January to May (incl) 1945  
1 month intense  
1 month normal  
1 month quiet  
6 months

N.W.E.

December 1944  
1 month quiet

January to June (incl) 1945  
2 1/2 months intense  
3 months quiet  
1/2 month quiet

Subsequent events were to render these forecasts invalid (see paras 604-5 and 617), but even as early as 20 Dec 44 the V.C.G.S. had warned the Adjutant-General not to disregard the Army Commander's words of caution: General Crerar had warned that such long term forecasts could not be considered reliable (10).

611. The Adjutant-General's tables, worked out at 31 Jan 44, showed the total estimated casualties for 1945 as 4126 officers and 49,120 other ranks (11). On the estimated basis of 50 per cent "recoverable casualties" (70 per cent of whom would be fit to return to front line duty) the total non-recoverable casualties for the first six months of 1945 would be approximately 35,000 all ranks. Against this it would be possible to place approximately 3,000 "recoverables" from immediate casualties and about 10,800 who had become casualties during 1944. If 35,000 men were despatched from Canada it would be possible to show a total of just over 48,000 against a loss of 55,000 all ranks. However, as General Murchie pointed out on 9 Jan 45, although the 16,000 additional infantry reinforcements from Canada would move only over a period of several months, the actual casualties suffered during the last quarter of 1944 had been 12,000 less than anticipated (12).

612. Bearing these facts in mind a manpower programme was drawn up within the Adjutant-General's Branch: it was based on the strength return of the Canadian Army Overseas for 30 Nov 44 as projected for the first six months of 1945. As submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 27 Jan, this programme called for the despatch overseas of 45,048 other ranks* during the first six months of 1945, moving forward as follows (13):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Training Stream</th>
<th>Unit Withdrawals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945 G.S.</td>
<td>N.R.M.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>4888</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2625</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17513</td>
<td>4580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This figure had been obtained by adding a safety margin of 5187 other ranks to the following calculation:

Since the Adjutant-General's proposals envisaged the despatch overseas of a possible 25,000 V.R.M.A. soldiers it would become necessary to obtain further authorization from the Government once the 15,000 authorized by Order in Council P.C. 8891 of 23 Nov 44 had been placed on draft. Due to the widespread absenteeism and the fact that G.S. soldiers occupied a larger share of the February and March sailings it was never necessary to seek such authority (para 603).
Gross casualties (Jan-Jun incl) 49,120
Less casualties to be recovered during period 12,182
Net replacement required 36,938
Net loss due to rotation leave 4,220
41,158
Less seasonal decreases in sickness anticipated during period 1,297
Net total requirements 39,861

Furthermore, this figure of 45,048 other ranks was the greatest number of physically fit reinforcements it was believed could be provided. The Adjutant-General considered that this provision would provide somewhat better than a two months' pool of reinforcements overseas at "intense rates" of wastage. Provided that there was a continuous flow of men from Canada, and that the return of "recoverable casualties" had been estimated correctly, it was felt that such a reinforcement pool could be accepted. Although earlier programmes had called for a reinforcement pool overseas equivalent to three months' wastage at "intense" rates, replenished from Canada by numbers equivalent to the "non-recoverable" wastage, such had never existed in practice (14). (These calculations had been made without any reference to Brigadier deLalanne and the information he had been requested to obtain.) (15)

Although there was a possibility that intensive fighting might continue throughout the summer of 1945 General Murchie felt justified in recommending acceptance of this overseas pool of two months' reinforcements, after weighing the pros and cons, provided:

... it is a pool of effective reinforcements and that there can be a continuing flow from Canada of reinforcements, augmented by recoverable casualties, sufficient to ensure that the total pool is maintained with fit and available reinforcements at not less than the two months figure for each corps. As, however, it is not anticipated that the reinforcements in the pool would all be required at one time, it can be accepted that a portion of the pool retained by the UK may be in training.

... I consider that it [the programme] can be implemented from the numbers the Adjutant-General states are now serving in Canada. It will however be necessary to ensure that the proper numbers are made available for despatch as they are required. I expect many difficulties in carrying it to a successful conclusion. The results anticipated will be reduced to the extent that NMDA personnel selected for despatch do not, in fact, reach the boats, but I consider that the plan has a substantial measure of safety to offset such losses (16)

Since implementation of this programme did not necessitate any alteration to the authorized "manpower ceiling" for the Canadian Army Overseas those was no need to seek approval from the Cabinet War Committee; General McNaughton merely initialled the submission on 1 Feb 45 (17).

During his visit to C.M.H.Q. Brigadier deLalanne learned that a statement of the former Chief of Staff (General Stuart) had been misconstrued in Ottawa. General Stuart had written that he would be quite satisfied to accept the wasting down of the reinforcement pool of general duty infantrymen until
it equalled only two months wastage by the end of June 1945 provided that it had been built up to a satisfactory figure by the end of 1944 (18). Further confusion had resulted from the receipt of Brigadier Bostock's memorandum of 8 Nov, showing the following disposition of the two months' reserve of reinforcements actually available (19):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st Army Group:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In theatre</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In U.K.</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
<td>8 weeks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cdn Tps Italy: |            |        |
| In theatre    | 6 weeks    | 6 weeks |
| In U.K.       | 2 weeks    | 2 weeks |
| Total         | 8 weeks    | 8 weeks |

Brigadier Bostock had explained to Brigadier deLalanne, however, "that this was not intended to indicate any change in policy but was merely for purpose of comparison as it had never been expected that there would be maintained a full 3 months' pool of effective personnel readily available for the field" (20).

616. After considerable discussion at C.M.H.Q it was considered that the maintenance of First Canadian Army Overseas would require the despatch of 7300 reinforcements per month from Canada and that Ottawa should be informed accordingly. The whole subject of reinforcements was discussed with the Adjutant-General, following his arrival overseas, but no action was taken to modify the programme approved for 1945 or to amend the "manpower ceiling" (in order to show separately the increasing number of non-effectives) (21).

617. At this time there occurred another of those events that eased the Infantry reinforcement problem for the Canadian Army Overseas. Among the decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when they met at Malta during the last week of January on route to the Tripartite Conference at Yalta, was that up to five divisions might be transferred from Italy to assist General Eisenhower's final offensive in North-West Europe. The Canadian Government had been long hoping to re-unite its Army and now 1st Canadian Corps was selected to lead the way (22).

618. During January 1945 a draft of 10 officers and 1549 other ranks had been despatched from the United Kingdom to make good the shortages of general duty infantrymen within 1st Canadian Corps, along with 95 officers and 423 other ranks for other corps. A further 1000 general duty infantrymen had been earmarked for despatch in February to restore the reinforcement pool which on 27 Jan was reported to contain only 236 general duty infantrymen, while units had actual deficiencies of 683 other ranks (23). The February sailing of the draft was cancelled and the men, with the exception of those who had served previously with units of 1st Canadian Corps, were despatched to No 2 C.B.R.G. in North-West Europe (24).

619. It was 8 Feb, therefore, before General Montague could reply to General Murchie's telegram of 26 Jan (for information on the changing operational forecast) to the effect that, due to the pending move of 1st Canadian Corps (Operation "GOLDFLAKE"), it would not be possible to obtain any accurate forecast from its Commander. On the other hand, General Crerar had advised him as follows:

As a rough rule while I may be able approximately to translate effect of own operational intentions into terms of Cdn fmm activities for next couple of months I am not in a position to assess for such a period the results of enemy intentions against forces under my comd or the longer term course of
war. The best I can do is to give you end of each month the Cdn activity situation as far as I can reasonably see it perhaps two months and you can apply factors obtained from Troopers to estimate the balance. For a working rule one half six months period intense one half normal should be on safe side (25).

620. As suggested earlier by both the C.G.S. and the Army Commander General Montague had sought assistance from the War Office in compiling the first of a series of monthly projections for the ensuing six month periods (26). The British practice, he had found, was to produce a six month forecast and renew it approximately two months before it was due to expire. Such a forecast stated merely the number of months at each degree of activity but not the sequence in which they would occur. The sole exception was when any arm or service was found to be deficient in reinforcement reserves and remustering was necessary: then the Director of Staff Duties would obtain a detailed forecast from the Commander in the theatre concerned. The current British forecast for First Canadian Army was four months "intense" and two months "normal": higher than General Crerar's estimate, but then the War Office customarily estimated on the safe side. While the War Office estimated that 1st Canadian Corps might be operationally employed by 1 Apr, General Montague considered that this would be a bit soon for the whole of that formation. He decided to strike a happy medium and sent back the following forecast (27):

(A) For present Cdn element of First Cdn Army one intense, one normal, three intense, one normal.

(B) For 1 Cdn Corps two quiet, three intense, one normal.

Thenceforth, activity forecasts were supplied monthly by C.M.H.Q. with that of 7 Apr estimating activity to the end of September (28).

621. During the month's heavy fighting to clear the west bank of the Rhine (8 Feb-9 Mar) the Canadian troops of General Crerar's command had 457 officers and 4948 other ranks killed or wounded (58 officers and 140 other ranks of the wounded remained on duty). Canadian formations then went into reserve and only the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion participated in the actual land and airborne crossing of the Rhine. 2nd Canadian Corps did not see heavy action again until early April, when it was assigned the role of clearing the enemy out of north-east Holland and north-west Germany. 1st Canadian Corps, by then re-united with First Canadian Army, was given the task of clearing the enemy out of western Holland. Altogether this was less intensive activity than had been predicted by the "planners" late in 1944.

622. A survey compiled at C.M.H.Q. on 9 Apr deduced that with field units up to strength the following reinforcements would be available within Nos 2 and 3 C.B.R.G. or C.R.U. on the dates shown (30):

"The direction of Operation "VERITABLE" was entrusted to Headquarters, First Canadian Army but the Canadian component became only about one-quarter of the total force engaged. Although this fact was carefully explained to war correspondents a storm was raised in the London newspapers by military commentators who complained that British formations were not obtaining sufficient publicity for their efforts. For security reasons it was not possible to make a satisfactory, official reply. Canadian newspapers took up the cry but used it as an excuse to attack the Government's manpower policy — Canada could not reinforce a whole army of her own (29)."
These estimates made provision for increased numbers of long service personnel to be returned to Canada on rotation leave and duty (ARW Report 23).

623. As early as 29 Mar the Minister of National Defence had instructed the Chief of the General Staff to report whether there was any need to despatch reinforcement drafts on 13 Apr and 5 May (31). Since men were needed in Canada as a possible "aid to the civil power", in the event of post war industrial unrest, and most certainly as workers in industry and agriculture it would be undesirable to send reinforcements overseas in excess of actual requirements. Later that day, and on the basis of the favourable Report submitted by General Sansom (see para 657), the Minister of National Defence told the Cabinet War Committee that the reinforcement situation overseas was 50 to 75 per cent better than in November 1944. For that reason, he had declined an offer of shipping space for 10,000 men to be despatched overseas during April and May. As of 31 Mar the strength of the Canadian Army Overseas (including non-effectives) was 18,654 officers, 2031 nursing sisters and 265,517 other ranks. In his reply to the Minister of National Defence of 4 Apr General Murchie pointed out that the more sensible course would be to reduce the May intake from civilian life. Men already trained as soldiers should be despatched overseas since there might be considerable casualties during the "mopping up" period of indeterminate length; it would be necessary to continue replacing men with a long period of overseas service; morale would decline in the Canadian Army Overseas if all reinforcement was curtailed; it might be necessary to retain personnel overseas if there should not be sufficient volunteers for the Canadian Army Occupation Force (33). There had been more than enough criticism of the Army's reinforcement policy. General Murchie recommended that, since only 2600 all ranks were due to sail on 13 Apr, this draft should proceed anyway. General McNaughton gave his approval but directed the C.G.S. to look into the matter further before making a recommendation regarding the following draft (34). General Murchie already had been told to submit an opinion as to the number of recruits who should be sought from civilian life in May (35).

*Soldiers returning to Canada after the First World War had introduced an influenza epidemic. Industrial unrest had followed, consequent upon the unemployment accompanying demobilization, and had culminated in the Winnipeg Strike of 1919. One of the factors governing the retention of the Reserve Army during the Second World War had been the possible need for "Aid to the Civil Power" (see Appendix "H"). By an Instruction of 12 May 45 the infantry units remaining in Canada were disposed so as best to provide assistance to the civilian authorities in the event of internal unrest and disturbances. Subsequent to the Japanese surrender it was decided that only four battalions need be retained for internal security purposes. Fortunately the nation's economy remained prosperous and there were no disorders (32).
According to the telegram which the C.G.S. despatched to General Montague (at C.M.H.Q.) on 7 Apr the fact that casualties had been "considerably less than forecasted", together with the satisfactory progress of operations, had caused the Cabinet War Committee to inquire whether activity forecasts might not now be revised downwards. The C.G.S. went on to point out that reinforcements could now be despatched from Canada at the rate of 6000 per month for each of the next three months and then 4000 for each of the following three months; 2000 for each of the two months that then followed. Until the end of hostilities it was essential that First Canadian Army be maintained at full strength and that sufficient additional reinforcements be provided to permit the return to Canada on rotation leave of personnel with a long period of service overseas. Concluding, he wrote:

Essential, however, at this stage to ensure that withdrawals from civilian manpower pools are confined only to extent necessary to meet military requirements. It is highly desirable that at conclusion of hostilities we should have minimum of unused manpower in Army. It seems to us that you should now be in a position to forecast requirements to end of hostilities in Europe (36).

This request was answered by a telegram of 17 Apr giving General Crerar's appreciation of possible activity during the period 9 Apr – 8 Jul 45. He had written:

It appears now that the enemy facing allies in west will not capitulate as a whole but will continue to resist strongly in places where he is favoured by natural obstacles providing of course he has necessary supplies to establish fortresses or has line of supply still open to him. A number of these places face First Cdn Army. These are West Holland, North Sea ports of Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Bremerhaven, and Cuxhaven. First Cdn Army will probably have some quite stiff fighting before final reduction of enemy in Army sector. Tasks allotted to Army are

One...To open up Arnhem-Zutphen route.

Two...To clear North East Holland.

Three...To clear North West Germany to line of R. Weser.

Four...To take over Bremen from Second Brit Army and advance eastward to R. Elbe clearing Cuxhaven peninsula.

Five...Simultaneously with Two to operate westward to clear West Holland.

Depending on how long German resistance continued fighting would be stiff. (Actually, the British Chiefs of Staff had concurred in a Joint Planning Staff appreciation of 12 Apr that main German resistance would be over by early June, even though fighting still might continue in Norway and a "Southern Redoubt") (38). General Crerar's forecast of week by week activity was as follows (39):

1 Cdn Inf Div. One normal, six intense, three normal, three quiet.

2 Cdn Inf Div. One normal, six intense, three normal, three quiet.

3 Cdn Inf Div. One normal, six intense, three normal, three quiet.
4 Cdn Armd Div. One normal, one intense, one normal, three intense, two normal, five quiet.
5 Cdn Armd Div. One normal, one intense, one normal, two intense, three normal, five quiet.
1 Cdn Armd Bde. One normal, five intense, two normal, five quiet.
2 Cdn Armd Bde. One intense, one normal, three intense, three normal, five quiet.
1 Cdn AGRA. One normal, five intense, two normal, five quiet.
2 Cdn AGRA. Five intense, three normal, five quiet.
1 Cdn Corps Tps. One normal, five intense, two normal, five quiet.
2 Cdn Corps Tps. One intense, one normal, three intense, three normal, five quiet.

First Cdn Army Tps. Three normal, ten quiet.

627. The Army Commander refused to attempt to forecast the end of hostilities but he did calculate his reinforcement needs (40). A revised calculation made at C.M.H.Q., had increased this estimate somewhat but a further telegram of 27 Apr indicated that sufficient reinforcements were available overseas to meet all estimated requirements until Germany collapsed, except for a possible continuation of fighting in Norway, the so-called "Southern Redoubt" and other isolated pockets of resistance (41).

628. General Murchie recommended that the reinforcement drafts scheduled to sail on 1 and 9 May (1419 and 2769 men) should go forward to complete the promised April quota (42). This was approved by the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 19 Apr. (43).

(ii) Finding Men for the Canadian Army, 1945

629. On 26 Jan 45 the Adjutant-General submitted his proposals for providing reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas (44), including the despatch of 45,048 other ranks during the first six months of 1945 (see para 612). Although an intake of only 5000 men per month from civilian life had been guaranteed by National Selective Service for the fiscal year 1944-1945, enlistments and enrolments had been better than that minimum to date and it had been estimated that 21,000 G.S. and N.R.M.A. soldiers would be obtained for the last quarter (January, February, March 1945) (45). Thereafter, however, it would be necessary to requisition 7500 men per month from National Selective Service.

630. The C.G.S. concurred in the Adjutant-General's submission and recommended acceptance in a memorandum of 29 Jan 45 (46). He advised the Minister of National Defence that an intake of 7500 men with a PULHEMS profile of 2222222 or better would be required monthly to replace anticipated battle casualties. Monthly training wastage would relegate 1500 men to civilian life, provide 1200 men for limited service in Canada and 4800 for overseas service. The balance of the 6000 required for
monthly despatch overseas (1200) could be found from among the
men with an overseas age and medical category still serving in
Canada. Should hostilities continue throughout 1945 this would
involve a maximum drain of 90,000 men, although those enlisted or
enrolled after 1 Aug 45 would not be available for overseas ser­
vice until the winter of 1946. Once hostilities ceased recruits
would no longer be required and further N.R.M.A. requisitions
need be made.

631. In order to forestall objections from National
Selective Service officials of the Department of Labour, the
Adjutant-General's Branch had prepared charts showing that
although total intake for the three Armed Forces had been 84,000
in 1944, the total number discharged to civil life had been in
the neighborhood of 68,000 (47). The Army had put 60,000 in uni­
form but had made a net gain of only 6000 (plus 5000 inter­
service transfers). In anticipation of receiving 15,000 men dis­
charged from the R.C.A.F. (see paras 637-644) the Army's require­
ment from the civilian manpower pool during 1945 was placed at
75,000; the R.C.A.F. had stopped recruiting but the Navy would
require 6000 recruits to offset wastage. It was estimated that
sufficient physically fit recruits could be made available from
the following civilian sources: 54,000 from those reaching the
age of 18 1/2; 60 per cent of the 165,759 postponements in agri­
culture and other primary occupations; 50 per cent of the other
82,425 postponements and a small percentage of married men over 30
years of age. Offsetting this the three Armed Forces expected to
return 111,000 men to civilian life.

632. The reliability of the statistics used at this
time must be considered open to question, but the several pro­
jections were agreed that the most valuable pool consisted of the
boys who reached 18 1/2 years of age each month. Moreover, since
18 1/2 year olds had not had time to get themselves settled into
the declining labour market, it would be easy to cancel any
postponements from military training.

633. Since Parliament was prorogued immediately upon
assembly on 31 Jan the conduct of the War continued in the hands
of the Cabinet, without any possibility of interference, until
the next session opened on 19 Mar. As a means of offsetting the
existing deficiency the Minister of Labour had accepted a March
requisition for 7500 but expressed the view that it would not be
possible to secure more than 5000 men per month during the next
fiscal year (48). In his reply of 15 Mar General McNaboth
pointed out that an intake of 7500 was necessary if 6000 rein­
forcements were to be despatched monthly: although reinforcements
could be provided from other sources for the next six months he
emphasized that:

...To accept now an intake lower than that figure
is to invite a shortage of reinforcements should
the war in Europe continue beyond August 1945. I
assure you that, should circumstances warrant it,
my requisitions will be reduced as far as prudence
permits (49).

There was the additional point that extra reinforcements would
be needed to replace the long service men who would be returning
to Canada in increasing numbers on rotation leave or duty (see
para 558).

634. Eventually General McNaboth's request found
acceptance and an N.R.M.A. requisition for 7500 men was placed
for each of the months of April and May. Due to a favourable
turn of events in North-West Europe, however doubts began to
form during the first week of April as to whether 7500 men really
should be requisitioned in May (50).
General Order 548 of 22 Dec 44 had again amended Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Serving Soldiers and Recruits for the Canadian Army, Active and Reserve, 1944 so that men with considerably lower medical standards might be acceptable for overseas service. In a letter of 31 Jan 45 the Minister of Labour had suggested that a further source of possible recruits was the 600,000 men "previously rejected on medical grounds, referring specially to those turned down for 'mental instability'" (see Appendix "P"). Although steps had been taken in the past to recall numbers of these men for examination by the R.C.A.M.C. (see paras 199 and 315), Mr Mitchell admitted that the necessary medical boards had never been available to do the work properly. Thus he could not be "too sure that the number of men found would warrant the effort" (51). On 9 Feb the Minister of National Defence replied that instructions had been drafted requesting Divisional Registrars to recall all men previously rejected with a grading of 3 or 4 under "E" or "S". The purpose, according to this letter, was

...to up-grade many who have been previously rejected. This will be accomplished by revising the standards so that the elimination will not be so fine. For instance, it has been decided that all who were previously grade E3 will now automatically be graded El. "S" standards have also been revised so that many who were previously graded 3 or 4 will now find themselves graded 1 (52).

There was some doubt in the Military Districts as to the scope of the instructions issued until a telegram of 20 Feb from the Adjutant-General ruled that a medical recheck was to be carried out for "all rejects whether NRM.A or volunteers" within the designated classes" (53). The only exceptions were to be unteachable illiterates and those who were unable to speak or understand sufficient English or French to undergo training (54). Thus, General McNaughton was able to conclude his letter of 15 Mar to the Minister of Labour (see para 633) with the following paragraph:

With respect to the numbers called up for examination and rejected by the Army, I note that during the period January to June 1944 59.4% of those examined were not accepted. During recent months, however, the percentage of rejections has been steadily and substantially reduced. In December 1944 46.5% of those examined were rejected, and this figure was further reduced to 37.0% during January of this year. Every effort is being, and will be, made to reduce the ratio of rejections, and lower category men are being employed wherever possible (55).

Once the War obviously seemed to be nearing an end, however, Brigadier Delalanne decided that there would be enough 18 1/2 year olds to meet continuing needs. After prior consultation with the Director of National Selective Service, he suggested to the Adjutant-General on 26 Apr that the maximum enlistment or enrolment age should be lowered from 37 to 25. This would eliminate the existing problem of dealing with young married men in their late twenties or early thirties. Furthermore, the search for defaulters in this age group could be dropped (56). The question became redundant, however, when the Germans surrendered. Action already had been taken to hold in abeyance the N.R.M.A. requisition for the month of May, which still earlier had been reduced to 3000 men, and the Cabinet now decided to suspend further call-ups, although the regulations remained on the statute books until 15 Aug 46 (57).

*Action had already been taken, under the amended medical standards, to revise the "E" and "S" categories of serving personnel where possible.
637. The other source of recruits was the Royal Canadian Navy and R.C.A.F. Since the Navy made a practice of retiring or discharging personnel only on medical or disciplinary grounds, its former members did not prove much of a source for Army recruits (58). On the other hand, the reductions in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, initiated in February 1944 and accelerated in October so as to wind up the programme by 31 Mar 45, had been expected to make surplus members of the R.C.A.F. available for military service (59).

638. Approximately 10,000 men undergoing aircrew training during the autumn of 1944 were allowed to graduate. Along with certain instructional personnel they were to be posted to a special Aircrew Reserve (Class E, General Reserve, R.C.A.F.), enabling them to resume civilian life unless, or until, they were required for active duty. The 4200 pre-aircrew trainees then awaiting posting to initial training were to be released, however, with R.C.A.F. personnel made surplus to requirements by the reduction in the number of training schools (60). (Arrangements already existed for "washed out" aircrew to transfer to the Army if they desired, or for them to be served with "Orders-Military Training" if they did not.)

639. Members of this new Reserve of Graduate Aircrew were exempt from the provisions of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations but they, and other aircrew released by the R.C.A.F., could voluntarily transfer to the Army (officers as provisional second lieutenants). As early as 12 Feb 45, however, the Cabinet War Committee was advised that increased demands from the Air Ministry for reinforcements had made it necessary to begin recalling to active duty some members of this Reserve. More and more of these reservists were recalled until it became necessary, on 28 Mar, for N.D.H.Q. to issue instructions curtailing the voluntary enlistment of further personnel without prior reference to Ottawa (62).

640. Despite criticism from certain sections of the press and general public, and bitterness among these boys themselves at being unable to become flyers, arrangements had been completed during the late autumn of 1944 for the 4200 pre-aircrew trainees to be discharged from the R.C.A.F. and immediately called for compulsory military service if they would not volunteer for the Army (63). By the time the last of these trainees had been discharged from the R.C.A.F. in late January some 560 had volunteered for general service with the Army and the remainder, apart from a few who were medically unfit or under-age, became liable for compulsory military service (64).

641. As early as 29 Jun 44, following agreement between officials of the Armed Forces and National Selective Service officials, it had been agreed that ex-Naval and ex-R.C.A.F. personnel with service limited to less than two years in Canada or its territorial waters, or who had been released because of inefficiency or misconduct, should be liable for compulsory military service. Effective 1 Dec 44 this policy had been extended to permit the recall of personnel who had seen less than three years' service in Canada. After 15 Jan 45 it became applicable to anyone who had seen service only in Canada (65). (Non-flying officers were made exempt from compulsory military service with effect from 25 Jan, but the way was left open for them to accept commissions in the Army.)

642. Beyond personal motives there was no incentive for surplus airmen to transfer voluntarily to the Army. The R.C.A.F. had provided better uniforms and accommodation, more opportunities for promotion and trades pay; now rehabilitation grants, opportunities to obtain further education and good offers from the labour market turned the faces of most towards "civvy street" (66). In practice, moreover, the R.C.A.F. tended to cut loose its recently enlisted general duty personnel with low medical categories first (see para 229), and retain its longer service personnel (a large number of whom were N.C.O.s and tradesmen) to await possible future needs. It was to offset this that Order in Council P.C. 1529
was promulgated on 6 Mar 45, permitting airmen to retain their previous rates of pay for a maximum of 10 months after voluntary transfer to the Army.

643. So that there should be no loophole for escape to civil life a procedure was devised, with effect from 12 Mar 45, whereby men being discharged from the R.C.A.F. would be medically examined by R.C.A.M.C. officers and, if found fit for military service and falling within the prescribed age groups, would be ordered to report for compulsory military service the day following the effective date of their R.C.A.F. discharge (67). With effect from 20 Mar a somewhat similar procedure was adopted for the Navy.

644. Effective 5 May 45, however, the recall of ex-Naval and ex-R.C.A.F. personnel for compulsory military service was discontinued. It would appear that a total of 6034 "Orders-Military Training" had been issued to ex-R.C.A.F. personnel and that 3171 men had either been enlisted or enrolled in the Army (68). Similar statistics for ex-Naval personnel are incomplete but it would appear that as early as 12 Feb 45 Orders-Military Training had been issued to at least 699 of the 1499 men whose names had been reported to the several Military District Headquarters as probably being suitable for recall (69).

645. According to War Service Records the total of all efforts to enlist and enrol men during 1945 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voluntary Enlistments From</th>
<th>Conversions from N.R.M.A.</th>
<th>N.R.M.A. Enrolments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7987</td>
<td>1692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>7250</td>
<td>2164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>7280</td>
<td>2131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5966</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the duration of the Second World War a total of 581,348 males voluntarily enlisted into the Canadian Army: however, 58248 of these were men who had volunteered for general service following compulsory enrolment and, therefore, should be subtracted from the total of 157,368 N.R.M.A. soldiers. Another 22,322 males received initial appointments to commissioned rank, while 3654 nursing sisters were appointed to the R.C.A.M.C.

(iii) General Sansom's Report

646. At the time of his appointment as Minister of National Defence (2 Nov 44) General McNaughton had been away from the Canadian Army Overseas for 11 months and was somewhat out of touch with confidential developments. There was too much to be done in Canada to permit him visiting the Canadian Army Overseas, himself, so he informed the Cabinet War Committee on 22 Dec that he was recalling a former subordinate, Lt-Gen E.W. Sansom, C.B., D.S.O., from retirement leave a second time* to become an Inspector-General (70). According to General Sansom's terms of reference (dated 15 Jan) he was to report to the Minister of National Defence on the availability and training of reinforcements in the United Kingdom, the standard of physical fitness and

*From 22 Nov to 2 Dec 44 General Sansom had been employed investigating the much-publicized press interviews which had been given by senior officers of Pacific Command on 20 Nov (see paras 518).
training of reinforcements reaching units in North-West Europe and Italy, their availability there, and the effectiveness of the remustering programme (71). On 20 Jan he arrived by air in the United Kingdom accompanied by Lt-Cols F.B. West and N.C.K. Wills who were to perform most of the "spade work". Since it would take a few days for those at C.M.H.Q. to prepare answers to his initial questions he continued by air to North-West Europe for cursory talks with General Crerar and his divisional commanders. Units were reported at full strength, except for day to day wastage, which was being promptly replaced from the reinforcement pool (72).

647. In his first telegram to the Minister of National Defence, dated 25 Jan, General Sansom reported that he had visited C.R.U. and the 13th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade and that he thought morale was better within the new training organization, helped by the fact that a proportion of battle experienced officers and N.C.Os. had been obtained as instructors (73). In his second telegram of 27 Jan he noted that the 14th Canadian Infantry Training Brigade was experiencing no trouble with its N.R.M.A. personnel, who were being impressed by the fact they would not be sent forward to units until their battle experienced instructors considered that they were properly trained (74).

648. On 27 Jan General Sansom returned to North-West Europe for a two day visit to First Canadian Army before visiting Italy. General Crerar told him that the infantry reinforcement pool was smaller than he would like. The three French-speaking Infantry battalions had been brought up to strength but there were only 34 officers and 57 other ranks available as replacements in the theatre. Desertion and absence without leave was far too prevalent: only 10 per cent of his troops were French-speaking but they had contributed 50 per cent of the desertions. Part of the trouble was attributed to the common belief that the war would soon be over and that, even if apprehended and convicted, soldiers would never have to serve out their sentences (75).

649. General Sansom and his staff then visited Italy where problems were discussed with the Canadian Corps and divisional commanders and with the officers commanding the Canadian sections of G.H.Q. 1st and 2nd Echelons and No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (76). He found a feeling at 2nd Echelon that not enough consideration was being given at C.M.H.Q. to the special problems in Italy which had necessitated the formation of additional G.S.D. 602 units. In view of the fact that 1st Canadian Corps had only one brigade in the line, occupying a quiet sector of the front, and that no active operations were in prospect for at least two months, he considered that the available reserves were sufficient (see para 617 re "GOLDFLAKE" move).

650. Upon his return to C.M.H.Q. General Sansom recommended, in a telegram of 16 Feb to the Minister of National Defence, that it would be desirable to have a backlog of reinforcements, equivalent to not less than three months wastage at

*It must be remembered that it was far easier for French-speaking personnel to remain lost to the Army in Western Europe than for men whose mother tongue was English—Narrator.

**On 27 Jan 45 there was an authorized entitlement of 2,347 all ranks tied up in "ad hoc" units, as against authorized reductions in C.G.S. 139 units of 1507 all ranks. The reinforcements tied up in any of these G.S.D. 602 units were R.C.A.M.C. and R.C...S.C. personnel required to man medical installations made necessary by the nature of the campaign and country, e.g. malaria and V.D. incidence.
"intense" rates in the United Kingdom itself, to guarantee against any future shortage resulting from protracted operations and guarantee the Army complete freedom of action (77). General McNaughton replied on 2 Mar that the creation of such a reserve would be far beyond Canada's manpower capacity. He then requested that General Sansom "sound out" the War Office regarding the quantity of reserves held behind the British divisions in North-West Europe and develop a comparison between the British and Canadian reinforcement holdings for that theatre of operations (78).

651. By this time General Sansom was again in North-West Europe but General Montague obtained the necessary information from the War Office and drew comparisons. On 10 Mar General Sansom embodied these findings in a telegram and letter to the Minister of National Defence (79). Comparing resources in Armoured Corps (exclusive of Reconnaissance), Artillery (anti-tank and field) and Infantry (rifle) for the six month period ending 31 Aug 45 the Canadian Army possessed reserves of 5,499 in the theatre against unit establishments of 31,783 (17.3 per cent) while the British Army had reserves of only 12,092 against establishments of 150,685 (8 per cent). This telegram deduced:

On the forecast of activity the British will be unable to maintain the overall reserve of 8 per cent in the theatre. With the exception of the Royal Arm Corps they have fewer rfts becoming available than they would expect to require over that period to maintain formations in 21 Army Group alone.

On the same basis... the Canadian position would be as follows: Infantry rifle. Units in the field would be at full strength. The pool of reinforcements in the theatre would be reduced slightly below the authorized rft holding and would amount to a little less than three weeks intense wastage. In the UK there would be 4250 inf rifle rfts, but these could not be classified as fit, trained and available. They would be in various stages of trg. CAC (excl inf recce). Units would be at full strength. The authorized rft holding in the theatre would be at full strength. The holding in the UK would be reduced to 1165 which is approximately seven weeks wastage at intense rates. Of these some 888 would be fully trained, fit and available and the remainder would be in various stages of training. RCA (Fd and ATk). The units would be at full strength. The authorized rft holding in the theatre would be at full strength. In the UK there would be 345 which amounts to approximately three wks wastage at intense rates and these last would likewise be in various stages of trg (80).

General Sansom's letter went into somewhat greater detail. The British holdings for Infantry were 12.7 per cent of establishments while the Canadians' reserves were equivalent to 29.7 per cent of their Infantry establishments. On the other hand, the British holdings were proportionately greater for Armoured Corps and Artillery (81).

652. On 14 Mar General Sansom rendered an interim report by telegram (82). Due to General Crerar's comment that there had been instances of Infantry battalions remaining at much reduced strength for weeks, with reinforcements not available in the theatre, it proved necessary for General Sansom to amend one paragraph of this report by a further telegram of 21 Mar (83). Back in Ottawa General McNaughton submitted this Report to the Cabinet War Committee on the following day. It was referred for study by Generals Murchie and Walford.
Meanwhile, the Inspector-General was drafting his final report, which was shown to Generals Montague and Crerar before he returned to Canada at the end of the month. Dated 29 Mar, this was a more detailed document and was accompanied by 18 explanatory appendices. From the graphs comparing the estimated with the actual casualties for the period 1 Apr 44 to 28 Feb 45, General Sansom and his staff deduced that actual Canadian casualties in 21st Army Group had exceeded the estimated gross casualties only during August, September and October, while in Italy they were much less than had been estimated. Therefore, the following conclusions were drawn:

(a) Reinforcements were despatched from Canada in excess of the numbers required to meet the estimated gross casualties during 1944.

(b) That a holding of reinforcements existed in the U.K. and forward, from month to month, which was more than sufficient to meet the month to month field requirements, but that they were not in the proper proportion of the arms in which the casualties occurred. Also surpluses in one theatre could not be used to meet deficiencies in the other theatre.

(c) That a shortage of Infantry reinforcements existed in N.W. Europe during the period August to early October, 1944. There were times when the numbers of reinforcements immediately available in the theatre were not sufficient to meet the actual deficiencies in the units. There were even occasions when the numbers available, both in the theatre and in the U.K. together, would not have sufficed to correct unit deficiencies of English Speaking Infantry. This occurred during the period while the surpluses in the other arms were being remustered to Infantry and retrained. In spite of all efforts, this remusterling programme could not be accelerated sufficiently to meet field demands for this period. As regards French Speaking Infantry, the situation was worse, inasmuch as an overall deficiency of French Speaking Infantry reinforcements persisted from about 1 August 44 right to the end of the year, and could not be fully corrected until the arrival of drafts of N.A French Speaking Infantry in January, 1945....

The Report contended that the situation described in (c) above had been aggravated by two factors which had tended to confuse the overseas reinforcement picture throughout:

(a) The formation of temporary units from personnel held as reinforcements in the United Kingdom.

(b) The formation of temporary units from personnel held as reinforcements in the theatres of war, chiefly the Italian theatre.

*Battle casualties and accidents only, since there was no ready means of determining what had been the actual wastage from normal causes such as sickness, compassionate leave and rotational duty.
These were the so-called G.S.D. 602 and G.S. 778 units (see paras 158 and 283). Many of these had had a long existence and General Sansom believed there was a tendency for them to increase, with the result that the "manpower ceiling" was exceeded and physically fit reinforcements were made unavailable in practice. While not questioning the essential nature of the duties they performed, General Sansom considered that it would have been preferable to have established them on a permanent basis in the order of battle of the Canadian Army Overseas. By this time, G.S.D. 602 units and increments in the United Kingdom included a large number of personnel then physically unfit for service as reinforcements (see para 396). As a result of the "comb out", the majority of the remainder were instructional personnel who could be released for service in the field only when the number of reinforcements actually in the training establishments decreased.

General Sansom's Report went on to describe the steps which had been taken in the United Kingdom and both theatres of operations to ensure that reinforcements were adequately trained before reaching a field unit. Battle experienced Officers and N.C.O.s. had been sent back to take charge of such training with the result that morale, as well as instruction, had improved. In conclusion it was stated that the general reinforcement situation then was satisfactory, except in respect of English-speaking Infantry officers. The only dark cloud, one which never did get across the horizon, was the possibility that if...future casualties are incurred at a rate in excess of that which was experienced during the past three months, the rate of output of the training stream will not suffice to increase the reserves of trained reinforcements held available (87).

656. Certain of General Sansom's conclusions required modification in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., and the Army Commander. In particular, exception was taken to General Sansom's remarks about G.S.D. 602 units. Generals Creer and Montague did not agree that the shortage of infantry reinforcements was aggravated by the formation of such units. Actually, they wrote:

> Of the 399 officers who underwent conversion training overseas during the autumn some 327 had qualified as Infantry subalterns by the middle of January. A further 554 officers were still undergoing training, made up as follows: 194 C.A.O., 243 R.C.A., 93 R.C.E. and 24 R.C.A.S.C. Despite the number of junior officers despatched overseas with formed units there still were insufficient English-speaking Infantry reinforcement officers and therefore N.D.H.Q. was queried by telegram on 3 Feb as to how many still remained in Canada, born in the years 1909, 1910 and 1911 and with an operational PULFEMS medical category. The reply of 24 Feb estimated that, apart from retaining an adequate number for the training establishments, the following Infantry officers could be despatched overseas: during March some 150 who had taken conversion training at O.T.C. (Brockville) and spent two weeks with No. 1 Training Brigade Group; during April-May 175 officers who had undergone conversion training at S-17 (Canadian School of Infantry, Vernon) and spent some time with No. 1 Training Brigade Group and 150 officers from Training Centres with perhaps a months training at the Brigade Group; in June 175 officers who had taken five weeks advanced tactical training at the Canadian School of Infantry (86).
The shortage of Inf Rfts manifestly came about primarily because too many men had been allocated to other arms and not enough to Inf in the period prior to 6 Jun 1944... We cannot accept any implication that we expended or misused manpower Overseas in temporary units thereby bringing about a shortage of Inf Rfts... (88)

The withdrawal of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy was now making possible the disbandment of a number of G.S. 778 units and the return of their personnel to the reinforcement pool. General Montague insisted that C.M.H.Q. always had been fully aware of the actual reinforcement situation in Italy and that the reinforcements despatched monthly had been all that could be spared from the more pressing needs of First Canadian Army in North-West Europe. Generals Crerar and Montague argued that the addition of increments to training units was the most economical method of adjusting the number of instructors to the size of the available reinforcement pool: such increments could be formed or disbanded to enable reinforcement units to expand or contract as drafts arrived from Canada or departed for the continent.

On 6 Apr General Murchie informed the Minister of National Defence that both the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant-General generally agreed with the statements made in General Sansom's final Report (89). It was not until 11 Apr, however, that it was possible for the Minister of National Defence to submit this final Report to the Cabinet War Committee. General Sansom, who was present for part of the meeting, stated that he had no recommendations to make. His Report was approved, but due to Parliament being prorogued on 16 Apr there was no need to table an abridged version in the House of Commons.

(iv) The Infantry Shortage Met

Justification for the establishment of peculiarly Canadian rates of wastage on 31 Aug 44 had been the type of campaigns then being fought in North-West Europe and Italy. At his morning conference of 20 Nov, however, while the conscription issue was still without a solution, General McNaughton brought up the possibility of operations developing into siege warfare. Should this come to pass during the winter months there would be a higher incidence of casualties in arms other than Infantry and the Canadian rates would no longer hold true. The Adjutant-General suggested that this possibility would be offset by the existence of surplus reinforcement personnel who, although they possessed too low a PULPS profile for conversion into general duty infantrymen could be employed with their own corps in a theatre of operations. General McNaughton was not altogether reassured, however, and at the conclusion of his morning conference he requested that the situation be explored. On 28 Nov a General Staff — Adjutant-General inter-branch study was submitted to the C.G.S., comparing the estimated wastage for the period 1 Jan—30 Jun 45 (based on an activity forecast of three months "intense", two months "normal" and one month "quiet") at Canadian rates with a table which substituted F.W.C. rates for the two months forecast as likely to be "normal". The difference was a decrease of 4,558 infantrymen and peratroopers but an increase of 3,710 for all other corps, made up as follows (91):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>A.A.I.</th>
<th>A.E.F.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.A.C.</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.A.</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.E.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C. Sigs</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.A.S.C.</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.A.M.C.</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.O.C.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.E.M.E.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Pro C.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Corps</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>2392</td>
<td>3710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the event that "siege warfare" should materialize the availability of such reinforcements for these corps would depend, however, on the extent to which C.M.H.Q. continued its programme of remustering men to Infantry (92).

659. Since the C.G.S. wanted to be quite sure that these corps would continue to possess an adequate reserve of reinforcements overseas (93) Brigadier deLalanne prepared a further statement on 2 Dec, pointing out that, until it was known what reallocations and remustering had been carried out by C.M.H.Q. subsequent to 30 Sep, it would be impossible to make a "reasonably accurate" projection (94). Brigadier deLalanne considered, however, that:

...in the latest return all Corps showed substantial reserves even after the remusterings to Infantry to 30 Sep 4, and it had always been contended by those in charge overseas that should there be a trend in the opposite direction, personnel remustered to Infantry from other Corps could, and would, be returned to their former Arm or Service if the circumstances warranted or permitted (95).

660. In a further memorandum of 7 Dec, the Adjutant-General advised General Murchie that it was "virtually impossible" to guarantee that remustering would not be carried to an extreme, although the special despatch of 16,000 N.R.M.A. other ranks would restore the Infantry pool overseas and lessen the pressure to continue remustering in the United Kingdom. In order to insure against this risk, the Adjutant-General proposed to take the following steps:

(a) to co-ordinate more closely the form of reporting from the U.K. to Canada so that we can really compute our reserves in terms of the overall resources, and

(b) Arrange for the prompt receipt and careful analysis of casualty figures from month to month so that any change in the trend of incidence between arms can be quickly reflected in adjustment of intakes to our advanced training centres in Canada (96).

It would take four to five months, however, before the effect of such changes could be felt.

661. Following his arrival in the United Kingdom Brigadier deLalanne telegraphed the Adjutant-General on 16 Jan 50 that over the next few months all reinforcement drafts from Canada should include substantial numbers of R.C.A. as well as some C.A.C., R.C.E. and R.C. Signals personnel. Furthermore, he recommended that:

Pending availability of more accurate figures than can be compiled at present recommend that GS and N.R.M.A soldiers of these corps now in training stream as well as any of Training Centre Staffs who may be released should not ... be remustered to infantry but designated as rfts for own Corps (97).

In reply, General Walford's telegram of 18 Jan stated that no personnel in the training stream had been reallocated to Infantry since the previous October and that they would be despatched in their existing corps when trained (98). The only personnel Canada being remustered at this time belonged to R.C.A.S.C., R.C.A.M.C. and R.C.O.I. General Walford suggested that the personnel on convoys A.T. 178 and 182 be screened for fully trained artillery
personnel (see paras 564-576).

662. On 30 Jan a telegram was despatched to C.M.F.Q. to the effect that, effective with the sailing of convoy A.T. 194 (which left Halifax on 25 Feb), both G.S. and N.R.M.A. reinforcements for C.C.C., R.C.A., R.C.E., R.C. Signals and Infantry would be despatched with PULHEMS profiles suitable for operational service in their own corps. For this, and possibly one later sailing, only G.S. and N.R.M.A. reinforcements for R.C.A.S.C., R.C.A.M.C., R.C.O.C. and R.C.E.M.E. (but with Infantry PULHEMS profiles) would be sent from Canada. N.R.M.A. soldiers from operational units in Canada, however, would be sent as general duty infantrymen only (99).

663. Furthermore, during February action was taken at N.B.H.Q. to substantially alter the training intake as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Increase from</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.C.C.</td>
<td>5 to 9.5</td>
<td>5 to 9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.A.</td>
<td>7 to 9</td>
<td>7 to 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.E.</td>
<td>2 to 3</td>
<td>2 to 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Substantial numbers of men previously withdrawn from units were despatched to C.C.C. and R.C.A. Training Centres so that they could become reinforcements for those corps (100).

664. Rather than draw all the required reinforcements for such corps from Canada, however, the Adjutant-General agreed during the course of his visit to the United Kingdom that 1050 confirmed N.C.O.s (corporal and up) might be sent forward as reinforcements for their original corps (101). Upon despatch to No. 2 C.B.R.C. they would revert to the status of private soldier, although they could continue to draw their confirmed N.C.O. rate of pay for six months (just as though they were going to an Infantry unit) (see para 414). The Army Commander's concurrence was sought, in a letter of 24 Feb, but it was 27 Mar before a favourable answer reached C.M.H.Q. (102). A further group of 427 N.C.O.s who already had been in a theatre of operations also were available for despatch but, having held N.C.O. rank in a field unit before becoming casualties, they were to be acceptable as such.

665. Following his return to Ottawa Brigadier deLalanne reported to the Adjutant-General that the "basis of computing pools for arms other than Inf may not provide an adequate number of rfts if hostilities continue for any considerable time" and that he had stressed:

... to responsible officers in the UK and in the theatre, the necessity of salvaging for the other arms as many as possible of those whose category does not permit their continuing to serve in the Inf. While there seems to be a feeling overseas that some of the services can be maintained from such wastage, I doubt whether such would be the case as regards various types of skilled trades (103).

Under the existing arrangement officers at C.M.H.Q. were continuously watching the output of the reinforcement and training units and comparing it with anticipated requirements. Being much closer to the "user" they were in a much better position to make adjustments. Brigadier deLalanne believed that a considerable number of those despatched overseas for service as infantrymen actually would be used in other corps (104). The Adjutant-General agreed and noted that, although it would take several months to set an altered output from the reinforcement training stream, a small reserve had been built up in Canada, over and above the numbers requested by the Canadian Army Overseas, and this could be drawn upon to fill any unexpected demands.

666. Brigadier deLalanne's suspicion turned out to be correct. With the end of the War in Europe at hand, General
Montague despatched a telegram to the C.G.S. on 3 May estimating the future reinforcement position for all corps except Infantry. At 31 Jul there would be a substantial reserve for C.A.C., small surpluses for R.C.A., R.C. Signals and R.C.E.M.E., possible deficiencies for R.C.E., R.C.A.M.C. and R.C.O.C. and a substantial deficiency for R.C.A.S.C. (105). In an effort to offset this, C.M.H.Q. was going to remuster from Infantry back to their original corps 500 R.C.A.M.C., 150 R.C.E., 600 R.C.A. and 500 Provost personnel. It was also hoped to provide some R.C.E. tradesmen from members of the Canadian Forestry Corps (see para 669).

(v) Victory in Europe

667. On 27 Apr General Montague telegraphed the C.G.S. that no further Infantry other ranks need be despatched overseas (106). There were sufficient reinforcements to replace any wastage which might be incurred until main German resistance collapsed: of course, should there be prolonged further fighting in Norway, the "Southern Redoubt" or other pockets of resistance it might be necessary to modify this conclusion later. All available accommodation in the United Kingdom was filled with reinforcements and the immediate need was the organization of a second Repatriation Depot to handle the increase of personnel back to Canada of personnel with a long period of overseas service. Infantry reinforcements would be arriving on 13 May but, if it were not too late, General Montague suggested that infantrymen be removed from all subsequent drafts (i.e. 21 May and 3 Jun). On the other hand, the Army Commander believed that, in order to meet the needs of the Occupation Force (25,000 all ranks) and ensure that long service men were despatched home within a reasonable period, it would not be sound to cut off completely the flow of reinforcements overseas, even after victory was won (108).

668. This intelligence caused the Minister of National Defence to cancel the departure of further Infantry reinforcements. Only sufficient personnel of other corps would continue to be sent overseas, to maintain a reinforcement pool equal to two months wastage at "intense" rates (109). This action, of course, required the official approval of the Prime Minister who was then at the San Francisco Conference, which was engaged in drawing up a World Security Charter and creating a United Nations Organization. Before leaving for Saskatchewan (27 Apr) to begin his election campaign in Qu'Appelle, General McNaughton also recommended that the May requisition should be cut from 5,000 to 3,000 men and that no requisition need be submitted for June. When the Cabinet met on the afternoon of 1 May General McNaughton's recommendations were given formal approval but it was considered that the May call-ups might be postponed for 8-10 days, pending developments in Europe (110). It was an easy matter to delay the actual mailing of call-up notices. This information was telegraphed to Prime Minister Mackenzie King who agreed: in a return telegram of 4 May Mr King pointed out that resentment might be caused later if any other course were followed and men whose services were never going to be needed were enrolled in the Army (111).

669. The issue really had been settled by a telegram despatched from C.M.H.Q. on the previous day (3 May). Even though it would be difficult to predict when resistance would come to an end, General Montague was "reasonably confident" that the manpower resources needed to finish the campaign already were available (112). Apart from the reinforcement drafts already scheduled to reach the United Kingdom on 13 May, no further quotas need be prepared for despatch overseas. Any tradesmen, specialists or other key men would be asked for specifically (see paras 628 and 666).

*On the following day the C.G.S. replied by telegram that infantrymen were being deleted from the draft due to arrive in the United Kingdom on 13 May (107).
670. Although the press was informed on 1 May that there would be an easing of the restrictions on granting postponements it was not until 7 May that the Canadian Government suspended the call-up indefinitely. It remained in force until 15 Aug 46 but, with the German surrender, there was no longer any need to enrol men.

671. The Canadian Army Pacific Force was to have been composed of volunteers only, according to the announcement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons as early as 4 Apr 45, despite the misgivings of General Crerar that insufficient men then serving overseas would volunteer to go to the Far East (113). As soon as possible after the German surrender all officers and other ranks serving in the Canadian Army Overseas were required to complete a Reallocation Questionnaire expressing his or her preference for (114):

(a) Volunteering for the Canadian Far East Force;
(b) Service with the Canadian Army Occupation Force;
(c) Reallocation in accordance with individual priorities and the requirements of the service.

By 30 May the following members of the Canadian Army Overseas had volunteered for service in the Far East (115):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From North-West Europe</td>
<td>From the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1404</td>
<td>1136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,809</td>
<td>6,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 28 Jul the number of those volunteering for service with the Canadian Army Pacific Force had risen to 36,025 all ranks (116). A number of those desiring to make the Army a permanent career had preferred to volunteer for the Canadian Army Occupation Force.

672. The immediate problem was to secure sufficient shipping in order to despatch these C.A.P.F. volunteers to Canada and yet continue the return of men with high personal point scores for repatriation (i.e. men who had been away from their wives and families for periods of five years or more). By 4 Aug a total of 55,485 all ranks (C.A.P.F. volunteers and men with high point scores) had been despatched to Canada (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 177). A week later (11 Aug) General Montague asked for, and received, the consent of N.D.H.Q. to discontinue granting top priority to C.A.P.F. volunteers and to concentrate on the return to Canada of those with the highest point scores, except for "key" personnel such as cooks who were "frozen" in their jobs. Exclusive of this, units now began their return to Canada intact, beginning with those of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.

673. In the meantime, action had been taken in Canada to organize the Canadian Army Pacific Force, even though the response was disappointing. Adventure and extra pay induced a number to offer their services and an indeterminate number of overseas veterans volunteered for the sole purpose of returning home more quickly. With the mobilization of the new 6th Division about to take place, as of 17 Jul, the total number of C.A.P.F. volunteers, in Canada and still overseas, stood at 9943 officers and 68,256 other ranks. Of these, however, only 2796 officers

*Title standardized as Canadian Army Pacific Force only on 11 Jun 45.*
and 56,386 other ranks were males in the "most select Group" — suitable for service with an Infantry division. This was more than enough to meet immediate requirements — 1,513 officers and 27,435 other ranks (790 officers and 15,058 other ranks in divisional establishments, 390 officers and 2761 other ranks elsewhere with the force, a small "contingency reserve", and three months reinforcements at American wastage rates). However, estimated requirements for a further eight months of operations totalled 1665 officers and 28,735 other ranks. As had been feared there was a grave deficiency of infantrymen — 536 officers and 20,775 other ranks out of a total estimated requirement of 1831 officers and 39,114 other ranks.

With the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Canadian Government decided that its Force would not be needed in the Pacific. It was not until 51 Aug, however, that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed that, since the situation was now "clarified", it was proposed to disband the Canadian Army Pacific Force (119). It only remained to dispose of the 1,963 officers and 22,058 other ranks (1,536 officers and 20,238 other ranks returned from Overseas) who actually had been posted to units of the Canadian Army Pacific Force (120). Having already undertaken a commitment for the first stage of the occupation of Germany a Special Cabinet Committee had recommended (14 Aug) that Canada should not participate in the occupation of Japan.

A few individuals managed to work their way back overseas to join the Canadian Army Occupation Force, which had commenced its duties on 11 Jul. Although the requirements of this Force had been estimated as 25,000 all ranks there had been only 6,000 old volunteers and it always remained considerably less. For example, on 25 Aug the strength of this Force was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Other Ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed to serve</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1196</td>
<td>18,875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those "detailed to serve" included both personnel with low point scores for repatriation and "key" men who had been compulsorily posted into specialist vacancies even though they had a high enough point score for early repatriation to Canada (see para 672). Over the course of the next few months these last-mentioned personnel were withdrawn from the Force. Since the Canadian Government was not offered a share in the political control of Germany it decided shortly to remove its occupation Army and Air Forces (122). It was not until 15 May 46, however, that command of the Canadian area could be turned over the British Army (123).

By this time there remained in the United Kingdom only such Repatriation Depots and units as were required to carry out essential services as long as there were any Canadian troops overseas. On 21 Jan 47 the last large group of Canadian servicemen, about 900 strong, reached Halifax on the S.S. Aquitania which had taken the Headquarters, 1st Canadian Division to the United Kingdom in 1939. On 21 Feb No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot ceased to exist. The job was done.

In Canada the Cabinet had decided on the eve of Japanese surrender (10 Aug 45) that there should be the "maximum possible acceleration" of demobilization once hostilities actually came to an end (125). At a meeting on 29 Aug the Defence Committee of the Cabinet decided, however, that personnel of the three Armed Forces could continue to serve anywhere required until 30 Sep 47, on existing pay and allowances pending the formation of permanent forces (126). Those intending to make the Army a career became members of an Interim Force on a probationary basis pending acceptance into a new Canadian Army (Active Force). Not until 30 Sep 47, however, did the Canadian Army
cease being on "active service" and the last of the war time personnel return to civilian life.
CONCLUSION

678. Victory had been achieved. But before that First Canadian Army had been re-united and, because of the vigorous action taken to remedy the shortage of general duty infantrymen in 1944, it had not been necessary to disband any of its divisions. Other Allies had not been so fortunate.

679. Three other belligerent Dominions — South Africa, New Zealand and Australia — also possessed dual systems of recruitment: men who had volunteered for service anywhere, including sizable Naval and Air components, and those who had been conscripted into the army for home defence. With only a small European population, including many of Boer descent who were opposed to the conflict, South Africa experienced great difficulty in maintaining troops overseas: after three years of fighting in other parts of Africa it was possible to maintain only the 6th South African Armoured Division in Italy.

By the end of 1943 New Zealand was over-extended, with a corps built around the 2nd New Zealand Division in Italy and two brigade groups of a 3rd New Zealand Division engaged in the Solomons. During 1944 the latter were withdrawn and all but cadre personnel despatched as reinforcements to Italy, together with officers and men released from reduced home defences. The volunteer Australian Imperial Forces had lost a division at Singapore and the three divisions in the Middle East had suffered considerable casualties before being brought home. In the South-West Pacific Area they were joined by units of the Australian Military Forces, which contained both volunteers and men who had been conscripted for home defence. The boundaries of Australian home defence had been extended following the entrance of Japan into the war. Even then, manpower shortages forced reorganization downwards, helped by the fact that jungle warfare required divisions with a lower establishment than those which had served in the Middle East.

680. Even with men conscripted for military service anywhere in the world the British and American Armies had to face the fact that manpower was not unlimited and that insufficient soldiers had been trained as general duty infantrymen. Men were remustered from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to the British Army and divisions were disbanded at home and abroad in order to meet the demands for reinforcements. During 1944 infantrymen were taken from units still training in the United States to become overseas replacements and a vigorous remustering programme was carried on both there and in overseas theatres.

681. In every case there also had been the conflicting claims of Navy, Army, Air Force, industry and agriculture for a larger slice of the nation's manpower, creating situations similar to those Canadian problems dealt with already and in the following appendices.

682. This report was compiled by J.M. Hitsman.
MA'POWER PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMv IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

VOLUME TWO

CONTENTS

APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot;</td>
<td>Enlistment and Enrolment of Aliens</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>Table Showing Changes in Quota for % of New Intake</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;D&quot;</td>
<td>Orders in Council, Employment of N.R.M.A. Personnel</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;E&quot;</td>
<td>N.R.M.A. Draft Dodgers and Deserters</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;F&quot;</td>
<td>Case History of Evading Military Service</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;G&quot;</td>
<td>Military Assistance to the Civilian Economy</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;H&quot;</td>
<td>The Function of the Reserve Army</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;X&quot; List</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;J&quot;</td>
<td>Avoidable Waste in the Canadian Army Overseas</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;K&quot;</td>
<td>Fighting Strength of an Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;L&quot;</td>
<td>The Canadian General Staff</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;M&quot;</td>
<td>Conscientious Objectors</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;N&quot;</td>
<td>Provision of Tradesmen</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;O&quot;</td>
<td>Corps of (Civilian) Canadian Fire Fighters for Service in the United Kingdom</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P&quot;</td>
<td>List of French-speaking Units as at 1 Mar 44</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Q&quot;</td>
<td>List of French-speaking Units as at 1 Mar 44</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

1. Appointments and Enlistments for General Service 372
2. General Service Discharges (All Ranks) 374
3. N.R.M.A. Enrolments by Month and Year of Enrolment 375
4. N.R.M.A. Discharges 376
5. Growth of Infantry Cdn Army Overseas 1942-44 377
6. Other Ranks A.A.I., Demanded and Despatched May 44-Jan 45 378
7. Canadian Reinforcement Drafts to North-West Europe 379
8. Deficiencies and Foldings of Canadian Infantry Other Ranks North-West Europe, 27 Aug-14 Nov 44 381
9. Deficiencies and Foldings of Canadian Infantry Other Ranks A.A.I., 2 Sep-4 Nov 44 382
10. Total Strength - Canadian Army 383
11. Statement of Reinforcements Authorized and Actual Strength of Reinforcements 384
12. Other Rank Reinforcements Remustered in the U.K. from other Arms to CIC 385

REFERENCE NOTES 386
MANPOWER PROBLEMS OF THE CANADIAN ARMY
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

APPENDICES
An Act to confer certain powers upon the Governor in Council for the mobilization of national resources in the present war. [Assented to 21st June, 1940.]

WHEREAS by reason of developments since the outbreak of the present war a special emergency has arisen and the national safety of Canada has become endangered; and

Whereas it is, therefore, expedient to confer upon the Governor in Council special emergency powers to permit of the mobilization of all of the effective resources of the nation, both human and material, for the purpose of the defence and security of Canada, and

Whereas it is expedient that the said powers should be conferred upon the Governor in Council during the continuation of the state of war now existing:

Therefore His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada enacts as follows:-

1. This Act may be cited as The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940.

2. Subject to the provisions of section three hereof, the Governor in Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community.

3. The powers conferred by the next preceding section may not be exercised for the purpose of requiring persons to serve in the military, naval or air forces outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof.

4. The powers conferred by this Act shall remain in force only during the continuation of the state of war now existing.

5. Every order or regulation passed under the authority of this Act shall be tabled in Parliament forthwith if Parliament is in Session and a copy thereof sent to every member of the House of Commons and of the Senate and if Parliament is not in Session then every such order or regulation shall be forthwith published in the Canada Gazette and copies thereof sent to every Member of the House of Commons and of the Senate forthwith; provided that any of the steps specified in this section may be omitted or deferred if the Governor in Council considers such omission or deferment
necessary in the national interest having regard to the special circumstances.

6. The Governor in Council may prescribe the penalties that may be imposed for violations of orders and regulations made under this Act, and may also prescribe whether such penalties shall be imposed upon summary conviction or upon indictment, but no such penalty shall exceed a fine of five thousand dollars or imprisonment for any term not exceeding five years, or both fine and imprisonment.
APPENDIX "B" — ENLISTMENT AND ENROLMENT OF ALIENS

1. Among the conditions of enlistment in the Canadian Active Service Force in September 1939 was one whereby men who were not British subjects by birth were required to produce evidence that they had become so by naturalization (1). Inquiries, and attempts to enlist, by citizens of the United States of America, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and others, but resident in North America, having become numerous, a small Interdepartmental Committee was set up to study the question (2). On 10 Nov this Committee recommended that the ban on the enlistment of Aliens into the C.A.S.F. should be removed (with adequate safeguards) (3). Approval having been obtained from the Minister of National Defence steps were taken to amend King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia (4). It was not until 15 Dec, however, that the Adjutant-General was able to issue the following change of policy regarding the enlistment of aliens:

... vide amendments to K.R. (Can) 145 (1) and 287, promulgated by C.O. 259 of 1939, the appointment to commissions or enlistment of personnel of other than British nationality is authorized with the proviso that this privilege is confined to aliens of nationalities other than enemy who were resident of Canada on the 1st September, 1939.

In view of the above ... applicants for enlistment who fall in the above category may now be accepted in the C.A.S.F. but it will be necessary to establish the bona fides of each applicant prior to appointment or enlistment (5).

2. On 18 May 40, the Canadian Minister in Washington advised Prime Minister King by telegram that (according to a message from the "highest quarter") the United States Government would not be embarrassed by the enlistment in Canada, of its citizens who had proceeded there for such a purpose, if it was understood that United States citizens would be required to take merely an Oath of Obedience and not that of Allegiance (6). This led to a further formal change in Canadian policy. Order in Council P.C. 5294 of 20 Jul 40 authorized the enlistment of Aliens other than enemy without taking the oath of allegiance "if, by so doing, that person would, under the laws of the country in question, forfeit his citizenship therein". Until this time such foreign nationals had lost their citizenship upon joining the Canadian Armed Forces.

3. The serious course taken by the War during the late spring and early summer of 1940 resulted in a decision that Canadian citizens of German and Italian racial origin, naturalized subsequent to 1 Sep 29, should not be permitted to enlist in the C.A.S.F. or R.P.M. unless they were in possession of a Certificate of Exemption issued by the R.C.M.P. This policy was set forth in a circular letter, signed by the Adjutant-General on 11 Jul 40 (7).

4. Although it had been specifically laid down in Section 4(1) of the National War Services Regulations, 1940, (Recruits) that only British subjects should be called for compulsory military training, it was discovered later that a number of Aliens had been ordered to report during 1941 and were serving either as 'R' recruits or Members (R.D.) of the Canadian Army (8). It would appear that Divisional Registrars had been presuming that all young men who reported for military training
were British subjects (9). However, on 22 Jan 42 the Adjutant-General issued a circular letter directing that such Enemy Aliens should be discharged when found, since "quite apart from the fact that such persons are ineligible for compulsory military training, the inherent danger resulting from their presence in the Armed Forces is obvious" (11). Although not eligible for enlistment in the Canadian Army (Active or Reserve) unless they possessed a Certificate of Exemption issued by the R.C.M.P. British subjects of Italian or German origin naturalized subsequent to 1 Sep 29 were liable for compulsory military training. It could be assumed that the majority were loyal to the country of their adoption, but they were to be closely watched by their Commanding Officers and any evidence of subversive activities reported to N.D.F. On completion of training such men were not to be posted to coast defence units and were to be employed on duties which gave little opportunity for subversive activities.

5. Mention should be made of the organization of contingents by certain Allied Nations which had set up Military Missions in Canada. The Interdepartmental Committee set up in October 1939 to study the question of enlisting Aliens had recommended that the French, Polish and Czechoslovakian authorities should be permitted to recruit their own Nationals, resident in Canada or elsewhere, as long as there was no interference with enlistment for the C.A.S.F.; it was recommended, however, that any such Military Missions in Canada should take no action to recruit within the United States of America (12). During the winter months of 1940 the Polish Consul-General in Ottawa carried on negotiations with the Canadian Government departments concerned in an effort to obtain permission for the enlistment in Canada and their concentration at an eastern port, prior to despatch to join the Polish Army then in France (13). Decision was delayed as a result of the uncertain military situation during May - June 1940. Subsequently it was realized that, if men were enlisted, they would have to be given basic military training in Canada as the troops already in the United Kingdom were busy preparing to face a possible invasion (14). In addition to finding a suitable permanent camp for the Polish Army there was the question of releasing additional funds for use by the Polish Military authorities, since the Canadian Government had no intention of assuming any responsibility, financial or otherwise, for any Foreign Force which might recruit in Canada.

6. On 22 Aug 40 the Canadian Government granted approval to a Netherlands' request that its nationals resident in Canada, of an age and category fit for military service, might be enlisted into the Dutch forces. On 28 Oct 40 a similar request from the Belgian Minister to Canada was granted (15). Nationals of these countries (born between 1900 and 1920) were requested to register with their Military Mission. Most European Governments adhered to the view that their nationals could be conscripted for military service irrespective of their place of residence. On the other hand, the Canadian Government considered that residence should determine liability to military service, although at this time only British subjects were liable for compulsory military training. Thus, in practice, foreign nationals had to volunteer for military service before they could be enlisted by the Military Mission of their country of birth. Since the Belgian and Netherlands Governments-in-Exile retained control of their overseas possessions, and resulting revenue, they were in a better financial position than other Military Missions in Canada to begin recruiting and training.

*It should be mentioned that all Enemy Aliens resident in Canada had been required to register with the R.C.M.P., be fingerprinted and report monthly to the nearest Registrar of Enemy Aliens, unless granted a Certificate of Exemption or interned (10).