

army which had been conspicuously denied battle experience was to be conspicuously chosen to lead the attack (Press Index No. 62, 3 Jun 43, item 8261). In its rival newspaper Elnore Philpott wrote:

The reasons for keeping the Canadians where they still are were sound. But that would not long hold good for the future.

If for any reason the Second Front is not to be opened this year in north-western Europe the Canadians should be allowed to do their stuff somewhere else.

(O.P.I. 63, Vancouver Sun, 29 May 43)

In the Maritimes several newspapers deplored this "barracking" of the Minister, and across the country many leading dailies soon expressed themselves as tired of continual wrangling over Dieppe\*. Publication at this time of Mr. H.A. St. G. Saunders' report "Combined Operations", however, kept Dieppe very much to the fore.

154. Analyzing the arguments from reports of the Ottawa debate which reached him in England, Shapiro drew attention to Col Ralston's statement that "General McNaughton had made it clear to the War Office in Britain that if it was at any time advantageous to supply individual formations to separate theatres of war he was prepared to recommend it". On this Shapiro commented:

But a distinction must be drawn between negative and positive direction of the Canadian army's activity. For Gen McNaughton, to be 'prepared to recommend' a suggestion from the War Office on the activity of the Canadian Army is a very different thing from making a strong recommendation to the War Office that the Canadian Army should be used on this or that specific front in order to gain battle experience.

(O.P.I. 63, Gazette, 10 Jun 43)

155. In June 1943 the Canadian press definitely reflected the enthusiasm for invasion shown in the United Kingdom, although with diminishing interest toward the middle of the month. Great prominence to Allied air assaults in the Mediterranean contrasted with speculation regarding the lull in the bombing of Germany. The Winnipeg Free Press, Journal and the Globe and Mail all sounded notes of caution with regard to optimistic invasion prospects. The press were thrown somewhat off balance when Madame Chiang Kai-shok stated to the combined Houses of Parliament "Like that of China, the contribution which Canada has made to our common cause has not been of the spectacular"; the Gazette, however, termed it a graceful compliment. On the eve of the Canadian entry into action in the Mediterranean, editorials generally seemed to relish the war of nerves being waged against the enemy. ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minin Press Nos 23-27 8 Jun - 3 Jul 43).

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\* Press Index No. 63, 4 Jun 43, item 8551, The Halifax Chronicle. See also O.P.I. 63, The Moncton Transcript, The Telegraph-Journal (St. John), Winnipeg Free Press, Vancouver Sun, Globe and Mail, Windsor Star, The Lethbridge Herald.



### CANADIANS IN SICILY

156. Prime Minister King's Dominion Day address to the Commons was interpreted generally as an attempt to prepare the public for big events involving action and perhaps severe casualties for Canadian forces (Press Index No. 91, 8 Jul 43, item 1862 Flaherty in the Windsor Star). In discussing forthcoming operations, the Ottawa Citizen stated "it is evidently anticipated that Canada's land forces will be in the next Allied offensive" and "It is reasonable to assume that there will be landing operations across the Mediterranean" ((H.S.) C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minin Preco No. 28, 10 Jul 43). In general, however, almost complete silence seems to have reigned until on 9 Jul Mr. King intimated that aerial and commando assaults on Italy and Sicily, Sardinia and Crete were "parts of a single strategy which the immediate future may be expected rapidly to unfold" (Debates, 1943, vol V, p. 4557).

157. The first communiqué from Algiers announcing the Sicilian invasion used only the term "Allied forces", but a supplementary communiqué from Washington also dated 10 Jul 43 spoke of "Anglo-American-Canadian armed forces". Mr. King in a broadcast that morning made it quite clear that Canadian soldiers were included, and on 12 Jul he told the House that Canada would be justifiably proud of the fact that "units of the Canadian army were at the spear-head of the attack" (Ibid, p. 4618).

158. Such pride was enthusiastically proclaimed in the press across Canada. The Allied offensive eclipsed all other news and Canadian participation was universally welcomed. There was general praise for the superb planning of the operation, which all correspondents assumed would be successful. Lacking definite information, several papers speculated at first on the strength of the Canadian forces and the suggestion was made that General McNaughton might be in command. Considerable irritation was expressed at the secrecy surrounding the Canadian forces, particularly until the name of their commander was revealed, but there was general satisfaction that they were serving under General Montgomery and with the Eighth Army. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minin Preco No. 29, 16 Jul 43).

159. Much discussion centred about the future of the balance of the Canadian Army. In England there was a feeling that Canadian divisions might be used to supplement task forces as the Australians and New Zealanders had done in Africa (Press Index No. 96, 14 Jul 43, item 2229, Globe and Mail). Col Ralston assured Parliament on 13 Jul, however, that the Mediterranean operations did not mean that the Canadian army had been broken up (Debates, 1943 Vol V, pp 4688-89). The Toronto Star stressed that the use of Canadians in Sicily finally disposed of oft-repeated rumours that Canada would consent only to the use of her army as a self-contained unit (Press Index No. 99, 17 Jul 43, item 2460). One political observer maintained that Canadians were quite content with the arrangement whereby a large part of their army had been separated from the parent body and banded with the British (Ibid, No. 102, 21 Jul 43, item 2703, Harrison in Windsor Star). Numerous papers spoke of the opportunities to be gained under a baptism of fire. The Prince Albert Daily Herald, for example, remarked that if the Canadian army had had to wait for the march on Berlin the privilege of leading it would have gone to other troops experienced in battle (Ibid, No. 110, 30 Jul 43, item 3298). Col Ralston's trip to England and the



visit of Generals McNaughton and Stuart to the Mediterranean were seen as indications of larger activities for Canadians (Press Indices Nos 110 and 122, 30 Jul and 13 Aug 43, items 3320 and 4139, Journal and Saskatoon Star-Phoenix).

160. Press opinion was divided, but in general supported the action of the Prime Minister in insisting upon equal recognition being given to the fact that Canadians were in action, although there were some complaints at undue publicity before fighting ability had been proven. Other protests developed after the relative size of the force became apparent.

161. The fact that Quebec was chosen for the conference of the Allied leaders in August provided full scope for suppositions that Canadians would henceforth play a major part in planned offensives. Simultaneous withdrawal of the 1st Canadian Division from the front line lent strength to conjectures that under the new strategy Canadian troops might be employed as an army. A Canadian Press despatch stated it was believed in London that such action had been due to disagreement between the Canadian Government and the War Office over employment of the army as an entirety or in part, the abrupt return home of Col Ralston being linked to the story. The Windsor Star contended it was inconceivable that the withdrawal had been the result of bickering but remarked that if an army had to be broken up the Canadians would find it hard to understand why it should be theirs - rather than the armies of the United States or Britain. (Press Index No. 126, 18 Aug 43, items 4407, 4410, and 4411, Toronto Star, Telegram, and Windsor Star). On returning from Sicily, however, General McNaughton said quite definitely that his troops were ready for use "in whole or in part" as the High Command desired. Newspapers of both political faiths accepted this as scotching the rumours completely. (Press Index No. 138, 1 Sep 43, items 5326 and 5328, Gazette and Windsor Star).

162. Tense excitement in the newspaper world about the Quebec Conference subsided somewhat when official reticence left papers with too much space to fill. Most forecasters believed at the beginning that the conference would plan new landings in Europe, but the Gazette printed an article by a leading New York correspondent suggesting that it would be concerned primarily with Pacific strategy. When the meetings ended without any real information being divulged other than the appointment of Lord Mountbatten, the Gazette reiterated this theme. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco Nos 34, 35 and 36, 19 and 25 Aug and 3 Sep 43). During the conference, moreover, the conquest of Sicily had been completed and public attention in Canada had been focussed upon the Pacific through the landings of 15 Aug on Kiska, which climaxed a growing agitation for action in that region.

#### KISKA

163. Before Sicily dominated public attention to the exclusion of practically everything else, there was a growing amount of speculation in North America about the possibility of driving the Japanese out of the Aleutians. Declaring that Kiska had tied down many Canadian and American troops and aeroplanes in a comparatively quiet battle-zone, the Globe and Mail early in May 1943 called for an amphibious force to dislodge the Japanese (Press Index No. 35, 3 May 43, item 5267). That month it was thought in Washington, although without official confirmation,



that the Canadians were likely to join in an assault on Kiska (Ibid, No. 53, 24 May 43, item 7476, Gazette). After the Americans landed on Attu on 11 May capital correspondents freely speculated on rumours that Canadians would join them there, the morale of Pacific Command units rising noticeably as a result. Harrison claimed that many of these had a greater morale problem than units overseas but marching orders for the Aleutians would change all that (Ibid, No. 55, 26 May 43, item 7681, Windsor Star). On the other hand, many Canadian newspapers published a misleading dispatch to the effect that Canada had a large force "pinned down" in Alaska with the implication that it could now be released. Denial of this was given wide publicity by the Washington correspondent Chester Bloom, who urged that Canada put her troops into action with U.S. forces when they came to attack Kiska, as he felt that Attu had been a "golden opportunity lost to get battle training, and to earn esteem, publicity and political advantage in the United States." (Press Indices Nos 57 and 61, 28 May and 2 Jun 43, items 7821, 7824, and 8185, Toronto Telegram and Winnipeg Free Press). He argued that if Canada did not take part in the Aleutian campaign she could have little to say when the war ended and international air routes came under discussion (Press Index No. 69, 11 Jun 43, item 8881, Edmonton Journal).

164. A veritable storm arose, however, when in the House of Commons on 24 May 43, Mr. W.R. MacDonald (Brantford City) said the following:

...I suggest to the Minister that draftees who will not volunteer to serve abroad should be sent in ever-increasing numbers to Alaska to defend Canada from that corner of the country... If Canada sent her draftees there, the United States soldiers could be relieved to fight in other parts of the world, and we would be co-operating with them in the best interests of the cause for which we fight.

(Debates, 1943, vol III, p. 2942)

Mr. A.R. Adanson (York West) vigorously protested that "if that suggestion should be adopted there would be more Canadian casualties in the bar rooms of the world than we ever suffered in war... To suggest that we allow somebody else, another nation, to do our fighting for us is the most fantastic thing ever to have been said in this house" (Ibid, p. 2961). The following day Mr. MacDonald defended his remarks by explaining that there were decisive battles being fought in Alaska at that very moment and Canadians should be in the thick of the operations, relieving the Americans if they wished or fighting side by side with them (Ibid, p. 2987). The press, meanwhile, treated his original proposal with scorn, Harrison maintaining that to send "our coddled Zombies" to Alaska would not enhance Canada's relations with her Allies (Press Indices Nos 58 and 62, 29 May and 3 Jun 43, items 7926, 7927 and 8259, St. Catherines Standard and Windsor Star). In answer to further questions from Mr. Adanson, Col Ralston stated in the House that the governor-in-council had the authority to send draftees to Attu and Kiska but that only a general order dealing with Alaska had been passed (Debates, 1943, p. 3021).

165. Among newspapers carrying editorials advocating Canadian troops joining the Americans in the Aleutian campaign



were The Calgary Herald, London Free Press and St. Catherines Standard (Press Index No. 63, 4 Jun 43, item 8355). The Nelson News noted a rising demand that Canada prepare to take the offensive from her Pacific bases and observed that "the demand is timely and its aggressive public expression will be just as necessary to stimulate Ottawa to action as it was to bring about the strengthening of our Coast defences" (Ibid, No. 75, 18 Jun 43, item 9420).

166. During July very little mention was made of the subject, although some attention was given to the visit of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to Alaska and the Aleutians (Press Indices Nos 89 and 100, 6 and 19 Jul 43, items 1669 and 2534, Gazette). The Winnipeg Tribune followed this up by praising the harmony wrought by the Board as witnessed by Canadians and Americans standing side by side on guard defending Alaska and Newfoundland (Ibid, No. 118, 9 Aug 43, item 3797). Encouraging Canadians to show a watchful interest in the Aleutians, the Stratford Beacon-Herald of 26 Jul spoke of the grim task of naval and air arms there without mentioning a possible role for the Army (Ibid, No. 124, 16 Aug 43, item 4226).

167. Meanwhile there had been growing complaints against the policy of keeping large numbers of troops idle in Canada, particularly after Mr. Bracken charged in a Toronto address on 2 Jul that maintaining the "draftee home defence army" was a "hoax" and a waste of man-power (Press Index No. 89, 6 Jul 43, items 1664 and 1665, Journal and Gazette). The Winnipeg Free Press felt that it would have been much more to the point to criticize the keeping of nearly 200,000 active service troops at home (Press Indices Nos 90 and 92, 7 and 9 Jul 43, items 1748 and 1921). Even after the landings in Sicily pressure continued in Parliament for the granting of extended leave to aid the shortage of man-power in industry and agriculture. Col Ralston met this by stating on 21 Jul that there was no such thing as a Home Defence Army, all troops including those known as home defence personnel were part of the Active Army and were essential to units which had to be kept ready to meet eventualities (Debates, 1943, vol IV, p. 5161). The Journal commented that these personnel might be in the Active Army but were definitely not of it because they would not fight nor could they be made to fight where the fighting was being done (Press Index No. 108, 28 Jul 43, item 3205). The Leader-Post (Regina) on the other hand maintained that it would not be wise to heed the great political outcry in Ontario against maintaining a considerable body of armed troops in Canada, all of them potential reinforcements for overseas (Ibid, No. 113, 3 Aug 43, item 3506). It is interesting to note that the Prince Albert Herald conceded it might be possible to relax defences on the Atlantic but asserted it was still too early to do so on the Pacific (Ibid, No. 121, 12 Aug 43, item 4024). Speaking for British Columbia, the Vancouver Sun seemed quite satisfied that danger to the West Coast had passed and that the land forces for defensive purposes there could be reduced considerably (Press Index No. 119, 10 Aug 43, item 3874). The Gazette on 7 Aug put the question directly "Are the Zombies going to Kiska?", and said with irony, "The boys who wouldn't volunteer to chase Italians beside the balmy Mediterranean would find themselves fighting a stubborn, entrenched Jap in the chilly Arctic" (Ibid, No. 121, 12 Aug 43, item 4025).

168. When Prime Minister King announced in a broadcast of 21 Aug that Canadians had joined with Americans in seizing Kiska on 15 Aug, the Gazette immediately wrote that the last



vestige of the threat to Canada had been removed and asked "What now - do we still need a garrison of 80,000?" (Ibid, No. 131, 24 Aug 43, items 4688-92 inclusive). There was general delight that no Japanese had been found there, although some remarks were passed about Canadians again being robbed of an opportunity to distinguish themselves.\* The use of N.R.M.A. troops some 2500 miles from Canada's coast at once suggested to many papers that conscription would or could be widened to European fields\*\*<sup>2</sup>. While the Moncton Transcript intimated that Canadian units would likely form part of the Aleutian Defence system, the Ottawa Citizen outspokenly contended that there was no further need to maintain Canadian divisions where they were never likely to encounter the enemy and advocated their active employment with Americans, Australians and New Zealanders in the Pacific (Ibid, Nos 135 and 137, 28 and 31 Aug 43, items 5097 and 5212). The Journal very pointedly asked whether the Canadian call-up troops would move on with the Americans when they left Kiska (Press Index No. 140, 3 Sep 43, item 5445). Vancouver papers were satisfied that British Columbia's fears of attack from the Aleutians had been removed (Ibid, No. 147, 11 Sep 43, item 5964, Vancouver Sun and News-Herald).

169. Returning from a visit to the Pacific, Bowman of the C.B.C. stated that General MacArthur had told him he looked forward to the day when Canadian soldiers would join him in the South Pacific and that General Blamey hoped there would be joint Canadian-Australian action with the U.S. forces (Press Index No. 143, 7 Sep 43, item 5655, Vancouver Province). As Canada entered her fifth year of war, Flaherty saw prospects for action by the Canadian Army in both the Pacific theatre and Europe, suggesting that the next step might be Japanese territory (Ibid, item 5715, Globe and Mail). The Winnipeg Free Press, however, said every eye in Canada was fixed upon Italy (where operation "Daytown" had been launched the week before) (Ibid, 15 Sep 43, item 6149). The Montreal Standard at this time reported a growing feeling that Canadians would be sent from the Italian theatre via the Mediterranean to the Asiatic theatre for possible employment under Lord Louis Mountbatten, and expressed the opinion that the Australians would like such a move (Ibid, No. 156, 22 Sep 43, item 6646).

170. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians, Allied successes in Europe, and a lessening of the submarine menace were the three reasons given by Col Ralston for a major reduction in the strength of the army in Canada, an action which the Gazette immediately praised as a step towards a realistic military policy (Ibid, No. 150, 15 Sep 43, items 6147 and 6148). The Minister's announcement said the 7th and 8th and part of the 6th Divisions were to be disbanded, their place to be taken by three brigade groups, and that a "substantial" number of men would be discharged and returned to civilian life. The Globe and Mail saw this at once as a tacit admission of overexpansion and wrote that the grandiose plan of putting a Canadian army in the field had been abandoned (Ibid, No. 151, 16 Sep 43, item 6222). The Journal said that the excuse it could not be done so long as the Japanese held the Aleutians was nonsense (Ibid, item 6223).

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\* The Windsor Star noted that General Pearkes had sent out both this expedition and the one to Spitsbergen and in neither case had a shot been fired (Ibid, No. 133, 26 Aug 43, item 4892).

\*\* Press Indices 132, 133, 134, 135 and 137, 25-28 and 31 Aug 43, items 4863, 4897, 5008, 5010, 5094 and 5213, Ottawa Citizen, Windsor Star, Toronto Telegram, Halifax Chronicle, Ottawa Journal.



171. The announcement caused a terrific outburst in the United States, where isolationists and opponents of Roosevelt such as John O'Donnell writing in the New York Daily News and the Washington Times-Herald made it appear that Canada was sending her men home from the Army (Ibid, item 6224, Ottawa Citizen). The timing was most unfortunate, as news of the set-back at Salerno had just arrived and Congress was debating the bill to draft fathers. Most Canadian papers, however, laid the blame for the furore upon the wording of the announcement and for days their critical editorials employed such phrases as "King Government exports trouble", "a blundering announcement", "statement from Ottawa on disbanding divisions misleads even Roosevelt", "W.I.B. failed to prevent this black eye for Canada", "use of 'disband' was unfortunate", "'dynamite' for Washington". (Press Indices 152-163 inclusive, 17 Sep - 2 Oct 43, items 6301, 6304, 6533, 6624 and 7096, Gazette, Ottawa Journal, Telegram, Toronto Star, Edmonton Journal). The Winnipeg Free Press termed it "addled English" but declared that the reason for confusion lay beyond the clumsy wording - namely, the delay in effecting changes in the home defence establishments in keeping with the needs of the time (Press Indices Nos 155 and 158, 21 and 24 Sep 43, items 6527 and 6794). The Edmonton Bulletin felt that there might still be nuisance raids on Canadian coastal communities by carrier-based planes but that neither Germany nor Japan had ships for an invasion army (Press Index No. 165, 2 Oct 43, item 7232). In general, however, Canadian newspapers evaluated the reasons for the changed policy in accordance with their stand regarding conscription for service overseas.

#### CANADIANS IN ITALY - THE DIVIDED ARMY

172. Meanwhile the public remained very much in the dark regarding the probable use of the two corps of the Canadian Army still in England. General McNaughton's visit to Sicily in August had stimulated hopes, however, that the next assignment would involve more than a single division and its ancillaries, his name again being mentioned as possible commander of the Allied invasion forces (Press Indices Nos. 136 and 138, 30 Aug and 1 Sep 43, items 5180 and 5330, Windsor Star and Montreal Star). There was a sense of relief when the battle for Sicily ended with fewer casualties than expected, and there was a feeling of pride that the Canadians had acquitted themselves well in their first sustained action. La Presse (Montreal) asserted that the Canadians were now ready for bigger operations, while The Telegraph-Journal (St. John) hinted at the prestige which would result from an army in action (Press Index No. 144, 8 Sep 43, items 5749 and 5748). On the West Coast Philpott wrote that Canadians hoped their army would fight "as a single team, not spare parts". (Ibid, item 5747, Vancouver Sun)

173. After wavering for some time the press assumed that the Italian Government had finally decided not to surrender immediately. Its abrupt capitulation was therefore not altogether expected, although the Allied landings in Italy on 3 Sep occasioned no surprise. Considerable prominence was given to the part played by Canadians in these landing operations. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco No. 37, 10 Sep 43). Flaherty remarked that in two months Canadian troops had thrice invaded enemy territory. Although Washington speculated that failure to mention American troops in the reports meant they were poised for another landing in Italy, it appears to have been taken for granted that Canadians would continue to fight alongside the British. (Press Index No. 141, 4 Sep 43, items 5501, 5504 and 5505, Journal).



174. Later that autumn there were vague rumours that Canadians might participate in a blow aimed at the Balkans. The Toronto Telegram reported that Canadian sympathy with Greece gave prospect of co-operation in opening up this new front. (*ibid*, No. 182, 23 Oct 43, item 8246). When it became known that the Canadians were on the Adriatic, the Edmonton Journal on 11 Dec wrote "It is just possible, of course, that the whole army may be assembled and operate as a unit in Italy or the Balkans" (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 195).

175. As the Italian campaign developed, the fortunes of the Canadian units involved were followed step by step with great interest. There was no marked tendency to repeat the criticism made elsewhere of the slowness of the advance in October and November, although during apparent lulls press comments fell off noticeably (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco Nos. 42 and 45, 15 Oct and 4 Nov 43). The general opinion was that slow progress in Italy presaged Allied pre-occupation with the opening of a Second Front elsewhere (*ibid*: Minim Preco No. 47, 19 Nov 43). The Winnipeg Free Press of 27 Sep interpreted the inclusion of Lord Beaverbrook in Mr. Churchill's Cabinet as an indication that the main assault from the West was about to be launched, but to this paper it no longer mattered whether or not the Canadian Army formed the sole spearhead. In an earlier editorial of 31 Aug this same Liberal organ had written:

It may be hoped that to the experience now won by the 1st Canadian Division will be added battle experience by other formations. Whether these fight side by side or not is, relatively speaking, unimportant now. But their separate entry into theatres of war does not wholly eliminate an ultimate hope that before the war is over, they will be brought together, just as the old Canadian Corps was united in the last war. But whether they are or not, the nation will ring to the tale of their achievements and their gallantry and once more the Canadian Army will play its great unifying role as a point around which our national pride can gather fresh strength and honour. No one can exaggerate the feeling of relief that this course is to be followed. Nobody demands unnecessary bloodshed for the sake of prestige at home or abroad. But it is a fact that the long inaction of the Canadian Army was the cause of criticism and dissension at home. Its gradual going into action now under conditions admirably adapted to minimize losses is something which far outweighs the possible advantage to the nation of any insistence that our army should be used altogether or not at all.

(Press Index, unnumbered and undated but presumably 1 Oct 43, items 7157 and 7161, Free Press)

176. General satisfaction greeted the announcement towards the end of November 1943 that a large body of Canadian reinforcements, including armoured units, had landed in Italy and would be merged with formations already fighting there to form a Canadian Corps under a Canadian commander. Although information was scanty, it was at once interpreted to mean that there had arrived another Canadian division, probably armoured, thus reducing the number left in England to such proportions that the necessity for an army headquarters came into question<sup>\*</sup>.

\* Press Indices Nos 209 and 211, 24 and 26 Nov 43, items 3159, 3161, 3338 and 3341, Gazette, Toronto Telegram and Montreal Star.



The Windsor Star commented that "Dreams of an army in the field were evanescent and impractical in the first place - now have come down to realities" (Press Index No. 212, 27 Nov 43, item 3404). Numerous editors asserted that the announcement definitely marked the final abandonment of the plan to maintain a full army establishment overseas\*.

177. The question of employment of the remainder of the forces at once came to the fore.

Now we are to have in action a corps of two divisions; in the last war we had four...No doubt the other three divisions will be used elsewhere when the right time comes, and will equally distinguish themselves. But what of our army headquarters? What of our lines of communication and base troops?...Scores of officers have been promoted to high rank to fill places in the army organization. What of them? Are they to cool their heels in England for the balance of the war, frustrated and disappointed?

(Ibid, Winnipeg Free Press, 30 Nov 43)

Saying that the Canadian Government would now have to decide whether the maintenance of an army staff was going to be necessary, a prairie newspaper hinted that British units might be grouped under Canadian command (Ibid; Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 24 Nov 43). A French-language daily on the contrary wrote that "1 Canadiens, en général, préféreraient voir combattre leur troupes en un corps d'armée distinct que fondues dans des unités anglaises" (Ibid: Le Droit, 23 Nov 43).

178. Rumours of the retirement of General McNaughton began at once (Press Index No. 210, 25 Nov 43, item 3260, Gazette). One correspondent said it seemed "unlikely the army overseas would operate as a complete unit for some time, if ever" (Ibid, No. 212, 27 Nov 43, item 7406, Marshall in the Windsor Star). The Toronto Star felt that the necessity for an army commander had been reduced, if not eliminated, and it was probable no new army chief would be named (Ibid, item 3407). According to the Vancouver Province, a report was already circulating in Pacific Command that the army overseas would be reorganized (Ibid, item 3408, Ottawa Citizen). Ross Munro was still of the opinion that the Canadian Army was not going to confine itself to one field and he predicted "it may make even greater commitments in a second-front campaign in Western Europe than in the Mediterranean theatre" (Ibid, No. 211, 26 Nov 43, item 3343, Montreal Star).

179. When the announcement of General McNaughton's retirement was made on 26 Dec, it was officially disclosed for the first time that General Crerar was in command of the Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 196, Citizen, 27 Dec 43). The Winnipeg Free Press had assumed this appointment in an editorial of 30 Nov, apparently based upon a report by Munro printed by the same paper on 24 Nov (Ibid: Free Press, 30 Nov 43). The Ottawa Citizen promptly

\* C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 193, The Moncton Daily Times, 26 Nov, The Standard (Montreal), 27 Nov, and The Guardian of the Gulf (Charlottetown), 1 Dec 43.



hinted that he might return to England to take over the post of Army Commander (Press Index No. 237, 28 Dec 43, item 4736). Back in Ottawa, Col Ralston without specifying names predicted that a permanent successor to General McNaughton would be appointed and he told newspapermen that the fact that one corps was in Italy was no reason for the Canadian Army not operating as such (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 204, Citizen, 27 Dec 43). The Minister's announcement that it would function as an army under General Eisenhower strengthened the belief that a number of British divisions would be added, giving it a composite character for the European invasion. Cables from London suggested that without them the Canadian Army could scarcely function as an army - it required either a complete British corps or a composite Canadian-British corps to operate with the other Canadian corps as a proper army formation. It was also forecast that General Montgomery's Army Group would include one British Army and the Canadian Army. (Ibid: Gazette, 29 Dec 43).

180. The most bitter condemnation of past policies was contained in a Globe and Mail editorial entitled "The Battle for the Stripes". This contended that "the Defense Minister, aided and abetted by the permanent force", had set out to create an all-Canadian Army of eight divisions plus at least two army tank brigades and necessary ancillaries. It argued that the plan had failed because Canada could not provide the reinforcements to maintain it in action, and the dispatch of the division to Sicily was described as "the breaking point for the stubborn insistence of a Canadian army, self-sufficient and sovereign". Finding further proof in disbandment of the "operational" divisions in Canada, the editorial asked:

What does it matter where and with whom the second corps fights so long as it fights well, with the same skill and tenacity the first corps has displayed in Italy? What can it add to the prestige they are winning for Canada to have a composite Allied force go into battle under the title of the First Canadian Army? General McNaughton's resignation and the reorganization it entails give the opportunity to break with the past and clear away the debris.

(C.M.H.Q. 4/Press/27/2: O.P.I. 201, Globe and Mail, 28 Dec 43)

Commenting on the reinforcements sent to Italy and the severe casualties suffered there, a politically independent New Brunswick paper said:

Probably the Canadians will be continued in service in Italy and perhaps the units now in England may join them there...It is possible that they may be drawn out of Italy and become part of the spearhead directed against the Nazi fortifications in western Europe.

(C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/3: O.P.I. 221, St. John Telegraph-Journal, 29 Dec 43)

The idea of the corps in Italy returning to fill the gap in the Canadian Army, however, was treated very lightly by Manitoba's leading paper, which remarked in parenthesis that it was "an unlikely proceeding under present circumstances" (Ibid: Winnipeg Free Press, 29 Dec 43).



PART V: PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS  
REUNION OF THE CANADIAN ARMY

181. The retirement of General McNaughton created at the beginning of 1944 the utmost confusion in public opinion regarding the future of Canada's military forces overseas. There had been no newspaper calls for his dismissal and most editors who praised the important services he had rendered were far from content to accept the official explanation of ill-health. In general it was seen to be connected with the collapse of the original plan for a separate Canadian Army and there was a great deal of outspoken comment on stories of disagreement with General Montgomery on that point (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco No. 43, 6 Jan 44). Obviously, the Opposition was going to press the Government for further information. Meanwhile the country had no clear idea of the part its Army was intended to play in the forthcoming assault upon Europe. It seemed ironic that at the very time when the Allies were announcing their invasion chiefs the Canadian Army lost its founder and was placed under a temporary commander who admittedly would not be its leader in battle. Underlying such queries as who would eventually command, what would be the size and composition of his forces, when and where would they be used, was the basic question whether they would operate in the invasion as a distinct Canadian army.

182. Indicative of the growing confusion in public thought about these issues, one Conservative paper in commenting on the appointment of Lt-Gen Simonds to command a Canadian corps wrote:

If, as seems probable, one Canadian Corps is to operate in Italy and the other in the western offensive, it may be that no permanent successor to General McNaughton will be named. There is little need for an army commander if the army does not fight as such.

(C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/3:  
O.P.I. 238, Victoria Colonist,  
2 Feb 44)

One Ottawa newspaper in asking why the army had been divided even went so far as to assume that three Canadian divisions had been sent to Italy (ibid: O.P.I. 233, Citizen, February 1944)

183. Many of these misunderstandings were clarified by Col Ralston when he gave Parliament on 11 Feb a very detailed explanation of the army organization overseas. He did not say whether or not the Canadians in Italy might be brought back as formations to rejoin those left in England, but he made it quite clear that there was no intention of disbanding the army headquarters there. (Debates, 1944, vol I, pp 411-416). Later, when Mr. T.C. Douglas (Weyburn) twice asked him why the entire Canadian Army had not been sent to Italy, Col Ralston stated that such a step would not have been possible under existing conditions and again defended the policy of battle inoculation by degrees (ibid, pp 514, 516-519).

184. As a result of these ministerial statements, press excitement over General McNaughton's retirement to some extent subsided (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26: Minim Preco No. 515, 17 Feb 44). The Vancouver Sun, for example, wrote that Col Ralston had disposed of "the hysterical cry of certain Canadian newspapers"



that the Canadian army was not an army at all but a "myth", as the Ottawa Journal put it\*. Cabling from London on 16 Feb, however, Shapiro attributed General McNaughton's illness directly to chagrin and disappointment over the break-up of the Army. He saw the winter of 1942-43 as the crisis in the General's plans when the Government at home was being prodded about its military policy at Hong Kong and Dieppe and about the absence of Canadian formations in Africa. Describing how Ottawa pressed to send troops to the Mediterranean until eventually a corps was built up there, Shapiro wrote:

In England Gen McNaughton's famous dagger has become more of a handle than a blade...

No spearhead would be these Canadian troops. The general's brave words of 1941 were a hollow laugh in 1944.

(Ibid: O.P.I. 229, Gazette, 17 Feb 44)

185. Finally, on 20 Mar 44, Col Ralston announced in the Commons the appointment of Lt-Gen Crerar to command the First Canadian Army (Debates, 1944, vol II, p. 1625). The press gave instant approval in numerous reviews of his career. Saying that it removed "the political dynamite lurking beneath the recent retirement", Shapiro wrote from London that the fate of the Canadian Army organization had hung in the balance while his ability as a corps commander was being tested by British superiors in Italy.

An adverse report would probably have meant dissolution of the Canadian Army and re-organization of the Dominion's second-front troops under British Army command. Such an eventuality coming in the wake of General McNaughton's retirement and coincidental with the elevation to general rank of three British-born Canadians - Simonds, Foulkes and Kitching - might have caused a first-class political explosion in Canada.

Early this month a favourable report was received on Gen Crerar's capacity as a field commander. Ottawa's dilemma was resolved and direction of the Canadian Army was established at last on a permanent basis.

(C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/6:  
O.P.I. 252, Gazette, 21 Mar  
44)

186. An editorial in the Gazette of 21 Mar said that the only uncertain factor remaining was just what troops would form the other corps necessary for him to take a two-Corps Canadian Army into action. Alternatives were either to bring back the 1st Canadian Corps or add a corps of British or United Nations troops. From repeated statements by Col Ralston that the Canadian divisions would be used when and where they were most needed, the editorial concluded that the Allied High Command would probably decide upon the disposition of the 1st Canadian Corps.

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\* C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/6: O.P.I. 272, Vancouver Sun, 18 Feb 44. Further examples are found in C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/3: O.P.I. 233, The Leader-Post (Regina), 14 Feb and O.P.I. 214, Gazette, 16 Feb 44. See also C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/27/4: O.P.I. 249, Citizen, Vancouver Province and Toronto Telegram, all of 17 Feb 44.



An Ontario paper agreed but added the comment that no immediate decision was expected. (Ibid: O.P.I. 255, Gazette, 21 Mar, and The Peterborough Examiner, 23 Mar 44). Toronto's morning paper, on the other hand, concentrated upon the second alternative.

Explanatory comments on the changes make the comforting assurance that the policy of keeping the Canadian overseas army in a segregated compartment has been finally abandoned. Apparently in the approaching operations Lt-Gen Crerar will command an army which in addition to the three Canadian divisions of our 2nd Corps will contain at least two British divisions.

(Ibid: Globe and Mail, 22 Mar 44)

187. As D Day drew near it became obvious that the 1st Corps was not going to return to England to take part in the assault. By May reports of rumours among the troops in Italy suggested that some might go to southern France and some to Burma, but one of the most common was that a division might be sent to Australia (Press Clipping No. 9690, The Sudbury Star, 3 May 44). To one of his invasion units in Britain General Crerar suggested that "it would be happier" if all Canadian troops were together instead of being "spread about a bit"; but, he added, "it would be very unhappy indeed if by any insistence that we fight only together the war ended without an opportunity on our part of contributing in an important degree to the military victory" (ibid: No. 2606, Toronto Star, 18 May 44).

188. When the main assault upon Europe finally took place the exact extent to which Canadian forces were involved was not disclosed for some time, but there was unconcealed pride that they formed part of the spearhead. It was all-important that they were being used where most effective, and to the Gazette of 8 Jun it seemed of small account whether Canadian soldiers were fighting as an army, as a corps, or as separate divisions. (Press Clipping No. 3671). Nevertheless, there was universal acclaim when early in August it became known that the First Canadian Army under General Crerar had taken up an operational role in France. At the same time, several papers pointed out that although commanded by a Canadian and with a Canadian headquarters it could by no means be considered all-Canadian. The Gazette of 9 Aug called it "a new composite army" and observed that only two Canadian divisions were known to be in France (Press Clipping No. 5692). Shapiro and Munro both stressed in their dispatches that British units were included, causing the Ottawa Journal of 10 Aug to venture to suggest that there were not more Canadian troops there than General Currie had in the First World War (ibid, No. 5763). Detailing the probable composition of the army, the Edmonton Journal of that same date hinted that British divisions had already fought in the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy and concluded that "once all gain battle experience...no British corps or division could ever regret service in the First Canadian Army" (ibid, No. 6057). In an editorial dated 16 Aug, the Toronto Telegram complained that the pattern of official information seemed intended to magnify the character of Canadian participation by impressing the fact that there was a Canadian Army in the field and to show reluctance to admit that British and Polish troops were part of it (ibid). When it later learned that troops of the Netherlands and Belgium had also been placed under command, this same Conservative organ wrote with sarcasm:



The Dutch, Belgians, Poles and British will doubtless provide their own reinforcements. If our own reinforcements fall down perhaps some French, American or Brazilian units can be added to make up the strength.

(Press Clipping No. 6146,  
Telegram, 21 Aug 44)

There seems to have been no press agitation to bring about re-union of the 1st Canadian Corps with the 2nd, however, and there is little newspaper evidence to suggest that the public showed very much active interest.

189. The cosmopolitan nature of the First Canadian Army, on the other hand, repeatedly became the subject of comment. When it became known that a Czechoslovakian group and American troops had been added, the Ottawa Citizen wrote of "Our Polyglot Army". Ross Munro termed it "the most international army of this war". Shapiro likened it to the French Foreign Legion and remarked that "Canadian troops certainly do not possess a voting majority in their own army". (Press Clipping No. 8026, Citizen, 1 Nov 44). Following many stories and cartoons which dubbed the First Canadian Army as "Crerar's International Brigade", Defence Headquarters issued on 14 Nov a brief statement on the disposition of Canadian forces which explained the integration of Allied arms (Press Clipping No. 8349, Gazette, 15 Nov 44).

190. During October the papers gave full attention to the controversy over the charges laid by Major Connie Smythe the previous month that Canadian reinforcements were "green, inexperienced and poorly trained" (Press Index No. 463, 22 Sep 44, item 6867, Journal). Col Ralston's visit to the troops overseas was known to be connected with the reinforcement question, and the dramatic news of his resignation on 1 Nov overshadowed all else. Among the many articles which resulted, one by F.C. Mears from Ottawa contained the following paragraph:

It was credibly reported that the plan contemplated by the Prime Minister is to reduce, in effect, Canada's military participation in the decisive operations in the Low Countries and in Italy by reducing the size of Canada's divisions, pulling the men out of the line and giving these hard pressed troops a rest. This is to be the alternative to providing adequate reinforcements...

(Press Clipping No. 8016,  
Gazette, 2 Nov 44)

Without vouching for their accuracy, the Journal on 6 Nov also made reference to these "disturbing tales" about fighting a "softer" war - a solution to the reinforcement problem by seeing to it that there were fewer men in action to be reinforced (Press Clipping No. 8123).

191. In spite of these rumours, the possibility of a complete withdrawal of Canadians from Italy does not appear to have been given any attention by the press during the winter months that followed. No one seems to have advocated such a proposal even in the heated debates on reinforcements during the special parliamentary session of November. Assigned by The



Canadian Press to write a story on what the Canadian troops thought of remaining in the Italian theatre, Douglas How said that they were "resigned to tolerate another winter in Italy" (Press Clipping No. 8550, Journal, 2 Jan 45).

192. In March the composition of the First Canadian Army again came under discussion when Sir James Grigg declared in the British House of Commons that "at the present time" two-thirds were United Kingdom troops. Simultaneously, the Daily Telegraph (London) claimed there should be a change of name to ensure British troops their fair share of publicity (Press Clipping No. 4225, Gazette, 7 Mar 45). The Toronto Telegram of 7 May at once agreed and pointed to Mr. King's insistence upon the term "Anglo-American-Canadian" with reference to Sicily (ibid, No. 4729). Although Defence Headquarters issued a 150-word statement saying the First Canadian Army was necessarily flexible, newspapers forcibly expressed themselves on the question for the balance of the month. Among them one said:

...it is the fault of those 'in high places' who did not follow the Canadian pattern of the last war and see to it that we had a compact, distinctively Canadian force designed to fit in with Canada's ability to supply troops for such a force. Not with the Canadians who are fighting in Italy would we have on the Western Front sufficient men and sufficient reserves and reinforcements to maintain a full-scale army in the field.

(Press Clipping No. 4458, Editorial of The Halifax Herald reproduced by the Ottawa Citizen, 17 Mar 45)

193. On 3 Apr Ross Munro began a despatch with the words "Together once more as an army" and in it wrote that "All Canadian infantry and armoured formations again are under Gen Crerar's command, as well as some British troops, but the latter are in the minority" (Press Clipping No. 4807, Gazette, 4 Apr 45). This caused the Ottawa Citizen of 5 Apr to ask for information about the 1st Canadian Division - "until recently understood to be in Italy" (ibid, No. 4834). That same day in Parliament, Mr. J.G. Diefenbaker (Lake Centre) expressed the hope "that in the near future Canada's overseas forces will be in truth a Canadian Army, and that the men of Canada will be united together in one corps" (Debates, 1945, vol I, p. 579). To this speech the Journal of 6 Apr gave the caption "Wants Canadians in Europe, Italy Fight as One Force" (Press Clipping No. 4870).

194. These rather obvious hints following so much public concern over the varied composition of the Canadian Army suggest that, although the question of reunion had received practically no press attention since early in 1944, there was a latent desire to see it accomplished. The popularity of the movement was amply demonstrated by numerous reports and editorials in various newspapers when the arrival of the 1st Canadian Corps in Holland was finally announced on 23 Apr 45 (See Press Clippings Nos 5286 and 5296, Ottawa Citizen and No. 5391, Toronto Telegram, 24 Apr 45). With regard to the timing of the release of information, one Liberal paper remarked that "It would have been disturbing to the Canadian public to have been told that it had been arranged to transfer the 1st Canadian Corps to the West front at the time when many people were concerned over the reported shortage of reinforcements" (Press Clipping No. 5373, Citizen, 25 Apr 45).



195. In discussing the matter during a political broadcast delivered shortly after VE Day, Maj-Gen Pearkes made the following charge:

The stark truth is thus revealed that the veterans of the campaign in Sicily and Italy were transferred to northwest Europe to make up the deficiencies in the trained men in the home defence army that might have been sent from Canada.

(Press Clipping No. 5857,  
Gazette, 12 May 45)

Prompt denial came from General McNaughton in his Regina speech of 15 May (ibid, No. 5899, Journal, 16 May 45). By that time, however, popular interest in the Canadian forces overseas had shifted to the problem of bringing them home and preparations for the defeat of Japan were becoming the dominant issue.

#### PART VI: PUBLIC PRESSURE REGARDING THE CANADIAN ARMY PACIFIC FORCE

196. Long before the capitulation of Germany there had been periodic demands in the press and Parliament for more active participation by Canada in the war against Japan. Until the Kiska expedition the main concern in this respect was defence, but reorganization of the 6th Division thereafter into brigades similar to "task forces" or "combat teams" was taken as a shift to the offensive spirit. This was the theme of an article by Flaherty entitled "Canadian Troops Tailored for Specific Job in Pacific" (Press Clipping No. 4562, Vancouver Province, 11 Dec 43). Norman MacLeod of the British United Press also began a series of articles on the important role Canada would play in new offensives against Japan (ibid, No. 8808, The Hamilton Spectator, 25 Oct 43).

197. When Parliament met Mr. H.C. Green on 10 Feb 44 urged the Government to send N.R.M.A. troops to fight "either beside the Australians and New Zealanders in the South Pacific or beside Americans in the Central Pacific" (Debates, 1944, vol I, p. 350). Later, news that twenty Canadian officers had been attached to Empire and United States forces in the Southwest Pacific was taken as a very definite indication that Canada would play her part in the final defeat of Japan (Press Clipping No. 8230, The Canadian Observer (Sarnia), 1 Apr 44). There apparently was little agitation to discover the form and extent of her intended contribution, however, until the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. Charles Bishop then wrote from Ottawa, "It is taken for granted here that Canadian participation in the Japanese war will be confined, very largely, to Air Force and Naval units, with a minimum of Army units" (Press Clipping No. 6842, Winnipeg Tribune, 14 Sep 44).

198. Much speculation arose from President Roosevelt's statement at the end of the conference that Canadians would fight alongside United States troops all the way across the Pacific. Soon afterwards the Canadian High Commissioner to Australia (Mr. T.C. Davis) in welcoming the Canadian Radar Detachment addressed them as "the first Canadian soldiers to set foot on Australian soil" - words which some commentators interpreted

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¶ See paragraphs 93, 101, 112, 137, 149 and 163 to 169.



as a hint that they were the vanguard of a Canadian Pacific Army. Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that no large scale movement of troops to the Pacific would take place until the war in Europe ended. The Gazette on 28 Sep remarked "When that time comes, it is believed Canada will put into the Pacific theatre a corps composed, perhaps, of two or three divisions" (Press Clippings Nos. 7059 and 7068, Windsor Star and Gazette, 28 Sep 44). A more accurate estimate was made by Kenneth Cragg, who wrote on 7 Oct that army forces would approximate a division with ancillaries, the whole totalling about 30,000 troops (Press Clipping No. 7420, Globe and Mail, 7 Oct 44).

199. Of greater interest than the size of the force was the method of selection. Would N.R.M.A. troops be sent from Canada or, as charged by Mr. W.E. Rowe at a political meeting in Toronto, would the war against Japan be waged "only to the last Canadian now fighting in the European war?" (ibid, No. 7295, 5 Oct 44). From the indefinite answers given by Col Ralston to such questions by the troops in Italy during his tour there, it was assumed that government policy had not yet been determined, but his remarks on demobilization implied that N.R.M.A. troops would not be used (Press Clippings Nos. 7277 and 7772, Toronto Telegram, 3 and 30 Oct 44). J.A. Hume reported from Ottawa a suggestion that these men could be used as Canadian army of occupation troops in Germany and Japan, thus allowing overseas men to be demobilized first (ibid, Nos. 7934 and 7935, Citizen, 27 and 28 Oct 44).

200. The main desire of the press at the time seems to have been to get the Government to make an announcement regarding the Army, particularly after plans for the Navy and Air Force were made known. A survey by the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs indicated that no strong views were held on the disposition of Canada's Pacific Forces; older people tended to favour co-operation under British command but percentages for the total interviewed were as follows:

With British.....	27%
With Americans.....	26%
With both.....	39%
Undecided.....	8%

(Press Clipping No. 8262, Citizen, 9 Nov 44)

According to Peter Stursberg of the C.B.C., by the end of 1944 troops in Italy were demanding a Government statement as to whether they would be turned against Japan before being given a chance to get home (Press Clipping No. 9632, Vancouver Province, 23 Dec 44).

201. The arrival in Australia of No. 1 Canadian Special Wireless Group, R.C. Sigs, brought renewed speculations in February 1945 together with hints that a Commander of Canada's Pacific Force should be announced. Lt-Gen Simonds and Maj-Gen Keller were most frequently mentioned for this post. By then the size of the force generally was considered to be two divisions (Press Clipping No. 3929, Gazette, 24 Feb 45). Once again the main concern of the press was to try to obtain a definite statement regarding policy, particularly with regard to the conscription issue.



202. When the Prime Minister finally announced in the House on 4 Apr 45 the policy Canada intended to follow with respect to the Pacific, English language papers generally, with the exception of the Montreal Star, expressed the opinion that the voluntary principle was unfair as it would mean that men who had fought in Europe would be the ones who would volunteer for the Pacific War. On the other hand, his speech was warmly welcomed by the French-speaking press.<sup>x</sup> A lively scene resulted in the Commons when Mr. H.C. Green charged that the Government was keeping silent for election purposes and Government speakers replied that the size of the force could not be announced until after final consultation with Britain and the United States (Debates, 1945, vol I, pp 615-17). The Ottawa Citizen continued to protest against the "hush hush" policy being pursued, observing that the editor of the Sydney Herald contended that there was a feeling of disappointment in Australia over Canada's attitude to the Pacific war<sup>xx</sup> (Press Clipping No. 5348, Citizen, 24 Apr 45). Other papers contrasted Canada's indefinite programme with the serious steps taken by the United States (ibid, Nelson News, 14 Apr, and an editorial of the Calgary Herald reproduced in the Ottawa Citizen of 24 Apr 45). After referring to an article by Quentin Reynolds which anticipated that American troops would be sent directly from Europe to the Pacific without leave at home, the Conservative Journal stressed the unfortunate reaction produced in the United States by the Prime Minister's bare statement that no Canadian would be sent against Japan unless he so elected (Press Clippings Nos. 5415 and 5590, Journal, 26 Apr and 4 May 45).

203. As peace came to Europe there were many reminders that war for Canada was far from being at an end and there was obvious impatience at the lack of definite information about plans for aiding in the defeat of Japan. After referring to demands that those to go to the Pacific should be taken from men who had not been in action, F.C. Mears pointed out that how many and who should go rested with the military leaders who had yet to confer on the increased scale of operations against the Japanese (Press Clipping No. 5737, Gazette, 8 May 45). With an election campaign then in progress, however, most official announcements were preceded and followed by vigorous political speeches.

204. While repeatedly calling upon the Government to make its policy known, Mr. Bracken announced in Ottawa on 16 May that his party stood for conscription against Japan. Defence Department sources were at once reported to have said that there were insufficient trained N.R.M.A. men in Canada to meet the need. (Press Clipping No. 5941, Citizen, 17 May 45). Before the size of the force had officially been disclosed, General McNaughton stated at Moosomin on 11 May that Canada did not intend to send huge numbers of men to the Pacific "to slug it out hand-to-hand with a foe perhaps better fitted than we to survive in jungle warfare" (Press Clipping No. 5903, Journal, 16 May 45). There was an immediate outburst at this, particularly when it became known over the following week-end that the Army component would number only 30,000. Speaking at Indian Head, Mr. Bracken said that no one expected Canada to send support beyond "our just share to the

<sup>x</sup> C.M.H.Q. file 4/Press/26/2: Minim Proco No. 856, 13 Apr 45, cites Globe and Mail, Gazette, Ottawa Journal, Winnipeg Free Press, La Presse and La Patrie (Independent)

<sup>xx</sup> Mr. Thomas Dunbabin, Australian press attaché in Ottawa, at once wrote the editor of the Ottawa Citizen refuting this allegation.



Pacific war, but no one expects us to run out on our Allies either" (Press Clipping No. 6257, Windsor Star, 24 May 45). The Secretary of the Canadian Corps Association immediately prepared an address calling upon Canada to "do no less" than Britain, Australia and the United States "in turning the whole weight of their power, with avenging fury, towards the Pacific" (Press Clipping No. 6227, Toronto Telegram, 23 May 45). In an editorial entitled "To Let Our Allies Whip Japan", one Ontario paper wrote:

The Dominion that demanded status as a leader among the 'middle-sized Powers' at San Francisco is to be all but a mere by-stander in the second - and maybe harder - half of the World War!

...Not only is the size of Canada's contribution a cause for shame at home and angry scorn across the border, but the effort is to be so slow that it will be several months before any Canadians can be in the scrap. And when this Dominion's soldiers do go across the Pacific they are destined to be a sort of bob-tail American outfit, equipped, trained and fed in U.S. style and probably wearing United States uniforms.

(Press Clipping No. 6190, Stratford Beacon-Herald, 22 May 45)

Mr. Maxine Raymond, national leader of the Bloc Populaire, on the one hand charged that Mr. King had engaged Canada to fight against Japan "to the last man and to the last cent" to serve only the interests of Great Britain. (Press Clipping No. 6115, Citizen, 25 May 45). Mr. M.J. Coldwell, national C.C.F. leader, on the other hand said that the Canadian role had been decided by the Americans, who regarded the war with Japan as "their own private quarrel" and therefore wanted the Canadians to fight as part of their Army rather than as a separate formation (Press Clipping No. 6259, Journal, 25 May 45).

205. It is impossible to follow here the various charges and counter-charges with respect to the C.A.P.F. policy which were leveled during the election campaign. For example, many editors foresaw that extra leave and campaign pay would be granted to the volunteers, yet immediately the official announcements were made there were cries of "bribery" from Mr. E.E. Perley, Progressive-Conservative candidate opposing General McNaughton (Press Clippings Nos. 5892 and 6082, Journal, 15 and 22 May 45). Two months later, when it was found necessary to reduce the number of days' leave in some cases, the Conservative Gazette accused the Defence Department of "welshing on full payment of the bribe" (Press Clipping No. 7375).

206. Newspapers which supported the Government were fully confident that sufficient volunteers would be obtained: those in opposition with equal assurance emphasized that there was little enthusiasm while draftees remained at home (Press Clippings Nos. 6279 and 6391, Toronto Star, 25 May, and Calgary Herald, 23 May 45). Presenting a non-partisan view, the official organ of the Canadian Legion contended that both volunteers and N.R.M.A. men should compose the force, which should be twice as large and in action much sooner or else the war might end before Canada could do her part (Press Clipping No. 6626, editorial from The Legionary reproduced by the Stratford Beacon-Herald, 7 Jun 45).



207. Outstanding among criticisms were continued references to reports from the United States that Canada's attitude was being misunderstood there. By the Conservative press the impression that Canada was fighting "a soft war" was attributed to some extent to the size of the force, but mainly to insistence upon the volunteer principle (Press Clipping No. 6664, Globe and Mail, 9 Jun 45). In officially welcoming Maj-Gen B.M. Hoffmeister to Ottawa on 14 June, however, the Prime Minister said in effect that Canada was sending all the soldiers that the United States had asked for at the Quebec Conference (Press Clipping No. 6744, Citizen, 15 Jun 45). Opposition papers at once asked why such an announcement had been delayed until after the election and the number of volunteers had been estimated (Press Clipping No. 7044, editorial of the Toronto Telegram, reproduced by the Gazette, 28 Jun 45). It was even suggested that perhaps the "conspicuously moderate commitments" had not been due to insistence by the Allies but "the result of the political adroitness with which the Canadian delegation managed the discussion" (Press Clipping No. 7636, Gazette, 23 Jul 45).

208. Criticism of the policy of the Government with regard to the Japanese war also expressed itself in protests against the retention of General McNaughton as Minister after his two political defeats (Press Clippings Nos. 7563 and 7729, Globe and Mail, 18 and 23 Jul 45). He remained in office, nevertheless, until hostilities had definitely ceased.

209. Immediately following the surrender of Japan there was much speculation regarding the fate of the C.A.P.F. and the possibility of Canada sharing in an occupational role. In an editorial entitled "The Wallflower of the Pacific", the Gazette pointed out that Canada's policy there had not been impressive to date, the Hong Kong force being her most significant contribution, and asked if the "same strategic silences" were to continue (Press Index No. 743, 23 Aug 45, item 8487, Gazette). The Prime Minister, however, before the end of August stated that the C.A.P.F. would be disbanded and that no occupation force was contemplated. Such pronouncements effectively ended further conjecture and little discussion of this question followed. With public attention fixed upon the repatriation of Hong Kong prisoners of war, the tendency was to withdraw all Canadians from the Orient rather than attempt to send troops there for garrison duty.

#### CONCLUSION: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE BALANCE OF EFFORT BETWEEN THE THREE SERVICES

210. Frequent reference has been made in this report to statements concerning the importance of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan<sup>#</sup>. Mr. King and members of his Cabinet often spoke of it as a major contribution of Canada, an opinion which Mr. Churchill publicly proclaimed while in Ottawa<sup>\*\*</sup>. It would appear that whenever public impatience with the original static role of the Canadian Army reached a high pitch, a prominent speaker would issue a reminder that the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force were actively engaged and in particular that the Air Training Plan was of enormous value to the war effort.

211. It is questionable, however, how far Canadian public

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# See paragraphs 25, 50, 53, 63, 74, 94 and 129

\*\* See paragraph 89.



opinion was prepared to accept this in itself as a satisfactory contribution to victory. Although recognizing the value of inter-service cooperation and the vital role of industry in modern warfare, the man on the street continued to think very largely in traditional terms of fighting by land forces. There were some who advocated increased naval strength and many who urged an all-out air effort, but the popular mind still recalled the exploits of the Canadian Corps in the First World War and recognized that the Army would again play a decisive role. The Ottawa Journal of 3 Jan 40, for example, in declaring that the Canadian people wanted many more troops to follow the 1st Division overseas, wrote: "They realize the vital need for air fighters, and will provide them, but we think they realize as well that there is need for land forces, and would like to give their share of them." Some two years later, when the New York Times published an editorial entitled "This is an Air War", the Globe and Mail of 10 Feb 42 countered that the need for shipping was then most pressing and went on to say: "When, however, the United Nations are able to assume the offensive, men, tanks and guns, no less than aircraft, will become the paramount consideration".

212. Such insistence upon a tri-service war effort, of course, meant exceedingly heavy demands upon Canada's limited resources of man power. It was on these grounds, rather than with respect to the high financial expenditure involved, that the most bitter political attacks were delivered. For example, in July 1943 the Financial Post alleged that the Canadian air ministry had been battling with army authorities to get priority to enlist category A men for aircrew. Mr. Graydon (then Leader of the Opposition) promptly asked on 24 Jul for a statement by the Minister. Although denying that there was any battle between the two Services, Mr. Power in his reply nevertheless made the following admission with regard to the Air Force:

We must state frankly that we are seriously alarmed at the lack of recruits coming forward in a constant stream sufficient to meet our current requirements. In other words, at the present time we are 'eating our fat' and not building up any reserve strength.

(Debates, 1943, vol V, p. 5359)

Referring to the article in the Post and to this Ministerial statement, the Conservative Vancouver Province of 30 Jul asked Col Ralston (who was then about to visit the Mediterranean theatre) to make certain not only that the Canadian Army had sufficient reinforcements but "that Canada's war policies will enable her to keep her commitments under the Commonwealth Air Training plan". The same article in the Post was used by the Vancouver Sun of 30 Jul to attack the Conservative party for charging that the Government had failed to enlist enough soldiers to maintain the Army overseas. Saying that this was the real basis of the original conscription issue, the Sun declared that "On the contrary, it is seen now that the government, undoubtedly under conscriptionist pressure, may have enlisted too many soldiers and thus endangered not only industrial production but also the vital progress of the Air Training Plan".



213. The foregoing will serve to illustrate that political leaders had constantly to be alert to public opinion regarding the balance of effort between the three Services. When attention turned to Japan, the Canadian public quite definitely again insisted that the initial emphasis upon the roles of the Navy and Air Force be expanded to a tri-service basis.\* The part to be played by the Army was rapidly receiving wider emphasis when hostilities abruptly ceased.

214. It is to the credit of the people of Canada that, in a lengthy war introducing many unforeseen complexities, the ideal of a balanced effort remained uppermost. Proud of the achievements by which the Navy and Air Force were gaining distinction, Canadian public opinion was determined to see the Army also play an aggressive part when opportunities for active employment became available.

215. This report was written by Major R.B. Oglesby.

*R. B. Oglesby Maj*  
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel  
Director Historical Section

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\* See Part VI of this report.