

NOTE

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Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CANCELLED~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DHD 3-3
by PLC for DHist NDHQ
Date: OCT 15 1986

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NO. 16
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

7 Jan 53

The Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-1945

AMENDMENT NO. 1

Cancel Addendum No. 1 dated 2 Jun 52
and substitute the attached, to be in-
serted between paragraphs 43 and 44.

J. M. O'Brien, Major
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MULE CONDUCTING PARTIES TO INDIA

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: DHD 3-3
 by CHW for DHist NDHQ
 Date: OCT 15 1986

43a. On 1 Feb 44 N.D.H.Q. received a telegram from the Canadian Military Attache in Washington stating that the British Army Staff were initiating shipments of mules on behalf of the Indian Government. The Attache passed to Ottawa the British request for the loan of Canadian Army personnel to conduct two shiploads of mules from New York to Karachi. The British had obtained U.S. personnel for earlier shipments but were reluctant to ask the Americans for further help. A shipload of mules numbered approximately 400 and required an escort of one conducting officer, one veterinary, three cooks, four veterinary attendants and roughly 28 general duty men, i.e., a remount troop (H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 3: Tel M.A. 771, Mawash to Defensor, 1 Feb 44) N.D.H.Q. agreed to provide the conducting parties and wired Washington accordingly (ibid: Tel Org 987, Defensor to Mawash, 9 Feb 44). To eliminate clerical work, the "muleteers" were to be attached to the British Army Staff as individuals and not as a unit or detachment. They were to be loaned for a maximum of six months. ((H.S.) 112.3S2009 (D185): Minutes of Meeting, 1 Mar 44) From the time of the original request to the end of the war, four conducting parties were sent.

43b. The difficulties of procuring sufficient mules led to a reduction of the original request from two parties to one (H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 3: Tel M.A. 1332, Mawash to A.G., 26 Feb 44). This first party concentrated at St. Johns, P.Q., and left for New York on 18 Mar 44. It consisted of Maj T.A.G. Moore, C.H. of O. (conducting officer), Capt R.G. Livermore, Can Fus (veterinary), and 43 other ranks of the Veterans Guard of Canada (ibid, vol 6: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 20 Jul 44). While considerable effort was made to ensure that the draft was smart and soldierly in appearance, it was not specified that the men chosen should be experienced in handling animals ((H.S.) 163.009 (D21): A.G. to D.Os.C., 23 Feb 44). Consequently, the Canadians had to call upon U.S. Remount personnel to help them load the ship. Some 476 mules were placed aboard the S.S. Empire Trail; 40 of these were sick and during the first night two died. (H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 6: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 20 Jul 44) The ship sailed from New York and joined its convoy (U.G.S. 37) at Hampton Roads, near Norfolk, Virginia, leaving there on 24 Mar 44. The convoy contained two other ships carrying mules; the animals in these ships and in two others (which had sailed earlier on 23 Feb and 4 Mar respectively) were conducted by U.S. personnel. (Ibid, vol 5: Tel, B.A.S., Washington to Embarkation Bombay, 25 Mar 44)

43c. The convoy route was Gibraltar - Suez (Port Tewfik) - Aden - Karachi, with stops at Suez and Aden. Off Algiers, the ships were attacked by enemy aircraft and at least one plane was shot down in flames. This delighted the old warriors of the Veterans Guard, who had voluntarily manned the ship's guns. Off Crete, they were attacked by German submarines. The ship

directly astern of the Empire Trail was hit and its steering gear damaged. The merchantman to starboard was also hit and in this case set afire. The convoy had to sail on, leaving both vessels drifting helplessly.* In Aden, the stokehold gang mutinied and had to be replaced by a crew of Somalis. Despite these incidents, the Empire Trail arrived at Karachi on 7 May 44 with all animals in good health. After unloading their ship, the Canadian conducting party took a train to Bombay and sailed from there on 2 Jun. After a stopover in Melbourne, they arrived at San Pedro, California, on 2 Jul and were back in Toronto on 15 Jul. (Ibid, vol 6: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 20 Jul 44. See also Report by Sgt. J. McCabe, 10 Aug 44)

43d. In August 1943 the British requested Canada to provide two more mule conducting parties in India. This time each group was to have an additional medical officer. (Ibid, vol 7: Q.M.G. to A.G., 3 Aug 44)

43e. Maj Moore was again in charge of detail No. 1 and two men who had been on the original voyage were included in his 43 O.R. of the Veterans Guard of Canada. Some 421 mules, including 26 sick, were loaded at Hoboken aboard the S.S. Empire Symbol which sailed on 10 Dec 44. About midnight it ran into a full gale. Loose lumber smashed several pens and a number of mules broke loose in the blackout. Rough weather continued as far as Port Said, where a stop was made, but eventually Karachi was reached on 19 Jan 45 and all 419 mules disembarked in good health. This time the conducting party remained on the same ship as far as Bombay and took another ship to Gourock, Scotland. After five days leave in the United Kingdom the detail re-embarked on 30 Mar for return to Canada. (Ibid, vol 10: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 24 May 45)

43f. The second of these two later parties (Group No. 3) embarked at New York on the S.S. Ocean Vista on 5 Jan 45, having loaded 319 mules. (Some 51 mules had been casualties en route to the port.) (Ibid, vol 9: B.A.S. Ottawa to AG, 19 Jan 45) Maj R.G. Betts was in charge, assisted by Capt C.W. Parker R.C.A.M.C. and Capt R.G. Livermore (the veterinary who had been on the original voyage). One man also was making his second trip. This party had 42 O.R. of the Veterans Guard of Canada plus a sergeant of the Permanent Force who had been a farrier (ibid, vol 10: D. Adm to D. Org, 10 Nov 44).

*One ship sank and the other was towed to Alexandria, but subsequently had to be written off as a total loss. (B.R. 137, British and Foreign Merchant Vessels, Lost and Damaged by Enemy Action During the Second World War, (London, 1945), p. 130. This is a publication of the Royal Navy held by the R.C.N. historian)

43g. The third British request for mule escorts arrived at N.D.H.Q. on 21 Feb 45 (ibid, vol 8: B.A.S. Ottawa to A.G., 21 Feb 45). The director of the Veterans Guard of Canada felt that his Veterans could not provide the required personnel and attend to their increased responsibilities for prisoners of war (ibid: D.V.G.C. to D. Adm, 27 Feb 45). It was therefore decided to employ low category G.S. members of No. 2 General Employment Company (ibid: A.G. to the Minister, 7 Mar 45). Accordingly, a party of three officers and 45 other ranks in charge of Capt R. Harris, C.A.C., arrived in New York on 2 April and sailed aboard the S.S. Empire Mauritius on 6 Apr 45. The voyage was uneventful except when one of the escorts, Pte C.E. Smith, was stricken with appendicitis. The surgeon of a U.S. destroyer was sent over by breeches buoy to assist the Canadian M.O. in a successful operation. Smith was dropped off at Gibraltar and the Empire Mauritius proceeded via Fort Said and Aden without further incident. The mules were unloaded at Karachi on 15 May, the party then going over to Bombay to take ship for Greenoch. After 13 days leave, the detail boarded the Duchess of Bedford at Liverpool, and on 27 Jul 45 arrived at Halifax. (Ibid, vol 11: Harris to A.G., 16 Aug 45)

43h. Thus it was that Canada supplied four parties to convoy approximately 1600 mules from the United States to India. The Canadian personnel engaged totalled nine officers and 170 other ranks, excluding the sick man left in Gibraltar and counting only once the two officers and three other ranks who made the voyage twice.*

*These appear to be the most accurate figures available according to the nominal rolls, although they do not agree with those arrived at previously (H.Q.C. 1915-75/58: D. Records to D.H.S., 13 Jun 47, and memo for file, 20 Jun 52) Nominal rolls for all four conducting parties are on file H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 12.

*Original by
signed by
H. H. Wood*

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

REPORT NO. 16
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

7 Jan 53

The Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-1945

AMENDMENT NO. 2

1. Pages 33-36

Delete paragraphs 35-38 inclusive and
substitute the attached:

2. Page 39, last line

Delete 32 and substitute 23.

J. H. Stacey
For (C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

ATTACHMENTS IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE

35. Because warfare conditions in the Pacific differ so widely from European battlefields, which until the present have been the main school of Canadian battle experience abroad, it was recognized during the course of the war that special study in that area would be invaluable. Maj-Gen Maurice Pope, Commander of the Canadian Army Staff, Washington, took a leading part in urging action in that regard. As early as May 1943, on hearing Mr Churchill pledge to the United States Congress full United Kingdom support in future operations against Japan following the defeat of Hitler, General Pope suggested to Ottawa that Canada send "a fully representative number of observers to serve with Australian and New Zealand land forces". He went on to observe that "the despatch of a group of observers to the South Seas would put us in possession of first-hand knowledge of fighting conditions in an area in which some day we may be called upon to fight", and he concluded by pointing out the value of demonstrating to Australia and New Zealand that Canada showed some concern with their problems. (W.D., General Pope, 23 May 43)

36. Although General Pope mentioned the matter off-the-record to Lt-Gen V.A.H. Sturdee, Head of the Australian Military Mission to Washington, no further action was taken at that time by Ottawa (*ibid*, 27 May 43). That summer, however, the British appointed a Joint Service Mission headed by Maj-Gen J.S. Lethbridge to investigate at first hand the types of equipment and most suitable organization of units and formations required for full-scale operations against Japan. ((H.S.) 314.009 (D377): Tel COS (W) 644, (British) Chiefs of Staff to Joint Staff Mission (Washington), 18 Jun 43) On hearing of this, General Pope at once suggested the attachment of Canadian service officers. (*Ibid*: Tel JS 159, C.J.S. to C.O.S., and Tel CAW 441, Pope to C.G.S., 25 Jun 43) As a result, Lt-Col J.E. Cumming, R.C. Sigs, and Lt-Col C.J. Bermingham, R.C.E., of the Canadian Army Overseas joined the Lethbridge Mission.* (C.M.H.Q. file 1/Missions/5: Tel GS 795, Defensor to Canmilitary, 14 Jul 43) They spent several months in the Pacific Theatre and in India, and later assisted in the preparation of a voluminous document known as the "220 Military Mission Report". (C.M.H.Q. file 1/Missions/5 contains a copy of the Table of Contents. (H.S.) 952.053 (D2) contains a copy of Chapter 16)

37. General Lethbridge's visit to Ottawa en route to the Far East provoked considerable interest in jungle warfare.** As a result, N.D.H.Q. sought to send

*The R.C.A.F. and United States Services also appointed representatives.

**Pacific Command, for example, set up various *ad hoc* schools to teach jungle warfare ((H.S.) 322.009 (D67)).

two of its officers to visit appropriate American training centres. (H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 1: Tel G.S. 897, Defensor to C.J.S. (W), 26 Aug 43) The War Department thereupon offered two vacancies at the Ranger School at Hawaii, which were allotted to Pacific Command (*ibid*: Tels Trg 5744 and 5813, C.G.S. to G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Comd, 8 and 9 Oct 43). The two infantry officers selected, Lt V.H. Zala and Lt F.K. Trites, completed the course in 1943. On their return they were sent to the United Kingdom, later joining a party of Canadian officers sent from there to South East Asia Command*. Lt Trites was wounded on 8 Oct 44 while in Burma. (H.Q.C. 6-T-426)

38. Meanwhile, General Pope continued to press for the despatch of Canadian observers to the Pacific. In November 1943 he proposed that a group be attached to U.S. Forces in the Central Pacific for future operations (H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 1: Pope to C.G.S., 5 Nov 43). The following month he suggested that Canadians be sent to the Australian Army School of Jungle Fighting (W.D., General Pope, 18 Dec 43). N.D.H.Q. was already following up his proposals, and early in 1944 the War Committee of the Cabinet approved the selection and attachment of Canadian personnel to United Kingdom and other Commonwealth Forces and to United States Forces in the Pacific and Asiatic area, "it being understood that no decision would be implied thereby as to the nature and extent of Canadian participation in these theatres" (H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 1: Waters to C.G.S., 14 Jan 44).

38a. Arrangements were made at once with the War Office to attach twenty officers of the Canadian Army Overseas to South East Asia Command based on India (*ibid*: Tel GS 30, Defensor to Canmilitary, 18 Jan 44). Headed by Lt-Col G.H. Spencer, R.C.E., the officers selected represented all arms as well as the medical and army service corps.** Their tour of duty, which extended from 11 Jul 44 to 17 Jan 45, included the following:

- (a) Three weeks visiting training units and training establishments.
- (b) Four months in Burma with formations of the Fourteenth Army and 15th Indian Corps.

*See paragraph 38a of this Report.

**A nominal role is attached as Appendix "A". Note that the twenty officers later were joined in India by three others. Details concerning the attachment of these officers to S.E.A.C. are contained in C.M.H.Q. files 1/Attach FE/1 and 1/2 and 1/Attach FE Reps/1.

- (c) Three weeks visiting units and military installations in India.

((H.S.) 313.013 (D10): Consolidated Report of Cdn Army Officers Attached to S.E.A.C., 12 Feb 45. (H.S.) 171.009 (D55) contains copies of their individual reports)

A number of these officers saw service with the 5th Indian Division during the period of operations on the Tiddum Road, Assam-Burma frontier, from 28 Aug to 8 Dec 44 (H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 5: C.M.H.Q. to D.H.D., 30 Apr 45). On their return to the United Kingdom, the regimental officers were sent to Canada for instructional duties while the five staff officers first completed an attachment within First Canadian Army in North-West Europe before being returned to Canada (ibid, 15 Mar 45).

38b. In February 1944, N.D.H.Q. instructed General Fope to arrange with the U.S. War Department and the Australian and New Zealand Military Missions in Washington respectively for twenty Canadian officers to be attached "for a period of instruction and training in the special conditions to be met in the Pacific Theatre and their subsequent employment with formations or units in the theatres of operations". They were to be attached as follows:

10 to United States Forces
8 to Australian Forces
2 to New Zealand Forces

(H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 1: C.G.S. to Comd, C.A.S., Washington, 5 Feb 44).

With the exception of one representative of N.D.H.Q. (Major E.W. Benjamin), all these officers were selected from Pacific Command* (ibid: C.G.S. to the Minister, 6 Mar 44).

38c. The ten officers for attachment to the U.S. Forces left first, flying from San Francisco to Honolulu on 27 Feb 44 (ibid: Tel PCO 7715, Comd Pacific to Defensor, 3 Mar 44). There they were to be attached for approximately three months to a U.S. Army division undergoing amphibious training (P.C.S. 504-1-10-8, vol 1: C.G.S. to Comd Pacific, 23 Feb 44). Most of them accompanied this 27th U.S. Infantry Division when it sailed from Pearl Harbor to support the U.S. Marines in assaulting the Mariana Islands in June 1944, landing on Saipan (ibid: "Saipan" (Cdn Report), 12 Sep 44). There Capt K.G. Russell contracted dengue fever and was invalided to Canada, Capt J.L. Cotter returning with him while the other officers proceeded to the South West Pacific Area for further duty (ibid: Wild to G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Comd, 25 Jul 44). On arrival in New Guinea they were attached to Alamo Force in the Aitape area, where mopping up operations were taking

*A nominal roll is attached as Appendix "B".

place to establish fixed defences around a beachhead (P.C.S. 509-1-10-8, vol 1: Report of Cdn Offrs Attached to U.S. Forces in New Guinea). Majors B.I. McGreevy, R.J. Wild, and D.M. Ramsay later were attached for a few days in August to the 41st U.S. Division on Biak Island, Schouten Islands which had been taken from the Japanese in June. During their stay there a small amphibious operation took place at Warsa Bay. (Ibid: Report on Attachment to 41 Div, 23-28 Aug 44.) Meanwhile, Capt A.L. Rogers, who had remained an extra month on Saipan, was attached to the 14th Anti-Aircraft Command in New Guinea and observed the landing operations at Morotai, Molucca Islands, on 15 Sep (ibid: Report on the Morotai Operation). Later he reported to the 32nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade in Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, and took part in the landing at Leyte in October 1944 (ibid, vol 2: Report on A.A. Employed in the Leyte Operation). He eventually returned to Canada in January 1945, the last of his group to return home (ibid: Rogers to Pacific Comd, 19 Jan 45).

38d. The two observers sent to the New Zealand Forces, Major J.R. Boulanger and Captain R. Murdock, sailed from San Francisco on 19 Mar 44 for Expeditionary Force Headquarters at Boorail, New Caledonia. After a short stay there they flew to Nisson Island, Green Islands (the northern end of the Solomons), where they were to be attached for one week to Headquarters 3rd New Zealand Division, then to a forward brigade, and finally to field units. (P.C.S. 509-1-10-10, vol 1: Boulanger to H.Q. Pacific Comd, 13 Apr 44.) As the fighting there had died down, they compiled some very useful reports on previous operations such as the capture of Vella Lavella in August 1943 and of the Green Islands in February 1944 (ibid, 8 May 44). They then joined the main party of Canadian observers in Australia (ibid, 4 Aug 44).

38e. Headed by Lt-Col H.P. Cotton, the eight officers for attachment to the Australian Forces sailed from San Francisco for Melbourne on 26 Mar 44 to be attached to the 17th Infantry Brigade, 6th Australian Division. This brigade had seen a great deal of action both in the Middle East and in New Guinea and was considered to be one of the best trained. (P.C.S. 509-1-10-9, vol 1: Interim Report No. 1, Cdn Offrs Australian Attachment.) Together with the two officers formerly with the New Zealand Forces, they flew to New Guinea in June and were assigned to the three brigades of the 5th Australian Division in the forward area* (ibid, No. 2). As the troops there were mainly engaged in mopping up, most of the observers returned to the mainland in July for further

*Capt T.E. Baylis was injured in a jeep accident there and returned to Canada.

training with the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions and then were given an opportunity to gain battle experience with U.S. Forces (*ibid*, No. 3). On reporting to Headquarters Tradewind Task Force at Aitape in September, they were assigned to operational units of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division for the Morotai expedition, subsequently returning to Hollandia (*ibid*: Report on Morotai Operation, Canadian and Australian Observers). They arrived back in Canada in November 1944 (H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 4: G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Comd to N.D.H.Q., 18 Nov 44).

38f. Lt-Col Cotton's party was accompanied to Australia by three Canadian intelligence officers, who toured various schools there. Capt M.M. Perrault, later joined the staff of the Canadian Military Attache at Chungking, China. (H.Q.C. 7375-2, vol 4: D. Pers to D.M.O. & P., July 1944) The other two spent six weeks in New Guinea, following which Capt R.M. Baldwin proceeded to South East Asia Command while Capt R.W. Archibald returned home (H.Q. 332-12-63, vol 2: Report of Visit of Cdn Offrs to S.W.P.A., 29 Oct 44). 23 Jan 55
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38g. Among Canadian officers sent out as individuals, Major R.F. Routh flew from San Francisco on 30 May 44 for an attachment to the South West Pacific Area. There he visited Australian and American parachute training centres and joined the Cyclone Task Force of the Sixth U.S. Army for the assault on Noemfoor Island, one of the Schouten Islands in Dutch New Guinea, 2 Jul 44. In that operation he saw parachutists being brought in as reinforcements. Later he was attached to South East Asia Command and saw parachutist training in India. Having been wounded in Burma on 25 August, he returned to Canada in October for a lecture tour. (P.C.S. 508-1-10-8, vol 1: Report of Liaison Tour of S.W.P.A. and S.E.A.C. by Major R.F. Routh.)

38h. Another Canadian officer, Lt-Col W.A. Bean, on gaining distinction at the U.S. Army and Navy Staff College, was recommended by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for an assignment of six months on the staff of a joint command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz). He thus served with the 1st U.S. Marine Division in the assault landing on Peleliu Island, Palau Islands, east of the Philippines, on 15 Sep 44. ((H.S.) 171.009 (D49): Operations Against Palau Islands, Report by Lt-Col W.A. Bean)

38i. In November 1944, when Canada had definitely decided to participate in the Pacific War in co-operation with U.S. Forces, N.D.H.Q. proposed to send thirty additional officers on attachment to the U.S. Forces in the Pacific for one month with an operational unit in training and two months with formations or units actively engaged in operations. There were to be three groups of ten, each consisting of a lieutenant-

colonel and nine majors or captains representing all arms and services.* Together with the original twenty and those sent by the Canadian Army Overseas to S.E.A.C., they would then be available to form a nucleus of officers with first-hand experience in the training and operational requirements of warfare in the Pacific. (H.Q.C. 8932-4, vol 1: C.G.S. to the Minister, 18 Nov 44.) Arrangements were made through Major-General H.F.G. Letson, who had succeeded General Pope in Washington (W.D., General Letson, November 1944, Appx "S": Letson to Marshall, 30 Nov 44).

38j. The first group, headed by Lt-Col V. de B. Oland, R.C.A., arrived at General Headquarters on Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 20 Feb 45 to be attached for approximately four months to the Eighth U.S. Army (ibid: Tel CAW 70, Cdn Army Staff to N.D.H.Q., 23 Feb 45). Finding there were no units in training in that area aside from those already committed to action, the group was attached to the 41st U.S. Division, which was then preparing for imminent operations in the Philippines (ibid, vol 2: Tel CAW 100, Cdn Army Staff to C.G.S., 23 Mar 45). Thus, without an opportunity to attend training establishments, they participated in the landing operations on Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao Island, on 10 Mar 45 (Operation V-4), and on 9 Apr 45 in further landings on the Tawitawi Group and Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago of the Philippines ((H.S.) 171.009 (D54): Report on Operations S.W.P.A. March-May 1945 by Capt D.S. MacLennan. See also (D50), Report by Capt J.B. Streater and (D45), Reports by Lt-Col V. de B. Oland, Capt J.B. Lind and R.E.H. Cross. Col Oland's report also discusses the capture of the remainder of Mindanao Island by X Corps (Operation V-5), the last operation of any size in the Philippines.)

38k. Groups two and three, headed by Lt-Cols J.G.G. Charlebois, R. 22e R., and E.G. Reade, C.A.C., respectively, arrived in Hawaii in February 1944. There they were regrouped for purposes of attachment to various formations of the U.S. Tenth Army, which was then in the final stages of preparation for the assault upon Okinawa on 1 Apr 44 (Operation "Iceberg"). Lt-Col Charlebois and six other officers** were attached to the assaulting divisions of III Amphibious Corps (1st and 2nd Marine Divisions), which had already held their rehearsal in the Solomon Islands. ((H.S.) 171.009 (D36): Cdn Observers' Report on Operation "Iceberg".) These two Marine divisions formed the Northern Task Force and assaulted on the left,

*See Appendix "C" to this Amendment.

**Among these, Maj A.J. Brunet, R.C.A.M.C., and Capt S.J. Simons, R.C.E., were wounded during the later fighting on Okinawa (H.Q.C. 8932-4, vol 2: Simons to Secty D.N.D., 4 May 45).

while on the right the XXIV Corps landed the 7th and 96th U.S. Infantry Divisions on the south shore. To this Corps Lt-Col Reade and nine other Canadian observers were attached. ((H.S.) 171.009 (D43): Canadian Observers' Report on Okinawa Operations, Parts 1, 2 and 3. See also (D38), Report by Maj D.W. Cunningham; and (D40), Report by Capt W.R. Lawson.) Major R.R. Munro and Captains R.S. Richards and R.D. Murray, on the other hand, were assigned to a division which had the task of carrying out feint landings off the south-east coast. This 2nd Marine Division practised off Tinian Island during March before sailing from Saipan to arrive off Okinawa with the rest of the Tenth Army on D Day (1 Apr 45). There a suicide bomber struck Capt Richard's ship and he was forced to transfer to another. As the campaign went well in its early stages, however, the 2nd Marine Division was withdrawn from army reserve on 11 April and sailed back to Saipan without actually having landed. For some time it remained on 24-hour notice, but eventually the three Canadian observers were returned to Hawaii without seeing further action. ((H.S.) 171.009 (D137): Report by Maj R.R. Munro. See also (D37): Report by Capt R.S. Richards.)

38l. In April 1945 the Minister of National Defence approved the attachment of a further fifteen Canadian officers to U.S. Forces in the Pacific Theatre of Operations for a period of approximately three months. The first five were to be staff officers, followed by a group of ten regimental officers. (H.Q.S. 8932-4, vol 2: C.G.S. to the Minister, 6 Apr, approved 10 Apr 45.)

38m. The five staff officers, forming Group No. 4 and led by Maj R.G. Kingstone, R.C.A., reach Okinawa in May 1945 while fighting was continuing there. They visited a variety of formations and compiled very detailed reports of U.S. staff procedure ((H.S.) 171.009 (D42): Report by Maj R.G. Kingstone and Capt J.W. Stewart. See also (H.S.) 218U10.013 (D22): Report by Maj S. Kanee and (D1): Report by Capt W.S. Estey.)

38n. The ten regimental officers, forming the fifth and final group and led by Lt-Col de L.H.M. Panet, R.C.A., reach Okinawa in June. They at once joined units of the Tenth Army engaged in active operations there. On 21 Jun one of these officers, Capt J.E. Hilliker, C. Int C., was wounded while with a party attempting to capture a Japanese general and his staff. (H.Q.C. 8932-3, vol 3: Report by Lt-Col de L. Panet; and vol 3: Report by Maj J.B. Robinson. See also (H.S.) 171.009 (D39): Report by Capt J.E. Hilliker; (D44): Report by Lt-Col M. Gagnon and Maj A. Condy; (D45): Report by Capt R.E.M. Cross; (D52): Report by Capt L.W. Garen.)

OFFICERS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS
ATTACHED TO
SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND

11 JUL 44 - 17 JAN 45

Lt-Col	G.H.	Spencer	R.C.E.
Lt-Col	P.R.	Bingham	C.I.C.
*Maj	C.H.	Cook	C.I.C.
"	A.A.	Duncanson	C.I.C.
"	W.	Bramley-Moore	R.C.A.M.C.
"	C.P.	Keeley	C.I.C.
"	H.D.P.	Tighe, M.C.	C.I.C.
"	J.S.	Mulholland	C.I.C.
"	E.G.F.	Anderson	R.C.C.S.
"	H.A.	Farthing	R.C.A.
"	C.V.B.	Corbet	C.I.C.
Capt	J.G.W.	Turney	R.C.C.S.
"	F.J.	Henderson	R.C.A.3.C.
"	A.P.	Boswell	C.I.C.
"	J.M.	Patton, G.C.	R.C.E.
"	P.A.	Ballachy	C.I.C.
"	E.H.A.	Carson	R.C.A.
"	W.A.H.	Law	C.A.C.
"	G.P.	Knifton	C.I.C.
"	W.R.	Berwick	C.I.C.
"	M.N.	Bow	C.I.C.
**Lt	F.K.	Trites	C.I.C. (wounded)
** "	V.H.	Zala	C.I.C.

((H.3.) 312.013 (D10):
Consolidated Report of Cdn Army
officers Attached to S.E.A.C.,
12 Feb 45)

*Arrived India 14 Nov 44 - tour concluded
approximately 15 Apr 45. This officer had returned to
Canada in March 1943 and had been serving in Pacific
Command.

**Arrived India mid-August 1944. These two officers
had completed the course at the U.S. Ranger School,
Hawaii (9 Oct - 19 Dec 43) before joining the Canadian
Army Overseas.

ATTACHMENT OF CANADIAN OFFICERS

TO THE PACIFIC THEATRE, 1944

U.S. Forces

Major B.I. McGreevy	R.R.C.
Major R.J. Wild	P.A. Vol
Major D.M. Ramsay	31 Alta Recce Regt
Capt F. Fulton	R.M. Rang
Capt K.G. Russell	6 Div Sigs
Capt C. Vermeulen	25 Fd Regt
Capt L. Cotter	W.L.I.
Capt A.L. Rogers	R.C.A.
Capt J.G. Leuty	Mid R.
Capt W.E. Watt	3. Ste H. & Sud R.

Australian Forces

Lt-Col H.P. Cotton	W.L.I.
Capt J.R. Hudson	28 Fd Amb
Capt A. Fortier	R. de Hull
Capt T.P. Baylis	K.O.R. of C.
Capt M.G. Kneale	R.C.A.
Capt G.J. Piggott	Kent R.
Major S.F. Turner	R.R.C.
*Major R.W. Benjamin	30 Recce Regt (Essex R.)

N.Z. Forces

Capt R. Murdoch	C. Scot R.
Major J.R. Belanger	Fus de St. L.

(H.Q.S. 7375-2, vol 3: D. Pers
Serv to D.M.O. & P., undated.
This is a revised list)

*N.D.H.Q. officer

4th Group - Pacific Ocean Area

Major	R.G.	Kingstone	R.C.A.
Major	S.	Kanee	R.C.A.
Capt	W.W.	Coward	R.C.A.S.C.
Capt	J.W.	Stewart	C.I.C.
Capt	W.Z.	Estey	C.I.C.

(Ibid, vol 3: C.G.S.
Memo to Officers Proceeding
on Attachment to U.S.
Forces in the Pacific Theatre,
25 Apr 45)

5th Group - Pacific Ocean Area

Lt-Col	de L.H.M.	Panet	R.C.A.
Lt-Col	M.E.P.	Garneau, D.S.O.	C.I.C.
Major	J.B.	Robinson	C.A.C.
Major	A.	Condy, M.B.E.	C.I.C.
Major	W.F.	Sharon, M.C.	R.C.E.
Capt	L.W.	Garen	R.C.A.S.C.
Capt	K.G.	Martin	R.C. Sigs
Capt	D.C.	Bews	R.C.A.M.C.
Capt	R.E.M.	Cross	C.I.C.
Capt	J.E.	Hilliker	C. Int C. (wounded)

(Ibid: A.G. to G.O.C.-in-C.
Pacific Command, 23 May 45)

ATTACHMENT OF CANADIAN OFFICERS TO U.S. ARMY
IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE, 1945

1st Group - South West Pacific Area

Lt-Col V. de B. Oland	R.C.A.
Major B.H. Miller	R.C.A.M.C.
Major H.V. Flett	R.C.E.M.E.
Major F.T. Hace	R.C.O.C.
Capt J.B. Lind	R.C.A.S.C.
Capt I.B. Shaw	R.C.A.
Capt I.D. Publicover	R.C.E.
Capt D.S. MacLennan	C.I.C.
Capt M.T. McConnell	C.A.C.
Capt J.R. Streater	R.C. Sigs

2nd Group - Pacific Ocean Areas

Lt-Col J.G.G. Charlebois	R. 22e R.
Major R.R. Munroe	C.A.C.
Major A.J. Brunet	R.C.A.M.C. (wounded)
Major L.D. McBride	R.C.E.M.E.
Capt W.L. Lawson	N. Shore R.
Capt S.J. Simons	R.C.E. (wounded)
Capt D.B. Dawson	R.C.A.
Capt F.B. Palmer	R.C. Sigs
Capt E.C. Purdy	C.D.C.
Capt J.A. Edmonstone	R.C.A.S.C.

3rd Group - Pacific Ocean Area

Lt-Col E.G. Reade	C.A.C.
Major C.A. Sabourin	R.C.A.
Major D.W. Cunningham	R.C.E.
Major G.A. Rheaume	R. de Mais
Major R.T. Bogle	R.C.E.M.E.
Capt R.S. Richards	R.C.R.
Capt R.D. Murray	R.C.O.C.
Capt G.P. Eligh	R.C.A.S.C.
Capt A.C. Smart	R.C. Sigs
Capt S.W.D. Hart	R.C.A.M.C.

(H.Q.C. 8932-4, vol 1:
D.M.T. to D.C.G.S. (B),
9 Feb 45)

R E P O R T NO. 16:
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

15 Jul 47

The Canadian Army Pacific Force

1944 - 45

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SECRET

R E P O R T NO. 16

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

15 Jul 47

The Canadian Army Pacific Force 1944-45

1. The object of this Report is to present a brief authentic outline of the history of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-45. Although this Force never took the field (the war with Japan having terminated before its organization and training had been completed), the project for it is nevertheless a matter of considerable historical importance, involving questions of national policy different from those raised by any aspect of Canadian participation in the war in Europe. It is particularly interesting in that the Canadian Army's contribution to the proposed campaign against the Japanese home islands was to take the form of an expeditionary force organized on United States lines and conforming to U.S. establishments. *

THE CANADIAN DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

(a) D.M.O. & P. Appreciation

2. "It is desirable that Canada should participate in the war with Japan by sea, land and air." This basic statement appears in an appreciation prepared for Lt-Gen J.C. Murchie, C.B., C.B.E., Chief of the General Staff, by the Director of Military Operations and Plans at Ottawa in January 1944 (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 1: Appreciation of Canadian Participation in the Pacific Theatre of War, Oprs 181-T, by Col J.H. Jenkins, E.D., revised 1 Feb 44. The original draft was sent by D.M.O. & P. to C.G.S. on 25 Jan 44 but does not appear on this file, which contains 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th revisions). The document was forwarded for comment to Maj-Gen M.A. Pope, C.B., M.C., Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Mission, Washington, who had observed indications that "the question of Canadian collaboration with the U.S. forces in the Pacific theatre was beginning to be mooted" in the American capital (W.D., General Pope, 25 and 27 Jan 44). His main

* Cf The Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operations, Historical Section (G.S.). To provide the Canadian component in the Greenlight (Kiska) Force 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade followed as closely as possible the organization of the corresponding United States Regimental Group and Brigade Headquarters was reorganized on the U.S. staff system. Units of the brigade, however, retained their Canadian establishments and, with certain exceptions, their Canadian weapons.

criticism of the appreciation was that "there seems to be a good deal of political flavour to the pudding", which he felt should be avoided in a purely military paper (Ibid, 9 Feb 44). In the light of his suggestions it was therefore redrafted (2 Mar 44) and in the summary of the revised version appeared for the first time these fundamental statements:

- (a) The decision as to whether or not Canada should participate is political and moral rather than strategical.
- (b) In the event that it is decided to participate two main courses are open:-
 - (i) To co-operate with the British attacking through Burma and/or Malaya,
 - (ii) To co-operate with the United States in their attack across the Pacific Islands.

(Ibid: Oprs 181-T, op cit, 2 Mar 44)

(b) Consultation with the United Kingdom

3. The appreciation remained within the Department of National Defence until April 1944 (Ibid: C.G.S. to the Minister (Hon J.L. Ralston), 15 Apr 44), when it was forwarded for the use of Mr. Mackenzie King at a conference of Prime Ministers in London whose agenda contained "questions arising from the conduct of the war against Japan, including the provision of forces from the British Commonwealth for that purpose" (Ibid: Heeney to Ralston, 14 Apr 44. Mr. A.D.P. Heeney held the dual position of Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the War Committee of the Cabinet). By then its argument had been expanded to become practically all-inclusive.

The reasons for Canadian participation are based on Military, political and moral, and commercial grounds.

(Ibid: Oprs 181-T, op cit, 25 Apr 44)

Co-operation with British or U.S. attacking forces remained as alternatives, and proposals regarding the extent of the land forces to be employed were left in general terms.

From the Army Overseas

A minimum of one division is suggested as a basis for discussion as Canada's contribution to the Pacific war.

From the Army in Canada

The Pacific war contribution might be considered as whatever number of Brigade groups that can be secured from the forces available.

(Ibid)

4. In London the matter was discussed by senior officers at "an off the record meeting" of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission * with the British Chiefs of Staff on 19 May 44, when

It was agreed that a communication from Government to Government was necessary in order to find out the views of the Cdn Govt in respect of the part it was to play...

(Ibid: Tel C.O.S. 93, Stuart to Murchie, 19 May 44)

With regard to the discussions at the Prime Ministers' meetings there, Mr. King later recorded "no definite proposals were advanced as to possible roles for the various Commonwealth forces in the final phases against Japan" (Ibid: Tel 108, Prime Minister to Prime Minister, 27 Jun 44). On returning to Ottawa he therefore cabled Mr. Churchill:

The [Cdn] Cabinet War Committee has recently considered with our Chiefs of Staff the matter of Canadian participation and feels that the attention of the United Kingdom government should be drawn to certain special considerations which apply, in this respect, to the position of Canada...

(Ibid)

The telegram proceeded to indicate that Canada's place as a member of the Commonwealth facing the Pacific yet closely connected with the United States stressed the desirability both from operational and logistic stand-points of basing her forces on Western Canada for close co-operation with U.S. forces, especially as operations in the North Pacific would enhance the importance of North-Western Canada as a base. These considerations were duly examined by the United Kingdom War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff, who drafted a reply in the form of an aide memoire suggesting:

From the strategic point of view, there would be little advantage in moving Canadian land forces direct from Europe to the South West Pacific or the Bay of Bengal. Having regard to movement, maintenance, and training considerations, it would be desirable for Canadian land forces to be moved to Canada as early as practicable, where they will be available for operations in the Far East, the area for their use to be decided as the situation develops.

* Members were the three Canadian service chiefs in London: Vice-Admiral P.W. Nelles, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner, D.S.C., Lt-Gen K. Stuart, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

Allowing for a measure of demobilization after the defeat of Germany, it is suggested that three divisions would be a reasonable contribution by Canada, of which two would be employed in the war against Japan, and one in the occupation of Europe.

(Ibid: Aide-Memoire on the Employment of Canadian Forces after the Defeat of Germany, the War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff, 24 Jul 44)

5. On reviewing this aide memoire, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff recommended to their Ministers 6 Sep 44:

...we consider that Canada's contribution should be based on Canadian capabilities and proportionate to the continuing effort of the United Kingdom and the United States.

It is considered most important that, should a major war effort be inaugurated against Japan by way of the North Pacific, either through Hawaii or the Aleutians, Canada be represented in the final assault on the Japanese homeland. This is a most important consideration as a means of avenging Hong Kong, saving face in the East, and restoring Canadian military prestige. The North Pacific area is one of particular importance to Canada both geographically and politically.

Insofar as the size of the contribution to the war against Japan is concerned, there is no indication as yet of the total forces that will be required. It does appear, however, that the Canadian contribution will in any event be only a small proportion of the total forces engaged. In these circumstances it is considered that the Canadian forces must operate as part of a larger force of either the U.K. or U.S. The North Pacific is an American strategic area and thus our forces would be under American command. In order to overcome supply difficulties, our forces should be provided with American type equipment...

Subject to the U.S. making available the necessary equipment, the Army contribution can be made ready for operations about eight months after the defeat of Germany, on the basis that personnel will be brought back to Canada for re-organization and re-equipping.

It is recommended that the Canadian plans be based upon the premise that the Canadian Army operate in the North or Central Pacific area in order to take part in the final assault against the Japanese homeland...[employing] one division with necessary ancillary troops.

(Ibid: Submission by Chiefs of Staff Committee to The Ministers, 6 Sep 44)

(c) Cabinet Decision

6. That same date the Canadian Cabinet as a whole considered the matter thoroughly and reached an agreement upon general policy.

The Prime Minister made reference to the meeting to be held in Quebec, in the immediate future, between Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff...

No final decision could be taken until after the Quebec meeting, when it was expected that an over-all Allied strategy would be determined, but Canadian representatives should be in a position to state, at Quebec, an agreed government view upon the nature and extent of the Canadian contribution.

The Cabinet, after extended discussion, agreed that, at the end of the war in Europe, Canadian military forces should participate in the war against Japan in operational theatres of direct interest to Canada as a North American nation, for example in the North or Central Pacific, rather than in more remote areas such as Southeast Asia, that government policy with respect to employment of Canadian forces should be based on this principle and that the form and extent of participation by the three Services should be determined following the forthcoming meeting at Quebec.

(Ibid: "Cabinet Conclusion" of 6 Sep 44, enclosed with letter Heeney to Ralston, 8 Sep 44)

Before presentation of the case there, the War Committee of the Cabinet meeting at Quebec on 13 Sep 44 concurred in the above conclusions (Ibid: Heeney to Leckie, 15 Sep 44. Air Marshal Robert Leckie was Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee). They thus provided the basis for Canadian policy at the international conference of war leaders then in progress at the Chateau Frontenac.

ACCEPTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES

(a) Canadian Proposals

7. At the Quebec Conference the Chief of the General Staff first outlined the Canadian proposals to the British Chiefs of Staff on 14 Sep 44.

Lieutenant-General Murchie said that consideration was being given to the provision of one Canadian division to participate in the Pacific war. Canada was most interested in operations in the Central Pacific or in its Northern Wing, if an attack should be mounted in that area.

This interest was based on geographical considerations and not because the Central area contained the main U.S. effort. It would, however, be some time before the Canadian division would be ready, since it would have to be reformed from units withdrawn from Europe.

(Ibid: Minutes of a meeting of the Canadian and British Chiefs of Staff, 14 Sep 44)

The same day, at a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet War Committee with Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, Mr. King suggested that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff might confer with the American Chiefs of Staff regarding the role which Canadian forces might play in the Pacific (Ibid: Copy of memo by General Pope, 16 Sep 44. General Pope was at this time Military Secretary to the Canadian War Cabinet Committee). The next day Mr. King held further conversations with Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. The C.G.S. thereafter was authorized by the Minister of National Defence (Hon J.L. Ralston), with the approval of the Prime Minister, to meet with the U.S. Chief of Staff, General Marshall, "to indicate what the Canadian Army were doing for purposes of planning, without commitment, and to discuss methods whereby mutual planning could be worked out to integrate Canadian Army component" (Ibid: Note for file, (sgd) J.L. Ralston, 16 Sep 44). General Marshall gave the C.G.S. and General Pope, who accompanied him, a very cordial reception. "He said at once he could see no obstacle in the way of meeting the Canadian Government's wishes in this matter" (Ibid: Memo by General Pope, op cit, 16 Sep 44). At his request they left him an aide memoire indicating in general terms the desires of the Canadian authorities (Ibid).

8. The way had thus been prepared, and the same policy was continued when on 2 Nov 44 General A.G.L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., replaced Hon J.L. Ralston as Minister of National Defence. On 20 Nov 44 the War Committee of the Cabinet formally approved a submission by the C.G.S. stating:

40TH
42ND
44th 50

- (a) The Canadian Force to comprise one division with ancillary troops as required, up to a total of 30,000. *

* Previously, on 8 Sep 44, the Canadian Cabinet had authorized:

...as a basis for planning, but without any commitment, one division and ancillary troops (approximately 25,000) as Army participation in the Pacific war, subject to satisfactory arrangements regarding the particular theatre of operations and the command with which the force would be associated.

(Ibid: Ralston to Heeney, 11 Sep 44)

- (b) This force to operate in the Central Pacific Area under the higher command of United States Forces and to be reorganized and re-equipped in accordance with United States tables of organization.

(Ibid: General Staff submission, Oprs 192-M, 20 Nov 44. See Appx "A" to this Report)

Subsequently, Maj-Gen H.F.G. Letson, C.B.E., M.C., E.D., who had succeeded General Pope as Commander, Canadian Army Staff, Washington, was authorized to put forward the outline of the Canadian proposals to General Marshall (Ibid, vol 2: Aide Memoire for General Letson, 27 Nov 44). This he did by letter on 9 Dec 44 (Ibid: Letson to Marshall, 9 Dec 44), to which Admiral William D. Leahy replied on behalf of the U.S.:

...the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept the proposal that a Canadian Army Force of one division with such ancillary troops as may be required will participate in the war against Japan under the higher command of the United States forces, with the understanding that this force will be available for use in any of the operations mounted in the Pacific.

The desirability of advancing planning measures for this project is recognized. However, present uncertainty as to the date the Canadian troops can be made ready for operations precludes decision at this time as to their exact employment.

(Ibid: Leahy to Letson, 21 Dec 44)

9. During March 1945 a Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff reviewed the entire situation and reported in favour of the proposed co-operative effort.

It is concluded...that without a greatly increased commitment of all three Services and the creation of a separate Canadian logistic organization, participation on a self-contained basis is impossible...

In the light of the above, it is recommended that the approved contributions of the R.C.N. and the Canadian Army should be employed with the R.N. and the U.S. Army as planned.

(Ibid: Minutes of Meeting of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, 15 Mar 45)

Acceptance of this report by the War Committee of the Cabinet on 22 Mar 45 confirmed the proposals for Canadian Army participation, and at once the C.G.S. instructed the Commander, Canadian Army Staff, Washington, to obtain certain further information.

You will therefore initiate discussions with United States authorities with a view to clarifying for planning purposes

- (a) Probable area in which Cdn division is to be employed.
- (b) Type of organization to be adopted.
- (c) Type and method of its equipment.

(Ibid: Tel C.G.S. 140, Murchie to Letson, 23 Mar 45)

(b) Public Announcement

10. Meanwhile, it was deemed advisable that the public should be acquainted with general plans for the Pacific. This was done in the course of a somewhat lengthy statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 4 Apr 45 during consideration of the War Appropriation Bill.

As regards the Army, it is proposed to provide a force to operate with the United States army. This force will be concentrated in Canada for organization and training prior to dispatch to the Pacific theatre of operations...

No one serving in the European theatre will proceed to the Pacific without first having had the opportunity of coming home...

The men to make up whatever military force is to be employed against Japan will be chosen from those who elect to serve in the Pacific theatre.

(Debates of House of Commons (Canada), 4 Apr 45, pp 434-5)

No immediate parliamentary debate on these points ensued other than a brief exchange between the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister emphasizing the policy regarding volunteers.

Mr. GRAYDON:...I take it from the Prime Minister's language that the forces will not be raised on a compulsory or widely distributed basis across Canada, but will consist of those who are prepared to serve against Japan although they may have already borne the heat and brunt of the battle overseas in Europe. Would the Prime Minister indicate the government's policy in that respect?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: My hon friend in his concluding words said that some would have to serve notwithstanding their having borne the brunt of the battle overseas in Europe. There will be no compulsion in connection with the service against Japan.

Mr. GRAYDON: My point was this. Somebody has to bear the brunt of the Japanese war, and I wanted to point out to the Prime Minister that under his policy it may be that those who have served in the heat of battle overseas in Europe may find that in order that the necessary forces may be raised they will have to volunteer and carry the battle against Japan also.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Only those who elect to serve will be included in the forces used against Japan.

(Ibid)

(c) Agreement in Principle

11. While negotiations with senior U.S. officers were still in progress, the C.G.S. and the Adjutant-General (Maj-Gen A.E. Walford, C.B.E., M.M., E.D.) recommended that the main component of the projected force should be armour.

We are of the opinion that there would be definite advantage if agreement could be reached to employ an Armoured rather than an Infantry division...

By reducing the infantry requirement from three to one brigade we limit the numbers needed from the arm for which it can be expected there will be the greatest difficulty in securing volunteers.

...the employment of an Armoured Division would give a composition more nearly representative of the arms and services presently employed in the Canadian Army Overseas from whom we must obtain the major proportion of our trained and battle worthy personnel.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 2: C.G.S. to the Minister, 8 Apr 45)

Although the U.S. Joint Staff Planners were in general agreement with Canadian proposals (Ibid: Tel C.A.W. 184, Letson to Gibson (V.C.G.S.), 4 May 45), they took the opposite view on this particular point.

It is believed that the force should consist of an infantry division, possibly reinforced with armor, and including a proportion of service and supporting troops, rather than an armored division. It appears that General MacArthur would prefer such a unit and that it would receive much more gainful employment. It is also preferable from a standpoint of supply and maintenance.

(Ibid: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, 15 May 45, quoted in tel C.A.W. 213, Letson to Gibson, 15 May 45)

Accordingly, this alone of the Canadian proposals was rejected when, closely following the end of the war in Europe, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 May 45 approved the following communication to General Letson:

...the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest as a suitable basis for initiating planning that the Canadian Army Force, whose participation in the war against Japan was agreed to in their letter to you of 21 December 1944 [see para 8 above] should:-

- (a) Consist of an infantry division, possibly reinforced with armor, with a proportion of service and supporting troops.
- (b) Be employed as a follow-up unit in the main operation.
- (c) Use United States army equipment and maintenance, except for uniforms.
- (d) Be reorganized along United States Army lines (unless further examination indicates such action will delay employment).
- (e) Be trained in the United States under the over-all supervision of the United States Army Ground Forces.
- (f) Be supplied as a normal United States Division and be based in accordance with operational plans.
- (g) Be returned to North America after cessation of hostilities in a priority consistent with that applied to other forces engaged in the Pacific War.

(Ibid)

Satisfied with these conditions of employment, the Canadian Cabinet readily agreed to their acceptance.

At meeting of Privy Council held on 17 May 1945 these proposals were approved in principle by the Cabinet upon a report by A/Minister of the financial commitments involved. Specific approval was recorded in respect of the armoured element.

(Ibid: Military Secretary (Col H.L. Cameron, O.B.E.) to C.G.S. and A.G., 18 May 45)

12. This meant, in effect, authorization to proceed with plans to recruit, train and despatch a Canadian Army Pacific Force consisting of an infantry division and a tank battalion together with necessary ancillaries, the initial force to total approximately 30,000 troops. On this basis it was estimated that up

to 31 Mar 46 the C.A.P.F. would require the following expenditures:

Cost of despatch to the United States and of embarkation leave	\$ 4,500,000
Cost of training in the United States (incl all Pay and Allowances)	\$29,366,000
Cost of initial equipment	\$23,763,000
Cost of Despatch Overseas	\$12,576,620
Total	\$70,205,620

(Ibid: C.G.S. to the Minister, 17 May 45)

THE PLAN FOR THE C.A.P.F.

13. With these principles adopted by both parties, the next step was to despatch to Washington 19 May 45 a Canadian Planning Team. At its head was Col W.A. Bean of A.G. Branch, who possessed outstanding qualifications by both training and experience:

He is a graduate of our own Staff Course, Intermediate Wing, R.M.C.; he was on attachment to the Eighth Army in North Africa; he took the U.S. Army and Navy Staff Course at Washington and Orlando...and for the past six months (prior to December 1944) has been on attachment with the U.S. forces in the South-West Pacific and took part in the operations against Paulu.

(Ibid, vol 3 D.C.G.S.(B) to D.C.G.S.(C) 11 Dec 44. Cf Report No. 95, Hist Offr, C.M.H.Q., which deals at length with Col Bean's experiences as senior officer of the first group of Canadians attached to First British Army in North Africa)

Other members were: Col A.J. Creighton, E.D., Director of Military Training, Lt-Col B.H. Darwin of the Directorate of Staff Duties, and Lt-Col C.E. Wrynn representing Q.M.G. and M.G.O. (Ibid, vol 2: Extract from Minister's Morning Conference, 19 May 45). Their instructions were:

[You are] to determine in collaboration with U.S. War Department Planning Staff the organizational and administrative implications involved in integrating a Canadian force within a U.S. force operating in the Pacific theatre and to recommend to N.D.H.Q. appropriate plans and procedure which will meet the joint U.S. - Cdn requirements.

You will operate under the direct supervision of the Commander, Canadian Army Staff, Washington...

In general your planning will follow the basis proposed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and now concurred in by War Committee of the Cabinet...

Provision from Canadian sources of portions of American units should be avoided. The additional units selected should be those which will continue to work in association with and in support of the Canadian Infantry division.

The Canadian Government have agreed to the provision of one Tank battalion.

(H.Q.S. 9131 - 4, vol 1: C.G.S. to Bean, etc, 19 May 45)

14. Working with U.S. planners in Washington, they produced an outline plan to govern the C.A.P.F. in its initial stages of organization and training. This plan contained:

Part One - The organization, training and maintenance of the force (including three months replacements) prior to departure from North America.

Part Three - The organization for training, accounting and despatch of replacements beyond those to accompany the force.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: Canadian Planning Team Draft Outline Plan for Canadian Army Pacific Force (As amended 28 Jul 45). Copies are also on file with the Historical Section (G.S.) at Army Headquarters. Extracts are given in Appendices "B" and "C" of this Report)

The published draft did not deal with the method of organizing the force in Canada, plans for which were prepared by N.D.H.Q., nor did it include:

Part Two - The organization, operation and maintenance of the force in the theatre.

(Ibid)

15. During consideration of this outline plan a number of amendments to the composition of the force were proposed (Ibid, vol 5: D.S.D. to D. Org, 13 Jul 45. The troop list indicating the strengths to which units were allowed to mobilize is given in Appendix "D" to this Report). Specific advice on a number of points in this regard was sought in June 1945 by the United

States Adjutant-General from General Douglas A. MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific.

It is desirable that you review the troop list and make definite proposals as to any adjustments required in the use of the balance of the personnel ceiling so as better to meet theatre requirements or balance the Canadian Force.

(Ibid: Unsigned and undated enclosure with copy of letter from C.-in-C. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, to A.G., Washington, 22 Jul 45)

To this and related requests General MacArthur replied 22 Jul 45:

...it is believed that the following units should be added to the Service Support elements in the proposed Troop List of the Canadian Pacific Force:

Unit	Strength
1 Med Clr Co	112
1 Med Coll Co	101
1 Ord M.M. Co	162
1 Ord Am Co	179
1 Ord Bomb Disp Sqdn	7
1 Q.M. Serv Co	212
1 Q.M. Truck Co (w/driver aug)	134
1 M.P. Co P.C. & S.	101
Total	1008 *

The following units appear to be excess and might be deleted:

1 Band	29 **
2 Spec Serv Plats	50 ***
Total	79

* These are U.S. Army abbreviations for:

Medical Clearing Company
 Medical Collecting Company
 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
 Ordnance Ammunition Company
 Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squadron
 Quartermaster Service Company
 Quartermaster Truck Company (with driver augmentation)
 Military Police Company Personnel Control and Security

** A footnote to the Troop List in Section 3 of the Draft Outline Plan states that one of the two bands in the infantry division and one of the two bands in the rear area will be pipe bands.

*** Special Service Platoons perform functions handled normally by Canadian auxiliary services.

- (b) An extra platoon is desired for the Clearing Company in the Medical Battalion and should be an organic part thereof...
- (g) A Canadian Section at Theatre Headquarters primarily interested in administrative matters is desirable.
- (h) It is believed that the installation of direct communication from the theatre to Ottawa should be discouraged and that as a matter of policy, all communications should be dispatched to Washington for redispach to Canada when necessary. If this is not acceptable, however, no objection will be offered to a direct line of casualty communication.
- (i) A Japanese language team should be furnished...a total of 5 officers and 14 enlisted men.
- (j) A visit by the Canadian Force commander and a small staff will be desirable when operational planning has been further developed.

(Ibid: C.-in-C. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, to A.G., Washington, 22 Jul 45)

These proposals were presented to N.D.H.Q. by a group of U.S. Army Ground Forces officers, who visited Ottawa for that purpose. At the same time they recommended certain changes of dates the effect of which would be to require more men to be trained in the earlier stages.

...the movement of the C.A.F.F. to the United States will be as follows:

First Advance Party (500 all ranks)	20-25 Aug
Second Advance Party (1000 all ranks)	3-8 Sep
Main Body C.A.F.F.	17-22 Sep

...P.O.M. [preparation for overseas movement] will commence 17 Dec i.e. about three months in advance of previous date...

(Ibid: Agenda of meeting at N.D.H.Q., 1630 hrs, 2 Aug 45)

16. C.G.S. recommendations to the Minister, which the latter approved 6 Aug 45, were to meet the new target dates but not to depart from "the basic conception in the organization of C.A.F.F. that we supply an infantry division plus a tank battalion, together with those units required for particular Canadian needs" (Ibid: C.G.S. to the Minister (sgd) R.B. Gibson, Maj-Gen, August 1945)

- (a) Because it is essential to comply with the operational requirements of the U.S. Forces with whom we are to co-operate, I consider we must agree with the dates

now proposed, recognizing that un-
toward steps may be necessary to ensure
the adequacy of the replacement pool,
and

- (b) I consider we should not accept the
Theatre Commander's suggestion to add
the non-divisional units totalling
1008 nor his suggestion to delete the
Band and two Special Service Platoons,
but we should provide the additional
medical platoon and the Japanese Lan-
guage Team.

(Ibid)

"Particular Canadian needs" were thus maintained as the
basis for selection of C.A.F.F. units, and operational
necessity dictated that the force should depart earlier
than anticipated. Both these factors served to stress
the urgency of providing adequate recruits, a problem
which continued to present difficulties and disappoint-
ments.

RECRUITING FOR THE C.A.P.F.

(a) Volunteer Basis

17. Regarding the method of raising the force,
the C.G.S. in December 1944 initially informed C.M.H.Q.
by cable:

Desirable that battle experienced troops
should be used in participation with United
States forces. Because of this and as
sufficient trained personnel not available
in Canada, necessary that bulk of the force
be selected from those now serving overseas.
Selection of necessary personnel will be made
before proceeding to Canada for reorganization.
Personnel should be found:

- (i) from those who express preference to
~~undertake~~ this duty and are prepared to forego
their priority in demobilization and whose
training and experience are acceptable;
- (ii) by detailing, if necessary, those in the
lower brackets of the priority scale of de-
mobilization;
- (iii) by completing where necessary with
specialists even though in the higher priority
brackets.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 1: Tel G.S.O. 844,
Murchie to Montague, 8 Dec 44)

This agreed with the recommendations regarding manpower approved by the War Committee of the Cabinet 20 Nov 44 (See Appendix "A" to this Report). Somewhat divergent views were expressed, however, by General H.D.G. Crerar, C.B., D.S.O. (G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army).

As "conscription for overseas" has now been adopted, within certain limitations as regards numbers, by the Cdn Government, this policy should be continued in respect of Cdn Far East contingent to the extent necessary. Volunteer (sic) officers and Warrant Officers and N.C.Os., also other rank tradesmen (to the number required) and private soldiers, from overseas formations, should have first priority. Any deficiencies should be made up by N.R.M.A. "non-volunteers".

(Ibid, vol 7: Letter summarizing views of G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, Montague to Murchie, 13 Jan 45)

18. On 4 Apr 45 Lt-Gen Hon P.J. Montague, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. M.C., V.D. (Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q.), informed the C.G.S. that recruiting difficulties were to be expected.

Crerar and I are convinced that we will be very unlikely to obtain sufficient volunteers overseas.

(Ibid: Tel C.O.S. 306, Montague to Murchie, 4 Apr 45)

That same day, however, the Prime Minister in his initial announcement to the House of Commons stated that only volunteers would be employed (See para 10 above). Upon receiving this advice, General Montague cabled again to N.D.H.Q.

Crerar states that his infm indicates that only a small proportion of the quota from First Cdn Army will be volunteers and that the remainder will require to be detailed from all fms and units of the Cdn Army in accordance with a policy yet to be communicated by Defensor [N.D.H.Q.]

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 886, Montague to Murchie, 6 Apr 45)

The Cabinet War Committee, however, abided by the volunteer principle for the Army contingent to fight Japan.

Those who meet the requirements will be retained in the numbers needed, from those who elect to serve, priority being given to specially qualified personnel and to personnel who have not had an opportunity of serving overseas.

(Ibid: Extract from "Cabinet War Committee Memorandum on Armed Forces Reallocation Repatriation and Demobilization after European War" quoted in tel Adgen 90, Walford to Montague, 24 Apr 45)

In replying to C.M.H.Q. the C.G.S. made this point very clear.

Cabinet decision that contingent quote will be chosen from those who elect to serve in the Pacific Theatre unquote.

(Ibid: Tel C.G.S. 191, Murchie to Montague, 25 Apr 45)

(b) The Response

19. Recruiting therefore proceeded along these lines. However, prior to issuing a general call for volunteers for C.A.F.F. as well as for troops to occupy Germany after her surrender, it was necessary to acquaint them with the terms of service. To this end C.M.H.Q. drafted the pamphlet After Victory in Europe, which stated:

The Canadian Far East Force will be chosen only from those who VOLUNTEER for service in the war against Japan. Preference so far as possible will be given to those who are under 35 years of age.

Those who volunteer and are accepted for service in the Pacific will be given the highest priority for return to Canada, where they will receive thirty clear days' leave at home before undertaking any further service. On the conclusion of their leave they will be ordered to concentrate for organization as a Force.

Soldiers who volunteer and are accepted for continued active service with the Far East Force will retain their acting or confirmed rank and/or trades pay and be posted to an establishment in which there is a vacancy permitting of such rank and/or trades pay. If, however, personnel are desirous of serving and there is no vacancy for them in their acting or confirmed ranks and/or trade groups, they may volunteer to serve in lower ranks and/or trade groups in which there are vacancies within establishment. Details of terms of service will be issued separately.

(After Victory in Europe, May 1945, pp 5 and 6)

Ministerial authority for its issue was given at once: "Contents entirely satisfactory and approved for immediate release overseas and in Canada" (H.C.S. 9131, vol 7:

Reply of the Minister, 7 May 45, quoted in M.S. to A.G., 8 May 45). Thereupon simultaneous release was arranged for 11 May 45, using The Maple Leaf and Canadian Press News overseas for initial publication (Ibid: Tel C.O.S. 411, Montague to Walford, 10 May 45).

20. Immediately following the German surrender questionnaires were rapidly circulated among all Canadian troops in order that they might indicate their preference for continuing service or discharge. In compiling returns listing electors for C.A.P.F., special attention was paid to those falling into the "Most Select Group". These were volunteers with PULHEMS profile 1112221 born between the years 1912 and 1926 with single status in the case of personnel overseas but married or single if in Canada. The first report from C.M.H.Q. "based on approx 90 percent returns of questionnaires as of 27 May" showed overseas totals of 2,540 officers and 21,764 other rank volunteers for C.A.P.F., of which 1,404 and 14,909 respectively were in North-West Europe. The Most Select Group, however, comprised only 1,333 officers and 13,892 other ranks (Ibid, vol 2: Tel C.O.S. 503, Montague to Gibson and Walford, 30 May 45. These totals included Nursing Sisters and C.W.A.C.). N.D.H.Q. commented on this report as follows:

It is evident from information contained in your telegram that unless numbers of volunteers particularly in inf and arty can be substantially increased it will be extremely difficult to meet specification for a trained experienced inf div upon which planning with U.S. War Dept is based...Continuing opportunity must be given for additional personnel to elect to serve with Pacific Force.

(Ibid: Tel C.G.S. 293, Gibson and Walford to Murchie and Montague, 1 Jun 45)

21. The response from both sides of the Atlantic continued to be far from encouraging as indicated by the following report to the Minister submitted, by the Adjutant-General (Maj-Gen A.E. Walford):

Up to 9 Jun 45, a total of 46,260 elections had been recorded, 30,124 overseas and 16,136 in Canada (incl adjacent territories). These numbers include electors both male and female, of all ages, categories and qualifications, many of whom will be of no use to the Force.

Analysis of overseas figures shows...the most select from the point of view of age and physical fitness 1027 offrs and 18,254 O.R. [single males].

There are 598 officers and 6,103 O.R. in the most select group in Canada. The proportion of electors who are single is not known in the case of personnel from Canada nor is it available without a great deal of work at the Records office...

Requirements of the force are taken at 30,000 (incl contingency reserve of 1111) to move to U.S.A., and 33,600 to be placed in training to maintain the force until 30 Sep 46.

The results to date indicate that early consideration will have to be given to remustering...It is my intention that personnel who have seen service in any arm or service will not be remustered to another arm and that in general remustering will be restricted to personnel who have not been in combat...

With the exception of the Arty and the Inf, we have a good prospect of completing the original force from present volunteers. These two arms can only be completed if further volunteers offer in substantial numbers. We have, however, to date, virtually no reserves to meet replacement requirements.

(Ibid, vol 6: A.G. to the Minister,
13 Jun 45)

This conclusion is confirmed by reports dated 17 Jul 45, which are the latest statistics at hand. * With mobilization of C.A.F.F. about to take place, the total number of volunteers then stood at 9,943 officers and 68,256 other ranks. Of these, however, only 2,796 officers and 36,386 other ranks were males in the most select group. The requirements of the force including reinforcements for the first eight months were set at 3,170 male officers and 56,170 other ranks; therefore deficiencies totalled 302 officers and 19,784 other ranks. The artillery had reached its quota of other ranks but still sought 47 more officers. Electors for the infantry, however, totalled barely half the 1,831 officers and 39,114 other ranks demanded. This grave deficiency of 835 officers and 20,775 other rank infantry volunteers remained the outstanding recruiting problem of C.A.F.F.

(c) Special Campaign Pay

22. In addition to 30 days' disembarkation leave granted all personnel returning to Canada, terms of service for C.A.F.F. included the provision of additional

* H.Q.S. 9131, vol 7, contains weekly summaries of electors and comparisons of the most select group with the requirements of the force. Extracts from the latest of these are tabulated in Appendices "E" and "F" to this Report.

pay. Early in May 1945 General Montague had written from London:

It will be assumed by tps that pay C.F.E.F. will be same or better than present rates and I feel sure that detail such as nature of force or slightly higher pay will have no substantial influence on tps considering volunteering for Far East service.

(Ibid, vol 7: Tel C.O.S. 383,
Montague to Welford, 6 May 45)

That same month, however, the Minister approved the proposal for special campaign pay and ruled:

The "theatre" pay to become effective on leaving Canada either,
(i) to carry out training out of Cda, or
(ii) to enter the theatre.

(Ibid, vol 2: Notes on Discussion -
Minister and A.G. at Indian Head,
Sask, 10 May 45)

Thereupon increases in pay were authorized by the Cabinet on the following grounds:

- 1(a) The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America have provided additional pay for service in the Far Eastern Theatre of war.
- (b) It is now deemed expedient to provide additional pay for those members of the force who will serve with the Canadian Pacific Force in recognition of the extra hazards peculiar to that theatre of war and to place the general scale of Canadian pay for the Japanese Campaign on a more favourable comparative basis with British and American scales of pay for personnel serving in the Pacific theatre of war.
2. The estimated cost of the foregoing proposal for seven months of 1945-46 amounts \$2,207,188.00 of recurring expenditure.

(H.Q.S. 9131-22: Copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Privy Council approved by his Excellency the Governor-General on 17 May 45)

Financial Regulations and Instructions (Canada) were accordingly amended effective 1 Jun 45 by adding a new Part XVI:

Pacific Theatre of Operations

Article : 400

Japanese Campaign Pay

- (1) A member of the Canadian Pacific Force shall upon date of departure from Canada and while serving in the Pacific theatre of operations and elsewhere beyond the territorial boundaries of Canada be granted extra pay as follows:

	<u>Daily Rate</u>	
	<u>Other than</u>	
	<u>C.W.A.C.</u>	<u>C.W.A.C.</u>
Officers of the rank of -		
Major and above	\$1.00	.80
Captain	.90	.70
Lieutenant and 2nd/Lieut	.75	.60
Other ranks -		
Warrant Officer, Class I	.65	.50
Warrant Officer, Class II	.55	.45
Squadron, Battery, or Company Quartermaster-		
Sergeant	.50	.40
Staff Sergeant	.50	.40
Sergeant	.45	.35
Lance-Sergeant, Corporal and Lance-Corporal	.35	.30
Private Soldier	.30	.25

- (2) The above rates of extra pay shall be payable in addition to the regimental or special rate of pay, tradesmen's rates or any other extra pay to which a member of the Force is entitled under these regulations.

(C.A.R.O. 5729 published 30 May 45:
F. R. & I. (Cda) Amendments (No 138))

23. It should be noted that this Special Campaign Pay was restricted rigidly to actual members of C.A.P.F., namely those few who left the country to train in the United States, despite determined efforts to extend its benefits to other Canadians who had met the enemy - Pacific observers, prisoners of war in Japanese hands, ships' dentists, etc.

The question as to whether this extra pay should be extended to members of "C" Force [Hong Kong] and also to other personnel who although not members of the Canadian Army Pacific Force served in various Pacific Areas, was submitted for consideration but not favourably received.

(H.Q.S. 9131-22: Reply to Enquiry of
the Ministry - Mr. Black (Cumberland)
10 May 46 prepared by Brigadier
F. Kelly, Paymaster-General)

(d) Limitations to Recruiting

24. Despite these and other aids, recruiting remained probably the greatest problem of C.A.P.F. As indicated above (paras 20 and 21) approximately half the electors failed to meet the age and medical standards required for the most select group. Very apparently a great many volunteered in the full knowledge that they could not be accepted even for non-combattant roles. In this regard N.D.H.Q. ruled by the middle of June 1945:

It has now been decided that all personnel with PULHEMS below 3333321 and/or who have attained the age of 45 years, cannot be accepted for service in the Canadian Army Pacific Force.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 815 dated 14 Jun 45)

Many volunteers were above the maximum age: others had not attained the minimum even to be despatched to the U.S.A. for training. Regulations stated that personnel volunteering for C.A.P.F. were not eligible to serve outside of Canada until they had reached ages as follows:

Officers	20th Birthday
Other ranks	19th Birthday
C.W.A.C.	21st Birthday

(C.A.P.F. - Policy, Wastage, Trg, etc:
Org 793 dated 2 Jun 45. This file is
held by Historical Section (G.S.))

Medical instructions called for a very thorough check of all applicants regardless of previous service.

Personnel from H./Es. will be examined prior to withdrawal from their present Units. Personnel from overseas will be examined upon arrival at the concentration areas... All examinations must be completed at the earliest possible date and in any case before despatch to U.S.A.

(H.Q.S. 9131 - 4, vol 2: Org 834
dated 21 Jun 45)

...a complete physical examination will be made of all personnel for the C.A.P.F., including x-ray examination of the chest, if such has not already been done during the previous six months...Fulhems profiles will be assigned, confirmed or changed.

(Ibid: D.G.M.S. to Command, District,
and Senior Medical Officers, 27 Jun 45)

The Director-General of Medical Services, (Major-General C.P. Fenwick) acting upon reports received from the U.S. Forces in the South Pacific, warned his medical officers that peculiar care should be taken in the selection of personnel for service in a tropical theatre. Skin diseases, careful psychiatric screening, dyspepsias, emotional instability, "eczemas", signs of chronic malaria or dysentery were cited among other examples (Ibid).

25. Restrictions other than age or medical included a unique departure from traditional Canadian Army policy. In order to conform to U.S. custom, it was found necessary to impose a colour bar against negroes.

Previous experience has indicated that certain difficulties are experienced in the despatch of coloured personnel with units or drafts proceeding through and to certain States of the U.S.A.

In view of the above, and in order not to embarrass the United States authorities and/or the soldiers concerned, you are requested to ensure that no coloured soldiers are included in units or drafts proceeding to the U.S.A. for despatch to C.A.P.F., or for training or duty within the U.S.A.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 922 dated 30 Jul 45)

Recruiting, therefore, involved many problems, which became most apparent at the time when concentration of the C.A.F.F. began.

ORGANIZATION

(a) Selection of 6 Cdn Div

26. In organizing C.A.P.F. one of the most difficult problems was to decide upon the nomination of the division which was to form its basic part. The C.G.S. strongly favoured use of the premier Canadian division overseas.

In regard to the Japanese war, it is considered that the 1st Division is the formation better suited for this role for the following reasons:

- (a) All of the former Permanent Force units are in the division...
- (b) The division is the most representative of all parts of Canada.
- (c) The division has had the longest period of battle experience...

- (d) It is the senior Canadian formation.
- (e) ...it may be more quickly disengaged in preparation for its new role.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 1: C.G.S. to the Minister, 1 Sep 44)

1 Cdn Inf Div was then on active operations in Italy, however, and campaigns there and in North-West Europe continued to engage all five Canadian divisions overseas. Towards the end of 1944, therefore, the C.G.S. cabled C.M.H.Q. as follows:

Considered that after release from operational role the selection and reallocation of personnel to comprise the force should take place overseas, preferably in the theatre of operations, to the greatest extent possible. Subject to transportation arrangements the force would then be concentrated in the United Kingdom prior to departure for Canada. After one month's leave in Canada the force will be reassembled in an appropriate area in Canada for reorganization, refitting and training prior to departure...Request that the foregoing information be communicated to the Army Commander so that he may give consideration to selection of division which will ultimately comprise the nucleus of the Canadian Force.

(Ibid, vol 7: Tel G.S.O. -844, Murchie to Montague, 8 Dec 44)

General Crerar's views, communicated in summary form by letter from C.M.H.Q., were definitely opposed to such organization being carried out on the Continent or even in the United Kingdom.

The organization of the Canadian Far East contingent is a matter which requires to be handled by N.D.H.Q. and done in Canada. Responsibility of the Cdn Army Overseas should be limited to furnishing "bona fide" volunteers...

1 Cdn Inf Div to be the selected basic formation. To be brought up to strength by volunteers from other Cdn formations overseas, and, if Government policy accepts, by N.R.M.A. personnel in "other ranks"...Apart from other reasons, it has a sentimental, if not moral, right to be the first formation to return to Canada.

(Ibid: Montague to C.G.S., 13 Jan 45)

A month prior to the German surrender, these views of General Crerar were again reported with added emphasis by General Montague.

...mobilization Far East Force should be undertaken in Canada and responsibility of H.Q. First Cdn Army be limited to collection org and

despatch to U.K. for first priority return to Canada of the quota of personnel required from First Cdn Army for this force. This quota to be indicated by Defensor. Crerar is quite firm on this, pointing out that personnel for the force will be drawn not only from First Cdn Army but also from approved categories now in U.K. and also in Canada...

The point is that he feels very strongly that he cannot "release" the selected fmn...if this expression means that the fmn as now composed is to return on very first priority to Canada. Such action would cut across the basic principles of reallocation of manpower as we understand those principles. On the other hand...he is strongly opposed to reconstituting 1 Cdn Inf Div overseas in accordance with these or any other principles of reallocation. Such action would result in the necessity of transferring the great bulk of the personnel now in 1 Cdn Inf Div to other fms and units remaining longer in the theatre. He is very definite in stating that any such procedure would be strongly opposed by such personnel and would cause bitter feeling and much trouble.

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 886, Montague to Murchie, 6 Apr 45)

The views of the Minister of Department of National Defence, on the other hand, were recorded in notes made by the Adjutant-General following a private discussion they held at Indian Head, Saskatchewan, immediately after the collapse of Germany.

The Minister considers selection and withdrawal of a complete Div impractical. The Force must be geographically representative of Canada, subject to which condition selection of Units should be left to the Army Comd.

The Div is to be designated 6 Cdn Div and to have a formation patch (to be used by the Force as a whole) a hexagon of suitable size comprising six equal segments, one of each of the Div colours, in clockwise succession, and the sixth black to represent the indep Armd Bdes...

(Ibid, vol 2: A.G. to C.G.S., 11 May 45)

Against this plan General Crerar stood firm in maintaining as before that he could not undertake selection of the units.

...the responsibility for the org of the Cdn Far East Force must be a D.N.D. responsibility and cannot be undertaken overseas in view of commitments repeat occup force demob etc... personnel cannot be returned as units but only as drafts and in accordance with procedure and arrangements laid down in pamphlet

quote After Victory in Europe unquote...

(Ibid, vol 7: Tel C.O.S. 452,
Montague to Murchie, 17 May 45)

To ensure full discussion of the matter, the C.G.S. at the express wish of the Minister crossed the Atlantic to confer with the Army Commander and the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., on this and related matters. As a result he eventually endorsed their stand and cabled back to Ottawa:

Para 1. Have discussed Cdn Far East Force with Crerar and am satisfied it is impractical for him to select units because:

- (a) Elections to serve are already with and coming in from all troops.
- (b) Time element prohibits physical formation of units here.
- (c) Drafts can be made up by districts with personnel earmarked for units and concentration areas.

Para 2. Am convinced no practical advantage to be obtained from unit selections. Therefore work is now commencing to prepare and despatch Canada Drafts as in 1(c)...

Para 5. In outline the plan for personnel is that 2 Ech select 'electors' for C.F.E.F. according to requirements post them to Canada Draft for home district and earmark them for specific unit and concentration area to which they report on expiration of leave. This avoids return to depot.

Para 6. In addition to unit requirements will return earmarked for each unit rfts to extent volunteers available calculated at 3 months U.S. rates for battle and non-battle combined.

(Ibid, vol 2: Tel C.G.S. D1, Murchie to Gibson, 22 May 45)

Committed to the adoption of this system of repatriation, N.D.H.Q. in the end desired it to be applied to all acceptable C.A.P.F. volunteers.

Concur your plan but you will understand we expect to have returned all suitable personnel who elect even though in excess of unit establishments and their three months rft requirements in order provide for wastage and org balance of Force.

(Ibid, vol 7: Tel C.G.S. 267, Gibson to Murchie repeat Montague, 25 May 45)

(b) Naming the Force and Its Units

27. Decision of the Minister to create a new 6th Canadian Division preceded adoption of a single name to indicate the entire Canadian Army Force to be employed against Japan. Hitherto a variety of designations had been employed for that purpose.

C.M.H.Q. are using the words "C.F.E.F." and various other titles are also becoming in common use such as "C.A.P.F.", "C.P.F." and "Pac Force". The "C.F.E.F." hardly seems appropriate as the theatre is not in fact "The Far East" insofar as Canada is concerned.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: D.C.G.S.(A)
(Brigadier L.M. Chesley) to C.G.S.,
11 Jun 45)

Necessary standardization was finally brought about by a meeting at N.D.H.Q. which "having in mind Cdn Naval and Air Force commitments in the Pacific Theatre agreed to recommend 'Canadian Army Pacific Force' (abbreviated C.A.P.F.) as the official designation for the Army component" (Ibid: Minutes of a Co-ordinating Meeting 11 Jun 45).

28. There were many changes, however, before satisfactory titles were finally authorized for the principal units within 6 Cdn Div. Complications arose over a fundamental difference between U.S. and British Army custom, Canada having hitherto followed the latter very closely.

It is difficult to reconcile completely the American practice which considers the regt as the parent unit as against the emphasis which is given to the bn as the main unit under Cdn practice. A complete adoption of the American practice of numbering bns has become almost impossible if we are to continue to emphasize the bn as the main unit and to stress its special territorial affiliations.

(Ibid, vol 2: D.C.G.S.(A) to C.G.S.,
30 May 45)

A press release of 11 Jun 45 announced that the term "Brigade" would be dropped in favour of its American equivalent, "regiment", into which infantry battalions would be grouped. Artillery batteries would be grouped into field artillery battalions, not regiments. The announcement continued:

Infantry battalions in the Force will be organized on a territorial basis, with each unit representative of a Military District and the appropriate numerical designation

will be allotted to each. Each battalion will carry its geographical identification in its title. For instance, one battalion will be the First Canadian Infantry Battalion (Western Ontario). Other units will be similarly representative of the various Military Districts and Provinces. As far as possible personnel will be posted to units representing their particular territorial affiliation.

(H.Q. 1-0-9: Press release, P.N. 463-45, issued 11 Jun 45)

Although there were to be only nine infantry battalions, this system resulted in titles such as "13th Canadian Infantry Battalion (Alberta)". Doubts were raised, however, over the likelihood of confusion arising from this deviation from American staff procedure, which numbered regiments and battalions consecutively. Reconciliation of the two systems was finally achieved by Maj-Gen B.M. Hoffmeister, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., on his arrival in Canada to command C.A.F.F. His recommendations were:

...that we should adopt numerical designations for the Battalions and Regiments comprising the 6th Division so as to conform exactly to American practice, but that each Infantry Battalion should be given a regimental affiliation, after its name, conforming to the titles of the major units comprising the 1st Division.

The 1st Infantry Regiment will reflect the composition of the 1st Infantry Brigade (Central Canada). The units of the 2nd Infantry Brigade will be perpetuated in the 2nd Infantry Regiment covering Western Canada, and the 3rd Infantry Brigade will be perpetuated in the 3rd Infantry Regiment covering Eastern Canada.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 4: Memo stating proposals of Maj-Gen Hoffmeister, C.G.S. to the Minister, 16 Jun 45)

With adoption of this solution, the titles finally selected for the principal fighting units of C.A.F.F. were:

1st Canadian Infantry Regiment	
1st Canadian Infantry Battalion	(The Royal Canadian Regiment)
2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion	(The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)
3rd Canadian Infantry Battalion	(42th Highlanders of Canada)

2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment
1st Canadian Infantry Battalion (Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light
Infantry)
2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Seaforth High-
landers of Canada)
3rd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Loyal Edmonton
Regiment)

3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment
1st Canadian Infantry Battalion (Royal 22e Regiment)
2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Carleton and
York Regiment)
3rd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The West Nova
Scotia Regiment)

Cannon Company, 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment (The
Saskatoon Light
Infantry (M.G.) *

22nd Canadian Tank Battalion (The Canadian Grenadier
Guards) C.A.C.

6th Canadian Infantry Division Reconnaissance Troop
(The Royal Montreal
Regiment)

(See Appx "D" to this Report)

The advantages of this arrangement were set forth in the press release announcing the units designated as Canada's representatives.

The decision to adopt the titles of regiments with long records of service in the European theatre will enable the Division to wear distinctive regimental badges and flashes which have been recognized by Canadian fighting men throughout the war. The selection provides for a Canada wide representation, each Military District being represented. It is also possible to make provision for two Scottish units in keeping with established Canadian Army custom.

* Cannon Companies of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiments similarly were designated "The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.)". At an A.G.'s conference on 8 Aug 45, however, it was recommended: "that Cannon Coys be designated as follows: 'Cannon Company, R.C.A.-Canadian Infantry Regiment (The Saskatoon Light Infantry)'....It was further decided that personnel in these coys should wear Sask I.I. cap badges and shoulder flashes with, in addition, the R.C.A. flash on the shoulder strap, it being confirmed that this personnel must continue to be R.C.A." (H.Q.S. 9131-4, vol 2: D.S.D. (Col E.G. Fullen) to D.C.G.S.(A), 10 Aug 45).

As previously announced the American system of numerical designation will also be used to avoid confusion in operational orders and planning.

(H.Q. 1-0-9: Press release, P.N. 482-45, issued 20 Jun 45)

(c) Senior Appointments

29. In comparison with the selection of units and their titles, the problem of appointments to command and staff appears to have been much less difficult. The general policy communicated by N.D.H.Q. to C.M.H.Q. in May 1945 was as follows:

Minister has instructed that he wishes personally to decide on the Force Comd from among three nominations with supporting reasons by Army Comd. Bde Comds and staff offers to be selected by Force Comd. Unit O.Cs. to be appointed by Army Comd. This action in first priority.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 7: Tel C.G.S. 240, Murchie to Montague, 15 May 45)

N.D.H.Q. emphasized this later by stating: "Confirm we do NOT repeat NOT reserve any appointments in Div and Tank Bn" (Ibid: Tel C.G.S. 267, Gibson to Murchie repeat Montague, 25 May 45)

30. Command of C.A.P.F. was bestowed upon Maj-Gen B.M. Hoffmeister, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., a former N.P.A.M. officer who had demonstrated decided ability in active operations in Italy and North-West Europe. Appointed O.C. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 11 Oct 42, Commander 2 Cdn Inf Bde 1 Nov 43, and G.O.C. 5 Cdn Armd Div 20 Mar 44, he assumed his new command at the age of thirty-eight. Brig H.A. Sparling, D.S.D., was chosen to command the Divisional Artillery, and the following were appointed Infantry Regimental Commanders: Brig J.D.B. Smith, C.B.E., D.S.O.; Brig J.P.E. Bernatchez, D.S.O.; and Brig J.M. Rockingham, D.S.O. (H.Q.S. 9131-5-1-2: Appx "A" to letter Hoffmeister to A.G., 15 Jun 45). In keeping with Canadian Army practice, these last retained their rank although the American counterpart would be colonel. Other senior appointments included: Brig W.P. Gilbride, D.S.O., C.B.E., to be Deputy Commander; Col W.A. Bean, E.D., to be O.I.C. 1st Echelon, with the acting rank of brigadier; and Col A.J. Creighton, E.D., to be Commander, Replacement Group, with the acting rank of brigadier (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: Record of Conference held 16 Jun 45).

31. Difficulties naturally arose over differences between Cdn and U.S. ranks for equivalent posts, but by May 1945 a satisfactory formula had been found.

...it was agreed that the general principle should be that a Canadian soldier should not be

asked to serve at a lower rank than the American soldier performing similar duties. In effect, it would appear that this principle would call for a gradual scaling up in N.C.O. and Warrant ranks and a gradual down-grading in Officer ranks.

(H.Q.S. 9131-4-1: Extract from Minister's Morning Conference, 15 May 45)

In some instances it was found necessary to allow alternative ranks as a temporary expedient.

In setting up Tables of Organization and Equipment for the Canadian Army Pacific Force, it has been considered desirable to make provision for squadron, battery and company commanders as "Majors or Captains" and executive officers as "Captains or Lieuts"... it being the intention that the alternative senior rank of Major in the case of Company Commander and Captain in the case of Executive Officer is provided to permit of the employment of trained and qualified Majors and Captains initially in the setting up of this Force, but that in subsequent appointments of officers to fill these appointments the alternative senior rank will not be construed as an avenue of promotion. In other words Captains will be appointed to command companies and Lieuts as Executive Officers, and will be required to remain in such ranks when filling these appointments.

(Ibid: Director of Personal Services (Col R.S. Carey) to O.I.C. 2nd Echelon Pacific Force, 22 Jun 45)

(d) 2nd Echelon and Base H.Q.

32. The system for the return to Canada of volunteers from overseas, which had taken so long to decide upon (see para 26 above), eventually proceeded along the following lines beginning in June 1945:

C.A.P.F. personnel are being selected in N.W.E. by Cdn 2 Ech 21 Army Group. Selection is being made down to individual appointments on War Establishments...

Personnel will be formed in drafts by Districts described as C.D. Serials _____. Drafts will be up to 260 all ranks and will contain draft admin staff consisting of C.O., Adjt, Q.M., etc.

(H.Q.S. 9131-4, vol 2: Memo No 1, Cdn 2nd Echelon, Pacific Force, 19 Jun 45)

At the expiration of their 30 days' leave, they were to report to designated concentration areas, where the actual formation of units was to take place. These locations were: Debert, N.S.; Sussex, N.B.; Brandon, Man; and Brockville, Barriefield, Camp Borden, and Petawawa, Ont (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 3: S.D. 1 Chart 708 dated 19 Jun 45).

The principle is that N.D.H.Q. and the District organization in Canada is responsible for supplying and delivering personnel to the new units and it then becomes the responsibility of unit commanders to proceed with the organization of their units.

(Ibid, vol 3: Minute (sgd) R.B. Gibson, Maj-Gen., to memo D.C.G.S.(A) to C.G.S., 18 Jun 45)

33. Control of personnel was exercised by Canadian 2nd Echelon Pacific Force, authorized effective 1 May 45 with a strength of 34 officers and 381 other ranks (Ibid: C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G. and M.G.C., 30 May 45). To carry out its functions, the C.I.C. possessed authority to have direct channels of communication either by letter or personal visit with N.D.H.Q. and units of both fighting troops and services of C.A.P.F. (H.Q.S. 9131-4-24: A.G. to D.O.C. M.D. 3, 31 May 45). The unit began to function on 4 Jun 45 at Connaught Ranges, near Ottawa, but on 25 Jun 45 moved to Brockville, Ontario (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 4: Appx "A" to Movement Instructions, 23 Jun 45). There it was found necessary to form "Zone 2nd Echelons" for Eastern, Central, and Western Canada respectively, each on an interim establishment restricted to 11 officers and 8 other ranks operating under the supervision of C.I.C. 2nd Echelon C.A.P.F. (H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 904 dated 20 Jul 45). Attached for the purpose of rapid compilation of essential data was No 1 Canadian Machine Records Unit (Type X).

The use of punch card tabulating machines in the field had been developed by the U.S. Army and had been proven over a period of years, under battle conditions, as the most efficient means of procuring strengths and statistics, etc, for use by Echelons and H.Qs. Study of U.S. Army methods by Cdn Army Offrs led to the adoption of a mobile unit of these machines for use with the Pacific Force. Another factor favouring this decision was the need for adoption of modified U.S. methods so that combined strengths and statistics might be facilitated. U.S. cards and forms were also adapted for use with Cdn Army data.

(H.D., 1 Can Machine Records Unit, 31 Jun 45)

34. At the end of July 1945, 2nd Echelon C.A.P.F. was converted and redesignated, effective 1 Jun 45, to become Canadian Army Pacific Force Base Headquarters,

abbreviated "C.A.P.F. Base H.Q." (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 5: C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G., and M.G.O., 31 Jul 45). Despite an increase in authorized personnel to 120 officers and 465 other ranks, it immediately found itself over-taxed with a flood of work arising from abrupt changes in the Japanese war picture in August 1945.

ATTACHMENTS IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE

35. Because Pacific warfare conditions differ so widely from European battlefields, which have hitherto been the main school of Canadian fighting experience abroad, it was recognized at an early stage that special study in that area would be invaluable. General Pope, when Commander, Canadian Army Staff, Washington, took a leading part in urging action in this regard. He records in February 1944:

Letter from Gibson to the effect that N.D.H.Q. was now desirous of proceeding with the proposal to send observers into the South and Southwest Pacific. I was glad to see this for I had made this proposal to Stuart as long ago as last May.

(W.D., General Pope, 9 Feb 44. Maj-Gen R.B. Gibson was then D.C.G.S.(A) Lt-Gen K. Stuart held the appointment of C.G.S. in May 1943)

General Pope now proceeded to place the matter before the Australian and New Zealand missions in Washington and also before the U.S. War Department through General Marshall, whose co-operation was immediately assured and whose suggestions were most helpful.

General Marshall said he saw no reason why our request could not be met. He added, however, that he thought we should derive greater value from officers of the rank of Captain and Major than from those of more senior rank as places could easily be found for the former within the establishments of units. Lieut-Cols would be harder to place. He said that the best arrangement would be to despatch the group of officers to Honolulu where the U.S. Army have a big school of jungle fighting and the U.S. Navy a school of amphibious warfare.

(Ibid, 10 Feb 44: Tel C.A.W. 73, Pope to C.G.S., 10 Feb 44)

Negotiations resulted in Australia agreeing to accept eight and the U.S. Army in the Pacific ten Canadian officers early in 1944 (Ibid, 16 Feb 44). Two Canadian officers were also attached to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific, later joining the main party with the Australian Military Forces. Moreover, Lt-Col W.A. Bean was attached for six months to Headquarters (C.-in-C.) Pacific Area and Lt-Col R.F. Routh for three months to Headquarters Allied Command South Pacific Area

G-1 Function in the U.S. Army", by Capt Willard Z. Estey, Sask L.I. (M.G.), May-Aug 1945). Another deals very thoroughly with artillery methods employed in jungle warfare and similarly indicates different principles requiring emphasis in training (Report of Artillery Observer - Okinawa, Major S. Kanee, R.C.A. Copies of both these Reports are in possession of Historical Section (G.S.)).

(b) Attachments to Australian Forces

39. In the same manner, useful experience was gained by Canadian Army personnel attached to Australian Military Forces. Led by Lt-Col H.P. Cotton, Winnipeg Light Infantry, a group of eight officers arrived in Melbourne on 26 Apr 44 and were attached to a noted brigade of the 6th Australian Division, then training in expectation of an early return to action. Their report stated: "The 17 Aust Inf Bde has probably seen more action than any other Bde in A.I.F. both in Middle East and New Guinea, and is considered one of the best trained". (F.C.S. 509-1-10-9, vol 1: "Interim Report No. 1, Canadian Officers Australian Attachment", May 44, by Lt-Col H.P. Cotton). Remaining on exercises in North Queensland until the end of May 1944, the group then attended a G.H.Q. Tactical School followed by a Jungle Warfare School (Ibid: "Interim Report No. 2, 26 May-30 Jun 44). While in Australia they were joined by Major J.R. Boulanger, Fusiliers du St Laurent, and Capt R. Murdock, 11 District Depot, both of whom had been attached to Headquarters 3rd New Zealand Division at Nissen (Green) Island since 9 Apr 44 (F.C.S. 509-1-10-10: "Report on Observations of New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific" by Major J.R. Boulanger and Capt R. Murdock). The party next proceeded by air to New Guinea, where they were attached to 5th Australian Division in the forward area and had ample opportunity to study Japanese fortifications and defences (F.C.S. 509-1-10-9, vol 1: "Interim Report No. 2", op cit). In July the group returned to Australia to be attached again to 6th Australian Division for training and then to 9th Australian Division for amphibious exercises (Ibid: "Interim Report No. 3", September 1944). Finally, to gain battle experience the party proceeded via New Guinea to Headquarters Tradewind Task Force at Aitape, New Guinea, and were assigned operational duties with 31st United States Infantry Division in the capture of Morotai, East Indies, September 1944 (Ibid: Report on Morotai Operation; Canadian and Australian observers).

40. During 1944 also Canada sent to Australia a detachment of highly skilled radar personnel to aid in maintaining certain radar equipments used with anti-aircraft defence in Northern Australia, New Guinea, and the South Pacific Islands.

These equipments were of Canadian manufacture and design, and a request was made by Australian authorities for sufficient Radar technical personnel to maintain these equipments, and also a small cadre for instructional duties at the Radar Wing of the Australian School of

Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, N.S.W.

This request for technical assistance was granted by the Minister of National Defence, Hon J.L. Ralston... Authority was given by the Adjutant-General in a Disposal Order issued 23 May 1944...

The Canadian Radar Detachment on Loan to Australian Military Forces was assembled at Lansdowne Park Barracks, 17 June 1944, being formed from Radar technical personnel from all parts of Canada and Newfoundland in order that the withdrawal of this considerable number of technicians would not cause a shortage of trained personnel in any particular location. Replacements were made in the main from the Radar Training Centre A-36 at Barriefield, Ont.

The draft consisted of technical personnel of both R.C.A. and R.C.E.M.E., with one N.C.O. from R.C.A.P.C. for pay and administration purposes as follows:

R.C.A.	5 officers	35 N.C.Os.	-	40
R.C.E.M.E.	4 officers	28 N.C.Os.	-	32
R.C.A.P.C.		1 N.C.O.	-	1
Total all ranks				73

(Master File, Canadian Radar Detachment on Loan to Australian Military Forces, July 1944 to 1946. This document is with Historical Section (G.S.))

The party arrived in Australia in September 1944 and a number were posted to 8 Australian Advanced Workshops at Moorebank, N.S.W., to work on modifications and tropicalization (*Ibid*, 20 Sep 44). Others were posted to L.H.Q. at Melbourne (*Ibid*, 6 Oct 44) and some were loaned to the Allied Intelligence Bureau at Brisbane (*Ibid*, 16 Jan 45). These radar experts later were granted permission to remain to work on major modifications and in operational workshops away from the mainland (W.D., General Letson, May 1945, Appendices "A" and "G") and the following postings were made in June 1945:

2/1 Aust A.A. Regt (Comp) W./S.,	Borneo	6
2/2	"	6
2/3	"	6
2/13	"	6
Allied Int Bureau		15
Serv Recce Dept		7
Total		46

(Master File, op cit, 21 Jun 45)

41. The largest party of Canadians loaned to Australian Military Forces was No 1 Special Wireless Group, R.C. Sigs, with a War Establishment of 12 officers and 277 other ranks * and an attached Intelligence Section of 6 officers and 39 other ranks, C. Int C. (H.Q.S. 8932, vol 3). Under command of Lt-Col H.D.W. Wethey, the unit was formed in July 1944 for special employment in Australia and trained on Vancouver Island prior to departure via San Francisco.

The Special Wireless Group and its attached Intelligence Section consist almost wholly of specialists...This unit is a free gift on loan to the country in which it will operate. It is to arrive complete as to equipment, Pay Service and Dental Service.

(W.D., No 1 Canadian Special Wireless Group, R.C. Sigs, October 1944, Appx "C": Wethey to Headquarters, Pacific Command, 13 Oct 44. Major F.H. Rowland, R.C.A.P.C., accompanied the unit, but the Australian Military Forces furnished medical, dental, and chaplain services)

Arriving at Brisbane 16 Feb 45, the group proceeded to an isolated area near Darwin, North Australia, where in May 1945 it took over work formerly carried out by 51 Australian Special Wireless Section and a detachment of the U.S. Signal Corps (Ibid, 3, 7, & 23 May 45). On 21 Jun 45 "the Cdn Intelligence Section assumed complete responsibility for the "I" work connected with 1 Cdn Special Wireless Group" and thereafter signalled a daily Intelligence summary along with various other reports (Ibid, 21 Jun 45). Ten members of this section were later attached to Central Bureau, Luzon, Philippine Islands, for duties there (Ibid, 1 Aug 45). The principal function of the unit was to intercept Japanese wireless messages from ship to ship or shore installations within reach. In addition, its Intercommunication Section operated a duplex radio teletype circuit to G.H.Q., Manila, a number of Sigcun "B" cipher machines, three line circuits to Brisbane and a wireless link also to Brisbane (Ibid, 4 Jul 45). The total enemy messages intercepted by the station near Darwin during the month of July 1945 was 36,123, and a senior R.A.A.F. officer wrote to the Officer Commanding:

The Canadian Special Wireless Group at Darwin has been doing a magnificent job continuously in all its contacts with us. They have increased the totals of traffic copied, improved the standard of teletype service, and turned in a much finer grade of traffic than we have ever before received from any other station.

At the present time they are sending us between 1000 and 1200 messages daily over the teletype and the quality of these is such (90% accuracy)

* Increased in July 1945 to 13 officers and 303 other ranks.

that results are about 20% better than those from any of our other stations.

(Ibid, 6 Aug 45)

(c) Results of Attachments

42. There were, in addition, certain Canadian missions projected for the Pacific islands. After an earlier proposal had been deferred by the U.S. War Department (H.Q.S. 9131-19: Tel C.A.W. 188, C.A.S. Washington to C.G.S., 7 May 45), a small party of Public Relations officers left in late July 1945 for Hawaii, Guam, Manila, and Australia. Its members were: Col R.S. Malone, Director of Canadian Army Public Relations; Commander P. MacRitchie, Senior Naval P.R.O.; and Major C. MacDougall, Canadian Army photographic technician (Ibid: Application for Airline Priorities for 22 Jul 45). Tentative arrangements were also in progress during the summer for a small liason group of three C.A.F.F. officers to leave for Manila in mid-August and for General Hoffmeister accompanied by a senior officer from N.D.H.Q. to visit there in October 1945 (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 5: Minutes of a meeting held at N.D.H.Q., 2 Aug 45). Events did not permit the completion of these plans, however, and the last two missions did not leave the country.

43. Because the loans to Australia for special radar, wireless and intelligence work were of a permanent nature, these personnel could not be released for instructional or staff duties with C.A.F.F. At least twenty Canadian officers, however, had been sent on staff courses related to operations in the Pacific. These were held at the following training establishments:

Australian Staff College, Canberra	4 *
U.S. Army & Navy Staff College	2
U.S. Comd & Staff School	10
U.S. Marine & Staff School	4

All but five of the above had also attended a British staff course. A survey of Canadian officers who had had experience with South-East Command or with Australian or U.S. Forces in the Pacific Theatre showed the following results:

Staff Officers

S.E.A.C.	5
S.W. Pacific Theatre and Pacific Ocean Area	32 **

* One of these officers, Major J.L. Malkin, Seaforth of C., was on the directing staff there.

** The majority of these served with U.S. Forces, but at least seven are known to have been with Australian Military Forces.

SECRET

R E P O R T NO. 16
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

2 Jun 52

The Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-1945

ADDENDUM NO. 1*

MULE CONDUCTING PARTIES TO INDIA

C. P. Stacey
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

*To be inserted between paragraphs 43 and 44 of Report No. 16.

MULE CONDUCTING PARTIES TO INDIA

43a. On 1 Feb 44 N.D.H.Q. received a telegram from the Canadian Military Attache in Washington stating that the British Army Staff were initiating shipments of mules on behalf of the Indian Government. The Attache passed to Ottawa the British request for the loan of Canadian Army personnel to conduct two shiploads of mules from New York to Karachi. The British had obtained U.S. personnel for earlier shipments but were reluctant to ask the Americans for further help. A shipload of mules numbered approximately 400 and required an escort of one conducting officer, one veterinary, three cooks, four veterinary attendants and roughly 28 general duty men, i.e., a remount troop (H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 3: Tel M.A. 771, Mawash to Defensor, 1 Feb 44) N.D.H.Q. agreed to provide the conducting parties and wired Washington accordingly (*ibid*: Tel Org 987, Defensor to Mawash, 9 Feb 44). To eliminate clerical work, the "muleteers" were to be attached to the British Army Staff as individuals and not as a unit or detachment. They were to be loaned for a maximum of six months. ((H.S.) 112.3S2009 (D185): Minutes of Meeting, 1 Mar 44) From the time of the original request to the end of the war, four conducting parties were sent.

43b. The difficulties of procuring sufficient mules led to a reduction of the original request from two parties to one (H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 3: Tel M.A. 1332, Mawash to A.G., 26 Feb 44). This first party concentrated at St. Johns, P.Q., and left for New York on 18 Mar 44. It consisted of Maj T.A.G. Moore, C.H. of O. (conducting officer), Capt R.G. Livermore, Can Fus (veterinary), and 43 other ranks of the Veterans Guard of Canada (*ibid*, vol 6: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 20 Jul 44). While considerable effort was made to ensure that the draft was smart and soldierly in appearance, it was not specified that the men chosen should be experienced in handling animals ((H.S.) 163.009 (D21): A.G. to D.Os.C., 23 Feb 44). Consequently, the Canadians had to call upon U.S. Remount personnel to help them load the ship. Some 476 mules were placed aboard the S.S. Empire Trail; 40 of these were sick and during the first night two died. (H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 6: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 20 Jul 44) The ship sailed from New York and joined its convoy (U.G.S. 37) at Hampton Roads, near Norfolk, Virginia, leaving there on 24 Mar 44. The convoy contained two other ships carrying mules; the animals in these ships and in two others (which had sailed earlier on 23 Feb and 4 Mar respectively) were conducted by U.S. personnel. (*Ibid*, vol 5: Tel, B.A.S., Washington to Embarkation Bombay, 25 Mar 44)

43c. The convoy route was Gibraltar - Suez (Port Tewfik) - Aden - Karachi, with stops at Suez and Aden. Off Algiers, the ships were attacked by enemy aircraft and at least one plane was shot down in flames. This delighted the old warriors of the Veterans Guard, who had voluntarily manned the ship's guns. Off Crete, they were attacked by German submarines. The ship

directly astern of the Empire Trail was hit and its steering gear damaged. The merchantman to starboard was also hit and in this case set afire. The convoy had to sail on, leaving both vessels drifting helplessly.* In Aden, the stokehold gang mutinied and had to be replaced by a crew of Somalis. Despite these incidents, the Empire Trail arrived at Karachi on 7 May 44 with all animals in good health. After unloading their ship, the Canadian conducting party took a train to Bombay and sailed from there on 2 Jun. After a stopover in Melbourne, they arrived at San Pedro, California, on 2 Jul and were back in Toronto on 15 Jul. (Ibid, vol 6: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 20 Jul 44. See also Report by Sgt. J. McCabe, 10 Aug 44)

43d. In August 1943 the British requested Canada to provide two more mule conducting parties in India. This time each group was to have an additional medical officer. (Ibid, vol 7: Q.M.G. to A.G., 3 Aug 44)

43e. Maj Moore was again in charge of detail No. 1 and two men who had been on the original voyage were included in his 43 O.R. of the Veterans Guard of Canada. Some 421 mules, including 26 sick, were loaded at Hoboken aboard the S.S. Empire Symbol which sailed on 10 Dec 44. About midnight it ran into a full gale. Loose lumber smashed several pens and a number of mules broke loose in the blackout. Rough weather continued as far as Port Said, where a stop was made, but eventually Karachi was reached on 19 Jan 45 and all 419 mules disembarked in good health. This time the conducting party remained on the same ship as far as Bombay and took another ship to Gourock, Scotland. After five days leave in the United Kingdom the detail re-embarked on 30 Mar for return to Canada. (Ibid, vol 10: Moore to Secretary D.N.D., 24 May 45)

43f. The second of these two later parties (Group No. 3) embarked at New York on the S.S. Ocean Vista on 5 Jan 45, having loaded 319 mules. (Some 51 mules had been casualties en route to the port.) (Ibid, vol 9: B.A.S. Ottawa to AG, 19 Jan 45) Maj R.G. Betts was in charge, assisted by Capt C.W. Parker R.C.A.M.C. and Capt R.G. Livermore (the veterinary who had been on the original voyage). One man also was making his second trip. This party had 42 O.R. of the Veterans Guard of Canada plus a sergeant of the Permanent Force who had been a farrier (ibid, vol 10: D. Adm to D. Org, 10 Nov 44).

*One ship sank and the other was towed to Alexandria, but subsequently had to be written off as a total loss. (B.R. 137, British and Foreign Merchant Vessels, Lost and Damaged by Enemy Action During the Second World War, (London, 1945), p. 130. This is a publication of the Royal Navy held by the R.C.N. historian)

43g. The third British request for mule escorts arrived at N.D.H.Q. on 21 Feb 45 (ibid, vol 8: B.A.S. Ottawa to A.G., 21 Feb 45). The director of the Veterans Guard of Canada felt that his Veterans could not provide the required personnel and attend to their increased responsibilities for prisoners of war (ibid: D.V.G.C. to D. Adm, 27 Feb 45). It was therefore decided to employ low category G.S. members of No. 2 General Employment Company (ibid: A.G. to the Minister, 7 Mar 45). Accordingly, a party of three officers and 45 other ranks in charge of Capt R. Harris, C.A.C., arrived in New York on 2 April and sailed aboard the S.S. Empire Mauritius on 6 Apr 45. The voyage was uneventful except when one of the escorts, Pte C.E. Smith, was stricken with appendicitis. The surgeon of a U.S. destroyer was sent over by breeches buoy to assist the Canadian M.O. in a successful operation. Smith was dropped off at Gibraltar and the Empire Mauritius proceeded via Fort Said and Aden without further incident. The mules were unloaded at Karachi on 15 May, the party then going over to Bombay to take ship for Greenoch. After 13 days leave, the detail boarded the Duchess of Bedford at Liverpool, and on 27 Jul 45 arrived at Halifax. (Ibid, vol 11: Harris to A.G., 16 Aug 45)

43h. Thus it was that Canada supplied four parties to convoy approximately 1600 mules from the United States to India. The Canadian personnel engaged totalled nine officers and 170 other ranks, excluding the sick man left in Gibraltar and counting only once the two officers and three other ranks who made the voyage twice.*

*These appear to be the most accurate figures available according to the nominal rolls, although they do not agree with those arrived at previously (H.Q.C. 1915-75/58: D. Records to D.H.S., 13 Jun 47, and memo for file, 20 Jun 52) Nominal rolls for all four conducting parties are on file H.Q.C. 8932-1, vol 12.

Regimental Officers

S.E.A.C.	18
Australian Military Forces	13
Pacific Areas (U.S. Forces)	31

(H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol 1: Nominal roles attached as Appendices "B" and "C" to Minutes of Meeting D.C.G.S.(B) and D.M.T. with Comd and Staff C.A.P.F., 15 Jun 45). These were the nucleus of Canadian Army personnel experienced in Pacific warfare conditions available for the training and direction of C.A.P.F.

TRAINING

(a) General Plan for Training

44. The plan for C.A.P.F. training was to divide it into three phases, with special courses for instructors and certain officers.

Phase 1 - The concentration of the Force at nine points in Cda where org on American lines will take place. In addition there will be:

- (a) Orientation in Japanese warfare.
- (b) Demonstrations of all U.S. weapons by nine teams of U.S. weapon trg experts.
- (c) Range courses in the M1 Rifle, the M2 Carbine and 2.36-in Rocket Launcher (Bazooka).

Phase 2 - After the move of the Force to the concentration area in the U.S. at Camp Breckinridge, Ky, individual and unit trg will be carried out as follows:

Part I - 2 weeks trg of the individual soldier in subjects common to all arms.

Part II - 2 weeks trg of the individual to take his place in a sub-unit of his own arm.

Part III - 4 weeks unit trg up to Bn and equivalent level.

Phase 3 - Combined trg of 2 weeks will follow phases 1 and 2 and will consist of divisional exercises embodying all arms of the Force with such U.S. supporting arms, including aircraft, as are necessary to train the Force adequately to take its place in an American fm.

Instructional Cadres - In order to implement the trg programme outlined in Phases 2 and 3, a Cadre of instrs of all arms is being concentrated at Barriefield, Ont, where they will undergo a

short course in Technique of Instr. On completion of this course, they will be despatched to U.S. Trg Ests where they will be trained as instrs in U.S. weapons, tactics, tradesmen technique, etc. On the concentration of the Force at Camp Breckinridge, this personnel will join the C.A.P.F. where they will act as instrs conducting Divisional Schools as necessary.

Offr Trg - Special courses will be conducted at R.M.C., Kingston, for Comds and Staffs before the Force proceeds to the U.S. These courses are designed to give a concentrated orientation in U.S. staff procedure. In addition, a large number of specialist offrs have been and will continue to be sent to special courses in the U.S.A. varying in length from a few days to some months. Many Cdn Staff and Regt Offrs have served with the U.S. Forces in the Pacific, and it is proposed to utilize their experience in trg this Force.

(H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol 4: Memo dated 27 Jun 45 attached as Appx "A" to letter D.C.G.S.(B) (Brig H.D. Graham) to D.C.G. & A.A. (Brig D.R. Agnew), 9 Jul 45)

In brief, the general plan followed the basic principle recommended by Canadian and U.S. planners in Washington, namely: "Basic training in Canada: all other training in U.S." (Ibid, vol 1: Tel C.A.W. 293, Cdn Army Staff, Washington, to C.G.S., 3 Jun 45).

(b) Training In Canada

45. On considering the possibilities of giving preliminary training overseas on U.S. weapons and organization to C.A.P.F. volunteers awaiting return to Canada, C.M.H.Q. was faced with a lack of instructors, U.S. weapons and ammunition, adequate time, etc, and concluded:

...anything we could do in this way would be of a sketchy and very incomplete nature with risk that soldiers might gain impression they would get no more adequate trg before going into action. If such a rumour got abroad the effect would clearly be bad. Therefore do not propose attempt anything beyond possible issue of such pamphlets, posters, etc as we may be able to get from U.S. Army base.

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 1362, Montague to Gibson, 6 Jun 45)

Training of these volunteers from overseas was also a major problem to N.D.H.Q., who advised General Hoffmeister:

The dates of concentration of Overseas volunteers on completion of their embarkation leave will be varied and will allow little or no time for trg in Cda. It is considered therefore that the only trg, other than physical conditioning, orientation, smartening up, etc, that can be carried out will apply chiefly to volunteers from Cda.

(Ibid: C.G.S. to G.O.C., C.A.P.F.,
15 Jun 45)

Instructions were issued to District Officers Commanding and Camp Commandants to aid C.A.P.F. training in every possible manner.

Units and personnel of the C.A.P.F. are to be relieved as far as possible of all administrative responsibilities and duties and thus be free to devote their entire time to organization and training during the period of concentration. Units and personnel of the C.A.P.F. will be provided with accommodation and messing, and clothing, equipment and barrack stores will be issued, in the same way as is done for personnel held in holding establishments. However, due to the shortage of cooks in Canada, where necessary C.A.P.F. cooks, on arrangements to be made with the O.C. of the C.A.P.F. units concerned, will be provided to help the units supplying the 'hotel service'.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 823 dated 18 Jun 45)

During the initial stages of this conc the H.Q. 6 Cdn Div will NOT be sufficiently org to supervise the trg of the Force. H.Q. Dists and Camps are therefore requested to render every advice and assistance...The following subjects are considered to be of special importance during this period:

- (a) Weapon Trg
- (b) Physical Trg & Obstacle Courses
- (c) Dismounted (close order) drill
- (d) Marching
- (e) Mines and booby traps
- (f) Security
- (g) First Aid
- (h) Orientation
- (j) Visual Trg
- (k) Tabloid Sports

(H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol 4: C.G.S. to D.Os.C.
and Comds Camp Borden and Petawawa,
5 Jul 45)

46. To familiarize commanders and senior officers with U.S. staff procedure and organization, an orientation course was held at the Royal Military College, Kingston, 23-28 Jul 45 attended by 6 brigadiers, 7 colonels, 24 lieutenant-colonels, and a major (Ibid, vol 3: Roll of Officers Attending No 1 Orientation Course). A second course arranged for 27 Aug - 1 Sep 45 was cancelled (Ibid, vol 5: Commandant, R.M.C., to Director of Military Training, 17 Aug 45).

47. On 1 Aug 45 the Minister formally approved the proposal to bring 9 U.S. Weapon Training Teams to C.A.F.F. concentrations in Canada to demonstrate and assist in training for approximately 45 days. The estimated cost excluding pay and allowances and return transportation was \$47,740 of non-recurring expenditure (Ibid: Deputy Minister (A. Ross) to the Minister, 30 Jul 45). Each team consisted of an officer and 22 other ranks, all weapon training experts. They arrived at the Canadian Small Arms School at Long Branch, Ont, 3 Aug 45 and were ordered to be despatched to Barriefield, Debert, Sussex, Shilo, Brandon, Petawawa, Camp Borden (2 teams), and Vernon respectively to arrive before 11 Aug 45.

Each team will be completely equipped with necessary weapons, amn, eqpt and trg aids for the purpose of carrying out their demonstrations. This eqpt will be under the control of the U.S. Offr i/c each team and must only be used as he directs.

(Ibid, vol 8: Copy of letter (sgd) Lt-Col M.P. Johnston for C.G.S., attached as Appx "E" to letter Major F.N. Pope to Financial Superintendent, 6 Mar 46)

48. To provide an organization to take care of infantry personnel for C.A.F.F., the Pacific Infantry Training Brigade was formed at Vernon B.C. effective 10 May 45. Commanded by Brigadier J.C. Jefferson, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., it consisted of a Headquarters together with Nos 1, 2, and 3 Pacific Infantry Training Battalions representing Central, Western, and Eastern Canada respectively. The original war establishment of this brigade totalled 90 officers and 702 other ranks to provide a training capacity at any one time of 39 officers and 2007 other ranks.

The a/m Inf Trg Bns are formed to provide facilities to hold and train Inf personnel who elect to serve in the Pacific Force, and who have completed Corps Trg, until they are posted to that Force.

(H.Q.C. 9131-1-3: C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G., H.G.O., 12 May 45)

It is intended that Pacific Trg Bde shall receive only fully trained inf soldiers who have been trained in the normal trg stream and then to complete their low level collective trg in Pacific Trg Bde. It is NOT intended that this fm shall undertake any form of refresher, basic, corps or conversion individual trg.

(H.Q.S. 9131-3-3: D.M.T. to D. Org,
18 May 45)

In July 1945, however, this organization was not considered adequate in view of the quickened tempo of the war, and therefore plans had to be considerably revised.

With the concentration of the C.A.P.F. at presently designated concentration pts in Cda, personnel now held in the Pacific Trg Bde will be despatched to the various units in C.A.P.F.

The trg of replacements for C.A.P.F. is to begin on or about 1 Aug 45. In order to meet the replacement commitment, it is necessary to train 3,800 soldiers per month. This trg will consist of 8 weeks basic trg to be the equivalent of the U.S. Branch Immaterial Trg, and in consequence will mean that 7,600 soldiers will ultimately be under trg at all times.

It is recommended in order to carry out this trg that the Pacific Trg Bde be reorg on a similar est provision to that of the U.S. Trg Centre in order that the Cdn trainee can complete his trg in the U.S. with continuity of trg unbroken...

The foregoing org results in:

- (a) The fm of an additional Trg Bn.
- (b) An increase of 119 offrs and 116 O.R. in H.W.Es. concerned.
- (c) An increase of approx 1800 in the trg capacity.

As of 1 Sep 45, it is anticipated that the numbers under trg will be increased by an additional 3,800, making a total of 7,600 under trg.

The present plan envisaged to meet this requirement is to form another four Trg Bns on the same basis as those outlined...above, and to move the complete Pacific Trg Bde consisting of a H.Q. and 8 Trg Bns to Camp Petawawa.

(H.Q.S. 9131-1-3: D.M.T. to D.S.D.,
10 Jul 45)

The intention was to organize battalions at four different points before effecting concentration of the entire brigade.

1, 2 and 3 Pacific Trg Bns will be brought up to strength by 15 Aug at Vernon.

4 Pacific Trg Bn will be formed at Vernon, the required personnel drawn from Trg Centres across Cda during week 13 Aug to start trg 3 Sep.

5 and 6 Pacific Trg Bns will be formed from H.W.E. of 26 and 23 C.I.(B) T.Cs. Grillia and Newmarket respectively by week of 20 Aug.

7 and 8 Pacific Trg Bns will be formed at Petawawa during week 27 Aug. Trg personnel will be drawn from present H.W.E. A.37 or other sources if necessary.

(H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol 8: D.M.T. to D.C.G.S.(B), 7 Aug 45)

Action in this regard had barely begun, however, when the events of August 1945 led to cancellation of all plans.

49. Canada was faced with a very real problem concerning the provision of interpreters with a command of the Japanese language. A ready source of supply existed in several hundred Canadian Nisei (Japanese born away from their native land), but there were two obstacles to be overcome. One was the necessity for individual investigation to prove fidelity, the other arose from public antagonism towards Japanese, particularly among citizens of British Columbia. Consequently, Army authorities had to exercise extreme caution, as the following letter from the Adjutant-General dated 27 Jul 45 will illustrate:

- (1) Authority is granted to enlist up to a maximum of 250, in the Cdn Army, Cdn born citizens of Japanese origin (NISEI)
- (2) Authority at present exists for the enlistment of 100 of these NISEI as follows:
 - (i) 35 - under Disposal Order No 102 for service with the British Army - S.E.A. (Have been despatched).
 - (ii) 3 - under Disposal Order No 103 for service with the Allied Political Warfare Committee. (Have been despatched).
 - (iii) 50 - under Disposal Order No 106 for service with the Australian Army. (Completing training in Cda).

- (3) This authority visualizes and provides for the loan of NISEI, as required, to U.S. Armed Forces.
- (4) Personnel selected for enlistment must first be vetted by N.D.H.Q. after investigation into their security is carried out. In this regard every assistance should be given N.D.H.Q. representative in facilitating the selection and enlistment of these personnel...
- (6) There must be no publicity whatsoever given to the enlistment of NISEI into the Cdn Army. (sic)

(P.C.S. 504-1-7-4: A.G. circular letter R 844(d) dated 27 Jul 45)

After completing basic training these Nisei were sent to the Japanese Language School, a unit of the Canadian Army established at Vancouver, B.C., under the command of Major A.P. MacKenzie, M.C. This school began classes for whites in August 1943 and despatched the majority of its graduates to the British Army for service with S.E.A.C. (P.C.S. 504-22-J.L.S., vol 4: Movement authority dated 27 Mar 45. See also W.D., Japanese Language School, 12 Oct 45 and 1 Feb 46). By August 1945 the school had 114 students in training, of whom 52 were Nisei (P.C.S. 504-22-J.L.S., vol 5: G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Comd to Secy D.N.D., 31 Aug 45). Their names are found on the roll of 110 students and staff accepted for service with C.A.P.F. (W.D., Japanese Language School, August 1945: Part 1 Order No. 54 dated 10 Aug 45).

(c) Training in U.S.A.

50. Regarding the training of C.A.P.F. volunteers in U.S.A., the greatest progress was made with Intelligence personnel. In the summer of 1944 three Canadian officers were attached to U.S. Intelligence for duty and training in order to take a five months' basic course in Japanese Order of Battle, organization, weapons and dispositions (W.D., General Letson, 10 Oct 44). In November of that year Canada loaned the U.S. War Department, at its request, three officers and three N.C.Os. who had just graduated from the Japanese Language School, Pacific Command (Ibid, 11 Oct and 27 Nov 44). In March 1945 General Letson received a request for additional linguists as well as clerks and typists for Intelligence work in U.S.A., and wrote to N.D.H.Q.:

I feel that such co-operation on our part will be regarded by our American friends as evidence of our determination to pull our full share in the Pacific war. The complete integration of a strong Canadian Intelligence team into P.A.C.M.I.R.S. [Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section, which was engaged in searching Japanese documents] will also be

of great value in ensuring that full information will be immediately available to N.D.H.Q. at all times.

(Ibid, March 1945, Appx "E"; Letson to Murchie, 12 Mar 45)

51. Due to difficulties in mastering the language and general unfamiliarity with the Orient, Canadians required very careful preparation before they could be assigned to military intelligence duties. To this end the United States made available its excellent facilities at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, the centre of U.S. Intelligence training.

Camp Ritchie offers 2 courses:

- (a) 8 weeks basic int course for personnel without previous int trg or experience and
- (b) 2 weeks advanced int courses for personnel redeployed from E.T.O. [European Theatre of Operations] for Pacific Force...

Commandant Camp Ritchie is willing to provide a special course for Canadians of say 4 weeks duration designed specifically to fill Cdn needs...They are prepared to select 60 all ranks on such a course. Personnel without int trg and experience should not be considered for this special course.

(H.Q.S. 9131-3-Q: Tel C.A. 7. 346, C.A.S. Washington to D.M.I. Ottawa, 19 Jun 45)

N.D.H.Q. pointed out in reply that trained and experienced Intelligence personnel were still overseas and there were none in Canada; therefore they wished to select from Canada a group to take the 8 weeks basic course at once and in September 1945 send up to 60 overseas personnel for the special course suggested. "Thus the two courses would supply practically the entire Int personnel of C.A.P.F. all trained and some experienced" (Ibid: Tel C.S.I. 1136, D.M.I. to C.A.S. Washington, 20 Jul 45). This plan the U.S. War Department accepted (Ibid: C.A.S. Washington to D.M.T. Ottawa, 25 Jun 45) and 22 officers and 35 other ranks were despatched from Canada for the basic 8 weeks course at Camp Ritchie beginning 25 Jul 45 (Ibid: Nominal roll), Plans for the advanced course were later cancelled.

52. Only a few Canadians were despatched to other courses in the U.S.A. beginning in July 1945.

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
Div C.W. Offr - Edgewood Arsenal, Md	1	..
Ground Liaison Offr - Meridian, Miss	2	..
Climatic Clothing & Eqpt - Camp Lee, Va	2	4
Order of Battle - Camp Ritchie, Md	2	2
Total	7	6

(H.Q.S. 9131-3, vol 5: Location and Strength State - Cdn Personnel in U.S., 17 Aug 45)

Meanwhile the main body of C.A.P.F. instructors was ordered to assemble near Kingston, Ontario.

Approx 300 offrs and 1000 O.R. to form the Instr Cadre for C.A.P.F. will conc at Barrielfield 20 Jul to undergo trg and adm necessary prior to move to Trg Ests in the U.S. approx 6-7 Aug. They will be joined on 5 Aug by approx 70 offrs and 130 O.R. who have been air-lifted from U.K. for this purpose. From these two groups the final selection of personnel to proceed to U.S. Trg Ests will be made.

(Ibid, vol 4: D.C.G.S.(B) to D.C.G. & A.A., 9 Jul 45)

Movement of the Instructional Cadre from Barrielfield to U.S. training establishments scattered over a wide area was to take place in accordance with the following schedule:

<u>Arm</u>	<u>1st Party</u>		<u>Destination</u>	<u>2nd Party</u>	
	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>		<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
C.A.C.	25	105	Fort Knox, Ky	1	4
Arty	46	317	Fort Sill, Okla	18	14
R.C.E.	12	43	Fort Belvoir, Va	1	..
R.C. Sigs	3	46	Fort Crowder, Mo	1	6
Inf	183	276	Fort Benning, Ga	7	8
Inf A/Tk Coy	3	29	Camp Hood, Texas	..	..
Q.M. Coy Inf Div	9	37	Camp Lee, Va	3	5
R.C.A.M.C.	24	43	Carlisle Bks, Pa	..	6
Ord Mtce Coy	6	28	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Pa	5	9
	311	924		36	52

(Ibid: Appendices "A" and "B" to letter A.G. to D.O.C. M.D. 3 and C.I.C. 2nd Echelon C.A.P.F., 20 Jul 45)

The first party was due to reach destinations in the U.S. by 9 Aug 45 and the second party by 17 Aug 45, but the latter did not leave the country. In point of fact, just

over 1200 instructors were despatched, according to a report by Brigadier H.D. Graham (D.C.G.S.(B)).

I find that the cadre requirements totalled 1209 and in actual fact there were 1207 all ranks despatched to U.S. I find also that a total of 150 all ranks (including 28 officers) were returned to units for various reasons, displaced by airlift personnel who were considered more suitable, sickness, and in a small number of cases because of unsuitability.

(Ibid, vol 5: D.C.G.S.(B) to C.G.S. and A.G., 10 Aug 45)

In addition, two officers were sent to a Flamethrower Course at Edgewood Arsenal, Md, and a considerable body of cooks together with small staffs to administer them reported for courses beginning 13 Aug 45:

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
Camp Plauche, La	6	259
Camp Crowder, Mo	1	65
Camp Lee, Va	1	81
Fort Belvoir, Va	1	35
	9	440

(Ibid: Location and Strength State, op cit)

By 17 Aug 45 the number of C.A.F.F. personnel attending courses in the United States totalled 347 officers and 1,391 other ranks (Ibid).

53. Meanwhile, U.S. Forces were busy preparing the site selected for the final training of C.A.F.F. prior to departure for overseas. A press release of 8 Jul-45 stated:

Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky, where Canadian soldiers will be concentrated for training before despatch to the Pacific, is one of the most modern military camps in North America... During the past few weeks the camp staff has been busy tearing down the former Nazi fortifications and buildings used for training purposes and erecting in their place a complete Japanese village.

(H.Q. 1-0-9: Press release P.N. 531-45 issued 8 Jul 45)

DISBANDMENT OF THE C.A.P.F.

(a) Surrender of Japan

54. All plans for C.A.P.F. were halted, however, when the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima 6 Aug 45 and another on Nagasaki three days later hastened the conclusion of the war. On 14 Aug 45 Japan sought unconditional surrender. Allied offensive operations against Japan's military and naval forces were ordered to be suspended that same date (H.Q.S. 9131-33: Tel Circular D.1456, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, 15 Aug 45). On 16 Aug 45 General MacArthur received a wireless message from the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters stating:

His Majesty the Emperor issued an imperial order at 1600 o'clock on August 16th to the entire armed forces to cease hostilities immediately.

(Ibid: Message quoted in Tel J.S. 54, Cdn Joint Staff, Washington, to Chiefs of Staff Committee, Ottawa, 18 Aug 45)

A few days elapsed before this order could reach troops in isolated locations and before General MacArthur could present to Japanese representatives his surrender requirements, which he did at Manila on 20 Aug 45. The formal surrender of Japan took place at Tokyo Bay, 2 Sep 45, with Col Moore Cosgrave, Canadian Military Representative at Canberra, signing on behalf of the Dominion of Canada (Ibid: Instrument of Japan's Surrender). At the reoccupation of Hong Kong the next day by a British Commonwealth Force, including H.M.C.S. "Prince Robert", the Canadian Army was represented by Brigadier O.M.M. Kay, Canadian Military Attaché at Chungking, China, and a former Commanding Officer of the Winnipeg Grenadiers.

(b) Proposed Commonwealth Forces

55. The war had now ended, but at this point it is necessary to turn back one month to consider certain proposals communicated by Mr Clement Attlee, who had replaced Mr Winston Churchill as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. As the Japanese war entered its final stage, Mr Attlee directed to Mr Mackenzie King certain telegrams outlining tentative suggestions which, if adopted, would have considerably altered plans for C.A.P.F. The first, dated 31 Jul 45, stated, in part:

I send you herewith, for your personal information, a summary of the major operational decisions reached in Anglo-American military discussions at Berlin...It was agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of logistical and other problems.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 7: Tel Circular D.1330, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 31 Jul 45)

A second telegram further explained this proposition.

...Just before the Potsdam Conference [which began 17 Jul 45] the British Chiefs of Staff approached the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with a proposal for including in the assault on Japan a British Commonwealth force of from 3 to 5 divisions. We had in mind at that time that, if you agreed, we would include in force a Canadian division but, in as much as you already had a Canadian division being trained and equipped in the United States ready to serve under United States command, we did not think it advisable to suggest a reorganization of your plans until the proposal had been accepted in principle by the United States.

I am to explain now, however, that at the Potsdam conference the President and Mr Churchill * on the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, accepted this proposal for the participation of a British Commonwealth force in the main operations against Japan, subject to the resolution of operational and administrative problems...A plan of this kind would necessitate the re-equipping of the British Commonwealth force with American equipment and the provision by the United States of the logistic support. If this turns out to be the kind of plan proposed, there would clearly be great advantage in including the Canadian division which is already being re-equipped with American equipment. The United States Chiefs of Staff have, in fact, informed us that General MacArthur has already tentatively suggested this. We should probably recommend as the other two divisions, one United Kingdom and one Australian...

(Ibid: Tel 166, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 Aug 46)

56. In Canada the matter was referred to the C.G.S. for military consideration, and in his report he reviewed pertinent factors such as manpower, organization, training and equipment, administration and channels of command, concluding:

* Mr. Attlee did not replace Mr. Churchill at Potsdam until 29 Jul 45.

For the foregoing reasons it is considered that the plans already made for the organization and training of the Canadian Force under United States direction have advanced to a stage where a complete reorganization of these plans would be militarily undesirable. There is the further consideration that it will be a long term advantage to the Canadian Army to operate closely with the United States Forces in order to become fully familiar with their methods. The experience already gained in Europe with British Forces in combined operations has been of great advantage and Canadian officers have already had the benefit of this cooperation.

Accordingly, it is recommended from the military point of view that the Canadian Force should continue its present programme of organization and training under United States direction rather than be diverted at this stage to participate in the formation of a British Commonwealth Corps. Since however the proposed British Commonwealth Corps and the Canadian Force will upon arrival in the theatre be operating under the overall command of the United States Theatre Commander, it may be quite feasible at a later date for the Canadian Division to be attached for operations to the British Commonwealth Corps if the operational situation and the Theatre Commander's plans so permit.

(Ibid: Memo initialled R.B.G. (Maj-Gen R.B. Gibson) for C.G.S. to the Minister, 6 Aug 45)

In forwarding this memorandum to the Prime Minister the Minister of National Defence stated "I am in full agreement" and added this comment beforehand:

I have had an opportunity to consider the effect this change of plans would have on the arrangements for the organization of the Canadian Army Pacific Force which are now well advanced and developing satisfactorily in all respects except for the matter of the recruitment of reserves.

(Ibid: McNaughton to Mackenzie King, 7 Aug 45)

57. With Japan's surrender imminent at this stage, the British Government now requested the Dominions to consider the following in lieu of the original suggestion for an invasion force:

A British Commonwealth force shall take part in the occupation of Japan. We suggest that it should be formed from one brigade group each of Australian, British, British/Indian,

Canadian and New Zealand troops with a tactical air force contingent.

We hope that you will agree with the proposal... that Canadian forces shall take part in the occupation of Japan. We will consult you further on the detailed arrangements and should be glad of your suggestions.

(H.Q.S. 9131-33: Tel No 170, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 13 Aug 45)

The Special Cabinet Committee meeting in Ottawa on the day of Japan's surrender, however, made the following recommendation:

...that Canadian Army and Air Force units should not participate, whether as part of a Commonwealth Force or otherwise, in the occupation of Japan or in other special duties in the Pacific theatre following Japan's surrender.

(Ibid: Extract from a Memorandum from the Special Cabinet Committee to the Cabinet, 14 Aug 45)

Accordingly, Ottawa replied to London:

We are not prepared to furnish a brigade group for occupation or other special duties in the Pacific theatre as you suggest...We now have considerable occupation forces in Europe and we are not ready to undertake any further commitment of this nature involving either Army or Air Force units.

(Ibid: Tel No 188, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 15 Aug 45)

(c) Canada Withdraws the C.A.P.F.

58. From this decision naturally arose the question of the future disposition of C.A.P.F., which the Minister discussed with the Prime Minister on 16 Aug 45. He then informed his service chiefs:

...it had been agreed that no action should be taken until the actual Peace Terms had been signed...In the meantime it has been agreed that approach should be made to the U.S. Government to decide whether or not any further steps should be taken at this time in connection with the despatch of C.A.P.F. to the U.S. for training. It was agreed that the method of approach should be decided by consultation by C.G.S. with Under-Secretary of State for

External Affairs [Mr Norman A. Robertson.]

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: Extract from
Minister's Morning Conference,
17 Aug 45)

The C.G.S. prepared the following draft telegram
addressed to Maj-Gen Letson in Washington:

Para One - In view of cessation of hostilities
against Japan we do not consider it necessary
to continue the present plans for training
and equipping C.A.P.F. in United States.

Para Two - We propose therefore immediate
cancellation of present plans for training and
equipping this force in the United States and
the subsequent cancellation of all movement
of C.A.P.F. personnel from Canada to U.S.
training areas.

Para Three - On the assumption that U.S. War
Dept agrees that there will be no revival of
hostilities which would require use of C.A.P.F.
in operations against Japan you are author-
ized to inform U.S. War Dept of foregoing
intention and make arrangements accordingly.

Para Four - Request earliest confirmation of
U.S. agreement with assumption in Para Three.

(Ibid: Draft telegram C.G.S. 417,
Murchie to Letson. The original draft
bears the notation "Amended after
Discussion with Mr. Robertson U.S. of
S. External (sgd) J.C. Murchie 17/8".
It is also stamped and initialled by
the Minister "Dispatch approved".)

After consultation between the C.G.S. and the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, however, para
4 and the clause in para 3 "that U.S. War Dept agrees"
were deleted from the original draft. (These deletions
are underlined in the above quotation). The telegram
as amended was then despatched 17 Aug 45. The next day
General Letson replied:

Content of your C.G.S. 417 has been communicated
to Assistant Chief of Staff Operations and
Plans Division. They concur in the action
indicated and will place immediate stop sign
on all arrangements. It is expected that
within the next ten days the remote possibility
of resumption of hostilities will become
clarified one way or the other. At that
time O.P.D. suggest that for purposes of the
record I should write formally to U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff informing them that in view of
the end of the war our proposal to participate
with them is now withdrawn. This will indicate
formal cancellation whereas present action is

morely on a planning and administrative level thus leaving the top level door open should we wish to resume activity if war continues.

(Ibid: Tel 2140, Letson to Murchie, 18 Aug 45)

59. Satisfied that the U.S. approved of Canada's intentions, N.D.H.Q. immediately issued these orders:

Defer all movement to United States of C.A.P.F. personnel pending further instructions. No publicity to be given this instruction. Addsd Comd C.A.P.F. Brockville rptd Comd Cdn Army Staff Washington.

(H.Q.S. 9131-33: Tel C.G.S. 419, C.G.S. to Comd C.A.P.F. and Comd C.A.S. Washington, 18 Aug 45)

When, towards the end of August 1945, it became obvious that Japan's complete surrender was assured, decisive action regarding the future of C.A.P.F. became possible. * The C.G.S. therefore despatched to General Letson the following instructions, in which Mr Robertson concurred:

...you are authorized to inform U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that upon execution of terms of surrender by Japan it is proposed to disband C.A.P.F. and that our proposal to participate with them in the war against Japan is accordingly withdrawn.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: Tel C.G.S. 434, Foulkes to Letson, 30 Aug 45)

General Letson at once wrote to Admiral Leahy a formal letter in which he reviewed the setting up of C.A.P.F. and concluded with these remarks:

When it became evident that victory over Japan was imminent and after consultation with the War Department (O.P.D.), movement of further Canadian troops was suspended until such time as the situation became clarified. I have now been instructed to inform the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that upon the execution of the terms of surrender by Japan it is proposed to disband the Canadian Army Pacific Force. It is desired at this time

* By this time General McNaughton had been replaced as Minister of National Defence by Hon Douglas Abbott (21 Aug 45) and Lt-Gen Murchie as C.G.S. by Lt-Gen C. Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (w.e.f. 31 Jul 45).

on behalf of the Canadian Army to convey to the U.S. War Department the thanks and appreciation of the Canadian Army for the cordial and ever ready co-operation which was received on every hand and at every level. We are at one with you in giving thanks that victory has been achieved but our thoughts are tinged with regret that circumstances have precluded us from serving side by side with the U.S. Army in fighting against our common enemy in the Pacific.

(Ibid: Letson to Leahy quoted in tel 2159, Letson to Foulkes, 31 Aug 45)

(d) Nil Strength

60. Meanwhile administrative action in Canada had necessarily been delayed until Japan's surrender became a certainty. It was possible to take only tentative measures, of which the following are examples:

In principle all moves to C.A.P.F. concentration areas should continue. This will be subject to certain variations in accordance with circumstances as they arise...

Further intake into the Army, and electing for the C.A.P.F. or to become G.S. has been suspended under the provisions of wire N.S.S. 171 dated 14 Aug 45.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 951 dated 20 Aug 45. A copy of the wire referred to has not been located)

Pending a firm decision as to the future of C.A.P.F., it is proposed to hold in abeyance all promotions and up-gradings of officers within the force effective 15 Aug 45.

(H.Q.S. 9131-5: A.G. to Comd Base H.Q. C.A.P.F. Brockville, 23 Aug 45)

61. By 30 Aug 45, however, the situation had become more definite and the A.G. directed:

Effective immediately all movements into C.A.P.F. concentration areas will cease pending further instructions STOP Personnel will be held in home districts under district arrangements.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 60 dated 30 Aug 45)

The next day the C.G.S. issued the following instructions to Heads of Branches authorizing them to take immediate action:

In view of cessation of hostilities against Japan it has been decided that there is no longer any operational requirement for the Canadian Army Pacific Force and that in consequence:

- (a) All movement of C.A.P.F. personnel from Canada to U.S. will be cancelled.
- (b) All plans and arrangements made for training and equipping C.A.P.F. in U.S. and for obtaining American equipment and training assistance in Canada will be cancelled.
- (c) The previously authorized organization of No 5, 6, 7 and 8 Pacific Training Battalions, the movement out of Petawawa of A-1 and A-5 Training Centres to provide accommodation therefore and all other special organizational arrangements for the training of C.A.P.F. reinforcements in Canada will NOT proceed unless in the opinion of the Adjutant-General they are required for the normal holding of such personnel pending other disposal.
- (d) Units of the C.A.P.F. will revert to District control and will cease to be under command of Commander C.A.P.F. effective 0001 hrs Tuesday 4 Sep 45. *
- (e) Personnel of the C.A.P.F. become available to the Adjutant-General for demobilization or other employment in accordance with approved plans applicable to the rest of the Army in Canada.

(H.Q.S. 9131-33: C.G.S. to A.G.,
Q.M.G. and M.G.O., 1 Sep 45)

62. Action with regard to (a) had already been taken (see para 59 above), and orders were at once issued to recall those troops who had previously been despatched across the border.

With exception of those engaged on cooks' training all C.A.P.F. pers in training in U.S.A. together with their administrative increments will return to Canada as quickly as can be arranged.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Org 73 dated 4 Sep 45)

* Commander C.A.P.F. had assumed command of the formations and units of the Force only with effect from 10 Aug 45. He had formerly acted merely in a co-ordinating, liaison and planning capacity (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G., and M.G.O., 9 Aug 45).

By 10 Oct 45 the movement homewards had been completed. "All Canadian C.A.P.F. trainees in U.S. have now returned. The last of them (cooks) scheduled to arrive at Petawawa this afternoon" (W.D., Cdn Army Staff, Washington, 10 Oct 45). Meanwhile, the nine U.S. Weapon Training Teams, which had arrived in Canada 3 Aug 45, had entrained at Long Branch 20 Sep 45 for return to Fort Benning, Georgia (Ibid, 20 Sep 45).

63. Within Canada, however, it was quite a difficult task to sort out personnel and arrange for their disposal. The situation as at 31 Aug 45 was as follows:

1963 offrs and 22,058 O.R. had been posted to C.A.P.F. units. Of these, 1,536 offrs and 20,238 O.R. were from overseas and 427 offrs and 1,820 O.R. were from units in Canada.

(Historical Material, Cdn Sec 2nd Echelon, C.A.P.F.: Report entitled Investigation C.A.P.F. Documents, Capt W.B. Couets, 8 Oct 45. This is in possession of Historical Section (G.S.) at Army Headquarters)

Unfortunately, however, instructions issued after the freezing order of 30 Aug 45 permitted movement within Districts or Commands to assembly areas, thus adding to the difficulties of control. Mobilization was far from complete, and considerable confusion existed over the exact location of personnel.

According to estimates made, based on leave expiry dates and the issue of movement orders, approximately 849 offrs and 13,397 O.R... should have reached Assembly Areas. It must be appreciated that the factors mentioned... i.e. leave extensions, hospitalization, A.W.Ls., and changes of home depots, all decreased this figure.

The remaining 1114 offrs and 8,661 O.R. were in District Depots or still on Special Leave.

(Ibid)

This failure to complete concentration ultimately brought about, in the words of an investigating officer, "a regrettable dispersal of C.A.P.F. bodies without documents and documents without bodies on disbandment of C.A.P.F." (Ibid: Major F.M. Cass to A/A.A.G. (Co-ord), 26 Oct 45).

64. Demobilization of C.A.P.F. volunteers had to be dovetailed into demobilization of other European veterans, most of whom were yet overseas, and of troops who had seen service only in Canada. The Adjutant-General proposed that the principle to be kept in mind was to

give no preference in demobilization to personnel by reason of the fact that they volunteered for the Pacific (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 6: Extract from Morning Conference, 30 Aug 45). An announcement to the press stated that:

In general, the plan is to disband C.A.P.F. units by releasing those who are eligible to return to civil life and by placing other personnel in employment with units already existing within the various Military Districts.

(H.Q. 5-0-53: Press release, P.N. 719-45 issued 4 Sep 45)

Retaining only future Active Force units required for the peacetime army, N.D.H.Q. arranged for the complete disposal of C.A.P.F. in September 1945.

All units of the C.A.P.F. are now being reduced to NIL str by the A.G. except:

- 1 Cdn F.A. Bn.
- 1 Cdn Inf Bn (R.C.R.)
- 1 Cdn Inf Bn (P.P.C.L.I.)
- 1 Cdn Inf Bn (R. 22e R.)

Nos 7 and 8 Pacific Inf Trg Bns, when no longer required by the A.G. for holding roles, will be reduced to nil str. Paras 1(b), 3 and 4 of S.D. 1 letter 2723 are hereby cancelled, thus abrogating the fnm of Nos 5 and 6 Pacific Inf Trg Bns which were to be formed from Nos 23 and 26 C.I.(B) T.Cs. The latter two units will therefore continue and be available as sortation units.

H.Q. Pacific Trg Bde and Nos 1, 2, 3 and 4 Pacific Inf Trg Bns are hereby placed at the disposal of the A.G. for reduction to NIL str when no longer required.

(H.Q.S. 9131, vol 7: C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G. and M.G.O., 19 Sep 45)

Formal disbandment of C.A.P.F. units was accomplished by General Order 425, effective 1 Nov 45.

WAR EXPENDITURE AGAINST JAPAN

65. Before concluding the story of C.A.P.F., it is interesting to note an estimate of Army costs to the Dominion of Canada attributable to the war against Japan in the period 1 Nov 41 to 22 Feb 46.

The total cost is estimated at \$438,000,000.
(Canadian dollars) which may be broken down
as follows:

"C" Force	\$ 13,750,000.
6th, 7th, and 8th Canadian Divisions	252,000,000.
Army Camp Sites on Pacific Coast	18,500,000.
Kiska Force	10,750,000.
Canadian Army Pacific Force	35,500,000.
Canadian Army Pacific Force - Special Expenditures	4,750,000.
Special Wireless Groups and Intelligence Sections	2,000,000.
Proportion of Expenses - Pacific Command	61,250,000.
N.D.H.Q. and General Overhead expenses	39,500,000.
	\$ 438,000,000.

(Ibid, vol 8: Memo to Deputy Minister Department of Finance, 10 May 46, prepared for signature of A. Ross, Deputy Minister D.N.D. A marginal note of 13 May 46, however, states: "To Fyle - As agreed with Col Kynch of D.Ms. office this memo will NOT be sent, but contents may be phoned Dept Finance. This was done 1450 hrs to-day. Fyle is therefore P.A.'d. (sgd) J.S. Walford, Lt-Col S.D. 3")

66. The total cost to Canada of the war against Japan was only a minor sum compared to the much larger amounts which would undoubtedly have been expended if hostilities had not ceased so abruptly. This saving must be calculated in lives as well as mere money, for campaigns in the Pacific area have always been noted for heavy casualties through disease as well as bloodshed. The Canadian Army Pacific Force advanced little beyond the planning stage, but those very plans and preparations were an active demonstration of Canada's decision of her own free will to share in carrying the fight into the enemy stronghold.

67. This report has been written by Capt R.B. Oglesby, narrator in the Historical Section, Army Headquarters.

R.B. Oglesby Capt.
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director
Historical Section (G.S.)

Appendix "A"

to Report No 16

HQS 9131

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, 20 Nov 44

SUMMARY TO: WAR COMMITTEE OF THE CABINET
RE: CANADIAN ARMY PARTICIPATION IN
OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN

1. Purpose

To approve Canadian Army participation against Japan on the following basis:

- (a) The Canadian Force to comprise one division with necessary ancillary troops as required, up to a total of 30,000.
- (b) This Force to operate in the Central Pacific Area under the higher command of United States Forces and to be reorganized and re-equipped in accordance with United States tables of organization.
- (c) The Division to provide the framework of this Force to be selected by the Army Commander with such substitution of selected units, if necessary, as may be required to ensure countrywide representation.
- (d) The Division and the personnel selected for these duties to be brought back to Canada, granted one month's leave and refitted in Canada prior to departure.
- (e) Action already initiated with the Chief of Staff United States Army regarding the role of this Canadian Force in conjunction with United States Forces, to be completed.

2. Considerations

- (a) Proposed area of operations and the acceptance of the United States Command have already been agreed to by Cabinet War Committee as being most appropriate from viewpoint of Canadian interest.
- (b) Desirable that battle-experienced troops should be used in participation with United States Forces. Because of this and as sufficient trained personnel are not available in Canada, it is necessary that bulk of the Force be selected from those now serving overseas.
- (c) Proposed size of the Force is that which can most appropriately be made available under these conditions of selection. Estimated that approximately six months will be required for its concentration, re-organization and re-equipping in Canada.

...../2

3. Manpower

Selection of the necessary personnel for this Force will be made before proceeding to Canada for re-organization. Personnel will be found (i) from suitable personnel expressing a preference to undertake this duty and who are willing to forego their priority of demobilization, and (ii) by detaching, if necessary, those with low priority of demobilization and in the case of specialists, regardless of priority (if necessary).

4. Proposal has been

- (a) Recommended by Chief of the General Staff.
- (b) Concurred in by the Chiefs of Staff.
- (c) Concurred in by the Minister of National Defence.

GENERAL STAFF
(Oprs 192-M)
20 Nov 44

The Cabinet on 20 Nov 44 gave approval to these proposals for Canadian Army participation in the war against Japan (H.Q.S. 9131, vol 1: M.S. to C.G.S., 25 Nov 44).

CANADIAN PLANNING TEAM DRAFT OUTLINE PLAN
FOR CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE
(As amended 28 Jul 45)

Part One

The organization, training and maintenance of the force (including three months replacements) prior to departure from North America.


The following extracts are from:

Section 2 - Sequence of Events

- 22 Jul 45 - Assembly of C.A.P.F. training cadres in Canada.
- 9 Aug 45 - Movement of cadres to training establishments in U.S.A.
- 1 Sep 45 - Initial movement of C.A.P.F. advance parties, total 500, to CAMP BRECKINRIDGE.
- 22 Sep 45 - C.A.P.F. moves to CAMP BRECKINRIDGE.
- 1 Oct 45 - C.A.P.F. moves to CAMP BRECKINRIDGE.

Section 3 - Troop List C.A.P.F. (First Revision) 29 Jun 45

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Inf Div	787	15,051	15,838
Tk Bn	39	685	724
Total forward area units	941	16,128	17,069
Total Rear Area Units	324	1,762	2,086
Total-Units	1,265	17,890	19,155
Theatre Overhead Cdn	52	993	1,045*
Initial Repls	605	9,195	9,800*
Aggregate Force	1,922	28,078	30,000


Section 4 - Channels of Comd and Comn(a) Purely Canadian Matters

* Of these the Infantry accounted for 7,708 all ranks.

(b) Training and Operations



(c) Local Administration



Section 5 - Training

- (1) The division and three months replacements to train at CAMP BRECKINRIDGE under U.S. Army Ground Forces and 2nd U.S. Army.
- (2) Training cadres for employment in instructing force to be trained in U.S.A., under U.S. Army Ground Forces arrangements.
- (3) Of the three months replacements with C.A.P.F., one third are to be carried on the strength of, and trained by appropriate divisional units, and two thirds with the replacement depot.

Section 6 - System of Supply, Clothing and Equipment

- (1) Equipment will be provided on the basis of U.S.A. T./O. & E. Scales, except special items of Canadian supply [chiefly battle dress, berets, badges and flashes]

- (2) U.S. Army training equipment will be used.
- (3) Rations will be as for a normal U.S. Army Division.
- (4) The overall cost will be borne by the Canadian Government based on a capitation rate, excluding these items [of Canadian supply.]
- (7) Officers and warrant officers will be allowed clothing allowances, on rates to be determined.

Section 11 - System of Providing and Maintaining Personnel

The system to be on a field return basis as employed by Cdn Army in other theatres, modified where necessary to fit U.S. procedure.

Section 12 - Medical

Annexure I - Immunizations

- (1) Small pox.
- (2) Typhoid.
- (3) Tetanus.
- (4) Typhus and Cholera - Only if indicated in movement order for departure from U.S.
- (5) Plague - Only to personnel under serious threat of exposure.
- (6) Yellow Fever - Not required for present active war theatre.

Section 13 - Discipline, Arrest, Confinement

Cdn Military Law and Regulations to apply. U.S. Military Law will not be applicable to Cdn troops. Cdn personnel to be tried and punishments awarded by Cdn Officers and courts - [aside from serious civil offences.] Powers - To be similar to those granted a corps commander overseas, with Comd C.A.P.F. Base Headquarters and Deputy Divisional Comd having powers similar to Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General a Cdn Corps; other officers of C.A.P.F. powers similar to those for an equivalent appointment in the Cdn Army Overseas.

Annexure I to Section 13 - Discipline and Detention Barracks

(Extract from Memorandum on "Legal Implications" dated 14 Jun 45 prepared by Deputy Judge Advocate-General, National Defence Headquarters after consultation with U.S. Authorities)

Discipline - An Act was passed on 30th June 1944, by the 78th Congress of the U.S. (Public Law 384 #) which provides that upon the request of an Officer Commanding a friendly foreign force, which has service courts of appropriate jurisdiction within the U.S.A., the American authorities may arrest any member of such force and deliver him to the foreign force for trial in the service court of such force within the U.S.A.

Under the provisions of Public Law 384 the Canadian service authorities will be able to administer Canadian Military Law in respect to the member of the force in the same manner and to the same extent as they would were such force serving in Canada.

Detention and Detention Barracks - Under U.S. Public Law 384 persons sentenced to imprisonment by a service court of a friendly foreign force may be confined in the disciplinary barracks, guardhouse or other place of detention of the U.S. armed forces or in a U.S. penitentiary or other penal institution at the expense of the power on whose behalf the prisoner is detained.

It will be necessary, however, to provide by Order-in-Council that Canadian personnel if placed in arrest or sentenced to a punishment of imprisonment may be kept in custody of such places as may be available for such purposes by the U.S. authorities.

Section 14 - Pay

Cdn field system of pay to be continued except that officers will be paid by use of pay books instead of advance books. Paymasters have been added to the troop list on the normal Cdn scale.

Existing regulations permitting the payment of \$125.00 per individual per month without charging exchange to apply.

Detached personnel to be paid by U.S. authorities through use of Cdn pay books.

Japanese Campaign Pay to be paid to personnel of C.A.P.F. in the U.S.A.

Deferred pay should not be applicable during period in U.S.A.

Section 15 - Welfare

Special Services - To be organized on U.S. T/O's and use U.S. equipment.

Post Exchange - To be operated by U.S. personnel for the benefit of all units on the post including

H.Q.S. 9131-4, vol 1 contains a copy of U.S. Public Law 384.

C.A.P.F. Arrangements to be made for the stocking of Cdn brands of cigarettes, duty and excise tax free, for sale to Cdns. No requirement for Cdn unit canteens. Beer to be available at the post exchange. Depending upon final decision of U.S. authorities C.A.P.F. to be entitled to distributions from the U.S. Post Trust Fund. .

U.S.O. Facilities - Will be supplied by the U.S. in the same way as for U.S. redeployed forces in U.S.A.

Section 16 - Legal, Claims, Financial, Etc

Command - Reciprocal powers of command on lower levels to be arranged as recommended by D.J.A.G. at Annexure I. This requires the passing of an Order-in-Council making orders of U.S. ofrs to Cdns under their command, legal orders from a Cdn standpoint.

Claims - To be investigated in the first instance by U.S. claims officers, and passed upon by Cdn Claims Commission Washington.

Financial - All expenses except the pay and allowances of C.A.P.F. personnel, and the cost of certain equipment to be used solely in Cda, to be paid under a capitation rate being worked out between the Deputy Minister and U.S. War Department.

Annexure I to Section 16 - Command, Claims

(Extracts from Memorandum on "Legal Implications" op cit, [Cf Annexure I to Section 13])

...I am of the opinion that a Canadian soldier serving in a joint U.S. Canadian force who refused to obey the orders of an American officer or N.C.O. could in an ordinary case where no special circumstances were involved be convicted under Section 40 and possibly under Section 9 or 11 of the Army Act, if he had been ordered by his Canadian superior officer to obey the orders of the American officer or N.C.O. concerned. There is sufficient doubt in this, however, to make it adviseable, in my opinion to pass an Order-in-Council similar in this respect to those made in connection with the Greenlight [Kiska] and 1st Special Service Forces. [P.C. 5012 dated 18 Jun 43 and P.C. 629 dated 26 Jan 43]

Section 17 - Promotions, Honours and Awards, Leave, Etc

Promotions:

- (a) Officers - U.S. authorities to have no jurisdiction.
- (b) Other ranks - Recommend that the same system as in Europe be used.

Honours and Awards:

- (a) U.S. Decorations - Immediate steps should be taken to obtain blanket authority for members of the force to accept such decorations.
- (b) British Decorations - To be handled as for commands in Canada. Arrangements should include provision for the awards to U.S. personnel.

Leave - No leave to Canada will be possible except on compassionate grounds similar to those on which personnel were returned to Canada from overseas.

Families, Etc - All ranks of C.A.P.F. to be warned that these will not be permitted to move to CAMP BRECKINRIDGE area.

Section 18 - Public Relations

To accord due publicity to the C.A.P.F. public relations group will become operational on establishment in Kentucky.

It is hoped to commence publication of The Maple Leaf, which will be the main source of Canadian news for the C.A.P.F., at the earliest possible date near CAMP BRECKINRIDGE.

A press liaison officer will be permanently attached to the C.A.P.F. Base Headquarters and Headquarters 6 Cdn Inf Div.

Appendix "C"

to Report No 16

CANADIAN PLANNING TEAM DRAFT OUTLINE PLAN
FOR CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE

(As amended 28 Jul 45)

Part Three

The organization for training, accounting and despatch of replacements beyond those to accompany the force.

The following are extracts from:

Section 1 - General Outline

Basis

Plan is based upon the despatch to U.S.A. of personnel who have completed basic (8 weeks) training in Cda along U.S. lines, for final period of 11 weeks advanced training. This period of training in U.S.A. to be longer for certain specialists and technicians. Upon completion of U.S. training, personnel to be returned to Cda or, during period C.A.P.F. is in U.S.A., may be sent direct to the Force. Training will be the responsibility of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces; administration the general responsibility of Cda.

Scale

...input into U.S. training centres of 3000 per month commencing 1 Oct 45 and 2350 per month commencing 1 Jun 46 will be necessary. This to produce 2500 and 2000 per month respectively, available 12-14 weeks later depending upon disposition.

Section 3 - Training

Phase One - Canada

All basic elementary training which is common to all arms (branch immaterial) including drill, discipline, fundamental (orientation) training, physical hardening, and fieldcraft, etc, to be carried out in training centres in Canada. This would present few equipment problems as the only weapons required would be rifle, carbine and rocket launcher (bazooka). Syllabus to be drawn up in consultation with G-3 U.S. Army Ground Forces to conform to U.S. Mobilization Training Programmes. ...U.S. to supply small training cadres to assist.

Phase Two - U.S.A.

Corps training and all technical tradesmen and specialist training to be carried out in U.S. replacement training centres and/or schools for arms concerned. A Canadian contribution to the training staffs to be made...

Appendix "D"

to Report No 16.

COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE

11 Jul 45

H.Q.S. 9131, vol 5: D.S.D. to D. Org, 13 Jul 45 refers to proposed amendments to authorized Canadian Tables of Organization and Equipment (i.e. War Establishments) for the C.A.P.F. and states:

Further detail with regard to these proposed amendments is now known, although as yet unauthorized. The attached Chart lists by arms and services the following:

Part A: Units of the 6th Canadian Infantry Division

Part B: Corps and Army Units of the C.A.P.F.

Part C: Base units of the C.A.F.F.

and indicates the strs to which units may mobilize. When the strs shown in the "Permissive Mobilization Strength" column is less than that authorized by the current Cdn T./O. & E., the latter str may be used.

The following pages contain information obtained from this Chart, which differs only in minor detail from the official troop list given in Section 3 of the Draft Outline Plan as amended 28 Jul 45.

COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE

6TH CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION

11 Jul 45

ARM OR SERVICE	FULL DESIGNATION	PERMISSIVE	
		MOB STR	O.R.
	Offrs		
H.Q. Units			
	Headquarters 6th Canadian Infantry Division	42	120
	Headquarters Special Troops 6th Canadian Infantry Division	2	7
	Headquarters Company 6th Canadian Infantry Division	4	100
	6th Canadian Order of Battle Team	1	2
	No 6 Canadian Photo Interpreter Team	2	5
Armd			
	6th Canadian Infantry Division Reconnaissance Troop (The Royal Montreal Regiment)	6	143
Arty			
	Headquarters 6th Canadian Division Artillery	17	113
	Headquarters Battery 6th Canadian Division Artillery		
	1st Canadian Field Artillery Battalion, R.C.A. [incl H.Q., H.Q. Bty, and A, B and C Btys]	31	433
	2nd Canadian Field Artillery Battalion, R.C.A.	31	433
	3rd Canadian Field Artillery Battalion, R.C.A.	31	433
	4th Canadian Field Artillery Battalion, R.C.A.	25	428
	Anti-Tank Company, R.C.A., 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment	5	96
	Anti-Tank Company, R.C.A., 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment	5	96
	Anti-Tank Company, R.C.A., 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment	5	96
	Cannon Company, 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment (The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.))	5	96
	Cannon Company, 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment (The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.))	5	96
	Cannon Company, 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment (The Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.))	5	96
Engrs			
	6th Canadian Engineer Combat Battalion, R.C.E. [incl Headquarters and Service Company, A, B, and C Companies]	28	593
Sigs			
	6th Canadian Signal Company, R.C. Sigs	11	295
Inf			
	Headquarters 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment	14	161
	Headquarters Company 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment		
	1st Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Royal Canadian Regiment) [incl H.Q., H.Q. Coy, three Rifle Companies, and Heavy Weapons Company]	37	977

2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)	37	977
3rd Canadian Infantry Battalion (48th Highlanders of Canada)	37	977
Headquarters 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment	14	161
Headquarters Company 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment		
1st Canadian Infantry Battalion (Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry)	37	977
2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada)	37	977
3rd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Loyal Edmonton Regiment)	37	977
Headquarters 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment	14	161
Headquarters Company 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment		
1st Canadian Infantry Battalion (Royal 22e Regiment)	37	977
2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Carleton and York Regiment)	37	977
3rd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The West Nova Scotia Regiment)	37	977
S. & T.		
6th Canadian Quartermaster Company, R.C.A.S.C.	10	176
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment	8	135
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment	8	135
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment	8	135
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 1st Canadian Field Artillery Battalion	4	70
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 2nd Canadian Field Artillery Battalion	4	70
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 3rd Canadian Field Artillery Battalion	4	70
Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 4th Canadian Field Artillery Battalion	4	72
Med [incl Chaplains]		
Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 6th Canadian Infantry Division (incl 1 Chaplain att)	2	12
Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 1st Canadian Infantry Regiment (incl 3 Chaplains)	11	124
Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 2nd Canadian Infantry Regiment (incl 3 Chaplains)	11	124
Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 3rd Canadian Infantry Regiment (incl 3 Chaplains)	11	124
Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 6th Canadian Division Artillery (incl 2 Chaplains)	7	49
Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 6th Canadian Engineer Combat Battalion	1	14
6th Canadian Medical Battalion, R.C.A.M.C. (incl 1 Chaplain) [incl Headquarters, A, B, C, and D Companies]	45	423
E. & M.E.		
6th Canadian Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, R.C.E.M.E.	9	141

Pro	6th Canadian Military Police Platoon, C Pro C.	7	169
Misc	No 34 Canadian Military Band	..	29
	No 35 Canadian Military Band	..	29
Total Divisional Troops		790	15,058

CORPS & ARMY TROOPS

H.Q. Units	Canadian Liaison Increment Corps	5	5
	Canadian Liaison Increment Second Army	15	10
	Canadian Liaison Increment Army (A.R.C.O.)	10	15
Armd	22nd Canadian Tank Battalion (The Canadian Grenadier Guards), C.A.C. [incl Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Light Tank Company, and three Medium Tank Companies]	33	556 *
S. & T.	Service Company, R.C.A.S.C., 22nd Canadian Tank Battalion	4	111
Med	Medical Detachment, R.C.A.M.C., 22nd Canadian Tank Battalion	2	18
	No 28 Canadian Evacuation Hospital, R.C.A.M.C.	38	218
	N./S.	40	..
Ord	No 1 Canadian Laundry Unit, R.C.O.C.	1	13
Misc	No 6 Canadian Graves Registration Platoon	1	76
	No 1 Canadian Special Service Platoon	1	24
	No 2 Canadian Special Service Platoon	1	24
Total Corps & Army Troops		151	1,070

BASE UNITS

H.Q. Units	2nd Echelon Canadian Army Pacific Force	34	381
	Canadian Liaison Increment - U.S.A. Q.M. Depots	25	25

* Each of the three Medium Tank Companies was allowed 5 offrs and 112 O.R. In the original chart these figures were not multiplied by three, an error which was repeated in the total and also in the grand total on the next page. Figures shown herein have been corrected.

BASE UNITS (Cont'd)

Engrs			
	1st Canadian Engineer Service Platoon (Utilities)	5	75
Sigs			
	No 1 Canadian Signal Detachment, R.C. Sigs	2	60
Postal			
	No 1 Canadian Postal Unit (Serial J), C.P.C.	1	19
Pro			
	No 1 Canadian Police Section, C. Pro C.	1	35
Misc			
	No 1 Canadian Machine Records Unit (Type X)	2	29
	No 6 Canadian Public Relations Group	15	60
	No 1 Canadian Concert Party	1	29
	No 2 Canadian Concert Party	1	29
	No 1 Canadian Replacement Depot	30	166
	No 1 Canadian Replacement Battalion	8	23
	No 2 Canadian Replacement Battalion	8	23
	No 3 Canadian Replacement Battalion	8	23
	No 4 Canadian Replacement Battalion	8	23
	No 5 Canadian Replacement Battalion	8	23
	No 1 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 2 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 3 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 4 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 5 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 6 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 7 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 8 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 9 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 10 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 11 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 12 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 13 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 14 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 15 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 16 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 17 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 18 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 19 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 20 Canadian Replacement Company	4	31
	No 3 Canadian Special Service Platoon	1	24
	No 4 Canadian Special Service Platoon	1	24
Total Base Troops		239	1,691
Total C.A.F.F. * 1,180		17,819	*

* See footnote to preceding page.

Appendix "E"

to Report No 16.

SUMMARY OF C.A.P.F. ELECTORS

Corrected to : Overseas report as at 14 Jul 45;
Canadian report as at 16 Jul 45.

Electors in the most select group:

Overseas - Personnel of Pulhems
1112221, Y.O.B. 1912-26,
single only.

Canada - Personnel of Pulhems
1112221, Y.O.B. 1912-26,
married or single.

<u>Corps*</u>	<u>Overseas</u>		<u>Canada</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
<u>Male Electors in Most Select Group</u>						
C.A.C.	164	3,017	115	647	279	3,664
R.C.A.	216	3,166	124	722	340	3,888
C.I.C.	424	8,904	572	9,435	996	18,339
.....						
Total Males	1,205	22,679	1,581	13,707	2,796	36,386

Male Electors in All Other Groups

C.A.C.	160	651	122	538	282	1,189
R.C.A.	131	1,104	355	966	486	2,070
C.I.C.	329	2,302	884	3,753	1,213	6,055
.....						
Total Males	1,505	9,954	3,784	15,841	5,289	25,795

Male Electors Combined

C.A.C.	324	3,668	237	1,185	561	4,853
R.C.A.	347	4,270	479	1,688	826	5,958
C.I.C.	753	11,206	1,456	13,188	2,209	24,394
.....						
Total Males	2,720	32,633	5,365	29,548	8,085	62,181

Female Electors All Groups

R.C.A.M.C. N./S.	700	..	712	..	1,412	..
C.W.A.C.	30	615	416	5,460	446	6,075

Total Male and Female Electors All Groups

3,450	33,248	6,493	35,008	9,943	68,256
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Note: Statistics are from reports on file H.Q.S. 9131, vol 7.

Appendix "F"

to Report No 16

COMPARISON OF MALE ELECTORS IN MOST
SELECT GROUP WITH REQUIREMENTS OF C.A.P.F.

Corrected to : Overseas returns as at 14 Jul 45.
Canadian returns as at 16 Jul 45:

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>O.R.</u>
<u>Approximate requirements to move to U.S.A.</u>			<u>Present Surpluses</u>	
C.A.C.	57	1,139	222	2,525
R.C.A.	253	2,735	27	1,153
C.I.C.	562	14,999	434	3,340
.....				
Total Males	1,513	27,435	1,283	8,951

<u>Replacements for first eight months</u>			<u>Total requirements</u>	
C.A.C.	110	1,106	167	2,245
R.C.A.	134	1,082	337	3,817
C.I.C.	1,269	24,115	1,831	39,114
.....				
Total Males	1,665	28,735	3,178	56,170

Electors in most select group compared with approximate requirements

	<u>Surpluses</u>		<u>Deficiencies</u>	
C.A.C.	112	1,419	..	..
R.C.A.	..	71	47	..
C.I.C.	..	..	835	20,775
.....	..	..	...	
Total Males	..	..	332	19,784

Note: These figures are taken from reports on file H.Q.S.
9131, vol 7.