

### SPECIAL LEAVE

233. As rapidly as they could be cleared through Vernon or Gordon Head all ranks proceeded on debarkation leave. As a special force returning from a theatre of war officers and men received thirty days' leave inclusive of travelling time, and transportation at public expense (303). For the next month the history of the Greenlight Force was made in cities and towns, villages and farm-homes, across the breadth of the Dominion. The blue circular patch with the silver bowie-knife became a familiar badge of identification to large numbers of the Canadian public. By late February all leaves were completed. The Wpg Gren at Gordon Head, the 46 L A A Bty at Colwood, the St John Fus at New Westminster, and the rest of the 13 Inf Bde Gp at Vernon, were once again entering upon the routine of training, in preparation for whatever role the future might bring.

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## THE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE KISKA OPERATIONS

### REFERENCES

1. Topographical material on Kiska taken from The Enemy on Kiska, a 102 page intelligence summary compiled by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Advance Command Post, HQ Alaska Defence Command, and Advance Intelligence Centre, North Pacific Area.
2. The Enemy on Kiska p 1.
3. The Enemy on Kiska p 83.
4. PCO 2616 d/20 Apr 43. Pearkes to CCS.
5. CAW 305 d/10 May 43. Pope to Stuart.
6. CGS 464 d/11 May 43. Stuart to Pearkes.
7. CGS 475 d/12 May 43. Stuart to Pope.
8. CAW 335 d/24 May 43. Pope to Stuart.
9. PCS 504-1-10-1 GO d/25 May 43.
10. PCO 2020 d/25 May 43. Pearkes to Stuart.
11. File HQ MS 9055-1 Vol 1.
12. See "Mobilization", para 29 below.
13. CGS 619 d/3 Jun 43. Pearkes from Murchie.
14. CAW 357 d/29 May 43. Stuart from Pope. Text of message, Stimson to Ralston.
15. CGS 632 d/3 Jun 43. Pope from Murchie. Text of letter, Ralston to Stimson.
16. See Appendix 1 and 2.
17. Training Instruction "Greenlight", Directive No 2, PCS 502-1-10-2 (GS) d/14 Jun 43.
18. PCS 502-1-10-2 d/5 Jun 43 vs HQS 20-3-12-11. See appendix 3.
19. Military Members Discussion 7 Jun 43. HQ MS 9055 Vol 1
20. See Appendix 4.
21. See Appendix 5.
22. "Report on Kiska Operation" - 13 Cdn Inf Bde - HQ MS 9055-1 Vol 3 d/22 Sep 43.
23. See Appendix 6.
24. 14 CT with one more OR in its medical and one more in its dental detachments had a total establishment of 1438 all ranks.
25. GS 1311 d/6 Jun 43. Canmilitary to Defensor.
26. HQS 5618 FD 76 d/18 Jun 43.
27. PCS 504-1-10-2-1, GS d/28 Jun 43.
28. See Appendix 7.
29. "General Staff Report on Greenlight Force. Period from Inception to Despatch to Adak." PCS 504-1-10-2 GS.
30. PCS 504-1-10-2 GS d/23 Jun 43. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 1.
31. See Appendix 8.
32. See Appendix 9.
33. Staff Table - Greenlight. Scales of ammunition and distribution of Ammunition. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/29 Jun 43.
34. See Appendix 10.
35. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 18 Jun 43.
36. Military Members Discussion 7 Jun 43, HQMS 9055 Vol 1.
37. War Diary, 1 Bn R de Hull 20-22 Jun 43.
38. These second lieutenants were all promoted to rank of full lieutenant. Greenlight Conference 8 Jun 43. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GOC).
39. "Administrative Staff Report on Greenlight Force." PCS 609-25-1-34.



40. Report of discussions between GOC-in-C and Gen DeWitt at HQ WDC 11 Jun 43. Pearkes to Stuart. PCS 504-1-10-2 GS d/15 Jun 43.
41. PCO 6012 d/15 Jun 43. Pearkes to CGS.
42. War Diary, 28 AA Regt RCA, 1 Jul 43.
43. See Appendix 11. Note by Narrator.
44. See Appendix 12. Note by Narrator.
45. See Appendix 13. Note by Narrator.
46. HQ Pac Comd Macklin to OC 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 609-25-1-34 (6) d/29 Jun 43. See Also Appendix 14. Note by Narrator.
47. See below. Medical Services Sec XVII.
48. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 31 Aug 43.
49. PCO 6049 d/7 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes. The original arrangement was that the Canadian Press and British United Press should each send an English language war-correspondent, and that the Canadian Press would also send a French Canadian correspondent to represent French member newspapers. To this arrangement BUP objected, nor could the D-in-C, Public Relations, come to an agreement with the two associations in the matter of sharing a French speaking correspondent. It was finally decided that only the two press representatives should proceed to the Aleutians, and that Capt Jean Marchand, PRO MD 4, would replace the third correspondent, and would act as French Liaison Officer, providing both CP and BUP with French Canadian material. - Memo D-in-C Public Relations to DM (C) Army d/23 Jul 43, and GS 821, Pearkes from Murchie, d/23 Jul 43, - both on HQMS 9055-1 FD 2.
50. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/26 Jun 43.
51. "Priorities for Off-loading Combat Ships in Training Phase II". Appx "A" and "B" to PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/25 Jun 43.
52. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GOC) d/18 Jun 43. Minutes of Greenlight Conference No 6.
53. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS). "General Staff Report on Greenlight Force." Para 36.
54. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8,9 Jul 43.
55. See Appendix 15. The number of men requested, 720, was later reduced to 400 as Greenlight provided its own working parties in the ships' holds. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/1 Jul 43. Appx 4 to War Diary, Greenlight GS Pac Comd Jul 43.
56. But later reports from Green Beach regarding the order in which stores came ashore suggest that the combat loading of the ships was not correctly done in all cases. In interviews at Kiska the following statements were made to the Narrator. "There was no breakdown of high and low priority ordnance, engineer and medical equipment in Seattle, when the lower nine tenths of the "SACAJAWEA"s holds were stowed - Maj RE Bricker, A/OC 1 Bn Cdn Fus. "The following sequence was observed in the unloading of equipment on Green Beach:- Ammunition - weapons - ammunition - rations (very little) - petrol and oil (large quantities) - ammunition - wood - coal - water (very little) - etc. The transport ships apparently were not combat loaded." Lt-Col D Menard, OC R de Hull. See also Brig Foster's "Report on Kiska Operations" Sec V, Transportation (HQMS 9055-1 Vol 3 d/22 Sep 43).



57. See 51.
58. To allow more training time at Adak, the embarkation date was advanced five days by Gen DeWitt. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/11 Jun 43. Appx 11 to War Diary, Greenlight GS Pac Comd Jun 43.
59. Verbal report to Narrator at Kiska by Capt E Meads, OC 30 Ord Store Coy.
60. See Appendix 16.
61. See Appendix 17.
62. See Appendix 18. The Embarkation List by Units, however, supplied by 2 Echelon, (PC Ech 3-0 d/14 Jul 43) shows a total of 257 officers and 4574 men, or 4831 Canadians embarked as follows: "BRANCH" 79 and 886, "SACAJAWEA" 45 and 937, "CHIRIKOFF" 58 and 1325, and "PERIDA" 75 and 1526.
63. See Appendix 19.
64. See Appendix 20.
65. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GOC). GOC-in-C's Conference, 8 Jun 43 para 2.
66. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Appx 5, 16 Jun 43.
67. See Appendix 21.
68. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Jul 43.
69. See Appendix 22.
70. PCS 609-25-1-34 (37), d/24 Jul 43. Allan to Letson, enclosing nominal roll of absentees, also PCS 609-25-1-34 (30), d/5 Aug 43.
71. See Appendix 23.
72. It is difficult to footnote rumours as they seldom appear in written form. The Narrator met them in Nanaimo, in Vancouver, in Halifax and in Ottawa. An example of some of the wildest charges appears in a letter d/24 Jul 43 from a Mrs AJ Nightingale, Chemainus BC, to the Prime Minister.
73. Maintenance of Greenlight Force. PCMS 609-25-1-34 (19) d/8 Jul 43. See Appendix 23a.
74. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) d/14 Jun 43. See War Diary "Greenlight" GS Pac Comd Appx 10, Jun 43.
75. Ibid.
76. "Maintenance of Greenlight Force". PCMS 609-25-1-34 (19) d/8 Jul 43, Sec 6.
77. Ibid. Sec 5.
78. Ibid. Sec 5(f).
79. See below. Accounting for Greenlight.
80. Report of Maj RJ Bolton, LO, d/20 Jul 43. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Jul 43. Appx 21.
81. PCS 504-1-10-2 GS d/23 Jun 43. Operational Plan, sec 8. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 1.
82. PCO 6060 d/8 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes.
83. Most Secret Memo CNS to CGS d/12 Jul 43. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 2.
84. PCO 6062 d/11 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes. 9055-1 Vol 2.
85. PCO 6060 d/8 Jul 43. Murchie from Pearkes. 9055-1 Vol 2.
86. Interview with Capt WP Dey, Ship's Adjutant, "DAVID BRANCH", Capt PW Faulkner, Wpg Gren, and Capt JA Milton RM Rang, TQM s respectively of "CHIRIKOFF" and "DAVID BRANCH" - Kiska, 2 Nov 43.
87. Certificate re life saving and buoyancy equipment on combat ships, Maj GR Hansen, US Transportation Corps, OIC Maintenance and Repair Division, SPOE, d/28 Jun 43. Appx "A" to "Greenlight" Liaison Report No 15, d/29 Jun 43. On HQMS 9055-1 Vol 1.



88. "Boat Drill Instructions for Canadian Troops" -  
War Diary, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Jun 43, Appx VIII.
89. Interview with Maj RE Bricker A/OC Cdn Fus - Kiska,  
3 Nov 43. See also War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus 9 Aug 43.
90. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Jul 43.
91. See War Diaries for July of all Greenlight units for  
descriptions of routine on board ship.
92. Appx A to "Ships' Standing Orders for Canadian troops",  
by Brig HW Foster, d/11 Jul 43 - War Diary HQ 13 Cdn  
Inf Bde, Jul 43, Appx VIII.
93. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 Jul 43.
94. PCO 6040 d/1 Jul 43, Murchie from Pearkes.
95. See Appendix 24.
96. "Lessons Learned from Operations on Attu" - Col LV  
Castner, 2 i/c US Forces at Attu, Alaska Defence Command  
7 Jun 43. Appendix to War Diary, R de Hull, Jul 43.
97. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rangers, 24 Jun 43.
98. Ibid. 22 Jun 43.
99. War Diaries of Units named. Jun 43.
100. "Action on Attu" - Reproduced by G-2 Alaska Defence  
Command, 30 Jul 43. Appendix to War Diary R de Hull,  
Jul 43.
101. PCO 6038, d/30 Jun 43. Stuart from Pearkes.
102. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 18 Jun 43.
103. Interview with Maj DH Rochester, OC 24 Fd Coy RCE, -  
Kiska, 3 Nov 43.
104. Interview with Lt-Col RP Drummond, OC 24 Fd Regt RCA,  
Kiska, 5 Nov 43.
105. Interview with Maj JA MacDonald, OC 46 Lt AA Bty RCA -  
Kiska, 5 Nov 43.
106. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 25 Jun 43.
107. PCS 504-1-10-2 (GS) over PC 609-25-1-34 (D2) d/18 Jun 43.
108. Ibid. Also War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Jun 43. In-  
terviews with regimental IOs at Kiska, 1-7 Nov 43.
109. Ibid. Also War Diary, R de Hull, 23 Jun 43.
110. PCO 6089, Murchie from Pearkes, d/22 Jul 43.
111. HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp Operation Instruction No 1, d/21  
Jul 43. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Jul 43, Appx 9.
112. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Jul 43.
113. See Appendix 26.
114. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Jul 43.
115. Ibid. 26, 29 Jul 43.
116. See Appendix 27.
117. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 3 Aug 43.
118. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Aug 43.
119. See Appendix 28.
120. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Aug 43.
121. Ibid. 10 Aug 43. This opinion was also expressed by  
Capt SA Hawkins, OC 13 Bde Sig Sec RC Sigs, and Capt  
E Meads, OC 30 Ord Store Coy in interviews at Kiska,  
3, 6 Nov 43.
122. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 9 Aug 43. For description of  
American K and D rations See Appendix 45.  
Note "A" and "B" Bags.

Every other rank was issued with a barrack bag (US) before leaving Canada. This was a dunnage bag somewhat larger than the Canadian issue kitbag. On it was stencilled the owners Regtl No and Name, and the serial number of his unit, all in letters one inch high. The letter "B" was stencilled at least 3 inches high. The soldier packed his personal clothing partly in the ruck sack and partly in his "B" bag.

At Adak those soldiers who were issued with pack-boards in place of rucksacks, were also issued with a second barrack bag, lettered "A", in lieu of his ruck-sack.

-PCS 609-25-1-34(20) d/29 Jun 43,



123. See Appendix 28.  
124. PCO 6102, d/9 Aug 43, Stuart from Bostock.  
125. Report by PRO Pac Comd, Maj G Siverus, 18 Oct 43.  
126. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Aug 43.  
127. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 11 Aug 43.  
128. "Day by day maps were scanned by officers and men alike to become as familiar with the ground as they could. It was gratifying to hear some of the men in the ranks after we had landed say, 'That hill on your left is Riot Hill, we are on Rex Hill, and that one over there, is Rooster Hill, and that's where the 15 CT are supposed to be. The Americans are on our left. I think it's one of the 87th.' That was the spirit with which we landed." War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, summary, Aug 43.  
129. PCO 7001, d/11 Aug 43, CGS from Murchie.  
130. PCO 7009, d/12 Aug 43, Stuart from Pearkes (deciphered 1245 hrs, 13 Aug).  
131. GS 863, d/12 Aug 43, CGS to Pac Comd.  
132. PCO 6110, d/12 Aug 43, Pearkes from Bostock.  
133. See Appendix 29.  
134. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 14 Aug 43.  
135. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 15 Aug 43.  
136. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 15 Aug 43.  
137. See Appendix 30.  
138. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43, Appx II.  
139. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43.  
140. Ibid, Sec 3a, Sec 3(1).  
141. Ibid, Sec 3 s(4).  
142. Ibid, Sec 3 b to g.  
143. Ibid, Sec 3 j to n. See map at end of text.  
144. See Appendix 31.  
145. Operations Map and Intelligence overprint attached as appendix to War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43.  
146. Field Order No 5, First Special Service Force, Amchitka, d/8 Aug 43, War Diary Special Service Regt, Sep 43 Appx "D".  
147. See Appendix 32.  
148. 14 Combat Team Operation Order No 2, d/10 Aug 43, War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, Aug 43, Appx "C". 15 Cdn Combat Team Operation Order No 1, War Diary 1 Bn Wpg Gren, Aug 43, Appx 5. 13-16 BLG Operation Order, d/12 Aug 43, War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, Aug 43, Appx 19.  
149. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Aug 43.  
150. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 16 Aug 43.  
151. See Appendix 33 for Battle Log, Advanced HQ Pac Comd, Adak, and Appendix 34 for Battle Log, HQ 13 Cdn Tactical Group.  
152. See Appendix 35, Note by Narrator. See also War Diaries of the infantry battalions of the Combat Teams.  
153. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 16 Aug 43.  
154. See Appendix 34. Report lines marked A,B,C,D on map at end of text.  
155. War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, 16 Aug 43.  
156. For diagram of camouflaged enemy position encountered by 15 CT see War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, Aug 43, Appx 4.  
157. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 17 Aug 43.  
158. See Appendix 36.  
159. See Appendix 37.  
160. War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, 17 Aug 43.  
161. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 20 Aug 43.  
162. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Aug 43.  
163. For location of unit sites in Canadian Army Area see map.



164. See Appendix 38.
165. War Diary, Le Regt de Hull, 16 Aug 43.
166. Figures supplied to Narrator by Lt-Col Menard, Kiska, 6 Nov 43. See also "Report on Kiska Operation", No 99 Det RCASC - Capt ME McCormick, OC.
167. War Diary, R de Hull, Jul 43. Appendix Jacket No 2, See also War Diary entry for 5 Sep 43.
168. "The 3rd Regt (SSF) found the sand beach shown on the map between Bamboo Bay and West Kiska Lake didn't have a grain of sand weighing less than 100 lbs. It was considered nothing less than a miracle the way they got their rubber boats and equipment across." - War Diary, 1 Cdn Special Service Bn, 23 Aug 43. See also 165 above.
169. From "Report on Kiska Operations", d/16 Aug 43, Lt-Col D Menard, OC R de Hull.
170. See Appendix 31. Adm Instruction for Beach Area, Appx A to 13 TG Admin Instruction No 1, d/9 Aug 43. The CEO Pac Comd later questioned the wisdom of piling engineer stores in the misc dump.- See 277 1 below.
171. Interviews with OSC, No 99 Det RCASC and No 30 Ord Store Coy RCOC, Kiska, 3 Nov 43.
172. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 22 Aug 43.
173. War Diary, No 99 Det RCASC, 16 Aug 43.
174. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 17 Aug 43.
175. War Diary, No 99 Det RCASC, 17 Aug 43.
176. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 31 Aug 43 and 4 Sep 43.
177. Interview with Brig Foster, Vancouver, 18 Oct 43. See also War Diary, R de Hull, 18 Aug 43. For a parallel situation in the Southern Sector see Report by Col Rickard, Commander TG 87, on file G-2 Office, Alaskan Defence Command.
178. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 19 Aug 43.
179. War Diary, R de Hull, 30 Aug 43.
180. War Diary, R de Hull, 5 Sep 43 and 9 Sep 43.
181. Ibid, 12 Sep 43.
182. Signal Annex. Annex No 5 to Field Order No 1 Landing Force 16.8, d/1 Aug 43. In War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Aug 43, Appx 2.
183. See Appendix 39.
184. "Communications Report, Kiska Operation" - Capt SA Hawkins, OC, 13 Cdn Inf Bde Sigs Sec.
185. See "Signals Appreciation, Amphibious Operations", - Chief Signal Officer, Pac Comd, d/24 Aug 43.
186. "Appreciation of Signal Equipment as Employed by Amphibious Force - North Pacific" - Chief Signal Officer, Pac Comd, d/24 Aug 43.
187. Col Rickard's Report (see 177) points out the difficulty of maintaining communications with the light cable. "No matter which side of a ridge the wire was laid, shifting wind would blow it into space, or saw it against sharp rock edge."
188. PCS 504-1-10-2 (Sigs) 1/20, d/3 Jul 43. War Diary Greenlight GS, Jul 43, Appx 24.
189. Interview with Col AR St Louis, CSO Pac Comd, 15 Oct 43. He is referring to OC 14 Combat Team.
190. Signal Operation Instructions ATF 9. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, Aug 43, Appx 20.
191. See Appendix 40.
192. See Appendix 41.
193. Report on Kiska Operation, d/3 Sep 43, - Lt Col DB Holman, OC 16 CT. "16 BLG was the third group ashore, and as no wires had yet been laid forward it was necessary to revert to the original set-up, laying wire from the Beach. This line, as well as lines to our coys were maintained throughout with practically continuous L/T communications.



193. We were the right flanking unit but at no time was lateral communication established to us. It was only late on the second day that the brigade line reached us. Our beach line was in constant use by all units of the Tactical Group, indicating that either no other line had been laid to the Beach, or that it was not kept in operation."
194. "Organization of Medical Services - 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Greenlight Force - War Diary, R de Hull, Jul 43, Appx2.
195. See Appendix 41.
196. A report from Maj JH McIntosh, Greenlight LO to WDC showed casualties sustained at Attu to total 30 per cent of personnel engaged. - SF/5-2 d/14 Jun 43.
197. See Appendix 43. Note by Narrator.
198. Memorandum Report - Kiska Operation - Lt-Col TM Brown, OC 25 Fd Amb, RCAMC.
199. Memorandum Report - Kiska Operation - Lt-Col TM Brown, OC 25 Fd Amb RCAMC.
200. Interview with Maj D Smaill, A/OC 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, Kiska, 2 Nov 43.
201. See Appendix 44.
202. War Diary, "C" Coy St John Fus (MG), Aug 43, Appx 1.
203. 1 Bn Wpg Gren. The gale referred to reached its peak at noon on 6 Nov 43. The Narrator was present.
204. War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, 9 Sep 43.
205. For description of the various types of US rations issued see Appendix 45.
206. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 Sep 43.
207. War Diary, No 99 Det RCASC, 20 Sep 43.
208. Report on Kiska Operations, No 99 Det RCASC, p.3. See also Report on Kiska by DAQMG, Pac Comd, Maj E Housley, d/3 Nov 43.
209. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 Aug 43.
210. War Diary, 24 Fd Coy RCE, 25 Sep 43.
211. 13 Cdn Inf Bde Operation Order No 1, d/2 Sep 43, War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx II.
212. War Diary, "C" Coy 1 Bn St John Fus (MG), 7, 9 Sep 43.
213. Observed on an inspection visit to Green Beach by the Narrator. 4 Nov 43.
214. Brigade Orders, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/27 Sep 43 and various Daily Orders in unit war diaries.
215. War Diary, 46 Lt AA Bty, 21 Sep 43.
216. Brigade Orders, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/28 Sep 43 - War Diary HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
217. War Diaries for September and October contain frequent allusions to the question of when the Canadians would return to Canada. Continuous rumours were prevalent, and hopes alternately rose and fell. Officers were not immune. For examples see:- War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 12,23 Sep 43; R de Hull, 12 Sep, 12,22,29 Oct 43. For the "Home for Christmas" promise see War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, Sep 43, Summary for September.
218. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 26 Sep 43.  
War Diary, 19 Fd Sec Section, 3 Sep 43.  
See also Wpg Gren Pt 1 Order No 35, d/23 Sep 43, Sec .2  
"All ranks will sleep with knives hunting by their sides in order to facilitate cutting themselves free of a collapsed tent in case of fire." - War Diary, Sep 43.  
The following weather report for Kiska for the month of Oct 43 was furnished by the US Weather Station on the island.



218. Precipitation  
(contd)

Rainfall for October 5.81 in.  
It rained every day during the month. Snow fell on 3 days.

Wind

Over 30 mph steady on 22 days.  
Maximum steady wind 58 mph.  
Maximum gusts 80 mph.

Sky

Fair 1 per cent  
Broken 34 per cent  
Overcast 65 per cent

Fog

On 13 days

Temperature

Maximum 50 deg.  
Minimum 29 deg.

(September, October and March are regarded as the three best months of the year.)  
See also Appendix 46.

- 219. War Diary, R de Hull, 31 Aug 43.
- 220. This belief, expressed in the hearing of the Narrator, while at Kiska, was declared unfounded by the Bde S-4, Maj JG Stevens, and OC 99 Det RCASC, Capt ME McCormick.
- 221. War Diary, 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, 7 Sep 43.
- 222. Brigade Order No 29, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/13 Sep 43.
- War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
- War Diary, 14 Dental Clinic CDC, 14 Sep 43.
- 223. War Diary, 14 Dental Clinic CDC, 5 Oct 43.
- 224. "Three meals out of five we encounter a pink, compressed, meatish substance rejoicing in the name of SPAM, its basic origin lost in the mist of bovine genealogical antiquity." - War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Sep 43.
- 225. 2000 gals of rum obtained from the Royal Canadian Navy accompanied the Greenlight Force, carried on the four transport ships. At Kiska it was stored for a time in a closely guarded Japanese-built tunnel, until the RCASC storage hut was erected. About 45 per cent overproof, the issue of one ounce per man was thoroughly appreciated by all ranks. - War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Sep 43.
- 226. "Report on Kiska", - DAQM, Pac Comd - Maj E Housley, d/3 Nov 43.
- 227. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 26 Sep 43.
- 228. War Diary, R de H, 15 Oct 43. Capt W. Dwyer, Camp Commandant, who started a male voice choir and organized weekly Brigade concerts, emphasized the value of retaining unit orchestras and bands in future similar operations. See 226.
- 229. War Diary, 1 Bn Cdn Fus, 30 Sep 43.
- 230. Less comprehensible to the British military mind, but strikingly illustrative of the contrast that the Canadian troops presented to their American allies, was the surprised congratulatory comment of the visiting US General at the completion of an impromptu inspection of the 13th Brigade troops, as he remarked to the Chief of Staff, "And do you know, I believe that every one of your officers and men had shaved this morning!"



231. Interview with Capt GM Chaout, Adj R de Hull, 20 Nov 43.
232. Figures supplied by Maj JF Petrie, Field Cashier, Kiska, 7 Nov 43.
233. 2 Echelon Casualty Return, d/12 Nov 43.
234. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 22 Aug 43.
235. War Diary, R de Hull, 31 Aug 43, Appx "D" and "E".
236. War Diary, R de Hull, 28 Sep 43.
237. War Diary, R de Hull, 16 Oct 43.
238. War Diary, R de Hull, 31 Aug 43, 27 Sep 43.
239. War Diary, 19 Fd Cash Office, 27 Aug 43.
240. War Diary, 11 Postal Det OPC, 31 Aug 43.
241. Ibid, 16 Oct 43.
242. Ibid, 14 Sep 43.
242. The Narrator spent eight days on Amchitka waiting for the mail plane to make the flight to Kiska.
243. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 4 Sep 43.
244. "C", St John Fus (MG) Coy Orders No 3, d/21 Sep 43 - War Diary, Sep 43, Appx 1.
245. War Diary, 19 Fd Cash Office, 23 Aug 43.
246. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 6 Sep 43.
247. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Sep 43, See Appendix 47.
248. War Diary, 19 Fd Cash Office, 17 Sep 43.
249. See Appendix 48.
250. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Sep 43.
251. Tele AG 0364 d/23 Jul 43.
252. Pac Comd Adm File Greenlight No 24, "Honors and Awards"- Letter from Brig HW Foster, Kiska, d/20 Aug 43.
253. See Appendix 49.
254. See Appendix 50.
255. Press Release, HQ Alaska Dept, PRO, d/6 Nov 43.
256. For congratulatory message to Canadian Troops from Gen Corlette see Appendix 51.
257. See para 79 above.
258. Report - Visit of DDOS Pac Comd to Alaska and Aleutian Islands, 16 Sep 43, - para 28.
259. For purposes of maintenance US Stores, equipment and supplies are divided into the following five main classifications:
  - (i) Class 1 - Rations
  - (ii) Class 2 - Clothing and Equipment  
These terms cover all stores as listed below:
    - Chemical stores
    - Engineer stores
    - Medical and Dental stores
    - Ordnance stores (incl MT)
    - Quartermaster stores
    - Signal stores
  - (iii) Class 3 - Fuel
  - (iv) Class 4 - Engineer Construction Materials
  - (v) Class 5 - Ammunition.
- 259 a. "Capitation Rates Canadian Troops in Alaska"- PGS 609-25-1-34 (28), d/4 Nov 43.
260. A Transfer Directive by the US Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) undated, "Transfers to Dominion of Canada by the Commanding General, WDC, "lists a total dollar value of \$1,523,565.52 (Enclosure to PGS 658-25-1-34 AQ d/28 Sep 43).
261. See Appendix 52.
262. DDOS Report, para 26, 27.
263. PGS 658-25-1-34 AQ d/28 Sep 43.
264. Brigade Orders No 44, 50, 54, 77 d/18, 20, 23, 30 Sep 43.  
War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde. Sep 43, Appx 1; Pt I Order No 7, d/6 Sep 43 War Diary 1 Bn RM Rang, Sep 43, Appx 1.



265. Brigade Orders No 20, d/8 Sep 43 - War Diary HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.
266. (i) War Diary, 19 Fd Sec Section, 7 Sep 43.  
(ii) War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, 16 Sep 43.  
(iii) Brigade Order No 9, d/4 Sep 43 - "A number of cases have been reported of "B" Bags, Rucksacks and Unit Stores having been pilfered while lying on beach or unit piles. Officers Commanding units will warn all ranks under their command that any offenders will be severely dealt with." War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, Sep 43, Appx 1.  
(iv) "Report on Kiska Operation"-  
"Breaking in of stores, looting of supplies has been indulged in freely by both Canadian and American forces. It would seem that in future operations steps should be taken to prevent this and that if necessary looters should be shot. The loss in this connection in my opinion has reached enormous proportions". - Lt-Col JA Wilson, OC Wpg Gren. In War Diary, Aug 43, Appx V.  
(v) War Diary, R de Hull, 14 Sep 43.  
"In this concern it is felt that too much equipment was carried by each man, and consequently the delay in distributing personal belongings to each man was the chief cause of so much pilfering being done on all beaches".  
(vi) "Report on Kiska"  
16 (b) Poor system of unloading. Apparently on landing the US and Canadian stores were all unloaded and pooled on the one beach (Green Beach). Although MPs were stationed there, they themselves did not know markings of boxes and who should take what equipment. Boxes were broken open and if the contents looked interesting it was taken by the personnel sent to clear the beach." -Maj E Housley, DCMG Pac Comd - 3 Nov 43.
267. Interview with Brig Foster, Vancouver, 18 Oct 43.
268. "The Enemy on Kiska" p.59.
269. Ibid p 98.
270. "Report on Kiska Operations - Southern Sector" - Col Rickard, OC TG 87.  
War Diary, Cdn Fus, 30 Sep 43.  
Interview with Canadian and US Army Officers in Aleutians, Oct-Nov 43.
271. See "Observer's Report on Embarkation and Landing Exercise of the 16th Combat Team, 13 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (Jul 31 - Aug 5, 1943, inclusive)" d/8 Aug 43 - War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, Aug 43, Appx 8.
272. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Aug 43.
273. "It is felt that officers and OR's of the 13 TG have got what it takes to be efficient in battle (guts), but unfortunately they were green as far as battle drill and proficiency in use of weapons is concerned. They must be given full opportunities for intensive training before another expedition begins. This training to be supervised by the Bde Comdr but to be entirely at the discretion of each Unit Comdr." - Report on Kiska Operations - 16 Aug 43, Lt-Col D Menard, OC R de Hull.
274. (i) See Appendix 53.  
(ii) For a report showing percentage of all soldiers of R de Hull qualified, partly qualified and unqualified prior to leaving for Adak on 12 Jul 43, see Appendix to War Diary, R de Hull, d/27 Sep 43.
275. All major Canadian units on Kiska submitted memoranda reports to HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde. These reports, on file with the Bde S-3, were made available to this Narrator, and were used in compiling the Brigade report of 3 Sep 43.



276. "Report on Kiska Operation" - 13 Cdn Inf Bde. HQMS 9055-1 Vol 3 22 Sep 43.
277. E.g. (i) "Report on Visit to Kiska", 9 Sep 43 - Col WG Swan CEO Pac Comd. PCS file 836-1-1, d/17 Sep 43.  
(ii) "Visit of DDOS Pac Comd to Alaska and Aleutian Islands" Col JE Willis, DDOS Pac Comd, d/16 Sep 43.  
(iii) "Appreciation of Communications Requirements and Proposed Organization for an Amphibious Force" - Col AR StLouis CSO Pac Comd, d/24 Aug 43.  
(iv) "Special Alaska Equipment" - Letter Brig i/c Adm Pac Comd, 609-25-1-34.(37) d/15 Sep 43.  
(v) "DAQMG's Report on Kiska" - Maj E Housley, DAQMG Pac Comd, d/3 Nov 43.
278. E.g. (i) Arrangements being made to send TQM candidates to Fort Orde, HQMS 9055-1 Vol 4, 15 Sep 43.  
(ii) Interest shown by the War Office in US items of supply used by Canadians. - SDW 686 Canmilitary to Defensor d/20 Nov 43. HQMS 9055-3 Vol 3.
279. CEO Pac Comd urged the need for an increase of at least 200 sappers in the Field Coy. See 277 (i) above.
280. (i) Report on Kiska operations - Capt ME McCormick, OC No 99 Det RCASC.  
(ii) See also 277 (v) above.
281. "Memorandum Report - Kiska Operation, 25 Fd Amb RCAMC, Lt-Col TM Brown, OC.
282. The US battlepack, worn by troops on the final move from Adak, was too small as compared with the British small pack. Many troops did not have access to rucksack or B-bag for over a week after landing.
283. US table cutlery was very light weight and rusted easily.
284. The OC Canadian Fusiliers expressed preference for the American pattern Kersey lined uniforms, and suggested that the desirability of Kersey lined clothing made in battle-dress pattern. Such an issue would of course be subject to the limitations of supply channels.
285. Sec XV above  
The problem of co-ordinating US Army and Naval landing plans is one that appears improbable of settlement at any lower level than Washington.
286. Sec XVI above.
287. Sec XVII above.
288. War Diary, 103 LAD RCOC. "Continuous stream of broken Jeeps. Trucks won't stand up on this terrain." - 22 Aug 43. "Transmissions and differentials starting to go on Jeeps. No parts available. Only good use for a Jeep is to dry out clothing." - 23 Aug 43. "Found three more derelict Jeeps, and got some badly needed parts." - 29 Aug 43. "Trying to get as many Jeeps in working order as parts will permit. Robbing one to fix another." - 31 Aug 43. (Note that all of these references are to snowjeeps, T-15s. No "Cars 5-cwt 4x4" were taken to Kiska.)
289. See Appendix 54. Note by Narrator.
290. See Appendix 55.
291. "The Enemy on Kiska" pp 59-74.
292. At the end of October these rows of dummy figures still remained along the ridges, giving a most realistic appearance at a few hundred yards' distance.
293. (i) Radio Tokyo, Japanese Home and Empire Service, 22 Aug 8.00 am EWT, - Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission. (On file at Dept of External Affairs).  
(ii) For more recent support of this story see Appendix 55a (added 16 Oct 44).



294. See Appendix 56. Note by Narrator.
295. The Message of congratulation sent to Greenlight by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Canadian people appears as Appendix 57.
296. War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde, d/7 Nov 43. For proposed list of sailings and allocations of units and equipment see Appendix 58.
297. See Appendix 59.
298. See Appendix 60.
299. War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, d/23 Dec 43.
300. (i) War Diary, 1 Bn Wpg Gren, d/3 Jan 44.  
(ii) War Diary, 46 LAA Bty, RCA d/3 Jan 44.
301. The mass of snow that fell during the last week of December and the first week of January flattened tents or drove tent poles many feet into the soft ground. Two US soldiers died when a Pacific Hut collapsed under the weight of the snow, and another lost his life in a terrible blizzard that swept the island on Christmas night.  
-War Diary, 1 Bn RM Rang, d/26 Dec 43, and 10 Jan 44.
302. Ibid, d/6 Jan 44.
303. 13 Cdn Inf Bde Order No 18, d/19 Jan 44, and No 27 d/27 Jan 44 - Appx to War Diary, HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde - Jan 44.



#### Note on SLEDS

The pallet, or sled, that proved so successful for the movement of stores on the Kiska beaches consisted of a sturdy wooden platform 8 ft by 4 ft mounted on three steel shod runners. It was fitted at each end with a steel towing cable with spliced eye, so that it could be pulled either forward or backward by a tractor. Each sled weighed about 500 lbs., and carried a load of from 1400 lbs to 1800 lbs consisting generally of three units of fire, or five days' supply of petrol and oil, or ten days' rations. These loads were securely bound to the sleds with sincode  $1\frac{1}{2}$ " steel strapping, to form a compact piece of freight that was readily stacked in the hold of a transport ship or on the floor of a landing barge.

On debarkation it was only necessary for a tractor to back into the front of the landing craft, hook on to the towing cable, and haul the load (sometimes two sleds in tandem) to the appropriate dump. Here the steel lashings were cut, the load removed, and the pallet returned to the beach for a further cargo. Whether the direction lay over rough beaches, along rocky stream beds, or through the gelatinous inland mud, the sleds moved readily with the minimum of tractive power.

#### Note on ATHEY TRAILERS

For the ground movement of all loose supplies, barrack bags, tarpaulins, stores of all types, the Athey Trailer proved an invaluable aid. Its substantial steel platform, 14 ft. by 6 ft. with removable 4 ft. sides and ends, was solidly based on a massive undercarriage that rode on two broad caterpillar treads. With a carrying capacity of six tons the trailer was pulled by a D-6 or D-8 tractor. Except for a tendency to capsize when moving along very steep side hills, due to the high centre of gravity when fully loaded, the Athey trailer operated completely successfully over the roughest terrain. In the later stages of the Kiska operation, when the heavy traffic of moving stores and construction material had turned rapidly built roads into channels of souplike mud, the Athey trailers and the caterpillar tractor provided the only reliable means of transportation on the island.

#### Note on SLEEPING BAGS

The U.S. pattern sleeping bag issued to all ranks consisted of two parts, - an inner and outer bag, each of a quilted broadcloth material filled with down. The inner receptacle was tapered to fit the body and could be closed up to the neck by a zipper fastener which ran down about half the length of the body. The outer component, measuring  $6\frac{1}{2}$  ft. by 6 ft. when opened out flat, was closed by a zipper track running across the bottom and up the side. Both bags were fitted with a hood and draw strings to tie about the neck. When rolled compactly the bag was wrapped in a waterproof cover, the whole forming a bundle about 20 inches long and a foot in diameter, and weighing about  $11\frac{1}{2}$  lbs.

For sleeping indoors at temperatures above freezing point the inner bag alone proved comfortably warm, whether clothing was worn or not, while the two bags together offered the fullest resistance to the cold. For use in the open, on damp ground or in wet weather, protection was provided by the use of a heavy waterproof poncho,  $5\frac{1}{2}$  ft by 7 ft, which was designed to wrap around the outer sleeping bag. Experience showed that some form of lacing was necessary to keep the outer covering securely in position. This poncho also served as a raincape, the wearer thrusting his head through a circular hole protected by a collar like flap.

#### Note on TRENCH FEET

Medical reports from Attu showed that one of the largest causes of disability in that operation was trench feet. With a view to determining the best preventive measures against this condition, both as regards footwear and prophylaxis, the 25 Field Ambulance RCAMC conducted a test during the Great Sitkin exercise. 300 men from



14 Combat Team were divided into two sections of 150 men each. One section wore the high leather boot continuously during the period of the test, the other training in the rubber shoe-pass. Each of the sections was further divided into three groups. The first received no treatment whatsoever, being used as a control group. The second group was supplied with ratfish oil and instructed as to its use. The men in the third group of each section were given formaldehyde footbaths prior to treatment with the ratfish oil. All the men trained for three days without removing their socks at any time.

Unfortunately the suddenness with which the Force embarked following its return to Adak from the Great Sitkin exercise interfered with the completion of the experiment. From what observations were made it was considered that the use of the ratfish oil was of definite value and its application was more effective when preceded by the formaldehyde treatment.

#### STRENGTH AT EMBARKATION

PAC COMD JERICO

PCS 504-1-10-2 GS

COMMANDING PACIFIC

PC06081

12-7-43.

MOST IMMED

MOST SECRET

FOR COL HARRINGTON U.S.L.O.

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL DEWITT FROM GENERAL PEARKES QUOTE GREENLIGHT EMBARKED AND WEIGHED ANCHOR 1015 HRS 12-7-43 TOTAL STRENGTH 261 OFFICERS 4539 OTHER RANKS CANADIANS PLUS 6 US FD HOSPITAL 18 OFFICERS 229 ENLISTED MEN STOP TOTAL 279 OFFICERS 4769 OTHER RANKS GRAND TOTAL 5047 UNQUOTE

MOST SECRET 1 MOST IMMED 1.

Brig  
for Maj Gen  
GOC-in-C Pac Comd.

#### Note on the Part Played by US Navy in Ldg Oprs.

Considerable confusion in landing was caused by the failure of the U.S. Navy's landing plan to coincide with the schedules prepared by the Military component parts of the planning. Reports from Bn. Landing Group Commanders showed that their carefully prearranged schemes for tactical landings were badly disrupted when they found themselves at the mercy of Naval parties whose theories regarding debarkation differed materially from the Army viewpoint. The following reports illustrate the difficulties faced by the Combat Team Commanders:

"At K plus 100 five LCVPs came alongside, loaded with 2 pls. of A coy (right fwd coy) and 3 pls of D coy (left fwd coy) and without pausing at any assembly area or RV area, they headed immediately into shore, landing at K plus 170, - 40 mins. ahead of time. Meanwhile two LCI's came alongside, loaded up, one with C coy (right res. coy) and the other with B coy (left res coy). The balance of the fwd coys, were left waiting for boats that did not show up for approx. one hour. No attempt to control landing craft into moves was made. The result was that the first part of the first move landed at K plus 170 (0910hrs) and the rest of the first move at K plus 240. Part of the third move landed at K plus 200, the balance at K plus 240. The second move landed at K plus 210. There was no control over the cox's who were extremely "lippy", not in the picture, and took orders from no one, not even their own officers".

(From p.7 Memorandum Report on Greenlight Trg. 25 Aug 43 - R.E.Bricker Major, 2 i/c 1st Bn. Cdn. Fus). O.C.14 C.T.)



"For the operation on Kiska Island, the Army Plan was laid down including the 13 T.G. Operation. Before sailing for Kiska a Naval Commander came aboard ship, took charge of the operation, and this officer was not aware of or had received instructions contrary to the plan laid down. This officer apparently had received sealed orders from the Naval Commander. These orders were to get the troops to shore as soon as possible without regard to the Army Plan".

(From Report on Greenlight - J.A. Wilson, Lt-Col.  
Wpg. Gren, O.C. 15 Combat Team).

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"Amphibious Training - The main lesson learned was that no matter what was planned the opposite would happen and the resulting confusion would have caused a disaster of major proportion had there been any opposition.

C.T.'s were instructed to make up boat assignment tables, move diagrams and landing schedules - this was done with great care and thought and depended a great deal on the Commander's plans.

The actual landings both on Great Sitkin and on Kiska Island were carried out with complete disregard for the tactical situation, for the composition of the force being landed and for the congestion on the beaches.

Disembarkation stations had to be changed at the last minute, troops were loaded into boats and then changed to others - landing craft were called to certain stations and reported to different ones, necessitating troops being shifted from one station to another. All this resulted in a great deal of unnecessary confusion, both on ship and subsequently on shore, and was caused by an apparent ignorance on the part of the Navy of the way we had been taught that landings would be made".

(From Report on Kiska Operation - 3 Sep 43) -  
D.B. Holman, Lt-Col., Rocky Mountain Rangers,  
O.C. 16 Combat Team).

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"The signal for sending the guns ashore was sent at 0930 hours. The 75 mm hows. landed at 1800 hours (16 Aug). They were manhandled 300 yds. inland and ready for action with 15 minutes' firing at 1830 hours. The 25 pdrs. left the boat at 2330 hours and after lying off shore all night were landed at 0800 hours on 17 Aug. They were hauled to their position on a plateau 100 ft. above sea level by D-6 Caterpillar Tractors, and were in action with ammunition for sustained fire by 1000 hours".

- (From Report on Kiska Operations-  
R.P. Drummond, Lt-Col.,  
O.C. 24 Field Regt., R.C.A.)

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## REPORT OF 13 BDE SIGS OFFR.

"A small signal centre was set up a few hundred yards inland. Without warning however the Brigade moved off and we were given incorrect information as to its objective. It was therefore some little time before communications caught up, and shortly after, again without warning, Brigade pushed on. A few moments later a call (from Gen. Ready, N. Sector) that could be taken by no one but the Brigadier came in, and men who had not eaten since 0400 hours had to race along with a line, which fell a quarter mile short of the ultimate objective for the night. This was later modified, while the rear party, left unprotected, staggered in at 0100 hours 17 August."

.....

"High priority equipment planned for the first five days' operations never reached us, and the situation was only partially relieved by the retiring Naval Gunfire Control Party leaving us its entire signal equipment."

- From Report of 13 Bde Signals  
Officer - Sept 1943.

### NOTE ON US HOSPITALIZATION

The Greenlight administrative planners found the U.S. authorities extremely reticent about hospital accommodation in Alaska, and loth to divulge any information regarding location or capacity of their hospitals in the Aleutian Chain. Failure to obtain this information created a difficult problem for the 13 Brigade S-1, Second Echelon and the pay services both at Kiska and at Pacific Command HQ and a considerable amount of correspondence flowed over the air in an attempt to trace the movement of Canadian casualties evacuated through US 6 Field Hospital at Kiska.

It was only after two or three Canadians had reached Vancouver after stops of varying lengths in American hospitals that the chain of evacuation became apparent. These casualties had been moved in turn through 179 Station Hospital, Adak; 183 Station Hospital, Ft. Richardson (Anchorage); and the A.W. Barnes General Hospital, Vancouver, Wash; and the assumption was reached that subsequent Canadian personnel requiring hospitalization would be so dealt with.

A visit to 179 Station Hospital at Adak on 8 Nov 43, when the Executive Officer, Maj. T. Shearer was good enough to conduct this narrator through the installation, disclosed the fact that while the present normal accommodation is 350 beds, at the time of the Kiska operation a temporary expansion to care for 1500 casualties was arranged. Patients are generally moved between stations by water transports, but a few ambulance planes are available, and in an emergency the regular Douglas C-47's of the Aleutian troop carrying squadrons may be used, provided a nurse or medical officer accompanies each plane.

The necessary crowding together of the Pacific Huts which house the various wards of the Station Hospital has produced a rather vulnerable air target, but as a partial security measure a large dummy hospital, with red cross emblems prominently displayed, has been erected on the opposite side of Adak Island, as an invitation to Japanese aerial attack.

### RATIONS

U.S. rations used by the Canadian troops during the Kiska expedition were of the following types, "D", "K", "C", "5 in 1", "B" and "A". Listed in their order of degree from emergency to normal issue their respective composition is shown below.

#### "D" Ration

3 bars concentrated sweetened chocolate (600 cal. each).



## "K" Ration

### Breakfast

- 4 oz. potted ham and egg
- 1 pkg. 3 K-1 biscuits
- 1 pkg. 4 K-2 biscuits (sweetened)
- 1 pkg. coffee
- 3 cubes sugar
- 1 pkg. "Charm" candies
- 1 fruit bar

### Dinner

- 4 oz. cheese
- 1 pkg. 3 K-1 biscuits
- 1 pkg. 4 K-2 biscuits
- 1 pkg. lemonade powder
- 3 cubes sugar
- 2 oz. dextrose tablets
- 1 stick chewing gum
- 4 cigarettes

### Supper

- 3 $\frac{3}{4}$  oz. pork and veal loaf
- 10 gm. bouillon powder
- 1 pkg. 3 K-1 biscuits
- 1 pkg. 4 K-2 biscuits
- 2 oz. "D" Ration chocolate
- 1 stick chewing gum
- 4 cigarettes

Each meal packed in flat cardboard box in waterproof paper.

## "C" Ration

A day's ration consisted of 3 tins of "B"-unit and 3 tins of "M"-unit. A meal consisted of one tin of each unit. Sterno heaters or heat tabs were issued for use with "C" rations.

### "B"-unit

- Bread ration (biscuits)
- Beverage - cocoa, coffee or lemonade
- 3 pieces of sugar
- candy or chocolate

### "M"-unit

- Meat and vegetable stew
- or
- Meat and vegetable hash
- or
- Meat and vegetable with beans

## "5 in 1" Ration

A cardboard carton containing 28 lbs. of prepared "B" ration, issued to feed five men for one day, (not one man for five days). Strictly an emergency ration, all food being packed in cans. This ration was used to a limited extent towards the end of the first week on Kiska as a welcome relief from "C" rations.

## "B" Ration

A complete bulk ration consisting solely of dried, dehydrated or canned foods. Menu No. 2 intended for Frigid or Cold areas, contained some 125 articles of diet. The "B" Ration was the standard issue during the stay at Kiska, except when it was supplemented from time to time by the arrival of a ship with "A" rations of fresh meat, vegetables and eggs. The full list of "B" ration items is given in "U.S. Issue Chart based on No. 2 Expeditionary Force Menu showing quantities required of each component for 10,000 rations. Revised 9/28/42."



REPORTS ON ACTS OF COURAGE

para 6(A)(B)(C)(D) of letter  
d/20 Aug 43, from HQ 13 Cdn. Inf. Bde.

6. The following specific acts of a courageous nature are outlined in each case:

(a) K 602101 Sgt. Foster, E., R.M. Rangers

Who when his pl comd was fatally injured by a land mine went to his assistance without regard for his personal safety and subsequently led his pl in the face of what was believed to be a strong Jap position.

(b) Lt. John Corner, R.M. Rangers

For coolness and initiative - when his landing craft capsized during the initial landing leaped into the sea heavily laden and assisted men struggling in the water to get free from their equipment, thereby saving any loss of life.

(c) D 615241 Sgt. Lannucilli, J. Regt. de Hull

Who by his prompt action and disregard for his own safety assisted Pte. Benoit to remove a burning gas engine from the hold of the U.S.A.T. David W. Branch, thereby saving the ship from destruction, the hold containing petrol and high explosives.

(d) E 62005 Pte. Benoit, B. Regt. de Hull

who assisted Sgt. Lannucilli and was painfully burned.

(H.W. Foster) Brigadier,  
13th Cdn. Inf. Bde.

REPORT ON GRENADE EXPLOSION

Salmon Pass Camp,  
3 Sep 43.

Commanding Officer,  
1 Bn. Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.

REPORT ON GRENADE EXPLOSION AT M-168891 28-8-43

On Saturday 28 Aug 43, I was in charge of a small detachment consisting of K-42577 L/Cpl. New, E.R. and K-42569 Pte. Ingham, K.A. We were dismantling Japanese sleeping quarters at a former Japanese Artillery Camp on Morgan Hill (M168991). We were watching carefully for booby traps and pulling up the panels on which the Jap beds are layed when a Jap grenade fell to the ground. This must have been fastened to the underside of the panels in some way next to the wall. The split pin was missing and the grenade made a sharp click on falling to the ground, which was stony. Pte. Ingham was the nearest man to the grenade and with great presence of mind he picked it up and ran about fifteen feet to the door which was partly blocked with debris throwing the grenade outside as far as he could. The grenade exploded before touching the ground. L/Cpl New was about ten feet from where I was working at the time and probably did not see the occurrence as clearly as I did. In my opinion Pte. Ingham's prompt action saved the three of us from serious injury or possible death.

(Sgd) D.O. DeWitt, Sgt.

"I" Section,  
1 Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.

Salmon Pass Camp  
3 Sep 43.



The detachment, as described above, was sent out by me to bring in lumber for the flooring of the Bn. Orderly Room Tent.

(Sgd) H.G. Lunn, R.S.M.(W.O.1)  
1 Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers, C.A.

#### DDOS REPORT ON STORES

Extract from letter from Headquarters, Pacific Command, Vancouver Barracks, Vancouver, B.C., dated 16 Sept 43 to Brigadier i/c Administration, Pacific Command, re visit of D.D.O.S. Pacific Command to Alaska and Aleutian Islands.

21. Brigadier Foster showed the A.D.O.S.(E) and the D.D.O.S., on a personal tour, the arrangements which were being set up for the units in his Command and their general disposition. He also arranged for their transportation to the beach encampment of Lieut. Colonel Mennard, Officer Commanding the Regiment de Hull, who was entrusted with the removal of the stores landed from the combat ships on Green Beach. At the time of the visit, which occupied a day and a half, a very substantial part of all unit stores and ammunition, including guns and small arms, were still stacked just beyond reach of the tide on this beach where they had been landed originally. While every effort had been made to store these in an organized fashion, there had been so many developments of an emergency nature that the beach still presented a very disturbing picture from a standpoint of valuable stores. It is understood, however, that two days later an L.S.T. was brought around to Green Beach and practically the whole of these stores were loaded and brought to the shore in Kiska Harbour where they were in the process of being removed as fast as possible to the various units areas, as manpower and tractor hauling facilities became available.

22. It was explained to the D.D.O.S. that U.S. Naval authorities insisted upon dumping stores contained in the combat ships of the whole force, Canadian and U.S. alike, on Kiska Harbour shores immediately following the occupation. No regard was made to any organized plans submitted by the Army and so long as an inch of space remained on the beach, the Naval authorities insisted on piling thousands of tons of supplies on the shore, in whatever fashion they had managed to lift them from holds of the ships, regardless of loading plans or ownership. The result was a scene of confusion that at first appeared to be of alarming proportions, particularly in view of the fact that thousands of rounds of high explosive ammunition were dumped in piles like cordwood and also thousands of drums of high octane fuel were also stacked in the immediate vicinity. Equally valuable stores, but of a less dangerous type, were spread in similar fashion over the whole area of the Harbour front.

23. It is understood that the Force Commander, following upon a period of intense confusion, when all units attempted to gather on the beach at once to find and withdraw their stores, finally ruled off all personnel and vehicles, excepting a limited allotment to the Canadian and U.S. Forces. This slowed down temporarily the removal of valuable stores to a point where they could be protected from the weather and the danger of pilfering and looting which was being carried on to a very great extent by the U.S. Naval personnel and the personnel of the U.S. Special Services. These references to pilfering and looting are hearsay only and cannot be verified by the D.D.O.S., but it was the opinion of every officer to whom the D.D.O.S. spoke that there had been a very great deal of such unauthorized practice carried on.

24. The D.D.O.S. in view of his responsibility for advising the staff in matters concerning stores, felt it incumbent upon him to make urgent representation to Brigadier Foster, requesting that he give whatever degree to precedence he could in the use of manpower and vehicles to the removal of these stores to a less dangerous and more protected area, both in the interests of the Unit Commanders and the Canadian public generally. Brigadier Foster expressed his willingness to do everything



possible providing the defensive plan to which he was committed would not be impaired by the utilization of vehicles and manpower for this duty, which he considered to be of secondary importance to his military plan.

#### Japanese Evacuation of Kiska

The following extract from a U.S. Intelligence Report is reproduced for information:

"First detailed account of the enemy's evacuation of KISKA appears in a captured notebook picked up on TARAWA. The notebook, property of a naval ensign, himself a member of the evacuating fleet, reveals the following:

- (1) The enemy's first intention, to evacuate the KISKA garrison of "more than 7,000 men" by submarine, was abandoned as too slow and too costly "because the efficiency of the enemy's radar was far superior to what we had expected."
- (2) On 6 July, 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers with hastily installed "counter-radar" equipment aboard sailed from PARAMUSHIRO to effect evacuation by surface vessels. Between the 6th and the 14th when ordered to return to PARAMUSHIRO, these vessels set three separate dates for the "run" - but on each occasion were destroyed by clear weather and KISKA reports of U.S. air and naval activity.
- (3) Sailing from PARAMUSHIRO again on 22 July with the 10 "Fifth Fleet" aboard the cruiser TAMA, the fleet resumed its wait for favorable weather. Collision sent two destroyers limping home. The remaining vessels, under cover of fog that grew steadily thicker from the 27th on, set their course for KISKA, and guided by that garrison's radio beams, crept around the northern tip of the island and into KISKA Harbour on the afternoon of 28 July.

Anchoring at 1350, the garrison's remaining strength of "over 5,000" loaded from barges within the next 2 hours. On the return trip 1 U.S. submarine which submerged immediately was sighted off KISKA. PARAMUSHIRO was reached without incident on 30 and 31 July".

-PCS 540-3-3-1-8 (G10)

d. 5 Apr 44.

#### The Probable Cost of Enemy Resistance

While any estimate of what might have happened in an opposed landing is necessarily conjectural, considered opinion agreed that American and Canadian casualties would have been heavy. A frequent estimate set the probable minimum figure at 7,000.

In reaching such a conclusion observers draw attention to the following factors:

(a) U.S. casualties at Attu amounted to 30 per cent of the attacking force. Some 2000 Japanese defended the island, but many casualties came from frost bite and exposure. At Kiska the Allied force numbered 32,000 as opposed to 7,800 Japanese. Making allowances for the better precautions taken to withstand Aleutian weather conditions, and for the very much more accurate knowledge of the topography of the island to be attacked, it was, nevertheless, considered that so large a Japanese force, fighting to the death, might well have inflicted a number of casualties equal to its own strength.

(b) Although the plan of attack carried the assault on to beaches remote from the main Japanese concentrations, and in areas not as strongly manned with guns as was the east side of the island, estimates of enemy artillery coverage of Broad Beach showed no less than twelve of the island's fifteen Japanese batteries bearing up on the side chosen for the Northern sector attack. (See Map 24, AIC NORPAC, - War Diary Wpg. Gren., Aug 43. Appendix V). While it is true that some of the Japanese batteries had been probably



rendered harmless through aerial and naval bombardment prior to D-day, later observation showed that nothing short of a direct hit would put a heavy gun out of action, protected as they were from bomb blast and splinters.

(c) The hills behind Green Beach harboured many a skillfully concealed and well protected machine gun nest, strategically sited to sweep the shore with enfilade fire. These positions extended on every ridge to the centre of the island. Until each of these fox holes and hillside strongholds had been cleaned out by attacking grenade parties, the role of the beach party would have been an unenviable one.

(d) Reference has already been made to the disorganizing factors that threatened to disrupt the ship to shore movement of men and supplies. In the opinion of the commanders of the Canadian combat teams the failure of the naval plans to coincide with the military debarkation schedules, and the crowding on to Green Beach of the U.S. landing craft destined for the other beaches created a confusion that in the face of an alert enemy might well have been attended by serious consequences.


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"APPENDIX 39"

COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM PHASE I


COMPANY NETS



NOTE: Combat Team Nets and Company Nets for 14 and 16 similar to those shown for 15 CT



# KISKA NORTHERN SECTOR



## CANADIAN CAMP

- ① Bde Hq. ② Wpg. Gren. ③ Cdn. Fus. ④ R. de Hull ⑤ R.M. Rang ⑥ 25 Fd Amb.
- ⑦ 24 Fd Regt. ⑧ 46 L.A.A. Bty. ⑨ St. John Fus ⑩ 24 Fd Coy.

==== Road constructed by Canadians

Canadian Forces shown in red

Historical Section, G.S.