

18 Jun 44, 1630 hours. Klinckowstroem - Wentzell

- K: The Corps requests to be informed as to which sector of the Green Line it is expected to occupy, in order that it may concern itself with the development of the sector. According to present information, the Green line is in no condition for defence. There is no barbed wire; no mines have been laid; the fields of fire have not been cleared; some command posts are begun, while the greater part are but half completed. The Corps considers it essential that position construction officers from the divisions that are later to defend these sectors be detailed immediately, with appropriate staffs for the sectors in question, so that construction work may make real progress.
- W: The construction of the Green Line is not the affair of the Corps; the present task is to hold the Frieda Line.[¶] The Corps should keep its eyes to the front.
- K: The Corps points out that, in spite of many timely requests on the part of the Corps, neither in the case of the withdrawal to the Dora Line and to the Senger Riegel, nor of the withdrawal to the "C" position did the Army give directives or instructions regarding a probable withdrawal and an allotment of sectors in these lines. On these occasions the Army spoke of battles of mobile warfare, with the result that neither the Senger Riegel nor the "C" position could be held. The Corps therefore urgently requests immediate directives for the construction and later occupation of the Green Line, so that it may make timely reconnaissances with a view to future commitment, strengthening and improved construction of the line. - As the movements in the Corps sector are proceeding according to plan, the Corps is definitely in a position to conduct frontal operations, and at the same time to take over construction work in the Green Line.
- W: We will again submit the case, but it cannot be expected that agreement will be found at higher levels.

(handsigned) Graf Klinckowstroem

(Photostat and Translation: 981A10.
(D162)) (G.M.D.S. - 55779/10, 51 Mtn
Corps, W.D.2, Vol "C" of Appx, Appx
c801, 18 Jun 44)

¶ See para 33 below.

WITHDRAWAL TO THE ARNO (20 Jun. - 17 Jul)

(a) Defence and Loss of the Trasimene Positions
(20 - 30 Jun)

31. Despite the constant stream of sharply worded directives exhorting O.B.SW to hold the Albert-Frieda Line at all costs, the German High Command knew well enough that this could not be done for long with the forces on hand.* While on the inner wings of the two Armies the remnants of the old elite divisions put up strong resistance against mounting pressure, the focal area of the Allied drive at first was on the right wing and the center of Fourteenth Army where some of the stop-gap formations were relatively helpless in the face of the determined advance of Fifth Army. Subsequently the left wing of Fourteenth Army was forced back as well, and Tenth Army had to withdraw its right wing in order to maintain a continuous front.

32. On 21 Jun, 38 Irish Bde (78 Brit Div) and 11 Cdn Armd Regt were pushing forward between Lake Chiusi and Lake Trasimene in the sector of 334 Inf Div, took Sanfaticchio and Carraia, and later in the day Pucciarelli. The Canadians in the sector remained unidentified however until 23 Jun when the daily Intelligence Report O.B.SW carried the following item:

1 Cdn Armd Bde with 11 Cdn Armd Regt
5 kms N.E. Vaiano.
(G.M.D.S. - 64832/4a, W.D., O.B.SW, Appx 17-23
Jun, folio 424, 23 Jun 44)

The vague allusions to a possible commitment of 1 Cdn Corps which had cropped up in the telephone conversations of the preceding days were now replaced by a definite but erroneous statement in the main synopsis of Tenth Army's War Diary:

23 Jun Renewed large-scale fighting must be expected momentarily. The decisive factor for the location of the center of gravity of the attack will be the commitment of the Canadian Corps which is now being concentrated behind the front. The Army expects interpolation of the Canadian Corps in the area west of Lake Trasimene.
(G.M.D.S. 55291/1 - Tenth Army, W.D. 7,
23 Jun 44)

* On 12 May O.B.SW had 22 almost complete divisions at his disposal; one month later his forces had been depleted to the point where he had 10 divisions almost fit for action and 16 divisions with the combat value of one reinforced regiment each. Therefore WFST came to the conclusion that only for a limited time would O.B.SW be in a position to hold the enemy in the Albert line. (For complete analysis see: Schramm, op cit, Translation, p. 65)

33. On 21 Jun 51 Mtn Corps received permission to fall back to the Frieda Line.[⊞] (G.M.D.S. - 55291/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, 21 Jun 44). The exact course of the line as well as the dispositions of the troops in the line on 24 Jun were shown in considerable detail on a map which is being retained in photostatic form (981A10. (D163)). (G.M.D.S. - 55779/5, 51 Mtn Corps, sit maps 11 May - 25 Jun 44, 24 Jun 44). The events in the area of Fourteenth Army have been detailed in: "Fifth Army History", Part VI. For the sake of completeness however, a photostatic copy is being retained of a trace showing the exact course of the Albert Line and the Anton-Riegel in the area of Fourteenth Army on 21 Jun 44 (981A10. (D164)). (G.M.D.S. - 64832/4a, W.D., O.B.SW, Appx 17-23 Jun 44, folio 244, 21 Jun 44)

34. According to a location statement of O.B.SW the fighting forces on 22 Jun were deployed from right to left in the following order:

Fourteenth Army	75 Inf Corps	16 S.S. Pz Gren Div
		19 G.A.F. Div
	14 Pz Corps	162(Turc) Inf Div
		3 Pz Gren Div
		20 G.A.F. Div
		90 Pz Gren Div
	1 Para Corps	29 Pz Gren Div
		26 Pz Div
		4 Para Div
		356 Inf Div
Tenth Army	76 Pz Corps	Para Pz Div H.G.
		1 Para Div
		334 Inf Div
		15 Pz Gren Div
		305 Inf Div
		94 Inf Div ^{⊞⊞}

⊞ Frieda Line: Valfabbrica - 2 km S.W. Nocera - Camerino - 1 km N.W. Caldarola - Tolentino - along Route 77 to coast at Porto Civitanova.

⊞⊞ The absorption of 94 Inf Div by 305 Inf Div had been rescinded. Tel cons 22 Jun: "The dissolution of 94 Inf Div has been countermanded, the High Command has refused concurrence and has promised 800 replacements per regiment". (G.M.D.S. - 55291/6, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 22-26 Jun, Appx 699, 22 Jun 44)

51 Mtn Corps 44 Inf Div[✱]
 5 Mtn Div
 71 Inf Div
 278 Inf Div

In rear areas for reorganization:

715 Inf Div
334 Inf Div^{✱✱}
65 Inf Div
362 Inf Div

For locations and further details see Photostat: (981A10. (D165)). (G.M.D.S. 65832/4a, W.D., O.B.SW, Appx 17-23 Jun, folio 337, 22 Jun 44). The locations of Tenth Army and 1 Para Corps may be found on Photostat: (981A10. (D166)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/15, Tenth Army, sit maps 11-25 Jun, 22 Jun 44)

35. On 24 Jun the pressure of 13 Brit Corps between Lake Chiusi and Lake Trasimene increased considerably. Supported by the divisional artillery of 4 and 78 Brit Divs, 12 Cdn Armd Regt and 28 Brit Inf Bde (4 Brit Div) attacked near Vaiano. All German reports mentioned violent fighting, heavy casualties and deep penetrations in the area of 334 Inf and 1 Para Divs and, indeed, seemed to show relief over the fact that the front was not torn up completely. 1 Cdn Corps with 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div had been reported from the area Todi - Foligno - Terni (G.M.D.S. - 64832/7, W.D., O.B.SW, folio 23, 24 Jun 44). The telephone conversations were filled with anxious speculations regarding the intended role of the Corps. (Photostat 981A10. (D167A)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/6, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 22-26 Jun 44, Appx 746, Record of tel cons for 24 Jun 44). At 0920 hours General Herr, Cmdr 76 Pz Corps, said to v. Vietinghoff:

... Now there have been prisoners taken from 4 Brit Div and three Canadians from an armoured brigade. The division has not been confirmed yet, but it can be assumed that these two divisions will be committed at this focal point...

1845 hours Runkel (C. of S. 76 Pz Corps) - Wentzell

... Runkel has just returned from 334 Inf Div. Once more they have fought well but they have also shed a good deal of hair. The infantry forces of the division are now a mere 350 men, so that a battalion from Rodt (15 Pz Gren Div) had to be taken there. The Para and H.G. people have also been extended to that area (2 Bn 3 Para

✱ 44 Inf Div at the time was in process of being relieved by 114 Jg Div.

✱✱ Less elements with 76 Pz Corps

Regt; and Recce Bn H.G. to Iozzuolo). According to Runkel the attackers must be from 4 Brit Div; 78 Brit Div has been beaten so often that the question is: 4 Brit or 1 Cdn Inf Div? 334 Inf Div has lost six Panthers ... One of these days the Canadian Corps is going to attack and then our center will explode ... (ibid)

1820 hours Wentzell - Roettiger

W: Furthermore the situation of Canstein is not clear (Fhr v. Canstein, 1 Ops Offr 334 Inf Div). There is a terrific attack at Vaiano.

R: Yes.

W: My Intelligence Officer tells me that it is 1 Cdn Inf Div; I believe it to be 4 Brit Div.

R: Maybe they are South Africans.

W: They are nearer to Chiusi.

R: Or 78 Brit Div.

W: They are no longer able to carry out that kind of attack. Personally I believe it is 4 Brit Div, but my Intelligence officer says: "Only Canadians attack like that" - and after all 5 Cdn Armd Div has been identified. ... (ibid)

The telephone conversations of the day dealt with many interesting subjects. Anyone reading the recurring reports of "falling back to the Albert Line" cannot help wondering whether in the face of the stern orders from the High Command, the Albert Line in some sectors was not wherever the troops were falling back to at the moment. Some light was shed on the subject when at 1940 hours General v. Vietinghoff reported the heavy fighting in the area of 334 Inf Div and the left wing of 1 Para Div:

v. Vietinghoff - Kesselring

v.V.: ... Under certain circumstances it may be necessary to withdraw to the mountain position behind the Albert Line.

K.: My C. of S. has already reported in that sense. For the moment I am unable to give my consent. I cannot prevent my Commanders from entertaining such thoughts but but it would be a catastrophe if they were passed along to the lower levels. You know under what suspicion I am working here, and if you wish to become my successor you will pass these ideas along to lower levels.

v.V.: Oh no! But unfortunately at the time the more advanced positions were called "Albert Line" whereas the other one is much better and tankproof (ibid)

36. The events of the next day were summarized in the War Diary of Tenth Army as follows:

25 Jun West of Lake Trasimene the defensive fighting continues with unabated violence. The greatest pressure was along Route 71. Although 334 Inf Div was again able to prevent a breakthrough, its fighting strength has further dwindled down. For this reason the commitment of 15 Pz Gren Div on the west side of Lake Trasimene is being considered; this in view of the fact that east of the lake hitherto only 6 Brit Armd Div has been encountered. A further saving of forces east of the lake will be obtained by occupying the "Albert-Riegel"^{**} in the general line: North-east corner Lake Trasimene - M. Tezio - Casa Castalda.^{**} With the occupation of the "Albert-Riegel" the front of 51 Mtn Corps will be extended westwards; 44 Inf Div will be committed as a compact formation on the west bank of the Tiber. (G.M.D.S. - 55291/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, 25 Jun 44)

The critical situation west of Lake Trasimene was discussed at length in the day's telephone conversations. Papers found on a British Lt-Col who had been captured in a disabled tank^{***} convinced the Germans that 4 and 78 Brit Divs and 1 Cdn Armd Bde with three regiments were alone in the area between the two lakes. This according to Wentzell left the Germans still with the task of worrying about the intentions of the Canadian Corps. At 1855 hours the question of the withdrawal to the Albert-Riegel was being discussed between Wentzell and Roettiger:

* Final course of Albert Riegel: Northeast corner of Lake Trasimene - S. Vito - Castel Rigone - M. Tenna - Menestrello - M. Tezio - height N.W. of Prozonchio - la Ventia - M. Castellaccio - Fratticiola Selvatica. (from document 981A10. (D170), introduced in para 37 below)

** M. Tezio: ITALY 1:100,000, Sheet 122, map ref 6602; Casa Castalda: Sheet 123, map ref 902018

*** 1915 hours 25 Jun 44. Tel cons v. Vietinghoff - Kesselring

v.V.: Unfortunately the Canadians (1 Cdn Corps) have not been located. The whole interrogation has led to nothing ... The prisoners, a Lt-Col and a Major, are a battalion commander and an artillery commander of 78 Brit Div, but they have not given any information ... (ibid)

R.: The decision of the Fuehrer has just been received. What you wished for has been forbidden.

W.: Forbidden.

R.: It has just come in. Preparations may be made, but nothing else. Maybe it will be lost in action.

W.: I know what you mean. (Dann wissen wir Bescheid)

(Photostat: 981A10.(D167B) (G.M.D.S. - 55291/6, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 22-26 Jun, Appx 771, tel cons 25 Jun 44)

37. On 26 Jun Eighth Army increased its pressure on both sides of Lake Trasimene but the deciding events took place in the area of Fourteenth Army where the Allied exploitation of German weakness paid off in terms of deep penetrations. During the morning the two Army commanders were in telephonic communication and while v. Vietinghoff mentioned the violent fighting in the area west of Lake Trasimene, Lemelsen said: "There are no words to express what is going on, he is breaking through on the coast and is extending his gains in the center. Everything goes wrong. There are no reserves to save the situation". Both commanders now were demanding permission to withdraw. (G.M.D.S. - 55291/6, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 22-26 Jun, Appx 794, tel cons 26 Jun 44). At 1700 hours O.B.SW issued the order for a general withdrawal; Tenth Army received permission to fall back to the Albert-Riegel while offering bitter resistance in the forefield. Pertinent details and map references appear in the following documents:

Photostat 981A10.(D168) O.B.SW, 26 Jun, 1700 hours, Operations Order for Tenth and Fourteenth Armies.

Photostat 981A10.(D169) Tenth Army, 26 Jun, 2040 hours, Operations Order for 76 Pz Corps;

Photostat 981A10.(D170) Tenth Army, 26 Jun, 2225 hours, Operations Order for 76 Pz and 51 Mtn Corps.

(G.M.D.S. - 55291/6, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 22-26 Jun, Appx 795, 796, 797, 26 Jun 44)

38. On the same day General v. Vietinghoff congratulated 22 Flak Bde on the occasion of their first anniversary of existence and 22 Flak Bde returned the compliment by submitting a location trace. (Photostat 981A10.(D171). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/7, Tenth Army, W.D., Appx 27 Jun-3 Jul, Appx 855, 28 Jun 44). - According to a detailed breakdown of the replacements received by Tenth Army during the period from 1-26 Jun, the Army had received 7765 men, a further 2121 men had been received but

lent to Fourteenth Army or Armeecabteilung v. Zangen, an additional 3,385 men had been reported as being en route to the Army. (Photostat 981A10. (D172). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/6, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 22-26 Jun, Appx 802, 26 Jun 44)*

39. The continuing retreat of Fourteenth Army forced Tenth Army to conform by further withdrawals of the right wing. (O.B.SW, Operations Order for Tenth Army, Photostat 981A10. (D.173) (G.M.D.S.- 55291/7, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 26 Jun - 3 Jul, Appx 843, 28 Jun 44). A location statement for both Armies appeared in the morning report of O.B.SW on 28 Jun (Photostat 981A10. (D174)). (G.M.D.S. - 64832/7, W.D., O.B.SW, Appx 24-30 Jun 44, folios 234 and 235, 28 Jun 44). The developments of 29 and 30 Jun were reflected in the War Diary of Tenth Army by the following entries:

29 Jun Owing to the heavy casualties of the preceding days the enemy limits his activities to small-scale assaults. To maintain contact with Fourteenth Army it has once more become necessary to carry out a withdrawal west of Lake Trasimene. ... (G.M.D.S. - 55291/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, 29 Jun 44)

30 Jun The enemy resumed his attacks but not with the violence of the previous days. The situation of Fourteenth Army demands a further withdrawal of Tenth Army. After a categorical refusal at 1405 hours, O.B.SW at 1715 hours issues the order for withdrawal during the night

* During these days much armour was lost on both sides and several squadrons of 25 Cdn Armd Delivery Regt were in the area delivering tanks. In this connection the following remarks appeared in German Intelligence reports:

26 Jun Prisoner of War information:

In addition to 11, 12 and 14 Armd Regts, 25 Armd Regt, (previously believed to be a part of 4 Cdn Armd Div) is said to belong to 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde. (Note: The Germans evidently had not yet found out that this designation had been 1 Cdn Armd Bde for more than six months.)

(From captured documents) 27 Jun Organization of 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde (sic):
11 Regt (Ontario)
12 Regt (T.R.R.)
14 Regt (Calgary)
25 Regt (Elgin)

The latter replacing disabled tanks;
Insignia: Yellow maple-leaf on black-red-black square.

(G.M.D.S. - 64832/7, W.D., O.B.SW, Appx 24-30 Jun, folio 123, Ic report 26 Jun, folio 187, Ic report 27 Jun 44)

30 Jun - 1 Jul. ... The last practical line based on Lake Trasimene has now been reached. ... Once the open country has been reached on the right wing, protracted resistance in the new positions will not be possible until the more favourable terrain near Arezzo has been reached. (ibid, 30 Jun)

40. During the month of June Army Group 'C' was increasingly harassed by well organized guerillas. The situation was described by the Intelligence Officer of the Army Group in a memorandum dated 30 Jun. In the closing paragraph the situation was appraised as follows:

In summation it may be said that the guerilla situation in the area of O.B.SW has worsened sharply. The exceedingly small German forces available for the purpose have been unable to carry out effective counter-measures. Foreign troops, including a great part of the Italian formations, have shown themselves to be most unreliable; they are a source of danger rather than a help in the fight against guerillas. Apart from their growth in numerical strength, the guerillas have become better organized and are led according to a definite plan. They have an excellent intelligence service in closest cooperation with Anglo-American Intelligence. It will be the aim of the Anglo-Americans to use the guerillas for the purpose of increasing the difficulties of defending the Apennine region, and by the occupation of the mountain ranges on the borders gradually to gain control over the main traffic and communication arteries in the Italian area. (Photostat 981A10 (D202)) (G.M.D.S. - 64832/7, W.D., O.B.SW, Appx 24 - 30 Jun, folios 360-363, 30 Jun 44)

(b) From the Trasimene Positions to the first Withdrawals across the Arno (1 -17 Jul)*

41. Kesselring's forces were now gradually being dislodged from their positions east and west of Lake Trasimene and the pattern of alternating resistance and withdrawal according to the degree of Allied pressure became a matter of routine for the current phase.

* In the present report this phase has been sketched in for the sake of continuity and to facilitate further research, if and when required. Statements not supported by specific source references are based on entries for that day in the Main War Diary of the Army concerned. (G.M.D.S. - 62291/1, Fourteenth Army, W.D. 4; 55291/1, Tenth Army, W.D. 7)

1 Jul

In the area of Fourteenth Army 75 Inf Corps lost Cecina in heavy fighting; the front was taken back and it was decided to relieve exhausted 19 G.A.F. Div by elements of 16 S.S. Pz Gren Div. 14 Pz Corps withdrew in consequence of the deep penetrations on the boundary with 75 Inf Corps; 1 Para Corps withdrew to conform with 14 Pz Corps. On the same day Fourteenth Army issued a detailed strength return for 1 Jul (Photostat 981A10.(D175). (G.M.D.S. - 62241/4, Fourteenth Army; W.D. 4, Appx 1 - 17 Jul, Appx 642, 1 Jul 44). The strength of the various formations was reported as follows:

26 Pz Div	14,911	
3 Pz Gren Div	12,292	
29 Pz Gren Div	12,889	
90 Pz Gren Div	11,840	
65 Inf Div	9,472	
356 Inf Div	10,909	
362 Inf Div	11,536	
19 G.A.F. Div	7,214	
20 G.A.F. Div	4,574	
Grenadier Instr Bde	2,016	of which "Fighting Strength" 45,787*
	<u>97,653</u>	

Air Force Formations

4 Para Div	9,161
Miscellaneous	2,924

S.S. Formations

16 S.S. Pz Gren Div	15,838	
Mtn Jg School	1,647	
Mittenwald		
Italians	962	
Russians	883	"Fighting Strength" (Not supplied)
	<u>31,415</u>	

G.H.Q. Combat troops with Fourteenth Army

G.H.Q. Arty	8,530	
Engrs	2,141	
Armd Tps	4,527	
Projector Tps	1,593	
Infantry	652	
Misc	6	of which "Fighting Strength" 10,115*
	<u>17,449</u>	

* For definition of "Fighting Strength" see: Para 14, above, footnote.

42. Apart from the above formations the Army comprised many small special units. It would be hazardous to draw conclusions from the above figures beyond the data actually supplied. The "Fighting Strength" of the divisions was recorded on 2 Jul:

26 Pz Div	5,627
3 Pz Gren Div	1,587*
29 Pz Gren Div	5,217 (Infantry:1734)
90 Pz Gren Div	3,954 (Infantry:1339)
65 Inf Div	4,601
356 Inf Div	3,927 (Infantry:2269)
19 G.A.F. Div	1,716
20 G.A.F. Div	2,068
162 (Turc) Inf Div	677
4 Para Div	4,054 (Infantry:1850)
16 S.S. Pz Gren Div	9,664

(ibid, Appx 654)

The "Fighting Strength" of Tenth Army's divisions as on 2 Jul was recorded in graphic form on 10 Jul (Photostat 981A10.(D179). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/9; Tenth Army; W.D. 7, Appx 10-13 Jul, Appx 1115, 10 Jul 44). According to this document the approximate fighting strength of the divisions was the following:

Para Pz Div H.G.	3,580
1 Para Div	1,530
15 Pz Gren Div	2,500
334 354 Inf Div	1,750 (formation then
305 Inf Div	1,410 under cmd 15
94 Inf Div	530 (formation then
	under cmd 305
	Inf Div)
44 Inf Div	2,700
114 144 Jg Div	3,420
5 Mtn Div	3,800
71 Inf Div	3,140
278 Inf Div	5,280
715 Inf Div	4,690

43. In the area of Tenth Army the first day of the month was relatively uneventful. On the right wing 15 Pz Gren Div (with remnants of 334 Inf Div under command) was hard pressed but managed to cling to the positions at the northwest corner of Lake Trasimene; on the other side of the Lake 305 Inf Div was forced back at S. Vito; on the Adriatic sector 2 Pol Corps attacked in the Filettrano sector of 278 Inf Div.

* This figure comprises merely the strength of the elements fighting with Battle Group Crisolly (20 G.A.F. Div plus elements 3 Pz Gren Div)

2 Jul

44. During the night 1/2 Jul Fourteenth Army carried out a withdrawal. On the right wing this had become necessary due to the penetrations obtained by the opponent, on the left wing it was a measure for shortening the front. (Siena was evacuated during the following night.) Tenth Army's War Diary summarized the day's events in the following entry:

The withdrawals on the right wing are being followed by the enemy in a hesitating manner. Enemy concentrations are in progress on both banks of the Tiber. After completing his preparations the enemy attacked in the Adriatic sector with two armoured spearheads, intending to obtain a breakthrough at Ancona. It can not be ascertained at the moment whether apart from 3 Pol Div and probably a British Armoured Brigade, the Canadians are possibly going to be committed there.*

* 2 Jul tel cons Wentzell - Roettiger

W: Operations are being conducted according to the needs of the moment; a schematical withdrawal is out of the question.

...

W: If I only knew where the Canadians (1 Cdn Corps) are.

R: The pressure in the Polish sector makes me thoughtful, maybe the Canadians are there?

Wentzell then pointed out that no indications had been noted and no prisoners taken; care would be taken to prevent a surprise.

(G.M.D.S. - 55291/7, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 27 Jun - 3 Jul, Appx 933, 2 Jul 44)

3 Jul

45. Withdrawals carried out according to plan had resulted in a considerable shortening of Fourteenth Army's front. Further withdrawals to more favourable positions were planned for the night 3/4 Jul. Large preparations for attack had been observed in the area of Fifth Army for several days. A new schematic order of battle of Fourteenth Army's large formations was issued on 3 Jul. (Photostat 981A10. (D176)). (G.M.D.S. - 62241/4, Fourteenth Army, W.D., Appx 1 - 17 Jul, 3 Jul 44)

War Diary Tenth Army:

...

Three focal points are discernible; the plain of Arezzo, the valley of the Tiber and the Adriatic coast (Ancona) ... In addition to 3 Pol Div, 5 Pol Div and 3 Pol Armd Bde have been identified. After the initial surprise 278 Inf Div has offered good resistance.

Regarding the attacks in the Ancona sector, the Army commander exhorted 278 Inf Div to stand fast as long as possible:

Today again the Fuehrer has ordered to hold Ancona as long as possible; this not only from the point of view of our own operations but also in connection with those in the western Balkans ...

(G.M.D.S. - 55291/7, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 27 Jun-3 Jul, Appx 953, 3 Jul 44)

4 Jul

46. Fourteenth Army had now reached a fairly favourable defence line and went on record as intending "to hold that line for some time". The line in question extended from Castiglione (on the coast) - south of Rosignano - Volterra - Castel S. Gimignano - Colle di Val d'Elisa - Vagliagli to Pietri. (G.M.D.S. - 62241/3, Fourteenth Army, sit maps, sit trace 4 Jul 44). No major developments occurred in the area of Tenth Army; the main War Diary carried the following notation:

In accordance with orders from O.B.SW the present lines will be defended until further orders.

Orders to hold had been given by O.B.SW; the text of the document is being retained in photostatic form (981A10. (D177), O.B.SW Operations Order for Tenth Army, 4 Jul 44). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/8, Tenth Army, W.D.-7, Appx 4-9 Jul, Appx 974, 975, 4 Jul 44)

5 Jul

47. On 5 Jul, however, Fifth Army resumed its attacks; 75 Inf Corps was under strong pressure at Rosignano and Castellina; east of Montecatini in

the sector of 14 Pz Corps penetrations had to be sealed off about one mile behind the original defence line; 1 Para Corps held its positions. On the right wing and center of Tenth Army there was considerable reconnaissance activity; hard fighting took place in the sector of 278 Inf Div at Osimo, 71 Inf Div extended its front to Filottrano while 278 Inf Div was being concentrated between Filottrano and the coast. The situation map of Tenth Army for 5 Jul is being retained in photostatic form (981A10. (D178)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/16, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, sit maps 26 Jun - 8 Jul, 5 Jul 44)

6 Jul

48. In the area of Fourteenth Army Allied pressure continued unabated; the positions were not fortified but could not be given up except for minor adjustments; a repetition of similar attacks on the following day would create a new crisis. On the right wing and the center of Tenth Army there were no significant developments; on the Adriatic coast, 5 Pol Div was probing for weak spots in the front between Osimo and Filottrano.

7 Jul

49. War Diary Fourteenth Army:

In heaviest fighting the Army succeeded in preventing the breakthrough ... As the present line is the last favourable ground south of the Arno, the Army intends to stand fast as long as possible.

Tenth Army: A significant attack occurred on the right wing of 51 Mtn Corps where on the left bank of the Tiber 114 Jg Div was under pressure in the sector south of Montone (north of Umbertide). Increasing pressure was also reported by 278 Inf Div.

8 Jul

50. Mainly due to a deep penetration west of Volterra (90 Pz Gren Div) Fourteenth Army now gave further ground. In a telephone conversation early in the afternoon, C. of S. 14 Pz Corps told C. of S. Fourteenth Army:

The Corps feels that by means of ceaseless attacks the enemy intends to prevent our troops from settling down south of the Arno, and if possible to reach the river crossings first and to block our troops at the crossings.

At 1800 hours Marshal Kesselring consented to a limited withdrawal. On the same day Tenth Army recorded raids in force and air-observed artillery-rangings at the front of 76 Pz Corps, the loss of M. Cucco and Rocca d'Aria in the Montone sector and continued heavy see-saw engagements in the Adriatic sector. Orders were issued for the construction of a second line of defence to the rear of the Gothic Line.

9 and 10 Jul

51. Allied attacks on all pressure points. Due to the relentless drive of Fifth Army's spearheads at the coast and in the center, Fourteenth Army gave further ground. A map showing the reconnoitred course of the various intermediate defence and switch-positions from the Lilli Line* to the Green Line-Forefield position was prepared by the Army on 11 Jul (Photostat 981A10.(D180)). (G.M.D.S. - 62241/4, Fourteenth Army, W.D. 4, Appx 1-17 Jul, Appx 699, 11 Jul 44). The approximate location of these various intermediate lines may be found on a reproduction on reduced scale of this map appearing as Appendix "K" to this report. On the front of Tenth Army there were no major developments on 9 and 10 Jul. Owing to the pressure of 10 Brit Corps in the Tiber valley, 44 Inf Div (west of the Tiber) lost ground and received permission for local withdrawals; on the Adriatic coast 2 Pol Corps obtained some slight gains.

11 Jul

52. On this day Fifth Army was consolidating its gains and making preparations for the next phase of the pursuit. Fourteenth Army remained in its positions; preparations were made, however, for withdrawal to the Lilli Line during night 12/13 Jul. In Tenth Army's area 10 British Corps gained ground in the Tiber valley and the inner wings of 44 Inf and 114 Jg Div withdrew to the line 2 kms south of M.S. Maria - south of Citta di Castello - M. delle Gorgacce. The deterioration of the situation on the Russian front made itself felt when orders were received during the day for the accelerated withdrawal and dispatch to Germany of Para Pz Div H.G.; 715 Inf Div received orders to relieve the departing formation.

12 and 13 Jul

53. In the area of Fourteenth Army 14 Pz Corps was under renewed pressure; 90 Pz Gren Div was forced back in the area of Laiatico, 3 Pz Gren Div on its left lost ground, 26 Pz Div on the right succeeded in holding its positions. The center and right wing of the Army withdrew to the Lilli Line. On 13 Jul 90 Pz Gren Div was barely able to prevent a major breakthrough. In view of the inability of the neighbouring divisions to provide assistance at

* From the coast about halfway between Torre di Calafuria and Quercianella - 2.5 km north Chianni - Castelfalfi - 3 km north S. Gimignano - 2 km north Poggibonsi - 1 km south Castellina in Chianti - to inter-army boundary at Gaiole in Chianti.

the critical points, O.B.SW consented in principle to a withdrawal to the Marlene Line. (See Appx "K"). There were no major developments in Tenth Army's area. Documents and telephone conversations dealt mainly with the relief of Para Pz Div H.G. by the numerically strong but qualitatively less valuable 715th Infantry Division. In an Operations Order of 11 Jul O.B.SW had pointed out the importance of preventing a breakthrough in the Tiber valley by standing firm in the defile south of Citta di Castelló. (Photostat 981A10.(D181)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/9, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 10-13 Jul, Appx 1186, 11 Jul 44) When the Indian formations of 10 Brit Corps continued to forge ahead on 12 Jul Kesselring said: "I have little confidence in that (44 Inf) Division"; v. Vietinghoff replied: "It is and remains our worst Division". On 13 Jul 44 Inf Div lost M.S. Maria and M. Civitella. (G.M.D.S. - 55291/9, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 10-13 Jul, tel cons 12 and 13 Jul 44)*

14 Jul

54. Fourteenth Army: Pressure on 14 Pz Corps continued; the Corps was able to hold the Marlene Line but realized that the next day might bring the necessity of falling back to the Nora Line (see Appendix "K"). Tenth Army: No developments at the front of 76 Pz Corps; on the Adriatic

* In the telephone conversations of 13 Jul the probable intentions of Eighth Army were repeatedly referred to by Vietinghoff and Kesselring. No doubt remembering the categorical statements of Heidrich, who predicted late in April 44 that Cassino would be the focal point of the next attack (Hist Sec Report No. 20, para 68), the Marshal said:

"I am always a bit sceptical of the appreciations of divisional commanders regarding future attacks in their own sectors; I have had bad experiences in this regard in the East and at Cassino."

After the surprise of the Liri valley, 1 Cdn Corps was never far from the mind of the German Commanders; and in a telephone conversation between v. Vietinghoff and Kesselring the following was said:

v.V: ... and then I have just received a report indicating that 2 Pol Corps is regrouping. This may mean several things. Either Eighth Army says: "The Poles are getting nowhere, we take them out and put in the Canadians." But he may also say to himself: "It seems to go well in the center, I will take the Canadians there and push ahead."

K: Which "center" do you mean?

v.V: The Tiber valley.

(G.M.D.S. - 55291/9, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 10 - 13 Jul, Appx 1179, tel cons v.V. and K. 0910 hours 13 Jul 44)

coast 2 Pol Corps resumed the attack and made slight gains north of Stuffolo.

15 Jul

55. In the War Diary of Fourteenth Army the constant pressure of Fifth Army was reflected by the following remark:

In order to prevent the destruction of our formations before they reach the Heinrich (Arno) line and to straighten the front which has been lengthened by several penetrations, the Army, leaving behind strong rear guards, withdraws during night 15/16 Jul with 75 Inf Corps and western wing of 14 Pz Corps to the following line: 7417 (Torre d. Boccale) - 5023 (S.E. Fauglia) - 5055 (2 kms N.W. Capannoli - 5054 (S. of Palaia).

On Tenth Army's front 13 Brit Corps advanced south and south-west of Arezzo, forced a withdrawal along the inter-army boundary, captured M. Lignano (the feature commanding Arezzo) and would soon break through to the Arno valley. 76 Pz Corps received permission to withdraw behind the Arno.

15 Jul 1110 hours tel cons Wentzell - Beelitz

W: ... The situation is as follows:
Firstly we have lost M. Lignano. From there the enemy has a view of Arezzo. Therefore we can not remain there much longer. The whole artillery of the enemy is ranging on M. Lignano. A counter attack would be very costly and is out of the question. ...

B: The Field Marshall agrees with me, with M. Lignano in the hands of the enemy we must withdraw.

(G.M.D.S. - 55291/10, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 14-18 Jul, Appx 1226, tel cons 15 Jul)

Minor engagements took place on the Adriatic front.

16 Jul

56. Fighting extended to the whole front of Fourteenth Army and all signs pointed to a big battle on the next day. In a telephone conversation just before midnight C. of S. Fourteenth Army informed C. of S. Army Group that the next day would bring a severe crisis and that no reserves were available with which to prevent a breakthrough that might lead to a crossing of the Arno by Allied troops ahead of the German troops. C. of S. Army Group "C" replied:

"In view of the necessity of gaining time for the preparation of the Green Line every position must be held to the last."

In the War Diary of Tenth Army the day's events were described in the following entry:

In the sector of 76 Pz Corps the enemy followed our own withdrawals already in the morning with infantry and armoured forces. On the whole he was repulsed by our rear elements. Based on the rapid pursuit by strong forces on a broad front in the Arezzo sector it may be assumed that our withdrawal occurred immediately prior to the launching of a strong enemy attack. Large enemy concentrations near the confluence of the river Aggia and the Tiber point to renewed large scale attacks on both banks of the Tiber. The evacuation of Ancona was again discussed with O.B.SW over the telephone. As the opponent has created large supply bases in Taranto, Brindisi and Foggia, it is improbable that he needs Ancona for a landing in the Rimini area. On the other hand the evacuation of Ancona would bring about a considerable shortening of the front and so increase the resistance value of the greatly overextended Army-front.*

17 Jul

57. This was the climactic day of the drive to the Arno; 14 Pz Corps was thrown back and during night 17/18 Jul withdrew to the Heinrich Line across the river. 75 Inf Corps withdrew to the Hildegard position north of Livorno, leaving some rear elements south of the city. The eastern wing of 1 Para Corps remained in the Marlene Line;

* Hitler's Order to hold Ancona had rankled in the minds of the experienced field commanders. Wentzell formulated this most clearly when he said to Roettiger:

...This is another one of those prestige places. To hold Ancona is an imbecility. (G.M.D.S. - 55291/10, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 14 - 18 Jul, Appx 1252, tel cons 16 Jul 44)

contact with Tenth Army at M. Maione.* In the area of Tenth Army the spearheads of Eighth Army advanced on all pressure points; 13 Brit Corps advanced from Arezzo in a northwesterly direction, 10 Brit Corps captured M. Cedrone, 2 Pol Corps cracked the lines of 278 Inf Div in a major assault; a continuation of the advance at Agugliano would (and did) force a German withdrawal from Ancona. The events surrounding the fall of Ancona were described in some detail in the War Diary of 51 Mtn Corps; a translation of the pages in question appears as Appendix "F" to this report (981A10 (D183)). (G.M.D.S. - 62296/1, 51 Mtn Corps, W.D. 3, 1 Jul - 31 Aug, 17 - 19 Jul 44). The dispositions of 51 Mtn Corps on 17 and 22 Jul were shown on a map which is being retained in photostatic form (981A10(D184)). (G.M.D.S. - 62296/2, 51 Mtn Corps, W.D. 2, vol "B" of Appx, sit map 17 and 22 Jul 44). Appendix "F" is best read in conjunction with Tenth Army's situation maps for 17 and 18 Jul (Photostats: 981A10(D185) and (D186)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/17, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, sit maps 9 - 21 Jul, sit maps 17 and 18 Jul 44)

FIGHTING IN THE FLORENCE AREA AND EVACUATION OF FLORENCE (18 Jul - 10 Aug)

58. Spearheads of the two Allied Armies had now reached the south bank of the Arno; 14 Pz Corps was in the Heinrich Line across the river north of Pontederra; 76 Pz Corps in the area north and northwest of Arezzo. But it would take another three weeks of bitter fighting to drive the last German elements from their positions south of the Arno.

18 Jul

59. Apart from an American attempt to widen the breakthrough at the joint between 90 Pz Gren and 3 Pz Gren Divs the day was uneventful on

* While not denying facts, some German War Diarists had become very adept at evading the description of important setbacks by the use of cryptic and euphemistic phraseology. The student in search of facts not available in Allied sources is well advised to scan the daily situation maps; in the War Diary a disastrous retreat may be glossed over by the citation of commendable resistance in better positions; once lost, large cities become mere map references. - Master maps and daily situation traces of Fourteenth Army from 1 Jul - 30 Sep 44 appear in: G.M.D.S. - 62241/3, Fourteenth Army, sit maps. Photostats of the master map 6 - 26 Jul as well as of the situation traces for 16, 17 and 18 Jul 44 are being retained by Hist Sec (G.S.) (981A10(D182a, b, c, d)).

the front of Fourteenth Army. During the night 17/18 Jul Headquarters Fourteenth Army were moved from Monsummano (S.W. Pistoia) to Abetone (40 km N.W. Pistoia), Headquarters Tenth Army were moved from Saltino (near Vallombrosa) to Pizzocalvo (12 km E. Bologna). 76 Pz Corps was able to prevent the opponent from reaching the road Arezzo - Montevarchi, but on the Adriatic coast Ancona had to be evacuated in order to prevent the encirclement of 278 Inf Div. - On the occasion of the morning telephone call Kesselring had told v. Vietinghoff that 1 Para Div was about to receive 3,000 replacements. This information and the somewhat alarming reports from the Adriatic sector induced v. Vietinghoff to propose the transfer of 1 Para Div to the coast:

1835 hours 18 Jul v. Vietinghoff - Kesselring

v. V.: On the coast there are either completely new tanks, if not a different formation altogether. Assaults have been carried out with unusual vigour. ... Consideration is being given to the question whether it would be possible to withdraw 1 Para Div from Herr (76 Pz Corps) and to move it over to the coast if necessary. ...

K.: I am not fully in the picture but I have just been speaking with Deelitz about the possibility of other troops having been committed there.

v. V.: It might be the Canadians.

K.: As an emergency measure I suggest that you move down 1028 Pz Gren Regt from the area of Corps Witthoert. * **

(G.M.D.S. - 55291/10, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 14 - 18 Jul, Appx 1291, tel coms 18 Jul 44)

* The proximity of an uncommitted enemy corps would obviously be a matter of paramount concern to any Army commander. In this particular case the Corps in question was 1 Cdn Corps. In accordance with the purpose of the present report such information, while not slanted, is stressed.

** During the morning call on 18 Jul Kesselring told v. Vietinghoff that he would be at Hitler's Headquarters on 19 Jul. Kesselring saw the Fuehrer and returned at 1800 hours 19 Jul (ibid; 19 Jul). It may have been on this occasion that the German High Command was given the impression that Canadian troops were in the coastal area. This was not the case, but even Schramm, (op cit, p.82), in dealing with the events of the last days of July stated:

(Cont'd on page 49)

19 Jul

60. According to "Fifth Army History" (op cit, p. 84) Livorno was taken in the early hours of 19 Jul against light resistance ("There was little fighting in the city"). According to the War Diary of Fourteenth Army, 75 Inf Corps had received orders to hold Livorno until the evening of 19 Jul. Based on the reports of the Corps, Fourteenth Army recorded the following:

75 Inf Corps ... and it came to heavy street fighting in which our troops, while forced to leave the city, succeeded in battling their way through to the North.

On the right wing of Tenth Army 715 Inf Div lost the Monte Maione in bitter fighting. In the sector of 278 Inf Div massed tanks passed the Esino river at Chiaravalle. Despite the fact that the German field commanders were pleased to see 51 Mtn Corps move to shorter lines, the tactics employed by 2 Pol Corps in their successful enterprise became the subject of prolonged discussions. In this connection the record of Tenth Army's telephone conversations on 19 Jul is being retained in photostatic form. (981A10. (D187)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/11, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 19-22 Jul Appx 1309, 19 Jul 44). Excerpts from the conversations are being quoted below:

1010 hours 19 Jul Wentzell - Roettiger

W: ... I am worried by the new tank tactics of the opponent. If he continues to make himself strong on a narrow front - with 200 tanks in the lead - the tanks accompanied by planes - and the infantry following in the rear - he will obtain further successes. When troops are being overrun by 200 tanks they can not wait for the enemy infantry. There is a difference between advancing with a few tanks and with such masses.

R: Did they all come at the same time?

W: More or less. This is a new problem. We must look deeper into this; it is of importance for the Green Line.

R: Very much so.

...

* (Footnote cont'd from page 48)

... On the Adriatic where the enemy had put Canadian and Polish troops in line, our troops withdrew step by step as the enemy, after short pauses, launched consecutive attacks. ...

- W: This is an entirely new problem. Previously he (Hoppe, Cmr 278 Inf Div) has done very well against the entire Polish Corps; now, after all the casualties the enemy has suffered he succeeds in breaking through.
- R: This is not an entirely new procedure.
- W: Yes, it is an absolute novum. Far ahead the tanks are advancing with air and artillery support.
- R: And the infantry follows in their wake. ... But if such armoured groups are discovered in their assembly positions they can be destroyed by the artillery.
- W: Yes, if recognized in time. ... The placing of anti-tank guns in the Green Line must be speeded up by all possible means. ... All divisions in reasonably tank-proof country must give up their anti-tank weapons.
- ...
- R: Where infantry is in danger of being overrun by massed tanks, a second strong defence line must be created so that the tanks can be intercepted between the two lines.
- 1100 hours Wentzell - Roettiger
- W: It is just as I expected, on the coast the enemy is advancing with massed tanks. At Chiaravalle 30 tanks have already crossed the river, the others can be seen following.
- ...
- W: If it goes on in this manner the danger becomes great. The Army Commander has therefore come back to his intention of moving 1 Para Div to the coast; to the Green Line for the time being. ...
- R: But to take out 1 Para Div where Para Pz Div H.G. has just left; there will be pressure in that sector too.
- W: That may be so, but it is not so dangerous there as we are moving into mountain country. But I see pronounced danger on the coast, and (Field Marshal) Alexander sees the soft spot and says to himself "there it goes well" and acts accordingly.
- R: True enough.

1500 hours Wentzell - Roettiger

R: What decision have you made?

W: The Army Commander wants to move 1 Para Div.

R: If you believe it to be necessary and justifiable the Marshal agrees to it.

2230 hours v. Vietinghoff - Kesselring

v.V: On the whole we succeeded (in stopping the breakthrough).

K: I was really frightened. ...

K: Today I spoke to the Fuehrer about your Army. He said "Yes, they are my best divisions". ... (ibid)

20 Jul

61. At the German inter-army boundary Monte S. Michele was lost during the day; preparations were under way for the dispatch of 90 Pz Gren Div to the area north of Florence as a mobile Army Group reserve; Kesselring gave orders to prepare the Paula Line for prolonged defence (see Appendix "K"). The road from Poggibonsi to Florence was described as the probable main axis of the next Allied advance; orders were given for suitable preparations. In the area of Tenth Army the day's main events occurred on the extreme right and left wings. The loss of Monte S. Michele to 6 South African Armd Div was ascribed in part to an attack from the rear by strong guerilla forces on 2 and 1 Bns 735 Inf Regt (715 Inf Div). It was the first occurrence of this nature in the Italian theatre of war. On the Adriatic coast Morro d'Alba was captured by Allied forces. 278 Inf Div was bolstered by the arrival in the sector of 914 Aslt Gun Bde, the 17 cm battery of 557 G.H.Q. Arty Bn and 6 guns from 525 G.H.Q. Hy A-tk Bn.

21 Jul

62. The sole development of any consequence occurred in the Citta di Castello sector, where renewed pressure from 10 Brit Corps caused Tenth Army to issue orders for a limited withdrawal on the inner wings of the two Corps during the night 21/22 Jul. An agent claimed to have seen the insignia of 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Corps in the area of 2 Pol Corps.

(G.M.D.S. - 55292/2, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Int rep Jul 44). The day's events were overshadowed by the attempted assassination of Hitler on the previous day.*

22 Jul

63. Intensive Allied preparations were observed at the front of 1 Para Corps, particularly on the east side of the road Poggibonsi - Florence. In the area of Tenth Army there were minor engagements at the usual pressure points. In the morning O.B.SW and the Army Commander discussed the situation on the Adriatic coast:

0915 hours 22 Jul

K: Did the enemy bring up additional forces?

v.V: We do not believe that fresh infantry forces have arrived but we have a report stating that the Canadians are behind the Poles. Polish prisoners and deserters have indeed always claimed that 2 Pol Corps would be relieved after the capture of Ancona, but as far as the infantry is concerned nothing of that nature has taken place up to now. Regarding armoured forces, a British armoured brigade has been observed and the Polish Armoured Brigade has received replacements. That makes two complete armoured brigades up there.

* Kesselring and his Army Commanders were apparently unaware of the plot. Irrespective of any different opinions which they might have held, at that moment they had no choice but to dispatch professions of undying loyalty to the Fuehrer. Although the plotters had come from their own class and no doubt had suffered much anguish before deciding to place love of country above honour and safety; and although no German general could fail to realize that Hitler was leading the country to its doom, Kesselring and his Army commanders chose to remain loyal to their oath of allegiance. In this connection photostatic copies of the following documents are being retained:

- 981A10.(D188a) Tenth Army, 21 Jul 44, Message to Hitler (G.M.D.S. - 55291/11, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 19-22 Jul, Appx 1338, 21 Jul 44)
- 981A10.(D188b) O.B.SW 21 Jul 44, Text of Message to Hitler (*ibid*, Appx 1339)
- 981A10.(D188c) C.of S. Tenth Army, Address before the officers of Army Headquarters, 21 Jul 44 (*ibid*, Appx 1341)
- 981A10.(D188d) Fourteenth Army, 21 Jul 44, Message to Hitler (G.M.D.S. - 62241/5, Fourteenth Army, W.D. 4, Appx 17 Jul - 30 Aug, Appx 741, 21 Jul 44)

K: Possibly the Canadian Armoured Division is there.

v.V: We hear constantly about the Canadians being in the rear area, but it is well possible that they are being saved for the attack on the Green Line. Farther up the coast the terrain is more favourable for their attack. For this reason it has been my constant wish to move 1 Para Div in order to have something decent there.

K: By 15 Aug Heidrich will have received 3,000 replacements.

v.V: That is alright, but Heidrich trains replacements for six weeks before commitment at the front.

K: Yes.

(Photostat 981A10(D189). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/11; Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 19-22 Jul, Appx 1371, tel cons 22 Jul 44)

To establish the picture of Allied dispositions in the reasonably nearby rear-areas was primarily the task of the Corps Intelligence Officer of 51 Mtn Corps^{XX}. A detailed appraisal of the enemy situation, based on the findings of this officer, was submitted by the Corps to Tenth Army on 22 Jul. A photostatic copy and a translation of this report appear as Appendix "G" to this report (981A10. (D199)). (G.M.D.S. - 62297, 51 Mtn Corps, Int Reps 1 Jul - 31 Aug, Ic Nr. 137/44, 22 Jul 44). The situation was appreciated in the sense that strong Canadian and British forces were being assembled in the Adriatic sector for a major breakthrough. Apart from the facts that the Army commander was ever predicting major action on the coast, and that the Intelligence officer according to all his training was bound to reach the same conclusion, there is no possible doubt that the report in question reflected the complete success of the deceptive scheme "OTTRINGTON" which had been carefully planned and executed by Eighth Army to create this very impression.^{XXX}

^{XX} Int Offr 51 Mtn Corps: Dietrich v. Menges
^{XX} v. Vietinghoff to Kesselring on 2 Aug: "51 Mtn Corps has an excellent Ic". (G.M.D.S. - 61437/2, Tenth Army, W.D. 8, Appx 1-4 Aug, Appx 37, tel cons 2 Aug 44)

^{XXXX} Hist Sec, C.M.H.Q., Report No. 187, Operation "OLIVE" to the Crossing of the Marecchia River, para 8

In the evening of the same day O.B.SW appeared at the headquarters of Tenth Army and said that the Allies might drop the plan for a landing in southern France and commit all available forces in Italy. The coasts would be the focal points but a breakthrough to the North at Florence was always a possibility. The forces on the Adriatic would have to be deployed in depth, 1 Para Div and one projector battalion to go behind the left wing.

23 Jul

64. Kesselring now called at the headquarters of Fourteenth Army and repeated his remarks regarding the probable cancellation of the landing in southern France in favour of an all-out attack on Army Group "C". The views and directives of the Marshal on that occasion were recorded by Fourteenth Army in a memorandum (Photostat 981A10.(D190)). (G.M.D.S. - 62241/5, Fourteenth Army, W.D. 4, Appx 17 Jul - 30 Aug, Appx 749, 23 Jul 44). Pressure on Fourteenth Army increased during the day, particularly in the sector of 1 Para Corps, where 13 Brit Corps had relieved the C.E.F. and was making the initial moves of the advance to Florence. The Germans knew well that 13 Brit Corps with 8 Ind, 2 N.Z. and 6 South African Armd Div had extended its operations further to the West; regarding the support of 8 Ind Div by Canadian armoured elements, there was however only one entry made in the records:

25 Jul ... Canadian armoured troops (?) allegedly seen with 6/13 Frontier Force Rifles.

(G.M.D.S. - 62242/1, Fourteenth Army, W.D. 4, Int reps 25 Jul 44)

On 23 Jul an Italian deserter had claimed that 5 Cdn Armd Div was moving north from the Siena region (*ibid*, 23 Jul). This piece of information was of interest to the Chiefs of Staff of both Armies; the matter was discussed on the telephone at 1145 hours 23 Jul. Wentzell stated the reasons which had led to the assumption that the Canadians would appear at the coast, and closed with the words:

... Clarification of this matter is of decisive importance to Tenth Army as 1 Para Div is being moved to the coast on the assumption that the Canadians will be committed there.

(Photostat 981A10.(D195)). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/12, Tenth Army, W.D. 4, Appx 23-27 Jul, Appx 1393, tel cns 24 Jul 44)

65. On the left wing of Fourteenth Army 1 Para Corps was under pressure and withdrew to the Olga Line. On both wings of Tenth Army Allied preparations were observed. The War Diary of Tenth Army carried the following entry:

... The fact that Eighth Army is continually taking over sectors lying further to the West, the fact that American Fifth Army now commands only one Corps in the front line, and the concentration of strong enemy formations at Naples and Salerno lead to the conclusion that the enemy is making preparations for a new landing operation. It may be directed against southern France or the Ligurian coast or the plains of the Po. In the meantime the resistance potential of the Rimini - Ravenna area has been increased materially; the infantry forces will be strengthened greatly by the imminent arrival of 98 Inf Div; in exchange 94 Inf Div will be moved to the Trieste area.

25 Jul

66. From the coast to 5 km west of Empoli Fourteenth Army was now in the Heinrich Line, from there to the inter-army boundary in the Olga Line. Pressure on 1 Para Corps continued, there were penetrations at the center of 356 Inf Div (M. Collegalla and Pgio di Rugliano). During night 25/26 Jul the eastern wing of 14 Pz Corps withdrew to the line: Sovigliana (N.W. Empoli) - Empoli - Villa l'Allore - la Martignana. In the area of Tenth Army local withdrawals in the sectors of 114 Jg and 305 Inf Divs. - On 25 Jul the sixth edition of the map: Italy, 1 : 100,000 (with new reference points) was taken into use by all higher headquarters of Army Group 'C'. A good specimen of this edition appears in the records of 51 Mtn Corps. It shows the whole area of Tenth Army and the main defence lines of 51 Mtn Corps on 26 Jul, 29 Jul, 5 Aug, 8 Aug, 12 Aug 44. (Photostat 981A10.(D191) (G.M.D.S. - 62296/2, 51 Mtn Corps, W.D. 3, vol "B" of Appx, sit maps)

26 Jul

67. During the day 1 Para Corps succeeded in maintaining its positions but during night 26/27 the front was taken back to the Paula Line (running S.E. from Montelupo (on the Arno) along the north bank of the river T. Pesa to Cerbaia, thence Pisignano - Faltignano - Falciani - la Presura - Strada in Chianti - Mughana - Cintoja and to the inter-army boundary at C. Pian d'Albero (ITALY 1:100,00, Sheets 106,113), (see Photostat 981A10.(D192), Master Map for sit traces Fourteenth Army, 27 Jul - 26 Aug 44). (G.M.D.S. - 62241/3, Fourteenth Army, sit maps 1 Jul-30 Sep 44). 90 Pz Gren Div received orders to move to the area on both sides of the road Parma-Modena; the first regimental group to move on 27 Jul. Under pressure itself, but mainly in order to conform with the movement of 1 Para Corps, the right wing of Tenth Army received orders for a further limited withdrawal.

27 Jul

68. Fourteenth Army: The last rearguards of 75 Inf Corps were driven from their positions south of the Arno. In the sector of 14 Pz Corps the withdrawal to the Paula Line was not followed immediately; on the front of 1 Para Corps Allied troops were consolidating and reconnoitring. Contrary to earlier plans the remnants of 19 G.A.F. Div now were moved north for reorganization. The Corps Commanders were told that the Green Line - forefield position would have to be defended, this to be followed by delaying resistance on the way back to the Green Line and then definitive defence of the Green Line. Tenth Army: Following the withdrawals of the night 26/27 Jul the day was uneventful. On the telephone the Chiefs of Staff of the two Armies discussed Allied intentions. The transfer of Allied air bases from Foggia to the West led both to believe that an attack on southern France would be the next Allied move; a major attack on the Adriatic or at Genoa would not require such shifting of air bases (G.M.D.S. - 55291/12, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 23-27 Jul, Appx 1487, tel cons 27 Jul 44). On 25 Jul 87 Inf Corps was named "Armeeabteilung Ligurien"; with the assumption of command by Marshal Graziani the designation would change to "Armee Ligurien". Army Liguria would comprise the following formations:

3 Ital Inf Div ("San Marco")
4 Ital Mtn Div ("Monte Rosa")
34 German Inf and 42 German Jg Div

Marshal Graziani was to be subordinated to O.B.SW but fully responsible for his Army. Army Headquarters staff would be supplied by 87 (German) Inf Corps (ibid, Appx 1490.)^F

28 Jul

69. Pressure on 1 Para Corps was growing, particularly in the Cerbaia sector of 29 Pz Gren Div. The Army Commander told O.B.SW the positions could not be held without fresh reserves. In the area of Tenth Army the heights commanding the San Sepolcro basin were lost and withdrawals to conform were ordered. 1028 Pz Gren Regt received orders to join 715 Inf Div; 15 Pz Gren Div was told that it would be committed on the coast in the case of an Allied landing; the Chiefs of Staff of Tenth Army and Army Group 'C' discussed the possible advantages of interchanging the two Corps Commanders and their staffs for the operations in and after the "Green Line - forefield position" ("Feurstein more experienced in mountain warfare, Herr in flat country; Herr would do well on the coast"). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/13, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 28-31 Jul, Appx 1507, tel cons 28 Jul). On the "Enemy Situation Map" prepared by 51 Mtn Corps on 28 Jul, 1 Cdn Inf Div was still being shown

* This implied the dissolution of Armeeabteilung v. Zangen. General v. Zangen, who had an excellent record as a Corps Commander on the Eastern front, reappeared in August 1944 as the commander of Fifteenth Army in France.

with the Italian Liberation Corps ("according to reliable sources"), and 1 Cdn Corps in the Adriatic rear area ("according to agents") (Photostat 981A10.(D200). (G.M.D.S. - 62297, 51 Mtn Corps, Int reps 1 Jul 31 Aug, 28 Jul 44)

29 Jul

70. Fourteenth Army: Continued pressure and hard fighting west of Cerbaia. Tenth Army: Uneventful. Telephone conversations dealt mainly with Allied dispositions: the center of gravity was shifting farther to the West, over two-thirds of 13 Brit Corps were now operating on the left wing of Fourteenth Army; Tenth Army would have to extend its front to the West;^z but on the other hand 1 Cdn Corps was said to be in the coastal area near the joint of 278 Inf and 71 Inf Divs; the attack on Florence would be forthcoming soon, and although primarily a holding action it would have the character of a prestige undertaking. (G.M.D.S. - 55291/13, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 28-31 Jul, Appx 1526, tel cons 29 Jul 44)

30 Jul

71. Minor engagements on the front of both Armies. The Corps of Tenth Army received permission for local withdrawals during night 30/31 Jul. Marshal Kesselring enquired about the presence of the Canadian Corps in the Adriatic sector. Tenth Army was unable to confirm its presence; agents were said to be engaged in the solution of the problem. (G.M.D.S. - 55291/13, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 28-31 Jul, Appx 1549, tel cons 30 Jul 44)

31 Jul

72. The most significant development was the renewal of determined pressure on 29 Pz Gren Div and the right wing of 4 Para Div. In the evening the left wing of 14 Pz Corps and all formations of 1 Para Corps received orders to fall back during the night to an intermediate defence line forward of the "Bridgehead position Florence". The extreme right wing of Tenth Army withdrew to conform. - The bulk of 1 Para Div was now assembled near Cattolica on the Adriatic coast. Tenth Army detailed the measures to be taken in the event of an Allied landing in the area of Genoa (case GUSTAV) or an Allied seaborne hook on the Rimini - Ravenna area

^z New inter-army boundary as of 0400 hours 31 Jul: 13253 - 14546 - 15085 - thence as before. (For details see: Photostat 981A10.(D193). (G.M.D.S. - 55291/13, Tenth Army, Appx 28-31 Jul, Appx 1527, 1528, 1529, 29 Jul 44). (For map references see Photostat 981A10.(D191)(para 66 above).

(case RICHARD). (Photostat 981A10.(D194) (G.M.D.S. - 55291/13, Tenth Army, W.D. 7, Appx 28-31 Jul, Appx 1574 and 1575, 31 Jul 44)

73. After the attempt on Hitler's life the telephone conversation had become very guarded; Wentzell was the first one to revert to the expression of "candid opinions":

1115 hours 31 Jul Wentzell - Beelitz

W: I am of the opinion that the whole strategical situation in Italy is not being handled properly.

B: Too pessimistic?

W: No. Much too optimistic in view of the situation in the East.

B: I told Roettiger yesterday that no officer not in the picture regarding the conditions in the East can judge the situation here.

W: I am of the opinion - and I have said the same thing to Roettiger over three weeks ago - that we should be in the shortest possible line from the republic to the coast.*

...

It is always the same old story. Strategically speaking we are badly disposed. From three to four divisions could be saved by an order to shorten the front.

B: Preparations are being made.

W: This is all much too late and should have been done long ago, then we would now have 3 - 4 divisions up there. But there is no strategical forethought on our side and we always muck around with battalions as long as possible.

* The words "republic" and "coast" presumably meant "Switzerland" and "Adriatic coast". When the same two officers discussed the situation on 6 Aug, Wentzell said:

A withdrawal to the shortest position between Switzerland and the Adriatic should have been carried out four weeks ago. It is foolish to tie up down here large forces which ought to be employed where there are no mountain chains between the enemy and Germany.

(G.M.D.S. - 61437/3, Tenth Army, W.D. 8, Appx 5 - 8 Aug, Appx 127, tel cons 6 Aug 44)