

- (374) Ibid., para 19.
- (375) Ibid., para 26.
- (376) Ibid., para 43.
- (377) Ibid., paras 44-46.
- (378) Ibid., para 47.
- (379) Ibid., para 48.
- (380) Ibid., para 51.
- (381) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 24.
- (382) Harrison, op. cit., p. 57.
- (383) Ibid., pp 55-6.
- (384) "Operation 'SKYSCRAPER': Appreciation" of 13 Mar 43.
The Combined Commanders also prepared a paper,
"Review of Certain Factors affecting Preparations
for a Return to the Continent", dated 18 Mar 43. The
outline of "SKYSCRAPER" which follows is based
mainly on: circular letter HF/20307/1/G(Plans)
from B.G.S. (Plans), G.H.Q. Home Forces, 24 Mar 43
on file 21 A.Gp/7826/-/Air, "Operations and Plans
1944". (A copy of this letter, together with traces
of three supporting maps, is in the possession of
Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.) Details of "SKYSCRAPER"
are also given in Invasion of North-West Europe,
1944, paras 39-47 and Harrison, op. cit., pp 57-8.
- (385) Letter from B.G.S. (Plans), G.H.Q. Home Forces,
24 Mar 43.
- (386) Ibid.
- (387) Ibid.
- (388) Harrison, op. cit., p. 58.
- (389) Quoted, ibid.
- (390) Ibid., note 40, from Gen Paget's notes. This evidence
suggests that Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944
is misleading in stating (para 34) that "SKYSCRAPER"
was "not approved by the Commanders nor, in consequence,
was it submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for consider-
ation."
- (391) The difficulty of establishing this relationship was
emphasized by Lt-Col H.A. Pollock (who drafted
Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944) in many
discussions with the present writer.
- (392) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 94, para 10.

- (393) Ibid., para 5.
- (394) Ibid., quoting The Times (London) of 23 Mar 43. The present writer served throughout "SPARTAN" with the 6th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (2nd Canadian Division).
- (395) Extract from telegram G.S. 560, Canmilitary to Defensor, 13 Mar 43, quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 94, para 63.
- (396) Ibid.
- (397) See: "G.H.Q. Exercise 'SPARTAN': March, 1943: Comments by Commander-in-Chief Home Forces", and "Extracts from Copy No. 20 of 'Exercise SPARTAN: Report by Chief Umpire'" (22 Mar 43), both in the possession of Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.
- (398) Extract from telegram G.S. 560, Canmilitary to Defensor, 13 Mar 43, quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 94, para 63.
- (399) Extract from Copy No. 20 of "Exercise 'SPARTAN': Report by Chief Umpire" (22 Mar 43), chap II, sec 1, para 1.
- (400) Ibid., para 3.
- (401) File 21 A.Gp/7901/-/Air, "Army Air Support: T.A.F. . . Policy": Letter, Headquarters Fighter Command to G.H.Q. Home Forces, 22 Mar 43.
- (402) Ibid.: "Minutes of Meeting held by Commander-in-Chief Home Forces at G.H.Q. on Tues, 11 May 43 to discuss Army Air Support problems in the light of recent Reports from the North African Theatre of Operations."
- (403) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 157.
- (404) Message No. 73527, War Office to A.F.H.Q. (Personal from C.I.G.S. for General Eisenhower, repeated for General Alexander), 24 Apr 43. (Copy in possession of Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.)
- (405) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 162.
- (406) The following information is based mainly on:
"Joint Report by Brigadier M.B. Dowse, G.H.Q., Home Forces, and Cmdr R.F.C. Struben, R.N. (ret'd), C.O.H.Q. on the Assault on Beaches with C.D.L. over Water", with covering letter to G.H.Q. Home Forces and C.C.O. of 23 Apr 43.
- (407) Ibid., "XII. Conclusions", para 15.
- (408) Ibid., Appx "B": "Supporting Fire: by Gunnery Officer for C.O.H.Q. attacked for Trials", para 1.

- (409) Ibid., Appx "C": "The Royal Artillery Picture", para 3.
- (410) Ibid., Appx "B", para 10. (Cf. Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, para 147.)
- (411) "Joint Report . . .", Appx "C", para 17.
- (412) Ibid., Appx "D": "The Infantry Picture - Exercise 10: The Assault on Kilbride Beach", para 2 of "Conclusions".
- (413) Ibid., para 5.
- (414) Ibid., para 9.
- (415) Ibid., Appx "G", para 20. "The task of the engineers -- to cut and mark gaps through the belts of shore obstacles before these were covered by the rising tide -- was one of the most critical in the operation, and its successful accomplishment demanded meticulous adherence to the time schedule." (Harrison, op. cit., p. 192)
- (416) "Training Directive to Maj-Gen P.C.S. Hobart, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.", By C.G.S., G.H.Q. Home Forces, 18 May 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7831/G(Air), "Directives to Formations of 21 Army Group". See, also: "Summary of 21 Army Group Training since March 1943" on docket "Encl BML to 21 A.Gp/7815/Air.
- (417) HF.00/41/2/1/G(Trg), "Tactical Problems of an Invasion of North-West Europe", - May 43, with covering note by B.G.S., First Canadian Army, of 19 May 43. This paper also contained two interesting observations on the enemy: "The German policy is to defeat invasion on the coast" (para 5); and "the Germans realize that tanks can be landed on open beaches, but are convinced we must still capture a port early in order to maintain ourselves" (para 22).
- (418) Ibid., paras 25-28.
- (419) "Training Directive to Maj-Gen P.C.S. Hobart . . ."
- (420) Ibid.
- (421) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 92. At this time General Morgan's (tentative) appointment was referred to as that of "Chief Staff Officer to the three Commanders-in-Chief" (Ibid.)
- (422) Morgan, op. cit., p. 41.
- (423) Quoted in Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 103. See, also, Morgan, p. 67. In paraphrasing sub-para (b), Gen Morgan adds the qualification of "in Britain" to "whatever forces of any and every kind happened to be available". This interpretation would have ruled out the possibility of sending troops from U.S.A. direct to invasion area.

- (424) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 725.
- (425) Leahy, op. cit., p. 189.
- (426) Churchill, op. cit., vol IV (American edition), p. 785.
- (427) C.O.S. (43) 281 (O), 3 Jun 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: "TRIDENT" (Part II): Record of Plenary Meetings held at the White House, Washington, between 12th and 25th May, 1943, p. 3.
- (428) Ibid., p. 4.
- (429) Ibid., pp 4-5.
- (430) Ibid., p.6.
- (431) Ibid., pp 6-7.
- (432) C.O.S. (43) 286 (O), 7 Jun 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: "TRIDENT" (Part III): Record of Combined Chiefs of Staff Proceedings at the Washington Conference between 12th May and 25th May, 1943, pp 2, 7.
- (433) Ibid., p. 7.
- (434) Ibid., p. 27.
- (435) Harrison, op. cit., p. 64.
- (436) Ibid., p. 65. The words "assuming two operations in the Mediterranean after the conquest of Sicily", deleted from this quotation, represent an inaccurate deduction from the official record. The actual figures of "Amphibious Assault Craft that can be in the United Kingdom, April 1, 1944" were given as:
- | | |
|---|--------|
| No operation subsequent to "HUSKY". . . | 4,657 |
| One " " " " . . . | 3,540 |
| Two operations " " " " . . . | 2,461. |
- (O.O.S. (43) 286 (O), 3 Jun 43: C.C.S. 235, 18 May 43, Appx "B".)
- (437) C.O.S. (43) 281 (O), 3 Jun 43, p. 17.
- (438) Ibid. See, also, C.O.S. (43) 286 (O), 3 Jun 43: C.C.S. 242/6, 25 May 43: Combined Chiefs of Staff: (Final Revision) Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, IV, 2 (b).
- (439) C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, p. 71.
(Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the "EUREKA" Conference, 30 Nov 43 at 0930 hrs.)
At the plenary meeting held on 24 May 43 there was some confusion over the meaning of "mounting" an operation:

Sir Alan Brooke said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. 'HUSKY', for example, had been mounted during 'VULCAN' [the final Allied drive against Tunis and Bizerte, April - May 1943]. It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the 'HUSKY' plan.

The Prime Minister thought that the word 'mount' meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

(C.O.S. (43) 281 (O), 3 Jun 43, p. 29)

- (440) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp 727-8.
- (441) Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, IV, 1 (a). The operation against the Azores ("LIFE-BELT") was never required because Anglo-Portuguese diplomatic negotiations resulted (October 1943) in suitable arrangements for Allied use of the required bases (Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 727).
- (442) C.O.S. (43) 286 (O), 7 Jun 43: C.C.S. 250/1, Combined Chiefs of Staff: Implementation of Decisions reached at the "TRIDENT" Conference: Enclosure "B", "Draft Supplementary Directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate)". A slightly different version of the supplementary directive is quoted in Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 107. See, also, Morgan, op. cit., p. 75.
- (443) Morgan, op. cit., p. 75.
- (444) C.O.S. (43) 286 (O), 7 Jun 43: C.C.S. 235, 18 May 43, Combined Chiefs of Staff: Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe: Appx "B" ("Defeat of Germany from the United Kingdom: Amphibious Assault Craft that can be in the United Kingdom, April 1, 1944").
- (445) Harrison, op. cit., pp 66-7.
- (446) Ibid.
- (447) Ibid., p. 67.
- (448) C.O.S. (43) 290 (O), 5 Jun 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Record of Meetings held in North Africa between 29th May and 3rd June, 1943, p. 3. (Meeting held at 1700 hr 29 May 43)
- (449) Ibid.
- (450) Ibid., p. 8. (Meeting held at 1700 hr 31 May 43).
- (451) Ibid., p. 10.

- (452) Quoted in Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 103.
- (453) Morgan, op. cit., p. 46. An "Organizational Diagram I" for COSSAC will be found, ibid., p. 44. See, also, Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 112.
- (454) Morgan, op. cit., p. 49.
- (455) Harrison, op. cit., p. 52.
- (456) Morgan, op. cit., p. 60. It may be noted that the Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston) afterwards commented on General Turner's position as follows: ". . . I question whether his position there [at COSSAC] was regarded as one of right. It would rather seem to me he was simply being granted the courtesy of liaison." (Extract from letter, Col Ralston to Gen Stuart, 13 Feb 44, quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 248.)
- (457) Morgan, op. cit., pp 92-3.
- (458) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 116.
- (459) Harrison, op. cit., p. 70.
- (460) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 119. (See: "Operation 'TINDALL': Appreciation", COSSAC(43) 16 (Final) of 30 Jun 43 on file 21 A.Gp/7815/13/G(Air), "TINDALL".)
- (461) Ibid., para 121.
- (462) Morgan, op. cit., p. 97.
- (463) The Canadians in Britain 1939-1944, p. 68.
- (464) On the date when Gen Paget assumed command of 21 A.Gp. see: Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 125. He was succeeded, as C.-in-C. Home Forces, by Gen H.E. Franklyn.
- (465) "Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation 'STARKEY': 16th August - 9th September 1943" on file 21 A.Gp/7815/15/1/Air, "STARKEY Reports".
- (466) The Canadians in Britain 1939-1944, p. 68.
- (467) Morgan, op. cit., p. 106. The present writer served, throughout "HARLEQUIN", with 2 Cdn Inf Div. His personal diary for 7-10 Sep 43 contains the following notes:
 "7 Sep: . . . Drew 48 hr rations: tins of tea, emergency ration, cheese (2), bully beef, canned heat, matches, dripping & large tin containing chocolate bars, etc.

9 Sep: Prepn for move to barges. 2350 hrs left Cowplain Camp [5-6 miles north of Portsmouth] on rd S. to transit area in Gosport.

10 Sep: Night move. We arrive at coast: is this it? Some load barges. We merely sit and wait . . ."

- (468) "Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation 'STARKEY' . . .", para 120. It should be noted that later investigations showed that the Dieppe Raid had cost the R.A.F. a total of 106 aircraft destroyed, while the Luftwaffe had lost only 48 destroyed and 24 damaged. (Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 81.)
- (469) Morgan, op. cit., p. 111. Cf. Harrison, op. cit., p. 71.
- (470) "Report by the Air Force Commander on Operation 'STARKEY' . . .", paras 122-130.
- (471) Letter, C.-in-C., 21 A.Gp, to A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command, 15 Sep 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7815/15/1/Air, "STARKEY Reports".
- (472) Morgan, op. cit., p. 130.
- (473) "Appreciation of the Assault and Occupation of a Bridgehead in the Cotentin Peninsula", Appx "D" to COSSAC (43) 28.
- (474) Morgan, op. cit., pp 138-9.
- (475) "Operation 'OVERLORD': Appreciation of the Assault and Occupation of a Bridgehead in the Pas de Calais Area", Appx "C" to COSSAC (43) 28. The Pas de Calais was defined, somewhat loosely, as "the area between GRAVELINES and the River SOMME". ("Digest of Operation OVERLORD" quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, footnote to para 162.)
- (476) Ibid., para 1.
- (477) Ibid., para 3.
- (478) Ibid., para 11.
- (479) Ibid., para 13.
- (480) Ibid., para 32. They also considered that the Pas de Calais might be suitable for "a large scale landing should any major changes take place in the German capacity to defend it". (Ibid., para 33.)
- (481) Ibid., para 33.
- (482) Morgan, op. cit., p. 148. He adds, however, that "we did not at this time appreciate what precisely was at stake regarding secret weapons" -- that is, the launching sites for flying bombs (V-1s) in the Pas de Calais.

- (483) Ibid., pp 145-6.
- (484) "Digest of Operation OVERLORD" quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 162.
- (485) "Appreciation of the Assault and Occupation of a Bridgehead in the Cotentin Peninsula", Appx "D" to COSSAC (43) 28. The Appreciation gave the inaccurate figure of 25 miles for the width of the "LESSAY-CARENTAN area".
- (486) Morgan, op. cit., p. 146. This opinion was shared by Field-Marshal Rommel, who took over command of Army Group "B", in the "OVERLORD" area, during February 1944. "We must stop the enemy in the water", he said, 'and destroy his equipment while it is still afloat'. The first twenty-four hours, in his view, would be decisive. Once the Allies secured a bridgehead it would be impossible to drive them back into the sea or to prevent them breaking out." (Desmond Young, Rommel (London, 1950), p. 200.) On this vital matter Rommel's opinion did not, of course, coincide with the more orthodox views (the "crust-cushion-hammer" plan) of Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West. (Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 181.) See, also, Hans Spöidel, Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign (Chicago, 1950), pp 52-55. (Lt-Gen Spöidel was Chief of Staff to Rommel before, and during, the Battle of Normandy).
- (487) "Appreciation of the Assault and Occupation of a Bridgehead in the Cotentin Peninsula".
- (488) "Digest of Operation OVERLORD" quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 162.
- (489) Morgan, op. cit., p. 149. On the inclusion of a Canadian division in the seaborne assault see: "'OVERLORD ONE': Notes for Meeting of Heads of Branches", prepared by G(ops), H.Q. 21 A.Gp, 5 Aug 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7815/14/1/Air.
- (490) Morgan, op. cit., p. 159.
- (491) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 176. See, supra, reference (486).
- (492) Morgan, op. cit., p. 149.
- (493) Ibid
- (494) J.P.S. record of 3 Aug 43 quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 127.
- (495) General Eisenhower's foreword to Morgan, op. cit., p. 10.
- (496) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 290.

- (497) "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to secure a Lodgement Area", 7 May 44, para 33.
Copy on file 21 A.Gp/00/209/64/Ops.
- (498) Ibid., paras 51, 53.
- (499) Harrison, op. cit., p. 73.
- (500) Ibid., p. 76.
- (501) "'OVERLORD ONE': Notes for Meeting of Heads of Branches", prepared by G(Ops), H.Q. 21 A.Gp, 5 Aug 43.
- (502) Harrison, op. cit., p. 76.
- (503) Ibid., p. 71.
- (504) Ibid., pp 79-82.
- (505) Morgan, op. cit., p. 113.
- (506) Ibid., p. 112.
- (507) See Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp 692-4. A "Post Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee" was not set up (under joint authority of the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff) until the summer of 1943. (Morgan, op. cit., p. 120). General Morgan afterwards recalled that "when the invasion of Europe was planned by the Allies there was never a co-ordinated, coherent, political plan of any kind . . . although General Eisenhower and he asked at the time what the political plan was they never had an answer . . ." (Address given before the Constitutional Research Association on 19 Oct 50 and reported in The Times (London), 20 Oct 50).
- (508) Morgan, op. cit., pp 115-6. See C.C.S. 320, 20 Aug 43: "Digest of Operation 'RANKIN'", contained in C.O.S.(43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43.
- (509) Morgan, op. cit., p. 116.
- (510) Harrison, op. cit., p. 81.
- (511) Morgan, op. cit., p. 118.
- (512) Ibid., p. 119.
- (513) Ibid., p. 125.
- (514) Ibid., p. 122.
- (515) Ibid., p. 125.
- (516) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 234. See, also, Morgan, op. cit., p. 123.
- (517) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 182, para 235.

- (518) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43:
War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: "QUADRANT":
Record of Plenary Meetings and of the Proceedings
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Quebec, August 1943:
 C.O.S. 320, 20 Aug 43, "Digest of Operation 'RANKIN'",
 para 12. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 82, note 113.
- (519) Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive
 (London, 1947), pp 263, 265.
- (520) Harrison, op. cit., p. 82. Cf Mr. Churchill's
 statement (infra, para 380) at the Cairo Conference:
 "It seemed to him that the timing of the operation
 depended more on the state of the enemy than on the
 set perfection of our preparations".
- (521) Leahy, op. cit., p. 208. See, supra, reference (45).
 Cf Churchill's recent revelation:

The President . . . did not feel it possible
 that Canada should be formally a member of the
 Conference, as he apprehended similar demands
 by Brazil and other American partners in the
 United Nations. We also had to think of the
 claims of Australia and the other Dominions....
 I for my part was determined that we and the
 United States should have the Conference to
 ourselves, in view of all the vital business
 we had in common. (Op. cit., vol V (American
 edition), pp 66-67.)

- (522) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 743. The contribution
 of the Canadian Naval Staff to the reorganization of
 the Atlantic convoy system is suggested by Harrison,
op. cit., p. 84. See, also: Joseph Schull, The Far
Distant Ships (Ottawa, 1950), pp 166 ff.
- (523) Leahy, op. cit., p. 197. Italian peace overtures were
 received from the Badoglio Government during the
 conference. (Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 741.)
- (524) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the
Secretary of War, p. 57.
- (525) Quoted by Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., pp 228-9.
 The letter was dated 10 Aug 43.
- (526) Quoted, ibid., p. 230. However, Harrison describes the
 President as being "still in the position of a man
 who having accepted persuasion from one quarter
 was psychologically prepared to listen to advice
 from another" (op. cit., p. 92.)
- (527) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 743. General Marshall
 wrote that, after the "TRIDENT" Conference, "it was
 our purpose to avoid the creation in Italy of a
 vacuum into which the resources of the cross-Channel
 operation would be dissipated as the Germans had bled
 themselves in the North African campaign". (Biennial
Report . . . to the Secretary of War, page 11.) See,
 also, Harrison, op. cit., pp 90 ff.

- (528) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee, "QUADRANT": Record of Plenary Meetings and of the Proceedings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Quebec, August 1943, p. 23.
- (529) Ibid.
- (530) Ibid., p. 24.
- (531) Ibid.
- (532) Ibid., p. 1.
- (533) Ibid., pp 7-8. (Plenary meeting of 23 Aug 43).
- (534) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 743. COSSAC has observed that "POINTBLANK" "enjoyed even higher priority at this time than did we". (Morgan, op. cit., p. 179). On "POINTBLANK" see: The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1949), vol II, chap 20. "STRANGLE" was really the air offensive against strategic targets in Italy which preceded Allied ground operations for the capture of Rome: "Air Interdiction", R.A.F. Mediterranean Review, No. 7 (Apr-Jun 44), pp 124-30.
- (535) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 28. "It was not until 1943 that we possessed sufficient and suitable aircraft for striking heavy and continuous blows, and in the same year the bombers of the American Eighth Air Force joined in our strategic air offensive." (Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 517).
- (536) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43: C.C.S. 319/5, 24 Aug 43: Combined Chiefs of Staff: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, paras 11, 12. Reprinted, with minor variations, by Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 84.
- (537) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 8.
- (538) Ibid.
- (539) Additional material on the Canadian policy will be found in the report, "Canada and the Higher Direction of the War", being prepared by Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.
- (540) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 8. (Plenary meeting of 23 Aug 43). At the first plenary meeting (19 Aug) Mr. Churchill had also advocated an enlargement of the scale of the assault:
- "He said that every effort should be made to add at least 25 per cent. strength to the initial assault. This would mean an increase in the landing craft necessary, but there are nine months available before the target date and much can be done in that time." (Ibid., p. 2).

Harrison observes that "for the fate of OVERLORD, the casual suggestion to increase its size was probably the most significant product of the Quebec Conference. It set in motion plans and preparations that acquired their own momentum, which with the mere passage of time became increasingly difficult to reverse". (Op. cit., p. 100)

- (541) Morgan, op. cit., pp 176-7.
- (542) Ibid., p. 177.
- (543) Quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 141. The amendment was not approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee until 3 Sep 43.
- (544) Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 85. He states that he informed Brooke "early in 1943".
- (545) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 755.
- (546) Stimson and Bundy, p. 230. Admiral Leahy (then Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt) has written:
"I would have had no personal objection to Brooke, but if he or any other Englishman had been named to the post, there would have been a storm of criticism in our country, because once 'Overlord' was under way and beach-heads were secured, the superiority in numbers of American to British in action would be built up rapidly." (Op. cit., p. 212.)
- (547) The circumstances attending the selection of General Eisenhower are discussed in some detail by:
Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, pp 755 ff; Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., pp 231-3.
- (548) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 41. It was not until 1 Apr 44 that Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (A.N.C.X.F.) "assumed operational control of U.S. naval forces and even then his command remained formal until the eve of the invasion. The principal duty of ANCXF in January was still the preparation of an Allied naval plan." (Harrison, op. cit., p. 162).
- (549) COSSAC (43) 81, "Directive to Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force", 16 Nov 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7831/1/Air. In his despatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Leigh-Mallory pointed out that "a definition of the role of the strategic air forces was not covered in the original Directive to me, but was deferred to a later date. However, my plans were made on the assumption that I should be able to count on the full support of the strategic air forces when it was required" (Air Operations ... November 15th, 1943 to September 30th, 1944, para 3).
- (550) Harrison, op. cit., p. 115. As the situation afterwards developed in the Battle of Normandy, it was the 12th United States Army Group (later designated the Central Group of Armies) which became operational, under General Bradley, on 1 Aug 44. This formation was composed of the First and Third United States Armies.

- (551) Quoted, ibid., p. 116.
- (552) Ibid., p. 115.
- (553) Ibid., p. 118. It may be noted that, in Normandy, General Montgomery actually directed the operations of the 12th United States Army Group (supra, reference (550)) until 1 Sep 44, when the Supreme Commander assumed personal control of all ground forces.
- (554) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 8. See, also, Morgan, op. cit., p. 173; Harrison, op. cit., p. 98.
- (555) Morgan, op. cit., pp 242-3.
- (556) Ibid., p. 172.
- (557) Biennial Report . . . to the Secretary of War, p. 18. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., chap III, 21-2.
- (558) Harrison, op. cit., p. 99.
- (559) Ibid., pp 99-100.
- (560) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 70.
- (561) Morgan, op. cit., p. 172. See, also, Leahy, op. cit., pp 212-3.
- (562) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part A), 11 Sep 43, p. 38. "HABBAKUK" resulted from the fertile imagination of Mr. Geoffrey Pyke, the British inventor who had also played an important part in the planning of "PLOUGH" (the scheme for operations in snow-covered Europe during the winter of 1942-3). For a colourful description of the consideration given to "HABBAKUK" at the "QUADRANT" Conference, see the report of Lord Mountbatten's address before the Institution of Structural Engineers (28 Mar 51) contained in: "'Ice Island' for Invasion: Staff Chiefs' Test in 1943", The Daily Telegraph (London) 29 Mar 51. See, also, Sir Charles Goodeve, "The Ice Island Fiasco", Evening Standard (London), 19 Apr 51; Leahy, op. cit., pp 212-3; Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 686; Churchill, vol V (American edition), pp 75-76, 90-91. (The latter prefers the spelling of "HABAKKUK".)
- (563) C.O.S. (43) 513 (O) (Part C), 30 Sep 43: War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: "QUADRANT": Record of the Proceedings at Washington between the 3rd and 11th September, 1943, p.9.
- (564) Goodeve, "The Ice Island Fiasco".
- (565) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 107. See, also, Maund, op. cit., p. 117. "CORKSCREW" was aided by naval bombardment. L.C.F. provided "good close supporting fire" (C.O.H.Q. Bulletin No. Y/20, Summary of Naval Bombardment in the Mediterranean, 1943 (issued

December 1943). At his North African meeting with General Marshall and General Eisenhower (29 May 43), the British Prime Minister had stated that "the operation would provide a very useful experiment as to the extent to which coast defences could be neutralized by aerial bombardment". (C.O.S. (43) 290 (O), 5 Jun 43, p. 2).

- (566) R.S./T.A.F. Memorandum, "The Air Bombardment of the Coast Defences of Pantelleria (Operation 'CORKSCREW')", 15 Oct 43 (circularized at H.Q. 21 A.Gp on 21 Oct 43), on file 21. A.Gp/7829/G(Air). This memorandum gave a resumé of the results of investigations carried out by Professor S. Zuckerman, F.R.S. (Scientific Adviser to Lt-Gen C.A. Spaatz, Commanding General N.A.A.F.) and his staff. See, infra, para 338.
- (567) Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 489.
- (568) Quoted by Morgan, op.cit., p. 157, from covering memorandum forwarded (15 Jul 43) to Chiefs of Staff with COSSAC plan for "OVERLORD".
- (569) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 95. See, also: Head, "Amphibious Operations", pp 489-90; Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 153, Appx "B", para 7.
- (570) "Notes on the Planning, Training, and Execution of Operation 'HUSKY'", para 33 (prepared by Colonel (later Brigadier) A.H. Head, C.O.H.Q.) 25 Jul 43. This is a detailed and valuable study of the operation, based on personal experience, with the requirements of "OVERLORD" in view.
- (571) Biennial Report . . . to the Secretary of War, p. 16.
- (572) "Notes on . . . Operation 'HUSKY'", para 34.
- (573) Ibid., para 44.
- (574) Ibid., paras 45, 46.
- (575) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 111.
- (576) Summary of Naval Bombardment in the Mediterranean, 1943. 6 L.C.T.(R.) were employed on "HUSKY". (Maund, op.cit., p. 90.)
- (577) Maund, op.cit., p. 117.
- (578) Quoted in Biennial Report . . . to the Secretary of War, p. 14.
- (579) Ibid., p. 16. "The importance of thorough training in night flying was the major lesson to be drawn from Operation 'HUSKY'". ("Minutes of Meeting held at Norfolk House on August 10th [1943] to discuss Future Policy relating to the Employment of Airborne Forces", n.d., on file 21 A.Gp/7930/4/G(Air).)

- (580) "Some Air Aspects of Operation 'HUSKY': Report on a Visit to North Africa and the Early Stages of the Invasion of Sicily - July 1943", by Lt-Col L.J. Milne, Air Branch, 21 A.Gp, Home Forces, n.d., on file 21 A.Gp/7834/-/Air.
- (581) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 113.
- (582) "Extract from an Unofficial Report on the Landings at Salerno and Nettuno/Anzio", circulated at H.Q. 21 A.Gp by B.G.S. (Plans), 25 Feb 44, on file 21 A.Gp/7823/Air.
- (583) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 171. See, also, "Summary of 21 Army Group Training since March 1943", n.d., circulated with memo of B.G.S. (Trg), H.Q. 21 A.Gp, 4 Jan 44, on docket "Encl BM 1 to 21 A.Gp/7815/Air".
- (584) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, paras 54-70.
- (585) "Exercise 'PIRATE': Combined Plan", 30 Sep 43, issued under signatures of Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, Commanding Force "J", Lt-Gen H.D.G. Crerar, G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps, and Air Marshal J.H. D'Albiac, A.O.C. Tactical Air Force. (This Plan is on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 908/F/43.) The original instructions issued by H.Q. 21 A.Gp are contained in the paper 21 A.Gp/00/53/4/G(Trg), "Exercise 'PIRATE' October 43: Exercise Instructions", 8 Sep 43, a copy of which is on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 908/B/43.
- (586) "Exercise 'PIRATE': Combined Plan", para 3.
- (587) Ibid., para 6(a).
- (588) "Commodore Commanding Force J's Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'", 28 Oct 43, para 2. A copy of this detailed report is on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 1144/43. (A condensed version of the report is contained in C.O.H.Q. Bulletin No. Y/16, "Naval Experiences gained from Exercise 'PIRATE'", - November 1943.)
- (589) "Report on Exercise PIRATE", C.-in-C., Portsmouth, to Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, 17 Nov 43, on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 1144/43.
- (590) No. X/0840/3/3/7, "Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'" by Admiral B.H. Ramsay, Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, 27 Nov 43. Copy on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 1144/43.
- (591) Letter No. 80/X/0840/3/3/7, Admiral B.H. Ramsay to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 29 Nov 43. Copy on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 1144/43.
- (592) "Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'" by Admiral Ramsay, para 1.
- (593) Ibid., para 4.

- (594) Ibid.
- (595) "Commodore Commanding Force J's Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'", para 3. Commodore Hughes-Hallett added:

It was, therefore, unfortunate that neither my Chief Staff Officer nor myself were able to give our undivided attention during the earlier planning of the exercise, on account of other more urgent commitments. I am of opinion that this was one reason for the exercise not being planned and mounted as well as it might have been.
- (596) Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, para 60.
- (597) "Exercise 'PIRATE': Combined Plan", para 11(b).
- (598) Ibid., para 15(iii). Support was also to be provided by "Close Support Craft carrying Tanks which beach in the first wave and engage the beach defences ..." (Ibid., para 15(iv)). There were no D.D. tanks in this exercise. (See, supra, para 128.)
- (599) "Commodore Commanding Force J's Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'", para 24.
- (600) "Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'", by Admiral Ramsay, para 14. An I.G. (Major C. Terry, R.A.), who was an observer on the beach, described the firing as "a classic example of 'How not to do it'." His opinion was corroborated by C.M.P. and C.M.S.D., C.O.H.Q. (Minutes on C.O.H.Q. docket CT 1144/43.)
- (601) "Notes on Exercise 'PIRATE'", by C.M.S.D., C.O.H.Q., 27 Oct 43, on C.O.H.Q. docket C.R.11,315/43. Later, bad weather necessitated the cancellation of the "Turn Round Control" and build-up phase.
- (602) Ibid., para 4.
- (603) Quoted in Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, para 62. However, this conclusion merely reaffirmed the experience of the "PRIMROSE" exercise. (Supra, para 220) See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 197, note 147.
- (604) See Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, para 69.
- (605) "Exercise 'PIRATE'", letter from A.O.C., T.A.F., to A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command, 29 Oct 43, on docket "Encl BM:- 21 A.Gp/7815/23 Air".
- (606) Ibid.
- (607) Ibid.
- (608) Letter, C.-in-C. 21 A.Gp to A.O.C., T.A.F., 13 Nov 43 on same docket.
- (609) "Exercise 'PIRATE'", 29 Oct 43, para 10.

- (610) Letter, C.-in-C. 21 A.Gp to A.O.C., T.A.F., 13 Nov 43.
- (611) Letter, A.O.C., 2nd T.A.F., R.A.F. to H.Q., A.E.A.F., 18 Dec 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7815/14/13/Air.
- (612) "Notes on Exercise 'PIRATE'", by C.M.S.D., C.O.H.Q., 27 Oct 43.
- (613) "Commodore Commanding Force J's Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'", para 23. The use of smoke in covering a landing was criticized on the grounds that it "could not be sufficiently controlled, that it offered too many opportunities for fatal mistakes, and that by interfering with observed fire it would handicap Allied fire superiority". (Harrison, op. cit., p. 191).
- (614) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, pp 171-2. The assault technique actually employed in Operation "NEPTUNE" is illustrated by Diagram "C" in Field-Marshal Montgomery's Normandy to the Baltic.
- (615) The following account is based mainly on "Report by the Inter Service Committee formed to Consider all Existing Means of Providing Fire Support when Landing Forces on a Heavily Defended Coast" (final draft dated 1 Nov 43) on file 21 A.Gp/7838/Air. See, also: Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, sec 22(a); The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 123.
- (616) "Combined Operations Headquarters (CR 9072/43): Short History of the Study of Requirements for Producing Fire Support for an Assault against a Defended Beach", 30 Aug 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7838/Air.
- (617) Ibid.: Appx "A": "Summary of Findings of C.O.H.Q. Assault Committee (November/December 1942)", para 1. Italics in original.
- (618) Ibid., para 7.
- (619) Ibid., para 3(a).
- (620) Ibid.: "Short History . . . Defended Beach", para 8.
- (621) Ibid., para 9-11. See, supra, para 114.
- (622) The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, para 105.
- (623) Ibid. Other problems included "the necessity for a daylight assault owing to the vast number of mixed groups of craft involved, the need for one central co-ordinating authority for the development of artificial harbours (MULBERRY), the need for the provision in adequate numbers of amphibians, and many other problems".

- (624) "Combined Operations Headquarters: Interservice Committee to Consider Provision of Fire Support for a Landing on a Heavily Defended Coast: Note by the Chairman", 30 Aug 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7838/Air. (The remaining references to the Graham Committee are taken from the same file.)
- (625) "Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Inter-Service Committee to Consider Provision of Fire Support for a Landing on a Heavily Defended Coast held on Saturday, 18th September, 1943 in Room 21, Montagu House, C.O.H.Q.", n.d., para 29.
- (626) Ibid.
- (627) "Report by the Inter-Service Committee . . . Heavily Defended Coast", para 8.
- (628) "Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Interservice Committee to Consider Provision of Fire Support for a Landing on a Heavily Defended Coast held on Saturday, 4th September, 1943, in the Conference Room, Montagu House, C.O.H.Q.", n.d., para 2.
- (629) Ibid., para 5.
- (630) Ibid., para 26.
- (631) Ibid., para 31.
- (632) "Minutes of the 2nd Meeting . . . C.O.H.Q.", para 10. (See, supra, para 304).
- (633) Ibid., para 23.
- (634) "Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Inter-Service Committee to Consider Provision of Fire Support for a Landing on a Heavily Defended Coast held on Saturday, 9th October, 1943 in Room 21, Montagu House, C.O.H.Q.", n.d., para 4.
- (635) Ibid., para 5.
- (636) Ibid., para 25.
- (637) "Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the Inter-Service Committee to Consider Provision of Fire Support for a Landing on a Heavily Defended Coast held on Saturday, 30th October, 1943 in Room 21, Montagu House, C.O.H.Q.", n.d. para 3.
- (638) "Report by the Inter-Service Committee . . . Heavily Defended Coast", para 2.
- (639) Ibid., para 3.
- (640) Ibid., para 6.
- (641) Ibid., para 52.
- (642) Ibid., para 68.

- (643) Ibid., para 69.
- (644) Ibid., para 71.
- (645) Ibid., para 72.
- (646) Ibid., para 73.
- (647) Ibid., para 76.
- (648) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 826.
- (649) Ibid., para 827.
- (650) Ibid., para 856. See, also, Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, para 139, and NJC/00/74/38, "'NEPTUNE': Joint Fire Plan", 8 Apr 44, which laid down "the general framework of the fire support programme for operation NEPTUNE, as a basis for detailed instructions to be issued as necessary by the three Services". Further information on the development of the fire support plan will be found in: third draft of H.Q., 21 A.Gp, "Staff Study No. 7: Fire Support for the Assault", 31 Dec 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7838/Air, vol 2, and in letter, Comd, Second British Army, to H.Q. 21 A.Gp, 27 Feb 44, on file 21 A.Gp/20651/23/G (Plans). Dealing with fire support for "OVERLORD", Harrison observes:

The fire support plan, in general, emphasized neutralization rather than destruction. It was hoped that, by bringing a continuous heavy volume of fire to bear on enemy defences, they would be rendered ineffective during the critical stages of the assault. Attacks by air and sea were thus planned in a crescendo up to H Hour. The first targets were the enemy coastal batteries capable of interfering with the sea approach. Second were the beach defences, the series of enemy resistance nests, which housed infantry weapons designed to check the assaulting troops on the beaches. Finally, naval guns were to furnish heavy artillery support for the infantry advance inland, pending the landing of army long-range artillery. (Op. cit., p. 194).

Mr. Churchill maintained an active interest in the preparation of the fire plan: see his memo of 20 Feb 44 to the First Sea Lord (op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 589).

- (651) "First Deliberations regarding a Landing in England ('Sea-Lion')", 12 Jul 40 (signed by Hitler, Keitel and Jcdl) in A.H.B. Translation No. VII/21, "Operation 'SEA-LION' (Invasion of Britain)".
- (652) "OVERLORD ONE: Syndicate B - Note No. 2", prepared by G(Ops), 28 Aug 43 (as amended), on file 21 A.Gp/7815/14/1/Air.
- (653) Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 31.

- (654) "Report on Discussion held by Comd 1 Corps 6 Sep 43"
on file 21 A.Gp/7832/-/Air.
- (655) Ibid.
- (656) Ibid.
- (657) "Examination of OVERLORD ONE", 24 Sep 43, by B.G.S. (Air),
H.Q. 21 A.Gp, in Box 00022/5; Air Branch file
"OVERLORD ONE: Draft Report".
- (658) Letter, C.-in-C., 21 A.Gp, to A.O.C., T.A.F., 13 Nov 43.
See, also, amended draft of: "OVERLORD TWO: Staff
Study No. 8: Timing and Weather Conditions", n.d.
(prepared by H.Q., 21 A.Gp, during November, 1943)
on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1. This study
pointed out that:

From the Naval point of view an assault in darkness reduces the manoeuvrability of flotillas and squadrons of craft and increases the possibility of navigational errors. Regrouping of the convoys into flights and waves for an assault on the scope envisaged would hardly be possible by night.

From the psychological point of view darkness would probably give a feeling of greater confidence to well-trained offensively-minded troops, and conversely, it is likely to have a demoralizing effect on the relatively low quality enemy coastal troops. On the other hand it would increase the possibility of confusion on the beaches and in the offing, and hamper the work of clearing exits.

Moonlight gives some of the advantages by daylight, but it retains the principal disadvantages of darkness to a greater or lesser degree; in particular, it does not permit the full development of air cover, and naval and air fire support.

The implications of the loss of surprise, as a result of a daylight landing, were summarized in the paper 21 A.Gp/INT/1101/4/4, BGS(I) to G(Ops), 5 Nov 43, on the same file.

- (659) "Air Pros and Cons of Night or Day Assault",
7 Dec 43 (prepared by Chief Air Planner, C.O.H.Q.)
on above file.
- (660) "Exercise 'PIRATE'", letter from A.O.C., T.A.F., to
A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command, 29 Oct 43.
- (661) "Report on Exercise 'PIRATE'" by Admiral Ramsay,
para 7.
- (662) Letter, C.-in-C., 21 A.Gp, to A.O.C., T.A.F.,
13 Nov 43.

- (663) Memo, Gen Crocker to B.G.S., 8 Dec 43. (Original on 3 Cdn Inf Div file 3 CD/4-3 FD 4.)
- (664) Third Draft of "Staff Study No. 7: Fire Support for the Assault", 31 Dec 43, on file 21 A.Gp/7838/Air, vol 2.
- (665) Ramsay, The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings, paras 26, 27.
- (666) Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 33.
- (667) "Uncorrected proof" of C.O.S. (SEXTANT) 28, Memo by C.C.O., 5 Dec 43, on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1.
- (668) Ibid. Moonlight preceding H hour was also preferred in order to facilitate naval movements: Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 32.
- (669) Ramsay, The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings, para 28. See, also: Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. 7, and Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), pp 591-2. For further information on the complications affecting the timing of "OVERLORD" see: memo, B.G.S. (Plans) to E., H.Q., 21 A.Gp, 15 Apr 44, and letter, C. of S., 21 A.Gp, to First U.S. and Second British Armies, 28 Apr 44, on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1.
- (670) "Minutes of Meeting held at Norfolk House on August 10th [1943] to discuss Future Policy relating to the Employment of Airborne Forces", n.d., on file 21 A.Gp/7930/4/G(Air).
- (671) COSSAC/4005/6/Mov & Tn, "Operation 'OVERLORD': Examination of the Effect of Bad Weather during the Period D Day to D plus 13 inclusive", 8 Sep 43, on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1. A "second draft" (27 Oct 43) of this paper amended sub-para (b) to read: "That the period D day to D plus 3 inclusive will consist of 'quiet' days. (Note: the meteorological experts estimate that there will be a 70% chance of being able to forecast accurately such a 'quiet' spell)". (Ibid.) It may be noted that, on D Day, "weather conditions off the beaches immediately before H hour were described as:
- [see, supra, p. 179].
- Wind - Westnorthwest, force 4-~~5~~20 m.p.h.]
Sea - moderate, waves 3-4 feet.
Sky - fair to cloudy with cloud increasing."
- (Quoted in reference (10) to Hist Sec (C.M.H.Q.) Report No. 147, p. 48.)
- (672) "Operation 'OVERLORD': Examination of the Effect of Bad Weather . . .", para 3. See, also, "Report on 'OVERLORD ONE': Staff Study No. 2: Administrative Appreciation", - Sep 43, in Box 00022/53 Air Branch file "OVERLORD ONE: Draft Report".

- (673) Second draft of 21 A.Gp/00/65/Ops, "Report on 'OVERLORD ONE'", 21 Sep 43, in above file.
- (674) Ibid.
- (675) Letter, A.O.C., T.A.F., to A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command, 29 Oct 43.
- (676) Ibid.
- (677) Draft paragraph with memo of 30 Oct [43] by Col L.O. Russell on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1.
- (678) Memo, B.G.S. (Ops) to Q(M), H.Q. 21 A.Gp, 3 Nov 43 on above file.
- (679) "OVERLORD TWO: Staff Study No. 8: Timing and Weather Conditions", para 17.
- (680) Letter, Chief of Staff to Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force, to Director Movements & Transportation, COSSAC, 15 Nov 43, on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1.
- (681) Letter, Naval Commander, Force "J", to G.O.C., 3 Cdn Inf Div, 24 Nov 43, on above file.
- (682) C.O.S. (SEXTANT) 7 of 22 Nov 43: "War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Operation 'OVERLORD': Report by Director of Plans, Admiralty, together with letter, Gen F.E.W. Simpson, W.O., to Gen B.L. Montgomery, C.-in-C., 21 A.Gp, 13 Jan 44, on above file. The report, as amended, is reproduced in C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part III), 8 Mar 44, pp 78-80, as C.C.S. 410, 25 Nov 43: Combined Chiefs of Staff: The Effect of Weather on Operation 'OVERLORD': Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.
- (683) C.C.S. 410, 25 Nov 43, para 2.
- (684) Ibid., para 3.
- (685) Ibid., para 4.
- (686) Ibid., para 6.
- (687) Ibid.
- (688) Ibid.
- (689) Ibid., para 10.
- (690) NJC 4 (Final), "'OVERLORD': the Effect of Weather", 14 Dec 43, on above file.
- (691) Ibid., paras 10,11.

- (692) "Application of Weather Forecasts in Deciding Start of Operations", with covering letter, C.-Met-O., S.H.A.E.F., to Staff Meteorological Officers, A.N.C.X.F., A.E.A.F., and 21 A.Gp, 22 Apr 44, on above file.
- (693) The familiar story of this dramatic conference is told by Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 275. See, also, De Guingand, op. cit., pp 373-4, and Edwards, op. cit., p. 118. (The latter states, incorrectly, that the decision was taken on the morning of 4 Jun.)
- (694) Morgan, op. cit., p. 267.
- (695) Churchill, op. cit., vol II, p. 217. See, also, vol V (American edition), p. 74.
- (696) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 258. See, also, Head, "Amphibious Operations", p. 490. On 30 May 42 Mr. Churchill addressed the following minute on floating piers to C.C.O.:
- They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be mastered. The ships must have a side-flap in them, and a drawbridge long enough to overreach the moorings of the piers. Let me have the best solution worked out. Don't argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves. (Op. cit., vol V (American edition), pp 71-2.)
- (697) Ramsay, The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings, para 12. See, also, Morgan, op. cit., p. 261; Edwards, op. cit., p. 31.
- (698) Rear-Admiral H. Hickling, "The Prefabricated Harbour", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XC, No. 559 (August 1945), p. 272. See, infra, reference (701). It may be noted that "the outline plan together with estimates of materials and labour needed for the work and suggestions as to how it should be executed" had been presented at the "QUADRANT" Conference by Sir Harold Wernher, who co-ordinated this work of C.O.H.Q. and C.O.S.S.A.C. (Morgan, op. cit., p. 264). A detailed ("confidential" account of the project, from the British point of view, is given by Rear-Admiral H. Hickling and Brigadier I.L.H. Mackillop, The Story of the Mulberries (War Office, 1947). The American aspect of the "MULBERRY" project has been described by Commander Alfred Stanford, U.S.N.R., Force Mulberry: the Planning and Installation of the Artificial Harbor off U.S. Normandy Beaches in World War II (New York, 1951).
- (699) Edwards, op. cit., p. 60.
- (700) Hickling, "The Prefabricated Harbour", p. 273.
- (701) Ramsay, The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings, para 12. It may be noted that Admiral Hickling was, at one stage, Chief of Staff to Admiral Tennant; subsequently Hickling became Naval Officer in charge of the Arromanches harbour. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), pp 586-7.

- (702) Morgan, op. cit., p. 265.
- (703) Hickling, "The Prefabricated Harbour", p. 278. Further details of the "MULBERRY" development will be found in: "Joint Maintenance Project - Administrative Plan (issued in conjunction with Initial Joint Plan : [N.S.C. 1004] dated 1 Feb 1944)", Appx "F": Construction and Development of Artificial Port. Part I British", in Box 00012 of 21 A.Gp "Top Secret" series.
- (704) "Report on 'OVERLORD ONE': Staff Study No. 2: Administrative Appreciation", - Sep 43, in 21 A.Gp "Top Secret" series, Box 00022/5, Air Branch file: "OVERLORD ONE: Draft Report".
- (705) Brigadier C. Ravenhill, "The Influence of Logistics on Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol XCI, No. 564 (November 1946), p. 496.
- (706) Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, A Sailor's Odyssey (London, 1951), p. 595. A British Journalist, who claims to have investigated the performance of the British "MULBERRY", has written:
- In the 128 days since it was first set up, Mulberry landed only 539,385 tons of war stores out of a total landed by all means of 1,627,082 tons.
- The arithmetic is simple. Mulberry carried less than one-third of our material across the Channel. How, then, did the rest of the stuff go? By the simple device of landing it by amphibious 'ducks'.
- George Campey, "Was MULBERRY a Failure?", Evening Standard (London), 26 Jul 48.
- (707) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 186.
- (708) Cunningham, op. cit., p. 596.
- (709) NJC 1004 dated 1 Feb 44: "Neptune: Initial Joint Plan", para 141.
- (710) Anthony Martionsson, Hitler and his Admirals (London, 1948), p. 204. See, also, Hickling and Mackillop, op. cit., chap XVI.
- (711) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 762. Mr. Churchill has described his earlier difference of opinion with General Eisenhower over the adoption of a more aggressive strategy in the Aegean, including the former's plans for the capture of Rhodes, Leros and Cos. (Op. cit., vol V (American edition), chap 12.)

- (712) Harrison, op. cit., p. 121. Maj-Gen J.R. Deane, Chief of the American Military Mission in Moscow, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (9 Nov) that "it was quite likely that Russian enthusiasm for a cross-Channel attack had cooled. He believed the Red Army was now confident of its ability to move into Berlin without benefit of the squeeze from the west" (Ibid., pp 121-2.). This appreciation was refuted, as regards "OVERLORD", by Stalin's attitude at the "EUREKA" Conference.
- (713) Quoted by Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, 763.
- (714) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 213. Churchill makes no reference to these discussions (op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 326.).
- (715) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 218.
- (716) C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part II), 25 Feb 44:
War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee:
"SEXTANT": Minutes of Proceedings at Cairo and Tehran between 22nd November and 7th December, 1943,
pp. 28-30. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 334.
- (717) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 770.
- (718) Harrison, op. cit., p. 123. (Author's italics).
- (719) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 771.
- (720) C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, p. 2.
- (721) Ibid., p. 3.
- (722) Ibid., pp 3-4. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), pp 351-2.
- (723) C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, pp 5-6. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V, pp 355-7.
- (724) Harrison, op. cit., pp 123-5.
- (725) C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part III), 8 Mar 44: C.C.S. 426/1, 6 Dec 43: Combined Chiefs of Staff: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the 'SEXTANT' Conference, para 11.
See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 125,
- (726) C.O.S. (43) 791 (O) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, p. 9.
(Second Plenary meeting held at 1600 hrs, 29 Nov 43).
- (727) Ibid.
- (728) Ibid.
- (729) Ibid. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 365.

- (730) C.O.S. (43) 791 (0) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, p. 11.
- (731) Ibid., p. 18. ("Minutes of Meeting of Military Experts held at the Soviet Embassy, Tehran, on Monday, 29th November, 1943, at 10:30 a.m.")
- (732) Ibid., p. 23.
- (733) Ibid., p. 24.
- (734) Ibid., p. 15. (Third plenary meeting held at 1600 hrs, 30 Nov 43).
- (735) Ibid.
- (736) Ibid.
- (737) Ibid., p. 16.
- (738) Ibid.
- (739) Ibid.
- (740) Ibid.
- (741) Ibid., pp 31-2. (Third ("SEXTANT") plenary meeting held at 1100 hrs, 4 Dec 43). Churchill writes that, "in spite of my arguments", Roosevelt had given the earlier commitment to the Chinese. (Op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 328). "As I saw the problem, the campaign in Italy, in which a million or more of our British, British-controlled, and Allied armies were engaged, was the faithful and indispensable comrade and counterpart to the main cross-Channel operation". (Ibid., p. 426).
- (742) C.O.S. (43) 791 (0) (Part II), 25 Feb 44, p. 34.
- (743) Ibid., pp 39-40. On the reallocation of craft at the Cairo Conference see, also, Harrison, op. cit., pp 126-7.
- (744) Harrison, op. cit., p. 126.
- (745) Sherwood, op. cit., vol II, p. 793; see, also, Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., pp 232-3; Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), pp 418-9. A reproduction of President Roosevelt's message advising Marshal Stalin (6 Dec 43) is contained in Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 229. The appointment was a surprise to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had assumed that General Marshall would be selected. (Leahy, op. cit., p. 254)
- (746) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. vii. It should be noted that, apart from being Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower "commanded Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), which controlled all American forces in the European Theatre". (Pogue, op. cit., p. 175)

- (747) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 242.
- (748) Morgan, op. cit., p. 217.
- (749) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. 4.
- (750) Ibid.
- (751) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 243.
- (752) Ibid., p. 245. Field-Marshal Montgomery afterwards observed: "The assault was an operation requiring a single co-ordinated plan of action under one commander; I therefore became the overall land force commander responsible to the Supreme Commander for planning and executing the military aspect of the assault and subsequent capture of the lodgement area". (Normandy to the Baltic, p. 6.)
- (753) Quoted in Sec "A", chap I of The Liberation of North-West Europe - Operation 'OVERLORD', vol 3, The Landings in Normandy (prepared by S/L J.C.R. Davies, R.A.F., at A.H.B., Air Ministry).
- (754) Ibid.
- (755) Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp 5-6.
- (756) Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 444. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., pp 165 ff.
- (757) General Eisenhower's Foreword (13 Mar 47) to Morgan, op. cit., p. 10. His version has been severely criticized by British writers, e.g. "Eisenhower's Book: The Facts" by the Military Correspondent of The Sunday Times (London) 21 Nov 48.
- (758) Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 6. Cf. De Guingand, op. cit., pp 340-7.
- (759) Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp 9-11.
- (760) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. 4.
- (761) Ibid., p. 6.
- (762) Ibid.
- (763) Biennial Report . . . to the Secretary of War, p. 30.
- (764) Quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 222.
- (765) Quoted, ibid., para 224. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 168.
- (766) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. 7. It was also considered that the number of vehicles for each assault division would have to be reduced from over 3,000 to 2,500. (Harrison, op. cit., p. 167)

- (767) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945,
p. 7.
- (768) Ibid. See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 168.
- (769) Quoted by Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 227.
See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American
edition), p. 511.
- (770) Quoted, Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 228.
- (771) Quoted, ibid., para 230. See, also, Churchill, op. cit.,
vol V, p. 512.
- (772) Invasion of North-West Europe, 1944, para 230.
- (773) Ibid., paras 235-6. See, also, Pogue, op. cit.,
p. 174, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition),
p. 585.
- (774) Field-Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya, Eight Years
Overseas 1939-1947 (London, n.d.), p. 196.
- (775) Ibid. Italics added. See, also, Churchill, op. cit.,
vol V (American edition), pp 512-3.
- (776) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. 6.
See, also, Harrison, op. cit., p. 186.
- (777) Air Vice-Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, War in
Three Dimensions: The Impact of Air-Power upon
the Classical Principles of War (London, 1949), p. 86.
- (778) Lord Tedder, Air Power in War [The Lees Knowles
Lectures of 1947], London, n.d., p. 110. "After
prolonged technical controversy . . . the plan
which prevailed was to destroy German railway
communications in France, Belgium, and Western
Germany by discharging 66,000 tons of bombs during
the three months before D-Day, thus creating a
'railway desert' around the German troops in Normandy".
(Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition),
pp 527-8).
- (779) See Sec "A", chap IV, of The Liberation of North-West
Europe - Operation OVERLORD, vol 3, The Landings in
Normandy (A.H.B. narrative).
- (780) Ibid.
- (781) Pogue, op. cit., p. 179.
- (782) Quoted in Sec "A", chap IV, of The Landings in Normandy.
- (783) Quoted by Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition),
p. 530.
- (784) Sec "A", chap IV of The Landings in Normandy.

- (785) Kingston-McCloughry, op. cit., p. 86.
 - (786) Report by the Supreme Commander . . . 8 May 1945, p. 21.
 - (787) Extract from BM 1 to S/00/355/9/G(0), "Appendix Y to Outline Plan" [COSSAC (43) 28], 20 Nov 43, para 1, in Box 14 of G.H.Q. Home Forces "OVERLORD" Series.
 - (788) Ibid., para 2.
 - (789) Ibid., para 3.
 - (790) Ibid., para 10. Some of these methods were: wireless deception, camouflage and concealment, mock movement preparations, restrictions on certain areas, deceptive lighting of assembly, transit and shipping areas, A.A. concentrations, sabotage in the Pas de Calais - Belgium area and civilian preparations (e.g. voluntary evacuations) supporting the deception.
 - (791) See, "NEPTUNE: Initial Joint Plan", 1 Feb 44, para 50, and SHAEF (44) 13, "Plan 'FORTITUDE'", 23 Feb 44. (Latter on docket "BM 2 to S/00/355/9/G(0)", in G.H.Q. Home Forces "OVERLORD" Series.
 - (792) "Comments on the Paper:- 'Naval Pros and Cons on Night, Dawn or Day Assault", 7 Dec 43, prepared by Col R. Henriques of C.O.H.Q. (This paper was forwarded to B.G.S.(Ops), H.Q. 21 A.Gp, with covering letter of same date.) The paper is on file 21 A.Gp/00/431/1/Ops(A), Part 1.
 - (793) See, for example, letter, C.-in-C., Home Forces, to G.O.C. London District and G.Os.C.-in-C., Eastern, Southern and South-Eastern Commands, 25 Jan 44, on file HF/63/C.-in-C., "Operation 'OVERLORD'" (File No. 2).
 - (794) Circular letter SHAEF/18216/Ops, 23 Feb 44, on docket "BM 2 to S/00/355/9/G(0)", in G.H.Q. Home Forces "OVERLORD" Series.
 - (795) See Lt Gen Sir Giffard Martel (who was present at the "EUREKA" meetings), An Outspoken Soldier: His Views and Memoirs (London, 1949), p. 259.
 - (796) "Plan 'FORTITUDE'", 23 Feb 44, para 2.
 - (797) Ibid., para 4.
 - (798) Ibid., para 5.
 - (799) Ibid., paras 23, 24. See, also, Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 596.
 - (800) Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, p. 173.
 - (801) Churchill, op. cit., vol V (American edition), p. 591.
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