

The "dagger" theme was again used by the Globe and Mail of 7 Oct to stress the need for mechanization to provide a highly mobile striking force. For a Canadian Press report of small groups of Canadian officers being selected for commando training, the Toronto Star of 11 Oct used the caption "Picked Canadians Trained as Invasion Shock Troops". Similarly, a despatch by Ross Munro telling of Exercise "BUMPER" appeared in the Ottawa Citizen of 20 Oct under the heading "Big Manoeuvres Held Training for 'Invasion'".

77. The size of the force Canada should provide again came into question. In commenting upon the recent arrival of "another huge flotilla of troopships", Saskatoon's Liberal Star-Phoenix on 22 Oct speculated that "possibly before long the Canadian force in Britain will provide two corps with General McNaughton in command of an army". To the Empire Club of Toronto Mr. P.J. Philip, Ottawa correspondent of the New York Times gave a warning that Hitler might be preparing to invade Britain in the spring with parachute and gas attacks and perhaps a Channel tunnel for tanks, yet he urged attack as the best defence and suggested the benefits of a tremendous drive "to make Africa securely ours" (Toronto Telegram, 23 Oct 41). Also speaking in Toronto, Mr. Hanson on his return from a visit to England declared the threat of invasion there had not passed and he called for "total enlistment at once of all available manpower, whatever system may be required to enlist them" (Gazette, 29 Oct 41).

78. When Parliament reassembled early in November, Mr. Hanson referred to the "full recognition in Britain that the war cannot be brought to a decisive conclusion without the invasion of enemy territory" but declared that "to ask Britain to start a campaign in western Europe to-day is to ask the impossible... It can be attained only by the combined efforts of Britain, the Dominions, our great neighbour to the south". He made mention of Canada's six divisions, "not all overseas, and a home defence army composed of drafted men", and said:

My own view is - and I am giving it only as my own view - that if the invasion of the continent is to be successfully accomplished Canada must provide more than six divisions, must provide an ever-increasing volume of man-power adequately trained and equipped for the offensive.

(Debates, 1941-42, vol IV, p. 4064)

Heading a list of specific questions he put was one asking for "The ultimate objective in man-power which it is hoped Canada may contribute" (ibid, p. 4069).

79. Col Ralston replied that Canada was determined to contribute "to the utmost of her ability". He stated that the drive for recruits had produced 34,000 enlistments for the Army from about 48,000 who had actually volunteered, but that the four succeeding months had seen a definite falling off as 37,000 odd had been asked for and only 24,000 plus enlisted. (Ibid, pp 4112-20) In commenting on these figures, the Toronto Star of 7 Nov wrote: "We believe that if the Canadian troops were in action and suffering casualties, many more volunteers would flock to the colours, their patriotism stirred by the sacrifices being made by their fellow-Canadians".

80. On 6 Nov 41 the same two speakers had a brief exchange with regard to control of the Canadian forces overseas during which the Minister, speaking off-hand, said: "If they go out of England for service the Government of Canada would be asked to give its consent" (Debates, 1941-42, p. 4133). This drew

criticism at once from Mr. Church, who pointed out that "sooner or later there must be another Peninsular war on the continent" and complained that Canada had not been represented as New Zealand and Australia had been in Africa, Greece, Syria and other countries (*ibid*, p. 4175). Dr. Bruce thereupon sounded a definite call for "compulsory selective service", supporting his demand with quotations from prominent Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy. The cry was taken up on 10 and 11 Nov by numerous Opposition members.

81. On 12 Nov 41 Senator Arthur Meighen accepted the leadership of the Conservative party and at once declared for "compulsory selective service over the whole field of war" (*Ottawa Citizen*, 13 Nov 41). That very afternoon the Prime Minister told the House that his Government stood by the policy of compulsory service for home defence, but that "without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas" (*Debates*, 1941-42, p. 4321). The divergence between the two major political parties on this issue stood clearly defined when Mr. P.F. Casgrain (Secretary of State) maintained that the great majority of the people of Canada and of Quebec did not want conscription for overseas while Mr. W.E. Rowe (Dufferin-Simcoe) upheld that it was necessary.

82. Without relating in detail how the controversy over conscription grew in intensity during the Parliamentary recess of 1941-42, mention must be made of certain influencing factors. A severe loss was suffered in the death on 26 Nov of Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe, who had vigorously championed a full war policy short of conscription for overseas. Two French-Canadian District Officers Commanding, Brigadiers E. deB. Panet of M.D. 4 and Georges Vanier of M.D. 5, both stressed the need for recruits in outspoken addresses which received wide publicity. The *Toronto Star* of 28 Nov carried a report indicating that up to 30,000 women would be recruited to release men for overseas. After a survey of Canada's war effort, Mr. Joseph Driscoll in the *New York Herald-Tribune* of 5 Dec wrote that general opinion seemed to be that the Canadian expeditionary force at this stage did not possess "the necessary reserves to carry on an all-out drive to Berlin".

83. Meanwhile, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division arrived in Britain in November 1941. The same day the news was released, the surprise announcement was made that Maj-Gen Crerar would command the 2nd Canadian Division with Maj-Gen K. Stuart becoming Chief of the General Staff. At once an article in Toronto's Liberal organ prophesied that Canada might soon have a full-fledged army overseas of six divisions forming two corps, with General McNaughton as Army Commander and General Crerar commanding the 1st Canadian Corps (H.R. Armstrong in the *Toronto Star*, 27 Nov 41). The *Montreal Star* of 27 Nov speculated that to achieve this the 4th Division might be sent overseas, or another division might be formed from reinforcements already there, or another Empire division might be added. It was generally expected, however, that the first overseas would be the first to see action.

HONG KONG

84. Earlier in this report brief mention has been made of the fears created when Japan and Germany were seen to be drawing closer together in 1940*. There was obvious public concern

* See paragraph 49 above.

not only over the defensive arrangements on the Pacific Coast but with regard to the loyalty of Asiatics residing there. These factors considerably influenced the Canadian Government in retaining as much as possible of the 2nd Division in Canada that summer (H.Q.S. 20-1-27: External Affairs to High Commissioner, 11 Jul 40).

85. The following winter anti-Japanese feelings, which had for many years been prevalent in British Columbia, rose to such a pitch that the Federal Government appointed a committee of investigation. This Sparling Committee recommended re-registration of Japanese in that province, also that they should not be called up for military service (not a unanimous decision) and that an appeal should be made to citizens and the press to diminish the ill-feeling. These suggestions were put into effect by another committee headed by Mayor F.J. Hume of New Westminster and the R.C.M.P. conducted the registration on a voluntary basis in March 1941. Press agitation thereafter subsided, although several British Columbia members of Parliament urged that a firm hand be shown.

86. Uneasiness returned upon Premier Tojo forming his war-like cabinet in October 1941, and newspapers across Canada hailed Mr. King's announcement on 16 Nov that Canadian troops had arrived at Hong Kong. Among many forecasts of imminent action was the following:

Canada's soldiers have had little active service so far, have been straining at the leash by all accounts. The raid on Spitzbergen's coal mines and oil depot was a welcome diversion for some. The Hong Kong development may be more momentous than that Arctic adventure.

(Gazette, 17 Nov 41)

87. Japan's shattering attack against Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec immediately caused widespread consternation along the whole Pacific Coast of North America. Canada's official declaration of war against Japan that day preceded by a few hours similar action by the United States and the United Kingdom. On 9 Dec Pensions Minister Mackenzie announced that the Government now considered that the entire Atlantic Coast south of Labrador and the entire Pacific Coast south of Alaska were subject to the risk of enemy attack. The following day the sinking of H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse off Malaya caused serious alarm to be felt in British Columbia. Although not reported in the press, rumours of inadequate defences there spread rapidly and before long were being repeated in the eastern cities. According to a survey made since, these rumours were not merely vague and general but named specific military installations, described the equipment available, and referred to the inadequacy of fire fighting apparatus in the larger cities (La Violette, Professor F.E., The Canadian Japanese and World War II, University of Toronto Press, 1948, p. 35). The Chief of the General Staff at once made a personal inspection of coastal defences there and declared in Vancouver that they were "capable of coping with any probable attacks that we may have to face". Continuing he said:

One of the objectives of the enemy is to create confusion in Canada and bring about a diversion to home defence of troops that would otherwise be sent overseas. We must not forget that this war will be won outside Canada and we must send our main forces to the place where they will be needed most.

(Montreal Star, 19 Dec 41)

This brought some measure of reassurance to the general public and helped to stem growing murmurs against sending further troops abroad (See the Gazette and Globe and Mail of 20 Dec 41).

88. By 20 December most newspapers were conceding the loss of Hong Kong and directing criticism to the lightness of the forces assigned to hold it. The Windsor Star spoke of Canada's "suicide squad" in bewailing the fact that instead of a token force "we hadn't a hundred thousand troops ready to throw into the defence of this vital Empire stronghold". The Vancouver Sun in asking for combined strategic planning and unified command demanded "no more sacrifice garrisons". There was universal praise, however, for the courage of the troops fighting on against odds. It is impossible here to portray adequately the feeling of Canada when news was received of the tragic fall of Hong Kong on Christmas Day 1941. One quotation may suffice:

The bitter cup drunk by Australia and New Zealand in Greece and Crete has now, in lesser measure, become that of Canada too... Now, alas, in the grim phrase of John Bright: the Angel of Death is abroad in the land. You can almost hear the flutter of his wings.

(Winnipeg Free Press, 26 Dec 41)

89. At this time when faith in fleets and fortresses had been badly shaken, Mr. Churchill did much to restore public confidence by addressing the Canadian parliament on 31 Dec 41. Saying that "the Canadian army now stationed in England has chafed not to find itself in contact with the enemy", he warned that invasion might yet come although their presence there might deter the enemy. After a tribute to the Canadian stand at Hong Kong, he referred to the Air Training Scheme as "another major contribution" and emphasized the importance of battles abroad (Debates, 1941-42, vol IV, pp 4478-82). There were many Canadians who had become convinced, nevertheless, that home defence should now be placed foremost.

PRESSURE FOR INCREASED HOME DEFENCES, 1942

90. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, even before Japan's sweeping successes on sea and land increased the tension, letters to the editor appeared in leading dailies of British Columbia pointing out the possibility of subversive acts by resident Japanese. In the same papers editorials urged that the people keep calm, but by the end of December the agitation had been taken up by local Members of Parliament, Conservative and Liberal Associations, and municipal bodies. Fearing that public demonstrations and street parades might provoke inter-racial clashes, the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command (Maj-Gen R.O. Alexander) promptly informed Ottawa:

Public feeling is becoming very insistent, especially in Vancouver, that local Japanese should be either interned or removed from the coast. Letters are being written continually to the press and I am being bombarded by individuals, both calm and hysterical, demanding that something be done.

((H.S.) H.Q. 6-0-7: Alexander to C.G.S., 30 Dec 41)

An article by R.H. Hague in Saturday Night (Toronto) of 3 Jan 42 emphasized that considerable political pressure for evacuation was going to be applied from British Columbia.

91. On 14 Jan 42 the Prime Minister announced a moderate policy designed to relieve the tension, yet not go so far as to cause reprisals by Japan against prisoners taken at Hong Kong. It deprived Japanese nationals of certain privileges, notably that of fishing, and provided for partial evacuation only. The immediate public reaction was one of approval, but anxiety soon returned over the apparent inaction of Ottawa officials in implementing the programme. Local politicians continued their agitation, spurred on now by resolutions from various service clubs, fraternal and patriotic societies, and veterans organizations. Immediately after Parliament met on 21 Jan numerous members from British Columbia, aided by several from Ontario, demanded drastic action at once. Although police officials and the Services were equally confident they could control internal trouble, public agitation increased to such an extent that on 26 Feb the Prime Minister announced there would be complete evacuation by compulsion.^{*} Economic interests may have had some influence, but public opinion with regard to defence was undoubtedly the leading factor in bringing about this evacuation. It was an outstanding example of public pressure overcoming military and governmental policy^{***}.

92. The Canadian Legion in particular stressed the military danger from the Japanese, and spoke of considerable uneasiness among the people of Vancouver and Victoria in formal¹¹ asking that "sufficient equipment be placed at the disposal of all local forces" (H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol 2: J.C.D. Herwig to Col Ralston, 13 Jan 42). Simultaneously many ships were being sunk off the Atlantic Coast and Mayor LaGuardia of New York issued a warning that air raids on coastal towns were imminent.

93. In the House of Commons Mr. Hanson on 24 Jan agreed that Canada's seaports were in grave danger, yet he declared that her first line of defence still lay overseas and he even proposed that she should send a division to Australia. "If we haven't a division of trained men in Canada", he said, "then send one of our trained divisions now in England and replace it with men from Canada. Those men over there would welcome the opportunity for active service." (Debates, 1942, vol 1, p. 22). Several French-speaking members, however, pointed to the precarious position in which Australia found herself after sending her troops abroad. One of the principal speakers campaigning on behalf of the government candidate in a Quebec by-election was said to have used these words:

There are events happening in Australia at present which more than ever would not only justify Prime Minister King's non-enforcement of conscription for overseas service but which might even oblige him to recall troops now stationed in England.^{***}

(Ibid, p. 335)

^{*} Although slower in gathering momentum, similar demands in California led to a Presidential Order of 21 Feb regarding evacuation of 136,000 nationals compared to Canada's 24,000.

^{***} See La Violette, op cit, chapters I and II. See also Historical Section file H.Q. 6-0-7: Evacuation of Japanese.

^{***} These words were read to the House by a Conservative, Mr. N.J.M. Lockhart (Lincoln), who attributed them to Mr. Taschereau of Quebec. The reference might have been to the Australians fighting in Malaya and particularly to those besieged in Singapore.

Among the numerous members demanding increased defences on the Pacific Coast, Mr. R.W. Mayhew (a government member) on 9 Feb expressed considerable concern over the protection of what he termed "vital spots". Although admitting that defences had been improved and feeling that there was not much danger of cities being bombed, he said, in part:

We have a little time to spare. I urge the minister and the government to make use of that time to the utmost of their ability and to see that the west coast of British Columbia is supplied with everything with which it is possible to supply it - with guns and tanks, and not with a company of men, but with divisions of men.

The minister said he would have them ready to move. I should like to see them move at least west of the Great Divide where we know we can get them when we want them.

(Ibid, p. 435)

This sort of pressure from its own supporters in Parliament was something which the Government could not overlook. No doubt still stronger pressure was being exerted privately.

94. Previously on 26 Jan the Prime Minister had warned against too great an emphasis on home defence. After declaring that "more important today than the size of an army is its striking force", he referred to the Air Training Plan as "the greatest and most vital of all Canadian military commitments in this war" (ibid, pp 33-34). Col Ralston on 10 Feb made a similar reference before proceeding to outline the army programme for 1942, which required a further 90,000 to 100,000 enlistments and the sending overseas of the 4th Division as an armoured division. He reaffirmed his preference for the voluntary system but suggested that if it failed he would feel it his duty "to advocate the adoption of the other method". (Ibid, p. 451). This provoked lively newspaper discussion and parliamentary debate on the issue of conscription for overseas.

95. When Singapore fell on 15 Feb, Mr. H.C. Green led an immediate demand in Parliament for a secret session on national defence. After referring to a resolution passed unanimously by the British Columbia legislature urging stronger Pacific defences, Mr. A.W. Neill (Comox-Alberni) read the following quotation from the Vancouver Sun:

Canada obviously has not made its plan of defence on the assumption of any real attack on the Pacific coast... That is the plan which must be reconsidered... we do expect a well-equipped, mobile striking unit which could pounce upon any Japanese landing attempt from Alaska southwards. No such force exists on our coast. No such force exists in Canada.

(Ibid, pp 717-18)

The Prime Minister later agreed to a secret sitting which was held on 24 Feb.

96. On 23 Feb a Japanese submarine fired some 25 shells at oil installations near Santa Barbara, California. All the shells but one fell harmlessly on the shore and that one did only slight damage to a derrick. The shelling lasted 20 minutes or more, and the audacity of the attack was most alarming.

97. As part of the agitation for greater protection, sections of the press called loudly for an inspection of coastal defences by General McNaughton, who then was visiting America. In his Washington press interviews, however, he warned against sporadic attacks on the west coast drawing away attention from more important objectives. Although agreeing that the enemy might at least attempt to strike at the Panama Canal or Alaska, he made it clear that he himself had no intention of staying in Canada to organize and command the defences against possible nuisance raids by either Japanese or Germans.*

98. On 18 Mar the Prime Minister announced that steps would be taken to establish unity of command between the three Canadian Services on the east and west coast and in Newfoundland. Secret instructions to the designated commanders pointed out that such a system had actually been in effect for some time but added that publicity was necessary for "reasons of State" ((H.S.) 955.003(D1), J.S.S.C.-6: Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to Secretary Joint Services Committee Atlantic Coast 19 Mar 42). La Presse of 19 Mar commented that Canadian defences would thereby become "plus serré, plus compacte et plus souple en même temps".

99. Meanwhile the Vancouver Sun undertook to force the pace by publishing from 13 to 16 Mar a series of articles entitled "The Derelict Defence". These contended that the General Staff was directing nine-tenths of its energy and thought to training forces for use in Europe, or elsewhere, and only one-tenth to the defence of the Pacific Coast. They complained of outmoded methods and shortages of effective equipment, of lack of co-operation and a failure to adopt an aggressive spirit. The censor felt that they were so damaging to public morale that he felt compelled to stop them and legal action by the Crown brought a fine of \$300.00 to the newspaper. A subsequent editorial in the Sun of 23 Apr asserted that "within a matter of days after we had published the offending articles the government (completely altering the whole military policy by the way) [sic] had decided to do virtually everything we asked" (H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol 3: G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command to C.G.S., 17 Mar and 24 Apr 42, with attached newspaper clippings).

100. On 16 Mar Premier Hart of British Columbia discussed these articles with the senior officers of the three Services stationed in his province. He appreciated the fact that they had to be prepared to meet "nuisance raids", but he went on to state that the people were definitely alarmed and "were obsessed with the necessity of the adequate protection of British Columbia from any possible eventuality and until this can be assured did not appreciate the necessity of sending weapons and equipment abroad" (Ibid: Alexander to C.G.S., 17 Mar 42). On 18 Mar these same officers met his Provincial Cabinet to reassure its members that defence measures were adequate, but the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command rather gloomily reported to Ottawa that "The morale of the public in British Columbia is undoubtedly at a very low ebb and the wildest statements and rumours are being made" (ibid: 19 Mar 42).

101. Despite public apprehensions over home defence, Mr. Green again asked Parliament to consider sending at least a token force to aid Australia, both for the sake of Commonwealth ties and as a protective measure. On the basis of Canada's commitments to

* See J.F. Sanderson in the Windsor Star, 9 Mar; L.S.B. Shapiro in the Gazette, 10 Mar; Gregory Clark in the Toronto Star, 11 Mar; Chester Bloom and R.P. Elson in the Regina Leader-Post, 12 Mar. See also the Edmonton Journal, 3 Mar, and the Vancouver Province, 11 Mar 42)

send troops to Britain, the Prime Minister immediately rejected the proposal. On 25 Mar, however, he spoke at length on the manner in which his Government was being torn between two dangerous extremes; those who would send all trained men and available weapons overseas and those who would keep them at home. He summed up the pressure as follows:

Before the Japanese attacks were made on British and American territories in the Pacific, the insistence of the government upon the maintenance of a foundation for the actual physical defence of Canadian territory aroused in some quarters a good deal of impatience. The opposite tendency has been more in evidence since December 7.

(Ibid, p. 1630)

Continuing, he announced the mobilization of the 7th and 8th Divisions, which he stated would be given the role of mobile reserves with special reference to the east and west coasts. Although most newspapers voiced approval, the St. Catherines Standard of 26 Mar sought an assurance that if and when the war situation improved regarding home defence these divisions could be used "as part of the striking force which must certainly be employed before the enemy is brought to his knees".

102. The action taken by the Government at this time of exceptional pressure from British Columbia should be noted in slightly more detail. The Cabinet War Committee on 18 Mar 42 approved the completion of 6 Cdn Div and the mobilization of the three brigade groups of 7 Cdn Div; on 20 Mar 42 it approved the completion of 7 Cdn Div and the mobilization of the brigade groups of 8 Cdn Div. On the former date it also approved a very large increase in the Home War Establishment of the R.C.A.F., estimated to cost \$206 million (later increased to \$216 million). The actual strength of the R.C.A.F. in Canada increased during 1942 from 16 squadrons to 36 (R.C.A.F. Logbook, Ottawa, 1949, pp 67, 70). Such was the influence of public pressure at this juncture.

103. While it might not be accurate to say that the Government was ahead of its military advisers in these home defence measures of 1942, it certainly kept well abreast of them. The final submission made by the C.G.S. (General Crerar) covering the Army Programme for 1942 (H.Q.S. 20-1-9, vol 3, 18 Nov 41) noted that there were no military factors in the existing situation warranting the mobilization of an additional division, but added that if conditions changed for the worse he might be obliged to recommend the completion of the 6th Division and the mobilization of the brigade groups of a 7th Division. Conditions did change for the worse with the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 Dec 41, but the action thus forecast was not actually taken until 16 Mar 42, when the new C.G.S. (General Stuart) recommended to the Minister the completion of 6 Cdn Div and mobilization of the brigade groups of 7 Cdn Div (H.Q.S. 20-1-5, vol 2).^{*} As already noted, the War Committee gave approval two days later. The first recommendation for the completion of the 7th Division and formation of the brigade groups of the 8th was made by the C.G.S. on 20 Mar 42 (H.Q.S. 20-1-25). The War Committee approved this action the same evening.

* This action had however been referred to as necessary at a meeting of Directors on 27 Feb 42 (H.Q.S. 20-1-6, vol 1, Minutes of meeting).

104. In a press interview on returning to England General McNaughton once more emphasized the offensive theme, although warning against undue haste or "a blow struck casually". Stressing that the General still thought an attack would be premature, the Gazette of 30 Mar concluded: "If McNaughton says 'wait', we shall wait content". The Winnipeg Free Press of 30 Mar recognized the force of the argument that he should be given a high position at home but declared that "It remains an undoubted public demand that he continue to lead the corps which now nears the day when the long period of preparation will be transformed into action".

105. When the announcement was made on 6 Apr regarding the formation of HQ First Canadian Army, newspapers almost without exception spoke of it as a preparatory step towards assuring the offensive.²² Nevertheless a statement at this time by Mr. W.D. Herridge (former Canadian Minister to Washington) to the effect that there were not sufficient reinforcements on hand for sustained action led to considerable controversy. The Minister of National Defence at once contended they were up to the full scale asked for by General McNaughton. Although supporting his stand, the Winnipeg Free Press of 11 Apr remarked that "when our army overseas gets into action and suffers losses, conscription will be necessary to fill the gaps". Among others expressing doubt that Canada could maintain a two-corps army, the Vancouver Province of 8 Apr said: "We have the organization, with brass hats galore. Have we the men?"

106. That month a series of highly critical articles entitled "The Dagger Point" appeared in the Globe and Mail. Objecting that expansion of the Canadian Corps into an army meant "multiplying our military responsibilities on the eve of action", these articles complained:

The present indications are that the training, equipment and organization of the Canadian Corps is not such that it could effect a successful landing on the Continent and sustain an offensive action. Artillery, engineers, armoured cars and infantry are organized separately and associated only in brigade groups, instead of working intimately in the smaller formations. There is an obvious lack of experience in the use of aircraft, and no large-scale training of parachute troops and specially trained airborne shock troops.

(Globe and Mail, April 1942)

Most of the arguments were based on German practices in the battle for Crete, but in the opinion of General McNaughton they indicated a lack of real knowledge of the subject. Discussing them with his staff officers on 23 May, he stated that he did not consider they would receive much support in Canada nor that they represented any considerable weight of public opinion (File (H.S.) P.L. 3-7 contains a note to this effect).

107. Canadian public attention meanwhile was very largely fixed upon the plebiscite of 27 Apr on the question of releasing the Government from its pledge regarding conscription for overseas service. Except in Quebec the result was overwhelmingly in favour of allowing Canadian troops to be sent abroad, with the Service percentage of "Yes" votes much higher than the civilian.

²² See Montreal Gazette and Star, also Ottawa Journal and Citizen, all of 8 Apr 42.

108. The Cabinet subsequently decided on 8 May 42 to amend the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 by seeking repeal of Section 3, which had caused prolonged discussion when originally adopted (see paragraph 43 above). This reversal of policy brought about the immediate resignation of Mr. P.J.A. Cardin from the Cabinet. Before debate on the amending bill took place, however, public fears for the safety of both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts came very much to the fore.

109. On 13 May 42 the Minister for Naval Services (Mr. A.L. Macdonald) confirmed the sinking of two ships in the St. Lawrence river by enemy submarine action. Pointing out that German broadcasters were saying that they had produced tremendous consternation in Canada, he declared that information of such incidents must be released only in such a way as to convey no benefit to the enemy. Mr. Church at once intimated that German submarines had been using the base and inland creeks of St. Pierre and Miquelon as hiding places for over a year and had received signals from the shore. The Minister was extremely skeptical of this and rejected the suggestion by Mr. Hanson that for the sake of morale there should be periodic announcements like those of Britain and the United States regarding shipping losses.

110. Soon afterwards Mr. J.S. Roy (Gaspé) startled the country by asking for an immediate secret session to discuss submarine activity "By reasons of particulars I possess and desire to share with the House, but which it would not be wise to disclose publicly" (*ibid.*, p. 2470). The Prime Minister suggested instead that he give the information to the Minister for Naval Services, which he did in writing. On receiving the information the Cabinet declined to grant his request, although newspapers played up the issue at length.

111. Early in June the Japanese threw the entire Pacific Coast into a state of alarm by raiding Dutch Harbor. Col Ralston at once assured the Commons that Canadian and United States commanders were taking action in accordance with the joint plans previously laid, and he also disclosed that the Chief of the General Staff had been for some days on the West Coast "supervising dispositions on the ground" (*Debates*, 1942, p. 3045). Mr. H. Mitchell (Minister of Labour) also assisted in re-establishing confidence by announcing that some 12,000 Japanese had already been evacuated from the British Columbian coastal area. A few days later Japanese submarines shelled Sydney and Newcastle, Australia, causing several members to express concern over defensive preparations. Mr. A.G. Slight (Parry Sound) requested barrage balloons at Halifax, Esquimalt, and Patricia Bay; Mr. Pouliot stressed the need for military highways; while Mr. J.L. O'Brien (Northumberland, N.B.) asked for an anti-submarine net to protect bridges of the Miramichi River.

112. Amid such tension the War Appropriation Bill finally passed and the Prime Minister on 10 Jun 42 opened the debate amending the National Resources Mobilization Act. Two days later rumours of Japanese landings in the Aleutians were confirmed. Soon it was announced that R.C.A.F. squadrons and Canadian anti-aircraft units were cooperating with the Americans in Alaska, and army leaders admitted that the situation was serious. In parliament Mr. J.G. Turgeon (Caribou) contended that the move into Alaska was Japan's first step in attacking Russia. Urging offensive action against Japan he said:

If we can secure the consent of Russia, or if Russia and Japan become embroiled, as I feel certain they

will, then we shall have to send our armies into Siberia. If we cannot get the consent of Russia, then we shall have to go across the Bering Sea or directly across the northern Pacific from Prince Rupert.

(Ibid, p. 3448)

Among speakers who followed, Mrs. Dorise W. Nielsen (North Battleford) hailed the interchange of diplomatic relations between Canada and the Soviet and declared that the people were expressing the need for offensive action and the opening of a second front. She felt that Col Ralston was correctly voicing the opinion of the Canadian people when he told the Rotary Club of Montreal that "the people are calling for action and so are the Canadian troops in Britain". (Ibid, pp 3459-60)

113. Public concern for the safety of Canada probably reached its climax after 20 Jun 42 when a Japanese submarine shelled the lighthouse at Estevan Point, Vancouver Island. "It was the first attack on Canadian soil that has been made since Confederation", Mr. King told the Commons (ibid, p. 3507). Mr. Green enumerated the disasters making that day "one of the grim days of a very grim war": the fall of Tobruk, the wedge driven by the Germans into Sebastopol, the Japanese seizure of Kiska, and the shelling of Estevan Point. Complaining that the policy of the Canadian Government seemed to focus the attention of their troops on defence when it should be on attack, he once more advocated that Canada should be building "an army for the purpose of eventually striking out in the Pacific, perhaps into Alaska, perhaps to Siberia or Australia, and finally into Japan". (Ibid, p. 3516). Mr. Clarence Gillis (Cape Breton South) on the other hand said that the people should be organizing means of defence in every section of the country and Mr. T.A. Fontaine (St. Hyacinthe-Bagot) gave him support by quoting at length reports broadcast from Tokyo regarding the shelling of Vancouver Island. Mr. Maurice Bourget (Lévis) also agreed and warned that "once our men are overseas, it is almost certain that in case of an attack against Canada, it will be impossible to recall them to this country" (ibid, p. 3549).

114. Newspapers carried full reports of the shelling together with a similar occurrence at Seaside, Oregon during the night 21/22 Jun. Many editors, however, immediately attempted to minimize public anxiety. The Ottawa Journal reported that Mayor McGavin of Victoria had said that the people's interest in the raid was due to curiosity, not "jitters", while the Citizen stated that "the shelling caused little excitement among British Columbia residents". Without actually invading beyond the Aleutians, nevertheless, the Japanese through these shelling incidents produced the same feeling on the Pacific Coast as sinkings by German submarines in the St. Lawrence caused on the Atlantic Coast.

115. By a decisive vote in the Commons on 7 Jul 42, legal restrictions against sending Canadian forces overseas by compulsion were removed. It is interesting to note that, whereas the prohibitory clause had originally been adopted at the time when affairs in Europe were at their blackest, its repeal took place when threats to Canada herself seemed most serious. Although removal of the legal bars increased the popular clamour to send N.R.M.A. troops overseas, the Government refrained from exercising its right until military necessity made such a course essential late in 1944. Long before then, however, all danger of attacks on Canadian soil had been removed.

DIEPPE AND DEMANDS FOR A SECOND FRONT

116. Without a doubt the Dieppe raid of 19 Aug 42 marked one of the most significant turning points in Canadian public opinion. It was like a safety-valve releasing many pent-up emotions. But for Dieppe, the Japanese landings on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, both occurring within the following week, might have intensified the mania for defence on the Pacific. Similarly, it served to relieve the nervous tension over sinkings in the St. Lawrence. By directing attention forcibly to the European front, Dieppe placed the offensive foremost and home defence assumed a more moderate perspective in public thought. Although the clamour for full-scale invasion continued, Dieppe brought a sombre realization of the many difficulties as Canada counted her casualties and the Allies surveyed the barriers to an assault on Hitler's domain.

117. Raised morale was evident throughout the Army and definitely reflected in the press, which carried many stories of volunteers "rushing to fill up the ranks" of units which had lost heavily. An examination of recruiting figures for all Canada, however, reveals only a very slight increase and in the succeeding weeks even a retrogression (See Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., Report No. 109, Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Part III: Some Special Aspects). Slogans similar to "avenge Hong Kong" were not noticeable. Rather, there was an evident desire on the part of the Army to profit by the lessons and prepare even more intensively for the next encounter. Reports of Canadian troops being overwhelmingly impatient for action were discredited by senior officers, who pointed out to the press that their men were fully conscious of the need for training for the offensive and were settling down to it earnestly.

118. Proud of the fact that the majority of the troops participating were Canadians, the press at first almost unanimously hailed the success of the raid as a vital invasion test. Due publicity was given to Mr. Churchill's pronouncement on 8 Sep that Dieppe was "an indispensable preliminary to full-scale invasion" and to Ross Munro's description of it as "a reconnaissance in force". Col Ralston's official statement issued from Ottawa on 19 Sep after his return from Britain drew many comments on his declaration that it was part of "the agreed offensive policy" of the Allies. Despite the high proportion of casualties, there seems to have been no desire to draw back from whatever future operations might be in prospect; on the contrary, speculation was rife on the probable fields for a Second Front. It was still assumed that Canadians would spearhead the attack in this. There were renewed proposals that General McNaughton be Supreme Commander, although Saturday Night suggested Stalin and later assailed "scientific" generals (Press Indices Nos. 289, 294 and 332; 3 and 9 Sep and 23 Oct 42; items 2716, Windsor Star, 2958 and 4819, Saturday Night).

119. Before the end of August, however, severe criticism of the methods employed at Dieppe appeared in the Globe and Mail (Press Indices Nos. 280 and 284, 23 and 28 Aug 42, items 2221 and 2417). Other newspapers followed suit, and many began to enquire whether the price paid in storming such strong ramparts had been worth it all. Doubts were expressed, also, regarding Canada's ability to withstand such excessive battle-wastage. The Gazette, for example, had entitled its first editorial on the raid "The Dagger is Whetted" but by 17 Sep it was asking if the dagger was to be blunted at its first thrust, implying that conscription was necessary to keep it sharp. With growing criticism

of the planning and leadership, much of the confidence the raid had inspired was seriously undermined as the winter passed without further action by the Canadian Army Overseas.

120. Early in September 1942 the arrival overseas of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division was greeted by numerous articles extolling the amazing extent of the nation's war effort. Nevertheless, the Winnipeg Free Press of 10 Sep deplored the fact that as Canada entered her fourth year of war there were so many newspapers and public men still urging that her contribution should remain moderate. Loud cries for conscription still continued, but they were now countered by emphasis upon National Selective Service to meet requirements of industry and agriculture rather than by demands to direct man-power into home defence. The public appears to have been generally pleased with measures taken to counteract direct threats to both coasts. Satisfaction over the appointment of Maj-Gen G.R. Pearkes, V.C., as G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command was expressed by the Vancouver Province while the Sun reported Maj-Gen H.N. Ganong as saying that morale of his 8th Division was excellent (Press Index No. 303, 19 Sep 42, items 3434 and 3436). Few papers from other parts of the country, however, seemed to be paying much attention to the West Coast. As for submarines in the St. Lawrence, when another sinking off Métis caused Mr. J.S. Roy to ask for a special session of Parliament, the Montreal Star said the matter was well in hand and termed his demand "silly". (Press Index No. 327, 17 Oct 42, item 4557). Mr. J.F. Pouliot and the Minister for Naval Services clashed over the matter, and Toronto's Telegram of 23 Oct endorsed the complaints of L'Action Catholique in requesting investigation by the Minister for Air. Nevertheless, although the torpedoing of the Newfoundland ferry S.S. Caribou created consternation, headlines indicated that problems of home defence had been crowded out by keen interest in far-off battlefronts.

121. During the summer attention had definitely shifted from Libya to Russia, whose defence of Stalingrad during September commanded universal admiration. After Stalin issued on 4 Oct a clear call for help, the Canadian papers linked together Mr. Churchill's remarks on expanding Allied strength and President Roosevelt's fireside chat hinting at new offensive to aid both Russia and China. Columnists such as Major Eliot and John Collingwood Reade at once mentioned Africa, and numerous American dailies wrote of Dakar. There was a hint of future joint operations in Col Ralston's statement that Canadian, British and American forces in Britain were exchanging a certain number of officers to increase cooperation (Montreal Star, 21 Oct 42). Canadian newspapers agreed, however, that no second front should be opened at the expense of Britain abandoning Egypt and the Middle East.

122. During mid-October interest in the second front waned considerably. The Gazette on 15 Oct ran a headline about Wendell Willkie repeating the call on behalf of Russia, but comments in many newspapers revealed much adverse opinion and the topic was soon dropped. When the German drive on Stalingrad stalled, Le Soleil on 17 Oct claimed that further discussion was pointless since the urgency had disappeared. ((H.S.) P.A. 3-7: Minim Preco [¶] No. 109, 20 Oct 42). The Montreal Star of 22 Oct reported that a McGill professor had suggested that loud vocal demands for action might only be part of the war of nerves against the Nazis. Speeches made by Tim Buck at this time did little to

* See footnote to paragraph 3 for an explanation of this term.

neant that they were reserved for a cross-Channel drive - "and that attack is not many months away" (Press Index No. 350, 13 Nov 42, item 3857, Gillis Purcell in the Gazette). Speaking to the Canadian Corps Association in Vancouver, General Clark¹ said:

It strikes me as one of the supreme tragedies of this war that the U.S., following one year in the struggle, has already placed men in battle engagements in Africa, while Canadian soldiers are sitting idle in England. This constitutes the greatest disgrace of the present war.

(Ibid, No. 363, 8 Nov 42, item 6559, the Vancouver Sun)

127. Writing from England, L.S.B. Shapiro contended that the Canadians there had grown indignant, irritated by the fact that American troops who had been in England less than six months and British divisions which had only been in the blueprint stage when certain Canadian divisions were fully mustered, had gone into action ahead of them. With some Canadians feeling they were "a sort of adjunct to the British Home Guard", said Shapiro, they were beginning to ask whether it was military strategy, government policy, or lack of reinforcements that was keeping them out of action. This theme he expanded in a series of articles on morale, which he felt remained high in the expectation that "a most spectacular and dramatic task" was being reserved for them. He maintained, however, that complexities expanded with each passing day the Army was not in action. Continuing, the writer pointed out that the Canadian soldier was highly sensitive about his inaction, that he was afraid people at home thought of him as a member of "a forgotten army" or of "the county constabulary in the English countryside". Shapiro summarized his point by saying "The whole problem of morale may disappear tomorrow, next week or next month - whenever the Canadians go into action". (Ibid, Nos 361, 369, and 379, 26 Nov, 5 and 16 Dec 42, items 6470, 6866 and 7334, Gazette).² In a broadcast of 15 Nov Shapiro had suggested that the Canadian Army would not be deflected from its original purpose - to invade France ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/PRESS/3/3: Extract from C.B.C. Broadcast of 15 Nov 42).

128. Taking advantage of a demonstration held on the third anniversary of the arrival of the first Canadian contingent in the United Kingdom, General McNaughton told the press "We never know that perhaps in a matter of days we may launch into something that will lead to a clash with the enemy" (Gazette, 18 Dec 42). Shapiro later commented that by this review and press conference the General had demonstrated the compactness of the Canadian Army as a striking force and had replied to critics who wanted it broken up to join the British in North Africa or the Middle East. Criticism had taken the form of a broad hint that General McNaughton was keeping the Canadians together because he did not want to diminish his command and also an unsubstantiated rumour that the Canadians had declined an invitation, accepted by the Americans in their stead, to send a division to join the First Army. Agreeing with Hannen Swaffer, outstanding British newspaperman, that the Canadian Army was most valuable when kept together as a bridgehead,

¹ ~~Formerly~~ Col (Hon Brig-Gen) J.A. Clark, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., of Vancouver. He was noted as an ardent advocate of conscription.

² The quotations are from Shapiro's article of 10 Dec 42 (delayed) entitled "Morale of the Army". A copy is filed in (H.S.) 000.5(D2).

help, many editors referring to what he had said before Germany attacked Russia. At this time there were signs in several papers of a softening towards Italy, with Mr. A.W. Roebuck and the Winnipeg Free Press conducting a campaign to remove the stigma from her nationals in Canada.

123. By October 1942 a major controversy over air versus land warfare was developing in the United States and Canada. In the Winnipeg Free Press of 2 Oct the concluding article of a series of three entitled "The Air Advocate's View" by B.T. Richardson called for abandonment of the idea of the Canadian Army as "the dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin". It was claimed that, if the country were ruined by bombing, a Canadian expeditionary force landed on the Baltic could make its way to Berlin rather than fighting laboriously through 800 miles of German land fortifications. (Press Index No. 318, 7 Oct 42, item 4088, Winnipeg Free Press). Despite the emphasis upon mass bomber raids during the succeeding months, however, there was continual pressure by the public for action by land forces.

OPERATION "TORCH"

124. On 21 Oct 42 Field Marshal Smuts delivered a widely-publicized speech which many interpreted as a definite announcement of a Second Front. Public attention in consequence veered towards Africa, although the Canadian press was very cautious in its initial comments on the opening of the Eighth Army drive from Egypt. The fact that almost all major members of the Commonwealth except Canada contributed its divisions was not overlooked, but not until later was stress laid upon the Canadian manufacture of most of its mechanized equipment (Press Index No. 374, 11 Dec 43, Item 7110, Chester Bloom in the Winnipeg Free Press). Immediately the Americans landed in French North Africa, on the other hand, numerous commentators predicted a major offensive through Italy or the Balkans. At this stage, however, wishful thinking that the Canadians might participate in such an operation was expressed more by implication than by outright suggestion.

125. Just prior to Operation "Torch" there had been certain complaints about the need for action by the Canadian Army Overseas. An editorial in the Winnipeg Free Press said that it would be "a sensible thing to send a full division to some theatre of war or next best at least our senior officers", adding that "an opportunity like Egypt to get actual fighting experience for officers and men should not be allowed to slip by complacently" (ibid., No. 341, 3 Nov 42, Item 5337. See also No. 352, 16 Nov 42, Item 6001, Vancouver Sun). Speaking in Toronto, Lord Bennett said he could find no reason why the Canadian Army should have to spend its fourth Christmas in England without firing a shot, nor why a second corps was to be formed on the basis of a single division (ibid., No. 342, 4 Nov 42, item 3593, Citizen). Even statistics of No. 1 Neurological Hospital were presented under the headline "Mental Illness in Overseas Army Laid to Inactivity and Anxiety" (ibid., No. 343, 5 Nov 42, item 5468, Gazette).

126. Immediately after the American landings of 8 Nov the President of the Canadian Legion called for the army overseas to be bolstered at once because "at the most we have until next spring before it is our turn" (Montreal Star, 10 Nov 42). Expressing the opinion that Canadians could have been selected for the North African push and undoubtedly were considered, one overseas correspondent said the fact that they were not nominated

Shapiro said it was a reasonable deduction that it would remain in England until the opening of a western European land front. (Ibid, 6 and 12 Jan 43).

129. Praise for the patience of the Canadian Army, despite its "story of disappointment and frustrated hopes", was given freely by London papers and echoed in many Canadian dailies commenting on the anniversary²⁵. In the publication of "human interest" stories, however, journalists hampered by tightened censorship regulations regarding the Army gave most space to exploits of the Air Force. Heavy raids over Germany caused Winston Mills in the Ottawa Citizen of 16 Nov 42 to praise again the Air Training Plan as perhaps the greatest single contributing factor towards the eventual defeat of the Axis. (P/O George Beurling's feats over Malta also made popular reading against which stories of troops training in England could not compete).

ATTACHMENTS TO THE BRITISH ARMY IN AFRICA
AND CONTINUED PRESSURE FOR ACTION

130. Press reports of 5 Jan 43 were the first to reveal that officers and non-commissioned officers from the Canadian Army in England had landed in North Africa to gain battle experience with the British First Army. This provided the press with another opportunity to comment on the main issue of getting the Canadians into action. A despatch by Ross Munro pointed out that it was the fourth²⁶ foreign assignment for the troops whereas Canadian airmen had fought "in virtually every theatre of war from Alaska to Ceylon" (Journal, 6 Jan 43). The Ottawa Journal of 7 Jan recalled that months before it had suggested such a policy upon reading in Lord Gort's despatches that during the fighting in France British detachments had always served with the French. The Montreal Star interpreted the news at once as a promise of action (Press Index No. 396, 9 Jan 43, item 236). The Winnipeg Free Press, which had just complained that army appointments were being made "without the ordeal of trial by battle", expressed the hope that not only permanent but non-permanent force officers were included (Press Indices Nos. 390 and 399, 4 and 13 Jan 43, items 4 and 343).

131. Strong criticism was voiced by a leading Conservative paper of the West, the Vancouver Province, which scornfully asked if Canadians were so backward, so unresourceful that they must have months of special training for special conditions while others learn as they fight.

And Canada, which is as vitally interested in the outcome as any people on earth, and which has been telling herself, proudly, that she has the world's best shock troops, sends to the epic contest - a little contingent of observers... It is an affront to the Canadian army that it should be so. It is an affront to the Canadian people.

(Province, 6 Jan 43)

²⁵ Press Index, No. 380, 18 Dec 42, item 7385, Gazette. See also the Globe and Mail, 19 Dec 42, editorial entitled "Three Long Years".

²⁶ It may be observed that since Munro listed Northern France, Gibraltar, Spitsbergen, and Dieppe, Canadians in Britain had been involved already in four assignments excluding the Norwegian episode.

The columnist W.R. Plewman replied "On the contrary, the move, which presumably had the support of General McNaughton and the British War Office, appears to be calculated to improve the Allies war-winning effort". In his opinion these detachments were not necessarily an advanced guard for the main Canadian forces to be sent to Africa; rather, "By keeping the enemy guessing as to the real intentions of the Canadians, an important surprise may be sprung on him a few months hence". (Toronto Star, 9 Jan 43).

132. Shapiro held the same opinion, although he would not rule out the possibility of the main body going to Africa. The Canadian Army was ready for action at any time, he said, but was part of an invasion plan which could not be put into effect until British and American units also involved were properly trained and equipped. Meanwhile, the Canadian high command was proceeding on the assumption that events would make it possible to carry through the original intention of hitting at Europe directly from embarkation points in Britain. He was firmly convinced that without action the existing high morale could be kept at operational level during the spring and part of the summer - but no longer.

After that our men may take it for granted they are destined to remain the British home guard for the duration and they will instinctively let down to a corresponding level.

There will be no mutiny; merely a general release of the mental tension which now makes them bright and eager troops. They will have become old men in the military sense.

(Gazette, 22 Jan 43)

Canada's Army, he felt, was too valuable a cog in the Allied plan for either the Canadian or the British high command to allow this to happen. He therefore predicted that, if there were no decisive changes in the Russian or Mediterranean fronts and if shipping and the political situation did not measure up to invasion standards, "it is a fair deduction that our troops will see action somewhere in the southern sector of the European theatre". (Ibid).

133. The arrival of the second group of Canadians in Africa caused little comment, although considerable publicity was given to individuals who distinguished themselves in action while attached to British units. Meanwhile many papers referred to the growing embarrassment of Canadians who remained in England, fed up with "paper exercises" and writing home of insults from lads and lasses of London asking why they were not in Africa (Press Indices Nos 402 and 413, 16 and 29 Jan 43, items 468 and 822, Windsor Star and Gazette). Some wondered whether in view of their battle inexperience the high command might not entrust them in the end with a vital role but might employ them merely as support troops (Press Index No. 403, 18 Jan 43, item 504, Gazette). There was renewed criticism that the Americans had preceded the Canadians into battle; the arrival of Newfoundland troops to join the British First Army on the other hand received publicity but no such comments (Press Indices Nos 418 and 422, 3 and 8 Feb 43, items 1086 and 1230, Winnipeg Free Press and Gazette).

134. Early in January the Gazette claimed that specula-

tion in England on the possible appointment of General McNaughton as leader of the United Nations forces had died down because of a growing suspicion that instead of one major assault against the enemy in Western Europe there might be two or even three independent thrusts (Press Index No. 397, 11 Jan 43, item 261). Even so staunch a Liberal champion as the Winnipeg Free Press on 18 Feb wrote, "There is too much reason to believe that the gateway now held by the Canadian army is one which will either never be opened or will not be opened until a still distant stage in the war has been reached". The main purport of its editorial entitled "Canadian Dagger" was to urge "at least fragmentary use of the great striking force" which Canada had raised and equipped.

The theatres of war are many; surely in one or more of them, one or two or even three Canadian divisions could play a useful role...

Does the pride of our commanders, the desire to lead their men all together, play a part in the maintenance of a policy of continued training while the armies of other nations learn their trade in battle? We do not know, but it is certain that disquiet is arising, and the Government should remember that the hand which holds the poised dagger can become palsied through lack of use.

(Gazette, 26 Feb 43, reprinted from Free Press of 18 Feb)

135. This argument seemingly lent support to the viewpoint expressed earlier by the Vancouver Province to the effect that Canadians, like others, could learn as they fought. At this time, however, the Americans had just suffered certain reverses which the Ottawa Journal of 23 Feb attributed largely to inexperience, coupled with a certain degree of overconfidence. In speculating whether the Canadians might not fare similarly after such a lengthy period in the United Kingdom, the Winnipeg Free Press of 24 Feb under the heading "Need of battle practice" enquired, "Is it not possible to find some way whereby substantial numbers of Canadian officers can learn their trade before they involve their own Canadian commands in disproportionate losses as a result of their own lack of experience?" ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/PRESS/26: Minim Press No. 9, 3 Mar 43). It would appear therefore, that the pressure for action was coupled with a strong desire to ensure that experienced leaders were in command.*

THE CHANGING EMPHASIS ON HOME DEFENCE, 1943

136. Conjectures regarding the employment of the Overseas Army brought kindred suggestions for more active use of troops stationed at home. Towards the end of January 1943 the columnist Grant Dexter accused the General Staff of "exceptional rigidity of mind" in failing to review the need for Pacific Coast defences since setting up the 7th and 8th Divisions in the previous March. "The fact to remember", he said, "is that our manpower resources are being strained not for overseas service, but

* It is probably not fanciful to see a direct connection between this strong agitation in the early months of 1943 and the pressure brought upon the British Government by the Canadian Government during March, to find a place for some Canadian troops in offensive operations. The result was the decision taken in April to include 1 Cdn Inf Div in the Sicilian assault.

for home defence" (Winnipeg Free Press, 20 Jan 43). Over the radio Chicago's Col McGornick charged that, although Canada was more liable to Japanese attack than the U.S. coast, she had sent no troops to fight them in the Pacific. In reply, the Vancouver Sun of 19 Jan 43 pointed to Hong Kong and Alaska and upheld that dispositions had been made according to plans of the United Nations. Several Canadian newspapers nevertheless voiced objections when Mr. T.C. Davis, speaking in Australia on taking up his appointment as High Commissioner, referred to Japan as Canada's principal enemy ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press Circ/1: Minim Press No. 3, 19 Jan 43).

137. In Parliament Mr. H.C. Green maintained that the despatch of detachments to Africa should be followed by the sending of units from Britain and Canada abroad for experience; he favoured sending at least officers and N.C.Os. from the Pacific Army to learn to fight the Japanese and referred to General Odum's suggestion at Toronto the previous November that Canadian troops should be sent to aid General McArthur. Mr. G.A. Cruikshank (Fraser Valley) objected on the grounds that even five divisions overseas were too many for Canada to handle adequately; he remarked that at the Canadian Corps Association meeting there had been protests against soldiers going to Africa to gain experience and he could not see the logic of wanting to send some to the jungle. (Debates, 1943, vol 1, pp 500 and 531). The Prime Minister, however, praised Commonwealth troops who were fighting far from home and strongly castigated his former follower, Mr. P.J.A. Cardin (Richelieu-Vercheres), for advocating Isolationism (ibid, pp 550-51 and 556-68).

138. In the Quebec Legislature, Mr. Onésime Gagnon renewed his charges of the previous November that Ottawa was utterly careless about defence of the St. Lawrence, where he claimed 20 ships had been sunk. Despite vigorous denials by all three Defence Ministers, Mr. J.S. Roy (Gaspé) carried the issue to the House of Commons and made out that the total number of ships sunk was 37⁺. Although criticism was directed mainly against the Navy and Air Force, the Army did not escape; the prominence given to the issue reflects the insistence by certain elements in Quebec that home defence ought not to be neglected. While the Montreal Star and the Edmonton Bulletin led the majority of English-language papers in scoffing at the suggestion that the Navy be recalled, others, including the Globe and Mail and the Journal supported Le Soleil and L'Événement-Journal in urging co-operation by military and civilian authorities in Quebec to form a spotting service and a St. Lawrence Patrol akin to the Dover Patrol (Press Indices Nos. 452, 10 and 15; 15 Mar, 3 and 9 Apr 43; items 2574, 2575, 3315 and 3856). Weeks later the Prime Minister on 8 Jun announced the appointment of Squadron-Leader J.P.J. Desloges, R.C.A.F., as defence co-ordination officer in the Gaspé and lower St. Lawrence to link civilian organizations with all three branches of the armed services.

139. In Parliament Mr. M.J. Coldwell (Rosetown-Digger) on 5 Apr 43 asked for full information, in open or closed session, regarding Canada's war situation. In particular, he asked about coastal defence, the submarine menace, protection on the Pacific, Labrador and Hudson Bay, the Athabaska region and the North generally. He received support from Messrs Gordon Graydon (Leader

* Press Indices Nos. 446, 447, 449 and 452; 8, 9, 11 and 15 Mar 43; items 2313, 2322, 2323, 2451, and 2575; Journal and Gazette. See also Debates, 1943, vol II, pp 1130-31, 1267-71 and 1337-44.

of the Opposition) and T.C. Douglas (Weyburn), the latter pressing for a statement before the spring offensive overseas, but the Prime Minister maintained that discussion of such affairs must await presentation of the War Appropriation Bill. (Debates, 1943, pp 1842-50). There were many other instances of the Government refusing to be drawn into premature debate on Army matters during the spring of 1943. By this time, however, the defensive role of the Army at home no longer received emphasis. Public pressure favoured offensive action and looked for active employment of the Army abroad.

THE GROWING DEMAND FOR OVERSEAS ACTION, 1943ⁱⁱ

140. As the winter of 1942-43 ended there were many hints that the Canadian Army Overseas would soon be in action. For example, in referring to Canadians "irked" at waiting so long to be engaged "in bulk" against the enemy, Sir James Grigg (Secretary of State for War) said in the British House of Commons on 25 Feb, "We trust that they will not have to wait much longer" (Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, Vol 387, (British) House of Commons, p. 340). Political parties were alert to apply such remarks to the conscription issue, of course. In March Mr. W.E. Rowe was reported to have told a Progressive-Conservative meeting that "We have the humiliation of listening to rumours that many military officers wanted our forces to enter the African battles, but it was not possible because there were not sufficient reinforcements over there" - a suggestion which Col Ralston refuted as "without foundation in fact" (Gazette, 16 Mar 43). According to one political observer, the possibility of a sudden collapse in Germany was causing very real concern to the Canadian High Command in March; what was termed "the McNaughton Policy" of keeping the Army intact for use as a spearhead, he said, had resulted in opportunities to send Canadians into other parts of the world being spurned ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27: O.P.I. 5, "The Man with a Notebook", Maclean's Magazine, 15 Mar 43).ⁱⁱⁱ

141. Newspapers hailed Exercise "SPARTAN" as a gigantic pre-invasion test and prominently publicized General McNaughton's statement to the press afterwards that his army was fit and ready for action, noting that when questioned he reaffirmed the hope he had expressed in December that it would soon be engagedⁱⁱⁱⁱ. In a series of three articles, Ross Munro described how British, American and European forces were training to invade alongside the Canadians (O.P.I. 27, 28 and 29, Toronto Telegram). Several Allied observers similarly reported in April that Canada along with Britain and the United States was massing huge invasion forces; they predicted main landings in Norway and Greece with diversionary thrusts across the English Channel and North Sea into France, Belgium and Holland, and across the Mediterranean into Italy (Press Index No. 11, 5 Apr 43, item 3571, Montreal Star). Berlin reported invasion barges at Gibraltar while the recognized official spokesman of the German High Command, Captain Sertorius, again claimed Canadians were being used in Tunisian

ⁱⁱ See footnote to paragraph 135.

ⁱⁱⁱ All references marked O.P.I. (Overseas Press Index) relate to photostat copies of clippings which may be found in C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27, now in possession of the Historical Section.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Press Index No. 1, 24 Mar 43, items 3000 and 3002, Globe and Mail and Gazette. See also (H.S.) 4/Press/27: O.P.I. 7, editorial "Ready to Go", Windsor Star, and O.P.I. 9, editorial "We are Ready", The Canteen (Montreal),

battles (Ibid, item 3579, Toronto Star, and O.P.I. 33, Gazette, 15 Apr 43). Remarking that General McNaughton was emerging again as a possible commander-in-chief of the Allied invasion, Shapiro pointed to the fact that the General was "politically a favourite choice to lead a striking force made up largely of British and Canadian troops with a comparatively small representation of Americans" (O.P.I. 3, The Vancouver News-Herald, 9 Apr 43. See also O.P.I. 6, editorial in Windsor Star, 25 Mar 43).

142. The prospect of action on the continent emphasized the fact that the threat of invasion of the United Kingdom had ended. Shapiro did not fail to draw attention to this significant change which had taken place. He wrote pithily:

In September, 1942, General McNaughton said invasion possible, and this view later echoed by Mr. Churchill. On Oct 31, General McNaughton said invasion unlikely. On April 20 Mr. Churchill releases church bells from their emergency retirement. Sometime between these dates the Allied situation in European zone so improved that the danger of invasion became unlikely.

(Press Index No. 36, 4 May 43, item 5347, Gazette)

143. With the prospect of action much more promising, press concern over favourable conditions became much in evidence. Symptomatic of nervousness after so long a wait, there were renewed warnings that due to lack of battle experience Canadians might expect initial setbacks. (Press Index No. 18, 13 Apr 43, item 4100, Ottawa Citizen reprinted from The Western Producer). The Windsor Star wondered whether sufficient intelligence of the enemy had been collected to risk a desperate frontal attack (Ibid, No. 21, 16 Apr 43, item 4309). Also reflecting the tension was the bitter military-political controversy which raged in the press and Parliament during April 1943 over General Roberts' transfer to command the reinforcement units. John Fisher connected it with the appointment of several younger officers to combat posts and wrote, "Some believe that it amounts to a shake-up in the High Command of the Canadian Army preparatory to the fighting which is looked for this year" (O.P.I. 1, Toronto Telegram, 15 Apr 43). Shapiro gave the following concise comment on the appointment:

What disturbs about the Roberts case is that it shows our Army still groping after three years. We lack battle experience, and in its inactivity our Army aging. We face the danger of becoming militarily old without having applied our youthful zest to the task for which our men rushed forward to recruiting depots.

(O.P.I. 49, Gazette, 28 Apr 43)

A Western paper observed, "It is rather startling that none of the battalion commanders who led their units into action at Dieppe are among the lieutenant-colonels now made brigadiers in the Canadian Army Overseas" (O.P.I. 49, Edmonton Journal, 16 Apr 43). The editor neglected to take into account the fact that, of the seven major Canadian units engaged, only one C.O. (Lt-Col D. Monard, D.S.O., who was severely wounded) returned from the raid.

144. "The McNaughton plan" was questioned severely in the press after Maj-Gen G.G. Simonds on his return to England from Africa declared that Tunisia had ruled out "blitz" warfare, armour having declined as an assault arm and infantry having increased in importance. One Ottawa correspondent saw these changing views as a shift from the concept of loading the Army with armour and keeping it from participating partially in field operations; at the same time he pointed out Gen McNaughton was near the retiring age. (O.P.I. 50, B.T. Richardson in Winnipeg Free Press, 29 Apr 43). The Gazette observed that Tunis did not bear out some of the comments on Operation "SPARTAN" (Press Index No. 32, 29 Apr 43, item 5013). The Windsor Star on the other hand asked the Government to promote Gen McNaughton to full General before the time came for him to lead his men toward Berlin (Press Index No. 49, 19 May 43, item 7232).

145. Explaining the reasons for keeping the Canadian forces in Britain, Mr. King in an address to the Canadian Club of Toronto on 19 Apr said:

If our forces overseas have remained so largely and for so long within the British Isles, if Canadian forces have not been broken up for service in other theatres, this has been due entirely to the considered judgment and advice of those concerned with the strategical direction of the war. It has not been because of any restriction imposed by the Government of Canada.

(The Times (London) 20 Apr 43,
with accompanying editorial)

The very day Parliament resumed after the Easter recess (6 May 43), nevertheless Mr. R.B. Hanson queried the inactivity of the Canadian Army, saying how unpleasant it was for men who had been overseas since 1939 "to have it thrown in their faces that while Australia and New Zealand are fighting gallantly on the sands of Africa personnel of the Canadian army are not there". Mr. Power in the absence of Col Ralston replied "Because they are doing something else which is considered important, by the high command" and in the spirited exchange which followed he stated definitely that they were being kept in England as the result of British not Canadian action. (Debates, 1943, vol III, pp 2451-52). Mr. P.J.A. Cardin later that day said he hoped the war would be won without Canada's sons being forced "for the vanity of glory to be butchered as a number of our sons were butchered on the shores of Dieppe" (Ibid, p. 2465).

146. Among press comments, Le Soleil (Quebec) took Mr. Hanson to task for asking "this absurd question" (O.P.I. 60, Le Soleil, 14 May 43). The Montreal Star asked him not to make the Army "a political football"; the Toronto Star referred him to answers which had been given again and again (O.P.I. 43, 7 and 11 May 43). The Citizen stressed the bottlenecks in shipping revealed by the Truman Report and said: "Naturally the Canadian Army alone cannot storn the Hitlerite 'West Wall'" (ibid, 10 May 43). On the other hand, the Globe and Mail of 14 May used the occasion to deliver a bitter attack upon the policy of denying the troops battle experience and to demand that the Canadian divisions be allowed to fight with those of the other Allied nations. To this the Toronto Star again replied that it was the policy of "the highest United Nations strategists" while the Journal of 14 May expressed itself as content if the decision really were

British but not if made at Canada's request. The latter's editorial concluded:

All other Empire troops have had battle experience in this war...The British have been everywhere. Only Canadians, among all the Allied combatants, have not been tried.

This, we confess, seems strange. To a great many it is disturbing.

(O.P.I. 43. All these articles were reproduced by Gazette, 15 May 43)

Defending its argument in a further editorial dated 15 May, the Globe and Mail wrote:

Now that the North African campaign is finished and a new phase of the war is opening up, the honest course would be to admit frankly, even at the expense of personal pride, that the creation of a cumbrous military establishment overseas was an error of judgment and to permit the utilization of Canadian divisions in any formation where they can be effectively employed. The experience of present-day warfare which they would gain could be communicated to the rest of the Canadian Army and the result would be to strengthen its striking power and diminish the casualties, which could scarcely fail to be very heavy if the army went into action without containing any battle-tested elements.

(Ibid)

147. Meanwhile Col Ralston denied in the Commons on 13 May that the role of units and formations of Canada's Army was rigid and stated that he had impressed upon British leaders the fact that "the Canadian troops were in England to be used either in whole or in part in any way in which they could best help to win the war". Summing up, he declared:

...let me say that any idea that the Government or Gen McNaughton or anyone in authority representing Canada has or ever had any notion of insisting or even desiring to maintain the Canadian Army intact, if its components can better serve separately, is wholly unfounded.

(Debates, 1943, p. 2668)

At first this statement was unintentionally overlooked by The Canadian Press, but later some of the Conservative newspapers printed it with brief comments of acceptance (O.P.I. 43 and 45, Gazette and Journal, 15 and 18 May 43). The Globe and Mail, on the other hand, interpreted the Minister's statement as a complete reversal of policy and called on him to "admit the blunders of the past and get on with the job of moving Canadian divisions into combat side by side with our battle-tested British comrades (O.P.I. 44; Globe and Mail, 15 May 43).

148. Just when and where the invasion would fall was of course the vital question. One correspondent predicted in April that the Canadians might shift to the Mediterranean, if, as

was suggested in England, the Western front could not be opened for some time; on the other hand they might remain where they were until a strong hold had been gained in the South (Press Index No. 25, 21 Apr 43, item 4562, J.F. Sanderson in the Windsor Star). Fourth Victory Loan speakers stressed the theme that the hour of crisis was at hand. For example, Prime Minister King at Toronto intimated that before long the Canadian Army would be in battle and invasion was not far distant, while Munitions Minister Howe at Port Arthur definitely asserted that the Canadians were being kept for "the big show" (O.P.I. 47, Windsor Star, 28 Apr 43). Mayor Stanley Lewis of Ottawa, on the other hand, claimed that General McNaughton had assured him "Canadian troops will not be used to put on a show for the uninformed who clamor for a second front, or another front" (Ibid, Gazette, 27 Apr 43). In England, stories of an interview with High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald carried such headlines as "Canadians to lead assault" and "Canadians for invasion" (Ibid, Journal, 30 Apr 43). Meanwhile, in paying tribute to the high morale which existed after a "never-before-heard-of wait for action", Conservative publisher George McCullagh on returning from a visit to England said prospects of Canadians getting to Africa were not bright. (Press Index No. 35, 3 May 43, Globe and Mail).

149. On 18 May 43 Col Ralston in the course of a lengthy statement to the House predicted a year of action with the Canadians in the thick of it and declared "They may fight as an army or in separate formations" (Debates, 1943, p. 2778). Mr. H.C. Green promptly asked why the Canadians had not had battle experience and asserted:

If battle experience is desirable for our Canadian divisions and troops before the Canadians fight as an army, it is the duty of the Canadian government - it is not a matter to be left necessarily to the British - to see to it that our units get that battle experience before the Canadian army goes into action as an army.

(Ibid, p. 2781)

He also remarked that Canada was apparently turning its back on the Pacific war and had sent no troops either for battle training against the Japanese² or as a token force to help the Australians. "The United States could send troops to Australia", he pointed out, "but Canada, so far as I know, has not sent a man" (ibid, p. 2782). Mr. T.C. Douglas (Weyburn) on the other hand expressed considerable opposition to demands to have the army broken up and sent to various theatres of war; he contended that it should go into battle as a Canadian unit under a Canadian commander (ibid, pp 2791-92). Mr. J.A. Ross (Souris) remarked that the army had been overexpanded and overorganized probably more for political purposes than as an active force for operations (ibid, p. 2798).

150. Press articles following this debate dealt mainly with the man-power issue but there were many signs of impatience with mere manoeuvres (Press Index No. 51, 21 May 43, item 7391, St. Catharines Standard). From Britain at this time came a report that the first detachment of Canadians had returned from Tunisia.

* Col Ralston soon after announced that Canadian officers were in Alaska to study defences, and the Vancouver Province reported that some had been sent to Attu to act as observers with the U.S. forces, collecting information for use in the training programme of Pacific Command (Press Index No. 60, 1 Jun 43, item 8115, Gazette).

Cook in the Winnipeg Free Press later remarked on the reluctance of these troops to discuss their adventure, although General McNaughton stated that their experience had proven invaluable. Cook also pointed out that until the Tunisian campaign it had been impractical to send Canadians to Africa due to the long voyage around the Cape but victories there had opened the Mediterranean for them to join British formations in the Middle East (Ibid, No. 69, 11 Jun 43, item 8378).

151. It was generally felt that the presence of Prime Minister King at the Washington conference of Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt indicated that offensive strategy involving the Canadians in the near future was being planned there. The Journal wrote with conviction "Our hour has come" (Ibid, No. 52, 25 May 43, item 7586). Correspondents Flaherty and Richardson both believed that the Canadian Army and Air Force would spearhead the attack (Ibid, No. 57, 28 May 43, items 2822 and 2823, Windsor Star and Winnipeg Free Press). Lacking a statement by the Prime Minister, the Winnipeg Free Press the next month appraised the possibilities of Canadian action and narrowed them down to the Mediterranean (Ibid, No. 78, 22 Jun 43, item 9718).

152. On 25 May 43 the Commons witnessed a sharp clash over the question of Army policy when Dr. H.A. Bruce contended that one or two divisions should have been sent to Africa. Col Ralston interjected:

I can say to my hon. friend that last fall, when I was over in England, I discussed the sending of a division of Canadian troops to North Africa, and I was given what I considered to be good and sufficient reasons, by those who were best qualified to know, that the suggestion could not be accepted.

(Debates, 1943, p. 3002)

A very disorderly debate later resulted when the Minister interpreted as a sneer the following remarks by Dr. Bruce:

I want to say just a word about the Canadian army's battle honours. After nearly four years of war they are represented by two tragic failures, Hong Kong and Dieppe. They were not failures to fight courageously to the death on the part of the rank and file and the officers in charge of the attacks, but were due to incompetent leadership in the high command.

(Ibid, pp 3004 and 3008)

Two days later another heated argument developed between them over Dieppe (ibid, p. 3101).

153. Sharp outbursts immediately occurred in newspapers right across Canada. The Journal asked who were those "best qualified to know" and remarked "There's too much heat in all this, not enough light" (O.P.I. 63, Journal, 29 May 43). Toronto's newspapers as might be expected took opposite sides, with the Globe and Mail praising Dr. Bruce for exposing the sham and the Toronto Star supporting Col Ralston's statements (Press Indices Nos 58 and 60, 29 May and 1 Jun 43, items 7924, 8089 and 8090). Closer agreement took place on the West Coast. The Vancouver Province wrote that it did not make sense to say that an