On 14 Mar Mr Gardiner further elaborated as follows:

Men are enlisting continuously, and it is just possible that if 25 per cent of the twenty-one year age group should enlist, there would not be enough men to fill the camps. They might enlist in the air force, the navy or somewhere else. As we go on with the war, it may become more and more necessary to take in the higher age groups in order to fill the camps if we are going to continue to have four months training. I should not like it to be understood that it is definitely decided that we are going to call for training only those in the twenty-one year age group. The intention is to start with that group and continue calling them as long as we need men for the camps (81).

Again, on 17 Mar, Mr Ralston repeated that the reason for the adoption of the 30-day training period had been shortage of equipment and the desirability of having as many men as possible get some sort of training. Continuing, he stated:

... The other point was the disturbing effect which the calling-up of these men had on industry; for 30,000 a month for ten months would have meant that 300,000 would have had to make arrangements to leave their civilian occupations for one month in the year. On this latter point I have repeatedly stated that the army has recognized the necessity for the maximum possible production in this country. But with the improvement in production and supply, the equipment situation is no longer a vital factor in preventing the adoption of a longer period.

In order to make allowance for industry, we want to consider whether it would be necessary to adopt a system of reserve occupations such as they have in England, or whether some other plan could be evolved which would cause a minimum of dislocation, without the complicated system of reserve occupations and the enormous amount of machinery necessary to administer it. We studied the situation overseas. We found, on examining the system of reserved occupations there, that it would be highly desirable, if it could be done and still supply our needs, to work out some plan which would avoid our having to set up machinery and prescribe arbitrary classifications and sub-classifications to be excepted. On our return the present plan was worked out. It provides for four months' training—two months' basic training and two months' advance training. This means that future additions to the reserve will be completely trained in all weapons with which, as individuals, they may be called upon to fight. It avoids the system of reserved occupations by the simple expedient
of confining the calls to a very limited group unless the circumstances change materially or the numbers in this group should prove unexpectedly small. It also embodies this desirable feature, that young men at the time of their coming of age are reminded to recognize and prepare themselves for their responsibility for the defence of Canada.

65. On 24 Mar a first quota of 4668 'R' recruits reported (4690 had been requisitioned) to the new Basic Training Centres along with 'A' recruits (see para 83).

66. In a further Appreciation submitted to the Minister of National Defence on 18 May General Crerar recommended that the Government return to his original programme for 1941, since the general military situation abroad had deteriorated. This would involve, first of all, the reconstitution of the 4th Canadian Division. This would take some time, due to the dearth of trained Officers and N.C.Os. to serve as cadres for units which would have to be mobilized to replace those utilized in the armoured division. The Infantry brigades were in a satisfactory state of training, however, and eight further infantry battalions were available for a fifth division which would have to be mobilized before the anticipated departure overseas of the armoured division during the autumn. Therefore he recommended the mobilization of another division at once: further recommendations could be made later to cover the period when only two divisions should be available for home defence.

67. General Crerar's request to reconstitute the 4th Canadian Division found immediate acceptance. The question of mobilizing a fifth division had been discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 9 May but deferred, Prime Minister Mackenzie King being worried over the possibility of public pressure being exerted for the introduction of conscription for military service overseas. The question came up for discussion again and again but no decision was made. On 10 Jun the Minister of National Defence for Air (Hon. C.G. Power) pointed out that there was more manpower available than had been originally estimated; even though the R.C.A.F. now totalled the equivalent of four army divisions and the Navy's strength equalled another division and a half. On 10 Jul Mr Ralston stated that, in his opinion, Canada was committed to send five divisions overseas, even though there was no written commitment. Because of the absence of Hon. C.G. Power and Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe no decision was possible at the meeting of 15 Jul, but the Prime Minister did point out that the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air (Capt. H.R. Balfour) had mentioned (during his

*Due to the re-designation of the 1st Canadian Armoured Division to 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division the projected fifth division became the 6th Canadian Division when mobilized.

**In a personal letter to General McNaughton, dated 19 May, General Crerar wrote: "I am constantly being pressed to mobilize further divisions but so far have succeeded in holding our Army expansion programme in some balance with the prospect of receiving equipment on which they can train and with which they can subsequently fight" (84).
recent visit to Ottawa) that the Government of the United Kingdom believed that the army role would be mainly police duty in Europe after victory had been made possible by air power. The matter was settled by the Cabinet War Committee on 29 Jul but only after a stormy debate during which Mr Ralston stated that, if necessary, he would support conscription for overseas service. Canada would make available four divisions and an army tank brigade for overseas service and retain two divisions at home. Although mobilization of a 6th Division was authorized, immediate authority was granted to complete only its three Infantry Brigade Groups. (These would be employed as an operational reserve at each of Nanaimo, Niagara and Valcartier.) Public announcement was not made until 9 Aug.

The Canadian Army programme for 1941 had been linked to the British Army's F.F.C. No. 35 (i.e. Field Force Conspectus) which had been drawn up during the autumn of 1940 to make the best possible use of available manpower. Although it became necessary to impose a 'manpower ceiling' of 2,195,000 all ranks during March 1941, a total force of 57 divisions (including those from the Dominions and Empire) was still planned. In accepting this 'ceiling' the British Army was given to understand that large numbers of women replacements would be made available through the A.T.S. (Auxiliary Territorial Service). By mid-summer 1941 it had proved necessary, however, to raise this 'manpower' to 2,374,800 all ranks: it was now considered that manpower should be treated as a bulk allotment and the Army be permitted to work out its own commitment in G.H.Q. and L. of C. troops rather than estimate the force purely on a specific number of divisions. The new plan was known as F.F.C. No. 36 and a draft was sent to C.M.H.Q. as early as 5 Aug 41 (88). The Canadian contribution to the new Field Force Contingent No. 36 (but distinct from the manpower allotted the British Army) was envisaged as three infantry divisions, one armoured division, one army tank brigade, an enlarged Forestry Corps and a proportion of corps and army troops units. It was against this background and the already mentioned activities of the Canadian Government that a Canadian Army Programme was planned for 1942.

General McNaughton's views as to further expansion of the Canadian Army Overseas were brought to Ottawa during early August by Brigadier G.R. Turner who had been sent back on a liaison visit. The Canadian Corps Commander felt that further additions should take the form of armoured formations (89). Replying to General McNaughton in a personal letter of 11 Aug the C.G.S. wrote:

*On 9 Dec 40 Prime Minister Churchill advised the Secretary of State for War that a more economical use would have to be made of the British Army's manpower. Over a million men were serving in the United Kingdom as corps, army or G.H.Q. troops, on A.D.G.B. (Air Defence of Great Britain) or at training establishments and depots while only 755,000 men actually were on the strength of fighting formations (86).

**During June the Vice Chief of the General Staff (Brigadier K. Stuart) had visited the United Kingdom. The Adjutant-General and Master-General of the Ordnance also visited the Canadian Army Overseas during the summer.
While the War Committee of the Cabinet has recently ruled that pending full examination of the man-power and financial situations no further increases will be authorized in the Canadian Army both overseas and here beyond the immediate organization of three Infantry Brigade Groups of the 6th Division, it is inevitable that during the next few weeks the Cabinet will need to consider seriously what forces are to be despatched overseas in 1942. In preparation for this, the Chiefs of Staff Committee here is now engaged on the drafting of an Appreciation as to the course of the war during the next year and, following this, the several Service Programmes for expansion will be drawn up.

It is my intention to put forward the Army Programme as a tentative one only and subject to detailed discussion with yourself and the War Office before its recommendation is firm. It is my hope and expectation that this procedure will require me, and probably the Minister, to take another trip to the U.K. very early this autumn. In the meantime, while the thoughts expressed in the memorandum which Turner brought back to me...will be taken fully into account, I suggest that the following factors might be considered by you:

To commence with, our departmental studies of man-power available do not indicate that numbers will be a restrictive factor for some time yet in respect to an expansion of the Canadian Army. Perhaps the A.G. has already spoken to you on this subject but, if not, I might say that our departmental appreciation indicates that man-power is available to maintain a Canadian Army of eight divisions, of which two will be in Canada, for a period of over six years from now. An Inter-departmental Committee on Man-power has now been formed and is considering the calculations submitted by this and other departments such as Labour and Munitions and Supply. It may be that the results of this Committee's considerations will be somewhat at variance from the estimates we have separately reached. On the other hand, our own calculations certainly do not suffer from optimism and I believe that the numbers for the Army are there, without interfering with essential industry and other home activities, providing the Government takes the steps required to get those numbers into the Services.

All the above leads me to the conclusion that, providing the Government are prepared to face up to the financial and other strain, we should be able to reinforce the Corps during 1942 with not only the 4th Division but another Armoured Division as well. This would result

*See para 126.*
in too large a Corps, but have you ever con-
considered the pros and cons of a Canadian Army
comprising two Corps each of 2 Divisions and
an Armoured Division? I fully admit that this
is a pretty ambitious proposal because the
necessary increase in Corps, etc., troops will
be fairly heavy. At the same time, I do not
think that the picture is an impossible one (90).

70. According to the Chiefs of Staff Committee
further "Appreciation of the Nature of the Canadian Military
Effort as of:-- 5th September 1941" the maximum military effort
should be put forward in 1942 (91). Should Russia be able to
continue in the War they considered it likely that there would
be British offensive action on the continent of Europe. On the
other hand, if the U.S.S.R. was crushed, Canada's maximum effort
would be more than ever necessary to help stave off a victorious
Germany. Therefore, Canada's Armed Forces should be expanded
at once.

71. In a long memorandum dated 29 Sep General
Creer elaborated on the above and set forth the possible al-
ternatives for a Canadian Army Programme in 1942:

... It is important that plans for the expan-
sion of the Canadian Army overseas should be
such as can be implemented with our present
system of voluntary enlistment for overseas
service. On the other hand, within whatever
restrictions may be imposed upon army expan-
sion by the availability of man-power and other
limiting factors, it is essential, from the
military point of view, that Canada should
provide the maximum force overseas that it
is possible to organize and maintain. It is
certain that the land forces of the British
Empire can never reach such numbers that we
will become overinsured in that respect. And
it is eminently desirable that we should now
tentatively explore the various alternatives
for providing a larger and more offensively
effective Army overseas, in order that cer-
tain general conclusions may be reached
in advance of any discussions with the War Office
and the G.O.C., Canadian Corps (92).

Actually a mobile reserve of two divisions and an armoured bri-
gade group had never existed in Canada on a properly equipped
and trained basis and General Creer was of the opinion, in
view of the fact that the United States was steadily moving
closer to actual belligerency, "that we are now justified in
reviewing the size of the mobile force held in Canada as a gen-
eral reserve for home defence and that, as mobilization of the
6th Division proceeds, the despatch overseas of the 4th Canadian
Division without its replacement in Canada may be considered".

*On 2 Oct the Minister of National Defence passed along this
suggestion to the other members of the Cabinet War Committee.
At the 10 Nov meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence
in Montreal the senior United States service member indicated
that he did not think the War Department in Washington would
view with disfavour a considerable reduction in the general re-
serve being maintained by the Canadian Government (93).
72. Since, under the conditions of modern warfare, it was not considered feasible to have a corps of more than three divisions it would be necessary to expand the overseas framework, even though it would not be "desirable or economical in manpower" to provide an additional corps headquarters, an army headquarters and at least 20,000 more ancillary troops. After weighing the pros and cons, however, General Crerar suggested:

(a) Conversion of the 4th Canadian Division to an armoured division for service overseas.

(b) Eventual formation overseas of a Canadian Armoured Corps of two divisions.

(c) Creation of a Canadian Army Headquarters overseas to command and administer the Canadian Corps of three Divisions and the Canadian Armoured Corps of two Armoured Divisions (94).

73. On 13 Oct the Minister of National Defence and the C.O.S. arrived in the United Kingdom to discuss the Canadian Army Programme for 1942 with General McNaughton and senior officers at the War Office. A definite decision was reached to recommend the conversion of the 4th Canadian Division to an armoured formation and despatch it overseas in May 1942 and to form a second army tank brigade from one of the existing infantry brigade groups of the 6th Division (replacing it by another). The original practice of including French-speaking representation in each formation had been violated by the hasty mobilization of the 4th Canadian Division and the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division; now it was planned to include the bilingual Sherbrooke Fusiliers in the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Les Voltigeurs de Québec in the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade and to create additional French-speaking units into which an increasing flow of "R" recruits could be channelled after the completion of advanced training (see para 103). The feasibility of creating a First Canadian Army also appears to have been discussed but was not included in the Programme to be submitted to the Cabinet on their return.

74. Following their return to Canada the C.O.S. presented an official submission of this programme on 18 Nov. Although Canada's military effort to date might be considered

*Statistics then available showed the Canadian Army disposed as follows:

**Overseas**

(1) **United Kingdom**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.Q. Canadian Corps</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Division</td>
<td>17,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Division</td>
<td>17,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Division</td>
<td>17,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (Arm.) Division</td>
<td>14,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Troops</td>
<td>12,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army, G.H.Q. and L. of C.</td>
<td>11,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cont'd next page*
to be a well distributed programme it did not represent, accord-
ing to General Crerar, the maximum effort which could be main-
tained, especially since there had been no battle casualties as
yet. The C.G.S. again reiterated that the "maximum expansion"
of the Canadian Army should take place during 1942 (96).

The Cabinet War Committee gave this proposed
Army programme long thought. At a meeting of 3 Dec it received
assurance from Maj-Gen. K. Stuart (recently appointed C.G.S.)
that such a programme could be completed by voluntary enlist-
ments and that, under foreseeable circumstance, there would be
an adequate number of reinforcements. General Stuart considered,
however, that this programme was the "visible ceiling" of army
expansion. As late as 29 Dec Prime Minister Churchill was asked
for his views on the wisdom of the proposed expansion of the
Canadian Army Overseas, when he met with the Cabinet War Com-
mittee during his visit to Ottawa (from the midst of the "ARCADIA"
Conference in Washington).

On 6 Jan 42 this Army Programme finally was
given approval by the Cabinet War Committee but it was not until
26 Jan (while General McNaughton was en route to Canada by sea)
that the Prime Minister made the following announcement in the
House of Commons:

During 1942 ... it is proposed to create over-
seas a Canadian army of two army corps; one
army corps to comprise three infantry divisions
and two army tank brigades; the other to con-
sist of two armoured divisions. In addition
all ancillary units to serve these two corps
will be provided ....

The 1942 army programme will create a thor-
oughly modern, well balanced and hard-hitting
Canadian overseas army. This army will be
complete and self-contained. It will be capa-
bile of operating in any theatre, and can be
effectively maintained in respect to both man-
power and equipment (97).

(cont'd from p. 33) Base Units and Organiza-
tions 9,943
Reinforcements 14,658
Canadian Forestry Corps 4,305
Total 121,332

Canada

(i) Newfoundland 3,734
(ii) Jamaica 842
(iii) Hong Kong 1,282
Total 127,890

Base Units and Organiza-tions 9,943
Reinforcements 14,658
Canadian Forestry Corps 4,305
Total 121,332

(i) Coastal Garrisons 12,529
(ii) 4th Division 15,477
(iii) 6th Division 7,673
(iv) Miscellaneous Units 628
(v) Reinforcements 28,722
(vi) Home War Establishments,
Training Centre Staffs,
Internment Camp Staffs
and Other Detachments 42,182
(vii) Veterans' Guard of Canada 6,429
Total 113,640
GRAND TOTAL CANADIAN ACTIVE ARMY 241,530
77. If such a First Canadian Army was to become a self-contained force, as General McNaughton insisted it should, however, certain deficiencies in rearward units amounting to 22,172 all ranks would have to be made good (98). This was the difference between the Canadian manpower being provided for the "field force" and the estimated requirements for a self-contained force built around three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two army tank brigades (approximately 200,000 all ranks). It was agreed at the War Office that the balance of this "administrative tail" (chiefly Engineers, Signals and Army Service Corps personnel) would have to be provided by the British Army if Canada was unable to do so (99).

78. Even before this, however, General Crerar had been able to realize his wish for a field command. With the military framework planned, it had been arranged during his trip overseas (see para 72) that he should replace Major-General V.W. Odlum in command of the 2nd Canadian Division (100). He had returned to Canada only to prepare the new programme for submission to the Cabinet and hand over to the V.C.G.S. who became his successor (see para 75). Due to the continued illness of the Canadian Corps Commander, General Crerar took over temporary command of the Canadian Corps in early December as the next senior officer, and remained as its commander when General McNaughton created a First Canadian Army.

(vi) Reinforcements and Recruiting, 1940-1941

79. Whereas Recruiting Memorandum No. 1 of 15 May 39 had concerned itself with recruiting men for the units which were subsequently mobilized (see para 27), Recruiting Memorandum No. 2 of 15 May 39 dealt with the problem of enlisting reinforcements for those units (101). Unlike the First World War, when Infantry battalions had to be disbanded following arrival in the United Kingdom to provide reinforcements for the Canadian Corps on the Western Front, each District Officer Commanding was made responsible for obtaining the quotas of recruits required to reinforce the units mobilized in his District (102).

80. The calculation of wastage rates was not possible until it was known whether the units mobilized would form part of an expeditionary force (see para 26) and even then those

*The planners used the following scales to compensate for the proportion of corps, army and G.H.Q. units required to maintain armies of any size in the field:

- 40,000 per infantry division
- 35,000 per armoured division
- 5,000 per army tank brigade

This was known as the 'divisional slice'.

**It was assumed that Infantry and Cavalry units would establish regimental depots to handle reinforcements whereas those for other arms and services would be enlisted by District Depots. Regimental depots were not established by all the units entitled to do so, however, and a General Order of July 1940 directed that the recruiting of all reinforcements should henceforth become the business of the District Depots.
compiled at N.D.H.Q. were unrealistic, being based on experiences of the First World War. Not until 14 Dec was Brigadier Crerar (then C.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) able to forward to Canada by telegram the War Office rates of wastage: these were hypothetical, however, and were "to be considered as the highest degree of activity to be prepared for rather than the most probable degree anticipated" (103). These tables classified wastage according to periods of 'normal' and 'intense' activity; the percentages for other ranks varied from 5 to 6 per cent monthly in the case of armoured, infantry and machine gun units in the first instance to 20 per cent (infantry rifle), 14 per cent (armoured corps, heavy units) and 10 per cent (light armoured units and machine gun) in the second. The other arms and services—Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Medicals, Army Service Corps and Ordnance were estimated at 7, 6, 4, 4, 3 and 3 per cent respectively during 'intense' periods. Officer casualties were estimated as being similar to other ranks during 'normal' periods but approximately double, except for tanks and infantry, during periods of 'intense' fighting.

On 15 Jan 40 a first reinforcement quota of 4728 men was ordered into the Training Centres recently established for their training. This quota had been calculated as the number of reinforcements required to make good three months possible wastage of the Canadian units then overseas. Even though these men would not be completely trained by April they would be despatched overseas to complete the complement of the Reinforcement Depots to be established at that time in the United Kingdom. Thereafter monthly despatches of trained reinforcements would enable these overseas depots to be maintained at strength. A further month's wastage would be held at the Base Depot to be established in the theatre of operations (i.e., France). The "first reinforcements" then being carried by units (approximately 10 per cent of establishment) would be returned to the reinforcement pool. (104).

Circumstances were completely changed by the fall of France. It was felt that the British 'quiet' or 'normal' rate was too low in view of the fact that Canada was far away and that, in the event of invasion or heavy losses from enemy air activity, it would take longer to procure additional reinforcements. Following a conference at 7th Corps Headquarters on 8 Aug a revised schedule of wastage rates was prepared to meet the special needs of Canadian troops (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap VIII, paras 68-73). It was proposed that the new situation might be met by holding a pool of Infantry reinforcements equal to 30 per cent (three months at 10 per cent per month) of establishments. Basic percentages for arm and services were estimated accordingly (105):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arm of Service</th>
<th>Per cent per month</th>
<th>Per cent per 3 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (R)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (MG)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.A.S.C.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.A.M.C.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.C.O.C.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*When the lowest age for enlistment was raised to 19 in November 1939 a number of 19-year olds were posted to District or Regimental Depots until they were old enough for despatch overseas as reinforcements. Subsequent reinforcement quotas were 1474 (1 Feb), 1372 (24 Feb), 1372 (22 Mar) and 1389 (17 May).*
These figures were approximately midway between the British 'normal' and 'intense' rates. After consideration in Ottawa a telegram was despatched to C.O.M.H.Q. on 24 Aug signifying agreement; it was pointed out further that an additional reserve of four months reinforcements would be held in Canada (106). With the adoption of this policy the earlier plan of despatching overseas a monthly draft of reinforcements was dropped:

83. With the Canadian Army Programme for 1941 approved the next problem was recruiting sufficient men to make it a reality. Furthermore, the organization of the armoured division and the considerable reorganizations undertaken overseas by the Canadian Corps had dissipated a goodly number of the trained reinforcements available both in Canada and the United Kingdom. In an appreciation of 28 Jan 41 the Adjutant-General strongly recommended that the existing recruiting procedure whereby most men were obtained "off the street" should be stopped (107). Recruiting should be through the Reserve Army and its members should be given the four months training being planned for N.R.M.A. personnel, but as volunteers destined for overseas service. Replying to the Adjutant-General on 4 Feb General Crerar expressed agreement that recruiting "off the street" should be reduced to a minimum and men passed through Reserve units even if they did not do much training (since in most cases they would require four months training anyway) before they would be acceptable for the overseas reinforcement stream. He considered that manpower sources, in order of importance, should be the Reserve units, N.R.M.A. personnel and "men off the street". However, he added:

"Until we have some experience of the working of the 4-months system of training men called up under the N.R.M.A. and find out how men volunteer, we should place no reliance on this source of recruits, though we may hope that it will be a substantial one. It is always possible to regard it as a reserve, for in case of necessity we could draft these trainees to fill Coast Defence and other units required for the Home Defence of Canada, thus releasing personnel who would volunteer for active service overseas (108)."

In practice, therefore, N.R.M.A. personnel undergoing four months compulsory training were to be counted as part of the four months quota of reinforcements held in Canada (see para 81).

84. This was all very well but the recruiting shortages for the first three months of 1941 totalled 6900 men and (as the Minister of National Defence told the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 23 Apr) only the French-speaking Reserve units had exceeded the quotas allotted to them. As the result of medical re-classification within the 3rd Canadian Division even more men were required to complete its establishments before

*As a result of this action, and the arrival overseas of the 2nd Canadian Division, it proved desirable to form three groups of holding units and provide, Canadian Base Units. "A" Group came to comprise three Infantry Holding Units; "B" Group consisted of an Engineer Holding Unit, a Signals Holding Unit, an Army Service Corps Holding Unit and a General Holding Unit; "C" Group had two Artillery Holding Units (Preliminary Overseas Narrative, Chap VIII, para 74).
proceeding overseas. Action was taken to comb out the coast defence units for men who wished to serve overseas and replace them with men whose medical categories had been lowered to 'B' but the number discovered was fewer than anticipated (109). There still were shortages in other active units to be remedied. Actually, by now the Armed Forces and expanding war industry had absorbed the majority of those who had been unemployed in September 1939.

As early as 6 Apr the three Defence Ministers had made separate appeals over the radio asking for a total of 116,000 men, 9000 for the Navy, 55,000 for the R.C.A.F. and between 5,000-6,000 per month for the Army during the balance of the year (110). Speaking to the House of Commons on the same theme Mr Ralston had suggested that there was room for everybody and the fact that pressure had not been applied as yet did not mean that men were not needed (111).

Parliament adjourned until 28 Apr but before it re-opened an important decision had been taken by the Cabinet War Committee. At the latter's meeting of 23 Apr Mr Ralston stated that it would be necessary to despatch overseas further men from coast defence units and replace them by N.R.M.A. personnel who should complete their four months compulsory training. This recommendation was approved, after the Prime Minister had once again cautioned against any commitment that might lead, directly or indirectly, to conscription for overseas service. Further agreement was reached on the desirability of conducting a definite nation-wide recruiting campaign.

On the morning of 26 Apr Mr Ralston announced at a press conference that the 5,000 odd "R" recruits who would be completing their four months training in July would be retained indefinitely for "coast defence, internal security guard in the interior" (112). This move was presented as "a natural development of government policy in the light of conditions and not a response to any emergency". It was expected that the policy of retaining such N.R.M.A. personnel would not be continued indefinitely and that it would be confined to the two classes (9,850) graduating in July and August. The account in the Ottawa Journal stated, however:

*The 1939 medical standards were too high for a citizen army to be recruited from average healthy citizens and, therefore, they were lowered somewhat by Canadian Army Routine Order 543 of 29 Jun 40. Men of a minimum height of five feet, a minimum weight of 120 pounds and a minimum chest measurement of 32 inches became acceptable as category "A" soldiers.

*It might be noted further that a considerable number of men recruited during the spring months were despatched directly to units destined for overseas, by-passing the newly re-organized Training Centres.

***Such 'R' recruits became known as Members (H.D.) of the Canadian Army on being posted to such duties. The all embracing term N.R.M.A. soldier was not adopted until December 1942, when men came to be enrolled for the duration of the War rather than for military training.
In view of deferments of compulsory military training allowed to workers in agriculture and other occupations, the Minister said the 21-year-old class might be exhausted by the time the July call was made and that men of other classes would have to be called up to meet the deficiency (113).

88. As a corollary it was agreed, between the Minister of National Defence and C.G.S. on 3 May, that further "B" category men should not be enrolled as "R" recruits and those already undergoing training should be posted to units other than Infantry or Artillery (114). Henceforth, "R" recruits would be posted to coast defence units as Members (H.D.) of the Army to replace "A" category volunteers withdrawn for service overseas while volunteers in other "active" units whose categories had been lowered would be absorbed into the Home War Establishment (115). The Department of National War Services endeavoured to decrease the number of "B" category men due to report on 20 May and agreed that none should be sought on subsequent requisitions (116).

89. When the House of Commons re-assembled on Monday, 28 Apr the Leader of the Opposition charged that the problem of manpower needs had not been faced realistically. Unlike certain vociferous sections of the press the Conservative Party also was committed to a policy of no conscription for overseas service but Mr R.B. Hanson felt free to attack the Government's methods. Replying to his charges the Minister of National Defence pointed out that until now sufficient men had been obtained to occupy the available accommodation for training and meet the overseas reinforcement needs of a Canadian Corps without a national recruiting campaign. Although a definite recruiting campaign was going to be undertaken there was "no occasion for anyone to feel jittery with regard to the man-power situation" he continued, reiterating that "this matter ebbs and flows" (117).

90. During the budget debate on 12 May, Dr. H.A. Bruce brought the question of conscription for overseas service farther into the open. While conceding that the Government probably would get the men immediately being asked for, this Conservative member pointed out that it would become increasingly more difficult to meet quotas set for later recruiting drives. The time had come, he argued, to use manpower according to a "national service plan". The powers of the National Resources Mobilization Act should be used to ensure that there was an equal-ity of service and sacrifice. Furthermore:

... Voluntary recruiting has reached the stage where it is slow, cumbersome and wasteful. I am certain that all parts of Canada will respond to the high patriotic call that the situation now requires. Selective compulsory service is the only fair and efficient way to meet the complex needs of Canada... (118)

91. The Minister of National Defence replied that, although he knew Dr Bruce was "sincere in his remarks", his speech was "nothing less than a blow at our national unity and, whether he intends it or not, an attempt to undermine it" (119). Voluntary recruiting might not be the most economical way to secure men but MrRalston pointed out its analogy with the Victory Loan campaigns which were being conducted to help finance the War. He did not bother to elaborate, as well he might, the
steps which were being taken to ensure that both the Armed Forces and industry should have sufficient skilled men (see Appendix "on").

92. Actually Mr Railton had opened "Canada's first recruiting campaign" with a radio broadcast on the preceding evening (11 May). He asked for 32,000 recruits for the Army in the next two months. The assistance of a professional advertising agency was obtained to put over this campaign, which was under the direction of a National Campaign Committee (120). (This National Campaign Committee had held its first meeting on 4 May under the chairmanship of the Adjutant-General.) On 15 May an appeal to unity was made over the French language radio stations of the C.B.C. by Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice) who was reported as saying that it was the duty of all physically fit men to volunteer for active service since "the war the Nazis are carrying on against us is a struggle to the death between Christianity and neopaganism, or rather nihilism; between freedom and slavery, between right and injustice of the most flagrant kind, between civilization and barbarism" (122). By this time large recruiting posters had appeared on some 890 billboards in 265 cities and towns across Canada; posters were affixed to buildings, cards placed in streetcars and busses, advertisements inserted in weekly and daily newspapers and, publicity inserted on radio programmes. The theme was immediate service in "Canada's Mechanized Army". Local committees of public spirited citizens were formed to work with recruiting officers to put over the campaign on a 'person to person' basis. It was hoped that the recruiting drive would reach its peak late in June: this would coincide with the end of the school year and, roughly, with the off-season between planting and harvest on the farms. In conjunction with the Victory Loan Drive, which opened on 2 Jun, a 'Victory Torch' was dedicated in Vancouver and then carried across Canada, stopping at 27 cities before reaching its ultimate destination—Prime Minister Churchill (123).

93. On 15 Jun Dr Bruce made a second attempt to urge the adoption of 'conscription' but was again countered by the Minister of National Defence who stated bluntly that such a suggestion was a blow against national unity and the recruiting campaign then being conducted (124). (Actually this subject had been discussed from time to time within the Cabinet War Committee. Indeed, on 20 May the Prime Minister had answered the suggestion that public apathy could be ended if Canadian troops could be involved even in small scale operations, with the remark that there was no justification for involving loss of life merely to arouse public sentiment.) Speaking at Calgary on 27 Jun the Prime Minister again made it clear that there would not be conscription for overseas service (125).

94. As suggested editorially by newspapers imitable to the Liberal Government, the basic reason for the limited success of the recruiting campaign was the policy of no conscription for overseas service. Young men were waiting until they should be called, rather than volunteer while their neighbours remained in civilian jobs (126). In reply to suggestions that the Army should eliminate fit men from its own offices Mr Railton stated on 17 Jun that enlisted men would not get "cushy" jobs at Headquarters. He admitted that there was a lack of glamour, compared to 1914–1918, and that one could walk through the streets of Ottawa without realizing that the country was at war. A considerable number of men contacted indicated that they were awaiting call by the R.C.A.F.; others considered they were contributing
more to winning the War by remaining on the farm or working in war plants (127). The Victory Loan was over-subscribed but the men for whom the tools of war had been designed were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers. Saturday, 28 Jun was set aside as 'Army Day', on which all camps and barracks across Canada were thrown open to public inspection, but the following telegram from Pacific Command probably can be taken as typical:

Camps and barracks opened to public all day and training activities given. Stop. Very well received by the public and particularly by veterans. Stop. Very few potential recruits amongst visitors everywhere. Stop. Total visitors all camps 15916. Stop. May possibly have some favourable effect on recruiting (128). 95.

Only 59 per cent of the recruits required had been enlisted but Mr Holton hoped that the remainder might be obtained by 12 Jul. In order to keep the Basic and Advanced Training Centres at capacity, however, larger N.R.M.A. quotas would have to be applied against the monthly intake. Thus, requisitions were made upon the Department of National War Services for 1500 21-year olds who had received 30-days training, another 1500 whose training had been postponed previously and 1400 youths who had reached the age of 21 since the inception of the scheme. (Only 1072 of the 1220 30-day recruits reporting could be accepted, however, and 2504 of the 2780 who reported from the other requisition.) (129)

96. Some space should be devoted to the attempts made to persuade 'R' recruits to volunteer for overseas service, a step which a man could take at any time. An Adjutant-General telegram of 5 Jul addressed to all District Officers Commanding stated: "Great opportunity to obtain R recruits for active service at this time when those completing four months training will otherwise be going to coast defence or other home service units" (130). The action taken locally varied and documentary evidence is incomplete. The following extracts from the war diary of No. 31 C.A. (B) T.C., Cornwall, Ontario are, however, of some interest:

3 Jun — At the 0.0’s parade in the morning Major Chambers W., the 2nd i/c in the absence of the commanding officer, Lt. Col. Larose, R., made a stirring appeal to the R.F. recruits to join the A.F. Amidst the cheers and applause of the A.F. recruits 102 members of the R.F. fell out of their ranks and formed up in front of the parade. They were attested during the morning. At the 0.0’s parade in the afternoon Lt. Col. Larose, R. made an appeal in French and English to the training R.F. recruits to join the A.F. Before making his appeal, he instructed the A.F. personnel to form sides of a hollow square which they did. Lt. Col. Larose stood in the centre of the fourth side. In a few, crisp words delivered both in French and English he stated the need of Canada for men and now. Sixteen men responded to his call and fell out in front of him. The total number of recruits for the day was 118 men. In the afternoon
the men had their pictures taken for the Cornwall Standard Freetholder. In the evening, the new A.F. recruits led by Capt. Crowe of the S.D.G. Highlanders and Lt. Desmarais of the Royal 22nd Regiment attended a complimentary entertainment at the Capitol Theatre... They marched to the theatre following the new guard for the next day... Music was supplied for them by the pipe band of the S.D.G. Highlanders. The enthusiasm of the new recruits (A.F.) was shown by the placards they carried...

1 Jul – Lt. Col. R. Larose... in a short address, called for men to join the Active Service, also stating that if he could get a 100 per cent to volunteer, he would give a long week-end from Thursday at 1700 3-7-41 until 0600 hrs. 7-7-41, asking the men to talk it over among themselves. Within a short space of time sixty-two men had volunteered...

2 Jul – ... On the morning Parade Lt. Col. R. Larose, again appealed for more recruits for Active Service and before noon that day 100 per cent had volunteered and were signed up.

Long week-end leave was granted but, on the surface, this is a poor reason for men to renounce their convictions. An interesting, but fictional, account of what may have happened in some training centres is given by Ralph Allen in his novel of Canadian Army life entitled Home-Made Banners (Toronto, 1946).

Less success was encountered generally and statistics supplied to the Adjutant-General showed that 64, 63, and 57 per cent of the first three quotas of 'R' recruits completed their training as such; a further 19, 16 and 18 per cent of these quotas were lost to the Navy and R.C.A.F., whose recruiting officers were permitted to visit basic training centres. The following trend was deduced: 60 per cent of 'R' recruits would remain in the Army as Members H.D., 20 per cent would volunteer for general service with the Army and the remaining 20 per cent would transfer to the R.C.A.F. or Navy (131).

Meanwhile, the special recruiting campaign had managed to pass its objective of 32,000. On 15 Jul MrRalston announced that up to 14 Jul 33,500 of the 49,000 odd applicants had been accepted (132). (During the same period the R.C.A.F. had enlisted over 12,000 and the R.C.N. about 3500.) In order to capitalize upon any remaining enthusiasm a Directorate of Army Recruiting was established within the Adjutant-General's Branch (133). Initially Lt.-Col. James Mess was employed as a civilian, as were his French-speaking Associate Director and certain other members of his staff. Although August enlistments dropped to almost half of those of July they were still close enough to the estimated 7,000 required monthly to maintain the Army's programme. disillusion came, however, and by the first week in October the Director of Army Recruiting was willing to admit the the enlistment trend was declining (134). Something like 37,000 men were needed for the four months following the conclusion of the recruiting campaign but little better than 24,000 had been enlisted. Speaking in the House of Commons on 5 Nov the Minister of National Defence attributed this state of affairs to expansion of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the rapid growth of war industry and the difficulty of persuading many young men (and their families) that they were needed in khaki when the Canadian Corps was sitting inactive.
in the United Kingdom (135). Mr Ralston might have added that by autumn many were established in occupations for the winter and unlikely to change their occupation until the warm weather returned. In any case, at its meeting of 26 Nov the Cabinet War Committee approved the use of volunteer personnel in Home Defence units and brigade groups of the 5th Division as overseas reinforcements and their replacement by further N.R.M.A. personnel (see para 84).

99. Misleading newspaper editorials, such as one appearing in The Toronto Evening Telegram of 20 Nov, attempted to demonstrate that certain sections of the country had not pulled their weight in the summer recruiting campaign? Actually, according to a statement made in the House of Commons by Hon. E.G. Power on 12 Nov, population had but little to do with the determination of the quota assigned monthly to each Military District (136). The public was further enlightened by Mr Grant Dexter, writing in The Winnipeg Free Press of 28 Nov as follows:

... The main factor is the existence in any given area of militia units. If there have been militia units in, say British Columbia, the men will be more military-minded, and recruiting should be better. Moreover, at the outbreak of war, our overseas army was created by calling militia units for active service. These are the units which require reinforcement and it is but natural that the department should seek to reinforce from the parent area. There were more militia units in some provinces than others and therefore some provinces are more highly represented overseas than others.

Only with the reorganization of the Training Centres in March 1941 had there developed a definite monthly demand for 10,000 recruits. The difference between the number of voluntary enlistments and 10,000 became the quota sought from N.R.M.A. enrollment. After December 1941, moreover, Military Districts were not given credit on their monthly quotas for the N.R.M.A. personnel who had volunteered for overseas service subsequent to enrolment (132).

100. There was the further point that a considerable number of men in British Columbia had enlisted in coast defence units: this would progressively lessen the number of men available for future enlistment, particularly when its industries—fishing, fruit farming, lumbering and shipbuilding—were booming. Even then, however, statistics bore out the fact that the provinces on both coasts and Manitoba had made a better showing in the summer recruiting campaign than Ontario, Saskatchewan and Quebec. The poor showing in Ontario was due partly to the growth

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*Results of the summer recruiting campaign by Military Districts were given:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military District</th>
<th>Reservoir of eligible men in District</th>
<th>Quota of District</th>
<th>Response by District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. London</td>
<td>61,672</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td>2,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Toronto</td>
<td>170,520</td>
<td>6,651</td>
<td>7,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kingston</td>
<td>72,426</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>2,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Montreal</td>
<td>67,297</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>1,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Quebec</td>
<td>2,342,342</td>
<td>21,138</td>
<td>27,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Halifax</td>
<td>52,869</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>2,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. St. John</td>
<td>82,289</td>
<td>2,703</td>
<td>2,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Winnipeg</td>
<td>65,908</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Victoria</td>
<td>97,953</td>
<td>2,711</td>
<td>2,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Regina</td>
<td>75,674</td>
<td>2,907</td>
<td>2,715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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of war industry in that province. Saskatchewan's poor showing could be ascribed to the prevalence of so-called 'new Canadians' who were not interested in a continent from which their parents had emigrated and others who were more interested in either remaining on farms or seeking work outside the province in war industry. It was considered, by newspapers in other sections of Canada, that the reasons for Quebec's poor showing were "quite apparent".

101. Special appeals had been and still were, directed at the French-speaking portion of the population: The Montreal Daily Star of 16 Oct had headed a news story "Stirring Appeal made to French-Canadians, Brig. G. Vanier urges Quebec Mayors to encourage Enlistments" while the rival Gazette carried the caption, "Vanier Bids Canadians Volunteer Lest They Betray Men Overseas, Dominion Not Getting Enough Soldiers, He Warns, Urging Quebec Mayors To Go Home and Call Their Citizens To the Colours (138)."

102. As early as 14 May General Crerar had directed the Director of Staff Duties to prepare an analytical study on "The Recruiting Problems of the Province of Quebec" (139). During June and early July this study (by Major W.W. Goforth) was sent to other directorates, the Adjutant-General and the District Officers Commanding in Montreal and Quebec for comment and the resulting opinions incorporated for action by the Minister of National Defense, after he had discussed the problem with Cabinet colleagues from the Province of Quebec (particularly Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe and Hon. C.G. Power). Misunderstanding had been fostered during the First World War by the failure to include a French-speaking battalion in the 1st Canadian Division and the subsequent "conscription" issue and had remained. Few French-speaking N.P.A.M. units had been active during the two decades of peace; there had been very few in proportion to the size of the population and even fewer technical units. Service in the last named was barred to many potential officers and men who were not bilingual and there was a popular belief that French-speaking soldiers could and would be employed only as infantrymen (140).

103. Agreement was obtained and it was left to Mr Lapointe to make the first public announcement of the new policy on 24 Sep (141). Brigadier Pope (A.C.G.S.) visited Montreal and Quebec to explain details of the plan to the respective District Officers Commanding and had an interview with Cardinal Villeneuve (26 Sep) to whom he explained the desirability of ensuring that French-speaking officers be bilingual so that their units might serve more satisfactorily with English-speaking units (142). Subsequently, civilian committees (145) were established in Military Districts 4 and 5 to assist in the work of providing sufficient French-speaking candidates for commissions and two wings of 44 C.A. (B) T.C. at St. Jerome* were created to give sufficient

*On 27 Feb 42 courses got under way at St. Jérôme. Civilians were enlisted as privates (into either the Active or Reserve Army) and given four weeks accelerated basic training by bilingual instructors. If successful they became members of the Active Army and were transferred to the Cadet Wing of the same Training Centre for a further four weeks training (similar to the Pre-O.C.T.U. training in the United Kingdom). These courses had a capacity of 100 and could be made available to serving officers and other ranks suitable for officer training if it was felt that they would benefit from its bilingual aspects.
military (and bilingual) instruction for them to proceed to the Officers Training Centre at Brockville where a French-speaking wing was being organized (144). Eventually it was hoped that 30 per cent of the output from Brockville would be French-speaking. These officers would be required for the additional units being mobilized to correct the omission of French-speaking units from the 1940 mobilizations (see para 33), units which contained 50 to 50 per cent French-speaking personnel but no officers of their own race and the conversion of certain coast defence batteries from English-speaking to French-speaking. Further arrangements were made to provide French-speaking instructors at each of the Advanced Training Centres in or near the province of Quebec so that those who could not speak English should not be discriminated against and to increase the proportion of French instructors in the Basic Training Centres within the province of Quebec. A bilingual Junior Leaders School was established at Megantic to give three-week courses to N.C.O.s: beginning with August 1942 its intake (210 candidates) became entirely French-speaking. The situation with regard to French-speaking chaplains was reviewed and steps were taken to train more French-speaking officers for command and staff posts. More opportunities for trades training were opened in the province of Quebec. Last but not least, additional staff was engaged at N.D.H.Q. to accelerate the task commenced in August 1940 of translating instructional manuals into French: a French-speaking journalist was added to the Public Relations staff and eventually the greater number of publications became available in both languages.

104. It was hoped that this action would make army life sufficiently congenial for large numbers of 'R' recruits to volunteer for overseas service.

Cardinal Villeneuve and the Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe had been among those favouring the establishment of a French-speaking Officers Training Centre but the C.G.S. and his bilingual A.C.G.S. (Brigadier M.A. Pope) considered that the mingling of the races would benefit both English and French. Lt-Col. E. Blais, who had been returned from overseas, was sent to Brockville during late August to organize a French-speaking Wing. During the summer of 1941 there had been a monthly intake of 40-50 French-speaking candidates but it had dropped to 17 for October, until special action was taken to increase it to 80. By the end of the year the desired monthly intake of 125 had been achieved.

In Quebec province itself there were Advanced Training Centres for Infantry (Rifle) at Valcartier and Farnham and Infantry (M.G.) at Three Rivers but these also catered to English-speaking recruits. Until such time as it was possible to provide French-speaking instructors, including a field officer, at the C.A.C.T.C.s. in Camp Borden, the C.A.T.C.s. and C.E.T.C. at Petawawa and the C.S.T.C. and C.O.C.T.C. at Barriefield it was realized that French-speaking recruits sent to Ontario for advanced training would have no one to listen to their complaints and problems. There is no doubt that discrimination was practised on occasion against men who spoke French only (some men understood more English than they pretended). Other grievances turned out to be imaginary, resulting from a man's failure to understand the English language and his unsuitability on the grounds of both education and language to undertake the technical training he had been previously led to believe was possible (145).
105. Politically a new phase opened on 12 Nov when Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen announced that he had accepted the leadership of the Conservative Party. Resigning from the Senate to contest a vacancy (South York) in the House of Commons this veteran politician who had twice been Prime Minister of Canada now came out publicly for the formation of a non-party government and compulsory selective service for every phase of the nation's war effort (146). Although Mr Meighen's statement did not specifically refer to conscription, it was critical of the existing method of obtaining recruits and was issued just a few hours after the Prime Minister had re-affirmed in the House of Commons that "without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for overseas service" (147). By returning the Liberal Party to power in the general election of 1940 the Canadian people had shown themselves opposed to conscription for overseas service but, as Mr Mackenzie King went on to explain:

... So far as conscription stands for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied and how far it should be extended is a matter which the government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them.

I want it to be distinctly understood that so far as the principle of compulsory selective service is concerned for Canada, in Canada, I stand for that principle. I have never taken any other stand. It is the position that I have held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the house will learn as the government takes its decisions on that matter (148).

106. Although Mr King denied the truth of a newspaper story suggesting that he had told a recent Liberal Party caucus that the question of 'conscription' had been discussed with Prime Minister Churchill during his visit to the United Kingdom (20 Aug - 7 Sep) it was true that this fact had been confided to the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 10 Sep. According to Mr Mackenzie King, the British Prime Minister had told him that the most effective Canadian contribution would be in the field of supply and that there would be no need to introduce conscription for overseas military service.

107. On the following day, 13 Nov, prominent members of the two major parties expressed further views. While Hon Pierre Casgrain (Secretary of State) declared that the majority of the people of Canada, and the vast majority of those in Quebec, did not want compulsory military service, Hon. W. Earle Rowe (Conservative) stated that "I do not believe that to-day this government has a mandate from the people of Canada for many of the things it is doing" (149).

108. During the course of the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 2 Dec the Minister of National Defence expressed the
opinion that sufficient men could still be made available to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the dilution of the (home defence) 6th Division with N.R.M.A. personnel would release a considerable number of volunteers for overseas service. He felt, however, that Canada should be able to maintain two army corps overseas with a strength of 175,000 men: only 3½ per cent of the population was in the Armed Forces as opposed to 8 per cent of that of the United Kingdom (see para 196). Mr Ralston refused, however, to give any guarantee that there would be no need for conscription for overseas service.
PART II - EXTENSION OF MANPOWER CONTROLS, 1942-1943

(1) Increased Home Defences

109. The War entered a new phase when the Japanese made surprise attacks against Hawaii, the Philippines and Hong Kong on 7 Dec 41. Hitherto Canada's war effort had centred around the training of Commonwealth aircrew for service in Europe, the creation of an unblooded military force in the United Kingdom, somewhat unfortunately referred to as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Berlin", and the expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy into what was primarily a convoy escort force. Casualties had been small and the War seemed rather remote to those remaining at home where agricultural prices were high and expanding industry was paying high wages. Potentially, the United States would become a mighty ally but the crippling of its main battle fleet at Pearl Harbor sealed the doom of the "white" outposts in the Far East, including Hong Kong where a small Canadian force had gone to do garrison duty, and increased the possibility of Japanese raids against the west coast of North America.

110. On 15 Dec 41 the Minister of National Defence was advised that 3031 officers and 52,243 other ranks were available for defence against possible raids: these belonged to the 4th Canadian Division, corps and army troops units also destined for service with the Canadian Army Overseas, the three Infantry Brigade Groups of the 6th Division, coast defence and anti-aircraft units, reinforcements undergoing advanced training and certain personnel on the strength of District Depots. A further 5812 officers and 60,278 other ranks were not available: these included men who had just commenced training, those at static headquarters, hospital patients, other low category personnel and members of miscellaneous details (1). Two days later (17 Dec), however, the Chiefs of Staff Committee advised the Cabinet War Committee that pressure to augment military strength on the west coast should be resisted, since Europe still was the decisive theatre of operations.

111. Assuming approval of the existing Army Programme for 1942*, the Chief of the General Staff suggested to the Minister of National Defence on 20 Dec that the 6th Division should be completed and a further four Infantry battalions mobilized for home defence (2). Territorial representation for this total of eight Infantry units had not yet been worked out but speedy mobilization of four or five French-speaking battalions would be easy, since about 30 per cent of N.R.M.A. personnel spoke that language (see para 102). General Stuart considered that men with 30-days training might be recalled as 'R' recruits and posted directly to new English-speaking Infantry units which would become, in effect, temporary Training Centres. Accommodation existing in Training Centres would be reserved for those proceeding to join the Canadian Army Overseas. A nucleus of Officers and N.C.O.s. would be returned from overseas for all the new units; the remainder would be found from the Reserve units themselves and personnel serving with units already mobilized or on the staff of Training Centres.

*Essentially the Army Programme involved the conversion of the 4th Canadian Division into an armoured formation; the provision of a second army tank brigade, three medium artillery regiments, one reconnaissance battalion, one engineer battalion, a number of units to become Armoured Corps troops or additional corps troops and three tank transporter companies. In practice it proved desirable to utilize existing units made surplus by the conversion of the 4th Canadian Division or mobilized for the 6th Division.
112. General Stuart subsequently decided, however, that further mobilizations should be delayed until the existing Army Programme, approved only on 6 Jan 42 (see paras 75-6), had been implemented (3). To that end the Cabinet War Committee authorized the construction of six additional Basic Training Centres and two further Advanced Training Centres on 23 Jan and at the following meeting (28 Jan) approved a 50 per cent increase in training centre capacity to provide accommodation for an intake of 15,000 recruits per month (4).

113. With the whole of Malaya in Japanese hands, General Wavell's ABDA Command disintegrating and General MacArthur's troops merely prolonging a hopeless struggle in the Philippines, Prime Minister King expressed concern over Canada's west coast defences to the Cabinet War Committee on 18 Feb. It was agreed that the Chiefs of Staff should attend the next meeting.

114. On the following day (19 Feb) General Stuart advised the Minister of National Defence that, although the entrance of Japan into the conflict had materially increased the frequency and scale of possible attacks, the only additional form of attack envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff had been that by small underwater craft. In order to provide adequate home defences it would be necessary to complete the 6th Division, add five Infantry battalions and a number of A.A. batteries to the coast defences, maintain two battalions for internal security (Niagara area), strengthen the defences of Newfoundland and Labrador and, finally, mobilize three Infantry Brigade Groups for a 7th Division. Most of the Army's home defence requirements—2164 officers and 41,518 other ranks—could be found from N.R.M.A. personnel. However, he added:

...the increased rate of recruiting of active personnel, and the fact that I feel our wastage requirements for the Army abroad have been generously provided in our previous manpower tables in relation to the Army programme, might quite possibly make it necessary and advisable to complete our more urgent requirements from trained active reinforcements at least until it is necessary to replace them later for overseas service. (5)

115. Although the Prime Minister again accepted the Chiefs of Staff opinion that defeat of Germany was the primary object, he told the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 20 Feb that

*Scales of attack laid down by the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the west coast, including amendments of 23 Dec 41, were:

(a) Bombardment by one capital ship; by two 8-inch cruisers; or by one merchant raider mounting maxim guns.

(b) Attack by minelaying craft, submarines, small surface craft and small underwater craft.

(c) Attack by small raiding parties, seaborne or airborne.

(d) Light-to-medium scale bombing attack by ship-borne aircraft on sea-borne, coastal and inland objectives.

(e) Slight risk of torpedo and gas attack from aircraft.
the envisaged scales of attack were not the only factor influen-
cing the steps to be taken for home defence: popular appre-
rehension on the west coast and the possibility of further deter-
ioration in the strategic situation also had to be borne in 

mind. 

Public alarm in British Columbia was growing to 
virtual frenzy, fanned by the removal of the Japanese population 
and the shelling of oil installations in California by a Japan-
ese submarine (25 Feb). Finally, after considerable pressure 
had been placed upon the Government, both by Liberal members 
of Parliament from British Columbia and the Government of that 
province, Prime Minister King reached a decision. On 18 Mar 
he told the members of the Cabinet War Committee that the ques-
tion of home defence had been discussed with General McNaughton 
(when in Ottawa) who had expressed the view that a large mobile 
force might be established within Pacific Command to allay pub-
ic anxieties. Thereupon approval was given to the Minister 
of National Defence’s recommendation that the 6th Division 
should be completed at once and three brigade groups of a 7th 
Division mobilized. Both Mr Macdonald and Mr Halton pointed 
out, however, that the Atlantic area was still more vulnerable 
to enemy activity than the Pacific. Two days later (20 Mar) 
the Minister of National Defence was given authority to complete 
a 7th Division for the east coast and mobilize three infantry 
brigade groups for an 8th Division (6). These latter brigade 
groups were intended as an additional reserve. 

By the end of 1942 home defence dispositions in 
Canada were as follows: the 6th Division in southern British 
Columbia; two brigade groups of the 8th Division stationed in 
northern British Columbia and the third at Valcartier (as a 
reserve under N.D.H.Q. control); the 7th Division in Atlantic 
Command as a general reserve; 10 "unallotted" Infantry battalions 
and one machine gun battalion on coast defence; two battalions 
on guard duty around Niagara; one Infantry battalion in Jamaica 
and four in Newfoundland (including Labrador); 25 coast batteries 
in Canada and 10,000 all ranks manning 93 heavy and 202 light 
A.A. guns in Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador; aerodrome defence 
companies guarding strategic airfields, and small garrisons in 
Bermuda, Bahamas and British Guiana (7). Even then, a good 
many of these units were not complete to establishment, as wit-
ness a shortage of 5000 gunners for authorized A.A. batteries 
and the following divisional breakdown (8): 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Division</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Division</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Division</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of men employed on operational duties 
in Canada—5511 officers and 59,984 other ranks (including 
25,424 N.R.M.A.)—was impressive, however, even though it did 
include 351 officers and 6753 other ranks of the 2nd Canadian 
Army Tank Brigade and ancillary units destined for service 
overseas with First Canadian Army. The above does not include 
the 402 officers and 6977 other ranks stationed in Newfoundland, 
Labrador, Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica and British Guiana. Thus 
was a grand total of 5562 officers and 60,208 other ranks serving 
on operational duty in the North American Area. In the event
of emergency some 3731 officers and 48,174 other ranks (including 8734 N.R.M.A.) on the strength of Advanced Training Centres might be deployed in an operational role (9).

119. By this time also [end of 1942], the question of a wider utilization for N.R.M.A. personnel had been faced. As early as 23 Apr 41 the Cabinet War Committee had approved their being utilized to fill vacancies in coast defence and internal security units (see para 86). What could be done with such "Members H.D. of the Canadian Army" once these establishments had been filled had been the subject of discussion during the autumn. General Crerar had summarized the pros and cons for the Minister of National Defence in a memorandum of 29 Sep and had suggested that the problem would be less troublesome if Newfoundland and Labrador could be considered as part of Canada's home defence area or if the number of 'R' recruits enrolled monthly could be reduced or converted into volunteers (10).

Again, on 6 Nov, General Crerar suggested that volunteers serving in Canada should be placed in the reinforcement stream for overseas service and replaced on home defence duties by N.R.M.A. personnel (11). Approval for this action was granted by the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Nov. The question of extending the sphere of "home defence" to cover service in Newfoundland and Labrador remained unsettled, however, though the Prime Minister told the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 10 Dec that there was no reason why this area should not be extended, possibly even to include the whole hemisphere.

120. Undoubtedly such an extension of the N.R.M.A. area of service would have made it easier to implement the provisions of ABC-22 (12), (authorized 7 and 19 Dec 41, and there was much point in The Ottawa Journal's editorial of 19 Dec entitled "Could They Defend Canada in Alaska or Seattle?"

Whereas the United States could send its troops into Canada to meet any emergency, Canadian units containing N.R.M.A. personnel could be employed only to "defend Canada in Canada". In a memorandum of 23 Dec the new V.C.G.S. (Maj-Gen M.A. Pope) informed Mr. H.L. Keenleyside (Assistant Under Secretary of State for Department of External Affairs and Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence) that the statements made by The Ottawa Journal had been correct: "as all units at present serving in Canada, other than the 4th Division, will progressively contain an increasing number of young men retained for service in Canada under the N.R.M. Act, the situation will become increasingly awkward" (13). In a memorandum of 20 Feb 42 addressed to the Minister of National Defence the C.G.S. pointed out that as a result of N.R.M.A. personnel being used to replace volunteers there was not a single infantry battalion in Canada without a quota of conscripted men. The "active" battalions serving in Newfoundland and Jamaica would have to be relieved within a year and, furthermore, newly organized anti-aircraft artillery units would have to be filled with "active" gunners if they were to be moved even to Newfoundland for the defence of Gander airport (14). By this time, however, the Liberal Government was committed to holding a National Plebiscite to learn whether the people of Canada would release it from past commitments (see para 139).

121. Due to the heavy casualties sustained by the 2nd Canadian Division at Dieppe (19 Aug 42) permission was sought to withdraw 73 complete platoons from the 33 Infantry (rifle and machine gun) battalions serving in Canada and despatch them overseas as "formed" reinforcements. A total of nine platoons were taken from The Algonquin Regiment, The Lincoln and Welland
Regiment and The Prince Edward Island Highlanders which were serving in Newfoundland and the only available replacements were Members H.D. of the Canadian Army (15). On 14 Sep authority was granted by Order in Council P.C. 8547 for "home defence" soldiers to be despatched, from time to time as required, to join these three infantry battalions in Newfoundland (including Labrador). Permission had been granted on 4 Sep (Order in Council P.C. 7995) to include N.R.M.A. personnel in three anti-aircraft batteries destined for duty on Annette Island (Alaska) as replacements for a unit slated for service overseas with the 2nd Canadian Corps (16).

Further Orders in Council permitting the despatch of N.R.M.A. personnel to Newfoundland and Labrador were: P.C. 11,159 of 8 Dec 42 providing for the reinforcement of artillery units; P.C. 11,346 of 16 Dec 42 permitting personnel on the strength of units to be despatched there; P.C. 362 of 19 Jan 43 dealing with R.C.A.M.C. personnel posted to hospitals and units; P.C. 907 of 5 Feb permitting the reinforcing of Engineer, Signals, Army Service Corps, Medical and Ordnance units; and P.C. 2008 of 12 Mar again dealt with infantry personnel. Service in Alaska was extended by Orders in Council P.C. 3258 of 20 Apr and P.C. 5011 of 18 Jun (expedition to Kiska). Order in Council P.C. 6296 of 11 Aug authorized N.R.M.A. personnel to serve with any "active" unit in Newfoundland (including Labrador), Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, British Guiana, Alaska and the United States of America; while P.C. 6901 of 31 Aug 43 permitted N.R.M.A. personnel to be sent to these locations, even if they were not on the strength of an Active Army unit. Thus N.R.M.A. soldiers became members of all Canadian Army garrisons in the North American Area.

(11) National Selective Service and a National Plebiscite

The extension of the Second World War into a conflict of global dimensions increased the popular demand for more equality of sacrifice. The new Leader of the Liberal-Conservative Party, supported most strongly in Toronto and the cities of the Pacific Coast, made National (or Coalition) Government the chief plank in his platform. Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen also committed the Conservative Party to "compulsory selective service over the whole field of war": in essence, this was generally taken to mean conscription for overseas military service (17). Even Premier J.B. MacNair of New Brunswick and certain federal Liberal Members of Parliament indicated readiness to support overseas conscription. It remained, however, for (Conservative) Premier John Bracken to carry such a resolution through the Manitoba legislature, whereas Ontario's Premier Mitchell Hepburn was content with redoubling his criticism of Prime Minister King's war policy.

Even though Mr Meighen's bid for parliamentary leadership was not thwarted until 9 Feb 42, when a C.C.F.

*Order in Council P.C. 4105 of 15 May 42 had permitted N.R.M.A. personnel to proceed on duty to the United States in connection with prisoners of war escorts. P.C. 10,300 of 3 Nov 42 provided for the inclusion of N.R.M.A. personnel in the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion which went to Fort Benning (Georgia) for training.
candidate won the South York by-election, the Liberal Government had already decided to meet all criticism by making ready new policies. According to the Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament on 26 Jan:

The government's policy of national selective service will be extended, as generally and rapidly as may be necessary to effect the orderly and efficient employment of the men and women of Canada for the varied purposes of war. You will be advised of the means the government proposes to adopt, to effect as complete as possible a mobilization of the material resources and manpower of the country in direct furtherance of a total national effort.

My advisers believe that the magnitude and balanced nature of Canada's war effort is being obscured and impeded by controversy concerning commitments with respect to the methods of raising men for military service which were made prior to the spread of the war to all parts of the world.

The government is of the opinion that, at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history, the administration, subject only to its responsibility to parliament, should in this connection and irrespective of any previous commitments, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise.

My ministers accordingly will seek, from the people by means of a plebiscite, release from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service (18).

The distinction between plebiscite and referendum was clearly drawn: electors would not be asked whether they were for or against conscription, but rather would they release the Government from engagements made before the War had spread all over the world and now allow it full freedom to use its own judgment 125.

Addressing the House of Commons on 10 Feb the Minister of National Defence stated that between 175,000 and 195,000 men would be required for the Armed Forces during the

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*Resigned as Leader of the Liberal-Conservative Party on 9 Dec 42 and was succeeded by Mr John Bracken. Mr Gordon Graydon acted as Party Leader in the House of Commons, however, until Mr Bracken was elected to Parliament in the 1945 general election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enlistments to date</th>
<th>Programme for 1942</th>
<th>Prospective total enlistments up to March 31, 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>70,000 - 80,000</td>
<td>170,000 - 180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>13,000 - 15,000</td>
<td>40,000 - 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td>90,000 - 100,000</td>
<td>385,000 - 395,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>422,000</td>
<td>173,000 - 195,000</td>
<td>595,000 - 615,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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coming fiscal year (1 Apr 42 to 31 Mar 43) to secure the required strengths and replace normal wastage which already was quite high. (By the end of 1941 a total of 44,458 all ranks had been discharged from the Canadian Army (Active).)

126. As early as the previous October a Labour Supply Investigation Committee, established by the Government's Committee on Labour Co-ordination, had submitted a lengthy Report. Among its findings:

The Committee was deeply impressed by the widespread failure to regard the man-power problem as a single problem. This country is engaged in a life and death struggle in which its entire resources, including its man-power, must be allocated to their most effective uses. While an individual responsible for the success of a given enterprise may be the best judge of the best uses to which labour may be put in the operations of that enterprise, he is not necessarily the best judge of whether labour should be available for this enterprise. Each man worth his salt will do everything he can to make his particular enterprise a success; but the success of this enterprise may be at the expense of another serving even more valuable national purposes.

Despite lip service to the contrary, the Committee thinks that many responsible persons are concerned primarily about the manpower supply for their own purposes and only secondarily, if at all, about the man-power available for others. This situation has produced a condition in which man-power resources are allocated on the basis of the competitive ability of various enterprises and less on the basis of national interest. Thus there is competition between the armed forces and industry, between war and non-war industries, and among industrial concerns generally. The Committee doubts that this situation results in the most effective use of the nation's man-power (20).

127. The Committee estimated that 550,000 men and 75,000 women were available for work in war industries and 2,387,500 men and 1,362,000 women for employment in non-war industries. Only 609,000 men between the ages of 17 and 40 years in August 1941 were potentially available for the Armed Forces, however, and "only if the most drastic measures [were] adopted". A continuation of existing recruiting methods would find manpower reserves in the Maritimes (49,340), Prairies (117,000) and British Columbia (40,340) barely adequate, while the reserve for Ontario (195,790) would probably be sufficient; Quebec was estimated as having 206,550 men still available. The problem therefore was to withdraw 437,000 for the Army, 132,000 for the R.C.A.F. and 40,000 for the Navy without disrupting the essential services in the less densely populated areas of Canada or over-drawing on the manpower pool in one place while leaving other pockets relatively untouched. In the Committee's opinion the required number of men could be found from: 23,000 proprietors and managers, 31,000 professional men, 18,000 in commercial occupations, 8000 in responsible and supervisory positions, 61,000 in clerical jobs, 37,000 skilled industrial workers, 70,000 intermediate skilled service workers, 61,000 semi-skilled
industrial workers, 16,000 low-skilled workers, 123,000 unskilled men, 38,000 farmers, 104,000 farm workers and 19,000 who had never worked (21).

128. When it came to recommendations the Report included the following:

The problem of providing for the man-power requirements of the armed forces and of industry necessitates considering the man-power pool as one on which both the armed forces and industry have claims, but on which neither has a necessary priority. The reason for adopting this general principle in the utilization of Canada's man-power is that both branches of the national war effort, namely, the military and the industrial, are equally vital to the success of the country's present effort. Priorities of the armed forces or of industry in particular fields may be subject to periodic revisions; but such revisions should be effected by assessing, from time to time, the relative degree of need in the armed forces and industry.

... policies be adopted which will increase the geographic, industrial and occupational mobility of workers to the end that they may be mobilized at the points of greatest need.

Where evidence in regard to particular areas indicates that workers will not move to centres of industrial activity, serious consideration should be given to the advisability of placing work in such areas in order that these reserves of labour may be more advantageously utilized.

... recognition of the acute or impending shortage of farm labour in certain parts of Quebec and Ontario, and that appropriate measures be adopted to conserve the labour force still remaining there by preventing unduly large future withdrawals.

... there should be a re-examination of the definition of "key man" as presently used in determining the essential or non-essential character of the civilian work being done by a man before he enlists or is drafted; and that this re-examination should take into account that a "key man" in a non-war industry may also be indispensable in furthering the war effort.

... there should be a comprehensive study of the means of determining the allocation of man-power as between the armed forces and industry....

... in formulating any programme for large additional enlistment to the three armed services, there should be kept constantly in mind the number of men available in the various geographical regions from which it is assumed that these additional men would have to be drawn under a voluntary system of enlistment.
... employers be urged to take an active, rather than a passive, role in adding female workers to their plant force as rapidly as possible; and that immediate steps be taken to publicize the fact that large numbers of married and unmarried women will be needed in industry in the near future.

As a corollary ... it is urged also that appropriate steps be taken to popularize the idea that women, by entering industry, will make a great national contribution to the war effort.

... employers be urged to work more closely with the officials of the War Emergency Training organization. A changed attitude on the part of some employers respecting the War Emergency Training efforts would unquestionably aid in the solution of the labour supply problem.

... young men drafted into the Army, who have completed their basic military training, should not be barred from tradesman training pending their enlistment for overseas service. The high percentage of enlistments for overseas service among draftees, and the urgent need for tradesmen in the Canadian Army, emphasizes the importance of the foregoing recommendation.

The statement by Army officials that it is the intention of the Army to train all of the tradesmen that it requires is of great importance as indicating a possibility that the drain upon skilled workers in industry may be reduced. This programme adopted by the Army is of paramount importance, and it is recommended that it be promptly and vigorously executed, so as to reduce the necessity of drawing upon industry for the Army's tradesmen (22).

129. The British system of dealing with manpower, of which the Labour Supply Investigation Committee thought so highly, involved the conscription for service for all men between the ages of 18 and 41, subject to their being in Reserved Occupations. Reservation was by occupational groups, not 'key men', and those in a reserved Group could not volunteer for the Armed Forces without a release from the Ministry of Labour and National Service. Twice yearly the Armed Forces submitted their demands and the Ministry of Labour and National Service found the numbers agreed upon: as the manpower supply dwindled men from the younger age groups in each Reserved Occupation had to be called for military service. The highest medical categories were earmarked as potential aircrew; next in priority came the Royal Navy, followed by the Army. Women over the age of 20 (unless pregnant or caring for young children) were liable for some form of service and were encouraged to volunteer for one of the Auxiliaries to the Armed Forces, munitions work, nursing, the Women's Land Army or N.A.A.F.I. Requisitions were

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*The increased needs of home defence coincident with the entry of Japan into the War made it necessary to permit N.R.M.A. personnel to fill tradesmen's vacancies; subsequently, they were used to replace volunteers despatched overseas.

**Navy, Army and Air Force Institute.
considered as being equally for men and women; in a ratio of 4 to 5 with the responsibility left to each Service or industry to absorb them. Unemployment had ceased, except for those in transit between jobs, and an effort was being made to keep unemployables occupied. In a memorandum addressed to the Director of Staff Duties it was pointed out by Lt.-Col. W.W. Goforth of that Directorate, however, that application of such procedures to Canada would encounter the following problems:

(a) The present Canadian voluntary system of enlistment for overseas service precludes the effective, unified controls over manpower and womanpower as exercised in U.K.

(b) Whereas everyone in U.K. knows that he is "fighting for his life" and has visible reminders of the conflict around him, our deceptive remoteness from the present operational theatres renders Canadian public opinion unprepared, as yet, for the restrictive realities of total war.

(c) Whereas U.K. is a compact economical unit, we hold an antithetical position, in which occupational mobility is much more difficult and expensive to accomplish (23).

130. With the above findings at its disposal the Cabinet Manpower Committee was busily engaged in drafting a plan for introducing National Selective Service. A plan was circulated and discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 4 Feb when three immediate steps were suggested: refusal to permit men eligible for military service to enter certain non-essential occupations; freezing of agricultural labour and the institution of government subsidies to control prices; placing under control a limited number of technical personnel required for war industry. A further report of the Manpower Committee was discussed by the Cabinet War Committee on 26 Feb. This recommended the freezing of skilled and other workers in all essential industries and met strong opposition from Mr Ralston, who stated that voluntary recruiting for overseas service would be discouraged if industrial employment was so enhanced. The Committee agreed with Mr Ralston that any scheme of National Selective Service should cater to the requirements of the Armed Forces and that all able bodied men should be directed towards them. The Cabinet War Committee appears (24) to have approved an outline plan at its meeting of 6 Mar.

131. It was 24 Mar, however, before the Prime Minister outlined the National Selective Service programme to the House of Commons and tabled 13 Orders in Council designed to implement it. In his speech Mr Mackenzie King emphasized that:

... In order to be selective, national service does not necessarily need to be compulsory. The Army, for example, does not accept every man who offers to enlist. As a war measure, compulsion is only of value where it serves to ensure a greater total war effort (25).

National Selective Service was placed under the Department of Labour and Mr Elliott M. Little, a Canadian industrialist who had been serving as head of the Wartime Bureau of Technical