten thousand men will be despatched in December, and thereafter at regular intervals similar forces will be continuously sent forward as rapidly as they can be armed and equipped.

4. Including the forces on garrison and outpost duty we shall thus have under arms or in training about forty thousand men' in Canada and, until the end of the war or until the War Office advises that further expeditionary forces are not needed, a steady stream of reinforcements will go forward from our shores to the seat of war.

5. If the expected communication from the War Office should make any modification in the above arrangement necessary that modification will be announced at a later date.

6. The Government is informed by its military advisers that it would be impossible to supply arms, guns and equipment on a larger scale than that laid down in these proposals.

7. Pending advices from the War Office as to the composition of the second contingent, which have not yet been received, infantry to the number of sixteen or twenty thousand will be immediately enlisted and the organization and training of infantry units will be proceeded with throughout the Dominion, from Halifax to Victoria.

8. As soon as the expected instructions arrive from the War Office immediate arrangements will be made for enlisting such cavalry, artillery, engineers and administrative units as the War Office. may advise.

9. The organization of these units and the forces contemplated by these proposals will be under the direction of officers commanding divisions and military districts and will be carried out by them.

ARTHUR.

(See 156)

158

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 20th October, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of the 16th October (see 166) and your telegram of the 18th October (see 157), Army Council are anxious not to give definite reply as to the composition of second contingent until sufficient opportunity has been afforded for examining composition of and arrangements for contingent which has just disembarked. Disembarkation of troops and their transfer to concentration station has been somewhat delayed, but it is hoped that it will be possible to give definite reply within very few days.

HARCOURT

159

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 31st October, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of the 20th October (see 158) Army Council suggest that Second Canadian Contingent should be organized so as to form with balance of Canadian troops now in England a second Canadian Division complete with proper proportion of line of communication units. Following units to complete 2nd Division therefore will be required: Two Brigades of Infantry of 8,654 men, 494 horses, 16 machine guns; HQ. Divisional Artillery of 18 men, 20 horses; three Brigades of Field Artillery, 2,541 men, 2,244 horses, 54 guns; Heavy Battery and Ammunition Column, 211 men, 144 horses, 4 guns; Divisional Ammunition Column, 609 men, 709 horses, H.Q. Divisional Engineers, 10 men, 8 horses; two Field Companies, 464 men, 152 horses; Cyclist Company, 200 men; Signal Company, 171 men, 80 horses; Divisional Train, 451 men, 378 horses; three Field Ambulances, 726 men, 178 horses. Line of Communication Units required will be Divisional Ammunition Park M .T., 464

men; Divisional Supply Column M.T., 265 men; Reserve Park (two horsed), 280 men, 358 horses; Field Bakery, 92 men; Field Butchery, 20 men; Railway Supply Detachment, 01 men; two Depot Units of Supply, 20 men. Grand Total, 15,272 men, 4,765 horses, 58 guns, 16 machine guns. Army Council add. that it is very important that provision should be made. to meet wastage (of?) officers and men and they therefore urge that efforts should be made to furnish *pan passu* with organization of 2nd Division reinforcements equal to twenty per cent of strength of first and second Canadian Divisions and that after completion of 2nd Division additional troops which it is eventually proposed to raise should be so organized as to be readily utilized for purposes of maintaining the two Divisions at full effective strength. It appears from your telegram of 8th October that difficulties were anticipated in forming complete Division (owing to ?) deficiency (of ?) guns. Army Council wish (to ?) know as soon as possible whether it is to be understood from your telegram of 19th October (*sic. 18th October, see 167*) that guns now can be provided by Canada as they themselves are unable (to ?) make such provision for any fresh Canadian troops for at least 9 months or possibly more.

HARCOURT

160

P.C. 2831

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 7th November, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report dated 6th November, 1914, from the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending—it having been decided to keep continuously under arms in Canada a force of 30,000 men (in addition to those required for garrison duty and protective services)—that the Minister of Militia and Defence be empowered to mobilize now, or as required, or to proceed with the mobilization of:—

(a) The Second Overseas Contingent, total 15,272 men, as detailed in the accompanying statement.

(b) Seven battalions of infantry, approximately 7,700 men.

(c) Four regiments of mounted rifles, approximately 2,400 men.'

(d) The balance of 4,826 required to make up the total of 30,000 men.

(e) Troops required in Canada to replace the Second or any subsequent Contingent, or any portion thereof, after its embarkation overseas.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

STATEMENT showing in detail the composition of the Second Overseas Contingent.

Field Units:—

Infantry (two brigades, each of four battalions)	8,654
Artillery (ten batteries, 58 guns)	3,379
Engineers (two field companies)	474
Cyclist company	200
Signal company	171
Divisional train (four companies, A.S.C.)	451
Medical service (three field ambulances)	726
Line of Communication (A.S.C.) units:—	
Divisional ammunition park	464
Divisional supply column	265
Reserve park	289
Field bakery	92
Field butchery	20
Railway supply detachment	61
Depot units of supply	26
Total	15,272

161

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 21st November, 1914.

Canadian Government have decided to increase number of men in training from thirty thousand to fifty thousand.

ARTHUR.

162

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 10th October, 1914.

Newspaper reports state that Army Council has called for the services of railway men. If this be so Canada can supply the want better probably than any other country. Two offers have already been received to raise construction gangs for rapid temporary repair work, or railway construction. If gangs are required should they be organized military units, or civilian gangs?

ARTHUR.

163

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 17th October, 1914.

Referring to my telegram October 10th (*see 162*) railway men, my Ministers anxious for reply.

ARTHUR.

164

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 22nd October, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of the 10th October (*see 162*), and your telegram of the 17th October (*see 163*) Army Council highly appreciate patriotic offer regarding railwaymen. At present it is not desired to accept it, but Army Council may be glad to accept offer later on. When accepted a railway corps should be organized on military basis through principal Canadian railways.

HARCOURT.

165

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 6th February, 1915.

With reference to your telegram of 2nd February (*not reproduced*), Army Council accept with gratitude offer of your Government of 500 railwaymen for construction work. They should be organized in two companies at establishment mentioned on page 197 of War Establishment, Part I, with major in command, and should bring picks, shovels, and any small tools they are accustomed to use. No construction plant required except thirty scrapers. They would be much obliged if steps could be taken to expedite raising of these units.

HARCOURT.

166

Letter from Major-General W. G. Gwatkin, C.G.S., to the Secretary, Toronto Home Guard Association.

H.Q. 593-1-29.

OTTAWA, 8th November, 1914.

Dear Mr. Gillis,

Thank you for your letter dated 6th November, and for inviting me to come and see the Home Guard of Toronto—an invitation of which I will gladly avail myself as soon as I can manage to get away from Ottawa.

General Hughes will be back in office tomorrow. What his attitude towards " Home Guards " will be I do not know; but, without committing him in any way, I venture to offer the following remarks which may, or may not, be of interest.

It does not seem to be generally known, although it has been publicly announced, that the intention of the Government is to keep continuously under arms in Canada a force of 30,000 men. This is in addition to the units and detachments (amounting to nearly 10,000 more) which are already employed on garrison duty and protective services. When men embark with Contingents for England or elsewhere, their places in Canada are at once to be filled; and, so long, as the war lasts, a total seldom much under 40,000 will be available for purposes of home defence.

In Canada to-day, in addition to the garrisons of coast defences, in addition to the troops called out for the protection of canals, railways, public works, &c., and in addition to the balance of the Militia not on duty, there are already mobilized, or in process of being mobilized—

- 4 regiments of mounted rifles,
- 15 battalions of infantry,
- 10 batteries of artillery,
- 2 field companies of engineers,
- 6 platoons of cyclists,
- 4 signalling sections,
- 4 army service corps companies,
- 3 field ambulances,

and more will follow.

Troops have been or are being mobilized at important points such as Halifax, N.S.; Saint John and Fredericton, N.B.; Quebec, Montreal, and St. Jean, P.Q.; Ottawa, Kingston, London and Toronto, Ont.; Winnipeg and Brandon, Man.; Saskatoon and Prince Albert, Sask.; Calgary, Edmonton and Medicine Hat, Alta.; Vancouver, Victoria and Esquimalt, B.C.

It may therefore be claimed, I think, that we are in a position to maintain internal order, and to stop filibustering raids across our southern frontier.

The danger of any such form of attack is often overstated. As a matter of fact, suspected localities are being watched, and we know fairly well what is going on. We are not likely to be taken unawares; and we can rely on the friendly co-operation of the United States Government. What happened in 1866 will not recur in 1914.

It is quite true that heavy demands have been made on our stocks of equipment; but we are better off than is generally supposed. On the other hand, until supply catches up with demand, the Militia Department will not

be able to issue arms, ammunition, and accountments to the " Rome Guards " which have sprung into being since the outbreak of the war.

We realise the potential value of such institutions. They could be made to serve as schools of military instruction, and they would prove a welcome addition to the armed strength of the nation. They stimulate patriotism; sustain resolution; and, incidentally ease the nervous strain from which all of us, in a greater or less degree, are suffering.

Nevertheless, for the time being, we are obliged to set our faces against the raising of new units. For what is the good of raising them unless they can be equipped and equipped properly.

Yours very sincerely,

W. GWATKIN.

Edward Gillis, Esq.,

Secy: Treas.,

Toronto Home Guard Sharpshooters'
Association,

705 Confederation Life Building
Toronto.

167

*Extract from Memoranda (No. 1) respecting
Work of the Department of Militia and
Defence, European War 1914-15, p. 38.*

British and Foreign Contracts.—The contracts made for British and foreign governments are as follows:—

20,000	sets British Saddlery at \$45.50	\$ 910,000.00
3,500	sets British Harness at \$80.00	280,000.000
23,500	British Saddle Blankets at \$3.06	71,910.00
20,000	sets French Saddlery at \$52.00	1,040,000.00
20,000	French Saddle Blankets at \$3.06	61,200.00
457,900	French Gray Blankets at \$4.05	1,854,495.00
20,000	sets Russian Saddlery at \$72.50	1,450,000.00
500,000	Aluminum Water Bottles, say 94c	470,000.00
25,000	pro. Artillery Traces at \$9.45 pr.	236,250.00
1,820	cwt. Copper Rod at 16c lb.	32,614.40
	Total	<u>\$6,406,469.40</u>

For most of these the Contracts Branch has made the contract, attended to the inspection, and certified the accounts for payments.

It will be observed that the foreign business alone, handled during the last six months, is, in value, double the ordinary work of the Branch for a whole year.

168

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, 24th September, 1914.

My advisers are informed that supplies of many different articles required for war purposes can be procured in Canada of good quality and at reasonable prices. In view of serious conditions of unemployment they would be glad to have Canadian manufacturers and producers considered as far as practicable. Canadian and United States press continually report that orders for such supplies are being placed in the United States.

ARTHUR.

169

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, 2nd October, 1914.

Your telegram September 25th, your Ministers can rely on our bearing carefully in mind the possibilities of Canada as a source of supply of materials for war purposes and on our taking full advantage of them as occasion arises. Perley is in personal communication with War Office and in addition correspondence is taking place between War Office and Militia Department.

HARCOURT.

170

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, 15th December, 1914.

My Ministers would be glad if it be brought to attention of His Majesty's Government and to the attention of the French and other Allied Governments through the proper channels that Canadian manufacturers are prepared to deliver at first cost large quantities of the following articles if they should be needed by any of these Governments: Picketing pegs and posts, shovels, mess tins, stock blankets, picks, pickhandles, sweaters or cardigans, flannel shirts, underclothing, short sheep-lined coats (limited quantity of long sheep-lined coats), mitts, both leather and woollen, socks, cap comforters, cholera belts, mackinaw coats, canned goods, braces, caps (cloth and regular uniform caps), uniforms, great coats, rubber sheets, tooth brushes, hospital beds, absorbent cotton, etc., boots.

ARTHUR

(See 171)

15135—9½

171

Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

DOWNING STREET, 25th January, 1915.

Sir,

With reference to Your Royal Highness's telegram of the 15th December (*see 170*) last on the subject of military supplies from Canada, I have the honour to request you to inform your ministers that the suggestions made in your telegram have been carefully noted by the Army Council and that no opportunity will be lost of placing orders with Canadian manufacturers.

2. I have to add that the Army Council have already purchased in Canada large quantities of most of the articles mentioned in your telegram and I enclose a list (*not reproduced*) giving full details of such orders placed up to the 25th December last.

I have, etc.

L. HARCOURT.

172

Telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to the Governor General

WASHINGTON, 1st November, 1914.

Relative to army contracts I am continually in receipt of statements to the effect that persons who give themselves out to be agents of the British Government are making offers for contracts at exorbitant prices.

I have information to-day from a reliable source that a British inspector of cartridges located at Bridgeport has been greatly imposed upon by bad powder.

The names of persons who appear to be buying stores in the city of New York, are Allison, Murphy, Morgan, MacAlpine, Sifton, Wright and McLean.

Could not the Consul General be given official information as to who are exactly the authorized agents? There is no central authority, such as the French and Germans have and the Russians will have, to whom we can refer. Canada and Great Britain are buying separately, I presume; if there is a War Office representative in Canada, kindly let me know, so that I may refer to him.

Everybody is favourable to us here but our market is spoilt by these proceedings. Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Canada.

SPRING-RICE.

173

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington

OTTAWA, 13th November, 1914.

Following copy of telegram sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington:—

Canadian Government have not authorized any agent to buy for British or allied Governments in United States. This applies to persons named in your telegram of November 1, addressed to Foreign Office, repeated here. Colonial Office have been so advised by High Commissioner and I understand allied Governments are also being advised.

ARTHUR.

174

Telegram from Private Secretary to Minister of Militia and Defence, to Russian Ambassador, Washington, D.C.

OTTAWA, 13th November, 1914.

The Minister of Militia and Defence for Canada, the Honourable Sam Hughes, has officially instructed Colonel J. Wesley Allison to aid the Allies in every way possible in purchases of requirements at lowest prices wherever his services are desired.

E. MACADAM.
Private Secretary.

175

Telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to the Governor General

WASHINGTON, 12th February, 1915.

Allison has concluded a contract in Petrograd for supply of shrapnel, and writes on paper marked "Canadian Committee for Supply of Allied Armies with Arms and Ammunition." I am asked by Russian Embassy whether such committee exists.

SPRING-RICE.
(See 176)

176

Telegram from the Governor General to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington

OTTAWA, 14th February, 1915.

Your telegram yesterday, respecting Allison, we know nothing of any such committee and have given Allison no official authority whatever. There is a committee in Canada known as the Shell Committee which has in charge manufacture of shells for British Government, but Allison is not a member of that committee.

ARTHUR.

177

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

LONDON, 8th September, 1914.

Please inform your Ministers that Government of Russia are desirous of purchasing ice-breaker to use this autumn at Archangel, and as it appears impossible that such a vessel can be secured in Great Britain they inquire whether your Government would be able to supply one.

In view of the great importance in present circumstances of keeping communications open between Archangel and this country as long as possible, His Majesty's Government hopes that your Ministers may be able to accede to this request.

HARCOURT.

178

Telegram from the War Office to the Minister of Militia and Defence

OTTAWA, 24th August, 1914.

Can you provide or obtain from American trade shell empty shrapnel Q.F. Guns, 18-pdr. without cases or fuses if so what rate delivery could you promise.

TROOPERS.

Quoted by Sir Sam Hughes, Debates House of Commons, 26. i. 1916, q.v.

179

MEMBERS OF THE SHELL COMMITTEE

Rank	Name	Status	Date appointed
Colonel.....	Alex. Bertram, V.D. . .	Manufacturer.....	2nd Sept./14.
Hon. Colonel.....	Thos. Cantley.....	Manufacturer.....	2nd "
Hon. Lieut.-Colonel.....	Geo. W. Watts.....	Manufacturer.....	2nd "
Lt.-Colonel.....	F. D. Lafferty.....	Supt. Dominion Arsenal.....	7th "
Hon. Lieut.-Colonel.....	E. Carnegie.....	Manufacturer.....	7th "
Colonel.....	T. Benson.....	Master General of the Ordnance.....	8th "
Colonel.....	C. Greville-Harston....	Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition.....	8th "
Hon. Lieut.-Colonel.....	D. Carnegie.....	Ordnance Adviser.....	23rd "

The above committee resigned 29th November, 1915. Colonel Bertram and Lt.-Col. D. Carnegie joined the Imperial Munitions Board (Canada) on that date.

180

*Extracts from
Memoranda (No. 1) respecting Work of the
Department of Militia and Defence,
European War, 191.E-16, p. 10*

REPORT OF WORK OF BRANCH OF THE
MASTER GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCE TO
31ST DECEMBER 1914

8. Shell Committee, formation of

Since the commencement of War a Shell Committee has been formed for the placing of very large orders from War Office for Gun Ammunition required from manufacturers in Canada. The Committee was especially necessary for the following reasons:—

- (i) Obtaining information as regards companies willing and competent to manufacture.
- (ii) Necessity of distribution of orders.
- (iii) Giving information to companies inquiring for a share of work, and so insuring uniformity of work and supervision.
- (iv) Control over contractors.

The Ammunition is finally inspected and proved by the Inspection Branch at Quebec.

A detailed report on the work and proceedings of the Shell Committee is shown in Appendix "J".

Appendix "J"

SHELL COMMITTEE REPORT

Report of progress of work in connection with the manufacture of 15 and 18-pr. ammunition for the British War Office through the Department of Militia and Defence for Canada.

1. A meeting of manufacturers was called by Colonel, the Hon. Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence, at his office on September 2nd, when the Minister explained to those present that the British Government had asked for information regarding the position of Canadian manufacturers to undertake the manufacture of 18-pr. Shrapnel shells.

After Colonel Lafferty, Superintendent of Dominion Arsenal, had explained in detail the process of manufacture, etc., and the matter was discussed thoroughly by the manufacturers, it was decided that the shells could be manufactured in Canada.

2. On September 8th, the Honourable Minister of Militia and Defence held a meeting at the Dominion Arsenal, Quebec, and appointed the following Committee:

Colonel Alex. Bertram, Chairman.
Mr. Thos. Cantley,
Mr. Geo. W. Watts,
Mr. E. Carnegie,
Colonel T. Benson, Master General of Ordnance,

Lt: Col. C. G. Harston, Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition,

Lt.-Col. F. D. Lafferty, Superintendent Dominion Arsenal.

2. (a) On September 23rd, Mr. David Carnegie, M-Inst. C.E., was by authority of the Honourable the Minister of Militia and Defence, appointed Ordnance Adviser to the Committee and has rendered invaluable service in connection with the work.

3. On September 19th, the Shell Committee, as appointed by the Honourable the Minister of Militia and Defence, was authorized to proceed with the manufacture of shells to conform to the War Office Drawings and Specifications. The Committee to purchase all the materials (in Canada if available) make and execute contracts with manufacturers for machine work, assembling, etc.

The shells supplied by the Committee to be inspected by or under the supervision of Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition or such other Inspector as the War Office may designate.

4. On September 24th, the Shell Committee received acceptance from the British War Office of the conditions covering the manufacture of shells and boxes for transport of same.

The orders for the first supply were then distributed among various manufacturers, but owing to the delay in the manufacture of master gauges, the work was not well under way until November 25th.

5. On November 13th the Shell Committee received an enquiry from the War Office, through Hon. Minister of Militia and Defence, regarding the manufacture of fixed ammunition.

On November 23rd, the Committee replied to the effect that they could undertake the manufacture of a certain amount of fixed ammunition, including propellants, but without fuse and packed in ammunition cases. This offer was formally accepted by the War Office.

Seventy-two companies have been allotted orders for the machining and assembling of the orders, and sixty-seven are now manufacturing the various component parts required, making a total of one hundred and thirtynine companies now employed on this work.

See also:—

(i) The History of Munitions Supply in, Canada 1914-18. By David Carnegie. Long. mans, Green & Co., London and Toronto.

(ii) Report of the Chairman of the Imperial Munitions Board (Canada) to the Minister of Munitions. (*Appendix I to the above.*)

(iii) The Manufacture of Munitions in Canada. By H. H. Vaughan. Presidential Address to The Engineering Institute of Canada, 1919.

181

*Extract from
Memoranda (No. 1) respecting Work of the
Department of Militia and Defence.
European War 1914-15*

The expenditure to December 31st ultimo chargeable to War Vote was as follows:—

Pay, Allowances and Maintenance of Troops and Horses.. . . .	\$11,885,107
Separation Allowance.. . . .	500,949
Purchase of Horses.. . . .	1,721,970
Clothing.. . . .	3,809,415
Ammunition Dominion Arsenal.. . . .	200,848
Field Guns and Limbers.. . . .	1,141,073
Rifles, Bayonets and Pistols.. . . .	520,358
Motor Cars and other vehicles.. . . .	871,023
Saddlery and Horse Equipment.. . . .	335,628
Other Equipment, Tents, etc.. . . .	1,871,802
Engineering Works.. . . .	520,177
Railway Transport and Travelling Expenses.. . . .	1,030,961
Ocean Transport.. . . .	1,454,281
Censors.. . . .	74,320
General.. . . .	284,268
Total to December 31, 1914.. . . .	\$26,221,980

182

*Debates, House of Commons, Session 1916,
Vol. III, p. 2693, 10th April*

Transportation of First Contingent

Mr. J. J. HUGHES:

1. How many ships were employed to carry the first contingent of 30,000 men across the Atlantic?

2. (a) From whom were these ships chartered?

(b) and what did they cost?

Mr. KEMP:

1. Thirty-one ships.

2. (a) Donaldson Line, Cunard Line, Canadian Northern, Canadian Pacific, Canada S.S. Co., Royal Mail Steam Packet, Allan Line, White Star Dominion Line.

(b) \$3,363,240.42. These ships were under Admiralty rates and regulations. The cost was largely increased in consequence of having to charter ships some time in advance, in order to secure a sufficient number and to go into (*sic. in*) consort, under a convoy of war ships, entailing considerable expenditure for demurrage. As these ships all had to go to one port to disembark their troops, this also added to the cost of victualling, as well as further demurrage charges.

183

*Debates House of Commons, Special Session
1914, 21st August, p. 57*

Sir ROBERT BORDEN: The Minister of Naval Affairs has informed us that he is contemplating a possible expenditure of \$6,000,000, but he does not anticipate that it will exceed \$4,000,000. That is exclusive of the submarines which were purchased at a cost of \$1,150,000. That is really about all I can say with regard to the part which concerns the Naval Service. As far as the military part is concerned, the explanation I have is as follows:

Mobilization and Canadian overseas contingent: Required to March 31, 1915.	
Pay of 25,000 men for 7 months	\$ 6,100,000
Rations for 25,000 for 7 months at 40 cents.. . . .	2,100,000
5,000 horses at \$200.. . . .	1,000,000
Forage for 7 months at 60 cents.. . . .	600,000
Subsistence of troops prior to arriving at Quebec.. . . .	275,000
Transport of men, horses, guns and equipment to Quebec.. . . .	450,000
Ocean Transport.. . . .	1,000,000
Transport abroad.. . . .	300,000
Return transport to Canada.. . . .	1,450,000
	\$13,275,000

Add:

Engineer services at Halifax, Quebec and elsewhere.. . . .	\$ 500,000
Equipment.. . . .	2,400,000
Clothing.. . . .	3,300,000
Dominion Arsenal—ammunition.. . . .	660,000
Censorship—7 months.. . . .	150,000
Pay, etc. of detachments of troops on guard at various places in Canada.. . . .	2,000,000
Movements of troops, ammunition, etc., to various places in Canada	100,000
For additional troops and unforeseen expenses.. . . .	7,615,000
Total.. . . .	\$30,000,000

The pay and rations have been estimated for seven months, but it is not very probable that the troops will return within that time.

183a

Press report of speech delivered at Ottawa, 28th September 1914.

184

*Letter from Mayor of Plymouth to General
Officer Commanding South-Western
Coast Defences*

GUILDHALL, PLYMOUTH,
15th October, 1914.

Dear General Penton.

I was sorry to be away from Plymouth when the splendid force of Canadian Volunteers arrived in our Port yesterday.

Would you kindly convey to them on behalf of the Civil population a cordial welcome, our

heartiest good wishes for the success of their arms, and our high appreciation of the lofty patriotism they have displayed in rallying to the support of the Mother Country?

If the exigencies of the Military Service permit I should like to be allowed to call on the Officer in command.

Can you secure an appointment for that purpose?

I am,

Dear General Penton,
Yours very truly,

T. BAKER,
Mayor.

Major-General A. P. Penton, C.B., C.V.O.,
Mount Wise,
Devonport.

185

*Telegram from Lord Kitchener to G.O.C.
Canadian Contingent*

LONDON, 16th October, 1914.

Will you please convey my cordial greetings, to the splendid contingent from Canada, which has just reached these shores, to take their share in the cause of the Mother Country. I am confident that they will play their part with gallantry and show by their soldier-like bearing that they worthily represent the great Dominion from which they came, they may always be sure that I will always do my best to forward their interests.

KITCHENER.

186

*Books published by Lieut.-General
E. A. H. Alderson:*

With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force, 1896. Methuen & Co., London, 1898.

Lessons from 100 Notes made in Peace and War. Gale and Polden Ltd., London, 1908.

Pink and Scarlet, or Hunting as a School for Soldiering. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1913.

187

*Letter from Colonial Office to Special
Representative of the Minister of
Militia and Defence*

VERY PRESSING

DOWNING STREET,
7th October, 1914.

Dear Sir,—

Mr. Harcourt desires me to inform you that he saw Lord Kitchener this afternoon after the interview at the Colonial Office at which

you were present. The War Office, he was informed, has nothing to do with the determination of the port of disembarkation. Mr. Harcourt therefore proceeded to the Admiralty and saw Mr. Churchill who informed him that the final decision with regard to the port of landing of the Canadian Expeditionary Force will be taken tomorrow. Mr. Harcourt will communicate this decision to you as soon as it is arrived at.

If Plymouth is to be the port the Admiralty have assured Mr. Harcourt that disembarkation would only take 6 days though there would be as has been shown, the difficulty of inadequate storage. Mr. Harcourt cannot say more at the moment than that he hopes and has some reason to hope that Southampton may be assigned as the port of landing. If it is Plymouth he will do all in his power to see that extra storage is provided.

Yours truly,

J. C. C. DAMSON.

Colonel Carson.

188

NOTE ON OVERSEAS DUTIES OF
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. W. CARSON

Colonel J. W. Carson (later Major-General Sir John Carson, CB.) was born in 1864. His first military service was as a gunner in the Montreal Brigade of Garrison Artillery from 1880 to 1883. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 5th Regiment Royal Highlanders of Canada in 1891 and eleven years later had risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and command of his unit. On the 5th Royal Highlanders being converted into a twobattalion regiment in 1906, Lieut-Colonel Carson was appointed Commandant. He spent two years on the Reserve of Officers and then in December 1911 took over the command of the 1st Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards) on re-organization. For this he was promoted Colonel on the 1st June 1914 but continued in his regimental command. On the outbreak of the Great War he took a leading part in the organization of the 14th Battalion, C.E.F.

On the 23rd September Colonel Carson sailed for England, in advance of the Contingent, for liaison duties. He returned to Canada in December but on 15th January 1915 was "appointed, during pleasure, to represent the Militia Department of Canada in the United Kingdom, in connection with supplies and other requirements for the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force both in the United Kingdom and at the seat of war"; and to act "as the agent of the Minister in maintaining the depots of articles of equipment and other supplies necessary for the upkeep and subsistence of the C.E.F." and to be under

control of the said Minister. (P.C. 107 of 15. i. 1915). As his duties connected with equipment fell within the province of the Divisional Commander, the commander of the Canadian troops in England, or the War Office, his function became more particularly that of personal representative of the Minister, with military rank but not holding any military appointment. Thus the scope of his activities extended to all matters in any way connected with the CAF. With the full cognizance of the Minister he frequently usurped the functions of Colonel (afterwards Major-General) J. C. MacDougall, C.M.G., who was notified 17th March 1915 that "As Officer Commanding all Canadian troops in Great Britain you are responsible to the Department of Militia and Defence, Canada, for all appointments to the force, for the training and discipline and all other matters pertaining thereto, including stores and equipment."

His functions were taken over by the Overseas Sub Militia Council (2\$. ix. 1916) of which he was chairman, and finally by the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, on formation (28. x. 1916).

Colonel Carson was promoted brigadiergeneral in May 1915 and major-general four months later; he was awarded the CB. (Civil Division) in the New Year's Honours 1916 and was created a Knight Bachelor on 25th May 1917.

(See 191).

189

*Telegram from Commanding Canadians to
Southern Command*

BUSTARD CAMP,

19th October 1914.

To: Commandeth,*
Salisbury.

I have just arrived back here from Plymouth and find that it is absolutely necessary that there should be canteens for sale of beer in camps. The men as I anticipated finding no liquor in Camp Canteens go to the neighbouring villages get bad liquor become quarrelsome and then create disturbances. I have just had serious complaints from local authorities.

COMMANDING CANADIANS.

*G.O.C. in C. Southern Command.

190

*Telegram from Minister of Militia and
Defence to G.O.C. Canadian Contingent.*

OTTAWA, 20th November, 1914.

Please cable regarding wet canteen. First hours open, second what liquors are sold, third regulations concerning government of same.

SAM HUGHES.

*Telegram in reply from G.O.C. Canadian
Contingent to the Minister of Militia and Defence.*
(Undated)

Canteens open one hour at noon three hours in the evening. Beer only sold. Non-commissioned officers always on duty. Trouble in the neighbouring villages has practically ceased since opening of canteens in camp.

E. A. H. ALDERSON.

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ANNEXE N° 714

Au quartier general, le 22 janvier, 1915.

G.P.N.

3e Bureau

Le général adjoint au
commandant en chef.

*Projet de relève établi entre is général Wilson et Is
général Foch.*

Is 21 janvier 1915.

Lea Canadiens (20,000 hommes environ) dé-barquant entre le 1er et le 10 février sont intercalés bataillon par bataillon clans lox troupes anglaises et, vers le 7 mars peut-etre, relèvent la deuxième division du 9e corps français.

* * * * *

P.O.: le chef d'état-major,

WEYGAND.

*"Lee Armies Françaises dam la Grande Guerre" Tome
II, Annexes 1er Volume, Annexe N° 714, pp.
1064-1066.*

*Scheme of relief agreed upon between General
Wilson and General Foch.*

21st January 1915.

The Canadians (about 20,000 men) did-embarking between the 1st and 10th February, are to be interpolated, battalion by battalion, among the British troops and, about the 7th March, relieve the 2nd Division of the IX French Corps.

191

P.C. 107.

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 15th January, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that Colonel John Wallace Carson, 1st Regiment (Canadian Grenadier Guards), be appointed, during pleasure to

represent the Militia Department of Canada in the United Kingdom, in connection with supplies and other requirements for the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force.

The Minister observes that Colonel Carson's duties are to consist in acting as the agent of the Minister of Militia in maintaining the depots of articles of equipment and other supplies necessary for the upkeep and subsistence of The Canadian Expeditionary Force both in the United Kingdom and at the seat of war;

That he will be under the control of the Minister of Militia and Defence, and will obey such orders and directions as may be from time to time issued to him through the proper channel. He will be rated as a General Staff Officer and will be given pay and field allowance as such with an allowance of ten dollars per diem for subsistence, in addition to his actual travelling expenses.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

192

Letter from G.O.C. Canadian Contingent to War Office.

HRADQUARTERS, C.E.F.
BUSTARD CAMP,

17th November, 1914.

To: The Secretary, War Office,
London.

Question of Formation of a
Base Remount Depot.

Sir:

1. With this Force at present there is an Advanced Remount Depot for 300 horses, and this is not up to strength. Our total establishment in horses is 7,700.

2. Is it considered necessary to form a Base Remount Depot, as laid down in War Establishments, for the Expeditionary Force as well as the Advanced Depot? If early information is given on this point a cable will be sent to Canada for instructions as to the best method of carrying this out.

3. In the event of a Base Remount Depot being formed I should be glad to know whether it would be located in England or at one of the bases in France.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

E. A. H. ALDERSON,

Lieut.-General,

Comdg. 1st Canadian Contingent,
Exped. Force.

Letter from War Office to the G.O.C. Southern
Command

WAR OFFICE, LONDON,
27th November, 1914.

121/Overseas/163 (M.O. 8) Confidential.

Sir:—

I am commanded by the Army Council to request that you will please inform the General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian Division, with reference to his letter of the 17th November, 1914, on the subject of the formation of a Base Remount Depot, that the matter is the subject of communication between the War Office and the Colonial Office. When a decision is arrived at, Lieut.-General Alderson will be informed of any particulars which affect the Division under his command.

I am to add, with reference to the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Lieut.-General Alderson's letter, copy of which is attached for your information, that direct communication between the General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian Division and the Canadian Civil or Military Authorities in Canada is not permissible. All communications from him on subjects affecting his command should be addressed to you for submission to the War Office, who must, if confusion is to be avoided, continue to be the sole channel of communication with the Colonial authorities on matters affecting the contingents furnished by them.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
B. B. CUDITT.

The General Officer,
Commanding in Chief,
Southern Command,
Salisbury.

*Letter from War Office to G.O.C. Southern
Command*

WAR OFFICE,

29th November, 1914.

116/Gen. No./6017 (Q.M.G. 4).

Sir,

In reply to your communication of the 25th instant, number 22577, I am directed to inform you that the whole question of Remounts and Remount organization is now being discussed with the Government of Canada and instructions will be issued in due course.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. F. MACMUNN,

Lieut. Colonel,

for Director of Remounts

The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Southern Command.

Letter from Headquarters Southern Command to G.O.C. Canadian Contingent

C.R. S.C. No. 22517 (R)
SALISBURY,

2nd December, 1914.

The General- Officer Commanding,
1st Canadian Division.

The attached copy of War Office letter No. 121/Overseas/163 (M.O. 8), dated the 27th November, 1914, is forwarded for your information.

2. I also attach a copy of War Office letter, 116/General Number/6017 (Q.M.G. 4), dated the 29th November, 1914, in reply to my minute of the 25th ultimo, forwarding your letter of the 19th idem, on the subject of the formation of Remount Depots for the Contingent under your command.

3. It is not understood why, the question having been -referred by you to the Secretary, War Office, on the 17th November, your letter of the 19th ultimo on the same subject was addressed to the Headquarters of this Command.

F. F. JOHNSON,

Colonel, A.Q.M.G.,

for Major-General i/c. Administration,
Southern Command.

Letter from G.O.C. Canadian Contingent to H.Q. Southern Command

HEADQUARTERS, C.E.F.,

BUSTARD, SALISBURY PLAIN,

8th December, 1914.

Headquarters,
Southern Command,
Salisbury.

Referring to your letter C.R.S.C. No. 22517 (R), dated the 2nd December and also to War Office letter No. 121/Overseas/163 (M.O. 8) dated 27th November, I should like to be allowed to explain as follows:

(1) I had no wish whatever to communicate direct with the Canadian authorities except in so much as it would minimize correspondence and facilitate the obtaining of equipment &c.

(2) In several instances I have received (and am still receiving) direct Cables from Canada. I have also been desired by the War Office to Cable direct to Canada concerning Arms and equipment, which were not available in the United Kingdom.

(3) (1) and (2) and also the then uncertainty as to exact procedure which was to be adopted, are the indirect reasons why I referred to cabling direct to Canada in the question of Remounts.

(4) Referring to para. 3 of your letter of the 2nd December, I would explain that some weeks ago, the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Southern Command, personally gave me permission to write direct to the War Office on all matters except those in which the Southern Command was concerned. My letter of the 17th November was one raising the general question of Remounts, and my letter of the 19th November went into the location of the Remount Depot in the Southern Command, hence the reason of the latter letter being addressed to you.

I should be glad if you would forward this explanation to the War Office.

E. A. H. ALDERSON,

Lieut.-General,

Commanding First Canadian Contingent.

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Letter from General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian Division to the High Commissioner for Canada

FRANCE, March 7, 1915.

Dear Sir George:

I have your letter in which you send a copy of a cable from the Prime Minister regarding the 17th Battalion.

Were it not serious in that it gives the people of Nova Scotia a totally wrong impression, the article in the Halifax Chronicle would be as childish as was the idea, that you told me of, that trenches round tents were not allowed on Salisbury Plain, because they would interfere with the hunting.

The only word of truth in the whole article is that . . . has been replaced.

The fact that these units knew that they were not coming with the division naturally dampened every one's spirits, and I have no doubt some of the men, in writing home, would overdraw the picture of the inevitable difficulties and discomforts.

All the nonsense about being used as scavengers, etc., is pure invention.

Yours sincerely,

E. A. H. ALDERSON,

*Debates House of Commons, Session 1915,
6th March, p. 1601.*

194

ROUTINE AFTER ORDER No. 1
BY LT.-GENERAL E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
Commanding First Canadian Contingent,
Expeditionary Force.

THE BUSTARD,

26th October, 1914.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

1. The G.O.C. has much pleasure in publishing the following kind and sympathetic address made to the Canadian Contingent by its Colonel-Commandant; (*sic Colonelin-Chief*) Field Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C., K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., V.D.

The address should be published in all orders and read on parades of each Unit.

"Brother soldiers of the Canadian Contingent:—

"It is an intense pleasure to me to be able to come here today as your Honorary Colonel, and to give you a most hearty welcome to the Mother Country. We have arrived at the most critical moment of our history, and you have generously come to help us in our hour of need. Words fail me when I try to tell you how deeply we appreciate your action, and the splendid spirit of loyalty which has prompted that action. Three months ago we found ourselves involved in this war, a war, not of our own seeking, but one which those who have studied Germany's literature and Germany's inspiration knew was a war which we should inevitably have to deal with sooner or later.

"The prompt resolve of Canada to give us such valuable assistance has touched us deeply. That resolve has been quickened into action in what I consider a marvellously short period of time, and under the excellent organizing and driving power of your Minister of Militia, my friend Major-General Hughes, you quickly found yourselves in a fine camp in your own Laurentian Mountains, where your training and musketry were able to be carried out in a most practical manner and with the least possible delay; the result being that today less than three months from the declaration of war, I am able to greet this fine body of soldiers on English soil.

"There is no need for me to tell you that you have a stern task before you. We are fighting a nation which looks upon the British Empire as a barrier to her development and has, in consequence, long contemplated our overthrow and humiliation. To attain that end she has manufactured a magnificent fighting machine and is straining every nerve to gain victory. In her determination to be the

ruling Power in the world, she has not scrupled to break faith with the smaller nations, and has shown by her actions that she is prepared by every means in her power-however unworthy and brutal-to achieve her purpose. It is only by the most determined efforts that we can defeat her. When the time comes for you to take your place in the Field, you will find yourselves fighting side by side with the men of our Regular Army who have already done great deeds and endured great hard ships. With the men of our Indian Army who have come with such devotion and eagerness to take their share in defending British interests, and with men who, like yourselves, are coming from the other self-governing Dominions to co-operate with us.

"I need not urge you to do your best for I know you will. For you will be fighting in the greatest of all causes, the cause of right, of justice, and of liberty. May God prosper you in the great struggle.

ROBERTS, F. M."

24. 10. '14

J. H. MACBRIEN,
Captain,
for A.A. & Q.M.G.

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*Letter from Special Representative of the
Minister of Militia and Defence to
The Minister of Militia and Defence*
LONDON, 7th December, 1914.

Major-General The Hon. SAM HUGHES,
Minister of Militia and Defence,
Ottawa, Canada.

My dear General,

I wired you on Saturday last as follows, and which I now confirm

Rumoured additional troops wanted Egypt. Australians there now. All ranks our contingent anxious get there. Likely not wanted Continent before February. Strongly urge you press authorities here send them abroad soon.

The conditions of camp life in England at this season of the year are simply appalling, and in my judgment are bound to have a serious effect on the health and morale of our troops. So far, on the whole, they have done wonderfully well, and we hear nothing but commendation for their appearance and general set-up and the little work they have been able, so far, to do. I should say that on an average, for several weeks back, it has rained five days in each week, and the rain is good and heavy when it comes down. The whole camp grounds, from Salisbury to Pond

Farm and from there to Bulford, where the 4th Brigade are now in huts, and then to Lark Hill, where we are moving in slowly by a battalion at a time, is just one sea of mud. The whole formation of the country is rock chalk, with from a few inches to one foot of earth on top of it, and as the water simply cannot drain away, the united results of heavy motor lorries, horses, guns and men continually moving over this ground is a straight morass over this entire district. I wear nothing but long rubber boots when I am down there, and it is just a ploughing round in the mud all the time.

Our men are wonderfully patient, but naturally one and all anxious to be doing something, and unless the weather changes and freezes up they can get but *very* little training in Salisbury.

Persistent rumours have been floating around the last few days to the effect that more troops would be sent to Egypt. Some few weeks ago I spoke to Lord Kitchener on this subject, but he stated he had all the troops he wanted in Egypt, and that our men would not be sent there.

I trust you will decide, in the best interests of our troops, to urge this Egyptian question on Lord Kitchener. Believe me, it is urgent, and after consulting a large number of our medical men the general consensus of opinion is that another two or three months of present conditions in England will have a serious effect on the general health and well-being of our troops, and we naturally, when they do go to the Front, want to send them there in the pink of condition. They would have been a thousand times better off in Canada than they are at Salisbury Plains.

I think it only right, as your representative here, to give you the fullest information on this subject.

Yours faithfully,

J. W. CARSON.

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NOTE ON UNOFFICIAL CANADIAN OVERSEAS VOLUNTEERS; 1914

The "Houghton Detachment" was a unit with an extempore but officially authorized establishment of two officers and fifty-five other ranks, enlisted in Winnipeg and Port Arthur as machine gunners for the Fort Garry Horse. One officer and fifteen other ranks sailed with the 6th Battalion (F.G.H.) from Quebec; one officer and forty arrived too late to join, and in civilian clothes embarked at Quebec on 3rd October in the S.S. Letitia. The latter party reached Glasgow on the 11th, and were temporarily taken under the wing

of the British army until despatched to Salisbury Plain, where they were posted to the Canadian Automobile Machine Gun Brigade on 1st November.

Another irregular but unofficial group of volunteers, calling themselves "Elliott's Horse," raised in Victoria and Vancouver with the intention of joining British cavalry units, sailed from Montreal, eighty-four strong, on 30th October. On disembarkation they learned that the Canadian cavalry was under strength. By special permission of the Army Council, obtained through the intervention of the acting High Commissioner for Canada, fifty-five were enlisted in the Canadian Contingent--chiefly the R.C.D. and L.S.H.--on Salisbury Plain; the remainder joined King Edward's Horse and other British Units. All expenses, including uniform and transportation up to this time, had been met by Mr. R. P. Elliott, K.C., of Victoria, B.C.

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NOTE ON RECRUITING FOR
CANADIAN CONTINGENT IN ENGLAND,
1914-15

The question of recruiting in England to complete establishment was raised on 29th October 1914 by the O.C. Royal Canadian Dragoons, who asked permission to enlist twenty-three "good men" who were then offering; approval was given by the G.O.C. Canadian Contingent. On 12th November the War Office reversed this decision:

Enlistment in the United Kingdom for the Colonial Contingent cannot be allowed.

This was published in Salisbury Plain Orders next day and at the same time General Alderson protested to the War Office that:

... as numbers of both men and officers are being permitted to transfer to the Imperial Army I should be glad if I might be permitted to enlist *bona file* Canadians who may be at-present in the United Kingdom, or who may have come over from Canada for enlistment in place of those transferred.

Prior to this certain units of the Contingent, including the 17th Battalion, had advertised for recruits in England.

In reply to General Alderson's protest, the Army Council said that the taking on of personnel of one of the independent detachments of Canadian volunteers (Elliott's Horse, see Appendix 196) had been authorized as a very exceptional case at the personal request of the acting High Commissioner for Canada. And, further, the Council pointed out that this was not to be taken as a precedent, that no other men were to be enlisted in England, and

that the policy of the Army Council and of the Canadian Government was that all enlistments for the Canadian Contingent should be carried out in Canada.

On 8th December General Alderson in a letter to the Southern Command again protested, saying that, in response to a request of the Military Secretary, he had forwarded from the Contingent no less than a hundred applications for commissions in, and had made no objections to the transfer of officers to, the Regular or Territorial Army. In accordance with War Office instructions he had been refusing applications from *bona fide* Canadians to enlist, and he again requested that he be allowed to enlist such men, up to the extent of the men discharged on appointment to commissioned rank in the Regular or Territorial Army. "If this is not allowed, commanding officers can hardly be expected to look with favourable eyes upon the appointment of men to commissions."

Three weeks later the Army Council modified their previous decision: the proposal of General Alderson was not approved but special cases might be submitted to the Army Council after very careful investigation of each. When, in accordance with the above, General Alderson on 12th January submitted to Southern Command a list of fourteen *bona fide* Canadians it brought a reply from the Adjutant-General that:

Lord Kitchener has always been opposed to your recruiting Canadians in this country for fear of our being inundated with men from the Colony, and by so called Canadians in England.

The very suggestion that higher rates of pay could be obtained in England than our regulars get, would have a very disturbing influence on our recruiting.

Lord Kitchener suggested that vacancies should be filled from Canadian reserve units, so that trained men would be secured instead of recruits; but fifteen special cases were subsequently approved.

The question was re-opened by Br.-General Carson on 25th May 1915, when he wrote to the Secretary of the War Office asking that enlistment of "strictly speaking Canadian citizens who may be in England" might be permitted. The Director of Recruiting a week later wrote to the Secretary of the High Commissioner "with reference to Mr. Carson's letter to Sir Reginald Brade . . . that under the present circumstances the War Office had no objection to such enlistments" and at the end of June a ruling was given that attestations in England must be restricted to—

Any man who can satisfactorily prove that he has not only been a resident of Canada, but that he is now domiciled there, i.e., that his home is established there, . . . irrespective of the length of time he has resided in Canada. This refers to British subjects.

Under this ruling, in the months of June to September 1915, inclusive, 123 recruits were enlisted in England.

Shortly before the Division left for France it was found that there was a shortage in the Artillery of about thirty artificers, farriers, shoeing-smiths and saddlers; General Alderson therefore on 12th January requested that authority be granted for their enlistment in England; the request was acceded to and the enlistment of non-Canadians carried out to this extent. One S.M. Instructor R.E. attached to the Canadian Engineers, was taken on strength of the C.E.F. on 10th February 1915.

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OFFICERS STRUCK OFF STRENGTH—FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT

18th October 1914—15th February 1915

Reason	Lt.-Col.	Major	Captain	Lieut.	N.S.	Total
(1) Permitted to resign his Commission, his services being no longer required.....		1	1	2		4
(2) His services being no longer required.....		1	4	4		9
(3) At his own request.....				1		1
(4) Permitted to resign his appointment with the Contingent.....	1	4	3	12	1	21
(5) Medically unfit.....			1			1
(6) Surplus officers recalled to Canada.....	6	6	14	29		55
(7) Returned to Canada on duty.....	1	2	1			4
(8) On appointment to British Forces.....		1	12	18		31
(9) Deaths.....	1		2	2		5
Total.....	9	15	38	68	1	131

199

OTHER RANKS STRUCK OFF STRENGTH—FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT
Salisbury Plain—18th October, 1914—15th February, 1915

Unit	On appointment to Commission		As Special Cases (See notes in remarks column)	K.R. 392(3) (c)— Recruits with- in 3 months of enlistment	K.R. 392(xi) —For mis- conduct Undesir- able
	In New Army	In other Services (See notes in remarks column)		K.R. 392(3) (e)— Unlikely to be- come an effici- ent soldier K.R. 392 (9)— Unfitted for duties of his corps	
Sub-Staff H.Q.					
R.C. Dragoons	7				1
L.S.H. (R.C.)	9	2 (b) (c)	1 (iv) 1 (i) 2 (vi)	3 10	13
R.C.H.A.	8				
Div. Mtd. Troops	2		1 (i)		1
Div. Cyclist Coy			1 (iv)		
Div. Artillery*					3
1st Bde. C.F.A.	8			1	
2nd Bde. C.F.A.	1			10	9
3rd Bde. C.F.A.	8	1 (a)	2 (iii)	2	4
Heavy Battery				1	6
Div. Ammn. Col.	1		1 (ii)	2	3
Div. Engineers*	3				2
1st Fd. Coy., C.E.	2		1 (i)	6	
2nd Fd. Coy., C.E.					1
3rd Fd. Coy., C.E.	1				2
Div. Signal Coy	2				
1st Inf. Bde.*	1			1	
1st Battalion	1				1
2nd Battalion					
3rd Battalion	16	1 (c)	1 (i)	1	4
4th Battalion	2		1 (iv)	3	11
2nd Inf. Bde.*	1				
5th Battalion	11	1 (f)	1 (v)	1	1
6th Battalion	7	2 (a) (c)	1 (i)	1	2
7th Battalion	36	3 (f) (g) (h)	3 (i) 1 (v)	1	4
8th Battalion	10		1 (i)	16	12
3rd Inf. Bde.*					
13th Battalion	6				
14th Battalion	5			6	6
15th Battalion	2			1	4
16th Battalion	27	5 (a) 2 (e)		1	
4th Inf. Bde.*					
9th Battalion	8	2 (c) (j)	2 (ii)	7	9
10th Battalion	3	1 (d)	1 (i)	7	14
11th Battalion	12			1	2
12th Battalion	1		2 (i) (ii)	1	11
17th Battalion	1	1 (a)	1 (iii)		
P.P.C.L.I.	1				
Auto M.G. Bde	1	2 (a) 1 (j)			
C.A.S.C.*	4				2
Divisional Train	4			4	6
Div. Ammn. Park	2			1	12
Div. Supply Col.				2	1
Depot Units Supply	1				
Reserve Park	1				1
C.A.M.C.*		1 (a)		1	3
C.A.V.C.*		1 (a)		1	
Base Pay Office				1	1
Remount Depot					
Totals	216	26	25	93	153

†Includes 46 returned as enemy aliens.

*Specific units not known.

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OTHER RANKS STRUCK OFF STRENGTH—FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT
Salisbury Plain—18th October, 1914—15th February, 1915

K.R. 392 (xvi)— No longer physically fit for war service	K.R. 392 (xxv)— His ser- vices no longer required	Reasons unknown	De- serters	Invalided to Canada medically unfit	Deaths	Remarks
			1			(a) Details unknown.
2					1	
9			5	3		(b) On apptmt. to Horse Gds. (Blue).
2				2		(c) On apptmt. in Sp. Res. of Officers.
				4		
3			1			(d) On apptmt. to R.N. Division.
9					1	
			1	2	1	(e) On apptmt. to R.N.V.R.
4	1		2	5	3	
4			5	3	3	
3	1					(f) Selection for R.M.C.
2	4					
				1	1	(g) On apptmt. to R. Marines.
2						(h) On apptmt. to Indian Army.
1						(j) On apptmt. to Royal Navy.
			6	1		
						(i) At own request and without ex- pense to public.
12	1		1	13	3	
3	2			6		
3	1		2	11	1	
11	1		1	8	3	(ii) To join his former Regt. in Belgian Army.
			1			
3	4	2	4	8	6	
2	2			2	1	(iii) To rejoin the Regular Forces.
5			5	3	3	
						(iv) To enlist in New Army.
9	5		11	4		
			1			(v) Citizen of U.S.A.
6			12	4	4	
4	2		9	3	4	
6	2		1	5	2	(vi) At parents' request.
2	1			4	3	
5						
4	14		3	2	2	
9	5		5	6	1	
9			1	3	3	
8	2	1		9	1	
8	1		1	7	7	
3					4	
			1			
1						
	1		4			
1			1	1	1	
2			1			
1	1		4			
2	2		1	3	4	
1						
			3	3		
161	53†	3	94	126	63	

RECAPITULATION

Discharges, 730; deserters, 94; invalided to Canada, 126; deaths, 63—total, 1,013

200

Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19. The Medical Services. By Sir Andrew Macphail. The King's Printer, Ottawa. pp. 257-260.

201

LOCATION OF UNITS OF III CONTINGENT AS AT 22nd DECEMBER, 1914

BUSTARD CAMP (Tents)

Divisional Headquarters.
 Divisional Mounted Troops (including Cyclist Company) (Newfoundland Farm).
 Headquarters, 1st Infantry Brigade.
 1st Infantry Battalion.
 2nd Infantry Battalion.
 3rd Infantry Battalion.
 4th Infantry Battalion.
 Automobile Machine Gun Brigade.
 No. 2 Company, Divisional Train.
 No. 1 Depot Unit of Supply.
 Details, No. 4 Unit of Supply.
 Ordnance Depot.
 No. 1 Field Ambulance.
 Depot Company C.A.M.C.

WEST DOWN SOUTH CAMP (Tents)

Divisional Ammunition Park (M.T.).
 No. 2 Field Ambulance (2 Sections at West Down North).
 Advanced Remount Depot (Canning's Farm).
 No. 1 Mobile Section, C.A.V.C.
 No. 2 Veterinary Section, C.A.V.C.
 Base Depot, C.A.V.C. Stores.

WEST DOWN NORTH CAMP (Tents)

"A" Battery R.C.H.A.
 "B" Battery R.C.H.A.
 Headquarters, Divisional Artillery.
 1st Field Artillery Brigade and Ammunition Column.
 2nd Field Artillery Brigade and Ammunition Column.
 3rd Field Artillery Brigade and Ammunition Column.
 1st Heavy Battery and Ammunition Column.
 Divisional Ammunition Column.
 Headquarters Company, Divisional Train.
 1st Railway Supply Detachment. No. 2 General Hospital.
 2 Sections, No. 2 Field Ambulance.

LARK HILL CAMP (NORTH) (Huts)

Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Brigade (No. 10 Camp).
 6th Infantry Battalion (No. 13 Camp).
 13th Infantry Battalion (No. 10 Camp).
 15th Infantry Battalion (No. 12 Camp).
 14th Infantry Battalion (No. 11 Camp).

LARK HILL CAMP (SOUTH) (Huts)

Headquarters, Divisional Engineers (No. 1 Camp).
 1st Field Company, Divisional Engineers (No. 1 Camp).
 2nd Field Company, Divisional Engineers (No. 1 Camp).
 3rd Field Company, Divisional Engineers (No. 1 Camp).
 Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Brigade (Nos. 6 and 7 Camps).
 5th Infantry Battalion (No. 6 Camp).
 7th Infantry Battalion (No. 7 Camp).
 8th Infantry Battalion (No. 8 Camp).
 16th Infantry Battalion (No. 2 Camp).
 Headquarters, Divisional Train (No. 9 Camp).
 No. 3 Company, Divisional Train (No. 1 Camp).
 No. 4 Company, Divisional Train (No. 9 Camp).
 No. 2 Depot Unit of Supply (No. 1 Camp).
 No. 4 Depot Unit of Supply (No. 1 Camp). Lieut.-Col. Moore, with details.

ROLLESTONE

Lieut.-Colonel Shannon, with 810 carpenters.

SLING PLANTATION CAMP (Huts)

Headquarters, 4th Infantry Brigade (Nos. 3 and 5 Camps).
 9th Infantry Battalion (Nos. 1 and 2 Camps).
 10th Infantry Battalion (Nos. 2 and 3 Camps).
 11th Infantry Battalion (Nos. 3 and 5 Camps).
 12th Infantry Battalion (No. 7 Camp).
 17th Infantry Battalion (Nos. 2 and 3 Camps).
 Reserve Park (No. 3 Camp).
 No. 3 Depot Unit of Supply (No. 5 Camp).
 No. 3 Field Ambulance (No. 5 Camp).

POND FARM CAMP (Tents)

Royal Canadian Dragoons.
 Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).

BULFORD MANOR

No. 1 General Hospital.

SALISBURY

Ordnance Depot.
 Base Pay Depot.

NETHERAVON

No. 2 Mobile Section, C.A.V.C.
 No. 1 Veterinary Section, C.A.V.C.
 Divisional Ammunition Park.

ENFORD

Divisional Signal Company.

SHREWTON

Divisional Supply Column.

AMESBURY

Advanced Depot, Medical Stores.

LONDON

Chief Paymaster. }
 Officer i/c Records. } .36 Victoria Street, S.W.
 D.A.A.G. at Base }

CLIVEDEN (TAPLOW) BUCKS

Clearing Hospital.

HAMPSTEAD (LONDON)

No. 1 Stationary Hospital.

NOTE: The P.P.C.L.I. and No. 2 Stationary Hospital had proceeded to France and the Newfoundland Contingent had moved to Fort George, Scotland.

202

NOTE ON FORAGE RATION

The scale of forage ration, as laid down in Allowance Regulations (British), was: for riding horses 12 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of oats; for heavy draught horses 15 pounds of hay and 19 pounds of oats: all draught horses in the Divisional Train, Field Ambulances, Ammunition Column, Heavy Battery, cook's carts and water carts were classed as "heavy draught." On 6th November this scale was increased for riding horses by 2' pounds of hay and 2 pounds of oats. On the 2nd December, as Canadian horses were stated to be accustomed to bulky food, the hay ration for riding horses was further increased to 18 pounds; the ration of oats remained the same, but variation was permitted on a basis of 1½ pounds hay for 1 pound oats. An extra 2 pounds of oats was authorized for draught horses on 11th December. On 23rd January two pounds of hay were added to the ration of the heavy Shires and Clydesdales, that had replaced Canadian draught horses. Finally, the ration for all heavy draught horses was fixed at 24 pounds of hay and 18 pounds of oats.

Other additions from 30th December were ½ pound crushed Indian corn three times a week to each horse riding or draught, and, special to Lord Strathcona's Horse, 1 pound carrots and 1 pound beets per diem for eight days.

Complaints were made at various times about the quality of the hay; part, at least, was imported and of "very inferior quality and some very mouldy," according to General

15135—10

Alderson, and some of it very old. Contractors sometimes gave short weight; in one instance, on a test of ten bales, the average weight was found to be 4 pounds below the reputed 56 pounds and none measured up to full weight.

203

Letter from. War Office to the Inspector General of Communications.

LONDON, 5th February, 1915.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that in response to an application from the General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian Contingent for exchange of the Ross Rifles with which the Cavalry and Artillery of the force were armed, for Short rifles, the Council decided that the exchange should not be made, and that these troops should take the field with the Ross Rifle which has been provided by the Canadian Government. I am to ask you therefore to be good enough to issue such orders as may be necessary to ensure that the exchange will not be effected in France without the sanction of the Army Council.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

B. B. CUBITT.

Inspector general of
 Communications,
 British Army in the Field,
 Expeditionary Force.

204

Telegram from G.O.C. Canadian Contingent to Department of Militia and Defence.

BUSTARD CAMP, SALISBURY,
 19th November, 1914.

The boots now being issued to the contingent are not suitable for rough wear in wet weather please cable instructions for purchase of boots here if we can obtain them.

COMMANDING CANADIANS.

Telegram from Department of Militia and Defence to G.O.C. Canadian Contingent.

OTTAWA, 19th November, 1914.

Reference your cable re boots. Forty-eight thousand pairs overshoes already shipped. Will this meet your requirements.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

Telegram from G.O.C. Canadian Contingent to Department of Militia and Defence.

BUSTARD CAMP, SALISBURY,
5th December, 1914.

Q three one one. It has been found that overshoes do not compensate for faulty construction of boots. Some pairs are useless after ten days wear. Special report is being made.

GENERAL CANADIANS.

Telegram from acting High Commissioner for Canada to the Prime Minister

LONDON, 24th November, 1914.

Confidential. Much difficulty obtaining orders Canadian boots. Authorities consider them too light altogether; say only heavy marching boots adapted to campaigning; find general complaint on this account regarding boots given our Canadian contingent; stated they will not stand mud and water and heavy work. Consider overshoes impracticable, as they are heavy to walk in and will only last short time on hard roads. In my opinion next contingent should be provided with boots made on regulation army pattern.

PERLEY.

(Debates, House of Commons, Session 1916, Vol. III, p. 2398). (See 205, 206, 207, 208.)

205

AFTER ORDERS BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.

Commanding First Canadian Contingent

THE BUSTARD,
27th January, 1915.

No. 1056—BOOTS FOR SERVICE
OVERSEAS

When proceeding to the Front every man must be in possession of a pair of perfectly serviceable Imperial pattern Army Regulation boots. Officers Commanding units will at once arrange for an inspection to be made of the boots in possession of all ranks and submit an indent with size roll immediately to C.O.O. Salisbury to complete their units accordingly. No Canadian pattern boots are to be taken overseas.

(See 206, 208, 209, 210.)

AFTER ORDERS BY LIEUTENANTGENERAL E.

A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.

Commanding First Canadian Contingent.

THE BUSTARD,
4th February, 1915.

No. 1200—BOOTS

Referring to Divisional Order No. 1056, dated 27th January, Officers Commanding units will render a certificate to the A.A. and Q.M.G. by 12 noon, Saturday 6th instant, that every man is in possession of a service pair of Imperial pattern Army boots.

(See 205, 207, 208.)

207

Debates House of Commons, Session, 1915, Volume I, pp. 19-21, 8th February.

(See 204, 205, 206, 208.)

208

Report of Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, printed in Debates of the House of Commons, Session 1915, Vol. III, pp. 2372 *et seq.*

(See 204, 205, 206, 207.)

209

Extract from letter Lieut.-General Alderson to Colonel Carson dated 88th March 1915

... I should like to say a word or two as regards the Webb equipment and the Bain wagons, because I have an idea that it is thought by some that they were condemned as unsuitable because they were not regulation, or because they were Canadian!

To take the Webb (*sic Webb*) equipment first or rather the Oliver equipment, for which the Webb was substituted. There is no doubt whatever that the Oliver equipment is not suitable for active service, as it is issued. The things against it are:—

(1) It only carries 50-80 rounds of ammunition, whereas a man has to carry 120.

(2) It cuts a man under the arms and this is accelerated after wet.

(3) It does not adapt itself to the wearers shape, as does the Webb.

(4) It has nothing which corresponds to the valise. I am sure that troops going on service with the Oliver equipment would be greatly handicapped.

210

Letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General

DOWNING STREET,
8th January, 1615.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Royal Highness for the consideration of your Ministers, a copy of a letter from the War Office forwarding a report on the mechanical transport of the Canadian contingent, together with the remarks of the General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian division.

I have, etc.,

L.HARCOURT.

Governor General,
His Royal Highness
The Duke of Connaught and of
Strathearn, K.G., etc.

Letter from War Office to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office.

LONDON, 31st December, 1914.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to forward the enclosed report, in duplicate, on the mechanical transport of the Canadian Contingent, together with the remarks of the General Officer Commanding 1st Canadian Division thereon, for transmission to the Governor-General of Canada. The Council desire that the attention of the Canadian Government may be invited to the following suggestions.

(1) That motor lorries capable of carrying a normal useful load of 3 tons should be provided for the present contingent. These should

be of one make only, either "Kelly Springfield," or "Peerless." The latter is preferable, as a number of this make are being supplied for the Army.

(2) That the equipment of motor lorries at present with the 1st Contingent, should be retained in England for the use of the 2nd Contingent, which would hold in reserve their own proper equipment until such time as they were ordered to join the Expeditionary Force.

(3) That 20 per cent should be supplied for reserve, all wastage being made up by further shipments from time to time.

I am to add, as regards the Base, that this would not be at a separate Port from the one which the main force is using, but it might

be advisable to use a separate storehouse, or allocate a definite portion of one, for the spares of the Canadian Contingent. The repair equipment on page 1 of the report should not be necessary.

I am further to say that the make of cars and motor bicycles is not so important a matter as that of the lorries, and probably the Canadian Government would prefer to supply those makes they are using now, to which there is no great objection.

I am, etc.,

B. B. CUBITT.

Letter from G.O.C. Canadian Contingent to Headquarters, Southern Command, Salisbury.

BUSTARD CAMP, 16th December, 1914.

The attached report is forwarded to you for favour of transmission to the War Office.

Regarding the report, with which I generally concur, I understand that Major Russell is returning to Canada, and will be able to explain any particulars in it which may appear somewhat doubtful, to the Militia Council.

2. The best type of heavy horse wagon appears to be the Port Arthur wagon, but as this requires four horses it is a matter for consideration whether the Light Bain would not be equally suitable.

In all types of wagon, if possible, the front wheels should be so arranged as to allow of the wagon turning in a smaller circle than it does at present.

3. It has been proposed by the War Office to double the strength of the Cyclist Company. This is being done, so the number of bicycles required monthly for the upkeep of this unit will be 100.

4. The best make of light lorry appears to be the Jeffrey. Of the others, the Kelly or Peerless. With more experience it is possible that this opinion may be modified, but there appear to be some serious defects in the Gramm Motor Lorry, as there has been considerable engine trouble with this type and several of the crank shafts have broken.

In any case, if it is possible, one make of lorry should be adopted and adhered to, so that the question of spare parts and repair would be simplified.

5. In Major Russell's report he mentions that 15 per cent of the lorries should be kept in reserve under ordinary conditions. I think this should be increased to 20 per cent.

6. Owing to the very heavy work which has been thrown on the mechanical transport during the time the Division has been encamped on Salisbury Plain, I think it will be

necessary to consider the advisability of replacing the whole of the lorries by new ones, which would be kept in reserve until the Division proceeds abroad. The used vehicles being left behind for use by the 2nd Contingent.

E. A. H. ALDERSON,
Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Canadian Contingent.

SALISBURY,
19th December, 1914.

Secretary, W.O.

Forwarded. I presume this report will be transmitted to the Canadian Government.

E. A. ALTHAM,
M.G.
for G.O.C.in-C., S.C.

REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
MECHANICAL TRANSPORT BASE
(By Major T. A. Russell)

The conclusion arrived at was the recommendation of a base for mechanical transport to include:—

- 1st. Stores and parts.
- 2nd. Large repairs.

The stores or parts may be carried separately from the regular ordnance or as a part of it, but in such case there should be a mechanical transport man or men attached who would be familiar with the parts and supplies that are required.

At such a base should be kept practically all the large stock of spare parts for motor lorries and cars.

Repair Equipment.—The repair equipment would not be mobile in the sense of being mounted on the lorry, but it should be possible to transport, in the event of the necessity of moving the base.

In the way of large equipment the following items should be secured:

One large lathe, one small lathe, one drill press, one grinder, one large forge, one petrol engine for power purposes, one electric light generator, one band-saw, one oxyacetylene out-light, two large vices, two large torches, together with the necessary small supplies for such, and equipment.

Reserve Cars and Lorries: If the efficiency of the transport is to be kept up it is necessary that some of the cars and lorries be held in reserve, and not used in ordinary work.

This is the only way in which it will be possible to have the equipment necessary for an emergency.

It would seem desirable that 15 per cent of the lorries should be kept in reserve at base under ordinary conditions.

RE NEW TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT

It is essential to provide for supplies of new equipment coming forward to take the place of that which becomes worn out or lost in active service. I have made an estimate of possible requirements of this character, and would suggest that monthly shipments come forward, beginning in December, about as follows:

Wagons.—One hundred per month, divided between light and heavy type, as experience in camp may have indicated.

Motor Cycles.—Ten per month.

Bicycles.—Seventy-five to one hundred per month.

Motor Lorries. Five per month for divisional supply column (White); fifteen per month for divisional ammunition park.

The officers commanding these units would be able to recommend from their experience which machines would be most suitable.

It is desired that the lorries ordered now be of as few types as possible so that the problem of carrying spare parts would be increasingly simple.

Motor Cars.—Six per month, to be divided between the lighter and heavier cars, according as experience would have indicated.

The suggestion has been made in the case of the heavier machines, that they should be fitted with shock absorbers and Rudge Whitworth detachable wire wheels, and that the back of the front seat should be made to fold backward when desired.

Spars Parts.—With each lorry and motor car coming forward, ask for an assortment of spare parts, exclusive of tires, to the value of \$250 per machine.

Spare Tires.—With each lorry coming forward have one complete additional set of solid tires, and with each touring car three sets pneumatic tires.

ORDER FOR SUPPLIES FOR MOTOR TRUCKS
AND LORRIES

50 magnetos—being one magneto for every three vehicles in service. These must be of the same types as supplied on the vehicles.

1,600 spark plugs, arranged as to type, so as to provide ten for each vehicle.

150 tow-ropes, 25 feet long, made with combination of steel cable and chain and hooks, according to information supplied to T. A. Russell.

150 hemp ropes, each 60 feet long, rope 1¼ inches.

10 Stromberg carburettors, also spare parts for same to the value of \$100.

10 spare demountable rims, beads, nuts, and clamps for demountable rims on Russell cars.

336 pairs non-skid chains in sizes to provide two pairs for the rear wheels of each motor truck and for the front wheels of the Jeffreys as well.

1,392 mud hooks in sizes to provide two sets of six each for the rear wheels of Gramm, Kelly, Peerless, and White trucks. Enquire into suggested improvement on these.

24 pairs non-skid chains for Russell cars.

60 pairs non-skid chains for Ford cars.

TIRES FOR MOTOR LORRIES

Order from Canada tires as follows:

Size	Equipment
42x5	82
40x5	122
38x5	40
36x5	218
40x4	80
36x4	52
36x3½	48

These tires should be all plain tread solid tires, and equipped with steel flanges with bolts and with a full supply of spare bolts.

This will make one extra set of tires for each lorry in service, and these Mires should be shipped as soon as possible.

TIRES FOR BICYCLES

1,000 covers.

1,500 tubes.

These should be ordered from Canada, will make a new set of tires, together with some spare tubes for all bicycles in use.

TIRES FOR MOTOR BICYCLES

150 covers.

250 tubes.

For Indian Motor Cycles. These should be ordered from Canada.

PARTS FOR INDIAN MOTOR CYCLES

Parts should be ordered from the Hendee Manufacturing Company, 366 Euston Road, to the value of £100.

It would be desirable to have a representative of the firm come down and check over the conditions of the motor cycles so that they could most intelligently supply the parts.

PARTS FOR GRAMM MOTOR TRUCKS

The following have been ordered by cable:—

"Rush express following parts, for Gramm 3-ton motor lorries; one engine complete with magneto, carburettor, piping fan; three radiators with brackets and connections; one

clutch shaft with universal joints complete; one clutch assembly complete; one gear box and transmission complete with differential counter shafts and sprockets, two engine crank shafts; two pairs of cylinders."

Order the following Gramm parts to come forward as soon as possible:

"One two-ton and one three-ton rear axle with wheel bearings and all fittings. One two-ton front axle and one three-ton front axle complete including swivel axles. King pins and front wheel bearings. One complete set of brakes with all operating mechanisms for two-ton and one complete set for threeton. One complete steering gear assembled; also rods, knuckles, pins, etc. (If two-ton different from three-ton in size make this item one complete set of each according to size). One complete set of road springs with shackles and pins for two-ton and threeton respectively. One complete set of wheels ironed for tires for two-ton and three,-ton sizes"

SPARE PARTS REQUIRED FOR 3 ½-TON TRUCKS

The following parts are to be duplicated for two-ton trucks only where parts differ.

Engine—One act of timing gears, two camshafts complete, eight pistons with gudgeon pins, three sets piston rings, eight gudgeon pins and bolts, twenty-four valves complete with springs and cups, four tappets complete, two oil reservoir plugs, two oil pumps, plungers and springs, four plugs for bottom of oil pump, three crank shaft front bushings, three crank shaft back bushings, three crank shaft centre bushings, twelve connecting rod big end bushings and twenty-four bolts and nuts, eight connecting rod small end bushings, one top water pipe, two exhaust manifolds and two holding clamps, one inlet pipe, two fans complete with spindle bearings and lubricators, six fan belts, four valve caps, four compression taps, two sets of oil pipes, one holding clip for magneto complete, three magneto couplings, one complete box magneto spare parts, two water pumps complete, four water pump spindles, two water pump couplings and twelve bolts and nuts, four oil floats and indicator wires, thirty-six crank case bolts and nuts, twelve rubber water pipe connections for top and bottom of radiator, thirty-six fly-wheel bolts and nuts, one fan pulley, two fan bearings, one commutator complete, twelve studs and nuts for cylinder tops, four wing nuts for tappet cover plates, eight connecting rods, twenty-four top water pipe flange joint backings, twenty-four cylinder top backings, twenty-four cylinder base backings, twelve crank case joint backings, twenty-four exhaust manifold joint backings, twenty-four

inlet pipe joint backings, twelve exhaust pipe joint backings, twenty-four valve cup washers, two carburettor floats and balances, twelve water pipe connections, one set water pipes, thirty-six sets screws for crankshafts and connecting rod big end bushings.

Jack Shaft and Gears.—One 4553 and 4520 timken roller bearing complete, one 4364 and 4320 timken roller bearing complete, one 5320 and 5356 timken roller bearing complete, one T2840 driving pinion shaft, one X463 driving broken pinion, one T983 driving bevel pinion washer, one L224 driving bevel pinion nut, two T2822 and T2821 splined shaft packing pieces, one T2824 splined shaft packing gland nut, one secondary gear shaft and gears complete, one T2823 sliding gear, one T2825 sliding gear, one reverse pinion and spindle, one T3363 differential complete, and two axle shafts and nuts, two small driving sprockets, twenty-four dowells X205, one T2827 stem wheel and shaft, one set of universal joints complete, four clutch leathers and screws or rivets, two 4533 and 4520 differential bearings complete, four gear stop plungers and springs, twenty gear box bolts and nuts, two propeller shafts and universal joints, couplings, etc., complete.

Rear Axle Equipment.—Two sets of brake shoe linings and rivets, one each right and left hand brake expander, two each back wheel roller bearings, one large sprocket wheel, twenty-four back wheel bolts and nuts and washers, four back brake springs, ten driving chains, one set of brake rods complete with ends and pins.

Front Axle.—Two L1792 swivel pins and lubricators and nuts, two L551 swivel pin lockpins, four L2059 steering arm ball pins with nuts, two 5354 and 5320 swivel pin roller bearings, one 5520 and 5550 swivel axle bearings, one 5351 and 5320 swivel axle bearings, twelve X579 front wheel bolts and nuts, one each left and right hand steering arms, two L2089 rod jaw pins and nuts, four L2144 rod jaw pins and nuts, one each steering coupling rods complete.

Springs.—Two sets of shackles and bolts and nuts, four front axle spring seats and nuts.

Steering.—One BF17 ball pin, one BF5 steering arm, one steering column down tube.

General.—One starting handle complete, two complete sets of lubricators and greasers, thirty-six mixed nuts and bolts, thirty-six mixed washers, thirty-six mixed cotter pins.

In addition to this authorize by letter the purchase of \$2,000 in value of further parts for Gramm motors, the particular parts to be settled by conference between T. A. Russell and Gramm Company in Canada.

PEERLESS

Order the following Peerless parts by cable:—

One engine complete with magneto, carburettor, piping, fan; three radiators with brackets, one clutch assembly complete, one gear box and transmission complete with differential counter shafts and sprockets.

In addition to this order by letter \$2,000 in value of parts, details of which to be arranged between T. A. Russell and representatives of the Peerless Company.

PARTS FOR JEFFREY TRUCKS

Order by cable:—

Two transmissions complete, three radiators complete.

In addition order by letter \$2,000 in value of spare parts, particulars of which to be settled between T. A. Russell and representatives of the Jeffrey Company.

PARTS FOR KELLY TRUCKS

Order by cable:—

One engine complete with magneto, carburettor, piping, fan; two radiators with brackets, one transmission complete, one jack shaft complete.

In addition, order by letter \$2,000 in value of spare parts, particulars of which to be settled after conference between T. A. Russell and representatives of the Kelly Trucks Company.

PARTS FOR WHITE TRUCKS

Order by cable:—

One engine complete, one transmission complete, one jack shaft complete.

In addition, order by letter, \$2,000 in value of parts, particulars to be settled after conference between T. A. Russell and representatives of the White Company.

SPARE PARTS FOR MOTOR CARS

Order the following for Ford cars:—

Two complete engines, two complete radiators, two complete front axles, two complete rear axles, two sets springs, two sets steering gear, two sets wheels complete, and small parts to the value of \$500.

Order for Russell touring car:—

One engine complete, two radiators complete, one clutch and transmission unit complete, two front axles complete, one steering

gear complete, two propeller shafts with universal joints, one rear axle complete, one set of wheels complete, one set of springs complete and small parts to the value of \$300.

RE SOUP KITCHENS

As lorries have to be out at work at all hours bringing in supplies, the Officers Commanding believe it would be of real value to have one soup kitchen attached to divisional supply column, and another to divisional ammunition park, so that men coming late with their loads could be attended to.

(See 211, 212)

211

Letter from G.Q.C. Canadian Contingent to Headquarters Southern Command

BUSTARD CAMP,
11th January, 1915.

Since the arrival of the Canadian Contingent in the United Kingdom, the Mechanical Transport has been worked to the utmost capacity. It was only calculated as sufficient for a Division in the first place, but there are about 11,000 troops above the strength of a Division requiring Supply and Transport. In addition to this, 16 lorries have been loaned to Sir John Jackson to assist in the urgent work of hut building.

The pressure of work, the bad state of the roads and the weather, together with the lack of shelter and facilities for repairs, have caused the breakdown of many motor wagons; out of the 24 Gramm lorries, all are laid up for repairs.

The Divisional Supply Column and the Divisional Ammunition Park have been used wholly for Supply and Transport, and have had no training whatever.

It is therefore requested that the 16 lorries loaned to Sir John Jackson at Larkhill be returned to duty at once.

It is requested that 30 lorries be lent to the Contingent from the British Mechanical Transport Section, so that the Canadian Transport can receive some war training and be overhauled, as at present they are unfit for continuous use.

J. S. B.
for Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Canadian Contingent.

(See 210, 212)

212

REPORT ON MECHANICAL TRANSPORT
rendered to the Deputy Assistant Director of
Transport, Southern Command

BULFORD, 19th Jan. 1915.

D.A.D.T.

I have taken the earliest possible opportunity of inspecting the vehicles of both the Supply Column and Ammunition Park of the 1st Canadian Division, and report as follows:

(1) SUPPLY COLUMN

This Column arrived with an establishment of vehicles as follows:

Three-ton Lorries	37
Thirty-cwt.....	5
Workshops.....	1
Store Wagons	0
Cars.....	2
Motor Bicycles.....	7

This establishment appears to be based on the establishment for a Supply Column of a Division as laid down in War Establishments, Part I, Expeditionary Force, 1914.

O.C., Supply Column, informed me that he has quite recently been told that his establishment would be increased to agree with the War Establishment of an Infantry Division on the most recent footing, that is to say, as follows:—

Heavy Lorries.....	44, or 45 if extra Inf. Bn. is with Div.
Light Lorries.....	14
Workshops.....	2
Store Wagons	2
Cars.....	2
Motor Bicycles.....	7

All the Lorries of this unit are "White's" and although they have been working continuously since the Column landed in England and have been working in most disadvantageous circumstances, they will all be fit for service if this Column can be given one week's rest from the active supply work in which it is now engaged before actually moving for embarkation overseas.

Assuming that the Establishment is to be in accordance with the latest edition, it will require the following lorries to complete:—

Heavy Lorries.....	7
30-cwt. "	9
Workshops.....	1
Store Wagons	2

The O.C. of this Company is naturally very anxious to have his deficiencies made up with further White Lorries, if available.

As to Cars, one of the two Cars—a Russell—is in working order: the other Russell was taken away from his Column by the Headquarters of his Division and replaced by a Ford, which is now useless. One car, therefore, will be required to complete.

Motor Bicycles. (7 h-p Twin "Indian"). Two fit; four require small replacements and spare parts, which are now on order from the Hendee Company, having been demanded for a very long time from Ordnance without avail. One Motor Bicycle is reported to have been stolen. One 7-h-p "Indian" Bicycle is therefore required.

(2) AMMUNITION PARK

The Establishment of this unit is said to be:—

Three-ton Lorries	93
Workshops.....	4
Store Wagons	2
Motor Cars.....	5
Motor Bicycles.....	9

This appears again to be based on the old War Establishments, six Heavy Lorries being added instead of six Tractors. The O.C. of this Ammunition Park was not aware whether there was any alteration in his Establishment approved to make it agree with up-to-date requirements. It is noticed that the present Establishment is rather smaller than that originally published in War Establishments, that is to say:—

Heavy Lorries.....	83
Workshops.....	4
Store Wagons	4
Motor Cars.....	5
Motor Bicycles.....	0

This unit was equipped with "Peerless", "Kelly", "Jeffrey" and "Gramm" Lorries. Of these the following will be fit but will all require at least 14 days rest in order to give them a thorough overhaul, as it appears that the whole of the equipment of this unit has been much less satisfactory than that of the Supply Column:—

"Peerless", fit.....	23
" " Workshops	2
"Kelly's"	26

All the "Gramms", of which there were 23, have proved quite unsatisfactory, the Continental Engines have given a great deal of trouble, the general designing is poor and the front construction of the Chassis weak.

The "Jeffrey's", of which there are 25, have been working satisfactorily until quite recently when they nearly all developed a serious fault in the "knuckle joint assembly" which is the driving gear on each wheel. This fault has appeared in 19 out of the 25 lorries now running, and the remaining six will undoubtedly fail owing to the same cause. A report on this fault has been sent to America and replacements to put it right have been ordered, but it is impossible to say when the

requisite parts will be delivered. It is therefore only possible to count as "Fit" machines in this Column:

"Peerless"	23
"Kelly's"	28
Workshops (Peerless).....	2

Two other "Peerless" machines are out of action owing to cracked cylinders, but it is understood that Major Russell has this matter in hand, and possibly new cylinders may shortly be received.

To complete the number of lorries, therefore to War Establishment, this unit requires:—

Heavy Lorries.....	34
Workshops.....	2
Store Wagons	4

Motor Cars. This unit now has one "Russell" (fit), and four "Fords" (all worn out). Four new cars are therefore required.

Motor Bicycles. This unit has seven 7-h.p. "Indian" Twins fit, and two unfit. One of these unfit can be repaired from spare parts and from parts off the other unfit, which is itself beyond repair. One new 7-h.p. "Indian" Twin is therefore required.

The Os. C. both these units are insistent upon the necessity of a short period of rest before embarking overseas in order that all hands may be put to work to get their "Fit" vehicles into proper working order.

Both Officers also, concur in their condemnation of the "Ford" Motor Car as being unsuitable for their work, all the "Ford" Cars which they have had being now unserviceable.

It is also to be noted that the 7-h.p. Twin "Indian" Motor Bicycle, although a very heavy and powerful machine, appears to be very popular and considered suitable for work on the very worst roads. The Officer Commanding the Ammunition Park was particularly strong on this point and considered that the satisfaction of this bicycle is due largely to the fact that its centre of gravity was very low and the engine was capable of being run at low speeds,

F. LINDSAY LLOYD,
Major, RE.
Commanding M.T. Depot.

(See 210, 211).

213

Extract from letter, Lieut.-General Alderson to Colonel Carson, dated 88th March 1916.

..... I now come to the question of the Bain wagon. This question is considerably complicated and it still remains to be seen how the wagon will stand active service work. As

a matter of fact I never asked to have it changed and I was prepared to go on service with it. Some days before we sailed an expert came down from the War Office to examine the transport and condemned practically all the wagons. I happened to be away, and a Board, which was assembled, came to the same conclusions as the expert. I concurred with the Board as to the obvious defects of the wagons but differed from them in that I said I considered that the large majority of the wagons were fit to do a good deal more work. I then went round all the wagons myself and I was confirmed in my own idea by my examination of them. I ordered stout chains to undergird and go right round the bigger and high aided Bains as these had, in some cases spread. I did not then think that we should get the general service wagon before we sailed. However, as you know, we did get a large number of them just before leaving the Plain. Those units which did not get a full complement of general service wagons took the Bains and we have now out here some 40 of the latter.

The points against the Bain, as compared to the G.S. Wagon, seem to be as follows:—

- (1) It is not so strong.
- (2) It does not carry so much.
- (3) There would be no spare wheels or spare parts at the front.
- (4) The fixing of the drivers seat is very bad, many broke and nearly caused accidents.
- (5) Many of the wagons appeared to be made of unseasoned wood.
- (6) The sides tended to spread particularly in the case of the high sided type.
- (7) It cannot, as it is, be used with team harness.

The points in favour of the Bain, as compared with the G.S. wagon seem to be:—

- (1) It is lighter.
- (2) It makes less noise on a hard road.
- (3) I understand that the pipe boxes of the wheels are purposely made to give considerable play so that when the wheel encounters a stone it tends to run off it, rather than meet it plumb. This may cut both ways, as it presumably subjects the wheels to more strain.

(See 214, 215, 216).

214

REPORT ON HORSE TRANSPORT

rendered to the Director of Supplies and Transport, War Office.

WAR OFFICE,

22nd January, 1915.

Director of Supplies and Transport.

In accordance with your instructions I proceeded yesterday the 21st instant to Salisbury Plain and inspected the 1st Line and Train Transport of the Canadian Contingent.

The harness is all new and serviceable, but unsuitable for ride and drive work, and is unadaptable to vehicles requiring this form of draught; also it cannot be adapted to team drive unless by using a swingle bar and swingle-trees on the end of the pole.

There are several types of wagons, but the parts of no one type are interchangeable with another, and in a large number of cases the wagons have *been* built from parts of three or four types of wagon and are consequently quite unsound from an efficiency point of view. All wagons have been built of green wood which is of a soft white coarse grained description, and will not stand any wear and tear, the -result is that, except in the Divisional Ammunition Column, which has not been worked, almost all the wagons are warped, split and splintered and practically worn out. The wagon called " the heavy Bain " is the only type which seems to be at all serviceable and to have stood the hard work of the past three months on Salisbury Plain.

My recommendations are:—

1. All let Line transport vehicles should be British Built Service pattern.
2. The Train should be given Service Pattern vehicles unless perhaps, the blanket wagons which will only be required for another couple of months, and the best of the heavy Bain wagons would probably survive that length of time.
3. The water carts are principally four-wheeled cylinders with one man-hole well forward, and a partition in the centre; there is no way in which they can be cleaned and there is no instrument for filtering or clarifying the water; all of this type must be condemned. A few water carts are Canadian built service pattern, but have no clarifiers, and from what I have seen of Canadian built vehicles I doubt if in all cases the woodwork is sound. I recommend that these vehicles be called in, overhauled and fitted with clarifiers, or replaced with British made Service pattern vehicles.

4. There are no Maltese Carts with the Division; various units use various types of wagons in lieu; but all are unsuitable and should be replaced.
5. The Divisional Ammunition Column has now 52 new medium Bain Wagons and it is very questionable if these wagons will stand the strain of a load of ammunition. I recommend that they be taken for the Reserve Park and replaced by G.S. Wagons. P.D.G.S. (*Pole Draught, General Service*) harness is coming from Canada for this unit.
6. The Brigade Ammunition Columns are in the same state as the Divisional Ammunition Column and my recommendations are the same.
7. Two Field Companies, RE. require all vehicles replaced except Pontoon Wagons and Tool Carts which are Canadian built Service pattern. The C.R.E. stated that his pontoons required re-canvassing, and he had repeatedly requisitioned for the material during the past two months without result. A very bad impression of Canadian built service pattern vehicles was obtained from these units. The tool wagons had warped so much out of shape that they will practically require remaking; this the units are now carrying out. The wood in the wheels in some cases was rotten and had the appearance of dry rot, the wood was not of the same description as is used in the Service.
8. I had not time to see the Cavalry, but understand that they are in the same state as the rest of the Contingent; service pattern vehicles should be issued. The question of the scale of transport arose, but no information could be obtained as to whether the two Cavalry regiments would be given the scale for Divisional Cavalry or for Cavalry brigaded into Divisions.
9. The Canadian harness is unsuitable for teams or ride and drive; therefore P.D.G.S. harness should be issued for all vehicles requiring ride and drive, except for the Artillery. I interviewed the A.D.O.S. and discussed the matter with him. He thoroughly understands the situation and will demand what is required if authority is given him from this office to do so. I recommend that his demands be met in toto, and as quickly as possible.

R. M. CAMPBELL,
Staff Captain.

(*See 213, 215, 216*)

215

Extract from letter, Lieut. General Alderson to Colonel Carson dated 98th March 1916

... I have not before referred to the question of the harness. There can be no doubt whatever that the breast harness is much better for military purposes than the collar harness. With the latter there is always difficulty in fitting collars to horses and even when fitted horses change with work. Again with the collar there is no quick release and the harness for a team is more complicated. The breast harness will fit any horse and the change in the horse's condition makes no difference, while release when necessary is quick.

(*See 213, 214, 216.*)

216

ORDERS BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
E. A. H. ALDERSON, CB.,
Commanding First Canadian Contingent
THE BUSTARD,
2nd February, 1915.

No. 1164—HARNESS

Officers Commanding units are held responsible that no black Canadian pattern collar harness is taken overseas. Only the Imperial pattern harness is to be taken.

THE BUSTARD,
3rd February, 1915.

No. 1181—HARNESS

With reference to Order No. 1164, in case pole draught G.S. harness is not available for use with the Light Bain Wagons (Officers Mesa Carts) then the Canadian Black Harness may be used.

(*See 213, 214, 215.*)

217

Telegram from the War Office to the Department of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 16th February, 1915.

Before the embarkation of the First Division, Canadian Forces for overseas, it was found necessary to substitute British service patterns of the following equipment, which was decided upon as the result of a conference at the end of last month.

Horse transport vehicles of Canadian patterns were replaced owing to the following causes: Variety of types, non-interchangeability of parts, weakness of material and

doubt as to strength to bear loads required, and, owing to variety of types, difficulty of maintenance.

Harness had to be replaced on account of Canadian pattern being unsuitable for British service vehicles which were issued instead. Motor lorries had to be replaced on account of wear.

Only five battalions were in possession of Web equipment, remaining battalions having Oliver equipment which had no pack or facilities for carrying the entrenching implement and were therefore completed with Web before embarkation.

British service regulation boots were issued on request of General Officer, Canadian supplies being unserviceable for war service. Any other issues were to complete for service.

The harness exchanged can be taken over and utilized for home service.

TROOPERS.

218

Telegram from Special Representative of the Minister of Militia and Defence to The Department of Militia and Defence

LONDON, 10th February, 1915.

Alderson states our wagons and harness condemned by order of War Office and replaced by general service wagons with breast collar harness. Knows nothing about prices. Does not think we will be or should be charged with these purchases. Will confirm and write you fully. Alderson states our shovels tried as shields but not found satisfactory. Trenching tools issued our troops. Could not carry our shovels in addition so they were left behind. Will gather full details from Brigadier and report to you fully. At Avonmouth till Friday.

CARSON.

219

Telegram from the Minister of Militia and Defence to Special Representative of the Minister of Militia and Defence

OTTAWA, 9th February, 1915.

No authority given anyone purchase other shovels order must be cancelled and Canadian shovels used you must hold a tight hand on all that improper work over there promptly cancel order for English entrenching tools see General Alderson and if necessary Earl Kitchener but I will not permit this improper

interference British entrenching tool absolutely useless for any purpose ours is perfect for protection and with handle attached is excellent for shovelling collect every Canadian shovel and have handles attached thereto man sent over with handles to do the work please act promptly.

HUGHES

(See 107, 220, 221, 222)

220

Extract from report of Speech by Major-General the Hon. Sir Sam Hughes to the Empire Club, Toronto, 9th November, 1918

* * * *

For the first year of the War Canada had practically no control of her forces Overseas. The administration, the promotion, the command, were all managed by the chief divisional officer commanding an Imperial officer. Our transport, our rifles, our trucks, our harness, our saddles, our equipment, our shovels, our boots, our clothing, our wagons; those were all set aside and in many cases--I say it advisedly, and I say it on my own responsibility, as I am saying everything else here today--in many instances they were supplanted by inferior articles.

(Quoted from report in Toronto Telegram, 14th November 1918.)

(See 219, 221, 222)

221

Debates, House of Commons Session 1917, 30th January, pp. 262-263.

Sir SAM HUGHES—Our little Canadian two-horse wagons in South Africa would carry a heavier load than the British wagons with four teams, and we could out-distance and out-travel them. In the Northwest Rebellion the ordinary farm wagons which were used there travelled more miles up to their axles in mud than the heavy British wagons travelled on the good roads of France and Belgium. When our wagons went to England they were thrown out by these young officers, yet, I may say that many of our trucks and wagons were running after many of those sent to the front from England were thrown out.

But, let us see for a moment how these inspections are made and what they amount to. Here is a letter that was addressed to me as Minister of Militia.

HOTEL CECIL, LONDON, W.C.
15th March, 1915.

Major General the Hon. Sam Hughes,
Minister of Militia and Defence, .
Ottawa, Canada.

My dear General,
re: Motor Lorries.

The main fault that the Mechanical Transport Department of the War Office had to find with our Motor Lorries was the fact that we had five makes in use, three of which were being sent over to France, and which necessitated carrying over spare parts for all these various makes.

When I heard that everything else had been thrown out, I naturally raised Cain with my officers here and found that everything was all right.

As I advised you before, when our 1st Division were ready to go to France, the British Mechanical Transport Department supplied us with 51 motor lorries and 9 motor cars to make our equipment complete.

The motors they rejected cost us about \$2,800 each, and they charged for the ones they gave us \$5,241 apiece.

I have been endeavouring ever since I got back here to get details of these lorries and cars; these have just been received by me and I am more than astonished to find that six English makes of motor lorries were supplied to us as follows:—

Leyland.....	5
Halford	4
Wolseley.....	6
Daimler.....	9
Albion.....	7
Seabrooke.....	20

and two makes of motor cars as follows:

Sunbeam.....	9
Vauxhall	2

These people do beat me I They impressed on me in no uncertain terms that we must positively get down our makes of motor lorries to if possible two, as the question of taking spare parts to the Continent and keeping them in stock was a very serious one indeed, and here they are doing the very thing that we were instructed not to do and doing it to a much greater extent than we had ever dreamt of doing. These things are rather difficult for me to comprehend, and I intend to take the matter up with the War Office officially tomorrow, but do not expect that I shall receive any more satisfaction than usual.

Yours faithfully,
JOHN W. CARSON.

So that the claim was all moonshine that we must have a uniform system in regard to the trucks because they themselves had nothing of the kind.

I take the stand that the soldiers who fought and won at St. Julien, Festubert, etc., are fit to furnish soldiers and officers for any service, and that we have inspectors in Canada who can determine what we shall have and what we shall not have. I did not know there were any people in the universe who would revive that old, exploded idea, but to show that there are such pre-historic people, I may say that the auditor general on his return recently brought back the old question which I explained last year, as to why our transport wagons and that sort of thing had been thrown out. I do not want to repeat what I have already said, but I may say that the objection to our wagons was based chiefly on the ground that they could not turn on the narrow roads of France. Why, Sir, the British wagon takes 85 feet of a circle in which to turn, while ours take 31 feet 9 inches. That was put before the Government in May 1915, or earlier, and yet we find a British officer in our service here bringing it up again a short time ago. The thing is nonsense. Our wagons turn in 31 feet 9 inches, while theirs takes 35 feet, and, as I have already pointed out, our wagon has proved better and has outlasted theirs. My stand is that Canada should decide as to what she herself shall use.

Mr. PUGSLEY: Before my hon. friend leaves that matter, could he say what was the value of the equipment thrown away?

Sir SAM HUGHES: I forget; it was millions. We did not look at the value; we were so busy swearing we had no time to figure up the value.

(See 219, 220, 222)

222

*Debates House of Commons Session 1919, 59th
September. Vol. 1, p. 830.*

Sir SAM HUGHES: I bow to your ruling, Mr. Speaker, and I will take the proper occasion to tell the story. I do not question your ruling in any sense, whatever, Sir, I might point out that when we went over to England our motor lorries were thrown out and a propaganda was carried on there which I shall tell you about. Our wagons were thrown out on the ground, alleged by the officials who were attending to the business, that they could not turn in the narrow roads of France, as the English wagons could, when as a matter of fact an investigation showed that they could turn in three feet nine inches less space than the English wagons and that the Canadian wagons

were in every sense better than the English wagons. This was a piece of camouflage, such as they carried on from start to finish, in order that they might reject the things that we sent over there. I could go down through a long list of articles which were all thrown out, on the ground that they wanted uniformity at the front. I had taken the ground that Canada was a unit in herself, exactly the same as Field Marshal Haig was a unit under General Foch. I claimed that our forces were a unit under Haig in this great war. I regret to say that it was only at a later period that I could get any recognition of my contention, not by the British authorities, because Lord Kitchener, Lloyd George and all those prominent statesmen, when the matter was explained to them were prepared to concede it, but from the subordinate officers. These subordinate officers would reject every thing we would send over there except our men. They rejected motor lorries, wagons, harness, collars, shovels, belts, rifles, bayonets, boots, clothes, field kitchens, tents, and machine gun batteries.

(See 219, 220, 221)

223

(i) Report of Special Parliamentary Committee on Boot Inquiry respecting Army Boots supplied to the Department of Militia and Defence for the Canadian Expeditionary Forces. Appendix to the Fifty-first Volume of the Journals of the House of Commons, Session 1915, Part III.

(ii) Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915, pp. 18, 21, 22 and 2372 to 2459.

224

Report of the Royal Commission concerning Purchase of War Supplies and Small Arms Ammunition.

(See also Ch. II section VEHICLES.)

225

NOTE ON ESTABLISHMENTS, 1914, 1915

Canadian Militia War Establishments (Provisional) 1914 had been issued as recently as March 1914 but special establishments were approved for the Canadian Expeditionary Force and published, subject to

many later amendments, in Militia Orders of 17th August 1914. It was stated in the preamble that "The Division and the units described as Army Troops will be organized as closely as possible on the lines indicated in (British) Expeditionary Force War Establishments, 1914" but the new establishments varied materially from these and from the Canadian War Establishments, 1914; the differences were chiefly in the number of staff officers and specialists attached to Headquarters and not taken from regimental establishments, in the number of companies per battalion, in the number of batteries per brigade and guns per battery, and in the increase of motor transport. The following are illustrative examples:—

DIV. HEADQUARTERS

Establishment	Off.	O.R.	Horses
Cdn. (Prov.) 1914.....	14	60	42
C.E.F. 17 Aug. 1914.....	26	86	69
B.E.F. 1914.....	15	67	54
27th Div.....	15	70	54
1st Cdn. Div. 1915.....	24	87	73

F. A. BRIGADE

Establishment	Off.	O.R.	Horses	Btys.	Guns
Cdn. (Prov.) 1914.....	20	516	466	3	12
C.E.F. 17 Aug. 1914.....	21	767	748	3	18
B.E.F. 1914.....	23	772	748	3	18
27th Div.....	24	736	714	4	16
1st Cdn. Div. 1915.....	24	703	720	4	16

INF. BATTALION

Establishment	Off.	O.R.	Cos.	Horses
Cdn. (Prov.) 1914.....	31	979	8	63
C.E.F. 17 Aug. 1914.....	34	1,034	8	63
B.E.F. 1914.....	30	977	4	56
27th Div.....	30	995	4	65
1st Cdn. Div. 1915.....	30	996	4	66

DIV. SUPPLY COLUMN

Establishment	Off.	O.R.	Motor Vehicles
Cdn. (Prov.) 1914.....	5	187	44
C.E.F. 17 Aug. 1914.....	5	187	44
B.E.F. 1914.....	5	240	53
27th Div.....	5	250	53
1st Cdn. Div. 1915.....	5	306	71

226

ORDER OF BATTLE AND WAR ESTABLISHMENTS
First Canadian Division and L. of C. Units—10th February, 1915

Formations and Units	Officers	Other Ranks	Total Personnel	Horses
Headquarters, 1st Cdn. Div.....	24	87	111	73
Divisional Mounted Troops—				
1st Cdn. Div. Cavalry Squadron.....	7	154	161	169
1st Cdn. Div. Cyclist Company.....	8	195	203	2
Artillery—				
Headquarters, 1st Cdn. Div. Arty.....	5	20	25	19
1st Brigade, C.F.A.—				
Headquarters.....	4	39	43	34
1st Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
2nd Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
3rd Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
4th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
1st Brigade Amm. Col., C.F.A.....	4	148	152	190
2nd Brigade, C.F.A.—				
Headquarters.....	4	39	43	34
5th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
6th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
7th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
8th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
2nd Brigade Amm. Col., C.F.A.....	4	148	152	190
3rd Brigade, C.F.A.—				
Headquarters.....	4	39	43	34
9th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
10th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
11th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
12th Battery, C.F.A. (4-18 pdrs.).....	4	129	133	124
3rd Brigade Amm. Col., C.F.A.....	4	148	152	190
1st Cdn. Heavy Battery (4-60 pdrs.) and Ammunition Column.....	8	195	203	146
1st Cdn. Div. Amm. Column.....	13	449	462	602
Engineers—				
Headquarters, Div. Engineers.....	6	12	18	9
1st Field Company, C.E.....	6	212	218	77
2nd Field Company, C.E.....	6	212	218	77
3rd Field Company, C.E.....	6	212	218	77
Cdn. Div. Signal Company.....	6	204	210	107
Infantry—				
1st Canadian Infantry Brigade—				
Headquarters.....	8	31	39	30
1st Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
2nd Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
3rd Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
4th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade—				
Headquarters.....	8	31	39	30
5th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
7th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
8th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
10th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade—				
Headquarters.....	8	31	39	30
13th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	1,002	1,032	66
14th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	996	1,026	66
15th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	1,002	1,032	66
16th Cdn. Infantry Battalion.....	30	1,002	1,032	66
Army Service Corps—				
1st Cdn. Div. Train, C.A.S.C.....	28	411	439	384
1st Cdn. Motor Ambulance Workshop, A.S.C.....	1	20	21	-
Army Medical Corps—				
1st Cdn. Field Ambulance.....	10	236	246	53
2nd Cdn. Field Ambulance.....	10	236	246	53
3rd Cdn. Field Ambulance.....	10	236	246	53
Total—Division.....	610	17,263	17,873	4,943
Line of Communication Units—				
1st Cdn. Div. Amm. Park, C.A.S.C.....	6	388	394	-
1st Cdn. Div. Supply Col., C.A.S.C.....	5	306	311	-
1st Cdn. Sanitary Section, C.A.M.C.....	1	29	30	1
1st Cdn. Mobile Veterinary Section, C.A.V.C.....	1	27	28	24
Total L. of C. units.....	13	750	763	25
Grand Total.....	623	18,013	18,636	4,968

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*Letter from Lieutenant-General Alderson,
G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division, to Colonel
Carson, Special Representative of the
Minister of Militia and Defence*

28th March, 1915.

My dear Carson,

I fear I have been some time in writing to you about the shovels, but various things have combined to delay matters. We came out of the trenches yesterday and there is now time to get level with paper work, etc.

I enclose *you* an extract from the report that has come in from those who have tried the shovels. You will see that it is not favourable.

What really bars the shovel is that it is too heavy for the men to carry, and if carried in the transport it would require 3 extra wagons per battalion to do so. There is, of course, no chance of getting these wagons and even if we had them it would be most undesirable to increase the length of the already over long column of transport.

That is just how the matter stands.

I have your letter of 23rd March & I quite see the point as regards equipment, etc. I think the two things we have lately asked for are (1) wire cutters, (2) sacking?

(1) The pattern issued to us here is not very good and I was most anxious to try and find a cutter with which a man could dash up to the wire and make sure of getting it into the jaws of the cutter at the first attempt. To fiddle about under fire entails avoidable losses. I knew that you would find such a cutter, if there was one. and find it quick!

At the time I started this hare it was probable that the Division would be making an attack within a week.

(2) Experience has proved -that cover from view, such as a brushwood artificial fence, etc., makes ground behind it comparatively safe as the Germans soon get tired of shooting where they cannot see results and they then leave the screens alone. Canvas is much more easily and quickly put up than anything else, hence the demand for it.

Again we wanted this quickly and hence the reason of the request going to you.

As regards equipment generally I am sure that the most satisfactory procedure would have been what I proposed when at Salisbury, i.e., for the Imperial Government to take over all Canadian stores, credit the Canadian Government with their value, and then keep the Contingent supplied with everything. A little thought would have been re-

quired about the Ross Rifles and the spare parts of Colt guns, and one or two other things, but all that could have been arranged.

This procedure would have done away with *any* necessity for a Canadian Ordnance Store in England, and would have saved both money and personnel.

I should like to say a word or two as regards the Webb (*sic Webb*) equipment and the Bain wagons, because I have an idea that it is thought by some that they were condemned as unsuitable because they were not regulation, or because they were Canadian t

To take the Webb equipment first or rather the Oliver equipment, for which the Webb was substituted. There is no doubt whatever that the Oliver equipment is not suitable for active service, as it is issued. The things against it are:

(1) It only carries 50-80 rounds of ammunition, whereas a man has to carry 120.

(2) It cuts a man under the arms and this is accelerated after wet.

(3) It does not adapt itself to the wearers shape, as does the Webb.

(4) It has nothing which corresponds to the valise. I am sure that troops going on service with the Oliver equipment would be greatly handicapped.

I now come to the question of the Bain wagon. This question is considerably complicated and it still remains to be seen how the wagon will stand active service work. As a matter of fact I never asked to have it changed and I was prepared to go on service with it. Some days before we sailed an expert came down from the War Office to examine the transport and condemned practi tally all the wagons. I happened to be away, and a Board, which was assembled, came to the same conclusions as the expert. I concurred with the Board as to the obvious defect of the wagons but differed from them in that I said I considered that the large majority of the wagons were fit to do a good deal more work. I then went round all the wagons myself and I was confirmed in my own idea by my examination of them. I ordered stout chains to undergird and go right round the bigger and high sided Bains as these had, in some cases, spread. I did not then think that we should get the general service wagon before we sailed. However, as you know, we did get a large number of them just before leaving the Plain. Those units which did not get a full complement of general service wagons took the Bains and we have now out here some 40 of the latter.

The points against the Bain, as compared to the G.S. wagon, seem to be as follows:—

- (1) It is not so strong.
- (2) It does not carry so much.
- (3) There would be no spare wheels or spare parts at the front.
- (4) The **fixing** of the drivers seat is very bad, many broke and nearly caused accidents.
- (5) Many of the wagons appeared to be made of unseasoned wood.
- (6) The sides tended to spread particularly in the case of the high sided type.
- (7) It cannot, as it is, be used with team harness.

The points in favour of the Bain, as compared with the G.S. wagon seem to be:—

- (1) It is lighter.
- (2) It makes less noise on a hard road.
- (3) I understand that the pipe boxes of the wheels are purposely made to give considerable play so that when the wheel encounters a stone it tends to run off it, rather than meet it plumb. This may cut both ways, as it presumably subjects the wheels to more strain.

I have not before referred to the question of the harness. There can be no doubt whatever that the breast harness is much better for military purposes than the collar harness. With the latter there is always difficulty in fitting collars to horses and even when fitted horses change with work. Again with the collar there is no quick release and the harness for a team is more complicated. The breast harness will fit any horse and the change in the horses condition makes no difference, while release when necessary is quick.

It has been said that harness, etc., was left lying about in the camps on Salisbury Plain when the Division left. Considering the conditions under which the units received and had to march with new wagons and harness I should not be surprised if this did happen in some cases. Indeed I anticipated something of this sort and that is why I asked for a large fatigue party of our own men from Tidworth to go over to the Bustard and Lark Hill to collect things left behind and clean up the Camps. I am afraid that this party made the most of the work they had to do, instead of quietly working on the principle:

"These are our brother's things, he has been much hustled in the wet and dark-let us collect the material left and put the camps straight quickly!"

That would have been the proper and soldier-like thing to do.

I will give an instance of the difficulties with which units had to contend when they marched away. The Engineers at Lark Hill only got their new wagons and harness at 10 p.m. and they had to be at Amesbury Station at 3 a.m. the next day. It was very dark and raining and blowing hard. The harness and wagons were new to them and all had to be fitted, holes punched, etc., etc. To make things worse the one marquee they had for putting the harness together in blew down! Even when they had finished their difficulties were not over for the horses, unused to breast harness and team work, would not, in many cases, pull the wagons out of the mud and they had to be man handled. In spite of all this the Engineers were only an hour late at their station.

Most of the units left their Camps in the dark and many of them had much the same experience as the Engineers. Is it to be wondered at that in some cases, it was practically impossible to hand the discarded harness, etc., over to anyone, and that certain things were lost sight of and left on the ground, in the dark?

Indeed, considering all things, I think it does them credit that more things were not left behind.

For the state of the Camps there is not so much excuse for, although much time was taken up in the fitting of the Webb equipment, the camps should have been cleaned the day before marching. Commanding Officers and Brigade Staffs should have seen to this. But here again inexperience and not want of will was the cause of the omission.

As I have before said this omission could have been and should have been put right by the fatigue party from Tidworth. Had I not been on the sea at the time I should have wanted the explanation of the Officer Commanding that party, as to why he did not put things right for his comrades and then not talk about it.

You will be glad to hear that the Division did very well indeed during its month in the trenches. The casualties have been 14 officers and 310 to 320 other ranks hit. They did a very great deal of work at improving the trenches, putting in over 150,000 sand bags. The health, both of men and horses continues good.

Yours sincerely,

E. A. H. ALDERSON.

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ENTRAINMENT OF 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION
FIRST DAY

Entraining Station	No. of Trains	Train loads	Off.	O.R.	Horses		Guns	Vehicles		Cycles
					Off.	O.R.		Four wheel	Two wheel	
Amesbury.....	8	‡ Infantry Battalion.....	15	500	37	11	2	5
"	1	Inf. Bde. H.Q. and Sec. Div. Sig. Coy.....	8	59	3	39	6	6
"	2	‡ Field Ambulance.....	5	113	31	6	5	1
Patney.....	6	‡ Battery C.F. Artillery.....	2	66	64	2	5	1	1
"	2	Bde. H.Q. & ‡ Bty., C.F.A.....	4	85	2	82	2	7	1
"	3	3rd Amm. Column, C.F.A.....	2	51	65	11	1	1

SECOND DAY

Amesbury.....	5	‡ Field Company R.E.....	3	107	40	5	5	17
"	1	H.Q. Div. R.E. and ‡ Field Coy.....	9	121	2	51	7	6	19
"	1	H.Q. & H.Q. Sec. Div. Sig. Coy.....	3	109	85	11	2	17
"	1	Divisional Headquarters.....	24	85	6	73	4	1	5
"	1	H.Q. & H.Q. Coy. Div. Train.....	13	108	57	5	3	9
"	1	Portion of Cavalry Sqdn.....	1	50	55
"	2	1 Company Div. Train.....	5	62	31	4	2	7
"	1	1 Company Div. Train.....	5	62	31	4	2	7
Lavington.....	8	‡ Div. Amm. Column.....	2	56	78	13	1
Bulford.....	1	Divisional Cyclist Coy.....	8	205	6	3	202
"	1	Cavalry Squadron.....	7	106	118	5	6
"	2	‡ Field Ambulance.....	5	113	31	6	5	1

THIRD DAY

Amesbury.....	8	‡ Infantry Battalion.....	15	500	37	11	2	5
"	1	H.Q. Inf. Bde. and 1 Sec. Div. Sig. Company.....	8	59	3	39	6	6
Patney.....	5	‡ Battery C.F. Artillery.....	2	66	64	2	5	1	1
"	2	Bde. H.Q. and ‡ Bty., C.F.A.....	4	85	2	82	2	7	1
"	1	Div. Art. H.Q. and ‡ Bty., C.F.A.....	4	88	2	86	2	7	1	4
"	3	3rd Amm. Col. C.F.A.....	2	51	65	11	1	1
Lavington.....	2	‡ Field Ambulance.....	5	113	31	6	5	1

FOURTH DAY

Amesbury.....	8	‡ Infantry Battalion.....	15	500	37	11	2	5
"	1	H.Q. Inf. Bde. and Sec. Div. Sig. Coy.....	8	59	3	39	6	6
Patney.....	6	‡ Battery Canadian F.A.....	2	66	64	2	5	1	1
"	2	Bde. H.Q. and ‡ Bty., C.F.A.....	4	85	2	82	2	7	1
"	3	3rd Amm. Column, C.F.A.....	2	51	65	11	1	1
Lavington.....	2	‡ Heavy Battery & Amm. Column.....	4	98	75	2	10	1

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See British Official History of the War. Naval Operations. Vol. II, pp. 137, 270 *et seq.*

a supposed need, which if it existed, was adequately met later by creating a recognized establishment with clearly defined and complementary functions.

(See 188, 191).

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NOTES ON OFFICERS HOLDING
SPECIAL APPOINTMENTS.

The following notes on officers given special duties and appointments not provided for in authorized military establishments, indicate the difficulties inherent in any attempt to employ inexperienced persons with the army who are not responsible to any commander in the field. Such appointments were made to meet

Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Sir W. M. AITKEN, created Baron Beaverbrook 1916, a Canadian-born financier in England, M.P. (U) Ashton-under-Lyne, of no military experience. Appointed to take over from the Chief Paymaster "the work connected with records generally appertaining to the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Forces and particularly the reporting of all casualties occurring therein from the time of the arrival of the said Forces in England." (P.C. 29 of 6.i.1915).

This order, which would have taken from the Chief Paymaster his duties connected with maintenance of records of personnel, was not carried out in the particular sense described: when the order was received it was agreed between Sir Max Aitkin and Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Ward (Chief Paymaster and Officer in charge of Records) that records of personnel should continue to be kept in the A.G. branch and that the work of the Canadian " Eye Witness " should be confined to historical records. In actual practice, as stated by the Prime Minister, " his duties were by means of daily cables to give the Public of Canada an account of the performance of the Canadian troops ". In this capacity also he wrote " Canada in Flanders." (Sir Robert Borden, Hansard 20. iii. 1918). In July 1915 he was given the rank of Honorary Colonel and in September he was appointed "General representative for Canada at the front" (G.O. 117 of 23. ix. 1915). Subsequently he was called upon to organize and take charge of the collection, publication and preservation of all Canadian historical, pictorial and photographic records of the Great War, a task which he performed without remuneration, as head of the Canadian War Records Office and also of the Canadian War Memorials Fund. In 1918 he was also appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and given a newly inaugurated portfolio in the British Cabinet—that of Minister of Information.

Lieut.-Colonel CLAUDE LOWTHER, M.P. (C) for the Eskdale Division of Cumberland. At the outbreak of war Captain on the reserve of the Westmorland and Cumberland Yeomanry; given the temporary rank of Lieut.-Colonel (1 Sept. 1914) to raise and command the 11th (Service) Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment. Had been in the diplomatic service and, had served with the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa. Was recommended to be appointed consultative Assistant to Colonel John W. Carson, to act in an advisory capacity (P.C. 112 of 18.1.1915). It was not clear to the Army Council that this appointment was an absolute necessity, and upon reconsideration the Minister of Militia stated that he had no desire to press for it. Recommended by the Minister of Militia to command the 2nd Canadian Division (29th March 1915). He held the temporary rank of Lieut.-Colonel in the Canadian Militia 14th Jan. 1915 to 18th Jan. 1919 but never served with a Canadian unit nor held a Canadian appointment.

(See 725)

Hon. Lieut.-Colonel W. GRANT MORDEN, a Canadian financier, with headquarters in London, England, who had been provisional Lieutenant in a Militia cavalry unit but had never trained. As Hon. Lieut.-Colonel he was appointed to the remount Committee (1.viii.1914). Appointed (21.x.1914) 2nd in Command, Advanced Remount Depot, CAF., of which Lieut.-Colonel W. Hendrie, an experienced Militia officer of twenty-two years' service, was in command; the appointment had been opposed by the C.G.S. Attached to the British Remount Depot, France, 25th November to 20th December 1914 and returned to Canada 1st February 1915. On 26th July 1915 he was placed upon the General List, and on 13th August 1915 he was appointed staff officer to General Sir Sam Hughes while in England (P.C. 1838 of 13. viii. 1915). He was, given duties regarding aviation, served on the Pensions and Claims Board, and was seconded to the War Office for duty with the Ministry of Munitions 21st May 1917.

Hon. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. CARRICK, M.P. (Thunder Bay and Rainy River) a real estate and financial agent of Montreal and Port Arthur, of no previous military experience; on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence "attached to the *C.E.F.* as Intelligence Officer or in such capacity as may be approved by the Imperial Government". (P.C. 16 of 71.1915). Attached to the 1st Cdn. Div. staff from 1st March to 29th May 1915, for "special duty ", as "Official Recorder, Canadians ". His functions overlapped those assigned to Lieut.-Colonel Sir Max Aitken—with whose organization he

had no connection—and also those of the A.G. Branch. On 8th March 1915 the Minister asked " Why do you state number killed and wounded without sending names? You should either. Give names or say nothing. Your cablegram merely excites dread without any satisfaction". But it was impossible to get the names which in accordance with regulations were reported direct by units to the Base. Four days later the D.A.A.G., Canadian Section, Rouen, whose duty it was to maintain the records of all Canadians in France, wrote " There is no record in this office of any Colonel Carrick belonging to any Canadian unit in France. Could you inform me who this officer is please?" Returned to Canada in August 1915, his duties being taken over by Colonel Sir W. M. Aitkin. Posted temporary Colonel on H.Q. Staff, Ottawa, September 1915, relinquished 10th May 1917.

Major F. MANLEY SIMS, D.S.O., later Brigadier-General, C.M.G. A retired captain K.R.R.C., aged 36, who had won the D.S.O. in South Africa and was a graduate of the Staff College, Camberley. Granted honorary rank of Major while employed as assistant to Hon. Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Carrick. Intelligence Officer for the *C.E.F.* to August 1915. Continued at G.H.Q. France as Lieut.-Colonel and assistant to Colonel Sir W. M. Aitken, General Representative of Canada at the Front, whose duties at G.H.Q. he assumed from 1st January 1917, with rank of Colonel and graded as G.S.O.1. Promoted Brig: General 7th December 1917. Seconded to War Office 17th June 1918; functions assumed by Canadian Section, G.H.Q.

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NOTE ON PAY SERVICES

Control of the pay services of the Canadian Expeditionary Force at Valecartier Camp was vested in Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Ward, Chief Paymaster, (who was also Officer in charge of Records), assisted by a staff of five officers and seven *n.c.o.*'s drawn from the small Canadian Army Pay Corps. Each battalion and equivalent formation in the Militia possessed a Paymaster and a Pay Sergeant but these regimental personnel had had no military pay experience beyond that gained in the preparation of pay sheets for their units called out for ten or fourteen days' training annually. However, in the final appointment of Paymasters to the Contingent care was taken to select, so far as possible, men experienced in banking and accounting and also possessed of some knowledge of military procedure.

Instructions for the pay services—at first of a tentative character—had to be drafted after the decision to mobilize a contingent was taken. Lack of forms, which also had to be prepared and printed, and the unfamiliarity of many regimental paymasters with military routine, led to difficulties; the absence of complete and correct nominal rolls, and the constant transfer of personnel from one unit to another, presented still more formidable obstacles to the establishment of a sound practice. Assignments of pay to families or relatives, and establishment of claims to separation allowance, were matters which in the majority of cases, were still unsettled when the Contingent embarked.

"Financial Instructions for the Canadian Expeditionary Force" were compiled by the Chief Paymaster on the voyage and rushed to the printers on disembarkation; distribution was already being made before the last of the troops arrived on Salisbury Plain. These

instructions defined the duties of Paymasters, set forth rates of pay for all ranks and appointments and laid down the procedure to be followed in accounting for public funds; in all main points of policy and procedure they provided a system followed throughout the war.

The Chief Paymaster established his office in London; the Canadian Pay Depot was at Salisbury and the office of the Field Cashier at Bustard Camp. The Base Pay Depot checked all pay sheets and expenditures upon claims and was the channel through which the Chief Paymaster's orders were transmitted. The Chief Cashier was the distributing centre for all moneys required by Paymasters.

The first duty of Paymasters was to submit complete and accurate nominal rolls; in many instances these had not been prepared, as ordered, on the voyage. As pay sheets were compiled by companies, changes in establishment of battalions from eight to four companies, and *vice versa*, caused complications. Conversion of accounts from dollars to British currency was made on the basis of five dollars to the pound; adjustment of the difference between five dollars and the par rate of four dollars eighty-six and two-thirds cents was made from time to time in the Chief Paymaster's office, where all ledger accounts were maintained.

On departure of the Division for France the Base Pay Depot, renamed Canadian Overseas Base Pay Depot, was established at Rouen, where close touch was maintained with the Canadian Section of the D.A.G.'s Office at the Base. The Field Cashier's office was established at a "safe" town, where banking facilities were available, as near as possible to Divisional Headquarters; Hazebrouck was selected in the first instance. Pay Sergeants were withdrawn from units before departure and concentrated in the Chief Paymaster's office in London.

In France limits were placed upon monthly issues of pay to 15 francs to privates, 45 francs to corporals and 60 francs to sergeants, but liberal withdrawals from accumulated balances were allowed to soldiers on leave.

With the influx in February 1915 of pay Sergeants withdrawn from units of the Division the staff of the Chief Paymaster reached a total of 150 all ranks; in addition, a Pay Office was established at Shorncliffe when the Canadian Training Depot was transferred there from Tidworth. The arrival of more units from Canada, and expansion of the work connected with the settlement of miscellaneous accounts, in particular as between Canada and the War Office, led to further

additions to the Chief Paymaster's Office, till by the end of 1915 the Pay Department had a total staff of 1870 in the London office.

As soon as the 1st Division had left England a reorganization of the Pay Department was taken in hand and was completed by July 1915. Under the Chief Paymaster and the Assistant Chief Paymaster there were 14 branches:

Accounts Branch; Advances Branch; Cashier's Branch; Pay Branch 1; Pay Branch 2 (with three sub-sections); Non-Effective Accounts Branch; Assigned Pay Branch; Separation Allowance Branch; Stationery, Printing and Supplies Branch; Legal Branch; Estates Branch; Auditor's Branch; Branch of the Officer i/c Details; Central Registry.

A rigid system of audit was established. As the staff of the Chief Paymaster's office ceased work for the day the audit staff took over the books and accounts; all observations which they might make had to be dealt with by the pay staff immediately on returning to duty at 8.30 a.m. the next morning.

In August 1915 Colonel W. R. Ward was appointed Director of Pay and Records and Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Roes was appointed Chief Paymaster.

Before the Contingent left Canada the troops had been paid up to 21st September, inclusive. From 22nd September to 31st March 1915 the amounts credited to members of the C.E.F. overseas on account of pay and allowances were as under.

Pay.....	\$5,986,097.29
Field Allowance.....	616,382.86
Working Pay.....	199,625.48
Other credits.....	94,184.84
	\$6,896,290.47

The actual cash payments amounted to \$4,270,861.91.

For the same period the total amount of pay assigned by officers and men to families and relatives was \$1,255,372.70, of which sum \$916,154.70 was paid out in Canada.

Payment of separation allowance to dependents commenced only in December 1914, when the amount was \$61,815.28: this figure remained nearly constant until after the Division had proceeded to France, but the influx of Second Contingent and reinforcing units led to rapid increase until the amount for December 1915 reached \$188,727.90. For the year 1915 the average monthly amount paid out for separation allowance was \$114,032.31.

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For details see "Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1914-1919" by Ralph Hodder-Williams. Hodder and Stoughton Limited, London and Toronto.

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DISPOSITION OF CANADIAN UNITS LEFT IN ENGLAND ON DEPARTURE OF 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION TO FRANCE.

CAVALRY

Royal Canadian Dragoons, Shrewton.
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.), Pewsey.
Canadian Cavalry Depot, Jellalabad Barracks, Tidworth.

ARTILLERY

Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Bde., Tinhead and Bratton.
3 Depot Batteries, Artillery, Devises, Market Lavington & Beechingstoke.

MACHINE GUNS

No. 1 Automobile Machine Gun Bde., Bustard Camp.

INFANTRY

9th Battalion, Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth.
11th Battalion, Kandahar Barracks, Tidworth.
12th Battalion, Kandahar Barracks, Tidworth.
17th Battalion, Jellalabad Barracks, Tidworth.
General Base Depot, Tidworth.
Infantry Base Depot, Lucknow Barracks, Tidworth.

MEDICAL CORPS

No. 1 Canadian General Hospital, Netheravon.
No. 2 Canadian General Hospital, Lavington.
Duchess of Connaught Cdn Red X Hosp., Taplow, Bucks.
Base Depot Medical Stores, Southampton.
No. 1 Advanced Depot Medical Stores, Amesbury.
No. 5 Canadian Mobile Laboratory, Bustard Camp.

VETERINARY CORPS

No. 1 Canadian Veterinary Hospital, Netheravon.
No. 2 Veterinary Section, Netheravon. Remount Depot, West Down South.

ARMY SERVICE CORPS

1st Reserve Park, Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth.
No. 1 Butchery, Larkhill.

ORDNANCE

Ordnance Depot, Salisbury.

MISCELLANEOUS

Canadian Pay and Record Office, London.

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For an account of the services of the Newfoundland Contingent see "The First Five Hundred" by Richard Cramm. CF. Williams & Son, Inc., Albany and New York. Also "The Trail of the Caribou" by Major R. H. Tait, M.C. The Newfoundland Publishing Co., Inc., Boston, Mass.

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NOTE ON KING EDWARD'S HORSE

This regiment originated towards the close of the South African War as the 4th County of London (King's Colonials) organized 29th November 1901. By Army Order of 1st April 1905 it was redesignated King's Colonials, Imperial Yeomanry, and on the formation of the Territorial Force became part of that organization 1st March 1909 as King Edward's Horse (The King's Oversea Dominions Regiment). The special character of the unit was marked in March 1913 when it was transferred to the Special Reserve by Army Orders:

The conversion, with His Majesty's approval of King Edward's Horse (The King's Oversea Dominions Regiment), from a unit of the Territorial Force to a unit of the Special Reserve, is intended to mark the connection of the regiment with the over sea Dominions, and the fact that the regiment is solely recruited from citizens of, or those intimately connected with, the King's Oversea Dominions.

A letter dated 29th April 1913 from the Commanding Officer to the High Commissioner for Canada gives further details:

The object of King Edward's Horse is to maintain a Regiment in the United Kingdom, wherein Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the several Oversea Dominions Military Forces may, while visiting the United Kingdom for a short period, be attached for drill and training, or should their stay be a prolonged one, join the Regiment, be trained and given the opportunity for qualifying for promotion in the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned ranks as if they were undergoing their training in any of the Oversew Dominions. The regiment was disbanded in 1924.

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NOTES ON ACTION TAKEN IN RESPECT TO ENEMY AT-TENS, 1914-1919

No policy had been laid down in advance, either in the United Kingdom or in Canada, as to the treatment of enemy aliens in the event of war, but on 5th August 1914, an Act, known as the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914, was passed at Westminster, providing that H.M. the King, by Order in Council, might impose restrictions on aliens: the Act conferred wide general powers but left all detailed regulations to the Orders in Council.

In its attitude towards enemy aliens the Canadian Government was guided by the advice given by the British authorities. At first, the British Government seems to have been uncertain of its attitude; on 3rd August

the Canadian Government was advised, if war should be declared, to allow of the departure of enemy army reservists except those definitely suspected of espionage, but to detain all enemy naval reservists. This policy was changed on the 7th August, *when* the British Government cabled that it was very important that all enemy reservists, naval and military, should be detained as prisoners of war "in order to have means of ensuring proper treatment of captured British officers and men". Officers Commanding Military Divisions and Districts in Canada were thereupon instructed to arrest and detain all German officers and reservists as prisoners of war, and to watch Austrian officers and reservists. The police were to be requested to co-operate.

The Canadian Government issued a proclamation on 8th August (P.C. 2086 of 7.viii. 1914) that immigrants of German nationality would not be interfered with so long as they pursued their ordinary avocations, unless there was reasonable ground to suppose that they were assisting the enemy in any way. It was added that all German officers or reservists attempting to leave Canada would be arrested and detained. On 13th August a similar proclamation (P.C. 2128) was issued in respect to Austro-Hungarians.

On 9th August the British Government cabled that they were anxious that care should be taken to avoid arresting persons whose characters precluded suspicion or who were satisfactorily vouched for, provided they were prevented from leaving the country; it was suggested that any such persons already detained might be released. While the declared policy was that German and Austro-Hungarian reservists attempting to leave Canada would be subject to arrest, no adequate measures were taken to detect such persons and prevent their departure. The Department of Immigration early reported that Germans and Austrians were leaving Canada by every train headed for the United States, and made suggestions as to the boarding of trains and boats with a view to the examination of passengers; their own organization, built up to check ingress to Canada, was not suited for the prevention of egress. It was decided not to take any action because of the danger of complications with the United States, it being considered that the maintenance of cordial relations with the United States was a matter of more importance than the escape of German reservists. The matter is not further elaborated on the official files, but it may be assumed that there was fear that the cross-examination of innocent passengers would cause irritation, and that the inadvertent arrest of United States citizens, which might well have occurred, would almost inevitably lead to diplomatic representations.

At first, powers of arrest and detention in Canada were limited to the military authorities. On August 15th, however, a proclamation (P.C. 2150) was issued by which, after reiterating the assurances contained in the proclamation of 8th August, "in addition to, and without affecting the powers already vested in the Militia in that behalf", power was given to the officers and constables of the Dominion and Royal North West Mounted Police and to such other persons as their respective Commissioners might delegate, to arrest and detain enemy aliens.

By this proclamation the following classes of aliens were to be arrested and detained:

(a) All German or Austrian or Austro-Hungarian officers, soldiers or reservists who attempted to leave Canada;

(b) All subjects of the German Empire or of Austria-Hungary who attempted to leave Canada and in regard to whom there was reasonable ground to believe that their attempted departure was with a view to assisting the enemy; and

(c) All subjects of the German Empire or of Austria-Hungary in Canada engaged or attempting to engage in espionage or acts of a hostile nature, or giving or attempting to give information to the enemy, or assisting or attempting to assist the enemy, or who were on reasonable grounds suspected of doing or attempting to do any of the said acts.

The Militia and Police were also authorized to release any such person so arrested on his signing an undertaking, to report to the authorities as prescribed, to obey the laws, to abstain from taking up arms, to refrain from communicating military information, and to do no act of injury to the British Empire.

All Militia or Police, or other delegated authorities who exercised any of the powers of detention or parole mentioned above, were to report in each case to the Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police, stating the name, address and occupation of the person detained or paroled, the place and date of detention and, generally, the circumstances of the arrest and detention, and all such additional details as might be necessary for the purpose of record and identification.

A further proclamation was issued on 2nd September (Extra Canada Gazette 2.1x.14) giving assurance that restrictive measures in respect to holding of property and carrying on of business would only be taken against enemy aliens, being officers, soldiers or reservists who attempted to leave Canada, or against enemy aliens of any category who engaged or attempted to engage in espionage or acts of a hostile nature, or to give information to or otherwise assist the King's enemies.

Another proclamation was issued on 3rd September (P.C. 2283) prohibiting the possession by enemy aliens of firearms, ammunition or other dangerous explosives and requiring the same to be handed in to a Justice of the Peace or to an officer or constable of the R.N.W.M.P. Later, modification was made to this order by which under certain circumstances licence to possess firearms, etc., might be granted.

Until the end of October 1914, by which time there were 10,000 enemy aliens either interned or on parole, arrangements for accommodation and custody of detained enemy aliens were entirely local; in each military district the D.O.C. made his own arrangements to secure suitable buildings and the Militia provided the necessary guards. This was not satisfactory: the searching out of aliens and investigating their records threw a heavy burden on both the military and police authorities at a time when their other duties were exceptionally heavy. The procedure was put on a better footing by the issue on 28th October of an Order in Council (P.C. 2721) providing for the appointment of Registrars, and by the issue on 6th November of a further Order in Council (P.C. 2817) providing for the appointment of a Director of Internment Operations. Their purport may be summarized briefly as under:

The Order in Council of 28th October (issued as a Proclamation in the Canada Gazette of same date) provided for the appointment of Registrars of aliens of enemy nationality, to be under the immediate direction of the Chief Commissioner of the Dominion Police. The Registrar was to examine each enemy alien attending before him - and register his name, age, nationality, occupation, desire or intention to leave Canada, and the name of his wife or children (if any) in Canada, and obtain such other particulars as might be considered necessary. Every alien of enemy nationality residing at or within twenty miles of a city or town or place where Registrars were established was to attend and register. No enemy alien was to be permitted to leave Canada without an exeat from the Registrar or from the Chief Commissioner of Dominion Police, who also had power to cancel exeat given by the Registrars. Exeats were only to be given if the Registrars were satisfied that the enemy alien would not assist, by active service, information or advice, the forces of the enemy. Any alien of enemy nationality who was refused an exeat was to report monthly to the police of the city or neighbourhood in which he was registered; if it were not considered desirable that the enemy alien should be allowed to remain at large he was to be interned as a prisoner of war. Names of all those allowed to remain

at liberty were to be reported to the Chief of Police of the city or neighbourhood in which they were registered. Failure of an enemy alien, who came within the terms of the proclamation, to register within one month rendered him liable to internment and such other penalties as prescribed by law. Wives and children were permitted to accompany interned aliens. The military authorities were to make provision for the maintenance of interned aliens and prescribe the work that might be required of them. Canadian nationalization might be given to registered enemy aliens under certain circumstances.

The Order in Council of 6th November provided for the appointment of Major-General Sir William Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O., as Director of Internment Operations, to take whatever military action might be necessary or expedient to carry out effectively the provisions of the Order in Council of 28th October. The Director was to make all arrangements for the accommodation, rationing and maintenance of interned prisoners of war and for such work as they might be required to perform. The military authorities were to provide such military forces as might be required, and the R.N.W.M.P. and the Dominion Police were to provide any necessary police and secret service assistance.

The Director of Internment Operations was at first under the Department of Militia and Defence, but he was subsequently placed under the Department of Justice. (P.C. 388 of 27. ii.1915).

Registrars were duly appointed by the Department of Justice in the principal cities and appropriate instructions were issued. By June

1915 all enemy aliens had been registered, paroled, interned or given exeat.

By April 1915 the completion or suspension of construction works at Vancouver had resulted in a considerable number of aliens of Austro-Hungarian and German nationality being thrown out of employment in that city. Although probably many of these were military reservists, permission was given by Order in Council (P.C. 810) dated 24th April 1915 for any who desired to do so, to proceed to the United States for the purpose of securing employment, subject to conditions which included an undertaking not to engage in hostilities or otherwise to assist the enemy.

Circumstances made it necessary, however, to modify the regulations permitting peaceful, law-abiding aliens of enemy nationality to remain at large. Animosity against Germans and Austro-Hungarians excited by the war, enhanced by competition in the labour market with native-born or British-born citizens, led to apprehension of breaches of the peace which the strictest administration of the law by police and other officials might not prevent. In June 1915 power was therefore accorded (P.C. 1501 dated 26.vi.1915) for the detention "at the public charge of these aliens of enemy nationality whose presence in any works, employment or community is a cause of such apprehended peril". Aliens interned under this Order were treated as prisoners of war, subject to release whenever it should appear that they might be discharged with due regard to the public safety.

Internment camps or stations were established at the places and in the buildings or other quarters named in the list below:

Name	Date of Opening	Date of Closing	Description
Montreal, Que.†	13. viii. 14.	30. xi. 18.	Immigration Building.
Kingston, Ont.	18. viii. 14.	3. v. 17.	Fort Henry.
Winnipeg, Man.†	1. ix. 14.	29. vii. 16.	Fort Garry.
Halifax, N.S.	8. ix. 14.	3. x. 16.	The Citadel.
Vernon, B.C.	18. ix. 14.	20. ii. 20.	Provincial Govt. Bldg.
Nanaimo, B.C.	20. ix. 14.	17. ix. 15.	do
Brandon, Man.	22. ix. 14.	29. vii. 16.	Exhibition Bldg.
Lethbridge, Alta.	30. ix. 14.	7. xi. 16.	Exhibition Bldg.
Petawawa, Ont.	10. xii. 14.	8. v. 16.	Militia Camp.
Toronto, Ont.†	14. xii. 14.	2. x. 16.	Stanley Barracks.
Kapuskasing, Ont.	14. xii. 14.	24. ii. 20.	Bunk Houses.
Niagara Falls, Ont.†	15. xii. 14.	31. viii. 18.	Armoury.
Beauport, Que.	28. xii. 14.	22. vi. 16.	Armoury.
Spirit Lake, Que.	13. i. 15.	28. i. 17.	Bunk Houses.
Saint Ste. Marie, Ont.†	13. i. 15.	29. vi. 18.	Armoury.
Amherst, N.S.	17. iv. 15.	27. ix. 19.	Malleable Iron Works (rented).
Monashee-Mara Lake, B.C.	2. vi. 15.	29. vii. 17.	Tents and Bunkhouses.
Fernie-Morrissey, B.C.	9. vi. 15.	21. x. 18.	Rented premises.
Banff-Castle, Alta.	14. vii. 15.	15. vii. 17.	Dominion Parks Bldg. at Banff. Tents at Castle.
Edgewood, B.C.	19. viii. 15.	23. ix. 16.	Bunk Houses.
Revelstoke-Field-Otter, B.C.	6. ix. 15.	23. x. 16.	Bunk Houses.
Jaasper, B.C.	8. ii. 16.	31. viii. 16.	Dominion Parks Bldg.
Munson-Eaton, Alta.	13. x. 18.	21. iii. 19.	Railway Cars.
Valcartier, Que.	24. iv. 15.	23. x. 15.	Militia Camp.

† Receiving stations only, where prisoners were kept till they could be sent to a permanent station.

The immediate supervision of camps or stations was entrusted to a staff usually composed of the following personnel: Commandant—Adjutant—Supply Officer: or Quartermaster—Medical Officer—Dental Officer. Of necessary, assisted by a subordinate staff of: Sergeant Major—Supply Sergeant—Quartermaster Sergeant—Orderly Room Sergeant—Hospital Sergeant—Provost Sergeant—Interpreter (civilian)—Matron (where women and children).

The duties devolving upon troops detailed as guards consisted of:

Sentries upon enclosures and buildings.

Escorts to working parties.

Police for the good order and supervision of prisoners' quarters.

The proportion of troops to prisoners varied but averaged about one to five.

The treatment of interned enemy aliens had necessarily to accord with the Hague Regulations; on this basis Standing Orders were drawn up by the Director. The prisoners were divided into two classes: the first class, emulating of officers or those of a standing considered to be equivalent to the officer grade, received superior accommodation and subsistence, and could not be called upon to perform work other than that necessary for their own comfort, cleanliness and health; others were put on Government work, such as clearing and stumping now, land, erection of buildings (barns, log-houses, bunk-houses), making of roads, etc., for which they received pay at the rate of 25 cents a day. This rate was based on the working pay of a soldier in Canada. Many prisoners were also allowed to be employed on road gangs by the Canadian Northern Railway, when the shortage of labour in Canada became acute; they were provided with quarters and were paid at the rate of 20 cents an hour, less 50 cents a day subsistence. While on this work men were kept under, military guard; the railway provided quarters and subsistence for the escorts.

Camps and stations, except receiving stations, were equipped with hospitals. A system of baths, with hot and cold water, was installed at every camp or station, and provision was likewise made for libraries and canteens, and facilities were given for recreation football, skating, quoits, gymnastics and lawn-tennis being the favourite amusements.

The rations allowed to the prisoners were on exactly the same scale as allowed to Canadian soldiers in the field, this being one of the requirements of the Hague Regulations. The amount was sufficient for men doing hard work but *was* excessive for those not engaged in manual labour. When, therefore, restrictions

were placed upon the civil population as to the amount of meat, etc., which they might consume, it was considered legitimate to reduce the rations of the prisoners not engaged on hard work to correspond. Although this caused dissatisfaction and led to some disturbances, the health of the prisoners benefited rather than deteriorated as a result.

At some of the camps the prisoners gave trouble; at Amherst a concerted refusal to parade, accompanied by an attack upon one of the military police, caused the guard to fire, with the result that five men were wounded, one fatally. Attempts of prisoners to escape were numerous, tunnelling being a common means employed: some were successful but nearly all were quickly recaptured; the risks run were serious, six were killed and four wounded, all by rifle fire.

The total number of male enemy aliens interned was 8,579, chiefly Austro-Hungarian (5,954) and Germans (2,009). Not more than 3,138 could be correctly classified as prisoners of war, that is, captured in arms or belonging to the enemy reserve forces; the remainder were "civilians" *who* because of unemployment were indigent, and others who, under the Hague Regulations, became liable to internment on being judged to be "agents" attached to the enemy, or persons whose activities were of service to the enemy in the war. Eighty-one women, with 156 children, who had no means of support when their husbands and fathers were interned, voluntarily, chose internment to accompany hue-bands and fathers; special arrangements were made for them at Spirit Lake, P.Q., and Vernon, B.C. Forty other women and 81 children, also being wives and families of interned prisoners, having no means of support and not desiring to enter into internment, were given a monthly allowance to cover rent, food and fuel.

The above figures include 817 transferred from Jamaica, the Barbados, St. Lucia, British Guiana and Newfoundland; the majority were from Jamaica.

The total cost of the internment operations was \$4,445,092.33, exclusive of the pay and allowances of the troops employed as guards; of this amount \$970,000 was refunded by the colonies above-mentioned on account of their prisoners.

In the first year of the war, apart from Proclamations dealing with "trading with the enemy", Privy Council Orders to the number of 38 were passed bearing upon the persons, behaviour, patents, corporations and property of enemy aliens in Canada.

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NOTE ON TEST MOBILIZATION,
TORONTO, 1914

At Toronto, headquarters of the 2nd Divisional Area (Major-General F. L. Lessard, C.B.) in co-operation with Militia units, the Grand Trunk Railway, the Toronto, Hamilton and Buffalo Railway, the Toronto Street Railway, the Bell Telephone Company and the Ontario Motor League, very detailed mobilization plans were made by the Divisional Commander. To test the efficiency of his scheme the G.O.C., at noon on the 16th November, without any preliminary warning, ordered a mobilization of the three Toronto militia infantry regiments. Within four hours after the call had been sent out, 1,492 officers and men were assembled and this result was held to be satisfactory, though General Lessard hoped to see it improved upon. Thinking the movement *portended* active military operations, some of the populace became alarmed and the Minister in a public speech stigmatised the test as "a piece of ridiculous nonsense . . . the worst military tactics that could possibly have been carried on". A circular letter was promptly sent out to all Districts instructing them, by direction of the Minister of Militia and Defence, that "in order to avoid frightening the inhabitants of cities, towns or villages, no test mobilizations are to be carried out, unless the people have been publicly notified in advance."

A second test of the local mobilization scheme was made at Toronto on 18th December. As the calling out on the previous occasion of members of militia units had caused dislocation of business, the second test was confined to *C.E.F.* personnel. The two *C.E.F.* battalions were divided into detachments of fifty and despatched to forty assembly centres. Under pre-arranged plans the automobiles of the Ontario Motor League were organized in four divisions of ten squadrons each; each squadron consisted of 16 to 20 cars. Actually about 700 cars were employed and 27 street cars. At a given hour the waiting detachments were picked up at their assembly points and rapidly transported to the mobilization centre in Queen's Park.

The mobilization was regarded as successful so far as it went but the somewhat artificial conditions produced by the employment of *C.E.F.* personnel only, and by the fact that notification had been issued on the previous day, considerably reduced its value as a trial of the plans made to meet a genuine emergency in which the Active Militia would be employed.

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P.C. 2821

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT
OTTAWA,

Friday, the 6th day of November, 1914.

Present:

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, under and in virtue of the provisions of section 6 of the War Measures Act, 1914, is pleased to make and doth hereby make the following orders and regulations respecting the prohibition in Canada of newspapers, pamphlets, tracts, writings or periodicals, calculated to be or that might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, or containing articles, correspondence, news or information bearing directly or indirectly on the present war and not in accord with the facts:—

1. The Minister may by warrant under his hand, direct that any newspaper, tract, writing or periodical which, in the opinion of the Minister, contains, has contained, or is in the habit of containing articles, correspondence, news or information, bearing directly or indirectly on the present state of war or on the causes thereof, contrary to the actual facts, and tending directly or indirectly to influence the people of Canada or any section of the people of Canada against the cause of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or in favour of the enemy, be refused the privileges of the mails of Canada and be prohibited from circulation in Canada in any way.

2. The Minister shall after refusing the privileges of the mails of Canada, or the circulation in Canada of any such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or other periodical, publish in the CANADA GAZETTE a notice to the effect that such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or other periodical has been refused the privilege of the mails in Canada or has been prohibited from circulation in Canada or both, and further to the effect that no person in Canada shall be permitted thereafter to be in possession of any such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or other periodical, or of any issue thereof, already published or thereafter to be published, and further to the effect that any person in possession of any such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or

other periodical, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or imprisonment for any term not exceeding five years or to both fine and imprisonment.

3. After the refusal of the privileges of the mails of Canada, to any such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or other periodical, and after the publication of the notice described in the preceding paragraph, no person shall use or attempt to use the mails of Canada for the purpose of circulating or distributing or sending any such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or other periodical, and no person shall be in possession of or circulate any such newspaper, tract, pamphlet, writing or other periodical or any issue thereof, theretofore or thereafter published.

4. Any person contravening or being a director or other officer of a company or corporation contravening to the knowledge of such director or officer, any of the provisions of the foregoing orders and regulations, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both fine and imprisonment, and such penalty may be recovered or enforced by summary proceedings and convictions under the provisions of Part XV of The Criminal Code and in any such proceedings against any such director or officer the onus of showing that he did not know of such contravention shall be upon such director or officer.

The word, "person" wherever used herein means person, persons, company or corporation.

The word "Minister" wherever used herein shall mean the Postmaster General or the Acting Postmaster General of Canada.

5. A prosecution for an offence under these orders and regulations shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.

Provided that the person charged with such an offence may be arrested and a warrant for his arrest may be issued and executed, and such person may be remanded in custody or on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of the Attorney General of Canada to the institution of the prosecution for the offence has not been obtained, but no further or other proceedings shall be taken until that consent has been obtained.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

(Published in CANADA GAZETTE (Extra)
November 6, 1914.)

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P. C. 2368

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT
OTTAWA

12th September, 1914.

*(Not published in the Canada Gazette until
19th December, 1914.)*

Present:

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council.

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council under and in virtue of the Provisions of Section 6 of the War Measures Act, 1914, is pleased to make and Both hereby make the following orders and regulations for the prevention of the giving out of information calculated to be or that might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy and for the prevention of espionage and generally for the security of the Forces of His Majesty in Canada and the welfare of the people of Canada.

1. No person shall without lawful authority publish or communicate any information with respect to the movement or disposition of any of the forces, ships, or war materials of His Majesty or of any of His Majesty's allies, or with respect to the plans of any naval or military operations by any such forces or ships, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with the fortification or defence of any place, if the information is such as is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy.

2. No person shall without the permission of the competent naval or military authority make any photograph, sketch, plan, model, or other representation of any naval or military work, or of any dock or harbour work in or in connection with a defended harbour, and no person in the vicinity of any such work shall without such permission have in his possession any photographic or other apparatus or other material or thing suitable for use in making any such representation.

For the purpose of this regulation the expression "harbour work" includes lights, buoys, beacons, marks, and other things for the purpose of facilitating navigation in or into a harbour.

3. No person without lawful authority shall injure or tamper, or interfere with, any wire or other apparatus for transmitting telegraphic or telephonic messages, or any- apparatus or contrivance intended for or capable of being used for a signalling apparatus, either visual or otherwise, or prevent or obstruct, or in any manner whatsoever interfere with the sending,

conveyance or delivery of any communication by means of telegraph, telephone, or otherwise or shall be in possession of any apparatus capable of being used for tapping messages sent by wireless telegraphy or otherwise.

4. No person shall with the intent of eliciting information for the purpose of communicating it to the enemy or for any purpose calculated to assist the enemy, give or sell to a member of any of His Majesty's Forces any intoxicating liquor; and no person shall give or sell to a member of any of His Majesty's forces employed in the defence of any railway, dock or harbour any intoxicating liquor when not on duty, with intent to make him drunk, or when on sentry or other duty, either with or without any such intent.

5. No person shall do any injury to any railway, or be upon any railway, or under or near any bridge, viaduct or culvert over which a railway passes with intent to do injury thereto.

6. No person shall by the discharge of firearms or otherwise endanger the safety of any member of any of His Majesty's forces travelling on or guarding any railway or of any authorized person guarding any railway.

7. No person without the permission of the competent naval or military authority, shall in the vicinity of any railway, or of any dock or harbour be in possession of dynamite or any other explosive substance, but nothing in this regulation shall be construed as affecting the possession of ammunition for sporting purposes.

8. No person in, or in the neighbourhood of, a defended harbour, shall by word of mouth or in writing spread reports likely to create disaffection or alarm among any of His Majesty's forces or among the civilian population.

9. No person shall, if an order to that effect has not been made by the competent naval or military authority, light any fire or show any light on any hill within such radius from any defended harbour as may be specified in the order.

10. The competent naval or military authority at any defended harbour may by order direct that all lights, other than lights not visible from the outside of any house, shall be kept extinguished between such hours and within such area as may be specified in the order; and all persons resident within that area shall comply with the order.

11. The competent naval or military authority at any defended harbour may by order require every person within any area specified in the order to remain within doors between such hours as may be specified in the order, and in such case no person shall be or remain

out between such hours unless provided with a permit in writing from the competent naval or military authority or some person duly authorized by him.

12. If any person with the object of obtaining any information for the purpose of communicating it to the enemy or of assisting the enemy, or with intent to do any injury to any means of communication or to any railway, dock, or harbour, forges, alters or tampers with any pass, permit or other document, or uses or has in his possession any such forged, altered or irregular pass, permit or document with the like object or intent, or with the like object or intent personates any person to whom a pass, permit or other document has been duly issued, he shall be guilty of a contravention of these regulations and may be tried and punished accordingly; and where in any proceedings against a person for contravention of this regulation it is proved that he has forged, altered or tampered with the pass, permit or other document in question, or has used or had in his possession the forged, altered or irregular pass, permit or document in question, or has personated the person to whom the pass, permit or document was duly issued, he shall be presumed to have forged, altered or tampered with it, or to have used or had it in his possession, or to have personated such person as aforesaid, with such object or intent as aforesaid unless he proves the contrary.

13. Any person who attempts to commit, or procures, aids or abets the commission of any act prohibited by the foregoing special regulation, or harbours any person whom he knows, or has reasonable grounds for supposing to have acted in contravention of such regulations, shall be deemed to have acted in contravention of the regulations in like manner as if he had himself committed the act.

14. No person shall, without lawful authority sell give, distribute or permit the selling, giving or distributing of any newspaper, tract or pamphlet or other publication whether printed or published in Canada or not containing any information which is forbidden to be published or communicated under paragraph 1 of these orders and regulations.

15. Any person contravening any of the provisions of the foregoing orders and regulations shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for any term not exceeding five years or to both fine and imprisonment and such penalty may be recovered or enforced by summary proceedings and conviction under the provisions of part 15 of the Criminal Code.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

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For further particulars of the mobilization of the 2nd Canadian Division see Chapter XVI.

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P.C. 2812

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 6th November 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 4th November, 1914, from the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence, stating that Contract Demands for Clothing, Necessaries and Equipment have been made by the Quartermaster-General for the outfitting of the Second Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force, involving an expenditure of \$3,056,811.39.

The Minister observes that these quantities will clothe and equip a force of 20,000 men, and with the surplus now on Ordnance charge will furnish a reserve of 100 per cent in the more important items down to 30 per cent in other items, as required by the War Office.

The Minister recommends that he be empowered to enter into contracts for the supply of such Clothing, Necessaries and Equipment as set forth in the attached* schedule at the prices therein stated, to the amount of \$3,056,811.39 the Director of Contracts having reported that these prices are fair and just.

The Committee advise that the requisite authority be granted.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

* Attachment not reproduced; the items detailed include clothing, necessaries, accoutrements, personal equipment, camp equipment, saddlery and 20,000 rifles and bayonets.

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NOTE ON MOBILIZATION 1914, SUBSEQUENT TO SECOND CONTINGENT

On 1st December, 1914, the Adjutant General telegraphed to each Division or Military District particulars of units to be mobilized, additional to the Second Contingent, "liable in whole or part for overseas service". The message continued: "Pending further instructions take no further action but regardless of number and without first consulting them wire in order of selection names of Officers whom you recommend to command and organize foregoing units".

The units, the numerical designations subsequently given to them and the divisions or districts in which they were to be raised are set out below.

Division or Military District	Unit	Numerical designation
1st Division....	One regiment Mounted Rifles less one squadron.	7th C.M.R. Regiment (less "C" Squadron).
2nd "	Two Infantry battalions. Two squadrons Mounted Rifles.	33rd and 34th Battalions. "C" 7th C.M.R. and "C" 8th C.M.R.
3rd "	Three Infantry battalions. One regiment Mounted Rifles, less one squadron.	35th, 36th and 37th Battalions. 8th C.M.R. less "C".
4th "	Two infantry battalions. One regiment Mounted Rifles, less one squadron.	38th and 39th Battalions. 5th C.M.R. less "C" but on authority 6th Jan. "C" was also raised.
5th "	One Infantry battalion. One squadron Mounted Rifles.	42nd Battalion. "C" 5th C.M.R. but the quota was transferred to Military District No. 4, 6th Jan.
6th "	One Infantry battalion. One regiment Mounted Rifles. One Infantry battalion.	41st Battalion. 6th C.M.R. 40th Battalion.
M.D. 10.....	Two regiments Mounted Rifles.	9th and 10th C.M.R.
M.D. 11.....	Four Infantry battalions. One regiment Mounted Rifles.	43rd, 44th, 45th and 46th Battalions. 11th C.M.R.
M.D. 13.....	Two Infantry battalions. Two regiments Mounted Rifles. Three Infantry battalions.	47th and 48th Battalions. 12th and 13th C.M.R. 49th, 50th and 51st Battalions.

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NOTE ON THE SERVICES OF MAJOR-GENERAL F. L. LESSARD, C.B.

Major-General Francois Louis Lessard, CB., was born in 1860. In 1878 he entered the Active Militia as a trooper in the Queen's Own Canadian Hussars and in 1880 was gazetted second lieutenant in the Quebec Garrison Artillery; he afterwards served as a lieutenant in the 65th Carabiniers Mont Royal. In 1884, on the organization of the Permanent Force he was appointed to the Cavalry School Corps, which afterwards became the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He served in the North West Campaign, 1885, and received the medal. He was appointed to the command of his regiment, as also of the Royal School of Cavalry, Toronto, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, in July 1899; for three years he had held the post of Inspector of Cavalry.

On the outbreak of the South African War Lieutenant-Colonel Lessard was appointed to the staff of the G.O.C. Cavalry Division (Sir John French) and was present at the operations at Colesburg and for the relief of Kimberley. On the arrival at Capetown on 26th March 1900 of the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles (afterwards renamed Royal Canadian Dragoons) he assumed command of the regiment and led it in many actions until its return to Canada in January 1901; at one time Lieut.-Colonel Lessard was in command of all the mounted troops of General Smith-Dorrien's column. He was twice mentioned in despatches and awarded the CB., as well as the Queen's Medal with five clasps.

In 1907 Colonel Lessard was appointed Adjutant-General at Militia Headquarters and was given the temporary rank of brigadier-general in 1911. He was promoted Major-General on 1st December 1912—the third officer of the Canadian Militia to reach that rank—on assuming command of the 2nd Divisional Area, with headquarters at Toronto, a position which he was holding in August 1914. Held by many to be the most accomplished officer in the Canadian forces at this time, there was some surprise and disappointment that he was not given a command in the overseas forces, an omission laid to the hostility of the Minister of Militia. (H. of C. Debates 3rd Feb. 1916, p. 547 and 10th Feb. 1916, p. 670). But his rank restricted possibilities of employment. In December 1914 he was made Inspector-General for Eastern Canada. Early in 1916 he was despatched to England to report and advise upon the standard and system of training of the Canadian forces in the United Kingdom; the reforms which he

advocated were only carried out after the institution of the Overseas Ministry in September 1916. In addition to his duties as Inspector-General, General Lessard was in 1918 given the command of Military District No. 6 and appointed Fortress Commander, Halifax. On the outbreak of the anti-conscription riots at the end of March 1918 he was despatched by special train to Quebec to take command there, but returned to Halifax when, as the result of his vigorous action, the situation had been brought under control. In June 1919 he was placed on the retired list. His death occurred on 7th August 1927.

(See 236.)

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NOTE ON THE SERVICES OF MAJOR-GENERAL S. B. STEELE, C.B., M.V.O.

On the 14th December 1914, when he was promoted Major-General and appointed Inspector-General for Western Canada, Colonel S. B. Steele was within a month of completing his sixty-sixth year. He had held commissioned rank as an ensign in the 35th (Simcoe County) Regiment as far back as 1866, but voluntarily reverted to the ranks and served as a private with the Ontario Rifles in the Red River Expedition 1870, for which he received the campaign medal. On the organization of the North West Mounted Police in 1873 he joined the force as sergeant-major of "A" Division. As a Superintendent of the Police, and with the rank of major in the Militia, he commanded, with much distinction, the mounted scouts of the Alberta column during the North West campaign, 1885; subsequently, from 1898-1900, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel in command of the police force, he was the man chiefly responsible for the maintenance of law and order at the height of the gold rush in the Yukon Territory, of the governing council of which he was a member. For his services he received the thanks of the Governor General in Council.

When Lord Strathcona offered to pay the expenses of equipping a regiment for service in South Africa, Lieut.-Colonel Steele was given the task of raising and commanding it. After the disbandment of Lord Strathcona's Horse in March 1901 on completion of its one year's term of engagement, Colonel Steele, who for his services in the field had been promoted to brevet colonel and awarded the CB. and the M.V.O., returned again to South Africa to organize and take command of "B" Division of the South African Constabulary.

The constabulary acted as a military body till the conclusion of hostilities, and Colonel Steele directed the operations of his Division. He was awarded the Queen's Medal with four clasps and the King's Medal with two clasps and was three times mentioned in despatches. In 1906, having been responsible for the normal peace duties of "B" Division of the constabulary for four years, he resigned his appointment and returned to Canada.

In June 1907 Colonel Steele was appointed to the command of Military District No. 13 (Alberta), and two years later was transferred to the command of the larger and more important Military District No. 10 (Manitoba and Saskatchewan), a post which he continued to hold until his appointment as Inspector-General, Western Canada.

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*Letter from O.C. 4th Division to the
Secretary Militia Council, Ottawa*

MONTREAL, 19th October, 1914.

Offer of personnel of a General
Hospital for service abroad from
McGill University.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith for the consideration of the Minister in Militia Council a copy of a communication received from the Dean of the Medical Faculty of McGill University, asking permission to organize a General Hospital for service abroad, and to recommend that if further General Hospitals are required other than those already Overseas, that McGill University may be authorized to organize such a Unit on the lines Suggested in the attached letter.

Having a Unit organized by the University in this manner will ensure that all the personnel is the best available, to the end that credit may reflect from the Unit on the University itself.

McGill University is one which has in the past devoted some time and energy to Military instruction.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. A. FAGES,

Colonel,

for O.A. 4th Division,
(On Command).

MONTREAL, 19th October, 1914.

From—The Dean of the Medical Faculty
McGill University

To—The a/A.D.M.S., 4th Division.

Personnel of a General Hospital,
from McGill University.

Sir,

I have the honour, with the authority of the Principal of McGill University, to offer upon behalf of the Medical Faculty the personnel of a General Hospital on the Lines of Communication for service abroad with the Second Canadian Expeditionary Force.

1. The personnel to consist of such Surgeons and Physicians and such Specialists as may be required, who shall have the following qualifications:—

a. That each holds a teaching appointment in the Faculty of Medicine and a similar position in either the Montreal General or the Royal Victoria Hospitals;

b. or a consulting position in a Hospital of like standing;

c. or Graduates of McGill University holding equal professional and teaching status;

d. to be able to speak either or both French and German;

e. that they enroll as Officers of the A.M.C., for service during the present war.

2. The Nursing Staff to be chosen as far as possible from such graduates of the two hospitals already mentioned, who may make application and the selection to be entirely on the basis of competence.

3. That the rank and file shall, as far as possible, be selected from the students of the Medical Faculty of McGill University, particularly those of the fourth and fifth years, these latter being especially suitable for the work that would be required of them.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. S. BIRKETT,

Lt.-Col. R.M.O., Dean.

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See Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-19. The Medical Services. Chapter XVIII. By Sir Andrew Macphail. Ottawa. The King's Printer.

246

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, 13th January, 1915.

Can Canadian Government provide personnel to man two guns lent from Bermuda by the War Office for mounting at St. Lucia? Two officers and forty-four men will be required to man the guns. For control a fire-commander and staff. Total, five officers and fifty-four other ranks. Can this force be furnished by the Canadian Government together with such administrative staff as may be considered desirable. If so how soon would they be ready to embark for this service?

HARCOURT.

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

OTTAWA, 16th January, 1915.

In connection with your telegram of the 13th instant, the Canadian Government can furnish the necessary detachment for St. Lucia. I will report later when they are ready to embark. Meanwhile please send me a description of the ordnance which the detachment will be required to handle.

ARTHUR.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General.

LONDON, 4th February, 1915.

His Majesty's Government greatly appreciate the readiness of the Canadian Government to assist in furnishing detachment for St. Lucia as expressed in telegram of January 16th. With reference to a telegram of the 23rd instant on this subject, the Admiralty have now arranged for the retention at St. Lucia of four French guns, 14-centimetre calibre, which will be in addition to the two British 6-inch breech-loader Mark VII guns on C.P. Mark II mountings.

The admiralty consider that in view of total number of guns, a fire-commander and staff are necessary. Could additional men required be supplied by Canadian Government, namely 4 officers and 50 other ranks, making a total in all of 9 officers, 104 other ranks? The officer in command should draw his own manning table on arrival, since defences are improvised. Would it be possible for one or two searchlights to be provided? Further details as to French guns will follow by mail.

HARCOURT.

Telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

OTTAWA, 27th February, 1915.

With reference to your cypher telegram of January 13th. on the subject of St. Lucia garrison, my Ministers desire to know what "Administrative Staff" is required.

With reference to your cypher telegram of February 4th, an artillery detachment consisting of four officers and 104 other ranks will be supplied.

It is feared that it will be impossible to supply searchlights.

ARTHUR

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*Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915
29th. March, p. 1662*

Major-General HUGHES: Before the House rises for recess I should like to place on Hansard a statement of our Estimates, and I shall be pleased later on to answer any questions that may be asked:

WAR APPROPRIATIONS	
Required, 1915-16.....	\$ 100,000,000
Voted 1914-15.....	50,000,000
Pay of 100,000 troops at \$1.25 each,	
12 months.....	\$ 45,700,000
Rations for 50,000 troops, 12	
months.....	7,300,000
Transport, rail and ocean, going	
and returning.....	18,625,000
Rifles, bayonets and scabbards,	
90,000 at \$33.25 each.....	3,100,000
Stores and equipment.....	15,000,000
13, 18 and 60 pounder guns with	
accessories, 75 per cent of value.....	3,750,000
10,000 remounts at \$200.....	2,000,000
	\$ 95,475,000

PARTICULARS OF TRANSPORT	
Required for outward transport of	
67,000 troops and equipment of 2nd contingent	
and reinforcements. all ranks, including	
equipment, etc.....	\$8,375,000
For mobilization transport in Canada.....	1,000,000
For return transport of 75,000	
troops, all ranks, including equipment.....	9,250,000
	\$ 18,625,000

NOTE: Estimated at \$125 per head each way for land and ocean transport, including horses and equipment.

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Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915
29th March, p. 1654

Mr. HAZEN: For the future, taking the period of 12 months from the 1st of April next, my estimate is that in round figures we will expend \$3,000,000 out of any war vote which passes Parliament. My estimate is made up in this way:

H.M.C.S. <i>Niobe</i>	\$ 726,125
H.M.C.S. <i>Rainbow</i>	366,450
Submarines <i>OO. 1</i> and <i>OO. 2</i>	170,075
Submarine Depot Esquimalt	38,800
Halifax Dockyard, civil employees	257,500
Esquimalt Dockyard, civil employees	173,350
H.M.C.S. <i>Shearwater</i> (depot)	207,425
H.M.C.S. <i>Diana</i> (depot)	264,975
Atlantic defences	396,000
Pacific defences	229,500
General account; Pension contributions to Imperial navy, Separation Allowance and other miscellaneous expenses	179,800
	<hr/>
	\$ 3,000,000

I may explain that certain expenditures at Esquimalt are charged up to the name *Shearwater*, while at Halifax certain charges at the dockyard are charged to what is called *Diana*. This \$3,000,000 is only an estimate and it may vary one way or the other according to the progress of the war. If we find it necessary for any purpose to charter other vessels or to make use of other vessels in connection with any of the services on the Atlantic and on the Pacific, the amount would be augmented to that extent. This is the nearest estimate we can make at the present time.

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Auditor General's Report 1915-16 (Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1917) Part P, p. P-2 and Part R, p. R-2.

250

(i) *Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915, 24th March, p. 1397, resolution moved by the Prime Minister.*

(ii) An Act for the granting to His Majesty aid for Military and Naval Defence. Assented to 15th April, 1915.

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REPORTS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE ON PURCHASE OF WAR SUPPLIES

(i) Medical Supplies, presented 25.iii.1915. Report printed in Journals of the House, 1915. For evidence, see Appendix 3 to Journals of the House. For Debate see H. of C. *Debates, 1915, pp. 1526, 2602, et seq.*

(ii) Binocular glasses, presented 12.iv.1915. Report printed in Journals of the House, 1915, p. 367. For evidence, see Appendix 3 to Journals of the House. For Debate see H. of C. *Debates, 1915, pp. 2602, et seq.*

(iii) Horses, presented 15.iv.1915. Report printed in Journals of the House, 1915, p. 376. For evidence see Appendix 3 to Journals of the House. For Debate see H. of C. *Debates, 1915, pp. 2602 et seq.*

252

Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915, 15th April, pp. 2602-2617, speech of Sir Robert Borden.

252a

Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915, 15th April, pp. 2615-2617.

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NOTE ON SOLDIERS' FRANCHISE

By the "Act to enable Canadian Soldiers on Active Military Service during the present war to exercise their electoral franchise", which received the Royal Assent on 15th April 1915, the exercise of the franchise was extended to those soldiers, twenty-one years of age or upwards, absent from Canada on active service, who were qualified voters, or who, not being qualified under the regular franchise, had within six months preceding enlistment or appointment been resident in an electoral district in Canada for not less than thirty days. A sufficient supply of special ballot papers and envelopes was to be kept in stock by the Secretary to the High Commissioner in London. On receipt of a cable from the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery notifying him of the issue of a writ for a general election, the Secretary to the High Commissioner was to transfer these documents to the Chief Paymaster; through him the regimental paymasters were responsible for seeing that they reached squadron, battery and company commanders. Each soldier desiring to exercise the franchise had to execute, at the time of the election, a prescribed form of affidavit, printed on the ballot envelope, declaring him to be of the full age of twenty-one years and stating the electoral district in which he was a qualified voter, or otherwise in which he, within six months of enlistment or appointment, had resided for the minimum period of thirty days.

As it was impossible to know in advance of an election the names of candidates, the dual-language ballot paper departed radically from the normal form. It gave the voter four choices:

1. I vote for
2. I vote for the Government.
3. I vote for the Opposition.
4. I vote for the Independent Candidate.

If the names of the candidates were known the voter might, if he so desired, fill in the name of the candidate of his choice against 1; otherwise he was required to place an X against 2, 3 or 4.

Squadron, battery and company officers were to conduct the election within their own commands, and to administer the oath on the signing of the affidavit. The soldier was to mark his ballot in the presence of the officer, but in such a manner as not to disclose the nature of his vote, place it in the envelope on which the affidavit was endorsed and seal the same. Detailed provision was made for the proper safeguarding of the ballots and for the transmission of the bags containing them to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery at Ottawa, who was responsible for the transmission of the sealed envelopes to the returning officers of the various electoral districts concerned. The envelopes were to be retained by the returning officers until the regular polling day, when they were to be opened, and the ballots, still folded, deposited in the ballot box in the presence of the candidates or their agents, to be subsequently examined and counted in the regular manner.

Similar provision was made for the troops in Bermuda, except that the officer commanding the Canadian troops was to perform the duties otherwise assigned to the High Commissioner and the Chief Paymaster.

For the troops in Canada the franchise was similarly extended to allow of the thirty-day qualification, but the votes were to be cast for candidates by name as provided under the normal election procedure. On the issue of the writ for a general election returning officers were to be appointed for each "camp or base", men were to take the affidavit as to their eligibility and electoral district, and within ten days after the issue of the writ the returning officers were to notify their names to the returning officers of the various electoral districts concerned, for inclusion in the register of voters. As soon as candidates had been nominated the returning officers of the electoral districts concerned were to telegraph the names to the returning officer of the camp or base, whose duty it then was to arrange for the appointment of deputy returning officers, for the printing of ballot papers in the

regular form and for the holding of the election on the appointed date. The camp or base returning officer was to be responsible for counting the votes and for telegraphing the figures to the various returning officers concerned; certified returns in accordance with the Dominions Election Act were to follow. To meet the cases of those soldiers, who, having made the affidavit, might be placed under orders to leave Canada prior to the polling day, provision was made for the holding of advance polls.

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*Debates, House of Commons, Session 1916,
10th April, p. 2367*

STATEMENT MADE TO THE HOUSE BY THE
PRIME MINISTER
Canadian Expeditionary Force—April 8, 1915

*Memorandum setting forth the present Organization
and Status of Canadian Expeditionary Force.*

The Canadian Expeditionary Force as at present organized is made up as follows:

- I. *The First Contingent*—
 1. The 1st Division, C.E.F.
 2. Army troops and surplus units.
 3. Line of communication units.
- II. *The Second Contingent*—
 4. The 2nd Division, C.E.F.
 5. Line of communication units.
- III. A force of Canadian Mounted Rifles.
- IV. An Infantry Reserve.
- V. Depots.

I. THE FIRST CONTINGENT

1. *The First Division, C.E.F.*

The first division (about 18,000 strong) is in the field. It includes:

Infantry: Twelve battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th) grouped into three brigades.

Mounted Troops: A squadron of cavalry and a cyclist company.

Artillery: Forty-eight 18 pr. and four 60 pr. guns, with ammunition columns.

Engineers: Three field companies.

Signal Service: A divisional signal company.

Supply and Transport: A divisional train (four companies, A.S.C.).

Medical Service: Three field ambulances.

2. Army Troops and Surplus Units.

The following units accompanied the 1st Division but are not included in it:

The Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona's Horse, "A" and "B" Batteries, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, an automobile machine-gun brigade, and six battalions, including the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

The cavalry and horse artillery have been posted to a mounted brigade commanded by Brigadier-General the Right Honourable J. E. B. Seely, D.S.O. The brigade is still in England.

So, also it is believed, are the automobile machine-gun batteries.

Of the infantry, the 6th, 9th, 11th, 12th and 17th battalions are in England. The 6th composed exclusively of detachments from mounted corps, serves as a depot for the purpose of providing cavalry reinforcements; the 9th, 11th and 12th furnish reinforcements for the infantry; and the 17th, to which no special rôle has been assigned, forms a general reserve.

The Princess Patricia's C.L.I. allotted to the 27th Division, is in France, where it has already distinguished itself.

3. Line of Communication Units.

Line of communication units are the administrative units which are required for duty on the railways, roads and navigable waterways between an army and its base or bases of operation.

The units shown in the following list embarked with the 1st Division, C.E.F., or were organized after it arrived in England:

Headquarters infantry base depot.

Headquarters general base depot.

Divisional ammunition park (mechanical transport).

Casualty clearing station.

Stationary hospitals (2).

General hospitals (2).

Advanced depots of medical stores (2).

Base depot of medical stores.

Base hospital (Cliveden).

Sanitary section.

Divisional supply column (mechanical transport).

Reserve park.

Railway supply detachment.

Field butchery.

Depot units of supply (4).

Advanced remount depot.

Mobile veterinary sections (2).

Veterinary sections (2).

Base depot of veterinary stores.

Advanced base ordnance depot.

Base ordnance depot.

Base army pay and record office (London).

Pay and sub-record office (Shorncliffe).

Overseas base pay depot (France).

Base post office.

II. THE SECOND CONTINGENT

4. The 2nd Division, C.E.F.

Stations (subject to alteration)

Divisional Headquarters. Not yet selected.

4th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brigade Headquarters. Toronto.

18th Battalion. London.

19th and 20th Battalions. Toronto.

21st Battalion. Kingston.

5th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brigade Headquarters. Montreal.

22nd (French Canadian) Battalion. Amherst, N.S.

24th Battalion. Montreal.

25th Battalion. Halifax.

26th Battalion. Saint John, N.B.

6th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brigade Headquarters. Winnipeg.

27th and 28th Battalions. Winnipeg.

29th Battalion. Vancouver.

31st Battalion. Calgary.

Divisional Mounted Troops.

Squadron of Mounted Rifles. London.

Cyclists. Toronto (with one platoon at Halifax).

Divisional Artillery.

- Headquarters Halifax.
- 4th Field Artillery Brigade Toronto, Guelph.
- 5th Field Artillery Brigade Winnipeg, Lethbridge.
- 7th Field Artillery Brigade Ottawa, Kingston, St. Jean,
P.Q., Fredericton.
- Heavy Artillery Battery and Ammunition Column Halifax.
- Divisional Ammunition Column Halifax, Toronto, Winnipeg &
Montreal.

Divisional Engineers.

- Headquarters Ottawa.
- 4th, 5th and 6th Field Companies Ottawa.

Signal Service.

- Divisional Signal Company Ottawa.

Supply and Transport.

- Divisional Train (Headquarters and 4 companies A.S.C.) Saint John, N.B.

Medical Service.

- No. IV Field Ambulance Winnipeg.
- No. V Field Ambulance Toronto.
- No. VI Field Ambulance Montreal.

Note.—There are being mobilized two armoured motor machine-gun units, one at Toronto and the other at Montreal. But whether or not they are to be associated with the 2nd Division, C.E.F., has yet to be determined.

5. Line of Communication Units.

The following line of communication units (possibly with others), will form part of the 2nd Contingent:

- Divisional Ammunition Park (mechanical transport).
- Casualty Clearing Station.
- Stationary Hospitals:
 - No. 3 (London, Ont.).
 - No. 4 (French-Canadian).
 - No. 5 (Queen's University).
- General Hospitals:
 - No. 3 (McGill University).
 - No. 4 (Toronto University).
- Divisional Supply Column (mechanical transport).
- Reserve park.
- Railway Supply Detachment.
- Field Bakery.
- Field Butchery.
- Depot units of supply (2).

III. CANADIAN MOUNTED RIFLES

When the Army Council decided on the form which assistance from Canada should take, disappointment was felt, especially in the West, at the exclusion of cavalry and mounted rifles.

So long as trench fighting continued, mounted troops were not required on the European continent, in the Western theatre of operations. But they were required in Egypt, which was threatened with invasion; and it was not unreasonable to suppose that before long the tactical situation in Belgium and France would undergo a change. Therefore it was decided to proceed with the organization of a body of mounted rifles; and thirteen regiments, as detailed below are being mobilized:

- | | Station
(Subject to alteration) |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1st C.M.R. Brigade. | |
| Brigade Headquarters | Winnipeg. |
| 1st Regiment | Brandon. |
| 2nd Regiment | Victoria. |
| 3rd Regiment | Medicine Hat and Edmonton. |
| 2nd C.M.R. Brigade. | |
| Brigade Headquarters | Sherbrooke. |
| 4th Regiment | Toronto. |
| 5th Regiment | Sherbrooke. |
| 6th Regiment | Amherst. |

Unbrigaded Regiments.	Station (Subject to alteration)
7th Regiment*	London.
8th Regiment	Ottawa.
9th Regiment	Lloydminster.
10th Regiment	Regina.
11th Regiment	Vancouver.
12th Regiment	Calgary.
13th Regiment	Pincher Creek.

* Less one squadron sent to England as a reinforcement.

IV. INFANTRY RESERVE

In Canada, in addition to the twelve "first line" battalions included in the 2nd Division, C.E.F., there are twenty-four "reserve" battalions in various stages of development.

They are (or will be) distributed as follows, and up to the present they have not been brigaded:

Battalions.	Headquarters (Subject to alteration)
33rd	London.
34th	Guelph.
35th	Toronto.
36th	Hamilton.
37th (Sudbury district)	Not yet selected.
38th	Ottawa.
39th	Belleville.
40th	Amherst.
41st (French Canadian)	Quebec.
42nd	Montreal.
43rd	Winnipeg.
44th	Winnipeg.
45th	Brandon.
46th	Regina.
47th	New Westminster.
48th	Victoria.
49th	Edmonton.
50th	Calgary.
51st	Edmonton.
52nd (Thunder Bay and Rainy River District)	Port Arthur.
53rd	Prince Albert.
54th (British Columbia, Mainland)	Not yet selected.
55th (New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island)	Not yet selected.
56th (Alberta)	Not yet selected.

The foregoing battalions will be utilized as circumstances require; in Canada for draft-giving purposes, or in England as training depots, or as complete units at the seat of war.

V. DEPOTS

In England, as previously stated, three infantry depots and a cavalry depot have already been provided for the 1st contingent;

the 23rd, 30th and 32nd battalions have lately been sent over to serve as depots for the infantry of the 2nd Division; depots have also been formed for artillery, engineers, army service corps, etc., and in Canada there are recruiting and training establishments for each of the units which the permanent force contributed to the 1st contingent and the garrison of Bermuda.

An analysis of the numbers of the various forces, supplied by the Adjutant General, is hereto appended as Appendix "A".

APPENDIX "A"
RECAPITULATION

	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Canadian overseas forces.....	3,698	82,055	85,753†
Units recruited and organized for overseas service but not mobilised.....	90	3,410	3,500
Units of the active militia on active service in Canada.....	551	9,228	9,777
Permanent force in Canada.....	147	2,283	2,430
Total.....	4,486	96,974	101,460†

Grand Total, 101,460 (sic 101,637) all ranks.†

†NOTE.—These figures omit 100 officers and men at St. Lucia.—By error in addition 10 officers and 67 other ranks of Divisional Headquarters are also omitted.

CANADIAN OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
RECAPITULATION

	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Divisional Headquarters.....	10	67	77
Cavalry and Mounted Rifles—			
1st Contingent.....	69	1,255	1,324
Reinforcements.....	6	151	157
2nd Contingent.....	6	187	173
3rd Contingent.....	360	7,051	7,411
Total.....	441	8,624	9,065
Artillery—			
1st Contingent.....	133	3,279	3,412
Reinforcements.....	25	792	817
2nd Contingent.....	98	2,873	2,971
Total.....	256	6,944	7,200
Machine Guns—			
1st Contingent.....	9	128	137
2nd Contingent.....	29	308	337
Total.....	38	436	474
Engineers—			
1st Contingent.....	39	708	747
Reinforcements.....		50	50
2nd Contingent.....	21	706	727
Training Depot.....	4	120	124
Total.....	64	1,584	1,648
Signal Service—			
1st Contingent.....	8	192	200
2nd Contingent.....	6	220	226
Telegraph Operators.....		80	80
Total.....	14	492	506
Infantry—			
1st Contingent.....	825	20,000	20,825
Reinforcements.....	108	3,291	3,399
2nd Contingent.....	447	13,094	13,541
3rd Contingent.....	588	18,775	19,363
Royal Canadian Regiment, Bermuda.....	27	955	982
Total.....	1,995	56,115	58,110
Cyclists—			
1st Contingent.....	5	88	93
2nd Contingent.....	10	211	221
Total.....	15	299	314

CANADIAN OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—Continued

	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Supply and Transport—			
1st Contingent.....	62	1,552	1,614
2nd Contingent.....	51	1,707	1,758
A.S.C. Training Depot.....	18	160	178
Total.....	131	3,419	3,550
Medical Services—			
1st Contingent.....	122	1,317	1,439
Reinforcements.....	42	392	434
2nd Contingent.....	111	1,441	1,552
1st Con. Base Depot of Medical Stores.....	1	8	9
Advance Depot.....	1	5	6
2nd Con. Base Depot of Medical Stores.....	1	8	9
Total.....	278	3,171	3,449
Nursing Sisters—			
1st Contingent.....	184		184
2nd Contingent.....	238		238
Total.....	422		422
Remount—			
1st Contingent.....	10	89	99
Reinforcements.....	2	75	77
Total.....	12	164	176
Veterinary—			
Mobile Veterinary Sections.....	2	26	28
Veterinary Sections.....	5	221	226
Base Depot Veterinary Stores.....	1	5	6
Total.....	8	252	260
Ordnance—			
Canadian Ordnance Corps.....	1	14	15
Postal Service—			
1st Contingent.....	2	14	16
Postal Corps Depot, England.....	1	5	6
Base Post Office, Boulogne.....		10	10
2nd Contingent.....		15	15
Total.....	3	44	47
Railway Construction Corps—			
2nd Contingent.....	12	492	504
Pay and Records—			
Base Army Pay and Record Office, London, England.....	4	2	6
Pay and Sub Record Office, Shorncliffe, England.....	2	2	4
Overseas Base Pay Depot.....	2	1	3
Total.....	8	5	13*

Grand Total, 85,753 (sic 85,850) all ranks.

*Exclusive of attached and civilians.

TROOPS ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN CANADA
RECAPITULATION

	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
1st Divisional Area.....	4	182	186
2nd " ".....	83	1,749	1,832
3rd " ".....	87	632	719
4th " ".....	25	616	641
5th " ".....	25	499	524
6th " ".....	208	2,709	2,917
Military District No. 10.....	31	458	489
" " No. 11.....	134	2,342	2,476
" " No. 13.....	1	39	40
Total.....	551	9,226	9,777

Grand Total, 9,777 all ranks.

STRENGTH OF THE PERMANENT FORCE IN CANADA FOR THE HALF
MONTH ENDING 31ST MARCH, 1915

Unit and Headquarters	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
Royal Canadian Dragoons— Regimental Depot, Toronto...	9	113	122
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.)— Regimental Depot, Winnipeg.	4	121	125
Total	13	234	247
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery— R.S.A. Reg. Headquarters and Dist. Est't., Kingston...	3	41	44
Supernumeraries, Kingston...	1	3	4
"C" Battery	2	163	165
Total	6	207	213
Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery— Staff, Halifax	4	54	58
Supernumeraries, Halifax		1	1
Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, Halifax	10	256	266
Staff, Quebec	5	40	45
Supernumeraries, Quebec		3	3
Nos. 3 and 4 Co's., Quebec	4	94	98
Staff, Esquimaux	1	19	20
No. 5 Coy., Esquimaux	2	59	61
Total	26	526	552
Royal Canadian Engineers— Regimental Staff, Ottawa	10	2	31
Supernumerary Staff, Ottawa		55	55
1st Fortress Co'y., Ottawa		129	129
2nd Field Co'y., Ottawa		59	59
3rd Fortress Co'y., Ottawa		18	18
Supernumeraries, Ottawa		20	20
Total	19	283	302
Royal Canadian Regiment— Regimental Depot, Halifax	6	191	197
No. 6 Station, Halifax	1	95	96
Instr'l. Cadre, Halifax	3	55	58
Supernumeraries, Halifax		15	15
Total	10	356	366
C.P.A.S.C., Ottawa	16	156	172
P.A.M.C., Ottawa	15	67	82
C.P.A.V.C., Ottawa	4	4	8
C.O.C., Ottawa	26	296	322
C.A.P.C., Ottawa	8	41	49
C.M.S.C., Ottawa	4	75	79
S.O.C., Ottawa		17	17
School of Musketry, Ottawa		13	13
School of Signalling, Ottawa		8	8
Total	78	677	750
Grand Total	147	2,283	2,430

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P.C. 2626

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 3rd November, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 17th October, 1914, from the Acting Minister of Militia and

Defence, stating that in view of the present emergency the Minister of Militia and Defence was requested by the War Office to allow them to take over from the present contractors, Messrs. Vickers, Limited, all ordnance, artillery vehicles and ammunition not yet delivered, which they had under contract for the Canadian Government. The Minister was also requested to place at the disposal of the War Office and to despatch with the Canadian Expeditionary Force, all the field guns and equipment (18-prs., 13- and 60-prs.), including ammunition, available in Canada. This request was acceded to; and it leaves the Canadian Military Forces with a very insufficient artillery equipment. It is therefore, of the utmost importance that orders be placed at once with Messrs. Vickers, Limited, the present contractors, for guns, ammunition and equipment, to replace those taken over by the War Office authorities and those sent with the Expeditionary Force.

The Minister therefore recommends that an order be placed with Messrs. Vickers, Limited, for the following:—

150 Q.F. 18-pr. guns, with field carriage.

24 Q.F. 13-pr. guns, with field carriage.

12 B.L. 60-pr. guns, with field carriage.

Together with spare parts, stores and accessories, and with 1,000 rounds of ammunition for each gun.

That an order be placed with the Canadian contractors, the Ottawa Car Manufacturing Company, Limited, of Ottawa, for the necessary number of limbers, ammunition wagons, spare parts and stores, and accessories, to complete the equipment of the guns mentioned above.

That it is the custom of the War Office, in such cases of emergency in time of war, to make advance payments to the contractor upon his application after the closing of the contract to effect (offset ?) and remove the difficulties which would otherwise be experienced in financing such an undertaking in the present unsettled condition of the money market.

The Minister, therefore, further recommends that a sum not to exceed 25 per cent of the total value of the contract, be advanced to Messrs. Vickers, Limited, and to the Ottawa Car Manufacturing Company, Limited, respectively, as soon as they have signed the contracts or otherwise signified in writing their acceptance of the terms thereof.

The prices to be paid Messrs. Vickers, Limited, are as follows:—

150 Q.F. 18-pr. field guns, including mechanism, £359 each.	£ 53,850
150 field carriages with bar sight and telescope, but exclusive of dial sights and carriers for dial sights, £588 each.	88,200
150 carriers, No. 7, dial sights, £15.5s. each.	2,287.10s.
150,000 rounds 18-pr. ammunition with shrapnel shells, £248.10s. per 100 rounds.	372,750
24 Q.F. 13-pr. field guns, including mechanism, £330 each.	7,920
24 Q.F. 13-pr. field carriages, with bar sight and telescope, but exclusive of dial sights and carriers for dial sights £578 each.	13,872
24 carriers, No. 7 dial sights £15. 5s. each.	366
24,000 rounds ammunition with shrapnel shells, £238.10s. per 100 rounds.	57,240
Total.	£ 596,485.10s.

These are at present War Office contract prices. The corresponding prices for the B.L. 60-pr. equipment are not at present available; but Messrs. Vickers, Limited, agree to undertake this part of the contract upon the same terms, namely, at present War Office contract rates.

The prices to be paid the Ottawa Car Manufacturing Company, Limited, are as follows:—

40 wagons, ammunition, Q.F. 13-pr. at \$1,528 each.	\$ 73,344
24 limbers, field carriage, Q.F. 13-pr. at \$1,470 each.	35,280
48 limbers, ammunition wagons, Q.F. 13-pr. at \$1,503 each.	72,144
300 wagons, ammunition, Q.F. 18-pr. at \$1,680 each.	504,000
150 limbers, field carriage, Q.F. 18-pr. at \$1,535 each.	230,250
300 limbers, ammunition wagons, Q.F. 18-pr. at \$1,595 each.	478,500
Total.	\$ 1,393,518

These have been the contract prices with this company for several years past. At these prices, the vehicles mentioned will cost from 5 to 13 or 14 per cent more than if purchased from Messrs. Vickers, Limited, and laid down in Ottawa, freight, duty and packing charges paid.

That in addition to these amounts an expenditure approximating 15 per cent thereof would be necessary to cover spare parts, stores and accessories, inspection and proof, and packing charges.

That the Canadian Government, if it so desires, as a matter of policy, may recover from the British Government the cost, at contract prices, of all the ordnance and war-like stores herein proposed to be contracted

for, and which may be taken over by the War Office, before delivery to the Canadian Government; and may also recover the cost, at prices to be determined, of the field guns and artillery equipment sent over with the Canadian Expeditionary Force, as follows:—

42 Q.F. 18-pr. field guns.
9 Q.F. 13-pr. field guns.
6 B.L. 60-pr. field guns.

Each complete, with carriage, limber, ammunition, wagons and limbers and the necessary accessories, stores, spare parts, etc., required to complete each equipment.

That if this reimbursement were made by the British Government, the field guns and equipment actually sent with the Canadian Expeditionary Force, at the expense of the Canadian Government, would be as follows:—

54 Q.F. 18-pr. field guns.
12 Q.F. 13-pr. field guns.
4 B.L. 60-pr. field guns.

Each complete.

That these should, therefore, now be replaced at the expense of the Canadian Government in any event in order to give Canada the same artillery armament as before the outbreak of the war.

Attached herewith, for the information of Your Royal Highness in Council, is a memorandum from the Chief of the General Staff, dealing with the present emergency; a copy of a letter dated 29th September, 1914, from the Secretary to the High Commissioner for Canada, addressed to the Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, and enclosing a memorandum containing the quotations from Messrs. Vickers Limited; a copy of this memorandum is also attached, together with a letter of that firm, requesting an advance payment of 25 per cent upon the execution of the contract.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

ANNEX 1

H.Q. 46-13-12.

17 VICTORIA STREET,
LONDON, S.W.,
September 29, 1914.

Sir,

I beg to acknowledge your cablegram, in code, of the 21st instant, the translation of which reads as follows:—

Enquire from Vickers' Limited for information of Premier if any order has been placed with them for 150 Q.F. guns 18-pr., 150 limbers for 18-pr. Q.F. guns, 150,000

rounds of ammunition Q.F. 13-pr., 24 Q.F. guns 13-pr., 24 limbers for 13-pr. Q.F. guns, 24,000 rounds of ammunition Q.F. 13-pr. with the necessary spare parts and accessories in same proportion to each gun ammunition as previous orders. When can they commence delivery? Will order be accepted at prices named previous orders—if not at what price. Also at what price will they supply twelve B.L. guns 60-pr. of 39 cwt. last model with 12,000 rounds of ammunition. Inform firm that their representative Lewis was present when this cable message was being drafted.

Enquiry was at once made of Messrs. Vickers, Limited, from whom was received, on the 25th instant, a memorandum of which a copy is forwarded, herewith, for your information. I now take the opportunity of confirming the cablegram, in code, sent you on the 25th instant, based on the information contained in memorandum referred to above:—

No order has been placed with Vickers for munitions of war mentioned your cablegram 21st September. They would accept order for delivery commencing July next completing whole of Q.F. guns 13-pr. and B.L. guns 60-pr. of 39 cwt. in October 1915, and Q.F. guns 13-pr. in November 1915,—prices of Q.F. guns 13-pr. and Q.F. guns 13-pr. equipments same as they state now paid by War Office showing considerable increase of prices over previous orders—forwarding particulars by mail—Vickers state they will quote shortly to War Office for B.L. guns 60-pr. of 39 cwt. equipments and will furnish prices of when settled.

I have, etc.,
W. L. GRIFFITH,
Secretary.

The Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence,
Ottawa.

ANNEX 2

Memorandum furnished by Messrs. Vickers
Limited

September 24, 1914.

Vickers can deliver the whole of the material mentioned in your telegram of 21st instant. Commencing in July next and completing the whole of the 13-pounder and 60-pounder material in October 1915, and the 13-pounder material in November 1915. Vickers will

accept order at same prices as now being paid by British War Office for the 13-pounder equipments are as follows:—

	£	s.
Field gun, including mechanism.	359.00	each
Field carriage with bar sight and telescope, but exclusive of dial sights and carriers for dial sights..	588.00	“
Carriage limbers..	205.00	“
Ammunition wagons..	229.00	“
Limbers for ammunition wagons..	222.00	“
Carrier No. 7 dial sight..	15. 5	“
Ammunition with shrapnel shells (per 100 rounds)..	248.10	“

Corresponding prices for 13-pounder equipments will be as follows:—

	£	s.
Field gun, including mechanism..	330.00	each
Field carriage with bar sight and telescope, but exclusive of dial sights and carriers for dial sights..	578.00	“
Carriage limbers..	198.00	“
Ammunition wagons..	222.00	“
Limbers for ammunition wagons..	215.00	“
Carriers No. 7 dial sight..	15. 5	“
Ammunition with shrapnel shells (per 100 rounds)..	238.10	“

Vickers are quoting to British War Office shortly for 60-pr. equipments and prices for these will be forwarded when settled.

ANNEX 3

VICKERS HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.,
September 24, 1914.

To the Minister of Militia and Defence,
Ottawa, Canada.

Sir,
Relative to the enquiry received from the High Commissioner and our reply of an even date, as the question of terms has not been referred to in the cable received from Canada, we did not make mention in our reply. Owing to the difficulties in financing at the present time, it is now customary and we are receiving from the English, French and other Governments, a payment of 25 per cent in each instance with the order, based on the total amount of the purchase, and we would much appreciate if you would kindly take this into consideration in accepting our proposals.

Might we also, in view of the conditions extant at this time, suggest that no time be lost in communicating with us by cable.

Trusting to hear from you at a very early date,

We have, etc.,
For VICKERS LIMITED.

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P.C. 1033

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 8th May, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 4th May, 1915, from the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, directing attention to the provisions of the War Appropriation Act, 1915, which set out that in addition to the ordinary grants of Parliament a sum not exceeding one hundred million dollars (\$100,000,000) may be paid and applied towards defraying the expenses incurred by and under the authority of the Governor in Council during the year ending 31st March, 1916, in the conduct of the military and other operations undertaken by Canada, arising out of the European war now in progress.

In view of the special and extraordinary expenditures entailed by these operations, the Prime Minister submits that it is in the public interest that a commission be appointed, composed of persons of experience in the conduct of business affairs, who, under the authority of and responsible to the Governor in Council, shall control the making of contracts in connection with such expenditures and perform such other functions as are hereinafter set out.

The Prime Minister, therefore, recommends that a Commission be appointed and that the constitution, powers, duties and regulations under which the Commission shall act shall be as follows:

1. The Commission shall be known as the War Purchasing Commission and shall consist of three honorary members appointed by the Governor in Council. There shall be a secretary to the Commission appointed by the Governor in Council upon the recommendation of the Commission at a salary approved by the Governor in Council.

2. The concurrence of at least two of its members shall be necessary for the execution of any act by the commission, and the act of two of its members shall be deemed to be the act of the commission.

3. All purchases of clothing, equipment, arms, guns, ammunition, horses, munitions and materials of war and supplies of every kind, and all contracts for such purchases, and all contracts for transportation, payable out of the funds appropriated by the War Appropriation Act, 1915, or out of the funds appropriated by any other Act for the purposes enumerated in the War Appropriation Act, 1915, shall be made by the commission or made under its direction and control, and the

commission is hereby empowered on behalf of the Government to make such purchases and to enter into or to direct and control the making of such contracts.

4. The commission shall on behalf of the Government enter into and direct all purchases of supplies and munitions of war which the Government may undertake for the British or any allied Government, excepting such purchases as fall within the scope of the functions of the Shell Committee.

5. Before any such contract as is mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof is made authority for expenditures out of money appropriated by the War Appropriation Act, 1915, or any Act appropriating money for the purposes for which expenditures can be made under the Act, must be given by Order in Council in accordance with the said Act. This authority may be a general authority for making expenditures necessary to effect any of the purposes authorized by the Act or it may be a specific authority approving of the making of certain purchases; and all Orders in Council hereafter passed granting such authority shall be on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, based upon the report concurred in by the commission, of the department concerned.

6. No contract shall be made by the commission or under its authority except upon requisitions made upon the commission by the department concerned. Such requisition shall refer to the Order in Council authorizing the expenditure called for by the requisition and shall state with particularity (a) the articles and materials needed, the quantity and description thereof and the time and place of delivery; (b) the nature of the service to be contracted for. The Commission shall have no authority to change or vary such requisition, but may in respect thereof make through the Prime Minister to the Governor in Council such representations as it sees fit.

7. In respect of all contracts to be made by the commission or to be entered into on its behalf, the following regulations shall obtain as far as practicable:

(a) Tenders shall be called for;

Purchases shall be made and contracts given at the lowest price offered.

These regulations may be departed from only in cases of urgency due to military considerations of the moment or for other good and sufficient reason, and in any such case the grounds of the departure shall be clearly recorded.

8. If the contract is entered into by the commission directly or by any one on its behalf other than the officers of the department concerned, the contract and all particulars thereof

shall be communicated forthwith to the department concerned. It shall be the duty of the officers of the department concerned, subject to the supervision of the commission, to see that all contracts made under the authority of paragraph 3 hereof are performed in accordance with the respective terms of such contracts.

9. The Commission may make inquiries as to the quantities of military and naval stores and other munitions and materials of war in the possession of the Government, the respective quantities or number of the like contracted for and not delivered as well as the probable needs in the immediate future for all such stores, munitions and materials.

10. The Commission may, on the authority of and at a rate of remuneration approved by the Governor in Council, employ such expert assistants as may by the Commission be deemed necessary, in order that complete information in reference to the matters mentioned in paragraph 9 may at all times be available, and such assistants may be employed by the Commission to revise and perfect methods of keeping records in regard thereto for the use of the Commission and the Departments concerned.

11. It shall be the duty of the Departments concerned and of all officers and employees of the Government to afford to the Commission all possible information in regard to any of the matters falling within the scope of the duties and powers of the Commission as herein set out and to co-operate with the Commission in the performance of such duties and the exercise of such powers whenever required by the Commission.

12. All relevant departmental and other records, documents and papers shall be placed at the disposal of the Commission.

13. The Commission may make report to the Prime Minister from time to time in reference to any matter within the scope of its duties as herein outlined, with any recommendations the Commission may see fit to make; and the Governor in Council and the Prime Minister may require from the Commission a report in regard to any such matters.

14. The Commission shall keep a systematic record of all its transactions.

15. The Commission shall be furnished with such office accommodation as may be necessary and may employ such number of officers, clerks and servants, at such rates of remuneration, not exceeding amounts named, as the Governor in Council may approve.

16. The members of the Commission shall be entitled to be reimbursed all travelling expenses and to be paid a living allowance of ten dollars per diem while actually engaged in the work of the Commission.

17. All salaries, wages and other expenditures incurred under the authority hereof shall be payable out of moneys appropriated by the War Appropriation Act, 1915, or any Act appropriating moneys for the purposes mentioned in that Act.

18. The following shall be the members of the Commission:

The Honourable Albert Edward Kemp, of Toronto;
George Frederick Galt, Esquire, of Winnipeg; and
Hormisdas Laporte, Esquire, of Montreal.

The first named shall be chairman.

19. All purchases of supplies and articles mentioned in the third paragraph hereof made out of the said appropriation before the passing of this minute and all contracts therefor shall be examined and reported upon by the said Commission.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

F. K. BENNETS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

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NOTE ON CONSTRUCTION OF
SUBMARINES IN CANADA

The Canadian Government first heard of the contract from the Vickers Company: while warmly welcoming and appreciating the construction of these submarines in Canada, they would have been grateful if earlier and official intimation could have been given, as the priority assigned to British Government work delayed Canadian Government contracts for an icebreaker and a dredger. The matter was considered by the British Government of very great importance; the Colonial Secretary, on behalf of the Admiralty, asked that it be kept absolutely secret, and, to forestall attempted sabotage, requested that great watchfulness should be exercised at the yards.

The news however appeared in sundry newspapers in the United States, and with this excuse a Canadian newspaper, in defiance of censorship regulations, published details on 15th January 1915.

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NOTE ON PURCHASE OF ARMY HORSES
IN CANADA

On 4th August 1914 the Secretary of State for the Colonies cabled:

Please inform your Ministers that Major-General Sir F. W. Benson, K.C.B., has been directed to proceed to Canada at an early

date to make all necessary arrangements in the event of it becoming necessary to purchase horses there for H.M.'s army. I should be glad if your Ministers would give him every assistance in making preliminary arrangements but no steps should be taken till he has arrived.

The Canadian Government agreed to give Sir Frederick Benson, as head of the British Remount Commission, all possible assistance; Major-General F. L. Lessard was instructed to aid him in his task, and veterinary inspectors of the Department of Agriculture also gave their help. Remount stockyards were established at Saint John, Halifax, Montreal and Toronto, under armed Militia guard, and thirteen transports were engaged, for three voyages each, to carry 10,000 horses to England per month; in October, 9,801 remounts for the British Army were shipped.

Although the British Remount Commission was purchasing horses while the First Contingent was being mobilized, offerings at that time were sufficient for both. An element of competition was, however, introduced when the Canadian Government again entered the field to complete the establishments of the 2nd Division and the Canadian Mounted Rifles Regiments, and to provide 1,500 remounts per month for the C.E.F. overseas, though these last went into the general pool in England: to avoid a rise in prices, the Benson Commission temporarily suspended purchases in Canada. Hon. Colonel Sir Adam Beck was appointed in December 1914 to supervise the buying of horses for the Militia Department in Eastern Canada and Lieut-Colonel A. D. McRae, C.A.S.C., was similarly appointed for Western Canada. Warned by disclosures arising out of certain dealings in connection with the horses of the First Contingent, the Department laid down that purchases were to be made direct from owners, a policy strictly adhered to. In August 1915 it was agreed between the British and Canadian authorities that the British Remount Commission should carry out all buying of horses in Canada, Canadian requirements overseas being met from the War Office pool. Thenceforward Canadian purchases were limited to such horses as were needed in Canada for training purposes.

The suggestion that purchase of horses in Canada for the French Army should be allowed was at first objected to by the British authorities on the ground that the French Government had undertaken not to buy in Canada. The export of army horses consigned from the United States through Canada to France in bond, was, however, authorized by order in council on 3rd October 1914

(P.C. 2490). As a result of personal representations by Sir Robert. Borden in August 1915, by which time prices had settled, French purchasers, with the concurrence of the Army Council, were no longer excluded from the horse markets of Canada.

British purchases in Canada fluctuated, and eventually practically ceased on transfer of operations to the United States, the reason officially given was the better arrangements for financing in the latter country. Throughout the war only 31,402 horses were purchased in Canada by the British Remount Commission as against 428,608 in the United States. The Canadian authorities had purchased 24,872 horses between 4th August 1914 and the end of November 1915.

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P.C. 1287

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 2nd June, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a Report, dated 21st May, 1915, from the Minister of Justice, recommending that Your Royal Highness cause inquiry to be made pursuant to Part I of the Inquiries Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, Chapter 104, concerning the purchase by and on behalf of Your Royal Highness' Government, through whatever agency, the purchase may have been effected, of arms and munitions, implements, materials, horses, supplies, and other things for the purposes of the present war, and as to the expenditures and payments made or agreed to be made therefor; and that inasmuch as such inquiry is not regulated by any special law Your Royal Highness do by a Commission in the case appoint a commissioner by whom the inquiry shall be conducted, and that the Commissioner so appointed shall be by the Commission authorized to have and exercise all the powers mentioned or described in Section 11 of the aforesaid Chapter as enacted by Chapter 28 of the Act, passed in the second year of His Majesty's reign intituled "An Act to Amend the Inquiries Act" and moreover that the Honourable Sir Charles Peers Davidson of Montreal, ex-Chief Justice of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec, be named as the said Commissioner, and that he be required to proceed with ill reasonable diligence, to make the said inquiry and' report from time to time as and when any Particular branch or subject of the inquiry is concluded,

his findings and recommendations, together with the evidence taken for the consideration of Your Royal Highness in Council.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

P.C. 1093

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 9th May 1916.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 8th May, 1916, from the Minister of Justice, submitting—with reference to the Commission of 2nd June, 1915, issued to the Honourable Sir Charles Peers Davidson to investigate the purchase of arms and munitions, etc., and the expenditure and payments therefor, that it is deemed desirable to extend the powers of the Commissioner so as to enable him to inquire into and investigate the facts and circumstances of or connected with the sale of disposal by Your Royal Highness's Government of small arms munitions since 4th August, 1914, referred to in returns made to the *House* of Commons on the 1st and 2nd May, 1916.

The Minister therefore recommends that Your Royal Highness cause inquiry to be made pursuant to Part 1 of the Inquiries Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, Chapter 104, concerning the aforesaid transactions, and that a Supplementary Commission be issued in the case conferring and charging upon the Commissioner all the powers and duties for the inquiry aforesaid which the Commissioner has under and by virtue of the aforesaid Commission of 2nd June, 1915.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

See also:

(i) *Royal Commission concerning Purchase of War Supplies and Sale of Small Arms Ammunition. Evidence, Vols. I, II and III. The King's Printer, Ottawa, 1917.*

(ii) *Reports of the Commissioner* concerning:—*

1. *Sale of Small Arms Ammunition.*
2. *Purchase of Submarines.*
3. *Remount establishment at Regina.*
4. *Purchase of Horses in the Vicinity of Regina.*

5. *Subsistence of troops at Regina.*
6. *Alleged irregularities and shortage at Regina.*
7. *Saddlery.*
8. *Subsistence of troops at Winnipeg.*
9. *Mounts of Mississauga Horse and G.G. Body Guard.*
10. *Qualities of socks accepted by the Department of Militia and Defence.*
11. *C. E. Frost & Co.-Medical Supplies*
12. *Editorial appearing in Men's Wear, Toronto.*
13. *Alleged tendering by R. A. Pringle, Esq., K.C.*
14. *Purchase of 40,000 bushels of oats.*
15. *"The Two Macs" Co. Housewives.*
16. *Military cloth (Auburn Woollen Mills Co.).*
17. *Purchase of Surgical Field Dressings and other Surgical Supplies.*

* The King's Printer, Ottawa, 1917.

259

Debates, House of Commons, Session 1915, 15th April, pp. 2613, 2614.

260

Report of speech, 5th December 1915, as given in the *Mail and Empire*, Toronto, of 7th December.

261

ATTACHMENT—CANADIAN DIVISION
Canadian Division.

The Canadian Division will be attached for instructional purposes as under.

The periods of attachment will be—

Period A. February 17th to 23rd. To 6th Division.

Period B. February 21st to 28th. To 4th Division.

Period C. February 23rd to Mar. 2nd. To 6th Division.

2. The following will be the composition of each detachment—

For A-to 6th Division.

H.Q. of one Infantry Brigade.

One Infantry Brigade.

One Company R.E.

Personnel of one Field Artillery Bde. consisting of—

1 Arty. Bde. Commander and Staff.

Battery Staffs of 4 batteries.

4 Subalterns.

4 Sergeants.

One Bde. Section of Signal Company.

Brigade Train.

ANNEX 4

Memorandum on the subject of guns, 13-pr. Q.F., 18-pr. Q.F. and 60-pr. B.L.

1. Under the authorized scheme of organization there are required in Canada in time of peace:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	36
18-prs. Q.F.....	284
60-prs. B.L.....	36

2. The Canadian Expeditionary Force embarked with:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	12
18-prs. Q.F.....	54
60-prs. B.L.....	4

and at the urgent request of the Army Council the following in addition have been shipped to England:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	9
18-prs. Q.F.....	42
60-prs. B.L.....	6

3. Therefore the total number of guns which have left Canada since the outbreak of the war amounts to:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	21
18-prs. Q.F.....	96
60-prs. B.L.....	10

and of those which are brought back (who shall say after how long a period?) not all are likely to be serviceable.

4. There are in the country some old pattern 12-pr. and 4·7" guns; but of the type under discussion there remain no more than:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	3
18-prs. Q.F.....	28*
60-prs. B.L.....	2

5. Ignoring possible casualties, but writing off the guns which have been shipped to England over and above the requirements of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (for it is almost certain that they will never be returned) the deficiencies at the end of the war are likely to be at least:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	24
18-prs. Q.F.....	214
60-prs. B.L.....	28

6. In view of the existing situation and of the conditions which are likely to obtain when the war is over, the Chief of the General Staff cannot too strongly recommend that orders be placed at once for:—

13-prs. Q.F.....	24
18-prs. Q.F.....	150
60-prs. B.L.....	12

With 1,000 rounds per gun.

W. G. GwArsrx, Colonel,
Chief of the General Staff.

October 16, 1914.

* Includes 22 now being mounted,

ANNEX 5

MEMORANDUM for the Honourable the Acting Minister of Militia and Defence.

Further to elucidate the liabilities to be incurred by the Crown in passing the attached Order in Council, the following information is submitted.

1. To be ordered from Vickers Sons & Maxim:—

150 Q.F. 18-pr. Field guns.....	£ 53,850 00 00
150 Field carriages.....	88,200 00 00
150 Carriers.....	2,287 10 00
150,000 Rounds 18-pr. ammunition.	372,750 00 00
24 Q. F. 13-pr. Guns.....	7,920 00 00
24 Q. F. 13-pr. carriages.....	13,872 00 00
24 Carriers.....	366 00 00
24,000 Rounds ammunition.....	57,240 00 00
	£ 596,485 10 00

Plus 15 per cent for spare parts etc.

89,472 19 6

£ 685,958 9 6

or.....

\$ 3,338,331.24

2. To be ordered from the Ottawa Car Company:—

48 Wagons, 13-pr. ammunition.	\$ 73,344.00
24 Limbers, 13-pr.....	35,280.00
48 Limbers, amm. wagons.....	72,144.00
300 Wagons, Amm. Q.F. 18-pr.....	504,000.00
150 Limbers, field carriage.....	230,250.00
300 Limbers, ammunition.....	478,500.00
	\$1,393,518.00

Plus 15 per cent for spare parts,
etc.....

209,027.70

\$1,602,545.70

3. The order for the 12 60-pr. needed, to be placed at War Office price, when details have been furnished by the High Commissioner, and to be the same as paid by the War Office. Delivery to begin in July next, and to be completed for the 18-pr. and 60-pr. Material—in October 1915, and the 13-pr. material in November 1915.

4. To be paid on placing of contract:—

Vickers, Limited, 25 per cent.....	\$ 834,582.81
Ottawa Car Company, 25 per cent...	400,036.42

\$1,235,219.23

The balance on progress estimates, on War Office inspector's certificates, and when the contract is completed.

EUG. FISET, Colonel,
Deputy Minister.

Department of Militia and Defence, October 19, 1914.

For B—to 4th Division.

Same as above with addition of Battery Staff of Heavy Btty.
1 Subaltern.
1 Sergeant.

which will be attached to the Heavy Btty. of the 4th Division.

For C—to 6th Division.

Same as for A.

3. In carrying out the above—

(a) The Headquarters of Brigades and Brigade Section of Bde. Signal Company will be attached to the Headquarters of a selected Infantry Brigade.

(b) The battalions of the Canadian Infantry Brigades will be divided up between the three or four brigades (3 in 4th Div., 4 in 6th Div.) holding the front of the division to which they are attached, in order that the greatest amount of individual instruction may be received during the period of attachment.

(c) The personnel of the Canadian Field Artillery Brigade will be attached to the head-

quarters of an artillery brigade of the Division, and will be given every facility for seeing the complete working of the brigade.

(d) The Canadian Field Company will be instructed in all the various forms of work that are being carried out by the R.E. companies of the division to which it is attached.

4. The units of the Canadian Division will march at such an hour as to reach their destinations at 1 p.m. on the 1st day of attachment as given in para. 1.

Units returning from attachment will leave the divisions to which they have been attached so as to reach their billeting areas by 1 p.m.

5. The 4th and 6th Divisions will report to 3rd Corps H.Q. the units to which the Canadian units will be attached and the places to which they should report on arrival for attachment, and will arrange to meet them at those places at 1 p.m. on the dates laid down.

The 6th Division will furnish this information by 10 a.m. to-morrow, 16th February.

6. The D.A. & Q.M.G. 3rd Corps will issue separate instructions as to rationing the units of the Canadian Division during attachment.

7. The following attachments will take place as under:

G.S.O. 1st Grade.....	To each Divl. H.Q. by arrangement with divisions concerned.
One 2nd Grade G.S.O. } One 3rd Grade G.S.O. }To 4th Division for period 22nd to 26th February.
One "A" Staff Officer } One "Q" Staff Officer }To 6th Division for period same as above.
One 2nd Grade G.S.O. } One 3rd Grade G.S.O. }To 6th Division for period 26th February to 2nd March.
One "A" Staff Officer } One "Q" Staff Officer }To 4th Division for period 26th February to 2nd March.
O.C. Signal Company } One Sergeant }To 6th Divl. H.Q. for period 22nd to 26th February.

8. The A.D.M.S. 6th Division will arrange with A.D.M.S. of Canadian Division for the attachment of officers of Canadian Field Ambulances for such periods as he may consider necessary.

9. The 4th and 6th Divisions will make all necessary arrangements as regards billets for the above parties and will arrange direct with the Canadian Division for billeting parties to be sent on in advance as required.

H.Q. Canadian Division is at PRADELLES.

10. Field Kits only will be taken and all surplus baggage, stationery, etc., should be left in the Canadian billeting area.

11. Some notes on the Course of Instruction recommended are attached. (See App. 262)

GEO. F. MILNE,
Br-General,
General Staff.

3rd Corps,
15.2.1915.

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FIELD TRAINING

The undermentioned units, etc., will be attached for instructional purposes to the 6th Division at, or below ARMENTIERES, as may be detailed later, from the 17th to 23rd February, inclusive:—

1st Fd. Artillery Bde.—Bde Commander & Staff.
Bty. Staffs of 4 Btys.
4 Subalterns.
4 Sergeants.
1st Field Coy, Canadian Engineers.
1st Infantry Brigade complete.
No. 2 Section, Divisional Signal Company.
No. 2 Company, Divisional Train.

The troops mentioned above will march out under the orders of the O.C. 1st Infantry Brigade, on the 17th instant so as to reach their destination at 1 p.m. on that date.

On returning from this instruction, the troops above mentioned will leave the units to which they have been attached so as to reach their original billets by 1 p.m.

The DA. & Q.M.G., 3rd Corps will issue instructions as to the rationing of these units while attached to the 6th Division.

The 6th Division will arrange for billeting and the units will be prepared to send billeting parties in advance as may be directed. 1 officer and 1 n.c.o. from each battalion and Field Company and for the Artillery, the billeting for the Signal Company and Artillery will be arranged for by one of the other units under the orders of the O. C. that unit.

Copies of the Course of Instruction are forwarded herewith. (*Not reproduced.*)

It will be noted that in the case of Artillery only the personnel mentioned are required—no horses or guns.

Please acknowledge receipt of this.

R. C. B. LAWRENCH,
Brig: General,
General Staff,
1st Canadian Division.

Pradelles,
16-2-15.

Courses of Instruction ARTILLERY

The Lieut.-Colonels, Adjutants, Battery Commanders forward observing officers and a small proportion of non-commissioned officers to go up in turn to the gun emplacements and see exactly how things are done, and then should spend a few days and nights in exactly the positions they would occupy were their own units in action. They should then return to their units and explain the exact procedure.

They should also be instructed in digging emplacements and concealing guns from aeroplanes, and in the methods of artillery communication.

INFANTRY

The course of instruction should be divided into:—

- (a) Practical instruction in the trenches.
- (b) Instruction out of the trenches.

(a) Instruction in the trenches.

1. The Canadians would first be taught individuality, the personnel of 8 platoons being put as individuals into the trenches of the front line companies of the regular brigade. Each Canadian to be associated with a thoroughly well trained regular soldier who is to teach him all he knows under the instruction of the Section, Platoon and Company Commanders. The Section, Platoon and

Company Commanders of the Canadian Companies in the trenches will during this period be attached to the regular commanders of corresponding units for instruction.

2. This individual instruction will be followed by putting Canadian Platoons into the front line trenches as complete platoons under their own Canadian Platoon leaders under the command of the Captains of the regular Company who will arrange for the close supervision and instruction of these Canadian Platoons by selected officers and n.c.o's. They will themselves continue the instruction of the Canadian Captains.

(b) Instruction out of the trenches.

During the time that the instruction as in (a) above is being given in the trenches instruction under a carefully arranged programme to be drawn up by the regular Brigadier will be given in all subjects of trench warfare—such as construction of trenches, revetting, making of obstacles, pumping, sanitation and the details of how to keep the men healthy, etc., etc. This will be carried out under their own Canadian Officers, selected regular officers and n.c.o's. (not less than 1 officer per company and 1 n.c.o. per platoon) acting as instructors. The instruction of the Canadian officers will be among the most important of the duties of these instructors.

Canadian Battalion Commanders and Battalion Staffs to be attached to Headquarters of regular Battalions to learn the many details of Battalion administration in trench warfare.

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EXTRACT FROM SIR JOHN FRENCH'S DESPATCH

From the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in the Field.

To the Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,
5th April, 1915.

* * * * *

On the 15th February the Canadian Division began to arrive in this country. I inspected the Division, which was under the command of Lieutenant-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB., on 20th February.

They presented a splendid and most soldier-like appearance on parade. The men were of good physique, hard and fit. I judged by what I saw of them that they were well trained and quite able to take their places in the line of battle.

Since then the Division has thoroughly justified the good opinion I formed of it.

The troops of the Canadian Division were first attached for a few days by brigades for training in the 3rd Corps trenches under Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney, who gave me such an excellent report of their efficiency that I was able to employ them in the trenches early in March.

* * * * *

264

OPERATION ORDER No. I

By

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

27th February, 1915.

The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, followed by the 1st Field Ambulance, and Pontoons, 1st Field Co., C.E., will march to-morrow, 28th February, to SAILLY Cross Roads where they will arrive at noon, and take up billets.

Route. MERRIS-DOULIEU-SAILLY.

Starting Point-Road junction at the "D" of R. DU LEET 3½ kms. S.E. of MERRIS.

Time to pass Starting Point-10 a.m.

The 1st Canadian Field Company will march to-morrow under instructions of O.C. Div. Engrs., via PONT de NIEPPE-CROIX DU BAC-POINT de la BOUDRETTE--SAILLY Cross Roads. This unit will not debouch onto SAILLY-DOULIEU road until 1st Infantry Brigade has passed. The Pontoons and bicycles of this Field Co. C.E. will follow the 1st Ca. Field Ambulance.

The 1st Ca. Artillery Brigade and Heavy Battery will march via STRAZEELE-DOULIEU-to SAILLY Cross Roads which they are to reach at 1 p.m.

Starting Point-ROUGE CROIX.

Time-9.30 a.m.

This column will be under the O.C. 1st Ca. Artillery Brigade and will remain behind the 1st Infantry Brigade.

A Staff Officer of the 1st Brigade accompanied by billeting parties of the Infantry, Artillery and Engineers will report to the 7th Division Headquarters at SAILLY at 8 a.m. 28th February.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 3.15 p.m. to

1st Infantry Brigade5 copies.
Divl. Arty5 copies.
Divl. Engrs.1 copy.
AD.M.S.1 copy.
A.A. & Q.M.G.1 copy.
G.S. File.....1 copy.

265

OPERATION ORDER No. 2

By

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

28th February, 1915.

The 2nd Canadian Artillery Brigade, followed by 2nd Canadian Field Ambulance and Pontoons 2nd Canadian Field Company, CE. will move to-morrow, March 1st via-

STRAZEELE, MERRIS, railway crossing 1¼ miles S.E. of MERRIS, road junction S. of "D" in R. DU LEET, DOULIEU to SAILLY Cross Roads. where they will arrive at 4 p.m. and go into billets.

Starting Point-SE. exit of STRAZEELE.

Time of passing Starting Point-12 noon.

Billeting parties under an officer will report to 7th Division Headquarters, SAILLY, at 8 a.m. March 1st.

Supply and Baggage Wagons will accompany units.

The A.P.M., 1st Canadian Division will see that the road from BORRE to DOULIEU, inclusive, is kept clear for the march of this Column.

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, and 1st and 2nd Canadian Field Cos. C.E. will march to-morrow from 4th Divisional Area to BAC ST. MAUR Cross Roads, which they will reach at 3 p.m.. Instructions for this march will be issued by 4th Division.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 10.45 a.m.

Copy Nos. 1-4 to O.C. Divl. Arty.
5 to AD MS.
6 to O.C. Divl. Engrs.
7 to A.A. & Q.M.G.
8 to O.C. Div. Sig. Co.
9 to 3rd Corps.
10 to A.P.M.
11 to G.S. Office.

266
OPERATION ORDER No. 3

By
Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

1st March, 1915.

The 3rd Canadian Artillery Brigade, followed by the 3rd Canadian Field Ambulance and Pontoons 3rd Field Company, Canadian Engineers, under command of O.C. 3rd Cdn. Artillery Brigade, will move to-morrow, March 2nd via—

STRAZEELE, MERRIS, railway crossing 1¼ miles S.E. of MERRIS, road junction S. of "D" in R. DU LEET, DOULIEU to SAILLY Cross Roads which are to be reached at 4 p.m.

Starting Point—Cross Roads at ROUGE CROIX

Time of passing Starting Point—

3rd Canadian Artillery Brigade..12.30 p.m.

3rd Canadian Field Ambulance..12.55 p.m.

Pontoons, 3rd Field Company,

C.E.....1 p.m.

Billeting parties under an officer will report to 7th Division Headquarters, SAILLY, at 8 a.m.

Supply and Baggage wagons will accompany units.

The A.P.M. will see that the route of the Column as far as DOULIEU is kept clear of traffic.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, and 3rd Field Company, Canadian Engineers, will march to-morrow from 6th Division Area to BAC ST. MAUR Cross Roads which they will reach at 3 p.m. Instructions for this march have been issued by 6th Division.

C. F. Roam, Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 10 a.m.

Copy Nos. 1-4 to O.C. Div. Arty.
5-6 to O.C. Div. Engrs.
7 to A.D.M.S.
8 to 3rd Corps.
9 to A.P.M.
10 to A.A. & Q.M.G.
11 to O.C. Sig. Co.
12 to A.D.O.S.
13 to G.S. Office.

267

ADDRESS BY GENERAL ALDERSON TO
THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

All ranks of the Canadian Division: We are about to occupy and maintain a line of trenches. I have something to say to you at this moment, which it is well that you should consider. You are taking over good, and on

15135—13

the whole, dry trenches. I have visited some myself. They are intact and the parapets are good. Let me warn you first that we have already had several casualties while you have been attached to other divisions. Some of these casualties were unavoidable, and that is war. But I suspect that some—at least a few—could have been avoided. I have heard of cases in which men have exposed themselves with no military object and perhaps only to gratify curiosity. We cannot lose good men like this. We shall want them all if we advance and we shall want them all if the Germans advance. Do not expose *your* heads, and do not look round corners, unless for a purpose which is necessary at the moment you do it. It will not often be necessary. You are provided with means of observing the enemy without exposing your heads. To lose your life without military necessity is to deprive the State of good soldiers. Young and brave men enjoy taking risks. But a soldier who takes unnecessary risks through levity is not playing the game. And the man who does so is also stupid, for whatever be the average practice of the German Army, the individual shots, whom they employ as snipers, shoot straight, and screened from observation behind the lines, they are always, watching. And if you put your head over the parapet without orders, they will hit that head. There is another thing. Troops new to the trenches always shoot at nothing the first night. You will not do it. It wastes ammunition and it hurts no one. And the enemy says: "These are new and nervous troops ". No German is going to say that of the Canadian troops. You will be shelled in the trenches. When you are shelled, sit low and sit tight. This is easy advice for there is nothing else to do. If you get out you will only get it worse. And if you go out the Germans will go in. And if the Germans go in, we shall counter-attack and put them out : and that will cost us hundreds of men instead of the few whom shells may injure. The Germans do not like the bayonet, nor do they support bayonet attacks. If they get up to you, or if you get up to them, go right in with the bayonet. You have the physique to drive it home. That you will do it I am sure, and I do not *envy* the Germans if you get among them with the bayonet. There is one thing more. My old regiment, the Royal West Kent, has been here since the beginning of the war and it has never lost a trench. The Army says, "The West Kents never budge". I am proud of the great record of my old Regiment. And I think it, is a good omen. I now belong to you and you belong to me: and before long the Army will say: "The Canadians never budge ". Lads it can be left there, and there I leave it. The Germans will never turn you out.

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To O.C. P.Q.R.S. Section.
B.1/1/92. 9th March 1915.

The following returns will be rendered by you before
8.30 a.m. daily aaa.

- (1) Number in Trench Officers and R. & F. aaa.
- (2) Patrol Report and Reconnaissance aaa.
- (3) Engineering work done in past 24 hours.
Improvements and new construction aaa.
- (4) Ammunition required aaa.
- (5) Engineering material and stores required aaa.
- (6) Casualty return from midnight to midnight, this
includes missing aaa. In case of Officers Rank
Initials and seriousness of wounds aaa.

From O.C. 1st Canadian Bn.
SUPPORT FARM. 9.55.

R. J. BROOK,
Captain and Adjutant.

269

1st Army.
2nd Army.
Indian Cavalry Corps.
Cavalry Corps.

1. With reference to paragraph 6 of my Circular Memorandum O.A.OO of 9-2-15, recent experience of the enemy's attacks upon our own and the French front show that he frequently aims at obtaining possession of one of our trenches either by mining, sapping, or direct attack with the object of provoking counter-attacks. These counter-attacks he prepares for by arranging to bring heavy machine gun and artillery fire on to the ground over which the attack must take place.

2. The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that to make it an invariable rule that a counter-attack is to be launched whenever the enemy penetrates any portion of our line is to play the enemy's game for him. There are, of course, a number of trenches in our line the possession of which by the enemy might entail serious consequences. In such cases a counter-attack delivered before the enemy has had time to secure himself in the captured position is a necessary part of the scheme of defence. There are however many trenches the loss of which is not a serious matter, and this applies particularly to places where a new line of trench connecting with those still held can be prepared quickly, or where such trenches already exist. As soon as the reentrenchment is satisfactorily established the dislodgment of the enemy from the ground he has gained can then be undertaken deliberately, by means of bombing, sapping or mining.

3. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you should consider the defence of our front line from this point of view and issue such instructions as you may consider advisable to give effect to the above policy.

E. M. PERCIVAL,
Brigadier-General.
G.H.Q. Sub-Chief of the General Staff.
23rd February 1915.

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PRINCIPLES OF DEFENCE
SECRET (Cdn. Div. G. 191).

1. The attached Sketch Map (*not reproduced*) shows the line held by the Canadian Division. This line is divided into 6 subsections, each of which is held by a battalion with its supports.

Behind the line of trenches certain works have been constructed to act as supporting points to the front line. These works consist of redoubts and are shown on the sketch map.

No. 1 Sub-section is responsible for 1.A., 1.B., and 1.C.

No. 2 Sub-section for 2D. and 2.E.

No. 3 " " 3.F. and 3.G.

No. 4 " " 4.H. and 4.I.

No. 5 " " 5.J. and 5.K.

No. 6 " " 6.L. and 6.M.

These works must be held by night, and every sub-section must make arrangements in its local scheme of defence for their being held by day in the event of attack and show how the garrisons and machine guns are to reach the works.

In nearly every case these works form part of a defended locality the extent of which is shown on the sketch map. In addition there are the following defended localities:-

1 X., 5.Y., and 6.Z.

the number showing the sub-section responsible for their defence.

2. The object of these defended localities is to provide a defensive line in case abnormal weather should render the front trenches untenable or a very heavy hostile attack has driven us temporarily from the latter.

3. But it must be clearly understood that the cardinal principle of the defensive scheme of the Division is a determination to hold the front trenches at all costs.

4. Experience has proved that even if the enemy succeeds in gaining a trench he requires time to re-organize before making further advance and that a prompt counter-attack nearly always drives him out of the captured trench. But this counter-attack must be carried out promptly and with resolution.

Brigadiers will be responsible for impressing the two principles in para. 3 and 4 on all their subordinates. Brigade and Sub-section defence schemes will include plans for prompt counter-attacks if certain parts of the front line are captured. These attacks will find a suitable basis or jumping-off line in the supporting points.

5. Prompt communication is of the utmost importance. The general principle is that each company in the trenches should be in telephonic or telegraphic communication with the battalion Headquarters, that each Battalion should be in direct communication with Brigade Hd. Qrs. and with the two battalions on its immediate right and left, and that each brigade should be in direct communication with divisional Hd. Qrs. and with the Brigade on its immediate right and left. Wires should be so laid that a cut in one place does not interrupt communication.

6. Of equal importance is co-operation between Infantry and Artillery. Brigadiers will see that their battalions in the front trenches are in direct communication with the batteries allotted to their Sub-section.

The repulse of a hostile attack or the success of a counter-attack is greatly aided by the ability of the artillery to bring quickly effective fire on the enemy's support and reserve trenches, and this can only be done especially at night, if the Infantry at once inform the artillery of the hostile attack.

7. The principle laid down in para. 3 implies that the front trenches must be kept in good repair and be constantly improved. It is only by hard and constant work that this can be accomplished. Moreover careful forethought and supervision are required. A definite scheme of work for each night must be drawn up by every company in the trenches and a definite task given to each individual or party.

Attention should especially be made to the wire entanglement. Moonless and dark nights should be utilized in improving wire. The Os.C. Field Companies will be responsible for the repair of the wire and will report to the Brigadier of their Sections on its condition.

8. Behind the front line and the supporting points mentioned in para. 1 a secondary line has been constructed in case events in other parts of the Allies' line necessitate a slight retirement. Instructions regarding this line which is known as the G.H.Q. 2nd Line are contained in this office G.189 of 4th March.

9. Finally, although this Memorandum deals with defence it does not follow that we are on the defensive. The Allies are besieging the enemy and the initiative belongs to them.

15125—13½

The Divisional Commander, therefore, wishes to remind all ranks of the necessity for maintaining this ascendancy over the Germans. Bold patrolling, persistent and accurate sniping, and prompt enterprises against any sapheads &c., must be continued. Ambushes must be prepared, hostile patrols cut off, and in fact everything done to force the conviction on the enemy that the Canadian Division is his superior.

This Memorandum to be acknowledged.

Divl.H.Q.
4.3.1915.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Canadian Division.

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G.H.Q. 2ND LINE

Description of line.

Behind the trenches and supporting points at present occupied by the Canadian Division a second line has been constructed by order of General Headquarters. This line will be known as "G.H.Q. 2nd Line."

It runs from a point in N.1.a. in front of the RUE DU QUESNES as far as work No. 22 (H.32.a & b), then through CROIX BLANCHE (work No. 26) and CROIX MARECHAL (work No. 27) to work 29 (H.29.c.), where it joins the 6th Division line. Intermediate posts have been made between works 20 and 21, while other intermediate trenches or parapets will be made between works 20 and 19 (in 7th Division area), between works 21 and 22, 22 and 26, and 26 and 27. A "switch" branches off from work No. 22 and runs through works 23, 24 and 25 to S. of FLEURBAIX where it joins another line being constructed by the 6th Division. This "switch" will not be at present considered although the 1st Brigade will see that all battalion and company officers know the position of the works.

Distribution of Line.

The line will be divided into two sections, Right and Left. The Right Section will run from the left of the 7th Division to work 26, exclusive. The Left Section will run from work 26 to work 29, inclusive.

Garrison.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade will hold the Right Section and the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade the Left Section. The 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. will form the Divisional Reserve.

The two Brigades in the front line will be responsible for the allotment of garrisons to each post, provided that they each keep at least 1 battalion in reserve.

The supports will be under cover close behind the locality defended by their battalions.

The local reserves will be placed as follows :-

Right Section—About ROUGE DE BOUT.

Left Section—About "NES" of RUE DU QUESNES.

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve will be in a position of readiness along DU QUESNOY and RUE BATAILLE.

HdQrs. of Sections and Divisional Reserve.

The Headquarters of Right Section will be on SAILLY-FRAMELLES road in G29-b.

The Headquarters of Left Section will be at southernmost road junction in H.21.a.

The Headquarters of Divisional Reserve will be at road junction in G.24.d. Divisional Headquarters will remain as at present.

Method of Withdrawal.

So long as the situation permits, the withdrawal will take place by night. The Battalions in trenches will withdraw gradually, each Company leaving one section to cover its withdrawal.

If the battalions in Local and Divisional Reserve are not engaged, work No. 20 will be occupied by the battalion of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve and work 21 by the battalion of that Brigade in Local Reserve. Work 26 will be occupied by the battalions of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve and work 27 by the battalion of that Brigade in Local Reserve. The other works will be occupied by the first battalion available belonging to the Brigade responsible for the particular work.

In the same way, if the Local Reserves are engaged while the Divisional Reserve is intact works 20 and 26 will be occupied by the battalions of the 3rd and 1st Brigade in Divisional Reserve. If all Divisional and Local Reserves are engaged, Brigadiers will allot their battalions as they become available.

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade will in all cases retire gradually to its position along DU QUESNOY and RUE BATAILLE.

Roads allotted for withdrawal.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade will use any road between a line drawn from "P" in PICANTIN to road junction in G274. and the BAC ST. MAUR—Fme BARLETTE-CROIX BLANCHE road (exclusive).

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade—The BAC ST. MAUR—"Q" in QUESNOY Fme. BARLETTE-CROIX BLANCHE road.

The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade—The road from road junction in H.13 ab. by "T" in RUE BATAILLE, "I" of RUE BIACHE FLEURBAIX to LA BOUTILLERIE.

Field Coys. and Field Ambulances.

Field Companies and advanced sections of Field Ambulances will withdraw by the roads allotted to their affiliated Brigades.

Arty.

The positions of artillery for G.H.Q. 2nd Line and the roads allotted to the various batteries for their withdrawal will be worked out by the C.R.A.

Responsibility of C.R.E.

The C.R.E. is responsible for the maintenance and improvement of the G.H.Q., 2nd Line. Application for any working parties will be made to this office.

Knowledge of G.H.Q. 2nd Line.

Brigadiers, Battalion and Company Commanders will, as soon as possible, make themselves acquainted with the defended localities and positions of the G.H.Q. 2nd Line which they are detailed to occupy as well as the roads allotted for their withdrawal.

But Brigadiers should impress on all concerned that no retirement to this line is contemplated and that the instructions contained in this memorandum are purely precautionary.

The receipt of this memorandum to be acknowledged.

83.1915. C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Canadian Division.

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ORDERS FOR BATTALIONS IN DIVISIONAL RESERVE IN CASE OF ATTACK

Cdn. Div. 0.187.

1. On receipt of orders to "stand to" battalions will immediately fall in. They will report to Divisional Headquarters when ready to move. Transport can follow as required and the necessary guides must be provided for it.

It is not necessary, unless that is considered more convenient, for battalions to assemble as such, provided that each company is fallen in ready to move opposite its own billets.

2. The Divisional Reserve Battalions may either—

- (a) Be placed at the disposal of their respective Brigadiers—or
- (b) Be required to act as a central force at the disposal of the Divisional Commander.

3. In the event of 2 (b), it will be necessary for the reserve battalions to proceed to a "position of readiness" whence they can be rapidly used as required. The position selected is on the RUE DU QUESNES in the neighbourhood of the cross roads 3/4 mile south west of FLEURBAIX (H.26.d.).

On receiving the order "move to position of readiness" the reserve battalions will proceed as follows:—

- (a) Battalion from 3rd Infantry Brigade.
(If not required in Corps Reserve) to ROUGE DE BOUT, then along the RUE DU QUESNES to a point 500 yards South West of the above mentioned cross roads in H.26d. where it will form up in the orchards North of the road.
- (b) Battalion from 2nd Infantry Brigade.
By RUE DU QUESNOY and Fme. BARLETTE to the RUE DU QUESNES where it will form up on the left. of the Battalion from the 3rd Infantry Brigade.
- (c) Battalion from 1st Infantry Brigade.
By the road junction immediately west of the " F " in FLEURBAIX and the cross roads in H.26.d. to a point on the RUE DU QUESNES 300 yards North East of the latter cross roads where it will form up in the Orchards North of the road.

These battalions will take all available tools with them to the above rendezvous.

4. On arrival at the "position of readiness" the Headquarters of Officer Commanding Divisional Reserve will be at the farm on the North side of the RUE DU QUESNES 150 yards North East of the present 3rd Infantry Brigade Headquarters.

Each battalion will detail 1 officer and 2 orderlies to report to the staff officer there.

5. For the present the Divisional Reserve when used as in (b) will be under the orders of Colonel T. B. Wood, A.A. & Q.M.G., with Lieut.-Colonel Lamb as his G.S.O.2.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Cdn. Division.

Divl.H.Q.
4.3.1915.

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The "Iron" or Emergency Ration consisted of:
1 lb. biscuits.
1 lb. (nominal), preserved meat. 1 oz. tea.
2 oz. sugar.

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ORDERS FOR BATTALIONS IN DIVISIONAL
OR CORPS RESERVE

Cdn. Div. G.186.

Officers Commanding Battalions or portions of Battalions in Divisional or Corps Reserve will report to Divisional Headquarters as soon as possible after taking up their billets. If the G.O.C. is out they will see the Staff Officer on duty and give him their names and positions of their Headquarters.

The following orders are issued for guidance of Battalions in Reserve:—

1. It is primarily intended that the battalion should obtain a rest, especially by night, during the time they are in Reserve.

2. It may of course be necessary to use the Divisional or Corps Reserve for tactical purposes.

3. Besides rest the period for which a unit is in Reserve is intended to give opportunities for cleaning up, shaving and haircutting, and tidying clothes and equipment, and generally speaking, pulling the unit together.

4. It must however be remembered that all the time a unit is in Divisional or Corps Reserve it must be available for tactical use in any direction at short notice. With this possibility in view, the following points require the closest attention:—

- (a) The Alarm Post must be clearly known to all ranks, and all details precisely arranged, so that, should emergency arise, the order to turn out requires no further amplification.
- (b) Every man must sleep with his arms, equipment and boots at his head, so as to minimize delay in turning out in the dark.

(c) No ammunition will be taken from the man while in Reserve—they will remain in possession of the full amount.

(d) Every man will carry the iron ration when the Reserve is turned out.

5. Men are not to be permitted to leave the area in which they are billeted except by a written pass signed by the Commanding Officer of the unit.

6. Equipment, rifles, clothing and feet are to be carefully inspected daily. Steady drill parades are to be held under the command of officers. If units in Reserve are required to dig by the C.R.E. orders will be issued.

Divl.H.Q.
4.3.1915. C. F. Roman, Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Cdn. Division.

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G.641,
Headquarters, Canadian Division,
17th March, 1915

To each Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Each Brigade will at once take steps to provide a section of miners. The section will be formed from miners, etc., serving in Battalions and should be billeted together so long as the Brigade is in the trenches.

The attached table shows the organization of each section. (*Not reproduced.*)

The subaltern in command of the section should have a knowledge of mining and how, when and where to do it.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
for Colonel,
General Staff, Canadian Division.

NOTE ON INFANTRY BRIGADE
MINING SECTIONS

The formation of brigade mining sections (2 officers and 67 other ranks) was not proceeded with in the 1st Canadian Division at this time. Mining was carried out by " Mining Companies" (i.e. Tunnelling Companies, R.E.) attached to Corps. At the end of July 1915, instructions from II Corps directed that each infantry brigade should form a mining section (1 officer and 30 other ranks) from its own personnel to carry out defensive mining on the brigade front under direction of the O.C., Corps Tunnelling Company. The sections were formed in August. A G.H.Q. decision of 24th October ruled that no extra pay could be given. In December 1915 the Canadian mining sections were absorbed into the 3rd Canadian Tunnelling Company, (C.E.). Thereafter all mining was carried out by Tunnelling Companies, RE., assisted by fatigue parties of infantry attached as required and under Army direction.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR BRIGADE
GRENADE COMPANIES

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION,
ETC.

1. Brigade Grenade Companies will be maintained in each Infantry Brigade.

2. Establishment

H.Q. Officer Command

ing Captain or Lieutenant to be nominated by Brigade Commanders for approval of Divl. General.

1 Senior N.C.O. Combining duties of C.S.M. and Q.M.S.

In addition to the above a junior Subaltern in each Battn. will be attached to the Brigade Grenade Company for a course of instruction for 10 days.

On completion of the course these officers will return to their units but will be available for recall to the Grenade Co. should their services be required.

1 Platoon per battalion composed of—

1 N.C.O. and 7 men per Company.

3. Officers, N.C.O.'s and men detailed for training in Brigade Grenade Companies will be struck off all other duties and billeted together.

Men who prove unsuitable for training as grenade throwers will be returned to duty at any time and replaced.

4. (a) In addition to the Brigade Grenade Company, 2 N.C.O.'s and 14 men per Company will be trained in grenade throwing. When trained they will return to their units and will be available for employment as grenade throwers as required by the unit.

(b) These men will be trained as follows:—

Approximately 50% of the permanent Grenade Co. will be temporarily returned to duty with their Battalions, their place being taken by a similar number of recruits. These recruits will then go through a course of 10 days duration at the end of which they will return to their units. When this operation has taken place 4 times the full number of men will have been trained, via, Brigade Grenade Cos. of 1 N.C.O. and 7 men per Co., battalion grenade throwers of 2 N.C.O.'s and 14 men per Co. After this, casualties will be made good and vacancies filled up by battalions sending men from time to time as required to the Brigade Grenade Company for instruction.

(c) The subaltern officers mentioned in para. 2 will be in charge of the battalion grenade throwers when in the trenches, and will continue and improve their training when the battalion is in brigade or divisional reserve, under the general supervision of the O.C. Brigade Grenade Company.

5. A standard test will be instituted of a searching nature and those men who pass it will be entitled to wear the grenade badge. The test will be held twice during the month. The details of this test will be settled in consultation with O's. C. Grenade Companies.

6. All officers and N.C.O's will receive instruction from the O.C. Grenade Company in the method of improvising grenades.

7. It may be necessary, in the event of a move, to temporarily return the personnel of the Company to their units, but it will concentrate again as soon as circumstances permit.

8. The custody and maintenance of all hand grenades and rifle grenades within the Brigade will be in the hands of the O.C. Brigade Grenade Company.

The following stock will be maintained:—

In the Trenches—150 per Company in the trenches.

Of these 100 will be kept in support trenches and 50 in fire trenches.

(All grenades to be kept in the boxes provided for the purpose—See para. 10.)

(Total in the trenches per Brigade, with 2 battalions in the trenches)

(a) In support trenches.....	800
In fire trenches	400

Total	1,200
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(b) With Brigade Grenade Company.. 800 (For the present, half of these (a) and (b), will be jampot and half Hales or Service.)

Above gives a total of 2,000 grenades per Brigade or 6,000 in all.

(c) Brigade Ammunition Columns 6,000. 2,000 for each Infantry Brigade.

(d) Divisional Ammunition Column 2,000

Total in the Division.....	14,000
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This total to be exclusive of any special reserves kept in redoubts, etc.

Under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Brigade, the Officer Commanding Grenade Companies will visit the trenches and satisfy himself that the grenades there are kept up to the correct numbers, are properly distributed and cared for, and that they are fit for use.

9. All hand grenades will be drawn by Infantry Brigades from Brigade Ammunition Columns in the same way as small arm ammo.

10. Tin-lined shrapnel or rifle grenade boxes will be issued for keeping grenades in the trenches and with the Brigade Grenade Companies. These will be obtained from the Divisional Ammunition Column.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MACHINE GUNNERS AND GRENADIERS

When the officer decides that a suitable position has been obtained for a machine gun, the machine gun detachment and working party, will construct a machine gun emplacement, blocking the trench, but leaving room for one man to pass to the front at a time.

The working party will dig out the trench in front so as to give a clear field of fire to the machine gun.

Meanwhile, the leading bayonet men, and grenadiers, will advance and on reaching a traverse from which the grenadiers can bomb the enemy, the leading bayonet men will be halted by the officer, and the grenadiers will throw their grenades, advancing to the next traverse when the portion of the trench bombed is clear.

A forward stop of at least 40 yards in front of the machine gun emplacement will be constructed, blocking the trench and also leaving room for one man to pass.

The grenadiers will continue to bomb forward, covering the construction of the stops. As soon as security has been obtained by blocking the trench, every effort must be made to push further along it. Every trench cleared of the enemy; in whatever direction, is a gain.

W. H. ANDSRSON,

Colonel.

1st March, 1915. General Staff, 8th Division.

MEMORANDUM ON THE TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF GRENADIERS (Issued by the General Staff)

The object of Grenade Throwing.

1. Among the more important purposes for which grenade throwing may be used are the following:—

- (i) To prevent the approach of the enemy's sap-head towards our own trenches.
- (ii) To facilitate the progress of a storming party along the enemy's trenches which have been successfully attacked.
- (iii) To prevent the advance of the enemy along our trenches which they may have succeeded in entering.

Selection of Men.

2. The men taken for training as grenadiers should be selected from the very best, bravest and steadiest in an emergency.

Training and instruction.

3. Training and instruction must be progressive and should commence with practice in throwing dummy grenades; this should always be carried out with the strictest observance of active service conditions, viz.:

- (a) The men must be fully armed and equipped.
- (b) Throwing must be invariably practiced from a trench or behind a barricade.
- (c) Men should be practised, not merely to throw over a traverse, but at least into the space beyond the second traverse from them.
- (d) For practice, traverses should be made at varying intervals and some should be loop-holed, in order to teach men that they may be checked by, and that they may have to resort to, rifle fire.
- (e) Men must be taught to throw accurately at both long and short distances.

The best results for long distance throwing are obtained by swinging the arm upwards and slightly forward, the hand, at the commencement of the swing, being about the level of the waist. For short distances, the grenades should be lobbed from the shoulder by an action similar to that employed in "putting the weight."

Practice with live grenades.

4. Before men are allowed to use live grenades the following should be explained to them:-

- (a) The construction and action of each sort of hand grenade should be first carefully explained.
- (b) The properties of fuses, detonators and explosives should be practically demonstrated.
- (c) Each man should be practised in making up and firing small charges to accustom him to handling explosives, cutting fuzes, etc.

- (d) Familiarity with explosives must not be allowed to induce carelessness in handling them.

The length of fuze at first should be such as to allow at least ten seconds burning: This length should be gradually reduced to the service length as the men gain confidence and skill in lighting and throwing.


The organization of a trench storming party.

5. A trench storming party will, as a rule, consist of:-

- (a) The bayonet man to cover the party.
- (b) The grenadiers.
- (c) The carriers; unless the grenadiers carry the grenades themselves (see below). This party should be followed by
- (d) The sand-bag men, who carry sandbags half filled. They block side entrances to the trench and finally barricade the furthest point reached in it. In an attack the sandbag men may form part of the main body and in working along a trench, be taken from the men detailed to modify or destroy the trenches or to hold them.

The sand-bag men, and other parties in rear of them, will vary in numbers, but for working along a trench the grenadier party may consist of two throwers, with a reserve of 4 behind to take their places in case of casualties: they might be followed by the same number of carriers, if they are necessary: and about 12 bayonet men. Four of these last, including the N.C.O. in charge, should be just in front of the leading grenadiers and carriers, and 8 behind them and in front of the reserve throwers and carriers. Some of the men in rear of the leading throwers and carriers must be left to watch - communication trenches that may be passed in advancing. In an attack, there should be spare grenadiers and carriers at the head of each company, who will be available to replace casualties and take over the watching of side trenches. from the grenadier party.


6. The following mode of action in working along an enemy's trench has been found successful.



On arriving at traverse 1, the bayonet men should place themselves in position AAA, the N.C.O. at C, or as required, the grenadiers at BB, behind the traverse with the carriers, if any, and spare bayonet men behind them. No. 1 Grenadier then throws a grenade over the traverse into trench X, and a second one in trench Y. The leading bayonet man can then move forward, so as to see into trench X. If it is clear he passes back word, and the 3 bayonet men move up trench X and occupy positions at traverse 2, similar to those at traverse 1. The grenadiers then follow, and throw grenades into Y and Z. Until Y is clear, the reserve bayonet men remain behind traverse 1, in case the enemy should throw grenades into trench X.

Should trench Y be too far to reach from traverse 1, the grenadiers should move to point D and throw obliquely into it before advancing to traverse 2.

Should an "island traverse" be encountered, the leading bayonet men must watch both sides of it whilst the grenadiers are hurling grenades (Fig. 2).



7. The storming party may be reduced in wise if grenadiers are provided with receptacles in which they can carry their grenades. These have been made in the form of a basket or box, similar to the machine gun belt box, with strap handle and fitted inside to take the type of the grenade in use.

The best type is that illustrated in the sketch (*not reproduced*). It consists of a leather belt of the bandolier type which goes three-quarters round the body, and has pockets in front for the grenades. The belt is supported by 2 straps attached in front, which are passed under the shoulder strap, then through loops on ends of the belt, and then are brought round the waist and tied in front. This leaves the man free use of both hands.

As regards the sandbag men, they should be practised in filling sandbags, and passing them quickly along a chain of men in a trench to a given point, where a barrier is to be constructed. When a barricade is made it must be machine gun proof.

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Headquarters,
8th Battalion,
March 11, 1915.

From O.C. 8th Canadian Infantry Battn. (90th Rifles)
To Headquarters 2nd Infantry Brigade.

Sir :-

I have the honour to inform you that I withdrew the telescopes from the Signalling Section, who at present have no use for them, and have issued them to the companies. I found this arrangement has produced excellent results, therefore I would request that you forward this letter to the Divisional Headquarters as this plan may be of use to other units. The results obtained today by the use of these high-power telescopes were as follows:-

No. 3 Co., Captain Bertram, reported that at 11.30 a.m. with the aid of these telescopes they made out the head of a sniper concealed in a pollard willow. The fire of a section was concentrated on this tree, the man dropped out of it and was shot as he got off the ground.

No. 1 Co., Captain Prower, reports that with the powerful telescope the movement of the rifle of a sniper who was lying concealed behind a pollard willow was noticed. The fire of a half section was concentrated on it and he rolled over from behind the willow.

Another man was made out concealed in the branches of a tree, the fire of a section was concentrated on the tree and the man fell forward into a forked branch.

None of these men could possibly have been discovered with the naked eye and it is unlikely that they would have been discovered with ordinary field glasses. As the telescopes have been so useful in ridding us of snipers I think that the other units would probably derive equal benefit from their use.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

L. J. LIPSETT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Comdg. 8th Cdn. Inf. Battalion (90th Rifles).

1st Cn. Infantry Brigade.

3rd Cn. Infantry Brigade.

The above copy of a letter received from the 2nd Inf. Brigade is forwarded for your information.

H. J. L., Lieut.-Colonel,
General Staff,
11.3.1915. 1st Cn. Division.

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BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
10th FEBRUARY 1915

HIGHER STAFFS.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Commander-in-Chief-Field-Marshal Sir John French.
Chief of the General Staff-Lieut.-General Sir William Robertson.

Adjutant-General-Lieut.-General Sir Cecil Macready.
Quartermaster-General-Lieut. General R. C. Maxwell.

FIRST ARMY (I and IV Corps)

General Sir Douglas Haig.

SECOND ARMY (II, III and V Corps)

General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

CORPS AND DIVISIONSCavalry Corps.

- 1st Cavalry Division.
- 2nd Cavalry Division.
- 3rd Cavalry Division.

Indian Cavalry Corps.

- 1st Indian Cavalry Division.
- 2nd Indian Cavalry Division.

I Corps.

- 1st Division.
- 2nd Division.

II Corps.

- 3rd Division.
- 5th Division.

III Corps.

- 4th Division.
- 6th Division.

IV Corps.

- 7th Division.
- 8th Division.

V Corps.

- 27th Division.
- 28th Division.

Indian Corps.

- Lahore Division.
- Meerut Division.

All the above divisions, except Indian, belonged to the British Regular Army.

At this time almost all British Infantry Brigades included one and occasionally two Territorial Battalions supernumerary to establishment. Territorial units of Cavalry, Infantry and Engineers were also in the field, attached separately to higher formations.

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General JOFFRE to Field-Marshal Sir JOHN FRENCH

G.Q.G.

Etat-Major

Au G.Q.G., le 15 fevrier 1915.

3e Bureau
No. 5213.

A son excellence, Monsieur le marechal French, commandant en chef les armees britanniques, Saint-Omer.

Monsieur le marechal.

L'ensemble des renseignements recus au cours de ces derniers temps, montre que les Allemands tout en renforçant decant no's lee effectifs de leurs unites, portent leur effort principal contre la Russie.

J'estime done qu'il importe de saisir cette circonstance pour prendre l'offensive sur notre theatre d'operations tant pour profiter de notre superiorite numerique actuelle, que pour retenir devant nous le maximum de forces ennemies. L'action actuellement engagee en Champagne par la IVe armee repond a cette double consideration.

Parmi les actions offensives en voie de preparations daps l'armee francaise, j'envisage une attaque de l'armee du general de Maud'huy. Cette operation aurait pour but d'amener cette armee:

A deboucher d'Arras avec sa droite.

A s'emparer, avec son centre, des hauteurs de Vimy, dominant ainsi tous la region de Douai.

A tenir ayes sa gauche les hauteurs de Lens et de Pont-a-Vendin.

Vous estimerez sans doute avec moi qu'il y aurait le plus grand interet h ce que lee armees britanniques sons vos ordres participent a cette operation.

Leur role, daps cette hypothese, pourrait etre envisage daps lea conditions suivantes:

1° Votre armee de droite attaquerait en direction de la Bassee et des hauteurs avoisinantes, contre lesquelles it eat possible do realiser un grand developpement d'artillerie par l'occupation des positions enveloppantes de Vermelles, Cambrin, Festubert, Richebourg/Avoue.

Il semble que cette attaque pourrait etre prononcee sans rencontrer grande resistance, jusqu'au canal de Pont-a-Vendin a Haubourdin, daps une situation oh elle prolongerait efficacement les progres que realiserait, de son tote l'armee du general de Maud'huy. Cette attaque devrait done s'executer en mime temps que l'action a, entamer par cette derniere armee.

2° Une seconde offensive pourrait etre prononcee en direction du front Warneton, Messines que les fortes positions d'artillerie a

l'ouest de la Hutte et du bois de Ploegstoert permettront de battre superieurement. L'action par la rive gauche de la Lys pourrait titre combinee avec une action par la rive droite partant d'Armentieres.

La deuxieme operation serait posterieure a la premiere. It. serait donc possible de renforcer successivement en artillerie lee troupes destinees a mener chacune d'elles. Il serait enfin necessaire de les relier par l'investissement de Lille sur le front jalonne par les hauteurs de Perenchies a Radinghen.

Ainsi conrcue, l'ensemble des operations de l'armee britannique degagerait, sans doute la region au sud d'Ypres; vers Wytschaete, ferait tomber la resistance de Lille, sans qu'il soit necessaire d'aborder directement cette ville, preparerait enfin l'entree en action des nouvelles armees que le gouvernement britannique doit envoyer sur le continent, a partir du printemps.

J'ai done l'honneur de vous demander, monsieur le Marechal, de me faire savoir si vous partagez ma maniere de voir exposee cidessus sur le projet general d'operations qu'il convient d'adopter pour lee armees allies de gauche. Dane le cas de l'affirmative, vous pourriez vous entendre directement avec le general Foch pour la date et les details de l'execution. Les preparatifs d'attaque de l'armee du general de Maud'huy sont en voie d'achevement. Il y aurait donc interet a ce qu'ils puissent titre entames incessamment a votre armee de droite.

Pour assurer l'unite d'action entre le canal de la Bassee et la Lys, it me parait indispensable d'y maintenir l'unite de commandement, telle qu'elle est actuellement realisee dans votre Ire armee et, par suite, de ne pas proceder a la releve du 1er corps anglais par des troupes francaises, a laquelle vous aviez un instant songe.

Par contre, une partie du front actuellement occupe par le 20e corps et qui devait titre releve par les troupes britanniques, pourrait titre conservee par lee troupes francaises. Il serait inadmissible, en effet que Is division active et lee divisions territoriales que je laisserai dans la region au nord de Poperinghe, conformement a nos conventions, restassent inactives, en arriere des troupes belges et britanniques sans occuper aucune partie du front, ni proceder a aucune releve.

La partie du front de la VIIIe armee a occuper par les forces britanniques, renforcee par les divisions et bataillons en cours de debarquement, s'etendrait donc de Is ligne Zillebeke, Zanwoorde, a la ligne Boesinghe, Langemark exclue (pour lee troupes britanniques).

Cette solution qui evitera tout mouvement complique pourrait titre dune realisation rapide.

Je me permets, en effet, en terminant, d'attirer a nouveau votre attention sur l'interet que presente, pour l'heureuse reussite de nos operations commencees, une prompte releve du 9e corps. Elle me permettrait de faire etat a bref delai de disponibilites nouvelles, non seulement pour assurer sur d'autres parties du front quelques releves urgentes, mais pour pouvoir mener a bien l'offensive de la Xe armee et pour mettre fin a certaines tentatives repetees des Allemands, notamment en Argonne et autour de Verdun.

Votre bien sincerement devoue,

J. JOFFRE.

*"Les Armees Francaises daps la Grande Guerre"
Tome II Annexes-2e Volume, Annexe No. 890, pp. 199-200.*

TRANSLATION

General Headquarters,
15th February, 1915.

Dear Field-Marshal,

Analysis of recent information received shows that the Germans, while adding to their effective strength opposite us, are directing their major effort against Russia.

I therefore am of the opinion that this circumstance should be seized upon to take the offensive in our theatre of operations, as much. to take advantage of our present numerical superiority as to contain on our front the maximum number of the enemy's forces. The action now being prosecuted in Champagne meets this double consideration.

Among the offensive actions in course of preparation in the French army, I am planning an attack with General de Maud'huy's Army. In this operation the aim of this Army would be:

To debouch from Arras with its right.

To seize, with its centre, the heights of Vimy, thus dominating the whole of the Douai region.

To hold with its left the high ground about Lens and Pont-a-Vendin.

You will doubtless agree with me that it would be most advantageous if the British forces under your command were to participate in this operation.

Their role, in this event, may be envisaged as follows:

- i. Your right army would attack in the direction of La Bassee and the neighbouring high ground, against which it is possible to bring to bear a great weight of artillery by occupying enveloping positions at Vermelles, Cambrin, Festubert, Richebourg-l'Avoue.

It would appear that this attack could be pushed on without meeting strong resistance as far as the canal from Pont-a-Vendin to Haubourdin, into a position where it might extend the progress which General de Maud'huy's Army, on its part, would have made. This attack should therefore be delivered at the same time as the operation for the break-through of the latter army.

- ii. A second offensive might be launched on the Warneton-Messines front, which could readily be heavily bombarded from the strong artillery positions west of La Hutte and Ploegsteert. The action along the left bank of the Lye might be combined with a thrust down the right bank from Armentieres.

The second operation would be subsequent to the first. Then it would be possible to give successive artillery support to the troops engaged in each. Finally, it would be necessary to link them together by the investment of Lille on the frontage defined by the high ground from Perenchies to Radinghem.

Thus conceived, the consummation of the operations of the British army would undoubtedly be the release of the area south of Ypres; towards Wytchaete they would break down the resistance of Lille unless it might be necessary to approach that town directly, and they would also open the way for the engagement of the new armies which the British Government will be sending to the continent in spring.

I have therefore the honour to request, my dear Field-Marshal, that you let me know if you agree with the views above expressed on the general conduct of operations which should be adopted for the allied armies on the left of the line. If you concur, you could communicate direct to General Foch the date and details of execution. The preparations for the attack of General de Maud'huy's army are on the way to completion. It is desirable that they should be at once correlated with those for your right army.

To ensure unity of action between the canal de la Bassee and the Lys, it seems to me essential that unity of command should be preserved there, as it in fact now is, by your First Army, and, in consequence, that the relief of the British I Corps by French troops, to which you gave a passing thought, should not be proceeded with.

On the other hand, a part of the front now occupied by the XX Corps, due to be relieved by British troops, might be retained by the French. Of course it would never do to have, lying idle behind Belgian and British troops,

and neither holding any front nor carrying out any relief, the active division and the territorial divisions, which, in accordance with our understanding, I shall leave in the area north of Poperinghe.

The part of the frontage of the VIII Army to be occupied by the British Forces, augmented by divisions and battalions in course of arrival, would then run from the line Zillebeke-Zandvoorde to the line Boesinghe-Langemark exclusive (to the British).

This solution, which avoids any complicated movements, might be quickly made effective.

May I therefore, in closing, again draw your attention to the desirability of the prompt relief of the IX Corps, to ensure the favourable outcome of the operations on which we have embarked. That would allow me to make new dispositions in short order, not only to ensure some urgent reliefs on other parts of the front, but to expedite the offensive of the X Army and to put an end to certain repeated German attempts, notably in the Argonne and about Verdun.

Yours most sincerely,

J. JOFFRE.

(See 280)

280

Field-Marshal Sir JOHN FRENCH to
General JOFFRE

G.H.Q. OA. 581/1
18th February, 1915.

My dear General,

In reply to your letter of the 16th instant (*sic* 16th, *vide* App. 879) I beg to say that I am in agreement with your views as to the necessity for an early offensive. I have, in fact, for some days past been preparing, as secretly as possible, a plan for an attack by my First Army in the direction of LA BASSEE, in conjunction with your attack near ARRAS, and was about to address you on the subject when your letter arrived.

It will be necessary, I think for various reasons to defer the relief of your IX and XX Corps until the operation in question has been carried out. I desire to give a further careful consideration to these reasons, and will send you a full reply by one of my officers this evening.

(The above is from an unsigned carbon copy. The letter marked *Secret* and signed J. FRENCH is reproduced in French in "Let Armees Francaises daps la Grande Guerre" Tome 11 Annexes Be Volume, Annexe No. 916, p. 234.)

Field-Marshal Sir JOHN FRENCH to General JOFFRE

OA.. 581/2

18th February, 1915.

My dear General,

In reply to your letter of 16th instant (sic *15th, vide App. 279*) I am, as stated in my letter to you this morning, in agreement with your views as to the necessity for an early offensive, and have already been preparing a plan for an attack by my First Army in the direction of LA BASSEE.

2. One of the chief factors which weighed with me in forming this plan was the advantage which was likely to accrue if this attack by my First Army were to take place simultaneously with General de Maud'huy's contemplated operations in the neighbourhood of ARRAS. It is very satisfactory to find that we are in complete accord on this point.

3. I am also preparing a plan for a subsidiary attack by my Second Army on the MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE ridge. The object of this operation is to deceive the enemy as to the *direction* of my main attack, and it is not my intention to allot more troops for this purpose than are absolutely required. The necessity and desirability of subsequently reinforcing my Second Army with a view to extending its operations towards WARNETON and LILLE, must, as I think you will agree, depend upon the result of our combined operations near ARRAS and LA BASSEE. In order to ensure these being successful it is essential to concentrate as large a portion of my forces as possible upon the attack at LA BASSEE, and this I am arranging to do.

4. I hope to be in a position to carry out the attack early in March. By that time I shall have received useful additions to the heavy guns at my disposal, and my difficulty in regard to scarcity of ammunition will, I trust, to a great extent have been remedied. Further, recent events have led me to think that my First Army has established a considerable moral superiority over the hostile troops by whom it is faced, and we know that the quality of these troops has depreciated during the past few months. If, therefore, we can break the enemy's line, formidable though it undoubtedly is, his troops may become demoralized and allow us to secure a large measure of success, provided the combined attack is made in adequate strength, is well timed, and is resolutely carried out.

5. I agree with you that the operation proposed for my First Army disposes for the Vreseat of the question of the relief of my

1st Corps, and for this and other reasons I have come to the conclusion, after very careful consideration, that it will not be possible for me to effect the relief of your IX and XX Corps, and at the same time undertake, with any prospect of success, the proposed attack on LA BASSEE. The arrangements I had in view for relieving these two Corps were dependent not only upon the relief of my 1st Corps, but upon receiving the 29th Division which is not now to be sent. This Division is, as no doubt you are aware, to be employed elsewhere, as agreed upon by our respective Governments. A Territorial *Division is to be sent instead and is due to arrive early next month, but is not of the same value as the 29th Division, and, like the separate Territorial battalions which arrive at about the same time, will require some training before being put into the trenches.

6. I am therefore not in the same position to relieve your two Corps as I expected to be when we met at CHANTILLY on the 21st January, either in regard to the 1st Corps or the 29th Division, while the Canadian Division, which has just arrived, must be allotted to the First Army in connection with the attack on LA BASSEE.

7. You will, I am sure, agree with me that it is necessary to be in sufficient strength at the point of attack, and that it would be false policy to divert troops required for offensive operations for purposes of relief or extension of line. The necessity, which you have urged, for an early offensive on a considerable scale, and my desire to employ my maximum available force for that purpose, both seem to make it imperative to postpone further arrangements for reliefs until after the result of our combined offensive at ARRAS and LA BASSEE is known. Any other course, would, in my opinion, result in dissipation of energy upon two incompatible tasks.

8. In thus suggesting a departure from our previous agreement you will, I am confident, understand that I do so because it seems preferable to concentrate our resources upon a resolute offensive, as early as possible. If the reinforcements I am receiving are used, when ready, for prolonging the defensive line I now hold to the north, I shall not be able to take any offensive operations before the first week in April. Even then such operations would, owing to lack of adequate troops, be of a comparatively minor nature. Further, by carrying out the programme of reliefs, as previously agreed upon, I would not increase your power of taking the offensive at an early date, since it is improbable that

your IX and XX Corps would be in a position to take part in an attack until some time after they had left the trenches they now hold. We should therefore incur a loss of valuable time, which would be avoided if my reinforcements are employed in the proposed offensive operations.

9. If you concur in the views I have put forward I will at once proceed to arrange details with General Foch.

(See 279 and 281)

(The above is from an unsigned carbon copy. The letter, marked Secret and signed J. FRENCH, is reproduced in French in "Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume, Annexe No. 917, pp. 286-257).

281

General JOFFRE to Field-Marshal Sir JOHN
FRENCH

G.Q.G.

Etat-Major

3e Bureau

No. 6365.

Au. G.Q.G., le 19 fevrier, 1915.

Le general commandant en chef, a son excellence le marechal French, comdant en chef armee britannique, Saint-Omer.

Monsieur le marechal,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser reception de vos lettres du 18 Wrier. (App. 280.)

Malgre l'interet des considerations que vous me soumettez, je considere comme absolument indispensable au succes de nos communes operations que vous procediez dana un tres court delai a la releve des forces francaises qui occupent le front s'etendant de la ligne Zanwoorde, Zillebeke, a la ligne Langemark, Boesinghe.

D'apres nos conventions precedentes, armee britannique devait remplacer les troupes frangaises, sur tout le terrain s'etendant jusqu'a l'armee beige. L'extension de front qui en resultait pour vous etait de 25 kilometres. Si les troupes francaises conservent l'occupation de la zone s'etendant a l'ouest de Langemark, armee britannique n'aura plus a nous relever que sur une etendue de 18 kilometres. Le gain de 7 kilometres qui en resulte, pour cette derniere eat superieure a l'etendue du front du 1er corps (5 kilometres).

Il eat d'autre part necessaire que le 9e corps, engage en ire ligne depuis 4 mois puisse titre mis le plus tot possible au repos. Dana ce

but, il avait meme etc entendu entre nous que vous le feriez relever en partie des maintenant par une de vos divisions de cavalerie. Il suffira d'ailleurs de quelques jours pour le remettre en etat.

Ce 9e corps m'est en effet absolument indispensable pour mener a bien l'attaque projetee de la Xe armee. Celle-ci sans rapport de ce corps d'armee, n'aurait pas des effectifs suffisants pour proceder a une operation efficace. La releve du 9e corps eat done la condition *necessaire* de l'offensive a laquelle vous m'avez demande vous-meme de participer et dont je vous ai indique les bases dans ma lettre du 16 fevrier.

Enfin les forces que je maintiendrai dans la region au nord de Poperinghe, ne seront pas entierement absorbees par l'occupation du front compris entre Langemark et l'armee beige. Une partie d'entre elles serait maintenue en reserve et pourrait en cas d'attaque serieuse des Allemands, porter une aide efficace aux troupes britanniques tenant la region en. avant d'Ypres.

Je crois enfin devoir vous faire remarquer, monsieur le marechal, que dans la situation actuelle, l'armee britannique tient, avec la valeur de 12 divisions, environ, un front de 50 kilometres, tandis que la Xe armee francaise tient le meme front avec 8 divisions.* Vous disposez ainsi efficacement d'importantes reserves de nature a vous permettre de conduire successivement les deux offensives projetees. Enfin dans l'ensemble du developpement de nos lignes, sur le theatre d'operations occidental, armee britannique, avec un nombre de rationnaires qui eat environ du 7e du nombre des rationnaires francais (350,000 pour 2,300,000) tient un front 14 fois moindre (50 kilometres contre 700). Dans l'ensemble, la densite des forces britanniques eat done double de la densite des forces francaises.

L'apport des forces nouvelles, que vous ayez recues et devez recevoir, bien que de moindre qualite, me semble done devoir vous permettre, non seulement d'entreprendre des actions offensives, mais de relever les troupes francaises sur les parties defensives du front. S'il n'en etait pas ainsi, je me trouverais, de mon cote, dans l'impossibilite de mener a bien les attaques que j'ai projetees. Ces, operations sont cependant indispensables dans l'etat actuel de la guerre et son excellence le marechal Kitchener vient precisement de me faire connaitre qu'il estimait necessaire de les entamer au plus tot. La situation dans les Balkans reste indecise. Les Allemands semblent bien avoir realise des progres sensibles

*Non compris les bataillons territoriaux. Dans ces deux armees.

en Prusse Orientale. Il est donc necessaire que nos armees allies obtiennent de leur cote des succes marques. Les excellents rapports que nous avons toujours entretenus me sont une garantie que l'armee britannique aura a coeur d'y participer dans toute la mesure de ses moyens.

J'ose esperer, monsieur le marechal, que les considerations ci-dessus vous convaincront de la necessite de relever, avant la fin du mois de fevrier, les troupes francaises sur le front s'etendant jusqu'a la ligne Langemarck, Boesinghe.

J. JOFFRE.

"Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume, Annexe No. 927, pp. 247-248.

TRANSLATION

General Headquarters,
19th February, 1915.

Dear Field-Marshal,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letters of 18th February. (*App. 280.*)

In spite of the weight of the considerations which you advance, I consider it absolutely indispensable for the success of our common operations that you proceed without delay with the relief of the French forces which occupy the front between the lines Zandvoorde-Zillebeke and the line Langemarck-Boesinghe.

According to our earlier agreements, the British army was to replace the French troops on the whole frontage up to the Belgian Army. The resulting extension of your front would be 25 kilometres. If the French troops continue to occupy the sector west of Langemarck, the British army will only have to relieve us on a front of 18 kilometres. The resulting gain of 7 kilometres, from this last is greater than the length of the front of the I Corps (5 kilometres).

It is furthermore necessary that the IX Corps, which has been in line for 4 months, should be brought out to rest as soon as possible. To this end it was also understood between us that you would relieve part of it forthwith with one of your cavalry divisions. It will also take some days to effect it.

To satisfactorily bring off the projected attack of the X Army the IX Corps is absolutely indispensable. The former, without the augmentation of this army corps, would not be strong enough to engage in an effective

operation. The relief of the IX Corps is then the *inevitable condition* for the offensive in which you personally asked of me to participate and of which I indicated the main features in my letter of 16th February.

After all, the forces I would keep in the area north of Poperinghe, will not all be used in the occupation of the front between Langemarck and the Belgian Army. Part of them will be held in reserve and could, in case of a serious German attack, give effective help to the British troops holding the Ypres salient.

Finally, I feel bound to say, my dear Field-Marshal, that as things stand the British Army is holding with a force of about 12 divisions a frontage of 50 kilometres, while the X French Army holds the same length of front with 8 divisions (both armies exclusive of territorials). You thus have at your disposal important effective reserves sufficient to allow you to conduct successively the two projected offensives. To summarize, over the whole extent of our frontages, in the western theatre of operations, the British army, with a ration strength of about one-seventh of the French ration strength (350,000 to 2,300,000) is holding one fourteenth of the front (50 kilometres to 700). As a result, the density of the British Forces is double the density of the French.

The arrival of new forces, which you have received and will receive, although of inferior quality, thus seems to me to be able to permit you not only to undertake offensive actions, but to relieve the French troops on the defensive parts of the front. If it were not so, I should, for my part, find it impossible to carry out the attacks I have projected. These operations are, nevertheless, indispensable at this stage of the war, and Lord Kitchener has specifically informed me that he thinks it necessary to enter upon them as soon as possible. The situation in the Balkans remains indecisive. The Germans seem to have made telling progress in East Prussia. It is thus necessary that our allied armies on their part should obtain telling successes. The excellent relations which have always existed between us are a guarantee that the British Army will be of a mind to participate to the fullest extent of its means.

I dare to hope, my dear Field-Marshal, that the above considerations will convince you of the necessity for relieving before the end of February, the French troops on the front up to the line Langemarck-Boesinghe.

J. JOFFRE.

(*See 280, 282.*)

282

*Field-Marshal Sir Joust FRENCH to
General JOFFRE*

O.A.613.

From:

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in the Field.

To:

His Excellency,
The Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies.
General Headquarters,
British Army in the Field.
23rd February, 1915.

Your Excellency,

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant (*App. 281*) in which you ask me to take over, before the end of this month, that portion of the defensive line now held by your IX and XX Corps.

As this request seems to disclose some misconception of the terms of our agreement of the 21st January, and of the changes in conditions which have taken place since that date and to which I referred in my letter of the 18th instant, it seems desirable to restate the whole case.

2. Briefly the terms of the agreement are:—

- (a) That I should relieve your IX and XX Corps as soon as reinforcements from England permitted (probably early in March), and that you should relieve my 1st Corps.
- (b) That you should keep on the left of the line then held by the XXth Corps a force equivalent to that which was then there—one active Division, as well as the Territorial Troops attached to it.
- (c)* I voluntarily offered to lend some Cavalry to General Foch to permit a portion of the IX Corps being given a few days rest, it being distinctly understood that this was not a permanent relief.

3. † On the date of the agreement I expected to receive the Canadian Division by

*In the margin, opposite pare: (c), is the following notation in the handwriting of General Joffre: "It was to me that this was promised."

† In the margin, opposite pare: 3, is the following notation in General Joffre's handwriting: "Incorrect. Far from being endorsed by me it was at my instance that a counter-order was given and that the 29th Division is going to France at the disposal of the Field Marshal."

(NOTE: The 29th Division was sent to Egypt and Gallipoli, March, 1915, not to France. In March, 1916, it was transferred to France and continued to serve on the Western Front until the end of the war.)

the 10th February, but it did not arrive until the 19th instant. The 29th Regular Division was expected to arrive on 15th February, but by agreement between the French and British Governments—presumably endorsed by you—it has been diverted elsewhere. Its place is to be taken by a Territorial Division which has not yet arrived, and I do not know when it will arrive; but it cannot possibly reach this country before the 28th of this month. Unlike the 29th Division, this Territorial Division cannot be employed in the defensive line as soon as it arrives, but will require some weeks' training.

It was on the assumption that my 1st Corps would be relieved, and that the Canadian and the 29th Divisions would be available by the dates originally fixed, that I agreed to relieve your IX and XX Corps. As these conditions have not been fulfilled the agreement necessarily falls to the ground, and becomes quite impossible to carry out.

4. You now ask me to undertake an offensive operation, and I am prepared to comply with your request.

5. In your letter it is stated that I undertook to take over all the ground up to the right of the Belgian Army, but this does not appear in the agreement, nor was I aware that such a proposal was entertained. On the contrary, it was part of the agreement that you would keep on the left of the line one Active Division, as well as the Territorial Troops; and I assumed that they would continue to hold that portion of the line between the point where my left would rest and the Belgian right. I have never contemplated being able to do more than occupy the line as far as LANGEMARCK.

6. As my 1st Corps is not to be relieved, I could not now, in any circumstances, do more than relieve the IX Corps; and as regards the relief of this Corps, I must draw your attention to the fact that the reinforcements now arriving include a certain number of Territorial battalions which do not constitute a new formation, but consist merely of separate battalions, and, like the Canadian and Territorial Divisions, require some weeks' training before they can be used.

7. I am sincerely desirous of doing everything in my power to assist you and to further our common cause, but I must be permitted to decide according to my own judgment as to when my reinforcements from England are fit to be put into the trenches. In my opinion the dates of arrival of these reinforcements, and their previous training, are such as will not allow me to begin the relief of the IX Corps before the 1st April. By that time, and as a result of our combined attacks, the

situation may have greatly changed; and therefore the necessity and desirability of carrying out the relief may then require further consideration. It was for this reason that I suggested in my letter of the 18th instant that further arrangements for the relief should be postponed until after the result of our operations is known.

8. In your letter you draw a comparison between the front held by the French and British troops, respectively; and in this connection I desire to point out that in the 350,000 British troops mentioned are included some 75,000 men who are in hospital at the Base, or comprise drafts to replace casualties, or are employed on various duties on the Line of Communication; and are not available for duty at the front.

The number of troops required to hold a front does not depend solely upon its length, but upon the character of the ground, the numbers and condition of the enemy, the amount of artillery ammunition available, and many other factors. No useful deductions can be drawn from any other comparison.

9. The above statement of the case was given personally to General Belin by my Chief of the General Staff on the 21st instant, but I have thought it best to record it in writing, so as to prevent further misunderstanding. It was suggested to my Chief of the General Staff by General Foch and General Belin that it might be possible to relieve a part of the IX Corps before the 1st April, and the reply given to them was that at present I could not give a definite answer. Whether it will be possible or not largely depends upon the efficiency of the Territorial Division. I regret that I cannot *say* more than this, except that I will give the matter my most careful consideration when the Division arrives.

10. I quite realise that, as we are superior to the enemy in our front, we ought to take full advantage of that superiority by massing our main strength at the points of attack. But, owing to unforeseen circumstances over which I have had no control, I am unable to do more than is indicated above. At the same time I hope to be ready to take the offensive by about the 7th March, and I trust that this offensive, combined with *your* operations about ARRAS, may alter the whole situation greatly to our advantage.

11. I shall be pleased to discuss any further points if you consider an interview desirable;

15135-14

and in the meantime I will continue my preparations for the attack referred to in my letter of the 18th instant.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,
J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in the Field.
(See 281 and 288)

(Reproduced from copy in British official files with notes added from French translation published in "Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume, Annexe No. 979, pp. 887-389.)

283

General JOFFRE to Field-Marshal Sir JOHN
FRENCH

G.Q.G.

Etat-Major

Au G.Q.G., le 7 mars 1915

3e Bureau

No. 2266

Personnelle et Secrete.

Le general commandant en chef, h son Excellence
Monsieur le marechal French, commandant
en chef les armees britanniques.

Monsieur le marechal,

Ainsi que je vous l'ai expose dans ma lettre du 19 fevrier dernier (*App. 281*) la necessite de detourner du front oriental une partie des efforts allemands m'a conduit h entamer des operations offensives.

Les attaques poursuivies en Champagne, depuis le 16 fevrier ont prix l'allure d'une grande bataille et ont obtenu deja une partie des resultats desirables. Elles ont contraint nos adversaires h y faire face, non seulement avec leurs disponibilites, mais avec des troupes prelevees sur d'autres parties de leurs lignes. Le transport en Champagne d'une division de la Garde en reserve h Douai et peut-etre d'elements du 15e corps tend h degager la region du Nord. L'offensive allemande s'est arretee en Russie. L'action en Champagne y a eu sa part d'influence, soit qu'elle ait force nos ennemis e, reporter sur cette region l'effort maximum de leur production en projectiles, soit que, comme le font envisager certaines communications du grand quartier general russe, ils transportent h nouveau des forces vers le front occidental.

Mon intention avait ete d'accentuer notre attitude offensive par une attaque de la Xe armee, h laquelle je vous avais demande

d'associer les armées britanniques. Mais la condition de cette attaque était la relève par vos coins d'une partie des forces françaises autour d'Ypres.

Vous m'avez fait connaître qu'il vous était impossible de donner satisfaction à ce désir. D'après les renseignements que me fait parvenir le général Foch, la cavalerie britannique vient d'être retirée des lignes qu'elle occupait et le 9^e corps a dû reprendre l'intégralité de son front primitif.

Dans ces conditions, les effectifs dont je dispose ne me permettent pas pour le moment d'entreprendre l'attaque de la Xe armée.

Mais d'autre part, l'arrivée de constants renforts, sans que votre front ait été modifié, vous a certainement permis de constituer de nombreuses réserves. Je suis donc persuadé que vous vous trouverez bientôt en situation de commencer l'opération offensive que vous avez préparée et que vous avez projetée d'après vos deux lettres du 18 et du 23 février. Je suis certain qu'elle obtiendra les meilleurs résultats.

Elle sera du reste grandement facilitée par l'offensive principale que j'ai prise et que je continuerai en Champagne.

Je suis convaincu en tous cas, monsieur le maréchal, que vous ferez tous vos efforts pour participer dans toute la mesure de vos moyens à notre œuvre commune. Depuis le commencement de la campagne, l'armée britannique a apporté aux armées françaises une précieuse collaboration. Notre complet accord est la garantie de la victoire; nos adversaires seuls pourraient en souhaiter l'affaiblissement.

JOFFRE.

"Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes—2e Volume.

Annexe No. 1108, pp. 607-608.

TRANSLATION

General Headquarters.
7th March 1915.

Personal and Secret.
Dear Field-Marshal,

As indicated in my letter to you of 19th February, (App. 281) the necessity of diverting part of the German efforts from the Eastern front has led me to enter upon offensive operations.

The attacks delivered in Champagne have since 16th February, developed into a major

battle, and have already achieved some of the results desired. They forced our adversaries to make a stand there, not only with their local forces, but with troops drawn from other parts of their line. The despatch of a *Guard* division from reserve at Douai into Champagne, and perhaps elements of the *XV Corps* also, tends to free the northern area. The German offensive in Russia has stopped. The activity in Champagne had some influence on that, whether it may have forced the enemy to bring to that area the greater part of their shell supply or whether, as communications from Russian G.H.Q. indicate, they are again moving forces to the Western Front.

My intention had been to accentuate our offensive attitude by an attack with the X Army, with which I asked you to co-operate with the British forces. But the condition governing that attack was the relief by your troops of part of the French forces about Ypres.

You have informed me that it will be impossible for you to accede to that request. From information supplied to me by General Foch, the British cavalry has just been withdrawn from the trenches which they were holding, and the IX Corps has had to reoccupy the whole of its original front.

In these circumstances, the troops at my disposal do not allow of my undertaking the attack with the X Army at present. But on the other hand, the continual arrival of reinforcements, without any alteration of your frontage, has certainly allowed you to build up strong reserves. I am therefore persuaded that you will soon find yourself in a position to begin the offensive operation you have prepared and which you contemplated according to your two letters of 18th and 23rd February. I am certain that it will achieve the most favourable results.

It will also be greatly assisted by the main offensive which I have undertaken, and which I shall continue to prosecute in Champagne.

I am convinced, in any case, my dear Field Marshal, that you will make every effort to participate in our common task to the full extent of your means. Since the beginning of the campaign the British army has acted in most valuable collaboration with the French forces. Our complete accord is the guarantee of victory; its weakening is hoped for by our adversaries alone.

JOFFRE.

(See 281, 282)

284
ARMY CORPS OPERATION ORDER No. 10

By
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR H. S. RAWLIN
SON, BART., K.C.B., C.V.O.
Commanding IVth Army Corps

Headquarters, IVth Corps,
7th March 1915.

1. In accordance with instructions received from the General Officer Commanding 1st Army, the IV Corps and Indian Corps will carry out a vigorous attack on the enemy on a date and at an hour to be notified later* The Village of Neuve Chapelle will be attacked and captured by assault after which a further advance will be made to gain the line Aubers-Le Plouich-La Cliqueterie Ferme-Ligny le Grand.

2. The attack on the village of Neuve Chapelle will be carried out in two stages by the 8th Division. Detailed instructions have already been communicated to G.O.C. 8th Division.

First objective. The enemy's front and support trenches opposite "B" lines.

Second objective. Eastern edge of Neuve Chapelle Village on the right to orchard and the Moated Grange on the left. The point of junction with the Indian Corps will be at the S.E. corner of the Village.

3. For the attack on the first objective, namely Neuve Chapelle Village, the artillery of the 7th and 8th Divisions, less the 47 inch heavy batteries will be grouped under the orders of the G.O.C. 8th Division; the 47 inch batteries of the 7th and 8th Divisions together with certain heavy batteries will form a group under the orders of the lot Army.

A simultaneous attack on Neuve Chapelle Village will be carried out by the Indian Corps from the south.

4. When Neuve Chapelle Village has been captured and made good, the 7th and 8th Divisions supported by the Indian Corps on their right will be ordered by the Corps Commander to press forward to capture the high ground. about Aubers-La Cliqueterie Ferme and Ligny le Grand.

5. When the 7th Division is ordered by the Corps Commander to move forward to the

*Contained in a message to 7th and 8th Divisions on 8th March.

attack, the following artillery units will come under the orders of the G.O.C. the 7th Division:-

The 81st Battery of the 7th Siege Brigade
6-inch howitzer.

4th Siege Battery 6-inch howitzer.

The 59th Battery 7th Siege Brigade, 6-inch howitzer.

31st 45 Howitzer Battery.

111th Heavy Battery, R.G.A. (47 inch).

"A", "F", "O", "Q", "T", "U" and "Z" batteries, R.H.A.

One section Pack Artillery attached to 23rd Infantry Brigade.

6. The 20th Brigade will be held in Corps Reserve and will not advance beyond the Rue de Bacquerot without the direct orders of the Corps Commander.

7. The Canadian Division will maintain its position and will open artillery, rifle and maxim gun fire on the enemy's positions in their immediate front, and on Fromelles village in order to hold the enemy to his ground, and prevent reinforcements being sent to Aubers.

8. The IVth Corps Report Centre will be at Pont Levis half a mile west of Estaires after 6.0 a.m. on the morning of the attack.

A. G. DALLAS,
Brigadier General,
General Staff IV Corps.

Issued at 11.50 p.m.

285

OPERATION ORDER No. 5

By

Lieut.-General E. A. H. ALDERSON, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

9th March, 1915.

1. The 4th Corps will attack to-morrow, March 10th. The first stage is the capture of NEUVE CHAPELLE. An Artillery bombardment will begin at 730 a.m. and at 820 a.m. the 8th Division will assault the enemy's trenches.

After the capture of NEUVE CHAPELLE the 7th and 8th Divisions will attack towards the high ground on the approximate line AUBERS-LIGNY LE GRAND. The left of the 7th Division will be directed at first on PIETRE and, after that place has been taken, on ROUGES BANCS.

2. The Canadian Division will assist in this attack by making a demonstration by fire along its entire front with a view to preventing the enemy from sending reinforcements

from the neighbourhood of FROMELLES to AUBERS. It will, moreover, be prepared to take the offensive when ordered by the 1st Army.

3. The C.R.A. will make arrangements to open an artillery bombardment at 7.30 a.m. Fire must be directed on

- (a) The enemy's fire trenches in order to convince him that he is about to be attacked.
- (b) FROMELLES and the FROMELLESAUBERS road as far as the railway crossing.
- (c) On LE MAISNIL and LE MAISNIL-FROMELLES road.
- (d) Enemy's known gun positions in order to keep down his fire.

The fire mentioned at (a) should be in the nature of as rapid a fire as the ammunition allowance will permit.

Any demand for artillery support from the 7th Division will be at once complied with.

4. The Infantry in the trenches will at 8 a.m. open a heavy fire both from rifles and machine guns. This fire should be continued at intervals throughout the day, with due regard to the necessity for keeping a supply of SAA. to repel a counter-attack.

Steps will be taken to see that the reserve of hand grenades in the trenches is made up to-night.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade will take special care to watch for the advance of the left wing of the 7th Division on ROUGES BANCS. As soon as that advance begins an intense fire will be opened on the German trenches, but the direction of this fire must be carefully regulated so as to avoid firing into the 7th Division whose line of advance will be slightly across the front of the 3rd Cn. Brigade.

5. All battalions in reserve, whether brigade, divisional or corps, will be under arms at 7.30 a.m., ready to move at a moment's notice.

The Divisional Mounted Troops and Cyclists (less those required for road control) will be under arms at 7.30 a.m. and proceed to a rendezvous S. of Saily which will be indicated to them by a Staff Officer of the Division.

6. Divisional Headquarters will remain as at present.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 3 p.m.

Copy No.1 to 1st Inf. Bde.

2	2 nd	"	"
3	3 rd	"	"
4	C.R.A.		
5	C.R.E.		
6	Divl. Mtd. Troops.		
7	A.A. & Q.M.G.		
8	A.D.M.S.		
9	G.S.		
10	G.S.		
11	7th Division.		

(See 286, 989, 991, 293.)

286

3rd Cn. Infantry Brigade.

With reference to last part of para. 2 of Operation Order No. 5 of the 9th instant, it is impossible to say at present what will be the objective of this Division should it be ordered to assume the offensive.

But it is probable that you will be ordered to attack the enemy's salient opposite No. 1 sub-section and you should therefore carefully reconnoitre the ground with a view to massing two battalions along the RUE DU BOIS, or nearer. As the country between RUE DU BOIS and the enemy's salient is very open it would probably be better for the actual assault to be made by the men in the trenches and supports, their place being taken by the battalion in brigade reserve.

In the event of an assault being ordered to be made by your Brigade, your battalion in Divisional Reserve will be placed at your disposal.

The officers of the battalions occupying No. 1 Sub-section should be warned to look carefully at the ground between them and the enemy's trenches. It should be considered how best our own wire could be traversed, how grenade detachments can best be utilized, how covering fire can be directed and how the enemy's trenches when taken can be held and strengthened.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Cn. Division.

9.3.1915

287

British Official History of the War, Military Operations. Vol. III. France and Belgium 1915,* page 87, f.n.1.

288

FIRST ARMY OPERATION ORDER No. 11
G.713. 10th March 1915.

The 4th Corps and Indian Corps will continue their advance tomorrow in accordance with the orders already issued. Objectives 4th Corps Aubers La Cliqueterie Fm both inclusive. Indian Corps Bois du Biez and thence to the line La Cliqueterie Fm exclusive Ligny le Grand inclusive. Advance to commence at 7.0 a.m. at all points. 1st Corps will continue its attack on German trenches East of Givenchy under arrangements to be made by 1st Corps and will in co-operation with the right of the Indian Corps attack southward from the vicinity of Richebourg L'Avoue with the object of capturing the German trenches in front of 1st Corps as far south as the La Basse Canal. The 5th Cavalry Brigade now about Pont du Hem will be ready to march at any time after 9.0 a.m. Indian Corps will retain two brigades as Army Reserve under the orders of G.O.C. 1st Army. Acknowledge. Addressed 1st, 4th, Indian Corps, 5th Cavalry Brigade.

From First Army,
11.30 p.m.

289

To-1st Ca. Inf. Brigade.

2nd " " "
3rd " " "

Divl. Artillery.
Divl Engineers.
A.D.M.S.
Divi. Mtd. Troops.

G.519. 10th March.

Operation Order No. 5, dated 9th instant, will hold good for to-morrow, 11th instant.

From 1st Cdn. Division.
Time-9.34 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lieut.-Colonel G.S.
(See 286, 286, 291, 293)

290

FIRST ARMY OPERATION ORDER No. 12
G.735. 11th March, 1915.

The Indian and Fourth Corps will continue the offensive tomorrow in accordance with the general plan of operations already ordered. Artillery fire will be concentrated on the enemy's positions about 95, 93 and about 85, 86 from 10 to 10.30 a.m. At 10.30 a.m. the

Fourth Corps will assault and secure the above positions and continue its advance simultaneously with the advance of the Indian Corps. The 4th Corps will be responsible for the capture of the cross roads at point 98. From 10.30 to 11 a.m. artillery fire will be concentrated on the enemy's position along the road on the North West of the Bois du Biez from the cross roads at point 98 inclusive to the road junction south east of Port Arthur inclusive. At 11.00 a.m. the Indian Corps will assault the above position and secure Bois du Biez. The First Corps will continue offensive operations in their front under Corps arrangements. The Indian Corps and 1st Corps will each retain one brigade as Army Reserve under the orders of the G.O.C. 1st Army. Acknowledge. Addressed First, Fourth, Indian Corps, Canadian Division, 5th Cavalry Brigade.

From First Army.

11.45 p.m.

291

To-1st Cn. Inf. Brigade.

2nd " " "
3rd " " "

Divl. Arty.
Divl. Engrs.
A.D.M.S.
Divl. Mtd. Troops.

G.514. 12th March.

Operation Order No. 5 dated 9th instant will hold good for today 12th instant.

H. J. LAMB,
Lieut.-Colonel,
G.S.

From 1st Cdn. Div.

Time 12.55.

(See 286, 288, 289, 298)

292

To O.C. 1st Bn. 5 Subsection.

B.M. 412. 12th March 1915.

20th Inf. Bde. have captured the line of road leading northwest from MOULIN DU PIETRE and are rushing on toward RUE D'ENFER (i.e. *the western entrance to AUBERS, opposite the Canadian front*) aaa and report capture of several hundred prisoners and state Germans are still surrendering aaa The Can. division is to be ready to act offensively in co-operation with this movement aaa The above message is for your information and as a preparatory warning to be in readiness for further orders.

From B.M. 1st Can. Inf. Bde. 4.30 p.m.

293

Divl. Artillery
 Divl. Engineers 12th March 1915.
 3rd Infantry Brigade (acknowledge)

The G.O.C. has directed that when the order is received for the Canadian Division to act offensively, the salient in front of No. 1 Sub-section shall be the first objective. The Divisional Reserve of the 3rd Infantry Brigade will be placed at the disposal of G.O.C. 3rd Infantry Bde.

An hour will be fixed for the assault. The G.O.C. will arrange that for precisely half an hour before the time fixed for the assault the salient mentioned above will be subjected to a rapid and concentrated fire of guns. When the hour for assault arrives the artillery will not cease firing but will increase their range. That is, the Infantry attack will not wait for the cessation of artillery fire but will deliver the attack precisely at the named hour.

For this assault, two reserve battalions of the Brigade will be brought up in close supporting distance and when the battalion in No. 1 Section advances to the assault its place must be immediately taken up by one of the battalions in reserve.

As soon as possible after the order is received naming the hour of attack, parties must be sent forward to cut passages through our own wire for the assaulting party and trench prepared to enable the assaulting troops to advance from their own trench with facility. It is essential that the assaulting troops leave their trenches and advance simultaneously to the attack. Parties to cut the enemy's wires and grenadiers will be included in the line of attack.

Should there be ditches or other obstacles to be overcome, measures must be taken for crossing these. For example, planks for crossing ditches must be obtained from the trenches and be carried by certain numbers of the assaulting party.

Every man of the assaulting troops should carry an empty sandbag if such is available.

When the trench is captured a proportion of the men must at once prepare it for defence against counter-attack. A second party must commence a communicating trench to our own lines while the remainder press the advantage gained by clearing the trenches, on their flanks and front, of the enemy. The close support of a success achieved is essential and must be the particular care of the G.O.C. the Brigade.

The report of all successes must be immediately communicated to the troops on the flanks and to Divisional Headquarters.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
 Lieut. Colonel,
 for Colonel, Gen. Staff,
 1st Can. Division.

(See 285, 286, 289, 291)

294

G.O.C. First Army to Commander-in-Chief
 12.3.1915

... Even much later, at 6.20 p.m., General Haig telephoned to Sir John French asking that, "in view of the promising situation, the 46th (North Midland) Division from the General Reserve might relieve the two left brigades of the Canadian Division, these two Canadian brigades to be massed in rear of the right Canadian brigade with a view to breaking through opposite Rouges Bancs and co-operating with the advance of the 7th Division."

British Official History of the War. Military Operations. Vol. III. France and Belgium, 1915, p. 143.*

295

FIRST ARMY OPERATION ORDER No. 13.
 G. 766. 12th March 1915.

The 4th and Indian Corps will continue to hold the advanced line reached by them today. This line to be established as a defensive line and secured against attack including wiring. The general advance will not be continued to-morrow morning without further orders and reliefs may be carried out within Corps accordingly. Acknowledge. Addressed First Corps, Fourth Corps, Indian Corps, Canadian Division, Gough's Detachment*, 2nd Echelon, 1st Army Aire.

First Army.
 10.40 p.m.

*Consisting of 2nd Cavalry Div. and an Infantry brigade of 46th (N. Midland) Div.

296

Telegram from Sir John French to Lord Kitchener,
 13.3.15

Cessation of the forward movement is necessitated to-day by the fatigue of the troops, and above all, by the want of ammunition. The First Army is consolidating and strengthening its new line. Further plans are being matured for a vigorous offensive.

British Official History of the War. Military Operations. Vol. III. France and Belgium, 1915, p. 149.*

297

*Telegram from Sir John French to Lord
Kitchener 15.3.15*

The supply of gun ammunition, especially the 18-pdr. and 4.5-inch howitzer, has fallen short of what I was led to expect and I was therefore compelled to abandon further offensive operations until sufficient reserves are accumulated.

British Official History of the War. Military Operations. Vol. III. France and Belgium, 1916, p. 160.*

298

MEMORANDUM ON OPERATIONS

1. The British Expeditionary Force has now resumed offensive operations, after a long period during which such attacks as were undertaken were purely local in character. The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to impress upon all officers certain points which he regards as essential to success in attack.

2. The necessity for careful preparation and the general lines which such preparation should follow appear to be well understood. It is not however always understood that in trench warfare the first infantry attack takes the form of what our regulations call the final assault in a battle. Such an assault must be made in adequate strength, and be carried out simultaneously by all who are to take part in it. There is no object in forming troops in depth with a comparatively weak firing line, since this procedure has for its object the building up of a firing line for the purpose of assault. Under existing conditions this building up can be carried out before the attack begins.

3. Depth of formation is still required, but not for the purpose of reinforcing the firing line. The objective of the first assault can usually be determined with sufficient accuracy before the attack is launched. When this objective is reached the energy of the assaulting troops must be exhausted to some extent. To follow up the initial success a second assault is necessary, and this assault also must have a definite objective and be pushed on to it through the first assaulting party. Merely reinforcing the troops in the front line is not sufficient to carry them forward, as the difficulties of organizing a further advance after the confusion of an assault and under heavy fire are usually insuperable.

4. The attack is completed by successive assaulting parties, each with a definite objective, until the enemy's various lines of defence are finally broken. Each assaulting party on gaining its objective must secure itself there in order to form an adequate support to the next party which will pass through it and to guard against counter-attack.

5. It must be clearly understood that it is the first duty of every one to push on until the allotted objective is reached. Opportunities have been missed in the past owing to officers waiting for orders, and to formations waiting on each other to gain ground. In the attack, enterprise and initiative are essential and the one inexcusable fault is inaction. Cases have occurred of officers refusing to advance when asked to do so by units on their flanks because they have not received specific orders to do so from their immediate superiors. Every delay gives the enemy time to strengthen himself, and makes ultimate success more costly and difficult. There should therefore, be no hesitation in putting in reserves to confirm and extend success.

6. The complicated modern system of communication sometimes leaves commanders completely at a loss when it fails. It must be recognized that telephone and telegraph wires are almost certain to fail during a successful advance. The means which existed before the introduction of wires still exist, and every possible effort must be made by all leaders to retain control of their troops by such means.

7. Experience shows that the enemy is very skilful in bringing up machine guns rapidly, and that he frequently makes use of buildings in which to employ them. Successful attacks have frequently been held up for some time by one or two machine guns so placed. Methods of dealing with these must be thought out before hand, and form part of every plan of attack. In close country pack artillery may be usefully employed for this purpose.

W. R. ROBERTSON,
Lieut.-General,
Chief of the General Staff.

General Staff, G.H.Q.,
British Army in the Field,
Operations Section.
No. O.A. 042.
14th March, 1915.

299

EXTRACT FROM SIR JOHN FRENCH'S
DESPATCH

From the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief
The British Army in the Field.
To the Secretary of State for War, War Office,
London, S.W.

General Headquarters.
5th April, 1915.

* * * * *

During the battle of Neuve Chapelle they (*troops of the 1st Canadian Division*) held a part of the line allotted to the First Army, and, although they were not actually engaged

in the main attack, they rendered valuable help by keeping the enemy actively employed in front of their trenches.

All the soldiers of Canada serving in the Army under my command have so far splendidly upheld the traditions of the Empire, and will, I feel sure, prove to be a great source of additional strength to the forces in this country.

* * * * *

300

To B.M. 1st Canadian Infantry Bde.
B. 1/1/149. 12th March 1915.

Ammunition return aaa Required 12,000 rounds aaa Company Officers report that the cartridge cases of the ammunition now being used, jam in the breech of the Rifle nearly every time and are very difficult to extract. Can this matter be gone into by an expert immediately aaa.

From O.C. No. 5 Subsection.
SUPPORT FARM 9.25 a.m.

R. J. BROOK,
Capt. & Adj. (*1st Bn.*)

To O.C. 1st Bn.
B.M. 402. 12th March 1915.

As far as possible SAA ammunition marked B14 should not be used at present aaa acknowledge aaa.

From B.M. 1st Can. Inf. Bde. 11.50 a.m.
Received & forwarded to P.Q.R.S.

Headquarters,
2nd Cdn. Inf. Brigade,
16th March, 1915.

From: The G.O.C. 2nd Can. Inf. Brigade.
To: D.O.O. 1st Can. Division.

Ammunition.

With reference to your letter dated 12th instant, asking for a report on the ammunition, etc., at present in use, the Officers Commanding Battalions of this Brigade have reported that the Small Arm Ammunition of British Manufacture (Kinoch) does not work as well in the Ross Rifle as the ammunition of Canadian manufacture.

They find, after firing a few rounds, that the shells seem to stick in the bore and are not easily extracted, in fact, more than the ordinary pressure must be applied. It seems that the cartridge case is slightly smaller than those

of Canadian manufacture and on expansion fits the bore so tightly that the difficulty mentioned above takes place.

This seems to me to be a point where the most rigid investigation is necessary, as a serious interference with rapid firing may prove fatal on occasions.

A. W. CURRIE, Brigadier-General.
G.O.C., 2nd Can. Inf. Brigade.

Note:

The O.C. 7th Battalion says he has no grounds for complaint.

13.3.15.

A.A. & Q.M.G.

(*See 111.*)

301

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER No. 6

By
Lieut.-General E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

14th March, 1915.

1. In accordance with the 1st Army Orders the 6th Division will take over the line at present held by the Canadian Division.

2. On the night of the 16th/17th the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division will take over Sections 4, 5 and 6 of this line under arrangements to be made between the 16th Brigade and 1st and 2nd Canadian Brigades. Officers of the 16th Brigade will be sent to reconnoitre the trenches in these sections on the night of the 15th/16th.

The two battalions of the 1st Canadian Brigade in Divisional and Brigade Reserve and the battalion of the 2nd Canadian Brigade in Brigade Reserve will move from their billets at noon on the 16th.

3. On the night of the 17th/18th the 18th Brigade of the 6th Division will take over Sections 1, 2 and 3 under arrangements to be made by the 18th Brigade and the 3rd and 2nd Canadian Brigades. Representatives of the 18th Brigade will reconnoitre the trenches on the night of the 16th/17th.

The Reserve Battalions (Brigade and Divisional) of the 3rd Canadian Brigade and the battalion of the 2nd Canadian Brigade in Divisional Reserve will move from their billets at noon on the 17th.

4. For the purpose of this move, the RUE DE LA LYS (H.7.d.)—FLEURBAIX road and all roads East of it are allotted to the 6th Division. Roads west of the above road are at the disposal of the Canadian Division.

5. The Field Companies C.E. and Field Ambulances will move at the same time as the Divisional Reserve battalions of their affiliated Brigades.

6. The Canadian Artillery will remain in position until further orders.

7. Further orders regarding destination of Canadian Division will be issued later.

H. J. LAMB, Lt. Colonel,
for Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 12 noon.

Copy No.1 to 1st Inf. Bde.
2 2nd " "
3 3rd " "
4 Divl. Arty.
5 Divl. Engrs.
6 A.D.M.S.
7 A.D.O.S.
8 A.A. & Q.M.G.
9-10 G.S.

302

OPERATION ORDER No. 7

By

Lieut.-General E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

22nd March, 1915

1. 8th Division will take over the line at present held by the Canadian Division.

2. On night of 25th/26th the 23rd Infantry Brigade, which will have entered the SAILLYBAC ST. MAUR area on the 23rd, will take over Nos. 4, 5 and 6 Section under arrangements to be made directly between the Brigades concerned.

3. On night of 24th/25th officers of the 23rd Brigade will visit the trenches in Nos. 4, 5 and 6 Section under arrangements made between Brigades concerned.

4. On completion of the relief, the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, less the battalion holding No. 3 Section, will march to their new billeting area north of the LYS. Reserve battalions can march at any time after 6 p.m.

Route-

Relieving Brigade.

BAC ST. MAUR-FLEURBAIX.

Outgoing Brigade.

RUE DU QUESNES-ROUGE DE BOUT-le
NOUVEAU MONDE-ESTAIRES.

5. On the night 26th/27th the 24th Infantry Brigade will take over Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Sections under arrangements made directly between the Brigades concerned.

6. Officers of the 24th Brigade will visit the trenches on night of 25th/26th under arrangements made between Brigades concerned.

7. On completion of the relief the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade and the remaining battalion of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade

will march to their new billeting area north of the LYS. Reserve battalions can march at any time after 6 p.m.

Route-

Relieving Brigade.

Fine BARLETTE-CROIX BLANCHE

Outgoing Brigade.

Cross Roads in H.31.c. and d-ROUGE DE
BOUT-SAILLY.

8. The Field Companies, Canadian Engineers and Field Ambulances will move to their new billeting areas on the same day and by the same route as their affiliated Brigades.

9. The Canadian Artillery will remain in their present positions and will come under the command of the 8th Division when that Division takes over the line at 10 a.m. on 27th.

10. Divisional Headquarters and Divisional Mounted Troops will move to ESTAIRES at 10 a.m. on 27th.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 2 p.m.

Copy No.1 to 1st Inf. Bde.

2 2nd " "
3 3rd " "
4 Divl. Arty.
5 Divl. Engrs.
6 Divl. Mtd. Troops.
7 Sig. Coy.
8 Divl. Train.
9 A.A. & Q.M.G.
10-11 G.S.
12 8th Division.

With reference to Operation Order No. 7, as the 8th Division is moving artillery into our area late on the nights of 25th/26th and 26th/27th, the route for the outgoing Brigades of the Canadian Division after leaving ROUGE DE BOUT must be

Cross roads in G.20.d-Road junction in G35.a-Pt.
de la JUSTICE-NOUVEAU MONDE-PT.
BAIS.

It will be advisable for Brigades to have a representative at the road junction in G.35.a. until the whole Brigade has passed.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Canadian Division.

23.3.1915.

Issued at 10.30 a.m.

Copy to 1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf. Bdes.

Divl. Engrs. A.D.M.S., 8th Div. & A.A. &
Q.M.G.

303
MARCH, 1915—ROSTER OF RELIEF IN TRENCHES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1st INF. BDE.—																									
1st Bn.....	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	B	
2nd Bn.....	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	
3rd Bn.....	B	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	
4th Bn.....	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	
2nd INF. BDE.—																									
5th Bn.....	B	B	B	T	T	T	C	C	C	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	T
7th Bn.....	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	C	C	C	T	T	T	B	B	B	B	B	T	T	T	T
8th Bn.....	T	T	T	C	C	C	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	C	C	C	C	C	T	T	T	T
10th Bn.....	C	C	C	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	C	C	C	T	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	T
3rd INF. BDE.—																									
13th Bn.....	B	B	B	T	T	T	D	D	D	B	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	B	B	B
14th Bn.....	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T
15th Bn.....	D	D	D	T	T	T	B	B	B	D	T	T	T	T	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	D	D
16th Bn.....	T	T	T	D	D	D	T	T	T	T	B	B	B	T	T	T	T	T	B	B	T	T	T

Norm.—T. Trenches.
B. Bde. Reserve.
C. Corps Reserve.
D. Div. Reserve.

304

General Joffre to Field-Marshal Sir John French

Au G.Q.G., le 24 mars 1915.

G.Q.G.

Etat-Major.

3e Bureau

No. 8451.

Monsieur le marechal,

Par une lettre du 7 mars dernier, (*App. 283*) j'ai on l'honneur de vous faire connaitre que, des que vous auriez pris des dispositions pour relever une partie des forces francaises autour d'Ypres, mon intention etait de prendre vigoureusement l'offensive avec la X' armee, en cooperation avec les armees britanniques.

Dane une guerre telle que celle que nous menons actuellement, ou l'adversaire occupe des positions defensives tres fortement organisees et dispose en personnel et en materiel de tons les moyens necessaires pour les defendre energiquement, notre offensive ne peut reussir que sous les conditions expresses que j'indique ci-apres

Etre menee avec la vigueur et la rapidite la plus grande, en operant par surprise, sur un front suffisamment etendu.

Posseder sur ce front la superiorite numerique sur l'ennemi.

Mettre en oeuvre tous les engins necessaires, soit pour la destruction des defenses accessoires de l'ennemi, soit pour le combat rapproche.

Disposer de larges approvisionnements en munitions d'artillerie de campagne et de d'artillerie lourde.

J'estime que c'est seulement vers la fin d'avril que j'aurai en ce qui me concerne, reuni tous les moyens d'action necessaires. La premiere condition pour cela est que l'armee anglaise relieve sur le front les 9e et 20e corps. Je vous serais reconnaissant de faire proceder a cette releve dans le plus court delai possible, pour que les corps designs aient le temps de se reorganiser et de se completer en vue de l'operation projetee.

L'appoint de ces deux corps et celui de forces nouvelles venant de l'interieur me permettront d'amener sur le front d'attaque des effectifs suffisants pour produire un effort decisif.

C'est vers la meme epoque que je compte avoir pu reunir tous les moyens materiels indispensables: munitions et engin de destruction.

Je regarde comme extremement desirable que les armees britanniques se mettent de leur cote en mesure de cooperer a l'operation avec le maximum d'efficacite, en reunissant les effectifs et constituant les approvisionnements en munitions et en materiel necessaires.

Les operations que je viens de mener en Champagne, outre le gain appreciable de terrain conquis qu'elles nous ont apporte, ont eu pour resultat de fixer sur leur front d'attaque 130,000 Allemands et une puissance d'artillerie lourde, retirees de toutes les parties de la ligne ennemie; elles ont empeche aussi notre adversaire de porter de nouvelles forces sur le theatre d'operations russe; elles ont ete arretees, lorsque les troupes que je pouvais y consacrer (et qu'il m'etait encore impossible en ce moment de remplacer par des forces fraiches) ont eu produit le maximum d'effort qu'on pouvait leur demander. Les troupes ont d'ailleurs conscience des succes qu'elles ont obtenus et elles ont pris sur l'ennemi un ascendant moral considerable.

L'action brillante menee par les forces britanniques h Neuve-Chapelle a obtenu un but analogue. Je vais tres prochainement executer sur un autre point du front une offensive partielle du meme ordre, dont j'attends d'heureux resultats.

Je ne verrais egalement que des avantages (si les munitions dont vous disposez le permettent et si vous jugez la chose possible sans nuire h l'operation principale de fin avril), et ce que vous executiez dans le courant de ce mois une attaque partielle, comme vous en avez annonce l'intention au general Foch.

Ces differentes actions secondaires useront l'ennemi. Elles l'empecheront soit de prendre l'offensive sur un autre point de notre front, soit de reporter des forces contre les Russes. Elles le laisseront enfin dans l'incertitude de nos projets jusqu'au jour ou nos armees allies, disposant de toute la plenitude de leurs moyens pourront executer l'offensive principale, qui fait l'objet de cette lettre.

J'ai pleine confiance que cette offensive, en infligeant a nos adversaires un echec susceptible d'entraîner de grands resultats, constituera un pas important vers la victoire finale que les armees allies poursuivent en parfait accord.

JOFFRE.

*"Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume.
Annexe No. 1249, pp. 711-712-713.*

TRANSLATION

*General Headquarters,
24th March 1915.*

Dear Field-Marshal,

In my letter of 7th March (*App. 288*) I had the honour to inform you that, as soon as you should have arranged to relieve part of the French forces about Ypres, my intention was to open a vigorous offensive with the X Army in co-operation with the British forces.

In a war such as this in which we are now engaged, where the enemy is holding strongly organized defensive positions and has available personnel and material of every kind necessary for their strenuous defence, our offensive can only succeed under the following express conditions:

To be prosecuted with vigour and the greatest speed, while carried out as a surprise, on a sufficiently wide front.

To possess on that front a numerical superiority over the enemy.

To bring to bear all the guns and other weapons necessary, whether for the destruction of the enemy's auxiliary defences or for use after battle has been joined.

To have in hand large supplies of artillery ammunition-for both field and heavy guns.

I find that only towards the end of April shall I, for my part, have collected all the necessary means required for action. The first requisite for that is that the British Army relieve the IX and XX Corps in the line. I should be obliged if you would proceed with that relief with as little delay as possible, so that the said corps may have time to reorganize and refit for the projected operation.

The addition of these two Corps and of new forces from the back areas will allow me to concentrate on the front of attack sufficient effectives to strike a decisive blow.

By about the same time I count upon having been able to collect all the indispensable material means: munitions and destructive weapons.

I consider it highly desirable that the British forces on their part. put themselves in' such a position that they can co-operate most effectively with the operation, by assembling effective troops and by collecting the necessary supplies of ammunition and material.

The operations which I have just undertaken in Champagne, besides the appreciable gain in ground which they have yielded us, have resulted in pinning to the front of attack 130,000 Germans and a great weight of heavy artillery, drawn from all parts of the enemy's line; they have also prevented the enemy from transferring new forces to the Russian theatre; I stopped the operations because the troops I could allot to them (and since it was still impossible at this time. to replace them with fresh forces) have exerted the maximum effort one could demand. The troops besides, have a consciousness of the successes they have achieved, and they have gained a considerable moral superiority over the enemy.

The brilliant action carried out by the British forces at Neuve Chapelle has achieved a similar purpose. At an early date I am going to carry out an offensive of the same sort at another part of the front, from which I expect favourable results. In the same way

I see nothing but advantages (if your available ammunition permits and if you consider the thing possible without detracting from the main operation at the end of April) in your executing in the course of this month a minor attack, as you told General Foch you intended to do.

These different secondary actions will wear down the enemy. They will prevent him both from taking the offensive against another part of our front, and from moving forces against the Russians. Finally, they will leave him uncertain of our plans up to the day when our allied armies, employing their forces to the fullest extent, can launch the main offensive, which is the subject of this letter.

I have every confidence that this offensive, by inflicting on our enemies a defeat susceptible of far reaching results, will constitute an important step towards the final victory which the Allies pursue in perfect harmony.

JOFFRE.

(See 283, 305.)

305

*Field-Marshal Sir John French to
General Joffre*

O.A.M. 808.

1st April 1915.

My dear General,

In reply to your letter of 24th March (*App. 304*) and with reference to our recent interview, I have the honour to inform you that I have issued orders for an early extension of my line to the North as far as the YPRESPOELCAPPELLE road inclusive. I am now in correspondence with General Foch with regard to the details of the relief of your IXth and XX Corps up to that road, and I have every reason to believe that this relief will be completed on or before April 20th.

I am also making preparations for certain minor operations with the object of harassing and deceiving the enemy and I hope to be in a position to co-operate in your offensive at the end of April with the whole of my First Army, which will by then have a strength of 8 divisions.

The above arrangements have been made on the assumption that the two additional- Territorial Force Divisions arrive from England by the third week of this month.

Believe me,

Your sincerely,

J. FRENCH.

By liaison officer.

(See 304.)

(Reproduced in French in "*Les Armies Francaises dans la Grande Guerre*" Tome II *Annexes-8e Volume, Annexe No. 1888, p. 770.*)

306

MEMORANDUM ON TRAINING

1st, 2nd & 3rd Inf. Bdes.

When Brigades have settled down in their new billets, it is probable that they will be called upon for working parties. But in spite of these calls, brigadiers will find many opportunities for giving further training to their commands. It is important that this training should include certain subjects which have not yet been practised.

The General Officer Commanding, therefore, desires that each Brigade should pay particular attention to the following:-

- (a) Charging in marching order over cultivated ground. This requires extreme physical fitness on the part of the men and a systematic course of training should be laid down, based on the assumption that 7 days are available.
- (b) Rapid entrenching, both by day and night and both with the entrenching tool and engineer tools. Officers and men must be trained to lay out a line of trenches at night over unreconnoitred ground. Speed in entrenching saves many lives.
- (c) Getting out of trenches and over parapets. This is important, and all ranks must understand the necessity of emerging quickly and simultaneously.
- (d) Battalions should be practised in the various formations suitable for assaulting a hostile line of trenches or a defended locality. These formations must include bombers, wire-cutters, plank or bridge carriers. So far as possible units should practise an assault throughout its stages, i.e. should be formed up behind cover or in dug-outs, should send its various echelons forward to the assault and should practice clearing the enemy's trenches and placing them in a state of defence against counter attack.
- (e) Machine gun Sections and Bomb Companies should be more fully trained, especially in co-operation with an assault.
- (f) Crossing wire entanglements. This has been successfully tried by the 5th Battalion by means of making use of strips of expanded metal. Other methods should also be tried.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Canadian Division.

26.3.1915.

306a

1st Army,
G.S. 67.

Gough's Detachment
Canadian Division
"A" and "Q".

The following changes will take place:-

The Notts and Derby Brigade will rejoin North Midland Division, which will form part of the 2nd Corps.

The Canadian Division will form part of the 5th Corps.

2nd Army is arranging for instructions to be issued direct to the above formations with regard to their movements from their present billeting area.

J. H. DAVIDSON, Lt: Colonel,
General Staff, 1st Army.

1st April, 1915.

(See 507)

307

To Canadian Division.

Q.R. 572. 3rd April 1915.

Your Division is to march to new billeting area as follows. One Brigade with attached artillery on Monday 5th inst. to North East corner with H.Q. at STEENVOORDE. Second group on Tuesday 6th to area West of 1st group. Place selected for headquarters to be reported. Third group on Wednesday 7th to area south of second group with H.Q. at Chateau D'IFFE East of CASSEL. Divisional H.Q. and Divl. Troops on 6th or 7th as desired, Divl. H.Q. being established at Chateau DU JARDIN at OXELAERE. Will send you 22 busses to help each brigade so say when and where required. Wire approximate time table so that roads may be kept clear. Your Ammunition Park will move to BAVINCHOVE. Inform me regarding its route and time table of move. Your railhead will be changed probably to GODEWAERS VELDE on Thursday 8th. Acknowledge. Addressed Canadian Division repeated 1st Army and South Midland Div.

From Second Army. Q.

(See 306a)

308

Secret.

2ND ARMY OPERATION ORDER No. 7
Headquarters, 2nd Army,
1st April, 1915.

Reference 1

44,000

1. The 2nd Army will extend its front to the North in relief of a portion of the 8th

French Army, up to the point at which the French line crosses the YPRES-POELCAPELLE road (inclusive).

2. In order that this extension may take place Divisions are allotted to Corps as follows:-

- Canadian Division to V Corps.
- S. Midland Division to III Corps.
- N. Midland Division to II Corps.

The Notts & Derby Brigade (North Midland Division) will rejoin its Division from the 1st Army under instructions from II Corps.

3. The Canadian Division will be concentrated, in accordance with special instructions, in the area ABEELE - WINNEZEELEOUEZEELE - HARDIFORT - OXELAIRE (excluding CASSELL)-ST. MARIE CAPPELGODEWAERSVELDE, and will be at the disposal of the V Corps from April 12th.

The South Midland Division will be moved into the III Corps area under arrangements to be made by the 2nd Army.

4. While the extension is being carried out the 3rd, 5th and 28th Divisions will be reconstituted in their original formations. With these objects in view moves and reliefs in accordance with the attached table will be carried out by the dates stated, details being arranged between Corps.

The point of junction between the II and V Corps will be to the left of the present 28th Division (1.30.).

5. The V Corps will carry out the relief of the portion of the 8th French Army mentioned in paragraph 1, commencing on the night 2nd/3rd April with that part of the line now held by the 9th French Corps up to a point 500 yards S.W. of the S.W. corner of the POLYGON WOOD.

The relief of the remainder of the French front is to be completed by April 20th. Details will be arranged direct between Corps Commanders.

6. Army Artillery and Reserve Heavy Artillery is re-distributed as follows:-

(a) II Corps.			
9 th	Heavy Brigade	}	
10th	Heavy Brigade	}	
3rd	Siege Battery	}	Army Artillery
48th	Heavy Battery	}	
108th	Heavy Battery	}	
1 How.	12th Siege Battery	}	Reserve
		}	Heavy
1 How.	Naval Battery	}	Artillery

(b) III Corps.		
24th Heavy Battery		
31st Heavy Battery		Army Artillery
S. Mid. Heavy Battery		
7th Siege Battery		Reserve
12th Siege Battery		Heavy
(less 1 How.)		Artillery
(c) V Corps.		
11th Heavy Brigade		
N. Mid. Heavy Bty.		Army Artillery
Canadian Heavy Bty.		

7. The French and Belgian Artillery attached to the V Corps will remain in its present position and is transferred to the II Corps.

The Brigade of Horse Artillery will remain at present with the II Corps.

8. The II Corps will hold one Infantry Brigade in Army Reserve.

9. A map, showing billeting areas and retired lines of defence will be issued separately (*not reproduced*).

10. Progress reports will be rendered daily.

Issued at 7 a.m.

G. F. MILNE, M.G.G.S.,
2nd Army.

Copies to II, III and V Corps.
8th French Army.
1st Army.

Table of Moves and Reliefs
(vide para. 4)

	Date by which to be completed
(a) 9th Inf. Bde./28th Div. to change places with the 85th Inf. Bde./3rd Div	Noon, April 6th.
(b) Artillery of 3rd Div. to relieve Artillery of 27th Div., which will rejoin its Div. in reserve.....	Noon April 2nd.
(c) North Midland Div. to relieve 5th Div. Inf. 5th Div. on relief to go into reserve in area at present occupied by 27th Div	Noon, April 7th.
(d) Artillery of 5th Div. to relieve Artillery of 28th Div. which will go into reserve.....	Noon, April 9th.
(e) 14th Inf. Bde. 5th Div. to relieve 85th Bde. 28th Div	Noon, April 9th.
(f) Hd. Qrs. 5th Div. and 28th Div. to change places	Noon, April 7th.

309

Secret

5TH CORPS OPERATION ORDER NO. 9

POPERINGHE.

11th April, 1915.

1. The 1st Canadian Division forms part of the 5th Corps from 12th April inclusive.

2. The 1st Canadian Division will take over the line on the left of the 28th Division as under:-

- (a) On the night 14th/15th April.
The 2nd Canadian Brigade to relieve the right of the 11th French Division.
- (b) On 16th April.
The 1st Canadian Brigade to move to about VLAMERTINGHE.
- (c) On night 16th/17th April.
The 3rd Canadian Brigade to relieve left of 11th French Division as far as the POELCAPELLE-YPRES Road inclusive.
- (d) On 17th April at a time to be fixed between Canadian Division and 11th French Division and reported to 5th Corps, G.O.C., Canadian Division will take command of the front, having the French Divisional Artillery under his orders.
- (e) On the night of 17th/18th.
One section of each Battery of Canadian Divisional Artillery to relieve a corresponding section of French Divisional Artillery.
One section Canadian Heavy Battery to relieve one section of a French Heavy Battery under orders given by Lt.-Colonel BATEMAN.
- (f) On the night 18th/19th.
Remainder of Canadian Divisional Artillery to relieve remainder of French Divisional Artillery. Remainder of Canadian Heavy Battery to relieve remainder of French Heavy Battery.

3. The above troops will move by STEENVOORDE-POPERINGHE and VLAMERTINGHE and if passing through YPRES will use streets north of the GRANDE PLACE and pass out by the ST. JEAN road.

4. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Brigades will move by bus or rail within limits and under orders which will be notified later. The remaining troops will march.

5th Corps to be informed early how many buses will be required and where they should be sent.

5. The 1st Canadian Brigade on arrival at VLAMERTINGHE will form a Corps Reserve.

It will remain under the G.O.C. Canadian Division for all purposes, but will not be moved without permission from Corps H.Q.

H. S. JEUDWINE,

B.G.G.S., 5th Corps.

April 11th, 1915.

(For amendment see App. 316.)

310

Secret

OPERATION ORDER NO. 8

by

LIEUT. GENERAL E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
COMMANDING 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION.

11th April, 1915.

1. The Canadian Division will relieve the French 11th Division as follows:-

2. The Second Canadian Infantry Brigade will take over the right of the 11th Division on the night of the 14/15th.

Motor busses will be available to transport the men of this brigade as far as VLAMERTINGHE. The Brigade will march by battalions to WIELTJE, which place the head of the leading battalion will reach at 9 p.m. Guides will meet each battalion at this point and conduct them to the trenches. Battalions will follow each other at intervals of half hour. Arrangements will be made direct with the French Brigadier, whose Headquarters are at farm N. of WIELTJE in square C22.b. All transport will march by road.

Separate instructions will be issued as regards busses.

3. The Commanding Officers and Company Officers of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade will go into the trenches on the night 12/13th, stay there during the 13th and come out at dusk. They will be at the bridge over the YPRES CANAL, in square 12.e., at 10 p.m., on the 12th, where they will meet the French guides. Two motor busses will be at STEENVOORDE at 7 p.m. for these officers.

4. The Third Canadian Infantry Brigade will take over the trenches on the night of the 16th/17th. Motor busses will be provided as in paragraph 2, and the leading battalion will be at WIELTJE at 9 p.m. on the 16th. Arrangements will be made similar to those mentioned in paragraph 2.

5. The Commanding Officers and Company Officers of the Third Canadian Infantry Brigade will go into the trenches on the night 14/15th and will be at French Brigadier's Headquarters at farm N. of WIELTJE in square C22.b., at 2 a.m., on 15th, where

guides will be provided. Two motor busses will be at STEENVOORDE at 9 p.m. for these officers.

6. The First Canadian Infantry Brigade will march to VLAMERTINGHE on the 17th, and will go into billets in that neighbourhood and will be clear of the road and in billets by 12 noon,

7. The Third Canadian Infantry Brigade will march to STEENVOORDE on the 15th and take over the billets at present occupied by the 2nd Brigade.

8. The Canadian Artillery will relieve the French Artillery on the nights of 17th/18th and 18th/19th, under arrangements to be made between C.R.A. Canadian Artillery and the French Artillery Commandant.

9. Field Companies and Field Ambulances will accompany their affiliated Infantry Brigades.

10. The General Officer Commanding the Canadian Division will take over command of the new line at 10 a.m. on the 17th.

H. J. LAMB, Lt.-Col.
for Colonel, General Staff.

Issued at 6 p.m.

311

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM

Confidential.

The Division is about to take over another part of our line which differs in several respects from the SAILLY line. The country is more open and undulating, and the enemy has captive balloons which can overlook the whole of our area. Moreover, owing to the fact that the allied line makes a prominent salient in front of Ypres, the enemy is able to bring artillery fire to bear on points which are some distance behind the trenches.

It is therefore important that we should be careful about our movements during daylight and the Divisional Commander directs that the necessity for concealment be impressed on all ranks.

Care must be taken to ensure that men and wagons do not assemble around battalion or brigade headquarters. Motor-cars are not to remain outside headquarters. Transport should move about as little as possible. It was noticed at Sailly that regimental transport was constantly on the roads unaccompanied by any officer or N.C.O. Commanding Officers will be held responsible that not even a single

wagon of their regimental transport moves without the order of the officer and that an N.C.O. invariably accompanies wagons.

Transport must be parked along the hedgerows and not in the centre of the fields.

C. F. Romer,
Colonel,
General Staff,
12441915. 1st Canadian Division.

312

Secret.

5th Corps
GX.720

1st Canadian Division.

1. The Corps boundaries on lines of defence have now been determined by 2nd Army and consequently the following will be the divisional boundaries:-
Between 5th Division and 27th Division.

Subsidiary Line: a line drawn S.E. from the angle of the road in I.23 & 3.5.

G.H.Q. 2nd Line: ZILLEBEKE POND.

G.H.Q. 3rd Line: The HALLEBASTOUDERDOM road (inclusive to 27th Division).
Between 27th Division and 28th Division.

Subsidiary Line: The road running S.E. and S. through J.1-WESTHOEK to the YPRESMENIN road (inclusive to 27th Division).

G.H.Q. 2nd Line: The short track running N.E. in I.4.d. from the POTIJZE-ZILLEBEKE road.

G.H.Q. 3rd Line: The track running N.E. through G.12.b. (inclusive to 28th Division).
Between 28th Division and Canadian Division.

Subsidiary Line: The track running East and West approximately parallel to the Northern side of D.20 (inclusive to 28th Division).

G.H.Q. 2nd Line: The road running through C.28.b. and d. and C.29.c.

G.H.Q. 3rd Line: The line dividing squares A.30 and G.6.
Between Canadian Division and French.

Subsidiary Line: The POELCAPPELLE-YPRES road (inclusive to Canadian Division).

G.H.Q. 2nd Line: The track running northeast through the northern edge of wood in C.10.d. (inclusive to Canadian Div.).

G.H.Q. 3rd Line: The ELVERDINGHE-POPERINGHE road (inclusive to Canadian Division).

2. Divisions are responsible for the construction, maintenance and occupation of the subsidiary line.

They are not responsible for the construction or maintenance of G.H.Q. lines unless specially ordered, but they will be prepared to occupy these lines within the limits stated, subject to any orders which may be given later.

3. Divisions will make any reconnaissances, and take any other steps that may be necessary to carry out the above instructions.

4. Roads between front line and G.H.Q. 2nd line are provisionally allotted as follows, but this allotment is subject to any modification that operations might require.

27th Div.

ZILLEBEKE—level crossing I.10. c. road.
GHELUVELT-YPRES road.

28th Div.

ZONNEBEKE-YPRES road.
ZONNEBEKE-WESTHOEK-FREZENBERG road.

Canadian Div.

PASSCHENDAELE-WIELTJE road.
POELCAPPELLE-YPRES road.

H. S. JEUDWINE,
B. G. G. S.
5th Corps.

10.4.15.

313

ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THE

DETACHEMENT D'ARMEE DE
BELGIQUE
APRIL 1915¹

Commander: General Putz.

COMPOSITION

14th April 1915:

Groupement de Nieuport (38th Division and 81st Territorial Division), commanded by General Rely d'Oissel.

Groupement d'Elverdinghe (45th Division and 87th Territorial Division), commanded by General Quiquandon.

23rd April 1915:

As above; plus the 153rd Division,

25th April 1915:

As above; plus the 18th and 152nd Divisions. The 18th and 153rd Divisions formed the IX Corps, commanded by General Cure.

22nd May 1915:

38th, 45th, 152nd and 153rd Divisions and 81st and 87th Territorial Divisions, comprising the XXXVI Corps, commanded by General Rely d'Oissel.

COMPOSITIONS OF DIVISIONS

18th Division

Commander: General Lefevre (Justinien).

35th Brigade: Commander, General de Cugnac. 32nd and 66th Infantry Regiments.

36th Brigade: 77th and 135th Infantry Regiments.

One squadron: 7th Hussars.

3 groupes of artillery (75 mm.).

45th Division

Commander: General Quiquandon.

90th Brigade: Commander, Colonel Mordacq.

2nd bis Zouaves de marche; 1st Tirailleurs de marche; 1st and 3rd Bus. d'Afrique.

91st Brigade: Commander, General Codet.

7th Zouaves de marche; 3rd bis Zouaves de marche.

One squadron: 1st Regiment de marche de Chasseurs d'Afrique.

3 groupes of artillery (75 mm.).

152nd Division

Commander: General Joppe.

304th Brigade: 268th and 290th Infantry Regiments.

4th Moroccan Brigade: Commander Colonel Savy. 1st Moroccan Infantry; 8th Tirailleurs de marche.

Two squadrons: 13th and 26th Dragoons.

2 groupes of artillery (75 mm.).

153rd Division

Commander: General Deligny.

306th Brigade: 418th Infantry Regiment; 2nd and 4th Battalions Chasseurs h pied.

3rd Moroccan Brigade: Commander, General Cherrier. 1st mixte Zouaves et

Tirailleurs; 9th Zouaves de marche.

Two squadrons: 8th and 21st Chasseurs.

2 groupes of artillery of 90mm. and

1 groups (2 batteries) of 95mm.

¹The *Detachment* existed as such from 22nd October to 16th November 1914; from that date to 4th April 1915, it was called the Eighth Army, and from 4th April to 22nd May, was again given its original appellation. On the latter date it became the XXXVI Corps.

87th Territorial Division

Commander: General Roy.

173rd Brigade : 73rd and 74th Territorial Regiments.

174th Brigade: 76th, 79th and 80th Territorial Regiments.

186th Brigade: Commander Colonel Marcieu: 100th and 102nd Territorial Regiments.

Two squadrons: 4th Dragoons.

2 groupes of artillery (90mm.).

314

MEMORANDUM ON OFFENSIVE ACTION

1st Canadian Division.

It is hoped that in the new area allotted to the Corps opportunities for offensive action will occur. How far we may be able to take advantage of these opportunities must depend in the first instance on the instructions we may receive from superior authority, but it is incumbent on us to be prepared for such action and to have definite plans as to where and how it should be carried out.

Within each Divisional Area Brigade Commander of a Section of the defence lines should consider the most suitable point or points in his section for offensive action.

These points should be selected as

- I. Being of themselves of tactical importance;
- II. Leading up to advantageous developments;
- III. Being of tactical value to the enemy, and after the points have been selected proposals should be submitted for attacking these, stating –
 - I. The method of attack;
 - II. The strength of the force to be employed;
 - III. The artillery support required;
 - IV. The preliminary measures necessary prior to the actual attack.

Such statements must necessarily include reports on the ground generally, the places for assembling troops detailed for the assault, artillery positions, the strength and weakness of the points in the enemy's lines selected for attack, measures against counter-attacks, etc., etc.

All these require throughout the whole section continuous reconnaissance and observations, in order to obtain and record the detailed information necessary.

Details as to the varying activity of the enemy's artillery and infantry from day to day, the work on his trenches carried out, the particular points strengthened, the hours

of working, times of relief, the amount of rifle fire by day and night, the number of shells fired into an area day by day are all useful when received from several different sources and placed together and are matters on which information *can* be obtained in a variety of ways calling for individual enterprise and intelligence.

Reports on such points can be submitted periodically or when received at the discretion of the G.O.C. Divisions and will be duly collated and tabulated at Corps Headquarters, the object in view being to adopt every possible expedient to obtain as complete knowledge as possible of the ground and disposition of the enemy *on* our immediate front.

HERBERT PLUMER,

Lt.-General,

Commanding Vth Corps.

13-41916.

(2)

1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf. Bdes. Divl.Arty. & Divl. Engrs.

For your information and necessary action as soon as the line is taken over.

C.F.R., Colonel,

General Staff,

1st Canadian Division.

13-4-1915.

315

To First Can. Division.

G. 23. 14th April, 1916.

Following message received from Second Army Begins Canadian Heavy Battery should remain where it is pending further orders as to its eventual disposal which will be sent later Ends AAA Acknowledge Addressed First Candn. Division repeated Fifth Corps.

From Advd. Fifth Corps. 125 pan.

By Wire received 1.47 p.m.

316

5th Corps.

G.X. 798.

Secret

Canadian Division.

1. Under instructions from 2nd Army, G. 4 dated 14th April, 1915, the Canadian Heavy Battery will move on the evening of the 16th instant arriving VIEUX BERQUIN early on the morning of 16th where it will come under orders of the First Army.

2. The O.C. Battery should report in advance to the G.O.C. No. 1 Group Heavy Artillery Reserve at Chateau CROIX MARMUSE, 11 miles south of LESTREM.

3. The wagons of the Divisional Ammunition Column carrying 60 pr. ammunition will accompany the battery.

4. Instructions for the movement of lorries of the Park carrying 60 pr. ammunition will be issued separately.

5. The greatest care should be taken to conceal all movements of guns from North to South.

H. S. JEUDWINE,
B.G.G.S.

14-4-'16.

5th Corps.
(Amending App. 509.)
(See also 315.)

317

V. Corps.
GX. 795.

1st Canadian Division.

Owing to the system of defence adopted by the French being rather different from our own it has been found that in taking over trenches from them the parapets generally require strengthening and thickening in order to be bulletproof. In cases where this has not at once been taken in hand casualties have sometimes occurred from bullets which have penetrated the parapet.

The Corps Commander wishes you to warn Brigade Commanders of this in order that there may be no delay in undertaking any work necessary to provide proper cover for the troops manning the trenches.

H. S. JEUDWINE,
Brig.-General, G.S.

14th April, 1915.

5th Corps.

Copy to each Inf. Bde. 1514115.

318

Extract from article by General Ferry, G.O.C.

11th (French) Division, 27th Sept. 1914

11th April 1916.

Nous mimes de suite au courant le General Aime, chef de la 21e Brigade, en service dans le secteur, et lui prescrivimes: 1°) de reduire pour le moment les effectifs, alors accumules, suivant les instructions superieures, dans lee premieres lignes, et d'eviter ainsi des pertes provoquees par lee gaz, si l'attaque annoncee se produisait; 2°) de chercher a, reperer et battre de son artillerie lee batteries de bouteilles signalees... Puis, nous lui envoyames ordre de prevenir tout son monde, de faire avertir par

15185-15½

un officier la 28e Division britannique (l Ypres) ninth que la Brigade canadienne h Boesinghe-laquelle devait entrer le soir daps le secteur-de montrer la plus grande vigilance et de rechercher les moyens de fortune propres a empecher la respiration des gaz.

En meme temps (14 avril 1915, midi) noes adressions par courrier special au 20e Corps qui avait charge d'en avertir hierarchiquement l'Armee et le Groupe d'Armees du Nord, copie de l'interrogatoire du prisonnier allemand et lui rendions compte de l'avis que nous en avions fait donner dans notre secteur, puis par un officier d'Etat-Major aux unites anglaise et canadienne precitees. De plus, un heureux hasard ayant amend sur le front un officier de liaison du Grand Quartier General, nous le mettions au courant de cet evenement et des mesures prises.

Nous pensions ainsi avoir fait aussi rapidement que possible tout le necessaire pour eviter la *surprise*, l'effet de terreur, et lee pertes massives que lee Allemande escomptaient de ce nouvel et abominable procede de guerre... Mais, nul ne bougea. . . ni au 20e Corps, ni à l'Armee, ni au Grand Quartier General . . . De celui-ci nous reçumes settlement, pert de fours apès, par l'officier de liaison prenommé et en guise de réponse, ces observations caracteris-tiques: 1^o) tous cette affaire de gaz ne peut etre prise au serieux"-(noun repétons que lea gaz allemands étaient alors connus du service ministériel d'informations)-2o) Un divisionnaire n'a pas le droit de communiquer directs-meat aver les troupes de nos allies, mais seulement par la voie du Corps d'Armee; 3o) la répartition des troupes daps lee tranchées et particulièrement des forces de premieres lignes a etc fixée, *ne varietur*, par lea instructions du Grand Quartier General...

"Ce qui s'est passé sur l'Yser", LA REVUE DES VIVANTS, Paris, juillet 1930, pp. 899 et 900.

TRANSLATION

We got in touch at once with General Aime, commanding the 21st Brigade which occupied the sector, and instructed him (i) to temporarily reduce the effectives, then accumulated in the forward trenches as ordered by higher authority, and so to avoid casualties from gas if the predicted attack should eventuate; (ii) to try to register and break with his artillery the reported cylinders. . Then we sent him orders to caution all his command, to send an officer to warn the 28th British Division (at Ypres) as well as the Canadian Brigade at Boesinghe (sic)-which

was due to go into the sector that night-to exercise the greatest vigilance and to seek suitable means to prevent inhalation of gas.

At the same time (noon, 14th April, 1915) we despatched by special messenger to the 20th Corps, which had been asked to forward it in due course to the Army and the Groupement du Nord, a copy of the interrogation of the German prisoner, and reported the information we had caused to be given out in our sector, and subsequently to neighbouring British and Canadian formations through a staff officer. Moreover, a fortunate chance having brought to the forward area a liaison officer from French G.H.Q., we informed him of the course of events and of the measures taken.

We thus thought we had done, as quickly as possible, everything necessary to avoid *surprise*, the effect of terror, and the heavy losses which the Germans counted on inflicting with this new and abominable weapon of war. . But, nobody budged. . neither at 20th Corps, nor at Army, nor at French G.H.Q. . From the latter we only received, a few days later, through the aforementioned liaison officer and by way of reply, the following characteristic observations (i) " all this gas business cannot be taken seriously "(we repeat that at this time knowledge of the German gas was already in possession through the Government intelligence service) –(ii) "a divisional commander has not the right to communicate direct with allied troops but only by the channel through Army Corps"; (iii) "the distribution of troops in the trenches and particularly of the garrisons in the forward lines has been fixed, *ne varietur*, by the instructions of French G.H.Q"

319

Secret

28TH DIVISION
OPERATION ORDER NO. 30

15th April, 1915.

1. Reliable information has been received that the enemy have arranged to attack the YPRES salient to-night.

2. Reliefs arranged for to-night will continue, but battalions relieved from the trenches will be disposed as follows:

The battalion of the 83rd Infantry Brigade when relieved will move to the West of POTIJZE and will bivouac to the North of the main road.

The two battalions of the 85th Infantry Brigade when relieved will move to ST. JEAN where they will bivouac.

The 85th Infantry Brigade will place half a battalion in the supporting line to the East of ZONNEBEKE and half a battalion in the railway dugouts. This supporting battalion will come under ' orders of the 84th Infantry Brigade as soon as relief is completed.

3. The remaining battalion of the 85th Infantry Brigade billeted in ST. JEAN and the two battalions 83rd Infantry Brigade billeted in YPRES will be held ready to move out at a moment's notice. If YPRES is shelled the two battalions 83rd Infantry Brigade with first line transport will move to bivouacs to West of POTIJZE via the RUE de THOUROUT and the cross roads 300 yds. East of MENIN GATE.

4. 84th Infantry Brigade will move one battalion to the Huts in Square H. 5 and one battalion from POPERINGRE to VLAMERTINGHE.

5. All battalions not in the trenches will be issued with ammunition to complete to 200 rounds per man.

6. In the event of no attack being delivered, battalions bivouacing will move to their billets as previously ordered at 7 a.m. 16th April.

ACKNOWLEDGE
LOCH.

Lieutenant-Colonel.
General Staff, 28th Division.

5 p.m.

(See 328)

320

*Extract from Intelligence (G.S.) War Diary
V Corps, April 1916*

11th Division.

TRANSLATION

Report and interrogation of German prisoner. Sent with 599 (28th Div.) of 14-4-'15.

Aug. Jaeger, Reservist of the *284th Reserve Regt. of Infantry, 61st Division, 26th Reserve Corps*, surrendered on the night of the 13th inst. to the 4th Battn. of Chasseurs, near LANGEMARCK.

Jaeger was called up on August 4th and attached on Nov. 9th 1914 to *234 Reserve Regiment* as Automobile Driver with the Army Corps.

The 61st Div. occupies the Sector between LANGEMARCK and PASSCHENDAELE. Two battalions of the *284th* hold the front LANGEMARCK - POELCAPPELLE and the

¹*Sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary for this desertion and betrayal. Reich Supreme Court 17th Dec. 1935.*

3rd Battalion is on the right of the POELCAPPELLE road. The 52nd Division occupied the front to the west of LANGEMARCK. .

During the day 1st line trenches are occupied by one Section per Company. At night the strength is doubled and from 4 to 6 in the morning, the whole Company is in position. Each Company has three machine guns in the 1st line, flanking each other, while the fourth gun is in reserve in rear.

Companies spend 8 days on the front and 8 days at rest. One battalion is always at rest in huts constructed in the small wood CALVAIRE (W.8.a) to the East of WEST ROOSEBEKE. Two other battalions rest at OOSTNIEUWKERKE.

The 380 mm. gun has just been mounted on a cemented platform in the S.W. of d'HOUTHULST forest. This gun has not yet fired. A battery of 210 mm. mortars, another of 155 mm. guns and several others of 77 mm. are approximately 1 kilometre WEST OF POELCAPPELLE railway station.

An attack is planned for the near future against the French trenches of the above mentioned sector. With this object in view four batteries have been placed in position in the first line trenches; these batteries each have 20 bottles of asphyxiating gas. Each Company has 4 such batteries. Each battery has 5 gunners. At a given signal, 3 red rockets fired by the artillery, the bottles are uncorked, and the gas on escaping, is carried by a favourable wind towards the French trenches. This gas is intended to asphyxiate the men who occupy the trenches and to allow the Germans to occupy them without losses. In order to prevent the men being themselves intoxicated by the gas, each man is provided with a packet of tow steeped in oxygen.

Since yesterday (13th inst), all trains and convoys in position at ROULERS and RUMBEKE have been warned to be ready.

Companies are about 160 strong on an average and are mostly commanded by active Army Lieutenants.

The name of the G.O.C. *61st Division* is VON RHEIS (?KLEIS).

The report centre of the Colonel Commanding the *234th Regt.* is at the Northern exit from POELCAPPELLE, and is the last house in red brick on the left of the exit.

Officer Interpreter of the 11th Division.

Sgd.....

Seen by

Gen. FERRY. G.O.C. 11th Division.

Field Message

To Fifth Corps.

G.G. 611. 15th April, 1915.

Reference to my G.G. 599 yesterday German prisoner further stated that the gas bottles or cylinders are fitted with rubber pipes running forward towards hostile trench AAA Cylinders are deeply buried in front trenches AAA Battery personnel and others provided with special package of tow oz cotton waste for use as protective mask AAA Sample of this cotton waste herewith for analysis if desired received to-day from French Division AAA Prisoner stated that the front intended to be attacked by means of asphyxiating gas on the first favourable opportunity extended from LANGEMARCK to POELCAPPELLE - WIELTJE Road and probably also further South AAA Prisoner said a dress rehearsal of attack but without gas was to have taken place on the thirteenth AAA French 11th Division report having seen three red lights in German lines on night of thirteenthfourteenth about one a.m. AAA French Division announces capture of another prisoner to-day who confirms above on general lines AAA No report on his interrogation yet to hand.

From 28th Division 10.40 a.m.

Field Message

To Fifth Corps.

G.G. 612. 15th April, 1915.

German prisoner JAEGER of two hundred thirty fourth Reserve Regt. captured by French eleventh Division night thirteen fourteenth gave further details on interrogation AAA. Four ZEPPELINS were brought to GHENT during last : few days preceding capture AAA Three squadrons each consisting of eight aeroplanes one captive balloon and one battery anti-aircraft guns had recently arrived AAA One Squadron at STADEN one at HOUTHULST village and one at RUMBEKE AAA RUMBEKE is probably not that at X Sixteen but more probably other RUMBEKE, near SLEGHAGGE Q. twenty seven. One biplane seen by 11th Division on eleventh instant was reported to resemble British pattern so closely that it was not at first fired at AAA Subsequently black maltese crosses were seen AAA Prisoner described how German Automobile anti-aircraft gun is provided with automatic loading arrangements AAA Long gun AAA capable of being turned completely round horizontally

on central pivot and capable of elevation or depression through large arc AAA also provided with double sighting arrangements both on right and left AAA French report having seen on fourteenth another type of German aeroplane of new shape somewhat resembling French type AAA Please inform Flying Corps.

From 28th Division 11.05 a.m.

Field Message

To—Fifth Corps.

G.G. 613, 15th April, 1915.

In continuation my G.G. numbers 599, 811 and 612 German prisoner further stated AAA Headquarters twenty sixth reserve corps at HOOGLEDE Q. seventeen AAA Regiments two hundred thirty three and two hundred thirty four alternate on front approximately bounded by LANGEMARCK--STADEN railway on the west to about D. one two on east AAA reliefs about every eight days AAA on fourteenth Regiment two hundred thirty four but on fifteenth regiment two hundred thirty three AAA Regiment two hundred thirty six prolongs to south but on sixteenth will be regiment two hundred thirty five AAA Prisoner gave following artillery emplacements which have been partly confirmed by French observation AAA Battery of one hundred five in V 20 b nine seven occupied AAA Battery of French one hundred Sky five in V fourteen a six one occupied AAA 12 guns of seventy seven in V thirteen a six four occupied AAA Battery of one hundred thirty in V 23 b four two occupied seven days ago AAA Prisoner stated that field railway had been laid from POELCAPPELLE railway station in north easterly direction into forest of HOUTHULST and one gun of three hundred eighty five new model mounted on truck had been taken along the railway to point unknown AAA Prisoner had not actually seen this last gun but his artillery friends told him of it AAA Prisoner further stated that one battery of two hundred ten one battery of one hundred fifty query one hundred fifty and two batteries of seventy seven had been seen recently proceeding westwards towards VELDHOEK in U four ten from cross roads in U six c.d. AAA

From—Twenty eight Division, 12:35 p.m.

Field Message

To—Advanced Fifth Corps.

G.G. 629, 15th April, 1915.

Following is result of conversation with Officer Interpreter of eleventh French Division who interrogated two German prisoners

made night thirteenth fourteenth and fifteenth morning respectively AAA As a result some amendment is necessary to early portion of my G.G. 613 of this date. Front held by the Fifty first Reserve Division of twenty sixth Reserve Corps extends from LANGEMARCK-STADEN railway to short distance east of ST. JULIEN-POELCAPPELLE road AAA One battalion only of this division has front East of above road AAA Next came fourth Landwehr Regiment and third Landwehr Regiment in that order south eastwards AAA third regiment reaches YPRES-ROULERS railway approximately AAA Fourth and third Landwehr Regiments are formed into a Brigade which alternates in the trenches with Brigade formed from seventy third and seventy fourth Landwehr Regiments AAA Relief of front by the last two named regiments should normally take place night fifteenth sixteenth AAA Each regiment has six companies in first line trenches AAA Fifty second reserve Division holds front from LANGEMARCK-STADEN railway westwards with Battalion of CHASSEURS number twenty four or twenty five on its extreme left AAA Fifty first Division front has support trenches and second line already constructed whereas in the case of front held by Landwehr Regiments the second line does not appear to have been completed AAA Northern part of WESTROOSEBEKE in V 12 is used for billeting troops AAA Copy of translation precis of results of interrogation of German prisoner Julius RAPSABL of fourth Landwehr Regt. is enclosed (*Reproduced next below.*)

From Twenty eight Division.

Enclosure with above.

11th Division.

Translation precis of the result of the inter rogation of the German prisoner taken
15/4/1915.

Julius RAPSABL, *4th Landwehr Regt.*, a former non-commissioned Officer who had been reduced on account of striking his superior Officer, surrendered to the French 69th Regt. (*11th French Div.*) at 7 a.m. on 15/4/1915.

The *4th Landwehr Regt.* which together with the *3rd Landwehr Regt.*, forms a Brigade, is attached to the *52nd Division 38th Reserve Army Corps.* These two Regts. alternate in the trenches with the *73rd* and *74th Landwehr Regiments* which are similarly attached to the *52nd Division.* These units hold the road between the POELCAPPELLE Road and PASSCHENDAELE. (front)

When the *4th Regiment* holds the trenches it has six Coys. in first line and six Coys. at rest. Five of the six rest Coys. are at POEL-

CAPPELLE behind the church, in the houses on the road leading towards WESTROOSEBEKE, and the sixth Company is distributed between the red house on the right of the windmill of POELCAPPELLE and adjoining farms. The first line trenches held by the deserter's Coy. are provided with four machine guns which flank each other. They do not contain any battery of asphyxiating gas bottles. The package of cotton waste which was brought in by the prisoner of yesterday would be used for the protection of the troops in the event of the Allies attacking them by means of asphyxiating gas (such as in hand grenades, bombs, etc.).

An artillery observation post has been established at the windmill (V.20. centre) situated on a slight rise to the East of POELCAPPELLE. This post controls the fire, it is said, of a 155 mm. battery in a position behind and situated to the north of POELCAPPELLE.

According to prisoner's statement, the second line trench is under construction only, only one portion of it being finished. In the first line shelters there are shelters for 2 or 3 men in each shelter.

The food is satisfying. A hot meal is provided every day but a big helping is given. Travelling kitchens bring the food every night between eight and eight-thirty p.m. to the northern entrance of POELCAPPELLE.

Companies average 120 and are commanded by Lieutenants and Ofizierstellvertreter.

The morale of the troops is fair, although the duration of the war is beginning to weigh upon them.

321

INFORMATION RECEIVED THROUGH
LIAISON OFFICER

Reliable Agent of the Detachment of the French Army of Belgium reports that an attack round Ypres has been arranged for nights 15/16th April. A prisoner of 234th *Regiment, 26th Corps*, taken on 14th April, near Langemarck, reports that an attack had been prepared since noon 13th. Reserves have been brought up and passages have been prepared across old trenches existing in rear of present German trenches to facilitate bringing forward arty. Germans intend making use of tubes with asphyxiating gas placed in Bts. (sic *batteries*) of 20 tubes for every 40 metres in front of 26th Corps.

This prisoner had in his possession a small sack filled with a kind of gauze or cotton waste, which would be dipped in some solution to counteract the effects of the gas.

The German morale is said to have much improved lately owing to having been told that there is not much in front of them.

It is possible that if the wind is not favourable to blow the gases over our trenches that the attack may be postponed.

Appendix 8, Second Army G.S. War Diary April 1916.

See extract from V Corps

G.8. War Diary 16th April, 1916 (App. 823).

322

Extract from:

5TH CORPS
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION NO. 45
15.4.15

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

A German reservist of the 234th Reserve Regiment of Infantry, 51st Division, surrendered on the night of the 13th instant near LANGEMARCK. He stated that he was called up on August 4th and attached on November 9th, 1914, to the 234th Reserve Regiment as automobile driver with the Army Corps.

He gave the following information:-

The 51st Division occupied the sector between LANGEMARCK and PASSCHENDAELE. Two battalions of the 234th hold the front LANGEMARCK-POELCAPPELLE and the 3rd Battalion is on the right of the POELCAPPELLE road. The 52nd Division occupies the front to the west of LANGEMARCK.

During the day first line trenches are occupied by one section per company. At night the strength is doubled, and from 4 till 6 in the morning, the whole company is in position. Each company has three machine-guns in first - line, flanking each other, whilst the fourth gun is in reserve in rear.

Companies spend eight days on the front and eight days at rest. One battalion is always at rest in huts in the small wood CALVAIRE to the east of WEST ROOSEBEKE. Two other battalions rest at OOSTNIEUWKERKE.

One 380 mm. gun has just been mounted on a cemented platform in the S.W. of d'HOUTHULST forest. This gun has not been fired. A battery of 210 mm. -mortars, another of 155 mm. guns and several others of 77 mm. are approximately one kilometre west of POELCAPPELLE railway station.

Four batteries have been placed in position in the first line trenches; these batteries each have 20 bottles of asphyxiating gas. Each company has four such batteries. Each battery has five gunners. At a given signal, three red rockets fired by the artillery, the bottles are uncorked and the gas on escaping, is carried by a favourable wind towards the opposite trenches. This gas is intended to

asphyxiate the men who occupy the trenches and to allow the Germans to occupy them without losses. In order to prevent the men being themselves intoxicated by the gas, each man is provided with a packet of tow steeped. in oxygen.

Companies are about 180 strong on an average and are mostly commanded by lieutenants of active army. The name of the G.O.C. 51st Division is von RHEIS (? KLEIS).

The report centre of the Colonel commanding the 234th Regiment is at the northern exit from POELCAPPELLE, and is the last house in red brick on the left of the exit.

Confirmation of the above artillery dispositions is required.

323

*Extract from War Diary, Fifth Army Corps,
G.S. April, 1915*

April 15th. Poperinghe.

12.50 a.m. 2nd Canadian In f. Bde. relieved right section of French .11th Div. on left of 28th Div.

1.50 p.m. Despatch received from II Army directing all precautions to be taken on account of an agent's report, confirmed from other sources, that enemy contemplated an attack on the Ypres salient on night 15th/16th April. Passages have been prepared across old trenches to facilitate bringing up of art. Germans intend making use of tubes with asphyxiating gas. They are placed in batteries of 20 tubes per 40 metres along front of *XXIV Corps*. A favourable wind necessary. Corps Commander interviewed Dill Commanders.

4.45 p.m. V. Corps Operation Order go. 11 issued. 28th Div. report that a German aeroplane at (110.5 a.m.) hit by fire (probably French Arty.) came down just inside enemy lines in J. 10.

7.0 p.m. Wireless message from aeroplane, still out, reports roads clear 3 miles in rear of enemy from Poelcappelle-Menin-Ypres Road. A subsequent report of the reconnaissance showed no unusual movement in front.

Adv. H.Q. remained in Chateau in H. 11.a.

324

Secret

FIFTH ARMY CORPS
Operation Order No. 11 G.S.

Advanced 5th Corps.
15th April, 1915.

1. In view of certain information which has been communicated to Divl. Commanders the following dispositions will be made:—

2. The 27th Div. and 28th Div. will select places of assembly astride of the Menin Road, and South of St. Jean respectively, in case it becomes necessary to clear troops out of Ypres.

3. If this becomes necessary troops and any first line transport will move out of Ypres by the following roads:—

27th Div. Menin Gate-cross roads I.8.b. —Menin Road.

28th Div. Streets north of Grande Place—Rue De Dixmude—road passing through I.2.c and d and I.8.d—cross roads I.8.b. Potijse

The road through I.1.c. and d.—I.2.c. and d. to St Jean will be at the disposal of the Canadian Div.

4. 27th Div. will move one Btn. from Vla meringhe to Ypres. To clear former place by 7 p.m.

5. 28th Div. will move one Btn. from billets between Vlamertinghe and Poperinghe to former place. Not to arrive before 7 p.m.

6. 1st Canadian Div. will hold one Infty. Bde. at Steenvoorde in readiness to move at half an hour's notice.

7. Reports to Chateau North of level crossing H.11.a.

H. S. JEUDWINE, B.G.G.S.,

Issued 4.45 p.m.

5th Corps.

325

Second Army letter 21/3/1915, forwarded by V Corps 15.4.15.

Original not available. Entry in 1st Canadian Division 'IN' field register reads:—

" No. 572, 15th April 1915, V Corps G.X.488, forwarding Second Army letter G.284, d/213.15, re. necessity for neglecting no precautions in order to avoid delay in preparation for launching counter attacks, should enemy succeed in penetrating Line."

326

WAR DIARY-A.D.M.S. 1st CANADIAN
DIVISION

15.4.15 Attended consultation of Officers at 5th Corps, with D.M.S., 2nd Army presiding. Rumour that this evening the enemy will attack our lines using an asphyxiating gas to overcome our men in the trenches. Arrangements made for the handling of 1,000 wounded tonight in the 5th Corps....

327

Extract from French Official History, "Les Armies Françaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome 71, Annexes Volume 2.

ANNEXE No. 1898

ARMÉE BELGE
Commandement de l'armée
2e Bureau.
No. 247.

G.G.G. le 16 avril 1015.
Arrive a 18 h.30.

Bulletin d'information.

Usage de gaz asphyxiants.

Les Allemands ont fait confectionner d'urgence a Gand 20,000 couvre-bouche en tulle, que les soldats porteront dans un sachet en étoffe impermeable de 0.10 x 0.175 (agent).

Les couvre-bouche imbibes d'un liquide approprié serviraient a protéger les hommes contre les gaz lourds asphyxiants que les Allemands se proposent de chasser vers les lignes ennemies, notamment au 26e CA.R.

Les hommes de ce corps auraient regu récemment, a Roulers une instruction speciale pour y apprendre le maniement des tubes a gaz; ces derniers seraient disposes our le sol, a raison d'une batterie de 20 tubes tous les 40 metres (declaration de prisonnier).

Au nom du roi:

Le sous-chef d'état-major de l'armée
WIELEMANS.

Published also in the (French) "Bulletin de Renseignements de la Detachment d'Armie de Belgique."

TRANSLATION

Use of asphyxiating gas.

The Germans have had made in Ghent, on a rush order 20,000 mouth protectors of Tulle, which the soldiers will carry in a waterproof cloth bag 10 cm. by 17.5 cm. (agent).

The mouth protectors, soaked with a suitable liquid, will serve to protect the men against the heavy asphyxiating gas which the Germans intend to discharge towards the enemy lines, notably on the front of the *XXVI Reserve Corps*.

The men of that corps have recently received, at Roulers, special instruction to learn the handling of gas cylinders; these last will be placed on the ground, to the extent of one battery of 20 cylinders every 40 metres (prisoner's statement).

328

To All units in trenches, and East Yorkshire.
B.M. 216, 15th April, 1915.

Reliable information that enemy intends to attack YPRES salient tonight AAA All ammunition now at battalion headquarters and elsewhere will be sent at once into fire trenches AAA Brigade ammunition reserve is being formed at FREZENBERG by SAA. carts from Ypres AAA Fifth King's Own will reinforce D and E trenches with one Company and will place the other support Company in the trenches close to their shelters J 10 B AAA KOYLI will reinforce their fire trenches with one Company AAA Second King's Own will place their support Company in the support trenches AAA KOYLI and Second King's Own to send one more machine gun each into front fire trenches AAA Moves to take place at once AAA Reliefs will be carried on as arranged AAA After being relieved KOYLI will bivouac West of POTIJZE North of the main road.

From 83rd Bde. 7.10 p.m.

(See 319)

329

To Advanced Fifth Corps
G.G.632, 16th April, 1915.

According to statements of German prisoner JAEGER captured night thirteenth fourteenth by eleventh French Division AAA Infantry units of Twenty sixth German Reserve Corps are armed with new rifles nineteen ninety eight model, and fire S bullet ammunition AAA There are fifteen rifles fitted with telescopic sights issued per company AAA Large proportion of machine guns in German first line trenches is due to guns from siege formations having been specially sent forward for the purpose.
AAA

From Twenty-eighth Division, 10.40 a.m.

330

Secret

OPERATION ORDER NO. 9

by

LIEUT.-GENERAL E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.
COMMANDING 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

1. The Divisional Mounted Troops will move tomorrow to a new billeting area near POPERINGHE, clearing STEENVOORDE by 10 a.m.

2. The 1st Canadian Infantry Bde., 1st Canadian Art. Bde. 1st Field Coy. and 1st Field

Amb., will move tomorrow, under orders of G.O.C., 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. to a new billeting area near POPERINGHE. The head of the column will not enter the STEENVOORDE-POPERINGHE road until 10 am.

3. Billetting parties will proceed in advance, under directions which will be issued later by the Divisional Billetting Officer. Busses will be provided for the billeting parties for the troops mentioned in para. 2.

4. Hours of march will be telegraphed to Div. Headquarters as soon as arranged.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lt.-Colonel,

General Staff, 1st Canadian Division.

Issued at 4.30 p.m. 17.4.15.

330a

SCHEME OF DEFENCE, CANADIAN
DIVISION

SECRET

1st Cn. Div.

G.967

The scheme of defence of the Division in the present line will be the same as that laid down in the case of the SAILLY line, viz. to hold the front trenches at all costs and in the event of any trench being lost, to counter-attack at once. The subsidiary line acts as a support to the front trenches and as a basis for any required counter-attacks.

Each brigade in the front line will detail one battalion as divisional reserve. The headquarters of battalions in divisional reserve must not be altered without reference to this office.

The G.H.Q. 2nd Line which runs just east of WIELTJE, is allotted provisionally as follows:—

RIGHT BRIGADE:—from where line crosses road in

C.29.c. to where it crosses track in C.23.a.

LEFT BRIGADE: from above track to where
line crosses track in C.10.c.

All regimental officers are to acquaint themselves at once with the details of this line.

In the event of this G.H.Q. 2nd Line being taken up, brigades will retire by the following roads:—

Right Brigade: all tracks or roads between YPRES-VERLORENHOEK road (exclusive) and WIELTJE-FORTUIN road (inclusive).

Left Brigade: all tracks between WIELTJEST. JULIEN road (inclusive) and the track running at N. edge of wood in C.10.b.6.1.

Certain temporary bridges have been built over the YPRES-YSER Canal. These bridges would probably have to be shared with the French and the 28th Div. if there was ever any necessity to use them. Meanwhile, the G.O.C. directs that Brigadiers and their Staff Officers and Battalion Commanders make themselves acquainted with the approaches to these bridges.

C.F.R.

Colonel, G.S.

17.4.1915.

1st Canadian Division.

331

1st Canadian Division.

It must be expected that during the next few days the Germans will endeavour to take some kind of offensive action against some part of the line as a reprisal for the successful action in the 5th Division area yesterday.

Such action will probably include a heavy artillery bombardment and possibly a mine explosion followed by an attempt to rush one or more of our trenches.

G.O.C. Divisions know the point or points within their new areas where any such attempt is likely, and should be prepared accordingly.

This in no way affects the general policy laid down of making every preparation for local offensive action on our new front.

HERBERT PLUMER,
Lt.-General,

18th April, 1915.

Commanding V Corps.

332

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING TRAFFIC
IN AREA OCCUPIED BY 1st
CANADIAN DIVISION

1. THE YPRES-WIELTJE-FORTUIN and YPRES-WIELTJE-ST. JULIEN Roads:—

- (a) No transport (except in cases of extreme urgency, for example, ammunition or engineer material) is permitted during daylight.
- (b) All fatigue parties, orderlies, etc., to be reduced to a minimum during daylight.
- (c) No transport to proceed east of cross roads D.14.a. or ST. JULIEN only at a walk between WIELTJE and these points.
- (d) No motor cyclists east of Brigade Headquarters (2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. WIELTJE: 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. Farm C22.b.)
- (e) No motor lights to be shown at night time east of Ypres.

- (f) No lorries or busses are to move E. of YPRES.
2. Battalion Headquarters not to be approached during daylight.
 3. No officers or men to approach near Artillery Observation Posts by daylight, except on duty.
 4. No officers or men to proceed beyond Divisional Area without permission from Divisional Headquarters.
 5. All movement of transport in the Divisional Area to be reduced to a minimum during daylight.
- 19.4.15.

333

5th Corps.
G.X. 849.

Canadian Division.

Divisions will be responsible for the ordinary maintenance, and prompt repair, if damaged, of bridges as under, and will have materials collected and at hand, and parties permanently told off for the purpose.

They will also have schemes prepared for the destruction of these bridges, so as to be prepared in the unlikely event of their destruction being required.

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| 27th Division | (1) Menin Gate Exit. Square 1.8.1., |
| | (2) New bridge from Sally Port in Square 1.8.d. |
| 28th Division. | (1) Bridge over L A A G WIELTJE-HOOG WILTJE Square 1.8.a. |
| | (2) Bridge over Canal--Square 1.7.a. |
| Canadian Div. | (1) Bridge over C a n a -Square 1.1.d. |
| | (2) No. 1 Wooden Bridge over Canal-Square 1.1.b. |

Vth Corps will be responsible for other wooden bridges over canals-N. of YPRES.

H. S. JEUDWINE,
B G G.S.
5th Corps.

20.41915.

334

REPORT ON CONDITION OF TRENCHES

C. R. E.,
21st April, 1915.

1st Canadian Division.

I beg to report as follows on the condition of the trenches in Sections 1 and 2, held by the Canadian Division as taken over by us on the 15th instant. (i.e. *Frontage of and C.I.B.*)

A sketch map compiled from a prismatic compass survey has been handed to you for the purpose of illustrating this report.

SECTION No. 1.

The total frontage of Section 1 is approximately 1,650 yards and at the time of taking over CONSISTED OF 15 ISOLATED PORTIONS OF TRENCH. The different portions are approximately situated in echelon falling back to either flank, the most advanced being the right of Sub-section B. The left flank of Sub-section 10 rests about 40 yards south of the STROOMBEEK creek. The main land mark is the metalled road running in an easterly direction through to the German trenches and passing along the left flank of Sub-section 1A.

Sub-section 1A was divided into three isolated parts at the time of taking over. The right flank and the next portion to the left had a parapet of mud heaped up in front approximately 2 feet thick at the bottom and from 4 inches to 1 foot at the top with an occasional loophole punched through the earth. There is no parapet for this part of trench. The water level is about two feet down below the surface of the ground with numerous shell holes and also a section of the trench behind partially filled with water. There was a plugged drain passing between these two sections in a North Easterly direction through the German lines. In front of these sections are numerous dead bodies in a decomposed state lying on the surface of the ground, also in the trench itself and round about there are numerous bodies buried at a very shallow depth making it impossible for us at many places to excavate at all. There is also human excreta littered all over the place. The right section is approximately 350 feet long and is separated from the Division on the right by a communication trench, since improved *by us* by about 25 feet in length. This trench has no traverses and is directly enfiladed from the German trenches to the north. Considerable sandbag revetting has been done on the parapet on this part of the trench and traverses are under construction. The trench has also been deepened about a foot.

The next portion of Sub-section 1A to the left, being about 300 feet long, is in practically the same condition as above, without traverses and enfiladed from the South West and the right flank of the same is badly bothered by snipers at night, two men having been hit the last three nights at this point. These two portions of Subsection 1-A are separated by an open space of about 25 yards through

which the drain above mentioned runs. This open space is full of shell holes, broken trench and numerous dead bodies under the surface.

The left of Sub-section 1A is approximately 200 feet long, has numerous old dugouts built against the front parapet, in some places 30 feet square, which prevents the parapet being manned, except by lying on the top of the dugouts in an exposed position. The parapet is not bullet proof being in the same condition as above. There is also no parados except at some points, also no traverses. These last two portions of Sub-section 1A have been connected up by a communication trench about 115 feet long. There is a machine gun emplacement where this last portion of the trench joins the road. The wire in front of the portion of Sub-section 1A from the road to the right flank consists of three strands of low barb wire out from the parapet and also a couple of rolls of French coiled wire a little farther out.

Advancing up the road towards the German line 50 yards and to the left of the road is the right of Sub-section 1B, being about 300 feet long. This was divided into three isolated parts which have since been connected up by us. It has two broken down buildings towards the centre of this portion. The parapet was in many cases non-existent and in many places not bullet proof. The parapet has now been built up, numerous sandbags placed and there now is a continuous line of trench throughout this portion. A machine gun emplacement has been built towards the right and two other emplacements are being constructed, one on the left and one on the right respectively. There was no parados, but this is now being constructed. Flimsy dugouts are leaning against the parapet preventing the same from being properly manned. The wire entanglements in front of this portion consisted of about one strand of low barb wire and one or two coils of French coiled wire. The only obstruction on the road was about 4 strands of low barb wire. We have placed out on the road, 35 yards to the front of the trench, a double row of barb wire cradles from one ditch to the other but there is easy passage way around either flank of the cradles through the fields. There are also unburied bodies to the right flank of this portion of the trench. A ditch has been dug across the road where the left flank of Sub-section 1A trenches joins the road and it is intended to make a communication trench up from here to the advanced portion in Sub-section 1B.

The next portion of Sub-section 1B is approximately 150 yards directly in rear of the left end of this advanced portion of Sub-

section 1B, i.e., along a line of willows commencing at the last large tree on this portion of the road. The remainder of Sub-section 1B to the left consisted, upon taking over, of a broken down line of German trenches full of shell holes and water with about six short isolated posts along the willows at this point. The parapet was only waist high and consisted of earth without any revetting and was not bullet proof, being merely mounds of earth, having no parados. We have connected up a lot of these posts, completed about 60 feet of sandbag revetting along the parapet, thickened and raised the same, dug down in the ground as far as possible, this being about a foot, and have constructed several substantial dugouts. This portion of the trench is enfiladed from both the left and right. Traverses are under construction. There are numerous dead bodies buried here and human excreta all over the place and the stench is terrible. This portion of 1B has low ground and we have put in a drain and the water is now running away to the front.

Behind Sub-section 1B is a network of communication trenches about two feet deep and full of water and mud. Between Subsections 1B and 1C is a sharp rise in the ground of about 5 feet, Sub-section 1C being on a higher table of land than Sub-section 1B. Along the right part of Sub-section 1C is a wide portion of old German trench broken in, and having numerous shell holes full of water, only isolated listening post is held by us. The whole of Sub-section 1C is an old German trench converted, the parapet being reversed. Considerable sandbag revetting has been done along here in places by us and the parapet thickened and we have dug down along the trench in places where the water level and the numerous dead bodies permit. About the centre of Sub-section 1C is a portion of this broken down German trench, about 250 feet in length, which has been temporarily improved by us of sandbags hastily laid and parapet thickened. This is now held by our troops permanently.

Moving to the left of this Sub-section 1C, about 200 feet through the broken down trench, a portion of the firing trench, about 15 feet long, is reached. This communication trench has been deepened and now permits of passage way through in the day time. The next portion of trench about 115 feet had a mud parapet about 1 foot thick at the top and about 21 feet thick at the bottom, the same not being bullet proof. The whole parapet along this portion has been revetted by us with sandbags and the earth filled in

in front and the parapet levelled and thickened so that it is now bullet proof. The trench itself was also dug down and is now Q feet to 5 feet below the ground. A couple of dugouts have been cut in the ground at the rear and are now closed in. A communication trench about 75 feet long leads to the left rear into another section of trench about 150 feet long, this latter section of trench is the left flank of Sub-section 1C and extends over to a point about 120 feet from the STROOMBEEK creek. This latter section of trench upon taking over had a parapet, about 6 inches to 1 foot thick at the top and 2j feet thick at the bottom, of mud piled up on the ground about five feet high and has numerous old dugouts leaning against the front parapet from the top of which a line of fire could not be maintained. This parapet has been thickened by us and a communication (*trench*) at the back dug deeper. Also a machine gun emplacement has been made on the left flank. There is a portion of dead ground about 50 or 60 yards in front where the creek flows so that it is necessary to keep the parapet up above the ground a certain height.

The wire in front of Sub-sections 1C and 1B consists of one or two strands of low wire stretched along about 6 to 8 feet in front of the parapet with also, further out, one or two coils of French coiled wire in a rusted and rotten state.

Behind and in front of Sub-sections 1B and 10 are numerous communication trenches running back and forth, the same being 2 feet to 271 feet deep. Several of these trenches lead up towards the German lines. Leading from the rear of Sub-sections 1B and 1C there are one or two shelled trenches about two feet deep, which apparently were built with the idea of communication, but they are filled with water and mud in places and the whole area will have to be drained before they are made use of and deepened.

Considering the Section as a whole upon taking same over it was in a deplorable state and in a very filthy condition, all the little broken down side trenches and shell holes apparently being used as latrines and burial places for bodies. There should be a considerable quantity of disinfectant sent into the trenches without delay in order to render them safe for holding.

SECTION No. 2

This Section 2 is approximately 1,250 yards long, this not including the trench on the extreme left, which has been held by the 3rd Infantry Brigade, and which we are taking over. A report on this trench will be

included in our daily report of 23rd instant, when notes will be available for plotting on maps.

In Section 2A we found on our arrival conditions to be extremely bad. On the extreme right is an isolated machine gun emplacement. Next about 400 feet of isolated trench on high ground. A large part of this position was enfiladed by the enemy's artillery and not protected by traverses. We have given the Infantry here sandbags to fill in this section which they have placed to give them temporary protection but as the ground is high here we are going to make the position a trench one and dig right in. We have commenced the work. Going to the left we next strike a small stream and a communication trench filled with water. We are draining this trench and will soon have it passable. Going to the left we next strike 650 feet of firing line completely enfiladed by the enemy's artillery, which had no traverses in it. The parapet ranged from 2 feet to 4 feet in height and from 6 inches at the top to three feet at the bottom in thickness. The ground where the men stand in the firing position is paved with rotting bodies and human excreta. The ground behind is full of excreta and dead bodies. This ground is about an average of 1 1/2 feet above the water table, so we are first putting in traverses to protect the men from the direct enfilading fire, next a parados to protect them from the side kick of the enfilading fire, then the deepening of the trench to the water table and the thickening of the parapet. This is all being carried on as rapidly as we can get material.

The remaining 350 feet in this Sub-section 2A has a better parapet than the other parts, but it is not bullet proof, as it has some turns in it and is not running in the same direction as the rest of the trench. It is safer and can be fixed up later.

The trenches in 2B, 400 yards long, are in a safer condition than those in 21 and 2C. The line in most places is more or less zigzagged and not so much exposed to enfilade fire as the other Sections. The parapet is one sandbag thick and no parados exists. The dugouts are right up against the parapet, preventing the firing line from being properly manned. Traverses are being made where required and parados being built all along the line as rapidly as possible. The water conditions are similar to those of Sub-section 2A and trench is being deepened from one to two feet thus making it possible to remove sandbags from top of parapet and using them

where they are more urgently required. Parapet will be thickened by throwing earth up from the front. Two machine gun emplacements have been constructed in this Section.

Section 2C is in echelon 40 yards behind 2B and joined to it by a communication trench, Which has been partially drained so that troops may be moved through it under cover.

This section is exposed to enfilade fire from the enemy's artillery and will have to be heavily traversed. It is divided into two Sub-sections, the right about 180 yards long and the left 190 yards. These sub-sections are in echelon, the left 30 yards in rear and connected by communication trench similar to that joining 2C to 2B. The remarks with reference to parapet, parados and water condition in Section 2B are also applicable in Section 2C.

In conclusion we would say that the trenches in Election 2 were in five isolated sections when we arrived and that now troops can pass from end to end of the Section to the other in daylight with fair cover from view.

Considering Sections 1 and 2 as a whole things were in a deplorable state from the standpoint of defence, safety and sanitation, and large quantities of disinfectant should be sent into the trenches immediately for liberal use. This is part of the duty of the Sanitary Officer I understand and quick action should be taken.

WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

A row of chevaux de frise will be placed along the entire front with the least possible delay.

T. C. IRVING,
Captain, C.E.,

Commanding 2nd Field Company, C.E.

335

Priority.

To Canadian Division.

G.A. 384. 21st April 1915.

In accordance with instructions from Second Army the Corps Comdr. wishes each of twenty-eighth and Canadian Div. to select some part of their front at which they can do most damage to the enemy and distract his attention from the south and to concentrate artillery on it with a view to cutting wire knocking down parapets or other offensive action AAA But all guns that can bear on useful targets in or near the enemy's position opposite the fifth div. line or gun targets in rear of it are to do so AAA It is understood that twentyseventh div. is already doing this AAA Four point seven ammunition including lyddite may be used as required within reasonable

limits for this purpose AAA Addressed twenty-seventh twenty-eighth Canadian diva. repeated fifth div AAA Acknowledge

From Fifth Corps 9.55 a.m. H. S. JEUDWINE.

(By hand received 10.05 a.m. Copy to Divl. Arty. for necessary action.)

336

See British Official History of the War, Military Operations, Vol. III. France and Belgium, 1915.¹⁰ pp. 37-50.

337

Priority

To 1st Canadian Divn.

B.M. 769. 22nd April 1915.

Situation report aaa No. 1 Section right situation normal aaa, Artillery fire nil No. 2 Section left situation normal aaa Very little firing since evening aaa Patrols are out their reports not yet received.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.10 a.m.

By wire received 640 a.m.

338

To 1st Canadian Divn.

B.M. 733. 22nd April 1915.

Situation quiet aaa Zeppelin reported moving north west over line at 2.50 am. From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.25 a.m.

By wire received 7 a.m.

339

To 3rd Can. Inf. Bde.

A.A. 645. 22nd April 1915.

There are one hundred mouth organs at divn'l HQ. for you aaa Please call for them aaa No cards available just now but will send you some out of next consignment. From 1st Canadian Div. 2.45 p.m.

By wire received before 3.05 p.m.

340

To Canadian Divn.

G.B. 157. 22nd April 1915.

Air reconnaissance between 6 a.m. and 6.45 a.m. this morning noticed signs of activities about FORET D'HOUTHULST am One battalion breaking bivouac HOUTHULST village aaa Train ZARREN to DIXMUDE shut off steam when aeroplane appeared aaa

Column of troops on POELCAPPELLE-HOUTHULST road quarter mile long head at POELCAPPELLE station moving south at 6.45 a.m. aaa Other signs of movement in south east corner of HOUTHULST FOREST avoided observation aaa Addressed twenty-seventh twenty-eighth and Canadian Divns. repton forty-fifth French Division.
From Fifth Corps, 11.40 a.m.
By wire received 11.66 a.m.

341

To H.Q. Canadian Division.
B.M. 763. 22nd April 1915.
Situation report AAA Section 1 situation normal AAA Section 2 fairly heavily shelled after 2.15 p.m. some shells melinite AAA. Heavy bombardment and rapid rifle fire heard on our left at 5 p.m. AAA Shells bursting near report centre 5.15 p.m.
From 13th Bn. 6.30 p.m.
Commandant St. Julien.
From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 5.25 p.m.
By wire received 6.35 p.m.

342

To lot Canadian Div.
B.M. 788. 22nd April 1915.
Situation quiet aaa Left Section reports observing at 5.00 p.m. a cloud of green vapour several hundred yards in length between the French trenches to our left and these of the Enemy aaa Firing is very heavy at that place also.
From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 5.13 p.m.
By wire received 6.80 p.m.

343

To 5th Corps, 28th Division, 45th French Division.
G. 516 22nd April 1915.
No. 2 Bde. report trenches were shelled during day
No. 3 Bde. report all quiet on their immediate front.
From 1st Canadian Division 5.50 p.m.
C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.
(See 341, 343)

344

Priority to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. G. 786. 22nd April, 1915.
French 45th Division being heavily attacked aaa
Order your Reserve Bn. to stand by

aaa Render any help possible by rifle fire on your part aaa Our artillery has been directed to support the French.

From Canadian Division 5.55 p.m.
C. F. ROMER, Colonel G.S.
By wire received 6.69 p -7n.
(See 31,2)

345

Priority to Divl. Artillery.
G. 784. 22nd April, 1915.
French 45th Div. being attacked on their right and centre aaa Help by bringing arty. fire to bear.
From 1st Canadian Div. 6 p.m.
C. F. Roman, Col. G.S.
By wire.
(See 844)

346

To O.C. 13 Bn.
22nd April, 1915.
We confirm verbal message to McCuaig. (i.e. *Capt. G. E. McCuaig, Adj. 13th Bn.*) Send company 14 Bn. towards Keerselaere, support of French.
From O.C. 3rd Bde. 6.08 p.m.

347

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 740. 22nd April, 1915.
Left of our left sub-section is retiring. From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.25 p.m.
G.B.H.
By hand received.

To 2nd Can. Inf. Bde.
S.C.502 22nd April, 1915.
The left of our left section is retiring having been driven in aaa Will you be ready to support us.
From 3rd Can. Inf. Bde. 6.32 p.m.
G. B. H.
By hand received

348

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
E.M. 276. 22nd April, 1915.
No doubt heavy retirement going on on our left aaa
Last report from our firing line by runner they were holding the line aaa ST. JULIEN command in position aaa Left must be supported quickly.
From 13th Bn. 6.30pm

Commandant St.Julien.

349

Priority to 3rd Canadian Bde. and
Divl. Artillery.

G. 518. 22nd April, 1915.

The French are being attacked between
LANGEMARCK and POELCAPPELLE ass, Bring
fire to bear on German trenches opposite this Sector
and be ready to counterattack if ordered.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.33 p.m.

C. F. ROMER.

*By hand received.
(See 344 and 346)*

350

To O.C. 13th Batt.
22nd April, 1915.

I have had to withdraw my men from barricade
across POELCAPPELLE road as it became
untenable owing to fire from enemy's new
entrenchment running at right angles to main line of
trench and of course the section captured from the
French. The Germans appear also to be on the north
side of road some 200 yards south of the barricade
they do not appear to be in great strength. I think that
a counter-attack delivered against the West end of
new barricade would be successful. Very difficult
and probably excessively costly to counteract from
present position. Think that counter-attack should be
made without delay. Artillery is safe in firing to
north of road and would ease matters here. Our
position is precarious.

From O.C. No. 1 Coy. 6.40 p.m.

D. R. McCUAIG, Major.

*By hand received and forwarded to
3rd C.I.B.*

351

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 741. 22nd April, 1915.

Your wire to us is down aaa Our left driven back and
apparently whole line forced back towards ST.
JULIEN. Two and a half reserve companies, have
been brought up and are occupying G.H.Q. line. aaa
Have no more troops available.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.45 p.m.

G.B.H.

*By hand received.
(See 347 and 367)*

352

*Extract from Supplement to
THE LONDON GAZETTE
of 22nd June, 1915*

No. 29202.

WAR OFFICE, 23rd June, 1915.

His Majesty the KING has been graciously pleased
to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to the
undermentioned Officers, Noncommissioned Officers
and Man for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to
duty:—

No. 24066 Lance-Corporal Frederick Fisher,
13th Canadian Battalion.

On 23rd (sic 22nd) April 1915 in the neighbourhood
of St. Julien, he went forward with the machine gun,
of which he was in charge, under heavy fire, and
most gallantly assisted in covering the retreat of a
battery, losing four men of his gun team.

Later, after obtaining four more men, he went
forward again to the firing line and was himself
killed while bringing his machine gun into action
under very heavy fire, in order to cover the advance
of supports.

Lance-Corporal Fisher was born in St. Catharines,
Ont., 3rd August 1895. He served two years in the
Toronto Public Schools Battalion, Cadet Corps. At the
outbreak of war he was a student. He enlisted in the 5th
Regiment (Royal Highlanders of Canada) on the 13th
August 1914 and went overseas with the 13th Battalion
(R.H.C.), C.E.F., in which unit he was promoted lance-
corporal 22nd December 1914.

353

To 16th Bn. and 3rd Inf. Bde.

G. 792. 22nd April, 1915.

Divisional Reserve battalion of 3rd Inf. Bde. is
placed at disposal of commander 3rd Bde. and is to
be prepared to move at a moment's notice aaa Added.
16th Bn. reptd. 3rd Inf. Bde.

From 1st Cdn. Div. 6.55 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

Received.

354

To 10th Bn. and 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. GA. 13. 22nd
April, 1915.

Divisional Reserve bn. (10th) to be ready to move at
moment's notice.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.55 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

*(10th Bn. had received orders from 2nd C.I.B. at
6.46 p.m. to report at Bombarded Cross Roads at 8.00
p.m. passing through Wieltje at 7.30 p.m. as a working
party.)*

355

To 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
G. 794. 22nd April, 1915.

You must guard your left and bring up your bde. reserve bn. so as to prevent being turned aaa The Div'l. Reserve Bn. can take the place of Bde. Reserve. aaa Important to keep high ground near subsidiary line.

From 1st Canadian Div. 7.00 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Lt.-Col.

(See 358)

356

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
B.M.742. 22nd April, 1915.

Are back on G.H.Q. line attack coming from west. Urgent support necessary.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.05 p.m. G.B.H.

By hand received 2nd C.I.B. Rear H.Q. Wieltje and telephoned to 2nd C.I.B. Fortuin 7.30 p.m.

357

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M.743. 22nd April, 1915.

We are forced back on G.H.Q. line aaa Attack coming from west aaa No troops left aaa Need ammunition badly aaa Have asked 2nd Bde. to support.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.10 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

*By hand received 7.40 p.m.
(See 347, 351 and 359)*

358

Priority to 5th Corps.
G.522. 22nd April, 1915.

French on our left have retired and our left is being driven back am sending up my Divl. Reserve.

From 1st Canadian Div. 7.15 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

(See 347;351 and 363)

15135-16

359

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G2. 22nd April, 1915.

The left of 3rd Bde. has been driven back but right is standing fast aaa You must hang on and take care of your own left. From 1st Canadian Div. 725 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. GB.

Received.

(See 847, 361, 866 and 367)

360

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 744. 22nd April, 1915.

Rifle fire has slackened and it is thought enemy is digging himself in aaa We have only one battalion available for counter attack aaa This would not be very effective aaa Attack seems to be developing more from S.W. (*sic N.W.*) of this H.Q. C22.b

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.30 p.m. G.B.H.

By hand received.

(See, 349)

361

Message telephoned at 7.30 p.m. to 1st Canadian Division from V Corps that French 'night had been slightly turned, and were organizing counter attack.

(See 361 and 374)

362

To 2nd Inf. Bde.
B.M. 745. 22nd April, 1915.

We have no troops between C22.b. (Mouse Trap Farm) and ST. JULIEN aaa Can you occupy this line please reply.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.55 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

*Received and acted upon before 8.38 p.m.
(See 372)*

363

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
B.M. 278. 22nd April, 1915.

Bombardment seems to be slackening aaa Last report from front all our lines were holding aaa Have sent out one coy. R.M.R. under Major Hanson and about 40 men under Capt. Morrissey to support and try

to hold on our left . flank aaa Have lost touch with Capt. Morrissey aaa Understand Major Hanson has been wounded and his coy. obliged to fall back. Not confirmed.

From 13th Canadian Bn. 8.00 pan.

By hand, received.
(See 346)

364

Priority to lot Canadian Div. G.A.395. 22nd April, 1015.

Two battalions of your first infantry bde. are placed at your disposal aaa The remainder will forma Corps Reserve aaa You must endeavour to make your left secure aaa Make certain of the second line of defence at any rate.

From 5th Corps. 8.00 p.m.

By wire received 817 p.m.

365

Priority to 28th Div.
G.584. 22nd April, 1915.

The French on our left were driven back and uncovered our left which has been driven back to St. Julien aaa Lines cut but believe our 2nd Bde. is alright aaa Have you been attacked.

From 1st Canadian Div. 8.05 p.m.

C. F. ROMER.
By wire received before 826 p.m.
(See 361 and 368)

366

To 5th Corps.
GA. 22nd April, 1915.

French Liaison Officer has just been here and says they are going to counter attack towards PILCKEM aaa I have ordered 3rd Bde. to make a counter attack towards U27.

From 1st Canadian Div. 8.16 pan.

G. W. GORDON-HALL.
By wire received before 846 p.m.
(See 881)

367

To 1st Canadian Div. B.M. 808. 22nd April, 1915.
3rd Inf. Bde. report that left section being driven in 7 pan. ass Ask for support C. 22

and 16 ass 10th Bn. div. reserve on its way from YPRES for working party have occupied G.H.Q. line C.23 and 29 aaa 7th Bu. reserve Battn. proceeding to locality C. to protect our left.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

By wire received 846 p.m.
(See 364)

368

Priority to Canadian Diva. G.L.787. 22nd April, 1915.

Our brigades report no heavy attack aaa Have you information as to where the French are on your left.

From Twenty Eighth Division. 825 pan.

By wire received 860 p.m.
(See 366)

369

To Bde. Major Canadian Div. Arty.
22nd April, 1915.

Big guns now shelling our trenches Section 3 (left). No rifle fire on our front or right, but desultory shooting on our left. Flashes of big guns are visible.

From Adj. 2nd Canadian Arty. Bde. 8.25 p.m.

C. S. HANSON, Capt.
By hand received.

370

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.747. 22nd April, 1915.

Our left subsection reported holding on aaa It is supported between ST. JULIAN and trenches by one and half companies an ST. JULIEN to Bde. H.Q. not occupied at present sea 3rd Fd. Co. Bomb Company and 3 companies 14th R.M.R. holding G.H.Q. from Bde. H.Q. to left 1000x aaa French troops mixed with them sea We do not know what is on left ass Ordered 1 co. 16th between ST. JULIEN and B.H.Q. and 1 co. to prolong left ass, 2 co. 16th to B.H.Q. aaa Rifle fire stopped virtually aaa

From and Canadian Inf. Bde. 825 pm.

G. B. H. Lt. -Col.
By hand received after 9 p.m.
(See 365, 863, 38J and 377)

371

Priority to let Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.6. 22nd April, 1915.

Send two Bns. at once via the VLAMER-
TINGHE-BRIELEN road and halt when head
reaches BRIELEN-YPRES road and tell senior
officer to report here.

From 1st Canadian Division. 8.30 p.m. repeated 9.35
p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

By wire received 9.0 p.m. (See 384)

372

To G.O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde. SC. 973. 22nd April, 1915.

Col. Boyle 10th Bn. has received instructions to get
in touch with you aaa He is at present as far as my
information goes on the WIELTJE-FORTUIN road
aaa His instructions are to report to your Bde. Hqrs.
ass, I am sending guide to him aaa O.C. 10th Bn. is
to take up position on the road WIELTJE-ST.
JULIEN without delay and send officer to report to
your Bde. Hqrs. Details have been collected and are
between WIELTJE and your B.H.Q. aaa They will
endeavour to get in touch with your left.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 8.33 p.m.

R. P. CLARK, Staff Capt.

*By hand received.
(See 354 and 382)*

373

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

E.M.281. 22nd April, 1915.

Reported from front our lines all holding aaa Have
reinforced 4 J, 4 K and 4 L aaa Reported that all our
wire entanglements are down aaa Will need
ammunition and rations here also badly need our
motor cycles aaa Bombardment still continues but
not so heavy.

From 13th Canadian Batt. 8.45 pm.

G. E. McCUAIG.

*By hand received.
(See 883)*

374

Priority to Second Army.

G.795. 22nd April, 1915.

My staff officer at Headgrs. of French fortyfifth Div.
at seven forty five p.m. reports that the French left
has fallen back

15135-16 1\2

on HET SAS T. twentynine aaa Their centre is about
the centre of square T. thirty and their right about
PILCKEM aaa A counter attack with six companies
has been ordered crossing the canal south of
BOESINGHE and advancing on PILCKEM ran First
Canadian Div. reports at 8.15 p.m. that the 3rd
Canadian Brigade has been ordered to counter attack
towards U. twenty seven aaa Addressed second army
repeated second corps and 27th, 28th and Canadian
Dive.

From Fifth Corps. 8.45 p.m.

*By wire received Cdn. Div. 9.85 p.m.
(See 381 and 368)*

375

Priority to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A.15. 22nd April, 1915.

As soon as you get your two battalions together
make a counter-attack towards the wood C.10.d. and
then on towards U.27 ass The French are counter-
attacking on your left towards PILCKEM a battalion
of 28th Div. is coming to your support.

From 1st Canadian Div.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

*Untimed; written about 8 p.m. and annotated
"8.52 p.m.; the time of delivery by
staff officer.
(See 349, 360 and 366)*

376

To 3rd Canadian Inf Bde.

G.8. 22nd April, 1915.

The 2nd Bde. is still holding its trenches but is
anxious to know where your right is aaa A Bu. of the
28th Div. is being ordered to WIELTJE where it will
come under your orders aaa It is important that you
gain connection with the French on your left and
hold on to G.H.Q. 2nd line at all costs Rae Report
situation by bearer and state if two Reserve Bns. 2nd
Bde. have yet reached you.

From Canadian Div. 8.55 pm.

C. F. ROMER, Col,

By hand received 94,6 p.m.

377

To 5th Corps and 28th Division

G.526, 22nd April, 1915.

Reports in from both Bdes. aaa 2nd Bde. is holding
its trenches aaa Right of 3rd Bde. is also in its
trenches as far as we can learn

but the left has been driven back aaa The Brigadier is holding G.H.Q. 2nd line and is trying to get in touch with French aaa It is also believed that he has brought up 2} Bus. to connect with his left and G.H.Q. 2nd line aaa Added. 5th Corps reptd. 28th Div.

From 1st Canadian Div. 9 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

(See 347, 551, 357, 387 and 370)

378

O.C. 15th Bn. (line) to O.C. 15th Bn.

Everything O.K. all trenches & Adv. H.Q. heavily shelled, no casualties, a number of French retired on our left probably 50. Have reports from Nos. 4 and 3 companies. I need more ammunition, have sent 7 boxes ammunition to adv. trenches.

From Major Marshall O.C. Adv. H.Q. 9.00 p.m.

By hand forwarded to 3rd CIB and received.

379

To 1st Canadian Division.

E. 600. 22nd April, 1915.

Bridges A and No. 1 behind my H.Q. are being prepared for demolition (if necessary) under direction of an officer aaa My H.Q. staff are also guarding these two bridgeheads aaa 2nd Field Coy. moved before dark from their billets in C.20.c. owing to heavy shelling and are occupying west bank of YSER Canal near Bridge No. 4 aaa Their tool wagons are also on West side of Canal aaa Capt. Irving reports he has parties preparing Bridges Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 aaa Latter two bridges are in French Sector but French officer reported to Irving they could not look after them aaa No telephone communication with signal exchange for last hour aaa Wires evidently cut by shelling.

From C.R.E. 1st Canadian Div.

(H.Q.I.1.d) 9.25 p.m.

CHARLES J. ARMSTRONG, Lt.-Col.

By hand received 10.80 p.m.

380

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. B.M. 95. 22nd April, 1915.

Can you inform me of the situation on your front aaa Am repairing my wire to you aaa My Reserve Battns. two in number have taken up a position North of YPRES-ST.

JEAN Rd aaa Half a battalion secures the pontoon bridge in square C.25.a. from both flanks aaa Colonel Geddes is in command at ST. JEAN.

From 85th Inf. Bde. 9.35 p.m.

C. J. DEVERELL,

Capt. B.M.

By hand received and C.I.B. Wieltje and telephoned at 10 p.m. to G.O.C. and C.I.B. Fortuin, confirmed in writing 10.15 p.m., received- also repeated by hand from 2nd C.I.B. Wieltje to 3rd C.I.B. and received.

(See 386)

381

To Senior Officer of two Bns. of 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. G.A. 15. 22nd April, 1915.

Proceed at once to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. Headquarters which are in the farm north of WIELTJE in square C22.b. and report for orders aaa You will move via cross roads in B.29.d. pontoon bridge in C.19.c. and thence via track to Bde. Hd. Qrs.

From 1st Canadian Div. 9.45 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

Received.

(See 871)

382

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A. 16. 22nd April, 1915.

Two Bns. of 1st Inf. Bde. have been ordered to march to his (*sic. "your"*) Hd. Qrs. to come under your orders aaa They are ordered to march via Pontoon Bridge in bottom of square C.19.c.

From 1st Canadian Div. 9.50 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

By hand received, by 10.30 p.m.

(See 364 and 381)

383

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 749. 22nd April, 1915.

In reply to G.8 (See 876)

10th Bu. only has reported aaa Have sent to find bn. of 28th Division aaa French have apparently fallen behind G.H.Q. line aaa We are holding a line as follows--Front line trenches as formerly, road to ST. JULIEN to Bde. Hq. to middle of C.16.b. to about C.16.a.0.10 aaa French on

our left have asked for help and we are sending what men of theirs have stayed in our line aaa Will counter attack with 10th and 16th Bns. (just arrived) aaa Orders herewith. (i.e, 388).

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.50 p.m.

G. B. Hughes, Lt.-Col.

By hand received.

(See 353, 372, 376, 376 and 388)

384

To 3rd Canadian Infantry Bde.
E.M. 284, 22nd April, 1915.

Some rifle fire coming from our left between ST. JULIEN and 3rd Brigade Headquarters aaa We cannot account for this.

From 13th Battalion. 10.10 p.m.

Commandant, ST. JULIEN.

385

Priority to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.A. 17. 22nd April, 1915.

Reference my G.A. 16 (*see 883*) two bns. of 1st Inf. Bde. marching to you via bridge in square C.19c. please send officer to meet and guide them.

From 1st Canadian Div. 10.15 p.m.

G. W. Gordon-Hall, Lt-Col

By wire received 10.30 p.m.

(See 364, 381 and 882)

386

To 3rd Inf. Bde.
S.C. 980. 22nd April, 1915.

The attached message from Brigade Major 85th Inf. Bde. is for your information aaa We have machine guns (5) in good position farm C28-a. (*Wielje Farm*) which is in touch with the right of 85th Bde. aaa There is a gap between machine guns and left of 10th Bn. at WIELTJE.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

R. P. CnAnx, S/Capt.

By hand received.

(See 880)

387

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
E.M. 288. 22nd April, 1915.

Do not understand verbal message aaa Our left has been pushed in as shown on sketch in blue pencil (*not reproduced*) aaa Have

ordered Major BUCHANAN with one platoon forward to junction in road marked B to stay in dugouts aaa Supporting company has been cut up aaa I am doing this to try and hold left where French have retired and lost touch aaa Reserves in ST. JULIEN consisting of less than 300 men in trenches in front of ST. JULIEN as shown in blue aaa Enemy are bringing heavy rifle fire to bear as shown by 3 blue arrows.

From 13th Canadian Battn. 10.45 p.m.

G. E. McCuaig.

(Capt. and Adjt.)

By hand received 11.30 p.m.

Acknowledged 11.35 p.m.

(See 393)

388

To 10th and 16th Bns., 3rd Bde. C.F.A.
22nd April 1915.

10th and 16th Bns. in that order will counterattack at 11.30 p.m. aaa Boa. will assemble in C23.a. north of G.H.Q. line aaa Clear wood C.10.d. aaa Direction N.W. to U27 aaa Attack on frontage of two companies aaa Remaining 6 companies in close support at 30 yards distance on same frontage aaa Artillery shell C.5.c. and N.W. of that square.

From 3rd Cn. Inf. Bde. 10.47 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt-Col.

Draft of this order, omitting time of attack, and numbered B.M. 748, received by 1st

Cdn. Div. with B.M. 749 (See App.

383). By hand received by all

addressees.

(See 883)

389

NOTE ON FIELD ARTILLERY

NIGHT 22/23rd APRIL

The 10th Battery which, shortly before midnight, had become separated on the way out from the position above St. Julien, was brought into action near Brielen, directly under 1st C.D.A.; the 11th Battery (less attached section of 8th) moved back at about 9 p.m., found the rifle and shell fire too heavy for occupation of their intended new position near Hill Top Farm, so selected and occupied another 1200 yards further south, and opened fire on the same targets as the 9th and 12th, as directed by 3rd C.I.B. The 118th (How.) Bde., R.F.A., was carrying out the order, received from 1st C.D.A. at 11.30 p.m. to withdraw behind the G.H.Q. 2nd Line. The 2nd Bde., C.F.A., as early as 7.40 p.m. had received an order to

open fire on U.17, 18, 23, 24 (an area 2,000= square adjoining Langemarek on the northeast and including part of the captured French trenches) (*See 346*) but refrained from firing because of a suspected erroneous substitution of the letter U for V, which would have meant an area 6,000 yards further east and out of range; the batteries fired on the 2nd C.I.B. front and at midnight were preparing to carry out the order to withdraw behind the G.H.Q. 2nd line-received at 1125 p.m. from let C.D.A.

390

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

S.C. 5. 22nd April, 1915.

Am sending one company Buffs (*2/E. Sent*) to report to Senior Officer Canadians ST. JULIEN aaa O.C. Buffs will send officer and orderlies to report Bde. Head Qrs. as requested.

From Col. Geddes.

G. SKATON, Staff Capt.

By hand received.

(*See 391*)

391

To O.C. St. Julien.

B.M. 750. 22nd April, 1915.

One Coy. Buffs is reporting to you aaa This Coy is to hold line ST. JULIEN-Bde Hqrs.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Brigade. 10.55 p.m.

P. F. Villiers, Capt.

(*See 390*)

392

To 3rd Inf. Bde.

B.M. 817. 22nd April, 1915.

It is imperative that I know disposition and strength of your line please inform bearer.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 11.05 p.m.

By wire received 11.12 p.m. and by hand. 3rd C.I.B. replied verbally at 11.30 p.m. that they were holding original line left of 2nd C.I.B. to Poelcappelle road, then "line V25.a, C.5.d, C.17.b, C.16.a aaa We are counter attacking wood C.10.d. at 11.30 p.m."

393

To 13th Canadian Bn.

K. 189. 22nd April, 1915.

In reply to E.M. 288 (*See 387*)

Acknowledge 288 sending at once the ammunition asked for aaa One Company of

Buff's on way to report to you aaa Am launching counter attack from C.17.b. through woods in direction of U27.d. at 11.30 p.m.

From G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 11.35 p.m.

(*See 387*)

394

Priority to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G. 22. 22nd April, 1915.

Report when two Bns. of let Bde. reach you aaa

They should be used primarily to prolong your left and fill gap between you and French aaa Acknowledge.

From Canadian Div. 11.50 p.m.

C. F. Row, 061. G.S.

By hand received.

(*See 382*)

395

Priority to Canadian Divn.

G. 805. 22nd April, 1915.

Remainder of First Canadian Inf. Bde. is placed at your disposal for purpose of counter attack and to be moved up at once to join the rest of your infantry am Acknowledge aaa Addressed Canadian Div. repeated Twenty seventh and Twenty eighth Divs.

From Fifth Corps. 11.56 p.m.

Received 12.06 a.m. 23rd.

(*See 884*)

396

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

E.M. 289. 22nd April, 1915.

Now impossible to communicate with left of our line aaa ST. JULIEN POELCAPPELLE road impassable on account heavy rifle fire aaa Enemy attacking along in direction of LANGEMARACK to KEERSELAERE as shown on map sent you an hour ago aaa Am using one company of Buff's in front of ST. JULIEN aaa Will expect you to look after all the territory S.W. of ST. JULIEN.

From 13th Canadian Battn. 12 midnight.

G. E. McCUAIG.

(Capt. and Adj.)

By hand received.

(*See 391*)

397

To 3rd Inf. Bde.

E.M. 290. 22nd April, 1915.

Enemy in strength on cross roads C.6 c. need more men in order to drive them out aaa Am not attempting to attack the enemy between ST. JULIEN and WIELTJE leaving that to you aaa Please instruct.

From 13th Canadian Battn. 12 midnight.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

By hand received.

398

To 1st Canadian Div.

V.501. 23rd April, 1915.

Counter attack launched 12.05 a.m. aaa Second and Third Battalions have reported.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Brigade.

P. F. VILLIERS, Capt.

*By hand received, 12.60 a.m.**(See 882, 888 and 89.4)*

399

Priority to 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. G24. 23rd April, 1915.

Move up with your remaining two Bns. by the VLAMERTINGHE-BRIELEN road thence via crossroads in B.29.d. then over the railway in B.30.b. and halt with your head at the road junction in C.25.a. aaa Send Staff Officer to report here aaa Acknowledge.

From Canadian Division 12.15 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

*By wire received 12.80 am.**(See 896)*

400

To French 45th Division.

G26. 23rd April, 1915.

Ayes vovs nouvelles aaa Dane quells direction contrattaquez-vous et h quells heure aaa Nous avons deux bataillons et pourront contrattaquer au meme temps.

From Canadian Division. 12.20 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

(See 374, 395 and 399)

401

To 1st Canadian Divn.

GA. 396. 23rd April, 1915.

Twenty eighth Div. will collect three and a half battalions at St. Jean as soon as possible where they will come under the *orders* of the G.O.C. Canadian Divn. who will utilise them to get in touch with the right of French forty fifth Div. and to deliver a counter attack aaa Acknowledge aaa Addressed in full twenty seventh, twenty eighth Canadian Divs.

From 5th Corps 12.30 a.m.

By wire received 1st Cdn. Div. 1245 a.m.

402

Priority to 27th Division.

G.A.397. 23rd April, 1915.

Reference my G.A.396 (*See 401*) the battalions of your division east of YPRES which I understand are two and a half at POTIJZE and one in G.H.Q. 2nd line will be held as a corps reserve to the counter attack which is to be delivered by the Canadian Divn. in conjunction with the French forty fifth Div. aaa Acknowledge aaa Addressed twenty seventh repeated 28th and Canadian Divns.

From 5th Corps 12.56 a.m.

*By wire received 27th Div. before 145 a.m.**and by 1st Cdn. Div. 117 a.m.**(See 895, 400 and 401)*

403

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M. 821. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation 2nd Inf. Bde. Section one and two quiet aaa 7th Battn. continues in Locality C. in support of left rear 8th Battn. aaa 1 Coy. 7 Batt. 200 yards south of St. Julien Crossroads in touch with 7th Battn. aaa Also in touch with some troops strength being verified to west of St. Julien aaa O.C. No. 1 Section received report from 85 Bde. on its right that German attack on right of our Section one had been repulsed.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.05 a.m.

By wire received 146 a.m.

404

To Col. Geddes. Buffs ST. JEAN.

G.30. 23rd April, 1915.

The three bns. of 28th Div. under your orders will move north and connect up the left of 3rd Canadian Bde. with the French

right driving back any enemy that may have penetrated aaa 3rd Canadian Bde. Hd. Qrs. are in Farm in C.22.b. and their left is a little distance to north of this aaa It is not known where the French right is although we know that they are holding railway bridge south of BOESINGHE aaa It will be advisable for you to communicate at once with 3rd Canadian Bde.

From Canadian Division 1.05 a.m.

C. F. Rome, Col. G.S.

*Received before 3.05 am.
(See 401, 407 and 409)*

405

To 1st Canadian Divn.
G.K.1. 23rd April, 1916.

I am informed by 85 Bde. that 2 buffs 3 Middlesex 5 K.O.R. Lancaster and York and Lancaster Regiments are placed under my Command and attached to Canadian Division aaa At present 2 Buffs and 3 Middlesex are holding line N. of YPRES-ST. JEAN road from E.End of ST. JEAN to Canal through LA BRIQUE aaa Two Companies 3 Middlesex are securing dying Bridge over Canal N. of YPRES aaa 5 K.O.R. Lane. in reserve at ST. JEAN aaa York and Lancasters have not yet arrived aaa My H. Qrs. are in ST. JEAN large house in Centre on South side road.

From Col. Geddes, Comdg. Buffs 1.15 a.m.

*By wire received 1.35 a.m.
(See 439)*

406

To Canadian Divn.
GSM, 23rd April, 1915.

Continuation of my G.A. 397 (See 402) the Battalions referred to to be concentrated about Potijze and name of commander reported aaa Acknowledge addressed twenty seventh Div. repeated 28th and Canadian Div.

From Fifth Corps 1.20 a.m.

*Received 27th Div. before 1.55 a.m. and by
1st Cdn. Div. 1.35 a.m.
(See 401 and 402)*

407

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.32. 23rd April, 1915.

Three Bus. 28th Div. under Col. Geddes of the Buffs now at ST. JEAN are being ordered to move up and connect your left

with French right the position of which is uncertain aaa The remaining two Bns. of let Bde. are near BRIELEN and will probably counter attack on your left.

From Canadian Division 1.24 a.m.

C. F. ROMER.

*By hand received.
(See 404 and 409)*

408

To 1st Brigade.
G.A.19. 23rd April, 1915.

Take your battalions across pontoon bridge in C.19 c. and take up position facing North along track running through C. 19 & 20 aaa Send Staff Officer to report position and await orders aaa Keep your right West of Crow Roads in C.20.c.

From let Canadian Div.

C. F. ROMER, LL-Col.

*Handed to G.O.C. 1st C.I.B. 146 a.m.
(See 599)*

409

To Colonel Geddes, O.C. Troops ST. JEAN.
G.B.2-X, 23rd April, 1915. Reply to G.K.1.

(See 406).

Following message been sent by despatch rider from Canadian Division begins Three battalions twenty eighth division under your orders will move north and connect up the left of third Canadian brigade with the French right driving back any enemy that may have penetrated aaa Third Canadian brigade headquarters are in farm in C.22.b. and their left is a little distance to north of this aaa It is not known where the French right is although we know that they are holding railway bridge south of BOESINGHE aaa It will be advisable for you to communicate at once with third Canadian brigade ends aaa Acknowledge to Canadian Division.

From Major DeBrett, 1.50 a.m.

Passed to 3 Can. Bde. (Received)

H. S. DeBRETT, Maj.G.S.
(28th Brit.Div.)

(See 401, 404 and 407)

410

To 1st Canadian Division.
G.D.16. 23rd April, 1915.

An attack by enemy on trenches in square D twentythree C has been repulsed aaa Cyclist patrol of fifth Division reports that the road from YPRES to BOESINGHE

is almost impassable for formed bodies of troops owing to shell fire aaa At twelve forty a.m. a cyclist patrol of the twenty seventh Divn. reports ST. JULIEN occupied by Canadians and that our trenches are across road eight hundred yards north of ST. JULIEN counter attack by Canadians is taking place aaa Addressed Second Army repeated Second Corps Twenty seventh Twenty eighth and Canadian Divns.

From Fifth Corps 1.53 a.m.

*By wire received 1st Cdn.Div. 2.80 a.m.
(See 898)*

411

Priority.

To 1st Canadian Div.

Q.R. 424. 23rd April, 1915.

Reference fifth Corps G.A.397 (*See 402*) have one and a half battalions (*4th R.B. and half 2nd K.S.L.I.*) near this Hd.Quarters POTIJZE aaa Two battalions (*2nd D.C.L.I. and 9th R.S.*) at present in H. Six Near your Hd. Quarters ordered to march at once via YPRES and MENIN GATE for POTIJZE aaa Commander on their arrival here will be Col. Tuson D.C.L.I. addressed Canadian Divn. Reptd. 5th Corps 28th Divn.

From 27th Divn. 1.55 a.m.

*By wire received 4.05 a.m.
(See 402 and 406)*

412

To 1st Canadian Divn.

B.M. 822, 23rd April, 1915.

Urgent support has been asked for by 3rd Bde. at Crossroads C.6.c. aaa Have sent three Companies 7th Battn. from Locality C aaa Situation normal elsewhere in trenches our front.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.05 a.m..

*By wire received 216 a.m.
(See 397 and 403)*

413

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde,

B.M.823. 23rd April, 1915.

Have ordered 3 Companies 7th Bn, now at D.7.c. and 8.a. to support you in C.6.

From 2nd Canadian Bde. 2.08 a.m.

*By wire received 2,25 a.m.
(See 412)*

414

To 2nd Canadian Bn.

B.M.753. 23rd April, 1915.

You will move forward to C.11.a. & b. and get in touch with 10th Bn. which is now occupying North end of wood C.10.d. aaa entrench on right of 10th aaa Line right of 10th Bn. towards POELCAPPELLE aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.30 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.Col.

By hand received 3 a.m.

415

To 1st Canadian Division.

755. 23rd April, 1915.

Have carried wood C.10.d. aaa Line now approximately V25.a. to C.16.a. aaa One Battalion in reserve C.22.d. aaa Am entrenching aaa We have not succeeded in getting touch with French on our left.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.45 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

*By hand received 8.46 a.m.
(See 388)*

416

To 13th and 15th Bns.

756. 23rd April, 1915.

We have counter-attacked and driven the enemy back to North of Wood C.10.d. aaa G.O.C. Brigade very much appreciates your gallant stand to-day aaa Three Companies (i.e. 7th Bn.) are supporting us at KEERSELAERE.

From 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde. 2.55 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

*Received.
(See 888 and /,12)*

417

To 3rd Inf. Bde.

F.L. 66. 23rd April, 1915.

Enemy occupy road from C.6.c. North aaa More troops needed to clear them off aaa Have been unable to get rations water or ammunition to firing line.

From O.C. 13th Bn. 3.00 a.m.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

*By hand received.
(See 421)*

418

To 3rd Canadian Brigade.
G.K. 3. 23rd April, 1915.

The 2 Buffs have been ordered to march at once by the road running N.W. from WIELTJE through C.22.c. and a. and gain touch with the left of the third Canadian bde. in C.16 and on gaining touch to deploy to the left aaa Third Middlesex (less 2 coys.) will march by LA BRIQUE-PILCKEM road and gain touch with the French right about C.2.b. aaa On gaining touch they will deploy to their right aaa 5 K.O.R.L. will move north from LA BRIQUE through C.27 and will gain touch with the Buffs and Middlesex from the cross roads in C.21.e. The York and Lance will follow the 5 K.O.R.L. in reserve Col. Geddes will be at the head of the reserves where all reports should be sent.

From Col. Geddes. 3.05 a.m.

By wire received 3.60 a.m.
(See 404)

419

To 3rd Canadian Fd. Artillery.
757. 23rd April, 1915.

Message from our front line C.10.d. 16th Bu. reads send up horses to save guns ends aaa These may be 4-7's.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 3.10 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By hand undelivered.
(See 416)

420

To Fifth Corps, and Canadian Division.
GR. 430. 23rd April, 1915.

Continuation my G.R. 426 D.C.L.I. 9th Royal Scots 4 Rifle Brigade and two companies K.S.L.I. now in vicinity of Potijze under command of Colonel Tuson D.C.L.I. aaa This is a composite brigade formed at the moment aaa Headquarters Potijze Chateau aaa Addressed 5th Corps and Canadian Division.

From 27th Division. 327 a.m.

H. L. REED, Lt.-Col. G.S.
27th Division.

*By hand received 1st Cdn. Div. through
V Corps 4.40 a.m.*
(See 411 and 436)

421

To 1st Canadian Division.
758. 23rd April, 1915.

Enemy pressing line from original trench crossing of ST. JULIEN-POELCAPPELLE Road to and beyond C.10.d. aaa Our left in C.16.a. is not yet in touch with French aaa Pressure at KEERSELAERE aaa Asking 2nd Bde. to support.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 320 am.

G.B.H., Lt.-Col.

By hand received 3.46 a.m.
(See 412, 413 and 417)

422

To 13th Canadian Battalion.
K. 196. 23rd April, 1915.

2nd Battalion are moving forward to occupy line C.11.c. and d. between the Wood and ST. JULIEN and will shove forward KEERSELAERE 1 Company on ST. JULIEN ROAD aaa. Please warn Companies.

From 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde. 3.35 a.m.

Received.
(See 414)

423

To 3rd Bde.
23rd April, 1915.

The 2nd Bn. are expecting word to charge the position to our left have they to do so they are at present prolonging our left.

From 16th Bu.

By wire received 3.40 a.m.
(See 414)

424

Order for counter-attack 6 a.m.
23rd April, 1915.

By 45th French Division.

L'intention de gener l'ennemi et de reprendre la position perdue hier sera prononcee aujourd'hui dans la direction ferme Zwanhof-Pilckem pendant que is 28eme Division Anglaise et une brigade Canadienne attaqueront en direction Wieltje, Wydenstref et Pilckem.

2. La contre-attaque sera dirigee par lee spins du colonel commandant la 90e Brigade qui a sons sea ordres 1 bataillon du 7e Zouaves sur la rive ouest 1 bataillon du 2e B. Zouaves h Elverdingen et 2 bataillons du 3e B. Zouaves tete a quatre heures a Elverdingen. Notre ligne actuelle est du canal sera franchie a cinq heures. L'attaque ne depassera pas a droite la route YpreePilckem.

3. Le general commandant la 91e Brigade a tous les elements de la 45e Division A l'ouest du canal, # bataillon du 2e B. Zouaves 1 bataillon du 3e B. Zouaves et 2 bataillons territoriaux qui débarqueront au cabaret de Wippe, respectivement vers 6 heures et 7 heures et auxquels il enverra les ordres necessaires. La mission est de tenir les tranchées de 2eme ligne ouest d'Elverdingen Woesten. Il mettra dans les tranchées de 2eme ligne tous les elements francais qui, franchissant le canal, se porteront sur l'arriere.
4. L'artillerie appuiera la contre attaque sur Pilckem et declanchera le tir a 4h. 55.
5. Le general commandant la 87e Division territoriale s'efforcera de franchir le canal et couvrira la gauche de la contre attaque. Il fera occuper la 2eme ligne des tranchées au nord de la 45e Division.

Le P .C. du general est a Elverdingen et en cas de Changement au cabaret de Wippe.

Timed about 1.50 a.m.

Received at Cdn. Div. by 8.46 a.m. 23rd April.

(See 400 and 4.25)

425

To 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A.21. 23rd April, 1915.

At 5 o'clock two French battalions are to make a counter-attack against PILCKEM with their right resting on PILCKEMYPRES road. You will co-operate with this attack by attacking at same time with your left on this road acknowledge.

From 1st Canadian Div. 3.47 am. Reptd.

4.26 am.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

By wire received 846 a.m. and delivered to

Brig. Gen. Mercer 416 a.m.

(See 424 and 429)

426

NOTE ON CANADIAN FIELD ARTIL

LERY 23rd APRIL, 1915

The 1st Brigade C.F.A. was held west of Ypres until 3.30 a.m. 23rd when it was ordered to support the counter-attack. The composite 2nd/3rd Battery went into action near Bridge 5; the 1st and 4th Batteries followed at 3.30 p.m. 23rd, and the right section of the 11th Battery was attached to the 1st Battery at about the same time. The left section of the 5th Battery was attached to the 4th Battery from night 23rd/24th.

At 4.05 a.m. 23rd all the Canadian artillery units were ordered by the C.R.A. to co-operate in the combined English and French attack, but no organized programme of times and targets could be laid out by him because the position of the enemy was as yet unknown. All batteries were heavily shelled, particularly those of the 3rd Brigade C.F.A., which, however, fired throughout the day, at first on the area between Kitchener's Wood and Keerselaere, and later on the German position on Mauser Ridge.

The 2nd Brigade C.F.A. at 4.40 a.m. 23rd, received the order which stated that the attack would begin at 4.30 a.m. and all batteries opened fire on the 2nd C.I.B. front; "there appeared to be no attack in progress, however," so batteries ceased fire at 5.10 a.m. About 6 a.m. orders were received that the attack had been postponed till 5 a.m. To engage the German trench on Mauser Ridge would have required a switch of about 120° more left and firing from the map at 4,500 yards without observation; "as everything was quiet no further action was taken." Later in the forenoon, enemy reported massing in Poelcappelle and trenches S.W. of it were bombarded.

The 118th (How.) Bde. R.F.A. engaged targets on the north of Mauser Ridge throughout the day.

Br.-General Burstall wrote in his report:-

Throughout the day all guns were in constant action against various targets by request of their infantry or by direction of Div. Art. Comm. The strong position held by the enemy on ridge from Fme. C.15.c to C.15d (*Mauser Ridge*) was constantly shelled.

427

To 2nd Bn. via 16th wire.

759. 23rd April, 1915.

You must make disposition to suit circumstances. You are to cover line C.10.d. north.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 3.50 a.m.

G. B. H. Lt. Col.

(See 428)

428

To 1st Canadian Div.

SC. 991. 23rd April, 1915.

Third Bde. ask for more supports at KEERSELAERE on road between ST. JULIEN and POELCAPPELLE D.6.d. (*Sic: 0.64* 10th Bn. ask for reinforcements in

C.10.d. in wood they specially require officers aaa 2nd Cn. Inf. Bde. have already sent two Bns. leaving two in trenches aaa Repeated to Colonel Geddes O.C. Temporary Brigade on the left of 3rd Brigade composed of Buffs, Middlesex, Yorks and Lanes. From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 3.50 a.m.

R. P. CLARK.

*By hand received 1st Cdn. Div.
(See 421)*

429

To 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.
G. 345. 23rd April, 1915.

The French are attacking at five o'clock towards PILCKEM with their right resting on PILCKEM-YPRES road aaa Two battalions of 1st Bde. under Gen. Mercer are to co-operate by attacking with their left on same road aaa If possible you should connect with this attack and oo-operate aaa Addressed 3rd Brigade and Colonel Geddes detachment. From Canadian Div. 4.10 a.m.

C. F. Romer, Col. G.S.

*By hand received 3rd C.I.B. before 520 a.m.
and by Col. Geddes before 44,6 a.m.
(See 407 and 425)*

430

To G.O.C. 3rd Brigade.
23rd April, 1915.

Capt. Rae has withdrawn his men from in front of the wood (north) and now holds trenches south of the Wood. This information for Artillery. From 18th Battalion, 4.00 a.m.

R. G. E. LECKIE, LtCol.

*By hand received.
(See 419)*

431

To 3rd Brigade.
G.528. 23rd April, 1915.

I have sent you various messages that 3 battalions of 28th Div, under Col. Geddes of the Buffs is coming up on your left, that French are counter attacking at 5 am.- with right on PILCKEM-YPRES road that 2 battalions of 1 Brigade under Gen. Mercer

will co-operate with their left on same road. It is important for you to stick to GHQ. 2nd line. From 1st Canadian Division (*between 410 a.m. and 5.00 a.m.*)

C. F. Romer, Col.

*By hand received before 620 am.
(See 407 and 429)*

432

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 829. 23rd April, 1915.

O.C. 7th Battn. reports having established a line at C.6.d.4, (sic:) with two Companies and one company in close support aaa He reports enemy evidently in close proximity judging from star lights aaa Situation in front of trench line quiet,

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 420 am,

H. K. Betty, Lt. Col. B.M.

*By hand received 620 a.m.
(See 416)*

433

To 1st Canadian Brigade.

G.K.9. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation believed as follows 5/Kings Own Royal Lanes reported past cross roads in C21.c. and are pushing on aaa Middlesex should be in touch with their left and pushing on aaa Buffs have passed over half an hour ago en route via WIELTJE and road through C.22.c.a. to gain touch with left of Third Canadian Brigade.

From Col. Geddes. 4.40 a.m.

Received 1st C.I.B. and repeated to 1st Cdn. Div. in message S.C. 613 timed 616 a.m. with added words "We have asked Col. Geddes to co-operate in our attack."

To 2nd Canadian Bde.

G.K.6. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation 4.30 a.m. Fifth Royal Lanes have reached crossroads C21.c; and are pushing on aaa Middlesex are believed to be in touch with two Battns. First Canadian Bde. about C20.c. aaa Buffs left over half an hour ago via WIELTJE and road through C.22.c.a. to establish touch with left of Third Canadian Bde. aaa This should help to relieve pressure as French also commence

attack towards PILCKEM at 5 a.m. Repeated to 1st
Can. Div. & 3rd Can. Inf. Bgde.
From Col. Geddes. 4.45 a.m.

H. M. M. CRICHTON, Capt.
*Received 1st Cdn. Div. via 2nd C.I.B. by hand 6.20 a.m.
with added words " Repeated to 3rd C.LB"*

To Canadian Div.
G.K.11. 23rd April, 1915.

Middlesex reported in touch about C20.c. with two
Battalions First Canadian Bde. aaa Fifth Royal Lanes
passed crossroads C.21.c. and are pushing on aaa
Bufs left about four a.m. to establish touch with
Third Canadian Bde. via WIELTJE and road
C22.c.a. aaa They have been told to extend to their
right and assist Third Canadian Bde. aaa Middlesex
have been told to co-operate with PILCKEM attack
aaa York and Lanes in C27.e. facing north along
road. Repeated 2nd Inf. Bde., 3rd Inf. Bde.

From Col. Geddes. 4.55 a.m.

H. M. M. CRICHTON, Capt.
*By hand received lot Cdn. Div. 6.20 a.m.; by hand to
2nd C.I.B., received about 6 a.m. and by wire to 3rd
C.LB.*

(See 425)

434

To 3rd Bn.
No. 761. 23rd April, 1915.

2 cos. move forward at once to line wood C.11.c.-St.
Julien, urgent.

From 3rd Canadian Bde. 4.40 a.m.

G.B.H.

Confirming telephoned order 4 a.m.

435

To Col. Geddes, 85th Bde.
764. 23rd April, 1915.

Unless you hasten your support on our left matters
will become serious. From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
4.40 a.m.

G. B. Hughes, Lt. Col.

436

Priority to Canadian Divn.
G.D. 21. 23rd April, 1915.

The three and a half Bns. (*4th R.B., 2nd D.C.L.I., 9th
R.S. and half K.S.L.I.*), twentyseventh Div. at Potijze
are to be in Reserve under corps commander and are
only to be used after reference to him added all
Divns.

From Fifth Corps. 526 a.m.

*By wire received 1st Cdn. Div. 5.55 a.m.
(See 420)*

437

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 796. 23rd April, 1915.

Enemy holding very strong position on ridge from
FME. C.15.c. to C.7.d. aaa Fourth battalion reports
two companies MIDDLESEX in front they will let
our attack through ass One battery 1st *C.F.A.* Bde. in
action cooperating W. of Canal B.24.d. aaa In touch
French, their right approximately C.13.b. (opposite
bridge) they will keep touch with our left aaa French
attack had not started 5.15 aaa.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 5.50 a.m.

R. HAYTER, Major.

*By hand received 6.15 a.m.
(See 424)*

438

To Colonel GEDDES, *Bufs.*
G.A. 24. 23rd April, 1915.

Colonel Macdonell has gone to you with following
message - viz - Gen. Alderson wants you to move up
on the left of the third Canadian Brigade and also
assist the counter attack of the 1st Canadian Bde.
which is being made to the east of the YPRES-
PILCKEM road, with left on that road aaa It is of
very great importance that the enemy should not
penetrate between the left of the 3rd Canadian Bde.
and the French or the Canal and if you cannot
advance you must dig yourself in on the left of the
3rd Canadian Bde.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.10 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.
(See 433)

439

To 2nd E. Yorks.
GA. 25. 23rd April, 1915.

Ascertain whether bridge at lower part of C.19.c. is
still held by part of the Middlx. aaa If j Bn. Middlx.
are no longer guarding bridge send a platoon there
for that purpose.

From 1st Canadian Div. 620 a.m.

G. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.
Received.

(See 405 and 457)

440

To 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.A. 28. 23rd April, 1915.

Reference your B.M. 796 (*See 487*), French say they started attack at 5 o'clock but they are in advance of you and farther to the west.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.25 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.
(*See 437*)

441

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 798. 23rd April, 1915,

4th Bu. leading line attack has reached line C.20.a.7.7. to C201.7.7. pushing forward well heavily engaged aaa Enemy's position appears to be entrenched and wired aaa 1st Battalion supporting aaa.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.30 a.m.

R. HAYTER, Major.

By hand received.
(*See 436*)

442

To Canadian Divn.

G.B. 169. 23rd April, 1915.

Following from Officer Comdg. the attack on East of Canal begins:

No further information about the enemy who appear to (*be*) 1800 metres S. of PILCKEM facing S. his right on railway aaa I don't know how far his left extends aaa I have commenced my attack by successive battalions with maximum of machine guns trying to throw the enemy back toward the N.W. aaa I shall keep till further orders one Batn. in reserve, which will march echeloned back on the right of my line to keep close touch with the two Canadian battalions who have just arrived and are marching on Pilckem with their left on PILCKEM-YPRES road aaa I have at this moment 8.45 a.m. 3J battalions of ZOUAVES on east of Canal and two Batns. on west, about to cross aaa I beg that English artillery may come quickly into action aaa The German shell fire is diminishing aaa Addressed Second Army and Fifth Corps and Canadian Division.

From Col. Hare, Elverdinghe. 7.35 a.m.

By hand received 8 a.m.
(*See 424 and 437*)

443

To 3rd Bn.

771. 23rd April, 1915.

Move to G.H.Q. line immediately left of Bde. H.Q. with two companies and occupy position vacated by two companies of 14th who are going forward.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.55 am.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

By hand received.
(*See 434*)

444

To Canadian Division.

D.B. 168. 23rd April, 1915.

The following from 87th Territorial Div. begins. On east bank of Canal there are no formed units left ass 73rd and 74th Regts. who were in first line had crossed the bridges with difficulty aaa On left bank from north to south they are in echelon sea The 80th are occupying LIZERNE and the works north of bridge head aaa The Germans hold the bridge at STEENSTRAAT and works south of LIZERNE aaa The 3rd Bde. of Light Infantry has not succeeded in its counter-attack against STEENSTRAAT and is holding on to ground South of LIZERNE aaa The 76th has not been able to completely retake HET SAS they are connected on right with 73rd to north of BOESINGHE ass The 79th are lining the Canal at BOESINGHE and are holding the bridge at BOESINGHE an There are no more reserves aaa We are putting into 2nd Line to E. of BOESINGHE the detachment more or less formed who are retiring from BOESINGHE and neighbourhood aaa The troops are suffering from effects of asphyxiating gas and incapable of much resistance ass Added. 2nd Army 5th Corps and Canadian Div.

From Col. Hare, (*Elverdinghe*).

By wire received let Canadian Div. 7.45 a.m.
(*See 424 and 442*)

445

To Canadian Division

GB. 170. 23rd April, 1915.

Report from French Commander attacking on East of Canal at 7.10 a.m. begins All goes well ass The Seventh Zouaves are holding well and making trenches aaa The 2nd Zouaves have crossed the Canal two Companies of them being already deployed at

wide intervals and are in touch with Canadians who have commenced to move forward aaa An English battery is in position on west bank of Canal one hundred metres south of bridge C.25.a. aaa I have asked them to support our advance aaa The morale of the troops somewhat upset this morning by asphyxiating gases is excellent aaa Addressed Second Army, Fifth Corps and Canadian Div.
From Colonel Hare, ELVERDINGHE, 8.15 a.m.

R. H. H.

*By hand received, 1st Cdn. Div.
(See 434, 442 and 444)*

446

To Canadian Div.
G.K. 18. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation 7.15 a.m. Buffs report they are in touch with Third Canadian Bde. from Farm C.15.d. to Farm C.16.b. aaa Third Canadian Bde. report satisfied with Buffs' position aaa Fourteenth Canadians are on left of Buffs aaa Middlesex in touch with First Canadian Bde. on left about C.15-c. and are cooperating in attack on PILCKEM aaa Fifth K.O.R. Lanes between Buffs and MIDDLESEX aaa First York and LANCS are in reserve about 500 yds. N.W. of WIELTJE. Repeated to 3rd Bde and Division.

From Colonel Geddes. 7.22 a.m.

H. M. M. CRICHTON, Capt. a/B.M.

By hand to 1st Cdn. Div. received 8.20 a.m.

By wire via 2nd C.I.B. received 3rd C.I.B.

8.15 a.m.

*(2/E Kent was actually in line C.16.c.4.0 to
C.16.d.4.0.)*

(See 435)

447

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 800. 23rd April, 1915.

4th Bn. held up on line reported in B.M. 798 (See 441) on lower slope of ridge held by the enemy about 400= E. of PILCKEMYPRES road aaa Enemy's rifle fire heavy aaa 4th Bu. report not yet in touch with French aaa Middlesex on right of 4th Battalion.

1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.20.

R. HAYTER, Major.

By hand received 7.40 a.m.

(See 441 and 446)

448

To 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.
G. 347. 23rd April, 1915.

French attack does not seem successful aaa It is therefore proposed not to advance further and you will dig yourself in and maintain your position between Col. Geddes Detachment and the Canal aaa It is believed that there are still two French Bns. on the East of Canal and if so you should get into communication with them.

From Canadian Division, 7.40 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

*By wire received before 8.80 a.m. Also sent
to Col Geddes and 3rd C.I.B.
(See 444 and 445)*

449

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
FL. 74. 23rd April, 1915.

Attack west of ST. JULIEN making some progress advanced line appears to be just south of wood, and right flank resting on river and C. 11.b.8.3. aaa ST. JULIEN command still in trenches north of village please instruct if a portion should advance just west of road ST. JULIEN-KEERSELAERE.

From O.C. 13th Battn. 7.40 a.m.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

By hand received.

(See 484)

450

To Fifth Corps.
G. 349. 23rd April, 1915.

As French counter attack has not been successful I am ordering my counter attack to stand fast and the troops to dig themselves in on a line between the wood in C. 10 and the canal aaa Am keeping East Yorks on the West bank as I am by no means confident of the French on my left aaa My cyclist patrols are on the line ELVERDINGHE BOESINGHE.

From Canadian Division. 7.55 a.m.

C. F. ROMER.

By wire.

(See 439)

451

To Twenty Eighth Division.
I. G.B. 48. 23rd April, 1915.

The East YORKSHIRES are on BRIELEN-YPRES road in reserve.

From 1st Canadian Division. 8.00 a.m.

C. H. MITCHELL, Major G.S.

452

To O.C. 3rd Bde. Canadians.

The enemy are too strong to dislodge, well entrenched. I will work to entrench ST. JULIEN to FARM and await orders. Need ammunition and stretcher bearers. If any troops available we need more here say a ½ battalion working out from ST. JULIEN.

From A. E. KIRKPATRICK, Major, 3rd Bn. 8.00 a.m.

By hand received (See 449)

453

To O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde.

C. 546. 23rd April, 1915.

Reports received from Officer Commanding platoon in old building marked X in my sketch reports that reinforcements numbering from 500 to 1,000 are being brought up, in front of our No. 2 Coy and 3rd Battn. are entrenched. I have placed a machine gun in Building marked X.

From H.Q. 2nd Bu. 8.05 a.m.

D. WATSON, Lt. Col.
O.C. 2nd Bn.

*By hand received.
Sketch not reproduced.*

454

To 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A. 28. 23rd April, 1915.

With reference to my G. 349 (*sic* 847) if the French are still pushing on you must cooperate.

From 1st Cdn. Div. 8.10 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.
*By wire received before 9.86 a.m.
(See 448)*

455

To 15th Canadian Bn.

765. 23rd April, 1915.

Advance your local reserve of three platoons which you should have in D.I.c. to hold enemy who are dug in about U.30.d aaa One of your sergeants with you explained location to Capt. Clark Kennedy I understand aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 8.10 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.
Received

456

Priority to First Canadian Div.

G. 817. 23rd April, 1915.

Thirteenth Inf. Bde. now E. of VLAMERTINGHE has been placed under the orders of commander Fifth Corps and directed by Army Commander to proceed to about cross roads in B. twenty-two one thousand yards N. of Chateau TROIS TOURS aaa The brigadier will report his arrival there to fifth. Corps and will keep one officer at H.Q. first Canadian Div. at TROIS TOURS through whom orders will be sent when necessary aaa Acknowledge aaa Addressed all Divs and repeated fifth Div. aaa.

From Fifth Corps. 8.30 am.

By wire received let Cdn. Div. 9.01 a.m.

457

To 1st Canadian Division.

E.Y. 1. 23rd April, 1915. Reply to GA. 25. Bridge at C: 19. c. lower part is not held by it Middlesex they are holding bridge C.19.c. N. West Corner-a party of Canadian Engineers hold former bridge, but may move any moment so I have sent a platoon to this bridge, to hold it should they advance.

From O.C.E.Y. 8.45 am.

W. F. SWENY, Lt. Col.
*By hand received 910 a.m.
(See 439)*

458

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

J. A. 184, 23rd April, 1915.

Major Marshall reports what I have already reported to you that a small party of Germans with machine gun are on left of our flank in rear of fifth (i.e. 18th Bn.) line having pierced the French line last night aaa Suggested before daylight that two companies with M.G. and if possible with field gun be used with bomb throwers to capture this position aaa Have steps been taken to destroy this party aaa I have no men in reserve to do the work having only about 40 men in reserve trenches, having utilized the rest to connect the line in rear with 14th with left bent back aaa Could not some other reserve be employed to do this aaa Casualties in reserve company 3 killed 14 wounded ass Front line and supports no heavy casualties reported.

From 15th Battalion, 8.50 a.m.

By wire received

459

To Canadian Divn., Second Army & V Corps.
G.B. 171. 23rd April, 1916.

Am informed by the Chief of Staff of French 45th Division that a counter attack from LIZERNE against STEENSTRAAT by two French battns. being brought from the North of our line near the Coast may be expected to take place between noon and - one o'clock.

From Lt. Col Hare, ELVERDINGHE, 9 a.m.

R.H.H.

By hand received 1st Can. Div.

460

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. BOB. 23rd April, 1915. In reply to G. 347. Have sent to French attack headquarters to ascertain exact position of their attack and have given him our situation and asked him to fill in the gap between their right and our left aaa let Batt. and 4th Batt. were sent instructions to extend their left to Canal but they may not be able to do so as they are very heavily engaged.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.05 a.m.

R. HAYTER, Major.

By hand received 915 a.m.

(See 448)

461

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

FL. 82. 23rd April, 1915.

Replying to 770 have ordered Capt. Brotherhood to send forward a patrol to investigate C.11.b. if attack is made here it must be in force evidently attack notified in 763 has not materialised this should be delivered along N. Side of Poelcappelle road without delay artillery should support our firing line and area North side of Poelcappelle Road aaa Has Capt. Clark-Kennedy reported to you *in person ass.

From O.C. 13th Battn. 9.05 a.m.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

By hand received.

462

To 1st Canadian Division.

Z. 310. 23rd April, 1915.

We will not be able to hold trenches from V.25.a. up to D.1.b. unless counter attacks regain lost French line aaa 200 enemy have dug in rear of our left section with machine gun aaa Enfiladed by enemy fire from

captured French trenches aaa Have had heavy casualties there this morning aaa We are waiting patiently for stretchers urgently needed. Please give French and English situation on our left. Important to know as we may counter.

From G.O.C. 3rd Infantry Bde. 9.15 a.m.

By hand received 11.00 a.m.

463

To 5th Corps.

G. 48. 23rd April, 1915.

3rd Bde.. report Germans massing north of wood in C. 10 & 11 aaa I have now only one Bn. in reserve East of Canal aaa Can I have a Bn. or two Bus. from the Corps reserve at POTIJZE.

From Canadian Div. 9.20 a.m.

C. F. ROMER.

By wire received before 9.30 a.m.

464

Priority to Canadian Div.

G. 820. 23rd April, 1915.

Cav. Corps and Second Cav. Div. have been ordered to rendezvous S, of Poperinghe aaa Addressed all Diva and thirteen Inf. Bde.

From Fifth Corps. 9.25 am.

By wire received 18t Cdn. Div. 9.46 a.m.

465

Priority to 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 805. 23rd April, 1915.

Have got touch with French Commanding Officer who reports he is now in touch with our left aaa He has 5} battalions but no artillery and needs artillery support French line extends from Canal bank at C.13.a.5.3. to road FILCKEM-YPRES at C. 20.a8.8.

From 1st Can. Inf. Bde. 9.30 a.m.

R. HAYTER, Major.

By hand received 10.00 a.m.

466

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.822. 23rd April, 1915.

Germans reported massing north of Wood in C.10.11 to number of 2500 aaa If any of the 27th Div. Battalions in Corps Reserve are required they are to be sent up on application of Canadian Div. aaa Addressed all Dive. and 13th Inf. Bde.

From Fifth Corps, 9.30 a.m.

By wire received 1st Cdn. Div. 10 a.m.

(See 463)

467

To Col. Geddes, Comg. Det. 28th Div.
G.A. 30. 23rd April, 1915.

2nd E. Yorks placed at your disposal and have been ordered to march via bridge in C. 19.c. and report to you.

From 1st Canadian Div. 10.15 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL.

468

To O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde.

M. 1. 23rd April. In reply to 765.

3 platoons under Major Marshall at Adv. H.Q. D.1.c. have taken up position and dug in with barb wire in front opposite the houses and hedges where Enemy are in position with Machine Guns. We have 1 machine gun.

From Major Marshall, 15th Batt. 1020 am.

By hand received.

(See 455)

469

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 845. 23rd April, 1915.

3rd Inf. Bde. reports their original trench line still intact aaa From point where it touched POELCAPPELLE road they say it drops sharp south along dividing line between U.30 and V. 25 forming sharp salient aaa Turns south west in C.6.b. and passes just north of KEERSELAERE then generally south west to woods C.10 and 11 ass I have sent a message to O.C. 7th Batt. who is at C.6.d.4.0 with three companies to get me accurate information as to 3rd Bde. dispositions at this point aaa Also Col. Lipsett 8th Battn. is engaged on the same mission aaa 3rd Bde. report party of Germans in rear of their front trench in V25.c.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 10.20 a.m.

H. K. BETTY, Lt.-Col.

By hand received 1115 a.m.

470

To Canadian Division.

GB. 174. 23rd April, 1915.

A report has been received by 45th Division that the Belgian artillery is making good practice on the bridge head defences T.17.c. aaa Two Belgian Bns. are occupying a trench line to North of LIZERNE square

T.16.c. and T.22.a. aaa Three French batteries of 75 cm. and two active Bus. reported in my GB. 171 are believed to be near WOESTEN now and will make an attack on the bridgehead at STEENSTRAAT in which two Belgian Bus. which are on the way to WOESTEN will participate aaa The battalions in the trench line will cooperate aaa Addressed second Army Fifth Corps and Canadian Divn,
From Colonel Hare, 10.45 am.

R. H. H.

By hand received 1st Cdn. Div. 11.05 a.m.

(See 501)

471

To 5th Corps, 27th Div. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.A. 29. 23rd April, 1915.

Corps Commander authorises despatch of two Bns. reserve of 27th Div. to Canadian Div. aaa Send them to farm in C.22.c. to report to Gen. Turner whose Rd. Qrs. are at farm in C22.b. aaa Addsd 27th Div. reptd 5th Corps and 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

From 1st Canadian Div. 10.50 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. -Col.

By wire received 3rd C.I.B.

(See 436 and 466)

472

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

F.L. 83. 23rd April, 1915.

Now certain that Germans have M.G. and trench in C.11.b. They should be driven out and Battn. attacking on our left should maintain touch with Coy. of 14th Battn. who are now in trenches north of ST. JULIEN aaa Enemy in great force convinced that something must be done quick aaa I should know what to expect if we are not to receive support I must withdraw my left flank in trenches to ST. JULIEN aaa We have lost touch with the left of our line and it will be impossible to regain with force I have available consider it absolutely necessary to hold present force I have in ST. JULIEN in order to protect possible retirement of left of line aaa Retirement is inevitable unless strong counter attack takes place without possible delay.

From O.C. 13th Canadian Battn. 10.50 am.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

By hand received.

473

To O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
23rd April, 1915.

We are entrenching but slowly, no tools. We cannot attack probably 30-40 killed or wounded. No stretcher bearers-heavy artillery fire from about D.7 centre. We need ammunition. 1 Coy. of 2nd Canadian Bn. here and about 200 3rd Bn. at outside. We cannot get our right in touch with ST. JULIEN-enemy fire too heavy and ground open. No casualties in last hour. Capt. Morton, Lieut. Cronyn and Ryerson wounded-Kirkpatrick I fear killed, two wounded Germans taken by 2nd Battn. last night. Sketch attached. (*Not reproduced*)

From Major A. E. Kirkpatrick, 3rd Bn. Farm
½ mile N.W. of ST. JULIEN C. 11. c. N. E. corner
11.00 a.m.

By hand received.

474

To 3rd Canadian Bde.

G.A. 31. 23rd April, 1915.

The situation on your left is now as follows Col. Geddes detachment and the 2 Bns. from the 1st Bde. are attacking on your left towards C.15.c. aaa On their left about 5/1 French Bns. are also attacking towards C.13. a. aaa Col. Geddes has still one Bn. in reserve and another Bn. is being sent to him aaa Two Bns. of the 27th Div. are being ordered to farm in C22.c. and will come under your orders aaa As regards your Z.310 the Divl. Comr. quite appreciates difficulty of your position aaa He suggests your throwing back your line from D.1.b. towards C.6.c. aaa If possible some sort of line might be dug by the supports and your troops fall back on to it aaa Report what steps you propose to take.

From 1st Canadian Div. 11.03 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

By hand received

(See 462, 471 and 476)

475

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A. 32. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation as follows French counter attacking with five Bns. between Canal and PILCKEM road and are assisting by two Bns. 1st Inf. Bde. and four Bns. 28th Div. aaa Remaining 2 Bns. of 1st Inf. Bde. with 3rd Bde. aaa Cav. Corps and Cav. Div. arriving

near POPERINGHE aaa Glen. Turner reports he must throw back his left wing owing to enfilade and reverse fire and Div. Commander has suggested bending it back from D.1.b. towards C.6.c. aaa Assist him where possible.

From 1st Canadian Division. 11.20 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

By wire received 11.50 a.m. Purport communicated by 2nd C.I.B. to 7th Bn. 12.10 p.m.; repeated to 8th Bn. 12.25 p.m.

(See 474)

476

To Canadian Division.

23rd April, 1915.

The York and Durham Brigade Northumbrian Division which has been placed under 5th Corps will be debussed at VLAMERTINGHE today aaa It will then act as a corps reserve and be placed temporarily under the orders of Major General Bulfin aaa The G.O.C. Canadian Division will endeavour to push back the enemy northwards on the east side of the canal working in cooperation with the French aaa To support the operation 13th Bde. now at square B22.c. will be placed under orders of G.O.C. Canadian Division aaa The 28th Division will continue to support the Canadian Division with its artillery aaa addressed Canadian Division repeated 28th and 27th Divisions and 13th Brigade.

From 5th Corps.

Telephoned direct to 1st Cdn. Div. about 1045 a.m. 27th Div. says timed 1116 a.m. received 12 noon.

477

Priority to 1st Canadian Div.

G.A. 404. 23rd April, 1915.

York and Durham Inf. Bde. is moving at once by bus via Poperinghe on Vlamertinghe and on arrival will come under command of G.O.C. 28th Division but be held as corps reserve aaa First line transport and supply section train are following by same route aaa Time of departure will be notified as soon as known Addressed all divisions and 13th Inf. Brigade aaa

From 5th Corps, 11.01 a.m.

By wire received Cdn. Division 11.40 a.m.,

(See 476)

478

To 1st Canadian Divn.
B.M. 811. 23rd April, 1915.

4th Battalion reports all his Companies in firing line within 500 yards of Enemy's trenches and that he cannot extend to his left he reports 10.30 a.m. not got touch with French yet but is trying to do so aaa 4th Bn. ordered to keep touch with troops on right and left and 1st Battalion ordered prepare supporting position at Cross Roads C. 20.c. in addition to supporting 4th Battn.

From 1st Inf. Bde. 11.25 a.m.

By wire received 11.36 a.m.

479

To 13th Bn.
No. 782. 23rd April, 1915.

You will hold present position in original front line trenches in V. 25 till after dark today aaa You will then take up a new line and entrench V.1.b.4.7. (sic See Note below) to C.6.b. aaa Seventh battalion and company of fifth will conform aaa Fifteenth Bn. will take steps to protect aaa Addressed 13th repeated 15th Bn. 2nd Inf. Bde.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 11.45 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES.

By hand received 13th Bn., carried to F.L.T. by Capt. W. H. Clark-Kennedy; also received by 2nd C.I.B. and repeated to 7th and 8th Bns. 2.10 p.m., adding "You will comply."

NOTE:—Map location thus on 3rd C.I.B. file copy but corrected to read D.1.b.4.7. on message actually delivered.

(See 461 and 476)

480

Priority to Canadian Divn.
G.O. 29. 23rd April, 1915.

Please inform Corps commander that an infantry brigade from WINNEZELLE with field company first line transport supply section of train has been ordered to move at once by march via WATOU to occupy G.H.Q. third line at BRANDHOEK astride POPERINGHE-YPRES road aaa Instructions are to be issued to this brigade by G.H.Q. aaa Inform him also that general DE LISLE has just been here and *says* that first cavalry div. will be about one mile s.w. of POPERINGHE by twelve thirty second and third diva. follow shortly afterwards aaa Have informed general DE LISLE that it is desired to learn situation on our left flank acknowledge.

From Fifth Corps, 11.50 a.m.

By wire received 1220 p.m. and delivered to General Plumer who was visiting let Cdn. Div. H.Q. General de Lisle (1st Cavalry Division) interviewed Corps Commander at that time.

481

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 814. 23rd April, 1915.

French Commander reports 12.15 p.m. that 2nd Zouaves are in touch with left of Canadians and that he has been ordered to stop and make trenches connected with Canadian trenches aaa 4th Bn. has been ordered to intrench in accordance with above aaa Owing to very exposed approaches big tools cannot be sent up by daylight but will be forwarded as soon as possible.

From 1st Canadian Brigade 12.35 pan.

By wire received 12.60 p.m.

482

To 1st Canadian Div.
783. 23rd April, 1915. In reply to GA. 31.

Have arranged to throw back left of original front line trenches to line D.1 b. to C 8.b. similar to suggestion of G.O.C. aaa This cannot be done in daylight and will be carried out at dusk aaa Two battalions of 27th div. are being led here now by our staff officer aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 12.30 p.m.

G. B. Hughes, Lt. Col.

*By hand received 12.45 p.m.
(See 474 and 479)*

483

To 13th Bn.
Z. 312. 23rd April, 1915.

In addition to 2 Companies of the 14th Battn. which will reach you at dark you will get two English Companies during afternoon aaa It is not intended to counter owing to Orders Higher Authority aaa Left flank of trench is to be thrown back everything else must be held.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.10 pan.

Received.

484

Priority to 1st and 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G. 357. 23rd April, 1915.

French report that Germans are apparently running short of ammunition. aaa They have been ordered to advance aaa Divisional Commander wishes you to seize this opportunity to push forward.

From 1st Canadian Division. 1.20 p.m.

Received 1st C.I.B. 1.35 p.m. Received 3rd C.I.B. 1.55 p.m. and annotated: "An example of the value of information received from the rear. R.E.W.T.24.4.15."

485

Order for French Counter attack 3 p.m. 23rd April, 1915.

Le General Commt. le G.E. a Col. CT. 90 eme Br.

I. Les Allemands semblent pour le moment avoir epuise leurs munitions.

II. L'heure de la contre attaque generale eat venue.

III. En consequence le Col. Cdt. la 90eme Bde. avec toutes les troupes dont il dispose attaquera sur le front BOESINGHEPILCKEM a l'E du canal-la droite a la route YPRES-PILCKEM en liaison intime avec l'armee britannique.

IV. A notre droite les Anglais prevenus de notre , attaque, se portent sur LANGEMARCK.

V. Artie. Le Colonel Fracque, disposant de toute l'artie. de la rive 0 du canal et de l'artie, britannique placee au N.O. d'Ypres, fera une preparation serieuse de 3 minutes et formera barrage en avant de l'infanterie pour faciliter sa progression. L'attaque declanchera a, 15 h.

L'artie allongera son tir a feuton de ce moment la.

QUIQUANDON.

23.4.15. 13 h. 20m.

By hand received 1st Cdn. Div. 2.20 p.m.

Orders by G.O.C., 45th Div.

G.B. 175. 23rd April, 1915.

I. The Germans appear for the moment to have exhausted their ammunition.

II. The time for the general counter attack has arrived.

III. Consequently the Colonel Comdg. 90th Bde. with all the troops at his disposal will attack on the front BOESINGHE-PILCKEM on the East of the Canal their right resting on the YPRES-PILCKEM road in close touch with the British.

IV. On our right the English warned of our attack will advance on LANGEMARCK.

V. Artillery-Col. FRACQUE with all the Artillery on the Western bank of the Canal at his disposal and of the British artillery placed to the N.W. of YPRES will prepare a serious Artillery fire for 5 (sic) minutes and will form a wall of fire in front of the infantry to facilitate its advance.

VI. Hour of attack. The attack will commence at 3 p.m. The artillery will increase its range from that moment.

QUIQUANDON.

Issued at 1.40 p.m. (*Sic 1.20 p.m.*)

Copies to 5th Corps. } by D.R.

" " 1/Canadian Divn. S }

R.H.H.

By hand received 1st Cdn. Div. 2.25 p.m.

(*See 4.94*)

486

To 13th Inf. Bde., Col. Geddes' Det., 1st and 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bdes.

GA. 33. 23rd April, 1915.

The 13th Inf. Bde. has been placed under the orders of the G.O.C. Canadian Division. It will move to the east of the canal via the Bridge in C.19.c. and will form up and attack in the direction of PILCKEM with its right on the PILCKEM-YPRES road the two reserve Bns, of Col. Geddes detachment and the two Bns, of the 27th Div. (i.e: *2/D.C.LJ. & 9/RS.*) will form up and attack on the East of the PILCKEM-YPRES road with the left on the road aaa The attack will . commence at 3.30 p.m. aaa The 2 Bns, of 27th Divd and the 2 Bns, of Col. Geddes will act in strict conformity with the movements of the 13th Bde. aaa The troops of the 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. and Col. Geddes Detachment holding the trenches made today will follow up the above attack so far as is consistent with maintaining proper garrison for the trenches aaa After the capture of the PILCKEM line the attack will be continued and the old French line reoccupied. From 1st Canadian Div. 1.30 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

By wire received let C.I.B. 2.16 p.m. 3rd C.LB. 2.60 p.m. Repeated by 3rd C.I.B. to O.C. attached bns. 27th Div. in message 798 timed 8.07 p.m. adding " Your two companies (9/R.S.) have been sent for to rejoin at once." Relayed to Col. Geddes by 2nd C.I.B. 3 p.m.

(*See 474 and 476*)

487

To O.C. 3rd Canadian Battalion.
786. 23rd April, 1915.

The party of French troops occupying our G.H.Q. line with you are to withdraw on account of having no ammunition or rations aaa Please arrange to occupy trenches they vacate by thinning your line.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.55 p.m.

G. B. Hughes, Lt.-Col.

Received.

488

To 5th Corps, 27th Div. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
GA. 34. 23rd April, 1915.

Would you move the third Bn. of the Corps Reserve (i.e. 4th R.B.) at POTIJEZ to the farm in C.22.c. where it will report to G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. whose Hd. Qrs. are at the farm in C.22 b. Addsd. 27th Div. repeated 5th. Corps and 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

From 1st Canadian Div. 2 p.m.

G. W. Gordon-Hall, Lt.-Col.

By wire received 3rd C.I.B. 8.00 p.m.

Acted upon by 27th Div. 4.10 p.m.

(See 436 and 499)

489

Priority to 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 8221. 23rd April, 1915.

Ref. your G. 357 French state their attack will commence at 3 p.m. shall he be asked to cancel it in view of attack by 13th and Geddes and 27th Division Detachment.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.30 p.m.

R. HAYTER.

By wire received 2.86 p.m.

(See 484)

490

To Canadian Divn.
G. 826 23rd April, 1915.

The army comdr. informs me that if the Brigade of the Northumbrian Div. is wanted I am not to hesitate to use it and he will send me another as corps reserve aaa So please call for it at once if you want it aaa It will be at VLAMERTINGHE by now aaa Army Comdr. desires me to express to the Canadians his appreciation of all they

have done aaa Addsd. Canadian Div. reptd. twenty-eighth Div. for information of York and Durham Bde.

From Fifth Corps. 2.30 p.m.

By wire received 1st Cdn. Div. 3.33 p.m.

(See 477)

491

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A. 352. 23rd April, 1915.

The Corps Commander and the Divl. Commander desire to congratulate you and your Brigade on the magnificent way you have stuck to your trenches.

From 1st Canadian Div. 2.40 p.m.

By wire received 3.04 p.m.

492

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

FL. 93. 23rd April, 1915.

Just received message sent 6.30 this morning from Maj. MacCuaig. You will note that the left is in a very difficult position, and no doubt the Germans have extended their line since this message was sent, it is also reported that the firing line is very badly cut up. I will endeavour to get your instruction to Maj. MacCuaig about the retirement but it may not be possible. Picks and shovels will be wanted and Engineers assistance. Maj. MacCuaig report enclosed (*not available*).

From O.C. 13th Cdn. Battn. 2.40 p.m.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

By hand received

493

Priority to 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

GA. 36. 23rd April, 1915. In reply to B.M. 8221.

No, let French commence their attack and if possible you might cooperate as far as possible and then let 13th Bde. go through you.

From 1st Canadian Div. 2.45 p.m.

By wire received.

(See 489)

494

To 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

23rd April, 1915.

Our Artillery will open fire at 2.55 p.m. till 3 p.m. to prepare our attack of Infantry

which will begin at 3 p.m. Would you kindly give the same orders. We will move at 3 p.m.
From P.O. L'Officier Et' Major.

MAITUNY.

(Received)
(See 485)

495

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 860. 23rd April, 1915.

Following message received from O.C. 8th Bn. Section 2 message begins. Have just returned from reconnaissance with Kirkaldy aaa We went along ridge to support 48 HIGHRS. in south west corner D.1.c. aaa 48th and 5th Royals (*16th and 13th Bns.*) were holding line 700 yards in front original trench then bends back to I judge about cross roads in C.6.b. aaa Houses just North and North West of this point must be occupied \$ y Germans as we got snipers enfilade fire from that direction aaa Reserve 48 Highrs. headquarters is in ST. JULIEN aaa 7th Battn. about C.12.b. German shells were falling in road C.12.b. apparently coming from north aaa German line appears to be from C.6.a. to Wood C.10.d. aaa All quiet in my front aaa Visited Artillery observing stations aaa Howitzer observing station in N.E. Corner D.7.d. is empty am Arranged disposition of 7th Company in locality C. in case northern flank 3rd Bde. was pushed in.

Message (*K. 88 from 8th Bn. timed 2.25 p.m.*) ends.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 3.14 p.m.

H. K. BETTY. Lt.-Col. B.M.

By hand received 5.10 p.m.

496

To 5/K.O.R. Lancaster.
G.K. 37. 23rd April, 1915.

Following has been sent to EAST YORKS and YORKS and LANCAS. Begins-The 13th Bde. crosses by the pontoon bridge at 3 p.m. and advances to the attack at 3.45 p.m. with the right on the PILCKEMYPRES road aaa First objective PILCKEM aaa O.C. EAST YORKS will send an Officer at once to report to General O'GOWAN at pontoon bridge C.19.c. aaa EAST YORKS and YORK & LANCSr will cooperate in this attack East of the PILCKEM-YPRES road. EAST YORKS with left on that road

and maintaining touch with the 13th Bde. aaa YORK & LANCSr will move on the right of the EAST YORKS aaa 2 battalions of the 27th Div. Will cooperate in the attack on the right of the YORKS & LANCSr. aaa BUFFS and 3rd MIDDLESEX will hold their present line aaa The 5th KINGS OWN ROYAL LANCASTER less one Company, will follow the attack in reserve, moving with its left on the PILCKEM-YPRES road aaa Each battalion will move on a front of 500 yards. Headquarters will remain for the present at WIELTJE, where reports should be sent.

From Col. Geddes 3.35 p.m.

Received 4.10 p.m.

497

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 128. 23rd April, 1915.

Attack cannot possibly start till 4.15 p.m. aaa Troops were delayed by French on road aaa Time originally allowed was not sufficient aaa Colonel Geddes informed aaa.

From 13th Inf. Bde. 3.45 p.m.

A. HUNTER.

By hand received 4.80 p.m.

498

Message to 2nd C.I.B. from Lt. Col. HartMcHarg. O.C. 7th Canadian Inf. Bu. as recorded in Report of G.O.C. end C.I.B.

Received message from O.C. 7th Battn. that he reconnoitred German position from Cross Roads C.6.c. and judged left approximately the centre of C.6.a. running in a circular line to about South West corner of C.5.d. He says it was full of Germans who had machine guns. He reports the 3rd Brigade original trenches undergoing terrific bombardment, also his position very heavily shelled. No part of trench given way. He points out difficulty of 3rd Brigade falling back with German where it is. He expects attack on himself when attack is made on trenches but reports he is in pretty good shape having connected up with some reserve trenches 3rd Brigade and suggest trench along C.6.c. and d, D.1 and 2. Reports shells giving off stupefying fumes being used by enemy.

Received 2nd C.I.B. 8.50 p.m.

(See 469 and 475)

499

To First Canadian Div.

G.R. 444. 23rd April, 1915. In reply to GA. 34.

Fourth rifle brigade has been ordered to C.22.e.

From 27th Div. 4.10 p.m.

*By wire received 4.35 p.m.**(See 488)*

500

To Canadian Division.

23rd April, 1915.

Attack of the Zouaves progressing favourably with the intermittent fire of artillery considering on the French side things are going on *very* well it might be advisable to push hard on the British side.

From French 45th Division 4.50 p.m.

Received

501

Priority to Canadian Divn.

G.B. 176. 23rd April, 1915.

Reference my GB. 174 owing to the nonarrival of the three ?French batteries the attack on the enemy holding the bridge head at Steenstraat has not yet been made sea 2 Belgian batteries have now been told off to support the attack which cannot take place until they have registered aaa The hour of attack is now fixed for 6 p.m. The two French battalions are in position to commence assisted by the Belgian infantry mentioned in my GB. 174 aaa I have no information from the French as to the progress of the attack on the Germans east of the Canal and south of PILCKEM added second Army Canadian Divn. and 28th Divn. repton. 2nd Corps.

From Col. Hare ELVERDINGHE, 4.50 p.m.

*By wire received 6 p.m.**(See 470)*

502

To O.C. 7th Bn.

F.L. 99. 23rd April, 1915.

The enemy has evidently enveloped left flank of my Battn. I have sent a message to Maj. MacCuaig commanding left company of my Battn. to try and get in touch with you at KEERSELAERE or east of KEERSELAERE and, dig themselves in, this should

make our line something like sketch enclosed (*not reproduced*) aaa Your Batta. should be in a position something like shown on sketch and be in touch with ST. JULIEN garrison just North of Village a good defensive position should be selected and dig in well. I understand that a counter attack is to be launched and attempt made to retake trenches.

From O.C. 13th Battn. (*About 5 p.m.*)*By hand received before 0 p.m.**(See 475 and 479)*

503

To B.M. 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

BI/1/409. 23rd April, 1915.

Col. GEDDES detachment (supposed) has arrived and is advancing with its left on the road aaa Canadian firing line has advanced and is close to the German trenches aaa 13th Inf. Bde. is working on the left of the Canadians aaa

From O.C. 1st Canadian Bn. 5.20 p.m.

Received 5.48 p.m.

504

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M. 823. 23rd April, 1915.

Right of attack has reached right up to edge of large farm on Crest C.15 c.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 5.30 p.m.

By wire received 5.40 p.m.

505

To 5th Corps.

G.A. 38, 23rd April, 1916.

13th Inf. Bde. have suffered heavy losses Brigadier is doubtful whether he can take German position aaa Request Northumbrian Bde. be placed at my disposal in case enemy makes strong counter attack down eastern bank of canal.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.00 pan.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

506

To G.O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde.

23rd April, 1915.

I have made arrangements to dig the battalion in tonight, the right linking up with the present reserve trenches of the 3rd Bde. left flank, about C.6.d.6.5. My left will connect with the ST. JULIEN garrison, just

north of the village. The reserve ammunition will be moved after dark to ENFILADE CROSS ROADS to which point I wish ration and water carts to proceed via BOMBARDED CROSS ROADS. The M. G. officer has reported with 2 machine guns which will be placed in position tonight on my right flank.
From O.C. 7th Canadian Bn. 6.05 p.m.

V. W. ODLUM, Major.

By hand received (See 498 and 502)

507

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 134. 23rd April, 1915.

The attack is progressing though slowly aaa The French have come on and our people getting on in Left aaa The Right attack is in very open country and seems more delayed aaa Please send one of Divl. Staff up to see situation aaa.

From 13th Inf. Bde. 6.10 pm.

By wire received 616 p.m.

(See 610)

508

To B.M. 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

B1/1/410. 23rd April, 1915.

Canadians and 13th Bde. are still close to the German trenches apparently under cover aaa Col. Geddes Detachment is closing up to the front line. They are advancing in two lines aaa The French on the left are advancing slowly aaa Our casualties appear to be very heavy aaa I have about 100 men in reserve if attack succeeds I will occupy the line of trenches dug by the Canadians this morning about 600 yards from the Crest aaa Support will be required to resist counter attack if made aaa

From O.C. 1st Canadian Bn. 6.15 p.m.

R. J. BROOK, Capt. & Adjt.

Received

509

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 825. 23rd April, 1916.

From observation Germans seem to have cleared out of Farm aaa Too smoky for accurate observation aaa French report their line seems to be advancing but information rather vague.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.30 p.m.

By wire received 6.45 p.m.

510

To First Canadian Division.

G.D. 35. 23rd April, 1915.

The following has been received from the Col. Comdg. 90th French Bde. timed 5.10 p.m.

"(1) Line has reached Station of BOESINGHE and approaches west of the farm MORTELGE (position unknown).

(2) Left-station of BOESINGHE.

(3) Right rests on approaches west of the farm of MORTELGE.

(4) In touch with Territorials on left and Canadians on right.

(5) Strength engaged 3 1/2 bns. of ZOUAVES with

(6) 14 bns. in reserve.

(7) Information. The enemy are holding on strongly and making considerable use of artillery and machine guns.

(8) My impression is that at this moment an attack vigorously conducted has chances of success.

At this moment the German artillery is heavily bombarding the Canadians and the Zouaves who however are still advancing" ends. The French ask for more help from the British artillery. The G.O.C. 90th Bde. is throwing in the 1 bn. of Zouaves, and keeping the other bn. in reserve. None of the French staff appeared to be able to place definitely MORTELGE FARM but believe it to be in square C.15.e.3.4. This does not seem to be in accordance with the position given by the first Canadian Division for their left with which the French state they are in touch. The G.O.C. V Corps was constantly asking this morning where the point of junction was situated.

From Capt. Stanhope, Elverdinghe, 6.55 p.m.

STANHOPE, Capt.

By hand received 716 p.m.

(See 507)

511

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A. 40. 23rd April, 1915.

Send bn. (4th R.B.) of 27th Div. at present your reserve to the bridge over Canal in C.19.c. to report to G.O.C. 13th Inf. Bde.

From 1st Canadian Div. 7.10 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

By wire received 7.22 p.m.

(See 488 and 499)

512

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 786. 23rd April, 1916.

Have three battalions which will follow up attack as it develops from the left aaa
From 3rd Canadian Infantry Bde. 7.20 p.m.
G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.
By wire received 7.60 p.m. Copy also received by 2nd C.I.B.

513

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
788. 23rd April, 1915. In reply to B.M. 865, (*timed 7 p.m. received 7.20 p.m.*)

Have sent word to Royal Highlanders (*18th Bn.*) to dig more or less on line suggested and to keep in touch with your 7th. From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 8.15 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.
By hand received.
(*See 498, 502 and 506*)

514

To Canadian Division.
G.837. 23rd April, 1915.

Following from Second Army mains-Should you require any further troops in order to push the enemy back to his original line you are not to hesitate to ask for them. (*Ends*) Corps Commander is pleased that your efforts have been appreciated and he would like a report on the situation with the above object kept in view.

From Fifth Corps. 9.10 p.m.
By wire received 10.23 p.m.

515

To 1st Canadian Division.
791. 23rd April, 1915.

Line same as when last reported aaa Am withdrawing two companies 14th who have been at Wood C.10.d. to line east of ST. JULIEN aaa No troops now in reserve but am holding a support line for greater part of length south of KEERSELAERE aaa Units are sorting out tonight and digging in aaa Establishing telephone where practicable aaa The counter attack of this afternoon did not develop sufficiently to draw us in aaa 48th Highlanders (*15th Bn.*) on our right section twice repulsed enemy attacks today aaa Both were preceded by heavy bombard

ments and asphyxiating gas bombs aaa 48th did not leave fire trenches and enemy did not reach our parapet in either case aaa.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.10 pm.
G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.
By hand received 11.25 p.m.
(*See 512*)

516

To 1st Canadian Div.
B.M. 869. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation report aaa Section I no change aaa Section II O.C. 5th Bn. reports trench 2.c. was shelled parapet damaged in about 6 places aaa Left of 2.a. was fired on by light trench mortar or light gun at close range aaa No casualties in trenches.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.20 p.m.
C. J. MERSEREAU, Major.
By hand received 11.00 p.m.

517

To 13th R.H.C.
793. 23rd April, 1915.

Two companies 14th R.M.R. under Col. BURLAND have now moved to ST. JULIEN and will report to you aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.25 p.m.
G.B.H.
Received.
(*See 483*)

518

To First Canadian Division.
G.A. 408. 23rd April, 1915.

One nine point two howitzer under command of Lieut. CHAMBERS will come under Canadian Divn. from tomorrow inclusive aaa Instructions as to its siting and zone of fire have already been given by corps H.Q. aaa Canadian Div. will direct its tactical employment ass Corps signals will arrange for signal communication aaa Lieut. CHAMBERS will report personally to C.R.A. Canadian Div. for Orders.

From Fifth Corps 10.00 p.m.
By wire received 10.55 p.m.

519

To 13th Canadian Bn.
794. 23rd April, 1915.

Will try to collect and send you shovels and picks later to-night aaa Hope to get you some sand bags also aaa. You will have to

use your regimental bombers aaa Brigade grenade officer says he has described location of St. Julien magazine to you aaa No news of situation aaa Counter attack today was successful as far as it went aaa Do not know why it did not proceed aaa We are pretty secure now-thanks in a great measure to R.H.C. (18th Bn.)

From 3rd Canadian Infantry Bde. 10.15.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

520

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

S.M.5. 23rd April, 1915.

Have given Lt. Col. Burland charge of left Sub-section Firing Line aaa Have reinforced this Sub-section with one Coy. 14th Bn. aaa The other Coy. to make good the gap in line WEST of ST. JULIEN aaa This with probably one exception, will make the line continuous if 7th Batt. gets into position correctly aaa This leaves us without any supports, or defensive position in which to put supports.

From O.C. 13th Canadian Bn. 11.30 p.m.

T. S. MORRISEY, Capt. a/Adjt.

By hand received.

521

To 1st Battalion,

B.M. 833. 23rd April, 1915.

Collect your battalion at Farm C.20.c. and occupy trenches at cross roads which you have constructed and act as a reserve to front line.

From B.M. 1st Canadian Bde. 11.30 p.m.

Received.

522

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M. 870. 23rd April, 1915.

Situation report aaa Section I Officer commanding 5th Bu. reports situation perfectly quiet sea Perfectly prepared Section II no change.

From 2nd Canadian Infy. Bde. 11.50 p.m.

By hand received 1,65 a.m. 24th.

523

To York and Durham Bde.

G. 54. 23rd April, 1915.

You will move your Bde. as soon as possible after receipt of this order to the Pontoon Bridge over YPRES-YSER Canal in C.19.c.

aaa You will form up your Bde. on the west bank of the Canal on either side of bridge and be prepared to move to the assistance of 13th Bde. whose Hd. Qrs. are on the road on the west bank aaa A staff officer is being sent to guide the Bde. to the bridge aaa Acknowledge ass,

From Canadian Division 11.54 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

Acted upon 1.45 a.m. 24th.

(See 490)

524

To Canadian Division.

G.D.1. 24th April, 1915.

Following received from Brigade about LIZERNE at 12.45 a.m. begins aaa Terrible artillery fire on our lines extending in depth to the windmill of ZUYDSCHOOTE aaa Enemy has attacked African battalion aaa Attack stopped by our artillery fire aaa The Zouaves here maintained their positions towards STEENSTRAAT aaa No change in our position at present aaa Addressed Fifth Corps and Canadian division.

From Capt. Fraser, 45th French Division, 1.35 a.m.

By hand received 2.02 a.m.

525

To 13th Inf. Bde. and York & Durham Bde.

G.A. 42. 24th April, 1915.

Two Bns. York and Durham Bde. to report to G.O.C. 13th Inf. Bde. at canal bridge on arrival there aaa Remaining two battalions on west bank of canal as already ordered in G. 54 acknowledge addressed Y. & D. Bde, repeated 13th Inf. Bde.

From 1st Canadian Division. 225 a.m.,

(See 523)

526

To Brigade Major, 3rd Inf. Bde.

Replying to your K.i. we have to admit that it is impossible for us to respond to your S.O.S. and along the entire original front as the trenches are out of range from our present position.

From 3rd Canadian Artillery Brigade,

By wire, received 4.01 a.m.

527

To Col. GEDDES.
24th April, 1915.

2 Bns. (*10th and 16th*) are being withdrawn from our line in C.10 owing to our right in D.3 being driven in aaa Bde. on right hopes to rally on ridge D.8. aaa We are getting artillery on wood C.10 and vicinity.
From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 4.30 a.m.

G.B.H.

*(Line in D.2. a and b was broken,
not D.3).
(See 528)*

528

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
797. 24th April, 1915.

The tenth Bn. has been ordered to withdraw from our line and return to you aaa They are now C.10.d, aaa Will you please arrange to send instructions to them.
From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 4.40 am.

G. B. HUGHES.

*Received before 5.15 a.m.
(See 527)*

529

To 1st Canadian Division.
798. 24th April, 1915.

Left of Second Bde. section trenches has been driven in aaa Our sixteenth and tenth Bn. about C.10.d. are being withdrawn to cover attack and artillery fire opened on C.10.d., C.11.b. to fill gap aaa Support is necessary C.10.a. aaa Have informed Col. Geddes aaa Heavy firing at St. JULIEN aaa Troops there have been warned.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 4.55 am.

G. B. HUGHES.

*By hand received before 5.30 a.m.
(See 527 and 528)*

530

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.136. 24th April, 1915.

Bde. H.Q.' in farm B.30.b.6.6. ass It was found on handing over trenches last night that Canadians had withdrawn without being relieved also Middlesex aaa Also that 9th Royal Scots had closed 700 yards to right and that D.C.L.I. had been advised to the same aaa 1 Coy. 4th Kings Own (i.e. *6th*) who were found in a trench facing the

wrong way were put into the gap and D.C.L.I. ordered to cover as much ground as possible aaa Thus the line which in its weak state should be strongly held is now strong in left Section but weak in right aaa Will you please instruct Col. Geddes as I have entirely failed to get in touch with him to take steps to remedy this state of things this evening.

From 13th Inf. Bde. 5 a.m.

By wire received 5.40 a.m.

531

To 1st Canadian Division.

G. 845. 24th April, 1915.

French forty fifth Div. reports at five fifteen a.m. that LIZERNE has been taken by the Germans aaa French and Belgians have joined up west of LIZERNE aaa French officer reports to Canadian H.Q. four thirty a.m. that German attack on BOESINGHE repulsed no detail available aaa Addressed Second Army second Corps second Cav. Div, and all Divs. aaa Cav. Corps informed.

From 5th Corps. 522 a.m.

By wire received 1st Can. Div. 6.15 a.m.

532

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 4. 24th April, 1915.

O.C. Section II Col. Lipsett reports Germans have entered trenches in Section III and are working down to his trenches aaa Evacuation of trenches due to asphyxiating gas from artillery shell fire aaa Have sent one company 7th Battalion and the company of 5th Battalion at St. Julien to report to O.C. 8th Bn, aaa Fifth Battn. Section I were not shelled and situation is quiet with them at 4.30 a.m. They have sent their one Support Coy. to assist 8th aaa 3rd Brigade have informed me they are sending 10th Battn. to me which I am ordering to Locality C so as to be in a position to maintain our forward position aaa As the 7th Batter. yesterday occupied and formed a portion of line held by 3rd Bde. at C.6.c. it has been arranged with G.O.C. 3rd Bde. that this battalion comes under his orders less the one Company sent to support 8th. It is since learnt that 10th Battn. only consists of less than 200 men. Message just received from 5th Battn. Section I that O.C. 8th informs them Germans entered Section 3 trenches and also his trenches in strength of one platoon.

Lipsett is counter attacking at once and telephoned at 4.50 am. that he thought he had the situation in hand.
From 2nd Inf. Bde. 5.15 a.m.

H. K. BETTY, Lt.-Col. B.M.

By hand received before 6.15 a.m.
(See 527)

533

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G. 66. 24th April, 1915.

Your B.M. 798. Let me know as soon as possible how situation develops aaa Can you get in touch with Artillery aaa You of course understand necessity of keeping ST. JULIEN.

From Canadian Division, 5.30 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

By hand received.
(See 629)

534

To 13th Inf. Bde.

G. 68. 24th April, 1915.

You have under your orders 13th Bde. and two Bns. of the York & Durham Bde. aaa You are responsible for filling the gap between the French and Colonel Geddes detachment, but it is impossible to give topographical limits as situation is still so undefined.

From Canadian Div. 6.05 a.m.

(See 525)

535

Priority to Genl. Alderson, Canadian Divn.

G.R. 448. 24th April, 1915.

If my guns assist you today as I hope they will please arrange more definite target than yesterday aaa Yesterday we were asked to fire at our extreme range on certain areas aaa After sighting I found out target was about 2500 yards behind enemys position aaa Possibly that was what you wanted but I doubt it aaa SNOW.

From 27th Div. 6.10 a.m.

By wire received 6.45 a.m.

536

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 6. 24th April, 1915.

Germans have broken through Highlanders trenches about 1000 yds, left of Section II 8th Bn. aaa I regard the situation of the

line through the Wood C.10 and 11 to C.1.b.(D.1.b?) as critical aaa Can I get any reinforcements to report at FORTUIN via WIELTJE-FORTUIN to be used as necessary aaa They have shelled sections II and III again with gas emitting shells aaa Direct telephonic communication between Bde. Hqrs. and Bn. Hqrs. in front line broken.

From 2nd Inf. Bde. 6.30 a.m.

A. W. CIRROE, G.O.C.

By hand received.
(See 527 and 532)

537

To Canadian Division.

G. 477. 24th April, 1915.

Air reconnaissance 4.30 to 6.30 a.m. Bridge at STEENSTRAAT has been repaired and appears fit for all description of traffic. The farm in C.7.d. is surrounded *with* trenches and appears to be a closed work west of the farm in 7.c.10 point 8 another fortified point appears to have been prepared in C.14.b2 point 8. The farm in C.8.d.10.2. was crowded with troops about 200 seen. In C.16.b. just west of the south west corner of the wood are two angular trenches with the apex facing east aaa There is a line of trenches running from the centre of C.10.c. through the northern portion of wood to C.5.d. nought point 1. Trenches between C.7. and C.16 are strongly garrisoned. A farm near C.4.d.10 point nought is crowded with troops two or three hundred visible. Second line has been prepared from railway in C.1.d. round south of village of PILCKEM and along south side of road to LANGEMARCK. Forward trench south and west of Farm in C.1.d.9 point 2. Three or four lines of trenches covering south side of LANGEMARCK Trench dug along railway from C.1.b. nought point 8 up to LANGEMARCK station.

From Fifth Corps. 8.05 a.m.

Received let Cdn. Div. and 3rd C.I.B.

538

To 13th Brigade.

G. 76. 24th April, 1915.

So far as is known the situation is that our right Brigade is attacked early this morning lost a trench but counter attacked with success aaa French on your left made an attack but did not persist ass Germans are attacking at LIZERNE.

From Canadian Division. 6.46 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

539

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 800. 24th April, 1915.

2nd Bde. informs me 6.00 a.m. that situation on right of this brigade is in hand and we are holding trenches aaa Have manned G\$. Q. line with one Bn. withdrawn from trenches two companies Buffs and details total about 700 aaa Artillery 3rd Bde, and batteries of 27th Div. is shelling our front about wood C.10.d. where troops were withdrawn aaa We have six companies neighbourhood ST. JULIEN and will hold on aaa Am in constant touch with 2nd Bde. aaa Have given them back their 10th Bit. which we had aaa Firing quieter aaa We do not feel uneasy.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.50 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By hand received.

(See 528)

540

To 3rd Inf. Bde.
F.L. 121. 24th April, 1915.

Quite a number of stragglers coming back evidently line broken just received message from Burland saying breaking through on our right aaa I will endeavour to collect stragglers and delay retirement quick. If any supports will be available please let me know.

From O.C. 13th Battn. 7 a.m.

F. O. W. LOOMIS.

By hand received.

(See 536)

541

To O.C. ST. JULIEN. (Lt. Col. F. O. W. Loomis)
B.M. 801. 24th April, 1915.

Our right section has given way aaa You will counter attack with two companies at once aaa A company 16th Bn is being hurried to ST. JULIEN to support you there aaa ST. JULIEN must be held aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.05 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

Received before 8.25 a.m.

(See 536, 542 and 548)

542

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 400. 24th April, 1915.

Our right section is retiring aaa Have ordered O.C. St. Julien to counter attack aaa

From G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.05 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

By wire received 7.20 a.m.

(See 536 and 541)

543

O.C., 48th Highlanders (15th Bn.)

B.M. 803. 24th April, 1915.

Reported that impression exists in your regiment that they are to retire on G.H.Q. line aaa This must be corrected at once aaa You are to hold your front line aaa If driven out collect your men organize counter attack and regain it aaa You are on no account to retire on G.H.Q. line.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.15 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

544

To York & Durham.

G.A. 45. 24th April, 1915.

Take the remainder of your Brigade to a line of trenches constructed across the YPRES-POELCAPPELLE road C.22.b., C. 23.a. and c. and C.29-a. and b. aaa You should cross canal by bridges south of C. 19.c. inclusive aaa On reaching trenches get into communication with 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade whose Headquarters are in Farm C.22.b. and with 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade whose headquarters are on the WIELTJE-FORTUIN road in C.18.d. aaa You will act as reserve to these two Brigades as required aaa Am sending Staff Officer to guide you aaa

From 1st Canadian Div. 7.40 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col., G.S.

544a

Priority to 2nd and 3rd Canadian Inf. Bdes.

G.363. 24th April, 1915.

Two battalions of York and Durham Brigade are moving up to the G.H.Q. 2nd Line astride the WIELTJE--POELCAPPELLE and WIELTJE-FORTUIN roads. Brigadier

has been directed to help you if necessary. Get in touch with him, Divl. Commander would like latest news.

From 1st Canadian Divn. 8 a.m.

By wire received 2nd CAB, at 8.16 a.m. by 3rd C.I.B. at 8.45 a.m.

545

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 804. 24th April, 1915.

Our line is broken C.6.c. to right aaa Organising at ST. JULIEN and occupying G.H.Q. line aaa No troops in rear aaa Support needed aaa Please give situation on our left.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.50 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By wire received 8.25 a.m.

Repeated 8.20 a.m. adding the words, "Is there any prospect for help." By wire received 8.27 a.m.

(See 542)

545a

To O.C. 85th Brigade.

Germans have broken through 3rd Brigade at Section three my line Sections one and two intact, holding locality C and helping Highlanders (3rd Bde.). Have you anybody to spare.

From O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 7.10 a.m.

A. W. CURRIE.

Received before 8 a.m.

(See 536)

545b

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

B.M.119. 24th April, 1915.

In reply to your message 7.10 a.m. regret that I have no one to spare all my Brigade is now in -my trenches or with the Canadian Division aaa Keep me informed of situation aaa Understand from your message that your right and centre sectors are intact but that your left sector is in difficulties and that the Germans have broken through aaa I am not clear where your left section trenches were aaa From reports received understand that the Germans are in ST. JULIEN.

From 85th Inf. Bde. 8 a.m.

C. J. DEVERELL.

By hand received before 9 a.m.

(In reply to 545a)

546

*Extract from Supplement to
THE LONDON GAZETTE
of 22nd June 1915*

No. 29202.

WAR OFFICE, 23rd June, 1915.

His Majesty the KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned *Officers*, Noncommissioned Officers and Man for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty:

No. 1539, Colour-Serjeant Frederick William Hall, 8th Canadian Battalion.

On 24th April, 1915, in the neighbourhood of Ypres, when a wounded man who was lying some 15 yards from the trench called for help, Company Serjeant-Major Hall endeavoured to reach him in the face of a very heavy enfilade fire which was being poured in by the enemy. The first attempt failed, and a Non-commissioned Officer and private soldier who were attempting to give assistance were both wounded. Company Serjeant-Major Hall then made a second most gallant attempt, and was in the act of lifting up the wounded man to bring him in. when he fell mortally wounded in the head.

Colour-Serjeant Hall was born in Kilkenny, Ireland, 21st February 1885, He enlisted in the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) and after serving twelve years and four months emigrated to Canada and at the outbreak of war was employed as a clerk. Having joined the 106th Regiment (Winnipeg Light Infantry), he was attested in the 8th Battalion, C.E.F., with which unit he proceeded overseas. He was appointed A/Serjeant 22nd October 1914 and was promoted Colour-Serjeant on the 1st December.

547

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M.9. 24th April, 1915.

My line still intact. 3rd Brigade front line fallen back. I am holding locality C with 3 Companies with orders to hang on there and help 3rd Brigade if possible. My 7th Battn. still in position C.6.b. Am collecting stragglers here and sending them to locality C. Understand 3rd Bde. holding St. Julien they should have 7 companies there in ad-

dition to what was in their front line which was 7 companies. Will try and establish new line C.6.d. D.1.c. and d. D.2.c and d.
From O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 8.25 am.

A. W. CURRIE.

*By wire received 8.37 a.m.
(See 529 and 545)*

548

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

FL. 105. 24th April, 1915. In reply to B.M. 801.

All men available now in firing line holding with difficulty around ST. JULIEN aaa Col. Burland is in command of left sub-section aaa Reported they have retired and I am afraid in bad shape aaa Everything possible being done to hold ST. JULIEN.

From O.C. 13th Bn. 8.25 a.m.

*By hand received.
(See 541)*

549

To 13th Brigade, York and Durhams, 3rd

Canadian Inf. Bde., 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. G.365. 24th April, 1915.

The two battalions of the York & Durham Brigade which were placed under the 13th Brigade will return to their own Brigade. They will join the remainder of the Brigade in the G.H.Q. 2nd line east of WIELTJE in C23.a. move in by the pontoon bridge in C.19.c. their place in the 13th Infantry Brigade will be taken by a cavalry Brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division. A Cavalry Brigadier will report as soon as possible to the 13th Brigade.

From 1st Canadian Division. 8.45 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col., G.S.

*By wire received 3rd CJ-B. 918 a.m. also received 2nd C.I.B. 9.18 a.m. and 10.15 a.m.
(See 534 and 544)*

550

To O.C. 13th.

B.M. 808. 24th April, 1915.

You are in command of all troops which were in our trenches last night aaa A counter attack through St. Julien by one battalion will be pressed by troops which are coming up from YPRES aaa Follow up with this aaa Ammunition has been sent you at ST. JULIEN.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 8.45 a.m.

G.B.H.

551

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 809. 24th April, 1915.

Line now from wood C.17.a. to centre C.12.c. to D.8.a. aaa Still heavily shelled and hard pressed at ST. JULIEN sea Casualties heavy aaa Our artillery cannot reach enemy guns aaa What time can we expect two battalions reserve.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 8.55 am.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By hand received 9.25 a.m.

552

To O.C. 85th Bde.

B.M.10. 24th April, 1915.

In reply to B.M.119 (See 545b).

My original line still intact have 3 companies locality C my 7th Bn. still in C.6.d. ass 3rd Bde. line broken but I am trying to organize new line C.6.d.1.c. and d. aaa D2. ass Germans are not in St. Julien ass My left section original trenches were in B.2.b. (sic D.2.b.) aaa Have been informed from Div. Hqrs. that 2 Bns. YORK and DURHAM BRIGADE are moving up to G.H.Q. 2nd line astride WIELTJE-POELCAPPELLE and WIELTJE-FORTUIN Rd. to support me.

From G.O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 9 a.m.

A. W. CURRIE, G.O.C.

*Received
(See 544a)*

553

To G.O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde.

B.M. 12. 24th April, 1915.

My front line still intact Sections I & II also holding locality C East of St. Julien D.7 (a) (b) (d) with 3 companies. Please inform me what steps you have taken to reorganize your right front line. Also how you appreciate the general situation from my left flank.

From G.O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 9.10 a.m.

A. W. CURRIE.

(See 552)

554

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.A. 46. 24th April, 1915.

The whole of the YORK & DURHAM Bde. has now been sent to G.H.Q. line and directed to get into communication with you aaa Line on your left appears to be all

right as no report to contrary has been received from Col. Geddes, keep in touch with him at WIELTJE aaa 2nd Canadian Bde. line intact aaa Cavalry Bde. now in Divl. Reserve.
From 1st Canadian Div. 9.15 am.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Col.
By hand received
(See 544 and 549)

555

To Second Army.
O.A.M. 950. 24th April, 1915.

Evidently not much reliance can be placed on the two French Divisions on your left. We do not know where the division ordered from Arras is at the present, but it ought to be in action by noon somewhere N.E. of Poperinghe. We are enquiring. It is of course of the first importance that our left should not be turned, and your dispositions should be such as to safeguard the left. The Chief is not fully aware of your dispositions or of the details of the situation, but he considers the whole of the cavalry should be used N. of the line Ypres-Poperinghe, supported by the two brigades from the 4th Division. This will enable you to use the Northumbrians E. of the Canal. The Chief thinks that vigorous action E. of the Canal will be the best means of checking the enemy's advance from the line LizerneBoesinghe. The Lahore Division is being ordered to proceed in the direction of Poperinghe. Further information regarding it will be sent you later.
9.30 am.

W. R. ROBERTSON, Lt. Gen., C.G.S.

556

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M. 811. 24th April, 1916.
Still holding ST. JULIEN line although being pushed hard aaa.
From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.50 a.m.

G.B.H.
By hand received 10.25 a.m.
(See 551)

557

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
C.. 80. 24th April, 1915. In reply to B.M. 811.
If absolutely necessary call on Brigadier York and Durham for assistance of one Bn.

but do not do so unless absolutely necessary as it is hoped to use this Bde. to relieve yours this evening.
From Canadian Division 10.35 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.
By hand received.
(See 544, 554, 556 and 561)

558

To 3rd Inf. Brigade.
B.M. 24th April, 1915.

If the GRAVENSTAFEL ridge is to be preserved it is imperatively necessary for your G.H.Q. 2nd line garrison your troops in rear to reinforce your left flank front aaa My last message ½ hour ago was that my 7th Battn. was still holding it aaa What is your ST. JULIEN garrison doing.

From 2nd Inf. Bde. 10.50 a.m.

A. W. Currie, G.O.C.
By hand per Brigade Major, 2nd C.I.B.
Received.
(See 559)

559

To: 1st Canadian Div.
K. 210. 24th April, 1916.

Have been requested by second Can. Bde. to go to their assistance aaa Am holding G.H.Q. line with 700 men aaa Brigadier second brigade says I must reinforce his front strongly or the whole front is lost aaa We have no news of Brigade coming up aaa We are holding from C.I.c. to 12.d.10.8. with troops which are being blown out of one position after another aaa

From: G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G. B. HUGHES.
By hand received 11.50 a.m.
(See 558)

560

Extract from Supplement to
THE LONDON GAZETTE
of 13th May, 1919

No. 31340. WAR OFFICE, 15th May, 1919.

His Majesty the KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the award of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officers:—

• • • • •
Captain Edward Donald Bellew, 7th Cdn.
Inf. Bn. (Brit. Columbia R.)
For most conspicuous bravery and devotion: to duty near Keerselaere on 24th April, 1915,

during the German attack on the Ypres salient. Captain (then Lieut.) Bellew as Battalion Machine Gun Officer, had two guns in action on the high ground overlooking Keerselaere. The enemy's attack broke in full force on the morning of the 24th against the front and right flank of the battalion, the latter being exposed owing to a gap in the line. The right company was soon put out of action, but the advance was temporarily stayed by Capt. Bellew, who had sited his guns on the left of the right company. Reinforcements were sent forward but they in turn were surrounded and destroyed. With the enemy in strength less than 100 yards from him, with no further assistance in sight, and with his rear threatened, Capt. Bellew and Serjt. Peerless, each operating a gun, decided to *stay* where they were and fight it out. Serjt. Peerless was killed and Capt. Bellew was wounded and fell. Nevertheless, he got up and maintained his fire till ammunition failed and the enemy rushed the position. Capt. Bellew then seized a rifle, smashed his machine gun, and fighting to the last, was taken prisoner.

Captain Bellew was born on the High Seas, 28th October 1882. Having graduated from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, he held a commission in the Royal Irish Regiment from May, 1901, to August, 1903. At the outbreak of the Great War he was a Civil Engineer in the Department of Public Works, Vancouver, B.C. On 10th August, 1914, he was appointed lieutenant in the 11th Regiment (Irish Fusiliers of Canada) and joined the 7th Battalion C. F., at Valcartier. He was a prisoner of war from 24th April, 1915, to 27th December, 1917, when he was exchanged and interned in Switzerland until 10th December, 1918. He was promoted captain 2nd January, 1916.

560a

To O.C. 85th Bde.
B.M. 14. 24th April, 1915.

Am still holding front line trenches and I think Locality C but third Bde. has apparently retired. May have to evacuate trenches as left is very much exposed. My right Section 1 will keep in touch with your left. I will not order retirement for some time yet.

From O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 11.05 a.m.

A. W. CURRIE.

Received before 12 noon

561

To: 5th Corps, 27th Div., 28th Div.
G. 367. 24th April, 1915.

2nd Bde. report that they are holding their original trenches and also part of a line in D.7.a. and c. but 3rd Bde. on their left are being hard pressed near ST. JULIEN aaa Have told 3rd Bde. to call upon York and Durham Bde. for assistance if absolutely necessary aaa York and Durham Bde. is holding G.H.Q. 2nd Line astride the WIELTJE - POELCAPPELLE and WIELTJE-FORTUIN roads* aaa Addsd. 5th Corps repd. 28th and 27th Divisions.
From: 1st Canadian Division. 11.07 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.
(See 556 and 557)

* *Leading Bn. did not reach G.H.Q. Line until after 12 noon.*

562

Priority to Canadian Division.
411. 24th April, 1916.

Tenth Infy. Bde. now at OUDERDOM will come under orders of Canadian Div. at once aaa Car has been sent to OUDERDOM to bring Bdr. Genl. HULL to Canadian Div. HQ. which are at CHATEAU DES TROIS TOURS BRIELEN B28.a.
From Fifth Corps 11j10 am. Poperinghe.

By wire received 11.35 a.m.

563

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
24th April, 1915.

Reply your B.M. 813 (copy not available) informing counter attack will be made orders have been given to 8th Bn. to hold fast in trenches as long as possible instead of retiring onto Gravenstafel Ridge as previously ordered. With this knowledge please direct counter attack to cover left flank of 2nd Section. Gen. Currie has left here for G.H.Q. Line and cannot be found. As left rear of 8th Bu. is not only exposed but Germans reported working their way through E. of St. Julien quickest action possible is essential. 2nd F.A. Bde. will support counter attack from present position with six guns.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 11.30 a.m.*

J. MERSEREAU, Major.

By hand received.

* *The time of this message should apparently be 12.30 or 1.30 p.m. because:-*

- (i) *Another message, addressed to O.C. 8th Bn. and written by the same officer, is timed 11.30 a.m. and is endorsed "Phoned by Brig.-Gen. Currie."*
- (ii) *Counter-attack was not ordered by 1st Cdn. Div. until 11.35 a.m. (See 566.)*
- (iii) *Gen. Bush did not meet Gen. Turner and discuss plan of counter-attack until about 12 noon.*
- (iv) *8th Bn. was not ordered to fall back to Gravenstafel Ridge until 11.45 a.m. (See 565a.)*
- (v) *Gen. Currie did not leave his H.Q. until after Lt. M. K. Greene had returned to Fortuin, after seeing bn. Y. and D. Bde. at the G.F.J.Q. line, at about 12 noon.*
- (vi) *Information as to counter-attack did not reach 8th Bn. until 1.15 p.m. (See 582.)*
- (vii) *c.f. text of 587 and 587a.*

564

To O.C. 13th Battalion.
24th April, 1915.

Enemy have shelled us out and are advancing from our left and front. Will hold every traverse if we have to retire along line to our right Captain WILLIAMSON killed.

From Capt. BROTHERHOOD 11.30 a.m.

By hand received.

565

To G.O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde.
24th April, 1915.

Have not substantial reinforcements at my disposal to reinforce your left Gravenstafel Ridge aaa We are holding G.H.Q. 2nd Line with about 700 men all that are available aaa My right front is being blown out of successive positions towards St. Julien. Still hold between C.11.c. to C.11.d.

From G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 11.30 a.m.

R. E. W. Tuswua, Br.-Gen.

By hand per Brigade Major 2nd C.I.B.

Received.

(See 558 and 559)

565a

Copy of record kept in orderly room 2ndC.I.B. of verbal telephone conversations.

To O.C. 8th Battn. (Col. Lipsett).
11.45 a.m. 24th April, 1915.

As the 3rd Bde. are falling back on G.H.Q. 2nd Line you will have to retire on the

Gravenstafel Ridge and hold there. The O.C. 5th Battn. is being told to conform with this.

The O.C. 5th Battn. told to retire in conformity with 8th Battn.

No reinforcements available.
(See 560a)

565b

To 85th Bde.
B.M. 15. 24th April, 1915.

Owing to my left flank Section II being entirely unprotected and having been informed that no reinforcements are available I have ordered the 8th Battn. Section II to retire by its left on to the GRAVENSTAFEL ridge the -5th Battalion Section one to conform to the movements of the 8th Bn. but to maintain contact with your left. Will endeavour to establish line from Wood in C.10 and 11 ST. JULIEN-Locality CGRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE. In order to retain GRAVENSTAFEL ridge substantial reinforcements required on line squares C.12, D.7 and 8 from which counter-attack might be launched but we have no troops available or sufficient for this purpose.

From 2nd Can. Inf. Bde. 12 noon.

A. W. C.

Received by 1.15 p.m.
(See 560a)

566

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G. 369. 24th April, 1915.

Two Bns. of York and Durham Bde. are placed at your disposal for a counter attack to restore situation on your right aaa This attack must be energetically pushed aaa The two Bns. from 13th Bde. will be sent to G.H.Q. 2nd Line in place of the two Bna. of York and Durham Bde. aaa Addsd. 3rd Canadian Bde. restd. 2nd Canadian Bde. and York and Durham Bde.

From Canadian Div. 11.35 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

By wire received 3rd C.I.B. 11.53 a.m. 2nd C.I.B. 12.30 p.m.
(See 557 and 569)

567

To Canadian Division.

G.B. 183. 24th April, 1915.

French have asked for support in their attack today against PILCKEM aaa Any batteries you can spare will you place under command Colonel Duffus who has been ordered to report to your Commanding R.A. and get into touch with commdr. at ELVERDINGHE.

From Fifth Corps 11.37 am.

By wire received 12.35 p.m.

568

To 13th Inf. Bde.

G. 369. 24th April, 1915.

The situation on the right of 3rd Canadian Bde. is serious and two Bns. of York and Durham Bde. are making a counter attack from ST. JULIEN ass, It is therefore necessary to call upon your two Bns. which are resting (2/K.O.Y.L.I. & 9/London) even though they are tired aaa They should move to the line of trenches constructed astride the WIELTJE POELCAPPELLE and WIELTJE-FORTUIN roads in squares C.23.a. and c. aaa The French are bringing up fresh troops and will be making a counter attack from BOESINGHE to PILCKEM sea The two Bns. of your Bde. should cross the Canal by the foot bridges south of Pontoon bridge in C.19.c.

From Canadian Div. 11.42 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

Received by 12.00 noon.

(See 566)

569

To 5th Corps.

G. 371. 24th April, 1915.

As situation on right of 3rd Canadian Bde. seems somewhat serious I am ordering two Bns. of York and Durham Bde. to make counter attack from St. Julien and am replacing these in G.H.Q. 2nd line by the two Bns. of 13th Bde. which are now resting west of the Canal aaa Added. 5th Corps •reptd. 27th and 28th Divisions.

From Canadian Division 11.45 am.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

(See 566 and 568)

570

To H.Q. 2nd Inf. Bde.

24th April, 1915.

Situation we -hold our trenches and some of 48th (15th Bn.) ass I have two platoons in hedges in front of Battalion H.Q. to pro-

tect my left rear aaa, So we have a bad gap between us and locality C in this gap I have only 20 men aaa I can hold my line provided the Germans do not get round my left rear aaa But it is a very bad situation unless we can get troops to fill gap from my Batt. H.Q. towards locality C. aaa If you are sending me reinforcements let them -come to just south of Battalion H.Q. aaa Please let me have instructions as to whether it is intended to hold this line or not sea Just heard German advance against our left seems to have slackened and come to a halt aaa I am not uneasy about being able to hold my line if the Germans are prevented walking round my rear-Medical details and doctor badly required aaa Mothersill is wounded.

From 8th Bn. 12 noon

L. J. LIPSETT, Lt. Col.

By hand received 2nd C.J.B. and copy passed

3.40 p.m. by hand to 1st Cdn. Div.

received 4.00 p.m.

(See 544, 552, 553 and 565b)

571

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.S. 537. 24th April, 1915.

Large bodies of mounted troops and infantry followed by artillery are moving down POELCAPPELLE Road which leads from C. six to St. Julien aaa Line still held as before but east of Wood in C eleven is very hard pressed aaa Above reported by a Canadian regt. to forward artillery observer of this divn. and wired in by him twelve noon have opened artillery fire on this road addressed 5th Corps 28th Div. Canadian Div. 5th Div. acknowledge.

From 27th Divn. 12.10 p.m.

By wire received 1st Cdn. Div. 1.10 p.m.

572

Priority to Canadian Divn.

G.O. 847. 24th April, 1915.

Have ordered two battalions Durham Light Infantry Brigade to move at once to ST. JEAN aaa Understand you will send staff officer to them at ST. JEAN with orders.

From Twenty-eighth Divn. 12.10 p.m.

By wire received 12.40 p.m.

Evidently written with the understanding that the D.L.J. Brigade had been transferred from the Cavalry Corps to 28th Div. Not acted upon. The D.L.J. Brigade was transferred from Second Army reserve to V Corps reserve at 5 p.m. 24th while at Vlamertinghe, and to come under orders of G.O.C., 27th Div. on arrival at Potijze.

573

To 1st Canadian Divn.

B.M. 146. 24th April, 1915.

Can I move the two battns. from Canal bank (K.O.Y.L.I. & Q.V.R.) to the trenches in C23.a. & c. and bring the two resting battns. up to Canal bank? It will be quicker and will suit me better aaa 1 Battn. now resting has only 2 Second lieutenants for officers.

From 13th Inf. Bde. 12.02 p.m.

A. HUNTER, Capt.

By hand received.
(See 566, 568 and 585)

574

To G.O.C. 3rd Bde.

B.M. 16. 24th April, 1915.

It is understood that you intend to hold G.H.Q. 2nd line to the last but I suggest that a local counter attack in the direction of ST. JULIEN-D.7 will do much towards restoring the situation. I would be glad if you would consider this and let me know your decision.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 12.20 p.m.

By hand received.

575

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

24th April, 1915.

We are going to counter attack with two battalions through C.18.a. on D.7.c.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

Received 12.30 p.m.
(See 566)

576

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.L. 850. 24th April, 1915.

Centre section reports at eleven ten a.m. that situation appears generally quiet except for concentration of enemy to north of BROODSEINDE aaa Artillery observing officer reports enemy moving south in D.7 howitzer Battery of Centre group firing at these.

From 28th Divn. 12.35 p.m.

By wire received. 1.15 p.m.

577

To Canadian Division.

G.S. 539. 24th April, 1915.

80th Inf. Bde. reports 12.45 p.m. begins 85th Bde. reports that report received from

second Canadian Bde* that he is still holding front line trenches but third Bde. has apparently retired he states he may have to evacuate trenches as left is much exposed aaa He will not order a retirement for some time yet aaa G.O.C. 85th Bde. has implored him not to retire and is sending him two toys. eighth Middlesex on their arrival and is asking 84th Bde. to help him aaa Observation officer 31st Bde. R.F.A. report Germans massing at cross roads C, six c.7.5.

From 27th Div. 1.15 p.m.

J. SPENCER, Capt. G.S.

By hand received 2.10 p.m.
(See 579)

* Original message (see 560a) is timed 11.05 a.m.

578

Priority to 1st Canadian Division.

G. 969. 24th April, 1915.

My cyclist officer reports from Wieltje timed one p.m. that 3rd Bde. Canadian Divn. is holding a line east and west through north edge of St. Julien. But it says it cannot hold on much longer as the 2nd Bde. on the right is suffering heavily aaa It reports that enemy of all arms are marching south through KEERSELAERE aaa The enemys artillery appear to have registered accurately on all entrenchments in rear which are held by supports aaa Right of 3rd Canadian Bde. giving way a little aaa Addsd. 2nd Corps 5th Corps 27th and Canadian Divns.

From 5th Div. 1.16 p.m.

By wire received 2 p.m.
(See 579)

579

To Canadian Divn.

G.C. 851. 24th April, 1915.

Following received from eighty-fifth Brigade begins aaa Following message received from Canadian second Infantry Brigade begins 11.50 a.m.* still holding front line trenches and I think locality C. But third Brigade has apparently retired may have to evacuate trenches as left is very much exposed aaa My right section one will keep in touch with your left I will not order a retirement for some time yet ends Have replied imploring him not to retire and saying that I will

* Original message (see 560a) is. timed 11.05 a.m.

send two companies 8th Middlesex to him on arrival if he wants them and that I will ask eighty-fourth Infantry Brigade to help him aaa Also that large reinforcements are coming up and that any retirement on my part would be disastrous to whole twentyeighth divn. line and that I have no intentions whatever of ordering any retirement aaa Will you please ask Canadian Divn. to stop any retirement contemplated and direct reinforcements to threatened part aaa Observation officer thirty first brigade RYA. REPORTS (just received) that Germans are massing at cross Toads at C.6.c.9.5. aaa One four six brigade R.F.A. informed and asked to concentrate fire on that point.

From Twenty-eighth Divsn. 1.30 p.m.

By wire received 2.20 p.m.

(See 577 and 578)

580

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

GA. 50. 24th April, 1915.

As Germans seem massing in C.6 you must not counter attack but utilise the Bus. of York and Durham to strengthen your line and hold on.

From 1st Canadian Division, 1 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL., Lt. Col.

Confirming telephone conversation and cancelling 566 above.

581

Priority to 2nd Army, 5th Corps.

G.A. 49. 24th April, 1915. In reply to G. 482.

Tenth Brigade ordered to march to G.H.Q. line in C22 by bridges between YPRES and C.19.c, with a view to taking over line held by Col. Geddes detachment between C.15.c. and C.17.a. tonight aaa Roads for march from VLAMERTINGHE are now being reconnoitred aaa Added. 2nd Army reptd. 5th Corps.

From 1st Canadian Divn. 1.05 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

582

To Major Matthews, Commdg. No. 2 Company

21 L. 24th April, 1915.

Following message received from 2nd Inf. Bde. AAA 3rd Brigade will counter attack with 2 battalions through C.18.a. on D.7.c. AAA Also 2 battalions of Durham Brigade will be employed to restore situation on left of 2nd Infantry Brigade AAA This message

just came in time to stop any order for withdrawal in view of progress Germans were making on Saint Julien AAA You are all doing splendidly AAA Please let them know.

From O.C. 8th Bn. 1.15 p.m.

L. J. LIPSETT.

By hand received—Passed to and signed by

O.C. No. 1 Co. 8th Bn. also in line.

(See 565a, 566 and 575)

583

Priority to 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.82. 24th April, 1915.

As situation at ST. JULIEN is serious send up your two battalions to General Headquarters 2nd Line which is situated on WIELTJE-POELCAPPELLE and WIELTJE-FORTUIN roads just east of WIELTJE and proceed yourself with them reporting arrival and position of your Headquarter area aaa Communicate with General Turner aaa Reptd 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

From Canadian Division, 1.10 p.m.

By wire received 1st C.L.B. 1.35 p.m., 3rd

C.I.B. 1.28 p.m.

(For reply see 593 and 594)

584

To O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde.

I.G.b.48. 24th April, 1915.

Two battalions of YORK & DURHAM Bde. are now entering G.H.Q. trenches about ¼ mile East of WIELTJE with instructions to push up to north and get astride WIELTJE-POELCAPPELLE Road and support you aaa A third Battalion is following.

From 1st Canadian Division (Intelligence)

Wieltje, 1.15 p.m.

C. H. MITCHELL, Major..

By hand received.

585

To 1st Canadian Divn.

B.M. 150. 24th April, 1915.

K.O.Y.L.I. and Q.V.R. have been ordered forward to C23.a. and c, are moving off aaa K.O.S.B. and R.W. KENT ordered up to canal bank aaa HQ. now on canal bank B. (sic " C:") 25.a.5.7. aaa Have had to move twice.

From 13th Infy. Bde. 1.40 p.m.

By wire received 2.00 p.m.

(See 566, 568 and 578)

586

To 5th Durhams, 4th Yorks, 2nd, 3rd, 13th, 14th, 15th,
16th Canadian Bns.

818. 24th April, 1915.

You will hold G.H.Q. line aaa From ST. JEAN-
POELCAPPELLE Road South.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.40 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

587

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

24th April, 1915.

How soon may infantry counter attack be expected
to reach left flank of Section II about locality C to
relieve pressure on that flank aaa Upon your answer
depends the decision of O.C. 8th Battalion as to whe-
ther to hang on to trenches or not aaa Immediate
reply requested. General Currie missing do you
know his whereabouts last seen going towards
G.H.Q. 2nd Line.

From 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.45 p.m.

H. K. BETTY, Lt. Col. B.M.

By hand received.

(See 563)

587a

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M. 18. 24th April, 1915.

On receipt of message from G.O.C. 3rd Inf. Bde. that
counter attack would be launched with 2 battalions
to restore the situation AAA O.C. 8th Bu. was
ordered to hang on to his front trenches as long as
possible instead of carrying out a retirement on
GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE which had been
previously ordered on information being received
from General Turner that he had no substantial
reinforcements available with which to protect the
left exposed flank of No. II Section. O.C. 5th Bn. has
been ordered to conform with retirement of 8th Bn.
AAA General Currie missing cannot be found
command 2nd Infantry Brigade devolves on Colonel
Lipsett AAA German infantry coming through left
rear 8th Bn. AAA Situation critical.

From 2nd Inf. Bde. 1.50 p.m.

Bde. Major.

Repeated 5th Div.

Repeated 27th Div. 2.05 p.m.

(See 565a)

588

Debates House of Commons, Session 1919.

29th September.

Sir SAM Hughes: ". . . I am not questioning Arthur
Currie's motive in going back; I merely say it was
unmilitary for him as a brigadier to leave his posi-
tion. . . ."

Debates House of Commons Session 1920.

16th June.

Sir SAM Hughes: "General Currie was promoted
before these facts (*relating to his actions on 24th
April, 1916*) were known. Had I remained in office
six weeks longer not only General Currie, but
several other officers would have been asked to hand
in their resignations"

589

NOTES AND REFERENCES

By a curious coincidence another Canadian officer
named Currie visited another dugout about two miles
distant at about the same time. During the absence of
Br: General Arthur W. Currie from his headquarters at
Fortuin-in a dugout consisting of a sheetiron drum some
12 feet in diameter, sunk in . the ground and covered
with earth, and shared with Headquarters 2nd Bde.
CFA.-it was visited by Colonel John A. Currie (15th
Bn., C.E.F.) who published a book relating some of his
experiences of 1914-1915.

Partial presentations of the actions of both these
commanders on this day were introduced into debates
in the House of Commons in 1916, 1917, 1919 and
1920, and also into public speeches, the press and the
Law Courts in 1928. From 1914 onwards there was
persistent confusion on account of the same surname,
and even in 1935 an incorrect story appeared.

The following references to printed matter on the
subject indicate the intensity of feeling aroused, due in
a measure to pardonable ignorance of the complex facts
as to localities, conditions, movements and governing
circumstances:

- i. Press reports of speech by Sir Sam Hughes in
Broadway Hall, Toronto, on 14th Dec., 1915.
- ii. Debates House of Commons, 22nd Feb., 1916.
- iii. Debates House of Commons, 23rd Feb., 1916.
- iv. Debates House of Commons, 30th March, 1916.
- v. " The Red Watch " by Colonel J. A. Currie,
M.P., published by McClelland Goodchild and
Stewart, Toronto, 1916.

- vi. Debates House of Commons, 12th Sept., 1917.
- vii. Debates House of Commons, 13th Sept., 1917.
- viii. Debates House of Commons, 4th March, 1919.
- ix. Debates House of Commons, 14th March, 1919.
- x. Debates House of Commons, 29th Sept., 1919.
- xi. Debates House of Commons, 16th June, 1920.
- xii. Reports of suit: Currie (Sir Arthur) vs. Preston and Wilson, Cobourg. April and May, 1928.

590

To G.O.C. 2nd Bde.
24th April, 1915.

Have instructed troops to hold G.H.Q. line. Orders for counter-attack cancelled.

From G.O.C. 3rd Bde. 1.45 p.m.

R. E. W. TURNER, Br.-Gen.

Received and endorsed "Repeated by phone to Col. Lipsett."

(See 580)

591

To 2nd Canadian Bn.

819. 24th April, 1915.

You will occupy G.H.Q. line in C.17.d.

From G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.55 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

(G.H.Q. line passed 600 yards S.W. of map location given).

592

Priority to Canadian Diva.

G.A. 196. 24th April, 1915.

My cyclist officer at WIELTJE at 1.50 p.m. many Canadians in disorder through here from right and left aaa The Buffs and Canadians at C.16.c. holding aaa Canadian Battery about 100 yards north of here safe aaa Road between me and ST. JEAN heavily swept by shell fire and it seems impossible to get gun ammunition by this road aaa The York and Durham Divn. (sic Bde.) has relieved the Canadians and are holding the line about road running S.E. of WIELTJE.

From 5th Division 2.15 p.m.

By wire received 3.00 p.m.

593

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 833. 24th April, 1915.

Your message received aaa 1st Bn. entrenched in supporting trenches along track C.20.c. d. will be ordered to withdraw across country to ST. JEAN aaa 4th Battalion at B.30.b. *(should read B.59.b.)* will march via W. of canal bridge I2.c. ST. JEAN-WIELTJE road. Time notified later.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.50 p.m.

(In answer to 583)

594

Priority to let Canadian Division.

B.M.833. 24th April, 1915.

Your message received aaa 1st Bn.in reserve trenches along track C20.c.d. heavily engaged. Will not withdraw till 7 p.m. aaa

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.00 p.m.

By wire received 2.20 p.m.

(See 583 and 593)

595

To Third and Fourth Bns. of York and Durham Bde.

820. 24th April, 1915.

You will hold a position East and West in C21.d. and C.22.c. aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.00 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

596

To Canadian Divn.

G. 358. 24th April, 1915.

Following reed. from Commander in chief begins Please forward following to Gen. Alderson begins I wish to express to you and Canadian Troops my admiration of the gallant stand and fight they have made aaa They have performed a most brilliant and valuable service aaa Last night and again this morning I reported their splendid behaviour to the Secretary of State for War and I have a reply from him saying how highly their gallantry and determination in a difficult position are appreciated in England ends.

From 2nd Army. 2.05 p.m.

By wire received 3.30 p.m. repeated by hand to Bdes.

597

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY.

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has received the following message from the Secretary, War Office:-

24th April, 1916.

To Sir John French,

General Headquarters.

His Majesty sends the following message.

"During the past week I have followed with admiration the splendid achievements of my troops including the capture and retention of Hill 60 after desperate fighting, and the gallant conduct of the Canadian Division in repulsing the enemy and recapturing our heavy guns. I heartily congratulate all units who have taken part in these successful actions."

598

To 13th Canadian Battalion.

S. C. 529. 24th April, 1916.

We have received orders to fall back through G.H.Q. lines.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Brigade. 2.10 p.m.

H. F. McDONALD.

*Received.**(See 586, 599 and 601)*

599

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

24th April, 1916.

We have been ordered to fall back on the 2nd G.H.Q. line which we are holding with the, York and Durham Bde.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.10 p.m.

*Received 2.25 p.m.**(See 595 and 598)*

600

To Gen. Turner, H.Q. 3rd Canadian Bde.

G.C. 2. 24th April, 1915.

The enemy's advance from Fortuin must be stopped at all costs. You must move every man you have got to drive him back, I have directed 2 battns. under OC. Suffolks from Frezenberg against Fortuin I am also sending you up the Royal Irish Rif. from here and have directed them on cross roads in C23.c. You will get in touch with these troops and take command in that part of the field and drive the enemy N. Eastwards I am issuing these orders as I

am on the spot and communication appears to be dislocated and time is of the highest importance. Act with vigor.

From G.O.C. 27th Div. 2.15 p.m.

By wire received 4.05 p.m.

601

Priority to 2nd and 3rd Canadian Inf. Bdes.

G.A. 61. 24th April, 1915.

One Bn. 27th Div. has been moved up to POTIJZE and other reinforcements are being sent up. It is of great importance to maintain your line.

From 1st Canadian Div. 2.30 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL., Lt. Col.

*By hand received.**(See 580 and 598)*

601a

To Bde. Major

Canadian Div'n'l Arty.

At 2.45 p.m. as there appeared to be no sign of reinforcements or chance of getting up more ammunition also as the 3rd Canadian Inf. Brigade has been ordered to retire to the G.H.Q. 2nd line, the 7th & 8th Batteries were ordered to retire to approximately a mile to a mile and a half in rear of G.H.Q. 2nd Line. The ammunition of 7th & 8th Batteries (approx. 100 rounds) was handed to the 5th & 6th Batteries who were ordered to remain. At the time this order was given, no ammunition was in sight and no infantry reinforcements reported coming. An infantry counter attack had been cancelled. We shall remain here till forced out by enemy and at least as long as ammunition lasts. 7th & 8th Batteries are to report their new positions. Reports to be sent to J. in ST. JEAN square I.3.b.

C. S. HANSON, Captain,

Adj. 2nd Canadian Arty. Bde.,

*(Untimed and undated: sent about 2.50 p.m.,
24th April. By hand received.)*

602

G.O.C. York and Durham Brigade.

24th April, 1916.

Canadian Division has placed your brigade under my command and your other two, battalions are to take up a position on Wieltje ridge C21.d.-C22.c. east and west. This is being begun by engineers now.

From G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.55 p.m.

R. E. W. Turner, Br.-Gen.,

(See 595)

603

To 10th Inf. Bde.
GA. 52. 24th April, 1915.

Continue to march with your Bde. via Cross roads in I.1.c.1.5. canal bridge in L1.d. to WIELTJE aaa It depends on the situation and also the time at which you arrive as to what orders will be sent you but it is probable that you will take over the line of trenches at present held by Col. Geddes detachment and part of the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. aaa Colonel Geddes is at ST. JEAN and 3rd Canadian Brigade Commander at farm in C22.b. aaa The line of trenches occupied by your brigade will be from farm in C15.c. on left to ST. JULIEN aaa Arrange with both commanders for guides.

From 1st Canadian Div. 2.55 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.
Received. (See 681)

604

To 5th Corps, 27th Div., and 28th Div.
54. 24th April, 1916.

Staff Officer has come back from the front which he left shortly after 3 p.m. at that time the left of the 3rd Canadian ml. Bde. rested approximately in C116b. and ran out towards ST. JULIEN but he could not say whether the line ran through ST. J MIEN or where it joined the left of the 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. the left of the latter bde. had had to fall back and was in D.7.a. it then ran through DS while his right was apparently in original trenches aaa East and around WIELTJE where the York and Durham Bde. two weak Bus. of the 13th Bde. and one weak Bn. of the 1st Canadian Bde. and it is presumed that the 3rd Canadian Bde. is using them to strengthen their line.

From 1st Canadian Div. 4.50 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col. 605
To Colonel Geddes, 3rd CS. Bde. and 10th Bde.
GA. 53. 24th April, 1915.

The 10th Infantry Bde. will take over Colonel Geddes line and a part of General Turner's line tonight, while the York & Durham Bde. will take over the remainder of Gen. Turner's line aaa The length of

front to be handed over by Gen. Turner to Gen. Hull will be settled between the two officers.
From 1st Canadian Division. 3.10 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.
(See 581 and 603)

606

Priority to Canadian Div.
G.A. 414. 24th April, 1915.

The Northumberland Bde. will move on receipt of this order via VLAMERTINGHE and BRIELEN to vicinity of POTIJZE where it will form a corps reserve addressed Northumberland Bde. repeated twenty seventh, twenty-eighth Div. Canadian Div.
From Fifth Corps. 3.25 p.m.

By wire received 3.25 p.m.

NOTE: *Instructions from Gen. Plumer to Gen. Snow for employment of Northumberland Bde. were "It is primarily for the purpose of repelling any advance on the part of the enemy from the north and north-east. I place it under your orders as it will be close to you, and if communication is cut and you cannot refer to me, you will use the Bde. at your discretion." (War Diary G.S. V Corps). Subsequent instructions to General Snow were "to make every effort to restore the situation where the Germans are reported to have broken through" (Brit. Off. Hist., Vol. III, Mil. Opns., France and Belgium, 1916*, p. 888.)*

607

To 1st Canadian Division.
24th April, 1915.

At 12.30 my left flank was entirely unprotected the 3rd Brigade having retired to St. Julien. The three companies at Locality C were practically non est. I then ordered 8th Batt. Section II to fall back to Locality C the 5th Battalion to conform to their movements and hold the Gravenstafel Ridge notifying the 85 Bde. of what I was doing. I then received notification that two battalions one the Durhams and the other the Yorks were being sent to me in order to counter-attack and that the attack was to be pushed with vigor. I came back to G.H.Q. 2nd Line to meet those two battalions. I saw the Durhams at one o'clock and their Brigadier and waited until two when I was told by Staff Officer 3rd Bde.

that counter attack was not to be made by Durham and Yorks and I came to Hdqrs. 27 Division to send report.

From O.C. 2nd Bde. 3.30.

A. W. CURRIE.

By hand received.
(See 565, 565a and 566)

608

Priority to Second Army.

O.A..959. 24th April, 1915.

Every effort must be made at once to restore and hold line about St. Julien or situation of 28th Division will be jeopardised. Am sending General Staff officer to explain Chief's views. Acknowledge.

From G.H.Q. 4.15 p.m.

F. MAURICE, Br: Gen. G.S.

609

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.M.856. 24th April, 1915.

My left section reports three thirty p.m. that the Suffolks and Twelfth Londons advanced at two thirty p.m. from FRENZBERG Ridge with orders to attack and hold FORTUIN aaa At three p.m. patrols reported enemy two hundred yards north of FORTUIN in strength aaa From other sources I understand that the attack by the Suffolks and Twelfth London and also the attack ordered to be made by Two Battalions York and Durham brigade have been cancelled aaa Gather that line now runs roughly from D.10 through D.15, D.14, D.13, C.18, C.17, C.16 aaa Would be glad to know if these statements are correct because if so my trench line is in a very critical position aaa Addressed Canadian Division reptd. 5th Corps, Twenty Seventh Div.

From Twenty Eighth Divn. 4.35 p.m.

By wire recd. 5.45 p.m.

610

To Adjutant 4th RB.

24th April, 1915.

French attack has apparently resulted in nothing, as they reported masses of Bosches in front. Many French have come up on both flanks and on my left to canal position is going to be entrenched-this position I will have reconnoitred. I am now in position along a bank just behind and in support of C. Coy.

From O.C. " B " Coy.

B. M. EDWARDS, Lieut.

Received 13th Bde. 9.40 p.m., 1st Cdn.

Div. 11.10 p.m.

611

Sir J. French's views, as subsequently reduced to writing by the C.G.S. in a letter to General Smith-Dorrien, and often reiterated, were:-

"He does not wish you to give up any ground if it can be helped, but if pressure from the north becomes such that the 28th Division *ought* to fall back from its line, then of course it *must* fall back, for such distance as circumstances necessitate. But we hope the necessity will not arise, The Germans must be a bit tired by now and they are numerically inferior to us as far as we can judge. In fact, there seems no doubt about it." (*Brit. Off. Hist., Vol. III, Mil. Opns., France and Belgium, 1916**, p. 233, f.n. 2.)

612

To 3rd Canadian Inf, Bde.

53. 24th April, 1915.

There are in and around WIELTJE four Bus. of the York and Durham Bde. the Yorkshire Lt. Inf. and the Q. Victoria Rifles of the 13th Inf. Bde. and part of the 4th Canadian Bn. aaa With these troops you must make head against the Germans aaa You must push troops up into your front line and prevent at all costs the Germans breaking through between you and the 2nd Canadian Bde. aaa I have no exact knowledge of your situation at the present moment but hope that you are still blocking ST. JULIEN and in close touch with the 2nd Canadian Bde.

From 1st Canadian Div. 4.35 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

By hand received.
(See 586 and 598)

613

Note from General Foch to Sir John French.

" I am calling up a second infantry division which will be in the region of Crombeke (5 miles north by west of Poperinghe) very early tomorrow. It is important that the British have strong reserves near Elverdinghe, Ypres and Wieltje at the same time. Starting from these four points and eastward of them, we will take a vigorous offensive against the front Steenstraat, Pilckem, Langemarck and east of these places." (*Brit. Off. Hist., Vol. III, Mil. Opns., France and Belgium, 1915**, pp. 233 and 234.)

614

To 5th Yorks.
827. 24th April, 1915.

You will take up a position and entrench in rear of our present line in C.16.c. aaa You will be ready to counter attack when necessary.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 5.05 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

615

To 85th, 84th, 83rd Infantry Brigades.
G.L. 858. 24th April, 1915.

Owing to retirement of troops on our left it is necessary to entrench and hold a line running roughly parallel to the FORTUIN road through squares D.10.c. D.9.d. D.15.a. D.14.b. aaa Without giving up any of your present line collect what men you can and start reconstruction as soon as possible aaa Eighty-fifth Brigade will be responsible as far as the HAANEBECK stream Square D.15.a. The Eighty-fourth Brigade will continue the line to the West aaa If you find Canadians are digging trenches along the line do not interfere with them but be prepared to occupy trenches if necessary. R.E. have been ordered to move up to help.

From 28th Div. 5.10 p.m.

This message will be sent by two separate orderlies—Brigades to communicate to ensure all receiving it.

Received 85th Bde., 84th Bde. 5.40 p.m.;

83rd Bde. 6.10 p.m.

616

Priority to First Canadian Division.
G.G. 859. 24th April, 1915.

Please direct my two battalions first Suffolks and twelfth Londons now at FORTUIN to return to eighty-fourth Infantry brigade headquarters at earliest possible moment as their presence is urgently required there aaa These battalions were sent to FORTUIN at three p.m. to-day by General Snows orders as he was out of touch with me and heard that Germans were occupying FORTUIN aaa Addressed First Canadian Division repeated eighty-fourth infantry brigade.

From Twenty-eighth Division. 5.15 p.m.

E. GROGAN, Major.

By wire received 5.55 p.m.

(See 600)

617

To General Turner.
B.M.490. 24th April, 1915.

In accordance with instructions received from D.H.Q. to bring remainder of Brigade to your assistance I am at 2nd Bde. Hqr. C.28.c. aaa I have only 200 men all that is left of 4th Batt. they are waiting W. of farm C28.d. aaa The 1st Bn. strength 250 were too heavily engaged to be withdrawn but have been ordered to march to WIELTJE at 7 p.m. aaa Please instruct what you wish done aaa I have not seen Gen. Currie and hear you have left your Hqrs.

From General Mercer. 5.15 p.m.

R. HAYTER, Major.

By hand received

618

To G.O.C. 27th Division.
24th April, 1915.

I will send out officer patrol tonight to reconnoitre towards Fortuin and through Squares 14, 20, 19, back to C22.b.

From 3rd Bde.

(See 600)

619

To Canadian Div.
GA .416. 24th April, 1915.

The Corps Commander wishes you to place under a selected Commander the tenth infantry brigade the York and Durham Bde. and the other Battalions including K.O.Y.L.I. 4 Canadian Bu. and Q.V.R., and the two Bns. of twenty-eighth div. and one of twentyseventh directed on FORTUIN by G.O.C. twenty-seventh Div. or such of them as you can assemble, and use them for the purpose of making the strongest possible counter attack with the object of retaking ST. JULIEN and driving the enemy in that neighbourhood as far north as possible so as to secure the left flank of twenty-eighth div. and re-establish our trench line as far to the northward as possible. aaa He leaves to you the time at which the counter attack is to be made with the proviso that it should not be delayed any longer than you consider absolutely necessary for reconnaissance and preparation aaa The Northumberland Bde, and D.L.I. Bde. of the Northumbrian Div. have orders to move tonight to about POTIJZE in Corps Reserve and you are authorized (or the Commander you nominate) to call upon this reserve for reinforcement or support or

to confirm and develop any success aaa These Bdes. will be temporarily until required under the command of G.O.C. 27th Div. aaa All divisions will render the counter attack all possible artillery support under arrangements to be made by C.R.A. Canadian Div. aaa Addressed Canadian, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth divs. Acknowledge.
From Fifth Corps 6.30 p.m.

H. S. JEUDWINE, B.G.
By hand received
(See 572)

620

To 13th Inf. Bde.

G.A.55. 24th April, 1915. In reply to B.M. 152.

Divl. Commander is very sorry to hear of heavy casualties aaa The two Bns. (2nd K.O.Y.L.J. and 9th Londons) must remain in that locality aaa Their commanders should report to Gen. HULL at 9 p.m. this evening at road junction in I.I.c.d. for orders aaa Gen. HULL will command the counter attack which will be made tomorrow morning.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.35 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.
By hand received.

621

To 3rd Inf. Bde. York & Durham Bde., Col. Geddes detachment.

G.A.56. 24th April, 1915.

Orders issued regarding relief of 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. and Col. Geddes detachment are cancelled that is the York and Durham brigade will not relieve the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. nor will the 10th Inf. Bde. relieve Col. Geddes detachment as the relieving troops are required for a counter attack.

From 1st Canadian Div. 6.50 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.
By hand received 3rd C1.B. 8.30 p.m.
(See 581, 603 and 605)

622

To Canadian Division.

G.K.67. 24th April, 1915.

We have just received a message from Fifth Kings Own saying a French regiment was taking over his lines and asking for instructions aaa Could you inform us if this regiment can be withdrawn and if so will

it remain at my disposal or is it to return to its own Brigade aaa Please also instruct as to other units placed under my command.

From Col. Geddes. 7 p.m.

H. M. M. CRICHTON, Capt.
By hand received 8.22 p.m.

623

To 1st Canadian Div.

24th April, 1915.

Latest information Germans digging in locality C and hold that end of the GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE aaa By information from the adjutant 8th Battn. Col. Lipsett still holds his original trench line and was protecting his left flank in the space between the trenches and locality C this however lacks confirmation at the present time.

From 2nd Inf. Bde. 7.05 p.m.

H. K. BETTY, B.M.
By hand received.

624

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M.492. 24th April, 1915.

Arrived five p.m. with three officers 246 other ranks for 4th Bu. and Brigade Signal Section reported to General Curry H.Q. and sent message to General Turner asking for instructions aaa In meanwhile have stabilized H.Q. in farm C28.d.4.1. with G.O.C. York and Durham Brigade and have occupied and am improving trenches started by his brigade 2 Bns. of which are Counter attacking aaa Am still awaiting instructions from Gen. Turner.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.05 p.m.

By wire received 8.55 p.m.
(See 617)

625

To Royal Irish.

B.M. 830. 24th April, 1915.

Counter attack will probably be -made tonight about ten p.m. aaa Matter is being referred to G.O.C. 27th Div. for information.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.20 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt. Col.

626

To Canadian Division.

G. L. 863. 24th April, 1915.

The following -from eighty-fifth Infantry Brigade has been received begins aaa Suffolks and twelfth London regiment reached

FORTUIN without opposition aaa My orders to them were to drive any enemy met with out of FORTUIN and to hold it at all costs aaa On reaching FORTUIN O.C. was ordered by some authority not known to me to advance as fast as possible north east towards D2 aaa He has now reached reverse slope of ridge running through D.7 and D2 and going to dig in being heavily shelled aaa I am trying to find out who issued the order to advance aaa Fifth Canadian Infantry on my left in trench line report that their orders are changed and that they are to remain holding their trenches aaa The situation has been quiet on my front and Canadians and Royal Fusiliers are in close touch aaa I had informed Second Canadian Infantry brigade that under no circumstances was I going to give up my trench line aaa East Surreys and Royal Fusiliers are in direct communication with one another in trenches aaa After the twelfth London and Suffolks had reached FORTUIN other troops were seen advancing east and north east towards FORTUIN and I have sent out to find who these were and under whose orders aaa observing officer sixty nine battery reports at five thirty p m. Germans advancing from D.14.a. to D.20.a. aaa Cannot understand this but have sent out patrols to clear up situation aaa Your G.L. 858 (*see 616*) is now under the new conditions not understood as Royal Fusiliers and Canadians on their left are still in their original trench line aaa I have no men available to dig a new line but will order OTC. Royal Fusiliers to use his support company in co-operation with Canadians and will try to collect eighth Middlesex who are entrenching a line through farm in C29.b. to carry out your orders but as the original line is still held by Canadians the reasons for digging a new line are not clear aaa Will you please send me instructions by return aaa am getting into touch with second Canadian Infantry brigade at ST. JEAN where Colonel Geddes also is aaa Latter is holding a trench line with his command aaa An officer now reports having reached D.13.b. and can see no Germans in D.14.a. aaa Ends. Our Artillery have been co-operating with French attack in direction of PILCKEM which is reported to be progressing favourably aaa.

From Twenty-eighth Division 7.55 p.m.

LOCH, Lt. Col., G.S.

*By hand received 8.46 p.m.
(See 615)*

627

OPERATION ORDER NO. 10,

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
COMMANDING CANADIAN DIVISION.

24th April, 1915.

1. By orders of the Corps Commander a strong counter-attack will be made early to-morrow morning in the general direction of ST. JULIEN with the object of driving the enemy back as far north as possible and thus securing the left flank of the 28th Div.

2. Brig.-Gen. Hull, Comdg. 10th Bde. will be in charge of this counter-attack.

3. The following troops will be placed at disposal of Brig.-Gen. Hull for this purpose, viz

10th Inf. Bde., York & Durham Bde., K.O.Y.L.I. & Queen Victoria Rifles of the 13th Bde., 1st Suffolks & 12th London Regt, of 28th Div., 4th Canadian Bu. & 1 Bu. of 27th Div.

4. The Officers Comdg. these units will report for instructions at 9 p.m. tonight to Gen. Hull whose Hd. Qrs. will be at road junction in I.I.c. & d. up till midnight.

5. The Northumberland Bde. & Durham Light Inf. Bde. of Northumbrian Div. forming the Corps Reserve and now at POTIJZE can be called upon for support by Gen. Hull.

6. The first objective of the attack will be FORTUIN (if occupied by enemy) ST. JULIEN and the wood in C.10 & 11. After these points have been gained Gen. Hull will advance astride of the ST. JULIEN POEL-CAPPELLE road and drive back the enemy as far north as possible. All units holding the front line of trenches will follow up the attack and help to consolidate the ground gained.

7. The C.R.A. Canadian Div. will arrange for artillery support of the counter-attack and get into touch with C.R.As. of 27th & 28th Diva. regarding all possible artillery support from these Diva.

8. The counter-attack will be launched at 3.30 a.m.

9. Divl. Hd. Qrs. will remain at the Chateau de Trois Tours near BRIELEN.

C. F. ROMER, Col.,
General Staff.

Issued at 8 p.m.

Copy No. 1 to 10th Bde.
" 2 to York & Durham Bde.
" 3 to 2nd Canadian Bde.
" 4 to 3rd Canadian Bde.
" 5 to 13th Bde.
" 6 to 1st Canadian Bde.
" 7 to 5th Corps.
" 8 to 27th Division.
" 9 to C.R.A.
" 10 & 11 to G.S.

628

To Colonel GEDDES.

G. 84. 24th April, 1915. In reply to G.K. 67.

The fifth Kings Own & all other units at present under your command remain under your command and you will be responsible for the line you are now holding.

From Canadian Division 820 p.m.

C. F.ROMER, Col. GS.

(See 622)

629

To Fifth Corps—Canadian Division—27th Division.

G.L. 864. 24th April, 1915.

Am in close touch with Canadian Division and did not order forward my two battalions near FREZENBERG as I heard G.O.C. Canadian division give orders for two battalions York and Durham brigade to move towards ST. JULIEN aaa In consequence of these two battalions being ordered forward I have now no reserve troops with which to support my line aaa In consequence of Fifth Corps message G.A. 416 (See 619) I have ordered representative eighty-fourth Infantry brigade to report to brigadier tonight at ST. JEAN to explain situation of battalions and to receive his orders for them aaa While I am responsible for holding a line of defence I must protest against troops allotted to its defence being moved without my knowledge aaa Will Fifth Corps please inform brigadier commanding Tenth Infantry brigade of arrangements I have made for putting him in communication with Suffolks and twelfth London aaa Addressed Twenty-seventh Division repeated Fifth Corps and Canadian Division.

From twenty-eight Division 8.40 p.m.

LOCH, Lt. Col. G.S.

*Received Canadian Div. 9.30 p.m.**(See 635 and 651)*

630

To 1st Canadian Division,

B.M. 835. 24th April, 1915.

Occupying G.H.Q. 2nd line from ST. JEAN-POELCAPPELLE Road to C.16.d. thence to about C.16.a. with remains of 2nd, 3rd, 14th & 16th Canadians and 4th & 5th York and 5th Durhams, Buffs, 1 and half companies Q.V.R. possibly 3500 total aaa Some of our troops still are in ST. JULIEN surrounded, this number originally 700 now

possibly 200 aaa We have asked G.O.C. 27th Division how we can co-operate with, him.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 8.45 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By wire received 11.10 p.m.

631

To G.O.C. 27th Division.

Z. 329. 24th April, 1916.

Your message G.c. 2. was received at 4.05 p.m. aaa At 1.35 p.m. I explained my position to first Canadian Division and was instructed to hold St. Julien as long as possible and then to occupy G.H.Q. line aaa I still had about 200 men in St. Julien at 5.30 p.m. who were holding but were surrounded by enemy aaa At 5.30 p.m. I went over to Royal Irish S.E. of St. Julien but had no information position of Suffolks aaa

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 9.35 p.m.

R. E. W. TURNER, Br.-Gen.

(See 600 and 612)

632

To 1st Canadian Division.

B.M. 25. 24th April, 1916.

Fifth Battalion hold original trenches Section one eighth Battalion Section two aaa Two battalions (1/Suffolks & 12 London) 28th Division entrenched D. 7 & 8. Have collected all I can find of seventh Battalion and sent them to report to Col. Lipsett O.C. 8th (about one hundred). Balance-10th Battalion that can be located are in G.H.Q. line.

From O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 11 p.m.

A. W. CURRIE.

*By hand received.**(See 623)*

633

To 28th Division.

B.M. 162. 24th April, 1915.

The O.C. Canadian 2 Inf. Bde. who has hung on to his trench line all day and maintained his position in touch with my left battalion in the trench line wishes me to report that he urgently requires reinforcements of four battalions as his men are in no fit state to hold the trench line for any longer period aaa He requires food and ammunition and is unable to gain touch with his own Division aaa Can you inform Canadian Div. or 5th Corps.

From 85th Inf. Bde. 11.20 p.m.

Received 12.17 a.m. 25th.

634

Priority to Canadian Division.
GSA. 417. 24th April, 1915.

Reference message received from Twenty seventh Div. and repeated to you by telephone -to the effect that all troops of third Canadian Bde. and those from twenty seventh and twenty eighth Div. have been ordered by Gen. Turner back to G.H.Q. second line or to their division thus giving up all the ground for which such a struggle has been made to-day and leaving the second bde. in the air Corps Commander directs that instant action be taken to reestablish a line as far forward as possible in the Direction of ST. JULIEN and in touch if possible with our troops on right and left aaa If necessary you are to appoint an officer to take command ass He suggests that a staff officer should be sent to deal with the situation on the spot.

From Fifth Corps. 11.35 p..

By wire received 11.53 p.m.

635

Priority to Canadian Div.
G.L. 868. 24th April, 1915.

Eighty-fifth. brigade reports he is in touch with Canadian second Inf. Bde. who are holding original trench line in D2., DS, and D.10 aaa Men reported exhausted ass Position of Suffolks and twelfth London explained to Colonel Lipsett aaa Plan for tomorrow also explained aaa Colonel LIPSETT reports he is temporarily in command of the Bde. aaa Enemy heavily shelling GRAVENSTAFEL ridge otherwise trench line is quiet aaa Above report not timed but must have been sent about nine thirty p.m. aaa Addressed Canadian Divn. repton. fifth Corps 27th Divn.

From Twenty-eighth Divn. 11.38 p.m.

*By wire received 12.15 a.m.25th
(See 626)*

636

To Canadian Division.
H. 543. 24th April, 1915.

Artillery should open upon St. Julien and woods to West also on FORTUIN if in possession of Germans aaa My attack will move forward from G.H.Q. line at 4.30 on FORTUIN and ST. JULIEN aaa Am maintaining telegraph office at level crossing H.12.b. till 1. a.m. aaa Brigadier York and

Durham brigade and Companies attached Btms. should be warned to report to me at South Westerly road junction in WIELTJE till 3 a.m.

From 10th Brigade, 11.45 p.m.

By wire received 11.57 p.m.

637

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
York and Durham Bde.
24th April, 1915.

Apparently there is a large gap between your right and 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. left caused by your bringing back your right on to the G.H.Q. line. Colonel Gordon Hall is coming out and will explain to you the General's wishes meanwhile I am sending out Div. cyclist Coy. with orders to push forward to FORTUIN and bold that point aaa The cyclists will be under the command of G.O.C. York and Durham Bde.

From Canadian Divn. 11.50 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

(See 612 and 634)

638

To 13th Inf. Bde.
G.88. 25th April, 1915.

French are credibly reported to be steadily advancing on PILCKEM and the Divisional Commander wishes you to keep in touch with them and take advantage of their progress.

From Canadian Division. 12.15 a.m.

C. F. ROMER.

639

To General Hull, 10th Bde.
G.90. 25th April, 1915.

Staff Officer has gone out to tell you situation aaa You may not be able to have York and Durham Brigade but in any case you will attack with your own Bde. ma, Your 11,543 received and Arty. will be informed but it is presumed your attack will start at 3.30 and not 4.30 as stated therein aaa Can you leave somebody at ST. JEAN to guide Commanding Officers to you should they wish to report to you tonight.

From Canadian Division 12.25 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel.

(See 636)

640

To 10th Inf. Bde.

G.92. 25th April, 1915.

3rd Canadian Bde. report that as late as 10 p.m. at any rate there were some 200 of his Bde. still holding out in St. Julien.

From Canadian Div. 12.55 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel.

(See 630)

641

To G.O.C. York and Durham Bde.

X.1. 25th April, 1915.

Extend the line from 1st Inf. Bde. on your right at about point D.13.a.- b. to the left at C.18.a. on the stream ZANEBECK aaa This line to be held in strength and entrenched.

From 1st Canadian Div. 1.30 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

(See 637)

642

To 3rd Canadians.

G.C.11. 25th April, 1915.

With reference to my G.C.10 can you now tell me please what steps you have taken to fill in the gap. The 3 Cos. (Suffolks & Middlesex) which you left absolutely in the air in the Canadian trenches about 7.a.* I am endeavouring to withdraw and to connect them up with Colonel Wallace's five Coys. holding the line 13.a2.0 to 14.d. Please keep me informed of situation.

From 27th Division 1.45 a.m.

*By hand received before 2.45 a.m.**(See 600, 618 and 631)*

* *This area had been in German hands since 11 a.m, 24th; the two companies Suffolks were 1,000 yards further east.*

643

To 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

X2. 25th April, 1915.

The two Bns. of your brigade at WIJLTJE will be moved up at once to a position on the left of the 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde aaa Right on the HAANE BEEK left on the ZONNEBEKE-LANGEMARCK road approximately.

From 1st Canadian Div. 1.50 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

*Received verbally 1.30 a.m.**(See 634 and 637)*

644

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.X.2. 25th April, 1915.

You will extend your right with the troops at your disposal to the ZANNEBEEK in square C.18.c. approximately where you will be in touch with the left of the YORK and DURHAM Bde. aaa The line to be entrenched aaa Report when this order is complied with. Troops at your disposal are your own Bde. and the 2nd & 3rd Bus. of the 1st Canadian Inf. Bde:

From 1st Canadian Div. 2.10 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

*By hand received 2.55 a.m.**(See 637 and 641)*

645

To 27th Division.

S.C.536. 25th April, 1915. In reply to G.C.11.

Acknowledge your G.C.11 (See 642) aaa As instructed will move 4th Durhams and 4th Yorks to position facing North West D.8.a. to C.18.c. aaa This move will be made at daybreak 25th a.m. aaa With reference to your remarks re Suffolks and Middlesex please note I received your message at 4.05 p.m. and received at 1.35 p.m. the same day from 1st Canadian Div. directions of another purport aaa With my troops widely dispersed and on the move I regret not having been able to comply with your request aaa Attached find officers reconnaissance asked for. *(Copy not available.)*

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.45 a.m.

H. F. MCDONALD, Capt. Staff Capt.

(See 618, 642 and 646)

646

To 4th Yorks and 4th Durhams.

S.C.538. 25th April, 1915.

Under instructions from G.O.C. 27th Div. please move your battalions at daybreak 25th and take up a line facing North West D.8.a. to C.18.c. aaa The senior officer will command aaa A counter attack will take place at 3.30 a.m. under Gen. HULL and he has been notified of your proposed move aaa Please report when position has been taken up to 3rd Can. Inf. Bde. aaa As

soon as your position is reached your battalions will proceed to make themselves secure ma Regret short notice which was unavoidable.

From 3rd Can. Inf. Bde. 320 a.m.

H. F. MCDONALD, Capt.,
Staff Capt.

(See 846)

647

To Fifth Corps.

25th April, 1915.

Have just received Canadian Division G.86* from which I gather Br.-Gen. Bush must have moved forward two Bns. in order to connect 2nd Canadian Bde. with their right aaa I have not been able to get in touch with Gen. Bush at all but two of his Bns. have already reported here (York and Durham Bde.) aaa I have given Gen. Hull the Northumbrian† Bde. and the Royal Irish aaa It leaves me reserve here 3 Bns. Durham L.I. Bde. one having been despatched by me to VERLORENHOEK G.O.C. 85th Bde. I had undertaken to send him two Bns. in lieu of two Bus. 28th Div. I had earlier in the day directed to attack enemy at FORTUIN ass The latter two Bus. I found did not retire as stated in my G.c.9. to FREZENBERG but held on to two linen-3 Cos. about 7.a., 5 Cos. 13.a.2.0. to 14.a. aaa I got into communication with Col. Wallace Comdg. these Bns. about 12 midnight and ordered him to withdraw these three forward Cos. and connect them with line formed by his rear 5 Cos. or to retire them in rear and so form a safe line saw I informed 3rd Canadians of this. This I trust was done some time ago. Please inform Canadian Div.

From 27th Div. 3.30 am.

Received verbally by 1st Cdn. Div.

* *Copy not available.*

† *Sic Northumberland.*

648

To 13th, 14th, 16th, 15th, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Battalions, 3rd Field Co. C.E.
B.M.841. 25th April, 1915.

You are to advance from the G.H.Q. line and extend on a line ZANNEBEEK in square C.18.c. to our present left in C.16.d. aaa Our right will be in touch with the DURHAM and YORK Brigade and our left in touch with the BUFFS ass The 14th Bn. will hold from the left to C.17.c.3.3. aaa, 3rd

Bn. from right of 14th to C.17.d.0.3. aaa 2nd Bn. from right of 3rd Bn. to C.17.d.2.3. aaa 16th and 13th Bns. from right of 2nd Bn. to creek in C.18.c. ass Line will extend when attacking troops have passed through am Entrench line.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 4.10 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By hand received by 3rd Cdn. Bn. and 3rd Fd.

Coy. C.E.

(See 644)

649

Priority to Canadian Divn.

G.L.872. 25th April, 1915.

Following received from eighty-fifth Bde. timed seven fifty a.m. begins. The two battalions York and Durham Bde. are retiring through VERLORENHOEK aaa Brigadier states battalion on his left retired at the double that he hung on as long as he could and has now retired aaa Am rallying brigade and have halted them below FREZENBERG ridge I do not understand the situation because I do not know the plan of attack but as far as can be observed there is nothing to stop the Germans advancing from FORTUIN to VERLORENHOEK and cutting my communications with my battalions in the trenches ends addressed Canadian Division repeated Fifth Corps twentyseventh Division.

From Twenty-eighth Division 8.40 am.

LOCH, Lt. Col. G.S.

By wire received 9.15 a.m.

By hand received Canadian Div.

650

To 1st Canadian Div.

848. 25th April, 1915.

3rd Inf. Bde. and 2nd and 3rd Bns. were advanced in front of wire on line ordered this morning but fell back to G.H.Q. line on retirement of 10th Bde. attack through them ass Now hold G.H.Q. line aaa
From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 7.55 am.

G. B. HUGHES, Lt.-Col.

By hand received 4.00 p.m.

(See 648 and 668)

651

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.G.873. 25th April, 1915.

My bus Buff, Middlesex, East Yorks, York and Lanes Kings Own have been con-

tinuously in firing line from afternoon of twenty-second without relief aaa I most earnestly request that these battalions may be relieved as early as possible to obtain rest and proper food aaa I would point out that before going to you they had done their tour of work in my front line trenches without any rest.

From Twenty-eighth Division 8.55 a.m.

E. GROGAN, Major, G.S.
(See 628)

652

To 1st Canadian Division.

G.B.25. 25th April, 1915.

Situation unchanged. Heavy rifle fire heard to our right between ST. JULIEN and FORTUIN aaa 3rd Can. Inf. Bde. Hdqrs. being shelled, but Genl. Turner still remaining aaa Our line to East from here runs from C.16. d.5.3. to C.17.c.3.4. to Farm C.17.d.1.9. Thence line appears to extend to about centre C.18 but am unable to observe properly aaa Our troops in G.H.Q. Line in vicinity of this Farm now being heavily shelled from direction of Wood in C.10 and 11 aaa Will remain with Genl. Turner pending further developments.

From Colonel Lamb, 8.50 a.m.

H. J. LAMB, G.S.
*Endorsed "seen A. Hull, Brig.-Gen. 9.22 am."
and initialled "C.H.M."*
(See 668)

653

To 5th Corps.

GZ. 25th April, 1915.

My cyclists to the north of me report that French near BOESINGHE attacked last night but were repulsed the Germans then counter attacked but were also repulsed aaa French blew up pontoon bridge at BOESINGHE during the counter attack aaa Germans were all driven across the canal last night.

From Canadian Divn. 9.08 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

654

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M. 1. 25th April, 1915.

Situation at 9 a.m. aaa Attacks on ST. JULIEN and Wood have failed aaa Casualties have been heavy aaa The whole of

15135-19½

10th Bde. and three Bus. of Northumberland Bde. have been used aaa Remaining. under my hand one Bn. Northumberland Bde. and one Bn. Royal Irish Regt. which I am keeping in reserve in case of counter attack on my right aaa Have no news of Second Canadian Bde. or Suffolk and 12th London aaa General CURRIE said to be in FORTUIN aaa Have sent cyclist Orderly also mounted officer to clear up situation about FORTUIN aaa Addressed Canadian Div. repeated 27th Div. and Composite Bde.

From 10th Inf. Bde. 9.15 a.m.

J. H. MACBRIEN, Major.
Repeated to V Corps 11.10 a.m.
(See 652)

655

To 28th Division.

G. 4. 25th April, 1915. In reply to G.L. 872.

(See 649)

Could you direct 85th Brigade to make the two Bus. of York and Durham Bde. advance again towards FORTUIN so as to close gap on left of our second brigade.

From 1st Canadian Division. 9.20 am.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel, G.S.
(See 649)

656

To 10th Infantry Brigade.

G. 8. 25th April, 1915.

If you consider further advance impossible consolidate your ground and hang on aaa Fill in gap between you and left of 2nd Canadian (Bde. at D. 7. utilising any troops holding G.H.Q. Line aaa If your troops are not in ST. JULIEN order C.R.A. at ST. JEAN to turn all guns on ST. JULIEN aaa.

From 1st Canadian Division. 9.45 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.
(See 640 and 654)

657

To 28th Division.

Observing Officer reports from 866 Bat. that an attack appears to be being prepared from direction of PASSCHENDAELE aaa Enemy observed advancing in masses from D. 8-9 and entrenching in spite of artillery fire in HANNEBEEK stream aaa 27th Divas. have sent me K.S.L.I. and 84th Bde. have WELCH intact-the former is about C.29b. C.30a. land the latter behind FREZENBERG ridge aaa have patrols out

in 3 directions searching for Gen. Hull but no one in the attacking force knows his whereabouts aaa Am being shelled by H.E. from the North aaa WIELTJE is absolutely vacated-it has been and is being heavily shelled and patrol sent there stopped by our artillery officer who sent him back and stated that he had been looking for Gen. HULL but was unable to find him aaa Am not in direct communication with my left battalion in the firing line my line having been out but attack from PASSCHEN-DAELE is reported to be directed in fair strength on Square D.16. Ends Addressed Fifth Corps Canadian Division, twenty-eighth Division.

From 85th Inf. Bde. 11.00 a.m.

Repeated 1st Canadian Div. 1.05 p.m.

By hand received 2.00 p.m.

658

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.R. 487. 25th April, 1915.

Corps reserve Durham Light Inf. Bde. (less one battn) detached and two battns. York and Durham Bde. hardly fit to use are here aaa Reference 10th Inf. Bde. B.M. 1. (see 654) cannot find General Hull although I have sent in every direction aaa Can you say where he is. Added. Can. Divn. Rept. 5th Corps.

From 27th Divn. 11.20 a.m.

By wire received Cdn. Div. 1.10 p.m.

(See 654)

659

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

GA. 58. 25th April, 1915.

Please inform commanders of all Infantry tides. you are in touch with that strong reinforcements are coming up to our assistance.

From 1st Canadian Div. 11.50 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.

Repeated by 2nd C.I.B. Gravenstafel to 7th and 8th Bns. 3.25 p.m.

660

To O.C. 8th Batt.

25th April, 1916.

I consider it imperative that steps be taken to arrange an attack to clear our left front. The Suffolks and Durham L.I. on our right and your immediate left seem disinclined to take the offensive. Our advanced line must be reinforced and relieved by night fall if attack is not made. Please get in

touch with G.O.C. 2nd Can. .*Id.* Bde. and advise him of situation. Also ask for instructions. Enemy on left front of our supporting line is being held but on right is advancing.

From O.C. 7th En. 12 noon.

V. W. ODLUM, Major.

By hand received 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. before

12.40 p.m.

(See 662 and 663)

661

To 13th Inf. Bde., Lt. Col. Geddes, 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

GA. 59. 25th April, 1915.

The French state they will launch an attack at 1 p.m. from their line in C. 7 and C. 14 toward PILCKEM co-operate with fire from your trenches.

From 1st Canadian Div. 12.30 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.

662

To 2nd Inf. Bde. Wieltje.

B.M. 2a. 25th April, 1915.

Durhams and Suffolks, 10th and 7th extend from house at D.8 northwest through D.8.a. They are subjected to Maxim gun fire and sniping from houses in D.7.c.3.7. Major Odlum in charge of 10th and 7th on left says it is imperative to arrange attack to clear left front. We can only hang on. Can we get any artillery support and how is attack along ST.JULIEN-POELCAPPELLE Road proceeding, where are 1st Brigade units. See nothing of them on our left.

From 2nd Inf. Bde., 5th Bn. H.Q.

(Written by Br.-Gen. A. W. Currie.)

Received and relayed by 2nd C.I.B., Wieltje, to Gen.

Hull 2.45 p.m. and to 1st C.I.B. 4.20 p.m.

(See 660)

663

To O.C. 7th & 10th Bus.

B.M.a.3. 25th April, 1915.

Your message No. 1 (see 660) received I have informed Hdqrs. at Wieltje and am sending message on to Lipsett. We must hang on at least to night fall. Can you locate maxim gun said to be in D.7.e.3.7.

Am trying to get information where our artillery is.

From O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. 12.45 p.m. at Hdqrs. 5th Bu.

By hand received.

(See 660 and 662)

664

To 10th Inf. Bde.

G.3. 25th April, 1915.

Airman reports that he saw this morning trenches occupied by British troops running at the bottom end of C.12.d. and D.7.c. aaa This is undoubtedly the left of our 1st Bde. which was sent last night to connect with 3rd Canadian Bde. aaa Try to connect with them.

From Canadian Div. 1.05 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

(Note: These were German not British trenches.)

665

To Canadian Div.

25th April, 1915.

Cyclist reports enemy holds wood C.10.d. and ST. JULIEN aaa FORTUIN doubtful enemy close to line of stream running south of D.8 and 9.

From 5th Division 124 p.m.

By wire received 2.40 p.m.

(Note: Correct as regards St. Julien only. Fortuin was in British hands and British line was 500 to 1500 yards north of stream.)

666

To 10th Infantry Bde.

G.12. 25th April, 1915.

28th Div. report enemy attacking from the north in long columns which are in D.7.8. aaa Please inform 2nd Canadian Bde.

From Canadian Division. 1.30 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

Relayed 3.00 p.m. by 2nd C.I.B. Wieltje; by hand received 2nd C.I.B.. Gravenstafel 345 p.m.

667

Priority to 27th Div.

G.14. 25th April, 1915. In reply to G.R.487.

In view of the strong hostile attack being made against left of 28th Div. and my right would you order Durham L.I. Bde. to move to the line now being made by the 28th Div. along the FORTUIN-PASSCHEN-DAELE road in Squares D.13. and 14 aaa If they cannot get as far as the road they should occupy line of the stream in D.24 and 19. (Sic C24 and D.19.)

From Canadian Div. 1.45 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

(See 658)

668

To First Canadian Division.

B.M. 856. 25th April, 1915.

Occupying G.H.Q. line as this morning aaa No new information regarding situation since Col. Lamb's report aaa.

From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.50 p.m.

By hand received 4.00 p.m.

(See 648, 650 and 652)

669

To 5th Corps.

G.16. 25th April, 1915.

In view of strong attack made against left of 28th Div. and my right am ordering Gen. Snow to move Durham L.I. Bde. to hold line made by 28th Div. along the road in square D.13 and 14 aaa If by any chance they cannot get to this road in time they are to hold line of stream in D24 and 19 (Sic 0.24 and D.19) aaa Addressed 5th Corps, rept 28th Div. and 10th Bde.

From Canadian Div. 1.55 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col.

Relayed at 3.06 p.m. by 2nd C.I.B. Wieltje to 2nd C.I.B.

Gravenstafel and received by hand 5.05 p.m. with location "D24 and 19" changed to "D14."

(See 615 and 667)

670

Priority to Canadian Div.

G.R.488. 25th April, 1915.

Canadian divn. have asked me to assist in repelling attack said to be directed against left of 28th Div. from direction of PASSCHENDAELE aaa Am sending forward G.O.C. D.L.I. Inf. Bde. and one battalion (9th D.L.I.) to VERLORENHOEK thence to move northwards towards squares C25 (Sic C.24.) and D.19 (area 1000" S. of Fortuin and 1600" eastwards) aaa Two remaining battalions (6th and 7th D.L.I.) ready to follow instantly if required when situation more clear addressed 5th Corps Canadian Divn. 8th (Sic 85th) Inf. Bde. 28th Div. and Gen. HULL.

From 27th Div. 3.15 p.m.

By wire received 1st Cdn. Div. 440 p.m. and by Gen. Hull.

(See 667 and 669)

670a

Notes made by Brigade Major End C.I.B. of conversation; about 316 p.m. 26th April, 1915.

fill gap

Bde.

3 Battns Durham Light Inf. Bde.

6th

7th

9th

come under orders Gen. Currie

to strengthen his line

join up with troops N. of Fortuin

form up line Zonnebec about 8.30 p.m.

No record of whether this conversation was with 10th Bde. or 1st Cdn. Div.

Field message:

G.O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde.

3 Bus. Durham L. Inf. Bde. are placed at your disposal for tactical purposes. It has been ordered to move to position of assembly South of stream D20 and will be there by 8.30 pin.

J. H. MACBRIEN, Major.

25.4.15.

10th Inf. Bde.

By hand received by B.M. Wielkje. Untimed, written about 3.15 p.m.

Annotations on above by Brigade Major End C.I.B.

L.O. Capt. Clayton will meet L.O. 2nd C.I.B. at point D.14.d.9.0.

This is held over for present.

(See 669)

670b

To Major Mersereau, Staff Major, 2nd Inf. Bde. B.M. 40.

Reference message by General Snow 27th Div. to let Canadian Division regarding movement of reinforcing troops for General Hull. The battalion moving now (9th D.L.I.) is desired to halt at VERLORENHOEK and the Staff Officer who was to be at that place, to please report to General Hull at his Headquarters C.28.a.6.0. (S.W. of Wielkje.)

From O.C. 10th Bde.

H. K. BETTY,
for O.C. 10th I. Bde.

Untimed, written about 5.00 p.m. 26th April, 1915.

Annotation by Brigade Major End C.I.B.

Gen. Currie report to Gen. Hull soon as possible after dark.

(See 670)

671

To O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde. (Wielkje)
B.M.a. 7. 25th April, 1915.

Do not know where tat Battalion is but do not think they are connected with our left in any way as our left is being fired on from river. 8th Battalion heavily attacked, hurry reinforcements. Disposition of troops is the same. Will hang on aaa Enemy operating machine gun ruin farm D.8.a.52. aaa Troops very tired.

From 2nd lief. Bde. (Gravenstafel). 3.22 p.m.

In reply to B.M. 29 timed 116 p.m. By hand received 2nd C.I.B. Wielkje about 6 p.m.

(See 662)

672

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
25th April, 1915.

D.a.b.c. trench had all men killed or wounded. A reinforcing company was driven out by shell fire which is reported to have destroyed trench. The 8th D.L.I. Canadians and Cheshire (1 Coy.) are holding line from the Hqrs. Farm to the road E. of it. I have a small reserve of about 100 men. Enemy do not appear to be pressing attack except by artillery fire.

G. A. STEVENS,
Capt. & Adj.,
8th D.L.I.

4.07 p.m.

Received 4.20 p.m.

673

Extract from Supplement to
THE LONDON GAZETTE
of 22nd June, 1916

No. 29202. WAR OFFICE, 23rd June, 1915.

His Majesty the KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and Man for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty:

Captain. Francis Alexander Caron Scrimger. Canadian Army Medical Service, Medical Officer, 14th Battalion, Royal Montreal Regiment.

On the afternoon of 25th April, 1915, in the neighbourhood of Ypres, when in charge of an advanced dressing station in some farm buildings which were being heavily shelled by the enemy, he directed under heavy fire the removal of the wounded, and he himself carried a severely wounded officer out of a

stable in search of a place of greater safety. When he was unable alone to carry this officer further, he remained with him under fire till help could be obtained. During the very heavy fighting between 22nd and 25th April, Captain Scrimger displayed continuously day and night the greatest devotion to his duty among the wounded at the front.

Captain Scrimger was born in Montreal, P. Que., 10th February, 1881. A graduate of Medicine (McGill, '05), he was commissioned Captain in the C.A.M.C. 13th April, 1912, and appointed Medical Officer of the Montreal Heavy Brigade, CA. On 22nd September, 1914, he was appointed M.O. of the 14th Battalion, C.E.F., with which he proceeded overseas. Having been detached to No. 1 General Hospital, Netheravon, on 21st January, 1915, he rejoined his unit in France on 23rd April. He left the 14th Battalion in December, 1915, and served in various Canadian hospitals in England and in France until demobilization. He was promoted major on 5th December, 1916, and lieutenant-colonel on 21st April, 1919. He died on 13th February, 1937.

674

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G. 13. 25th April, 1915.

Your Bde. will come under the orders of Gen. Bulfin commanding 28th Div. at 7 pan. and it is hoped that you will be relieved by the 11th Bde. tonight.

From Canadian Division 6.00 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt. Col.
Received.

675

OPERATION ORDER NO. 11

by

LIEUT.-GENERAL E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
COMMANDING 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION,
25TH APRIL, 1915.

1. The line of trenches held by the Canadian Division will be strengthened as much as possible tonight.

2. The following redistribution of the line will be made:—

The 13th Inf. Bde. (including 4th Rifle Bde.) will take over the line now held by Colonel Geddes, that is from the FARM in C.15.d. to approximately the FARM in C.16.d. Colonel Geddes will send back the units relieved from

the front line to POTIJZE where they will report to General Snow. Colonel Geddes will himself remain at ST. JEAN with his present reserve.

3. The K.O.Y.L.I. and Q.V. Rifles will rejoin the 13th Bde.; the 10th Bde. will take over the line on the right of the 13th Bde. to the ST. JULIEN FORTUIN road where they will connect with General Bulfin's troops. General Hull will only command his own Bde. and the R. Irish. The Northd. Bde. under its Brigadier will form a divisional reserve south of WIELTJE.

4. The 1st Canadian Bde. will be assembled on the west bank of the Canal and take over charge of the bridges now held by the 13th Bde.

5. The 3rd Canadian Bde. will be assembled near LABRIQUE.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 6.15 p.m. to

Copy No. 1 — 13th Bde.
2 — Colonel Geddes.
3 — 10th Bde.
4 — Northd. Bde.
5 — 1st Canadian Bde.
6 — 3rd Canadian Bde.
7 — Divl. Artillery.
8 — Divl. Engineers.
9 — A.A. & Q.M.G.
10 — 5th Corps.
11 — Divl. Signal Company.
12 — 28th Division.

676

To 11th Inf. Bde. 83rd, 84th, 85th Bdes. and Cdn. Div.
G.L. 882. 25th April, 1915.

Eleventh infantry brigade has been placed under orders of G.O.C. twenty-eighth Division aaa This brigade will move so as to reach FORTUIN not later than nine p.m. tonight marching via road running north in square H.12.c.--north side of YPRES-ST. JEAN-WIELTJE-FORTUIN aaa One platoon divisional cyclists has been ordered to report to eleventh infantry brigade at five thirty p.m. and will remain attached to the brigade aaa This platoon will provide a guide for the road to FORTUIN aaa Canadian division report present line runs from original trenches in D.2.d.10.0-D.8.b.9.9. D.8.a.0.7--thence straight to FORTUIN--thence due west aaa brigadier commanding eleventh infantry brigade will be responsible for *this* line from original trenches on the right to the road running south east in square C.18 d. and will if possible occupy it tonight and hold it strongly as security of the whole trench line southwards depends on the enemy

being kept well to the north of this line aaa If the line named cannot be occupied a new line will be dug in best position, north of the FORTUIN road in touch with the original trench line on the right and tenth infantry brigade on the left aaa The line will be immediately reconnoitred and reorganised aaa Brigadier commanding eleventh brigade will assume command of all troops at present holding or supporting this line these include second Canadian brigade one battalion first Canadian brigade three battalions Durham Light infantry brigade two battalions York and Durham brigade two battalions eightyfourth infantry brigade besides various companies entrenched on south side of the FORTUIN road aaa As soon as the situation permits all detached units will be withdrawn and collected in rear of the line these units will be returned to the brigades to which they belong if they belong to the twenty-seventh twenty-eighth or Canadian divisions with the exception of the second Canadian brigade which will remain under orders of the eleventh infantry brigade till such time as it can be dispensed with aaa Such territorial units as can be spared will be sent to POTIJZE to report to twenty-seventh division and eleventh infantry brigade will report to twenty-eighth division stating what units are sent back aaa Brigadier commanding eleventh infantry brigade will report situation every three hours through eightyfifth infantry brigade headquarters commencing at nine p.m. aaa Position of eleventh brigade headquarters will be given in first report aaa Guides will be provided at second Canadian brigade headquarters C.274.7.6.

From Twenty-eighth Division 625 p.m.

LOCH, Lt.-Col.

By hand received 1st Cdn. Div. 7.30 p.m.

677

To 1st Canadian Divn.
G.Z.322. 25th April, 1915.

My Brigade headquarters shelled and burnt staff third Inf. all well' G.H.Q. line is held but will reinforce from reserve Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers as many men badly shaken aaa My Hqrs. will be in small house three hundred yards East (sic *South*) of former house close in rear of trenches.

From G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.30 p.m.

By wire received 8.10 p.m.

678

To 1st Canadian Divn.
G.C.26. 25th April, 1915.

O.C. 10th Bde. has cancelled order to Durham Bde. to move. The 11th Bde. will take their place.

From Lt. Col. Lamb, 6.45 p.m.

By wire received 7.30 p.m.

(See 627 and 670b)

679

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.A.17. 25th April, 1915.

At four a.m. this morning the first line trenches 2nd Canadian Bde. were held by 5th Battalion in Section one and by one company eighth Section IIa and two Cos. Durhams in Section II B and C. About 12.30 p.m. the Durhams left their trenches for no apparent reason other than a shelling by mortars. The one Company 8th were driven out the balance of seventh and tenth battalions *who* held a second line close to Gravenstafel ridge to the left of 8th Battalion Hdqrs. were simply blown out of their trenches by Artillery fire. The whole line was forced off the Gravenstafel Ridge, but denied it to the Germans *who* attacked in very great strength from Sections D3 and nine. My information now is that the 5th Battalion still hold front trenches (but this I doubt as no officers 5th Battalion have reported to me) the balance of the 10th 8th and 7th are being collected in Wieltje what disposition of them shall I make tonight.

From O.C. 2nd Inf. Bde.

A. W. CURRIE.

Sent from Wieltje about 11 p.m.

By hand received, 2.30 a.m. 26th.

680

To 80th Infantry Brigade.
26th April, 1915.

Following message received from Commander in Chief am Begins Enemy doubtless trying to exploit unexpected success met with Thursday night but we know he cannot be strong in numbers and his troops are very exhausted and he must have suffered heavily aaa Tide should turn in our favour this afternoon ends You should convey this message to all under your command aaa Addressed 80th Bde. Repeated 81st and 82nd Bdes.

From 27th Division, 3.30 p.m.

681

To 80th Infantry Brigade.
G.S.577, 30th April, 1915.

Following message received from Plumer's force begins P.129. The Force Commander is pleased to communicate the following special order of the day, received from the Field Marshal commanding AAA Begins AAA Lt.-Gen. Sir H. Plumer, K.C.B., I desire to convey to you and the troops under you who have so splendidly repulsed the attacks of the enemy my warmest appreciation of the skill evinced by commanders of all ranks and magnificent courage and endurance displayed by officers, N.C.O's. and men I wish to make particular mention of the 84th and 85th Bdes. of the 28th Div. who with the Canadian Div. so bravely withstood the German onslaught, on the night of 22nd: 23rd AAA As regards the Canadians their Prime Minister wires to me to say with what pride Canada has heard of the gallantry of her sons and how every recruiting office in the Dominion tells of the instant response to the resolution to support their comrades in the Field and strengthen still further the bonds of Empire with more and yet more men AAA J. D. French F/M ends.

From 27th Division.

682

From General FOCH.

To Field-Marshal Sir JOHN FRENCH,

Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces.

At the moment when the 45th French Division is once again about to find itself in contact with the British Forces to the North of YPRES, I have to thank you for the very efficient aid rendered to this Division by your troops after the incidents of the 22nd April.

The 45th Division will recall, how, in order to give it time to recover from the effect of the asphyxiating gases and to return to the offensive, the V Corps in a generous spirit of self-sacrifice and despite severe losses, came into action on the 22nd April with heroic bravery, drawing on itself a portion of the enemy's attacks.

I should be much obliged if you would be good enough to transmit to the G.O.C. V Corps, the grateful thanks of the French troops and my warm congratulations on the superb conduct of his Corps.

F. FOCH.

*(Appendix to War Diary 80th Bde. 27th
(British) Div. May, 1915)*

683

Headquarters, 2nd Army,
6th May, 1915.

My dear ALDERSON,

I have purposely refrained from writing to express my thanks to you and the gallant Canadian Division for the glorious deeds on the night of the 22nd of April, 1915, and following days, for before doing so I wished to learn the fullest particulars of the many incidents of the battle, which, owing to the scattered nature of the fighting forced on them by the most exceptional and difficult situation, it was impossible to glean at once.

The more details I learn, the greater to me does the resourcefulness and bravery of Brigadiers, Battalion Commanders, and individuals appear, and I am convinced that with less gallant and determined troops, the disaster which occurred outside the line they were holding might have been converted into a serious defeat of our troops.

I regret extremely the loss of so many brave officers and troops, but they did not lay down their lives in vain.

I have visited Brigadiers and Battalion Commanders, and expressed my admiration and thanks, but I have found it impossible to visit Artillery and R.E. and Medical Units all of which shared equally with their Infantry comrades in the honours of that desperate fighting.

Where all have vied with each other in their successful efforts to restore the situation by determined offensive action, it would be invidious to mention individuals by name, but I should like you to communicate to the whole Division my thanks and admiration as Army Commander for the services they rendered to the 2nd Army during the critical period following the Germans' successful attack on our Allies on the night of the 22nd April.

Yours very sincerely,

H. L. SMITH-DORRIEN.

To: Lieut.-General E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
Commanding Canadian Division.

Published as an appendix to 1st Cdn. Div. Routine Orders dated 8th May, 1916.

(See 681 and 682)

684

Secret

OPERATION ORDER No. 12

By

LIEUT.-GENERAL E. A. H. ALDERSON, CB.,
COMDG. CANADIAN DIVISION

26th April, 1915.

1. French troops strongly reinforced are attacking with their right on the YPRESLANGEMARCK road. The Lahore Division

which will be deployed by 120 p.m. from the Farm in C.28.a. to YPRES-LANGEMARCK road will attack with its right on the wood in C.10.d. The 5th Corps will co-operate in the attack.

2. An artillery bombardment will begin at 120 p.m. and be continued till 2 p.m. during which time the Lahore Division will advance. At 2 p.m. rapid fire will begin and continue till 2.5 p.m. after which the assault will take place.

3. A Bn. of the 10th Bde. will advance in co-operation with the Lahore Div. between the wood in C.10.d. and the WIELTJE-ST. JULIEN road. The Northumbrian Bde. will attack ST. JULIEN and advance astride of WIELTJE-ST. JULIEN road at the same time as the Lahore Div. moves forward.

4. The troops holding front line of Canadian Div. will assist the attack by fire.

5. Col. Geddes will move the three Bns. now in reserve at ST. JEAN to the G.H.Q. 2nd Line in C23.c. and 29.a, as soon as the Northumbrian Bde. clears the ground.

6. The 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will move to position south of WIELTJE and form the Divl. Reserve as soon as the Lahore Div. commences its advance.

7. The artillery of Canadian Div. will support the attack of the Bn. of 10th Bde. and the Northumbrian Bde. by the heaviest possible artillery fire on the German position between the wood in C.10.d. and ST. JULIEN inclusive.

8. Reports to Chateau des Trois Tour.
C. F. ROMER, Colonel.
Gen. Staff.

Issued at 12.15 p.m.

- Copy No. 1 — 10th Bde.
2 — Northumbrian Bde.
3 — C.R.A.
4 — 13th Bde.
5 — 3rd Bde.
6 — 1st Bde.
7 — Col. Geddes.
8 — 5th Corps.
9 — 25th Div.

685

Advanced Headquarters, 2nd Army,
27th April, 1916.

My dear ROBERTSON,

In order to put the situation before the Commander-in-Chief, I propose to enter into a certain amount of detail.

You will remember that I told Colonel Montgomery (HM. de F., General Staff, G.H.Q.) the night before last, after seeing General Putz's orders, that as he was only

putting in a small proportion of his troops (and those at different points) to the 'actual attack, I did not anticipate any great results. You know what happened—the French right, instead of gaining ground, lost it, and the left of the Lahore Division did the same, but the British regiment on the right of the Lahore Division, the Manchesters, did very well and took some enemy trenches and held them for a considerable time.

The Northumberland Brigade to their right made a very fine attack on St. Julien and got into it, but were unable to remain there.

Away to the right, between St. Julien and our old trenches about square D.10 (85th Brigade area), there was a good deal of fighting, but with fairly satisfactory results—the Germans eventually retiring.

The enemy's losses are very heavy. Artillery observing officers claim to have mown them down over and over again during the day. At times, the fighting appears to have been heavy, and our casualties are by no means slight.

I enclose you on a separate paper the description of the line the troops are on at this moment. I saw General Putz last night about to-day's operations, and he told me he intended to resume the offensive with very great vigour. I saw his orders, in which he claims to have captured Het Sao, but on my asking him what he meant he said the houses of that place which are to the west of the canal. He told me also that the success at Lizerne had been practically nil in fact, that the Germans were still in possession of the village or were last night.

From General Putz's orders for to-day, he is sending one brigade to cross the river east of Brielen to carry forward the troops on the east of the canal in the direction of Pilekem, and he assured me that this brigade was going to be pushed in with great vigour.

It was not till afterwards that I noticed that, to form his own reserve, he is withdrawing two battalions from the east of the canal and another two battalions from the front line in the same part to be used as a reserve on that bank of the river, so the net result of his orders is to send over six fresh battalions to the fighting line and to withdraw four which had already been employed.

I have lately received General Joppe's orders. He is the general commanding the attack towards Pilekem on the east of the canal, and I was horrified to see that he, instead of using the whole of this brigade across the canal for this offensive, is leaving one regiment back at Brielen, and only putting the other regiment across the canal to attack—so the net result of these latter orders with

regard to the strength of the troops on the east of the canal for the fresh offensive is the addition of one battalion.

I need hardly say that I at once represented the matter pretty strongly to General Putz, but I want the Chief to know this as I do not think he must expect that the French are going to do anything very great-in fact, although I have ordered the Lahore Division to co-operate when the French attack, at 1.15 p.m., I am pretty sure that our line tonight will not be in advance of where it is at the present moment.

I fear the Lahore Division have had very heavy casualties, and so they tell me have the Northumbrians, and I am doubtful if it is worth losing any more men to regain this French ground unless the French do something really big.

Now, if you look at the map, you will see that the line the French and ourselves are now on allows the Germans to approach so close with their guns that the area east of Ypres will be very difficult to hold, chiefly because the roads approaching it from the west are swept by shell fire, and were all yesterday, and are being today. Again, they are now able to shell this place, Poperinghe, and have done it for the last three days; all day yesterday at intervals -there were shells close to my Report Centre and splinters of one struck the house opposite in the middle of the day, and splinters of another actually struck the house itself about midnight-in other words, they will soon render this place unhealthy.

If the French are not going to make a big push, the only line we can hold permanently and have a fair chance of keeping supplied, would be the G.H.Q. line passing just east of Wieltje and Potijze with a curved switch which is being, prepared through Hooze, the centres of Squares I.18.d., I.24.b. and d. (that is by Hooze and Sanctuary Wood), to join on to our present line about a thousand yards northeast of *Rill 60*.

This, of course, means the surrendering of a great deal of trench line, but any intermediate line, short of that, will be extremely difficult to hold, owing to the loss of the ridge to the east of Zonnebeke, which any withdrawal must entail.

I think it right to put these views before the Chief, but at the same time to make it clear that, although I am preparing for the worst, I do not think we have arrived at the time when it is necessary to adopt those measures. In any case, a withdrawal to that line in one fell swoop would be almost impossible on account of the enormous amount of guns and paraphernalia which will have to be withdrawn first, and therefore, if withdrawal becomes necessary, the first contraction

would be, starting from the left, "our present line as far as the spot where the Haanebeke stream crosses the road at the junction of Squares D.7 and D.13 (1,500 yards east of St. Julien), thence along the subsidiary line which is already prepared, as far as the SouthEast corner of Square J2 (1,500 yards southeast of Frezenberg), from whence a switch has been prepared into our old line on the east side of J.14 b., i.e. just excluding the Polygone Wood" I intend to-night if nothing special happens to re-organize the new front and to withdraw superfluous troops West of Ypres.

I always have to contemplate the possibility of the Germans gaining ground west of Lizerne, and this, of course, would make the situation more impossible-in fact, it all comes down to this, that unless the French do something really vigorous the situation might become such as to make it impossible for us to hold any line east of Ypres.

It is very difficult to put a subject such as this in a letter without appearing pessimistic--I am not in the least but as an Army Commander I have of course to provide for every eventuality and I think it right to let the Chief know what is running in my-mind.

More British troops, of course, could restore the situation-but this, I consider to be out of the question, as it would interfere with a big offensive elsewhere which is after all the crux of the situation and will do more to relieve this situation than anything else.

Since writing above, our Cavalry report that the French actually took the whole of Lizerne last night capturing 120 Germans, and are now attacking the bridgehead covering the bridge leading over the canal to Steenstraat.

General Putz has answered my protest and has ordered General Joppe to put in the whole of the fresh Brigade and not to leave one Regiment of it in reserve at Brielen. The attack is to commence at 1.15 p.m. and we are to assist with heavy artillery fire, and the Lahore Division is only to advance if they see the French troops getting on.

Our Cavalry is where it was last night, one division west of Lizerne, one dismounted in reserve holding G.H.Q. trenches east of Ypres, one dismounted in huts at Vlamertinghe.

I am still at my Advanced Headquarters in Poperinghe. Whether I remain here to-night again I do not know, the main advantage of my being here is my close touch with General Putz and my being able to impress, my views upon him.

Yours sincerely,

H. L. SMITH-DORRIEN.

British Official History of the War--Military Operations, Vol. III--France and Belgium 1916. Appendix 29, pp. 400-402.*

686

TELEPHONED MESSAGE¹

2.15 p.m. 27th April.

C.G.S. To: SECOND ARMY

Chief does not regard situation nearly so unfavourable as your letter represents. He thinks you have abundance of troops and especially notes the large reserves you have. He wishes you to act vigorously with the full means available in co-operating with and assisting the French attack having due regard to his previous instructions that the combined attack should be simultaneous. The French possession of Lizerne and general situation on Canal seems to remove anxiety as to your left flank. Letter follows by Staff Officer.

British Official History of the War—Military Operations Vol. III—France and Belgium, 1915. Appendix 30, p. 402.*

¹ The record is in the writing of the C.G.S. Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Robertson.

686a

To Col. Geddes Detachment thro 10th Brigade. G. 80. 27th April, 1915.

Corps directs that the units of your detachment are to return to their Divisions who will inform you when and where they wish them sent.

From 1st Canadian Division. 9.35 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel,
G. S.

Received 10 p.m.

687

Extract from letter to General Joffre from his liaison officer with General Foch.

...L'attaque Joppe a d'abord progresse jusqu'aux tranchees ennemies. Accueillie par des gas asphyxiants, elle a reflue a 400-500 metres en deca de sa ligne de depart. Recommencee a 17h. 30, elle avait repris, puis depasse de nouveau cette ligne vets 19 heures. Ce matin la situation n'a pas changee..

"Les Armies Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume. Extract d'Annexe N° 1461. p.1088.

TRANSLATION

Joppe's attack at first went forward as far as the enemy's trenches. Assailed by asphyxiating gas it recoiled 400 to 500 meters on this side of its jumping off line. Recommended at 5.30 it retook, and then went on again beyond, that line at 7 p.m. This morning the situation is unchanged.

688

Extract from letter to General Joffre from his liaison officer with General Foch.

...Le general Foch est tree calme, tree confiant. Il ne veut pas appeler a lui d'autres troupes, estimant avoir pour le moment asses de monde pour son front. Il va tenter de convaincre le marechal de la necessite pout lea Anglais de faire un effort violent pour retablir Ja situation...

"Les Armies Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume. Extract d'Annexe 1468. p. 1044.

TRANSLATION

General Foch is very calm and very confident. But he does not want to call up other troops for he estimates that for the moment he has enough for his front. He is going to try to convince Field-Marshal French of the necessity of the English making a violent effort to re-establish the situation.

689

GRUPE PROVISOIRE
DU NORD.
ETAT-MAJOR.

3e Bureau. Q.G., le 28 avril 1816.

NOTE POUR MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL
FRENCH.

Comme suite a l'entretien* de ce matin, 28 avril 1915, le general Pooh a l'honneur d'exposer par ecrit a Monsieur Is marechal lea considerations qu'il a developpees de vive voix.

Monsieur le marechal a fait entrevoir au general Foch la necessite dans laquelle il pourrait se trouver de se retirer our la ligne: *Fortuin, Frezenberg*, traversee de la route *Ypres, Menin*, entre *Hooge* et *Veldhoeck*, ancienne ligne *cots 60*, etc.

Parce que:

1e. Les troupes anglaises qui soot etablies a rest de cette ligne soot tres fatiguees, tres eprouvees, difficiles a ravitailler.

2e. L'action autour d'*Ypres* eat une affaire secondaire a tote de celle a entreprendre plus .au sad. Bile ne doit absorber ni nos forces ni notre activite.

Sans nier la valeur de ces considerations, Is general Foch a l'honneur de faire observer que:

1e. La position nouvelle projetee par l'armee britannique tient Is pied des hauteurs, elle sera plus difficile a occuper que la position actuelle tracee sur ces hauteurs.

2è. L'ennemi maître des hauteurs abandonnées pourra l'attaquer en de bonnes conditions; il pourra, en outre, rapprocher d'Ypres son artillerie de Pest; frapper ainsi dans une direction nouvelle ce noeud de communications.

3è. Tant que l'ennemi occupe la région *Langemarck* et plus au sud, il tient sous son canon *Ypres*, *Vlamertinghe*, *Poperinghe*, ligne de ravitaillement anglaise. Par suite le ravitaillement des troupes faisant face à Pest restera difficile.

Au total, ce ravitaillement ne peut être assuré que par la reprise par les alliés de la région de *Langemarck* et non par un simple retrait.

4è. Après s'être replié volontairement sur la ligne *Fortuin cote 60*, il est à prévoir que l'on sera rejeté plus en arrière sur *Ypres*, le canal.

Le recul continuera sur un terrain où les positions sont de moins en moins fortes.

5è. Le recul de la ligne actuelle vers la ligne *Fortuin, cote 60* sera un aveu d'impuissance, il appellera une poussée allemande particulièrement renforcée. En outre des conditions tactiques supérieures précédemment énumérées, l'ascendant moral passé donc du côté allemand. On aura ainsi provoqué une nouvelle bataille d'Ypres, et cela dans des conditions matérielles et morales inférieures à celles où on l'a précédemment eue.

6è. Si la bataille plus au sud, vers *Neuve Chapelle, Arras*, doit être considérée comme plus féconde en résultats stratégiques, comme plus importante, on ne peut néanmoins songer à la préparer par un recul qui serait le commencement d'un échec dont la portée peut être grande.

Les conclusions à retenir de ce qui précède sont aux yeux du général Foch

1è. Le recul n'est pas à ordonner pour le moment; il doit être prosaïque. L'infanterie ennemie n'attaque pas dans la région considérée, il ne faut pas l'y appeler par la retraite; son artillerie seule y est en action; par des organisations défensives on peut en réduire les effets.

2è. Il est absolument nécessaire pour les armées alliées de maintenir l'attitude actuelle; l'attaque vers *Langemarck*; faire de nouveaux efforts pour reprendre de ce côté le terrain perdu, dont la possession permet seule de tenir à *Ypres* et environs.

La journée du 28 peut ne pas être décisive, mais celle du 29, grâce à l'arrivée d'une forte artillerie lourde, donnera sans doute des résultats, si l'armée britannique s'associe pleinement à l'offensive française.

Le général Foch a l'honneur, en conséquence, ce, de demander au M. le maréchal de ne pas entrevoir de retrait de ligne, en raison de ses profondes conséquences matérielles de bien vouloir se maintenir dans son ordre d'idées actuel, et d'appuyer l'offensive française pour reprendre avant tout la région de *Langemarck*, à partir du 29.

FOCH.

"Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume. Annexe 1467.pp1040-41-42.

*See 691.

(For British official translation see 690.)

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Headquarters,
28th April, 1915.

General adjoint
to the Commander-in-Chief.
Groups Provisoires
du Nord.

NOTE
FOR THE FIELD-MARSHAL COM
MANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
BRITISH FORCES

(1) In continuation of the interview of this morning, 28th April, 1915, General Foch has the honour to put in writing for the Field Marshal the arguments which he developed verbally.

(2) The Field Marshal indicated to General Foch the necessity in which he might find himself to retire to the line: Fortuin, Frezenburg, the Ypres-Menin road between Hooge and Veldhoek, old front Hill 60, for the reasons that

- (a) the British troops established east of this line are very tired, have suffered heavily and are difficult to supply;
- (b) the fighting round Ypres is a secondary matter in comparison to the scheme further south. It should absorb neither troops nor resources.

(3) Without denying the value of these arguments General Foch has the honour to observe:

- (a) the new position selected for the British Army is at the foot of the ridges, and will be more difficult to hold than the present one on the crest.
- (b) the enemy, master of the abandoned crest will be able to attack under favourable conditions; he will be able to bring his artillery nearer to Ypres from the east and thus shell from a new direction that junction of communication.

- (c) As long as the enemy occupies the Langemarck region and further south he holds under his guns Ypres, Vlamertinghe, Poperinghe, the British line of supply. Thus, the supply of troops facing east will remain difficult. To sum up, the supply can only be assured by the recapture by the Allies of the Langemarck region and not by a simple retirement.
- (d) If we retire voluntarily to the line Fortuin-Hill 60 it may be anticipated that we shall be driven further back on Ypres and the Canal. The withdrawal will be over ground where the positions are less and less strong.
- (e) The withdrawal of the present line to the line Fortuin-Hill 60 will be a confession of impotence, it will simply invite a very strong German effort. Besides the important tactical considerations already enumerated, the moral ascendancy will pass to the Germans. A new battle of Ypres will be provoked and that under conditions materially and morally worse than those under which the former was fought.
- (f) Even if the battle further south, towards Neuve Chapelle--Arras ought to be considered as more fertile in strategic results and more important, the preparation for it by a retirement is not to be thought of: for this would be the beginning of a set-back whose extent might well become very large.
- (4) The conclusions to be drawn from the above in the eyes of General Foch are:
- (a) The retirement should not be ordered for the moment; it should be forbidden. If the enemy infantry does not attack in the region under consideration it should not be provoked to one by a retreat. His artillery alone is in action; its effects can be reduced by defensive arrangements.
- (b) It is absolutely necessary for the Allied Armies to maintain their present attitude: the attack towards Langemarck; to make fresh efforts to recover the ground lost there, the possession of which alone permits the holding of Ypres and its environs.
- (5) The 28th April may not be important but the 29th, thanks to the arrival of a strong force of heavy artillery, will without doubt give results if the British Army co-operates fully with the French effort.
- (6) General Foch in consequence has the honour to request the Field Marshal not to consider any further the retirement from the

line on account of the serious consequences which would ensue, but to be good enough to keep to his present intention, and to support the French *offensive to retake the Langemarck region at all costs*,* beginning at noon on the 28th.

F. FOCH.

British Official History of the War. Military Operations Vol. III-France and Belgium, 1915. Appendix 33, pp. 404-405. (For original in French see 689)*

* NOTE: at all costs is, in the French version, *avant tout*.

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RESUME DE LA CONVERSATION DU
28 AVRIL 1915, 11h., ENTRE LE
GENERAL FOCH ET LE MARE
CHAL FRENCH.

La MARECHAL--Mes troupes sent trios fatiguees, mes ravitaillements deviennent diffi-tiles, je ne puffs tenir dans la situation defa-vorable oil je me trouve.

Notre grosse affaire en ce moment, cleat l'offensive au nord d'Arras, je ne veux pas la compromettre, en consommant mes reserves autour d'Ypres.

Je vais done me retablir en arriere sur la ligne Pertain, Frezenberg, Westhoek, car noun n'avons pas reussi hier, noun n'avons aucune chance-de mieux reussir aujourd'hui.

La GENERAL FOCH.--M. le marechal, sans doute la situation eat delicate, mail votre repli sur la ligne indiquee ne la retablira pas, au contraire.

Tart que noun n'aurons pas reoccupe Langemarck, vos communications et ravitaillements seront precaires, parce que le recul de ce cote met soul le canon ennemi tous la route Ypres, Vlamertinghe, Poperinghe. Au lieu d'ameliore la situation, votre repli sur la ligne de Frezenberg livre en outre h l'ar-tillerie ennemie tous la crate an N. E. et 6. Pest d'Ypres. L'action s'en ajoutera 6, celle des batteries du nerd. Vous ne pourrez done pas tenir sur cette nouvelle position reduite, dominee, appelant la concentration des feux.

Vous me dites: noire grosse affaire eat celle d'Arras, abandonnons la bataille d'Ypres.

Je reponds: sans doute, notre grosse affaire eat celle d'Arras, mail cleat une tactique deplorable, pour gagner une 26 bataille, que de se resigner h en perdre une ire.

Je m'oppose done absolument h cette solution et je die: Is possession de la crete au nerd et it l'est de Zonnebeck nous eat indispensable, agissons done pour moue y maintenir et comme noun y serons mieux en reoccupant

Langemarck dont la possession est indispensable, agissons pour assurer cette reprise de terrain.

Je vais essayer une nouvelle action d'ouest en est. Aujourd'hui, ayant peu d'artillerie lourde, je ne vous promets pas de réussir, mais demain mieux outillé et ce point de vue je compte sur un bon résultat.

Conclusion de la conversation:

Le maréchal a dit qu'il attendrait jusqu'à demain soir 29 avril le résultat de l'offensive française que les Anglais appuieraient de leur mieux aujourd'hui par leurs fusils et leurs canons seulement en se cramponnant & leurs positions actuelles et cherchant à réaliser quelques offensives partielles, si les circonstances s'y présentent.

Le général Foch espère d'ailleurs, même si les résultats des journées des 28 et 29 avril sont faibles, amener le maréchal à persister dans l'effort vers Langemarck.

Resume lu au général Foch et approuvé par lui.

"Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes—2e Volume. Annexe 1465. pp.1038-39.

TRANSLATION

FIELD-MARSHAL FRENCH

My troops are very tired. My supply is becoming difficult. I cannot continue in the unfavourable situation in which I find myself.

Our big undertaking at this time is the offensive north of Arras and I do not wish to compromise it by using up my reserves at Ypres. Therefore I am going to re-establish myself on the rearward line Fortuin Frezenberg-Westhoek, for we did not succeed yesterday and there is not the slightest chance of better success today.

GENERAL FOCH

My dear Field-Marshal: Without doubt the situation is delicate but your withdrawal to the line indicated would not re-establish it, but the very reverse. Because we have not reoccupied Langemarck your communications and lines of supply are precarious, because the loss of that position brings under hostile fire the whole of the Ypres-Vlamertinghe-Poperinghe road. Instead of easing the situation your withdrawal to the Frezenberg line would also open up to the enemy's guns in addition to this the hill crest north and north east of Ypres. Their fire would be added to that of the northern batteries and so you could not hold this new position confined, dominated and inviting artillery concentration.

You say: "Our big show is the one at Arras, let us give up the Ypres battle." I reply "No doubt our big show is the one at Arras

but to resign oneself to losing a first battle with the intent to win a second is deplorable tactics."

And so I say I am absolutely opposed to this solution and I say: The possession of the crest, of the ridge north and east of Zonnebeke is indispensable to us, let us then take action to.. make sure of our re-capture of that ground.

I am going to try a new drive from west to east. Having few heavy guns today I don't promise you that - I shall succeed, but tomorrow, better provided in that regard, I am counting on getting results.

Conclusions arrived at in the conversation.

Field-Marshal French said that he will wait until tomorrow night, 29th April, the result of the French offensive which the English will support to the utmost today by rifle and gun fire only, while holding on to their present positions and taking advantage of any favourable opportunities for local offensive.

Moreover, General Foch hopes that even if the results of the 28/29th April are slight that he will be able to persuade Field-Marshal French to persist in the operation against Langemarck.

Resume read to General Foch and approved by him.

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Le 28, 4, 15.

LE GENERAL FOCH

Adjoint au General
Commandant en Chef.

Mon general,

La copie ci-jointe de la note¹ que j'adresserai au maréchal ce soir vous resume mieux; que je ne puis le faire, notre conversation de ce matin.

En realite, il vent se replier, malgre tous les inconvenients de cette mesure. Pour le moment, tenir, il nous faudrait d'importants resultats aujourd'hui. Nous ne pouvons y compter, notre A.L. ne pouvant donner qu'à partir de demain.

Ou d'importants resultats demain, ce que je ne peux garantir, ignorant ce que nous avons obtenu et si l'état de fatigue des troupes permettra de reprendre l'attaque de demain.

Dans ces conditions, et apres m'être entendu, ce soir, avec Wilson, je terminerai ma note par Tune ou l'autre des 2 finales suivantes:

1re. finale: "It partir du 29".

2e. finale: "d partir du 29, la preparation par l'artillerie remplissant cette journée et l'attaque d'infanterie remplissant celle du 30"

¹ Note du S.H.-Cf. annexe 1467. (App. 689.)

A défaut dun succes serieux noun rendant Langemarck et l'aneienne ligne, je voudrais gagner du temps, en maintenant lee Anglais -our la ligne actuelle, en lee maintenant ensuite le plus longtemps possible, sur celle qu'ils visent,, pour gagner l'epoque (6 ou 8 mai) de notre affaires d'A.

Reconquerir la region de Langemarck, ire. tentative a entreprendre avec l'Angleterre; en cas d'insucces definitif, noun maintenir noun, sur non positions actuelles et retarder le plus possible l'arrivee des Anglais our lour ligne do repli, 2e. phase quo je prolongerai jusqu'au commencement de l'attaque d'A. Voila l'ordre d'idees que j'envisage pour l'ins- tant; vous demandant votre avis, et si, vous le croyez bon, votre appui pres du marechal.

Bien respectueusement h vous,

FOCH.

Dans ma note au marechal, j'ai fait le tableau des consequences du recul plus noir que je ne le vois--car en fait l'adversaire set pen mordant, sauf sex gaz--et nous lea con-naissons actuellement.

"Les Armees Francaises daps la Grande Guerre" Tome II Annexes--2e Volume. Annexe 1466, pp. 1039-40.

TRANSLATION

General FOCH to General JOFFRE:

28th April 1616.

My dear General:

The attached copy of memorandum (*See App. 689*) which I have addressed to FieldMarshal French tonight will give you better than I can the gist of our conversation of this morning.

The fact is he wants to withdraw in spite of all the inconveniences of the measure. To sustain him it is necessary to achieve important results today. We cannot count on that as our heavy artillery cannot be in action until after tomorrow.

He insists upon important results tomorrow which I cannot guarantee. He ignores what we have already won and whether the fatigue of the troops will allow resumption of the attack after tomorrow.

This being the situation I will finish my memorandum, after speaking this afternoon with Wilson, with one or other of the two following conclusions:

1st conclusion: "Commencing on the 29th."

2nd conclusion: "Commencing on the 29th artillery preparation occupying the whole of that day and an infantry attack occupying the 30th"

If an important success does not give us Langemarck and the ridge line I would like to gain time, holding the English on their present line and subsequently holding them as long as possible on the one they propose so as to reach the period (6th or 8th May) of our show at A. (*Arras.*)

To recapture the Langemarck region, in conjunction with the English, that is the 1st thing to be. attempted: in case of definite failure, to maintain ourselves, in our ;present positions, and retard as long as possible the withdrawal of the English on their rearward line, that is the 2nd phase which I will prolong until the beginning. of the Arras attack. That is the sequence of ideas which I have in mind at present; will you kindly advise me and if you approve let me have your support with Field-Marshal French.

Most respectfully yours,

FOCH

In my memo to the Field-Marshal I have painted the picture of the consequences of withdrawal blacker than they appear to me--because the fact is that the enemy is not very noxious except with his gas--and we know all about that now.

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Extract from letter to General Foch from his liaison officer with D.A.B.

..En rendant compte de cot echec, le general Joppe demandait A reprendre plus tard une nouvelle preparation et A remettre l'at-taque I la tombee do la nuit.

Le general Putz lui a repondu que.

1° L'effectif engage avait etc ridiculement faible;

C'est une operation . reprendre entierement.

DE MIERRY.

"Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tame II Annexes--2e Volume. Extrait d'Annexe 1474. P. 1050.

TRANSLATION

In reporting this check, General Joppe asked that new preparation might be carried out later and that the attack might be renewed at nightfall.

General Putz replied that:

(1) The force engaged had been ridiculously small.

The whole operation will have to be done over again.

DE MIERRY

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To: 1st Canadian Bde. (2 routes), 3rd Canadian Bde., C.R.E., 13th Bde. (2 routes)

G. 96. 28th April, 1915.

Under instructions from Plumers Force the 1st Canadian Bde. will entrench and fortify tonight a line running from farm in 22.a. to the farm in C.15.c. AAA This line will start on the right from the trenches at present held by the Rifle Bde. AAA The farm in C.15.c. will be prepared by the French, Canadian Divn. finding material AAA When above line is completed it will be occupied by the 13th Bde. AAA The 3rd Canadian Bde. will take the place of the 1st Canadian Bde. on the west bank of the Canal and be in position by 8.30 p.m. AAA The 1st Canadian Bde. after completion of trenches will return to the West bank of the canal to the billets vacated by 3rd Canadian Bde. let Canadian Bde. will report to 13th Bde. when trenches are ready for latter's occupation and 13th Bde. will report to Divisional Headquarters when they have taken over new trenches AAA Acknowledge addrsd. 13th, 1st Canadian & 3rd Canadian Bdes.

From: Canadian Diva. 3 p.m.

C. F. ROMER, Col G.S.

By hand to 18th Inf. Bde. in two parts timed 2.30 p.m. and 2.45 p.m. and received.

By wire to 1st C.I.B. timed 2.50 p.m. and received 3 p.m.

By hand to 3rd C.I.B. timed 3 p.m. and received before 5 p.m.

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To: 1st Canadian Divn.

G. 393. 28th April 1915.

Conforming to Plumer's force telegrams p 13 and p 26 AAA this division will arrange to put the line mentioned into a state of defence from Farm C.15d.93 inclusive to the French to right if you will carry out the work from the above mentioned farm exclusive to the farm in C.22.b. AAA our work will commence soon after 8.30 p.m. AAA do you concur.

From: Lahore Divn. 6.10 p.m.

By wire received 6.55 p.m.

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PREPARATORY ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TIP OF SALIENT

1. In case it should be considered necessary to shorten our present line east of Ypres, the following is a general outline of the withdrawal:-

- (a) The north and north-east fronts will be maintained as long as possible unchanged,

the movement of artillery commencing from the south and south-east.

- (b) A reserve will be kept about Potijze throughout.
- (c) Arrangements will be made so that during the movement flank protection by artillery posted west of the canal will be available.

2. During the withdrawal the following formations will be moved west of Ypres in the order stated:

- ¹(a) Lahore Division;
(b) Northumbrian Division;
(c) 2nd Cavalry Division.

3. The line to be finally occupied will be as follows:-

From present trench line in I.30.b.¹ due north to Hooze Chateau, I.18.b., thence north-west to G.H.Q. line about C.29.a.c.² along G.H.Q. line to farm in C.22.b.,³ and thence along present British and French trench line.

A tracing of this line, which has been reconstructed during the last few days, is attached.

4. This line will be held, in order from south to north, by the following divisions:-

- (a) 27th Division;
(b) 28th Division;
(c) Canadian Division.

5. The allotment of the new line will be as follows:

27th Division: From left of II. Corps in I.30.d.¹ to level -crossing in I.6.c.⁴ (exclusive of railway line).

28th Division: From level crossing in I.6.c.⁴ (inclusive of railway line) to farm in C.22.b.³ (exclusive).

Canadian Division: From farm in C.22.b.³ (inclusive) to French right at farm in C.15.e.⁵ (exclusive).

6. The allotment of roads for carrying out this move will be as follows:-

27th Division: All roads to south and exclusive of road running west from cross roads Westhoek (J.7.b.).

28th Division: The above road (inclusive) and all roads up to and including the Passehendaele-Ypres road, but that part of the road from Wieltje (C.22.b.) to Ypres will be common to both 28th and Canadian Divisions under the control of 28th Division.

¹ In front of Armagh Wood.

² Bast of Wieltje.

³ Mouse Trap Farm.

⁴ 1,000 yards south-west of Frezenberg.

⁵ Turco Farm.

Canadian Division; St. Julien-Wieltje road, with part use of, that portion from Wieltje to Ypres, and all roads and bridges west of it, excepting road leading to No. 4 Bridge (C.25.a).⁶ This last road only to be used by arrangement with the French.

7. It is proposed, if the tactical situation permits, to carry out the withdrawal in four nights. In view of the fact that the movement will probably commence to-night, all preparations and plans should be considered.

8. The final withdrawal from the present trench line to the one detailed above in paragraph 8 will take place in one night. Arrangements will be made by divisions to make use of the "Subsidiary Line," in order to ensure co-operation as regards timing. The advisability of leaving a strong outpost line on the present front line should be seriously considered.

9. Detailed orders will be issued day by day.

G. F. MILNE
Major-General,
C.G.S. Plumer's Force.

29th April 1915.

9.30 a.m.

"British Official History of the War"—Military Operations Vol. III—France and Belgium, 1915. Appendix 35, pp. 406-7-8.*

⁶ *Bridge east of the northern end of Brie Ten.*

Letter to General Joffre from Colonel Dufieux, his Liaison Officer with General Foch, dated 29th April, 1915.

Le 29 avril 1915, 18 heures.

Mon general,

La journee du 28 n'a rien donne sauf entre Lizerne et Steenstraate, oh l'action se poursuit methodiquement et heureusement comme l'a indique le compte rendu d'hier soir. La cause de ce resultat negatif reside dans une mauvaise preparation par l'artillerie de l'attaque Mordacq, sur la rive droite du canal, a laquelle etaient subordonnees dans le temps des autres attaques.

Pour aujourd'hui, continuation de l'action sur Steenstraate seulement. D'une part, l'artillerie lourde n'etait pas prete a travailler, le voyage de la He armee au D. A. B. ayant deregule les appareils de pointage du groupe de 120 L. a tracteurs. D'autre part, lea malfacons du 28 avril avaient montre la necessite de reorganiser lei groupements d'artillerie.

Il a done 616 lance aucune attaque sur Is reste du front, mais on a travaille activement, fait lea reglages, et on eat pret pour demain.

L'heure n'est pas encore fixee. Elle le sera dans la soiree, apres entente aver lee Anglais.

Car le general Foch, apres vous avoir envoye I a lettre que vous ayes revue a midi, a eu a once heures ce matin la visite du marechal French. Il lui a explique lea motifs du retard pour lea attaques projetees, a retorque lea arguments mis de nouveau en avant par le marechal pour justifier un recul sur is ligne Fortuin, Frezenberg, Westhoek, cote 60 et l'a place en face de sea responsabilites. Finalement le marechal a promis d'attaquer aver nous demain, 30 avril.

Le general Foch compte bien le faire perseverer daps cette voie jusqu'au declenche-ment de l'offensive au nord et a Pest d'Arras.

A ce sujet, le general m'a fait lire une lettre daps laquelle le general d'Urbal indique:

1° Qu'il compte avoir recu Is 1er mai toutes lea troupes et toutes lea batteries qui lui ont ete jusqu'a present annoncees.

2° Qu'il a pousse les organisations et travaux preparatoires pour etre pret le 6 mai.

3° Qu'il estime tres important de ne pas differer son attaque davantage pour attendre l'arrivee hypothetique, soft de troupes retirees de is region d'Ypres, soft de troupes nouvelles envoyees par vous. Lea Allemands ont, en effet, renforce leurs organisations devant la Xe armee et fait venir une division vers Douai. Il ne faut pas leur laisser le temps d'organiser completement la parade.

Le general d'Urbal, tout en ne renoncant pas completement a l'elargissement de son action par une attaque au nord our Loos, cote 70, au sud sur Beaurains, Ficheux, au cas oil il recevrait deux nouvelles divisions, ne vent pas subordonner a cet elargissement eventuel is date de son attaque principale, prete pour le 6 mai.

Le general Foch eat du meme avis. Je crois que c'est bien l'esprit des instructions que vous m'avez donnees aujourd'hui et que j'ai transmises an general Foch.

Le general va des ce soir travailler lea Anglais pour obtenir d'eux que l'offensive de leur ire armee soit, comme cells de notre Xe armee, fixee au premier jour de temps elair a partir du 6 mai.

Je ne vous parle pas de l'affaire de Dunkerque (tir du 380 de Westende, a 30 kilometres de distance) un compte-rendu vous ayant ete adresse a ce sujet par telegramme chiffre. A l'heure ou je termine ma lettre (18 h. 45) on n'a pas encore de details.

Je n'ai pu aller ce soir au poste de commandement du general Putz, qui devait le quitter de bonne heure, j'irai voir le general

et son nouveau chef d'etat-major, le lieutenant-colonel Desticker, A Rousbrugge ce soir a 20 heures.

Je vous prie, mon general, de vouloir bien agreer l'expression de mes sentiments tree respectueux et devoues.

DUFIEUX.

" *Les Armees Francaises daps le Grande Guerre*" Tome II Annexes-2e Volume, Annexe No 1479, pp. 1057-1058.

TRANSLATION

29th April, 1915, 18.00 hours.

My dear General,

The day of the 28th yielded nothing except between Lizerne and Steenstraat, where the action progressed methodically and favourably as indicated in last night's report. The cause of this negative result lies in bad preparation by the artillery covering Mordacq's attack, on the right bank of the canal, to which the other attacks were subordinated as to time.

Today, operations continued against Steenstraat only. On the one hand, the heavy artillery was not ready for action, the journey from II Army to the D.A.B. having deranged the sighting apparatus of the tractor drawn group of 120 mm. heavies. On the other hand, the bunglings of the 28th April had shown the necessity of reorganizing the grouping of the artillery. Thus no other attack has been delivered on the rest of the front, but work has been actively carried on, adjustments have been made, and all is ready for to-morrow.

The zero hour is not yet fixed. It will be in the evening, after arrangements have been completed with the British.

With regard to General Foch, after having sent you the letter which you received at noon, he had a visit from Field-Marshal French at 11 o'clock this morning. He explained to him the causes of delay in the projected attacks, made retort to the arguments again advanced by the Field-Marshal to justify a withdrawal to the line Fortuin-FrezenbergWesthoek-Hill 60, and placed his responsibilities squarely in front of him. In the end the Field-Marshal promised to attack with us to-morrow, 30th April.

General Foch thinks he can hold him to this course until the opening of the offensive north and east of Arras.

On this subject the General has shown me a letter in which General d'Urbal indicates:

- i That he expects to have received by 1st May all the troops and all the batteries allotted to him up to date.
- ii That he has pushed on organization and preparatory works so as to be ready by 6th May.

15135-20%,

- iii That he considers it very important not to postpone his attack any longer pending the possible arrival either of troops withdrawn from the Ypres area or of new troops sent by you. The Germans have, in fact, reinforced their formations in front of X Army and have brought one division up to Douai. They must not be given time to fully organize their dispositions.

General d'Urbal, while not entirely averse to the extension of his operations by an attack to the north on Loos and Hill 70 and to the south on Beaurains and Ficheux in the event of his receiving two new divisions, does not wish to make the final date of his main attack, ready for 6th May, subordinate up to this extension.

General Foch is of the same opinion. I think that this is quite in accordance with the spirit of the instructions you gave me to-day and which I transmitted to General Foch.

The General is going this evening to endeavour to get the British to agree to fix the offensive of their First Army for the first fine day after the 6th May, the same as for our X Army. I make no mention to you of the Dunkerque affair (bombardment by 15-inch gun at Westende, 19 miles distant) a telegraphic report having been addressed to you on this subject. At the time of closing this letter (6.45 p.m.) details are not yet available.

I have been unable to go to General Putz's headquarters this evening, he had to leave it early, I will go to see the General and his new G.S.O.1. Lieut.-Colonel Desticker, at Rousbrugge to-night at 8. p.m.

Believe me to be, my dear General, with sentiments of great respect,

Yours most faithfully,
DUFIEUX.

(See 304)

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" *Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre.*" Tome II, p. 714.

699

OPERATION ORDER No. 13.

Secret.

by
LIEUT.-GENERAL E. A. H. ALDERSON, C.B.,
COMMANDING 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION.

2nd May, 1915.

1. In order to shorten the line the 27th and 28th and Canadian Diva. will withdraw on night of 3rd/4th May to a prepared line running from about WESTHOEK in J.7.b

through FREZENBERG to the north of the Farm in C.22.b. Of this line the Canadian Div. will hold from Farm in C.22.b. inclusive to the farm in C.15.c. exclusive, which is held by the French. The 28th Division will hold the line on the right of the Canadian Div.

2. For this retirement the Canadian Div. is allotted the FORTUIN - WIELTJE - LA BRIQUE-No. 2 Bridge (I.1.b.)-Road Junction in I.1.c.10.8.-Road Junction in B.29.c. 9.9. VLAMERTINGHE road. The Canadian Div. shares this route with the 28th Div. but it has also allotted to it the road running parallel to canal on west bank as far as and including road on west bank from No. 4 Bridge to BRIELEN in B.20.c. and C.25.a.

3. The retirement will be carried out as follows : the remainder of Canadian Artillery will begin the withdrawal at 8.30 p.m. to its position in B24. and C.19., moving by the same roads as were used on night of 1st/2nd.

4. The Infantry of the Canadian Div. holding the trenches east of Farm C.22.b. will fall back as follows: Half at 1 a.m. the other half at 1.45 a.m.

5. The troops of the 28th Division on the Canadian right will fall back as follows: half the infantry will begin to withdraw at 9 p.m. halting at 10 p.m. on the Subsidiary Line running from J.9.a.5.4. to D.20.b.8.8. At 10.30 p.m. this party will continue its withdrawal to the new line. The half of the Infantry of the 28th Division remaining in the trenches will begin withdrawing at 10.30 p.m. reaching Subsidiary Line at 11.30 p.m., halting there till midnight and complete withdrawal by 1 a.m. The last party will commence its withdrawal at 12 midnight and fall back at once to new line which it will reach by 1.45 am. The 28th Division is responsible for the timing of this retirement and will keep the Canadian Division in

formed of its progress.

6. The 10th Brigade will keep up to 1.45 a.m. a Battalion in its right rear in the vicinity of C.23.b. until the Infantry holding the trenches east of the Farm have all withdrawn from the trenches. He will also keep one Battalion in the G.H.Q. 2nd Line just South of Farm in C.22.b. until same hour.

7. The 10th Bde. as its troops are withdrawn will send them back via WIELTJE-ST. JEANLA BRIQUE into the trenches at present held by the 3rd Canadian Bde. at the bottom of C.19. and C20. The 3rd Canadian Bde. will move to the west bank, starting at 2.15 a.m. via No. 4 Bridge and road junction in B.29.d. and go into bivouac in B26. They will leave a Staff Officer behind to show trenches to the troops of 10th Bde.

8. The G.O.C. 12th Bde. will be during the night of 3rd/4th at the Hd. Qrs. of 10th Bde. in C.27.d.8.6. and the two Bdes. will act -in the closest co-operation. The 10th Bde. will also keep up communication with 11th Bde. and send an officer to its Hd. Qrs. in C.29b. 9.0. A wireless installation will be at VERLORENHOEK so that if necessary short messages can be sent from there to Force Hd. Qrs.

9. Every care must be taken by the 10th Bde. to see that all officers know the route from their old trench line to trenches in C19. and C20. and communication must be carefully maintained between Bus. and Bde. H.Q.

10. No move in an easterly direction of troops or vehicles will be permitted east of the Canal after 6 p.m. to-morrow night. All horses and transport not indispensable to the Operations will be moved west of YPRES to-night.

11. Reports to be sent to Divisional Hd. Qrs.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 530 p.m.
to all concerned.

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THE 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION AT
YPRES, 1915

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES

- (1) *From the Governor General of Canada, H.R.H. Field-Marshal the Duke of Connaught to Major-General the Hon. Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence, dated 26th April, 1915.*

Dear General Hughes,

I write to you, as Minister of Militia, to express to you my deepest sympathy in the heavy losses of valuable lives amongst our first division in the splendid fight they have made at Ypres.

Canada has every reason to be proud of the gallantry of her sons who have nobly done their part in this great struggle for the liberties and honour of our Empire against the tyranny and injustice of Germany.

As an English officer I am proud of our Canadian comrades, and feel that they have brought honour to the British arms as well as to themselves, and that their heroic work will thrill the Dominion from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Assuring you again of my heartfelt sympathy for the relations of all those Canadians, officers, non-commissioned officers and men who have so nobly fallen on the field of battle.

Believe me,
Yours sincerely,
ARTHUR.

P.S.—His Majesty, Lord Kitchener and Sir John French have cabled to me their admiration at the conduct of your Canadian troops. I have answered them and have also cabled to General Alderson expressing my appreciation.

- (2) *From the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden to Lieut. General E. A. H. Alderson.*

Report of splendid gallantry and efficiency of Division under your command has thrilled all Canada with pride. Warmest congratulations.

- (3) *From the Minister of Militia and Defence, Major-General the Hon. Sam Hughes to Lieut. General E. A. H. Alderson.*

Please convey to all your splendid Division the deep appreciation of their comrades in Canada and of all Canadians of their gallant fight and their splendid behaviour. We rejoice in their gallantry but while mourning the loss of many brave comrades our one great desire is to avenge the loss. The hearts of all Canadians are with them.

- (4) *From the G.O.C., V Corps, Lieut.-General Sir Herbert Plumer, to Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson.*

The Canadian Division is being transferred to another Corps after a short but very strenuous period of service with 5th Corps.

For their services during the continuous heavy fighting that has characterized that period they have already received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief.

As the commander of the 5th Corps, I should like to add my testimony as to the value of those services, which cannot be estimated too highly, and to say how proud I am to have had them under my command.

The senders of other messages included the acting High Commissioner for Canada, Provincial Premiers, Mayors of towns and cities, service clubs, societies and individuals, not only in Canada but in such places as Allora, Queensland, and Casino, N.S.W.

(See also messages from H.M. the King quoted in Chapters X and XV, and other communications from various commanders, *Apps.* 596, 681, 682, 683, 701a, 704, 705.)

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MOVES OF CANADIAN ARTILLERY
5TH-20TH MAY,
1915.

On the night 5th/6th May the 2nd Bde. C.F.A. (less 5th and 6th Batteries and 2nd B.A.C.) was withdrawn, the 10th and 11th Batteries were brought out of action and attached to it with the 3rd B.A.C. On 11th May this composite Brigade under Lieut.-Col. C. H. MacLaren relieved the 29th Bde. R.F.A. (4th (Brit.) Div.) covering the 144th Inf. Bde. (S. Midland Div.) in front of Ploegsteert Wood until the 18th when the 50th Bde. R.F.A. (9th Scottish Div.) took over. The 5th and 6th Batteries and 2nd B.A.C. remained as a composite brigade under Lieut.-Col. H. M. Macleod attached to the 4th (British) Div. until 14th May.

The 1st Bde. C.F.A. less 1st B.A.C. was withdrawn on 9th May and marched to Steenwerck where the 2nd Bty. was detached to reserve under the 6th (British) Div. at Nieppe. On the 14th the Brigade consisting of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Batteries relieved the 14th Bde. R.F.A. (4th (Brit.) Div.) covering a frontage east of Ploegsteert Wood until the 18th when the 52nd Bde. R.F.A. (9th Scottish Div.) took over. For this period the 4th (Warwickshire) How. Bty. and one section of No. 2 Mountain Battery were attached to the 1st Bde. C.F.A.

The 3rd Bde. C.F.A. consisting now only of the 9th and 12th Batteries and supplied by the 2nd B.A.C. remained in action west of the canal under 4th (Brit.) Div. until 18th May. They fired in support of French attacks against Mauser Ridge on 16th and 17th May. The 118th (How.) Bde. R.F.A. came out of action on the same day.

After relief these scattered units were directed to march to Hinges where by the 20th they were all reunited under First Army. For a month the chances of war had kept brigades and batteries split and detached, there had been heavy casualties in officers, men, horses and guns but the spirit of the Canadian Gunners had been improved rather than impaired by desperate fighting under adverse conditions.

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NOTES AND EXTRACTS

The damaging of an enemy by other than metallic means had been thought of independently by private individuals in Canada. The following are extracts from submissions to the Department of Militia and Defence.

1 Sept. 1914. "Jai rever pendant la suit que j'aitais dans une ville du Canada ou ils etais preparer pour recevoir l'enemi. Jai

vu des habile pompier, repousser l'ennemi avec leurs tuyau de pompe a feu. La force de l'eau lea etouffais. Serais-t-il pas possible de vous servir en realite de cette methode Wean. Par exemple mettre dans l'eau quelques chose, des chimiste pourons vous dire cela . . ." (sic)

2 Sept. 1914. "A pipe line, equipped with spray nozzle, fed from a large underground tank of gasoline or alcohol or other liquid explosive. This to be fired by electricity. The whole works to be underground except the nozzles. A heavy air pressure pumping plant would give the needed force. An army advancing into such a fort could be sprayed and set on fire by a single man, or it could be made a wall of fire against which no army could advance . . ."

4th Oct. 1914. ". . . I believe that keyene pepper could be used to advantage dropped from aeroplanes or fired from cans used in artillery."

4th Nov. 1914. ". . . that tubes of CS.2 highly charged with cacodylcyanide be thrown to burst in the enemy's trenches."

17th. Feb. 1915. "I have invented a four inch cartridge which explodes when fired, giving off from one hundred fifty to two hundred cubic feet of extremely poisonous gas. Tests show that it is so poisonous that one deep breath of it will prove fatal. . At the present time such an instrument in your hands would prove a great factor in breaking Germany's power."

The official reply to the last, dated 20.ii.1915, was: "I am to thank you for your offer but to state that the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gases is not allowed by the International Declaration signed at The Hague, 29th July 1899."

701a

Communique issued by the War Office to the Press on 24th April, 1915.

The fight for the ground into which the Germans penetrated between Steenstraate and Langemarck still continues.

The loss of this part of the line laid bare the left of the Canadian Division, which was forced to fall back in order to keep in touch with the right of the neighbouring troops.

In the rear of the latter had been four Canadian 4-7 guns,* which thus passed into the hands of the enemy. But some hours later

* Not Canadian: they belonged to the 2nd London Heavy Battery, attached to 28th Division.

the Canadians made a most brilliant and successful advance, recapturing these guns and taking a considerable number of German prisoners, including a colonel.

The Canadians had many casualties, but their gallantry and determination undoubtedly saved the situation. Their conduct has been magnificent throughout.

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Extract from
SIR JOHN FRENCH'S DESPATCH
dated 15th June 1915
published in The London Gazette
No. 29225 of 10th July 1915

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command, which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the South, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties; and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

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NOTE ON CANADIAN MEDICAL
SERVICES AT YPRES
22nd April-4th May, 1915

On 22nd April the medical units of the 1st Canadian Division were distributed as under:

<i>A.D.M.S.</i>	Brielen.
<i>No. 1 Cdn. Field Ambulance,</i> operating as a Divisional Rest Station.....	Convent at Watou.
<i>No. 2 Cdn. Field Ambulance.</i> Main Dressing. Station (less two tent sub-divisions at Oosthoek).....	N. of Ypres near blind end of canal.
Advanced Dressing Station	Road junction, Wieltje.

No. 8 Cdn. Field Ambulance.

Main Dressing Station	Girls' School, Vlamertinghe
Advanced Dressing Station	Hampshire Farm, S.E. of Pilckem.
<i>No. 1 Sanitary Sectio</i>	Vlamertinghe.
<i>No. 1 Motor Ambulance Workshop</i>	Vlamertinghe..

The bearer divisions and all ambulance vehicles of No. 1 Canadian Field Ambulance were attached to No. 2 Canadian Field Ambulance at Oosthoek.

No. 2 Canadian Field Ambulance cleared the 2nd C.I. Brigade on the right and No. 3 Canadian Field Ambulance cleared the 3rd C.I. Brigade on the left.

Even before the 22nd it had been impossible, owing to the exposed position, to remove wounded during daylight from regimental aid posts, located near battalion headquarters; but the advanced dressing stations were cleared throughout the twenty-four hours to the main dressing station at Vlamertinghe.

Upon the first gas attack the position of the advanced dressing station of No. 3 Field Ambulance at Hampshire Farm became precarious and by 11 p.m. the same night it was reopened in an estaminet at Wieltje.

To handle more efficiently the sudden rush of casualties, further readjustments followed on the 23rd. At 10 a.m. the bearer division of No. 1 Field Ambulance opened an advanced dressing station on the west bank of the Yser canal by the Brielen bridge, to serve the 1st and 4th Battalions. Two tent sub-divisions of No. 2 Field Ambulance established by 2 p.m. a main dressing station in the school at Brielen and the remaining tent sub-divisions opened a dressing station at the Red Chateau, midway between Brielen and Ypres. By 8 p.m. the advanced dressing station of No. 2 Field Ambulance had withdrawn from Wieltje to St. Jean.

Early on the 24th all available personnel of No. 1 Field Ambulance from Watou opened a main dressing station at Vlamertinghe, to which place, also, the main dressing station of No. 2 Field Ambulance moved at 4 p.m. By 8 p.m. the advanced dressing station of No. 2 Field Ambulance at St. Jean was compelled to retire again to the Red Chateau. The A.D.M.S. moved his headquarters into Vlamertinghe.

On the night of the 24th/25th two motor ambulances, sent forward to St. Julien in ignorance of its occupation by the Germans, fell into the hands of the enemy. On the

same night the Wieltje-Gravenstafel road was blocked near Fortuin by trees felled across it by enemy shells, cutting off two groups of stretcher cases at aid posts near Bombarded Cross Roads and Gravenstafel. The engineers having cleared the obstruction, ambulances went forward after nightfall on the 25th; one of the groups, of some fifty stretcher cases, was evacuated, but the other fell into enemy hands, as did Captain Hart, C.A.M.C. and his bearers on their way to evacuate them.

All other regimental aid posts had meanwhile been concentrated in the villages of St. Jean and Wieltje, and near the Brielen bridge. These posts were cleared, both by horsed and motor ambulances, back to the advanced dressing stations. The divisional motor ambulances, assisted by the cars of No. 4 (British) Motor Ambulance Convoy, cleared from the advanced dressing stations to the main dressing stations in Vlamertinghe, whence evacuations were made to the casualty clearing stations at Poperinghe, Hazebrouck and Bailleul. Red Cross cars, ambulances, motor lorries, general service wagons and all available returning vehicles were used for sitting oases. The severe shelling of the whole battle-area made the collection of casualties dangerous, and it became increasingly difficult to keep motor ambulances on the road owing to shell holes, blockage by fallen trees and congested traffic.

No. 12 (British) Field Ambulance was attached to the Canadian Division on the 24th, and No. 10 (British) Field Ambulance, which opened a main dressing station at Vlamertinghe and an advanced dressing station at St. Jean, was likewise placed under the orders of the A.D.M.S., Canadian Division.

It was not until the 27th, when the Canadian infantry ceased to hold the front line, that it became possible to give the bearer divisions of the field ambulances a much needed rest, although the main dressing stations in Vlamertinghe continued to serve all troops in the area of the Canadian Division, which was responsible for the front until 4th May. Advanced dressing stations were handed over to the 10th and 12th (British) Field Ambulances.

Heavy shelling of Vlamertinghe on the 27th necessitated hurried clearing of some 350 stretcher cases in main dressing stations to the casualty clearing stations at Bailleul and Hazebrouck. The two attached British field ambulances were moved out of the village on the 28th. The shelling of Vlamertinghe continued, and No. 2 Canadian Field Ambulance moved to Ouderdom on the 28th; No. 3 Canadian Field Ambulance closed its main dressing station on the 29th and parked at Hillhoek. No. 1 Canadian Field Ambulance followed on

the 30th to Watou, where a dressing station was opened, but its bearer division continued to assist in clearing wounded from the battlefield.

From 22nd April to 4th May over 12,000 casualties passed through Canadian medical units much the largest proportion being British.

	Officers	O.R.
Canadian	79	1,983
British	304	9,739
French	—	82
Indian	—	148
German	—	12
	<u>383</u>	<u>11,964</u>

703a

Note on Casualties, Battles of Ypres 1915

Close comparisons of losses in the Battles of Ypres 1915 are impossible on account of differences in methods of calculation and compilation of returns, (e.g. Germans wounded at duty were often not shown), and of variations in strength and in time spent by units in the battle area (e.g. the 28th Division of 17 battalions spent 33 days, the 1st Cdn. Div. of 12 battalions spent 13 days).

The German casualties are stated to have been 34,873. For the period 22nd April to 31st May the Corps most heavily engaged (*XXVI Reserve Corps* consisting of two Divisions and two attached Brigades, 18 battalions) is recorded as having lost 12,845.

Neither the French nor the Belgian figures for the whole battle are available: the former have been estimated at 18,000 on 22nd April, from the 26th to the 29th they were 3,973. The British battle casualties, including Canadian and Indian troops, for the period 22nd April to 31st May are stated as 59,275, of whom over one-quarter are shown as "Missing," a term embracing Prisoners, Unknown Dead, and men temporarily separated from their units.

BRITISH BATTLE CASUALTIES BY
DIVISIONS, IN THE BATTLES
OF YPRES 1915

	Days in battle area	Battle Casualties
4th Division (of 15 bns)	81	10,859
5th Division (of 15 bns)	83	7,994
27th Division (of 15 bns.)	83	7,263 *
28th Division (of 17 bns.)	33	15,533
50th Division (of 12 bns.)	81	5,204
(less Div. troops.)	13	8,841 †
1st Cdn. Div. (of 12 bns.)	4	8,888
Lahore Div. (of 15 bns.)		

* Includes 647, P.P.C.L.I.

† Corrected figure.

(See *British Official History, Military Operations, Vol. III. France and Belgium, 1915**.)

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Au G.Q.G., le 5 mai 1915.

Grand Quartier General
des Armees de l'Est.

Etat-Major

3e Bureau.

No. 1877.

Le general Commandant en chef a Son Excellence le marechal French, commandant en chef des forces britanniques.

Monsieur le Marechal,

Je vous confirme mon intention d'attaquer le 7 avec la Xe armee, comme le general Foch vous l'a deja fait connaitre.

Des mesures ont ete prises pour que trois divisions francaises actives soient maintenues a la gauche des forces britanniques, comme cela a ete egalement convenu, et pour que leur ligne soit organisee et tenue tres solidement.

Je compte que la premiere armee britannique sera en mesure d'attaquer le 8, en liaison avec nous.

Au moment oil s'ouvre une phase nouvelle de notre action commune, je tiens a vous adresser mes plus chaleureux remerciements pour la promptitude du contours apporte aux notes par la division canadienne et pour l'aide si efficace pretee par les autres troupes britanniques au detachement d'armee de Belgique au tours des derniers evenements.

Elles ont montre en cette occasion une vaillance et un entrain qui ont ete justement apprecies de tons et je semis heureux si vous pouviez leur faire savoir combien les armees francaises ont admire leur belle conduite.

Ces combats livres en commun auront encore resserre les liens deja nombreux qui unissent nos armees.

Je compte que leur nouvel effort aboutira A un plein suttee.

J. JOFFRE.

(*" Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre" Tome III, Annexes—Le Volume, Annexe No 121, p. 200.*)

TRANSLATION

The General Commanding-in-Chief to his excellency Field-Marshal French, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces.

Dear Field-Marshal,

I confirm my intention to attack on the 7th with the X Army, as General Foch has already informed you.

Steps have been taken for three active French divisions to be maintained on the left

of the British forces, as also has been agreed upon, and for their line to be organized and very firmly held.

I expect that the British First Army will be ready to attack on the 8th, in liaison with us.

At the moment when a new phase of our united action is opening, I take the opportunity of tendering to you my warmest thanks for the promptness of the assistance rendered to our troops by the Canadian division, and for the very efficacious aid lent to the Detachement d'Armee de Belgique by the other British troops in the course of recent events.

They displayed on that occasion a valour and spirit which have been justly appreciated by all, and I should be glad if you would let them know how much the French forces admired their fine conduct.

These fights shared in common have further strengthened the bonds, already numerous, which unite our forces.

I expect their new endeavours will result in complete success.

J. JOFFRE.

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Extract from

THE LONDON GAZETTE

No. 29225 of 10th July, 1915

From the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, the British Army in France.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,

15th June, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report that since the date of my last despatch (5th April, 1915) the Army in France under my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks of the line held by the British Forces.

1. In the North the town and district of Ypres have once more in this campaign been successfully defended against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces of the enemy, and supported by a mass of heavy and field artillery, which, not only in number, but also in weight and calibre, is superior to any concentration of guns which has previously assailed that part of the line.

In the South a vigorous offensive has again been taken by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured from the enemy, whilst valuable support has been afforded to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such marked success against the enemy's positions to the east of Arras and Lens.

2. I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterized on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilized war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention.

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralyzed and then meets with a lingering and agonizing death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience suggested effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an Army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

3. (*Section 3 relating to the Hill 60 operation omitted.*)

4. It was at the commencement of the Second Battle of Ypres on the evening of the 22nd April, referred to in paragraph 1 of this report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:—

From Steenstraete to the east of Lange marck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division. (*Sic. The 45th Algerian Div. and the 87th French Territorial Div. held this front.*)

Thence, in a south-easterly direction towards the Passchendale-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional Reserve (*sic two, the 10th and 16th*) and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division (*sic Divisions*) at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m., thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixchoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about 50 guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected slaughter, the French Division would have stood firm.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the East.

In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences.

They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the Divisions holding the salient and by a Brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division (*sic attached to British 28th Div.*) was posted behind the right of the French Division, (*sic in Kitchener's Wood within the Canadian area*) and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the 3rd Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraste and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about eight hundred yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Pooh informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches

which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the North had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend. (*Sic. The Germans did not deliver any assault during daylight 23rd.*)

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed two Brigades of the 3rd Corps, and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command, which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the South, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties; and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were -reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organized a powerful counter-attack with his own Brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his Brigade Staff, parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line. (*Sic. The original point of junction was abandoned at about 10 p.m. 23rd.*)

During the night, and the early morning of the 25th, the enemy directed a heavy attack against the Division at Broodseinde cross-roads which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the East and West were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore Division and a Cavalry Division were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the 5th Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back some little distance toward the North, but their further advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern portion of that village. (*Sic. The attack did not reach the village.*) They were, however, eventually driven back, largely owing to gas (*sic. gas was not released here*), and finally occupied a line a short way to the South. This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation.

Although no attack was made on the southeastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction which took some of the battalions, which were advancing North to the attack, in reverse.

Some gallant attempts made by the Lahore Division on the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy further North; but they were partially frustrated by the constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

The French had succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and had made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas; but up to the evening of the 28th no further progress had been made toward the recapture of the original line.

I sent instructions, therefore, to Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the operation, to take preliminary measures for the retirement to the new line which had been fixed upon.

On the morning of the 29th I had another interview with General Foch, who informed me that strong reinforcements were hourly arriving to support General Putz, and urged me to postpone issuing orders for any retirement until the result of his attack, which was timed to commence at daybreak on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and instructed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.

No substantial advance having been made by the French, I issued orders to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1st to commence his withdrawal to the new line.

The retirement was commenced the following night, and the new line was occupied on the morning of May 4th.

I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out deliberately with scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders.

The successful conduct of this operation was the more remarkable from the fact that on the evening of May 2nd, when it was only half completed, the enemy made a heavy attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it. (*Sic. The village was entirely in German hands from early 25th April.*)

An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at the same time under similar conditions.

In both cases our troops were at first driven from their trenches by gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting battalions and two brigades of a Cavalry Division, which were sent up in support from about Potijze, all the lost trenches were regained at night.

On the 3rd May, while the retirement was still going on, another violent attack was directed on the northern face of the salient. This was also driven back with heavy loss to the enemy.

Further attempts of the enemy during the night of the 3rd to advance from the woods west of St. Julien were frustrated entirely by the fire of our artillery.

During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled the trenches we had evacuated, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied. So soon as the retirement was discovered the Germans commenced to entrench opposite our new line and to advance their guns to new positions. Our artillery, assisted by aeroplanes, caused him considerable loss in carrying out these operations.

Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks at short intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to the east of Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with heavy loss.

Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the night of April 22nd all the troops in this area, had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or to properly reorganize the line, after the confusion and demoralization caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent almost daily gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date (May 8th) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided.

(*Remainder of Section 4 covering later phases of Ypres, 1915, omitted; for Section 5 relating to the battle of Festubert, see App. 784a; sections 6 to 14 covering New Army and Territorial Divisions, Royal Flying Corps, services, etc., not reproduced.*)

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

J. D. P. FRENCH,

Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief,

The British Army in France.

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THE GERMAN OFFICIAL HISTORY

"DER WELTKRIEG, 1914-1918"

(REICHSARCHIV)

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GERMAN G.H.Q. AND THE WESTERN FORCES

IN APRIL, 1915

In the first months of the year 1915 the German armies in the west had engaged in heavy defensive fighting, which reached its climax in the winter battle in Champagne. In spite of the throwing in of strong forces and months of bitter struggle, the French had still been unable to break through the front

of the German *Third Army*. The British attempts to overrun *the Sixth Army* at Neuve Chapelle had also been shattered, as had an encircling French attack against both sides of the salient in the line at St. Mihiel. The German front on the west, in the middle of April, was solid and united; it had resulted from the consistent defensive victories, which had restored to the troops, in spite of their inferiority in numbers, the feeling of superiority over the Allied forces on the western front. As General von Falkenhayn has written, German G.H.Q. began to arrive at the conviction "that it would not be possible for the enemies in the west to force a decision within a measurable time, even if further portions of the formations in process of reconstruction on the Western front had to be used in the East to annihilate the defensive power of the Russians for all time." Recognition of this had facilitated the decision of the Chief of the German General Staff, on 15th April, preliminary to the development of offensive plans in the West, to transfer the centre of operations to the Galician theatre.

At the end of March and beginning of April the intelligence branch at German G.H.Q. had expressed its opinions in a series of detailed memoranda on the probable increase in strength of the Allied forces on the Western front.

With regard to the BRITISH ARMY it might be taken as certain that there could appear at the front the 1st Kitchener's Army ((at earliest during April, and the 2nd and 3rd "not before summer." Altogether the formation of at least four Kitchener's Armies, each of six divisions, might be counted on. In the course of the summer, including Canadian and Indian troops, about 35 or 36 British Divisions might be assembled in France.

In the FRENCH ARMY the class of 1915 had been on the battle front since the middle of March; the conscripts of the year 1916, about 180,000 men, would be called to the colours at the beginning of April, and those of the year 1917 would be mustered in April and May. At the same time a number of classes hitherto exempt would be called up, and men found unfit for military service would report for re-examination. "The French war administration by these measures will call up for active service, regardless, the very last half-fit man," was the opinion of the intelligence branch as expressed in a memorandum of 24th March. The formation of the new Army Corps--XXXI to XXXIII--appeared to be established.

An increase in the strength of the BELGIAN ARMY was not to be expected during the next few months.

Even if extensive German offensive operations in the West would have to be foregone, German G.H.Q. was not by any means willing to hand over the initiative completely to the enemy and merely stand on the defensive. Lively activity in the trenches, combined with forward thrusts, "was to cloak the transportation of the troops to Galicia."

Such offensive undertakings were proposed in Flanders as well as on the Strantz and Gaede Army-group fronts. On the front of the Fourth Army the GAS ATTACK, planned long since, was now at last to materialize, moreover the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army in the Field considered its early commencement to be of particular importance, because he wished to form his own opinion of the efficacy of this new weapon of war.

THE GAS ATTACK OF THE *Fourth Army* AT YPRES

Before the Great War only the French planned to bring GAS into use as an instrument of war. In their army a 26 mm. gun shell with a suffocating Bromacetate filling had been introduced as an aid to siege warfare. Germany, on the other hand, was not prepared in any way for Gas warfare.

At the beginning of the war there repeatedly appeared in the foreign press--and that, moreover, without any censorious comment--notices of the employment by the French of a strange new kind of weapon of war which would cause death without discernible external wounds. The French chemist Turpin was named as the discoverer. The fact is that at the outbreak of war he offered that *very* sort of munitions to the French Ministry of War. It was tested also, but it was not found to be suitable for any purpose. In the Prussian War Ministry, on the contrary, similar propositions were lying unheeded at the outbreak of war.

From the beginning of static warfare in 1914 the nearness of the opposing trenches multiplied the difficulties of firing high explosive, because of the damage resulting to one's own troops from the blowing back of splinters. It also became evident that, against an enemy organized in depth and entrenched, shattering effect was no longer productive of valuable results. And so there began a search for employable munitions. The FRENCH command, at the beginning of January 1915, requisitioned for the front the existing gas shells. The French War Ministry on 21st February issued instructions to the troops for the use of gas shells and gas hand grenades which were introduced simultaneously. In this it is stated "The fumes of the bursting charge are not deadly, provided they are not inhaled to excess." Thus the possibility of a deadly effect

is unquestionably expressed, for the extent of inhalation is not often left to the choice of the individual shot at. From the end of February onwards THESE WEAPONS according to numerous military reports WERE MADE USE OF against German soldiers on the Western Front.

The GERMAN command had to reckon with the probability of the employment of chemical munitions on the part of the enemy, and was not willing to be taken unawares. They next endeavoured with the help of gas, merely to drive the foe from the shelter of his trenches into the area covered by firearms. Towards the end of 1914 the preparation was accomplished of an artillery shell (15 cm. shell 12.T.), which, besides a considerable bursting charge, contained a gas charge (Xylyl bromide) which in its irritating effect resembled that used by the French but was less potent. The so called T shell was employed for the first time at the beginning of 1915 on the Russian front-with insufficient effect, because of the great cold. The supposition was that, for complete success, mass effect would have to be obtained. To achieve this by means of gas SHELLS, was however precluded at first by the lack of guns and of means of projection for such an exceptional object. So as a way out WIND POWER was hit upon, whereby air currents would carry the gas towards the enemy.

The existing INTERNATIONAL agreements--the Hague Convention and Declarations made between 29th July 1899/18th October 1907 including the Hague declaration respecting deleterious gases of 29th July 1899--did not deal in general with a war of gas. The Hague declaration merely prohibited the use of projectiles whose SOLE purpose was the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The question whether these declarations were still generally binding upon the belligerents on account of the "all participants" clauses, after the 3rd Nov. 1914, the day on which Turkey, a non-contracting party, became a military participant, need not be considered. For, even if it be assumed from that that the declaration between the contracting parties remained binding, yet the use of projectiles which, like the German T shell combined explosive with gas effect, as in the international statement, was not forbidden because the diffusion of gas was not the "sole object" On the other hand the French artillery shell had no explosive charge and could only be intended for the sole purpose of diffusing poisonous gases. Thus the employment of this French artillery shell represents the FIRST BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT in the sphere of gas warfare. The gradually evolved cloud

projection was a discovery of German war research and in no way contravened earlier international agreements. Moreover the precepts of humanity did not forbid the introduction of the gas weapon, because the hundredfold fatal casualties from projectiles were and remained substantially higher than these from cloud gas. Gas casualties could be almost completely and permanently cured without residuary mutilation.

As a GAS FOR FIGHTING DOSES, CHLORINE was first chosen; its production was possible in *sufficient* quantities without encroachment on the national production of munitions. The blowing of the liquid chlorine from numerous steel cylinders buried in the front line.. trenches promised to develop a cloud of chlorine, which in spite of diffusion in the open air would have to roll over the position of the enemy in sufficient density. Besides, on account of its volatility, Chlorine gas had the property of leaving behind no residue worth mentioning, and so permitted an immediate advance of our own troops behind it. The effects of Chlorine upon the human body were less than those of bromacetous ester and chloracetone which the French had chosen. The production of a GAS PROTECTIVE DEVICE followed the preparation' of this means of offence. In the course of the year 1916 a gas mask was issued to the German troops which protected the face and respiratory organ&

In January 1916 researches had been so successful that General von Falkpnhayn decided to place at the disposal of the *Fourth Army* about 6,000 large Chlorine gas cylinders ready for use. In addition to these 24,000 of smaller size were in process of being made ready. ' The High Command had ordered the commander of the *Fourth Army* to employ the new means of making war in an operation against the Ypres Salient. It was reckoned .that on an average there should be one large or two small cylinders Per running meter. The technical control was in the hands of Professor Dr. limber of the government secret board to whom had been entrusted, by this time the direction of the Chemical Branch of the Prussian Ministry of War. The execution of the project was assigned to the pioneer companies newly organized for the purpose under Lieut.-Colonel Peterson. Difficulties that were far from insignificant still remained, however, to be overcome. Almost throughout the forces both leaders and troops regarded with mistrust the still untried means of offence, if they were not entirely inclined against it. Besides, the High Command set but little store by the gas weapon, and lent their voice in support of the imminent break

through offensive on the Galician front, because they were not at the time desirous of making themselves dependent on this apparently quite unreliable means of offence. The undertaking against the Ypres Salient would for the first time make trial of its war worthiness.

On the forenoon of the 21st April, 21ST APRIL, General von Falkenhayn had an interview with the commander of the *Fourth Army*, General-Colonel Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg, and strongly urged the early prosecution of the gas attack. The *Fourth Army* must "not set any too distant objectives for itself, but make the attack at the first possible favourable opportunity." Already because of favourable weather conditions the undertaking could be ordered for the 22nd of April at 5.45 a.m.

The commander of the *Fourth Army* had entrusted the *XXIII* and *XXVI Reserve Corps* with the carrying out of the attack. In their frontage north of Ypres from Steenstraat to Poeleappelle the allotted gas cylinders had been dug in. In Army reserve, apart from parts of the *43rd Reserve Division* there were not available any large forces for the development of a success. To the *XXIII Reserve Corps* fell the heavy task of securing a crossing over the Yser Canal. As first objectives there were laid down: for the *XXIII Reserve Corps* a line northwest of Steenstraat-Lizerne – southwest of Pilckem, for the *XXVI Reserve Corps* the high ground along the road Boesinghe--Pilckem-Langemarck -- Poeleappelle. Further objectives were specified as "the securing of the Yser Canal up to and including Ypres."

Because of the atmospheric calm 22ND APRIL, which prevailed on the early morning of the 22nd April the attack had to be put off to a late hour in the afternoon. This meant a corresponding increase in the difficulties existing, since all preparations had been made for an advance in the grey light of morning. The commander of the *XXII Reserve Corps*, General von Kathen, at once declared his opinion against an attack in broad daylight, while the commander of the *XXVI Reserve Corps*, General von Hugel, was emphatic that a success for his corps could only be expected if flank protection were simultaneously provided by an attack of the *XXIII Reserve Corps*. The C.G.S. of the *Fourth Army*, General Ilse, tried by long distance telephone to remove these qualms, eventually the following unequivocal direction was issued "The commander expects that in accordance with the decision already taken, the *XXIII Reserve Corps*, in conjunction with the *XXVI Reserve Corps* will gain Hill 20 near Pilekem,"

At 5 p.m. the buried gas cylinders were opened opposite the French 87th Territorial and 45th Infantry Division. Some days previously the Belgian General Staff had warned

the French higher command of the possibility of a German gas attack; but apparently they had not attached sufficient importance to it. The wind blew from a northerly direction, at a rate of about two metres per second. A continuous whitish-yellow cloud bank rolled towards the enemy's trenches. Even before it reached them the enemy could be seen to, waver before it after firing a few shots. Simultaneously brisk enemy artillery fire was directed on the German trenches. Immediately behind the gas cloud at 5.15 p.m. the German infantry moved forward to the assault.

On the frontage of the *XXIII Reserve Corps* opposite Steenstraat the projection of the gas was not altogether successful, so that the left wing of the *46th Reserve Division* commanded by Gen. Schopflin, could only gain ground slowly in the face of heavy enemy defensive fire. Only late in the evening and with considerable losses was the village of Steenstraat taken by parts of the *45th* and *46th Reserve Divisions*. A further prosecution of the attack in the direction of Lizerne was beyond the strength of the already seriously weakened troops. The main body of the *46th Reserve Division* under General Hahn went quickly forward to the Canal and, north of Het Sae., overran it with part of the force and secured a footing on the western bank. Opposite Boesinghe they were able to reach the canal at a few places only.

Opposite the right wing of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* the moral effect of the gas was unusually great. The assaulting units of the *52nd Reserve Division* commanded by General Waldorf were able to break through unchecked and by 5.40 p.m. had already reached their objective, the high ground at Pilckem. They were halted there at first, because the neighbouring divisions had not come up. The advance of the adjoining *51st Reserve Division* was substantially more difficult. On their front the gas both at and east of Langemarck had not had an overpowering effect, or else the troops had not followed it up immediately. So it was that the extreme right wing of the French and the Canadians adjoining on the east could offer an obstinate resistance. Only at 6 p.m. was the village of Langemarck, so nobly and bloodily disputed in earlier fighting, in German Possession. General Friedrich von Kleist now received an order to gain possession on this day of the bridges over the Haanebeek south of Langemarck and if possible to take St. Julien.

The *37th Landwehr Brigade*, held ready in general reserve, was placed at the disposal of the successful *52nd Reserve Division* and pushed forward on Pilckem. Towards 6.45 p.m. this division reported that it was advancing on the ridge south of Pilckem. On its front apparently the artillery and reserves of the enemy had also gone off to the rear in panic-stricken flight. On the other hand the enemy opposite the *61st Reserve Division* had brought up reinforcements to St. Julien, which made it difficult to advance. Railway traffic on the Hazebrouck-Poperinghe line, as confirmed by air reports, made it appear that the enemy was bringing up more reinforcements to the battlefield. The *102nd Reserve Infantry Brigade* held back in Houthoult Forest was therefore brought up as far as Koekuit still later in the evening. Towards 8.30 p.m. the *61st Reserve Division* reported that it was in possession of both the crossings of the Haanebeek south-west of Langemarck; to the south fighting was in progress for another crossing. Both Divisions were now ordered to maintain the positions reached and to continue the attack the next day, the *87th Landwehr Brigade* was instructed to build a support line on the high ground near Pilckem. The commander of the heavy artillery was ordered to bring the artillery forward during the night and to make dispositions so that the enemy west of the canal, as well as the town of Ypres, could be brought under fire.

Thus on the 22nd April the *XXIII Reserve Corps* had thrown the enemy back across the Canal between Steenstraat and Het Sas; the *XXVI Reserve Corps* had thrust forward as far as a line south of Pilckem and north west of St. Julien. The booty comprised unwounded prisoners to the number of 1,800 French and 10 British, more than 51 guns, of which four were heavy, and about 70 machine guns.

On the enemy's side on the evening of the 22nd a wide gap lay open between the canal and St. Julien. Of the French there were only weak units in position southeast of Boesinghe, and, intermixed with Canadians, to the north of Keerselaere. The gap was but scantily secured by British troops, a continuous line no longer existed. Because at the same time the canal crossings near Ypres were under heavy German fire, which made the movement of troops and supplies through the town increasingly difficult, the position of the enemy in the Ypres Salient had become serious.

Impressed by the success of this 23RD APRIL first day's fighting the commander of the *Fourth Army* thought that the objectives of the attack, hitherto placed only on the Yser Canal,

might now be substantially broadened, and he issued instructions on the morning of the 23rd April for the continuance of the attack IN THE DIRECTION OF POPERINGHE. For the *XXIII Reserve Corps* the next objective was the line Pypegaale--area south west of Boesinghe. The *XXVI Reserve Corps* would press the attack in a southerly direction with the right wing along the canal to take in rear the enemy opposed to the *XXVII Reserve Corps*. For the prosecution of this task there was added to the *XXII Reserve Corps* the army reserve under General Runckel (parts of the *43rd Reserve Div.*) whose *88th Reserve Brigade* was forthwith substituted for a brigade of the *46th Reserve Division*, which was thus released for participation in the attack. Besides this, two regiments of the *Marine Corps* were brought up into the area Staden-Houthoult.

On the night 22/23 April in the sector of the *XXIII Reserve Corps* the left wing of the *46th Reserve Div.* was repeatedly attacked from the direction of Lizerne. The German troops did indeed beat off the attacks, but after that were not in a fit condition to continue the advance as ordered. So the *46th Reserve Division* on the 23rd April was only able with difficulty to reach the edge of the Yperlee stream west of Steenstraat. In front of the *48th Reserve Division* the enemy had again established a line on the road LizerneBoesinghe, and had brought up reinforcements. For this reason the attack of this Division could also gain but little ground.

Very early in the morning of the 23rd April the troops of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* had to withstand British counter-attacks. To expedite the advance of the *61st Reserve Division* General Freiherr von Hugel by about 7.45 a.m. had already ordered the commander of the gas troops to dig in the remaining gas cylinders on the frontage of that division. From the Army orders for the attack, received about 11 a.m., the Commander of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* was given to understand that the Army commander "regarded the undertaking against Poperinghe as the main operation and the advance of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* only as a secondary operation. Since there was not sufficient strength available for the advance across the canal in the direction of Poperinghe, the success of this operation was for that reason questionable. Similarly the advance of the army corps with the right wing along the canal was impossible so long as the adjacent corps was not in possession of Boesinghe and further advanced towards Poperinghe. Only by that means could the strong enemy artillery in echelon on that side of the canal be disposed of."

According to information received at the headquarters of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* during the afternoon, the enemy had entrenched about 500 metres distant from the German line; reinforcements were brought up into this sector from Ypres. Towards 5.30 p.m. combined English and French forces advanced to the attack on both sides of the Ypres-Pilckem road, and French troops pressed forward across the bridges at Boesinghe. It is true that the enemy's attack was beaten off, but the forward movement of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* had also come to a standstill. For the 24th April the *62nd Reserve Division* was ordered to hold the positions won. The *61st Reserve Division* and the *102nd Reserve Infantry Brigade* attached to it would, in the meantime, conjointly capture the ridges north of the line Wieltje-Frezenberg in a gas attack wafted through the line early on the 24th April.

But in the meantime the Higher Command had intervened, and stated to the commander of the *Fourth Army* "that Poperinghe did not primarily enter the question at all as an objective for the operation, and that for the present it was strictly a matter of cutting off the Ypres Salient."

In the early hours of the 24th April and after a hard struggle, parts of the *46th* and *46th Reserve Divisions* carried Lizerne by assault. The left wing of the *46th Reserve Division* was able, after heavy and costly fighting which continued late into the night, to win the eastern bank of the canal opposite Boesinghe. Gas was released on the front of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* north of St. Julien at 4 a.m.; the *102nd* and *101st Reserve Infantry Brigades* followed close after the cloud which had but little density. Their attack pressed gradually onwards in the course of the morning, after obstinate fighting at first west of Keer selaere, and later also east of it. But the fate of this place, which was defended with tenacious determination by the enemy, was only sealed at about 11 a.m. South of this, in the farms and hedges of St. Julien, the enemy put up renewed resistance. In the afternoon the Army Commander placed both regiments of the *Marine Corps* under the *XXVI Reserve Corps*. General Freiherr von Hugel thereupon issued orders about 1.45 p.m. to press on through to the west of St. Julien. But only towards 6 p.m. had the regiments of the *61st Reserve Division* obtained possession of St. Julien after a fight, soon after that they had to evacuate the village again in the face of attacking British battalions. With the *62nd Reserve Division*, which lay adjacent on the west the day passed in general quiet. For the 25th

April General Freiherr von Hugel planned the prosecution of the attack as already ordered. The zero hour was fixed for 4.15 a.m. Colonel Peterson was directed this time to dig in gas cylinders in the sector of the *62nd Reserve Division* from the Ypres-Pilckem road eastwards to the wood west of St. Julien.

On the 24th April the right wing of the *XXVII Reserve Corps*, adjoining the *XXVI Reserve Corps*, was also mustered to the attack. Its co-operation was so arranged that at daybreak a temporary composite brigade of the *63rd (Saxon) Reserve Division* under General von Schmieden, would follow behind the left wing of the *61st Reserve Division*, would wheel into the fight as it progressed, and would roll up the enemy in front of the *38th Landwehr* and *106th Reserve Infantry Brigade* from the north west. But in the course of their attack the *Brigade Schmieden* encountered an unweakened enemy, and had to execute a frontal attack. Only after this opposition had been overcome was a wheel to the south-eastwards possible. On the evening of the 24th April the right wing of the *Brigade* found itself engaged in an indecisive fight on the high ground north west of Gravenstaffel.

By the 25th April the hostile fire 25TH APRIL on the troops of the *XXIII Reserve Corps* west of the Canal

had increased to such an extent that a profitable renewal of the attack was no longer to be thought of.

Early on 25th April St. Julien, again evacuated by the enemy, fell into the hands of the *XXVI Reserve Corps*. The *51st Reserve Division* had orders to secure the objectives of the 24th April, the ridges north of the line Wieltje-Frezenberg. The *62nd Reserve Division* would co-operate in the fight of the neighbouring division by furnishing effective aid. Then suddenly at 6 a.m. about seven British battalions came over southwest of St. Julien in an attack against the German troops which were marshalled ready for the attack. Not until 7 a.m. could the hostile attack, delivered in great strength and carried on by successive waves, finally be brought to a standstill. But the striking power of the now greatly weakened German troops was also worn out in the doing; only the regiments of the left wing of the *51st Reserve Division* won, later on and after tough fighting, another narrow strip of ground to the east of St. Julien.

On the right wing of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* the Fortuin-Mosselmarkt road was reached as darkness fell, about 1,000 Canadians had been taken prisoner. The enemy, although thrown back was able with the help of reinforcements to afford new opposition.

The further designs of the command of the *Fourth Army* were imparted in orders given at an interview with the G.O.C. *XXIII Reserve Corps* on the afternoon of the 25th April. General von Kather stressed the necessity of going on further and taking Boesinghe. But the Army Commander vetoed this project on the following grounds: "The success of this attack would be questionable. It would entail heavy losses, and it would be difficult to maintain a position of such width on the western bank. The Corps must be satisfied with what it had gained. . The aim of the Army operation was for the present, to lop off the pocket east of Ypres by the advance of the *XXVI Reserve Corps*. Only after that would an advance through Boesinghe come up for consideration"

On the afternoon of 26th April a 26TH Aran number of heavy French attacks were delivered against the front between Steenstraat-Het Sas. They were carried out by Territorial troops as well as by parts of the newly committed 153rd Infantry Division, and they were supported effectively by British and Belgian artillery. The *48th Reserve Division* was in evil case; the position west of Het Sas was captured by the enemy, but the sluice itself remained in our possession. Meanwhile towards 5 a.m. Lizerne had also been attacked from a northerly direction and had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The Germans occupied the old French trenches east of the village. An intended counter-attack, under hostile fire, never materialised.

In the course of the morning reports from the *XXVI Reserve Corps* indicated that the enemy had concentrated one or two fresh corps in the area east of Ypres and evidently planned an assault which was heralded by heavy fire. Soon after 1.1 a.m. strong enemy forces-parts of the English 28th as well as the recently arrived 4th, the 50th Territorial and the Lahore Division-moved forward to the attack between the Canal and St. Julien. But all advances were shattered by the steadiness of the German infantry.

As had happened at St. Julien, counterattacks mounted also in the vicinity of Gravenstafel on the 26th April had delayed further gain of ground by the *XXVII Reserve Corps*.

In the ensuing days the enemy tried in vain to throw back again TO the east bank of the canal 1ST MAY. the already extraordinarily weakened regiments of the *46th Reserve Division of the XXIII Reserve Corps*. The waves of attack broke anew against the German front. The Division, effectively aided by the *46th Reserve Division* was however able to retain possession of the new position on the Yperlee brook.

During these five days the G.O.C. *XXVI Reserve Corps* desisted from continuing the attack, because it appeared to him that the number of gas cylinders so far dug in was insufficient. An attack without the aid of gas was however, in face of the enemy entrenched and in strength and in view of the weakness of our own artillery almost out of the question. Consequently the further *ad vanes* of the *XXVII Reserve Corps*, whose purpose was, to force a way through with the right wing hearing down from the north upon Gravenstafel, was delayed.

Meanwhile the English C-in-C., Yield-Marshal French had been taking steps to put into effect his deliberations with regard to the further retention of the endangered salient at Ypres. Already on the 27th April he had directed the commanders on the spot to consider plans for withdrawal to a rearward position still east of, but nearer, Ypres. Because of the emphatic protests of General Foch the prosecution of this intention was postponed regardless of the difficult tactical position. An Englishman, captured on the 29th April, imparted the illuminating intelligence that "The position of both the English and French detachments at Ypres is very serious. We must be prepared for bad news." The G.O.C. *Fourth German Army* perceived in that a confirmation of his own view that the salient jutting out east of Ypres was becoming more and more untenable and that consequently, with a renewal of pressure an early evacuation was to be expected,

2ND/3RD
MAY

On the 2nd May the attacking formations of the *Fourth Army* north of Ypres moved anew to the attack under cover of a gas

projection.

Both divisions of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* reported shortly after 5 p.m. that the gas cylinders buried between Pilckem and St. Julien had been opened. The effect of it on the enemy was however adversely influenced, because the transmission of orders was seriously interrupted owing to the cutting of telephone wires by shell fire, and on that account syn-chronization of release was prevented. The gusty wind also reduced the density of the gas and lessened the impression produced on the enemy who was already provided with efficient means of protection. The attacking troops ran into insuperable resistance.

On the 3rd of May a Marine Infantry Regiment was put at the disposal of the *61st Reserve Division*, which was no longer able to sustain the main burden of attack on its left wing. But there also the enemy, aided by the

dead ground in an area scattered over with numerous isolated farms, put up a tough resistance.

In spite of this, on the 2nd of May, the *88th Landwehr Bde.* on the right wing of the *XXVII Reserve Corps* succeeded in gaining some ground along the Mosselmarkt-Fortuin road. The adjoining *105th Reserve Infantry Brigade* (Schmieden) however was stuck fast in front of an obstinately defended earthwork in the little wood north of Gravenstafel. In view of the slight and hard contested gains, the G.O.C., General von Schubert, proposed to the Army Commander to withdraw from the advanced works at Zonnebeke which were costly to hold and to assemble the forces thus released, one division at least, in the neighbourhood of Keerselaere at the disposal of the Army Commander, in order to help forward the attack of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* in the decisive direction towards Ypres. But the Army Commander did not concur in this proposal. Therefore the *105th Reserve Infantry Brigade*, on the 3rd of May, had to make a fresh attack on the earthwork held by the enemy. The assault, which was everywhere carried out with determination, was accompanied by complete success.

4TH/7TH
MAY

Under the pressure of this attack the British, on the night of 3/4th May, evacuated their positions in the Salient from Fortuin as far as the south west of Gheluvelt. The G.O.C. of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* thereupon sent the *51st Reserve Division* forward to the attack forthwith. In the evening, and after continuous fighting to overcome obstinate resistance, it was only possible to reach the line Vanheule Farm-Haanebeek valley.

The *XXVII Reserve Corps* and the left of the neighbouring *XV Army Corps* lying opposite the southern section of the Ypres Salient encountered little resistance. General von Schubert set the right wing of the *53rd Reserve Division* in motion towards Frezenberg, and the left wing of the *64th (Wurtemberg)* towards Eksternest. From the *XV Army Corps* came the news that the *89th Infantry Division* was even then pressing on towards Eksternest. At about 3 p.m. the divisions were again held up in front of a strongly fortified and heavily manned enemy position in the area north of the line Wieltje-Frezenberg-east of Hooge, which made a new and carefully organised attack necessary; this was ordered on the afternoon of 6th May.

The commander of the *Fourth Army*, filled with a keen aspiration to drive the enemy back across the Yser as soon as possible, wished to launch the attack in all possible

strength and embracing the objective on three sides. To effect this the *XXVI Corps* would advance southwards and seize the high ground near Wieltje, the *XXVII Reserve Corps* would attack the hill position opposed to it on the west, the *XV Army Corps* would throw back the enemy northwestwards between Bellewaarde Lake and Zillebeke Lake. The opening of the preparatory bombardment was set for 7 a.m. on the 8th of May.

8TH/9TH
MAY

The *XXVII Reserve Corps* carried the weight of the subsequent attack. On the 8th of May after about three hours of artillery preparation, its advancing regiments, at 9.30 a.m. under weather conditions favourable for attack against the 27th and 28th British Infantry Divisions, found the front line trenches evacuated by the enemy. In advancing onwards across the open country the attack was soon brought to a standstill by the heavy defensive fire of the enemy. In spite of everything as darkness fell the commanding main line of trenches west of Frezenberg-Eksternest was in German hands.

Next day at 1.40 p.m. the Army Commander issued instructions to the G.O.C. *XXVI Reserve Corps* to the effect that: "His Royal Highness informs you that on the basis of a captured English order for withdrawal, there is every indication that the English have ordered a determined stand to be made on the east bank of the Yser. At the moment the *Sixth Army* is being attacked by strong English forces (i.e. *at Festubert*). It may be confidently presumed that the English will concentrate all their available forces opposite the *Sixth Army*." General von Schubert thereupon ordered a new preparatory bombardment to take place from 2.30 p.m. to 4 p.m. which facilitated the capture by the assaulting troops of a small advantageous piece of ground extending to the line Verlorenhoek-Bellewaarde Lake. But the object, "To drive back the enemy into this last position at Potijze," was not achieved in spite of the devoted bravery of the attacking regiments.

On the 9th of May, besides the troops of the *XXVI Reserve Corps* and the right wing of the *XV Army Corps* which were able to make only immaterial advances, parts of the *XXII Reserve Corps* on the sea-coast also joined in the battle. There the attack however, on account of the strong position of the enemy's trenches, also miscarried.

With the 9th of May the field operations at Ypres came altogether to a close. The whole offensive had cost the Germans over 35,000 casualties. The English totalled theirs in the period from 22nd April to 31st May at

59,275 men; those of the French were, according to their own assertion, equally high, on the 22nd April alone they lost 18,000 men.

The attack at Ypres had not, apart from its initial success, achieved the desired result, the intention to cut off the Ypres Salient had not been successful in spite of the employment of gas as a new means of fighting. The reason for this was above all that on 22nd April night came too soon to allow the surprise of the enemy to be fully exploited. Although the enemy did withdraw on a wide frontage from Wieltje to Klein Zillebeke, yet that was under the pressure of the troops of the *XXVI* and *XXVII Reserve Corps* who attacked again and again in spite of severe losses. Certainly the battle-gas was chiefly to be thanked for the initial successes north of Ypres. In the eyes of leaders and troops it had proved to be a new weapon in spite of shortcomings connected with its utility for war purposes.

(NOTE: *In the above translation times have been adjusted by one hour, the difference between the British and the German clock on the Western front at this period. Thus, by German time, the gas cylinders were first opened at 6.00 p.m. Sand April, 1915.*
(See 706a, 706b, 706c, 706d)

706a

Extracts from contemporary German official communiques published in the British Press.

23rd April.

Yesterday evening, along our front from Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck we attacked the enemy position north and northeast of Ypres and advanced on a front of about five and a half miles to the heights north of Pilkem and east of these heights.

Simultaneously our troops, supported, by artillery, forced a passage across the Yser Canal near Steenstraate and Het Sast, where they gained a footing on the western bank. The places of Langemarck, Steenstraate, Het Bast and Pilkem were taken, and we captured at least 1,600 French and English prisoners and 30 guns, including four heavy English guns.

24th April.

All attempts by the enemy to regain the lost ground north and north-east of Ypres failed.

North of Ypres a strong French attack, and an English attack north-east of Ypres, near St. Julien, broke down with heavy losses. A

further attack by the enemy on the road from Ypres to Bixschoote and east of that road was repulsed. West of the Ypres Canal, during the night, we stormed the village of Lizerne.

The number of captured French, English and Belgians has been increased to 2,470. Moreover a great number of machine-guns, many rifles and other material was captured.

Major Moraht, commenting in the *Berliner Tageblatt* on the German success near Ypres violently attacks the alleged English method of warfare. He declares that the English are using German uniforms in order to gain cheap successes, and are carefully employing bullets emitting asphyxiating gases and dum dum bullets, and by other means, are carrying on a brutal war.

25th April.

Near Ypres we have gained further successes. Yesterday we again maintained the ground captured on April 23 against the enemy's attacks.

Further eastward we continued our attacks, and stormed the Solaert Farm, south-west of St. Julien, and also the places of St. Julien and Kersslaere and advanced victoriously against Gravenstafel (all north-east of Ypres). We captured about 1,000 Englishmen and seven machine guns.

In the morning we repulsed a British counter-attack on our position west of St. Julien, the enemy suffering most severe losses.

To the west of the mill British attempts to attack were stifled in their birth.

706b

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

Infantry units and formations on the front of the 1st Canadian Division 22nd April-4th May, 1915

FOURTH ARMY (*part of*)

Commander: General Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg.

Chief of the Staff: Major General Ilse.

XXII Reserve Corps (*part of*):

(General von Falkenhayn.)

43rd Reserve Division:

85th Res. Bde.: 201st and 202nd R.I.R.

86th Res. Bde.: 203rd and 204th R.I.R.

44th Reserve Division:

207th Res. Inf. Regt. (of 88th Res. Bde.).

XXVI Reserve Corps:

(General von Hugel).

51st Reserve Division:

101st Res. Bde.: 233rd and 234th R.I.R.,

102nd Res. Bde.: 235th and 236th R.I.R.

23rd Res. Jager Bn.

52nd Reserve Division

103rd Res. Bde.: 237th and 238th R.I.R.

104th Res. Bde.: 239th and 240th R.I.R.

24th Res. Jager Bu.

Attached Formations

4th Naval Bde: 4th and 5th Naval Regts.

37th Ldw. Bde.: 73rd and 74th Ldw. I.R.

2nd Res. Ers. Bde.:

3rd R.E.I.R. (33rd, 34th and 35th

Res. Ers. Bn.).

4th R.E.I.R. (36th, 37th and 38th

Res. Ers. Bn.).

Composite Bde. of 43rd Res. Div. (XXII Res. Corps).

XXVII Reserve Corps:

(General von Carlowitz.)

53rd Reserve Division:

105th Res. Bde.: 241st and 242nd R.I.R.

106th Res. Bde.: 243rd and 244th R.I.R.

25th Res. Jager Bn.

54th Reserve Division:

107th Res. Bde.: 245th and 246th R.I.R.

108th Res. Bde.: 247th and 248th R.I.R.

28th Res. Jager Bn.

Attached Formation

38th Ldw. Bde.: 77th and 78th Ldw. Regt.

NOTE: *An Assault Brigade (Sturmbrigade Schmieden) consisting of three composite regiments of the 53rd and 54th Res. Divs. was employed on the right of the XXVII Res. Corps from 24th to 29th April, 1915. See Appendix 706d.*

706c

Notes on German Establishments, Strengths and Losses

1. A German Infantry Regiment consisted of 12 companies formed into three battalions. Establishment of each battalion was 26 *officers* and 1,050 other ranks.

2. The total establishment of a German Infantry Division was 17,500 all ranks; 4,000 horses; 72 guns.

3. The fighting strength of the infantry of two German Infantry Divisions on 20th April was as follows:

51st Res. Div. 343 off. and 12,993 other ranks and 33 M.Gs.

52nd Res. Div. 343 off. and 13,551 other ranks and 26 M.Gs.

4. Casualties for two German Corps are recorded as follows, 21st-30th April, 1915.

XXVI Reserve Corps (inc. 37th Ldw. and 2nd Res. Ers. Bde.)

Officers			Other Ranks		
k.	w.	m.	k.	w.	m.
50	119	4	998	4,247	813

XXVII Reserve Corps (inc. 38th Ldw. Bde.)

Officers			Other Ranks		
k.	w.	m.	k.	w.	m.
16	38	2	319	1,121	144

5. Drop in fighting strength of infantry of two German Divisions, 20th April-11th May.

51st Res. Div. 119 off. 4,281 other ranks.

52nd Res. Div. 106 off. 4,317 other ranks.

(The reinforcements received are not stated.)

(See 706b)

706d

NOTES AND EXTRACTS FROM GERMAN REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

The density of trench garrisons of the *XXVII Res. Corps* was reduced on 5th April, so that battalions not in line might undergo special training in the attack on trenches and in open warfare. On the 15th the Kaiser inspected and addressed some of the units at Dadizee, ten miles east of Ypres, and stood each man a litre of beer out of his own private purse.

The support and reserve battalions of the *XXVII Res. Corps* were temporarily brigaded (*Sturmbrigade Schmieden*), and employed in rolling up the Canadian line from Keerselaere to Gravenstafel.

COMPOSITION OF ASSAULT-BRIGADE SCHMIEDEN

Temporary formation, *XXVII Res. Corps*, 23rd-29th April, 1915.

Regiment Wilhelmi.

II/78 L.I.R. (38th Ldw. Bde.).

III/78 L.I.R. (38th Ldw. Bde.).

II/244 R.I.R. (106th R.B. 53rd RD.).

Regiment Reussner.

II/241 R.I.R. (105th R.B. 53rd RD.).

III/241 R.I.R. (105th R.B. 53rd RD.).

II/242 R.I.R. (105th R.B. 53rd RD.).

Regiment Heygendorff.

III/245 R.I.R. (107th R.B. 54th RD.).

II/247 R.I.R. (108th R.B. 54th RD.).

3 co. } 246 R.I.R. (107th R.B. 54th

4 co. } RD.).

9 co. } Battn. Kolle.

(Designation of German battalions: II/78 L.I.R. = 2nd Battalion, 78th Landwehr Infantry Regiment; etc.)

OPERATIONS OF *Regiment Reussner*

23RD APRIL 11 a.m. "The 51st Div. is awaiting an imminent British attack and intends to attack later itself" (*53rd Res. Div. order.*)
105th Res. Bde. informed by *53rd R.D.* that the attack of *51st R.D.* planned for today is postponed until tonight.

The Division is to hold itself in readiness to attack as hitherto.

24TH APRIL 1.15 am. *Regt. Reussner* assembled on Moorslede-Passchendaele road, ready to attack, in battle order with masks for protection against poison gas.

1.30 a.m. Advanced in direction of Passchendaele. There was no time for contemplation, all were cold and glad that things were moving on quickly.

3.30 a.m. Conference at Poelkappelle road junction and written orders issued to regimental commanders.

1. The enemy is at Keerselaere, along the Stroombeek and southwards.

2. The Brigade will roll up the enemy's position opposite the *38th Landwehr Brigade* in front of Poelkappelle and keep touch with the brigade of *61st Div.* advancing to the west.

Boundary 12-1 300 metres S.W. of Poelkappelle to x roads Ypres-Mosselmarkt and Langemarck-Zonnebeke (i.e. *Bombarded Cross Roads*).

3. *Regt. Reussner* will form up for the advance with the right flank south-east of the road junction in Poelkappelle. Boundary: from road junction to line farm 200 m. east of Hill 32. (*Boetleer Fm.*)

4. The Bde. will advance as soon as the advance of the *61st Div.* is seen. *Regiment Reussner* will keep in touch.

5. The main objective Hill 32-1200 m. east of St. Julien; subsequently, as 2nd objective, the line Hill 37 (1 km. north of Zevenkote)--Gravenstafel.

The regiment at once took up its assembly position, 2nd Bn. *241st R.I.R.* near the Mill with the right on the Poelcappelle-Langemarck road. The 3rd Bn., *241st R.I.R.* on the left. The 2nd Bn., *242nd R.I.R.* at the disposal of the brigade.

Like a fiery steed that can be reined in only with difficulty, the battalions of *Regiment Reussner* stood fast under their commanders and awaited the advance of the *233rd R.I.R. (61st Res. Div.)* with which the Regiment had to link up on the right.

It is extraordinarily difficult to say definitely at this date why at 7.10 a.m. *Regiment Reussner* could be restrained no longer and dashed forward. At 7.20 a.m. it had already gone forward 600 metres and at 7.30 a.m. the *233rd R.I.R.* advanced.

Again let it be emphatically declared that no gas cloud was released, that *Regiment Reussner* was only supported by artillery. (*The gas had been released at 4 a.m.*) But the artillery fired incredibly sparingly and with gas shells. Their fire was centred on the enemy trenches and strong points.

At 820 am. the *2nd Bn., 241st R.I.R.* reported that its front line was from 60 to 100 metres short of the farm designated as its objective. Since the German guns were firing on the British fire-trenches in front of this farm, and since the left was exposed to infantry and machine-gun fire, the battalion had to wait until the attack of the *3rd Bn., 241st R.I.R.* had advanced to the same line and the German artillery had lifted. When interbattalion touch had been established the objective was reached and the 2nd and 3rd Bns. wheeled to the left.

Once again both battalions pressed irresistibly forward and at 3.40 p.m. the assault reached Hill 32 (*Between Locality C and Boetleer Farm*).

But again both battalions were held back and received orders to dig in because the *77th and 78th Landwehr Infantry Regiments* had not come up. Heavy enemy artillery fire was encountered, whereas the German guns had exhausted their ammunition. Otherwise the attack would not have come to a standstill.

Even at night the *77th and 78th L.I.R.* did not come forward on account of heavy British artillery and M.G. fire. Similarly the *61st Reserve Division* remained about 300 metres behind on the right flank.

Hot was the day and bloody the battle, a day of glory in the history of the *241st Regiment* and also in the annals of their brave opponents.

The great importance of capturing the Cross roads on 24th April was fully understood at the time. All the enemy's moves were clearly observed. Thus it was reported on 24th April at 3.45 p.m. that the enemy's artillery were going back; and at 3.52.p.m. that two more waves of infantry (*1st Suffolk and 12th London*) were advancing in a north easterly direction. Other reports followed which showed that the British had no intention of withdrawing from the hotly-contested battlefield without a fight.

The *2nd Bn. Naval Regiment* asked MajorGeneral von Schmieden if they could act in conjunction. They belonged to the *XXVI*

Reserve Corps but that did not matter. He sent them up on the right of the *2nd Bn., 241st R.I.R.* where they closed the yawning gap. Lieut.-Colonel Reussner was obviously delighted. With riding-switch and monocle, and puffing a cigar, he was everywhere in evidence, even under the heaviest fire.

In the grey of morning, on the 25th April, Hill 32 was overrun and the enemy's main position stormed. The British made a furious counter-attack but it collapsed under our fire. That was at 7.30 a.m. Again at 8 a.m. the second counter-attack followed. It also collapsed under the fire of the *2nd Bn., 241st R.I.R.* and the *Naval Cyclist Company*. The British effected a lodgment 150 metres in front of the new position of the *2nd Bn., 241st R.I.R.* (*The 7th and 10th Cdn. Bns. took up a line on this front early on 25th April.*)

At 2 a.m. on the 26th April a -new order to attack reached the regimental staff on Hill 32. No. 5 Company of the *5th Naval Regiment* voluntarily placed itself under *Regiment Reussner* and suffered losses in assaulting with the regiment on the right flank. Parts of *Regiment Wilhelmi* followed the advance on the left of *Regiment Reussner*. But fate was unkind. In the evening the *78th L.I.R.* withdrew and the *2nd/5th Naval Battalion* came into Corps Reserve. (*See History of the 241st Reserve Infantry Regiment pp. 97-101.*)

OPERATIONS OF *Regiment Heyendorff*

24th April, 1915.

5.30 p.m. Regiment marched by Passchen-
daele to farm 1 km. south of
SPRIET.

25th April, 1915.

4.00 am. Ordered to attack PADDLEBEEK
(i.e. *Stroombeek*) southwards.

9.30 am. Order cancelled.

10.30 a.m. Marched to POELKAPELLE.

Evening. *Bn. Kölle* in support west of
Wallmolen.

The British, withdrawing both southwestwards and southeastwards, and strengthened by reserves, were holding up the further progress of the German attacking waves. The British enfilade fire from both flanks had led to confusion as to the direction of the attack on the part of the assaulting troops, and as a result wide gaps had occurred in the front line. Under these conditions *Bn. Kollé* was sent forward to clear up the situation and strengthen the position.

Bn. Kollé advanced towards crest 7.30 p.m. at Mosselmarkt-Fortuin road and

attacked Farm A. II/247th on the right, III/245th on left.

The attacking lines were met with heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the front and right flank which made further advance impossible.

Hand to hand fighting at Graven-
26TH APRIL stafel. The crest of the ridge
taken and the new line consoli-
dated. One Canadian officer and two men
captured.

On 3rd May, when Berlin Wood was captured, it is recorded that the spirit of the German troops knew no bounds, and next day "In the midst of the bursting shrapnel some high-spirited fellows had dragged a harmonium out into the road and were singing lustily. For long afterwards the men carried pieces of booty and so on about with them, indeed a British rubber cape was priceless in the Flanders rain."

"In-the police station at Zonnebeke a ration dump with a mixed assortment of preserves was found, but all in a heap and sprinkled with a white powder. Poison!--The brave troops were averse to such a death. They went on, until at last an undamaged house established the fact that the white powder was only flour."

(See History of the *246th Reserve Infantry Regiment*)

OPERATIONS OF THE *5th Matrosen Regiment*

April 1915

The Regiment was withdrawn by
23RD APRIL rail to Staden, and billeted in the
already closely crowded town.

Numerous prisoners, among them many sick from gas, came from the front; a motley mixture of men, black, yellow, white English and French.

The spirits of the Regiment ran high, all were glad to be coming at last against the enemy after the long period of training. Particularly great was the bitterness of our seamen against the Englishmen, whom they had learned to know in every corner of the earth as boastful and arrogant.

The band was broken up and the musicians detailed as battalion stretcher-bearers. The field dressing station was at the southern exit of Poelkapelle.

The Regiment came under the 24TH Aran. *2nd Ersatz Brigade (XXVI Res. Corps)* and marched to Poelkapelle. That evening the *fat* and *3rd Bns.* were sent against a piece of trench which remained from the 22nd April in rear of the

new German front and which was heavily manned by the enemy. (*Left of original front line of 2nd C.I.B.*) So as not to endanger the 77th R.I. Regiment (38th Ldw. Bde.) which was in contact with the enemy the attack would be enveloping and delivered with cold steel. In altogether unknown terrain, and on a pitch dark rainy night, the heavy task could not be accomplished; only elements of the 1st Battalion succeeded in rolling up a short length of trench, which it had, however, to give up again on account of strong opposition and after sustaining casualties. The battalions were brought back to Poelkapelle in the grey of dawn; the immediate prosecution of the attack by daylight with the two battalions did not take place. The piece of trench could only be captured on the evening of the 25th after hours of artillery preparation.

On the afternoon of the 24th the 2nd Bn., the cyclist company, the landing-gun battery (*two 56 cm. guns*) and the M.G. company were sent up to reinforce the left of the 2nd Ersatz Bde. (4th Ersatz Regiment) which was fighting east of St. Julien at Hill 32. (*Between Locality C and Boetleer Farm.*) The sailors, not having been seen before with their broad flat waterproof-covered caps, were at first mistaken for British by the German infantry. At the last moment they were recognized before any harm resulted.

The 2nd Bn. cool and in perfect 25TH APRIL as if on review on the parade ground stormed Hill 32, going forward in waves after excellent preparation by the landing-gun battery and M.G. Company, taking prisoner 21 Canadians.

The Regimental staff, with the 1st and 3rd Bns. lay in rear as reserve to the 2nd Bns in front line; in the afternoon they were withdrawn to Poelkapelle into Corps reserve. The 1st Battalion next supported the attack of the 78th Reserve Infantry Regt. (Regt. *Wilhelmi*) on the Gravenstafel-Wallemolen front. In an irresistible attack the seamen, in spite of severe losses, captured 92 Canadians and three machine guns.

For three days we lay on the hill, which our battalion will never forget; then we were relieved. "Sleep, only sleep," that was our only thought after these three days of duty and death, which indeed none can erase from memory. "The three days on 'Rill 32...'"

(See History of the 5th Naval Regiment.)

(See 706b)

707

THE FRENCH OFFICIAL HISTORY
"LES ARMEES FRANCAISES DANS LA
GRANDE GUERRE."

(MINISTERE DE LA GUERRE.)

Tome II. Part 3. Ch. XV, pp. 608-721.

(Textual numbers refer to "Annexes" printed below.)

IV. OPERATIONS OF THE PROVISIONAL GROUP
OF THE NORTH (G.P.N.) IN THE MONTH OF
APRIL 1916.

*The German Attack Assisted by Gas
(22nd April to 22nd May 1915.)*

During the first three weeks of the month of April the movements of troops which took place in the group of the Armies of the North were not troubled by any important action on the part of the enemy. On our side at the beginning of this month the General in Chief had issued instructions that measures should be taken to capture prisoners in order to obtain some details as to the forces opposed to us. The Corps of the Tenth Army like that of the Armies on its right as far as the Fourth were to execute bombardments on useful objectives so as to trouble the enemy who seemed to desire a period of peace. These bombardments would last six days and a daily quota of 1,000 rounds of 76 for the whole of the army was allotted to them.

The execution of these orders did not bring any serious reaction from the enemy and the front of the Armies of the North remained comparatively calm. Beyond that it may be cited that during this period occurred an intermittent, reciprocal bombardment and mining activity which continued on the X and XXXIII Corps front, the engagement of Drie Grachten on the front of the Belgian Army and that of Notre Dame de Lorette on the front of the XXI Corps.

On the 4th April, to the south of Drie Grachten, the Germans succeeded in crossing to the west of the Canal. The situation was almost re-established the next day, but on the 9th the Germans took possession of the locality. On the 11th the Belgians who had managed to cross to the right bank of the Yser, to the south of the Maison du Passeur, were compelled to withdraw to their original position and gave up trying to retake Drie Grachten, a position which they did not consider to be indispensable.

On the Tenth Army front, on the 15th April, the XXI Corps, after an artillery preparation of one hour, seized the last trenches which the Germans had gained south east of the great spur of Notre Dame de Lorette and reached the crest. The enemy retaliated with

a violent bombardment, and on the 15th and 17th made fruitless attempts to retake the lost ground.

But the enemy did not remain inactive and prepared a highly elaborate action with the aid of asphyxiating gas.

On the 16th April 1915, the General Staff of the Belgian Army had advised our (*French*) High Command that the Germans had made mouth covers of gauze which, impregnated with a suitable liquid, would protect men against the heavy asphyxiating gas which they proposed to release towards our trenches. The men of the *XXVI (German) Reserve Corps* had recently received special instructions on the handling of gas cylinders. These were going to be distributed on the ground with a density of one battery of twenty tubes per 40 metres.

The attack took place on the 22nd April at 17.00 hours, after a very quiet day the Germans on the front, Steenstraat, Langemarck and further east, made a projection of suffocating gas, very voluminous, producing its effect more than a kilometre from the point of origin. A yellow green mist blown by the wind, rolled towards our trenches followed by the German troops in mass formation. The greater part of the Territorials of the 87th Division in the line between Steenstraat and Wyndendrecht were asphyxiated by this gas and the survivors streamed back towards Boesinghe. The occupants of the 2nd line, although affected in a less degree, abandoned the bridgehead at Boesinghe and the guns there, and came back to the west bank of the Yser Canal.

The units of the 45th Division disposed between Langemarck and the English left evacuated that area with heavy loss and retired to the south east of Boesinghe on the east bank of the Canal. These withdrawals were finished at 17.30. At the same time the English left withdrew on St. Julien and formed a refused defensive flank facing north-west, the southern extremity of which was two kilometres north of Wieljtje. (*Actually the Canadian left did not withdraw from the original front line until 22.00 next day*). The line was broken for a distance of 31 kilometres between our right and the English left. The road to Ypres was open.

On the left the enemy had seized Steenstraat and Het Sas which was immediately retaken, and had established a bridge-head on the west bank of the Canal north of Het Sas. 1422 Eleven batteries were taken by the enemy after their crews had exhausted their ammunition.

General Putz sent a regiment from Army Reserve to be at the disposal of General Quiquandon, who commanded the 45th Division

and the Groupement d'Elverdinghe, instructing him to counter-attack immediately and retake all the lost ground. This regiment was engaged at 20.00 hours in the direction of Pilckem on the right of the elements which south east of Boesinghe formed our extreme right. It was unable to make progress.

During the course of the night 22nd/23rd April, a new regiment and later two 75 mm. batteries in Army reserve were given to General Quiquandon. The 186th Brigade of the 87th Territorial Division in reserve to the Detachment d'Armee de Belgique was given the alarm and despatched by bus south east of Woesten where it was put at the disposal of the Groupement d'Elverdinghe.

Towards midnight General Foch instructed General Putz that it was necessary above all, first to make certain of the retention of occupied points, second, to organize upon them a base of departure for a counter-attack which would recapture the lost ground, and third, to deliver this counter-attack-1423

During this same night the units which were south of Boesinghe on the right bank of the Canal under the orders of Colonel Mordacq, extended their front towards the right while the British troops prolonged theirs towards the left with the help of two Canadian Battalions. On the 23rd April at 7.00 hours contact was established on the Ypres-Pilckem road abreast of Zwaanahof farm 1424 1425. To allow of the delivery of the counter-attack which he had ordered, General Foch took the 153rd Division of the XX Corps, Tenth Army, and placed it at the disposal of General Putz who placed it in Army Reserve in the neighbourhood of Crombeke. The Tenth Army was warned, in anticipation of the despatch of new units, to make allotment should the situation north of Ypres so require.

Moreover the 6th (*Belgian*) Division lent three battalions to General Quiquandon and was itself reinforced on its right. Marshal French put the I (*British*) Cavalry Corps at the disposal of the DAB. Lastly General Putz took from the Groupement de Nieuport two battalions and three 75 mm. batteries and give them to the Groupement d'Elverdinghe.

At the same time he directed General Quiquandon to have the medical service seek out means of protection against the action of the gas. He recommended the wearing of a moistened pad over the mouth until other means could be found.

On the forenoon of 23rd April the Groupement d'Elverdinghe carried out two counterattacks which miscarried.

For the operations of the 23rd April, General Foch repeated his previous instructions,¹⁴¹⁹ and General Putz reported that we

held, from north to south "Lizerne, the course of the Yperlee up to Het Sea, Boesinghe, west bank of the canal, Zwaanahof Farm, the house 400 metres south of the cross-roads YpresPilokem and Wieltje.-Boesinghe" where was the junction with the British Army. As to preparations -for the counter-attack, his reply was contained in a copy (attached to his letter) of the orders he had given General Quiquandon. He did not think he could use the 153rd Division on that day, but intended to engage one brigade of it next day in an attack in the direction of Pilckem and to hold the other brigade in general reserve north of Elverdinghe.¹⁴²⁷

The orders from General Puts to General Quiquandon provided for an offensive east of the Yperlee carried out from south to north, the right wing in advance in close touch with the British Army and supported by all the batteries available east of Elverdinghe. The battalions from Nieuport supported by the three batteries of 75's which had come with them and by the Belgian artillery would attack from Lizerne on Steenstraat.¹⁴²⁸

General Allenby, commanding the I British Cavalry Corps, which had been placed at the disposal of General Puts, would bring its artillery into action in the vicinity of BrielenChapelle Notre-Dame to bring oblique fire to bear upon the Pilckem area and the ground over which the English left would advance. The whole of the Cavalry Corps would support the offensive east of the Pilckem road by our allies, in conjunction with Colonel Mordacq's right. One division of this Corps would be kept in hand east of Vlamertinghe (6 kilometres west of Ypres) to guard against any contingency on the left bank of the Yperlee.¹⁴²⁶

General Quiquandon gave Colonel Mordacq the order to attack on the front between Boesinghe and the Ypres-Pilckem road in close liaison with the British Army. On our right the English aware of our action would themselves attack on Langemarck. During the execution of Colonel Mordacq's counter attack, the 87th Division would make an effort to retake the canal crossings.

Colonel Mordacq's attack launched at 4.45 p.m. by 6 p.m. reached a line extending from Boesinghe station on the left to the western approaches of the Mortelje Farm which had been recaptured by the Canadians. The left attack from Lizerne against Steenstraat which, directed by General Codet, had been in progress since the morning, was gradually reinforced by two Belgian battalions. At 8 p.m. it had not obtained any appreciable results¹⁴³⁰ Further south an attack by the 87th Territorial Division at Het Sea had miscarried.

In the course of the afternoon General Joffre gave the order to exploit the results already obtained, by throwing back the enemy upon his original positions and if possible behind them. General Foch was in a position to call away sufficient units from the reserves already established behind the Tenth Army, it would always be possible to bring them back to their original position in sufficient time.¹⁴¹⁷

After an interview at Wormhoudt with General Puts, General Pooh reported to the Commander-in-Chief that the front held by the Allied armies extended from east to west along the curve of the Stroombeek east of Keerselaere, the wood one kilometre west of St. Julien, the farm half way between Wieltje and Boesinghe, Boesinghe, the left bank of the Yperlee Canal to Het Sao, and the eastern outskirts of Lizerne. The cooperation between the Allied armies had been "perfect and active."

As a result of the interview with General Foch, General Puts had ordered that on the 24th April, Colonel Mordacq should attack from south to north in the direction PilokemHorteker, in liaison with the British Army, that General Quiquandon should operate on the western bank of the Canal to throw the enemy back on the eastern bank and to regain the footing there. Colonel Mordacq was reinforced by two Chasseur battalions of the 153rd Division, General Quiquandon by a regiment of the same division and by the 87th Territorial Division. The 3rd Moroccan Brigade (163rd Division) would remain in reserve S.W. of Elverdinghe.¹⁴³¹

General Quiquandon divided the troops under his orders into two groups. On the north General Codet would continue his attacks on Steenstraat : on his right General Roy, commanding the 87th Division, would attack at Het Sas.

During the night 23rd/24th April at 2 a.m. the enemy after a new discharge of gas gained possession of Het Sas and Lizerne¹⁴⁸⁶ On our right he attacked the English left. The Canadians had to abandon St. Julien (sic, *they held it until after midday 24th*) and to fall back southwestwards about 700 metres between St. Julien and Mortelje Farm where they held their position in liaison with us.

General Foch ordered General Puts to establish liaison and agreement with the commanders of the neighbouring English and Belgian units, to inaugurate a vigorous forward movement, and to call up and throw in the reserves.

It was essential that he should act "vigorously and on the offensive" east of the Canal, in liaison with the English who had been directed by Field-Marshal French to take similar action, and to throw back upon the

canal the parties of the enemy who were at Lizerne and further south. General Putz might engage all his reserves, for General Foch was going to call up another division which would be in the neighbourhood next day. Furthermore, the English reserves would be at Elverdinghe on the day of the 24th April. 1435

As ordered by General Foch, the Tenth Army sent on the afternoon of the 24th April the 152nd Division of the IX Corps to General Putz. The 18th Division would follow next day.

In reporting to General Joffre upon the situation and on the steps taken, General Foch stated that he had brought from the Tenth Army, the 152nd Division which could be employed on the 25th April and that he had warned another which would arrive next evening, if the situation at nightfall showed such action to be necessary. If it were not necessary, he would countermand the order to move. On the English side Field-Marshal French had two infantry brigades and three cavalry divisions about Ypres. He was going to bring up other important reserves. General Foch believed that he himself was in a position to carry on the battle and to resume the offensive with a view to driving the Germans back to Langemarck.¹⁴³⁴

General Smith-Dorrien commanding the Second English Army had in fact received from Field-Marshal French the order to attack with the whole of his left in liaison with the French troops. The I English Cavalry Corps was concentrated in the region Woesten-Elverdinghe. The Indian Cavalry Corps was arriving near Cassel. One infantry brigade was moving to Vlamertinghe, another was lying in the outskirts of Ypres. The Lahore Division would, in the course of the evening, be in the neighbourhood of Godewaersvelde (7 kilometres south west of Poperinghe).

On the 24th April, the execution of the counter-attacks ordered by Generals Putz and Quiquandon was held up by enemy attacks on Lizerne and St. Julien. Colonel Mordacq's attack which took place at 1.30 p.m. made a little progress, but was held up at 7 p.m. without having been able to reach the enemy trenches. General Codet attacked Lizerne at 2 p.m. and secured a footing there for a short time but could not hold on there. On his right General Roy was going to recapture Het Sas but his progress was stopped at once.

General Putz ordered General Quiquandon to retake Lizerne at any cost during the night, but the attacks miscarried.

General Putz decided that the offensive should be carried on next day, 25th April. General Deligny commanding the 125th Division would take command of the forces en-

gaged on the front Steenstraat-Het Sas inclusive, reinforced by one regiment of his division. His task would be to throw the enemy back upon the right bank of the Canal. General Quiquandon would take command of all the troops engaged south of Het Sas including Mordacq's detachment east of the Yperlee, General Roy, leaving part of his division (87th Territorial Division) with General Deligny, would himself, with the other part of his command, pass under the orders of General Quiquandon. The last named commander would thrust forward vigorously with Mordacq's detachment, so as to debouch as soon as possible through Boesinghe on the right bank. His objectives were Pilokem and the wood to the north-west. The zones of action of Generals Deligny and Quiquandon were separated by the line Korteker Cabaret-Het Sas (inclusive to General Deligny), Poperinghe. On our right the English Army was going to continue to support our attacks. One division of the I British Cavalry Corps was ready to intervene between our left and the Belgian right. The other cavalry division from 6 a.m. onwards, would be standing by in the vicinity of Poperinghe.

The 152nd Division from the Tenth Army would upon arrival be assembled in Army Reserve south of Woesten.

On the morning of the 25th Generals Deligny and Quiquandon commanding the two groups organized by General Putz also divided their units each into two sections.

General Deligny constituted, before Lizerne, the Codet Sector and, before Het Sas, the Cherrier Sector (3rd Moroccan Brigade, 153rd Division).

General Quiquandon placed that element of his forces which was in position west of the Canal, under the orders of General Roy, while the troops engaged between the Canal and the English left remained under the orders of Colonel Mordacq.

On account of the extreme fatigue of the Territorials and of the time taken up in organizing the group, the attack of Deligny's group was resumed the next day, 26th April. On the front of Quiquandon's group, Colonel Mordacq's attacks, feebly supported by our Allies who had been very hard pressed, were launched at midday without result. Resumed at 1 p.m. they were immediately stopped. In the Roy Sector our troops were able to do no more than prevent an enemy attack across the Canal between Het Sas and Boesinghe.

In compliance with the order given the day before by General Foch, the 18th Division was transported during the evening of the 25th from the Tenth Army to the Groupement d'Elverdinghe. Soon after it had left, General

Curé commanding the IX Corps received the order to move himself with his staff to the vicinity of Elverdinghe and to rejoin his two divisions there (18th and 152nd).

Moreover in the course of an interview between Generals Putz and Smith-Dorrien, it was arranged that the 1st English Cavalry would remain in reserve behind the point of junction of the French and British Armies, that the 3rd Cavalry Division would go back to the command of our Allies, that the 2nd Cavalry Division would be handed back to them as soon as the 152nd Division had been moved from its point of detrainment to Brielen. The attack planned for the 26th April east of the Canal in a northerly direction, and executed by Colonel Mordacq and part of the 152nd Division, would be extended on his right by an English attack carried out by a fresh division.

General Putz divided the troops under his orders into three groups: on the right between the Canal on the Ypres-Langemark road (English left) General Joppe, commanding the 152nd Division, employing his own division less one brigade and troops placed under the orders of Colonel Mordacq, to attack in the direction of Pilckem and the crossroads one kilometre to the north-east. On his left and on the other bank of the Canal, General Quiquandon would be in command as far as Hot Sas exclusive. He would hold himself in readiness to debouch through Boesinghe as soon as the progress by General Joppe on the right bank would allow him to do so. General Cure, operating between Het Sas and the Belgian right and employing the 18th Division less one brigade and the troops already placed under the orders of General Deligny, would have the task of throwing the enemy back upon the right bank and of pushing forward through Steenstraat and Hot Sas in the direction of Bixsehoote. The attacks of General Joppe and Cure would be launched at 2 p.m. On English cavalry division would be held behind the junction of the French and Belgian fronts One brigade of the 18th Division would be army reserve west of Elverdinghe.

General Putz amplified this order by instructions addressed to General Deligny upon the subject of the participation of the Belgian Army in our attack next day. That Army was going to support with its artillery our attack on Lizerne and itself attack that village from the north with one battalion.

On the 24th April General Foch had warned the Tenth Army against a gas attack similar to that at Langemark; he indicated protective measures against gas and the tactics to be adopted to repel an attack of that nature

This note having been communicated in One in the

form of a report to General Joffre, the latter informed all his Army Commanders of the method of attack recently employed by the enemy. He indicated to them the means to be taken to meet this kind of attack¹⁴⁴².

The Belgian right, having been attacked with gas during the night 25th/26th April, had been able to hold on by making use of wetted handkerchiefs placed over the mouth and had repelled the enemy.

On the morning of the 26th April General Curé who had arrived during the night, entrusted the command of the left attack to General Deligny who retained the organization of the day before: Codet's sector opposed Lizerne and Steenstraat, Cherner's sector opposed Het Sas. The preparation of attacks would begin at midday, one regiment would be in Corps Reserve.

The attacks of Cure's group were delivered at 3 p.m. By the end of the day our troops were along the bank of the Canal to a point near the locks. North of there our line bent towards the west, bending round a farm surrounded by a wood fortified by the enemy. It ran through the village of Lizerne of which we had captured the western part.

Joppe's group had made an advance of about 150 metres during the afternoon in the centre and on the right. At noon the 4th Moroccan

Brigade (152nd Division) began to cross the Canal further south and beyond Mordacq's detachment, to take up a position on the right of Joppe's right. At 2 p.m. it attacked in conjunction with the Lahore Division, which had just reinforced the English left, upon the axis: Ypres-Langemark road. The advance was unexpectedly stopped by a discharge of gas and the troops driven back in some places to the south of their jumping-off places. Mortelje Farm was evacuated and then recaptured at 6 p.m.

The slight progress of Joppé's group did not allow of any attempt by Quiquandon's group to cross the Canal at Boesinghe.

During the night 26/27th April General Putz gave the order to pursue the offensive on the 27th. The three groups, Curé, Quiquandon and Joppé were retained and their tasks remained the same.

These groups organized as and when reinforcements arrived, in the midst of difficulties from the start, were composed of elements belonging to very different units. General Curé commanding the IX Corps had under his orders, units of the 153rd and 45th Divisions and one regiment only of his own Army Corps. General Quiquandon, commanding the 45th Division, had no longer under his orders any

men of that division. General Joppe, commanding the 152nd Division and responsible for the principal attack was going to carry out the operation with Mordacq's detachment, one brigade of his own Division (4th Moroccan Brigade) and one brigade of the 18th Division. In his report to General Joffre, Major Dufieux, Liaison Officer from G.Q.G. explained this state of things to *which* he attributed the poor results so far obtained.¹⁴⁶¹

The same condition also existed with the enemy. His units were very mixed up and very much reduced by the fire of our artillery. General Putz therefore concluded that this was the moment to put every effort into the attack. General Foch was of the same opinion.

In Curé's group, General Codet on the 27th April completed the conquest of Lizerne, but was stopped in front of Steenstraat.

Joppé's group and the English left attacked at 520 p.m. After having advanced as far as the enemy's trenches the troops found themselves, as on the previous day, met with asphyxiating gas *which* forced them to withdraw to the south of the jumping-off place. The situation was re-established by the intervention of local reserves. At the end of the day, we were back in our positions of the morning.

And so it came about that the action of the gas had once again nullified the results of the attacks of the day. In seeking means of protection the High Command caused to be sent to the DAB. respirators similar to those used in mines and by the firemen of Paris, but there were few of them and General Foch ordered that the manufacture of this equipment in bulk should be hastened.

He wrote on the evening of 27th April to General Putz that the forces available were sufficient "to carry through the affair and bring it to a favourable conclusion." But it was necessary to push on and take immediate action by a close combination of all the fighting troops both French and Allied, undertaken without delay and vigorously pressed. He did not agree that the units already engaged should be relieved. They should be reinforced by advancing.

With our Allies all the British troops operating about Ypres were placed under the orders of General Plumer, commanding the V English Corps, who would be directly responsible to Field-Marshal French. In consequence General Putz issued orders that the most energetic action should be taken. General Cure would complete the business of chasing the enemy from the western bank of the Yperlee, cross the Canal at Hat Bas and down stream from it and establish himself

firmly on the right bank. General Quiquan-don would cross the Canal at Boesinghe and attack in the direction of Pilekem. The English, having let it be known on the 27th that they were not in condition to attack, General Puts moved the axis of attack of Joppe's group towards the west, so as to facilitate the issue of General Quiquandon and to reduce the enemy's line by taking it in enfilade. (*sic. The reasons given at the time by Foch to Joffre were that German artillery fire east of the Canal was heavy, and that the northerly wind still blowing favoured a gas release by the Germans.*) The attacks to be launched at 2 p.m. Since gas projections had to a large extent been responsible for the small success of our attacks, General Foch issued instructions as to anti-gas measures to General Putz, who at once transmitted them to his troops.

General Puts's artillery, very much reduced since the 22nd April, was reinforced on 27th April (*sic. Contemporary memorandum gives night 98th/89th*) by General Joffre by two groups of 190 mm. and one group of 120 mm. long, tractor drawn, and General Foch warned the commander of the Tenth Army to hold in readiness one division for transportation to the area of the DAB. but he was hopeful he would not need it.

On that same day, 27th April, (*sic. Contemporary documents give 28th*) towards midday, Field-Marshal French went to Cassel where he told General Poch about the fatigue of his troops and the difficulty of supplies. The great business of the moment, he said, was the projected attack north of Arras which he did not wish to compromise by using up his reserves at Ypres. He wanted to withdraw his line to Fortuin Frezenberg-Westhoek because not having been successful in the attacks of the 27th, we had no better chance of succeeding next day. General Poch replied that the withdrawal under consideration far from bettering the situation would make it worse. Our communications would be engaged still more heavily than before by the enemy's guns at shorter range from commanding positions which we would have abandoned. As for the big show at Arras, one must not resign oneself to lose a first battle to gain a second battle. It was finally agreed that the Field-Marshal would wait until the evening of the 27th (*sic. Contemporary documents give 29th*) for the result of the French offensive which the English would support as well as they could by fire while holding on firmly to their present positions.¹⁴⁶⁵

General Foch reported this conversation to the Commander-in-Chief. In order that the English troops should be maintained in their

present positions it was necessary that he should have a success which was not very likely considering the fatigue of our troops. Consequently General Pooh intended to obtain from our Allies a new offer to retake Langemarck. If unsuccessful he would make an effort to gain time and to maintain the *status quo* until the day of our attack at Arras.¹⁴⁶⁶

General Poch addressed a note to Field-Marshal French in which he reviewed and developed the arguments put forward in the course of their discussion and concluded that withdrawal should not be ordered, but forbidden, and that the Allied Armies must persevere upon an attack on Langemarck. The day of the 28th might not be decisive, but that of the 29th might be, thanks to the arrival of heavy artillery forces, if the British Army would associate itself fully with the French offensive. General Foch asked the Field-Marshal to give up the idea of withdrawing a line and to support the French offensive for the recapture of Langemarck "beginning" on the 29th 1466 and 1467.

The attacks of the 28th April brought but slight results. Cure's group overpowered the enemy in the wooded area between Het Sas and Lizerne but was blocked before Steenstraat. On our right General Joppe's attacks delivered at 1.30 p.m. and renewed at 7.30 p.m. miscarried. Their lack of success prevented General Quiquandon from attempting to cross the canal.¹⁴⁷⁴

Our attacks on the right bank were unfavourably affected by the direction of the wind which, blowing from the north, carried over our troops the gas discharged by the enemy. General Putz then gave up the idea of making a principal effort on the right bank (*sic. This decision taken evening of 27th, see ante*) and moved his artillery on the left bank northwards to use it in operating from west to east to force the passages at Het Sae and Boesinghe and to reduce the enemy lines at Pilckem.¹⁴⁶⁸ He gave the order to chase the enemy from the western bank of the Canal, to cross the water between Steenstraat and Boesinghe, and to throw back the enemy as far as Pilckem. On the right bank the offensive would be pursued in conformity with the orders already issued.

In the forenoon of the 29th April, General Foch ordered General Putz to undertake and follow up the attacks. Nevertheless, if, on certain frontages, the preparation did not seem to be sufficiently complete, he must not be afraid of holding up the attack, provided he warned General Plumer of the pressure of necessity.

The latter informed General Putz that he had received from Field-Marshal French orders

to support our action by fire and to attack, "as opportunity might offer" so as to profit by our success. Under these conditions General Putz decided to put off until next day (*ie. 30th April*) the attack which had to be carried out by Joppe's group in liaison with the English. So there was no attack on the east of the Canal on the 29th April. The day was given up to reorganization in the infantry and in working out programmes of fire for the artillery. The only activity was east and southeast of Lizerne where progress was hardly noticeable, Towards noon the Germans bombarded Dunkerque with a 380 mm. gun.¹⁴⁷⁹

In the forenoon Field-Marshal French had gone to Cassel, not having abandoned the idea of withdrawing his force" to the 2nd line and being desirous to carry it out the following night. General Foch and the Field-Marshal agreed in recognizing that the present situation was untenable. The Field-Marshal wished to improve it by withdrawing, General Foch by attacking on Langemarek. It was finally agreed that the two armies should attack in liaison the next day, 30th April. Field-Marshal French would carry out the withdrawal under discussion if success were not obtained. General Foch calculated that that was already one day gained, and he planned, by carrying out negotiations, to put off withdrawal from day to day until the Arras attack.

The attacks planned for the 30th April would be carried out under the following conditions: Cure's group would continue to operate against Steenstraat and its approaches and would try to get forward to the right bank of the Canal. Quiquandon's group would hold itself in readiness to debouch through Boesinghe in liaison with the left of Joppe's group. The wind having changed to the south-west, the main attack would be conducted east of the Canal by Joppe's group, in liaison with the British Army against the German line between the Canal and the Ypres-Langemarek road, with Pilckem as final objective.

On the 30th April the attacks, delayed by mist, were not launched on the whole front until 11.15 a.m. By the end of the day, the line extended from the southern slopes of Hill 29 (800 metres north-west of Mortelje Farm), the intersection of the Ypres-Pilckem and Boesinghe-Wieltje roads and the farm 400 metres north-west of that crossroads. This progress did not yet allow General Quiquandon to debouch east of Boesinghe. At Steenstraat the attack was slow. It was a matter of cleaning up houses and blockhouses bristling with machine guns. The Germans must have been very much exhausted because they did not counter-attack.

The English artillery co-operated effectively with our action, but the infantry did nothing except one brigade which attacked at 5 p.m. on Hill 29.

General Foch went in the evening to see Field-Marshal French at Hazebrouck; he told him of the results of the day and asked him to extend his co-operation to the offensive which he intended to pursue next day. It was agreed that the Field-Marshal would not commit any fresh troops north of Ypres, that he would preserve them for the projected offensive at Arras, Neuve-Chapelle. But so as not to be attacked by the enemy before that offensive, he would maintain north of Ypres an aggressive attitude which would be evinced by making local attacks.

On the 1st May General Puts tried to exploit the results obtained on the 30th April. He regrouped the 45th Division under the orders of General Quiquandon. General Joppe who only commanded the 4th Moroccan Brigade and the 35th Brigade, was reinforced with one regiment from Army Reserve. The common objective of the two groups was Pilckem, the eastern part of which General Joppe would attack while making an effort to occupy the area between that village and the Ypres-Langemarck road. General Quiquandon's right (Colonel Mordaeq) would take possession of the ridge west of Pilckem. General Cure would continue at his task of chasing from the left bank of the Canal, the enemy forces which were still there. The infantry attacks would be launched on the 1st of May at 3.10 p.m.

On the afternoon of the 1st May General Puts perfected his orders of the day before. It was essential that the attack on the plateau of Hill 29 should be undertaken at 3.10 p.m. Furthermore to allow General Plumer to cooperate in the attack on Hill 29 it was decided that as soon as the cross-roads called the Five Roads (on the Pilckem-Ypres Road) was captured by the 35th Brigade, the commander of that brigade would then inform the 4th Moroccan Brigade and General Plumer would then attack Hill 29.¹⁴⁹¹

The attacks of the 1st May gave no results. The British left, moreover, had attacked further east than had been planned.

General Foch reckoned that we could expel the enemy from the left bank, but that with the means at our disposal we could not make much progress east of the Canal. Under such conditions Field-Marshal French resumed his intentions of executing a withdrawal on the night of 3/4th May. There could no longer be any question of retaking Langemarck. General

Foch ordered General Putz to rest his troops while keeping the enemy under threat of an attack. He must make sure of the organization and absolute possession of the ground retaken by us on the western bank, and he ordered him to reduce the density of his troops in the front line to allow them to rest. He must restore order among the units and make dispositions in depth. General Puts would put one reconstituted division into army reserve.

On receipt of these instructions General Puts who had just ordered that the attack should be continued, limited the offensive to the operations of General Cure on the west bank. He transmitted General Foch's instructions to the other units.

On the 2nd May in the evening, the enemy after a violent bombardment delivered an attack with a discharge of gas on our right and on the whole of the English left. It was driven off.

On that same day General Foch informed General Putz that the 18th Division and one artillery group of 180 mm. would be withdrawn from him as soon as circumstances would allow. In consequence General Puts gave an order that, on the 5th May, the 18th Division would be re-assembled in the region of Stavele (10 kilometres north-north-west of Poperinghe). After its departure the front would be held by the 152nd Division which would occupy the sector then held by Joppe's group from Crossroads 17 (800 metres north-east of Zwaanahof Farm) to the Ypres-Langemarck road inclusive. On its left, the front of the 45th Division would extend from Cross-roads 17 to south of Het Sas. The 153rd Division would hold the front between Het Sas inclusive and the Belgian right 200 metres north of Steenstraat. The 87th Territorial Division would be divided between the 45th and 153rd Divisions, but the troops brought from the Nieuport Group would be returned to it. General Cure would continue provisionally to direct operations on the front Het Sas-Steenstraat.

To cover the withdrawal of the 18th Division which was due on the 6th in the area of the Tenth Army, General Puts ordered Generals Cure, Quiquandon and Joppe each to carry out a local attack at noon on the 4th May and to show great activity on the rest of the front.

Although attacked by the enemy in the forenoon on the front Fortuin-Gravenstafel, the V British Corps carried out without any incident its withdrawal to the line FortuityFrezenberg-Westhoek during the night of the 3/4th May.

Next day General Cure's attacks captured some elements of enemy trenches south of

Steenstraat. General Quiquandon gained possession of the out-buildings of Farm 14 (southeast of Boesinghe Station). General Joppe could not attack because field defences had not been sufficiently destroyed.

General Puts decided that the offensive action being carried out must be methodically followed. The activity of divisional commanders would be directed upon the consolidation and organization of the front.

Next day, 5th May, General Cure took over the command of the IX Corps collected again in the area of the Tenth Army. General Deligny resumed command of the sector occupied by his own division, the 153rd.

From then onwards, in the region of Ypres, all activities had no other end than to hold back the enemy while the Allied armies engaged upon an important offensive north of Arras.

To conclude the story of the D.A.B. which went out of existence on the 22nd May, the events which occurred on its front up to that date are here related.

In his instructions of 5th May, General Foch gave in detail the task of the D.A.B. from the 7th May onwards, the date on which the offensive of the Tenth Army would begin in Artois. The detachment would ward off enemy attacks: hold in front of it the enemy forces which were there and to do so, undertake local offensives on points considered suitable. General Puts would more particularly decide to what extent the Groupement d'Elverdinghe would be able to take "an aggressive attitude in view of the partial results" and effect the necessary understandings with the English forces in that vicinity.

The days of the 5th-8th May were marked by violent German attacks accompanied by discharges of gas principally on the British front where they caused, on the 8th May, the withdrawal of the line Fortuin-Frezenberg Westhoek in front of Verlorenhoek-Bellewaarde Lake. Everywhere else, particularly at Steenstraat on 6th May, they were repulsed. General Puts, warned of the possibility of a fresh withdrawal of the British Army, informed General Allenby on the 9th of his firm intention to hold his positions north of Wieltje.

That indeed was an essential condition for the renewal of the local attacks ordered by General Foch. These attacks, planned at first for the 6th May, were put off till 9th. Only the work of sapping against Het Sae was followed without cessation.

The operation orders of General Puts provided for three local operations: the 152nd

Division would get in close liaison with the V British Corps and operate against the intersection of the Five Roads. The 45th Division would gain possession of Farm 14 (S.E. of Boesinghe). The 153rd Division had for its task the attack on Steenstraat and would continue its advance to gain access to the locks at Het Sag.

The attacks delivered on the 9th May in compliance with this order yielded few results: only the 153rd Division made some slight progress at Steenstraat. From the 10th-14th of May sapping was carried out on the left bank of the Canal.

The enemy having withdrawn some of his troops on his front, General Puts ordered his divisions on the 12th May to increase their offensive attitude.

The 153rd Division on the 15th May attacked on its whole front. On the right we progressed on the left bank of the Canal up to 150 metres north of the locks. On the left, Steenstraat and the Canal Bridge were captured. In the centre our operations miscarried, held up by fire from a fortified house called Maison du Collegue.

To exploit these successes, General Puts ordered the 153rd Division to continue on the 16th May its methodical progress in the vicinity of Steenstraat while, on the right bank, the 45th Division would attack on the Salient of Hill 17 and the 152nd south of the intersection of the Five Roads.

On the 16th May, in spite of violent counterattacks between Steenstraat and Het Sas, the 153rd Division gained possession of Maison du Collegue on the left bank, the 45th Division captured a trench on Hill 17 but the 152nd met with no success south of the intersection of the Five Roads.

On the morning of the 17th, the front line units of the 153rd Division ascertained that the enemy had during the night abandoned the positions which he had occupied on the left bank of the Canal. They immediately advanced up to the bank and organised it.

From that time our line ran along the Canal from Steenstraat as far as the railway bridge at Boesinghe. These successes produced a stable condition, thanks to which the neighbourhood of Ypres was going to become a quiet sector.

On the 22nd of May the D.A.B. ceased to exist. The XXXVI Corps was created and placed under the orders of General Rely d'Oissel.

ANNEXE No. 1417.

Code Telegram. 23rd April, 1915
 3.05 p.m.
 To General FOCH,
 Cassel.

Your code telegram 64 of today received. I congratulate you on the speed with which you have taken measures to re-establish the situation. It is desirable to exploit the results already obtained by throwing back the enemy on his old positions and beyond if possible. I see no inconvenience in your withdrawing more units from the reserves at present held behind the Tenth Army. It will always be possible to bring them back in plenty of time to their original positions.

J. JOFFRE.

ANNEXE 1419.

23rd April 1915.
 9.00 am.

S C. 60/8.

Reply to a Report from the G.O.C. D.A.B. on the subject of the German Attack with this annotation.

By the terms of memorandum timed 12.10 a.m. it is necessary:

- (i) To know the points which we hold.
- (ii) To have a base organized as a point of departure of attack.
- (iii) To organize an offensive which will be launched from it.
- (iv) To pay particular attention to the execution of the orders given for this offensive.

I seek in vain for a reply to each one of these four points.

Kindly reply to them without delay.

FOCH.

ANNEXE 1422

23rd April 1915.

From General Foals to General Joffre on the subject of *German Attacks with Gas.*

My dear General:

Yesterday evening we had a short and sharp surprise. The Germans sent over a suffocating gas, in great quantities, producing its effect at more than one kilometre, on the whole front Steenstraat-Langemarck and further east. At 5 p.m. our Territorials at and near Triangular Wood were completely asphyxiated across the whole front line and flowed back right to Boesinghe; in the second line they suffered less; nevertheless they abandoned the Boesinghe bridgehead and the artillery there. The number of guns which they were able to bring back is not yet known. At the same time our Tirailleur regiment of the 45th Division, in position at Langemarck and neighbourhood, lost that area with heavy casualties and withdrew to the S.E. of Boesinghe (right back of the Yser). These events had taken place by 5.30 p.m. At the same time also the English left bent back on St. Julien and rejoined the old front on the Stroombeek (at 1600 metres west of Wallemolen). Our line

was broken on a width of 3500 metres between our right and the English left; the road to Ypres was open. At the same time the Germans captured Steenstraat and Hetsas which was soon recaptured.

Happily and since 5.00 o'clock this morning on the right bank of the Yser the Zouaves between the Year and the Pilckem-Ypres road, also three English battalions from Ypres, also the Canadian Division, established close touch with each other and took up the attack while we maintained ourselves on the defensive in front of Steenstraat at recaptured Hetsas, at Boesinghe and all along the Yser. This offensive, carried out in close combination, has been in progress throughout this afternoon.

Now we are attacking Steenstraat also. I do not know the results. I have called up from Nieuport two battalions of Zouaves and an artillery group of 75's which have already arrived; and from the Tenth Army the 153rd Division with two Groups of Artillery now in process of detrainment. The English left has been reinforced by 7 battalions. Tonight they have in addition one Infantry and three Cavalry divisions; on our left the Belgian Army is supporting our movement against Steenstraat and the right bank of the Year with a number of field and heavy batteries.

Thus we have up to the present all the means necessary for undertaking tomorrow, the 24th, a vigorous offensive with a view to completely regaining the lost ground. I am holding one brigade and two Artillery groups of the Tenth Army ready to be sent up in case of need. A perfect and most active understanding has not ceased to exist between all the Allied forces.

Yours most respectfully,

FOCH.

ANNEXE 1423.

23rd April, 1915.
 1.50 a.m.

Special Order No. 1865, to the G.O.C. Groups ment d'Elverdinghe,

I. It is above all else necessary to make certain of the supporting points which we hold and to make all possible dispositions to maintain them at all costs; to organize a base point of departure for an offensive undertaken to recapture the lost ground; to pass immediately to the offensive as soon as these dispositions have been made.

II. The G.O.C. Groupement d' Elverdinghe must maintain constant liaison with the G.O.C. D.A.B. and pay particular attention to the maintenance of proper liaison with his subordinates, Brigadiers and Colonels, and to their immediate reestablishment in case of interruption.

It is essential by these means to keep the higher command constantly in touch with the situation, with the progress of undertakings and with the instructions governing the different steps.

III. The G.O.C., Groupement d'Elverdinghe will report by the officer bearing this instruction

whether he considers it possible with the forces under his command (including the third battalion of Zouaves):

- (a) To maintain himself under all conditions on the ground now occupied, taking into consideration the support given by the Allies on his two flanks.
- (b) To reconquer the ground lost.

He will communicate plans on these two aspects, taking into consideration the direction of the wind as affecting asphyxiating gas.

One regiment of the 186th Territorial Brigade will be brought by bus this morning, 23rd, to the Cabaret de i e (S.W. of Woesten) to occupy the 3rd G. Q. line to the east of Woesten.

General Putz.

ANNEXE 1484.

23rd April, 1915.
6.20 a.m.

From Liaison Officer of G.P.N. at D.A.B. To Staff Officer G.P.N.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Mordacq's attack has not got on far. His right rests on the Ypres-Pilckem road. The Germans are 1800 metres south of Pilckem. They do not seem to be attacking at the moment.

It is difficult to find out what is happening behind the front line; the Germans are making a smoke cloud (probably asphyxiating) which extends from Pilckem to Boesinghe.

The right gives some concern. The Canadians are preparing an attack whose left seems to be aligned on Wieltje-Langemarek. We are in touch with them north of Wieltje. Between them and us other units from Poperinghe (three battalions) are going into the line. We are rather put out at the slowness of the English attack, this uneasiness is reflected a little on the right of Mordacq's attack.

Liaisons are as follows:-

One officer from Elverdinghe with the Canadians.

One English officer from Poperinghe at Elverdinghe.

At the finish of the conversation the gap between the French and Canadians seems to be closed.

ANNEXE 1426.

23rd April, 1918.

From Liaison Officer of G.P.N. at D.A.B. To Staff Officer, G.P.N.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Two Canadian battalions have just established touch with Mordacq's detachment.

These battalions have their left on the Ypres-Pilckem road. At 8.30 p.m. they were one kilometre south of Zwaanhof Farm. (Map 1/40,000).

Steenstraat is lost. The Territorials hold Lizerne.

Briefly, Colonel Mordacq thinks: the situation seems to be good; it will be reestablished provided that the Canadians throw themselves into the fight without reserve, above all with their artillery.

A liaison officer reports that they are now bringing heavy fire to bear.

The Germans are sending over more asphyxiating shells.

ANNEXE 1426

23rd April, 1915.
12.45 p.m.

*Special Order to General Allenby, Commanding
I British Cavalry Corps*

General Putz, commanding the Detachment d'Armee de Belgique, has the honour to invite General Allenby, commanding the I British Cavalry Corps to be good enough to:

- (i) Lend as soon as possible the support of part of his artillery in the vicinity of Brielen-Chapelle Notre Dame to fire obliquely on the area south of Pilckem and the ground over which the left of the Canadians is to go forward.
- (ii) Support with the main body of his Cavalry Corps the offensive launched east of the Ypres-Pilckem road by the Canadian Division and available units of the 28th Division (in liaison with the Zouaves).
- (iii) Hold his 3rd Division available in the region Poperinghe-Vlamertinghe to guard with the 13th British Infantry Brigade against any contingency which may arise on the left bank of the Yperlee.
PUTZ.

ANNEXE 1427

23rd April, 1915.

*General Putz, Commanding DAB. to General
FOCH:*

In reply to memo S.C. 80/9 of 23rd April (*Annexe 1419*) I have the honour to report that:

(i) The points held by the D.A.B. are, starting from the north, Lizerne, channel of the Yperlee up to Hetsas, Boesinghe, west bank of the canal, Zwaanhof Farm, house 400 metres south of the intersection of the roads Ypres-Pilckem and Wieltje-Boesinghe, at which point is the junction with the British Army.

(ii) The instructions, copy attached, answer questions Nos. 2, 3 and 4.

(iii) May I add that as regards the 153rd Division, which does not seem to be able to be employed this evening, I intend, subject to events on the left bank of the Yperlee, to employ tomorrow morning, 24th, one brigade of it to pursue the offensive in the direction Pilckem-Korteker and to hold the other brigade in general reserve to the S.W. of the line Elverdinghe-Woesten.

PUTZ.

ANNEXE 1428

*Personal and secret instructions to the G.O.C.
Groupement d'Elverdinghe*

I. The G.O.C. D.A.B. approves of the organization of a secure base of departure on the line Lizerne, Yperlee Canal up to Hetsas, Zwaanhof Canadian left on the high ground near Zwaanhof on the Ypres-Pilckem road.

II. The offensive entrusted to Colonel Mordacq east of the Yperlee must be carried out from south to north, the right wing leading, in close liaison with the British army and supported by all the available batteries east of Elverdinghe.

III. The Zouave battalion sent from the Groupement Nieupoort will attack from Lizerne against Steenstraat, supported by the Belgian artillery and by the cup of 75 a on the way from Nieupoort to Woesten. The G.O.C. 45th Division will detail a commander for this attack.

IV. Marcieu's Brigade (186th) will organize a 2nd line of resistance on, the general line Brielen-Pypegale, holding his support battalions on the line already established on the high ground at Woesten.

V. The G.O.C. I British Cavalry Corps, the head of which is due at Poperinghe at midday, has been invited to be good enough to:

- (a) Lend as soon as possible the support of part of his artillery in the vicinity of Brielen-Chapelle Notre Dame to fire obliquely on the area south of Pilckem and the ground over which the left of the Canadians is to go forward.
- (b) Support with the main body of his Cavalry Corps the offensive launched east of the Ypres-Pilckem road by the Canadian Division and available units of the 28th Division (in liaison with Zouaves).
- (c) Hold his 3rd Division available in the region Poperinghe-Vlamertinghe to guard with the 13th British Infantry Brigade against any contingency which may arise on the left bank of the Yperlee.

VI. Special instructions will be issued for the disposal in the region Copernollehoek Crombeke-Westvleteren of the 153rd Division which will arrive in the evening.

VII. General Quiquandon will report the hour at which each one of the attacks as planned in paragraphs II and III above will be launched.

PUTZ.

ANNEXE 1430

23rd April, 1915.

From D.A.B. (*Putz*) 9.15 p.m.
To G.P.N. (*Foch*)

REPORT FOR 23RD APRIL.

After having on the night 22nd-23rd April and in concert with the Canadians stopped the progress of the offensive launched by the Germans between the Poelcappelle-Ypres road (on the east) and the Ypres-Yser Canal (on the west), the Groupement d'Elverdinghe launched, in the forenoon of the 23rd April, two counterattacks; the one from Zwaanhof Farm (on the canal south of Boesinghe), on a north and south direction in the sector between the canal (on the west and the road Ypres-Pilckem (on the east) supported on the right by a counter-attack carried out by the Canadians, the other from Lizerne with Steenstraat as objective. The first, carried out by six Zouave battalions, progressed with difficulty, because of a barrage laid down by the enemy artillery; the second, carried out by an African battalion, was held up at the eastern exit of Lizerne.

During the afternoon of the 23rd the right counter-attack made progress and at 6 p.m. reached a line extending from Boesinghe station on the left to the western approaches of Morteldje Farm (at the fork Y the roads YpresLangemarck and Ypres-Keerselaere) with the Canadians on the right; the left counter-attack, gradually reinforced by two battalions of the 4th Zouaves (from the Nieuport Detachment) and by three Belgian battalions, continues the attack on Steenstraat.

Groupement de Nieuport—The enemy artillery has resumed its activity along the whole front with all calibres 420 included. The number of rounds fired by the German artillery yesterday, midnight to midnight, against the Groupement de Nieuport is in excess of 4,000.

ANNEXE 1431

23rd April, 1915.
11.30 p.m.

OPERATION ORDER No. 1.

(*Issued by D.A.B. to subordinate units.*)

The offensive begun on the 23rd April will be continued tomorrow with the greatest energy as follows:

I. East of the Yperlee Canal Colonel Mordacq, making use of all the troops under his orders already engaged in that area and also of the 2nd and 4th battalions chasseurs, will continue his attack from south to north in the direction Pilckem-Korteker; his left on the Yperlee, his right astride the Ypres. Pilckem road in close liaison with the British Army.

First objective: Pilckem, then Korteker.

This attack will be supported by all the artillery in position east of Elverdinghe and by one artillery group of the 153rd Infantry Division.

II. The 2nd and 4th chasseurs battalions are directed on the barge bridge.

III. General Quiquandon will have direct command west of the Yperlee. His mission is to throw back upon the right bank all elements of the enemy forces which have crossed it and to gain footing on that bank. He will place the elements of the 44th Infantry Division which were not placed today under the orders of Colonel Mordacq, also attached units of the Groupement de Nieuport, of the 418th Infantry, of the 2nd Artillery Group of the 153rd Infantry Division and of the 87th Territorial Division. The 418th Infantry upon debussing will be directed on Ondank Cabaret. The 186th Territorial Brigade will carry on for the time being under its present orders.

IV. The 3rd Moroccan Brigade with the staff of the 153rd Division will be held in army reserve at widely separated points in the area south west of Elverdinghe; one regiment near Hospital Farm, one regiment near the barge crossroads marked 16.

V. Headquarters: Elverdinghe; General Quiquandon and General Deligny. Noordhof crossroads (east of Brielen); Colonel Mordacq.

PUTZ.

Annotations in General Poch's handwriting:

No time.

No order to act.

Everybody *directing* from afar.

ANNEXE 1434

24th April, 1915.

From G.P.N. to General JOFFRE.

My dear General:

On the *west* bank of the Canal things are going well with us. We are in a fair way to begin and to take Steenstraat and Hetsas.

On the east bank Mordacq's brigade reinforced by two chasseur battalions, finds difficulty in advancing because on his right the English, beyond the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, are being very strongly attacked near St. Julien. As far as can be judged the Germans

are attacking us with all or part of the XXIII Corps on the canal, with the XXVI on their left.

I am bringing another Division from the Tenth *Army* the 152nd. By making use of bus and rail I will have it here tomorrow morning ready to be employed.

I have warned a third which will begin to entrain on the 25th at 2 am. and will be here on the 25th at 11 p.m. But according to the situation in the evening I shall bring it up or countermand the order tonight.

Field-Marshal French has now four infantry brigades in reserve about Ypres and three Cavalry Divisions west of the Canal which success on our part will set free. He is bring up' other important reserves tonight. think that he is in a fit state to sustain the battle in the vicinity of St. Julien and to resume the offensive to drive the Germans back to Langemarok. I have just seen him. He is in g form.

Yours very respectfully,
FOCH.

ANNEXE 1435
4th April, 1915. 9.40 a.m.

From General Putz, Commanding D.A.B., To General FOCH, Commanding G.P.N.

Mordacq's attack was held up tonight on the front marked by the Boesinghe-Wieltie road in the sector between the near-by bend in the Yperlee on the Pilekem-Ypres Road. The enemy afforded a stubborn resistance.

It is necessary to wait until the *Masseur battalions*' can take action to resume this offensive; one of them has not arrived—it cannot be done *this* morning.

Besides, the English cannot *for the moment* take offensive action. I have just seen General Smith-Dorrien's Chief of Staff. He states that their troops are too tired, that they have had heavy losses and that their effectives are too weak to take action on the whole front between the Ypres-Pilckem road and Kerselaere. I asked for vigorous action on the left on Pilckem and its eastern approaches.

They will carry *this* out this afternoon at a *time to be set and communicated by General Quiquandon to General Plumer*. But because of the forward thrust of the Germans upon Lizerne *where the Belgians have fallen back*,² I cannot put in on Mordacq's front the only brigade remaining at my disposal; it may be needed at any moment between us and the Belgians.³

The Territorials of the 87th are still shaken by the charge of the day before—one cannot expect much of them or of Marcieux's brigade—I say nothing of the Algerian auxiliaries.

Conclusions.—The front Pilckem, Lizerne is the longest upon which I can take action with the elements at my disposal or in process of arrival upon that front. I shall expend the maximum of effort.

PUTZ.

Annotations in the handwriting of General Foch as under:

- (1) Arrived at what time?
- (2) It was not the Belgians who were at Steenstraat.
- (3) Yes (*Bien*).

S.C. 91, 8. 24th April, 11.15 a.m.

Action must be taken:

1. By vigorous offensive east of the Canal In co-operation with the English who have been put in motion to this end by Field-Marshal French.

2. It is necessary to attempt at all costs to throw back from the Canal the German elements which have crossed at Lizerne and further south-push up your reserve to do this. It can all be engaged by nightfall-I am calling up another division; you will have it tomorrow morning. You will have besides that the English reserve at Elverdinghe throughout the day.

3. Give orders to that effect and without delay.

FOCH.

ANNEXE 1442

G.P.N. 25th April 1915.
S.C. 155/8.

Note for G.O.C. X Army

An attack with asphyxiating gas is always to be apprehended.

For protection the Germans place over the mouth and nostrils a little bag of rubberised cloth filled with cotton waste,, impregnated with a solution of hyposulphite of soda and a fixed alkaline hydrate (Sodium or potassium) j' The same precautions are to be taken by us.

By order,

WEYGAND,
C.G.S.

†per keg of waste, it has been found that in one cake there were:—

15 gm. hyposulphite to 2 potassium hydrate.

and in another:—

30 gm. hyposulphite to 2 potassium hydrate.

Extract from ANNEXE 1461

With these dispositions command is going to be very difficult, General *Joppé* conducting the main attack over ground which he hardly knows, with troops of whom more than half belong to units which are not normally under his command. General Quiquandon, who knows the ground, is reduced to the command of a regiment belonging to Deligny's division and has a role which is primarily defensive:

As to General Cure, on the same front as General Deligny, he is operating with two groups:—

against Het Sas, General Cherrier, who has only the 9th Zouaves of his own brigade

against Lizerne, General Codet of the 45th Infantry Division, who has no troops whatever of that division with him.

No doubt allowances must be made for the difficulties of the first phase and on account of the successive arrival of troops brought b bus and rail. I give you these details, Genera because they explain in part the inconsiderable progress made yesterday.

ANNEXE 1465.

Reproduced as Appendix 691.

ANNEXE 1466

Reproduced as Appendix 692.

ANNEXE 1467

Reproduced as Appendix 689; English translation Appendix 690.

Extract from ANNEXE 1.468

Extract from letter to General Joffre from his Liaison officer with General Foch dated 28th April 1915, 8.30 a.m.

The attack from south to north (right bank) is not making headway. It has opposed to it, besides a powerful concentration of fire, the effect of asphyxiating has favoured by the direction of the wind which has been from the north up to the present. Therefore the plan is to give up making the principal effort on the right bank, to move northwards the artillery massed on the right bank and to operate with it from west to east, forcing the passage at Boesinghe and Hetsas, to reduce the German line at Pilckem and thus to clear the front of our troops on the right bank and of the English left. The action to be combined with an attack of Joppe's left on the right bank.

That is what is going to be tried today and to be continued tomorrow (i.e. 29th) with the support of an artillery group of 120 em., tractor drawn, coming from II Army and of a battery of 155 cm. heavies which the Belgians are sending us. These new heavy batteries go into action tonight to fire tomorrow.

ANNEXE 1474

For extract see Appendix 693.

ANNEXE 1479

Reproduced as Appendix 697.

ANNEXE 1491

1st May, 1916.

General PUTZ, Commanding D.A.B., to General PLUMER:

Since the ground in front of the Sirhind Brigade which is on my right will not allow that brigade to make a successful forward movement I concur in your statement as to the assistance which you can give me today. I am relying therefore upon this brigade acting upon its left so as to prolong my attack and thus reduce the position of the enemy on their front by taking it in enfilade.

The troops under your command will thus be enabled to occupy Bois des Cuisiniers (Kitchener's Wood) after I have taken possession of Hill 29 which seems to me to be the result to be achieved today.

Besides that I am counting upon it that the support of your artillery, which was so very valuable yesterday and which has played a great part in the success of one section of my line, will be continued tomorrow.

It will be necessary that the officer commanding this artillery should arrive at an understanding with Colonel Blanchon who is commanding General Joppe's artillery to locate the targets to be bombarded and to set times at which shoots are to be carried out.

I shall let you know as soon as possible the times fixed for my preparatory shoots and for the launching of my attack.

PUTZ.

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ORDER OF BATTLE—BRITISH DIVISIONS

4TH DIVISION: Major-Gen. H. F. M. Wilson.

10th Brigade: Br.-Gen. C. P. A. Hull,
1st Bn., The Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
2nd Bn., Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-Shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's).

1st Bn., Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers).

2nd Bn., The Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

7th Bn., Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) (Territorial).

11th Brigade: Br. Gen. J. Hasler.

1st Bn., Prince Albert's (Somerset Light Infantry).

1st Bn., The East Lancashire Regiment.

1st Bn., The Hampshire Regiment.

1st Bn., The Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).

5th Bn., The London Regiment (London Rifle Brigade) (Territorial).

12th Brigade: Br. Gen. F. G. Anley.

1st Bn., The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment).

2nd Bn., The Royal Irish Regiment. 2nd Bn., The Lancashire Fusiliers. 2nd Bn., The Essex Regiment.

5th Bn., The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire Regiment) (Territorial).

2nd Bn., The Monmouthshire Regiment (Territorial).

4th Divisional Artillery:

14th Brigade, R.F.A. (68th, 88th Batteries).

29th Brigade, R.F.A. (125th, 126th, 127th Batteries).

32nd Brigade, R.F.A. (27th, 134th, 135th Batteries).

Royal Garrison Artillery: 2nd Mountain Battery.

Field Companies: Royal Engineers 9th; 1st West Lancashire (Territorial).

Mounted Troops: "A" Squadron, Northamptonshire Yeomanry.

4th Divisional Cyclist Company.

5TH DIVISION: Major-Gen. T. L. N. Morland.

13th Brigade: Br.-Gen. R. Wanless O'Gowan.

2nd Bn., The King's Own Scottish Borderers.

2nd Bn., The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).

1st Bn., The Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment).

2nd Bn., The King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry).

9th Bn., The London Regiment (Queen Victoria's Rifles) (Territorial).

14th Brigade: Br.-Gen. G. H. Thesiger.

- 1st Bn., The Devonshire Regiment.
- 1st Bn., The East Surrey Regiment.
- 1st Bn., The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
- 2nd Bn., The Manchester Regiment.
- 5th Bn., The Cheshire Regiment (Territorial).

15th Brigade. Sr.-Gen. E. Northey.

- 1st Bn., The Norfolk Regiment.
- 1st Bn., The Bedfordshire Regiment.
- 1st Bn., The Cheshire Regiment.
- 1st Bn., The Dorsetshire Regiment.
- 6th Bn., The King's Liverpool Regiment (Territorial).

5th Divisional Artillery:

- 15th Brigade, R.F.A. (52nd, 80th Batteries).
- 27th Brigade, R.F.A. (119th, 120th, 121st Batteries).
- 28th Brigade, R.F.A. (122nd, 123rd, 124th Batteries).
- 130th Battery of 30th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A.

Field Companies, Royal Engineers.

- 59th, 2nd Home Counties (Territorial), 1st North Midland (Territorial).

Mounted Troops: "C" Squadron Northamptonshire Yeomanry.

- 5th Divisional Cyclist Company.

27TH DIVISION: Major-Gen. T. D'O. Snow.

90th Brigade: Br.-Gen. W. E. B. Smith.

- 2nd Bn., The King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
- 3rd Bn, King's Royal Rifle Corps.
- 4th Bn., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
- 4th Bn., The Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

81st Brigade: Br.-Gen. H. L. Croker.

- 1st Bn., The Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment).
- 2nd Bn, The Gloucestershire Regiment.
- 2nd Bn., The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.
- 1st Bn., Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders).
- 9th Bn., The Royal Scots (Territorial).
- 9th Bn., Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) (Territorial).

82nd Brigade: Br.-ten. J. R. Longley.

- 1st Bn., The Royal Irish Regiment.
- 2nd Bn., The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
- 2nd Bn., Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers).
- 1st Bn., The Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment, (Royal Canadians).
- 1st Bn., The Cambridgeshire Regiment (Territorial).

27th Divisional Artillery:

- 1st Brigade, R.F.A. (11th, 98th, 132nd, 133rd Batteries)¹
- 19th Brigade, R.F.A. (39th, 06th, 06th, 131st Batteries)¹
- 20th Brigade, R.F.A. (67th, 99th, 148th, 364th Batteries)².
- 61st Battery of 8th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A.
- Field Companies, Royal Engineers: 17th, 1st Wessex (Territorial), 2nd Wessex (Territorial).*
- Mounted Troops: "A" Squadron, Surrey Yeomanry (Territorial) 27th Divisional Cyclist Company.*

28TH DIVISION: Major-Gen. E. S. Bulfin.

83rd Brigade: Br.-Gen. R. C. Boyle.

- 2nd Bn., The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment).
- 2nd Bn., The East Yorkshire Regiment,
- 1st Bn, The King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry).
- 1st Bn., The York and Lancaster Regiment.
- 5th Bn., The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment). (Territorial).
- 3rd Bn., The Monmouthshire Regiment (Territorial).

84th Brigade: Br.-Gen. L. J. Bols.

- 2nd Bu, The Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1st Bn., The Suffolk Regiment.
- 2nd Bn., The Cheshire Regiment.
- 1st Bn., The Welsh Regiment.
- 12th Bn., The London Regiment (The Rangers) (Territorial).
- 1st Bn., The Monmouthshire Regiment (Territorial).

85th Brigade: Br: Gen. A. J. Chapman.

- 2nd Bn., The Buffs (East Kent Regiment).
- 3rd Bn., The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment).
- 2nd Bn., The East Surrey Regiment.
- 3rd Bn., The Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment).
- 8th Bn., The Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment). (Territorial).

88th Divisional Artillery:

- 3rd Brigade, R.F.A. (18th, 22nd, 62nd, 366th Batteries).¹
- 31st Brigade, R.F.A. (69th, 100th, 103rd, 118th Batteries)¹
- 146th Brigade, R.F.A. (75th, 149th, 366th, 387th Batteries)¹
- 8th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A. (37th, 66th Batteries).

¹ 4-gun batteries.

Field Companies, Royal Engineers: 38th, 1st Northumbrian (Territorial).

Mounted Troops: "B" Squadron, Surrey Yeomanry. 28th Divisional Cyclist Company.

50TH (1ST NORTHUMBRIAN) DIVISION (Territorial)

Major-Gen. Sir W. F. L. Lindsay.

149th Brigade (1st Northumberland): Br.-Gen.

J. F. Riddell.

4th Bn., The Northumberland Fusiliers.

5th Bn., The Northumberland Fusiliers.

6th Bn., The Northumberland Fusiliers.

7th Bn., The Northumberland Fusiliers.

150th Brigade (1st York & Durham): Br. Gen.

J. E. Bush.

4th Bn., The East Yorkshire Regiment.

4th Bn., Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own (Yorkshire Regiment).

5th Bn., Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own (Yorkshire Regiment).

5th Bn., The Durham Light Infantry.

151st Brigade (1st Durham Light Infantry):

Br. Gen. H. Martin.

6th Bn., The Durham Light Infantry.

7th Bn., The Durham Light Infantry.

8th Bn., The Durham Light Infantry.

9th Bn., The Durham Light Infantry.

50th Divisional Artillery:

1st Northumbrian Brigade, R.F.A.².

2nd Northumbrian Brigade, R.F.A.².

3rd Northumbrian (County of Durham) Brigade, R.F.A.².

4th Northumbrian (County of Durham) (How.) Brigade, R.F.A.³.

Field Companies, Royal Engineers: 2nd Northumbrian.

Mounted Troops: "A" Squadron, Yorkshire Hussars.

50th Divisional Cyclist Company.

1ST CANADIAN DIVISION: Lieut.-Gen. E. A. H. Alderson.

1st Canadian Brigade: Br. Gen. M. S. Mercer.

1st Bn., (Western Ontario Regiment).

2nd Bn., (Eastern Ontario Regiment).

3rd Bn., (Toronto Regiment).

4th Bn.

2nd Canadian Brigade (Western Canada):

Br.-Gen. A. W. Currie.

5th Bn., (Western Cavalry).

7th Bn., (1st British Columbia).

8th Bn., (90th Rifles).

10th Bn.

3rd Canadian Brigade: Br.-Gen. R. E. W. Turner, V.C.

13th Bn., (Royal Highlanders of Canada).

14th Bn., (Royal Montreal Regiment).

15th Bu., (48th Highlanders of Canada).

16th Bn (The Canadian Scottish).

1st Canadian Divisional Artillery:

1st Brigade, C.F.A. (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Batteries)¹

2nd Brigade, C.F.A. (5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Batteries)¹

3rd Brigade, C.F.A. (9th, 10th, 11th, 12th Batteries)¹

118th (How.) Brigade, R.F.A. (458th, 459th Batteries).

Field Companies, Canadian Engineers: 1st, 2nd, 3rd.

Mounted Troops: Special Service Squadron, 19th Alberta Dragoons.

1st Canadian Divisional Cyclist Company.

LAHORE Division: Major-Gen. H. D'U. Keary.

Ferozepore Brigade: Br.-Gen. R. G. Egerton.

Connaught Rangers.

9th Bhopal Infantry.

57th Wilde's Rifles.

129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis.

4th Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). (Territorial).

Jullundur Brigade: Br. Gen. E. P. Strickland.

1st Bn., The Manchester Regiment.

40th Pathans.

47th Sikhs.

59th Scinde Rifles.

4th Battalion, The Suffolk Regiment (Territorial).

Sirhind Brigade: Br. Gen. W. G. Walker, V.C.

1st Bn., The Highland Light Infantry.

15th Ludhiana Sikhs.

1st Bn. 1st King George's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Malaun Regiment).

1st Bn. 4th Gurkha Rifles.

4th Bn. The King's Liverpool Regiment.

Lahore Divisional Artillery:

5th Brigade, R.F.A. (64th, 73rd, 81st Batteries).

11th Brigade, R.F.A. (83rd, 84th, 85th Batteries).

18th Brigade, R.F.A. (59th, 93rd, 94th Batteries).

43rd (How.) Brigade, R.F.A. (40th, 57th Batteries).

¹. 4-gun batteries.

². 15-pdrs.

³. 5"-hows.

Engineers: 20th, 21st Companies 3rd Sappers & Miners.

Pioneers: 34th Sikh Pioneers.

Mounted Troops: 15th Lancers (Cureton's Multanis).

2ND Cavalry Division: Major-Gen. C. T.

McM. Kavanagh.

3rd Cavalry Brigade: Br.-Gen. J. Vaughan.

4th (Queen's Own) Hussars.

5th (Royal Irish) Lancers.

16th (The Queen's) Lancers.

4th Cavalry Brigade: Br.-Gen. Sir P. W. Chetwode.

6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers).

3rd (King's Own) Hussars.

Oxfordshire Hussars (Territorial).

5th Cavalry Brigade: Br.-Gen. Sir P. W. Chetwode.

2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys).

12th (Prince of Wales's Royal) Lancers.

20th Hussars.

3rd Royal Horse Artillery Brigade ("D," "E," "J," Batteries).

No. 2 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers.

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See Chapter III, p. 109 and Chapter IV, p. 160

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Telegram from Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Governor General, dated 2nd November, 1914.

Have informed Colonial Office for second contingent we should like to form second division with proportion of line of communication troops using balance Canadian troops now here in England, together with the following units to be raised in Canada, two infantry brigades, headquarters divisional artillery and three field artillery brigades, heavy battery and ammunition column, divisional ammunition column and headquarters divisional engineers and two field companies and cyclist company, two hundred men signalling company, divisional train, three field ambulances, also divisional ammunition park and divisional supply column, both motor transport, reserve park, field bakery and butchery, railway supply detachment, two depot units of supply.

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NOTE ON 22ND BATTALION, C.E.F.

On 25th September a distinguished delegation representative of both political parties in the province of Quebec, fifty-eight strong, and headed by the Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux—

and including nine Dominion Senators; four Knights; the Mayor of Montreal and four other federal M.Ps.; the Premier of Quebec; with two of his Cabinet and five M.L.As.; six judges and a group of prominent lawyers, professors, doctors, journalists and business men of the Province—interviewed the Prime Minister and sought from him "authorization to levy a French Canadian Contingent to enroll in active service for Great Britain." It was suggested that—

The Unit (if sanctioned) should be an infantry battalion, to be organized in the Province of Quebec on the same lines and at the same war establishment as the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

As will have been noted, no distinction had hitherto been made in the military forces between volunteers of one race or another, attestation was based upon an oath of allegiance to King George V, but no questions were asked as to ancestry, although country of birth had to be stated. The decision as to whether an individual was French Canadian — a term still undefined but generally taken to mean one descended from French colonists who had transferred their allegiance to the British flag in 1760 and whose home tongue was French—rested with the volunteer himself, and he was not called upon to declare it. (See App. 88, Attestation form.)

On 7th October the decision was taken that "the French Canadian battalion will be merged in an infantry brigade of the 2nd Contingent."

Even before the unit was officially authorized, recruiting was begun, and on the 15th October a "grand ralliement" attended by some 20,000 citizens was held at Sohmer Park, Montreal, when Sir Wilfrid Laurier and other notable personages addressed an enthusiastic audience. On 20th October O.S.C., 4th and 5th Divisions (Montreal and Quebec) were informed that "Colonel F. M. Gaudet, has been authorized to raise a French Canadian Regiment in the province of Quebec, and I am to request that you will kindly give him all the assistance in your power."

On 27th October it was published in the press that more than nine hundred had enrolled, but returns for that day show 27 officers and 575 other ranks on strength. On 30th October the A.G. wrote that the regiment was "four or five hundred short" and directed that all French Canadian recruits be drafted from the 23rd and 24th Battalions, C.E.F., which was done. On 5th November the battalion was reported to be up to establishment, although strength returns on that day give only 32 officers and 891 other ranks.

From 22nd October the new regiment occupied the barracks at St. Jean, P.Q., vacated by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, until 12th March, when at the request of the Commanding Officer it was moved to Amherst, N.S. At the end of March establishment was completed by drafting 1 officer and 100 other ranks from the 41st Battalion, C.E.F.

712

See Debates House of Commons, 1915, 3rd March, p. 612; 5th March, p. 687; 11th March, p. 905; 24th March, p. 1428 *et seq.*; 25th March, p. 1496, *et seq.*

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Telegram from Adjutant-General to Officer Commanding 6th Division, Quebec, P.Q., dated 30th October, 1914.

If agreeable to you would like you to send all French Canadian recruits already enlisted to Colonel Gaudet's regiment at St. John's (M.D. 4). He is at present four or five hundred short. I can obtain four or five hundred from the west to make up shortages in the two English regiments from our two Divisions (i.e. 4th and 5th).

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

Telegram from District Officer, Commanding Military District No. 15 to Secretary Militia Council, dated 4th November, 1914.

Two hundred recruits in charge of Captain Birney, 103rd Regiment, left Calgary four p.m. should arrive Montreal eleven p.m. Saturday.

CRUIKSHANK.

Telegram from District Officer Commanding Military District No. 10 to Adjutant General dated 6th November, 1914.

One hundred men leave for Montreal tomorrow. Have notified Officer Commanding 4th Division hour of arrival.

D.O.C., M.D. 10.

Telegram from District Officer Commanding Military District No. 11 to Secretary Militia Council 10th November 1914.

Beg to report 200 men recruited for overseas battalion with Lieut. Col. H. Hume in charge left Vancouver for Montreal yesterday O.C. 4th Division informed of date of arrival.

D.O.C., MD. 11.

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Circular letter from Adjutant-General to Districts dated 28 December 1914.

Mobilization

2nd Canadian Division.

SIR,—I have the honour, by direction, to supply you with the following information:

1. The 1st Contingent, Canadian Expeditionary Force took with it to England, eighteen battalions; and the assumption had been made that four of them would be available to form the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 2nd Canadian Division.

2. But the actual situation is as follows:—

Twelve of the eighteen have been included in the 1st Canadian Division, leaving six battalions surplus; the 6th, 9th, 11th, 12th and 17th, and Princess Patricia's C.L.I.

The 6th, composed entirely of detachments of mounted corps, is intended to furnish reinforcements for the cavalry; the 9th, 11th, 12th and (apparently) 17th, are to be used for the purpose of providing infantry reinforcements; Princess Patricia's C.L.I. has been allotted to the 27th Division; and of the thirty-four battalions being, or about to be mobilized in Canada, four more will be required to complete the 2nd Canadian Division than was originally calculated.

3. So far, therefore, as relates to INFANTRY, the arrangements prescribed in' H.Q. Circular letter No. 593-3-12, dated 17th instant, have been cancelled, and those shown in the accompanying statements "A" and "B", are substituted.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

R. J. Gwynne, Lt.-Colonel,

for Acting Adjutant-General.

Statement "A"

2ND CANADIAN OVERSEAS DIVISION

4TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

18th Battalion,—1st Divisional Area.

19th Battalion,—2nd Divisional Area.

20th Battalion,—2nd Divisional Area.

21st Battalion,—3rd Divisional Area.

5th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

22nd (French Canadian) Battalion, P.Q.

24th Battalion—4th Divisional Area.

25th Battalion—6th Divisional Area.

26th Battalion—6th Divisional Area.

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See Chapter IV, p. 157

6th CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
 27th Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 28th Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 29th Battalion—Military District No. 11.
 31st Battalion—Military District No. 13.

NOTE.—Battalions allotted to the 4th, 5th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades will be mobilized as laid down in War Establishments, Part I, Expeditionary Force, 1914, pages 142-148, but will include a Transport Officer (not borne on the establishment of a company), a Signalling Officer and a Paymaster, as well as "Details left at the Base."

Statement "B"
 INFANTRY BATTALIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE 2nd CANADIAN OVERSEAS DIVISION

23rd Battalion—4th Divisional Area.
 30th Battalion—Military District No. 11.
 32nd Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 33rd Battalion—1st Division Area.

34th Battalion—1st Divisional Area.
 35th Battalion—2nd Divisional Area.
 36th Battalion—2nd Divisional Area.
 37th Battalion—2nd Divisional Area.
 38th Battalion—3rd Divisional Area.
 39th Battalion—3rd Divisional Area.
 40th Battalion—6th Divisional Area.
 41st Battalion—5th Divisional Area.
 42nd Battalion—4th Divisional Area.
 43rd Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 44th Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 45th Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 46th Battalion—Military District No. 10.
 47th Battalion—Military District No. 11.
 48th Battalion—Military District No. 11.
 49th Battalion—Military District No. 13.
 50th Battalion—Military District No. 13.
 51st Battalion—Military District No. 13.

NOTE.—The foregoing Battalions will be mobilized at the same establishment as those allotted to the 4th, 5th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades, but will not include Transport Officers nor "Details left at the Base."

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MILITIA ORDERS

HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

17th May, 1915.

No. 257.—CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—ESTABLISHMENT—CANADIAN ARMY DENTAL CORPS. Militia Order No. 219, 1915,* is hereby cancelled and the following substituted. The following establishment¹ has been approved for each Overseas Canadian Contingent:—

	Officers.	Orderlies	Batmen	Total Personnel	Horses
Chief Officer in charge of Dental Services.....	1	1	1	3	1
<i>For each Division</i>					
Dental Surgeons, 2 per each Infantry Brigade.....	6	6	6	18
Dental Surgeons, 1 per each Artillery Brigade.....	4	4	4	12	4
Dental Surgeons, 1 per each Field Ambulance.....	3	3	3	9
Dental Surgeons, 1 for other units of Division.....	1	1	1	3
Total for Division.....	15	15	15	45	5
Dental Surgeons for each Brigade of Mounted Rifles..	1	1	1	3	1
Dental Surgeons for each Field Hospital.....	1	1	1	3
Dental Surgeons for each Base Hospital.....	1	1	1	3
Dental Surgeons for each Base Stores.....	1	1	1	3
Total Personnel required for Division with 1 Brigade of Mounted Rifles, Stationary and Base Hospitals and Base Stores.....	19	19	19	57	6

RANKS FOR OFFICERS OF DENTAL CORPS

The Chief Officer in Charge to have rank of Lt.-Colonel.

The Senior Officer with each Division to have rank of Major.

Officers with Field Ambulances and Hospitals to have rank of Captain.

Remainder of officers of the Corps to be Lieutenants.

The Orderlies to be Sergeants and Corporals, in accordance with qualifications and service.

*Issued 26th April, 1915; not reproduced.

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NOTE ON INDEPENDENT MACHINE
GUN UNITS

An independent body of volunteers, enlisted to form a mounted machine gun unit (which, after many vicissitudes, became in June, 1916, the Yukon Motor Machine Gun Battery), was privately organized in the Yukon Territory by Mr. (afterwards Hon. Lt.-Colonel) J. W. Boyle, who enrolled and clothed in frontiersmen's uniform some fifty men and despatched them to Vancouver via Victoria, B.C. There they were mounted and billeted at his expense, but their horses were withdrawn and the detachment, which had a special establishment authorized by the Minister of Militia, was attached first to the 29th Battalion and later to the 2nd C.M.R. Regiment, with which unit it proceeded overseas.

A unit outside divisional establishment was "Borden's Armoured Battery," afterwards the Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery. It was named for the Prime Minister and was recruited chiefly in Ottawa, Haileybury and the Porcupine district. With an initial establishment of six officers and 63 other ranks, it was raised, as had been Automobile Machine Gun Brigade No. 1, through the private action of certain citizens of Montreal, where it was mobilized. Although three or four Colt machine guns were secured, no motor equipment was received in Canada.

Simultaneously, the Eaton Machine Gun Battery was raised in Toronto at the expense of Sir John Eaton. The original establishment required fifteen armoured cars, a number increased by the Militia Department to forty, which cost \$260,207.53. The nine attendant cars cost \$30,333.40. The personnel for the augmented battery—25 officers and 281 other ranks—was complete by December, 1914; only four Colt machine guns were forthcoming, and the cars, unobtainable before sailing, were shipped later.

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P.C. 567

CERTIFIED copy of a report of the committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Highness the Governor General on the 16th March, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Militia and Defence, advise that the accompanying draft General Order, dated 9th March, 1915, relating to the 2nd Canadian Overseas' Expeditionary Force, be approved. No extra expenditure is involved.

Rodolphe Boudreau,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

GENERAL ORDERS 1915

Headquarters,
OTTAWA, 15th March, 1915.

ORGANIZATION

In virtue of Orders in Council by His Royal Highness The Governor General in Council, numbered P.C. 2067 dated the 6th day of August, 1914, (*see App. 43*), 2831 dated the 7th day of November, 1914, (*see App. 160*), and 2068 dated the 6th day of August, 1914, (*see App. 717a*), the organization of the under-mentioned units as temporary corps of the Active Militia of Canada is authorized, and they are severally placed on Active Service as from the 7th day of November, 1914:—

CANADIAN MOUNTED RIFLES

1st Canadian Mounted Brigade

Brigade Headquarters,
1st Regiment,
2nd Regiment,
3rd Regiment.

2nd Canadian Mounted Brigade

Brigade Headquarters,
4th Regiment,
5th Regiment,
6th Regiment.

Unbrigaded Regiments

7th Regiment,
8th Regiment,
9th Regiment,
10th Regiment,
11th Regiment,
12th Regiment,
13th Regiment.

2ND DIVISION,

CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

4th Canadian Infantry Brigade

Brigade Headquarters,
18th Battalion,
19th Battalion,
20th Battalion,
21st Battalion.

5th Canadian Infantry Brigade

Brigade Headquarters,
22nd (French Canadian) Battalion,
24th Battalion,
25th Battalion,
26th Battalion.

6th Canadian Infantry Brigade

Brigade Headquarters,
27th Battalion,
28th Battalion,
29th Battalion,
31st Battalion.

Divisional Mounted Troops
Squadron of Mounted Rifled,
Cyclists.

Divisional Artillery
Headquarters.

4th Field Artillery Brigade
Headquarters,
13th Field Battery,
14th Field battery,
15th Field Battery,
16th Field Battery,
Ammunition Column.

5th Field Artillery Brigade
Headquarters,
17th Field Battery,
18th Field Battery,
19th Field Battery,
20th Field Battery,
Ammunition Column.

6th Field Artillery Brigade
Headquarters,
21st Battery,
22nd Battery,
23rd Battery,
24th Battery,
Ammunition Column.

7th Field Artillery Brigade
Headquarters,
25th Battery,
26th Battery,
27th Battery,
28th Battery,
Ammunition Column.

2nd Heavy Battery & Ammunition Column
2nd Divisional Ammunition Column
Headquarters,
No. 1 Section,
No. 2 Section,
No. 3 Section,
No. 4 Section.

Divisional Engineers
Headquarters,
4th Field Company,
5th Field Company,
6th Field Company.

Signal Service
2nd Divisional Signal Company.

Supply & Transport
2nd Divisional Train,
Headquarters,
No. 5 (Headquarters) Company,
No. 6 Company,
No. 7 Company,
No. 8 Company.

Medical Service
No. IV Field Ambulance,
No. V Field Ambulance, No.
VI Field Ambulance.

LIME OF COMMUNICATION UNITS

Ammunition
2nd Divisional Ammunition Park.

Medical
No. 2 Casualty Clearing Station,
No. 3 Stationary Hospital,
Nos. 3 & 4 General Hospitals.

Transport & Supply
2nd Divisional Supply Column,
2nd Reserve Park,
2nd Railway Supply Detachment,
3rd & 4th Depot Units of Supply,
No. 1 Field Bakery,
No. 1 Field Butchery.
W. E. Hodgins, Br. General,
A/Adjutant-General.

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P.C. 2068
AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT
OTTAWA

6th August, 1914.

Present:

His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council.

Whereas in view of the state of war existing between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies of the Empire, on the one side, and Germany on the other side; and in view of the fact that thereby the Dominion of Canada is liable to invasion and other assaults of a hostile nature, such an emergency has arisen as calls for the placing of the Militia on "active service."

Therefore His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council, under the authority of Section Sixty-nine of the Militia Act, is hereby pleased to order that such corps or parts of the Militia as may. from time to time, with the approval of the Governor General in Council, be named or designated in General Orders published in the *Canada Gazette*, be placed on Active service in Canada.

RODOLPHE BOUDEAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

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*Cablegram from the Governor General to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies*
SECRET

OTTAWA, 2nd January, 1915.

Following particulars regarding ammunition available and in sight for information of Army Council: In Canada, in regimental and ordnance, about 21 million rounds, mostly

Mark VI. Due from outside firms in next eight months, 15 million rounds, Mark VII. Dominion Arsenal output, one million rounds of Mark VII per month or 12 million rounds per annum.

Forty-eight million rounds only is total in sight and available.

Canadian Government have to rely on British Government for supply, as no more ammunition can be obtained from United States.

ARTHUR.

—
P.C. 1059

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 14th May, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 6th May, 1915, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, submitting the accompanying copy of a memorandum, dated 25th March, 1915, from Major-General Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, upon the requirements of the Canadian Military Forces in respect of rifles and rifle ammunition; and recommending, in particular, that additional orders should be placed at once for 60,000 rifles and two hundred million rounds of ammunition.

It is believed to be highly important and necessary that these recommendations of Major-General Gwatkin be acted upon without delay.

The Minister, therefore, recommends that authority be given for the purchase of 60,000 rifles, from the Ross Rifle Company of Quebec, of the latest pattern known as Mark III, at the price last paid, viz: \$28 for each rifle complete with screw elevating sight; and also for the purchase of 60,000 bayonets therefor, of the latest approved pattern, at the contract price, viz: \$525 for each bayonet complete with scabbard; and that these orders be given the Ross Rifle Company subject to the conditions of the existing contracts with that company for rifles and bayonets.

The Minister further recommends that an advance payment of \$200,000 on this account be made the Ross Rifle Company at the time of the making of the contract.

The Committee submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Honourable
the Minister of Militia.

CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Deficiencies in Rifles and Rifle Ammunition

In a year's time, if the war lasts so long, at least 150,000 men should have joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

They will require not less than 160,000 rifles; 100,000 (plus 30 per cent spare) for use abroad Q and 40,000 for use at home.

For each of 100,000 rifles for use abroad not less than 1,500 rounds should be provided; and for use at home not less than 500 rounds for each of 40,000 rifles. Total 170,000,000 rounds and, in addition, there are machine guns to be considered.

Requirements for one year may therefore be put at 160,000 rifles and 175,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

We have or have in sight 160,000 rifles of which about 120,000 are still under way; and of ammunition 75,000,000 rounds, of which 30,000,000 have yet to be delivered.

Therefore after the delivery of 120,000 there would be rifles just enough for one year; but after the delivery of the 30,000,000 rounds still under order, there would be a deficiency of 100,000,000.

And as the war may last more than a year, additional orders should at once be placed for, say—60,000 rifles and 200,000,000 rounds of ammunition. There is no authority to order any of the 60,000 rifles; but there is authority to order 100,000,000 of the total number of rounds required.

W. Gwatkin,
Major-General, C.G.S.

25th March, 1915.

(See 111)

719

From the Chief of the General Staff, Canadian Militia, to Divisions and Districts, dated 27th October, 1914.

OTTAWA, 27th October, 1914.

MUSKETRY TRAINING
SIR,

1. With reference to Musketry training of the battalions now being organized for overseas, I have the honour, by direction, to state that the supply of service ammunition being very limited, it is suggested that as far as possible rifle practice should be carried out on indoor ranges with gallery practice ammunition.

2. Arrangements will be made to provide a limited number of Mark III Ross Rifles with which gallery practice ammunition can be

satisfactorily used. These rifles should be kept solely for this purpose, and drill and exercises carried out with the rifles with which the men are armed. It is the intention, if nothing prevents, to equip those going overseas with the Mark III rifle, and it is thought that the Musketry practice will give the men an opportunity of familiarizing themselves with the method of loading, sighting, handling, etc., besides affording sufficient rifle practice under the circumstances.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,
W. GWATKIN, Colonel,
Chief of the General Staff.
(See 111)

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P.C. 3116

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the. Committee of the Privy Council, Approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 15th December, 1914.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 11th December, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending for the consideration of the Governor in Council, in connection with the supply of vehicles for land transport, both for the Canadian Expeditionary Force for Overseas Service and for the troops mobilized for service in Canada, the purchase in equal proportion from the following companies of 150 trucks of the "three-ton" type for service with Canadian Overseas Con-

tingent, provided the price in each instance does not exceed the sum as represented by the list price less twenty-five per cent discount in each case, such list prices being respectively --VAN from the Kelly-Springfield, of Springfield, Ohio, \$3,400 from the Packard of Detroit, Michigan, and \$3,700 from the White of Cleveland, Ohio, and provided such price does not exceed the lowest price at which such trucks have been or are being sold to other Governments, f.o.b., at point of manufacture; and further provided that each firm representing any truck purchased by the Department of Militia and Defence under this order shall agree to have made in Canada such portions of the body and tire work as may be done in this country; and in case any of those companies should, within one week from the date hereof, fail to accept all of these conditions, then the portion or portions of the order allotted to each such Company or Companies shall be distributed among and to the Company or Companies accepting these conditions.

The Minister further recommends, for the purpose of encouraging and bringing about the manufacture of motor trucks in this Dominion, that authority be given for the immediate establishment of a type or standard of component parts of a truck to be assembled and made up in Canada-plans, specifications and details of same to be furnished by the Department of Militia and Defence, to any manufacturer desirous of constructing or assembling same in Canada, for use by the Government or for other purposes.

The Minister observes that these contracts will cover the supply of the following:

150	Truck chassis, including parts, tires, accessories and assembling.....	at	\$2,500	ea.	\$382,500
300	Spare tires for above	at	42	ea.	12,600
150	Sets Spare and Repair parts for above	at	240	set	36,000
141	Transport bodies, truck	at	160	ea.	23,688
6	Transport bodies, fitted for tools, etc.....	at	300	ea.	1,800
12	Work shop bodies (fitted)	at	3,500	ea.	42,000
40	Armoured trucks with spare tires.....	at	6,066	ea.	<u>242,640</u>
	Total				\$741,228

The Minister also recommends that the following vehicles be purchased:—

56	Water Carts	at	\$ 275 00	ea.	\$ 15,400 00
35	Motor Cycles.....	at	313 50	ea.	7,837 50
570	Bicycles.....	at	62 00	ea.	35,340 00
377	Light Transport Wagons	at	120 00	ea.	45,240 00
517	Heavy Transport Wagons	at	140 00	ea.	72,380 00
30	Motor Ambulances.....	at	3,200 00	ea.	96,000 00
11	Motor Cars	at	2,000 00	ea.	22,000 00
3	Cable Wagons	at	1,720 00	ea.	5,160 00
4	Tool Wagons, single	at	366 00	ea.	1,464 00
12	Tool Wagons double.....	at	500 00	ea.	6,000 00
15	Limber G.S. Wagons.....	at	600 00	ea.	<u>9,000 00</u>
	Total				\$ 315,821 50

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation, and submit the same for approval. Rodolphe Boudreau, Clerk of the Privy Council.

721

Letter from the Minister of Militia and Defence to the Prime Minister dated 18th May, 1916.

OTTAWA, 13th May, 1915.

DEAR SIR ROBERT,

Since my return from England last November, I have repeatedly notified you that owing to the interference and plans of the "so-called" sub-committee and to the repeated hold-ups and needless obstructions of some of my colleagues in the affairs of this department, the Contract branch has been very much hampered and practically blockaded; delays have been very prolonged; the cost has been greatly enhanced and the goods supplied have been, in many cases inferior. Indeed, the most ardent agents of the German Government could scarcely have been more successful in holding up the proper equipment of our forces, had they been in control.

As one of many specific examples. Take the trucks for the Second Division. They should have been ready last December, they are not ready yet. Some of my colleagues constituted themselves champions of this or that truck and brought about delays whereby untried trucks would be purchased; high prices would be paid in commissions to agents, and the Government, and the country would be treated practically as a retailer. My policy, as you may remember, in this and in all other matters, was to force dealers to give the Government wholesale, or manufacturers' rates.

At the present time there are upwards of one hundred requisitions that have long been in. The quartermaster general has over and over and over again, until his heart has grown sick, brought them before me, they have been promptly passed on to the director of contracts, and the great majority of them, when passed on to the Privy Council, have been held up in Council, or by the Treasury Board, laid aside or sent back-but always delayed; while the director of contracts and his officers have unceasingly been interfered with, delayed, and given endless and unnecessary work by the sub-committee.

I saw, by an article in the Free Press, that it is current everywhere among the soldiers and officers, that they are short of nearly every class of equipment and supplies. In fact, three times recently I have been severely reproached about shortages in supplies and equipment, by outsiders who had learned of these shortages from soldiers and officers of the force.

Further, to my surprise, I was spoken to in Montreal this week, and informed that

our Medical units going over were only half equipped while many of our combatant units are not properly outfitted.

In addition to the serious aspect of the case and from the viewpoint of the efficiency of our soldiers, there is the disheartening side. It is not only unfair to the gallant boys, who are giving and willingly risking their lives for the cause, and making domestic sacrifices, but it is absolutely unjust to me and my officers.

Therefore, as Minister of Militia, I must respectfully enter my protest, as I have frequently before entered it, at the interference and delays caused in all these things. It tends, not only to the injury and inefficiency of our soldiers, thus jeopardizing the success of British arms, but it must politically reflect seriously upon the Government.

It is charged that the sub-committee have given contracts for soldiers' clothing to be made by jobbers, who sublet them and never entered a stitch themselves. Women's linen underwear, women's blouse makers, women's corset makers and truss makers, have all been among these contractors.

We believe, we are in a position in this department to truthfully say that there never was such a volume of business so successfully and economically transacted, or under such an efficient system of purchase and inspection, as had been developed by us up to the time when I went to Europe, and when the subcommittee took control.

I may say that at that time I did not know of this truck and bicycle question.

I feel very fortunate in having under me officers, both civil and military, in all the leading departments, in whom I can place absolute trust. They have done nobly, under very adverse surroundings, and I can conceive of no plan by which the work could have been more honestly, economically and effectively done, than was ours.

I regret to have to submit these facts once more, but in justice both to myself, as well as to the splendid, gallant soldiers we are endeavouring to equip for the front, I must ask your serious consideration of these matters,

I have but one desire, the upbuilding of Canada, the Empire and humanity.

Let me hope that *you* will regard this letter as written with due respect to myself, to my country, to you, as my leader, and in justice to our soldiers.

Faithfully,
SAM HUGHES.

*Debates House of Commons, 50th January,
1917, p. 267*

(See 720; also Chapter IV, p. 146)

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*From the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor General*

CANADA.
SECRET.

Downing Street, 6th May, 1915.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Royal Highness, for the consideration of your Ministers, a copy of a letter from the War Office (*dated 4.v.1915, below*) dealing with the subject of the reinforcements required for the Canadian contingents.

I have, etc.,

L. Harcourt.

Governor General,
His Royal Highness,
The Duke of Connaught
and of Strathearn, K.G., etc.

From the War Office to the Colonial Office

SECRET.

121/Overseas/46. (A.G. 1)

May 4, 1915.

Sir,

With reference to War Office letter No. 121/Overseas/46 (M.O. 8), dated 8th December, 1914, and telegrams 2892 cipher of 28th January, 1915, 4219 cipher of 26th April, 1915, and 4291 cipher of 29th April, 1915, I am commanded by the Army Council again to advert to the subject of reinforcements for the Canadian contingents, it being a matter of great importance that drafts should reach this country punctually and in such numbers that the trained men required to maintain units in the field at full establishment and otherwise efficient may always be available.

2. The information at the disposal of this Department shows that in some cases the percentages of reinforcements hitherto accepted as sufficient to make good losses from all causes during the first year of war are too low.

3. In these circumstances, and in order to allow time for further training after arrival in England, the Council will be glad if the Canadian Government will arrange to send over drafts for the 1st Canadian Contingent at regular intervals of three months on the following scale:—

Cavalry.....	600
Field and Heavy Artillery.....	450
Engineers, Mounted Branch.....	50
Engineers, Dismounted Branch.....	100
Infantry (including-500 for Princess Patricia's Light Infantry).....	8,000
Army Service Corps as in Schedule A, Annexed.	

The first instalment of infantry asked for in this paragraph, which the Army Council understand is being despatched on the first opportunity, is the same as the first instalment to meet future requirements mentioned in the telegram of 26th April, 1915, quoted above. No drafts for Horse Artillery will be required until the Canadian Cavalry Brigade takes the field as cavalry, after which 75 men should come over every three months.

Fox, other branches the percentage of reinforcements for the first year of a war given in section 28.2 Field Service Regulations, Part II (reprinted 1913), appear to need no modification.

4. As regards the composition of drafts coming from Canada, those for artillery should include a proportion of fitters, farriers, shoeing-smiths, saddlers and wheelers, or of men who have worked at these trades in civil life, whilst those for engineers should, so far as possible, include men of various trades in the percentages given in schedule B.

5. The following reserve depots have been formed from surplus units which came over with or followed the 1st Canadian Contingent and from surplus personnel left behind by units now in the field, via: depots for cavalry and horse artillery, a field artillery reserve brigade to act as a depot, training depots for engineers, and army service corps, and seven reserve battalions of infantry. In the case of the infantry, two reserve battalions are affiliated to each brigade in the field, the seventh in part supplementing the other six battalions and in part acting as a depot for Princess Patricia's Light Infantry. As the cadres of these depots are now complete, additional senior officers, warrant-officers and non-commissioned officers are not required for them and it is only necessary to send with reinforcements from Canada a due proportion of company non-commissioned officers and officers.

6. In view of experience gained since paragraphs 5 and 6 of the letter 121/Overseas/46 (M.O. 8), dated 8th December, 1914, was written it is necessary to modify the requests then put forward by the Council. I am therefore to say, in confirmation of telegram 4291, cipher despatched on 29th April, 1915, that units of the 2nd Contingent embarking for this country should bring with them reinforcements in excess of their war establishments equal to 10 per cent of their personnel and, in addition, be accompanied by three months' reinforcements on the scale given in this letter for the 1st Contingent, but omitting cavalry, i.e., 450 field artillery men, 50 mounted and 100 dismounted engineers,

5,500 infantry and 95 army service corps. As these reinforcements, other than infantry, can easily be dealt with by depots already in this country no depot organizations for other arms with the 2nd Contingent are asked for. The infantry reinforcements, however, should be organized in six battalions, which on arrival will become reserve or depot battalions, two for each brigade, and additional to the seven now here, which will continue to furnish drafts for the 1st Contingent.

7. The next instalment of reinforcements for the 2nd Contingent after that referred to in the preceding paragraph should be ready to leave Canada when that contingent is

about to take the field and further and similar instalments should follow every three months.

8. I am to add that the Council hope that all reinforcements despatched from Canada Will be given as much training as is possible in the time available before they embark for England.

9. Copies of the three telegrams referred to in this letter are annexed.

I am, etc.,

B. B. CURBITT.

The Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
Whitehall, S.W.

ENTER TABLE AS IMAGE!

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SCHEDULE B

Reinforcements for Canadian engineers should, as far as possible, include men of the following trades in the proportions stated:—

<i>Trade</i>	Per cent
Carpenters and Joiners.....	17
Office Telegraphists.....	11
Bricklayers.....	8
Line Telegraphists.....	7
Blacksmiths.....	6
Motor Cyclists.....	5
Masons.....	5
Plumbers and Gasfitters.....	4
Wheelwrights.....	4
Fitters and Turners.....	3

<i>Trade</i>	Per cent
Plasterers.....	2
Slaters.....	2
Electricians (Field).....	2
Engine drivers (Field).....	2
Saddlers and Harness makers.....	2
Painters.....	2
Tailors.....	2
Shoeing and Carriage Smiths.....	}
Clerks.....	}
Coopers.....	}
Draughtsmen.....	}
Surveyors.....	} 16
Motor Cycle Artificers.....	}
Instrument Repairers.....	}
Shoemakers.....	}
Miscellaneous Tradesmen and Pioneers.....	}
	<u>100</u>

*Letter from the War Office to the Colonial
Office dated 8th December, 1914*

121/Overseas/46 (M.O. 8)

WAR OFFICE,

London, S.W., December 8, 1914.

Sir,—

I am commanded by the Army Council to advert to the subject of reinforcements for the Canadian contingents, and in particular to War Office letter No. 058/3758 (M.O.8), dated September 1, 1914. In this letter it was suggested that the Canadian Government should provide, in addition to the "first reinforcement" of 10 per cent of the original strength of the 1st Division and Army Troops, 60 per cent of that strength to replace wastage during the first twelve months after the troops should take the field.

2. The actual experience of the first three months of the war has, however, shown that a higher proportion than 60 per cent for twelve months is required to make good losses from all causes, and it is now calculated that the wastage to be replaced will be at the monthly rates of 10 per cent in the cavalry, 7# per cent in the artillery, and 15 per cent in the infantry. This being so, the Council desire me to say that they will be glad if the Canadian Government may be asked to provide drafts, to meet the probable wastage for three months in the 1st Canadian Division and Army Troops, of 375 men for cavalry, 500 men for artillery, and 5,400 men for infantry, with the requisite proportion of officers in each case, and that these numbers may be held in readiness to arrive in the United Kingdom as soon as the 1st Division takes the field.

Similar numbers for the arms mentioned will be required every subsequent three months.

3. Meanwhile, the Council is proceeding with an organization to meet the requirements for reinforcing the 1st Canadian Division and Army Troops on the following lines:—

The 1st Canadian Contingent brought with it 17 battalions, exclusive of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, allotted to the 27th (Regular) Division. Of these, 12 battalions are required to form the 1st Canadian Division, viz : Battalions Nos. 1-5 inclusive, 7, 8, 10 and 13-16 inclusive, leaving battalions Nos. 6, 9, 11, 12 and 17, outside the Divisional organization. Three of these battalions, viz : Nos. 9, 11 and 12, will be taken to form "Depots," i.e., one battalion

for each infantry brigade. These battalions, together with the surplus *personnel* in each Brigade, would provide reinforcements, -as regards rank and file, for the infantry, for the first two months after the 1st Division takes the field.

The 6th Battalion which is composed entirely of detachments from mounted corps, will be utilized to provide reinforcements for the two cavalry regiments and the Divisional squadron.

The artillery is being reorganized into brigades of four 4-gun batteries per brigade, and the surplus *personnel* will be formed into three depot batteries, each of which will have two guns, to act as feeders to the three brigades in the field.

4. In War Office letter No. 121/Overseas /53 (M.O.8), dated 30th October, 1914, it was calculated that four battalions would be available towards the Second Canadian Contingent, but as the Council now propose to utilize these battalions to form the depots referred to in paragraph (3) above, it will be necessary for four more battalions to be supplied with the Second Canadian Division, in order to complete it. A divisional squadron will also be required, as it is proposed to organize the two cavalry regiments of the Permanent Forces for service independently of the two Canadian Divisions.

5. The Council would further request that the Second Canadian Division may be sent with a depot organization complete, on similar lines to that being formed for the 1st Canadian Division.

6. I am also commanded to say that the Council consider it important that provision should be made for the replacement of wastage of officers and men in the Second Canadian Division, at the rate of 10 per cent per month in the case of cavalry, 15 per cent for infantry, and 7½ per cent for artillery.

In respect of other arms and services of the two contingents, the Council do not consider that any revision of estimates for reinforcements is necessary at the present time, and the percentages shown in Field Service Regulations, Part II, may be regarded as sufficient.

I am, etc.

B. B. CUBITT.

The Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

*From War Office to Minister of Militia,
Canada*

2892 Cipher M.O.S. 28th January, 1915.

As the 1st Canadian Contingent are about to take the field, please despatch so as to reach England as soon as possible the drafts which will be required to meet wastage in the 1st Canadian Division and Army Troops, for three months. The numbers *which* are now required are cavalry 250 men, artillery 500 men, and infantry 6,400 men; the reinforcements for other arms should be reckoned at the percentage shown in Field Service Regulations, Part 2. The drafts for every arm should be accompanied by a proportion of officers.

722-E

*From War Office to Minister of Militia,
Canada*

4219 Cipher. 26th April, 1915.

With reference to War Office letter 121/ Overseas/46 M.O.8 of 8th December, 1914, and cable 2892 Cipher M.O.8 of 28th January, 1915, only some 3,000 infantry out of 5,400 asked for for 1st Canadian Contingent have yet reached England. To make up this shortage and to provide for heavy casualties recently incurred, 6,000 infantry, including 800 for Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, are

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required at once. In addition, to meet future requirements, 6,000 infantry, including 500 for Princess Patricia's, should reach England every three months, first instalment to be despatched as soon as possible. As depot organizations exist here organized battalions are not required and drafts should consist of rank and file with proportions of non-commissioned officers and company officers only. Letter follows dealing with reinforcements for other arms and 2nd Contingent.

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*From War Office to Minister of Militia,
Canada*

4291 Cipher. 29th April, 1915.

Besides reinforcements for First Contingent asked for by telegram 4219 Cipher, each unit of the Second Contingent should be accompanied by first reinforcements equal to ten per cent of its war establishment. In addition to the foregoing the following reinforcements for three months are required for the Second Contingent: 450 artillerymen, 50 mounted and 100 dismounted engineers, and 100 army service corps with proportion of non-commissioned officers and company officers and 5,500 infantry organized in six depot battalions. No other depot cadres are required. The whole of these reinforcements should accompany the Second Contingent.

(See App. 98)

2ND CANADIAN DIVISION AND
MOVEMENT TO ENG

Unit	Trans-Atlantic Sailing				
	Ship	Embarkation Port	Date	Disembarkation Port	Date
H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Division.....	MISSANABIE.....	Halifax	24-4-15	Liverpool	2-5-15
	MEGANTIC.....	Montreal	15-5-15	Devonport	24-5-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Cav. Sqn.....	CALEDONIAN.....	Montreal	9-6-15	Devonport	22-6-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Cyclist Coy.....	CALEDONIA.....	Halifax	14-6-15	Devonport	24-6-15
	CORINTHIAN.....	Montreal	15-5-15	Devonport	27-5-15
H.Q. 2nd Cdn. Div. Arty.....	NORTHLAND.....	Quebec	29-6-15	Devonport	9-7-15
H.Q., 4th Bde. C.F.A.....	MISSANABIE.....	Montreal	20-5-15	Devonport	30-5-15
13th Bty. C.F.A.....	MISSANABIE.....	Montreal	20-5-15	Devonport	30-5-15
14th Bty. C.F.A.....	MISSANABIE.....	Montreal	20-5-15	Devonport	30-5-15
15th Bty. C.F.A.....	NORTHLAND.....	Montreal	29-5-15	Devonport	8-6-15
16th Bty. C.F.A.....	MISSANABIE.....	Montreal	20-5-15	Devonport	30-5-15
4th Bde. Ammn. Col.....	CORINTHIAN.....	Montreal	16-5-15	Devonport	27-5-15
H.Q. 5th Bde. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	9-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
17th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	9-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
18th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	9-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
19th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	9-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
20th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax.....	9-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
5th Bde. Ammn. Col.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	9-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
H.Q. 6th Bde. C.F.A.....					
21, 22, 23, and 24th Btys.....	MEGANTIC.....	Halifax	23-2-15	Liverpool	6-3-15
6th Bde. Ammn. Col.....					
H.Q. 6th (How.) Bde. C.F.A.....	In September, 1915, the first 4.5 inch howitzer Brigade—6th (How.) Bde. C.F.A., C.E.F. (29th, 30th and 31st (How.) Btys.)—was formed from personnel drawn from the Reserve Artillery Brigade, Shorncliffe. It was renumbered 6th (How.) Bde. C.F.A., C.E.F. (21st, 22nd, and 23rd (How.) Btys.) on 25th October, 1915.				
21st (How.) Bty. C.F.A.....					
22nd (How.) Bty. C.F.A.....					
23rd (How.) Bty. C.F.A.....					
6th Bde. Ammn. Col.....					
H.Q. 7th Bde. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	8-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
25th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	8-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
26th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	8-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
27th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	8-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
28th Bty. C.F.A.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	8-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
7th Bde. Ammn. Col.....	METAGAMA.....	Halifax	8-8-15	Plymouth	18-8-15
No. 2 Hvy. Bty. & Ammn. Col.....	CALEDONIA.....	Halifax	14-6-15	Devonport	24-6-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Ammn. Col.....	CORINTHIAN.....	Montreal	15-5-15	Devonport	27-5-15
	CALEDONIA.....	Saint John	13-6-15	Devonport	24-6-15
H.Q. 2nd Cdn. Div. Engrs.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
4th Field Coy. C.E.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
5th Field Coy. C.E.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
6th Field Coy. C.E.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Signal Coy.....	MEGANTIC.....	Montreal	15-5-15	Devonport	24-5-15
Borden Motor M.G. Bty.....	CARPATIA.....	Quebec	16-5-15	Devonport	28-5-15
H.Q. 4th Cdn. Inf. Bde.....	METAGAMA.....	Montreal	6-5-15	Plymouth	15-5-15
18th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	GRAMPIAN.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
19th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	SCANDINAVIAN.....	Montreal	13-5-15	Plymouth	22-5-15
20th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	MEGANTIC.....	Montreal	14-5-15	Devonport	24-5-15
21st Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	METAGAMA.....	Montreal	6-5-15	Plymouth	15-5-15
H.Q. 5th Cdn. Inf. Bde.....	CAMBRONIA.....	Montreal	11-5-15	Devonport	20-5-15
22nd Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	SAXONIA.....	Halifax	20-5-15	Devonport	29-5-15
24th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	CAMBRONIA.....	Montreal	11-5-15	Devonport	20-5-15
25th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	SAXONIA.....	Halifax	20-5-15	Devonport	29-5-15
26th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	CALEDONIA.....	Saint John	13-6-15	Devonport	24-6-15

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PROPORTION OF L. OF C. UNITS
LAND AND FRANCE

Trans-Channel Sailing

Ship	Embarkation Port	Date	Disembarkation Port	Date
QUEEN.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
CITY OF BENARES.....	Southampton	16-9-15	Havre	17-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
S'WESTERN MILLER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
ANGLO-CANADIAN, NIAVERNA AND MAIDAN.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16

Within a month of arrival in England, was converted into a depot unit designated Reserve Brigade, C.F.A., and identity of Brigade and Batteries disappeared.

.....	Southampton	18-1-16	Havre	19-1-16
S'WESTERN MILLER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
VIPER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
VIPER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
VIPER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
VIPER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
VIPER.....	Southampton	17-1-16	Havre	18-1-16
CALIFORNIAN.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
N'WESTERN MILLER, GOLDEN EAGLE and MANCHESTER.....	Southampton	16-9-15	Havre	17-9-15
MONA'S QUEEN.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
CALIFORNIAN and VIPER.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
VIPER.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
MAIDAN and CARDIGANSHIRE.....	Southampton	14-9-15	Havre	15-9-15
MILITARY LEAVE SHIP.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
1/3 or MILITARY LEAVE SHIP.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
1/3 or QUEEN.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
QUEEN.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
DUCHESS OF ARGYLL.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
ST. SMIRIOL.....	Folkestone	14-9-15	Boulogne	15-9-15
MILITARY LEAVE SHIP.....	Folkestone	15-9-15	Boulogne	16-9-15
DUCHESS OF ARGYLL.....	Folkestone	15-9-15	Boulogne	16-9-15
QUEEN.....	Folkestone	15-9-15	Boulogne	16-9-15
DUCHESS OF ARGYLL.....	Folkestone	15-9-15	Boulogne	16-9-15
ST. SMIRIOL.....	Folkestone	15-9-15	Boulogne	16-9-15

2ND CANADIAN DIVISION AND
MOVEMENT TO ENG

Unit	Trans-Atlantic Sailing				
	Ship	Embarkation Port	Date	Disembarkation Port	Date
H.Q. 6th Cdn. Inf. Bde.....	CARPATHIA.....	Quebec	16-5-15	Devonport	28-5-15
27th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	CARPATHIA.....	Quebec	16-5-15	Devonport	28-5-15
28th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	NORTHLAND.....	Montreal	29-5-15	Plymouth	8-6-15
29th Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	MISSANABIE.....	Montreal	20-5-15	Plymouth	30-5-15
31st Cdn. Inf. Battn.....	CARPATHIA.....	Quebec	17-5-15	Devonport	28-5-15
2nd Cdn. Inf. Base Depot.....	Organised in England, September, 1915.				
2nd Cdn. Div. Train.....	GRAMPIAN.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Ammn. Park.....	(MEGANTIC.....	Montreal	15-5-15	Devonport	24-5-15
	SAKONIA.....	Halifax	20-5-15	Devonport	29-5-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Supply Col.....	MEWAGAMA.....	Halifax	10-4-15	Liverpool	18-4-15
Two Depot Units of Supply.....	GRAMPIAN.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
Three Depot Units of Supply.....	NORTHLAND.....	Quebec	29-6-15	Devonport	9-7-15
No. 2 Cdn. Field Butchery.....	GRAMPIAN.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
No. 2 Cdn. Field Bakery.....	MISSANABIE.....	Halifax	24-4-15	Liverpool	2-5-15
No. 2 Cdn. Reserve Park.....	SCANDINAVIAN.....	Montreal	13-5-15	Devonport	22-5-15
No. 2 Cdn. Rly. Supply Det.....	MISSANABIE.....	Halifax	24-4-15	Liverpool	2-5-15
No. 4 Cdn. Field Amb.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
No. 5 Cdn. Field Amb.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
No. 6 Cdn. Field Amb.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
No. 2 Casualty Clearing Stn.....	NORTHLAND.....	Halifax	18-4-15	Avonmouth	29-4-15
No. 3 General Hospital.....	MEWAGAMA.....	Montreal	6-5-15	Plymouth	15-5-15
2nd Cdn. Div. Sanitary Sec.....	NORTHLAND.....	Quebec	29-8-15	Devonport	9-7-15
No. 2 Cdn. Mobile Vet. Sec.....	Organised in England, 9-7-15.				

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PROPORTION OF L. OF C. UNITS—*Con.*
 LAND AND FRANCE

Trans-Channel Sailing

Ship	Embarkation Port	Date	Disembarkation Port	Date
LA MARGUERITE.....	Folkestone	17-9-15	Boulogne	17-9-15
LA MARGUERITE.....	Folkestone	17-9-15	Boulogne	17-9-15
LA MARGUERITE.....	Folkestone	17-9-15	Boulogne	17-9-15
ST. SMERIOD.....	Folkestone	17-9-15	Boulogne	17-9-15
DUCHESS OF ARGYLL.....	Folkestone	18-9-15	Boulogne	18-9-15
KING EDWARD.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
LYDIA.....	Southampton	10-9-15	Havre	11-9-15
.....	Avonmouth	10-9-15	Havre	11-9-15
LYDIA.....	Southampton	10-9-15	Havre	11-9-15
KING EDWARD.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
KING EDWARD.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
KING EDWARD.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
KING EDWARD.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
.....	Southampton	22-8-15	Havre	23-8-15
KING EDWARD.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
KING EDWARD and ARCHIMEDES.....	Southampton	13-9-15	Havre	14-9-15
INDIAN and VIPER.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
VIPER.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15
CITY OF BENARES and MANCHESTER IMPORTER.....	Southampton	16-9-15	Havre	17-9-15
HUANCHACO.....	Southampton	17-6-15	Boulogne	18-6-15
CITY OF BENARES.....	Southampton	16-9-15	Havre	17-9-15
CITY OF BENARES.....	Southampton	15-9-15	Havre	16-9-15

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P.C. 1887

CERTIFIED Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General in Council on the 12th August, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 9th August, 1915, from the Acting Prime Minister, submitting herewith a memorandum signed by General Gwatkin and Commander Stephens, which summarizes the result of a conference between officers of the Department of Militia and Defence and the Department of the Naval Service, held with a view of adopting measures which would avoid any possible complications in respect to the transport of troops, stores and munitions of war between Canada and Great Britain and France.

In accordance with the unanimous agreement arrived at by the Officers of both these Departments, the Acting Prime Minister recommends that in the matter of overseas transport of troops, war munitions and stores, the following plan of action be observed:

(a) The Militia Department is to be entirely responsible for the embarkation of troops and horses and all stores accompanying them;

(b) The Naval Department shall issue all orders to the masters of ships;

(c) The Naval Department shall be the medium of communication with the Admiralty;

(d) The Militia Department shall be relieved of all the responsibility for the protection of transport at sea.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

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Telegram from the Minister of Militia to the Secretary of State for War

OTTAWA, 20th March, 1915.

I purpose appointing Major-General Sam Steele to command Second Overseas Canadian Division. He is splendid organizer and disciplinarian. Do you object?

SAM HUGES.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for War to the Minister of Militia

London, 22nd March, 1915.

Reference to your telegram of twentieth March. I am sorry that in present state of warfare on the continent, it would not be

possible to place General Steele in command of a division. Very experienced officers are necessary in such positions to do justice to the troops under their command.

KITCHENER.

Telegram from the Minister of Militia to the Secretary of State for War

OTTAWA, 29th March, 1915.

Regret your views *re* Steele. Could he have done worse than at Salisbury? My opinion based on years of experience and observation in war and on manoeuvres convinces me Steele and my brother, Colonel John Hughes, each as qualified for division as any officer in British service. General..... seriously suggested from England. Believe I have fifty better. However, Steele could take division across and commander satisfactory to you could be named later. How would Lowther do?

SAM HUGHES.

*See 229

Telegram from the Secretary of State for War to the Minister of Militia

LONDON, 1st April, 1915.

Your telegram of twenty-ninth. I have no objection to General Steele coming here in charge of contingent, if it is clearly understood by General Steele that when the contingent takes the field as a division other arrangements for its command will have to be made.

KITCHENER.

Telegram from the Minister of Militia to the Secretary of State for War

OTTAWA, 7th April, 1915.

Am somewhat surprised at your 3833 cipher April 1st. Am not in habit of deceiving and Steele will certainly know exact situation. Am not dictating, merely reviewing. I know many of your major generals; some good and capable, but many absolutely reverse, far inferior for administration in office or capability in the field to Steele or a dozen other of my officers. Have calmly and loyally remained aloof from interference with Salisbury horror and disintegration of First Canadians, but please do not ask that too much be borne. Claim no authority to manage force in field but under Army Act Canada has absolute authority in respect to appointments. Further,

offensiveness and contemptuousness of some army officers in First Division became almost intolerable. I look to you to see that courtesy, even-handed justice and fair play are accorded to all my deserving officers.

SAM HUGHES.

NOTE: *The foregoing telegrams were quoted in the House of Commons by Sir Sam Hughes in a speech on 30th January, 1917. Before reading the last, he told the House: "So I sent the following reply, which the Prime Minister, very properly, in his opinion, objected to."*
(*Hansard, Debates House of Commons, 1917, pp. 284, 285*).

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*Cablegram from the Minister of Militia and
Defence to Brigadier-General*

J. W. Carson

OTTAWA, 26th May, 1915.

Kindly keep identity and command of Second Canadian Overseas Division separate from other Canadian units in England. Please keep each separate and distinct.

SAM HUGHES.

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NOTE ON ACCOMMODATION FOR
CANADIAN TROOPS IN ENGLAND,
1915

Anticipating the preliminary arrangements for the reception in England of units for the Second Canadian Contingent, the Governor General despatched the following telegrams to London:-

OTTAWA, 2nd February, 1915.

My advisers inform me that reports as to conditions at Salisbury Plains which have reached families and friends of men of first Expeditionary Force have not aided the cause of rapid recruiting throughout the Dominion.

OTTAWA, 2nd February, 1915.

Having regard to unfortunate conditions which the first Expeditionary Force encountered at Salisbury Plain, my advisers will be glad to know the nature of arrangements made for the second Expeditionary Force, should they be stationed for a time in Great Britain.

To these messages reply was received from the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

LONDON, 5th February, 1915.

SECRET.

Lord Kitchener to whom I have shown your telegrams of the 2nd February asks me to send you the following:-

During this exceptionally wet season Salisbury Plain has been no worse than any other training grounds in England. The King has just seen Canadian Division and was much struck at the improvement that had taken place among the men. Since their arrival health has been excellent and the Canadian Division looked remarkably well. I asked several Commanding Officers who, though expressing their regret at the wet weather they had been through, all said everything possible had been done for them and their men were quite content and happy.

Apparently in response to a request for information, the Minister of Militia received the following from the Secretary of the War Office, London, on 6th February, 1915:-

We will give them a good place when the time comes. It will not be Salisbury Plain which I want for the Second Army.

It was evidently expected that the Second Contingent would be sent to Salisbury Plain, for on the 12th February, 1915, Colonel Carson wrote to the Minister of Militia of the terrible condition of the Plain and suggested that the departure of the Contingent be held back until Salisbury had a chance to dry up. (*App. 196*). But several days later the Chief of the General Staff at Ottawa (Major-General Gwatkin) received a private letter dated War Office 18th February which read in part:-

It is not settled yet where the 2nd Division will go: not unlikely Aldershot. If they had been going to Salisbury word would by now have been sent to start them off; but it is the difficulty of accommodation which is holding things up. As soon as the New Army commences pushing over (March or April) then it will ease up the accommodation question.

On 23rd February Colonel Carson received advice from the War Office of the contemplated removal of the Canadian Training Division and reinforcements at Salisbury to Shorncliffe instead of to Plymouth, and of the placing of the Second Contingent, when they arrived, at Shorncliffe instead of Aldershot. He wrote on 23rd February to the

Minister of Militia that in his opinion this "last proposed change is very much to our advantage and is very warmly welcomed."

The above advice was amplified in a letter to Colonel Carson on 12th March from General Heath, Director of Movements and Quarterings at the War Office, in which he said: "Those remaining at Salisbury after Monday will be moved about 22nd or 23rd, not earlier, as I want the ground at Shorncliffe to dry up a bit more before moving them."

When reporting the general situation to Ottawa, Colonel Carson wrote on 17th March that all the infantry and artillery in England, with the exception of the 11th and 12th Battalions, had -been moved and located comfortably in barracks at Shorncliffe, and that "everything was moving very satisfactorily indeed"; that when the Second Contingent arrived "we would have all our artillery and infantry concentrated in one huge range of barracks." The Ordnance Stores were moving to extensive and commodious quarters in Ashford, Brig.-General Seely's Command to Maresfield Park, and the Fort Garry Horse was comfortably located at Canterbury.

On 15th April Col. Carson, in a letter to the Minister at Ottawa, reported adversely on the arrangements which were being made to receive the Second Contingent in the Shorncliffe area. He predicted that there would be considerable trouble in these camps, which were more or less inconveniently situated. One had hut accommodation for about 8,000 men and the remainder were then nothing . but open fields and two or three miles distant from one another. The railway facilities were only fair as the station and *yards* were *very* small, and only in one camp (Sandling) was there water-at the others water would have to be brought long distances, in one case 1½ miles. He believed it would be a physical impossibility to have these camps ready for occupation by the end of April or beginning of May, and as a consequence the troops would. have to be packed into the huts in the Sandling Camp and gradually moved to the Shorncliffe camps as they became ready, which he was sure would take to the end of May. Col. Carson considered this delay unnecessary and that it was the result of eleventh hour changes by the War Office, who had arranged to move the 23rd (British) Division from the Shorncliffe Barracks and put the Second Canadian Contingent in its place. The War

Office had then decided to stop all billeting of troops after 16th April and put them under canvas. Col. Carson said he "simply told the War Office that they had to lay out our camps, put water in them, deliver all our tents and camp equipment, superintend the putting of them up and provide mechanical transport until such time as ours was available, all of which they agreed to do"

On the same day (15th April) Colonel Carson cabled to Ottawa that two brigades of infantry were to be placed in huts and the remainder of the Division under canvas.

On 30th April Lt.-Col. P. E. Thacker, A.A. & Q.M.G. 2nd Canadian Division, who was then at Shorncliffe, informed Col. Carson of the difficulty of making arrangements regarding the camps at Shorncliffe and said that they were working in the dark because of the absence of information as to what units for the 2nd Division were being despatched from Canada and the approximate date of sailing. Col. Carson replied that even the Canadian Government did not know and that the trouble was lack of transport and escort.

Even up to 31st May the question of camp accommodation was unsettled. On this day H.Q. Eastern Command asked G.O.C. Canadians, Shorncliffe, what was being done about the camp of the 2nd Canadian Division, if it had been ascertained whether water could be arranged for the extension of the Otterpool camp. If not, they asked if another camp had been found, and suggested going further afield if there was not one nearby and also that brigades might be divided up to suit the available camp accommodation.

On arrival, all troops of the Second Canadian Overseas Contingent, whether reinforcements or belonging to the 2nd Canadian Division, were concentrated in the Shorncliffe Area, where the 2nd Canadian Division was formed, and distributed under canvas at Dibgate, Otterpool and New Inn Green; in the hutments at East Sandling, West Sandling and Westenhanger; and barracks at Shorncliffe.

The Canadian Training Division was located at Shorncliffe, including reinforcements and depots, and also certain combatant units whose disposal was *as yet* undetermined, occupying the Risboro', Somerset, Ross, Moore, Napier, R.E. and A.S.C. Barracks, canvas camps at Dibgate, Caesar's Camp North, Caesar's Camp South and St. Martin's Plain; and hutments on St. Martin's Plain.

DISTRIBUTION OF 2ND CANADIAN
DIVISION. JUNE 1915

DIBGATE. (Canvas.)

6th Cdn. Inf. Bde. (27th, 28th, 29th, 31st
Bus.)
2nd Cdn. Div. Cavalry Squadron.
2nd Cdn. Div. Cyclist Co.
H.Q. 2nd Cdn. Div. Engineers.
4th, 5th, 6th Field Co. C.E.
2nd Cdn. Div. Signal Co.
2nd Cdn. Div. Train (Nos. 7 and 8 Co.)
4th Cdn. Field Ambulance.
2nd Cdn. Div. Motor Ambulance Work-
shop Unit.
2nd Cdn. Div. Ammunition Park.
2nd Cdn. Div. Supply Column.
Borden's Motor M.G. Bty.

NOTE: *The above moved to Otterpool (Canvas) on 8/9/80 June; except Borden's M.M.G.Bty. which moved to Ross Barracks on 16th June and to Caesar's Camp North (Canvas) on 8th July.*

WEST SANDLING. (Hutments)

4th Cdn. Inf. Bde. (18th, 19th, 20th, 21st
Bus.)
2nd Cdn. Field Bakery.
2nd Cdn. Field Butchery.

EAST SANDLING. (Hutments)

5th Cdn. Inf. Bde. (22nd, 24th, 25th, 26th
Bns.)

OTTERPOOL. (Canvas)

Hq. 2nd Cdn. Div. Artillery.
(5th and 7th Bdes. C.F.A. arrived 19th
Aug.)
2nd Cdn. Heavy Bty. & Amm. Col.
2nd Cdn. Div. Amm. Col.
5th and 6th Cdn. Field Ambulances.

WESTENHANGER. (Hutments)

4th Brigade, C.F.A.

NEW INN GREEN. (Canvas)

2nd Cdn. Div. Train (H.Q. and Nos. 5 &
6 Cos.)
2nd Reserve Park, C.A.S.C.
No. 6 Depot Unit of Supply.

SHORNCLIFFE. (A.S.C. Barracks)

No. 2 Railway Supply Detachment.
No. 5 Depot Unit of Supply.

DISTRIBUTION OF CANADIAN TRAIN-
ING DIVISION JUNE 1915

RISBORO' BARRACKS.

17th Bn. (Houses), 32nd Bn. (Huts).

SOMERSET BARRACKS.

Cdn. Cavalry Depot (Huts & Tents).

ROSS BARRACKS.

Res. Bde. C.F.A. (Huts), No. 1 Cdn. Vet.
Hospital and Remount Sqdn. (Tents).

NAPIER BARRACKS.

30th Bn. (Huts), Nos. 7 & 9 Depot Units of
Supply (Houses & Tents).

R.E. BARRACKS.

Depot Company, CE. (Huts & Tents).

DIBGATE.

9th Bn. (Tents), 23rd Bn. (Tents).

CAESAR'S CAMP NORTH.

36th Bn. (Tents), 39th Bn. (Tents) (arrived
4.7.15).

ST. MARTIN'S PLAIN.

11th Bn. (Huts), 12th Bn. (Huts & Tents).
Inf. Base Depot (Huts), CAMC Depot
Coy. (Huts).
P.P.C.L.I. Depot (Huts).
Postal Corps.

OTHER CANADIAN UNITS

DIBGATE.

2nd Bde. C.M.R. (Tents).

CAESAR'S CAMP NORTH.

48th Bna. (Tents), (arrived 11.7.15).
Eaton's M.M.G.Bty. (Tents).

CAESAR'S CAMP SOUTH.

1st Bde. C.M.R. (Tents).
Yukon M.M.G.Bty. (Tents).

ST. MARTIN'S PLAIN.

42nd Bn. (Tents), 43rd Bn. (Tents).
49th Bn. (Tents), No. 5 Cdn. Stat. Hosp.
(Tent Hosp.), No. 4 Cdn. Gen. Hosp.
(Huts).

MOORE BARRACKS.

Moore Barracks Hosp. (personnel No. 2
Cdn. Cas. Cl. Stn. and No. 3 Cdn. Stat.
Hosp.) No. 1 Adv. Depot. Med. Stores.

RISBORO' BARRACKS.

No. 4 Cdn. Stat. Hosp. (Tent Hosp.).

MONKS HORTON.

Cdn. Convalescent Hosp.

BROMLEY.

Cdn. Convalescent Hosp.

TAPLOW.

Duchess of Connaught's Red Cross Hos-
pital.

SOUTHAMPTON.

Base Depot Medical Stores.

HOUNSLOW HEATH.

Cdn. Res. Cyclist Coy. (Attached Army
Cyc. Corps).

LONGMOOR CAMP (near Bramshott).

Cdn. Overseas Rly. Construction Corps.

CANTERBURY.

Cdn. Cavalry Depot.

ASHFORD.

Ordnance Depot.

There was some confusion, overcrowding and discomfort in the Shorncliffe camps occupied by units of the Canadian Training Division, and difficulty in obtaining adequate accommodation and equipment.

On 28th May there was an acute shortage of tents. The 9th and 23rd Reserve Battalions at Lower Dibgate were in the tentage of one battalion, and reinforcements to bring these units up to war strength were due to arrive. The Camp Commandant was scouring the country but there were no bell tents or marquees available for the reserve units. Eventually 48 marquees were obtained from the D.A.D.O.S. at Dover and loaned to the medical units until bell tents could be procured; also 100 old bell tents were obtained from the Ordnance Officer, Dibgate Plain, and erected for accommodation of the 9th Reserve Battalion.

The 9th Battalion complained of the tentage situation. On 7th July the Battalion had 119 bell tents and 1,046 men in camp, with 400 men on furlough and sick leave and returned casualties constantly coming in. Of these tents one was used for Record Office, one for Pay Tent, one for Post Office, four Company Store Tents, one for Barber Shop, one for Armourers, one Sergeants' Mess Stores, one for *Officers'* Mess Stores, two Guard Tents and 23 for officers, making a total of 36 tents that were absolutely necessary for these purposes. There was an average of 12 men per tent, and convalescents were being crowded 10 and 12 in one tent.

When the 42nd, 43rd and 49th Battalions arrived in June, with strengths of 1,018, 1,043 and 1,022 respectively they occupied camps on St. Martin's Plain and were each issued with 131 bell tents, 3 marquees and 2 store tents, from British Ordnance, as the promised tents from Canada had not arrived.

Complaint was made of the leaky condition of the majority of the roofs on hutments at St. Martin's Plain. During the rains of April 12th and 13th great inconvenience was caused to all ranks. In many cases officers and other ranks had to lay waterproof sheets over their beds to keep dry.

On 9th July a Board of Officers enquired into the condition of the tents supplied to the 49th Battalion. The unit considered them worn out and unserviceable, all in poor condition and leaking badly; some of the men had to wear greatcoats to keep off the rain. The Board found that the tents were unfit for service. Also on this date the Sanitary Officer for Shorncliffe reported overcrowding in tents and huts occupied by the 9th, 11th, 12th, 23rd, 32nd, 43rd and 49th Battalions; there were 10, 12 and 13 men to one tent. The huts were

intended to accommodate 24 men: 32nd Battalion had 33, 12th Battalion 41 and 11th Battalion 42 men to a hut.

At Caesar's Camp North the tentage requirements of the 38th, 39th and 48th Battalions on arrival at the end of June, with strengths of approximately 1,044, were 140 bell tents, four marquees and one store tent, each. The Quartermaster, 36th Battalion protested on 10th July that he could not be held responsible for damage to stores and equipment due to exposure because of lack of adequate tentage.

The 1st Brigade, C.M.R., arrived at the end of June with 86 officers and 1,788 other ranks and went to Caesar's Camp South. They were given 305 tents and 11 marquees. Command Headquarters requested that 100 tents be returned as being in excess of establishment, but the O.C., 1st C.M.R. replied that he was entitled to 357 bell tents and consequently was short 52 tents. On 19th July a Board of Officers met at Caesar's Camp South by order of Major-General P. S. Wilkinson, Commanding Troops, Shorncliffe, to enquire into the site of the camp occupied by the Canadian Mounted Rifles. The opinion of the Board was that the camp was overcrowded. The G.O.C. instructed that the camp be extended.

In September the Canadian Cavalry Depot in Somerset Barracks was accommodating nearly double the number of men for which the barracks were intended, and the overcrowding of quarters had become a serious matter. The Sanitary Officer insisted to Headquarters that in view of a probable cerebro-spinal meningitis epidemic steps ought to be taken to rectify this bad condition of overcrowding.

Regarding the unsuitability of camping sites occupied by Canadian Troops, Lt-Col. D. W. B. Spry, A.A. & Q.M.G. C.T.D. forwarded the following comments to Headquarters, Shorncliffe Command on 23rd September:—

ST. MARTIN'S PLAIN—43rd Battalion is encamped on the low ground on St. Martin's Plain. In wet weather it has been found most unsatisfactory. An objectionable feature is the drainage into a small stream, and danger of pollution of the water. This site was occupied by Imperial Troops prior to 1915.

CAESAR'S CAMP SOUTH—The 1st Brigade, Canadian Mounted Rifles occupied this camp. It was originally laid out and intended for a dismounted unit. Shortly after the 1st C.M.R. arrived, horses were added to its establishment and this ground proved to be unsatisfactory for a mounted camp.

CAESAR'S CAMP NORTH—The siting of the 36th, 39th and 48th Battalions' camps proved unsatisfactory in wet weather. Portions of the tents of all units were flooded. The drainage arrangements have proved to be unsatisfactory. If this camp is to be continued in use the siting of the tents should be altered.

DIBGATE PLAIN—The troops from the 2nd Canadian Division moved from this camping ground on account of the dust and sand. The only troops of the Canadian Training Division which have occupied camping sites on Dibgate Plain were the 2nd Brigade, Canadian Mounted Rifles, and they complained of the unsuitability of the ground.

(For conditions on Salisbury Plain see Chapter IV and Appendices.)

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P.C. 532

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 16th March, 1915.

The Committee of the *Privy* Council have had before them a report, dated 8th March, 1915, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, recommending that authority be given for the conversion of 50,000 sets of Valise Equipment, Oliver pattern, now in stock, to a modified pattern, which has been carefully tested and approved.

The Minister states that the total cost of the necessary alterations and additions is estimated at \$187,500; as will appear from the accompanying copy of a memorandum of Major-General MacDonald, Quartermaster-General, dated 27th February, 1915; but this cost is offset by some advantages and credits.

The Minister observes that the Quartermaster-General's memorandum shows in detail that while the Oliver Pattern Equipment, modified as now proposed, will, in his opinion, be an improvement upon the new British pattern; the net cost per set will be only \$9.15, as against \$9.75 per set paid by the British Government for their Equipment. The proposed alterations are, therefore, very much in the public interest.

The Committee concur in the above recommendation and submit the same for approval.

RODOLPHE BOUDREAU,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

CONVERSION OF OLIVER EQUIPMENT

Memorandum

Regarding cost per set for altering Oliver Equipment to the pattern which has been approved of by the Honourable the Minister.

The average cost of the Oliver

Equipment when new was	\$ 7 00
Cost of change to new style.....	1 00
New canvas pack bag	1 48
New cartridge leather pouch.....	1 30

Total cost.....

Less kit bag.....

Less one mess tin strap and two

overcoat straps from Oliver

Equipment of use on service

for militia purposes

Net cost of new Equipment

The new Pack Bag at \$1.45 and the new leather Pouch at \$1.30 are absolutely essential in any event. However, the cost of the new British Equipment is \$9.75 and the cost of this new, and in some respects better one, is only \$9.15.

The D.C. & E. has written this day to D. of C. (copy attached*) to cancel certain items of Oliver Equipment which are still due from contractors, but have become obsolete and therefore are not required.

He also indicated those items which have to be modified in pattern, and which service therefore should be undertaken before manufacturers turn out any more.

The cost of altering 50,000 sets will be about \$187,500 which sum is recommended for consideration.

As will be seen from Messrs. Carson's letter attached the price is inclusive of the use by Contractors of all parts of the Equipment, except coat and mess tin straps. These articles can be used by the men for their respective purposes and will remain part of the set of this altered Equipment.

D. A. MACDONALD, Major-General.
Quartermaster-General.

OTTAWA, 27.2.15.

*Not reproduced.

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See Chapter IV, p. 146, and Appendix 209

730

*From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the
Governor General*

Canada.
No. 205.

DOWNING STREET, 5th March, 1915.

Sir:

I have the honour to inform Your Royal Highness that His Majesty's Government are anxious to ascertain the precise wishes of your Government with regard to the incidence of the charges incurred in connection with the Canadian Contingents.

2. The suggestion reported in your telegram of the 2nd of August last (*App.* 17), con tingently upon the Empire becoming involved in war, was that the Canadian Government should be responsible for pay, maintenance and equipment. This responsibility I understand to include all charges for initial equipment, pay and allowances including pensions which will naturally follow the pay throughout, and the provision, during the period of embodiment, of supplies, equipment, animals, etc. It does not, however, expressly include the cost of transport by sea, or of travelling on land.

3. So far as concerns initial equipment, pay, allowances and horses, for the supply of which your Government is understood to be making separate arrangements, no difficulty, therefore, arises; nor, so long as the Contingents are in this country, as regards supplies and stores. But the cost of land travelling whether in this country or on the Continent, of transport between this country and the Continent, and of stores and supplies issued from Army stocks to Canadian units when once they have actually, taken the field, could not be *earmarked*, and could only be allocated on an estimated basis.

4. I should be glad if you would ask Ministers to consider to what extent it is intended that Canada should assume responsibility in respect of these charges, as well as in respect of transport from Canada to England. They will appreciate that His Majesty's Government have no desire to press upon them the acceptance of any liabilities not previously within their contemplation; but they will no doubt agree that it is desirable, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future, that the wishes of the Dominion with regard to any points of uncertainty in this matter should be clearly defined.

I have, etc.,

L. HARCOURT.

Governor General
His Royal Highness
The Duke of Connaught
and of Strathearn, K.G., etc.

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Extract from Sessional Paper No. 12. of 1916
MEMORANDUM RESPECTING WAR
EXPENDITURE

Under instructions of the Minister of Finance a Meeting was convened in the Office of the Minister of Finance at 4 p.m. August 27, 1914.

10. With reference to the requirements of the Naval Department, an Order in Council was passed placing the *Niobe* and *Rainbow* at the disposal of the Imperial Government Any expenditure necessary to carry out this offer is accordingly authorized. The pay and allowances are also provided by Order in Council.

11. For the purchase of stores, wireless stations and aeroplanes and for the hire of vessels or outlay on any of the services apart from those already authorized in connection with the *Niobe*, *Rainbow*, and two submarines and pay and allowances, authority, by an Order in Council will be obtained with as much detail as conveniently can be given.

*See Appendix 25.

732

P.C. 1657

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 16th July, 1916.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 8th July, 1915, from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, to whom was referred a despatch, dated 28th May, 1915, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the subject of the cost of certain naval stores supplied to His Majesty's Canadian ships co-operating with His Majesty's ships during the continuance of the war, and for the pay of all ranks and ratings serving in those ships.

The Minister represents that the Canadian Government is willing to pay the full expenses of His Majesty's Canadian ships NIOBE and RAINBOW, and therefore, is prepared to meet the total amount of pay to the officers and men employed on these vessels, and, further, that the charges for liabilities of retired pay and pensions of all Active Service, Naval and Marine Officers and men serving during the war in His Majesty's Canadian ships may be included in the usual

claims made annually upon Canadian funds in the manner, and according to the agreements already in force with regard to active service personnel loaned to the Canadian Government.

The Minister observes that it is presumed that these payments will cover any liability with regard to pension for wounds, widow's pensions, etc., so far as either Active Service or Newfoundland Naval Reserve personnel are concerned, and for any special post bellum gratuities which the Imperial Government may decide to pay to Imperial Active Service or Reserve personnel.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, advise that Your Royal Highness may be pleased to forward a copy of this Minute, if approved, to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the information of the Lords of the Admiralty.

All of which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

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P.C. 1593

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 8th July, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report from the Minister of Militia and Defence, dated 1st July, 1915, representing that by an Order in Council (P.C. 2067) (*App.* 43), dated 6th August, 1914, Your Royal Highness, in view of the state of war existing between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies of the British Empire, on the one side, and Germany, on the other side, creating a menace to the well being and integrity of the

Empire, declared it to be desirable to mobilize militia units of such effective strength, as might from time to time be determined by Your Royal Highness in Council, such units to be composed of officers and men who are willing to volunteer for overseas service under the British Crown.

The minister states that by virtue of that authority some 30,000 officers and men, forming what is known as the First Contingent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, were raised, equipped and despatched to the United Kingdom.

The minister further represents that another Order in Council (P.C. 2831) (*App.* 160), dated 7th November, 1914, authorized the 2nd Overseas' Contingent and other troops for service in Canada, aggregating another 30,000 men and that also by the said last mentioned Order the Minister of Militia and Defence was authorized to mobilize troops required in Canada to replace the second or any subsequent contingent, or any portion thereof after its embarkation overseas.

The minister submits that it is desirable to limit in definite terms the numbers thus raised, and to be raised, under the provisions of the first herein before mentioned Order in Council.

The minister, therefore, recommends that he be authorized to raise, equip and send overseas for the purposes aforesaid, officers and men not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand, including those who have already been raised and equipped under authority of the said Orders in Council, and including also those who have been, or may hereafter, be raised for garrisons and guard duties in Canada.

The Committee concur in the foregoing and submit the same for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

(*See 48 and 160*)

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INFANTRY, PIONEER AND C.M.R. UNITS, C.E.F., EXCLUSIVE OF FIRST CONTINGENT, AUTHORIZED PRIOR TO
15TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

Unit	Recruiting Area	Mobilized at	Date Authorized	To England	Strength on Sailing	
					Off.	O.R.
2nd Canadian Division Headquarters.	Canada.	Shorncliffe.	7-11-14	16-5-15	3	5
4th Cdn. Inf. Bde.—	Military District No. 2.	Toronto	31-12-14	6-5-15	36	1,081
H.Q.	Western Ontario.	London	1-10-14	18-4-15	41	1,073
18th Battalion.	Central Ontario.	Toronto	19-10-14	19-5-15	35	1,100
20th Battalion.	Central and Northern Ontario.	Toronto	19-10-14	14-5-15	42	1,053
31st Battalion.	Eastern Ontario.	Kingston	19-10-14	4-5-15		
5th Cdn. Inf. Bde.—	Military District No. 4.	Montreal	31-12-14	11-5-15	6	14
H.Q.	Province of Quebec.	St. Jean P.Q.	21-10-14	20-5-15	36	1,097
22nd Battalion.	Montreal	Montreal	22-10-14	11-5-15	42	1,089
24th Battalion.	Nova Scotia.	Halifax	23-10-14	20-5-15	42	1,081
25th Battalion.	New Brunswick.	Saint John.	2-11-14	13-6-15	42	1,008
26th Battalion.	Military District No. 10.	Winnipeg	31-12-14	20-5-15	5	26
H.Q.	Brandon, Portage la Prairie, Rainy River, Kenora, Winnipeg.	Winnipeg	21-10-14	17-5-15	33	1,065
27th Battalion.	Regina, Moose Jaw, Saskatoon, Fort William, Port Arthur, Prince Albert.	Winnipeg	19-10-14	20-5-15	36	1,084
28th Battalion.	Vancouver and New Westminster.	Vancouver	24-10-14	20-5-15	37	1,104
29th Battalion.	Alberta.	Calgary	16-11-14	17-5-15	37	1,123
31st Battalion.	Canada.	Halifax	Permanent Force.	10-9-14	30	990
The Royal Canadian Regiment.				(To Bermuda)		
				(To England)	34	1,083
23rd Battalion.	Vancouver, Montreal, Quebec, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg.	Quebec, P.Q.	21-10-14	23-2-15	35	942
24th Battalion.	British Columbia.	Victoria	27-10-14	23-2-15	36	978
25th Battalion.	Manitoba and Saskatchewan.	Winnipeg	7-11-14	23-2-15	35	963
32nd Battalion.	London.	London	2-1-15	17-3-15	40	946
33rd Battalion.	Guelph and District.	Guelph	23-10-15	1-102	41	1,115
34th Battalion.	Toronto	Toronto	23-4-15	16-10-15	41	1,115
35th Battalion.	Hamilton and District.	Hamilton	11-3-15	19-6-15	39	1,004
36th Battalion.	Northern Ontario.	Niagara, Ont.	4-1-15	27-11-15	40	1,104
37th Battalion.	Ottawa and District.	Ottawa.	24-12-14	8-3-15	33	999
38th Battalion.	Eastern Ontario.	Belleville	30-12-14	30-5-15	35	1,001
39th Battalion.				(To England)	40	1,005

40th Battalion.....	Nova Scotia.....	Aldershot.....	5- 5-15	18-10-15	40	1,090
41st Battalion.....	Ottawa and Province of Quebec.....	Quebec, P. Q.....	11- 8-15	29-10-15	36	1,082
42nd Battalion.....	Montreal.....	Montreal.....	8- 2-15	10- 6-15	40	1,078
43rd Battalion.....	Winnipeg.....	Winnipeg.....	16-12-14	1- 6-15	40	998
44th Battalion.....	Manitoba.....	Brandon.....	1- 2-15	23-10-15	36	1,076
45th Battalion.....	Saskatchewan.....	Winnipeg.....	21-12-14	17- 3-16	38	1,119
46th Battalion.....	Saskatchewan.....	Moose Jaw.....	1- 2-15	23-10-15	36	1,115
47th Battalion.....	New Brunswick.....	New Westminster.....	15- 2-15	13-11-15	36	1,115
48th Battalion.....	British Columbia.....	Victoria.....	22- 2-15	1- 7-15	38	1,020
49th Battalion.....	Edmonton.....	Edmonton.....	4- 1-15	4- 6-15	36	996
50th Battalion.....	Calgary.....	Calgary.....	15-12-14	27-10-15	41	1,036
51st Battalion.....	Edmonton.....	Edmonton.....	4- 1-15	19- 4-16	37	1,035
52nd Battalion.....	Port Arthur, Kenora, Dryden, Fort Francis.....	Port Arthur.....	20- 3-15	23-11-15	40	1,032
53rd Battalion.....	Prince Albert, Saskatoon, Melfort, Battleford.....	Winnipeg.....	16- 5-15	1- 4-16	35	1,063
54th Battalion.....	British Columbia.....	Vernon.....	1- 5-15	22-11-15	36	1,111
55th Battalion.....	New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.....	Sussex, N.B.....	2- 5-15	30-10-15	42	1,099
56th Battalion.....	Calgary.....	Calgary.....	24- 4-15	1- 4-16	40	1,070
57th Battalion.....	Quebec.....	Quebec, P. Q.....	28- 4-15	2- 6-16	18	419
58th Battalion.....	Central Ontario.....	Niagara, Ont.....	21- 5-15	22-11-15	40	1,091
59th Battalion.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Kingston.....	1- 7-15	5- 4-16	36	1,073
60th Battalion.....	Montreal.....	Montreal.....	23- 5-15	6-11-15	40	1,024
61st Battalion.....	Winnipeg.....	Winnipeg.....	18- 5-15	5- 4-16	37	1,096
62nd Battalion.....	Vancouver, Victoria, Prince Rupert.....	Vancouver.....	1- 7-15	1- 4-16	36	1,037
63rd Battalion.....	Edmonton, Medicine Hat, Calgary.....	Edmonton.....	28- 6-15	23- 4-16	36	1,013
64th Battalion.....	N. B., N. S., and P. E. I.....	Halifax.....	29- 8-15	1- 4-16	38	1,039
65th Battalion.....	Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Prince Albert.....	Saskatoon.....	6- 9-15	20- 6-16	33	1,040
66th Battalion.....	Edmonton.....	Edmonton.....	23- 6-15	1- 5-16	36	1,075
67th Battalion.....	Victoria.....	Victoria.....	6- 7-15	5- 4-16	34	1,074
68th Battalion.....	Regina, Moose Jaw and District.....	Regina.....	3- 7-15	17- 4-16	34	1,023
69th Battalion.....	Province of Quebec.....	Montreal.....	1- 9-15	23- 4-16	35	1,023
70th Battalion.....	Counties of Essex, Lambton, Kent and Middlesex.....	London.....	30- 8-15	5- 4-16	35	963
71st Battalion.....	Woodstock and District.....	Woodstock.....	10- 9-15	1- 5-16	1	46
72nd Battalion.....	British Columbia.....	Vancouver.....	4- 9-15	26- 4-16	34	1,094
73rd Battalion.....	Montreal, P. Q., and Almonie, Ont.....	Montreal.....	5- 9-15	1- 4-16	36	1,033
74th Battalion.....	Counties of York and Peel.....	Niagara Camp.....	30- 9-15	1- 4-16	36	1,046
75th Battalion.....	Toronto, Hamilton, London.....	Toronto.....	28- 7-15	26- 4-16	36	1,114
76th Battalion.....	Barrie, Orillia, Collingwood, Ont.....	Niagara Camp.....	16- 7-15	20- 6-16	38	1,006
77th Battalion.....	Ottawa and District.....	Ottawa.....	8- 7-15	22- 5-16	37	1,097
78th Battalion.....	Winnipeg and District.....	Winnipeg.....	1- 9-15	25- 4-16	37	1,095
79th Battalion.....	Manitoba.....	Brandon.....	1- 9-15	22- 5-16	35	1,041
80th Battalion.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Belleville.....	1- 9-15	1- 5-16	36	1,071
81st Battalion.....	Toronto and District.....	Toronto.....	4- 8-15	22- 5-16	34	1,006
82nd Battalion.....	Calgary.....	Calgary.....	29- 7-15	1- 5-16	35	1,085
83rd Battalion.....	Toronto.....	Toronto.....	10- 9-15	20- 6-16	36	913
84th Battalion.....	Nova Scotia.....	Toronto.....	11- 8-15	13-10-16	34	1,001
85th Battalion.....	Hamilton, Welland, Dundas.....	Halifax.....	10- 9-15	22- 5-16	36	1,072
86th Battalion.....	Gaspé, Eastern Townships, Pembroke, and Dun- des Counties. Mining Districts of Quebec and Ontario.....	Hamilton.....	10- 9-15	23- 5-16	36	1,026
87th Battalion.....	Toronto.....	Montreal.....	2- 8-15	23- 5-16	36	1,096
92nd Battalion.....	Toronto.....	Toronto.....				

INFANTRY, PIONEER AND C.M.R. UNITS, C.E.F., EXCLUSIVE OF FIRST CONTINGENT, AUTHORIZED PRIOR TO
15th SEPTEMBER, 1915—*Con.*

Unit	Recruiting Area	Mobilized at	Date Authorized	To England	Strength on Sailing	
					Off.	O.R.
1st Cdn. Pioneer Bn.	Vancouver, Victoria, B.C., and Western Canada.	Winnipeg	3-8-15	20-11-15	30	1,046
1st C.M.R. Bde.— H.Q.	Western Canada.	Winnipeg	15-1-15	12-6-15	8	48
1st Regt. C.M.R.	Brandon, Saskatoon, Yorkton.	Brandon	5-11-14	12-6-15	28	602
2nd Regt. C.M.R.	Victoria, Vernon.	Victoria	5-11-14	12-6-15	28	605
3rd Regt. C.M.R.	Calgary, Edmonton, Medicine Hat.	Medicine Hat	5-11-14	12-6-15	28	598
2nd C.M.R. Bde.	Montreal.	Montreal	18-7-15	18-7-15	6	27
4th Regt. C.M.R.	Central Ontario.	Toronto	5-11-14	18-7-15	31	602
5th Regt. C.M.R.	Province Quebec.	Sherbrooke	1-12-14	18-7-15	35	601
6th Regt. C.M.R.	N.S., N.B., and P.E.I.	Amherst, N.S.	1-12-14	18-7-15	32	598
7th Regt. C.M.R.	Toronto, London, Sarais, Windsor, Amherstburg.	London	1-12-14	9-6-15	6	166
8th Regt. C.M.R.	Ottawa, Peterborough, Toronto.	London	"A" Sqdn.	20-6-15	7	159
9th Regt. C.M.R.	Lloydminster, Saskatoon, North Battleford, Swift Current, Battle Creek.	Toronto	"B" Sqdn.	23-2-15	6	154
10th Regt. C.M.R.	Regina, Moosemin, Indian Head, Grenfell.	Ottawa	"C" Sqdn.	9-10-15	31	601
11th Regt. C.M.R.	British Columbia.	Lloydminster	1-12-14	23-11-15	27	599
12th Regt. C.M.R.	Calgary, Red Deer.	Regina	1-12-14	1-5-16	23	395
13th Regt. C.M.R.	Pincher Creek, Macleod, Carleton.	Vancouver	1-12-14	16-7-16	34	583
14th Regt. C.M.R.		Calgary	1-12-14	9-10-15	27	541
15th Regt. C.M.R.		Pincher Creek	1-12-14	20-6-16	34	933

DRAFTS DESPATCHED OVERSEAS

Drafts for P.C.L.I.— 23rd, 30th and 32nd Bns.	Montreal, Victoria, Winnipeg.	Halifax	20-1-15	14	499
No. 2 Univ. Coy.	Montreal (McGill University)	Montreal	20-6-15	6	264
No. 3 Univ. Coy.	Montreal (McGill University)	Montreal	4-9-15	4	323
No. 4 Univ. Coy.	Montreal (McGill University)	Montreal	27-11-15	5	250
18th Battalion	Western Ontario.	London	6-4-15	1	20
19th and 20th Bns.	Toronto	Toronto	6-4-15	1	30
23rd Battalion	London	London	17-6-15	5	250
24th Battalion	London	London	17-8-15	4	247
34th Battalion	Guelph and District	London	19-6-15	5	245
35th Battalion	Guelph and District	Guelph	17-8-15	5	250
35th Battalion	Toronto	Toronto	4-6-15	5	250
37th Battalion	Toronto	Toronto	17-8-15	5	250
37th Battalion	Northern Ontario.	Niagara	10-6-15	5	250
37th Battalion	Northern Ontario.	Niagara	17-8-15	5	251

38th Battalion, No. 1 University Coy.	Montreal (McGill University)	Ottawa	29-5-15	250
38th Battalion	Ottawa	Ottawa	24-6-15	251
40th Battalion	Nova Scotia	Aldershot	15-6-15	250
40th Battalion	Nova Scotia	Aldershot	9-10-15	250
41st Battalion	Ottawa and Province of Quebec	Quebec	17-6-15	5
44th and 45th Bns	Manitoba	Winnipeg & Brandon	1-6-15	10
44th Battalion	Manitoba	Winnipeg	4-9-15	5
45th Battalion	Manitoba	Brandon	4-9-15	5
46th Battalion	Saskatchewan	Brandon	5-7-15	5
47th Battalion	Saskatchewan	Brandon	4-9-15	5
47th Battalion	British Columbia	Moose Jaw	17-6-15	250
47th Battalion	British Columbia	New Westminster	24-6-15	244
50th Battalion	British Columbia	New Westminster	1-10-15	249
50th Battalion	Calgary	New Westminster	14-6-15	251
51st Battalion	Edmonton	Calgary	11-9-15	250
51st Battalion	Edmonton	Edmonton	14-6-15	253
51st Battalion	Edmonton	Edmonton	11-9-15	250
52nd Battalion	Western Ontario	Edmonton	18-12-15	44
52nd Battalion	Western Ontario	Edmonton	17-6-15	250
53rd Battalion	Saskatchewan	Port Arthur	4-9-15	250
53rd Battalion	Saskatchewan	Port Arthur	17-6-15	250
54th Battalion	British Columbia	Winnipeg	4-9-15	250
55th Battalion	British Columbia	Winnipeg	21-7-15	250
56th Battalion	N.B. and P.E.I.	Vernon	23-10-15	250
56th Battalion	Calgary	Vernon	19-6-15	250
57th Battalion	Calgary	Sussex, N.B.	5-7-15	250
57th Battalion	Calgary	Calgary	11-9-15	250
58th Battalion	Prov. Quebec	Calgary	11-9-15	250
58th Battalion	Central Ontario	Quebec, P.Q.	21-7-15	248
58th Battalion	Eastern Ontario	Niagara	17-8-15	248
60th Battalion	Eastern Ontario	Kingston	27-8-15	244
61st Battalion	Montreal	Kingston	13-11-15	250
62nd Battalion	Winnipeg	Montreal	27-8-15	250
63rd Battalion	Alberta	Winnipeg	11-9-15	249
63rd Battalion	Manitoba and Saskatchewan	Vancouver	1-10-15	250
66th Battalion	Edmonton	Edmonton	11-9-15	250
66th Battalion	Edmonton	Edmonton	25-9-15	250
68th Battalion	Saskatchewan	Edmonton	11-9-15	250
71st Battalion	Woodstock, Ont.	Regina	25-9-15	248
74th Battalion	Counties of York and Peel	Woodstock	20-11-15	250
75th Battalion	Central Ontario	Niagara Camp	1-10-15	250
77th Battalion	Central Ontario	Toronto	1-10-15	250
78th Battalion	Eastern Ontario	Niagara	1-10-15	251
78th Battalion	Winnipeg	Ottawa	23-10-15	250
78th Battalion	Manitoba	Winnipeg	25-9-15	250
79th Battalion	Manitoba	Winnipeg	10-8-15	100
79th Battalion	Manitoba	Brandon	27-8-15	150
79th Battalion	Manitoba	Brandon	25-9-15	250
79th Battalion	Manitoba	Brandon	8-10-15	250
79th Battalion	Manitoba	Brandon	18-12-15	249
83rd Battalion	Toronto	Toronto	25-9-15	250
84th Battalion	Toronto	Toronto	25-9-15	250
92nd Battalion	Toronto	Toronto	27-11-15	250

INFANTRY, PIONEER AND C.M.R. UNITS, C.E.F., EXCLUSIVE OF FIRST CONTINGENT, AUTHORIZED PRIOR TO
15TH SEPTEMBER, 1915—*Con.*
DRAFTS DESPATCHED OVERSEAS—*Con.*

Unit	Recruiting Area	Mobilised at	Date Authorized	To England	Strength on Sailing	
					Off.	O.R.
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....	Eastern Canada.....	Toronto.....	29- 6-15	2	50
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....	Eastern Canada.....	Toronto.....	17- 8-15	2	50
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....	Eastern Canada.....	Toronto.....	23-10-15	1	50
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....	Eastern Canada.....	Toronto.....	23-11-15	1	50
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....	Western Canada.....	Winnipeg.....	29- 6-15	2	50
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.).....	Western Canada.....	Winnipeg.....	4- 9-15	2	50
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.).....	Western Canada.....	Winnipeg.....	18-10-15	3	100
2nd Regt. C.M.R.....	British Columbia.....	Victoria.....	1- 7-15	2	88
2nd Regt. C.M.R.....	British Columbia.....	Victoria.....	7- 7-15	1	1
8th Regt. C.M.R.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Ottawa.....	10- 6-15	1	50
8th Regt. C.M.R.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Ottawa.....	17- 7-15	3	150
8th Regt. C.M.R.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Ottawa.....	23- 8-15	2	50
9th Regt. C.M.R.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Ottawa.....	20- 6-15	1	50
9th Regt. C.M.R.....	Eastern Ontario.....	Ottawa.....	20- 6-15	2	46
10th Regt. C.M.R.....	Saskatchewan.....	Lloydminster.....	23- 8-15	1	50
10th Regt. C.M.R.....	Saskatchewan.....	Lloydminster.....	23- 8-15	2	50
11th Regt. C.M.R.....	Saskatchewan.....	Regina.....	23- 8-15	1	50
11th Regt. C.M.R.....	Saskatchewan.....	Regina.....	23- 8-15	2	50
12th Regt. C.M.R.....	British Columbia.....	Vancouver.....	23- 8-15	1	50
12th Regt. C.M.R.....	British Columbia.....	Vancouver.....	23- 8-15	2	50
13th Regt. C.M.R.....	Alberta.....	Calgary.....	10- 6-15	1	50
13th Regt. C.M.R.....	Alberta.....	Calgary.....	23- 8-15	1	50
13th Regt. C.M.R.....	Alberta.....	Fincher Creek.....	10- 6-15	1	50
13th Regt. C.M.R.....	Alberta.....	Fincher Creek.....	23- 8-15	2	50

735
ARTILLERY UNITS, C.E.F., EXCLUSIVE OF FIRST CONTINGENT, AUTHORIZED PRIOR TO
15TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

H.Q. 2nd Cdn. Div. Arty.....	3	17
4th Bde. C.F.A.—	8	37
H.Q.....	4	138
15th Battery.....	Toronto and London.....	Toronto.....	6-11-14	20- 5-15	5	138
15th Battery.....	Brantford, Hamilton.....	Toronto.....	4-11-14	20- 5-15	5	151
15th Battery.....	Toronto, St. Catharines.....	Toronto.....	4-11-14	20- 5-15	5	151
15th Battery.....	Toronto, Hamilton.....	Toronto.....	4-11-14	20- 5-15	5	151
15th Battery.....	Guelph, London.....	London.....	4-11-14	20- 5-15	5	151
4th Bde. Ammun. Col.....	Toronto.....	Toronto.....	6-11-14	16- 5-15	4	141

5th Bde. C.F.A.—	Winnipeg, Lethbridge, Regina.....	4-11-14	9-8-15	5	33
H.Q.	Winnipeg.....	4-11-14	10-8-15	4	151
17th Battery.....	Regina.....	4-11-14	10-8-15	5	148
18th Battery.....	Winnipeg.....	4-11-14	10-8-15	3	151
19th Battery.....	Lethbridge.....	4-11-14	10-8-15	4	149
20th Battery.....	Winnipeg.....	4-11-14	9-8-15	3	154
5th Bde. Ammn. Col.....					
6th Bde. C.F.A.—	Montreal.....	7-11-14	23-2-15	5	26
H.Q.	Montreal.....	4-11-14	23-2-15	4	151
21st Battery.....	Kingston.....	4-11-14	23-2-15	4	151
22nd Battery.....	N.S. and N.B.....	4-11-14	23-2-15	4	151
23rd Battery.....	Fredricton.....	4-11-14	23-2-15	4	151
24th Battery.....	Nova Scotia.....	12-14	23-2-15	4	152
6th Bde. Ammn. Col.....					
7th Bde. C.F.A.—	Valcartier.....	7-11-14	10-8-15	5	33
H.Q.	Ottawa and District.....	1-3-15	9-8-15	5	127
25th Battery.....	Eastern Ontario.....	1-3-15	9-8-15	4	110
26th Battery.....	Montreal and District.....	1-3-15	9-8-15	5	131
27th Battery.....	Maritime Provinces.....	1-3-15	9-8-15	5	121
28th Battery.....	Valcartier.....	11-14	10-8-15	3	113
7th Bde. Ammn. Col.....					
2nd Cdn. Div. Ammn. Col.....	Fredricton.....	7-11-14	16-5-15	8	304
2nd Cdn. Heavy Bty. & Ammn. Col.....	Fredricton.....	15-6-15	15-6-15	10	133
29th Battery.....	P.E.I., Cobourg, Levis, Quebec, Montreal, Halifax, Saint John.....	3-11-14	15-6-15	7	212
30th Battery.....	London and Guelph.....	14-6-15	2-3-16		
31st Battery.....	Toronto.....	2-6-15	2-3-16		
32nd Battery.....	Hamilton and District.....	2-6-15	5-2-16		
33rd Battery.....	Ottawa and District.....	5-8-15	5-2-16		
34th Battery (Overseas as 2nd B.A.C.).....	Kingston and Toronto.....	5-8-15	5-2-16		
35th How. Battery.....	Peterborough.....	5-8-15	5-2-16		
36th How. Battery.....	Montreal and E. Que.....	11-8-15	2-3-16		
37th Battery.....	Cape Breton.....	11-8-15	2-3-16		
38th Battery.....	Winnipeg.....	9-8-15	2-3-16		
39th Battery.....	Sask. and Manitoba.....	9-8-15	2-3-16		
40th Battery.....	Alberta.....	11-8-15	2-3-16		
40th Battery.....	Hamilton and District.....	18-8-15	5-2-16		
No. 1 Heavy Battery (Depot).....	Montreal, Saint John and Cobourg.....	30-6-15	22-11-15	6	210
(Overseas as 1st Cdn. Siege Battery)					
No. 2 Heavy Battery (Depot).....	P.E.I.....	30-6-15	27-11-15	7	273
(Overseas as 2nd Cdn. Siege Battery)					

Individual strengths
not available.

Brigaded before departure
overseas.

ARTILLERY UNITS, C.E.F., EXCLUSIVE OF FIRST CONTINGENT, AUTHORIZED PRIOR TO
15TH SEPTEMBER, 1915—*Con.*

DRAFTS DESPATCHED OVERSEAS FOR ARTILLERY

Unit	Recruiting Area	Mobilised at	Date Authorized	To England	Strength on Sailing	
					Off.	O.R.
R.C.H.A.....	Kingston.....	9-6-15	2	50
R.C.H.A.....	Kingston.....	17-8-15	2	50
5th Bde. C.F.A.....	Winnipeg.....	20-6-15	4	158
5th Bde. C.F.A.....	Winnipeg.....	12-8-15	3	100
7th Bde. C.F.A.....	Valcarlos.....	31-7-15	2	100
20th Battery.....	Lethbridge.....	10-8-15	1	41
25th and 26th Batteries.....	Kingston.....	29-6-15	3	118
27th Battery.....	Montreal.....	14-6-15	1	41
28th Battery.....	Fredericton.....	14-6-15	1	41
30th Battery.....	Toronto.....	17-8-15	2	50
31st Battery.....	Hamilton.....	17-8-15	2	50
Boorman's Artillery Draft.....	Vancouver.....	17-8-15	2	40
R.C.H.A.....	Kingston.....	13-11-15	2	100
R.C.H.A.....	Kingston.....	18-12-15	2	100
26th Battery.....	Guelph.....	18-12-15	1	51
30th Battery.....	Toronto.....	20-11-15	2	51
31st Battery.....	Hamilton.....	20-11-15	2	51
32nd Battery.....	Kingston.....	20-11-15	2	51
32nd Battery.....	Kingston.....	16-10-15	2	100
33rd Battery.....	Kingston.....	18-12-15	2	100
33rd Battery.....	Kingston.....	16-10-15	2	100
34th Battery.....	Kingston.....	18-12-15	2	100
34th Battery.....	Kingston.....	16-10-15	2	100
35th Battery.....	Montreal.....	18-12-15	1	51
36th Battery.....	Sydney.....	18-12-15	1	51
37th Battery.....	Winnipeg.....	27-11-15	1	51
38th Battery.....	Regina.....	27-11-15	1	51
39th Battery.....	Lethbridge.....	18-12-15	1	51
40th Battery.....	Hamilton.....	20-11-15	2	51
5th Regt. C.G.A. (C.M.).....	Victoria.....	16-10-15	2	50
5th Regt. C.G.A. (C.M.).....	Victoria.....	18-12-15	4	100

736

SECRET

1st Army, 2nd Army, Canadian Division,
51st (Highland) Division, III Corps.
O.A.157. 13th May, 1915.

1. The Canadian Division will be under command of the 1st Army from 6 p.m. tomorrow AAA

2. The 51st (Highland) Division, less *artillery now* with 1st Army, will move on 14th May, to the area CAESTRE-BORRF, MERRIS-METEREN where it will remain in General Reserve under orders of G.H.Q. and continue to be administered by the 1st Army AAA. It will be clear of its present billeting area by noon AAA

3. Canadian Division (less artillery) will move during night of 14th/15th May to 1st Army area AAA

4. Move of 51st and Canadian Divisions will be arranged between 1st and 2nd Armies and instructions will be issued by 1st Army as to

the time of march and roads to be used G.H.Q. to be informed AAA

Addressed 1st Army repeated 2nd Army, III Corps, Canadian Division, 51st Division AAA From Adv. G.H.Q. 10.30 p.m.

W. R. ROBERTSON, Lieut. -General,
Chief of the General Staff.

737

SECRET

1st, 2nd and 3rd Bde., Divl. Engrs., Seely's
Det.,
Divl. Mtd. Troops and Div. Amm. Col.
G244.

The 1st Canadian Division will march this evening in accordance with the attached March Table. (*See next page.*)

Infantry Brigades, etc., will be careful as they go into billets not to block the Brigades, etc., behind them.

14.5.1916

C. F. ROMER, Colonel, G.S.,
1st Canadian Division

738

1 Field Coy. C.E.
2 Field Coy. C.E.
3 Field Coy. C.E.

E.B.80.

Div. Hdqrs. sends following message, No. Q.317:—

Following from 3rd Corps begins The supply is so very meagre that at present all available for 3rd Corps must go to Divisions holding trenches. Suggest that as your R.E. are not busy just now they should make a large quantity of JAMPOT grenades aaa ends.

With reference to the above the O.C., D.E. wishes you to commence the manufacture of these bombs at the earliest possible moment. Div. Hdqrs. have been asked to arrange with Brigades that from now on as many empty jam pots as possible will be collected and given to their affiliated field corps.

4.40 p.m. 11.5.15.

T. V. ANDERSON, Major,
Adj. D.E.

739

**STRENGTHS: 1st CANADIAN DIVISION
INFANTRY, 18th May, and FIELD
ARTILLERY, 16th May, 1915**

	Officers	Other Ranks
1st Battalion..	24	812
2nd Battalion..	27	806
3rd Battalion..	25	874
4th Battalion..	31	990
5th Battalion..	27	794
7th Battalion..	23	734
8th Battalion..	19	778
10th Battalion..	28	883
13th Battalion..	31	826
14th Battalion..	27	803
15th Battalion..	17	855
16th Battalion..	29	873
Total..	308	10,028
1st Bde. C.F.A..	21	678
2nd Bde. C.F.A..	23	618
3rd Bde. C.F.A..	24	699
Total..	68	1,995

740

British Official History of the War. Military Operations, Vol. IV. France and Belgium, 1915**, pp. 23-39 and footnotes.

741

Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome III, pp. 41-42.

742

SECRET.

1st Corps, 4th Corps, Indian Corps,
Canadian Division.
G.349. 16th May, 1915.

First Corps to co-operate to-morrow with a view to closing the gap between the Second and Seventh Divisions and to subsequently securing a line from its present left about V.1 via the FERME COUR D'AVOUE and LA QUINQUE RUE to its present right about L 2 AAA Once this line is secured the line V.1—FERME COUR D'AVOUE—LA QUINQUE RUE will be established as a defensive flank and subsequent operations directed with a view to extending the right via RUE D'OUVERT and CHAPELLE ST. ROCH to GIVENCHY AAA The Fourth Corps, Indian Corps and BARTERS Force will remain in occupation of their present line AAA The Sirhind Brigade will remain in its present position in Army Reserve AAA The head of the leading brigade of the Canadian Division will be at LE TOURET at 8 a.m. AAA Addressed First, Fourth, Indian Corps Barter's Force Canadian Division No. 1 Group repeated adv. G.H.Q. AAA Acknowledge.

From Adv. First Army, 11.45 p.m.

743

To Canadian Division.
G.350. 17th May, 1915.

The Canadian Dvn. will march on 17th so that its brigades are disposed as follows aaa One Brigade with head at road junction LE TOURET X.16 at eight a.m. aaa One Brigade assembled about LOCON at nine a.m. aaa One Brigade assembled about LE CORNET MALO at nine a.m. AAA All roads leading from present billets to new positions are available but movement from CALONNE to CORNET MALO should be via QUENTIN AAA There are two military bridges practicable for field guns branching off from main LESTREM—LOCON road in square R.32.d.1.7 and in square X.1.d.6.10 aaa Acknowledge aaa Addr'd Canadian Div. Reptd. Indian Corps and Adv. First Corps. From Adv. First Army. 12.15 a.m.

744

To Advd. 2nd Div, 7th Div. 3rd Cdn. Bde.
1st Group H.A.R., Indian Corps,
Barter's Force, 1st Army.
G.245. 17th May, 1915.

There are signs that the enemy's resistance is breaking down AAA The strengthening of

738

1 Field Coy. C.E.
2 Field Coy. CE.
3 Field Coy. C.E.

E3.80.

Div. Hdqrs. sends following message, No. Q.317:-

Following from 3rd Corps begins The supply is so very meagre that at present all available for 3rd Corps must go to Divisions holding trenches. Suggest that as your RE. are not busy just now they should make a large quantity of JAMPOT grenades aaa ends.

With reference to the above the O.C., DE. wishes you to commence the manufacture of these bombs at the earliest possible moment. Div. Hdqrs. have been asked to arrange with Brigades that from now on as many empty jam pots as possible will be collected and given to their affiliated field corps.

4.40 p.m. 11.5.15.

T. V. ANDERSON, Major,
Adj. D.E.

739

STRENGTHS: 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION
INFANTRY, 18th May, and FIELD
ARTILLERY, 16th May, 1915

	Officers	Other Ranks
1st Battalion	24	812
2nd Battalion	27	806
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10th Battalion	28	883
13th Battalion	31	826
14th Battalion	27	803
15th Battalion	17	855
16th Battalion	29	873
Total		308
1st Bde. C.F.A.....	21	678
2nd Bde. C.F.A.....	23	618
3rd Bde. C.F.A.....	24	699
Total		68

740

British Official History of the War. Military Operations, Vol. IV. France and Belgium 1915**, pp. 23-39 and footnotes.

741

Les Armees Francaises daps La Grand Guerre, Tome III, pp. 41-42.

742

SECRET.

1st Corps, 4th Corps, Indian Corps,
Canadian Division.

G.349. 16th May, 1915.

First Corps to co-operate to-morrow with a view to closing the gap between the Second and Seventh Divisions and to subsequently securing a line from its present left about V.1 via the FERME COUR D'AVOUE and LA QUINQUE RUE to its present right about L 2 AAA Once this line is secured the line V.1-FERME COUR D'AVOUE-LA QUINQUE RUE will be established as a defensive flank and subsequent operations directed with a view to extending the right via RUE D'OUVERT and CHAPELLE ST. ROCH to GIVENCHY AAA The Fourth Corps, Indian Corps and BARTERS Force will remain in occupation of their present line AAA The Sirhind Brigade will remain in its present position in Army Reserve AAA The head of the leading brigade of the Canadian Division will be at LE TOURET at 8 a.m. AAA Addressed First, Fourth, Indian Corps Barter's Force Canadian Division No. 1 Group repeated adv. G.H.Q. AAA Acknowledge. From Adv. First Army, 11.45 p.m.

743

To Canadian Division.

G.350. 17th May, 1915.

The Canadian Dvn. will march on 17th so that its brigades are disposed as follows aaa One Brigade with head at road junction LE TOURET X.16 at eight a.m. ma One g Brigade assembled about LOCON at nine 3 a.m. -aaa One Brigade assembled about LE s CORNET MALO at nine a.m. AAA All roads leading from present billets to new 8 positions are available but movement from 8 CALONNE to CORNET MALO should be 8 via QUENTIN AAA There are two military. 9 bridges practicable for field guns branching off from main LESTREM-LOCON road in square R.32.d.1.7 and in square X.1.d.6.10 aaa Acknowledge an Addrds Canadian Div. Reptd. Indian Corps and Adv. First Corps.

From Adv. First Army. 12.15 a.m.

744

1995
Advd. 2nd Div, 7th Div. 3rd Cdn. Bde. 1st Group H.A.R., Indian Corps, Barter's Force, 1st Army. G.245. 17th May, 1915.

There are signs that the enemy's resistance is breaking down AAA The strengthening of

the line M.3-LA QUINQUE RUE-P.14 -P.16-Fme DU BOIS when gained must still be carried out AAA Subordinate commanders must at the same time on their own initiative take advantage of any weakening of the hostile forces opposite to them to press forward towards LA BASSEE AAA 7th Dn. will advance in - direction of RUE D'OUVERT-CLLE ST. ROCH-CANTELEUX aaa 2nd Div. on RUE DUMARAIS and VIOLAINES AAA 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. is in 1st Corps Reserve about LE TOURET AAA SIRHIND Bde. is in Army Reserve about RUE DES CHAVATTES and will be employed when required to join up Defensive flank between 2nd Div. and Indian Corps aaa . Addressed 2nd and' 7th Dive. 3rd Canadian Bde. Sirhind Bde. 1st Group H.A.R. repeated Indian Corps, Barter's Force, 1st Army and Canadian Div.
From Advd. lot Corps, 11.30 a.m.

R. WHIGHAM, B.G., G.S.

745

Priority to Canadian Division.

G.360. 17th May, 1915.

Leading Canadian Inf. Bde. at LE TOURET is placed at the disposal of the 1st Corps AAA Addsd. Adv. First Corps and Canadian Division, reptd Indian Corps AAA Acknowledge.

From Adv. First Army. 10.35 am.

By wire received 11.45 a.m.

3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade,
G.414. 17th May, 1915.

Your Brigade is placed at the disposal of 1st Corps from whom you will receive your orders.

From Adv. Canadian Div. 11.55 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col., GB. *By hand received.*

746

To Canadian Division.

G.265. 17th May, 1915.

Junction of 2nd and 7th Diva, has been effected and about 350 prisoners have been taken to-day AAA The line gained will be organized for defence particularly against shell. fire AAA The left brigade of the 2nd Div. will be relieved by the Indian Corps under instructions already issued and completion of relief reported AAA Orders for to-morrow's operations will be issued later

AAA Addressed 2nd and 7th Diva, 3rd Canadian Bde. reptd Canadian Division, Indian Corps, 4th Corps, Barter's Force AAA Acknowledge AAA.

From 1st Corps, 7.15 p.m.

R. WHIGHAM, B.G., G.S.

By hand received Cdn. Div. 8.10 p.m.

747

SECRET.

By Despatch Rider

Adv. First Corps, Fourth Corps, Indian Corps. BARTER'S Force, No. 1 Group, Canadian Division, Adv. G.H.Q. G.370. 17th May, 1915.

Positions gained to be consolidated AAA Operations of First Army to be continued to-morrow with a view to establishing the line and extending the right as indicated in G.349 AAA That portion of the line occupied by the Sirhind Brigade in extension OF the Indian right will come under the Indian Corps AAA The Fourth Corps and BARTER'S Force will remain in occupation of their present line and engage . the enemy actively with fire AAA The Canadian Division less one brigade which is under the orders of the First Corps will remain in Army Reserve in readiness to move at two hours notice AAA Addressed Adv. First Corps Fourth Corps Indian Corps BARTER'S Force Canadian Division No. 1 Group repeated Adv. G.H.Q. AAA Acknowledge.
From Adv. First Army. 735 p.m.

R. BUTLER, B.G.

By hand received Cdn. Div. 10 p.m.

748

To Adv. 3rd Canadian Bde.

G.A.59, 17th May.

The line gained by the attacks at dusk tonight will be further consolidated and troops reorganized AAA Artillery bombardments will begin to-morrow as soon as there is sufficient daylight for accurate observation AAA Dividing line for artillery areas as . to-day AAA 1st Group H.A.R. will bombard buildings of COUR D'AVOUE, Q.11, buildings P.13, P.14, P.15, P.16 buildings M.9, N.12 in the first instance AAA The infantry of 7th Div. will gain the line of the road from M.3 to road junction at LA. QUINQUE RUE AAA The right brigade of 2nd Div. will gain the line

LA QUINQUE. RUE-P.15-Fme COUR D'AVOUE
 AAA These infantry attacks will take place at 9 a.m.
 but advantage must be taken of any weakening of the
 enemy in the immediate front to advance under cover of
 the bombardment AAA The 3rd Canadian brigade will
 be in positions of readiness in the area RUE de
 L'EPINETTE-LE TOURETSE du RAUX by 8.30 a.m.
 AAA Acknowledge AAA Addressed 2nd Div. 7th Div.
 3rd Canadian Bde. 1st Group H.A.R. repeated Canadian
 Div. Indian Corps, Barter's Force, Aeronautics 3, Indian
 Cavalry Corps, 1st Army. From 1st Corps. 11.20 p.m.

R. WHIGHAM, B.G. G.S.

*Received 3rd C.I.B. and by hand received Cdn.
 Div. 12.50 a.m. 18th.*

749

Operation Order No. 13,
 by
 Major-General H. de la P. Gough, C.B.
 Commanding 7th Div.

18th May, 1915.

The 1st Army will continue its attack on to the line
 M.9, P.14, Q.12, Q.16 this afternoon, the 4th Guards
 Brigade assaulting the front P.14 inclusive to Q.8 and
 the 3rd Canadian Brigade, which has been placed under
 the Orders of the G.O.C. 7th Division, on the front P.14
 exclusive to the BLACK HOUSE immediately North of
 M.7.

The left of this attack may not be able to proceed
 beyond the road. The Right portion, assisted by a
 detachment working round the German parapet from
 M.5-M.6-M.8 should establish itself at M.9.

In co-operation with this advance the troops of the
 22nd Brigade now holding the line M.5-N.9 will swing
 round and establish their left in touch with the right of
 the Canadian Brigade wherever that may be. The line of
 the LA QUINQUE RUE should be reached by 4.30
 p.m. at which hour the Artillery bombardment, which is
 preparing the assault, will lift so as to allow the assault
 to be made.

A mortar gun will meet the flank detachment of the
 Canadian Brigade, as explained to G.O.C. at M.5.

The line gained will be firmly consolidated. From
 7th Div.H.Q.

F. GATHORNE-HARDY, Lt.-Colonel,
 General Staff, 7th Div.

750

To Adv. 2nd Div., Adv. 7th Div.

3rd Canadian Bde., 1st Group H.A.R., Indian
 Corps, Canadian Div.
 G.286, 18th May, 1915.

The infantry attack will take place at 4.30 p.m. to-
 day AAA Its object is to gain and consolidate the line
 M.5-LA. QUINQUE RUE-P.14-P.15-P.16-Q.12 AAA
 2nd Div. will attack with 4th Guards Bde. objectives
 P.14-P.15-P.16-Q.12-Q.11 AAA The 3rd Canadian
 Bde. is placed under orders of 7th Div. and will attack
 on right of 4th Guards Bde AAA Objective of 7th Div.
 LA QUINQUE RUE road from P.14 exclusive to M.5
 inclusive AAA The Indian Corps will attack FERME
 DU BOIS and establish a defensive flank in connection
 with left of 2nd Div. AAA Dividing line between
 artillery of 2nd and 7th Divs. Q.5-P.10-M.12 AAA 1st
 Group H.A.R. will engage objectives which have been
 communicated to Divs. by the B.G.R.A. 1st Corps
 AAA The bombardment will begin at 2.30 p.m. and
 continue till 4.30 p.m. when it will be lifted sufficiently
 to allow the infantry assault to take place AAA
 Acknowledge AAA Addressed Advd. 2nd and 7th
 Divs. 3rd Canadian Bde. repeated Canadian Div. 1st
 Group H.A.R. -Indian Corps Barter's Force,
 Aeronautics 3.

From Advd. 1st Corps. 2 p.m.

R. WHIGHAM, B.G. G.S.

By hand received Cdn.. Div. 3.35 p.m.

751

To 13, 14, 15, 16 Canadian Bns.

Bde. Grenade Co.
 3rd Pd. Co. CE.

B.M.3, 18th May, 1915. ,

The 14th and 16th Canadian Bns. will move forward
 at once to forming up trenches immediately west of
 INDIAN VILLAGE AAA The 13th and 15th Bns. will
 move to the line of RUE DE L'EPINETTE in X.24.a
 AAA 14th and 13th Bus. will move by route C. AAA
 16th and 15th Bus. by route B. AAA Grenade Company
 will report to battalions as arranged AAA 3rd Pd. Co.
 C.E. will furnish party to report RUE DE L'EPINETTE
 for construction of dugout AAA Transport will use
 main road not route B and route C. AAA Acknowledge.
 From 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 1.00 p.m.

G.B.H.

752

To 3rd Canadian Bde.
GA. 18th May, 1915..

In connection with Operation Order No. 13 which is forwarded herewith latest information is that 4th Guards Bde. has had patrol to P.11 and Crossroads LA QUINQUE RUE AAA Except for shell fire therefore there should be little difficulty in reaching line of road though the capture of M.9 may not be so easy AAA The G.O.C. wishes you therefore to impress on your commanders the importance of not thickening their firing line prematurely though the line gained will have been strongly entrenched at night.

From Adv. 7th Div. 3 p.m.

F. GATHORNE-HARDY,
Lt.-Colonel, G.S.

By hand received.
(See 749)

753

Adv. 7th Division.
B.M.9. 18th May, 1915.

Am consolidating line of QUINQUE RUE from touch with WILTSHIRE battalion on our right to road junction at QUINQUE RUE where 4th Guards Bde. are to gain touch AAA

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Bde. 922 p.m.

G.B.H.

754

Priority to 3rd Canadian Bde.
G.A.57. 18th May, 1915.

Guards bde are held up on line of breastwork running from P.18 to N.15 with their right about P.14 aaa Push a company round the right of Guards bde and from the South attack COUR D'AVOINE* AAA
From Advd. 7th Div. 7 p.m.

* *The name Cour d'Avoue was mis-spelled thus on the upside-down map.*

By wire received 810 p.m.

755

To 3rd Canadian Brigade.
G.65. 18th May, 1915.

Attack of 4th (Guards) Brigade failed to secure P.14 AAA 3rd Canadian will consolidate line they gain and obtain touch on their left with 4th (Guards) Brigade at N.11 or any place further forward that they may gain under arrangements to be made direct with

4th (Guards) Brigade AAA 3rd Canadian Bde. will also obtain touch on their right with 21st Brigade whose left was at N 6 or 7 when their operations started but was ordered to push forward in touch with right of Canadians. From Seventh Division. 7 p.m.

F.H.

By hand received

756

Priority to 3rd Canadian Bde.
G.A.52. 18th May, 1915.

Locality M.9, N.13 is reported to be in your possession AAA This will be held as an advanced post AAA It is suggested that you trench along the line of the QUINQUE RUE holding the houses as points d'appui but it is left to your discretion to hold a more advanced line M.6, M.8 if you think it desirable AAA Acknowledge.

From Adv. 7th Div. 7.45 p.m.

By wire received 8.01 p.m.

757

2nd Division.

Report of action and opinion on tactical situation

At 4.30 p.m. exactly Grenadiers on right and Irish Guards on left advanced as ordered by short rushes of half platoons each advance being covered by fire and the Irish Guards M.G. being employed to bring cross fire from about Q.5.

On the right 3 rushes were made and each rush resulted in a loss of 75 per cent of the platoon.

The country is dead fiat with no particle of cover and running is very difficult owing to slippery and wet ground.

On the left the Irish Guards were able to make rather more progress as almost all the fire was from machine guns between P.16 and 14 and possibly one or at most two M.G. from about Q.8.

I think further advance would have been impossible without complete annihilation and no strength left for assault.

After studying the ground carefully this morning from P.10 I am convinced that a night advance can be made to bring the right up 300 yards and the left 200, dig a new line here within assaulting distance, and on the next night assault. I should be glad to do this with my brigade.

The enemy are digging when shelling permits in amongst the houses about P.13 and are

trying to connect P.15 to houses on north. These houses are more scattered than appears on map.

The amount of rifles, equipment, ammunition and bombs mostly German in area North of road and inside N.8-N.11-P.9-P.10 is very large indeed. It will take a long time to clear the battlefield of dead alone. I am beginning to bury dead in deep shell holes to-day.

CAVAN, Brig.-General,

Commdg. 4th (Guards) Brigade.
19th May, 1915.

758

Canadian Division.

G291. 18th May, 1915.

Attack on FERME COUR D'AVOUE and FERME DU BOIS did not succeed in gaining the farms AAA Some progress made by 4th Guards Brigade and Canadian Brigade AAA Enemy brought heavy artillery fire to bear from the southeast as well as machine gun fire from ruined buildings about P.14 AAA Troops are hanging on and securing ground gained AAA Addressed adv. G.H.Q. Second Army, First Army, Cavalry Corps, Indian Cavalry Corps, 3rd Corps, Canadian Div., Barter's Force, 4th Corps.

From Adv. First Army. 7.10 p.m.

By wire received Cdn. Div. 9.46 p.m.

759

Adv. Canadian Div.

G.A.379. 18th May, 1915.

The Canadian Div. will probably march this afternoon to relieve troops now engaged AAA Definite instructions will follow later AAA

From Adv. First Army. 10.45 am.

By wire received 11.06 a.m.

760

SECRET

Adv. 1st Corps.

4th Corps.

Indian Corps.

Canadian Division.

Highland Division.

Barter's Force.

M.G.R.A.

A.Q.M.G.

01/c Signals.

First Army.

1st Army, G.S.86a,
18.5.15.

The following is the procedure to be followed in regard to the reliefs of the 2nd and 7th Divisions by the 51st (Highland) and Canadian Divisions respectively:-

(1) The 7th Division (less artillery) will be withdrawn to the area LILLERS-BUSNES, there to rest.

The 7th Division will remain under the orders of the G.O.C., 1st Corps.

The 1st Corps will communicate direct with the Indian Corps in regard to such billets as may be in the Indian Corps area.

(2) The 7th Divisional Artillery will remain in action in its present positions and will come temporarily under the orders of the Canadian Division, when the relief of the 7th Division is completed.

(3) The 39th F.A.Bde. will be withdrawn on the night of the 20th/21st May and will rejoin 1st Division. The French Group of Field Artillery, 75 m.m. will take the place of this Brigade.

(4) The Canadian Divisional Artillery will be assembled on the 19th instant in the vicinity of LOCON. First Corps will make the necessary arrangements for its billets there.

(5) The 2nd Divisional Artillery will remain in action in its present positions, and will come temporarily under the orders of the Highland Division, when the relief of the 2nd Division is completed.

(6) The Highland Divisional Artillery (less the FA. Bde. at present with the Indian Corps and the Howitzer Bde. with 4th Corps) will be assembled in the vicinity of ZELOBES on the 19th inst. Indian Corps will make the necessary arrangements for its billets there.

R. BUTLER, Brigadier-General,
General Staff, 1st Army.

18th May, 1915.

761

SECRET.

1st and 2nd Canadian Inf. Bdes.

G.795. 19th May, 1915.

Following from 1st Corps at 11.10 pan. 18th inst. begins Result of this afternoon's attack was to gain the line M.5-LA QUINQUE RUE-P.11-P.10-Q.7 AAA This line is being consolidated AAA A deliberate artillery bombardment will begin to-morrow as early as light permits AAA Dividing line for artillery of 2nd and 7th Divs. Q.5-P.10-M.12 AAA First Group H.A.R. will bombard COUR D'AVOUE buildings P.13-P.14-P.15-P.16-Q.11 AAA Under cover of this bombardment 2nd Div. will seize every opportunity of gaining ground to capture the line P.14-Q.12-Q.11 AAA The time for delivery of an assault will be left to the discretion of G.O.C. 2nd Div. AAA Infantry of 7th Div. will similarly take advantage of artillery bombardment to gain ground towards L.8-L.10-L.12-M.9 AAA

Relief of 2nd and 7th Diva. will be carried out tomorrow night (i.e. *night 19th/20th*) by Highland and Canadian Diva. respectively AAA Advantage should therefore be taken of any opportunity to withdraw units not required in front line AAA 4.5- and 6-inch howitzer ammunition is to be. husbanded and 5 -inch howitzer to be utilized in preference AAA Acknowledge.

From Advd. Canadian Div. 9.00 a.m.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel.

762

To 18th Canadian Battalion.

B.M.10. 19th May, 1915.

You will send a patrol forward to reconnoitre and place in a state of defence with a machine gun the house shown on map south side of road half inch S.W. of road junction at word QUINQUE RUE AAA Patrol report required by 1.00 p.m. today AAA Further you will send a patrol along communication trenches to reconnoitre houses at L.12 and discover if they are occupied AAA Definite reports as soon as possible AAA Artillery is to shell orchard N.12-N.14 till 10.00 p.m. to-night when you will take the position AAA Patrols working on L. 12 to-day are to be used as guides for another battalion which will occupy L.12 to-night AAA Obtain machine gun from 13th Bn. AAA.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 10.45 a.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

To 16th Canadian Battalion.

B.M.14. 19th May, 1915.

It is reported that your forward trench lines have no sand bags and on account of water are not able to dig deep AAA There is a large store of sand bags at INDIAN VILLAGE available for you AAA It is essential that your position be made good and houses defended AAA Your position is permanent AAA Every effort to reconnoitre your own position as well as your front AAA.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Bde. 1.00 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

To 16th Canadian Battalion. B.M.15. 19th May, 1915.

You will attack to-night the German position in the orchard between M.9 and N.13 AAA It is suggested that this attack should be carried out. by a force of one company or less moving through M.8 south of M.9

and attack from the rear AAA The idea should be to reach the enemy's position before being discovered AAA Engineers with material to defend the position after capture will be at M.3 at 10.00 p.m. AAA You will send guides there to direct them forward AAA Artillery is to bombard the orchard until 10.00 p.m, the intensity of bombardment being increased between 9.00 and 10.00 p.m. AAA Acknowledge.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Bde. 2.25 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

(Cancelled by B.M.20, 19th May)

To 3rd Fd. Co. Canadian Engineers.

B.M.16. 19th May, 1915.

A portion of the 16th Bn. is to attack the German position in the orchard M.9-N.13 to-night AAA You will have two sections with 2,000 sand bags and tools at M.3 at 10.00 p.m. to-day ready to place the position in a state of defence after capture AAA Guides from 16th Bn. will meet this party and lead them forward AAA.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 2.80 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

To O/C 15th Bn.

T.125. 19th May, 1915.

You will send one company and take L.12 farm AAA Route via La Quinque Road. The artillery fire will be concentrated on this area up to 10 p.m. to-night, and will then be lifted, 10 bombers from 48th Hdrs. to be sent AAA A detachment of engineers will meet you at M.5 on Quinque Rd. to go forward after capture of farm.

From 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.

R. E. W. TURNER, Br. Genl.

To 3rd Fd. Co. Can. Engrs.

B.M.19. 19th May, 1918.

In addition to two sections ordered to report to 16th Bn. to-night you will have one section report to Capt. MUSGROVE 15th Bn, at M.3 at 10.00 p.m. AAA This section should have 15000 sand bags and tools to place house locality at L.12 in defensive state AAA Addressed 3rd Fd. Co. C.E.—repeated 15th Canadian Bn.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 4.05 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

SECRET.

To 16th Canadian Bn.
B.M.20. 19th May, 1915.

B.M.15 is cancelled on account of relief of 21st Brigade AAA.

You are to establish to-night strong posts at the following three points AAA House Half inch S.W. of road junction QUINQUE RUE AAA East of point M.7 AAA Point near road junction QUINQUE RUE AAA These are to be held AAA Engineers will report to you as stated in B.M.15 and may be used as you think advisable AAA This operation will begin at 12.00 midnight AAA Your present front line should be made as strong as possible to-night.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Bde. 4.50 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

To 3rd Fd. Co. CE.
B.M.21. 19th May, 1915.

Reference B.M.16, the party referred to will not be used for defending the locality mentioned therein but to establish three strong posts which will be occupied by the 16th Bn. AAA Officers of 16th Bn. will direct you and guides will meet you as stated in B.M.16 AAA.
From Adv. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. 5.00 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

4th Guards Bde. Instructions for
Operations 19/20

Second Coldstream will not send any patrol forward till after midnight. They will send to reconnoitre COUR D'AVOIN (sic COUR D'AVOUE) farm. If absolutely unoccupied they will seize it with a few men and will pass a M.G. up into it after it is occupied, It must be remembered that Q.11 is a German work and it is to be clearly understood that this farm is not to be fought for but only occupied as a Forward Post if it can be got for nothing. The 2 Cold. Gds. will anyhow make strong forward posts at Q.7 and the A. of COUR D'AVOIN (sic COUR D'AVOUE) 10,000 sand bags available at INDIAN VILLAGE. Communication back to old line will be made good. It must be remembered that a perfectly new division will relieve us to-morrow and all must be made as serene and easy as the ground allows before relief. The Canadians are attacking small houses 200 yds. S. of R. of RUE in QUINQUE RUE and may also attack M.9. Arrangements have been made that these attacks do not start before 12 midnight.

Instructions for night operations 19/20 May.

No patrol will be sent forward before 12 midnight at which hour our shelling stops. 3 Cold. Gds. will reconnoitre P.14 and if absolutely unoccupied will seize it with a few men and will pass a mg. up into it after it is occupied. It is to be clearly understood that this post is not to be fought for but only occupied as a forward post if it can be got for nothing.

Three Cold. Gds. will anyhow establish and make good a forward post in the old communication trench somewhere NE. of P.11.

Remainder of line will be held and improved. 10,000 sand bags are available at INDIAN VILLAGE. Communications back to old German breastworks will be deepened and improved.

2

3rd Canadian Brigade.
B.M.467. 19th May, 1915.

Forwarded for your information

GORT,

Captain B.M.

4th Guards Bde.

By hand received.

To Adv. 7th Division.
B.M.23. 19th May, 1915.

On account of relief of 21st Brigade deferring operation till midnight it is considered inadvisable to attack orchard M.9 to-night.

From Adv. 3rd Canadian Bde. 5.15 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

To Advanced 7th Division.
B.M.26. 19th May, 1915.

Patrols towards L.12 have had rifle fire from communication trenches in that direction and have been unable to proceed AAA Further reconnaissance is necessary AAA It is thought better to defer the attack on L.12.

From 3rd Canadian Bde. 7.30 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES, B.M.

To 3rd Canadian Bde.
G.A.75. 19th May, 1915.

The strengthening of line will be continued to-night and patrols pushed forward in close observation of enemy's position.

From 7th Div. 7.40 p.m.

By wire received.

To Adv. 7th Div.
B.M. 28. 19th May, 1915.

Attack on L.12, L.11 is not to be made tonight AAA
Your IG 809 received 8.30 p.m. From 3rd Canadian Inf.
Bde. 8.35 p.m.

G. B. HUGHES,, B.M.

763

OPERATION ORDER No. 14

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C. B. Com-
manding 1st Canadian Division

19.5.15.

1. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will relieve the 21st
Inf. Bde. to-night.

2. Reconnoitring officers of the two Battalions of the
2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. going into the trenches will be
met at the Road Junction in S.25.d.2.7 (*in Festubert
village*) by an officer of the 21st Inf. Bde. at 2 p.m.

3. Guides from the 21st Inf. Bde. will meet the two
battalions going into the trenches at the Road Junction
in S.25.d.2.7 at 7.30 p.m.

4. The third battalion of the 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
will be placed in support trenches as Brigade Reserve
and the fourth battalion of this Brigade will be in
Divisional Reserve.

5. The 2nd Field Company C.E., will, under the
orders of the G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
accompany the brigade.

6. Headquarters of 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will be
established in RUE DE L'EPINETTE.

7. Completion of the relief will be reported to 7th
Division.

8. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. (accompanied by 1st
Field Company and No. 1 Field Ambulance) and
Seely's Detachment will march to billets in ESSARS
vacated by the 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. at an hour to be
notified later.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lt.-Colonel, General Staff.

Issued at 2 p.m.

Copy No. 1 to 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

2 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

3 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

4 Seely's Detachment.

5 Divl. Engineers.

6 A.D.M.S.

7 A.A. & Q.M.G.

8 7th Division.

9 G.S.

764

SECRET

Adv. let Corps.

4th Corps.

Indian Corps.

Canadian Division.

Highland Division.

Barter's Force.

O.i./c Signals.

A.Q.M.G.

Intelligence.

First Army.

Second Army.

Cavalry Corps.

Indian Cavalry Corps.

French X Army. Adv. G.H.Q.

1. The Slat (Highland) Division will come
temporarily under the orders of General Alderson
from receipt of this order.

2. The artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions will
come temporarily under the orders of General Alderson
from 9 a.m. 20th May. The B.G., R.A., 1st Corps and
the C.R.As. 2nd and 7th Divisions, will be at the
disposal of General Alderson.

3. The Canadian and Highland Divisions, together
with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, will be
known as "Alderson's Force," with Headquarters at the
"Halte" in square W.24.c.

4. General Alderson will take over command of the
active operations between K.4 and R.4 from 9 a.m. 20th
May.

5. The G.O.C. 2nd Division will remain in command
of the front line from the left of the Canadian Division
to the right of the Indian Corps until the relief of the
2nd Division by the Highland Division is completed.

6. The Canadian and Highland Divisions will be
administered by the Indian Corps.

7. The 1st Corps and Alderson's Force will report by
wire when General Alderson has assumed command of
the active operations.

8. From 9 a.m. 20th May, Barter's Force will cease to
exist, the 7th Division will be temporarily attached to
the let Corps, which will then consist of 1st, 2nd, 7th
and 47th Divisions, under the command of General
Monro.

9. The 7th Division will be in Army Reserve.

R. Burrs, Br.-General,
General Staff, 1st Army.

1 p.m. 19th May, 1915.

765

ARTILLERY OF ALDERSON'S FORCE

20th-22nd May, 1915

Under C.R.A. 2nd Division

XLI Bde., R.F.A. (9,18,17)-18-18 pdr. from
2nd D.A.

XLIV (How.) Bde., R.F.A. (60,56 (1 Sec.))-
8-4.5" haws. from 2nd D.A.

IV W. Riding (How.) Bde., RYA. (10,11)-8-5" hows. from 49th DA.
 N., V., X. Btys., R.HA-18-13 pdr. from II Ind. Cav. DA.
 Groupe, 3rd Regt. French Arty. (3 Btys.)-9-75 mm.
 Groupe, 19th Regt. French Arty. (3 Btys.)-9-75 mm.
 XIV Siege Bde., R.G.A. (9,11)-8-8" hows. from First Army.
 XII Heavy Bde., R.G.A. (1,4)-8-6" hows. from Second Army.
 35th Heavy Bty., R.G.A.-4-60 pdr.
 No. 7 Mountain Bty., R.G.A.-4-10 pdr. from 2nd DA.

Under C.R.A. 7th Division

XXII Bde., RYA. (104,105,106)-18-18 pdr. from 7th DA.
 XXXV Bde., RYA. (12,25,58)-18-18 pdr. from 7th DA.
 XXXVI Bde., RYA. (48,70,71,47 (How.))-18-18 pdr. from 2nd DA. 6-4 5" hows.
 XXXVII (How.) Bde., R.F.A. (31,35,55)-18-4.5" hows. from 7 and 8 DA.
 VIII London Bde., R.F.A. (21,22)-8-5" hows. from 47th DA.
 VII Siege Bde., R.G.A. (6,59,81)-12-6" hows. from I Corps.
 I Bde., R.H.A. (A.,Q., and U.)-18-13 pdr. from 1st Indian Cav. DA.
 XIV Bde., R.H.A. (F. and T.)-12-13 pdr. from 7th DA.
 Groupe, 45th Regt. French Arty. (3 Btys.) 9-75 mm.

Trench Artillery

No. 2 Trench Mortar Bty-2-1 1/2" TM. from Ind. Corps.
 R.N.A.S. Armoured Car Section-2-3 pdr. from Ind. Corps.

Incoming Artillery for Reliefs

51st DA. relieved 2nd DA. 22nd May:
 1st Highland Bde., R.F.A. (1,2,3 Aberdeen Btys.) relieved N.V.X. Btys., R.H.A.-12-15 pdr.
 2nd Highland Bde., RYA. (Forfar, Fife and Dundee Btys.) relieved XLI Bde., RYA. -12-15 pdr.
 (3rd Highland Bde. RYA. (How.) attached IV Corps.)
 1st Canadian DA. relieved 7th DA. 22nd and 23rd May:
 1st Bde., CFA. (1,2,3,4) relieved I Bde., R.H.A.-16-18 pdr.
 2nd Bde., CFA. (5,8,7,8) relieved XXXV Bde., RYA.-16-18 pdr.

3rd Bde., CFA. (9,10,11,12) relieved XXII Bde., RYA-16-18 pdr.
 CXVIII (How.) Bde., RYA. (458,459) relieved XXXVII (How.) Bde., R.F.A.-8-4 5" how.

766

Canadian Division.

Q.1434. 18th May, 1915.

The remainder of the batteries of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Artillery Brigades with the 3rd Corps will arrive at ESTAIRES about midnight 18/19 instant AAA They will be billeted in ESTAIRES AAA The two batteries of the 3rd Canadian Artillery Brigade with the 5th Corps are due at LA GORGUE at about 9 a.m. 19th instant AAA The 118th Howitzer Bde is due at LA GORGUE at about 10 a.m. 19th instant AAA All these batteries will be directed to proceed to LOCON on morning of 19th instant.

From Adv. let Army. 7.30 p.m.

H. C. HOLMAN, Lt.-Col.

By hand received 8.00 p.m.

767

G.S. 95 (a)

SECRET.

Alderson's Force.	Intelligence.
let Corps.	First Army.
4th Corps.	Adv. G.H.Q.
Indian Corps.	C.E.
No. 1 Group H.A.R.	D.M.S.
M.G. RA.	Q.
No. 1 Wing R.F.C.	O.i/c Signals.

1. The operations of the 1st Army will be continued in accordance with the general plan of operations already laid down.

2. Instructions will be issued shortly for further combined operations, but, in - the meanwhile, active hostilities will be carried on continuously with a view to relentlessly harassing the enemy and wearing down his resistance.

3. With this view, the following immediate objectives and roles are assigned to formations:

4. (a) Alderson's Force will secure the following localities:

L11-12, M.9 and the group of houses P.13-14-15-16.

(b) Indian Corps will secure the locality Q.15-16, R.8.

The manner and time of seizing the above localities is left to the direction of the

G.Os.C. concerned, but the operation should be completed by the morning of Saturday 22nd May.

5. A slow deliberate bombardment of the enemy's position will be maintained by the artillery, both by day and night, under the orders of the commanders concerned. All avenues of approach to the enemy's forward positions are to be kept continuously under shrapnel fire throughout the night, especially between dusk and 10 p.m.

6. All units holding the line will use every means both day and night, to continually harass the enemy and keep him on the alert.

R. BUTLER, Brig: General.
General Staff, 1st Army.

7 pm. 19th May, 1915.

768

SECRET.

OPERATION ORDER No. 15

by

Lieut-General E. A. H. Alderson, C. B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

20.5.1915.

1. The 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will to-night secure localities M.9 and M.10. The assault will be preceded by an artillery preparation of high explosives up to 8 pm. and of shrapnel from 8 p.m. to 9 pm.

2. During the shrapnel fire from 8 pm. to 9 p.m. the Infantry will be deployed, one company with a bombing party and engineer party to each locality. At 9 p.m. the assault will take place.

3. At the same hour the 2nd Division will attack group of houses P.13, 14, 15 and 16.

4. Localities M.9 and M.10 will be consolidated as soon as secured, and connected up with the 2nd Div. left and the present 3rd Bde. trench on the right.

5. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will secure K.5 tomorrow morning. A heavy bombardment on K.5 and the surrounding trenches will be carried out from daylight till 6 am. when the infantry will assault.

6. The attack will be made by bombers and a substantial bayonet party of about one company by way of the trench between K.3 and K.5. A trench mortar will be brought up as soon as possible to destroy the German blocking parties between K.3 and K.5.

7. As soon as K.5 is secured the trenches towards J.1 on the right and L.8 to the front will be secured, as far as possible by bombing outwards.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.

Issued at 11.30 am.

Copy No. 1 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
2 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
3 Divisional Artillery.
4 Divisional Engineers.
5 2nd Division.
6 Alderson's Force. .
7 G.S.

(Cancelled by 0.0. No, 18 issued 3 p.m. Ruth May)

(See 789)

769

OPERATION ORDER -No. 16

by

Lieut-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

20.5.1915.

1. Operation Order No. 15 (*App. 768*) is cancelled.

2. The 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will to-night secure Localities L.12 and L.11, with two companies. The assault will take place at 7.45 p.m., preceded by a heavy bombardment with 9.2 inch guns from 6 p.m. till 7 pm. and from guns of the Canadian Divisional Artillery from 4 p.m. till 7.45 p.m.

3. At the same hour a small party of the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will attack points M.9 and M.10. These points will have been similarly submitted to artillery bombardment.

4. All ground gained will be consolidated and joined up.

5. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. with two companies, will secure K.5 at 7.45 pm. A heavy bombardment of K.5 and the surrounding trenches will be carried out by 9.2 inch guns from 6 pm. till 7 pm. and by heavy and field guns of the Canadian Divisional Artillery from 4 p.m. till 7.45 p.m. After 7.45 p.m. the 9.2 inch guns will fire on L.8.

6. As soon as K.5 is secured the trenches towards J.1 and L.8 will be secured as far as possible by bombing outwards. All ground gained will be consolidated and joined up.

7. The 2nd Div. will keep up a slow continuous bombardment throughout the night

on P.13 to 16 and RUE DU MARAIS. The heavy gun group will bombard through the night K.13 and CHAPELS ST. ROCH.

G. W. GORDON-HALL
Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.

Issued at 3 p.m.

Copy No. 1 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
2 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
3 Divisional Artillery.
4 Divisional Engineers.
5 2nd Division.
6 Alderson's Force.
7 47th Division. 8 G.S.

770

SECRET.
Alderson's Force.
Adv. 1st Corps.
4th Corps.
Indian Corps.
No. 1 Group.
M.G. R.A.
R.F.C.
Intelligence.
Signals.
Q.
B.M.S.
First Army.
Adv. G.H.Q.

With reference to let Army No. G.S. 86 (a) dated 19th May, 1915 (*App. 767*)—

1. Alderson's Force will arrange to secure the following localities this evening:

K.5, L.11–12, N.12–M.9.

The Infantry attack on the above place will start at 7.45 p.m.

The Indian Corps will also this evening operate with a view to securing Q.15–Q.16–R.8, in accordance with the orders already issued.

2. The artillery will co-operate as follows:—

Artillery of Alderson's Force as directed by General Alderson.

No. 1 Group H.A.R.

6 to 7 p.m.—Points K.5, L.10–11–12, and the communication trench through L.9, M.9–10 and P.12–13–14–15–16 will be bombarded with high explosive. During this period the enemy's observation situation (sic) in LA BASSE will also be knocked down.

15135–251

After 7 p.m.—A steady shrapnel fire will be maintained on RUE D'OUVERT from L.13 towards the CHAPEL ST. ROCH, the RUE DU MARAIS, M.11–M.10, the road junctions M.20, N.23, M.25, and K.12–13.

Artillery of 1st Corps is to carry out a slow bombardment of the area south of a line through J.1–K.7 from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. increasing the rate of fire between 7.45 p.m. and 8.15 p.m.

Artillery of the Indian Corps in addition to such artillery co-operation as is required for their own operations, will maintain a steady rate of fire on the communication trenches Q.11, Q.12, Q.17, P.19, P.20 and Q.13, Q.14, Q.18.

All the above in addition to the artillery fire ordered in para. 5 of G.S. 86 (a) referred to above.

R. BUTLER, Br.-General,
General Staff, 1st Army.

4.30 p.m., 20th May, 1915.

771

To Canadian Division.
J.B.5/278. 20th May, 1915.

Program for MOTHER this afternoon.

4 p.m.–5 p.m. Register K.5.

6 p.m.–7 p.m. 2 Mothers will fire 50 rounds between them at K.5.

7 p.m. 7.45 p.m. these 2 Mothers lift onto

(a) 15 rounds L. 8 to L.10 (1 Mother)

(b) 15 rounds L.11 to L.12 (1 Mother)

7.45 p.m. one Mother blocks road in vicinity of J.19 with one round each five minutes.

Presume you clear trench near K.5 from 6 p.m.–7 p.m.

From 1 Group Hy. Arty. Reserve. 3.18 p.m.

J. B. W.

772

OPERATION ORDER No. 16

Brigadier-General Turner, Commanding 3rd
Can. Inf. Bde.

20th May, 1915.

1. The 16th Canadian Bn. will assault the locality of the orchard M.9–N.13 and the house M.10 at 7.45 p.m. to-day.

2. The 15th Canadian Bn. will assault the locality L.11–L.12 at 7.45 p.m. to-day.

3. Two companies of each battalion are to be used in the attack.

4. On the attack of the 16th Bn. being carried through they will be relieved by two companies of the 13th Bn. in the new position and the remainder of the 13th Bn. in the present 16th trenches and the 16th Bn. will withdraw to the former front British trenches now held by the 13th.

5. Both positions will be at once placed in a state of defence.

6. The attack will be prepared by a heavy artillery bombardment till 7.45 p.m. The artillery will then lift. The assaults are to be made at 7.45 p.m. without fail without respect to the artillery bombardment.

7. Engineer parties will report at both localities after the assault to assist.

8. The 14th Bu. is Brigade reserve.

9. Frequent reports to Bde. H.Q.

G. B. HUGHES, Lieut.-Colonel.
B.M., 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.

Attacks will be made in as open a formation as possible.

To 15th Cdn. Bn.
16th Cdn. Bn.
S.M. 59. 20th May, 1915.

We are sending up signal lights to be used as follows:-

16th Bn. attack on orchard when position has been secured one (1) light to be sent up AAA 15th Bn. attack on L.11 and L.12 when position has been secured two (2) lights to be sent up AAA These lights are not to be used on any account for any other purpose.
From adv.. 3rd Cdn. Infy. Bde. 520 p.m.

T. S. MORRISEY.

Priority to 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.36. 20th May, 1915.

Two Companies 16th Bu. occupy Orchard N.13. M.9 and are digging in AAA Attack on M.10 held up by machine gun fire from it AAA Have directed 37th Howitzer Bde. to fire 4 rounds on house M.10 which we are to observe.
From 3rd. Inf. Bde. 9 p.m.

By wire received 9.20 p.m.

Priority to 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.39. 20th May, 1915.

Unable to report progress of attack on L.11, L.12 AAA Orchard M.9, N.13 in our hands confirmed.
From 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde. 9.30 p.m.

By wire received 9.53 p.m.

Priority to 3rd Canadian Inf.
Bde. G.797. 20th May, 1915.

If the success at L.11 and 12 is confirmed steps must be taken to secure trench L.10 and bomb down toward L.8 AAA It is presumed engineer parties under officers with material necessary are being sent up to consolidate positions won.

From Canadian Div. 9.45 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Colonel, GS.

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.793. 20th May, 1915.

G.O.C. congratulates you and 16th Bn. on your fine work in the capture of the Orchard and hopes you will strongly consolidate your position there.

From Canadian Div. 9.65 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Colonel, GS.

Priority to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.803. 20th May, 1915.

If you have got in touch with the trench mortars attached to your Bde. the observing officer of the 37th Arty. Bde. now at M.9 will meet them at any point you arrange and guide them up to Point 9 to continue the attack on M.10 which point should be secured before daylight and held as an advanced post.

From Canadian Div. 10.10 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Colonel, GS.

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.807. 20th May, 1915.

You should connect the Orchard at N.12 with your old line by means of communication trench running along west side of road from N.12 to LA QUINQUE RUE AAA If locality L.11, L.12 is secured it should also be connected with M.6 by communication trench and a post with machine guns established at M.6 AAA Both the Orchard and L.12 should also be connected by phone with your old line AAA Trust you are moving trench mortar battery up to Orchard for attack on M.10 AAA Acknowledge.

From Canadian Div. 10.55 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Colonel, G.S.

To 15th Canadian Bn.
S.M. 67. 20th May, 1915.

All available men used in attack on L.11 and L.12 must dig themselves in between M.5 and M.6 and connect up with 13th Can. Bu.

AAA Long traverses must be dug to protect from enfilade fire AAA Advise what arrangements have been made for bringing in your wounded AAA
From Adv. 3rd Can. Bde. 1120 p.m.

T. S. MORRISEY.

772a

To O.C. No. 10 Batt.
B.M.148. 20th May, 1915.

1. You will attack K.5 at 7.45 this evening.
2. The attack will be carried by one company preceded by bombers. The bombers will be under Lieut. Tozer who has orders to report to you. A section of the Field Co. RE. will also be placed at your disposal.

3. As soon as K.5 is secured the trenches towards J.1 & L.8 will be secured as far as possible by bombing outwards. All ground gained will be consolidated and joined up. From 2nd Canadian Brigade. 5.30 p.m.

G. MEYNELL, Bde. Major.

773

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.148. 20th May, 1915.

From reconnaissance K.5 since my return recommend postponement attack till tomorrow. Impossible to withdraw from trenches K.1 to K.3 without being seen and exposed thereby giving show away AAA Tomorrow communication will be secure.
From 2nd Inf. Bde. 3.19 p.m.

A.W. CURRIE.

(Sent by wire 4.00 p.m.; received 4.25 p.m.)

774

To Hdqrs. Canadian Divn.
B.M.153. 20th May, 1915.

It is reported that attack on K.5 has failed AAA Am going up to see O.C. 10th Battalion.
From Brigadier, 2nd Cdn. Bde. 920 p.m.

By wire received 10.10 p.m.

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.811. 20th May, 1915.

The attack on K.5 will be renewed tomorrow morning after an artillery preparation of about three hours which will start as early as observation permits about 5 a.m. but you will be definitely informed in the morning

AAA Make your preparations accordingly AAA Ensure cover and communication to southern end of your present line and reconnaissance of ground to be crossed in attack. From Canadian Div. 11.15 p.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.

By wire received 11.51 p.m.

(See 775)

To 1st Canadian Division.
B.M.154. 20th May, 1915.

I attach herewith report from O.C. 10th whom I went to see on hearing that the attack on K.5 did not succeed AAA He was with the attacking party and states the attackers were stopped by machine gun fire from K.5 and trench K.5 L.8. Direct fire from K.5 as they emerged from the trench and cross fire from the other AAA They are closing the gaps to-night and making a thorough reconnaissance to K.5 AAA I have told them to be ready to attack early tomorrow morning. They will cut gaps in the parapet making egress easier AAA Lt. Tozer, O.C. Grenade company slightly and Captain Costigan wounded.
From 2nd Inf. Bde. 11.45 p.m.

A. W. CURRIE.

Headquarters 10th Bn.
May 20th, 1915.
10 p.m.

To G.O.C. 2nd Can. Inf. Bde.

At 7.45 p.m. under your B.M.148 (See 772a) Grenade Company advanced towards K.5 along trench followed by "A" Coy. 10th under Maj. Ashton, "B" Coy. ready to support; "C" Coy. standing to; and "D" Coy. ready at old British line to occupy "A" Coy. position. From 8.30 p.m. until 825 p.m. a terrific shell fire was directed on all trenches and approaches to our position.

Attacking party advanced and immediately met enemy driving him back one hundred yards. As K.5 had not been shelled this afternoon by our artillery and as men would have to file out of trench in single file and were met by heavy machine gun and rifle fire, O.C. "A" Coy. did not continue but made good what had been gained.

P. A. GUTHRIE, Major
O.C. 10th Br

775

*From G.O.C. 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde. to G.O.C.
2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.*

Dear Genl. Currie—

Please have Col. Lipsett bring up his left flank towards M.6 to connect up with me: suggest long traverses. We are digging in from M.9. M.8. M.6.

R. E. W. TURNER,
Br. General.

Lipsett seen on telephone & promised to comply.

G. M. (eynell),
(B. M. 2nd C.I.B.)
By hand received

776

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.815. 21st May, 1915.

Reference my G.811 (*see* 774) during artillery bombardment your trench on extreme right to the east of a. line through K.1 and K.3 must be kept clear of troops after 5 a.m. AAA Attack on M.9 and N.13 succeeded ground is being consolidated AAA Attack on L.11 and L.12 failed AAA Should your attack on K.5 succeed you may call upon the left battalion of the London Div. to join up the line.
From 1st Canadian Div. 12.30 a.m.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lieut.-Colonel.

By wire received 12.50 a.m.

To Alderson's Force.
G. A.63. 21st May, 1915.

47th Div. will arrange that a battalion of 4th London Brigade is available to be placed at disposal of Alderson's force if required AAA To save delay Alderson's force will communicate direct with G.O.C. 4th Bde. AAA Addsd. 47th Div. repeated Alderson's force.
From 1st Corps. 8.30 a.m.

By wire received 9 a.m.

To 2nd Canadian Bde.
B.M.515. 21st May, 1915.

The Sixth Lon. refit. on our left have been instructed to comply with any request to join up with the right of 2nd Canadian Bde.

should that bde. gain ground to the front AAA Addsd. Alderson's Force reptd. 2nd Canadian Bde. AAA.
From 140th Inf. Bde. 1.44 p.m.

To G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Brigade.
B.314. 21st May, 1915.

We will co-operate as requested and help to consolidate any position gained AAA Please instruct what work you require us to do and when you want it done AAA.

From Sixth Lon. Reg. 9 p.m.

W. HUGHES, Capt. & Adjt.

*Handed in to Sigs. 8.05 p.m. Received
2nd C.I.B. 810 p.m.*

NOTE:—4th London Brigade otherwise designated 140th Infantry Brigade. Although Alderson's Force communicated by telegraph direct, these arrangements took from 12.80 a.m. to 810 p.m. to complete.

777

Alderson's Force.
Adv. 1st Corps.
Fourth Corps.
Indian Corps.
No. 1 Group H.A.R.
M.G., R.A.
No. 1 Wing, R.F.C. Intelligence. A.Q.M.G.
O.i/c Signals.
D.M.S. 1st Army.
First Army.
Adv. G.H.Q.

With reference to 1st Army G.S.86 (a) dated 19th May, 1915 (*App.* 767).

1. Alderson's Force will arrange to secure K.5 and M.10 to-night. The infantry attack on K.5 will take place at 8.30 p.m.

Alderson's Force will also arrange to throw forward and entrench a line from the left of the Canadian Division on LA QUINQUE RUE through the two advanced posts east of P.9 and Q.7 and be ready to throw the left forward to conform with the right of the Indian Corps.

The Indian Corps will arrange to secure FERME DU BOIS Q.15, Q.16, R.8 to-night.

2. The artillery will co-operate as follows:—

No. 1 Group H.A.R.

From 5 to 6 p.m.—K.5 is to be bombarded.

From 5 to 9 p.m. the following localities are to be bombarded. L.10, L.11, L.12, and the new trenches to the N and W of

these points. The communication trench running from a point between L.10 and L.11 through K.7, J.12, L.13. The Group of buildings about CHAPELLE ST. ROCHE. J.5, the trenches and works between J.9 and J.13 to J.15.

In addition to the above, the H.A.R. will direct artillery fire throughout the night as ordered in para. 5 of G.S. 86 (a) referred to above.

Alderson's Force Artillery.

From 2 to 8.30 p.m. -K.5 trench K.5-L.8-L.10. System running S. from K.5, J.4, J.5, J.6, J.9, and J.1, J.3.

From 8.30 to 9 p.m.-J.4, J.5, J.9.

From 1.10 a.m. to 125 a.m.-P.14 to Q.9, Q.11, P.12, Q.12, Q.17, Q.18 and intensive bombardment.

Indian Corps-Will make their own arrangements for artillery bombardment.

1st Corps-Will carry out a slow bombardment of the area S. of a line through J.1, K.7, and to intensify from 8.30 to 8.45 p.m.

All the artillery bombardments between 5 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. are to be regulated according to the following time table:-

Slow Bombardment-S to 6 p.m.

After 6 p.m. as follows:-

Bombardment 6 to 6.30, 7 to 7.30, 8 to 8.20.

Pause 6.30 to 6.35, 7.30 to 7.35.

Shrapnel only 6.25 to 6.40, 7.35 to 7.40.

Pause 6.40 to 7, 7.40 to 8.

R. BUTLER, B.G. G.S. 1st Army.

21st May, 1915. 5 p.m.

778

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
G 817. 21st May, 1915.

Horse Artillery gun is being sent to M.9 to demolish M.10 AAA Attack on K.5 will be continued to-morrow morning after an artillery bombardment of three hours commencing about 5 but exact time will be notified AAA Your B.M. 44 received (*not reproduced*).

From 1st Candian Div. 12.30 am.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lieut.-Colonel.

778a

To Headquarters Canadian Division.
B.M. 170. 22nd May, 1915.

As remains of grenade company were practically put out of action last night would be glad of assistance of 1st Brigade Company if this could be arranged for.
From 2nd Canadian Brigade. 225 p.m.

G. MEYNELL, Major.

779

To 47th Div.
Canadian Div.
R. W.I. 22nd May, 1915.

Right of 2nd Canadian Bde. (Br. Gee. CURRIE) is about midway between J.4 and J.6 aaa Canadian troops hold the trench which runs from J.4 through letter B to K.4 aaa There are no Canadian troops in the breastwork K.3-J.1-J3 which is believed to be unoccupied by enemy also aaa

47th Div. will to-night relieve the Canadian troops from K.3 to their right a little south of J.4 aaa Arrangements to be made direct with Canadian Div. aaa

The following work is essential and must be carried out by 47th Div. aaa The line taken over from Canadians must be strengthened to the utmost and wired aaa Communication trenches or breastwork must be made between the line held at present by 4th London Bde. and the breastwork K.3-J.1-J.3, and also between that breastwork and the trench J.4-letter B. (i.e.. *from J.4, 800 yards towards K.4*) aaa The breastwork should be prepared as a second line aaa Particular attention must be given to turn back the right flank against enfilade fire aaa Acknowledge aaa Addressed 47th Div. repeated Canadian Div.

From 1st Corps. 5.10 p.m.

R. W. WHIGHAM, Brig: General G.S.

By hand received Cdn. Div.

780

1. The relief of the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. and that portion of the front held by 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. from M.6 to M.3 will be carried out by the 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. tonight. Arrangements for this relief will be made directly between Brigadiers and completion of relief will be reported to this office.

2. The Squadron of Seely's Detachment in trench about M.6 will be withdrawn to-night. Two regiments of Seely's Detachment are

placed under the orders of 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. and will report to the O.C. Brigade at a time to be arranged by Brigadiers.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lieut.-Col.
General Staff,
1st Canadian Division.

22.5.1915.

Issued at 1.45 p.m.

Copy No. 1 to 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
2 to 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
3 to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
4 to Seely's Detachment.
5 to Divl. Artillery.
6 to Divl. Engineers.
7 to A.D.M.S.
8 to A.A. & Q.M.G.
9 to Divl. Train. 10 to G.S.

781

To 1st Canadian Divn.

B.M.197. 22nd May, 1915.

I am convinced that we hold J.4 and J.6. Major Guthrie claims J.1 and J.3 do not exist as what appears to be a trench there is a ditch. His men have been terribly bombarded and ask for artillery support.

From 2nd Inf. Bde. 2.35 p.m.

By wire received at 8.50 p.m.

PRIORITY.

To 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.

G.29. 22nd May, 1915.

It is most important that you should support 10th Bu. holding the line between K.4 and a point midway between J.4 and J.6 and send them food, water and ammunition. The London Div. is being asked to take over the trench between K.3 and 13. You will still have the two regiments of Seely's Detach. to relieve your troops and also the 1st Bde. who will relieve the trench between M.3 and M.4. Acknowledge.

From Canadian Div. 3.20 p.m.

C. H. MITCHELL,
Major, G.S.

By wire received 3.33 p.m.

To 1st Canadian Div.

B.M.203. 22nd May, 1915.

Message received (G29) Trench J.1 and J.3 does not exist it is a ditch. From 2nd Inf. Bde. 3.40 p.m.

By wire received 3.58 p.m.
(See 779)

782

OPERATION ORDER No. 17

By

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

23rd May, 1915.

1. The 2nd Bde. will attack K.5 at 2.30 a.m. tomorrow morning, 24th May. This attack will be made simultaneously with the attack of the 47th London Division down the trench K2-J.1-J2. The 47th London Division is engaging K.5 and vicinity with its 2" mortar battery. The 1V mortar, now at General Currie's disposal, will also bombard K.5.

The Artillery of the Canadian Division will maintain a slow continuous bombardment on K.5 until 2.25 a.m., in accordance with instructions issued to C.R.A. The 2nd Bde. will see that the infantry is at least 200 yards away from K.5 during this bombardment. The attack on K5 which will be launched at 2.30 a.m., will be made along the trench K.3-K.5 and efforts will also be made to turn this locality by the trench or ditch running from K.4 in a northeasterly direction.

An officer from the right Bn. of the 2nd Canadian Bde. will be sent to the left Bn. of the 47th Division as liaison Officer.

2. As soon as it is dusk the 2nd Bde. will establish a line of posts along the ditch running from K.4 in a north easterly direction and will connect up with the post of the 1st Bde. established south of M.4.

3. At the same time patrols are to be pushed forward in order to reconnoitre accurately the German trench L.10-L.8 and towards K.5. It is especially important to find out if there are any bridges or narrow places on the ditch which extends immediately to the north of this trench.

4. In the same way the 1st Canadian Bde. will send out patrols to reconnoitre the German line L.9, trench north of L.12 and the line of the road between L.12 and M.11.

5. The new trench constructed to the southwest of M.6 and to the south of M.4 will be joined up and improved and touch established with the posts formed by the 2nd Canadian Bde. in accordance with para. 2.

6. The 1st Canadian Bde. will to-night seize the small house between M.9 and M.10, will establish a post in it with a machine gun and join it up with the southeast of the ORCHARD:

7. Careful reconnaissance is to be made of the German line M.10-N.14 with a view to attacking tomorrow night the former locality and trench to the south of it. 1V mortar with personnel and ammunition from the

Indian Corps will be placed at the disposal of General Mercer this evening and will be put into a position in the ORCHARD ready for the attack to-morrow. The mountain gun, now under General Mercer's command, in action in X.30.c will be brought up to-night to a position behind the hedge west of M.7, so as to be ready to engage to-morrow M.10.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 7.30 p.m.

Copy No. 1 to 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
2 to 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
3 to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
4 to Divl. Artillery.
5 to Divl. Engineers.
6 to A.D.M.S.
7 to AA. & Q.M.G.
8 to Advd. 1st Army.
9 to Indian Corps.
10 to Highland Division.
11 to 1st Corps.
12 to G.S.

782a

To 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
B.C. 64. 24th May, 1915.

Message from Major POWLEY No. 1 Company begins Situation on our right untenable unless relieved by our artillery or fresh reinforcements with bombers. Time 6.10 a.m. Message ends. Have sent up Capt. GUNNING with No. 2 Company to reinforce and assist in putting through new communicating trench. Have only one Company under Capt. COOPER left here. Am sending up bombs with carrying party as rapidly as they can be procured.

From O.C., 7th Battalion, 6.35 a.m.

V. W. ODLUM, Major.

By hand received before 7 a.m.

782b

To O.C., 7th Battalion.
B.M. 243. 24th May, 1915.

Your B.C. 64 received aaa Do not send up further reinforcements at present aaa Our heavy artillery are now firing and field guns will ring us round with shrapnel aaa It is a case of digging in and hanging on aaa As Col. Tuxford is ill, Tenaile and Edgar wounded and as you have three companies in I am placing

you in command of 5th and 7th and relieving Tuxford notifying him accordingly. From 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., 7 a.m.

A. W. Cunam.

By hand received.

(See 782a)

782c

NOTE ON GERMAN ACCOUNTS

Regimental Histories of German infantry units engaged against the Canadians at this time (*57th I.R.* and *91st R.I.R.* published by Gerhard Stalling in 1926 and 1936) reflect their confidence in themselves and in their supporting artillery, which is highly praised for close co-operation and effective shooting. The attack of the 3rd C.I.B. on 18th May is disposed of briefly by the *57th I.R.*: " When towards 5 p.m. English assault columns advanced from their trenches, they encountered such an effective barrage fired by the *43rd Field Artillery Regiment*, augmented by two batteries of the *22nd Field Artillery Regiment* on the left of the *13th Infantry Division*, that the attack collapsed after a few minutes and was not again renewed against the regiment's position. The subsequent English attacks were focussed on the position of the *68th I.R.*" (*i.e.* the K.5 front). That night the regiment, having been in the battle since the 9th, was relieved ; it had lost 30 officers and 1,800 other ranks, its heaviest losses in one engagement for the whole war. The history of the *91st R.I.R.* shows that K.5, called the Germans " the Bridgehead," and their forward covering trenches on either flank were to be maintained by reinforcement and counter-attack until the new line just west of the Rue d'Ouvert was ready for occupation; there is a full description of how this was done. For the period 21st to 27th May casualties are given as 11 officers and 43 men.

783

To Canadian Div.
G.A.69. 24th May, 1915.

The 47th Div. will secure to-night the detached breastwork J.3 and the line of trench J.4-letter B aaa This line and the breastwork K.3-J.1-J.3 is to be consolidated aaa Communication trenches are to be made between our old line and the breastwork K.3-J.3 and between that breastwork and the trench J.4-letter B so that the troops of 47th Div. shall not have to pass through the trenches occupied by the Canadian Div. aaa Addressed 47th Div. repeated Canadian Div.

R. W. WHIGHAM, B.G.

From 1st Corps. 520 p.m.

By hand received Cdn. Div.

783a

Secret.

OPERATION ORDER No. 18

By

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

24.5.1915.

1. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will consolidate the position around K.5 and form a line with its right thrown back towards the trench K.4-J4 and with its left along the trench running to the ditch 200-yards south of K.S. From this point a series of strong posts will be made along the ditch to connect up with the right of the 1st Brigade at MA. This line is to be made as continuous as possible and is to be occupied to-night by the troops at present holding the line K.2-M.3. At the same time patrols will be sent out as ordered in para. 3 of Operation Order No. 17 of yesterday. (*App. 785.*)

2. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will complete and occupy to-night the new line M.6-M.4 connecting with the left of the 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. and will push out patrols from this line towards L.12.

3. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will assault at 11 p.m. the German trench M.10-N.14. Having gained this trench the assaulting party will turn right and left and bomb towards N.14 and towards M.10. At the same time the latter locality will be attacked from the small house seized last night between M.9 and M.10 and also from a south-easterly direction from the trench between M.9. and M.8. The attacking party will then push on down the trench running south from M.10 and will endeavour to secure the cross roads and obtain a lodgment on the south side of the road running from L.12 to M.11 and push out as far as possible towards L.12. All ground gained is to be consolidated and- joined up on its right with our breast work M.6-M.8. and on its left with the easterly edge of the Orchard.

4. In addition to the artillery bombardment described in the succeeding paragraph, M.10 and the trench between M.10 and N.14, will be bombarded by the three trench mortars at General Mercer's disposal. The mountain gun will also engage M.10 under instructions which have. already been issued to the O.C. by General Mercer.

5. The artillery will commence a slow continuous bombardment at 5 p.m. on the following points:-

The new Brick House on the road between L.12 and M.11; on the work south of M.10; on M.10-N.14; M. 11 and M.12 and the trench east of the Orchard on the road L.12-M.11.

At 11 p.m. fire will be lifted to the following points:-
Trench junction south-west of P.14; junction of N.14 and N.15 trenches; the trench just north of L.12; communication trench running south-east from M.12.

A barrage will be formed on the line P.14-N.15-M.13 and on line M.13-M.11-L.14-L.13.

The 1st Group H.A.R. has been asked to fire on CHAPELLE ST. ROCH and M.10.

6. In order to assist in the defence of K.S and the trenches in the neighbourhood, bar rage will be placed as follows:-

L.8, L.10, L.11, RUE d'OUVERT and trench parallel to it up to J.18 and J.19, thence to J.15, J.10, J.9, J.5, and also on the path running from K.12 to L.13. Important parts to be fired on by heavy shell, remainder by shrapnel.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff

Issued at 3.15 p.m.

Copy No. 1-1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
2-2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
3-3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
4-Divl. Artillery.
5-Divl. Engineers.
6-A.D.M.S.
7-A.A. & Q.M.G.
8-Advd. 1st Army.
9-Indian Corps.
10-Highland Division.
11-1st Corps.
12-G.S.
13-1st Group H.A.R.

 784

Priority to 1st Can. Div.
I.G.B.80. May, 1915.

Attack on trench. at M.10 started 11.30 have a portion of trench at 11.40 and going along no progress to right towards M.10 at 11.45.

From Lt. Col. C. H. Mitchell,

Genl. Staff. 11.50 p.m.

By wire received 1 a.m.

To 1st Can. Divn.

I.G.B.81. .25th May, 1915.

Attack on M.10 failed at 11.50 aaa Machine guns posted in trench opposite corner of orchard caught attack emerging from M.9 aaa Few men got into trench and did effective bombing but could not get on aaa

Preparations being made for a second attack later but propose further artillery bombardment temporarily withdrawing from orchard aaa Location of machine guns now known. From Lt. Col. C. H. Mitchell. 12.10 a.m.

By wire received 1.00 a.m.

To Adv. 1st Army, 1st Corps,
Adv. Indian Corps.
G.783. 25th May, 1915.

General Staff Officer near the ORCHARD reports at 12.10 a.m. that the attack on M.10 failed as machine gun posted in trench opposite corner of ORCHARD caught attack emerging from M.9 aaa Our men who reached the trench did some effective bombing but were enfiladed by machine gun aaa Trench mortars are now endeavouring to deal with machine guns aaa Added. let Army rept'd 1st Corps and Indian Corps.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

From Canadian Div. 120 a.m.

Priority to 1st Canadian Div. via 1st Bde.
I.G.B.82. 25th May, 1915.

As insufficient time is available before daylight for artillery preparations and as trench mortar officer is unable to range on machine gun at night Col. RENNIE decides not to make the second attack mentioned in my I.G.B.81 aaa He has also been advised that artillery officers state that they cannot get sufficiently accurate results at night. Various methods of approach have been discussed including that by the small diagonal trench west of M.10 but officers on ground do not think that the attack could succeed without artillery preparation. Withdrawal of portion of force is now proceeding. in order to thin out crowded trenches. Enemy used *two* machine guns one in trench one due east of easterly corner of Orchard and one apparently in or near house at M.10.

From C. H. Mitchell, Lt. Col.

Genl. Staff. 1.45 am.

By wire received 2.60 a.m.

Priority to 1st Canadian Div.
B.M.154. 25th May, 1915.

O.C. 3rd Battn. reports that no men who got into the trench are alive or uncaptured aaa The attack which proceeded E. from the corner of the Orchard obtained a footing in the trench. The supporting lines were stopped by machine guns only 50 yards away from

the S.E. corner of the Orchard aaa The advance from the house N.9 in the trench and M.10 was stopped by machine gun fire from machine guns in M.10 and house west of cross roads aaa Artillery reported at 12.50 a.m. that no further support or bombardment of M.10 could be carried out at night owing to not being able to observe aaa The trench mortars could not open on the machine gun in hostile trench as it had not registered on it and as they were in position for bombarding the house at M.10 and trench near it and not the trench opposite to the S.E. corner of Orchard aaa 1st Battn. report have completed and consolidated their line and are in touch with 2nd Bde. on their right. From let Canadian Inf. Bde. 225 a.m.

By wire received 2.50 a.m.

784a

Extract from
THE LONDON GAZETTE
No. 29225 of 10th July, 1915

From the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in France.
To the Secretary of State for War, War Office,
London, S.W.

General Headquarters,
15th June, 1915.

MY LORD.—

The state of the weather on the morning of the 18th much hindered an effective artillery bombardment, and further attacks had, consequently, to be postponed.

Infantry attacks were made throughout the line in the course of the afternoon and evening; but, although not *very* much progress was made, the line was advanced to the La Quinque Rue-Bethune Road before nightfall.

On the 19th May the 7th and 2nd Divisions were drawn out of the line to rest. The 7th Division was relieved by the Canadian Division and the 2nd Division by the 51st (Highland) Division.

Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian and 51st Divisions, together with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Alderson, whom he directed to conduct the operations which had hitherto been carried on by the General Officer Commanding First Corps; and he directed the 7th Division to remain in Army Reserve.

During the night of the 19th-20th a small post of the enemy in front of La Quinque Rue was captured.

During the night of the 20th-21st the Canadian Division brilliantly carried on the excellent progress made by the 7th Division by seizing several of the enemy's trenches and pushing forward their whole line several hundred yards. A number of prisoners and some machine guns were captured.

On the 22nd instant the 51st (Highland) Division was attached to the Indian Corps, and the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps took charge of the operations at La_Quinque Rue, Lieutenant-General Alderson with the Canadians conducting the operations to the north (*sic south*) of that place.

On this day the Canadian Division extended their line slightly to the right and repulsed three very severe hostile counter-attacks.

On the 24th and 25th May the 47th Division (2nd London Territorial) succeeded in taking some more of the enemy's trenches and making good the ground gained to the east and north.

I had now reason to consider that the battle, which was commenced by the First Army on the 9th May and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded with; and I gave orders to Sir Douglas Haig to curtail his artillery attack and to strengthen and consolidate the ground he had won.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant.

J. D. P. FRENCH,
Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in France.

785

To Canadian Divn.

G.B.319. 25th May, 1915.

Ref. para. 6 (a) of 47th Div. Op. Order No. 10 and para. 3 of Artillery program attached thereto sea The barrage to the left of the 142nd Inf. Bde. attack on the line J.3-J.6-J.9 will prevent the co-operation of the 140th Inf. Bde. until such time as it is lifted eastwards off J.3 but directly this lift takes place J.3 is to be attacked by bombing parties and consolidated as soon as captured aaa First Corps have been asked to arrange for the co-operation of bombing parties from the Canadian Divn. attacking southwards along the German trenches running from the neighbourhood of K.6 towards J.6 aaa Acknowledge.

Addressed 140th Inf. Bde. repeated 47th Divl. Artillery, 142nd Inf. Bde. Canadian Div. and First Corps.

From 47th Division. 10.35 a.m.

WM. THWAITES, Lt. Col.

NOTE.—Bombing parties were detailed from Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.)

By hand received Cdn. Div.

786

SECRET.

OPERATION ORDER No. 19

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

25.5.1915.

1. The 142nd Brigade of the 47th London Division is attacking at 6.30 p.m. to-day, its primary objective being the enemy's breast work I.4-J.7 and its further objective I.8-J.9.

2. Seely's Detachment of the Canadian Division will co-operate in this attack by bombing from K.5 towards L.8 with the object of securing the northern end of the trench running from L.8 through K.6 to J.10, and then pushing towards L.10 and L.11. This attack will be delivered at 9 p.m. At the same time the German Sniping Posts west and north of the ditch running from L.8 towards K.5 will be cleared out. All ground gained will be consolidated and the trench K.5 to L.8 and L.11, held and a defensive bank thrown out from the left towards the line L.6-M.4. The attack will be preceded by an artillery bombardment as described in the Appendix.

3. The leading and flank troops of the 47th -Division attack will be marked by a disc 2 feet in diameter, covered with sandbag cloth with black cross. The cap raised on the bayonet will also indicate 47th Division troops. The attacking column of Seely's Detachment will use a green rocket to indicate their progress towards L.8. They will send up two rockets in quick succession when they have reached L.8.

4. Two battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Bde. will be placed at General Seely's disposal as a Brigade Reserve. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will inform General Seely of the battalions detailed.

5. The posts established last night between L.6 and M.4 will be improved into a continuous line and extended towards K.5.

6. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will improve the trench running on the west side of the

Orchard between M.9 and N.12 to the LA QUINQUE RUE, so that the infantry in the Orchard can be withdrawn to this trench tomorrow for the purpose of allowing the artillery to bombard effectively the German trench between M.10 and N.14. Gaps will be made in the hedge on the eastern side of the Orchard so as to allow of the issue of an attack against N.14. These gaps should be so arranged that they can be brought under fire from our back trench between M. 9 and N.12.

7. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will take steps to ascertain definitely whether there is a German trench on the north side of the road running from L.12 to M.11.

8. The zones of artillery fire between the 47th and Canadian artillery are as follows:

47th Division.

Area of breastwork K.5–L.8–L.10 (exclusive) up to but not E. of RUE D'OUVERT.

Canadian Division.

RUE D'OUVERT as far S. as CHAPELLE ST. ROCH and area E. of RUE D'OUVERT.

The artillery programme for the Canadian Division is shown in the attached Appendix.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel, General Staff.

Issued at 3 p.m.

Copy No. 1 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
2 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
3 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
4 Seely's Detachment.
5 Divl. Artillery.
6 Divl. Engineers.
7 A.D.M.S.
8 AA. & QM.G.
9 Indian Corps.
10 Advd. 1st Army.
11 Highland Division.
12 47th London Division.
13 1st Corps. 14 G.S.

APPENDIX TO OPERATION ORDER
No. 19

25.5.1915.

PROGRAMME OF CANADIAN DIVISION ARTILLERY
(Referred to in para. 8 of Operation Order No. 19)

To support the 47th Division attack.

The 36th Brigade will place a light barrage of 2 18-pr. batteries with shrapnel from 6.30 p.m. to 9 p.m. on the trench L.10–K.7 as far as K.8.

The O.C. 8th London Brigade will shell L.12–L.11 with HE. from 6.30 to 9 p.m.—rate four rounds per hour.

To support Canadian
Division bombing
from K.5 at 9 p.m.

Seely's
Detachment

Two 18-pr. batteries, 36th Brigade, R.F.A. will continue their barrage as above from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m.

The 47th Howitzer Battery, 36th Brigade, R.F.A. and 118th Howitzer Brigade will shell trench L.10–L.8 from 8.30 p.m. to 9 p.m. with H.E. at rate of 10 rounds per battery—Zones as under:

47th Battery, R.F.A.—L.10 to ½ way to L.8.

One Battery 118th Bde.—½ way to L.8 up to L.8.

Second Battery 118th Bde.—L.8 to 100 yards S.W. in direction of K.5. On no account must fire go more to S.W. in direction of K.5 than this on account of danger to bombers.

The three French guns will place a light H.E. barrage from L.9 to L.11 from 8.30 p.m. to 9.30 p.m.

On commencement of bombing attack at 9 p.m.—

French batteries will continue barrage as before until ordered to stop.

47th Howitzer Battery
118th Howitzer Brigade

will continue slow bombardment as before at rate of five rounds per battery every five minutes, ceasing and altering fire as directed by Forward Officer to whom, as well as to O.C.118th and O.C., R.F.A., 36th Brigade, full instructions have been given.

787

OPERATION ORDER

By

Brigadier-General the Right Hon. J. E. B. Seely,
D.S.O., Commanding Right Section 1st Canadian
Division.

25.5.1915.

1. The 142nd Brigade of the 47th London Division is attacking at 6.30 p.m. to-day, its primary objective being the enemy's breastwork I.4–J.7 and its further objective L.8–J.9.

2. This Brigade will co-operate in the attack by bombing from K.5 towards L.8 with the object of securing the northern end of the trench running from L.8 through K.6 to J.10 and then pushing towards L.10 and L.11. This attack will be delivered at 9 p.m. At the

same time the German Sniping Posts west and north of the ditch running from L.8 towards K.5 will be cleared out. All ground gained will be consolidated and the trench KS to L.8 and L.11 held and a defensive flank thrown out from the left towards the line L.6-M.4. The attack will be preceded by an artillery bombardment described in the appendix (*See App. 786*).

3. The leading and flank troops of the 47th Division attack will be marked by a disc two feet in diameter covered with sandbag cloth with black cross. The cap raised on the bayonet will also indicate 47th Division troops. The attacking column of Seely's Detachment will use a green rocket to indicate their progress towards LB. They will send up two rockets in quick succession when they have reached L.8.

4. The 8th and 10th Battalions of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade are placed at General Seely's disposal as a Brigade Reserve and will be prepared to move at 15 minutes notice from their present location. Units to furnish orderlies at Brigade H.Q.

5. The posts established last night between L.6 and M.4 will be improved into a continuous line and extended towards K.5.

The O.C. 8th Battalion will detail four officers and 200 men to report to Capt. Morrison, C.R.E. at corner of WILLOWS ROAD at 8.30 p.m.

The O.C. 10th Battalion will detail a similar party to report to Lieut.-Mathieson at FESTUBERT CORNER at 8.30 p.m.

These parties will be employed on joining up the line as indicated in 2 but should not begin work before 10 p.m. They should also be employed in deepening the trench K.5—K.3, this latter work to begin as soon as possible.

6. The bombing from K.5 towards LS will be carried out by Lieut.-Timmis' Bombing Party. They will start from K.5 at 9 p.m. The Bayonet Party, Working Party and Carrying Party for the Bombers will be detailed by O.C., R.C.D. as required by Lieut.-Timmis.

7. The O.C., R.C.D. will also detail one troop to secure any fresh trench made good by the Bombing Party as laid down in para. 2.

8. At 9 p.m. O.C., L.S.H. (R.C.) will arrange to send out a party to clear out German sniping posts reported to be west and north of the ditch running from K.5 to L.B.

9. After the operation ordered in paras. 5 and 6 the R.C.D. will relieve the L.S.H. under arrangements with the O.O. Regiments. The

O.C., L.S.H. will occupy the British line with two squadrons and send one back to Brigade H.Q.

E. C. JURY,
Capt.
Bde. Major.

Issued after 5 p.m.

788

SECRET.

To 3 Bdes and Seely's Det.

G.103. 25th May, 1915.

G.H.Q. wishes Seely's Detachment to use the new gas bombs in their attack to-night against LS aaa. Some 200 of these bombs are being sent to Gen. Seely's Headqrs. this afternoon and Bdes. will send at once to Gen. Seely the officer and N.C.Os. and men who were instructed at ST. VENANT yesterday in the use of these bombs aaa Acknowledge by wire aaa Addsd. Seely's Det. repton. all Bdes.

C. F. ROMER,
Col., G.S.

From Canadian Div. 12.45 p.m.

789

OPERATION ORDER No. 20

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

26-5-1915.

1. The 47th London Division has gained the line I.4—J.7 and also J.3, and they have been ordered to make a further advance. They have been ordered to connect up with the right of the Canadian Division near K.5, moving through J.6 and J.5, or through J.4, as may be most feasible. From here they will connect up with a point on the road running from K.5 to GIVENCHY, 200 yards southeast of K.5.

2. General Seely will bomb out at 1.30 am tomorrow, 27th May, down the road from K.5 to GIVENCHY for 200 yards.

3. The line from the point mentioned in the preceding para. through K.5 and LS will be consolidated. A defensive flank will be thrown back at L.8 and a communication trench opened up back to the line completed last night between K.5 and L.7.

4. The troops of the 3rd Canadian Brigade will relieve to: night the troops of Seely's Detachment, under arrangements to be made direct between General Seely and General

Turner. General Seely will continue to command the right sector of the Canadian Division line until mid-day to-morrow, 27th May, after which hour General Turner will assume command.

5. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will detail such working parties as may be required by General Seely for the work to-night.

6. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will complete the work which was ordered in para. 6 of Operation Order No. 19 of yesterday.

7. Both Sectors of the line will send out constant patrols to obtain information of the enemy's new defensive line.

8. Arrangements for Artillery barrages will be the same as shown in the Appendix to Operation Order No. 19 of yesterday. (App. 788.)

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 4.15 p.m.

- Copy No. 1—1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
- 2—2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
- 3—3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
- 4--Seely's Detachment.
- 5--Divl. Artillery.
- 6--Divl. Engineers.
- 7--A.D.M.S.
- 8--A.A. & Q.M.G.
- 9--Sigs.
- 10--Indian Corps.
- 11--Advd. 1st Army.
- 12--Highland Division.
- 13--47th London Division.
- 14--1st Corps.
- 15--G.S.

790

PRIORITY.

To Seely's Detachment.

- Adv. 1st Army.
- 1st Corps and
- Adv. 47th Division.

G.592. 26th May, 1915.

The last part of para. one and whole of para. two of Canadian Division Operation Order No. 20 of to-day are cancelled as 47th Division will not move to J.6 or J.5 to-night aaa Addsd. Seely's Det. restd. Adv. 1st Army, 1st Corps and 47th Division aaa Acknowledge.

H. J. LAMB,
Lt.-Col. G.S.

From Canadian Division. 5 p.m.

Acknowledged by 1st Corps and Adv. First Army

Also sent at 7 p.m. for information to:—

- 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bdes, Div. Engineers,*
- A.D.M.S. A.A. & Q.M.G., Signals, Indian Corps*
- and Highland Div.*

PRIORITY.

To Seely's Det.

Adv. 47th Div.

G.598. 26th May, 1915.

The 47th Div. has ordered its left Bde. to have a detached fortified post either at J.5 or J.4 aaa You will endeavour to connect with this post by establishing a post some 200 yards south of K.5 aaa Addsd. Seely's Det. restd. Adv. 47th Div.

C. F. ROMER,
Colonel,
G.S.

From Canadian Div. 922 p.m.

791

To G.S.O. 1st Canadian Division.

H.Q. 1st Canadian Division.

L.26. 26th May, 1915.

1. I beg to report all my officers, familiar with the situation, do not believe we hold K.5. They state they are certain the bombing party under Lieut. Timmis, R.C.D., came down the new trench constructed the night before last towards L.6 from line K.5.B, (i.e. *K.6 towards K.3*) and 200 yards down it sent up two green flares. They are certain we do not hold L.8. Captain Morrison, R.C.E. states he examined the point from which the rockets were sent up and is satisfied it is not on the line LS to KS. Lieut. Mathieson was about L.6 when rockets went up and is certain they went up from a point between him and the line K.5 to B. (i.e. *from K.5, 160 yards towards K.8*).

2. I understand, from hearsay, the operations of the troops on our right are based upon the assumption we hold the line L.8 to K.5. For that reason I am reporting direct to you that my officers, Capt. Morrison, Lts. Mathieson and Lynn are emphatic in their opinion that we do not hold that line.

3. Brig. Genl. Seely and Lt. Col. Lipsett informed verbally. Copy sent to O.C., D. E. Information just received by me. From 0.0., 2nd Field Co. C.E. 5.45 p.m.

W. BETHUNE LINDSAY,
Lt.-Col.

By hand received 6.17 p.m.

(NOTE.—The letter B used as a map location in this and other messages was that designating the 500-yard grid square A.3.b. and printed on the map between the points K.8 and K.6.)

792

Adv. 1st Army.

I forward a report by General Seely and a Sketch Map (*not reproduced*) which gives our position at K.5 according to his personal observation.

It is very hard to get the real position of K.5. Colonel Napier, Commanding 7th Siege Brigade, who has been firing on K.5 for the last fortnight states that there is no doubt whatever we are occupying now the German work known as K.5. Our infantry there hoisted a blue flag at noon and Colonel Napier says he could see them clearly on the parapet.

E. A. H. ALDERSON,
Lieut.-General,

Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

27.5.1915.

From G.O.C. Seely's Detachment.

To G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division.

I forward herewith a tracing of the large scale map (*not reproduced*) of the area including K.5-L.8, L.5, K.4 with the positions now occupied by the troops under my command.

I have verified the K.5 position by personal observation in daylight. The Germans had two redoubts at this point, one East of the ditch running north and south through the western edge of the circle as shown on the map another west of that stream.

Before I took over the command of this Sector the Canadian Division assaulted and took the western of these redoubts.

The easterly one, across on the eastern side of the ditch remained in German hands and they still hold it.

From the position of K.5, which we hold, this redoubt can be clearly seen at a distance which I estimate at 90 yards, but which the O.C. the position when I was there estimated at 60 yards. The direction taken and the action of the bombing party which went out towards L.8 the night before last is now quite clear. Their instructions were to proceed along the German communication trench running north by east from K.5 and following this up, turning slightly more to the eastward, to make good L.8. The party accordingly started out in the required direction but following the communication trench west of the ditch cutting K. 5 instead of that

running east of it. Having gone about 100 yards without opposition they left the trench in order to continue their north northeasterly course and advanced over open ground meeting small ditches at intervals.

Some of these were held by the enemy in ones and twos all of whom retired and some of them were killed by bombs thrown at close range. The party accordingly arrived at a point about 200 yards west of L.8 and from there sent up their rockets.

In the interval during their -absence the Engineering Officer who had been digging the new trench from L.6 to K.5 arrived at K.5 and pointed out to the officer commanding the post that in order to get into the trench leading to L.8 it was necessary to cross the stream immediately in front of his position and get into the trench at the northerly edge of the circle round K.5. The O.C. Post accordingly sent to the Officer commanding the Bomb party and withdrew him to K.5 with a view of his starting afresh to get into the right trench. The Officer started out again, but being exposed to heavy fire, could not cross the ditch leading towards L.8 and accordingly followed a ditch in a northeasterly direction on this western side for about 100 yards. Daylight and heavy fire stopped further progress. At this time heavy shell and rifle fire broke communication with our post at K.5.

There is no doubt that although the bombing party failed to get to L.8 they succeeded in clearing the neighbourhood of snipers, who had previously caused considerable *loss* to the troops holding the approaches to K.5 and greatly facilitated the making of the new trench running through L.6, L.5 and L.7 now completed and held by us.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the fact that there were two K.5 redoubts, the western one of which we hold, explains the circumstance that an officer so experienced as a regimental commander and all the other officers with him were positive that the rockets had been sent up from a point it or near L.8 and reported accordingly. It will be seen from the position as shown on the sketch map that it will be practically impossible on a small scale map to tell the difference between the two redoubts at K.5 owing to their close proximity to each other.

J. E. SEELY,
Br.-General.

27.5.15.

793
SECRET.
Adv. 1st Army, G.S.89.(a).

1st Corps,
4th Corps,
Indian Corps,
Canadian Division,
No. 1 Group H.A.R.
M.G.R.A.
Intelligence,
No. 1 Wing, R.F.C.,
A.Q.M.G.,
D.M.S.,
O. i/c. Signals,
First Army, G.H.Q.

Redistribution of troops.

1. For the purpose of operations to be undertaken in the immediate future, the 1st Army will be temporarily reorganized and redistributed as described below:—

The new commands will come into force from 6 a.m. the 31st instant.

(a) Indian Corps. 8th, 49th, Meerut and Lahore Divs. under the command of General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.B. will take over the defensive front from the present left of the 1st Army as far south as the LA QUINQUE RUE road exclusive.

(b) IV Corps. 7th, 51st and Canadian Dive., under the command of Lt.-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Bart., K.C.B. will take over the front from QUINQUE RUE road inclusive, as far south as the La BASSEE canal.

(c) 1st Corps. 1st, 2nd and 47th Divs. under the command of Lt.-General Sir Charles Monro, K.C.B., will take over the front from the LA BASSEE canal to the left of the French Xth Army.

Reliefs.

2. In order to give effect to the above redistribution reliefs will be carried out as follows:

Night of 30th/31st May.

The Indian Corps will relieve the left Bde. of the 51st Div. and will carry out such readjustment of the fronts occupied by the 8th, 49th, Meerut and Lahore Divs. as may be considered desirable.

Night of 31st May/1st June.

(a) The 51st Div. under instructions of the 4th Corps, will take over the front at present held by the Canadian Div. from the LA QUINQUE RUE road inclusive to L.6 inclusive.

The 7th Division under the orders of the 4th Corps will take over the front at present held by the Canadian and 47th Divisions from L.6 exclusive, to the vicinity of L.4.

(b) That a portion of the 47th Div. relieved as in (a) will be withdrawn under the instructions of the 1st Corps.

Night of 1st/2nd June.

(a) The Indian Corps will -relieve the remainder of the 51st Div. and complete the redistribution of troops for the defence of the front mentioned in para. 1 above.

(b) The Canadian Div. will under the instructions of the 4th Corps, take over the front at present held by the 47th Div. from the vicinity of L.4 to the LA BASSEE Canal.

(c) The 47th Div. will be withdrawn in accordance with orders to be issued by the 1st Corps.

All details regarding reliefs to be arranged direct between Corps.

Corps to report progress of reliefs.

Artillery.

3. (a) The Divisional artillery (less 6" How. Bdes.) will be readjusted to suit the new distribution of frontage, and the operations in view, under the orders of Corps Commanders.

(b) 6" How. Bdes. will be redistributed as follows:—

1st Corps.—6th Bde. R.G.A. (2nd and 5th Siege Btys.)

14th Bde. R.G.A. (9th and 11th Siege Btys.)

4th Corps.—7th Bde. R.G.A. (6th, 59th and 81st Siege Btys.)

12th Bde. R.G.A. (1st and 4th Siege Btys.)

(c) Movements.—The 8th and 14th Bdes. R.G.A. will march on the night of 30th/31st May via BETHUNE to join the 1st Corps.

(d) The three groups of French artillery will remain in their present positions under the command of the 4th Corps.

Billeting Areas.

4. Boundary between Indian Corps and 4th Corps—RUE DE L'EPINETTE—LE TOURET—LE VERT LANNET—PACAUT RUE DES VACHES—ROBECQ—LA BRASSERIE—HAMET BILLET—all inclusive to 4th Corps.

Boundary between 4th Corps and 1st Corps—LE PREOL—LE QUESNOY, both inclusive

to 4th Corps. BETHUNE-CHOCQUES-both inclusive to 1st Corps. LILLERS, inclusive to 4th Corps.

Reports.

5. Advanced 1st Army will move to CHOCQUES on a date and a time to be notified later.

R. BUTLER,
Br.-General,
General Staff, 1st Army.

29th May, 1915.

794

NOTE ON MAPS AT FESTUBERT 1915

The perverted representation of trenches and topography on the 1/10,000 maps issued at this time was particularly disconcerting for the artillery, because the plotted positions of features, such as road junctions and buildings, were relatively incorrect, so that all attempts at alignment and triangulation were futile. Scale and protractor readings were entirely worthless; a compass bearing meant nothing; hedges, ditches and tracks, shown indiscriminately by the same symbol, defied identification. The Canadian gunners, of whom a number were trained surveyors, proceeded to make maps of their own by registration, using the range drum for distance and the dial sight for theodolite. In the last week of May the Canadian Engineers began a survey of the forward area, intending to make a reliable trench map, but the Division moved before it could be produced.

795

Debates House of Commons. 29th September, 1919. p. 633.

796

The Times, London, England. 25th May, 1915.

797

NOTE ON CANADIAN MEDICAL
SERVICES AT FESTUBERT
18th-31st May, 1915

On withdrawal from the Ypres sector the field ambulances moved to Bailleul, Oultersteene and Steenwerck. The most urgent to which now fell to the Medical Services, was the provision of some measure of protection against gas for which they were made respons-

ible. All available medical personnel, with the assistance of fifty women in the village of Nieppe, were engaged in making masks. The protection was primitive compared with later developments, and the masks consisted only of cotton waste, dipped in an alkaline solution, between layers of gauze, to which tapes were sewn.

On the 15th May medical units marched to the area northwest of Bethune. By 5.40 pm. on the 18th 'No. 3 Field Ambulance had opened a temporary advanced dressing station 500 yards east of Le Touret to serve the 3rd C.I.B. which was then attacking under the 7th Division. Owing to reliefs of British field ambulances being effected in stages it was not until the 20th that the Canadian medical units were all in their locations for the battle of Festubert. All three field ambulances, with a combined main dressing station under canvas, were located at Hinges, with advanced dressing stations at Rue de l'Épinette (No. 1), Rue du Bois (No. 2) and Le Touret (No. 3). On account of its exposed position the advanced dressing station of No. 2 Field Ambulance moved on the 22nd to Hamel. No. 7 Motor Ambulance Convoy, a British unit, carried wounded' from the main dressing station to Nos. 1 and 4 Casualty Clearing Stations at Choques and Lillers. From the 24th, however, serious cases were transferred at Hinges to the ambulance barges of No. 2 Ambulance Flotilla, which operated on the Aire-La Bassee Canal; these barges evacuated to stationary hospitals at Dunkirk and Calais, a three days' journey.

At first, clearing from regimental aid posts to advanced dressing stations was slow and difficult, a hand-carry of a mile over miry roads being necessary, but from the 20th improved conditions allowed of much speedier evacuation; even motor cars were able to reach most regimental aid posts and clear direct to main dressing stations. Clearing was almost all done by night.

Exclusive of 405 sick, cases handled by Canadian medical units from the 20th to 31st May numbered:-

Canadian.....	996
British.....	111
German.....	2

1,109

A certain number of Canadian walking wounded found their way to British advanced dressing stations in the 47th Divisional Area, and are not included in the foregoing figures.

798

To 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.
2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
G.630. 30th May, 1915.

The 51st High. Div. will on the night of 31st/1st June take over the trenches occupied by the 1st Canadian Bde. and also that portion of the 3rd Canadian 'Bde. from their left to L.8 aaa On the same night the 7th Div. will take over the remaining trenches of the 3rd Canadian Bde. and in addition the line of the 47th Div. as far as I.4 aaa Officers and N.C.O's of the relieving Bdes will come into the trenches to-night aaa On the 1st June probably about dusk the 2nd Canadian Bde. will take over that portion of the 47th Div. line running from I.4 to the canal aaa 2nd Bde. should arrange with Bde. occupying this sector with Hd.Qrs. at canal junction F.10.b. about sending into trenches officers and N.C.O's for reconnaissance aaa Addsd. 3 Bdes. Seely's Det. C.R.A. & C.R.E. & Signals. From Canadian Div. 6.50 am.

C. F. ROMER, Col. G.S.

799

OPERATION ORDER No. 21

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division
30th May, 1915.

1. The 51st, 7th and Canadian Divisions will form the 10th Corps from 6 a.m. 31st May.

2. On the night of 31st May/1st June the 51st Division will relieve the trenches occupied by the 1st Canadian Brigade and the trenches occupied by the 3rd Canadian Brigade as far as L.8.

On the same night the 7th Division will relieve the remainder of the trenches occupied by the 3rd Canadian Brigade and will also take over the trenches occupied by the 47th Division as far as I.1.

3. The relieving troops will march via LE TOURET and RUE DE L'EPINETTE, the 7th Division leading. On the completion of the relief the 3rd Canadian Brigade will march via RUE DE BETHUNE-GORRE and BETHUNE to No. 4 Billeting Area, 1st Canadian Brigade will march via same route to No. 3 Billeting Area, giving precedence to 3rd Canadian Brigade.

4. During the 1st June, the 2nd Canadian Brigade will relieve the trenches occupied by the 47th Division from I.1 to the Canal,

Headquarters of the Brigade being at Canal Junction in F.10.b. Route for relieving Brigade, LE HAMEL-GORRE.

5. Seely's Detachment will march at 5.30 p.m. 31st May via HALTE (in W.30.c.)-LE HAMEL-GORRE to No. 2 Billeting Area.

General Seely will place one regiment at the disposal of the 2nd Canadian Brigade as Brigade Reserve. This regiment should be billeted about LE PREOL.

6. The Canadian Divisional Artillery will move in accordance with instructions issued by Brig: General Birch.

7. Divisional Headquarters will close at HALTE (in W24.c.) at 9 a.m., 31st May, and open at the same hour at the School House VENDIN LES BETHUNE.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel, G.S.

Issued at 10.30 p.m.

Copy No. 1-1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.
2-2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
3-3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
4-Seely's Detachment.
5-Divl. Artillery.
6-Divl. Engineers.
7-Divl. Sig. Company.
8-A.A.
9-A.D.M.S.
10-10th Corps.
11-47th Division.
12-7th Division.
13-51st Division.
14-G.S.

(See 798)

800

C.R.E. 1st Canadian Div.

REPORT ON 2ND LINE DEFENCES

1. WINDY CORNER.

The buildings around WINDY CORNER are mostly fortified with sandbags and are now practically in a good state of defence. It would appear that the only remaining thing to be done would be to loophole the walls in suitable places and make adequate arrangements for defence in the various cellars; some of these cellars can be easily adapted to take machine guns.

There are several communication trenches leading up to the first line from the region around WINDY CORNER; these trenches are all in excellent condition and give very good cover.

There is a defensive post in the front of WINDY CORNER consisting of good fire trenches. To the left of the road leading

from WINDY CORNER to GIVENCHY, (A.7.c. A.7.d., Bethune sheet), there are two rows of fire trenches. These fire trenches form a semi-circle around WINDY CORNER to the East of it. The trenches have low wire entanglement in front of them and the wire is in good condition and hidden in the long grass. The fire trench which is the closer of the above two towards the enemy is in quite good condition, and that nearer BETHUNE (about 50 yards in front of the road running to PONT FIXE) is in fairly good condition. In both cases traverses are good, but the grass in front is very high and obscures the field of fire. Each trench requires a firing step of sorts on account of its depth. The above trenches would only be discovered with difficulty by aeroplane observation.

2. FROM WINDY CORNER TO PONT FIXE.

There are no continuous trenches connecting the above mentioned points, but the houses along the road can be very easily put in a complete state of defence; they are practically so now, having the windows blocked with sandbags, etc. There are some shelter trenches in the roadside ditches which would be suitable for fire trenches and would have a good field of fire for most of their length. There is no wire in front and the grass is very rank and long. There are plenty of good dugouts on the West side of the road between WINDY CORNER and PONT FIXE. Aeroplane observation for above trenches would be difficult owing to good concealment.

3. PONT FIXE.

There is quite a large defensive post about PONT FIRE and it is in good condition. There is a redoubt in the orchard to the N.E. of the distillery which is capable of holding 200 men: this redoubt is very strong and would have a good field of fire to the E., N.E. and N. on the intervening hedges being cleared. The grass is long, but in this instance would not obstruct the field of fire to any great extent. A low wire entanglement, in good condition, runs from a point about 50 yards West of PONT FIXE on the canal bank right around the front of the redoubt to the canal bank on the E. side. This wire is almost completely hidden by the long grass. There is a barricade of wire ready to throw across the road to the N. of PONT FIXE. On the bridge itself there are heavy iron sheets along the enemy side of the bridge; these sheets are bullet proof. About 260 yards (estimated) to the E. of the bridge are the locks in the canal; these locks have been destroyed. Underneath the bridges there is a "barrage" consisting of a sunken barge. It

would be hard to distinguish the redoubt from the surrounding ground by aeroplane observation.

4. "SIDBURY MOUND."

The trenches on SIDBURY MOUND (to the NE. of the Distillery) are not in very good condition, nor are the dugouts. These trenches might be observed from an aeroplane without much difficulty. They might be improved by troops occupying them.

5. TRENCHES FROM WINDY CORNER TO NORTH.

These are in good condition; they run behind some hedges in A.8.a.3.0 to A.8.a.10.0; they are screened by hedges for the whole distance and are continuous. At present there is only a poor field of fire owing to the hedges. It would be extremely difficult to locate these trenches from an aeroplane.

6. A communication trench running from the Distillery to "GUNNERS SIDING" (Givenchy) would give a good place of concentration fire for one battalion while waiting to counter attack; for a part of its length it would make a convenient fire trench.

7. Communication trenches as a whole are very good and convenient and give excellent protection to troops on the way to the front line.

The above paragraphs comprise the defences in the 2nd Line of Defence included in the Canadian Area. More complete details were not obtainable owing to the suspicion of a sergeant of police of the Border Regiment, who would not accept a pass signed by the A.P.M. of the Canadian Division, as he said it did not hold good within an area occupied by the troops of other Divisions. It was noticed that the Border Regiment and a Territorial Battalion of the Gordon Highlanders were in billets about WINDY CORNER which is now in the Canadian Area.

8. 3rd Line Defences (in Wood near 2nd Inf. Bgde. Hdqrs. in FAA. and F11.a. Bethune Sheet).

The trenches from the canal at F.11.a. to F.4 central are in excellent condition and require no work whatever. They are about 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet in depth; have a very good field of fire for trenches sited in a wood as there is a clearing a small distance in front of them. In this clearing, hidden in the long grass, is low wire entanglement, which is in good condition. The trench is continuous for about 95 yds. N. of the canal, where there is a small break. It was not possible to obtain the width of this gap, as there was a battery of French "75s" in action

and it was thought inadvisable to go in amongst the guns while they were in action. The trenches beyond the guns above mentioned on the way to F.4 Central, are in just as good a state of repair as those nearer the canal. There are quite a number of good dugouts opening off these trenches and in the immediate vicinity. These trenches are screened from aeroplanes by the trees. The long gram does not affect the field of fire in this instance, as the trench parapet is on a small rise in the ground, and there is a gentle downward slope towards the wire entanglement. If these trenches were to be occupied as fire trenches, it would probably be necessary for the troops occupying them to provide themselves with improvised firing steps. There are plenty of outlets from these trenches towards the rear.

J. B. DUNBAR, Captain,
A/Adjutant, Divisional Engineers,
1st Canadian Division.

4th June, 1915.

801

Extract from secret memorandum No. G.S. 91(a) dated 4th June 1915 addressed to G.H.Q. and signed by General Haig.

802

OPERATION ORDER No. 21

by

Lieut.-General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bt.,
K.C.B., C.V.O.

Commanding IVth Army Corps
Adv. Headquarters, IVth Corps,
31st May, 1915.

1. In accordance with secret memorandum 89 (a), dated 30th instant, issued by the 1st Army, the Pith Corps will carry out an attack on the RUE D'OUVERT and CHAPELLE ST. ROCH on a date that will be notified later.

2. The attack will be carried out by the 7th and 51st Divisions, the Canadian Division rendering such assistance as may be possible without actually assaulting the enemy's trench line.

- (a) The objective of the 7th Division will be CHAPELLE ST. ROCH and the houses in the RUE D'OUVERT as far as K.7 inclusive.
- (b) The objective of the 51st Division will be the RUE D'OUVERT from L.12 to K.7 exclusive.

3. For purpose of supporting these attacks the following artillery will be available under the orders of Brigadier-General J. F. N. Birch, A.D.C.

6 Groups

- (a) Canadian Divisional Artillery.
2nd Canadian Brigade, 4 batteries, 16 guns (18 pr).
3rd Canadian Brigade, 4 batteries 16 guns (18 pr.)
118th Howitzer Brigade (458th & 459th Battys)
8 guns (4.5" Howitzer).
45th Group French Artillery 75 mm. 12th Siege Brigade (1st & 4th) 8 guns (6" Howitzer).
 - (b) Highland Divisional Artillery.
1st Highland Brigade, 3 batteries, 12 guns (15 pr).
2nd Highland Brigade, 3 batteries, 12 guns (15 pr).
3rd Highland Brigade, 2 batteries, 8 guns (5" Howrs).
3rd Group French Artillery, 75 mm.
 - (c) 14th Brigade, R.H.A.
"F" and "I" Batteries, 12 guns (13 pr).
 - (d) "Alexander" Group.
22nd Brigade, R.F.A. (104th, 105th, 106th Battys) 18 guns (18 pr). 19th French Group, 75 mm.
 - (e) "Nicholson" Group.
35th Brigade RYA. (12th, 25th, and 58th Battys), 18 guns (18 pr).
1st Canadian Artillery Brigade, 4 batteries, 16 guns (18 pr).
 - (f) Siege Group.
7th Siege Brigade (6th, 59th and 81st Siege Batteries) 12 guns (6" Howr).
37th Howitzer Brigade (31st and 35th Batteries) 12 guns (4.5" Howrs.)
4. The artillery of No. 1 Group, (Heavy Artillery Regiment) under Brigadier-General G. McK. Franks, will assist by dealing with the hostile artillery.
5. IVth Corps Headquarters will remain at HINGES.
A.G. DALLAS, Br.-General, G.S.
IVth Corps.
- Copy No. 1 7th Division.
2 51st Division.
3 Canadian Div.
4 Adv. 1st Army.
5 1st Corps.
6 Office Copy IV Corps.

803

OPERATION ORDER No. 23

by

Lieut-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

8th June, 1915.

1. The 7th Division will attack the hostile front on the line H.3–I.4 and then, having gained possession of the trenches as far as J.16 and I.11, will attack the House at J.15 from the south and afterwards press forward against J.18, J.20 and J.12. This attack will take place on June 11th at a time which will be notified later.

2. The Canadian Division will, at the same time, break through the enemy's line on the front H.2–H.3, both inclusive, and will establish a protective flank from the right of the 7th Division to their present line.

3. In accordance with the above plan, the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will attack H.2–H.3, both inclusive, with its left on, but clear of the road running through H.3 in a northeasterly direction. When the line H.2–H.3 has been carried the attack will be pushed forward without delay to the enemy's 2nd Line, and then, as the right of the 7th Division progresses, to the enemy's main communication trench I.17 and I.20.

The exact tracing of the protective flank, which will subsequently be thrown back, will depend on the point reached by the right brigade of the 7th Division.

4. As each of the lines mentioned in para. 3 is gained bombers will move out to the right and bomb down each line until the flanks of the lines at H.2, H.6, and I.20 are fully secured. In this connection the trench between I.17 and I.19 must not be neglected.

5. The attack will be made by one company in the front line, supported by a second company and with the remainder of the Battalion in reserve. The leading company will endeavour to advance without a check to the line I.17–I.20 where it will consolidate its position. The second company will support this attack and ensure it being pushed forward to the line named and will have sufficient bombers to bomb down from H.2. The remaining companies will be held in reserve in the British trenches to ensure the capture of and consolidation of the three lines.

6. Each company will have on its flanks in the advance a party of bombers, the greater number being on the right flank.

7. Engineer parties, with working parties found from a battalion not engaged in the attack, will be detailed to consolidate each line gained in the attack, and a separate party will be told off to construct a communication trench joining the front German

trench about H.2 with our present trench at a point about 200 yards south of H.2.

8. Arrangements will be made for machine guns to be established at each hostile line as it is gained, with special reference to bringing fire on the German trenches to the south.

9. A Bomb Depot and an Engineer Depot for material will be established as far forward as possible in the British lines in preparation for the attack.

10. Steps will be taken to ensure a rapid and simultaneous advance of the attacking parties from the British trenches.

11. Blue distinguishing flags to mark the progress of the attack will be carried.

12. Places of assembly for the attacking troops to be prepared on the front to be attacked if there is insufficient room in the existing British trenches.

13. While the attack is in progress a heavy machine gun and rifle fire will be maintained on the remainder of the hostile trenches, from H.2 to the Canal.

14. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will form the Divisional Reserve. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will form the Corps Reserve. Both Brigades will be in readiness to move at short notice.

15. The regiment of Seely's Detachment allotted to 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will be moved up into the support trenches. General Seely will replace it at LE PREOL by another regiment which will form the reserve of the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.

16. The attack will be preceded by an artillery bombardment on the 8th, 9th and 10th June. This bombardment will become more intense before the assault.

17. The 3rd Canadian Inf Bde, will prevent the enemy repairing the wire in trenches damaged by the artillery during the bombardment mentioned in the preceding para.

18. Divisional Headquarters will open at the Advance Report Centre in LE QUESNOY F.8.b., on a date which will be notified later.

C. F. Romer, Colonel.
General Staff.

Issued at 2.30 p.m.

- No. 1 1st Can. Inf. Bde.
- 2 2nd Can. Inf. Bde.
- 3 3rd Can. Inf. Bde.
- 4 Div. Artillery.
- 5 Div. Engineers.
- 6 AA. & Q.M.G.
- 7 A.D.M.S.
- 8 4th Corps.
- 9 7th Division.
- 10 1st Division.
- 11 G.S.

NOTE.—Cancelled and superseded by Operation Order No. 24 of 12th June, see App. 815.

804

SECRET.

OPERATION ORDER No. 22
by
Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, CB.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division
2nd June, 1915.

1. The 7th Division will attack 1.4, 1.3, and 1.2 at 9.40 p.m. June 3rd, the attack being preceded by a heavy bombardment during the afternoon.

The 51st Division is to cut the wire in front of the enemy's trenches between M.6 and L.12 and between L.8 and L.10.

2. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade will withdraw the garrisons, with the exception of small outposts and machine guns, from their first line trenches to their support trenches during the bombardment of 1.2, and will, furthermore, keep down the enemy's fire at H.3 and H.2 by engaging these points with small arm fire at dusk on June 3rd.

3. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will also assemble at suitable places in the south-east outskirts of GIVENCHY enough sandbags and engineer materials to join up their present line with H.3 of I.1 in the event of the 7th Division gaining possession of one or both of these points.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.
1st Canadian Inf. Bde.

Issued at 10.30 p.m.
Copy No. 1 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
2 Divl. Artillery.
3 Divl. Engineers.
4 A.D.M.S.
5 A.A. & Q.M.G.
6 7th Division.
7 G.S.

805

To 7th Div.
51st Div.
Canadian Div.
HRS.214. 10th June, 1915.

In accordance with latest instructions from 1st Army the deliberate bombardment of the enemy's positions will commence on the morning of June 11th and the infantry assault will be delivered at 6 p.m. on June 13th. From 4th Corps. 8.5 a.m.

A. G. DALLAS, B.G. G.S.

806

To 7th Division.
51st Division.
Canadian Division.
HRS.214/A. 10th June, 1915.

Reference my HRS.214 of to-day aaa Operations are postponed for a further period of 24 hours aaa acknowledge. From IV Corps. 3.45 p.m.

R. Q. CRAUFORD, Captain, G.S.

807

To 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
G.273. 10th June, 1915.

The 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will be relieved by the 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. this evening under arrangements to be made between the Brigadiers concerned aaa From Canadian Divn. 11.10 a.m.

C. F. ROMER.

808

To 7th Division.
51st Division.
Canadian Division.
HRS214. 11th June, 1915.

1st Army notify operations will not take place before 15th instant aaa Acknowledge aaa From 4th Corps. 11.35 a.m.

IVth Corps H.R.S. No. 214.

7th Division
51st (Highland) Division
Canadian Division
7th Divisional & IV Corps Artillery.

Operations have this morning again been postponed for 24 hours.

These constant postponements are liable to lead to confusion regarding. dates and times. It is, therefore, to be understood that in accordance with existing orders, including the above postponement, the 48 hours preliminary bombardment will commence at 6 am. on the morning of June 13th and. will last till 6 a.m. on June 15th.

The first day of this bombardment will be devoted mainly to wire cutting, but on the second day (14th) the Heavy Artillery Reserve and the heavy howitzers under General Birch will also take part.

On the 15th between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. a heavy bombardment of the enemy's trenches

will take, place by all the heavy guns at our disposal, increasing in intensity until 6 p.m. when the infantry attacks will be delivered, if the results of the wire cutting and the effect of the bombardment are satisfactory. H.Q.IVth Corps. 11th June, 1915.

A.G. DALLAS, Br.-Gen. G.S.
IVth Corps.

809

To Can. Division.
8th June, 1915.

Reconnaissance report on gun positions. Suggested forward position for wire cutting aaa

- (1) On E. Side of road in reserve trenches from A.1.d.3.0. to F.6.c.6.5.

There is accommodation for 8 guns there aaa Batteries can come into position by day via south turning fork road.

- (2) In Hedge at A.8.c.2.9.
- (3) On south side of road in hedge behind house at A.7.d.3.6.
- (4) In brush on left of French battery at F.12.c.42.

The last three positions can be occupied by day via road through woods in F.4.10.11.

Best field of fire can be obtained from position (1).
From O.C. 5th Can. Battery.

E. GERALD HANSON, Major.

By wire received 1010 a.m.

810

NOTE BY BRIG.-GEN. H. E. BURSTALL
on draft Operation Order No. 23, Canadian
Division. (*App. 803.*)

Artillery Support.

Pending final orders wire cutting will start at 8 a.m. on line H.3, H2, 1.7, 12, I.4, enemy's front line trench.

I ask for our front trenches to be cleared by 8 a.m. as far as possible along front, especially (as regards Canadian Division) at H2, H.3, and 12. At all other places if not cleared infantry must be warned to keep down. All ranks must understand that wire cutting will continue until dark.

I ask for an officer, if possible two, who will lead the assault to examine the wire cutting at 7 p.m. on the 8th. If satisfied that it is practicable for assault he will give a certificate to that effect to the Artillery officer who will

meet him at 7 p.m. at Artillery House, Givenchy. Both officers will examine the wire cutting from every possible view. If not satisfied the wire cutting will continue on the morning of the 9th until assaulting officer is satisfied when he will give the certificate.

Firing will not start until I hear from the Division before 8 a.m. that our trenches are cleared.

The support, 2nd Line trenches, will be shelled for wire cutting on the 9th. No use doing it before as it would be mended in the night. Therefore the later we attack on the 9th—the better from artillery point.

The infantry in the trenches *must* prevent enemy from repairing the wire in the night.

H. BURSTALL, Brig.-General.
Cmdg. Artillery, Cdn. Division.

7.6.15. 11 p.m.

811

Headqrs. Divisional Art.
1st Canadian Division.
10th June, 1915.

Headquarters,

1st Canadian Division.

Re expenditure of Ammunition
8th and 9th June.

Reference your G.825, dated this date—The expenditure was incurred in carrying out the task allotted to Canadian Artillery by G.O.C., RA. VII Division Commanding Corps Artillery. This task was to cut wire on front and rear trenches on the front H2–H.3 and I.4–I.7, nearly 900 yards in all.

The expenditure referred to was under the normal scale of 6 rounds per yard for difficult country. The cutting on this front is most difficult, owing to defilade, which can be best pointed out from GIVENCHY observing Stations.

I understand that the wire cutting task co-ordinated with the extent of front along which the Infantry of the VII and Canadian Divisions required to be free of wire when carrying out assault.

The task required two days. It was extremely doubtful what hours would be available on the second day because the H.A.R. were doing a lot of Registering on the second day, and required clear ranges for exact registrations. As much of the task as was possible was therefore arranged for the first day.

It was understood that the whole of the task must be completed by the evening of the second day.

Wire cutting was stopped by the G.O.C. VII Division immediately he knew that the operations were postponed.

Much of this wire cutting has been neutralized, the enemy having put up fresh wire.

H. E. BURSTALL, Brig. General,
Commanding Canadian Div. Artillery.

812

REPORT on Wire and on Positions for 18 pr. guns in GIVENCHY South of I.2.

I examined the whole of this front early this morning very carefully from the various houses and the long grass on the forward slope and in the trenches.

I used a powerful glass and Lieut. Duguid, CA., helped me.

The rain has beaten down the grass and crops to a certain extent and I was able to see more than usual.

WIRE.

I.2 to I.7 did not look heavy and was well cut about. Uncut coils at intervals, especially at I.2. At 8.45 p.m. last night I saw one coil of black wire lifted on a long stick and put in place. From I.7 to H.2: such as I could see of the wire looked fairly light: coils of light new wire all along the front of the parapet.

From H.2 and I.13 the wire is very formidable, yards deep, chiefly coil, some of the coils very thick with meshes at every six inches. At the point H.2 the wire is lighter.

On this front the stakes of the low wire are all splintered and I could see the cut wires hanging down.

There was a considerable amount of new wire.

On the second line trenches I could see no coils.

GUNS.

Near the SHRINE and in OXFORD STREET enemy trenches are defiladed from us by a small rise in the ground. A good position for one gun at the CORNER HOUSE at the junction of the GIVENCHY—CHAPELLE ST. ROCH—LONE TREE Road. Two more guns might be in SHAFTESBURY AVENUE (i.e. *front line*) trench and a fourth gun in the open field near ORCHARD FARM. This gun would have a range of 1,000 yards, the CORNER HOUSE gun 300 yards and the others 100 yards.

Targets would be main mass of wire and two machine guns on the H.2 and H.3 front, the re-entrant angle at H.3 and a portion of the parapet between I.7 and H.3.

Considerable engineering work will be necessary and the guns should be fitted with the special shields.

I append Colonel MacLaren's report (*see below*), my indebtedness to him will be seen.

A. E. WARDROP,
Lt. Col., R.H.A.

11th June, 1915.

To G.O.C., Can. Div. Arty.

I reconnoitred this afternoon accompanied by Lieut. Duguid of the 8th Battery, the ground in rear of H.2 to H.3 with the object of placing an 18 pr. gun in or near the 1st line trench.

At least 48 hours notice should be given if this gun is to be so placed in order that a road may be prepared to take the gun in over our own trenches.

I would report as follows.

a. A gun might be placed in Cow House (9.c.10.7) 1/10000 map. The trench could be swept from to the right of H.3 to I.2. The gun would easily be located and it would be necessary to build several bridges over our trenches to get the gun in.

b. There is another position at 9.c.72. This is out in an open wheat field about 1,200 yards from H.3 and 1,000 yards from H.2. It is necessary to cross 5 trenches to reach this position and a certain amount of work would have to be done on the position itself. I think this position is the better of the two, it would be harder for the enemy to locate it and no difficulty would be encountered in clearing our own trenches when firing at H.2 or H.3.

A great deal of work must be done before the gun could be taken in and difficulty would arise once the position was located in removing the gun after the firing was over.

C. H. MACLAREN, Lt. Col.
O.C. 2nd Can. Art. Bde.

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OPERATION ORDER No. 24

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

12th June, 1915.

1. Operation Order No. 23, dated 8th June, is cancelled. (*App. 803.*)

2. (a) The 4th Corps will on June 15th and following days attack and capture the German position from the GIVENCHY—CHAPELLE ST. ROCH Road to the northern end of the RUE D'OUVERT.

(b) The Canadian Division will attack on the front H.2–H.3, both inclusive, and will establish a protective flank from the right of the 7th Division to their present trenches.

(c) The 7th Division will attack on the front H.3 exclusive,–I.4.

(d) The 51st Division will attack the enemy's salient opposite L.8 and gain possession of the line L.10–L.9 and the northern end of the RUE d'OUVERT, eventually joining up with the 7th Division about K.7.

(e) The Infantry assault will be simultaneous and will take place at 6 p.m. on June 15th.

3. In accordance with the above plan, the 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will attack H.2–H.3, both inclusive, with its left on, but clear of the road running through H.3, in a north-easterly direction. When the line H.2–H.3 has been carried the attack will be pushed forward without delay to the enemy's 2nd Line I.14–H.6; and then, as the right of the 7th Division progresses, to the enemy's main communication trench I.17 and I.20.

The exact tracing of the protective flank, which will subsequently be thrown back, will depend on the point reached by the right Brigade of the 7th Division.

4. As each of the lines mentioned in para. 3 is gained bombers will move out to the right and bomb down each line until the flanks of the lines at H.2, H.6 and I.20 are fully secured. In this connection the trench between I.17 and I.19 must not be neglected.

5. The attack will be made by one company in the front line, supported by a second company and with the remainder of the Battalion in reserve. The leading company will endeavour to advance without a check to the line I.14–H.6 and then, keeping pace with the advance of the 7th Division, push on to the line I.17–I.20 where it will consolidate its position. The second company will support this attack and ensure it being pushed forward to the line named. The remaining companies will be held in reserve in the British trenches to ensure the capture and consolidation of the three lines.

6. Each company will have on its flanks in the advance a party of bombers, the greater number being on the right flank.

7. Engineer parties, with working parties found from a battalion not engaged in the attack, will be detailed to consolidate each line gained in the attack, and a separate party will be told off to construct a communication trench joining the front German trench about H.2 with our present trench at a point about 200 yards south of H.2.

8. Arrangements will be made for machine guns to be established at each hostile line as it is gained, with special reference to bringing fire on the German trenches to the south.

9. A Bomb Depot and an Engineer Depot for material will be established near the Headquarters of the 1st Battalion on WILLOW ROAD.

10. Steps will be taken to ensure a rapid and simultaneous advance of the attacking parties from the British trenches.

11. Blue distinguishing flags will be carried to mark the progress of the attack. The 7th Division will employ a red and blue flag divided diagonally. The 7th Division will also use the following rocket signals:–

Rocket Signals for day–

Two rockets showing blue smoke for the capture of the German front line.

Two rockets showing white stars for the capture of the German second line.

Two rockets showing green smoke for the capture of J.15.

12. While the attack is in progress a heavy machine gun and rifle fire will be maintained on the remainder of the hostile trenches, from H.2 to the Canal.

13. The 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. will form the Divisional Reserve. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will form the Corps Reserve. Both Brigades will be in readiness to move at short notice.

14. The regiment of Seely's Detachment at LE PREOL will be moved up into the support trenches and will come under the orders of G.O.C. 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. General Seely will replace it at LE PREOL by another regiment.

15. The attack will be prepared by a slow bombardment commencing on June 13th and continuing by day and night up to the moment of assault.

The bombardment of the German front trench will lift at 6 p.m. on June 15th and that on the German second trench at 6.5 p.m.

A barrage will be placed on the communication trench between I.17 and I.20 up to 6.20 p.m. at which hour it will be moved to east of I.20.

16. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will prevent the enemy repairing the wire damaged by the artillery during the bombardment mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

17. Divisional Headquarters will open at Advance Report Centre in LE QUESNOY (F.8.b.) at mid-day June 15th.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel, G.S.

Issued at 8.30 p.m.

No. 1 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.
2 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
3 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
4 Seely's Detachment.
5 Div. Artillery.
6 Div. Engineers.
7 A.D.M.S.
8 4th Corps.
9 7th Division.
10 1st Division.
11 51st Division.
12 General Birch.
13 A.A. & Q.M.G.
14 G.S.

814

EXTRACTS FROM 4TH CORPS
MEMORANDUM

Bombardment immediately prior to Assault-

June 15

5.30-6 p.m.

- (2) 4.5" Howitzers.
(a) Canadian How. Group.
5 Batteries—New Trench parallel to and 50 yards W. of I.12—J.14—J.13; also trench I.9—I.8—I.10—I.14—H.5.

- (3) Horse and Field Batteries.
(a) Canadian Division Artillery.
Front trench Bend East of H.1—H.2.3—1.7.2.4.3; also J.20.

Note—the battery firing on the bend East of H.1—H2 will search back 150 yards.

FIRST LIFT—Canadian Division—June 15th 6—6.5 p.m.

- (3) 4.5" Howitzers.
(a) Canadian Division Artillery.
1 Battery Bend E. of H.1 for 100 yards towards H.8—H.4—to front trench 100 yards S.W. of H.4.
1 Battery I.17. 15. 11—House just South of I.11.
1 Battery 3rd line trench I.11—4.16 and W. end of BRICKFIELD.
2 Batteries New trench parallel to and 50 yards W. of J.14—J.13; fire not to be directed S. of J.14.

CONTINUE ON THIS TARGET till 6.10 p.m.

- (4) Horse and Field Batteries.

(b) Canadian Division Artillery.

1 Brigade Salient W. of H.8—H.4. (1st and 2nd Line trenches) H.4—1.13.
1 Brigade I.13—1.8.
1 Battery H.9—1.19.
2 Batteries I.19. 17. 15. 11.
1 Battery H.8—H.4; search back 200 yards.
French Bde J.19. 20.

SECOND LIFT—Canadian Division—

June 15th

6.5 p.m.—6.20 p.m.

- (3) 4.5" Howitzers. Canadian How. Group.

1 Battery Bend E. of H.1—H.8.
1 Battery Communication trench I.17—120.
1 Battery Road Junction 100 yards S. of 3.18—3.18.
2 Batteries Continue fire till 6.10 on New trench parallel to and 50 yards W. of J.14—J.13; fire not to be directed S. of J.14.

6.10—6.20 p.m.

1 Battery J.17.
1 Battery Trench from a point 100 yards N.E. of J.15 for 150 yds. towards J.12.

- (4) Horse and Field Batteries.

(b) Canadian Division Artillery.

1 Brigade Salient E. of H.1 for 200 yds. to N. and sweep back to the line H.6—H.4.
1 Brigade 2 Batteries H.8—H.9.
2 Batteries will act as counter batteries or be prepared to fire on to G.1. G.12. F.10. F.5 if required.
1 Brigade H.9—1.20.
French Bde I.17—1.18.

THIRD LIFT—Canadian Division—June 15th

6.20—6.50 p.m.

- (3) 4.5" Howitzers (Canadian Div. Art.).

1 Battery Bend E. of H.1—H.8.
1 Battery Communication trench I.21—H.19.
1 Battery Trench I.22—road Junction S. of J.18.
1 Battery Road and houses from road Junction S. of J.18—J.20 (exclusive).
1 Battery Houses E. of road J.20—J.12.

(4) Horse and Field Batteries.(b) Canadian Division Art.

1 Brigade.....Line bend E. of H.1-150 yards
S. of H.2 to line HA. H.8.

1 Brigade2 Batteries H.8-H.16.
2 Batteries will be prepared to
act as counter batteries or to
shell G.1-G.12. F.10-F.5.

1 BrigadeH.16--I.22.

French Bde.....Communication trenches
about Z.6. Z.7. (see map
issued to day-not reproduced).

G. W. GORDON-HALL.,

Lieut.-Colonel,G.S.,

1st Canadian Division.

15.6.1915.

815

To Cdn. Div., Arty.
M.52. 15th June, 1915.

Lieut. Kelly, commanding right forward gun reports that he smashed one machine gun and Lieut. Craig's gun smashed two. Later the dust and smoke obscured view of effect of fire. When our mine exploded it killed and wounded practically all (*our*) infantry in front trench and partly buried (*our*) gun crews. Kelly and one sergeant hurt and all gunners bruised more or less. Craig fired 80 rounds, cut all wire and knocked down 40 yards of parapet. Kelly buried under earth when advance took place cannot report final effect. He fired 40 rounds when gun went out of action. Tried three strikers without success. I have sent forward an artificer.

From O.C. 1st Canadian Artillery Brigade.

820 p.m.

816

To 1st Canadian Divn.
B.M.428. 15th June, 1915.

2nd Btn. on right of Section B2. at Junction road near H.1. Reports 1st line taken bombing party moving south in front of their line are now moving south along German front trench sea Flags can be seen moving down towards H.5 Salient aaa Wire temporarily broken to 1st Btn.

From 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. 6.35 p.m.

By wire received 7 p.m.

817

Extract from Supplement to

THE LONDON GAZETTE

Of 20th August, 1915

No. 29272.

WAR OFFICE, 23rd August, 1915.

His Majesty the KING has been graciously pleased to award the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officers and Non-commissioned Officers in recognition of their most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty in the Field:—

Lieutenant Frederick William Campbell, 1st Canadian Battalion.

For most conspicuous bravery on 15th June, 1915, during the action at Givenchy.

Lieutenant Campbell took two machineguns over the parapet, arrived at the German first line with one gun, and maintained his position there, under very heavy rifle, machine-gun, and bomb fire, notwithstanding the fact that almost the whole of his detachment had then been killed or wounded.

When our supply of bombs had become exhausted, this Officer advanced his gun still further to an exposed position, and, by firing about 1,000 rounds, succeeded in holding back the enemy's counter-attack.

This very gallant Officer was subsequently wounded, and has since died.

Captain Campbell, who was posthumously promoted with effect from 23rd April, 1915, was born in Mount Forest, Ont., 15th June, 1869, and farmed in Wellington County all his life. For twenty-one years he was connected with the 30th Regiment (Wellington Rifles), with ten years in the ranks, and was still serving in that regiment as lieutenant at the outbreak of the Great War. He served in South Africa, Nov. 1899-Nov. 1900, with the R.C.Rs as private in the machine gun section and received the Queen's Medal and four clasps. At Valcartier, in September 1914, he was appointed machine gun officer in the 1st Battalion C.E.F. with rank of lieutenant. On 15th June 1915, he was wounded, severely; he died four days later.

818

To 1st Canadian Divn.
B.M.437. 15th June, 1915.

O.C. 1st Btn. reports have heard from runner that the 2nd Line German Trench is in the possession of the 1st Btn. Major Smith in command he reports he is held up and hard pressed but is holding on aaa A company of 3rd Btn ordered forward to support aaa

From 1st Can. Inf. Bde. 9.05 p.m.

By wire received 9.30 p.m.

819

To Adv. Can. Divn.
A.164. 16th June, 1915.

The attacks on the front H.2-J.4 today were unsuccessful aaa The 20th Inf. Bde. have occupied the German trenches from J.10 to K.6 aaa The highland division have established themselves about L.10-L.9 aaa The highland diva. will renew their advance 1.45 a.m. The Canadian Division and 21st Inf. Bde. will assault the line H.2-I.4 at 5.30 a.m. the assault will be prepared by an artillery bombardment aaa The position will be consolidated when captured the objective being the enemy's first trench aaa Acknowledge addsd. 20th, 21st, 22nd In f. brigades. 7th Diva. R.A. repeated 4th Corps Canadian Divn. Highland Divas.
From 7th Division. 1.15 a.m.

By wire received 210 a.m.

820

SECRET.

To Canadian Div.
G.166. 16th June, 1915.

The 4th Corps will resume the attack today, the general plan for the 7th, 51st and Canadian Divns. being the same as for yesterday the 15th instant aaa The assault will be launched at 4.45 p.m. after an intensive bombardment commencing at 4 pan. aaa The general dispositions of the 7th Division will be the same as yesterday but the attack of the 21st Infantry Brigade will be confined to the front H.3-I.4 and the first objective will be the enemy's front line trench which will at once be consolidated aaa The second objective will be the enemy's 2nd line trench from 1.10 to 1.9 which will also be captured with the least possible delay aaa No message previous to the attack should be sent by telephone wires aaa Acknowledge aaa Addressed 20th, 21st, 22nd Inf. Bdes, 'A', R.A., R.E., A.D.M.S., Signals, Cyclists, Div. Sqdn., 4th Corps, 51st and Canadian Divas.

From 7th Division. 12.35 p.m.

F. GATHORNE-HARDY, Lt.-Col.
By hand received

821

To 1st Canadian Divas.
17th June, 1915.

Message from O.C. 1st Can. In f. Bde. begins aaa With reference to operations of the 15th inst. I wish to record the fact that the wire in front of the line H.2-H.3 was found to have been most satisfactorily dealt

with by the Artillery and I will be glad if you will advise the G.O.C. Can. Divn. Art. and all others concerned of the fact aaa As an obstacle to our advance the wire has ceased to exist.

From Can. Div. Art.

By wire received 12.42 p.m.

822

NOTE ON CANADIAN MEDICAL SERVICES AT
GIVENCHY 15th-20th June, 1915

After the battle of Festubert the Canadian field ambulances received their first issue of wheeled stretchers, four in number. Three operating tents per field ambulance also formed a valuable addition to the equipment.

On account of the narrow frontage and limited force engaged only one field ambulance (No. 1) was employed in the clearing of the line during the operation at Givenchy, but additional transport was loaned from the other two ambulances. The main dressing station was in a sandpit at le Quesnoy and the advanced dressing station on the Rue Fontaine south of the canal and half way to Pont Fixe. Regimental aid posts were on the road known as Harley Street, which runs from Pont Fixe to Windy Corner, a mile behind the village of Givenchy. The new wheeled stretchers were used to clear from the posts to the canal near Pont Fixe, where cases were transferred by horsed and motor transport for evacuation to the advanced dressing station. A medical detachment was stationed at the transfer point and the officer in charge was in constant touch with the regimental aid posts. From the 17th, motor ambulance cars were run forward to Pont Fine; they cleared direct to the main dressing station.

From 15th to 20th June, 486 Canadian and 170 British wounded were handled.

823

OPERATION ORDER No. 27

by
Lieut.-General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Bt.,
K.C.B., C.V.O., Commanding IVth
Army Corps
Headquarters, IVth Army Corps.

18th June, 1915.

1. With the object of pinning the enemy to his present positions in front of the IVth Corps and of causing him loss, the following operation will be undertaken on the morning of the 19th instant.

2. An artillery bombardment of the enemy's positions in the area L.12-L.9-Z-L.10-L.11-L.13-K.7 will commence at 330 a.m. and will continue for 30 minutes. During this bombardment artillery fire will also be maintained on other selected points on the IVth Corps front under the orders of the G.O.C. Pith Corps artillery. By arrangement with the G.Os. C. 1st and Indian Corps certain batteries of both these Corps will take part in the bombardment.

3. At 3.40 a.m. small detachments of the troops of the 7th Division near the salient L.8 will move forward out of their trenches and lie down in the grass as if in preparation to assault the enemy's positions.

At the same time arrangements will be made by the 7th Division to induce the enemy to man his parapets in the neighbourhood of L.10 by undertaking such other infantry movements as will lead him to suppose that an immediate assault will take place.

The infantry of the Canadian Division will carry out a similar demonstration in the neighbourhood of H.2-H.3.

4. Reports to IVth Corps Head-quarters, HINGES.
G. DALLAS, Br.-General,
General Staff, Pith Corps.

Issued at 5.45 p.m.

Copy No. 1 7th Division.
2 51st Division.
3 Canadian Division.
4 Advanced 1st Army.
5 1st Corps.
6 Indian Corps.
7 No. 1 Group, H.A.R.
8 No. 2 Sgdm. R.F.C.
9 M.G.R.A. 1st Army.
10 DA. & Q.M.G., IVth.Corps.
11 Pith Corps Artillery.
12 File Pith Corps.

824

OPERATION ORDER No. 27

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

23rd June, 1915.

1. The 1st Canadian Division will be relieved by the 7th Division and will march up to the 3rd Corps Area and take over the trenches at present occupied by the 48th and 12th Divisions.

2. The 3rd Corps will be reconstituted so as to comprise 8th, 27th, 12th and Canadian Divisions.

3. Consequent on this re-organization, the following moves will take place.

- (a) The 2nd Canadian Brigade Group, consisting of-

2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
2nd Canadian Artillery Bde.
118th Howitzer Bde.
1st Field Company, C.E.
No. 2 Field Ambulance,

under the command of G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will march on the night of 24th/25th to NEUF BERQUIN.

Route-Via LOCON, LESTREM and LA. GORGUE.

Starting Point-Canal Bridge in W.24. c.

Time-10.5 p.m.

The Group will billet at NEUF BERQUIN and on the night of 25th/26th will move to area about NOOTE BOOM. On night 26th/ 27th this Group will move up under orders of 12th , Division (Headquarters, NIEPPE) to relieve 144th Brigade Group of the 48th Division and take over trenches 66 to 73, both inclusive, as shown on attached map Battalion and Company Officers will proceed by Bus at 10 a.m. 24th," inst. to Headquarters 48th Division. Billeting parties will be sent forward on 24th to NEUF BERQUIN.

- (b) The 1st Canadian Brigade Group, consisting of-

1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
1st Canadian Artillery Bde.
3rd Field Company, CE.
No.1 Field Ambulance,

under the command of G.O.C. 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will march on the night of 25th/26th to NEUF BERQUIN.

Route-LOCON, LESTREM, LA GORGUE.

Starting Point-Road Junction in W.18-b. 8.4.

Time-9.50 p.m.

On the night of the 26th/27th the Group will move to NOOTE BOOM and on night of 27th/28th it will be moved up under orders of 12th Division to take over that part of the line held by this Division from trenches 32 to 65, both inclusive, as shown on attached map. Battalion and Company officers will proceed by Bus at 10 a.m. on 24th to Headquarters 48th Division. Billeting parties will be sent forward on the 25th to NEUF BERQUIN.

*Not reproduced.

- (c) The 3rd Canadian Brigade Group, consisting of—
 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
 Seely's Detachment.
 3rd Canadian Artillery Bde.
 2nd Field Company, C.E.
 No. 3 Field Ambulance,

under the command of G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde, will march on the night of 26th/27th to NEUF BERQUIN and on the night of 27th/28th to NOOTE BOOM where it will remain for the present. Billeting parties will be sent forward to NEUF BERQUIN on the 26th.

Route, Starting Point and Time—Same as for 2nd Canadian Brigade Group.

4. The 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. and Seely's Detachment will be relieved in the trenches by the 20th Brigade of the 7th Division on the night of 24th/25th under arrangements which will be communicated later.

5. Headquarters Canadian Division and Divisional Troops will march by day on 27th to NIEPPE.

6. The Canadian Division will take over command of the new line, that is, trenches 32 to 73, both inclusive, as soon as the 1st Canadian Brigade Group has relieved the 12th Division.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel, G.S.

Issued at 12.30 a.m.

- Copy No. 1 1st Canadian Inf. Bde,
 2 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
 3 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
 4 Seely's Detachment.
 5 Divisional Artillery.
 6 Divl. Engineers.
 7 A.D.M.S.
 8 Div. Signal Company.
 9 Divl. Train,
 10 Divl. Mtd. Troops.
 11 AA. & Q.M.G.
 12 3rd Corps.
 13 7th Division.
 14 2nd Division.
 15 4th Corps.
 16 48th Division.
 17 12th Division.
 18 G.S.

825

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER No. 28

by

Lieut-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
 Commanding 1st Canadian Division

27th June, 1915.

1. The front held by the Canadian Division will be subdivided as follows:—

FRONT LINE--

- Seely's detachment Trenches 72 to 08.
 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. Trenches 67 to 62.
 1st Canadian Inf. Bde Trenches 61 to 32.
 all figures inclusive.

The attached map* shows the subdivision of the area in rear of the front line.

2. Each Brigade will be responsible for the supporting points within its area. General Seely will select and report position of his Headquarters as soon as possible.

3. Seely's Detachment will take up its line on the night of the 28th/29th. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will take up its new line on the night of the 29th/30th. Completion of reliefs to be reported.

G. W. GORDON-HALL,
 Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff.

Issued at 10.30 p.m.

- Copy No. 1--1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
 2--2nd Canadian Inf Bde.
 3--3rd Canadian Inf Bde.
 4--Seely's.
 5--Divl. Engineer.
 6--Divl. Artillery.
 7-- A.D.M.S.
 8--Divl. Signal Company.
 10--A.A. & Q.M.G.
 11--Divl. Train.
 12--3rd Corps.
 13--12th Division.
 14--50th Division.

*Not reproduced.

826

1st Canadian Division
 G.438

SECRET

To:

1. The front held by the Canadian Division is divided into three Sections, the Right Section held by the 1st and 3rd Canadian Inf. Bdes. alternately; the Centre held by the 2nd Bde.; the Left section held by Seely's Detachment.

2. Length of front.

The frontage held in the Right Section is approximately 2,250 yards; in the Centre Section 1,450 yards; in the Left Section 800 yards.

3. First and Second, Line of Defence.

The front line of trenches is the main line of defence. A Second line is in course of construction, short lengths have already been constructed in places. Both first and second lines are to be firing trenches, strongly wired;

traverses and machine gun emplacements built; and strong dugouts provided. Machine guns should be placed in projecting portions of trenches whence an enfilade fire can be brought to bear on all the ground in front. The object of the second line is to permit the garrison being withdrawn from the first line, should the latter be subjected to a heavy artillery bombardment; it need not be made continuous, but it should be connected with the first line by numerous communication trenches, some of these being reserved for traffic from front to rear, and distinctly marked as for this purpose.

Stores of reserve small arm ammunition, grenades and engineer material and tools should be provided in both these lines. A reserve supply of water should also be provided where necessary.

4. Supporting Points.

In rear of the first and second lines of defence, certain supporting points with all round defence have been constructed with the object of checking and breaking up a hostile attack which may have penetrated the front line. They are intended also to cover the organization and deployment of counter attacks to regain lines lost.

These points should each contain a sentry group by day, and by night be occupied by a full garrison with machine guns. Reserve ammunition, grenades, tools, engineer stores and two days water and reserve rations for the full garrison should be held at each post.

5. Counter-attacks.

Forming up places should be selected in each Section for assembling troops for counter attacks against any hostile bodies that may succeed in getting a footing in our front line trenches.

6. The safety of the front held by the Canadian Division, and only to a lesser degree the safety of the fronts of the Divisions on the right and left, are dependent largely on the successful defence of Hill 63.

This must be borne in mind in the siting and construction of all works built for the actual defence of the hill itself as also of the defended localities mentioned in par&. 4. and finally, of the positions selected for reserves to form up for counter-attacks.

- (a) The defences of the Hill must be self contained and capable of resisting attacks from the North, East and South. Garrisons for these works must be detailed and the works must be manned on an attack on our lines appearing imminent.

- (b) Supporting localities must be sited so as to be capable of bringing an enfilading fire on a force advancing to an attack of Hill 63 after penetrating any portion of our front line.

- (c) The location of Reserves must be so selected that counter-attacks can be launched with the least possible delay.

7. Divisional Reserve.

The Divisional Reserve consists of an Infantry Bde. and the Divisional Mounted Troops. Of these, one Battalion is billeted at LAMPERNISSE, one at LA CRECHE, and two with Brigade Headquarters at NOOTE BOOM. The mounted troops are billeted at STEENTJE.

8. Artillery.

The Commander of each Section is in direct communication with the artillery allotted to the support of the Infantry in that section, in order to ensure close co-operation. Short signals for- artillery support, in case of emergency, are to be arranged direct with the infantry in the front line for use by day and night.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col.,
General Staff,

1st Canadian Division.

2nd July, 1915.

827

SECRET.

8th .

12th

27th

Canadian Division.

DEFENSIVE LINES

The Corps Commander desires that especial attention shall be paid to the construction throughout the line of defence of strong support trenches, or breastworks, furnished with a sufficient number of splinter, or bomb, proofs, to contain from two-thirds to three-quarters of the normal number of troops in front line and immediate support, and connected with the front line by means of communication trenches.

As far as materials admit these. should be made bomb proof against the fire of *the* smaller high explosive shell, by means of heavy timber, sandbags filled with hard material, layers of bricks, etc., but in the absence of such material protection against splinters and shrapnel at least should be secured.

The support trenches should be placed as near to the front line as is consistent with their not being involved in destruction caused by the shelling of the front line.

The greatest care should be taken that the floors of the shelters should be above the winter water level of the ground. This will often involve the erection of the breastworks and great care should be devoted to the drainage of these trenches.

It is very desirable that they should be so organized as to be capable of being used as fire trenches in case of necessity.

A.LYNDEN-BELL,
B.G., G.S.

G.1697.
28.6.15.

828

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY III CORPS
RE DEFENCE LINES, PLOEG
STEERT FRONT

12th Division.
27th Division.
48th Division.

1. Under the conditions which existed earlier in the campaign a number of defensive lines have been reconnoitred and a considerable amount of labour has been expended on their preparation.

2. Since February the Commander-in-Chief considers that the gradual increase in the size of the Army in the Field has caused a change in the General Situation which has made it necessary to modify the principles on which our defensive plans must be based. We must still be prepared to meet a determined attempt by the enemy to break through our line, but the present strength of our army, as compared with the numbers which the enemy is likely to be able to bring against it, makes it improbable that we shall be obliged to carry out a deliberate retirement of the kind which was formerly contemplated.

In view of the fact that the amount of labour at our disposal is strictly limited, the Commander-in-Chief has therefore decided that, for the present, all available men and tools are to be used for the purpose of making the zone immediately in rear of the front line as strong as possible, and that no work will be carried out on lines further to the rear which are less likely to be required.

3. Experience shows that the policy hitherto pursued in some portions of the area in rear of our present fighting line of

constructing continuous lines of trenches strengthened in parts by supporting points placed immediately in rear is, in many cases, unlikely to meet the tactical requirements of the situations which may arise. The Commander-in-Chief therefore directs that this policy should be generally discontinued, and that in future our organization for defence is as far as possible, to consist of a wide defensive belt composed of a network of localities, so sited that the interval between any two adjacent localities is swept by the effective fire from the flanks. Cases may, however, occur in which, owing to the configuration of the ground, the adoption of the above system will not meet the case; for instance in open undulating country where the ground can only be effectively swept by frontal rifle fire from a line of trenches.

4. The defended localities should be so chosen as to block approaches and to secure important tactical points such as farm enclosures, portions of woods, groups of buildings or villages, and their fire trenches should be so sited as to ensure an all round defence. They should be thoroughly wired in and liberally provided with machine gun emplacements and splinter proofs. The liability of these localities to become shell-traps can only be reduced by the judicious siting and dispersion of the defences. After construction, labour must be earmarked for their maintenance in a condition which will enable them to be occupied at short notice, and the question of furnishing them with water and reserve supplies must be considered, in order that it may be possible to hold them for a time if they are temporarily cut off.

5. If carefully designed and solidly prepared, these defended localities will enable a temporary success on the part of the enemy to be checked and localized while a counter attack is being organized; and, failing the success of the counter attack, they will form supporting points on which a new line of trenches can be built up in such a manner as to surrender the minimum of ground to the enemy. The construction of this system of localities is to be commenced from the front, and the defended zone then extended to the rear as rapidly as time and available labour will permit.

6. It is considered that our defensive arrangements will not be in a thoroughly satisfactory condition until the defensive zone is completed all along the line to an average depth of from four to five miles behind our present front. In rear of points at which there are salients in the line, which form

probable objectives for the enemy's attacks, the depth of the zone should be greater still. Commanders of all sections of the line are responsible that their system of defence dovetails in with that of the sections on their flanks.

7. Divisions holding sections of the 3rd Corps front will be responsible for all work carried out between the front line and the present divisional subsidiary line, assistance being rendered by the corps as found possible. Corps Headquarters will arrange for the construction of all necessary works lying further to the rear than the present Divisional subsidiary lines.

8. Each division holding any portion of the front line will keep up a map showing what works are constructed in the area for which it is responsible and will inform Corps Headquarters as soon as the construction of each work is completed.

9. The Corps Commander leaves it to the discretion of Divisional Commanders to communicate to their subordinates as much or as little of the contents of this memorandum as they may consider necessary in order to carry out the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief that the 3rd Corps should be prepared for all eventualities however improbable. He is, however, most anxious that it should be impressed on all ranks in the Corps that there is no intention whatever of giving up one inch of the ground at present held by the Corps but that on the contrary he considers it a point of honour with every battalion not to give up its trenches except to advance. He also particularly wishes everyone to understand that the object of making strong supporting points in the rear of the front line of trenches is not to furnish a secure line to which the front line can retire if pressed but rather to give additional strength to the front line by having ready & number of strong localities which may be held by reinforcements intended to help the front line to hold its position at all costs.

Brig.-General,
General Staff.

G.1531.
14.6.15.

829

To Canadian Division.

With reference to previous instructions *re* the formation of support trenches, the Corps Commander considers these to be of such immediate importance, that he desires that

they should be dug in without reference to winter water levels if the formation of BreastWorks will delay the work.

The support trenches, together with good communications to and from them, should be considered to be a matter of the very first necessity, and all available labour should be concentrated on them, the only works of equal importance being—

- (1) The upkeep of the front defence works.
- (2) The strengthening of certain of the more important supporting points, which should be made as strong as possible and have specially strengthened places for machine guns.

The support trenches should be about 70 yards (on level ground) from the front line.

By a suitable organization of labour and by working in these trenches by day as soon as reasonable cover has been obtained, the support trenches should be finished within a comparatively short period, even though it may not be possible in the same period to put in all the splinter or bomb proofs required.

It is requested that a programme may be sent in showing the number of infantry it is proposed to employ on the works, daily and nightly in each Brigade.

W. W. BARTHOLOMEW, B.G., G.S.
3rd Corps.

2

Seely's Detachment.

With reference to the above, will you please forward a reply as regards last para., as soon as possible.

G. W. GORDON-HALL, Lt.-Col., G.S.,
1st Canadian Division.

3rd July, 1915.

830

PROGRAMME OF WORK

Proposed to be done on the Front held by
1st Canadian Division

1. First Line. The front line trenches though fully completed, still requires work to be done on it in strengthening breastworks and parapets, in drainage, and in provision of loopholes for machine guns and snipers. This work is being done by the garrison maintained in the first line and is steadily progressing. The wire in front of this line also needs constant repairs and as the width of entanglements is in places very narrow much new wire is being night (*sic nightly*) put out. A new trench has been

built across PROWSE POINT . (U.14.d.9.9) with communication trenches connecting it with the old line and barbed wire entanglements have been erected.

Listening posts have been constructed in front of trench 126 and 141 but more are required and will be built as time permits. These are very necessary as the Germans have been very actively pushing out posts from their line to "the restriction of the activity of our patrols.

2. Second Line. Little work has been done on the 2nd Line. Small lengths existed in rear of trenches 129, 130, 136 and 137 and round ST. YVES, so that about 4,000 yards of trench work was required on this line. All except a small length behind trench 131 has now been dug, though much of it is unfinished, and considerable work is required over the whole line. As soon as the line itself has been dug and completed as a fire trench and has been wired along its whole front, dugouts will be constructed and recesses made for ammunition, bombs, food and water. These recesses will be constructed near the junction of communication trenches with the 2nd line so as to facilitate distribution to the troops holding the 1st line trenches. The dugouts will be constructed as sufficient material of a suitable character is obtained and will be made as low down as possible in the trenches so that the maximum cover may be obtained. The construction of communication trenches between 1st and 2nd line is keeping pace with the construction of the 2nd line itself, but when time permits they will be increased in number, so as to allow of the selection of certain trenches for communication. from front to rear-only, for the evacuation of sick and wounded. All fire and communication trenches in the 1st and 2nd line are being named or numbered and signboards are being placed to guide troops moving along these trenches. This work is also in hand.

3. Supporting points to Front Line. A number of supporting points to the front line had been selected before the Division took over this line. All these require work to be done upon them; in some cases work had been commenced. The work on these points supporting has been in most cases postponed until the 2nd Line has been completed. They will be taken in hand as soon as possible. It is the intention to make these self-supporting works for small garrisons of about a platoon. Reserves of ammunition., rations, bombs and Very lights and water will be installed in each work. Each point will be completely wired and where necessary communication will be arranged with the subsidiary line in rear.

4. Subsidiary Line. The Subsidiary Line consists of a continuous line of trenches and breastworks with supporting points in rear. Considerable work is required on this line. In some cases the trenches are very shallow, breastworks not bulletproof and dugouts insufficient. The number of men available for this work at present is very small but where possible improvement has been made, notably in the portion of line in U.14.a. and o. LE ROSSIGNOL and at U.12.a. and c. Work is also being done by the few men available at some supporting points, but until a larger working party is available these cannot be considered satisfactory, though most of them are already in a condition for occupation in case of necessity. Besides the deepening of trenches and strengthening of breastworks and parados, dugouts are required in large numbers and recesses for reserve supplies. As these are dependent upon the supply of engineer material the want of working parties is not delaying the work. Working parties are engaged on the supporting points to the Subsidiary Line. CLISSOLD FORT is now almost completed and good work has been done on RATION FARM and DOUCE FORT, but it will be some time before the remainder can be completed owing to the shortage of labour.

5. Main Communication Trenches. The Lines of approach to the front trenches are at present, for the right and centre, by the communication trench running close to the Subsidiary Line in U.14.a. and c. and by MUD LANE and the STRAND. The position here is satisfactory, but when labour is available these will be supplemented by means of communications running along ASH road, PROWSE ROAD, MUD CORNER and MOATED FARM to the first and 2nd Line. On the left section the trenches are approached by communication trenches running from WHITE GATES and. RATION FARM and thence by two long communication trenches to the front line. These have all been worked at and linked up and are now safe to use. The work is still proceeding as they require deepening and further cross communications are necessary.

6. It is estimated that the work on the 1st and 2nd lines will be completed in a week; that the work on the supporting points of these lines will take a fortnight longer and it will be a month before the Subsidiary line and the Supporting points in the rear can be completed.

7. During the past week the average number of men employed daily per Brigade on work referred to in preceding paragraphs is as follows:-

1st Canadian Inf. Bde 1,300
 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde 500
 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde 650
 Seely's Detachment 250

8. Map showing the work done up to date was forwarded to you yesterday under my G:569. (*Not reproduced.*)

E. A. H. ALDERSON, Lt.-General,
 Commanding 1st Cdn. Div.

10.7.15.

831

To Bdes (Inf.), Div. Art., etc.

G. H. Q. 2nd Line

1. Infantry Frontage-in the event of a retirement to the G.H.Q. 2nd line being ordered-

- (a) Seely's Detachment will occupy that portion from the MESSINES-NEUVE EGLISE ROAD, exclusive, to the road at T.16.c.7.9, exclusive.
- (b) 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will occupy from the road in T.16.c.7.9, inclusive, to the road in T.22.a.4.0., inclusive.
- (c) That portion between the road in T.22.a.4.0 exclusive to ROMARIN PLOEGSTEERT ROAD, exclusive will be occupied by the let or 3rd Can. Inf. Bde. as ordered.
- (d) The Brigade not detailed for G.H.Q. 2nd line will move to a position near the road junction in T.27.b. in Divisional Reserve.

2. Artillery-Positions for artillery to cover . this line will be reconnoitred by the Canadian Divisional Artillery and reported to this office.

3. Engineers-The Engineer Company in reserve will join the Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve at a point in the neighbourhood of the road junction T.27.b.

4. Medical-Suitable localities for dressing stations will be reconnoitred by the A.D.M.S. and reported to this office.

5. Roads-The only through road available is that passing through T.24.a., 23 b, c and d, 22.d., 28 a and b., 27. a and d. and 26 c. and d. This road will be reserved for the Artillery and the G.0 C. artillery will submit a plan for the withdrawal of the artillery by this

road to the positions selected in rear. All transport belonging to the Infantry and Engineers will be withdrawn from the front before the Artillery moves commence, or after that time by other roads in Brigade areas.

6. Divisional Headquarters will be established at the Farm in T.25.d.9 5.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel, G.S.
 1st Canadian Division.

11.7.15.

832

3rd Corps
 G.1704.

Canadian Division.

1. About 500 men of the 3rd Cavalry Division will be working on the line Hill 63-NEUVE EGLISE for about a week from Wednesday morning next. They will be employed in strengthening this line for the 3rd Corps and will billet in huts near KORTEPYP Square T20 Sheet 36,* but their tool depot will be at road junction T.23.b.7.2. (TILLEUL DE LA PETITE MUNQUE) Sheet 36.*

2. Please detail 3 limbered wagons to be at the tool depot at 8 a.m. each day commencing Wednesday 30th instant to convey tools to destinations as required by the Engineer officer (Major Sankey) in charge of the party.

3. Major Sankey in charge of the work has asked for an experienced machine gunner officer to assist him from time to time in the plans for construction of machine Gun emplacements. Will you kindly place an officer at his disposal. The officer will only be required at intervals and in the first instance should report to Major Sankey at the tool depot (para. 1) at 8 am. on June 30th.

Major for,
 Brig.-General
 General Staff.

28.6.15.

*Should read 28.

833

SUMMARIES OF INFORMATION,
 JULY, 1915

SECRET

1st CANADIAN DIVISION
 Report on Situation for Week Ending 5 P.M.
 2nd July, 1915

Dispositions.

1st Canadian Div. H.Qs. closed at VENDIN LES BETHUNE at 11 am., 27th June, 1915 and opened at NIEPPE at same hour.

On night of 26th/27th June, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved the 144th Brigade, taking over trenches 137 to 142 inclusive.

On night 27/28 June, 1st Canadian Infantry Bde. completed relief taking over trenches 121 to 136 inclusive.

On night 29/30 June, Seely's Detachment took over from 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. the trenches from 137 to 142 inclusive. On night 30th June/1st July 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved portion of front held by 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. taking over trenches 131 to 136 inclusive.

Divisional Reserve—3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
with Hd. Qrs. at NOOTE BOOM.

Work performed.

Since taking over (the) line considerable work has been performed on front line trenches, communication trenches, support trenches and supporting points and several machine gun emplacements have been constructed.

Considerable repairing of wire has been done and a number of dugouts built.

General Situation.

The general situation along our front has been quiet, with exception of occasional light shelling and sniping.

E. A. H. ALDERSON, Lt.-General,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

2.7.1915.

G.522

SECRET

1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

Report on Exploits and Enterprises for Week
Ending 6th July, 1915

1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Active patrolling has been carried out every night along the whole front held by 1st Can. Inf. Bde. At dawn on the 30th June a German was shot in front of a listening post at Trench 125 the body was brought in on the night of the 30th and was found to be that of a Sergt.-Major-Lieut. of the 25th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, 2nd Army Corps (Landwehr).

An enemy listening post near road in front of 128 was bombed on the night of the 30th by a patrol of the 2nd Bn. and it seems certain that the enemy suffered casualties. An enemy supporting patrol advanced against our patrol which fell back. A party was organized to drive back the enemy patrol, but *they* got away and did not stand.. An attempt was

made to recover the bodies of the listening post but they had been removed by their own men.

Nightly combats between patrols have taken place with advantage to us.

Our patrols are now armed with bombs and it is considered of the greatest importance that revolvers should be issued to all grenadiers.

2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Up to the present there have been no exploits nor enterprises. Time and men spent in working parties improving line defences, etc.

Seely's Detachment.

Patrol sent out on the night of the 4th with orders to confirm if possible the working at gravel or concrete heard at point 200 yards South of big tree on creek, work along bank and examine bottom of creek, then proceed to Sniper's House and return by the MESSINES ROAD which cuts the centre of "A" Squadron trench, noting any entanglements or impediments placed there by the enemy.

They report that no work was going on at a point 200 yds. South of BIG TREE on CREEK, with the exception of some ordinary trench work near the German Lines.

The Big Tree is on our side and where the creek winds an asthmatical sentry (who coughed continually) was stationed on opposite bank.

The Creek is dry and bed was thoroughly examined in several places. No gravel was found only a damp clay bottom and not even wet. It is overgrown with long rank grass and many willow shrubs. No sign of paths or tracks of men.

The moon having risen, sentry retired 100 yards from creek, and struck off *N.N.W.* across our front about 150 yards away and parallel to creek to the line of bushy willows that run down to Sniper's House to a point 100 yards away from it. Patrol crept down the line of willows to bank of creek where they rested 20 minutes and listened for any sounds from house, which is some 30 yards on other side.

There was the ringing of a hammer on metal (not anvil) during the whole time they remained there, but they heard no voice or sounds of other work. They returned back by same route as there was hardly sufficient time to carry out the rest of the programme.

E. A. H. ALDERSON, Lt.-General,
G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division.

6th July, 1915.

1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

Report on Situation for Week Ending 5 p.m.
9th July, 1915

1. DISPOSITIONS.Right Section Trenches 121 to 130.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade at 11 p.m. 5th July, the 1st Brigade becoming the Divisional Reserve.

Centre Section Trenches 131 to 136.

The 5th and 7th Battalions, 2nd Can. Inf. Bde. relieved the 8th and 10th Bns. 2nd Can. Inf. Bde. on the night of the 6th/7th July in trenches 131 to 136, supporting trenches and subsidiary line from MESSINES ROAD to DEAD COW FARM exclusive. The 8th and 10th Battalions continue to provide the permanent garrison for LE ROSSIGNOL and subsidiary line West thereof.

Left Section Trenches 137 to 142.

On the night of 3rd/4th July the K.E.H. relieved the Royal Canadian Dragoons in front line trenches, the latter taking over the subsidiary line in the vicinity of LA PLUS DOUCE farm from the Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.).

On the night of the 6th/7th the L.S.H. relieved the K.E.H. in front line and the K.E.H. relieved the R.C.D.'s in subsidiary line.

2. GENERAL SITUATION.

The general situation throughout the week has been normal. Everything has been comparatively quiet and working parties have been very little molested.

Enemy snipers have been fairly active. Hostile machine guns have been rather active also every night between 9 p.m. and 10.30 p.m. evidently with the intention of interfering with our working and ration parties.

Enemy aircraft and artillery have been somewhat more active than last week. -Registrations on portions of our support line has been carried out with aeroplane observation. Hill 63, the ground in the vicinity of THE LODGE subsidiary line, also ground North of LE ROSSIGNOL and DEAD COW FARM have been shelled at various times and NEUVE EGLISE and CHATEAU LA HUTTE and vicinity have been frequently shelled during the week.

Very little damage has been done.

3. WORK.

The work performed by the division since taking over the defence of this area is shown on the enclosed map (*not reproduced*).

E. A. H. ALDERSON, Lieut.-General,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

9.7.1915.

3rd Corps.

The following exploits and enterprises were carried out by this division during the week ending 13th July.

Right Section—

Patrols have been active every night and have in some cases reported enemy working parties. On these occasions our working parties have been withdrawn and rapid fire opened on the enemy's parties.

Sniping has been encouraged and the results have been most satisfactory.

On the night of the 9th/10th, after the explosion of the mines in front of trench 121, our troops occupied the Craters and under the cover of patrols linked them up to the front line trench. There was a very weak response on the part of the enemy.

On Night of the 10th/11th after a report that the enemy in the BIRDCAGE were massing, we gave them 10 minutes rapid rifle and machine gun fire followed by 5 minutes heavy bombardment by our artillery. The artillery fire was very accurate and it is thought considerable damage was done. The positions of three enemy machine guns were located on this occasion.

Centre Section—

Practically no exploits or enterprises carried out in this section since the last report. Time and men mostly spent in working parties. improving the line, defences, etc.

On night of 9th/10th a ditch was discovered running parallel to our front at a distance of about 50 yards. A listening post has been established there.

The following enemy equipment was found and brought in from a distance of about 60 yards in front of our parapet—

- 42 bombs,
- 4 rifles,
- 3 wire cutters,
- 20 feet rope,
- 2 caps and badges,
- 1 dagger.

The rope had a noose at one end. Some of the bombs were dated 21.6.15.

Patrols have been sent out each night. Listening posts have been established. Snipers have been posted and have accounted for several enemy snipers. Patrol of 7th Bn. went to within 30 yards of the enemy trench without being noticed.

Left Section—

Officers' patrol reconnoitred the River DOUVE and discovered that it provided considerable cover for massing troops in preparation for a sudden attack. Consequently the river bed is now wired and the listening post has been dug so that the wire cannot be removed without our knowledge. Sniping operations were taken on to hinder enemy's work opposite trench 142 from the 6th to 10th July. One N.C.O. and two men were detailed for continuous observation. The report with sketch of this party is attached (*not reproduced*).

Lieut.-General

Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

13.7.15.

To 1st Canadian Division.

S.M.837. 20th July, 1915.

Summary of operations week ending July 20th
 July 13th mines blown up in front of 121 we occupied craters
 July 14th trench mortar fired on house containing enemy sniping post and stopped sniping
 July 18th used gamage catapult and registered a few rounds into the bird-cage
 July 20th used gamage catapult and put half a dozen jam pots into birdcage
 the enemy replied with a trench mortar doing no harm we then fired a fusilade of rifle grenades which appeared to fall into the enemy's trenches this ended this incident.
 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

10.20 p.m.

By wire received 10.65 p.m.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION, FROM 13TH To 20TH JULY, both inclusive.

1. The situation along the front held by the 1st Canadian Division has been continually quiet and, with the exception of minor trench incidents and inter-Brigade Reliefs, there is nothing to report.

2. At 9 p.m. on 13th July the mines prepared just East of trench 121 were fired. The enemy appeared much agitated and opened a hot rifle and machine Gun Fire. When this fire had quietened down our working parties occupied the Craters.

3. In accordance with orders issued to all concerned for the extension and re-arrangement of the line, on the night of the 14th/15th the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade took over trenches C.1-C.4 from the 149th Brigade of 50th Division and the remainder of our line was re-arranged, as follows:

1st Canadian Infantry Brigade took over trenches 140 and 141 from 1st Canadian Cavalry Brigade.

1st Canadian Cavalry Brigade took over trenches 136 and 135 from 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade took over trenches 130 and 129 from 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

All the above reliefs were satisfactorily carried out and completed by 3 a.m. on the 15th instant.

4. On the 15th instant the enemy's artillery heavily shelled NEUVE EGLISE, with the church as their objective, special reports on which were forwarded on the 16th instant.

5. In accordance with 2nd Corps operation order No. 49 of 16th instant, I issued orders to all concerned on the 17th instant, for shortening the line held by the Canadian Division and the readjustment was satisfactorily carried out and completed by 2.30 a.m. on the 19th instant.

6. On the 20th the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade used the Gamage Catapult and put half a dozen Jam-pots into the BIRDCAGE. The Enemy replied with a trench mortar, doing no harm. A fusilade of rifle grenades was then fired and seemed to fall into the enemy's trenches—the enemy did not respond.

7. Throughout the week our snipers have been very active and have proved successful in subduing the enemy snipers.

8. Working parties have been continually employed on improving the existing lines, repairing wire, etc., and digging support trenches with dugouts in rear of the front line.

E. A. H. ALDERSON,
 Lieut: General,

Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

21.7.15.

1st Canadian Division
 31st July, 1915.

G.995.

2nd Corps.
 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION, FROM 21ST To 31ST JULY (both inclusive).

Since the 21st instant the situation along our front has been normal, with the exception of aeroplanes which have been particularly active.

On the night of the 21st/22nd, the lot Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved the 3rd Canadian Infantry *Brigade* in trenches in Right Section, the latter becoming Divisional Reserve.

On the 22nd, by order of 2nd Corps, the responsibility for the maintenance and defence of NORTH AND SOUTH MIDLAND FARM was allotted to the 28th Division.

On the morning of the 24th, the enemy shelled 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade H.Q.s. obtaining two direct hits, and also dropped about sixteen shells into NIEPPE. Our Artillery retaliated on WARNETON, which apparently had the desired effect.

On the evening of the 24th, our Artillery, in conjunction with Artillery of the 28th Division, shelled enemy's Cookers in MESSINES between 9 and 9.30 p.m. Our Artillery report shoot was effective.

On the 27th, an enemy patrol, consisting of three N.C.O's, were rounded up by one of our patrols and surrendered, with the exception of one man who fired after he had thrown up his hands; he was instantly shot by one of our patrol.

On the night of the 28th/29th, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved the lot Canadian Infantry Brigade in the trenches of Right Section, the latter becoming Divisional Reserve.

During the *week* large working parties have been continually employed on improving the existing line and constructing new trenches.

Our snipers have also been very active during the week and obtained good results by their vigilance.

On 29th instant, instructions were received from the 2nd Corps that this Division would no longer be responsible for the Care and Maintenance of G.H.Q. 3rd Line.

R. H. KEARSLEY, Lt.-Col. G.S.;
for Lieut. General,
Commanding 1st. Canadian Division.

834

July 9th, 1915.

3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

With reference to mines exploded in front of trenches Nos. 121 and 122, I now submit the following report:—

Our parties were prepared at 8.30 p.m. to go forward and hold the craters formed by the explosion of mines. My instructions to Capt. Pery in command of No. 1 Company which was entrusted with this operation were as follows: there was to be no firing by us.

After the explosions he was to make effort to allow firing by the enemy and our own troops to quieten down. The parties to go forward were to proceed quietly and avoid being seen by the enemy.

At 9 o'clock the Engineers exploded the mines it was found however that only those in front of No. 121 succeeded. The mines in front of 122- failed. The enemy at once commenced rapid fire (rifle) and threw band bombs, there were also minnenwerfer bombs and artillery shells from the enemy. These however did not cause any damage, and as we did not reply very soon moderated.

Our party of bombers and rifles numbering thirty (30) then went forward quietly and occupied the position in front of the craters. A working party was immediately sent out with the Engineers to dig a fire trench. The sketch herewith* illustrates the position of the fire trench, and the position occupied by the advance screen of bombers and rifles.

At the present hour the trench is well advanced and is being connected with the old trench, as shown on sketch so that this new fire position will be accessible in day time. The enemy have kept up a desultory rifle fire and are using flares on the position but our men have been all cautioned and instructed and I am pleased to report that up to the present we have not had one casualty.

F. O. W. LOOMIS, Lt.-Col
13th Canadian Battalion.

11.45 p.m.

*Not reproduced.

835

INSTRUCTIONS No. 2
Headquarters, Division Artillery, 1st Can.
Division

June 28th, 1915.

With a view to providing efficient protection of our front and prompt action on an attack taking place, the following will be the principles to be observed for inter-communication with infantry and protection of our front throughout the 18-pr. batteries of C.D.A.

1. One telephone instrument, one operator and two orderlies per battery (the latter not necessarily elephone operators-but simply reliefs to keep awake and keep in touch with Infantry Company Commanders) will be in the portion of front line or support trenches allotted for protection to that battery.

This instrument will be connected directly with its Battery position. (Not through F.O.O. Station or Bde. H.Q.).

The duties of this party will be on any attack, gas or unusual occurrence taking place, the orderly on duty will at once be at shoulder of Company Commander whom he must be able to find at any moment.

He will take any message to be transmitted to Guns, usually "Gas" or "S.O.S." and will give it to the telephone operator for transmission to Battery. He will later supplement the first message (which should be the briefest possible and will not specify any particular locality-it being understood to refer to the position covered by the Battery in question), by a further message from the Company Commander such as "stop," "concentrate opposite trench 32" &c.

On S.O.S. Signal reaching guns-already loaded and laid on night lines, telephone operator receiving message will himself fire nearest gun or will, if too far away, shout "S.O.S." to sentry who will fire nearest gun and then others which will wake detachments.

Four rounds Gun Fire will be fired at once. This will be followed by a pause of 1 minute and then if no further message received followed by four more rounds section fire 5 seconds and then another pause of 30 seconds and so on according to situation.

Fuzes for first four rounds per gun to be set beforehand. On Gas signal reaching guns a steady rate of section fire will be opened on night lines pending further information.

2. One Officer per Brigade will sleep at Infantry Brigade H.Q. and thence keep Artillery Brigade Commander in touch with Brigadier, C.F.A. supplying instruments and operators and being responsible for wire.

3. One officer per battery will during the hours of daylight remain in observation on the front covered by his Battery and will sleep at night in a position, presumably his O.P. where he can see and hear what is going on on his front and supplement messages sent during the hours of darkness by Company Commander as in Para. 1.

In such a position his reports provide an alternative to those from trenches. in case of a break down, and in case of Gas or of our trenches being rushed he is far more competent to deal with situation than if he were in the thick of it in the trenches,

4. On either S.O.S. or GAS signals being given the following messages will be sent:

- (i) Company Commander to Battery covering his trenches.
- (ii) Battery commander to Brigade Commander.

- (iii) Brigade Commanders to other battery Commanders warning them of what he knows and ordering them to fire if he thinks fit.
- (iv) Battery Commander to F.O.O. if latter not au fait with situation.
- (v) Brigade Commander to C.D.A.

Brigade Commanders will please inform this office if above arrangements present any difficulties and if they have any other suggestions. to make.

E. F. NORTON,
Captain, RA.

Brigade-Major, Canadian Divisional Artillery.

836

*From the Governor General to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies*

TELEGRAM

OTTAWA, June 26, 1915.

Prime Minister sails to England on *Adriatic*, June 30th.

ARTHUR.

P.C. 1514

CERTIFIED copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor General on the 28th June, 1915.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 25th June, 1915 from the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, observing that during the past ten months matters of unusual urgency and importance have continually engaged the attention of the Government in connection with the conduct of the War, and that in many cases such questions have involved lengthy correspondence with His Majesty's Government and with the Acting High Commissioner for Canada with a view to the most effective co-operation between the two Governments in such matters.

The Prime Minister further observes that it appears both desirable and important that certain of the matters aforesaid should be the subject of personal conference and discussion with His Majesty's Government and it is understood that this is the view entertained by that Government.

The Committee, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister, therefore advise that he be authorized to visit London for the purpose aforesaid, and generally for the purpose of conferring with His Majesty's Government and of discussing

with them matters of common interest, and particularly those of special interest to the Dominion of Canada.

All of which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.

*From the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor General*

SECRET.

TELEGRAM.

LONDON, July 1, 1915.

With reference to your telegram of 26th June Borden's voyage, news has been stopped in all newspapers in France and here but I understand it has been published in New York and Canada. In this connection please see my secret despatch* of April 27th last.

BONAR LAW.

*Not reproduced; deals with certain breaches of censorship regulations.

NOTE ON VISIT OF
SIR ROBERT BORDEN TO EUROPE;
1915

Sailed from New York--Wed. 30 June Received by H.M. the King--Tues. 13 July Cabinet Council Meeting, 10 Downing Street

--Wed. 14 July

Review 2nd Cdn. Div., Beachborough Park, Shorncliffe--Sat. 17 July

Visiting Canadian wounded in England--Sun. and Mon. 18 and 19 July

To France; visiting Base Hospitals, War Graves--Tues. 20 July

Visiting 1st Cdn. Div. and P.P.C.L.I. Wed. and Thurs., 21 and 22 July

Visiting French Army--Fri. 23 July

Paris: interviews French President and

Cabinet Ministers--Sat. 24 July

To England--Sun. 25 July

Shorncliffe--Mon. 26 July

Freedom of City, Guildhall--Thurs. 29 July

Memorial Service, St. Paul's--Wed. 4 Aug.

Lands at New York--Thurs. 2 Sep.

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AFTER ROUTINE ORDER No. 847

by

Lieutenant-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

30th July, 1915.

MESSAGE FROM SIR ROBERT BORDEN,
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

The following extract from a letter received by the General Officer Commanding from the Right Hon'ble. Sir Robert L. Borden, G.C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada, is published for the information of all concerned:--

The fine spirit of the Canadian Division and their evident efficiency for the great task in which they are engaged very deeply impressed me. It was a great privilege to have the opportunity of seeing them and of conveying to them from the people of Canada a message of pride and appreciation. As I said on more than one occasion in addressing the officers and men they can hardly realize how intensely all Canada has been thrilled by the tidings of their achievements.

The President of the French Republic as well as General Joffre and Sir John French spoke of the troops under your command in the terms of the highest praise.

I bid you God speed in the great task in which you are engaged.

G. R. Farm,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
A.A. and Q.M.G.

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NOTE ON VISIT OF
MINISTER OF MILITIA TO EUROPE,
1915

Sailed from New York--Fri. 2 July.

Visits to Canadian troops, Shorncliffe--13, 14, 17 and 22 July and 4 and 21 Aug.

To France--Thurs. 5 Aug.

At British G.H.Q. and met King Albert on Belgian front--Fri. 6 Aug.

At 1st Cdn. Division--Sat. 7 Aug.

At British G.H.Q.: interviews Sir D. Haig; Reviews P.P.C.L.I. and R.C.H.A.--Sun. 8 Aug.

Interviews General Foch at his H.Q.--Mon. 9 Aug.

At Rheims, First French Army--Tues. 10 Aug.

At Paris: Met the President of the French Republic; and the French Minister of War –Wed. 11 Aug.
Created K.C.B.–Tues. 24 Aug.
Lands at New York–Thurs. 2 Sep.

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SECRET

Canadian Division

Warning Order

1. Consequent on the reorganization of the 1st and 2nd Armies, the frontage at present held by the III Corps from the ARMENTIERES-WEZ MACQUART road (inclusive) to the WULVERGHEM-MESSINES ROAD will be handed over to the II Corps.

2. The Canadian Division will be transferred to the II Corps from midnight 14th/ 15th July.

The 12th Division will be transferred to II Corps from midnight 15th/16th July, and will take over the frontage at present held by the 82nd Infantry Brigade.

The remainder of the front of the 27th Division as far as the ARMENTIERESWEZ MACQUART road (inclusive) will be handed over to the II Corps from midnight 17th/18th July. (The 50th Division take over this portion of the 27th Division front.)

3. All guns will remain in their present positions until further orders.

B.G., G.S.
III Corps.

G.1860.
13.7.15.

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OPERATION ORDER No. 31

by

Lieut.-General E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.,
Commanding 1st Canadian Division

13th July, 1915.

1. Operation order No. 30 of the 12th instant is cancelled.

2. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will on the night of the 14th/15th take over the trenches C.1–C.4 at present occupied by the 149th Brigade of 50th Division. Arrangements for the relief to be made between the Brigades concerned.

3. The 1st Canadian Inf. Bde. will also take over trenches 140 and 141 from Seely's Detachment.

4. Seely's Detachment will take over from the 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. Trenches 136 and 135.

5. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. will take over from the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. Trenches 130 and 129.

6. The reliefs mentioned in paras. 3, 4 and 5 will be completed by 3 am. on 15th and all arrangements will be made between the Brigades concerned.

7. Reliefs to be reported to this office when completed.

C. F. ROMER, Colonel.
General Staff.

Issued at 2 p.m.

Copy No. 1 1st Canadian Inf. Bde.
2 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde.
3 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde.
4 Seely's Detachment.
5 Canadian Divisional Artillery.
6 Canadian Divisional Engineers.
7 A.D.M.S.
8 Divisional Train.
9 Signal Company.
10 A.A. & Q.M.G.
11 2nd Corps.
12 3rd Corps.
13 12th Division.
14 50th Division.

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SECRET.

1ST CANADIAN DIVISION OPERATION ORDER

No. 32

July 17th, 1915.

1. The 2nd Corps have shortened the front to be held by the 1st Canadian Division, and in consequence the following readjustment will take place during the night 18th/ 19th July.

2. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Bde. will take over trenches 129 and 130 from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Bde.

3. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Bde. will take over trenches 135 and 136 from SEELY'S Detachment.

4. SEELY'S Detachment will take over trenches No. 140, 141, and 142 from the 1st Canadian Infantry Bde.

5. The 1st Canadian Infantry Bde. will hand over trenches C.1 to C.4 both inclusive and 'the existing communications to

WESTHOF FARM to the 85th Brigade of the 28th Division, who will communicate with 1st Canadian Infantry Bde. at WESTHOF FARM.

6. All the arrangements for the above moves will be made between the Brigades concerned. The reliefs will be completed by 2.30 a.m. on the 19th.

7. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Bde. will also take over FORT BOYD and the Support Line North of the STRAND from the 35th Infantry Brigade of the 12th Division to-day. Arrangements to be made between brigadiers.

8. On completion of the relief, the 1st Canadian Infantry Bde. will come into Divisional Reserve and will be billeted as

follows:-

Brigade H.Q. s., LAMPERNISSE (B.3.a.13).

1 Bn. in huts T.27.b.4.5., 1 Bn. in square

T.26.a.b. and c.

1 Bn. in huts T.26.a. and 1 Bn. in huts T.20.a.

9. On the night of 21st/22nd July, the 1st Canadian Infantry Bde. will relieve the

3rd Canadian Infantry Bde. All arrangements to be made between the Brigades concerned. The 3rd

Canadian Infantry Bde. will then form the Divisional Reserve being billeted in para. 8.

10. The sub-division of the responsibilities of the area in rear of the front line will be issued later.

R. H. KEARSLEY, Lt.-Col.

General Staff,

1st Canadian Division.

Issued at 10 a.m.

Copy No.	1	1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.
	2	2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
	3	3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.
	4	Seely's Detachment.
	5	Canadian Div. Art.
	6	Can. Div. Engrs.
	7	A.D.M.S.
	8	Divl. Train.
	9	Signal Coy.
	10	A.A. & Q.M.G.
	11	2nd Corps.
	12	28th Division.
	13	12th Division.

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COMMANDS AND STAFFS 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

From 13TH February To THE 12TH September, 1915

(Showing intervening changes)

HEADQUARTERS

G. O. C.....	To 11-7-15	Lieut.-Gen. E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.
	12-7-15-18-7-15	Br.-Gen. R. E. W. Turner, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.
	From 19-7-15.....	Lieut.-Gen. E. A. H. Alderson, C.B.
Senior G.S.O. (Br.-Gen.).....	To 26-2-15	Br.-Gen. R. C. B. Lawrence.
G.S.O. (1).....	To 23-2-15	Colonel E. S. Heard.
	24-2-15-13-7-15	Colonel C. F. Romer, C.B.
	From 14-7-15.....	Lieut.-Col. R. H. Kearsley, D.S.O.
G.S.O. (2).....		Lieut.-Col. G. C. W. Gordon-Hall.
G.S.O. (2).....		Lieut.-Col. A. H. Macdonell, D.S.O.
A.A. and Q.M.G.....	To 11-7-15	Colonel T. B. Wood.
	From 12-7-15.....	Lieut.-Col. G. R. Frith.
D.A.A. and Q.M.G.....		Major J. H. MacBrien, D.S.O.
D.A.Q.M.G.....		Major J. S. Brown.
D.A.A.G.....		Major E. de B. Panet.
A.D.M.S.....		Colonel G. LaF. Foster, C.B.
D.A.D.M.S.....		Major H. A. Chisholm, D.S.O.
A.D.V.S.....	To 12-3-15	Lieut.-Col. W. J. Neill.
	From 13-3-15.....	Lieut.-Col. A. B. Cutcliffe.
D.A.D.O.S.....		Lieut.-Col. J. A. S. Murray.
A.P.M.....	To 31-8-15	Captain E. S. Clifford, D.S.O.
	From 1-9-15.....	Major A. McMillan, D.S.O.
Field Cashier.....	To 17-5-15	Captain C. T. Costigan.
	From 18-5-15.....	Major A. L. Hamilton.
Senior Chaplain.....	To 28-8-15	Hon. Major R. H. Steacy.
	From 29-8-15.....	Hon. Lieut.-Col. F. G. Scott.

1ST CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE		
Headquarters		Br.-Gen. M. S. Mercer, C.B.
Brigade Major		Major R. J. F. Hayter, D.S.O.
1st Battalion	To 1-3-15	Lieut.-Col. F. W. Hill.
	1-3-15-20-3-15	Major H. C. Becher.
	21-3-15-21-6-15	Lieut.-Col. F. W. Hill.
	22-6-15-26-6-15	Captain F. A. Creighton.
	27-6-15-8-9-15	Lieut.-Col. F. W. Hill.
	From 9-9-15	Major F. A. Creighton.
2nd Battalion	To 30-8-15	Lieut.-Col. D. Watson.
	From 1-9-15	Lieut.-Col. A. E. Swift.
3rd Battalion.....	To 19-6-15	Lieut.-Col. R. Rennie, M.V.O.
	20-6-15-23-6-15	Major W. D. Allan.
	24-6-15-13-8-15	Lieut.-Col. R. Rennie, M.V.O.
	14-8-15-22-8-15	Major W. D. Allan.
	From 23-8-15.....	Lieut.-Col. R. Rennie M.V.O.
4th Battalion.....	To 23-4-15	Lieut.-Col. A. P. Birchall.
	23-4-15-27-4-15	Major J. Ballantine.
	27-4-15-13-5-15	Lieut.-Col. C. H. Rogers.
	14-5-15-6-6-15	Lieut.-Col. R. H. Labatt.
	From 7-6-15	Lieut.-Col. M. A. Colquhoun.
2ND CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE		
Headquarters		Br.-Gen. A. W. Currie, C.B.
Brigade Major	To 26-4-15	Lieut.-Col. H. Kemmis Betty, D.S.O.
	27-4-15-23-5-15	Major G. Meynell.
	From 24-5-15	Lieut.-Col. J. H. Elmsley.
5th Battalion.....	To 9-6-15	Lieut.-Col. G. S. Tuxford.
	10-6-15-15-6-15	Captain E. Hilliam.
	16-6-15-2-9-15	Lieut.-Col. G. S. Tuxford.
	3-9-15-11-9-15	Major E. Hilliam.
	From 12-9-15	Lieut.-Col. G. S. Tuxford.
7th Battalion.....	To 23-4-15	Lieut.-Col. W.F.R. Hart-McHarg.
	23-4-15-8-8-15	Lieut.-Col. V. W. Odlum.
	From 8-8-15.....	Major A. B. Powley.
8th Battalion.....	To 10-9-15	Lieut.-Col. L. J. Lipsett, C.M.G.
	From 11-9-15.....	Major J. M. Prower.
10th Battalion.....	To 23-4-15	Lieut.-Col. R. L. Boyle.
	23-4-15	Major J. McLaren.
	23-4-15-24-4-15	Major D. M. Ormond.
	24-4-15-27-5-15	Captain C. G. Arthur.
	28-5-15-1-6-15	Major D. M. Ormond.
	From 2-6-15	Lieut.-Col. J. G. Rattray.
3RD CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE		
Headquarters	To 11-7-15	Br.-Gen. R. E. W. Turner, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.
	12-7-15-19-7-15	Lieut.-Col. F. O. W. Loomis, D.S.O.
	20-7-15-12-8-15	Br.-Gen. R. E. W. Turner, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.
	From 13-8-15.....	Br.-Gen. R. G. E. Leckie, C.M.G.
Brigade Major	To 25-5-15	Lieut.-Col. G. B. Hughes.
	26-5-15-9-7-15	Captain P. F. Villiers.
	10-7-15-19-7-15	Captain T. S. Morrissey.
	20-7-15-22-8-15	Captain P. F. Villiers.
	From 23-8-15.....	Major J. A. W. Spencer.
13th Battalion.....	To 11-7-15	Lieut.-Col. F. O. W. Loomis, D.S.O.
	12-7-15-19-7-15	Major V. C. Buchanan.
	20-7-15-4-9-15	Lieut.-Col. F. O. W. Loomis, D.S.O.
	From 5-9-15.....	Major V. C. Buchanan.
14th Battalion.....	To 18-6-15	Lieut.-Col. F. S. Meighen.
	19-6-15-26-7-15	Lieut.-Col. W. W. Burland, D.S.O.
	27-7-15-24-8-15	Lieut.-Col. F. W. Fisher.
	From 25-8-15.....	Lieut.-Col. W. W. Burland, D.S.O.
15th Battalion.....	To 8-5-15	Lieut.-Col. J. A. Currie.
	From 9-5-15.....	Lieut.-Col. W. R. Marshall, D.S.O.
16th Battalion.....	To 6-7-15	Lieut.-Col. R. G. E. Leckie, C.M.G.
	7-7-15-28-7-15	Major J. E. Leckie, D.S.O.
	29-7-15-11-8-15	Lieut.-Col. R. G. E. Leckie, C.M.G.
	12-8-15-19-8-15	Lieut.-Col. J. E. Leckie, D.S.O.
	From 20-8-15.....	Major C. W. Peck.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS		
Canadian Cavalry Brigade		
Headquarters		Br.-Gen. The Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely, D.S.O.
Brigade Major	To 9-6-15	Captain E. C. Jury.
	9-6-15-8-7-15	Captain Sir A. H. M. Sinclair, Bt.
	From 8-7-15.....	Captain D. Y. Watt.
Royal Canadian Dragoons.....		Lieut.-Col. C. M. Nelles.
Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.)		Lieut.-Col. A. C. Macdonnell D.S.O.
2nd King Edward's Horse		Lieut.-Col. M. Cradock, C.B.
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.....		Lieut.-Col. H. A. Panet, D.S.O.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS-Continued

1st Canadian Divisional Artillery		
Headquarters	To 7-7-15	Br.-Gen. H. E. Burstall, C.B.
	8-7-15-14-7-15	Lieut.-Col. E. W. B. Morrison, D.S.O.
	From 15-7-15.....	Br.-Gen. H. E. Burstall, C.B.
Brigade Major	To 18-6-15	Major C. F. Constantine.
	From 19-6-15.....	Captain E. F. Norton, M.C.
1st Brigade, C.F.A.		
Headquarters	To 8-7-15	Lieut.-Col. E. W. B. Morrison, D.S.O.
	8-7-15-15-7-15	Major G. H. Ralston.
	15-7-15-28-7-15	Lieut.-Col. E. W. B. Morrison, D.S.O.
	28-7-15-8-9-15	Lieut.-Col. C. H. MacLaren
	9-9-15-29-9-15	Lieut.-Col. E. W. B. Morrison, D.S.O.
	From 29-9-15.....	Lieut.-Col. C. H. MacLaren
1st Bty., C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.)	To 6-5-15	Major C. H. L. Sharman.
	From 7-5-15.....	Major L. C. Goodeve.
2nd Bty., C.F.A. (4 18 pdrs.)	To 25-4-15	Lieut.-Col. C. H. MacLaren
	27-1-15-18-7-15	Major D. A. White.
	19-7-15-27-7-15	Lieut.-Col. C. H. MacLaren
	From 28-7-15.....	Major D. A. White.
3rd Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.)		Major R.H. Britton.
4th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.).....		Major G. H. Ralston
2nd Brigade, C.F.A.		
Headquarters	To 27-4-15	Lieut.-Col. J. J. Creelman.
	27-4-15-18-7-15	Lieut.-Col. C. H. MacLaren
	From 18-7-15.....	Lieut.-Col. J. J. Creelman.
5th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.).....		Major E. G. Hanson.
6th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.).....		Major H. G. McLeod.
7th Bty., C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.).....	To 24-4-15	Major A. G. L. McNaughton.
	24-4-15-19-6-15	Captain E. C. Hale.
	20-5-15-29-7-15	Major C. F. Constantine.
	From 30-7-15.....	Major J. A. McDonald.
8th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.)		Major S. B. Anderson.
3rd Brigade, C.F.A.		
Headquarters		Lieut.-Col. J. H. Mitchell.
9th Battery C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.)		Major E. A. MacDougall.
10th Bty., C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.).....	To 4-8-15	Major W. B. M. King, D.S.O.
	From	Major J. C. Ball.
11th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.)		Major H. G. Carscallen.
12th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs.)		Major E. W. Leonard.
1st Cdn. Divl. Ammunition Col.....	To 9-7-15	Lieut.-Col. J. J. Penhale.
	10-7-15-17-7-15	Major C. E. Long.
	From 18-7-15.....	Lieut.-Col. J. J. Penhale.
1st Cdn. Heavy Battery (4 60-pdrs.)		Major F. C. Magee.
1st Canadian Divisional Engineers		
Headquarters	To 3-7-15	Lieut.-Col. C. J. Armstrong.
	4-7-15-12-7-15	Major W. B. Lindsay.
	From 13-7-15.....	Lieut.-Col. C. J. Armstrong.
1st Field Company		Major W. W. Melville.
2nd Field Company	To 15-5-15	Captain T. C. Irving.
	16-5-15-3-7-15	Lieut.-Col. W. B. Lindsay.
	4-7-15-12-7-15	Captain T. C. Irving.
	13-7-15-20-8-15	Lieut.-Col. W. B. Lindsay.
	21-8-15-30-8-15	Captain T. C. Irving.
	From 31-8-15.....	Lieut.-Col. W. B. Lindsay.
3rd Field Company	To 21-5-15	Major C. B. Wright, D.S.O.
	21-5-15-7-6-15	Major J. P. Fell.
	From 7-6-15.....	Major A. Macphail, D.S.O.
1st Cdn. Divl. Signal Company	To 5-7-15	Major F. A. Lister, D.S.O.
	6-7-15-12-7-15	Captain E. Forde
	From 13-7-15.....	Major F. A. Lister, D.S.O.
1st Cdn. Divl. Train.....	To 4-7-15	Lieut.-Col. W. A. Simson.
	6-7-15-11-7-15	Major W. G. Coles.
	From 12-7-15.....	Lieut.-Col. W. A. Simson.
Canadian Army Medical Corps		
No. 1 Canadian Field Ambulance.....		Lieut.-Col. A. E. Ross.
No. 2 Canadian Field Ambulance.....		Lieut.-Col. D. W. McPherson.
No. 3 Canadian Field Ambulance	To 2-9-15	Lieut.-Col. W. L. Watt.
	From 3-9-15	Lieut.-Col. J. A. Gunn.

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COMMANDS AND STAFFS 2ND CANADIAN DIVISION

AS AT 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1915

HEADQUARTERS

General Officer Commanding	Major-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., C.B., D.S.O.
General Staff Officer (1)	Colonel H. D. De Prée.
General Staff Officer (2)	Major C. A. Ker, D.S.O.
General Staff Officer (2)	Lieut-Colonel G. B. Hughes, D.S.O.
Asst. Adjutant and Quarter Master General	Colonel P. E. Thacker.
Deputy Asst. Adjutant and Quarter Master General	Lieut-Colonel T. F. Homer-Dixon.
Deputy Asst. Quarter Master General	Lieut-Colonel W. W. P. Gibsone.
Deputy Asst. Adjutant General	Major F. S. Morrison.
Asst. Dir. of Medical Services	Colonel J. T. Fotheringham.
Deputy Asst. Dir. of Medical Services	Lieut-Colonel H. M. Jacques.
Deputy Asst. Dir. of Veterinary Services	Lieut-Colonel H. D. Smith.
Deputy Asst. Dir. of Ordnance Services	Major K. C. Folger.
Asst. Provost Marshal	Lieut-Colonel A. M. Jarvis, C.M.G.
Field Cashier	Major G. M. Todd.
Senior Chaplain	Hon. Lieut-Colonel W. Beattie.

4TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Headquarters	Brig-Gen. Lord Brooke, M.V.O.
Brigade Major	Lieut-Colonel R. G. Stewart.
18th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel E. S. Wigle.
19th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel J. I. McLaren.
20th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel C. H. Rogers.
21st Battalion	Lieut-Colonel W. St. P. Hughes.

5TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Headquarters	Major Brig-Gen. D. Watson.
Brigade Major	Major T. M. McAvity.
22nd Battalion	Colonel F. M. Gaudet.
24th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel J. A. Gunn.
25th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel G. A. LeCain.
26th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel J. L. McAvity.

6TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Headquarters	Brig-Gen. H. D. B. Ketchen.
Brigade Major	Major P. A. Moore.
27th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel I. R. Snider.
28th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel J. F. L. Embury.
29th Battalion	Lieut-Colonel H. S. Tobin.
31st Battalion	Lieut-Colonel A. H. Bell.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

Headquarters, 2nd Cdn. Divl. Artillery	Brig-Gen. H. C. Thacker.
Brigade Major	Major C. F. Constantine.
4th Brigade, C.F.A.	
Headquarters	Lieut-Colonel W. J. Brown.
13th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs)	Major G. E. Vansittart.
14th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs)	Major W. H. Merritt.
15th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs)	Major F. F. Arnoldi.
16th Battery, C.F.A. (4 18-pdrs)	Major W. Simpson.
2nd Cdn. Divl. Ammunition Column	Lieut-Colonel W. H. Harrison.
2nd Cdn. Divisional Engineers	
Headquarters	Lieut-Colonel H. T. Hughes.
4th Field Company	Major G. A. Inksetter.
5th Field Company	Major S. H. Osler.
6th Field Company	Major W. L. Malcolm.
2nd Cdn. Divl. Signal Company	Major J. L. H. Bogart.
2nd Cdn. Divl. Train	Lieut-Colonel A. E. Massie.
Canadian Army Medical Corps	
No. 4 Canadian Field Ambulance	Lieut-Colonel W. Webster.
No. 5 Canadian Field Ambulance	Lieut-Colonel G. D. Farmer.
No. 6 Canadian Field Ambulance	Lieut-Colonel R. P. Campbell.

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ROUTINE ORDERS

by
Brigadier-General R. E. W. Turner,
V.C., C.B., D.S.O.,
Commanding 2nd Canadian Division,
St. Martin's Plain

14th September, 1915.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

The following has been received by the General Officer Commanding from His Majesty the King:

"Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the Second Canadian Division.

Six months ago I inspected the 1st Canal than Division before their departure for the Front. The heroism they have since shown upon the field of battle has won for them undying fame. You are now leaving to join them; and I am glad to have had an opportunity of seeing you to-day; for it has convinced me that the same spirit which animated them inspires you also.

The past weeks at Shorncliffe have been for you a period of severe and rigorous training and your appearance at this Inspection testifies to the thoroughness and devotion to duty with which your work has been performed.

You are going to meet hardships and dangers, but the steadiness and discipline which have marked your bearing on Parade to-day will carry you through all difficulties.

History will never forget the loyalty and the readiness with which you rallied to the aid of your Mother-Country in the hour of danger.

My thoughts will always be with you. May God bless and bring you victory." 2nd September, 1915.

P. E. THACKER, Lt. Col.
AA. & Q.M.G.

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See Chapter XVI, p. 449.

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*From the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor General*

SECRET.
TELEGRAM.

LONDON, May 31, 1915.

The Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in the field telegraphs that the Chief Officer in Command of the Canadian Division proposes that for the present Officers of

the rank of Lieutenant only should be sent out as reinforcements for Canadian Artillery and infantry, vacancies in the senior ranks being filled by promotion of officers serving in the Division. The Commander-in-Chief asks whether there is any likelihood of any objection to this proposal. I should be grateful if you would kindly inform me as to whether your Ministers concur. Several Captains of little military experience have, it appears, been sent to Princess Patricia's Light Infantry and placed over subalterns who have done good service at the front and who were in every way fitted for promotion.

BONAR LAW.

*From the Governor General to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies*

CANADA.
SECRET.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
OTTAWA, June 28, 1915.

Sir:-

With reference to your secret telegram of the 31st May, on the subject of the promotion of officers, I am informed that the general principle is accepted that vacancies in the senior ranks of the First Canadian Division should be filled by the promotion of officers serving in that division, and it is agreed that for the present, officers above the rank of lieutenant should not, as a rule, be sent from England as reinforcements for Canadian units of artillery and infantry.

I understand that the General Officer Commanding Canadians in England has been so notified.

I have, etc.,

ARTHUR.

The Right Honourable A. Boner Law, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

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*From the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor General*

CANADA.
SECRET.

DOWNING STREET, June 30, 1915.

Sir:

With reference to Your Royal Highness' telegram of the 18th October and to my telegram of the 31st October, I have the honour to transmit to you, for the consideration of your ministers, a copy of a letter

from the War Office respecting the organization of any further reinforcements which your Government may be able to supply.

I have, etc.,

A. BONAR LAW.

Governor General
His Royal Highness
The Duke of Connaught
and of Strathearn, K.G., etc.

From the War Office to the Colonial Office
121/Overseas/720 (S.D.2).
CONFIDENTIAL.

WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W. June 24, 1915.

Sir:—

I am commanded by the Army Council to suggest that it is now desirable to consider the question of the steps to be taken regarding the organization of any further reinforcements which will be supplied by the Canadian Government.

2. The steps which the Canadian Government proposed to take were outlined in the letter from the Governor General forwarded under your No. 40438/1914, dated 20th October, 1914, and the views of the War Office as regards the organization of the 2nd Canadian Contingent were given in the letter from this office, No. 121/Overseas/53, dated 29th October, 1914. In accordance with the latter, the 2nd Canadian Division has been formed and should shortly have arrived in England, with the results that broadly speaking the contingents supplied by the Dominion of Canada will amount to two divisions, which will eventually be formed into a Canadian Army Corps.

3. The question then arises whether the Dominion will be in a position to do more than raise, equip, and train the reinforcements required to maintain the contingents which they have so far organized; or whether, in addition to providing these reinforcements they see their way to raising further formed bodies of troops. The Army Council would accordingly be glad if inquiries could be directed to obtain information upon these points as early as practicable.

4. As regards the former, I am to state that the approximate numbers estimated as necessary to maintain the Canadian forces already sent over to England are the following per month:

	Officers	Men
Infantry.....	120	4,000
Cavalry.....	15	400
Artillery.....	10	325
Engineers.....	3	100
Army Service Corps.....	1	30
Royal Army Medical Corps.....	1	30

As regards the latter, I am to suggest, should the Dominion Government find it practicable to do so, that endeavours should be made to raise a third division of like composition and strength to those which have already been furnished.

5. In any case it appears to the Army Council desirable that the question of the further supply of troops by Canada should now be considered, and that the steps to be taken for the organization of any fresh bodies of troops for service in England should only be adopted after preliminary consultation with Council.

6. This seems especially necessary in regard to mounted troops, the conditions of employment of which have of late considerably altered, and of which so far as can be foreseen there is already a sufficiency; and, as Mr. Secretary Bonar Law is no doubt aware the Canadian Cavalry regiments were recently dismounted and are now acting as infantry. It would appear, however, from telegraphic correspondence (a copy of which is enclosed) that the Canadian Government had then in contemplation the raising of additional mounted troops. The Army Council, therefore, take this opportunity of asking that they be informed whether any, and if so what, steps have been taken to give effect to this contemplated measure.

7. I am to remark that in asking for this information and making these suggestions, the Council are only animated by a desire to direct into the most effective channels the efforts, which the Dominion of Canada is making in support of the common cause; efforts the value of which the Army Council most thoroughly realize and fully appreciate.

I, am, etc.,

B. B. CUBITT.

COPY OF TELEGRAMS

*From Minister of Militia, Canada, to
War Office*

(No. 185, cypher)

November 25, 1914.

"We are mobilizing four regiments of Mounted Rifles and can mobilize more. Will you require all or any of them in the near future, and if so, where?"

*From War Office to Minister of Militia,
Canada*

(No. 2233, cypher M.O.8)

November 26, 1914 (4.35 p.m.)

"Your No. 185, cypher. The four regiments of Mounted Rifles can be used for service in Egypt, and we shall be very glad to have them for that purpose. Please cable how many more regiments you could mobilize, and by what date."

*From General Hughes, Canada, to War Office
(197 cypher)*

December 3, 1914.

"Your 2233 cypher MOS. Should troopships and naval escort be available, a brigade of three regiments Mounted Rifles can be sent to Egypt in January, and about a month afterwards another similar brigade."

The Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.

*From the Under Secretary of State for
External Affairs to the Governor
General's Secretary*

SECRET.

OTTAWA, August 3, 1915.

Sir:—

With reference to the telegram to His Royal Highness from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 29th ultimo, pressing for a reply to his secret despatch of the 30th June, 1915, in regard to the question of the organization of any further reinforcements to be supplied by the Canadian Government, I have the honour to enclose, herewith, copy of a letter which has just been received from the Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, said by him to have been addressed to you on the 19th instant (*sic ultimo*), and I am to suggest that the substance of this letter should be communicated to the Colonial Office in reply to the telegram referred to, if this has not already been done.

I have, etc.,

W. H. WALKER,
Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

The Governor General's Secretary,
Ottawa.

*From the Deputy Minister of Militia and
Defence to the Governor General's
Secretary*

July 19, 1915.

Sir:—

Touching on the provision of reinforcements for the Canadian Oversea Contingent, and with reference to secret despatch, Canada, dated 30th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:—

1. The undermentioned Canadian troops are, or will soon be, at the front, i.e. on the Continent of Europe:

The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions;

The 1st and 2nd Brigade Canadian Mounted Rifles
(six regiments in all, vide attached cablegrams)
(*see above*);

The Royal Canadian Dragoons;

Lord Strathconas Horse (Royal Canadians);

A Brigade of Royal Canadian Horse Artillery;

The Royal Canadian Regiment (from Bermuda);

The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry;

A pioneer battalion;

A railway construction corps;

An automobile machine-gun brigade;

A large number of line of communication units; and, in the event of the two Canadian divisions being grouped into a Canadian Army Corps, there are certain additional units which would have to be provided.

2. To maintain in the field the strength and efficiency of so large a force is as much as Canada should undertake. Having regard to what war wastage means, it would be better to concentrate effort on the raising and training of reinforcements, than to go on adding to the number of units at the front.

3. Moreover, the situation is such that Canada cannot afford to give no thought to self-defence and the preservation of internal order; and there is a limit to the number of troops which, without unduly weakening herself, she can send on service overseas.

I have, etc.,

E. FISET,
Surgeon General,
Deputy Minister.

Governor General's Military Secretary,
OTTAWA.

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*From the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor General*

CANADA.

No. 511.

DOWNING STREET, June 7, 1915.

Sir:—

I have the honour to transmit to Your Royal Highness, for the consideration of your ministers, copy of a letter from the Army Council regarding the inclusion of the McGill Overseas Company in the 38th Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

The enclosure is a printed circular headed "The Graduates Society of McGill University," and dated 12th February, 1916.

I have, etc.,

A. BONAR LAW.

Governor General,

His Royal Highness The Duke of Connaught
and of Strathearn, K.G., etc.

From the War Office to the Colonial Office
121/Overseas/621 (M.O.I.C.)

WAR OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W. May 28, 1915.

Sir:—

I am commanded by the Army Council to forward a printed copy of a letter relative to the inclusion of the McGill Overseas Company in the 38th Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (*not reproduced*).

The Council have found from experience in this country that there are only a limited number of men available, possessing the education and attainments necessary to make satisfactory and efficient officers, and they have further found that, if those suitable for commissions are fighting in the ranks, a dearth of candidates suitable to fill officer vacancies is likely to arise. In view of the difficulty of selecting from the ranks suitable candidates for commissions it has been found convenient to establish officers' training companies in which individuals likely to make good *officers* can be instructed.

The men of the McGill Company appear to belong to a class eminently suitable to act as officers, and the council suggest to the

Secretary of State for the Colonies that he might represent to the Canadian Government that the company ought not to be included in the establishment of any unit, but ought rather to be organized as an *officers'* training corps. It would appear to be desirable that the company should continue to be located in Canada.

I am, etc.,

B. B. CUBITT.

The Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
Whitehall, S.W.

*From the Under Secretary of State for External
Affairs to the Governor General's
Secretary*

OTTAWA, September 28, 1915.

Sir:—

With reference to a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor General dated 7th June, 1915, I have the honour to represent that the 38th Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force, has proceeded overseas, not to Europe but to Bermuda. It did not take with it the company of McGill contingent, Canadian Officers Training Corps, which for a time formed part of its establishment. That Company, by special request, was sent to England as a reinforcing draft for the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

I am to add that no difficulty is experienced by the Militia Department in obtaining officers for the Canadian Expeditionary Force. It has not, therefore, been found necessary to act on the suggestion contained in War Office letter No. 121/Overseas/621 (M.O.I.C.), dated 28th May last.

I am to request that His Royal Highness may be humbly moved to cause the Secretary of State for the Colonies to be informed in this sense.

I have, etc.,

JOSEPH POPE,

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

The Governor General's Secretary,
OTTAWA.

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Extract from Report of the Accountant and Paymaster General dated 30th March, 1916

WAR EXPENDITURE, AUGUST, 1914, TO JANUARY 31, 1916

Month and Year	Expended in Canada	Expended in England	Total monthly expenditure
1914			
August.....	\$ cts. 1,640,347 40	\$ cts.	\$ cts. 1,640,347 40
September.....	4,566,812 18	1,249 58	4,568,061 76
October.....	4,715,538 28	1,463,383 82	6,178,922 10
November.....	4,387,205 64	2,434,010 43	6,821,216 07
December.....	5,413,623 46	757,578 02	6,171,201 48
1915			
January.....	5,841,601 19	985,008 23	6,826,609 42
February.....	6,941,965 18	714,051 81	7,656,016 99
March.....	10,960,864 47	2,353,373 86	13,314,238 33
Total, 1914-15.....	44,467,957 80	8,708,655 75	53,176,613 55
April.....	4,006,143 13	1,341,826 07	5,347,969 20
May.....	5,819,724 70	1,014,276 91	7,834,001 61
June.....	6,954,585 82	1,951,397 77	8,905,983 59
July.....	6,768,445 37	5,418,939 31	12,187,384 68
August.....	7,621,075 81	3,441,284 78	11,062,360 59
September.....	7,716,581 63	2,458,051 92	10,174,633 55
October.....	9,264,526 90	3,774,491 03	13,039,017 93
November.....	13,045,036 20	1,044,653 89	14,089,690 09
December.....	11,686,095 40	5,462,298 76	17,148,394 16
Total, 1915-16.....	73,912,214 96	25,907,220 44	99,819,435 40
Total, 1914-15.....	44,467,957 80	8,708,655 75	53,176,613 55
Grand Totals.....	118,380,172 76	34,615,876 19	152,996,048 95

EXPENDITURE ON ACCOUNT OF WAR APPROPRIATION

Particulars	1914-1915 Eight Months, August 1 to March 31	1915-1916 Nine Months, April 1 to Dec. 31, 1915	Total
	\$ cts.	\$ cts.	\$ cts.
Pay and allowances (includes subsistence, billeting, rations and assigned pay).....	23,692,431 98	58,180,806 67	81,873,238 65
Separation allowances.....	1,414,103 49	7,734,504 28	9,148,607 77
Clothing (except boots).....	5,205,355 08	4,706,352 53	9,911,707 61
Boots and repairs to boots.....	1,070,875 02	3,290,634 10	4,361,509 12
Necessaries (underclothing, kit bags and articles of kit).....	1,833,856 30	2,248,064 64	4,081,920 94
Outfit allowances.....	318,832 92	1,076,211 24	1,395,044 16
Saddlery and horse equipment.....	832,024 90	1,023,479 43	1,855,504 33
Motor trucks, ambulances, and other vehicles.....	1,776,851 78	1,103,831 84	2,880,683 12
Accoutrements.....	1,059,016 85	621,231 36	1,680,248 21
Binoculars, telescopes, heliographs, prism compasses, range finders.....	264,649 46	201,799 00	466,448 46
Drugs and surgical instruments.....	299,700 04	663,707 99	963,408 03
Dominion Arsenal (from War vote).....	620,532 99	620,532 99
Dominion Cartridge Company—Ammunition.....	635,540 56	1,430,724 73	2,066,265 29
Ross Rifle Company—Rifles and bayonets.....	599,860 05	2,823,628 15	3,423,488 20
Machine guns.....	136,243 30	487,735 35	623,978 65
Vickers, Limited.....	365,000 00	365,000 00
Heavy ordnance.....	1,298,869 71	316,240 10	1,615,109 81
Travelling and transport—Sea.....	3,576,254 77	3,686,844 53	7,263,099 30
“ “ Land.....	960,161 54	2,329,427 76	3,289,589 30
Forage and stabling.....	375,533 62	482,763 74	858,297 36
Pay, etc., of censors.....	101,761 38	121,440 19	223,201 57
Pay of civil employees.....	355,075 88	191,274 83	546,350 71
Rent, water, fuel and light.....	330,343 71	393,916 20	724,259 91
Stores (furniture, bedding and utensils).....	2,516,231 25	2,393,428 96	4,909,660 21
Engineer services and works.....	915,819 69	881,248 59	1,797,068 28
Funeral expenses.....	5,633 10	10,502 37	16,135 47
Recruiting (medical examination, attestation, and advertising).....	27,626 67	119,638 14	147,264 81
Telegrams, telephones, and postage.....	78,948 05	131,768 91	210,716 96
Printing and stationery.....	64,057 00	199,342 81	263,399 81
Conservancy and contingencies.....	236,803 60	220,931 69	457,735 29
Purchase of remounts, expenses of purchasers, etc.....	3,194,151 85	1,762,422 73	4,956,574 83
Total.....	53,176,613 55	99,819,435 40	152,996,048 95

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EXTRACT FROM PRESS CENSORSHIP
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM

Colonial Troops.

(6) Special considerations apply in the case of Colonial Troops arriving in this country, as it is desired that public attention and interest should be properly aroused in regard thereto. The Press, as soon as Naval considerations permit an announcement of arrival to be made (as to which notice will, if possible, be given), may give any details they think fit of the landing of the troops provided that they do not touch upon the following matters:

(a) The names and numbers of transports; times and ports of departure; all information regarding convoy, or sighting of friendly or enemy warships or merchantmen en route;

numbers or dispositions of troops carried and all particulars relating to the course or direction followed.

(b) The number of troops arriving.

(c) The organization of the troops, i.e., the brigades and divisions in which they are serving and the Commanding officers of those brigades or divisions.

(d) Any of their movements in or from this country which in any way relate to or throw any light upon their departure from this country on active service: e.g., their journey to any port for embarkation, their voyage to the Continent, and their arrival there or movements after they shall have arrived.

If all details of the kind above mentioned are excluded, descriptive accounts of the landing of Colonial troops in this country and of their reception and training here, will be welcomed.

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BATTLE CASUALTIES CANADIAN FORCES

Date (1915)	1st Canadian Infantry Brigade										2nd Canadian Infan					
	Hqrs.		1st Bn.		2nd Bn.		3rd Bn.		4th Bn.		Hqrs.		5th Bn.		7th Bn.	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
January 8-February 14																
February 15-21				4		3		3								
February 22-23				1		5							5	1	5	
March 1-7			1	14		15		4		2			1	1	2	
March 8-14			1	15	2	7		11		2			8	1	5	
March 15-21			1	6		6		3	1	5		1	3	1	5	
March 22-26								3		2			2		1	
March 27-April 2				1		1				3			1		4	
April 3-9						1		1		2			1			
April 10-14				2						2			1		1	
April 15-21				9		2		1		3			9	1	25	
April 22		1		30	1	239	1	10	1	14		1	4	1	5	
April 23		1	5	90	5	35	3	36	10	209			10	1	1	
April 24			3	99	5	86	7	296	2	72	2	5	39	4	422	
April 25				46	1	44		17	3	46			49	7	46	
April 26				28	3	62	1	8		27	2		55	1	41	
April 27				32	1	20	1	11		34	1	2	29		14	
April 28				15		9	3	3		9		1	23		9	
April 29				10		8		5		15		1	11	4	9	
April 30				25	1	1		3		5			1	1	5	
May 1				3		4		2		4			10		2	
May 2				4		1		57		3		1	10		4	
May 3				1						2			8		3	
May 4-10				7		7		8		8		2	29	1	16	
May 11-17				2		2		6		6			4		3	
May 18				1				1		7					1	
May 19															1	
May 20				2				1		3			2		1	
May 21				4		3		3		2		1	15		4	
May 22				5		3	1	8		6		4	40	2	30	
May 23		1		6		6		18		11			15		13	
May 24				14		4	2	23		14		3	177	4	91	
May 25				3		5	3	32		9		5	25	3	25	
May 26-June 1				27	2	19	2	71	4	85		2	39		39	
June 2-8				2		1		2		6			4		13	
June 9-14					1	8		4		8					2	
June 15			20	238	2	11	1	21		4			12			
June 16				23	1	23		22		11			3			
June 17-24				59		35	4	89		19			3	1	9	
June 25-26								1					4		1	
June 27-July 3				1		4		2	1	10			3		8	
July 4-10				2		4		1		4		1	6		2	
July 11-17				1		4		1		1			1		3	
July 18-24				1		5		1	1	1			5		5	
July 25-31				2				1		4		1	4		1	
August 1-7				2			1			1			1		2	
August 8-15				14		7		5		4			3	1	5	
August 16-22			1	1		1		4		4			7		4	
August 23-29			1	1		5				5			3		20	
August 30-September 5				6		3		3		5			2			
September 6-12			1			3		3					8		5	
	1	2	34	864	25	712	31	805	23	699	3	5	29	695	36	913

NOTE: The above, compiled from the personal records of individuals, includes killed, died of wounds, wounded, missing (later presumed dead) and prisoners of war. Sick are not included, but a number of those evacuated sick, particularly during the Battles of Ypres 1915, were in fact suffering from the effects of poison gas, hence properly battle casualties. For that period also.

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BATTLE CASUALTIES CANADIAN FORCES

Date (1915)	Divisional Troops															
	Div. Hqrs.		Cav. & Cycl.		Heavy Arty.		Engrs.		Sigs.		CASC		CAMC		Others	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
January 8-February 14.....																
February 15-21.....																
22-28.....				1				1								
March 1-7.....									2			1		1		
8-14.....									2			1				
15-21.....									1					1		
22-26.....									1							
March 27-April 2.....										1						1
April 3-9.....				1										1		
10-14.....				1						1				1		
15-21.....		1									1			1		
22.....									2		1		1	1		
23.....					4			11						6		
24.....					2			14		1		1	2	12		
25.....					5			7				1		6		1
26.....					2			5		4			1	1		
27.....					3			4					2	1		
28.....		1		1				10				1	2		1	
29.....				2				1		1				2		
30.....							1	3				1		1		
May 1.....				1				3		1				1		
2.....			1					2				2	1	1		1
3.....								4				2		2		
4-10.....						1				2	1	3	1		1	1
11-17.....						1		1		2		1				1
18.....												1				
19.....								4						1		
20.....								2						2		
21.....		1						1	4					1		
22.....												1		1		
23.....								3								
24.....										1						
25.....							1	3								
May 26-June 1.....								5				1				2
June 2-8.....								4				1		3		
9-14.....																
15.....							1	1		1				1		
16.....								1								
17-24.....								13		1				1		
25-26.....																
June 27-July 3.....						1		1				1				
July 4-10.....												1				
11-17.....								4								
18-24.....						1		2								
25-31.....			1		1							1				
August 1-7.....								1		1		1				2
8-15.....					2											
16-22.....														2		
23-29.....								1								
August 30-September 5.....								2		1						1
September 6-12.....								1				1				
.....		4	1	26	4	6	125	21	1	28	10	48	2	10

NOTE: The above, compiled from the personal records of individuals, includes killed, died of wounds, wounded, missing (later presumed dead) and prisoners of war. Sick are not included, but a number of those evacuated sick, particularly during the Battles of Ypres 1915, were in fact suffering from the effects of poison gas, hence properly battle casualties. For that period also,

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IN THE FIELD TO 12TH SEPTEMBER 1915—Concluded

Canadian Cavalry Brigade								PPCLI.		CMMG. Bde.		Lines of Comm.		TOTAL	
HQ & Bde. Units		RCD.		LSH.		RCHA.		Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
.....								5	61					5	61
.....								1	10					2	21
.....									33					2	65
.....								3	43					5	112
.....									8					6	118
.....								7	53					13	126
.....									17					1	44
.....									2						25
.....															17
.....									9						28
.....								1	32					9	172
.....									6					20	622
.....									8					42	786
.....									11					59	2,099
.....								2	11					28	685
.....									2					11	450
.....									10					11	351
.....									7					12	183
.....									4					5	164
.....								1	4					8	85
.....									6					2	99
.....									2					7	154
.....								1	5					1	83
.....								12	491					27	704
.....					2				31						109
.....														1	93
.....									1					6	76
.....									1					5	246
.....									1					11	351
.....									1					14	350
.....					1				2					6	143
.....									1					22	409
.....			5		3				1					18	166
.....			2		2				2					13	416
.....					31				10					3	108
.....					27				2					3	40
.....			29		19				3					25	298
.....					1				2					1	94
.....														10	307
.....									1						13
.....									1					1	58
.....			10		3				8					4	63
.....			2		1									3	60
.....			1		3				1					2	55
.....					4						1			3	47
.....			1		8				1					2	47
.....					2				1					2	61
.....					13				2					3	54
.....			1		2				1					1	57
.....					2				3			1		3	54
.....									1					1	54
.....									1					1	42
.....									2						
.....	1	5	95	7	124	38	913	2	437	11,070

owing to the nature of the fighting, casualties were frequently not discovered until after units had been withdrawn: this accounts for most of the figures opposite dates on which units were not in the forward area.

EFFECTIVE STRENGTHS, IN THE
In preparing the Chart certain units have been grouped under general headings;
Chaplains and Nursing Sisters are included

Artillery Brigades
1st, 2nd and 3rd Bde. H. Q.
Field Arty. Batteries.
Brigade Amm. Columns.
Divisional H.Q.
Div. H.Q.
H.Q. Div. Arty.
H.Q. Div. Engrs.
Cavalry and Cyclists
1st Div. Cavalry Sqdn.
Cyclists Company.

Engineers
1st, 2nd and 3rd Fld. Coy. Companies.
Signals
H.Q. Signal Coy. Company.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Signal Bde. Sects.
Sig. Coy.
C.A.S.C.
1st Div. Supply Column.
1st Div. Train.
C.A.M.C.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Fld. Ambulances.
No. 1 Cdn. Sanitary Section.

STRENGTHS, CANADIAN FORCES IN

1915	1st Canadian Infantry Brigade										2nd Canadian Infantry					
	Hqrs.		1st Bn.		2nd Bn.		3rd Bn.		4th Bn.		Hqrs.		5th Bn.		7th Bn.	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
31 Jan.....																
27 Feb.....	9	33	32	986	31	994	30	994	31	966	10	33	30	996	31	987
3 April.....	10	31	26	955	29	995	28	929	30	1,022	9	30	29	945	27	987
2 May.....	10	33	24	788	20	565	16	547	29	1,084	10	30	20	769	16	434
30 May.....	11	34	27	808	25	815	28	997	28	949	9	30	11	508	15	539
4 July.....	11	35	9	409	27	749	16	581	25	835	10	24	22	589	24	576
1 Aug.....	10	32	15	426	30	736	23	779	28	771	11	23	25	769	32	553
29 Aug.....	10	33	22	844	29	941	30	819	26	937	11	24	29	979	34	531

1915	Divisional Troops															
	Div. Hqrs.		Cav. and Cye.		D.A.C.		Engrs.		Sigs.		CMMG. Bde.		CASC.		CAMC.	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
31 Jan.....																
27 Feb.....	38	122	9	263	13	389	17	591	9	265			24	704	37	735
3 April.....	33	128	14	339	13	425	18	632	6	197			26	701	35	726
2 May.....	35	129	13	326	12	451	18	563	6	255			26	700	34	698
30 May.....	34	125	13	341	11	474	18	599	4	145			26	690	35	735
4 July.....	33	145	12	355	14	504	14	625	4	175	9	156	25	698	39	717
1 Aug.....	35	138	12	345	13	462	16	621	4	180	8	152	24	660	34	714
29 Aug.....	32	147	12	350	12	494	18	637	5	176	9	154	24	714	39	727

FIELD, TO AUGUST 29TH, 1915

allocation of these units, under the various headings, are as shown hereunder. in the formations with which they did duty.

Others

- No. 1 Mobile Vet. Section.
- C.O.C.
- Canadian Cavalry Brigade
- H.Q. and Sig. Troop.
- R.C.D.
- L.S.H.
- R.C.H.A.

Heavy Artillery

- Heavy Battery and Amm. Column.

Lines of Communication

- 1st Div. Amm. Sub. Park.
- 1st Reserve Park.

Lines of Communication—Continued

- 1st Field Bakery.
- 1st Field Butchery.
- Depot Units of Supply.
- No. 1 Cdn. Rly. Supply Det.
- No. 1, 2 and 3 Cdn. Gen. Hospitals.
- No. 1 and 2 Cdn. Stationary Hospitals.
- No. 1 Cdn. Casualty Clg. Station.
- Advance Sect. Medical Stores.
- No. 1 Cdn. Mobile Laboratory.
- 1st Cdn. Motor Ambulance Workshop.
- No. 1 Cdn. Vet. Hospital.
- No. 1 Cdn. Remount Depot.
- Cdn. Base Pay Unit.

THE FIELD TO 29TH AUGUST, 1915

Brigade		3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade										Field Artillery							
8th Bn.		10th Bn.		Hqrs.		13th Bn.		14th Bn.		15th Bn.		16th Bn.		1st Bde.		2nd Bde.		3rd Bde.	
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
32	1,000	32	985	10	31	31	991	30	996	30	1,022	31	959	27	728	27	718	26	695
30	953	27	953	10	32	30	947	31	954	29	981	30	956	24	704	24	691	28	680
11	484	28	869	9	32	28	744	21	648	7	440	29	971	25	706	24	699	24	699
19	665	13	631	9	31	16	732	22	728	27	762	19	528	22	672	24	591	21	620
30	607	15	582	9	30	27	707	27	819	30	801	25	665	22	717	22	717	25	734
27	837	23	534	9	32	24	674	28	782	32	971	24	1,025	24	717	25	728	26	726
28	933	21	711	8	32	28	678	29	777	25	964	24	974	23	723	24	700	24	715

Others	Total 1st Cdn. Div.		Canadian Cavalry Brigade				Heavy Arty.	PPCLI	Lines of Commn.		Total in the Field								
	Off.	O.R.	Hqrs. and Bde. Units	R.C.D.	L.S.H.	RCHA			Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.							
									25	917	47	101	72	1,018					
1	27	628	17,180					5	190	19	942	92	744	744	19,056				
1	26	597	16,919					5	193	22	1,011	228	1,193	852	19,316				
2	28	495	13,692					6	194	27	953	259	1,518	787	18,357				
2	26	489	13,775	8	23	25	416	22	354	7	193	24	650	396	2,144	971	17,555		
2	29	528	13,581	9	64	22	548	18	558	7	192	22	632	518	2,269	1,124	17,844		
2	31	564	14,418	9	63	23	515	21	546	17	457	7	208	25	776	496	2,336	1,162	19,319
2	33	578	15,742	8	63	19	533	22	551	14	447	7	206	29	729	451	2,182	1,128	20,453

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CANADIAN EXPEDI

STRENGTHS IN ENGLAND (OTHER THAN 2ND

ALL IN THE SHORNCLIFFE AREA

Unit	11th June		9th July	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
Minister's Representative (London) (General Carson).....	2	4	2	4
London Administrative Offices.....	26	240	30	298
H.Q. Canadian Training Division.....	13	95	13	101
A.D.M.S. Canadian Training Division.....				
H.Q. Paymaster.....	3	7	3	9
Canadian Cavalry Depot (Canterbury to 3-9-15).....	29	867	34	875
Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company (Hounslow).....				
Reserve Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery.....	23	496	37	654
Canadian Engineer Training Depot.....	18	146	15	201
1st Brigade Canadian Mounted Rifles.....			84	1,784
(1st Regt. C.M.R.)				
(2nd Regt. C.M.R.)				
(3rd Regt. C.M.R.)				
2nd Brigade Canadian Mounted Rifles.....				
(4th Regt. C.M.R.)				
(5th Regt. C.M.R.)				
(6th Regt. C.M.R.)				
Royal Canadian Regiment.....				
9th Reserve Battalion.....	37	649	45	1,444
11th Reserve Battalion.....	37	897	56	1,200
12th Reserve Battalion.....	32	391	40	1,294
17th Reserve Battalion.....	27	495	39	962
23rd Reserve Battalion.....	35	360	61	1,441
30th Reserve Battalion.....	36	555	47	1,296
32nd Reserve Battalion.....	49	558	65	1,672
36th Reserve Battalion.....			39	1,001
39th Reserve Battalion.....			42	1,001
42nd Canadian Infantry Battalion.....			41	994
43rd Canadian Infantry Battalion.....	40	1,003	40	1,003
48th Canadian Infantry Battalion.....				
49th Canadian Infantry Battalion.....			36	997
Eaton Motor Machine Gun Battery.....			24	255
Canadian Overseas Railway Construction Corps (Longmoor).....			21	503
Canadian Army Service Corps Training Depot.....	23	300	24	305
Depot Company, Canadian Army Medical Corps.....	21	93	4	26
No. 1 Canadian Advance Depot Medical Stores.....	1	5	1	6
No. 3 Canadian General Hospital.....	109	189		
No. 4 Canadian General Hospital.....	112	203	112	203
No. 5 Canadian General Hospital.....				
No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital.....	44	86	36	83
No. 4 Canadian Stationary Hospital.....	44	83	44	92
No. 5 Canadian Stationary Hospital.....	3	85	10	81
No. 2 Canadian Casualty Clearing Station.....	11	95	11	133
No. 3 Canadian Casualty Clearing Station.....				
Canadian Convalescent Hospital (Monks Horton).....	5	41	6	88
Canadian Convalescent Hospital (Bromley).....	3	22	4	22
Duchess of Connaught Canadian Red Cross Hosp. (Taplow).....	19	99	27	96
Canadian Army Dental Corps.....				
Canadian Ordnance Corps (Ashford).....	3	42	4	60
Canadian Army Veterinary Corps.....	4	100	4	72
Canadian Remount Depot (Romsey).....				
TOTAL.....	809	8,206	1,101	20,256
	9,015		21,357	

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TIONARY FORCE

CANADIAN DIVISION) JUNE TO SEPTEMBER, 1915.
UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.

6th August		2nd September		30th September		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	
2	5	2	5	2	5	
35	427	39	514	45	622	
19	125	12	105	13	106	
5	23	5	35	5	46	No returns earlier than 6-8-15.
3	14	4	18	4	29	
32	896	55	1,413	62	1,696	
4	143	4	139	6	152	Organized 24th May, 1915, but no returns available earlier than 6-8-15.
41	923	82	1,306	44	721	
4	78	31	523	34	660	
60	1,605	84	1,797	Arrived England 19-6-15. Left for France 22-9-15.
93	1,606	103	1,828	103	1,877	Arrived England 29-7-15.
.....	49	1,054	Arrived England 6-9-15.
14	500	76	1,432	85	1,754	
19	507	59	728	90	1,745	
33	1,035	72	1,053	82	1,343	
18	452	53	1,049	69	1,465	
44	1,024	93	1,564	106	1,917	
62	1,368	75	1,451	92	2,045	
38	729	78	1,037	70	1,233	
24	863	40	1,003	41	1,014	Arrived England 29-6-15.
28	919	42	1,001	54	1,266	Arrived England 4-7-15.
31	791	43	969	40	1,053	Arrived England 19-6-15.
33	530	42	693	41	837	
26	946	38	1,020	36	773	Arrived England 11-7-15.
26	866	45	976	44	1,049	Arrived England 13-6-15.
22	238	25	300	24	310	Arrived England 13-6-15.
21	503	4	61	1	29	Arrived England 25-6-15. Left for France 24-8-15.
29	400	40	491	41	834	
1	79	63	350	81	554	
1	7	1	10	1	11	
.....	Left for France 17-6-15.
112	173	113	200	114	197	
.....	109	201	Arrived England 5-9-15.
.....	Left for Near East 1-8-15.
37	138	47	140	47	123	
.....	Left for Near East 1-8-15.
11	140	8	78	Left for France 16-9-15.
3	78	8	78	8	78	Arrived England 11-7-15.
9	101	9	102	13	113	
3	24	3	25	3	24	
30	73	38	129	64	156	
18	73	52	78	51	101	Dental Personnel commenced to arrive in England in July, 1915.
4	69	7	87	8	110	
5	59	5	104	7	109	
.....	7	30	5	29	No returns earlier than 2-9-15.
1,000	18,530	1,607	23,922	1,794	27,441	
19,530		25,529		29,235		

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NOVEMBER 1914 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 1915

May 31st		June 30th		July 31st		Aug. 31st		Sept. 30th		Sailing Date	Strength on Sailing		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.		Off.	O.R.	
6	48									12-6-15	8	48	1 Raised for the 2nd Canadian Division.
18	350									12-6-15	28	602	
27	605									12-6-15	28	605	
30	642									12-6-15	28	598	
4	19	4	22							18-7-15	6	27	
34	630	36	600							18-7-15	31	602	
30	518	39	531							18-7-15	35	601	
30	533	35	597							18-7-15	32	598	
										23-2-15	6	154	
19	349									9-6-15	6	166	"C" Sqdn. 7th Regt. C.M.R. sailed in advance.
36	534	35	518	35	610	30	618	40	603	20-6-15	7	159	
25	539	25	525	27	584	33	620	26	522				"A" Sqdn. was selected in Canada and despatched to England as 2nd Canadian Divisional Mtd. Troops.
30	630	32	608	30	600	30	578	30	442				
28	584	32	513	25	654	26	572	29	566				
27	546	31	546	33	551	32	528	31	545				
32	583	30	546	32	568	26	518	29	539				
										20-5-15	8	37	
										20-5-15	4	138	
										20-5-15	5	138	
										20-5-15	5	151	
										20-5-15	5	151	
										16-5-15	4	141	
										20-5-15	1	37	
5	34	5	30	4	31					10-8-15	5	33	
4	153	4	153	4	146					10-8-15	4	151	
4	153	3	142	5	148					10-8-15	5	143	
4	154	3	148	3	151					10-8-15	3	151	
4	150	3	144	4	149					10-8-15	4	149	
4	153	3	117	3	152					10-8-15	3	154	
	21		20		20					10-8-15		34	
										23-2-15	5	36	
										23-2-15	4	151	
										23-2-15	4	151	
										23-2-15	4	151	
										23-2-15	4	151	
										23-2-15	4	152	
3	36	5	36	5	37					9-8-15	5	33	5 Owing to depletion and re-organisation in England the composition of the 6th Brigade, C.F.A. was completely changed before proceeding to France.
6	142	6	175	5	148					9-8-15	5	127	
5	149	8	144	4	145					9-8-15	4	110	
4	155	3	155	5	140					9-8-15	4	121	
5	147	3	151	5	121					9-8-15	5	121	
6	141	6	140	2	121					9-8-15	3	113	
		6	121	7	151	7	186	9	193				
		5	137	10	153	5	194	10	192				
		5	135	10	160	5	139	8	181				
						4	93	7	191				
						4	136	10	194				
						3	138	8	232				
						4	80	4	158				
								5	150				
						3	119	3	138				
								2	75				
								8	207				
													6 While authority had been given for the organization of the 39th Bty. prior to September 30th, 1915 recruiting did not commence until a later date.

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BER 1914 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 1915—Continued

May 31st		June 30th		July 31st		Aug. 31st		Sept. 30th		Sailing Date	Strength on Sailing		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.		Off.	O.R.	
7	214									15-6-15	7	212	1 Raised for the 2nd Canadian Division. 2 Sections D.A.C. sailed 16-5-15. Hqrs. and 1 Sect. sailed 15-6-15. 3 5 Platoons of the 2nd Cdn. Divn Cyclists sailed 16-5-15. One Platoon sailed 15-6-15.
		2	28	3	72	6	170	7	175				
						6	162	6	175	16-5-15	8	304	
9	101									15-6-15	10	138	
										18-4-15	3	10	
										18-4-15	7	225	
										18-4-15	6	228	
										18-4-15	6	200	
25	137	25	215	28	410	33	325	35	522				
										15-5-15	9	313	
1	35									16-5-15	9	176	
						8	121	8	208	15-6-15	1	35	
										6-5-15	3	5	
										13-4-15	36	1,031	
										13-5-15	41	1,073	
										14-5-15	35	1,100	
										4-5-15	42	1,057	
										11-5-15	5	14	
										20-5-15	36	1,097	
										11-5-15	42	1,082	
37	1,137									20-5-15	42	1,081	
										13-6-15	42	1,108	
										17-5-15	5	18	
										17-5-15	33	1,039	
										29-5-15	36	1,078	
										20-5-15	37	1,090	
										17-5-15	36	1,033	
										23-2-15	35	942	
										23-2-15	35	980	
										23-2-15	35	962	
49	1,190	41	1,083	40	1,195	38	1,087	41	1,084				
39	1,177	39	917	39	1,161	43	1,174	41	1,147				
41	1,095	35	1,065	45	1,062	36	1,157	41	1,128				
40	1,228									19-6-15	39	1,004	
40	896	35	896	39	1,047	36	1,034	40	1,067				
38	905	45	1,419	45	1,202					8-8-15	37	1,038	
43	1,114									24-6-15	40	1,003	
30	878	36	737	39	943	36	1,331	43	1,325				
36	950	31	726	31	773	33	495	33	950				
42	963									10-6-15	40	978	
40	998									1-6-15	40	998	
41	1,327	30	1,050	33	1,143	24	743	32	1,027				
31	738	35	955	34	1,067	38	885	31	1,055				
30	1,259	39	1,262	35	1,117	30	828	36	1,002				
36	1,025	39	965	39	1,009	27	1,231	34	1,228				
37	985	38	1,020							1-7-15	38	1,020	
36	996									4-6-15	36	996	
27	638	34	1,090	35	1,140	24	1,198	31	1,019				
28	981	37	1,101	42	1,109	39	1,278	35	1,071				
22	1,024	32	1,185	37	1,155	35	1,171	35	1,081				
30	1,064	36	981	37	1,099	34	822	33	434				
30	832	31	967	35	1,283	33	1,265	34	1,348				
32	737	45	1,106	43	1,009	42	1,022	44	1,017				
30	802	36	1,297	31	1,305	40	1,204	33	1,043				
2	269	24	451	32	862	37	537	39	273				
		15	569	39	944	35	1,152	38	1,074				
7	440	20	1,239	36	790	38	1,195	50	1,202				
23	64	44	723	40	903	45	1,083	44	1,075				
		25	961	34	1,047	38	1,260	38	1,117				
				28	641	34	1,140	31	1,078				
				38	1,108	38	1,110	39	969				
						39	900	37	1,864				
				12	284	24	623	24	425				
				35	1,107	37	1,097	32	958				

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STRENGTH C.E.F. IN CANADA 30TH NOVEM

Unit	Nov. 30th		Dec. 31st		Jan. 31st		Feb. 28th		Mar. 31st		Apr. 24th	
	Off.	O.R.										
67th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
68th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
69th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
70th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
71st Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
72nd Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
73rd Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
74th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
76th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
76th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
77th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
78th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
79th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
80th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
81st Cdn. Infantry Battn. ^a												
82nd Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
83rd Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
84th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
85th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
86th Cdn. (Machine Gun) Battn.												
87th Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
88th Cdn. Infantry Battn. ^a												
89th Cdn. Infantry Battn. ^a												
90th Cdn. Infantry Battn. ^a												
91st Cdn. Infantry Battn. ^a												
92nd Cdn. Infantry Battn.												
1st Cdn. Pioneer Battn.												
P.P.C.L.I. (1st Reinforcing Draft)			3	453								
No. 1 Univ. Coy. (2nd P.P.C.L.I. Reinforcing Draft)									6	116	6	216
No. 2 Univ. Coy. (3rd P.P.C.L.I. Reinforcing Draft)												
No. 3 Univ. Coy. (4th P.P.C.L.I. Reinforcing Draft)												
No. 4 Univ. Coy. (5th P.P.C.L.I. Reinforcing Draft)												
Borden Motor M.G. Battery			2	16	6	55	6	54	6	54	6	53
Eaton Motor M.G. Battery					9	92	23	258	23	256	25	258
Yukon Motor M.G. Battery	1	51	1	49	1	50	1	50	1	52	1	51
Cdn. O/S Rly. Constr. Corps.									9	107	16	480
2nd Cdn. Divisional Train ¹	7	329	15	471	24	471	24	467	25	464		
2nd Cdn. Divn. Amm. Park ¹			8	322	8	366	8	455	8	472	8	455
2nd Cdn. Divn. Supply Column ¹			5	208	5	250	5	262	5	268		
No. 5 Depot Unit of Supply ¹			1	9	1	13	1	13	1	13		
No. 6 Depot Unit of Supply ¹			1	10	1	13	1	13	1	13		
No. 7 Depot Unit of Supply ¹												
No. 8 Depot Unit of Supply ¹												
No. 9 Depot Unit of Supply ¹												
No. 2 Cdn. Field Butchery ¹			1	20	1	20	1	20	1	20		
No. 2 Cdn. Field Bakery ¹			1	91	1	91	2	90	2	92		
No. 2 Cdn. Reserve Park ¹			7	290	8	300	6	289	6	293	6	238
No. 2 Cdn. Railway Sup. Det. ¹			1	60	1	60	1	61	1	61		
C.A.S.C. Training Depot												
No. 4 Cdn. Field Ambulance ¹	8	172	9	168	11	249	11	235	11	224		
No. 5 Cdn. Field Ambulance ¹	9	253	10	248	11	250	10	254	10	254		
No. 6 Cdn. Field Ambulance ¹	7	247	8	271	10	264	10	257	10	262		
No. 1 Cdn. Field Amb. Depot.	2	81	2	82	5	148	5	173	7	161	4	156

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BER 1914 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 1915—Continued

May 31st		June 30th		July 31st		Aug. 31st		Sept. 30th		Sailing Date	Strength on Sailing		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.		Off.	O.R.	
						22	300	34	987				1 Raised for the 2nd Canadian Division.
				10	228	20	676	30	571				
						21	551	33	727				
								36	775				
								30	877				
						30	500	27	833				
						34	132	24	708				
				31	1,175	35	1,166	35	1,106				
				8	276	40	1,143	35	1,111				
				27	688	39	1,204	37	1,117				
						29	1,044	48	1,202				
				21	973	44	1,102	31	835				
						22	809	27	720				
								36	673				
						26	15	32	48				2 Although mobilization of 81st Battn. was authorized on 1st September 1915, attestation of recruits did not commence until 1st October.
						36	1,115	35	1,113				
				15	710	38	1,021	39	1,021				
								34	416				
								29	958				
								26	61				
				3	56	32	1,116	38	1,297				
						9	82	15	388				
										20-1-15	14	499	
										29-5-15	6	250	
4	106									29-6-15	6	264	
				3	148	6	335			4-9-15	4	327	
								3	94				
26	262									16-5-15	7	53	
	59		53							4-6-15	24	254	
										1-7-15	2	48	
17	520									14-6-15	21	503	
										18-4-15	25	464	
										15-5-15	8	477	
										10-4-15	4	258	
										18-4-15	1	13	
										18-4-15	1	13	
1	8	1	10							29-6-15	1	13	
1	11	1	13							29-6-15	1	13	
1	13	1	13							29-6-15	1	13	
										18-4-15	1	24	
										24-4-15	2	92	
										13-5-15	6	235	
										24-4-15	3	61	
		2	4	10	91	19	199	15	111				
										18-4-15	12	277	
										18-4-15	11	248	
										18-4-15	11	259	
7	224	16	288	12	322	28	531	27	473				

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STRENGTH C.E.F. IN CANADA 30TH NOVEM

Unit	Nov. 30th		Dec. 31st		Jan. 31st		Feb. 28th		Mar. 31st		Apr. 24th	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
No. 2 Cdn. Field Amb. Depot.....												
No. 3 Cdn. General Hospital ¹									17	201	107	202
No. 4 Cdn. General Hospital ¹									102	171	112	213
No. 5 Cdn. General Hospital.....												
No. 3 Cdn. Stationary Hosp. ¹						83	9	84	9	86		
No. 4 Cdn. Stationary Hosp.....									8	85	44	86
No. 5 Cdn. Stationary Hosp.....											44	88
No. 6 Cdn. Stationary Hosp.....												
No. 2 Cdn. Cas. Clearing Stn. ¹							8	77	8	76		
No. 3 Cdn. Cas. Clearing Stn.....												
Duchess of Connaught Cdn. Red Cross Hospital.....							6	69				
"A" Sanitary Section.....												
Cdn. Remount Depot.....											11	390
Mobile Veterinary Section.....												
TOTAL.....	468	16,118	835	24,575	1,048	30,735	1,322	36,341	1,891	46,949	2,073	46,753

SUMMARY

	Nov. 30th		Dec. 31st		Jan. 31st		Feb. 28th	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
Canadian Mounted Rifles.....			89	1,991	151	4,045	259	5,755
Artillery.....			85	2,212	98	2,742	73	2,045
Engineers.....	7	193	17	296	25	695	26	763
Signals.....								
Cyclists.....	1	20	9	190	9	192	9	193
Infantry.....	426	14,772	563	17,571	662	20,286	817	24,404
Motor Machine Gun Units.....	1	51	3	65	16	197	30	362
Cdn. O/S Rly. Constr. Corps.....								
Cdn. Army Service Corps.....	7	829	40	1,481	50	1,584	49	1,670
Cdn. Army Medical Corps.....	26	753	29	769	37	994	59	1,149
Remount Depot.....								
Cdn. Army Veterinary Corps.....								
TOTAL.....	468	16,118	835	24,575	1,048	30,735	1,322	36,341

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BER 1914 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 1915—Concluded

May 31st		June 30th		July 31st		Aug. 31st		Sept. 30th		Sailing Date	Strength on Sailing		Remarks
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.		Off.	O.R.	
8	272	11	319	10	305	17	680	20	524	6-5-15	105	204	1 Raised for the 2nd Canadian Division.
		6	162	11	225					16-5-15	102	205	
										27-8-15	107	203	
										18-4-15	9	85	
										6-5-15	44	86	
										6-5-15	44	88	
								10	112				
										18-4-15	8	75	
		8	97							1-7-15	8	97	
										15-3-15	4	76	
	20									20-8-15	1	26	
12	194									11-5-15	4	188	
		1	12							9-8-15	5	177	
										7-7-15	1	13	
1,466	36,636	1,268	31,953	1,423	38,730	1,775	47,090	2,090	53,127		1,848	38,089	

BY ARMS

March 31st		April 24th		May 31st		June 30th		July 31st		August 31st		Sept. 30th	
Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
342	6,939	357	7,068	376	7,110	299	5,006	182	3,567	177	3,434	185	3,217
97	2,866	99	2,939	70	1,903	75	1,976	79	2,045	47	1,417	87	2,291
25	788	28	176	25	187	25	215	28	416	33	325	35	522
6	254	8	260										
11	215	11	234	1	135					8	121	8	208
1,139	32,202	1,186	33,406	921	25,868	822	23,785	1,091	31,759	1,446	40,383	1,703	45,699
32	362	26	321		53								
9	107	16	450	17	520								
50	1,696	14	693	3	32	5	40	10	91	19	199	15	111
182	1,520	311	745	15	516	41	866	33	852	45	1,211	57	1,109
		11	390	12	194								
						1	12						
1,891	46,949	2,073	46,753	1,466	36,636	1,263	31,953	1,423	38,730	1,775	47,090	2,090	53,127

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1ST CANADIAN DIVISION: TRANSPORTATION BY SEA
AVONMOUTH, ENGLAND—ST. NAZAIRE, FRANCE. FEBRUARY 1915

Unit	Transport	Date Embarked	Date Dis-embarked
Headquarters.....	City of Benares.....	9th	12th
Div. Cav. Sqdn.....	Rosetti & Courtfield.....	9th	11th
Cyclist Co.....	City of Benares.....	8th	11th
1st C.D.A. H.Q.....	Archimedes.....	10th	13th
1st Bde. C.F.A., H.Q.....	African Prince.....	8th	12th
1st Bty.....	African Prince.....	8th	12th
2nd Bty.....	African Prince.....	8th	12th
3rd Bty.....	African Prince.....	8th	12th
4th Bty.....	African Prince.....	8th	12th
1st Bde. Amm. Col.....	African Prince.....	8th	11th
2nd Bde C.F.A., H.Q.....	Archimedes & City of Dunkirk.....	10th	12/13th
5th Bty.....	City of Dunkirk.....	10th	14th
6th Bty.....	Lake Michigan & Cardiganshire.....	11th	14th
7th Bty.....	Archimedes & Cardiganshire.....	11th	13/14th
8th Bty.....	City of Dunkirk & Archimedes.....	11th	14th
2nd Bde. Amm. Col.....	Lake Michigan & Kingstonian.....	10th	14th
3rd Bde. C.F.A., H.Q.....	Maidan & City of Chester.....	11th	16th
9th Bty.....	Maidan.....	11th	15th
10th Bty.....	Maidan & City of Chester.....	11th	16th
11th Bty.....	City of Chester.....	11th	16th
12th Bty.....	Maidan & City of Chester.....	11th	16th
3rd Bde. Amm. Col.....	City of Chester.....	11th	16th
1st Cdn. H.B. & Amm. Col.....	Australind.....	11th	15th
1st Cdn. Div. Amm. Col.....	Novian.....	11th	16th
1st Cdn. Div. Engrs., H.Q.....	City of Benares.....	9th	12th
1st Field Co. C.E.....	Courtfield.....	9th	12th
2nd Field Co. C.E.....	Courtfield.....	9th	12th
3rd Field Co. C.E.....	City of Benares.....	9th	12th
1st Cdn. Div. Sig. Co.....	City of Benares.....	9th	12th
1st C.I.B., H.Q.....	City of Edinburgh.....	9th	11th
1st Cdn. Bn.....	Architect.....	8th	12th
2nd Cdn. Bn.....	Blackwell.....	8th	11th
3rd Cdn. Bn.....	City of Edinburgh.....	9th	11th
4th Cdn. Bn.....	Atlantian.....	8th	12th
2nd C.I.B., H.Q.....	City of Dunkirk.....	11th	15th
5th Cdn. Bn.....	Lake Michigan.....	10th	14th
7th Cdn. Bn.....	Cardiganshire.....	10th	15th
8th Cdn. Bn.....	Archimedes.....	10th	13th
10th Cdn. Bn.....	Kingstonian.....	10th	14th
3rd C.I.B., H.Q.....	City of Chester.....	11th	15th
13th Cdn. Bn.....	Novian.....	11th	16th
14th Cdn. Bn.....	Australind.....	11th	15th
15th Cdn. Bn.....	Mount Temple.....	12th	15th
16th Cdn. Bn.....	Maidan.....	12th	15th
1st Cdn. Div. Train.....	City of Benares.....	9th	12th
No. 1 Cdn. Fld. Amb.....	Atlantian.....	7th	12th
No. 2 Cdn. Fld. Amb.....	City of Dunkirk.....	11th	15th
No. 3 Cdn. Fld. Amb.....	City of Benares.....	9th	12th

OTHER UNITS FIRST CANADIAN CONTINGENT
TRANS-CHANNEL SAILINGS, 1914-1915

Cdn. Cav. Bde., H.Q.*.....	Onward.....	4- 5-15	5- 5-15
R.C.D.*.....	Onward.....	4- 5-15	5- 5-15
L.S.H. (R.C.)*.....	Onward.....	4- 5-15	5- 5-15
R.C.H.A.....	Bellerophon, Queen Alexandra, Barrosa.....	19- 6-15	20- 6-15
P.P.C.L.I.....	Cardiganshire.....	20-12-14	21-12-14
1st C.M.M.G. Bde.....	African Prince.....	16- 6-15	17- 6-15
1st Cdn. C.C.S.....	Huanchaco.....	2- 2-15	3- 2-15
No. 1 Cdn. Stat. Hosp.....	Huanchaco.....	2- 2-15	3- 2-14
No. 2 Cdn. Stat. Hosp.....	City of Benares.....	7-11-14	9-11-15
No. 1 Cdn. Gen. Hosp.....	Trafford Hall.....	13- 5-15	16- 5-15
No. 2 Cdn. Gen. Hosp.....	Algerian.....	13- 3-15	14- 3-15

*Folkestone-Boulogne. All other units Southampton-Le Havre.

ABBREVIATIONS

I. GENERAL

A.	Branch of Adjutant-General.
A./or a/	Acting.
A.A.	Army Act. or Anti-Aircraft.
AAA or aaa.	Full stop.
A.A. & Q.M.G.	Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.
A. & P.M.G.	Accountant and Paymaster General.
A.A.G.	Assistant Adjutant-General.
A.D.C.	Aide-de-Camp.
Addsd.	Addressed.
A.D.S.	Advanced Dressing Station, or Assistant Director of Signalling.
Adjnt.	Adjutant.
A.D.M.S.	Assistant Director of Medical Services.
Adv.	Advanced.
A.D.V.S.	Assistant Director of Veterinary Services.
A.G.	Adjutant-General.
Amb.	Ambulance.
Amm. Col.	Ammunition Column.
Anzac.	Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
A.O.	Army Order.
A.P.M.	Assistant Provost-Marshal.
A.Q.M.G.	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Arty.	Artillery.
Bde(s)	Brigade(s).
B.E.F.	British Expeditionary Force.
B.G.G.S.	Brigadier-General, General Staff.
B.L.	Breech loading.
B.M.	Brigade Major.
Bn(s)	Battalion(s).
Br.-Gen.	Brigadier-General.
Bty.	Battery.
Cav.	Cavalry.
C.D.A.	Canadian Divisional Artillery.
Cdn. Arty.	Canadian Artillery.
C.C.S.	Casualty Clearing Station.
Cdn.Div.	Canadian Division.
Cdn. Inf. Bde.	Canadian Infantry Brigade.
C.E.	Canadian Engineers, or Chief Engineer.
C.E.F.	Canadian Expeditionary Force.
C.F.A.	Canadian Field Artillery.
C.G.A.	Canadian Garrison Artillery.
C.G.S.	Chief of the General Staff.
C.I.A.A.	Chief Inspector of Arms and Ammunition.

C.I.B.	Canadian Infantry Brigade.
C.I.G.S.	Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
C. in-C.	Commander-in-Chief.
C.M.	Canadian Militia.
C.O.	Commanding Officer.
Comdg.	Commanding.
Comdr.	Commander.
C.O.O.	Chief Ordnance Officer.
Coy(s)	Company. Companies.
C.R.A.	Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery.
C.R.E.	Officer Commanding, Royal Engineers.
C.S.M.	Company Sergeant-Major.
C.T.	Communication trench.
D.A.	Divisional Artillery, or Dominion Arsenal.
D.A.A.G.	Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
D.A.A. & Q.M.G.	Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
D.A.B.	Detachement d'Armee de Belgique.
D.A.D.M.S.	Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services.
D.A.D.O.S.	Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services.
D.A.G.	Deputy Adjutant-General.
D.D.M.S.	Deputy Director of Medical Services.
D.D.O.S.	Deputy Director of Ordnance Services.
D.D.V.S.	Deputy Director of Veterinary Services.
D.E.O.S.	Director of Equipment and Ordnance Services.
Det.	Detachment.
D.G.M.S.	Director-General of Medical Services.
Div.	Division, or Divisional.
Div. Amm. Col.	Divisional Ammunition Column.
Div. Arty.	Divisional Artillery.
D.M.	Deputy Minister.
D.M.O.	Director of Military Operations.
D.M.S.	Director of Medical Services.
D.M.T.	Director of Military Training.
D.O.C.	District Officer Commanding.
D. of C.	Director of Contracts.
D. of S.&T.	Director of Supplies and Transport.
d.o.w.	Died of Wounds.
E.A.	Enemy Aircraft.
Engrs.	Engineers.
Fd. Amb.	Field Ambulance.
Fd. Arty. Bde.	Field Artillery Brigade.
Fd. Coy.	Field Company.
F.L.T.	Front Line Trench.
F.O.O.	Forward Observing Officer.
F.S.R.	Field Service Regulations.
G.H.Q.	British General Headquarters.
G.O.	General Order.
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding.
G.O.C.-in-C.	General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

G.P.N.	Groupe Provisoire du Nord.
G.Q.G.	Grand Quartier General. i.e. French G.H.Q.
G. or G.S.	General Staff, or General Service.
G.S.O. 1, 2,3	General Staff Officer, 1st, 2nd or 3rd Grade.
H.A.R.	Heavy Artillery Reserve.
H.B.	Heavy Battery.
H.E.	High Explosive.
How.	Howitzer.
H.Q.(Hd. Qrs.)	Headquarters.
H.T.	Horse Transport.
H.V.	High velocity.
i/e	in charge of, or in command.
I.G.	Inspector-General.
J.A.G.	Judge Advocate General.
k. in a.	Killed in action.
K.R.	The King's Regulations for the Army.
<i>L.B.</i>	Landwehr Brigade. (German).
<i>L.E.</i>	Lee-Enfield.
<i>L.I.R.</i>	Landwehr Infantry Regiment. (German).
L. of C.	Line, or Lines of Communication.
M. & D.	Militia and Defence.
M.D.	Military District.
M.D.S.	Main Dressing Station.
M.G., G.S.	Major-General, General Staff.
M.G(s)	Machine gun(s).
M.G.O.	Master-General of the Ordnance.
Mk.	Mark.
M.M.L.	Manual of Military Law.
M.O.	Medical Officer, or Militia Order.
M.P.	Military Police or Member of Parliament.
M.T.	Mechanical Transport.
N.C.O.	Non-commissioned Officer.
N.D.H.Q.	National Defence Headquarters.
N.P. or N.P.A.M.	Non-Permanent Active Militia.
N.S.	Nursing Sister.
O.C.	Officer Commanding.
O.H.L.	Oberste Heeresleitung, i.e. German Supreme Command.
O.M.F.C.	Overseas Military Forces of Canada.
O.O.	Operation Order.
O.P.	Observation Post or Party.
O.R.	Other Ranks.
P.C.	Privy Council, or poste de commandement, i.e., headquarters of a field formation.
pdr.	pounder.
P.F.	Permanent Force (Canadian Militia).

Q.	Branch of the Quarter-Master-General.
Q.F.	Quick Firing.
Q.M.G.	Quarter-Master-General.
Q.M.S.	Quartermaster-Sergeant.
R.A.P.	Regimental Aid Post.
R. & F.	Rank and File.
R.B.	Reserve Brigade. (German).
R.D.	Reserve Division. (German).
rds.	Rounds.
rept. reptd.	Repeat(ed).
R.E.R.	Reserve Ersatz Division. (German).
Res.	Reserve.
Res. of Off.	Reserve of Officers.
R.I.R.	Reserve Infantry Regiment. (German).
R.M.C.	Royal Military College.
R.N.	Royal Navy.
R.N.V.R.	Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.
R.O.	Routine Orders, or Reserve of Officers.
R.S.M.	Regimental Sergeant-Major.
R.T.O.	Railway Transport Officer.
S.A.A.	Small Arms Ammunition.
S.C.	Southern Command or Staff Captain.
S/Capt.	Staff Captain.
Sec.	Section.
S.H.	Historical Section of the French General Staff.
Sig(s)	Signal(s).
S.M.	Sergeant-Major.
S.M.L.E.	Short Magazine Lee-Enfield.
S.O.	Staff Officer.
S.O.O.	Senior Ordnance Officer.
S.O.S.	Emergency call for help.
S.S.A.C.	Standing Small Arms Committee.
T.	Territorial.
temp.	temporary.
T.F.	Territorial Force.
T.M.	Trench Mortar.
Vet.	Veterinary.
W.E.	War Establishment.
W.O.	War Office.

U. CANADIAN FORCES

CA. or Cdn. Arty.	Canadian Artillery.
C.A.D.C.	Canadian Army Dental Corps.
C.A.M.C.	Canadian Army Medical Corps.
C.A.P.C.	Canadian Army Pay Corps.
C.A.S.C.	Canadian Army Service Corps.
C.A.V.C.	Canadian Army Veterinary Corps.
C.D.A.	Canadian Divisional Artillery.

Cdn. Cav. Bde.	Canadian Cavalry Brigade.
C.E.	Canadian Engineers.
C.F.A.	Canadian Field Artillery.
C.G.A.	Canadian Garrison Artillery.
C.I.B.	Canadian Infantry Brigade.
C.M.M.G. Bde.	Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.
C.M.R. Regt.	Canadian Mounted Rifles Regiment.
C.M.S.C.	Corps of Military Staff Clerks.
C.O.C.	Canadian Ordnance Corps.
C.O.T.C.	Canadian Officers' Training Corps.
C.P.A.S.C.	Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps.
C.P.A.V.C.	Canadian Permanent Army Veterinary Corps.
C.P.C.	Canadian Postal Corps.
C.S.C.	Canadian Signal Corps.
C.T.D.	Canadian Training Depot.
C.O.R.C.C.	Canadian Overseas Railway Construction Corps.
F.G.H.	Fort Garry Horse.
L.S.H.(R.C.)	Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).
P.A.M.C.	Permanent Army Medical Corps.
P.P.C.L.I.	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.
R.C.A.	Royal Canadian Artillery.
R.C.D.	Royal Canadian Dragoons.
R.C.E.	Royal Canadian Engineers.
R.C.G.A.	Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery.
R.C.H.A.	Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.
R.C.N.	Royal Canadian Navy.
R.C.R.	The Royal Canadian Regiment.
R.M.C.	Royal Military College.
R.N.C.V.R.	Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve.
R.N.W.M.P.	Royal North West Mounted Police.
R.S.A.	Royal School of Artillery.

III. BRITISH REGIMENTAL

A.&S.H.	Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland High. lancers).
A.S.C.	Army Service Corps.
Bufs.	The Buffs (East Kent Regiment).
Ches. or Cheshire	The Cheshire Regiment.
D.C.L.I.	The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
D.L.I.	The Durham Light Infantry.
E. Kent	The Buffs (East Kent Regiment).
Essex	The Essex Regiment.
E. Surrey	The East Surrey Regiment.
E. York	The East Yorkshire Regiment.

K.E.H.	King Edward's Horse (The King's Oversew Dominion Regiment).
K.O.R. Lanc	The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment).
K.O.S.B.	The King's Own Scottish Borderers.
K.O.Y.L.I.	The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
K.S.L.I.	The King's (Shropshire Light Infantry).
K.R.R.C.	The King's Royal Rifle Corps.
Linc.	The Lincolnshire Regiment.
9/London(Q.V.R.)	9th London Regiment (Queen, Victoria's Rifles).
L'pool	The King's (Liverpool Regiment).
Middx.	The Duke of Cambridge's Own (Middlesex Regiment).
Mon.	The Monmouthshire Regiment.
N.Fus.	The Northumberland Fusiliers.
R.A.	Royal Artillery.
R.A.M.C.	Royal Army Medical Corps.
R.E.	Royal Engineers.
R.F.A.	Royal Field Artillery.
R.F.C.	Royal Flying Corps.
R. Fusiliers	The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment).
R.G.A.	Royal Garrison Artillery.
Rifle Bde.	The Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).
R. Ir. Fus.	Princess Victoria's (Royal Irish Fusiliers).
R. Ir. Rif.	The Royal Irish Rifles.
R.N.A.S.	Royal Naval Air Service.
R. Scots	The Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment).
R. West Kent	The Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment).
Sea. Highrs.	The Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's).
Shrops. L.I.	The King's (Shropshire Light Infantry).
Suff.	The Suffolk Regiment.
Welch.....	The Welch Regiment.
Wilts.	The Duke of Edinburgh's (Wiltshire Regiment).
W. Rid.	The Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment).
Y.&L. or York & Lanc.	The York and Lancaster Regiment.
York	Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own (Yorkshire Regiment).

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MAPS

MAPS

(In case opposite)

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