NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interpretations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986
# MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

## VOLUME ONE

### CONTENTS

| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| PART I - CREATION OF AN ARMY | |
| (i) The Years Before | 3 |
| (ii) Mobilizing An Army | 8 |
| (iii) Advent of the National Resources | |
| Mobilization Act, 1940 | 13 |
| (iv) 30-Day Training | 14 |
| (v) General Crerar's More Realistic Programmes | 21 |
| (vi) Reinforcements and Recruiting, 1940-1941 | 35 |
| PART II - EXTENSION OF MANPOWER CONTROLS, 1942-1943 | |
| (i) Increased Home Defences | 48 |
| (ii) National Selective Service and a National Plebiscite | 48 |
| (iii) The Adoption of British Wastage Rates | 52 |
| (iv) Manpower Ceiling for the Canadian Army Overseas | 64 |
| (v) Recruiting and National Selective Service, 1942 | 69 |
| (vi) The Home Front, 1943 | 81 |
| (vii) Reduction of the Army in Canada, 1943 | 90 |
| PART III - PREPARING FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS | 102 |
| (i) Completing the Canadian Army Overseas | 109 |
| (ii) Operational Forecasts and Reinforcement Flow | 114 |
| (iii) Last Minute Changes Before D-Day | 127 |
| (iv) The Home Front, 1944 | 136 |
| PART IV - ACTIVE OPERATIONS | 159 |
| (i) Canadians in Italy - Their First Year | 155 |
| (ii) Reinforcement Organization in North-West Europe | 165 |
| (iii) Revising the Wastage Rates, 1944 | 175 |
| (iv) Autumn 1944 Losses in Italy | 188 |
| (v) Remustering Reinforcements for North-West Europe | 192 |
| (vi) Shortage of French-Speaking Infantrymen | 195 |
### PART V - CONSCRIPTION CRISIS

1. Mr Ralston's Resignation
2. Conscription Comes
3. Sending N.R.M.A. Soldiers Overseas
4. N.R.M.A. Soldiers in the Canadian Army Overseas

### PART VI - THE FINAL STAGES

1. Overseas Needs, 1945
2. Finding Men for the Canadian Army, 1945
3. General Sansom's Report
4. The Infantry Shortage Met
5. Victory in Europe

### CONCLUSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOLUME TWO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCE NOTES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army during the Second World War

1. This Report attempts to describe how the Canadian Army made use of its share of the national manpower pool during the Second World War. First of all there was the question of whether men and women could serve their country best by joining the Armed Forces, taking jobs in rapidly expanding industries, or remaining in agricultural production. Again, were the services of those who enlisted in the Canadian Army, or were enrolled under the authority of the National Resources Mobilization Act, employed to the best advantage? Or could their services have been used to better advantage in the R.C.A.F. or Navy? Many problems were common to all but since the R.C.A.F. and Navy, and the three Women's Services, accepted only volunteers their stories are reserved for separate studies, which it is hoped to do later.

2. Although conscription for overseas military service lurked in the wings as a bogey for the first five years of War and cast its shadow over every action attempted by the country's political and military leaders, too much importance can be attached to it. When a crisis did develop over conscription it was because of a temporary shortage of general duty infantrymen. Primarily this had resulted from adherence to British rates of wastage designed to meet global needs rather than the conditions to be found in only two European theatres of operations: but the question really went back to the incorrect lessons which had been drawn from the early German successes with blitzkrieg tactics. Recruiting posters had been too successful in urging young Canadians to become "Captains of the Clouds", "Guardians of the Deep", members of "Canada's Mechanized Army" or mere skilled tradesmen in one or the other. The "poor bloody infantry" had received little attention unless it was from C.E.F. veterans who advised their sons to join something that did not walk.

3. Furthermore, as the War progressed an increasing proportion of uniformed personnel became concerned with the maintenance of the physical well being and morale of the remainder. Reference will be made to this increase in administrative "tail" at the expense of the "teeth", or fighting component, but the narrator does not consider himself competent to discuss the internal organization of an Army at any length.

4. Although it may appear at times to some readers that mere expediency governed the conduct of the Canadian Army it should be remembered that Canada was only a "middle power" and that her voice was not often heard in the inner councils,
where the United Kingdom, United States and Russia settled questions of grand strategy to their own satisfaction. Royal Canadian Naval and Royal Canadian Air Force units and individuals serving with British Forces were not nearly so affected by this ignorance of operational planning as was the (almost) self-contained Canadian Army which was training and waiting in the United Kingdom for the time when it could come to grips with an enemy.

5. Statistics produced by War Service Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs have been used wherever applicable, but it has proved necessary to refer to many wartime projections and estimates to illustrate particular points, even though the adequacy of such figures is open to question. Shortage of administrative staff during the early months of the War kept many officers and men busy with what they considered to be more urgent work than the compilation of frequent statistical returns (undoubtedly many of them knew, for instance, that the mere fact of being rejected for enlistment would not stop men from trying medical boards elsewhere in the hope of eventual success). In other instances, officers failed to make sufficient allowance for variable factors when estimating future enlistments or trying to predict casualties from the supposed forecasts of activity. Then, again, units in action could be too busy with the enemy to prepare satisfactory war diaries.

6. Finally, attention is directed to the several Appendices, which discuss particular aspects of the Manpower problem in more detail than is possible in the body of the Report, and the statistical tables that follow them.
PART I - CREATION OF AN ARMY

(1) The Years Before

7. Although Canada is one of the world's largest countries geographically it has a correspondingly small population. A large proportion of its people always has been engaged in primary industries, although that percentage has been dwindling steadily as the Twentieth Century advanced, and a considerable number are required to maintain certain fixed services which are extensive in nature irrespective of the population in any particular area. Thus the number of men who could be withdrawn from civilian pursuits always has been limited.

8. The forces with which Montcalm attempted to hold New France in the last days of the French regime dwindled as militiamen sneaked home to harvest their crops and, in the years following, the needs of ploughing and harvesting continued to influence the effectiveness of the Canadian Militia. Canadians fought Americans in the War of 1812, repulsed incursions by the 'Hunters' and Fenians in the years that led to Confederation and put down the North West Rebellion of 1885, but it was not until the South African War (1899-1902) that the Canadian Government raised volunteer troops for overseas service.

9. In 1914 Canada immediately ranged herself at the Mother Country's side and by the autumn of 1916 a Canadian Corps of four divisions was serving on the Western Front. Despite a continuous recruiting campaign, however, wastage no longer was being replaced by voluntary enlistments. Although by the end of May 1917 Canada had sent overseas 322,589 men the number recruited during the twelve months just completed was only slightly more than the casualties for the same period (74,005). On the other hand, the voluntary National Registration completed by 1,549,360 individuals during 1916-1917 disclosed that plenty of men still were available for military service, particularly since physical standards had been lowered and the enlistment ages extended. Other courses having failed, more and more groups within the country were brought to the realization that some form of military conscription, whether for overseas service or home defence only, would prove to be necessary. At the same time opposition stiffened within the ranks of organized labour and the Liberal Party, particularly amongst the latter's supporters from the province of Quebec. A Bill introduced into the House of Commons on 18 May by Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden to conscript single men and childless widowers aged 20-34 was passed and received Royal Assent on 29 Aug as the Military Service Act (1). One result was temporary disintegration of the Liberal opposition and formation of a National

*Reorganization within the Army itself to conserve manpower arrangements to recruit Canadian citizens resident in the United States; formation of a Canadian Defence Force whose members would undergo part time training, including attendance at summer camp with personnel destined for the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
Government.

10. As a more immediate measure the 5th Canadian Division in England was disbanded during February 1918 to provide reinforcements for the Canadian Corps and only its artillery proceeded to France as formed units. At home so many claims for exemption were received that Orders in Council were passed on 20 Apr 18 cancelling exemption for all men aged 20, 21 and 22 and providing for the registration of 19-year olds. Total registration to 11 Nov 18 was 522,899 but 395,162 claims were made for exemption and only 83,355 men actually were conscripted for overseas service. Four mistakes in administering the Act were suggested by the Director of the Military Branch within the Department of Justice:

(a) Those called or about to be called under the Act should not be allowed to volunteer. Registrars and Deputy Registrars had recommended this change.

(b) Exemptions were too loosely and unscientifically allowed by Registrars.

(c) Registrars should have been allowed jurisdiction over draftees until they were turned over in person to the Military.

(d) Low category draftees should have been diverted to work of national importance.

Uncertainty in the mind of the general public due to the review and change of exemptions had complicated the question of employing young men; would they be conscripted or could they be employed with safety?

11. Statistically it might be noted that some 628,462 Canadians donned uniform during the war period, of whom 619,636 joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force. On 11 Nov 18, however, its total strength was only 362,774 all ranks, of whom 154,271 were serving in France, 123,024 in England and 86,491 in Canada.

12. Disturbances, and even rioting in Quebec, had been occasioned by the conscription issue and caused much bitterness and hard feeling, which did not end with the coming of peace. Many Canadians considered, and for more than one reason, that conscription for overseas service should never again be invoked.

13. The Committee established in 1919 under Major General Sir William Otter to study a post war reorganization of the Canadian Militia was of the opinion that, in a struggle for the very existence of the British Empire, Canada should be able to mobilize, transport and maintain an expeditionary force of six divisions, with a cavalry division, if necessary, and the necessary proportion of Corps, Army and Line of Communications Troops. In a war of self defence, fought on Canadian territory, the maximum force which the Dominion could raise and maintain for a period of two years' hostilities would not exceed 11 divisions and four cavalry divisions, with certain ancillary units and formations: the whole could not be greater than 300,000 all ranks.
14. When Defence Scheme No. 3* was revised in 1937 increased emphasis was placed on local defence, including measures for internal security, but provision remained for the organization of a Mobile Force which might, should the Government so decide, be despatched overseas as an Expeditionary Force. This Mobile Force was to comprise a corps headquarters, two divisions, a cavalry division and quotas of corps, army and L. of C. (Line of Communication) troops, as well as the necessary base organization both in Canada and overseas. After the departure of this Force (in two echelons of roughly equal size) there would be a further expansion of four divisions to provide a total Force roughly equal to that contemplated by the Otter Committee (5).

15. Units for inclusion in the Mobile Force were to be selected for their efficiency by the Officers Commanding the several Military Districts but there were other problems to be considered: the Coastal Districts would have to be represented in the Field Force even though the requirements of coast and anti-aircraft defence would be heavy; because of quite different characteristics in the population across the country the territorial distribution of militia units was not in direct proportion to the population; few French-speaking N.P.A.M. units were really active during these years of peace; the possibility that only one division might be mobilized made it necessary to ensure that units for each of the two divisions should be drawn from every geographical section of the country (6). (The cavalry division was deleted from the proposed Mobile Force following a General Staff recommendation of May 1939.)

16. Although war clouds were threatening the democratic nations by the early thirties the peoples of the British Commonwealth had become imbued with the idea that any war would be fought by comparatively small numbers of specialists and that never again would more than a token expeditionary force be sent to Europe. What large armies might be necessary would be found by the French while the United Kingdom's main contribution would centre around the Royal Navy and the comparatively youthful Royal Air Force. The attitude of the Canadian Government towards rearmament was expressed in the following statement made to the House of Commons on 24 Mar 38 by the Minister of National Defence:

... A certain amount of priority has been established after deliberation: first for the air services; secondly, for naval defence; and thirdly, in regard to the repairing of deficiencies in equipment of militia services, permanent and non-permanent.... (7)

*During the years following the First World War the General Staff gave considerable attention to the preparation of three major Defence Schemes, each involving mobilization, concentration, and operations of large militia forces. The first two schemes had become unreal, in that they envisaged respectively war against the United States and a situation where Canada remained neutral from a Japanese-American war.
17. Politically, the Liberal Government of Mr W.L. Mackenzie King had refused to enter into any prior commitments regarding its action upon the outbreak of war: the most explicit statement was that of 30 March 1939 when Mr King told the House of Commons that "...it is for the government to recommend and for parliament to decide upon the course to follow" (8). Again, during the course of this speech the Prime Minister declared:

... One strategic fact is clear: the days of great expeditionary forces of infantry crossing the oceans are not likely to recur. Two years ago, I expressed in this house the view that it was extremely doubtful if any of the British Dominions would ever send another expeditionary force to Europe.

... Profits could and would be rigidly controlled, and profiteering suppressed. But men's lives and men's wills cannot be put on the same basis as goods and profits. The present government believes that conscription of men for overseas service would not be a necessary or an effective step. Let me say that so long as this government may be in power, no such measure will be enacted ... (9)

In the same vein the Conservative leader (Dr R.J. Manion) added that he had "reasons for thinking it is improbable that an expeditionary force on anything like the scale that existed in the last war will ever again be expected of Canada" (10). While adding his opposition to conscription for overseas military service Dr Manion was firm in his conviction that Canada should co-operate fully with the remainder of the British Commonwealth and Empire. In view of the fact that Canadians had comprised a goodly proportion of the flying personnel during the First World War, he suggested that air force units might be despatched in the event of hostilities.

18. A Defence Committee* had been created within the Canadian Cabinet during August 1936 and a Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Defence Co-ordination established in March 1938. By May 1939 the findings of the latter's sub-committees had been embodied in a draft War Book, but manpower was not allotted a separate chapter (11). Since the extent of Canada's participation in any war had not been defined by the Canadian Government the task of the Chiefs of Staff was made more difficult. In a memorandum of 29 Aug, entitled "Canada's National Effort (Armed Forces) in the Early Stages of a Major War", the Chiefs of Staff set forth the courses open to the Canadian Government and the form in which the three Armed Forces might participate:

The Navy's part would be to organize an auxiliary force as rapidly as possible in order to give protection to shipping against mine and submarine attacks in Canadian waters, and at the same time to assist the British forces in keeping the sea communications clear of enemy vessels. This assistance to be progressively increased as the Naval resources of the Country are developed.

*Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Finance and Minister of National Defence.
Air Force assistance would, as in the case of the Navy, begin with the cooperation rendered in safeguarding trade routes adjacent to our territory. But in addition, we are in a position from the outset to provide direct intervention in the shape of personnel for an Army Cooperation Wing of three squadrons, but with no aircraft or equipment.

The Army's contribution would take the form of immediate raising of an Army Corps of two divisions and ancillary troops (roughly 60,000 men) in accordance with the Militia Service plan, and its despatch abroad as soon as arrangements can be made in consultation with the British Government to transport it and make good such deficiencies in its war equipment as cannot be supplied from Canadian sources (12).

19. When Germany attacked Poland on 1 Sep the Canadian Prime Minister issued a statement that Parliament would meet on 7 Sep and that, if the United Kingdom should become engaged in war, the Canadian Government would seek authority to undertake effective co-operation at her side: a state of 'an armed war' was proclaimed and declared to have existed since 25 Aug. Immediately following the United Kingdom's declaration of war on 3 September the Canadian Prime Minister despatched a telegram outlining what measures Canada was taking for local defence and requesting information as to the probable theatre and character of main British and Allied military operations so that Canadian policy might be developed (13). On 6 Sep the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs replied that the greatest need at the moment was additional Canadian dollars to finance war expenditure. He pointed out that:

Generally, so far as immediate steps are concerned, provision of naval vessels and facilities and of air force personnel would be of most assistance, and in particular at present time supply of any pilots and aircraft crews available is a capital requirement. As regards land forces, policy here is to avoid a rush of volunteers such as occurred in the last war and to expand by means of a controlled intake. The chief requirement is for certain technical personnel (14).

A complementary memorandum of the same day suggested what lines the military effort of Canada's Armed Forces might follow. These included, for the Army, the despatch overseas of a "token" unit to serve with the British Expeditionary Force, the provision of Canadian technical units (Engineers, Signals, Medical, Ordnance and Transportation) to serve with the British Army and assistance in enlisting technical personnel for service in the British Army (15). What appeared to be passing for Anglo-French strategy was reliance on the Maginot Line, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and the possibility of crushing Germany by destroying her economy.

20. Prime Minister Mackenzie King's address to the Canadian House of Commons on 8 Sep contained the following very significant paragraph:
I wish now to repeat the undertaking I gave in parliament on behalf of the government on March 30 last. The present government believe that conscription of men for overseas service will not be a necessary or an effective step. No such measure will be introduced by the present administration. We have full faith in the readiness of Canadian men and women to put forward every effort in their power to preserve and defend free institutions, and in particular to resist aggression on the part of a tyrannical regime which aims at the domination of the world by force. The government, as representing the people of Canada, will use their authority and power to the utmost in promoting the most effective organized effort toward these imperative ends (16).

21. Apart from the purely local defensive measures already being undertaken, the Canadian Government envisaged its war effort as planned cooperation with the United Kingdom, with military participation kept subordinate to assistance by agriculture and an expanding war industry. The United Kingdom Mission which arrived in Canada to make a survey of industrial potential had remained in Ottawa as a British Supply Board but placed relatively few orders, however, since British manufacturers were unwilling to release designs and specifications to Canadian firms which thus would become competitors in the post war world: and the British Government was loath to make available the necessary dollars from its limited supply. A Canadian delegation to London, headed by the Minister of Mines and Resources (Hon. T. A. Cressar), met with no better success (17). Thus the problem of utilizing Canada's manpower to best advantage was made difficult at the outset.

(ii) Mobilizing an Army

22. During the hungry thirties the trend towards urbanization had been slightly accelerated in Canada and, with the exception of British Columbia, farm communities proportionately lost population to the larger cities. Except for the exodus from Saskatchewan population generally tended to flow from areas with a high natural increase to those with a low natural increase (18). Thus Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec (which had retained most of its natural increase) possessed the greatest number of men and women available for the Armed Forces or employment in war industry. This shift in population had not yet been officially recorded or recognized, however, nor had it been adequately reflected in the 1936 reorganization of the Canadian Militia (i.e. the N.P.A.M. units).

23. At the same time, however, there still was considerable slack to be taken up in the Canadian economy which always had been subject to seasonal fluctuation, even apart from the

*A useful pamphlet is Changes in Population and In the Labour Force, Issued as a Supplement to The Labour Gazette, December, 1945 Research and Statistics Branch, Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1946.
fact that the 1930s had seen many men unemployed for long periods. Despite the fact that September generally was the busiest month of the year, the outbreak of war found seasonal employment at its lowest. There was an unemployed labour force of almost 600,000 as against an estimated working force of 3,000,000 in industries other than agriculture. The importance of this has been well summed up as follows:

The existence of unemployed labour and capital equipment is an important factor facilitating military and industrial mobilization for war. In so far as the mobilization can be carried out by utilizing men and machinery which were previously idle, there need be less disturbance in the remainder of the economic system (19).

24. During the precautionary period (26-31 Aug) certain units and details of other units of the N.P.A.M. were called out to man coastal and anti-aircraft defences and to guard vulnerable points in accordance with Defence Scheme No. 3 but it was not until 1 Sep that the Cabinet authorized the mobilization of a Canadian Active Service Force (i.e. Mobile Force) consisting of two divisions and the appropriate quota of corps, army and L. of C. units: this General Order No. 135 also retained units and details of the earlier mobilization as part of the C.A.S.F. (20).

25. On 11 Sep the possibility of using the Canadian Active Service Force overseas was mentioned in the House of Commons by the Minister of National Defence but a decision was not reached by the Cabinet until 16 Sep. One division would be despatched to join the B.E.F., together with a number of technical units as requested by the British Government ("with the proviso that they shall remain Canadian units and return to Canadian control, should they be required for a Canadian Expeditionary Force, should it later be decided to send one") (21). Such an eventuality had been foreseen and territorial representation had been achieved for the 1st Canadian Division by mobilizing Infantry units from Ontario for the 1st Brigade, from Western Canada for the 2nd Brigade and from Quebec and the Maritimes for the 3rd Brigade: units comprising the supporting arms and services similarly were drawn from those spread across the country and representation for Prince Edward Island was provided by two batteries of medium artillery slated for service as corps troops. Consequent upon the Government's decision, the remaining units authorized by General Order No. 135 as corps troops gradually dwindled away (see para 28).

26. A Cabinet re-shuffle of 19 Sep resulted in the transfer of Mr Norman McLeod Rogers from the portfolio of Labour to National Defence and the entrance into the Cabinet as Minister of Finance of Mr J.L. Ralston, a former Minister of National Defence. It should be emphasized that the Cabinet was continuing top priority for the R.C.A.F., even before the British request of 28 Sep that a British Commonwealth Air Training Plan be organized to train aircrew in Canada.

*Similarly the Infantry of the 2nd Division was drawn from Ontario (4th Brigade), Quebec (5th Brigade) and Western Canada (6th Brigade). Not until July 1939 had the plan for a French-speaking 5th Brigade been dropped so that the Royal 22e Régiment might be incorporated with other Permanent Force units in a first contingent for overseas service and avoid the opprobrium of the First World War when there had been no French-speaking unit in the First Division.
27. Enlistment problems, which included that of reattest for overseas service everyone in uniform, will be discussed at greater length in Volume I of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Numbers of men held back from enlistment due to the uncertain need and the policy of not accepting for service in the ranks university graduates with medical, engineering or other professional degrees, ex-cadets of the Royal Military College and the Canadian Officers Training Corps, bankers, accountants, youths under 18 years of age and men who had been dishonorably discharged earlier. With the exception of the last two groups, however, the above were eligible for appointment to commissioned ranks where vacancies existed. Aliens were not, however, eligible for enlistment (Appendix "B"). Recruiting Memorandum No. 1 also favoured the enlistment of men without dependents and included the proviso that "married men with four or more dependents should not be enlisted". This was variously interpreted, by some units to mean that married men should be rejected, and confusion was ended only on 14 Sep when the Minister of National Defence expressed a preference for not accepting married men with more than two children (the maximum number for which separation allowance could be paid); men already enlisted could either accept this limitation or be discharged (22). A goodly number of the prospective recruits (many of whom were veterans of the First World War) were

*This was to be an "economic war" and according to newspaper stories four or five civilian workers would be required to keep one man in uniform. In a news story of 21 Dec 39 The Ottawa Citizen went even further in discouraging men from giving up their jobs to enlist:

For active service in this war, however, manpower goes very much further than it did in the last war. By means of mechanism [sic] a smaller number of men can produce more "fire power" than a larger number could before.

Authorities say that 650 men with small machine guns can fire as many rounds now as 1,000 men using rifles could do before.

Consequently the requirements of manpower are correspondingly reduced. The faithful horse, for cavalry or mounted rifle units, is giving way to quicker and more efficient means of motive power. It is being replaced by armoured cars and light tanks. Mechanization is being extended all along the line.

The result is that, while the forces will be more effective than before, fewer men will be needed to bring about the same degree of efficiency.
rejected because of the high medical standards* then demanded
and a bottleneck was created by the inability of existing medi-
cal boards to handle the numbers of recruits applying (24).
Furthermore, as was pointed out at a meeting of the Defence
Council on 24 Oct, units had not been told there was any urgency
to recruit to establishment and some were proceeding slowly un-
til clothing, equipment and better accommodation became more
readily available (25).

28. Three weeks had been the maximum time envisaged
for mobilization under Defence Scheme No. 3 but the conclusion
of this period found very few units at full strength. As early
as 2 Sep modifications had been made to General Order No. 135,
with steps being taken to delay the mobilization of certain an-
cillary units which would not be required until later. In all,
recruiting was suspended for some 70 units involving establish-
ments of more than 15,000 all ranks (26) and available men were
channelled into those where the need was greatest (see para 25).
On 24 Sep an order went out deferring further recruiting in all
arms except the infantry of the Mobile Force. Finally, on 11 Oct,
further instructions were issued to suspend all remaining re-
cruiting for the 2nd Canadian Division in order that the last
Canadian Division might be completed and equipped as far as pos-
sible for early despatch overseas (27). The Royal 22e Régiment's
deficiency of 285 men on 1 Nov was made good only by enlarging
its recruiting area to encompass the whole of Quebec province,
where the air had been cleared by the victory of the Liberal
Party in the election of 25 Oct (28). Within the 2nd Canadian
Division (as of 20 Dec),

*Medical categories, as set forth in Physical Standards and
Instructions for the Examination of Recruits, 1938, were:

"A" Fit for general service.

Men perfectly fit mentally and physically for all
active service conditions of actual warfare in
any climate, who are able to march, can see to
shoot, and hear well.

"B" Fit for service abroad (but not for general
service).

Men free from serious organic defects, able to
stand active service conditions on lines of com-
munication; who are able to march at least five
miles, see to shoot with glasses and hear well.

"C" Fit for service in Canada only.

Men free from serious organic disease, who are
able to stand home service conditions and under-
take duties chiefly of a sedentary character,
able to walk five miles.

"D" Temporarily unfit.

"E" Unfit for service in Categories "A", "B" and
"C".

Almost as soon as recruiting began it was realized that the vis-
ion requirements for the several categories were too high. Medi-
cal Boards were instructed, with effect from 9 Sep 39, that pros-
pective recruits in possession of glasses correcting their vision
to the required standards were to be categorized "AV", "BV" or
"CV", if in all other respects they fell into one of these accep-
table categories. Such personnel became eligible for enlistment
only to a limited extent, however, as they were specifically
excluded from serving in field units (23).
Le Régiment de la Chaudière* was 466 men under strength and The South Saskatchewan Regiment was lacking 334 other ranks (29).

29. By the end of the year virtually the whole of the 1st Canadian Division had reached the United Kingdom and a "third flight" of corps troops (or ancillary) units was being groomed to follow. The growth of the Canadian Active Service Force had been as follows (30):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Nursing Sisters</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2943</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>54844</td>
<td>57868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4376</td>
<td>4620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3633</td>
<td>4024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>2401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3860</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>64902</td>
<td>68913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although recruiting for tradesmen was not re-opened until February 1940 and general recruiting until 18 Mar, there was a steady trickle during the winter to provide reinforcements for units overseas (see para 81). There were enough 'starry-eyed' idealists and men who had "got down on their luck" in the thirties to meet such demands.

30. From a financial point of view the Canadian Government was trying to fight the war on a stringent, peace-time type of budget and it was impossible, therefore, to enlist and equip more men than could be covered by the available financial appropriation (31). Furthermore, although the information did not get beyond the Cabinet War Committee, before signing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan Agreement on 17 Dec Prime Minister Mackenzie King received assurance from the British Government that air training should retain precedence over any other form of assistance sought from Canada. On 12 Feb 40 the Canadian Prime Minister admitted to the members of the Cabinet War Committee that the only reason he had told the House of Commons on 25 Jan that a 2nd Canadian Division would be sent overseas "as soon as may be possible" (32) had been to keep the question out of the forthcoming election campaign. The large majority obtained by the Liberal Party on 26 Mar would appear to have convinced the Government that a policy of moderate participation in the War was desired by the Canadian people (33). Indeed, as late as 20 Apr the view was expressed during the course of a meeting at Canada House attended by the Minister of National Defence, that "a balanced Canadian Corps of two divisions and ancillary troops might prove to be the maximum which Canada could maintain by voluntary recruiting in a war of long duration" (34). Generals McNaughton and Odlum had then emphasized that it would be more effective to keep such a formation at full strength than to have a larger establishment under strength by reason of insufficient reinforcements.

*La Régiment de la Chaudière had been mobilized as a machine gun battalion for the French-speaking brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division. Following a reorganization of the divisional order of battle it became surplus to requirements and with effect from 24 May 40 became part of the 3rd Canadian Division.
Advent of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940

31. The belief that the War could be won without putting large numbers of Canadians into uniform suffered a jolt on 10 May 40. As the Anglo-French forces fell back, and the myth of the Maginot Line was exploded, the people of the democracies were brought to the realization that this War no longer could be fought chiefly by economic means. The very existence of the British Commonwealth was soon at stake: if the United Kingdom was vanquished then the continent of North America might well be Hitler's next objective in his search for 'Lebensraum'. That the Germans had more immediate plans was beside the point. More and more Canadians began to clamour for active service.

32. Following his return to Canada the Minister of National Defence reported to his colleagues of the Cabinet War Committee on 17 May that the United Kingdom was completely unprepared for mobile warfare. The Prime Minister told his colleagues that the situation was acute and they must decide what must be done to help the common cause. (The telegram of 10 May offering assistance to the British Government had included the suggestion that the despatch overseas of the 2nd Canadian Division might be accelerated.) (35). The mobilization of a 3rd Canadian Division and creation of a Canadian Corps were approved but the latter's expansion to three divisions was left to later discussion. Once again units were selected so as to give appropriate representation to all parts of the country.

33. On 27 May authority was given to mobilize the Infantry battalions of a fourth division from the N.P.A.M. so that home defence forces would still be the equivalent of two divisions after the 2nd Canadian Division departed for overseas. (Contributions planned for the defence of the United Kingdom and the Atlantic area would leave Canada virtually undefended and prompted Prime Minister King to suggest to the Cabinet War Committee on 29 May that a Ministry of Home Defence should be established. The Minister of National Defence considered that a Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces would be more appropriate to deal with internal security problems.) The balance of a 4th Canadian Division was ordered to mobilize in early June and somewhat later further units were authorized: the most important of these were nine further infantry battalions, five motorcycle regiments, a Canadian Forestry Corps of 20 companies for overseas service and additional coast defence units. (The haste with which these mobilizations were ordered and carried through made it almost inevitable the principle of territorial representation should be relaxed at the expense of French-speaking units.) The Adjutant-General had been opposed to opening wide the doors for enlistment until there was sufficient accommodation and equipment but, because of public clamour for action, he was overruled (37). (More strenuous efforts were to be made, however, to obtain equipment and accommodation.) Permanent army recruiting offices were opened all across Canada to handle the influx of volunteers. Older veterans of the First World War could enlist in the Veterans Home Guard, authorized on 24 May for active service in Canada and subsequently re-named the Veterans Guard of Canada.

*Most immediate military assistance was the despatch of an infantry battalion to Newfoundland, a garrison battalion to relieve British troops in Jamaica and Bermuda and three infantry battalions ('Z' Force) to Iceland.

**Pre-war planners had considered that two divisions, or their equivalent, should be retained in Canada to meet the needs of home defence and this thought had been continuously kept in mind (35).
Meantime, opposition members in the Canadian House of Commons were trying to prod the Prime Minister into doing far more. When the House opened on 23 May, the day following the institution of more strict manpower measures in the United Kingdom, Mr T.L. Church asked whether any national registration would be undertaken to determine fully the resources available for the war effort. Prime Minister Mackenzie King replied that this question "like all others that require a statement of government policy, will be answered as the policies of the government of Canada are announced" (39). At this time the C.C.F. (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) Party was urging the conscription of manpower, wealth and industry for a full prosecution of the war, as was the Dominion Executive Council of the Canadian Legion (40). Veterans organizations and newspapers inimical to the Government were urging further that General McNaughton should be brought back to Canada to direct the war effort (41). The question of a national registration was raised again on 14 Jun by Hon. R.B. Hanson, Parliamentary Leader of the Opposition, following the Prime Minister's statement pledging support to France in her hour of need. Once again, however, the latter merely intimated that the question was under consideration (42).

Only on 18 Jun, the day that the French Government sought armistice terms from Adolf Hitler, did Prime Minister Mackenzie King announce in the House of Commons that a bill* although conscription for military service had been introduced into the United Kingdom in the months preceding the war, it was feared that organized labour would not accept industrial conscription and so no steps were taken, even after its outbreak, to enable the Government to control and transfer civilian labour according to national needs. Therefore, as late as April 1940 there still were 1,000,000 unemployed industrial workers while skilled artisans already were at a premium. With the appointment of a trade union leader, Mr Ernest Bevin, as Minister of Labour and National Service in Mr Churchill's National Government, however, it proved possible to take the necessary logical action.

While Prime Minister Churchill was conferring with Premier Paul Reynaud on 22 May the British House of Commons approved the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, in all its stages, in less than three hours. Regulations made under this Act enabled the Minister of Labour and National Service to direct any person to perform such service as might be directed. After the Trade Union Congress had given its blessing on 25 May, union restrictions could be relaxed for the duration of the war, skilled tasks split up and greater employment given to a greater extent on industry. The registration of men was speeded up, with the result that by the end of July all those aged 34 or under had been recorded.

During June, July and August 1940 the British Army received 275,000 men. Since this was far beyond the capacity of the training organization 120 infantry battalions were formed and subsequently organized into 'country' divisions for employment on coast defence. Later, as more equipment became available, part of this manpower was used to provide corps and army troops (38).
would be introduced at once "to confer upon the government special emergency powers to mobilize all our human and material resources for the defence of Canada" (43). The following paragraphs of Mr Mackenzie King's speech were very relevant:

So far as man-power is concerned, it will relate solely and exclusively to the defence of Canada on our own soil and in our own territorial waters. It will enable the government to make the most efficient use of our man-power for the varied needs of modern machine warfare. It is of the utmost importance to realize that success in war to-day depends upon the use of men for the kind of work for which they are best fitted. The armed forces are only a part of the essential equipment of war. The skilled worker in the factory, the transport worker and the farmer, to mention only a few, are as essential to the effective prosecution of war as the soldier, the sailor and the airman. The mobilization of our resources will not, however, be confined to requiring the services of men and women. The government will have power under the provisions of the bill equally to call property and wealth, material resources and industry to the defence of Canada.

The bill is intended to remove any doubt as to the power of the government and the will of parliament that the whole material resources of the country should be available whenever they are required to meet the needs of the war. The operation of the measure will be confined to the period of the war.

Recruitment for service overseas will be maintained on a voluntary basis. No difficulty has been experienced and no difficulty is anticipated in raising by the voluntary system all the men required for service outside Canada. The bill to be introduced to-day in no way affects the raising of men to serve in the armed forces overseas. Once again I wish to repeat my undertaking, frequently given, that no measure for the conscription of men for overseas service will be introduced by the present administration.

A complete inventory of Canada's man-power and other resources, properly classified, affords a necessary basis for some of the further essential measures of home security and defence, which I have announced. A national registration of Canada's man-power will accordingly be instituted at once. Let me emphasize the fact that this registration will have nothing to do with the recruitment of men for overseas service (44).

It was planned further to establish a new Department of National War Services to co-ordinate the activities of existing voluntary war services* and to mobilize and direct the activities of Canadian citizens towards war ends.

*Orders in Council P.C. 2620 of 9 Sep and 2636 of 11 Sep 39 had established a Voluntary Service Registration Bureau to direct and have general control of the tabulation, organization and co-ordination of all offers of voluntary assistance for the war effort. A separate section was entrusted with the registration of all university graduates and undergraduates in technical fields. The results of a voluntary registration of women, undertaken a few months before the outbreak of war, were passed to this Bureau also (45).
The acting Minister of National Defence* gave a more detailed statement of what the Government was trying to accomplish. It was felt that energies should be directed to:

(a) The task of recruiting men for service in the Canadian active Service force;

(b) The immediate training of certain non-permanent active militia units and home guard reserve;

(c) The training of men who will be called up under the legislation to which the Prime Minister has referred (46).

According to Mr Power the Canadian Active Service Force was enlisting recruits at the rate of approximately 800 a day. Steps were being taken to replenish the N.P.A.M. which had provided units for the C.A.S.F. and authority had been given to all Infantry regiments not yet mobilized, as well as certain other N.P.A.M. units to recruit to establishment and carry on training, including attendance at summer camps. With regard to compulsory training he stated:

... Every able bodied man in Canada will be given an opportunity of training in the use of arms, so as to come to the defence of the home land if necessary. The procedure will be that men will in due course be called up for a period of training so as to be prepared for the active defence of this dominion. The training, after due consideration for the requirements of the naval and air forces, will be entrusted to units of the non-permanent active militia which will be recruited voluntarily or filled under the powers of the new legislation according as the facilities for training and accommodation permit.

The length of the period of training will be determined by regulation. Whether this will be for a continuous period of three months or for a lesser period depends: (a) on the advice of the technical officers of the department; (b) on the requirements of industrial and productive man-power as shown by a survey to be immediately undertaken (47).

37. The Prime Minister then moved the first reading of the Bill and asked that it might be allowed to pass all three readings that day, an action which had been accomplished at Westminster on 22 May (see para 34). Due to discussion by C.C.F. members of the elimination of the profit motive from war and the more general debate on the question of home defence as opposed to overseas service, the Bill had received only its second reading when the House rose at 11.35 p.m. It was not until 20 June,

after considerable further debate, that it received third reading. The remaining procedure was accomplished quickly and the National Resources Mobilization Act became law on the following day (See Appendix "A" for text).

38. Not until 12 Jul, however, was a bill introduced into the House of Commons to create a Department of National War Services. Hon. James A. Gardiner assumed this portfolio in addition to that of Agriculture and Hon. Mr Justice T.C. Davis became an Associate Deputy Minister. Organized and directed by this new department, and locally conducted by voluntary workers, a National Registration of all males and females, 16 years of age and over, was held during the three days 19, 20 and 21 Aug. The cards then were passed to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Nearly 8,000,000 men and women registered, of whom 802,458 were found to be unmarried men, or childless widowers, between the ages of 21 and 45 (as of 15 Jul 40) (48). Issued as Order in Council P.O. 4185 (27 Aug 40) the National War Services Regulations (Recruits) 1940 specified that these unmarried men and childless widowers should be liable to undergo and perform military training within Canada and the territorial waters thereof as should be required of them by proclamation of the Governor in Council. The following persons were, however, excepted:

(a) Judges of Superior, District or County Courts of Justice;

(b) Members of the Clergy or Religious Orders;

(c) Regular Clergymen or Ministers of religious denominations;

(d) Members of the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada on Active Service and Cadets entered at the Royal Military College of Canada;

(e) Permanently employed workers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and of Provincial Police Forces;

(f) Permanently employed members of Police Forces and Fire Brigades of any incorporated city;

(g) Permanently employed workers and officers of all penitentiaries, prisons and lunatic asylums, or mental hospitals (49).

39. Recruiting for the N.P.A.M. officially had come to an end on 15 Aug, after which entry was to be permitted only to men who had undergone 30-days compulsory military training. On 29 Jul there had been only 47,733 all ranks still serving in the N.P.A.M. but by the end of August the 91 units authorized to recruit to establishment (whether or not they had provided a C.A.S.F. unit) and the 29 reserve companies authorized for the Veterans Guard of Canada had a strength of 107,219 all ranks (50). Although a good part of this phenomenal increase must be attributed to the desire of older men "to do their bit" there can be little doubt that a considerable number of young men joined the N.P.A.M. to avoid the stigma of having to perform compulsory military training. Speaking of the men who would be used to replenish the N.P.A.M. the Minister of National Defence had told the House of Commons on 29 Jul that:

*The other appointment as Associate Deputy Minister was filled only on 17 Oct by Major-General L.R. Lamleche who had been, however, assisting with the preparations of the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits).
I should like to stress again that all these members of the non-permanent active militia, whether they have been enlisted or been called for training, are to be regarded on exactly the same basis. Training is being given in order that they may be ready and able to defend their country. The call for training is a summons to the highest service which any citizen can render. They are all Canadian soldiers. They go to the same kind of camps and belong to the same regiments, and there will be no distinction whatever between them.

It must be remembered that there are many young men in the country who have already offered themselves for active service in special branches and who have not been taken on because there were no vacancies in that particular branch. There will also be men who would have been ready to enlist in the non-permanent active militia but who, because of their being regarded as essential in industry, were convinced that they could better serve for the time being in helping produce essential war supplies. These men will be called for training as their age class is reached, and it would be unfortunate indeed if any line of distinction were drawn between them and those who had enlisted (51).

(40) 30-Day Training

Meanwhile, the construction across Canada of 39 Militia Training Centres against an opening date of 9 Oct had been proceeding. Centres were located in the vicinity of the N.P.A.M. units for which they were to train reserves but localities where there would be a concentration of C.A.S.F. troops during the coming winter were avoided (52). The camps varied in size and, according to the density of population in the area encompassed, had one, two, three or four training companies. Notwithstanding the increase in relative cost of setting up small training centres Government policy was to maintain as much decentralization as possible: both business and local pride would benefit by having men trained in their home locality. Administrative and training staffs were provided by officers and other ranks from the local N.P.A.M. units called out for full time service. For example, the four-company Training Centre at Cornwall, Ontario (No. 31) had a staff drawn from, and would provide recruits for, Le Régiment de Hull, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, The Governor General’s Foot Guards and The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders. This staff, and that for the Brockville and Peterborough Training Centres also in Military District No. 3 underwent special training at Petawawa Military Camp during the period 4 Sep - 2 Oct (53).

41. Order in Council P.C. 4671 of 11 Sep directed that unmarried men and childless widowers aged 21-24 should be called for 30 days military training. On 23 Sep Militia (Special) Regulations were issued, Canada was divided into 13 administrative divisions, corresponding to the Military Districts in most
instances† with a Divisional Registrar made responsible to the Minister of National War Services in Ottawa. With a duplicate National Registration card of every designated man in his office the Registrar was responsible for selecting the men required by the Army for each training intake, plus a percentage to compensate for medical rejection. It was planned to hold eight 30-day training periods during each year. Thus, if the total accommodation of 30,000 were filled for each period a total of 240,000 young men would receive training annually. Men so selected were mailed an Order-Medical Examination (54). All medical practitioners in good standing had been authorized to examine such men, using a copy of Physical Standards and Instructions for the Examination of Recruits, 1938 as a guide, and were paid a fee of $1.00 for each examination. The medical practitioner then forwarded the medical report, together with the Order-Medical Examination, to the Registrar, who was provided with a medical adviser to interpret borderline cases. If the Registrar was of the opinion that a man was unfit for training a certificate was issued to the effect that he had been medically examined but, because of his physical condition, would not be called for the time being. At this time it was considered that all those placed in a medical category as low as "C-1" would be acceptable for military training (55).

42. This procedure did not prove to be very satisfactory. Family-doctor relationships, failure to understand properly the physical requirements necessary for men engaged in modern warfare and the inability of overworked elderly physicians to devote sufficient time to such medical examinations (when their younger colleagues were in uniform) resulted in certain borderline cases being passed and acceptable men rejected. The extent to which borderline cases were weeded out during the subsequent R.C.A.M.O. medical examination at the Militia Training Centre may be gauged from the following statistics (56):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Military District Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>London, Ont.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Toronto, Ont.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Kingston, Ont.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Port Arthur, Ont.</td>
<td>(in M.D. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Montreal, P.Q.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Quebec, P.Q.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Halifax, N.S.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Saint John, N.B.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Charlottetown, P.E.I.</td>
<td>(in M.D. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Winnipeg, Man.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Vancouver, B.C.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Regina, Sask.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Edmonton, Alta.</td>
<td>13 (Calgary)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In most cases these administrative divisions were centred in the same city as the Military District Headquarters.
43. Every man was advised at the time he received his Order-Medical Examination that he could apply for postponement of military training once he had been medically examined. Such applications, however, had to be made in writing to the Registrar within eight (later 14) days of the date on the Order. Applications for postponement were heard by a National War Services Board, one or more of which were established in each administrative division under a chairman who held an appointment as judge in that province. Although these Boards normally possessed more than three members this was the maximum number which could sit at any one meeting. Except for farmers who could be granted postponement until further notice, no postponement order could be issued in the first instance for more than six months. Extensions could be granted, although the Board always had the right to cancel an order at any time (57). Thus training might be postponed for the physically fit, but not avoided, and civilian jobs had to be retained for those undergoing training.

44. In the case of students, postponement might be granted for succeeding years provided that academic standing remained satisfactory. Most colleges and universities were planning to undertake a compulsory programme of 110 hours military training in each academic year, plus two weeks summer camp, for those who were physically fit, while training in the Canadian Officers Training Corps (C.O.T.C.) continued on a voluntary basis (58). (Such a programme was to continue, and indeed expand, as the War progressed but students continued on postponement only so long as their academic standing remained satisfactory. Such a principle came to apply later to older students still attending secondary schools.)

45. National War Services Boards also granted postponements to Doukhobors, Mennonites, members of certain other religious sects (59) and men whose conscientious objections to military service were recognized as being sincere (Appendix N).

46. Two weeks before a training period was to begin either Orders-Military Training or a notification that they would not be called for the present was mailed to all men for whom satisfactory medical reports had been received so that employers might be notified and any necessary personal arrangements made before the date of reporting (60). A list of those called was supplied to the D.O.C.J.'s representative in each Military District. Penalties were set forth for failure to comply with this procedure.

47. All across Canada single men reported for training on 9 Oct. The diarist of the Militia Training Centre (No. 131) at Camrose, Alberta, noted that, although 933 men had reported as fit for training, some 55 were rejected by the camp R.C.A.M.C. staff as being medically unfit (61). The Militia Training Centre (No. 31) at Cornwall also reported itself under strength (62). The war diary of the latter noted on 11 Oct:

Training continues on a fine day as per syllabus. This Syllabus is in a very concentrated form and covers a very wide range of training for these young recruits. If anything it tries to cover too much in too short a time. It is therefore very exhausting on both recruits and instructors particularly for the junior sub-alterns.
Again on 22 Nov this diarist commented on the second class as follows:

On the whole, the recruits are a very fair type and of almost the same quality as the first group. There appear to be more farmers in this group. This was due to farmers having their service postponed for harvesting season.

The third class started to arrive on 9 Jan 41 and was composed largely of men who were aged 22-3; in only Military Districts 4 and 13 were 24-year olds called. After undergoing the same type of training, modified by winter conditions, this class departed on 7 Feb. The Minister of National Defence did admit in the House of Commons on 11 Mar that there could have been only 22 days of actual training in the 30-day period but he insisted that it had been the "most intensive and the best twenty-two days of practical training we have had in this country since confederation" (63). However, although each man was given an opportunity of expressing a preference for voluntary service in the Navy, Army, or Air Force, no provision was made for actually accepting enlistments and the 81,878 men trained merely became members of the Non Permanent Active Militia.

(v) General Crerar's More Realistic Programmes

When Major-General H.D.G. Crerar was brought back to Ottawa early in July 1940 to become Chief of the General Staff he found that "the pressure of public opinion to 'get on with the war' had developed to such a height that there was a tendency on the part of the Government in general, and this Department in particular [i.e. National Defence], to go in all directions at highest possible speed" (65). He was able, however, to convince the New Minister of National Defence, Hon. J.L. Ralston, of the need for adopting a rational policy which would lead towards a balanced and progressive development of the maximum military effort of which Canada was capable.

Co-ordination of the three Armed Forces was through the Defence Council as before, but there now were separate Ministers and Deputy Ministers for Air and Naval Services, and Mr Ralston's primary responsibility as Minister of National Defence was for the Army. Moreover, Mr Ralston had secured the services of (Lt.-Col.) A.A. Magee (President of Barclay's Bank (Canada)), (Lt.-Col.) G.S. Currie (prominent Montreal chartered accountant) and (Major) Victor Sifton (newspaper owner) as executive assistants. An editorial appearing in The Winnipeg Free Press of 6 Jul had spoken for the general public:

"Defence is now "Big Business", the biggest business Canada has and will have while this country remains in danger. Its direction and control must therefore lie in the hands of the very ablest men Canada has. War is no longer

*During the first two training periods the number of 30-day recruits who expressed a willingness to volunteer for "active service" was 19,805 (Navy 2667, Army 7269, and R.C.A.F. 9869) (64).
the manipulation of bodies of infantry. It is a technical profession dependent for its success in war on a score of skilled trades. The old days of drill ground end field manœuvre are gone. Armies must be led and directed by specialists whose acquaintance with Field Service Regulations, necessary enough, is secondary to their organizing, administrative and technical knowledge, and who have the ability (which civil industry must have or perish) of rapid adjustment to ever changing conditions.

Newcomers therefore became Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Master-General of the Ordnance.

General Crerar considered that the Government's compulsory military training and service programme was a "very superficial scheme for training and utilizing the man-power so called up" but it was too late to change its basis (66). In his opinion, all that could be accomplished in such a limited time and with no weapons to train with, was to make such men "military minded". His own views were set forth in a memorandum prepared on 3 Sep for the Minister of National Defence:

The present war has shown that man-power armies cannot resist the German mechanized land and air forces. To do this we must have offensive arms, i.e. air and armoured forces, with the necessary defensive elements. This means that our forces may be relatively small but must be highly trained.

Individual training requires 4 months; collective training a further 6 months continuously, thus the programme contemplated under the Natural Resources Mobilization Scheme, and the N.P.A.M. Training Scheme, will be inadequate. We don't need the number of men for which those schemes cater, but we require longer and more thorough training for a smaller number of men.

We should assert the principle and put it into practice that men may be compelled to serve for the defence of Canada in this hemisphere. The only volunteers we should have are those who volunteer for overseas service, also those who are required to form permanent cadres of formations.

Once this principle is established, a detailed plan of organization for the Canadian Army can be built up, but if home defence and training for it are left mainly on the voluntary, part-time militia basis, no sound system of defence can be organized (67).

Lack of equipment now and shortage of volunteers later would limit the size of Canada's armed forces. General Crerar considered that a force of five to seven divisions, of which one or more should be armoured, might well be all that Canada could maintain overseas in a war of several years duration. Although national morale had required bolstering during the weeks following
the British evacuation from Dunkirk the N.P.A.M. was not suit-
able for assuming the home defence role. For one thing, many
of its members were employed in industry or essential services;
if these donned uniform there would be dislocation of the nation-
al economy. Home defence should, therefore, be left to men en-
rolled by conscription.

52. In this appreciation General Crerar dealt with
three possibilities: defeat of the United Kingdom, peace by com-
promise and outright victory. In even the most favourable case,
the world would be left in a troubled state. With the United
States then attempting to expand its army by conscription under
the Selective Training and Service Act Canada could not afford
to take proportionately less action. Armies on the old model
would not do, General Crerar believed:

... So our forces of the future must be based
on mechanized power, which includes artillery,
armoured fighting vehicles and close-support
aircraft. Man, on the battlefield, is only
needed as eyes and brain for the machine-
powered weapons; in the mass, he is merely a
target inviting destruction. We need only
mobilize a limited portion of our manpower
for the actual fighting (but what we do select
should be of high quality); on the other hand,
all the resources of the nation should be mo-
obilizable to produce the machines needed for
success (68).

The second requirement for defence was the capacity to manufac-
ture all essential kinds of war material. Manufacturing capa-
city should be built up in the knowledge that it would be vital
to future security even if not ready in time for the existing
war. Finally, armies must take the offensive to win and for
this they would need a higher standard of training: "It is no
longer reasonable to believe that the first-line defence of a
country can be made up of voluntary, part-time militiamen, stif-

tened by a few professionals" (69).

53. The defence of Canada would require a 
minimum of two infantry divisions and an armoured brigade group, which
would have to be maintained on a permanent basis (see para 33). He
considered that the principle should be established of util-
izing men called out under N.R.M.A. (i.e. National Resources
Mobilization Act) to form or complete units (apart from a cadre
of volunteers) designed for home defence only. If sufficient
volunteers could be spared from the overseas reinforcement
stream then certain units might be raised on a C.A.S.F. basis.

54. To be useful, compulsory training should last
at least four months, which was the minimum period necessary
for "individual training". 75,000 men with four months' training
would be more use than 500,000 men with a 30 days' training.
Should the situation require the despatch overseas
during 1941 of the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions and the Armoured
Brigade; further 5th and 6th Divisions could be completed with
N.R.M.A. personnel who had completed four months' training. Men
not needed to complete such establishments might be dispersed
to civilian life but remain subject to recall as reservists.

55. In a later Appreciation of 25 Sep General
Crerar pointed out that 1941 should be devoted to building up

*Its units later were utilized in the formation of the 1st
Canadian Army Tank Brigade and the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Di-
vision (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap IX, paras 64-9).
resources. While he did not consider that a German invasion of the United Kingdom would be successful neither did he feel that the British would have the resources to undertake large scale operations on the continent of Europe during 1941. He reiterated what he had told the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Jul—the front line was the British Isles—and the main effort should be developed to building up the Canadian Army Overseas in a "balanced and co-ordinated manner" (70). He recommended, therefore, that:

(c) A Canadian Corps of three divisions should be completed by the early spring of 1941, and should be joined by an Armoured Brigade Group as soon as possible thereafter.

(d) While the date the 4th Division would be required overseas cannot as yet be determined, we should be prepared for its despatch in the latter part of 1941.

(e) Subsequent additions to the Canadian Forces overseas should be armoured forces rather than Infantry.

(f) Provision should be made for replacing the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the Armoured Brigade Group by equivalent forces for home defence.

(g) The unmobilized portion of the N.P.A.M. will become the Reserve units and formations of the Canadian Army, with as their principal functions, the holding of partially trained personnel and the completion of their training (71).

In a complementary memorandum, dated the previous day (24 Sep), General Crerar had elaborated his proposals for a Canadian Army Programme for 1941. These included definite recommendations that units should be selected at once so that additional formations could be raised to maintain the necessary mobile reserve in Canada after the departure of existing formations. With the expectation that compulsory training would be extended to four months he recommended that N.R.M.A. soldiers could be used to complete the strength of such home defence divisions. The importance placed by the C.G.S. on munitions production and technical training may be gauged from the following extract:

The power of the modern army resides in its arms and equipment—not in the number of men in its ranks. Our first objective in military organization must then be to produce the arms and equipment we need for our Army. In the unhappy event of the defeat of the United Kingdom, production of arms on this continent would be absolutely vital; we cannot defend Canada by masses of half-trained men with a variety of rifles in their hands. Therefore at this stage nothing in the way of military training should be allowed to interfere with production. Specifically, requests by war industries for exemption of key men from the training scheme should be granted. Later on
adjustments can be made so that no man will evade his proper responsibilities, but it is better now to risk some "draft-dodging" than to risk disorganizing production.

A machine-power army is primarily dependent on technicians to keep it in operation. Getting the requisite number of trained men, in competition with the services and with the demands of war industries is one of the most difficult problems with which we shall be faced, and it can only be solved by increasing facilities for technical training (72).

57. General Crerar further wanted the existing term "Militia" replaced by that of "Canadian Army", with "Active" and "Reserve" components, which would be more in line with Canada's status of independent nationhood². For the Canadian Army Overseas, however, military service should be voluntary:

What the war will demand of Canada in the way of military effort in the more distant future cannot be clearly foreseen, but it is presently the opinion of the General Staff that the most effective sort of action will be in the direction of raising and equipping of further armoured formations, rather than infantry. This, it may be expected, will keep the demands for man-power for overseas operations to what may be met by the voluntary system. Ten Armoured Divisions (the number the Germans had when they overthrew France) contain only 80,000 men, and Canada has already raised 162,664 men in the C.A.S.F.

While there are military grounds for preferring volunteers in an overseas army, which should be a corps d'elite, principally designed for offensive action, this does not affect the principle that service in the defence forces in Canada should be compulsory for all fit male Canadians (73).

58. The Army programme for 1941 was presented to the Cabinet War Committee on 1 Oct. After some discussion the Prime Minister pointed out that it had been agreed at the outset, and the British Government had concurred, that the development of air power was of paramount importance (see para 26). At subsequent meetings the possibility of effecting economies in the proposed Navy, Army and Air Force programmes was investigated and the question of increasing the compulsory military training period to four months was discussed. As it was the 30-day training period was causing dislocation to industry and the Cabinet War Committee decided (5 Oct) that letters should be sent to National War Services Mobilization Boards instructing that postponements should be given to key workers in war industry. Tentative approval for a four months compulsory

²This re-designation was approved by General Order 273 of 29 Nov 40.
military training scheme seems to have been given on 31 Oct.* but the possibility of men going to industry, the Navy or R.C.A.F. after completion of 30-days training still remained under consideration. At the meeting of 4 Dec Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated definitely that manpower should be directed primarily to war industry, R.C.A.F. and the Navy, where needs were the most urgent. All information continued to point to the vital importance of naval and air power. A large army would mean more equipment and thus more men in industry. Regarding the possibility that had been broached, during Mr Gardiner's recent visit to the United Kingdom, of Canadian troops being despatched to Egypt, the Prime Minister stated that he personally was opposed to any course which would result in the sacrifice of Canadian lives—unless this should be absolutely necessary. He was interested primarily in the total contribution which Canada could make to the war effort: despatch of troops to Egypt would prejudice this build up. Mr Lapointe agreed with him. At the further meeting of 18 Dec it was decided that no large army would be needed before 1942.

59. During this period the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff were visiting the United Kingdom and completing arrangements for the formation of a Canadian Corps. Prime Minister Churchill informed MrRalston that there had been no thought of sending Canadian troops to Egypt. Conversations with General McNaughton and the War Office did result, however, in agreement being reached for the despatch overseas of the 3rd Canadian Division, balance of Corps troops, and an army tank brigade during the first half of 1941 and an armoured division during the autumn (75). While no commitment was entered into with the War Office at this time regarding the 4th Canadian Division, Mr Ralston later told the members of the Cabinet War Committee (10 Jul 41) that a wish had been expressed for its despatch overseas by the summer of 1942 (see para 67).

60. On 28 Jan 41 Prime Minister King warned his Cabinet War Committee colleagues of the danger of undertaking a war programme beyond Canada's capacity. The Canadian Army's overseas programme was approved but the Committee members agreed that the Armed Forces' programmes for the coming fiscal year should be adjusted so as not to cost more than $1,500,000,000. General Crerar subsequently recommended that the international situation had been sufficiently improved by General Wavell's initial successes in Libya to make it militarily sound to postpone the mobilization of the 5th and 6th Divisions, utilize certain 4th Division artillery, engineer, army service corps and ordnance units to complete the armoured division and delay the reconstitution of the 4th Canadian Division (76).

61. The question of extending the period of compulsory military training was again brought before the Cabinet War Committee on 27 Jan and it was suggested to the Minister of National Defence that, after two months military training, men might elect to enlist in the Navy or R.C.A.F. or be withdrawn.

*Speaking in the House of Commons on 15 Nov 40 the Minister of National Defence had reminded the members that the 50-day training period "was never unchangeable or final." Later in this speech he added: "The war committee of the cabinet has had the matter of the length of the training period under review repeatedly in connection with the manpower problem, and we are now considering the further step of lengthening the training period to four months and reducing the aggregate number of men to be called from civil occupations in the year." Such a step would tend to prevent undue disturbances in industry, but would involve more extended postponements of training if war industry was to expand (74).

**Held ministerial portfolios of Agriculture and National War Services.
to war industry if they were key personnel. The C.G.S. personally was in favour of total exemption from compulsory military training for key personnel in war industry but had agreed to such a compromise for political reasons and to avoid internal dissension. Any proposal, such as that advanced by Hon. James G. Gardiner, that compulsory training should end after two months was impracticable, however, since such men "would still have only one-half the training which has been proved by experience to be necessary to enable them to take their places, as effective fighting men, in the ranks of an operational unit" (77). On the following day the Cabinet War Committee accepted the recommendation for four months compulsory training, subject to the proviso inserted by Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe, that this extension should not be accepted as a prelude for compulsory military service overseas (78). Not until 20 Feb was a proclamation issued: this introduced four months training for the 21-year-olds but reduced the call on manpower somewhat by cancelling the earlier proclamation of 11 Sep 40 designating those aged 21, 22, 23 and 24 as being liable for military training (see para 41). Not until 18 Mar were revised instructions issued as Reserve Army (Special) Regulations, 1941 by Order in Council (P.C. 1910).

Speaking to the House of Commons on 11 Mar, during the debate on the War Appropriation Bill, the Minister of National Defence made public the Canadian Army Programme for 1941. Following the example of both the British and United States Armies all training would be conducted by Training Centres. Since four months was the minimum time required to train both reinforcements for the Canadian Army (Active) and N.R.M.A. personnel for a possible home defence role it had been decided to train both types of recruits in the same Training Centres, utilizing the existing 39 Militia Training Centres and the 22 Training Centres then training reinforcements for the Canadian Army (Active). The men were to be referred to as 'A' and 'R' Recruits respectively. Approximately two-thirds of the existing Militia Training Centres would become Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centres: the remainder would become Advanced Training Centres (additional to those created from the existing corps training centres), (two) Officers Training Centres, N.C.O.s. training schools and centres for specialist training. At the conclusion of two months basic training all recruits would move to Advanced Training Centres to receive a further two months instruction peculiar to the Corps with which they would serve. Available and projected accommodation would permit a regular monthly intake of 10,000 recruits (79).

Members of the Opposition expressed doubt as to whether the 21-year old single men and childless widowers would suffice to maintain this training programme and there was some quibbling in the answers given to the House of Commons. The Minister of National Defence did state, however, in reply to the Leader of the Opposition, that:

I am advised by officers in whom I have the fullest confidence that, having regard to everything we can foresee, this plan will take care of our needs for the defence of Canada provided recruiting—end in spite of what the hon. member who preceded me has suggested—keeps up to a reasonable degree. I have not the doubts and fears entertained by my hon. friend in that respect. If the call comes, I think the men of Canada will answer (80).

63.