

422. COSSAC's "Appendix Y" was not superseded until 23 Feb 44, when the final deception plan ("FORTITUDE") was completed (794). By that time the scheme had been co-ordinated with certain Russian cover plans which had been discussed at the Teheran Conference (795). The overall Allied plan ("BODYGUARD") was intended to lead the enemy to the following conclusions:

- a. That forces are being held in readiness in the UNITED KINGDOM for a return to Western EUROPE at any time in the event of a serious GERMAN weakening or withdrawal.
- b. That an operation would be carried out in conjunction with RUSSIA in the spring with the immediate object of opening a supply route through Northern NORWAY to SWEDEN, thereafter enlisting the active co-operation of SWEDEN for the establishment of air bases in Southern SWEDEN to cover an assault on DENMARK from the UNITED KINGDOM in the summer.
- c. That a large scale cross-Channel operation with a minimum force of fifty divisions and with craft and shipping for twelve divisions would be carried out in late summer. (796)

423. Within the above framework the "FORTITUDE" cover and deception policy was based on these assumptions:

- a. That the target date for 'NEPTUNE' will be 1st June, 1944.
- b. That NO real operations, other than 'RANKIN', will be carried out in NORWAY before D day 'NEPTUNE'. (797)

The object of the Plan was:

To induce the enemy to make faulty dispositions in North-West EUROPE before and after the 'NEPTUNE' assault, thus:-

- a. Reducing the rate and weight of reinforcement of the target area.
- b. Inducing him to expend his available effort on fortifications in areas other than the target area.
- c. Lowering his vigilance in FRANCE during the build-up and mounting of the 'NEPTUNE' forces in the UNITED KINGDOM.
- d. Retaining forces in areas as far removed as possible from the target area before and after the 'NEPTUNE' assault. (798)

424. The present narrative is not concerned with details of the "FORTITUDE" plan, covering periods both before and after D Day. Those details were chiefly concerned with the simulation of Allied threats to Scandinavia and the Pas de Calais. However, it may be noted that the threat to the latter area was built up to impressive proportions. The "story" was as follows:

With a target date of 'NEPTUNE' D plus 45, a cross-channel operation will be carried out by a total force of fifty divisions with craft and shipping for twelve divisions. The assault will be made in the PAS DE CALAIS area by six divisions, two EAST and four SOUTH of CAP GRIS NEZ. The follow-up and immediate build-up will be a further six divisions. The force will be built up to the total of fifty divisions at the rate of about three divisions per day.

The first phase of the operation will be the establishment of a bridgehead which must include the major port of ANTWERP and the communication centre of BRUSSELS. From this bridgehead large-scale operations will be conducted against the RUHR with the final object of occupying GERMANY. (799)

By their presence in the Dover area during the period immediately preceding and following D Day the Headquarters of the 2nd Canadian Corps, large numbers of Corps Troops, and the 2nd Canadian Division contributed to the success of this threat across the Channel (800).

CONCLUSION

425. Four years of planning had culminated in the final adjustments to the grand design for the Allied invasion of Normandy. Beginning with Mr. Churchill's efforts to regain the initiative -- even as the last British and Allied troops were withdrawing from Dunkirk -- the plan for the great assault had passed through many critical phases. During the period immediately following Dunkirk the Commonwealth stood virtually alone against the formidable Axis Powers, and such invasion plans as were prepared retained little more than a theoretical interest. The overall picture was radically altered when, in succession, Hitler began his fatal war with Russia, Japan struck at Pearl Harbour and the United States entered the conflict. Thereafter, American industry and manpower were welded to British resources and experience to form an invincible combination.

426. Nevertheless, even after the United States joined the Commonwealth in the struggle, there was no obvious solution to the problem of invading North-West Europe. A long tug of war began between American impatience and British caution over the prospect of an early assault against enemy-occupied Europe. With their decision to attack French North Africa at the end of

1942 the Allied leaders really postponed the cross-Channel attack from 1943 to 1944. Thereafter, the "hard experience at Dieppe" emphasized the necessity of more equipment and more training for a major assault across the Channel (801).

427. The crippling shortage of landing craft -- the most significant factor in all large-scale amphibious operations throughout the war -- and the extension of the Allied commitment in the Mediterranean frustrated all hopes of an early re-entry in force to North-West Europe. An additional, at times a dominating, factor was Allied concern over the progress of the war in Russia. For it was obvious that a decisive German victory over the Red Army would immediately make the approaching invasion an infinitely more hazardous venture.

428. It is evident that the first comprehensive appreciation and plan for the invasion was produced by the Combined Commanders, in London, during the spring of 1943. In their selection of the target area (including the eastern beaches of the Cotentin Peninsula), in their estimate of the forces required, and in their forecast of operations subsequent to the assault, the Combined Commanders made a very significant contribution to the study of fundamental problems of the invasion.

429. The later work of the COSSAC staff carried pre-invasion planning through its most crucial stage. By consolidating and evaluating all earlier studies on the subject, and by making specific proposals for carrying out the operation (with the resources then available), the COSSAC appreciation became an indispensable foundation for the final "OVERLORD" plan. Nevertheless, lacking the authority of a Supreme Commander, COSSAC was unable to increase the scope of the intended operation in certain respects afterwards found to be essential to the plan.

430. Meanwhile, the experience gained in the Mediterranean landings during the summer of 1943, and the training carried out in the United Kingdom on such exercises as "SPARTAN", "PRIMROSE", "HARLEQUIN" and "PIRATE", were providing practical answers to many problems. Methods of supplying overwhelming fire support for the assault -- the principal lesson of the Dieppe Raid -- were being closely studied and tested in such exercises as "PIRATE". Out of this essential, preliminary experience came the assault technique which afterwards proved its worth against the "Atlantic Wall".

431. Finally, the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and the erection of SHAEF on the COSSAC foundation introduced the final period of "OVERLORD" planning. During this period great decisions were taken which broadened and strengthened the scope of the initial assault, which settled the relationship of "OVERLORD" to "ANVIL", which determined the timing of the invasion and which ended controversies over the air aspect of "OVERLORD". In the end, four years of planning and preparation supported the dramatic decision made at 0415 hrs, 5 Jun 44, by the Supreme Commander:


"We will sail tomorrow."

432.
Hunter, R.C.A.

This report was prepared by Major T.M.

T.M. Hunter, Major
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director Historical Section.

CHAIN OF COMMAND



NOTE: The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe and the R.A.F. Bomber Command remained under the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

References

(1) The following are of particular interest:

(a) Books.

- Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vols I-III (London, 1948 - 50), vols IV, V (Boston, 1950 - 51);
Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vols I & II (London, 1948-49);
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (London, n.d.);
P.J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgment (London, 1948);
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London, 1948);
Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic (B.A.O.R., 1946);
Lt-Gen Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (London, 1950);
Maj-Gen Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (London, 1947);
Lord Tedder, Air Power in War [the Lees Knowles Lectures of 1947], (London, n.d.);
John Creswell, Sea Warfare 1939-1945: a Short History (London, 1950);
Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol II (Operations in North African Waters October 1942-June 1943) (Boston, 1950);
Rear-Admiral L.E.H. Maund, Assault from the Sea (London, 1949);
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman based on his Notes and Diaries made at the Time (London, 1950);
Commander Kenneth Edwards, Operation Neptune (London, 1946);
W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing, British War Economy (London, 1949).
Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, D.C., 1951).

(b) Articles

- Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, "21st (British) Army Group in the Campaign in North-West Europe, 1944-45", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XC, No. 560 (November 1945), pp 431-454;
Rear-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XCV, No. 580 (November 1950), pp 580-588;
Brigadier A.H. Head, "Amphibious Operations", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XCI, No. 564 (November 1946), pp 485-494;
Commodore J.A. Grindle, "The Development of Combined Operations Material and Technique", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XCIII, No. 572 (November 1948) pp 537-550;

Lieutenant-Commander R. Stanbury, "Some Naval Aspects of an Assault Landing", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XCVI, No. 581 (February 1951), pp. 117-120;

Forrest C. Pogue, "The Supreme Allied Command in Northwest Europe, 1944-45", Essays in History and International Relations in honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee (Worcester, Mass., 1949), pp 171-192.

(c) Reports & Despatches

The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material (Prepared under the direction of The Chief of Combined Operations, March 1946), a "Confidential" paper;

Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War (London, 1945);

Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (London, 1946);

Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings (Supplement to the London Gazette, 30 Oct 47);

Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Operations in North-West Europe from 6th June, 1944 to 5th May, 1945 (Supplement to the London Gazette, 4 Sep 46);

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air Operations by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in N.W. Europe from November 15th, 1943 to September 30th, 1944 (Supplement to the London Gazette, 2 Jan 47);

Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Liberation of Europe (Operation "OVERLORD"): Operations of Coastal Command, Royal Air Force, from May to August, 1944 (Supplement to the London Gazette, 30 Oct 47).

(2) The G.H.Q. Home Forces "Overlord" Series contains a great deal of material with a bearing on the administrative planning for "OVERLORD".

(3) The records in question are those of the following conferences:

"ARCADIA" at Washington (22 Dec 41 - 14 Jan 42);

Second Washington Conference (19-25 Jun 42);

London Conference (18-25 Jul 42);

"SYMBOL" at Casablanca (12-23 Jan 43);

"TRIDENT" at Washington (12-25 May 43);

"QUADRANT" at Quebec (12-24 Aug 43);

"SEXTANT" at Cairo (22-26 Nov, 3-7 Dec 43);

"EUREKA" at Teheran (28 Nov - 1 Dec 43).

(4) Quoted by G.R. Gleig, The Life of Arthur Duke of Wellington (London, 1897), pp 445-6.

- (5) Forward from Victory: Speeches and Addresses by Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O. (London, 1948), p. 127. ". . . We can find in history the forerunners of nearly every single kind of special ship and craft such as we used in the last war". (Grindle, "Development of Combined . . . Technique", p. 538.)
- (6) Churchill, op. cit., vol II (Their Finest Hour), p. 214. The entire chapter XII, "The Apparatus of Counter-Attack", throws much light on the origins of certain aspects of pre-invasion planning.
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) Maund, op. cit., p. 2. He was "chairman" of the I.S.T.D.C. The latter is sometimes referred to as the "Inter-Service Technical Developments Committee". (Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 485). A useful source of information on early developments (1921-1940) in the technique of Combined Operations is to be found in: The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, Part I. A brief sketch of early American experience is contained in Morison, op. cit., vol II, pp 19-20.
- (9) Maund, op. cit., preface, p. vii. The I.S.T.D.C. advised the Chiefs of Staff that "if they wanted to mount a brigade against slight opposition and maintain it in enemy territory over the beaches, we could not produce the necessary craft in less than eighteen months or two years". (Grindle, "Development of Combined . . . Technique", p. 538).
- (10) Maund, op. cit., p. 21. However, the I.S.T.D.C. was reformed in December 1939: The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 21. "The position with regard to ships and craft at the outbreak of hostilities was as follows: 12 L.C.A.; 1 new L.C.M.; 10 old jet-propelled L.C.M.; and 1 L.C.S." (Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 486).
- (11) C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa, 1948), p. 9. See, also, Maund, op. cit., chap II, "Narvik Operation".
- (12) Maund, op. cit., pp 58-9. It is believed that the Narvik expedition provided "the first occasion in history on which tanks were landed over a beach in an operation of war": The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 24. See, also, Maund, op. cit., pp 42-3.
- (13) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 217. (Author's italics).
- (14) Maund, op. cit., p. 63. However, Mr. Churchill described these raids as "silly fiascos". (Op. cit., vol II, p.572). See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, paras 30, 31; Grindle, "Development of Combined . . . Technique", p. 540.
- (15) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 437.

- (16) Maund, op. cit., p. 73. See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 38. Grindle, "Development of Combined ... Technique", pp 540-1
- (17) Maund, op. cit., preface, p. vii; text, p. 68. Mr. Churchill gives October 1940 as the date when the L.C.T. had its first trials. (Op. cit., vol II, p.221). See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, paras 39, 40. Brigadier Head stated that Field-Marshal Sir John Dill (then General and C.I.G.S. until 18 Nov 41) "deserves the credit for having been the first to insist on something like the L.S.T." ("Amphibious Operations", p. 487).
- (18) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 219. The previous Director of Combined Operations, Lt-Gen A.G.B. Burne, had been "Commander of Raiding Operations and Adviser to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations". (The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 28.)
- (19) Infra, para 86.
- (20) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 220.
- (21) C.O.S.(40) 14 (O) (J.P.) as quoted in Hist Sec, Cabinet Office, narrative: Section D, Chapter I - OVERLORD: Plans and Preparations: 1940 to the 'Touch Down', para 5. (This narrative was prepared by Lt-Col H.A. Pollock, D.S.O., during the period 1946-49. Throughout the remainder of the present report the Cabinet Office narrative is cited by its original, abbreviated, title: Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944.) It appears that, in order of priority, operations were considered against Metropolitan Italy, Norway, Iberian Peninsula, France and the Low Countries.
- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 187.
- (24) Ibid., p. 222.
- (25) C.P. Stacey, "Allied Grand Strategy in the Defeat of Germany 1939-1945", Canadian Army Journal, vol 2, Nos. 5 & 6 (August-September 1948), p. 1.
- (26) Ibid.
- (27) Ibid. (This article emphasizes the importance of the timing of ABC-1 in relation to the subsequent effect of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour on American public opinion.)
- (28) Harrison, op. cit., p.2.
- (29) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, paras 36, 44; Maund, op. cit., p. 75.

- (30) Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, Raid on Military and Economic Objectives in the Lofoten Islands (Supplement to the London Gazette, 23 Jun 48). Amphibious operations in the Eastern Mediterranean during the spring of 1941 are summarized in The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, paras 49-53.
- (31) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 222.
- (32) Maund, op. cit., p. 65. It is useful to recall the distinction between "ship" and "craft":

The 'ship' is designed to be capable of making long ocean passages, and is largely self-supporting administratively; the 'craft' is specially designed for inshore or, in a few cases, cross-Channel work, but for anything more than a short sea passage it has to be carried in a parent ship and in any case requires a shore-based or ship-based administrative and maintenance organization. Both ships and craft may, in some designs, be capable of beaching, and they then become landing ships or landing craft. (Grindle, "Development of Combined ... Technique", p.538)

- (33) Churchill, op. cit., vol III (The Grand Alliance), p. 481.
- (34) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 64.
- (35) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 223.
- (36) Stacey, "Allied Grand Strategy . . .", p. 2.
- (37) Sherwood, op. cit., vol I, p. 359. There does not appear to be any reference to this disclosure in Churchill, op. cit., vol III, chaps XXIII and XXIV.
- (38) Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 388. On the earlier planning (March 1941) for the occupation of the Canary Islands see Hist Soc (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 67, para 29.
- (39) Infra, paras 150 ff.
- (40) C.O.S. (42) 80, February 1942: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Washington War Conference December 1941 - January 1942, Annex I ("American-British Strategy: Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff", para 3). See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 624, and Sherwood, op. cit., vol I, p. 449.
- (41) "American-British Strategy: Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff", para 4.
- (42) Ibid., paras 16,17.

- (43) Washington War Conference December, 1941 - January, 1942: Records of Discussions between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, Annex VII ("Meeting of United States and British Chiefs of Staff and their Advisers held on Wednesday, December 24, 1941, at 10:30 A.M.", pp 15-16)
- (44) Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 212. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol III, pp 608-9. He afterwards observed: "The control of all our combined operations and world strategy must rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington under the final direction of the Heads of Governments." (Ibid., vol V (American edition), p. 302))
- (45) Stacey, "Allied Grand Strategy . . .", p. 2. "It was Roosevelt's conviction that only Britain and the United States could really co-operate in formulating and implementing global strategy, and, most importantly, in determining the allocation of the combined resources". (Sherwood, op. cit., vol I, p. 467) See, infra, reference (521). At the later "SEXTANT" Conference, in Cairo, the possibility of Soviet and Chinese representation at meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was discussed (22 Nov 43):

There was general agreement that, subject to further consideration, the best procedure would be for the Chinese and Soviet Representatives to be invited to attend only those meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which matters concerning the fronts in which they were interested were under discussion. At "EUREKA" [see, infra, paras 377 ff], however, it would obviously be necessary for the Soviet representatives to attend all meetings held. (C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, p. 45))

A proposal by the United States Chiefs of Staff for a "United Chiefs of Staff" ("set up at the Chiefs of Staff level to include the principal Allies -- that is, for the present, the four 'Moscow' Powers") was opposed by the British representatives and was abandoned. (C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part III), 8 Mar 44, pp. 67, 68; (Part II), pp. 52-53.

- (46) C.O.S. (42) 80, February 1942, Annex XI ("Post ARCADIA Collaboration: Memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff", para 6). The following definitions were adopted:

"Joint": "Inter-Service collaboration of one nation";

"Combined": "collaboration between two or more of the United Nations".
(Ibid., para 2)

- (47) Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 573.
- (48) Ibid., pp 583-4.
- (49) Infra, paras 367ff.
- (50) J.P.(41) 1028, 24 Dec 41, as quoted in Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, paras 7, 9. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 8. The latter points out that an earlier version (J.P.(41) 823 (O) Draft) was dated 9 Oct 41. There is no mention of this version in Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944 which, however, refers to "an interim report" (J.P.(41) (799) of 1 Oct 41). See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 57.
- (51) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 8.
- (52) Harrison, op. cit., p. 8.
- (53) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 10.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Ibid.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, paras 13, 14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 6. A.O.C.-in-C., Bomber Command, does not appear to have been included in the Combined Commanders.
- (58) Supra, para 10.
- (59) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, pp 8, 45.
- (60) Ibid., p. 45.
- (61) Previously (21 Jul - 25 Dec 40), Lt-Gen McNaughton had commanded an Anglo-Canadian 7th Corps consisting of the 1st British Armoured and the 1st Canadian Divisions together with the New Zealand Force and Corps Troops.
- (62) Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 656.
- (63) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 3. This report deals with "The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army, 1942-1944". See, also: The Canadian Army at War: The Canadians in Britain 1939-1944 (Ottawa, n.d.), p. 35.
- (64) Quoted by Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 46; see, also, Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 4.
- (65) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 4; see, also, Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 46.

- (66) The Times (London) 27 Aug 41; Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 5.
- (67) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 22.
- (68) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 36.
- (69) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 9.
- (70) Ibid.
- (71) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 31.
- (72) Ibid., p. 51.
- (73) Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 620.
- (74) Ibid., p. 621.
- (75) Sherwood, op. cit., vol I, p. 472. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 9.
- (76) Sherwood, op. cit., vol I, p. 472.
- (77) Harrison, op. cit., p. 9.
- (78) Sherwood, op. cit., vol I, pp 472-3. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 624.
- (79) Churchill, op. cit., vol III, p. 624. See, also, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War, p. 8.
- (80) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 67.
- (81) Ibid.
- (82) Maund, op. cit., p. 83. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol III, pp 610-612. Brigadier Head stated: "It is my firm conviction that the Americans by starting to build L.S.T. at that time contributed the biggest single factor to the success of amphibious operations, because without the L.S.T. we could not have carried out any of the big landing operations; not because of their ability to carry tanks but because they made possible a very rapid build-up." ("Amphibious Operations", p. 488).
- (83) Quoted by Harrison, op. cit., p. 11. The appreciation was contained in a memorandum (28 Feb 42) for the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George C. Marshall.
- (84) Ibid., p. 22.
- (85) Ibid.

- (86) Ibid.
- (87) Ibid.
- (88) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 14.
- (89) Ibid., para 18.
- (90) Quoted by Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 47.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Quoted by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 515. (The date of the cable is given at p. 523, where there is a slightly altered version of the text).
- (93) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 515.
- (94) Ibid., vol I, p. 13.
- (95) Ibid., vol II, p. 523.
- (96) Harrison, op. cit., p. 15.
- (97) This memorandum is discussed by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp. 524-5, and Harrison, op. cit., p. 15. See, also, Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 216.
- (98) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 525. The origin of the code name "SLEDGEHAMMER" has not been ascertained, although Harrison attributes it to Mr. Churchill (Op. cit., p. 12). The narrative, Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, is of no help on this point. See, also, infra paras 67 ff, 90-1, 97-9, 103, 146, 178ff, 233.
- (99) Harrison, op. cit., pp 15-16. Stimson and Bundy state, incorrectly, that "ROUNDUP" was to be mounted with 50 divisions; they also confuse "BOLERO", the administrative aspect of "ROUNDUP", with "ROUNDUP" itself. On the latter point, see Harrison, op. cit., p. 19, footnote 52. The correct definition of "BOLERO" is: "Operation of transferring American forces from the United States to the United Kingdom". (Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 557). At the "TRIDENT" Conference (12 May 43) Mr. Churchill defined "BOLERO" as "the administrative arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom". (C.O.S. (43) 281 (O), 3 Jun 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: "TRIDENT" (Part II): Record of Plenary Meetings held at the White House, Washington, between 12th and 25th May, 1943, p. 4.)
- (100) Extract from J.P.(42) 274 (S), Draft of 15 Mar 42: "Operation 'SLEDGEHAMMER': Report by the Joint Planning Staff", contained in "Notes on Operation 'SLEDGEHAMMER' based on Material provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".

- (101) "War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Part of C.O.S.(42) 87th Meeting: Operation 'SLEDGEHAMMER'", 17 Mar 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51."
- (102) Ibid.
- (103) Sherwood states that the President gave his approval on 1 Apr (op. cit., vol II, p. 525). See, also, Stimson and Bundy (op. cit., p. 216); but Harrison says that General Marshall gave his memorandum to the President on 2 Apr (op. cit., p. 15).
- (104) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 316.
- (105) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp 540-1. The American build-up in the U.K., by 15 Sep 42, was estimated by General Marshall as only two and a half infantry divisions, one armoured division and 900 aircraft. (Harrison, op. cit., p. 17).
- (106) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), pp 322-3.
- (107) Ibid., pp 323-4.
- (108) "War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Part of C.O.S.(42) 98th Meeting held on Saturday, 28th March, 1942", contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51". The objections to an attack against the Cherbourg Peninsula, from the point of view of the R.A.F., had been emphasized by Air Vice-Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory, A.O.C., No. 11 Group, R.A.F. (See extracts from: "Memorandum by A.O.C. No. 11 Group on a Proposed Offensive against the Cherbourg Peninsula", 24 Mar 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".)
- (109) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 320. The date of Mr. Churchill's message was 17 Apr 42.
- (110) Extract from "War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Part of C.O.S.(42) 110th Meeting (Minute 6) held on Wednesday, 8th April, 1942, at 10.00 a.m.", 9 Apr 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".
- (111) Quoted by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 533.
- (112) General Sikorski later advised Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt "fully shared" his (Sikorski's) views on this matter. See extract from "War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: A 'Second Front'," 15 Apr 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".
- (113) Harrison, op. cit., p. 24. The President's paper was dated 6 May 42.

- (114) See illustration in Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, opposite page 565.
- (115) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 333.
- (116) Ibid.
- (117) Ibid.
- (118) Ibid., pp 333-4.
- (119) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 559.
- (120) Ibid.
- (121) Ibid.
- (122) Ibid., p. 566.
- (123) Ibid.
- (124) Ibid., p. 567.
- (125) Quoted, ibid., p. 582. Sherwood adds: "The exact meaning of those words and all the implications involved in them provoked interminable and often violently acrimonious discussion for a long time thereafter." (Ibid.)
- (126) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 341.
- (127) Ibid., pp 341-2.
- (128) Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 219; see, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 25.
- (129) Quoted by Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 217.
- (130) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 593.
- (131) C.C.S. 27th Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of Meeting (Revised) Held in Room 240, Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Friday, June 19, 1942, at 12.30 p.m., pp 3-4.
These operations were discussed at another meeting on the same date:

The possibility of conducting a 1942 attack against some point in Western Europe was also discussed. Particular points were Brest, Channel Islands, Cherbourg and Northern Norway. It was agreed that each would be accompanied by certain hazards that would be justified only by reasons that were compelling in nature. However, it was generally agreed that any of these plans would be preferable to undertaking Gymnast, especially from the standpoint of dispersing base organization, lines of sea communication, and air strength. [See top of page 224]

(Combined Chiefs of Staff: Memorandum for Information: Minutes of an Informal Meeting between General Marshall and Members of his Staff representing the United States War Department and Sir John Dill, General Sir A. Brooke and Major General Sir H. Ismay, held in General Marshall's Office, at 2 p.m. June 19, 1942, para 4.)

- (132) C.C.S. 28th Meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 240, Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Saturday, June 20, 1942, at 11:00 a.m., p. 2.
- (133) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), pp 381-2.
- (134) C.O.S. (42) 189 (O), 29 Jun 42: Annex (Memo of 22 Jun 42).
- (135) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 383.
- (136) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 595. See: "Notes of a Meeting held at the White House at 11.30 P.M. on Sunday, June 21st between the President and Prime Minister", n.d.
- (137) Harrison, op. cit., p. 26; see also, Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 220; Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 595.
- (138) Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" was being continuously studied in the United Kingdom throughout this period: "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".
- (139) Harrison, op. cit., p. 26. The British Prime Minister had discussed "ROUNDUP" with General Eisenhower in Washington; Mr. Churchill afterwards wrote: "At that time [21 Jun 42] I thought of the spring or summer of 1943 as the date for the attempt". (Op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 385.)
- (140) Quoted by Harrison, op. cit., p. 27.
- (141) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 434.
- (142) Harrison, op. cit., p. 27.
- (143) Ibid. See, also, Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 597; Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 220. As previously mentioned, supra, reference (96), the American writers have tended to confuse "BOLERO" with "ROUNDUP" proper.
- (144) Quoted by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 605. Mr. Churchill has described the President's memorandum as "the most massive and masterly document on war policy that I ever saw from his hand". (Op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 441.)
- (145) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 609.

- (146) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 447. Italics added. Major-General Sir Ian Jacob (a member of the War Cabinet Secretariat) afterwards wrote:
 " . . . I doubt whether any American can really understand to the full the British mind of the spring and summer of 1942. We had been fighting hard for two-and-a-half years, and while we had had some successes we had met many disasters. We had the feeling of being stretched to the limit even before the Japanese blow fell on us in the Far East and added greatly to our commitments. U-boat sinkings were running at 400,000 tons a month, and it was all we could do to feed ourselves and to maintain our armies in the Middle East. We were completely mobilized, and had little, save the Home Army, left to throw into the fight. To suggest, in this kind of situation, the launching of the cross-Channel invasion seemed to the British crazy impetuosity which could not possibly profit anyone, least of all the Russians." ("Stout-hearted Hopkins", The Observer (London), 24 Apr 49).
- (147) Quoted by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 610.
- (148) Quoted, ibid., p. 607.
- (149) Ibid., p. 612.
- (150) Ibid., p. 615.
- (151) C.C.S. 32nd Meeting, 24 Jul 42: Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of Meeting Held in Conference Room B, War Cabinet Offices, Great George St. London on Friday, 24th July, 1942 at 12 noon, pp 1-2.
- (152) Ibid., p. 2.
- (153) Ibid., p. 3.
- (154) Ibid.
- (155) C.C.S. 94, 24 Jul 42: Combined Chiefs of Staff: Operations in 1942/43: Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (156) C.C.S. 33rd Meeting: Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of Meeting Held in Conference Room B, War Cabinet Offices, London, on Saturday, 25th July, 1942 at 10.30 a.m., p.2.
- (157) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 611.
- (158) Stacey, "Allied Grand Strategy . . .", p. 6.
- (159) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp 79-80. Cf. Gen Marshall's remarks at the "TRIDENT" Conference (15 May 43), infra, para 232.
- (160) Quoted by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 615.
- (161) Maund, op. cit., p. 108.

- (162) See "Extracts from C.O.H.Q. 'List of Operations with Code Name, Place, Date, Forces Engaged and References' for North-West Europe (1942)", as obtained from Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51.
- (163) Quoted by Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 41.
- (164) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 24.
- (165) Quoted, ibid., para 25.
- (166) Quoted, ibid., para 29.
- (167) Ibid., para 30.
- (168) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 70.
- (169) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, p. 55.
- (170) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 73.
- (171) Stanbury, "Some Naval Aspects . . .", p. 119. On "ABERCROMBIE" see Stacey, op. cit., pp 53-4; Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 81.
- (172) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 27.
- (173) Extract from C.O.S.(42) 79 (0): "War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Operation 'SLEDGEHAMMER': Report of the Third Sea Lord and Controller", 30 Mar 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51". As early as the autumn of 1941, "ideas and demands for landing craft had hopelessly outstripped the capacity of British yards". (Maund, op. cit., p. 82).
- (174) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 68. The C.O.L.O. was also "responsible for advising the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff [i.e. the British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff] on all aspects of Combined Operations". (Ibid.) See, also, Maund, op. cit., pp 85-6.
- (175) Grindle, "Development of Combined . . . Technique", p. 544. Some excellent photographs of various L.S.T. are to be found in Maund, op. cit., between pp 80-1.
- (176) Maund, op. cit., p. 86.
- (177) Ibid.
- (178) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 36.
- (179) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 66.

- (180) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, pp 54-5.
The statement contained in The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 76, that Admiral Ramsay was "appointed to C.O.H.Q." to supervise naval planning for cross-Channel operations is, of course, incorrect. Admiral Ramsay's influence on pre-invasion planning was exercised primarily through his membership in the "Combined Commanders" (supra, para 28) and, later, as the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, designate.
- (181) Extract from "Annex I: OPERATION SLEDGEHAMMER: Joint Memorandum by Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Fighter Command and Chief of Combined Operations", n.d., circulated with Note C.O.S.(42) 92 (0) of 7 Apr 42, and contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".
- (182) Extract from a Joint Memorandum, C.O.S.(42) 99 (0) of 14 Apr 42, prepared by same authorities, and contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51".
- (183) "Notes on Operations 'BLAZING', 'IMPERATOR' and 'CLAWHAMMER' based on Material provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51".
- (184) Ibid.: Letter, Commander, 1st Independent Guards Brigade Group, to Chief of Combined Operations, 31 May 42. See, also, Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", p. 585.
- (185) Ibid.: C.O.S.(42) 141st meeting held on 6 May 42.
- (186) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, paras 17 ff.
- (187) "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51"; Letter, C.C.O. to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 25 May 42. One of the papers in this group refers to the "United Commanders" which, presumably, was an alternative (little used) title for the "Combined Commanders".
- (188) Ibid.: "IMPERATOR", (b) "Forces to be Employed".
- (189) Ibid.: "Operations in France: A Suggested Alternative to 'SLEDGEHAMMER': a New Alternative for 'IMPERATOR'", 25 May 42.
- (190) Ibid.: "Operation 'IMPERATOR'", paper prepared by Colonel A.H. Head, Military Adviser to C.C.O., 6 Jun 42.
- (191) Ibid.: Memorandum with letter, Admiral Ramsay to Lord Louis Mountbatten, 25 Jul 42.
- (192) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 167, para 2.

- (193) Ibid., para 6. A British Staff Study (23 Sep 42) later revealed that a corps of only two divisions might be provided for "JUPITER". This revelation merely reinforced the conclusions in General McNaughton's earlier review of the operation. (Ibid., para 17.)
- (194) Quoted, ibid., para 7. On 8 Jul 42 the Prime Minister had written to the C.I.G.S. and C.O.S. Committee: "Climate proclaims that the Canadian Army should undertake this task, if it is thought feasible". (Quoted by Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 436.)
- (195) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 167, para 8.
- (196) Quoted, ibid.
- (197) Quoted, ibid.
- (198) See, ibid., paras 10-19; Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, paras 65-69; Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), pp 569 ff.
- (199) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 167, para 18.
- (200) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 167, para 10.
- (201) C.C.(42) 42 (3rd Draft), "Combined Commanders: Operation 'WETBOB' - Appreciation", 30 Jul 42, para 1. (Extracts from copy in possession of Hist Sec, Cabinet Office, October-November 1950). Italics added.
- (202) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 64.
- (203) "Combined Commanders: Operation 'WETBOB' - Appreciation", 30 Jul 42, para 73.
- (204) Ibid., para 7.
- (205) Ibid., para 122.
- (206) See Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 65.
- (207) "Combined Commanders: Operation 'WETBOB' - Appreciation", 30 Jul 42, para 77.
- (208) See Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939 - 1945, pp 54-86; also, by the same author, "Dieppe, 19 August, 1942", Canadian Geographical Journal, vol XXVII, No. 2 (August 1943) pp 47-63. Shortly after the Raid, C.O.H.Q. produced the printed and extremely detailed C.B.04244: Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid: 1942 (October 1942). Detailed information on various aspects of the Raid is contained in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Reports Nos. 89, 90, 100, 101, 107, 108, 109, 116, 128, 130, 142, 153, 159 and (A.H.Q.) Reports Nos.

10 and 36. (These underlined are of particular interest from the point of view of the present narrative.)

In addition to the above (numbered) reports, there is a Special Report, prepared by Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.), "The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Communications to and from Canada concerning the Operation", 11 Feb 43.

- (209) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 55. Except where stated otherwise, the brief account of planning and training which follows is based largely on this work.
- (210) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) No. 153, Appx "B", para 5.
- (211) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 56.
- (212) As regards the earlier use of tanks in the Narvik Operation see, supra, reference (12).
- (213) Quoted by Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 56.
- (214) Ibid., pp 57-8.
- (215) Ibid., p. 59.
- (216) "Minutes of a Meeting of the Council and Advisers with Major-General Gregson-Ellis, D.C.G.S., Home Forces, held at C.O.H.Q. at 1830 hours on Wednesday, July 7th, 1942", contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 14 Feb 51". The meeting agreed "that it was essential that exercises should not be more difficult than the actual operation which the forces concerned were to undertake". (Ibid.) Cf. Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", p. 585.
- (217) Quoted by Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 60.
- (218) Ibid., p. 61.
- (219) Ibid., p. 62.
- (220) Ibid., p. 68.
- (221) Ibid., p. 62-3.
- (222) C.B.04244: Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942 (prepared by C.O.H.Q., October 1942), para 344. Original in italics. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 193.
- (223) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 84; Maund, op. cit., p. 298; Grindle, "Development of Combined . . . Technique", p. 545. However, it has also been stated that "probably the most important [lesson] was that a frontal assault on a heavily defended port was not a practical proposition". (The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 82.)
- (224) Maund, op. cit., pp 87-90.

- (225) "Address to Staff College Candidates, Central Command, 3/5 May, 1948" (copy in files of Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.).
- (226) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, para 362.
- (227) Ibid. In his "Conclusions and Recommendations" the Naval Force Commander (Captain J. Hughes-Hallett) noted the "need for heavy support craft with good armour protection". (Enclosure No. 2 to the Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92 of 30th August, 1942, contained in: Secret 76: C.O.H.Q. Records: JUBILEE: Vol VA: Naval - Air - Military Force Commanders' Reports, Records Office, C.O.H.Q.). For a brief summary of the examination of fire support requirements, immediately following the Dieppe Raid, see: The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, paras 88, 89.
- (228) Maund, op. cit., p. 90.
- (229) Ibid., p. 91.
- (230) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, para 357.
- (231) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 84.
- (232) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 82.
- (233) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 85.
- (234) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, para 358.
- (235) Ibid.
- (236) Paper "Exercise 'BENTLEY' - 15th January 1943" on file 21 A.Gp/7901/1/Air. Reference was also made to the expectation of "major engagements during the assault, in which event, as at Dieppe, we can expect large air battles".
- (237) Letter, Air Marshal J.H. D'Albiac to Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 18 Dec 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7815/14/13/Air, "OVERLORD: Command and Control of Air Forces". For the influence of Dieppe on "the static organization" of the Combined Control Centre, see: Captain Norman Macmillan, The Royal Air Force in the World War (London, 1950), vol IV, p. 164.
- (238) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, para 363. Italics added.
- (239) The Story of 79th Armoured Division: October 1942 - June 1945 (Hamburg, 1945), p. 9.
- (240) Montgomery, "21st (British) Army Group . . . 1944-45", p. 447.

- (241) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, para 365.
See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 82.
- (242) Major-General Charles H. Miller, History of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own) 1922-1947 (London, 1949), p. 72.
- (243) Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", p. 585.
See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 82;
Maund, op. cit., p. 298.
- (244) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, para 345.
- (245) "Extracts from Copy No. 15 of Most Secret C.O.S. (43) 33 (0), 28 Jan 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: 'SYMBOL': Record of a Conference held at Casablanca in January 1943" (Printed for the War Cabinet January 1943): 67th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (22 Jan 43).
- (246) Ibid. 68th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (23 Jan 43).
- (247) Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", p. 585.
- (248) Ibid., pp 585-6.
- (249) Ibid., p. 586.
- (250) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 171. (See, infra, paras 298 ff.)
- (251) Ibid., p. 86. Cf. "WETBOB" plan (supra, para 101).
On the question of securing a port see, also, Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 488; Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 153, Appx "B", para 6; The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 80)
- (252) See Hist Sec (A.H.Q.) Report No. 36, para 65.
See, also, "Air Historical Branch Translation No. VII/50: Extracts from Reports of Fuehrer Conferences . . .": Conference held on 20 Dec 43. Hitler's interest in the Dieppe Raid was shown by the fact that he sent his own interpreter to interrogate Canadian prisoners: Dr. Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter (London, 1951), pp 250-3.
- (253) Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid 1942, paras 346, 349 and 370.
- (254) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 84.
- (255) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 511.
- (256) Ibid., pp 478-9. The Churchill-Stalin discussions are also reported in some detail by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp 616-21.

- (257) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 497.
- (258) Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids", p. 586.
- (259) "Operation 'CLAWHAMMER': Combined Plan", 12 Oct 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51".
- (260) Letter, C.C.O. to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 11 Oct 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51."
- (261) "Minutes of Meeting of the Executive and Chief Planners, held in Room 412 on 29th September, 1942 at 1730" contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51."
- (262) Extract from letter, Naval Force Commander to C.C.O., 11 Oct 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51."
- (263) "Operation 'CLAWHAMMER': Combined Plan", 12 Oct 42, contained in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51."
- (264) Letter, Naval Force Commander to C.C.O., 11 Oct 42.
- (265) Ibid.
- (266) Ibid.
- (267) Ibid.
- (268) Letter, C.C.O. to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 11 Oct 42, quoted in full in "Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51."
- (269) Ibid.
- (270) Ibid.
- (271) The decision was taken at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held on or before 14 Oct 42. ("Notes . . . provided by Records Office, C.O.H.Q., 29 Jan 51.")
- (272) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 72.
- (273) Quoted, ibid.
- (274) Quoted, ibid., para 73.
- (275) Ibid., para 74.
- (276) Ibid., para 77.
- (277) Harrison, op. cit., p. 35.
- (278) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 82.

- (279) PA 5-3-1, H.Q. First Canadian Army, "Memorandum: Minutes of a meeting held in General McNaughton's office at 1720 hrs, 3 Oct, 42", 4 Oct 42. (Copy in possession of Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.)
- (280) Ibid.
- (281) Ibid.
- (282) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 80.
- (283) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 92.
- (284) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 92.
- (285) Quoted, ibid., para 93.
- (286) Ibid., para 94.
- (287) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 460. See, also, Maund, op. cit., p. 108. The "striking force" for the Canary Islands included (March 1941) "two Royal Marine Brigades, the Special Service Brigade and supporting tanks, artillery, Engineers and Services." (The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 44).
- (288) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 98.
- (289) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 167, para 33.
- (290) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 99.
- (291) Quoted, ibid., para 100.
- (292) Quoted, ibid., para 104.
- (293) Ibid.
- (294) Quoted, ibid.
- (295) Quoted, ibid., para 106.
- (296) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, pp 91-2.
- (297) Quoted, Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 104.
- (298) See Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 167, paras 49, 50; Report No. 182, para 107.
- (299) Maund, op. cit., p. 116. "Unloading troubles" in an American sector of the assault are described by Morison, op. cit., pp 159-61.
- (300) Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 489. It should be noted that this, and other "lessons" of TORCH, owed something to the earlier experience obtained (May 1942) during the landing in Madagascar (Maund, op. cit., pp 113-4, 116). For a graphic description of the confusion on certain beaches in an American sector of the "TORCH" landings, during the night 8-9 Nov, see Morison, op. cit., vol II, pp 126-7.

- (301) "Only after the landing in Sicily . . . did the idea of mounting a major assault operation on a beach maintenance basis really catch hold". (Opinion of Brigadier A.H. Head: Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 153: Appx "B".)
- (302) Maund, op. cit., p. 216.
- (303) Harrison, op. cit., p. 165.
- (304) Head, "Amphibious Operations", pp 488-9; The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 92.
- (305) Quoted by Morison, op. cit., vol II, pp 41-2.
- (306) Ibid., pp 83-4.
- (307) Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 489.
- (308) Foreword by Maj-Gen R.E. Laycock to Survey by Starlight: A True Story of Reconnaissance Work in the Mediterranean, by Ralph Neville (London, 1949). See, also, Maund, op. cit., pp 103, 116; Grindle, "Development of Combined . . . Technique", p. 545; Stanbury, "Some Naval Aspects . . .", p. 118.
- (309) Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 489. See, also, The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 92.
- (310) Morison, op. cit., vol II, p. 83. See, also: Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 489.
- (311) Maund, op. cit., p. 111. See, also, Morison, op. cit., vol II, pp 26, 81. "TORCH" was "much more expensive in shipping than had been expected." (Hancock and Gowing, op. cit., p. 429.)
- (312) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 653.
- (313) Quoted, ibid., pp 653-4.
- (314) Quoted, ibid., p. 654.
- (315) Quoted, ibid., p. 661 (General Eisenhower's report to General Marshall of 29 Dec 42).
- (316) Quoted, ibid., p. 668. On the lack of an agreed decision with respect to "ROUNDUP" see, also, Harrison, op. cit., pp 36 ff.
- (317) ". . . It was agreed that . . . there should be an intense effort made to try and achieve the favourable June moon as the date of the operation." ("Extracts from . . . Conference held at Casablanca in January 1943: Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp, on Saturday, January 23, 1943, at 1700").

- (318) Ibid. The freedom from "political considerations" did not, of course, extend to the contemporary De Gaulle - Giraud controversy. (Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp 672 ff.)
- (319) Ibid.: "Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of [55th] Meeting held at Anfa Camp, on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 1030."
- (320) Ibid.
- (321) Ibid.
- (322) Ibid.: "Extract from Minutes of 57th Meeting of Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Anfa Camp on Friday, January 15, 1943, at 1430."
- (323) Ibid.
- (324) Ibid.: "Extract from Minutes of 58th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Anfa Camp on Saturday, January 16, 1943, at 1030." There is, however, evidence that the American representatives were not completely united. "The U.S. Chiefs of Staff appear to have been by no means unanimous at this Conference: King as a sea-power man saw the enormous advantage of increased security in the Mediterranean, and Arnold as an air-power man could not fail to be tempted by the prospect of obtaining such advanced bases as Foggia in Italy." (Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 671). General Marshall's views were fully shared by Mr. Harry Hopkins. (Ibid., p. 672.)
- (325) "Extracts from . . . Conference held at Casablanca in January 1943: Extract from Minutes of 58th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff . . ."
- (326) Ibid.
- (327) Ibid.
- (328) Ibid.
- (329) Ibid.
- (330) Ibid.
- (331) Ibid.: "Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of [60th] Meeting held at Anfa Camp, on Monday, January 18, 1943, at 1030."
- (332) Ibid.
- (333) Ibid.
- (334) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp on Monday, January 18, 1943, at 1700."

- (335) Ibid.
- (336) Ibid.
- (337) Ibid.
- (338) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp, on Saturday, January 23, 1943, at 1700."
- (339) Ibid. At an earlier meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Prime Minister had described "SLEDGEHAMMER" as the "residuary legatee"; but he had emphasized that some operation of this kind would be necessary in order to broaden the area of the fighting and to make use of the powerful Anglo-American [- Canadian] forces remaining in United Kingdom which could not be used elsewhere." ("Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes of Meeting held on Friday, January 15, 1943, at 10.30 A.M.") This statement undoubtedly reflected American pressure for the utilization of the Allied Forces in the United Kingdom.
- (340) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp on Monday, January 18, 1943, at 1700."
- (341) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp, on Saturday, January 23, 1943, at 1700."
- (342) Statement by General Brooke ("Minutes of Meeting . . . January 18, 1943, at 1700").
- (343) Maj-Gen Sir Ian Jacob, "Stout-hearted Hopkins", The Observer (London), 24 Apr 49.
- (344) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 672.
- (345) "Extracts from . . . Conference held at Casablanca in January 1943: Extract from Minutes of 58th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff . . ."
- (346) Ibid.: "Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp on Thursday, January 21, 1943, at 1000."
- (347) See, ibid., remarks of Lord Louis Mountbatten in "Extracts from 67th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Anfa Camp, on Friday, January 22, 1943, at 1430." (An annex to the minutes of this meeting gives figures for British types of landing ships and craft available on 1 Dec 42 and estimates for 1 Apr and 1 Aug 43.)
- (348) Ibid.: "Combined Chiefs of Staff: Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp on Thursday, January 21, 1943, at 1000."
- (349) Ibid. (Remarks of Lt-Gen B.B. Somervell, Chief of United States Army Services of Supply.)

- (350) Ibid.
- (351) Ibid.
- (352) Ibid.: "Extracts from 67th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff . . ."
- (353) Ibid.
- (354) Ibid.
- (355) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting . . . January 21, 1943, at 1000."
- (356) Ibid.: "C.C.S. 169. January 22, 1943: Combined Chiefs of Staff: Proposed Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Operations for a Re-entry to the Continent across the Channel, beginning in 1943: Note by the Combined Staffs."
- (357) Ibid.
- (358) Ibid.
- (359) Ibid.
- (360) Ibid.
- (361) Ibid.
- (362) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting . . . January 18, 1943, at 1700."
- (363) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting . . . January 23, 1943, at 1700."
- (364) "C.C.(42) 108 (P.S.O's Draft) of 5 Feb 43: Combined Commanders: The Selection of Assault Areas in a Major Operation in North-West Europe." (A copy, without maps, is in the possession of Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.)
- (365) Ibid., para 2.
- (366) Ibid., para 4.
- (367) Ibid., para 4(d).
- (368) Ibid., para 5.
- (369) Ibid., para 9(d).
- (370) Ibid., para 12, and Map III.
- (371) Ibid., para 11.
- (372) Ibid., paras 13-15.
- (373) Ibid., para 16(c).