agreed that the existing authority to call aliens for military training should be exercised at once (see Appendix "B"). The question of conscripting married men aged 19-30 was referred to the Ministers of Labour and National War Services. Mr Ralston's other suggestion that 18-year olds should be conscripted was left unanswered.

200. That same day the Adjutant-General signed a circular letter stressing the necessity of making the very best use of the Army's manpower resources: "The goal to be aimed at is the releasing of all Active personnel, suitable for overseas service, from Home War Establishments as soon as it can be effected" but as an immediate step 25 per cent of such "A" category men were to be released from existing employment before 31 Dec (113). If necessary, such men would be sent to an appropriate Training Centre before being despatched overseas.

201. Seemingly the Government was taking appropriate action but the Director of National Selective Service did not think so and had submitted his resignation, effective 16 Nov. Mr Little stated:

As Director of National Selective Service, I find myself carrying grave responsibilities without commensurate authority. The present situation is one of ambiguous and divided authority, which has led progressively from confusion to friction and obstructionism. The result has been virtual paralysis in the organization (114).

This statement resulted in considerable editorial comment and unfavourable comparison with private business. Even though the Minister of Labour had risen from the ranks of organized labour the acting President of the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress stated that "Our organization has confidence in Mr Little but not in Mr Mitchell" (115). The President of the rival Canadian Congress of Labour placed the blame squarely on the Cabinet's lack of policy and stated in part:

Organized labour feels that Mr. Little has been trying under extremely difficult circumstances to do a good job in the field of selective service, and expressed confidence in his sincerity and ability. He has endeavoured to improve relationships between labour and management, through collective bargaining and labour-management production committees, in the interest of industrial efficiency, but he has had not had the support of other branches of government nor of more than a few employers in carrying out his plans (116).

202. Mr Little placed his own case before the public in a letter which The Financial Post (Toronto) printed in its

(cont'd from page 87)

In practice both volunteers and N.R.M.A. call-ups came to be handled by the Army Reception Centres authorized in December 1942. The purpose of the Army Reception Centre was to replace heterogeneous establishments by one central organization in each Military District, where each recruit would be examined by groups of medical specialists and given a psychological examination by an Army Examiner; the balance of the recruiting procedures were handled by experienced personnel (112).
weekly issue of 28 Nov. He charged the Government with delays in implementing the agreed on policy of 30-31 Jul (see para 188): not until 26 Sep had an Order in Council been promulgated transferring the N.R.M.A. call-up machinery from the Department of National War Services to the Department of Labour with effect from 1 Dec 42; not until 16 Oct had the Cabinet agreed to make the new Director of Employment Service and Unemployment Insurance subordinate to him and even then such an Order in Council did not appear until 14 Nov—the week end of his resignation.

203. The crux of the whole matter seemed to be, however, that in his ultimatum of 15 Nov Mr Little had demanded that "the Director shall, under the Minister, have the exclusive management and direction of the National Selective Service Branch and shall, for that purpose, be the Deputy of the Minister" (117). Mr Little considered that, "if the government is really serious about implementing its professed desire to tackle the manpower problem, the very minimum powers which are needed by anyone selected to carry out that responsibility are at least commensurate to those of a deputy". Having been rebuffed Mr Little considered that he had no alternative but to resign. He was succeeded by Mr. Arthur James MacNamara who had been serving as both Chief Commissioner of the Unemployment Insurance Commission and Associate Deputy Minister of Labour. On 30 Nov The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix summed up the question as well as any:

Thus selective service, after six months of confusion, vacates the field so far as coordination of manpower is concerned. The four major contestants—army, munitions and supply, agriculture and essential civilian services—remain in the battle. Each of them is represented in the cabinet by a different minister.

Coordination of man-power, therefore, remains just where it was last March before Mr. Little was appointed—a problem for the government. The moral of the Little episode is that no one man can do this job. Only the government can coordinate its competing departments.

204. On 1 Dec the administration of the N.R.M.A. manpower functions passed to the Department of Labour and the National War Services Regulations were replaced: National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations dealt with the call-up of men for compulsory military service while National Selective Service Civilian Regulations were a consolidation of all the Orders in Council respecting civilian employment and the war effort (118). In order that there might be uniformity of interpretation by the several Mobilization Boards (see para 43) the Cabinet Manpower Committee gave the Department of Labour permission to circulate a series of "interpretative" letters.

205. Order in Council P.C. 11326 of 15 Dec authorized the drafting of all married men born in the years 1932-1917 inclusive but since those married after 15 Jul 40 already were classed as single men and subject to call if born in the years 1923-1902 it was not expected to add large numbers to the Canadian Army. It did add, however, as was pointed out by The Windsor Daily Star (17 Dec), that there were "virtually no single men left who are properly liable for service".

206. Although the Minister of Labour had told the Cabinet War Committee on 9 Dec that, apart from filling the
Army's needs, the manpower situation was not serious at the moment the Minister of Finance proceeded to point out that everything pointed to an acute shortage in the spring. Since there was no feeling of urgency or worry in the public mind, however, it had been considered expedient to avoid any immediate curtailment of non-essential industry. When the Deputy Minister of Labour (Dr Bryce Stewart) resigned at the end of the year he was succeeded by Mr MacNamara. Thus did the Functions of Director of National Selective Service and Deputy Minister of Labour fall into the hands of one man.

(w1) The Home Front, 1943

207. Rising production during 1942 had virtually eliminated unemployment and lent credence to journalistic claims for Canada as both an "Arsenal of Democracy" and a "Granary of Democracy". From 1939 to early 1943 the numbers of persons engaged in manufacturing had increased from 681,114 to 1,241,068, with the number of women employed increasing from 144,461 to 349,535 (119). The labour which made this expanded production possible came from three sources:

1. A redistribution of manpower between industries, enabling employment in manufacturing firms especially to increase at the expense (relatively) of that in other occupations, and involving a large movement of workers from the farm to the city.

2. The absorption of practically all of the surplus of unemployed labour with which the economy was burdened in 1939.

3. The drawing into the labour force of large numbers of workers from classes not formerly gainfully employed, especially women (120).

The migratory trend from one province to another had been accelerated in favour of Ontario and British Columbia, with the Prairie Provinces being the principal losers. Nova Scotia gained slightly but this was more than offset by the loss in the other two Maritime Provinces. Quebec alone remained fairly constant, although supplying some labour to Ontario (121).

208. The greatest number of workers leaving one industry for another went into war production, being replaced by men and women who were entering industry for the first time. Apart from those who took advantage of wartime industrial training to learn skilled trades (see Appendix "O") the new entrants into industry predominated in the unskilled, semi-skilled, clerical and sales groups (122). War industry attracted 40 per cent of all incoming workers due to better wages, higher labour priority and consequent postponement from compulsory military training. As the pool of unemployed was dissipated, industries began to increase wages in order to tempt workers from existing jobs (123). In all non-war industries, except construction, mining and public utilities, the female substitute workers came to outnumber the males.

209. Readers will be aware that the Government had never indicated that the Armed Forces should have first priority for physically fit men and there were too many people who believed that there were other fields of endeavour just as important to the war effort. According to the Labour Survey of January 1943 there were 277,000 single men and 369,000 married men (aged 18-40) working in industries with a labour
91

priority of "A" or "B" and 115,000 single and 160,000 married men engaged in those with labour priorities "C" and "D" (124). Thus the Director of Requirements at N.D.H.Q., was convinced that the factor restricting the manpower pool available for the Army was not age or medical category but the requirements of war and non-war essential industries (125). The monthly enlistment of 8,000 volunteers was needed to produce 5,000 trained reinforcements for despatch overseas. Furthermore, an estimated N.R.M.A. intake of 28,500 during the first quarter of 1943 and 17,500 during the following five months would be necessary to complete units and establishments in Canada and replace physically fit G.S. soldiers who would then become available for overseas service (126).

210. As a further means of expanding the labour force the New National Selective Service Civilian Regulations (consolidated on 19 Jan 43) encouraged farmers to engage in another primary industry occupation during their seasonal lag without obtaining a permit from the nearest Employment Office (127). Moreover, they were given the special privileges, while seeking re-employment, of looking around for three months before becoming liable for compulsory military service. The first of the National Selective Service circular letters designed to help interpret the new Civilian regulations implied, however, that the onus rested with the Divisional Registrar to prove that a man was not employed in essential farm work, rather than for the man to demonstrate that he was actually an agricultural worker. Once this interpretation became known the drift from the farm to industrial work in nearby factories was accelerated and agriculture was forced to call increasingly for help from the Armed Forces in order to gather its harvests. (See Appendix "O").

211. Those officials of National Selective Service and other Government agencies interested in "controlling" the other basic industries—lumbering, fishing and mining—pressed for the same consideration but tended to ignore the fact that higher wages and better working conditions were prime reasons why men left these industries where all had not been happy in the "depressed" 1930s. Then again, many of those who had donned a uniform preferred life in the Armed Forces and there was little

*Representatives of the Department of Munitions and Supply, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the Department of Labour had worked out a labour priority schedule by the end of 1942 and issued an Industrial Classification Manual. Although industries might be transferred to a different category, as a result of interdepartmental agreement, the following breakdown existed during the summer of 1943:

"A" - fuel, chemicals, aircraft lumber, shipbuilding, aircraft construction, base metals, munitions.

"B" - logging, transportation, agriculture, processing foods, promotion of civilian health and safety, government promotion of munitions industries, etc.

"C" - low priority but some essentiality; pulp and paper, civilian textiles, wholesale and retail services.

"D" - no priority; non-essential production for civilian use and purely civilian enterprises.
reason why they should be forced to return to uncongenial em­ployment when National Selective Service officials were unable to prevent existing workers from taking more attractive jobs.

212. Certain of these flaws in manpower administration had been freely admitted by Prime Minister King during the de­bate of 28 Jan 43 on the Speech from the Throne, when he spoke of the manpower problem as follows:

... Every country that is at war, indeed, for that matter even if it is not at war, has that problem to a greater or less degree. There cer­tainly is no more difficult situation to handle than that of taking people out of occupations in which they have spent their lives and putting them into entirely different occupations. There is nothing more disruptive to good feeling than to be obliged, as the government is, in a time of war, to make restrictions which will prevent people carrying on the pursuits in which they have been engaged since their earliest days and to which they had hoped to devote their lives, and to tell them to do something else, to go somewhere else. There is nothing more distaste­ful than suddenly to be obliged to have an officer of the government go into the homes of citi­zens of our country and tell them that it is a part of government policy that not merely the men but in some cases the women as well in those homes must leave them in order to help in the war industries of the country or to take part in some other form of war service. This is the most difficult problem with which any country can be faced at any time, and the amazing thing to me is that we have been able to work out matters as smoothly as we have (128).

After attacking the Government's detractors, the Prime Minister continued:

Let me repeat that the government does not claim that it has been able to do everything perfectly or even as rapidly as might be desired. Perhaps I might direct the attention of hon. members to this fact, that there has not been a single phase of the war effort—I make no exception—in con­nection with which this government has not been charged from the very start that we are not go­ing fast enough; that we were not getting the results that should be obtained. The very first year it was, Why didn’t we have more troops over­seas; why didn’t we have more clothing; why didn’t we have more equipment? My colleague the Minis­ter of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) was con­tinually taunted with not getting planes fast enough, not getting tanks, that we had no tanks and the like. So it has been all the way. Little if any account has been taken of the fact that unless there had been very careful planning at the outset, all the rest might likely have been a muddle. I claim for the present adminis­tration that we have planned carefully from the start. We have resisted the pressure to proceed at a rate which would sacrifice quality for quan­tity. As a result, what we have done stands in good stead for this country and for the united nations to­day (129).
As a result of the pending industrial changeover from the production of capital requirements to that of replacements Mr Howe indicated to the Cabinet War Committee on 5 May that about 30,000 workers would be released to other employment. Furthermore, on the previous day a first Compulsory Employment Transfer Order had been issued to move single and married men in the 19-25 age group, and certain others aged 26-40, from non-essential employment to essential industry or agriculture. (Should no work of higher priority be available when an individual reported to the nearest Employment Office, however, he was given a special permit to continue his previous employment on a temporary basis.)

A month later (4 Jun) Mr Ralston was prompted to despatch the following letter to the Minister of Labour:

There seems to be an ineradicable impression that these men must be transferred to some other industry. But it seems essential that the Army be recognized for what it is, namely an integral part of the national economy—the front line for the factories, farms, railroads, mines, etc. The system has been designed to transfer workers to the jobs where their efforts will count most, and the Army is the primary occupation for the young and strong who are released. The older men and women and the less physically fit should be the ones primarily to man the other components of the economy.

The army's needs can only be met if National Selective Service makes it clear that young men, physically fit, should go to the Army as soon as their jobs can be taken by older men or by women or by unfit men.

There is a prevailing impression that so-called key men in industry can be kept there indefinitely. I think the target should be that practically every man considered a key man can be relieved of his job by training someone else to do his work. There is nothing impossible about replacing key men if the necessity for it is recognized. There are key men in the Army as well as elsewhere and when they become casualties the Army does not stop functioning but other men are found to take their place. I am sure industry can do the same.

I know you agree with the above and I wanted to put it down in writing and ask that it be impressed on all concerned.

Mr Mitchell's reply was delayed until 22 Jun. On that date he wrote his colleagues that National Selective Service was doing its best to apportion available labour but was not being successful in convincing employers that production should taper off at the existing level, thus making additional men available for the Armed Forces. "The present difficulty", he pointed out, "is probably the fact that over 50% are being refused acceptance, and the general opinion of the public and, indeed, of our Registrars and Mobilization Boards, is that the Army is too particular".

Whatever the reasons both enlistments and enrollments had dwindled to almost half the January figures:
Voluntary Conversion N.R.M.A. Enlistments from N.R.M.A. Enrolments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>N.R.M.A. Enlistments</th>
<th>N.R.M.A. Enrolments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>10,489</td>
<td>5834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>7,892</td>
<td>5870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6,739</td>
<td>5825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5,462</td>
<td>3,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>5,423</td>
<td>2,855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implications of this situation were made clear to the Minister of National Defence in a lengthy memorandum which the Adjutant-General submitted on 22 June (133). As the following table shows, the Army had been forced to modify successively its demands for the period 8 Aug 42 to 31 Mar 44 (see paras 190 and 195-6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower Requirements</th>
<th>Gross Drain</th>
<th>Discharges to be returned to Pool</th>
<th>Net Drain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report 16 Sep 42</td>
<td>312,000</td>
<td>77,500</td>
<td>234,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report 14 Nov 42</td>
<td>242,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report 6 Jan 43</td>
<td>239,500</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>172,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Plan</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>152,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This reduction in requirements had been made possible by the imposition of 'manpower ceilings' for the Canadian Army overseas and in Canada (see paras 179-180 and 232). General Letson now believed that continuing demands could be met by an intake of 8000 per month, which would provide 5000 reinforcements for overseas, 1500 to make up wastage in Canada and 1500 for return to civilian life (see para 183). This was a net drain of 6500 men per month. Finally, General Letson conceded that demands could be met by a combined G.S. and N.R.M.A. intake of 8000 per month, by the expedient of making up the deficit between the General Service enlistments and the required 8000 by withdrawals of G.S. soldiers already serving in Canada.

This last had been made possible as a result of an agreement reached with National Selective Service on 19 May 45 that, beginning with July, the monthly Requisition should be approximately 8,000 per month and credit given for all such men who enlisted, since it had become accepted by this time that 80 per cent of voluntary enlistments resulted from men receiving an Order-Medical Examination or Order-Military Training (134). In a letter of 27 May the Minister of Labour had promised to instruct Divisional Registrars to bring under the Mobilization Regulations as quickly as possible all men remaining in the designated classes (135). Regarding the accompanying dispute as to whether all men aged 18-40 should be called for military service the Adjutant-General had pointed out to the Minister of National Defence that:

*Following the authorization of a General Service Badge for wear (except in the United Kingdom) by all other ranks who had enlisted for service anywhere (C.A.R.O. 2671 of 9 Dec 42) the term "G.S." gradually came into use to differentiate between volunteers and the new single class of N.R.M.A. soldiers.
... it is disturbing to think that such extension is largely necessitated by the failure of thousands in the presently designated classes to respond to calls, and the inability of N.S.S. to follow up effectively. The inadequacy of the enforcement machinery and the insistent demands of essential industry militate against any early correction of this inequity. (136).

218. Mr Ralston put forward this recommendation to the Cabinet War Committee at the next meeting of 24 Jun but no answer was reached. The seriousness of the manpower problem was realized, however, and the Committee agreed that the Prime Minister should discuss with Mr Mitchell the advisability of separating the post of Director of National Selective Service from that of Deputy Minister of Labour: in that way there would be a resultant strengthening of the administration of National Selective Service.

219. It became apparent at the next meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 28 Jun that the three Defence Ministers and Mr Howe were dissatisfied with the existing National Selective Service set-up and were not mollified by Mr Mitchell's suggestion that an Associate Director might be appointed to assist Mr MacNamara with National Selective Service and a certain amount of decentralization achieved by the creation of five regional directorates. No decision was reached and at the meeting of 2 Jul Mr Mitchell still voiced his opposition to separating Mr MacNamara from his two key jobs.

220. Mr MacNamara had been far from idle and on 5 Jul forwarded to the Vice Adjutant-General a proposal he wished to put before the Cabinet Manpower Committee. After suggesting that the Armed Forces get together to discuss their requirements so that "A" category men should not be enlisted for ground duty in the R.C.A.F. and that the Navy should not recruit more than its quota requirements* Mr MacNamara advanced the following proposal:

*By early 1942 the cream had been skimmed off the manpower pool and it was becoming difficult for the R.C.A.F. to obtain sufficient aircrew trainees. The Army regarded men of such calibre as potential Officers or N.C.Os. and was unwilling to consider them as being of more use in aircraft. During January 1943 the Minister of National Defence for Air suggested to Mr Ralston that "washed out" aircrew candidates might be exchanged with the Army for potential aircrew then wearing khaki. The Director of National Selective Service urged that the R.C.A.F. should employ only low category personnel on ground duties. Conferences were held and an agreement was drafted whereby the Army would make available monthly 1000 potential aircrew and 500 low category men for ground duty in exchange for the R.C.A.F's "washed out" aircrew who were still physically fit for overseas service. Unfortunately, however, negotiations came to an end because each thought the other would get the better of the deal.

Due to the fact that most ground crew enlistments now were men who had received call-up notices for military service this was sheer waste but there was little the R.C.A.F. could do. During mid-summer Mr MacNamara brought this situation to the attention of the Cabinet Manpower Committee, however; a letter of 18 Aug from the Minister of Labour to the Prime Minister forced a solution. The result was an agreement between the R.C.A.F. and Army to institute a joint recruiting campaign during the autumn (137).
That the Home Defence Army situation be studied by a joint committee representative of National Defence and Selective Service in order to devise a plan whereby the services of men in the Home Defence Army can be made use of to aid in respect to the short labour supply in high priority industries. A plan which might be studied is briefly outlined hereunder:-

1. To convert the Home Defence Army into a Labour Corps and simply use the services of the men in Government owned or operated projects now under way or which could be readily developed such as cutting of fuel wood or operating strip process coal mines or in the alternative.

2. To give leave to men who have completed six months training provided they accept and carry out work to which they are assigned by Selective Service and providing they report in person once every sixty days to a National Service Officer and have an identification card stamped (138).

Commenting on this proposal, which of course did not meet with approval within the Department of National Defence, the Vice Adjutant-General noted in a letter of 6 Jul to the Director of Organization:

... This is extremely interesting, but also very dangerous from the Army standpoint. Note, please, how Mr. MacNamara is prepared to use the Army (both active and Reserve) for his purposes because he is unable to fill his part of the bargain. His suggestion about the Home Defence Army...is intriguing and I think he does not appreciate just what he is proposing here. He certainly will have a hard time convincing our Minister that the Active Army in Canada should be used for this purpose. He might make some progress towards a still more generous outlook on leave. If, on the other hand, he proposes to use the Reserve Army, then he is suggesting that Mr. Howe’s men, because the men in the Reserve are men in industry, be used in two ways at the same time (139).

On 12 Jul Mr MacNamara’s proposals were submitted to the Clerk of the Privy Council by the Minister of Labour. Three days later the Vice Adjutant-General submitted his comments to the Minister of National Defence so that Mr Ralston could refute these proposals before the Cabinet War Committee (140). A military decision had been reached on the granting of agricultural leave for troops stationed in Canada but the Department of Labour’s proposal to release men to industry following six months military training would completely dislocate the defence programme. There was no “Home Defence Army” but rather home defence soldiers in the Active Army. Continuing to attack the Department of Labour’s arguments this memorandum stated that the Army was maintained in Canada:

(1) The Direct Defence of Canada and obligations to U.S. for joint defence.
(ii) To train and administer and service the Forces at Home and Abroad.

(iii) To serve as a source of potential reinforcements for the Army overseas.

(iv) To act as a strategic Reserve to be used if and when required. It must be remembered that the War in the Pacific has yet to be fought.

It is pointed out that H.D. personnel are enrolled to take the place of G.S. men released from Units in Canada to join the Army Overseas, (after further training where necessary). It must be remembered that the governing factor is that we must produce 5,000 G.S. men for the boat every month. Enlistments are going down and N.R.M.A. men are needed to replace G.S. men who are overseas. The provision of G.S. men in this matter imposes severe administrative burdens and training delays. (G.S. men in many cases have to be retrained to suit the Corps they are reinforcing and the N.R.M.A. men have to be trained to replace them.)

Men rejected on application for enlistment, certain men discharged for medical reasons and men rejected on call-ups would supply material from which a Labour Corps could be built and these men are all available now to National Selective Service. The Fuel Wood Administrator estimates that he could use 10,000 men cutting fuel wood—it should not be difficult to find 10,000 men from these sources (141).

To make matters worse, the nasty suspicion was beginning to grow that a considerable number of the 100,000 "A" category "general service" personnel serving in the North American Area were available as reinforcements only on paper, and, as a result of injuries or illness since original enlistment, would be placed in lower medical categories on re-examination (142).

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An Ontario provincial election was in the offing and the new Dominion leader of the Conservative Party (Mr John Bracken) was adding fuel to the fire. Speaking in Toronto on 2 Jul he had challenged the Liberal Government "to abandon its negative, partisan policy with regard to manpower and adopt a rational system of compulsory selective service for the farms, factories and armed forces". The Ottawa Journal (3 Jul) further reported:

He [Bracken] expressed criticism of the home defence army, cost of which he estimated at $150,000,000 a year and said that in the face of labour shortage "the men are out of agriculture, out of the war and out of everything but the public treasury".

"It is my judgement that this home draftee army is not only an injustice to the men who are in it but it is the biggest hoax ever perpetrated on the nation."

He added: "I am not referring to the reserve army, which is a voluntary service. I am referring to the home army, composed of large
numbers of young men who are under no duty or legal obligation to serve outside Canada".

He said Canadians were asking: "Why is this double standard of military service being maintained? Why is this army not being made available for the tasks of the farm and the factory and the mine, if it is not to be used where the fighting must be done?"

Disagreement over the extension of the age groups for compulsory military service continued throughout the Cabinet War Committee's meeting of 14 Jul. Apparently the arrival in Ottawa on Saturday 17 Jul of the members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence after a two week tour of defence installations on the west coast of Canada and in Alaska resulted in a solution being found. Both the American and Canadian members were convinced that there had been an over-insurance against the dangers of Japanese attack on the mainland and that the scale of home defences now could be reduced (143). The report prepared by the Canadian members for the Prime Minister was "toned down" before being submitted at the end of the month but the following conclusion obviously must have been made known to Mr King at this time:

It is recognized that the stationing of approximately two divisions of the Canadian Army in British Columbia was necessitated only in part by strictly military considerations; that it was also motivated by the necessity of meeting the demands of public opinion in the area. Civilian morale in British Columbia has been greatly improved in recent months, and in the view of the Canadian members of the Board there is not any present or prospective military necessity for maintaining two divisions in defensive dispositions in the British Columbia area (144).

On the following Wednesday (21 Jul) the Cabinet War Committee decided that the Chiefs of Staff should re-examine the manpower required by the Armed Forces for the defence of Canada in the light of the changed strategical situation, bearing in mind the shortages of manpower for other needs. The Cabinet War Committee compromised on the other points of contention. The Ministers of Labour and National Defence were instructed to work out a method of organizing and employing a "works" battalion (see Appendix "G"). Order in Council P.C. 5708 of 9 Aug extended the liability for military service to youths born in 1925 (upon attaining the age of 18 years and six months) and married men born in the years 1913 to 1925. Order in Council P.C. 6387 of 10 Aug authorized a reorganization of National Selective Service. An Administration Board was established under the chairmanship of the Director of National Selective Service, with Associate Directors placed in charge of each of the following divisions (145):

- Mobilization
- Labour Priorities
- Essential Civilian Services
- Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
- War and Heavy Industry, including Mining
- Coal Mining and Transportation
- Employment of Women
Employment Service
Industrial Mobilization Survey

Along with representatives of other Government departments or agencies, labour and industry they became members of a National Selective Service Advisory Board. A certain amount of decentralization was obtained by appointing Directors for each of the five Employment Regions. They, in turn, became members of Regional Selective Service Advisory Boards.

226. On 13 Aug The Ottawa Journal had the following rather pungent editorial comments to make, however:

Judging from what Mr. Mitchell has said, the reorganization smacks more of political expediency than practical change. It is evident that the whip of public indignation has stung. But in a practical sense the most important feature of what Labour Minister Mitchell calls the "MacNamara plan" is the admission that the reorganization which followed Mr. E.M. Little's departure was a mistake. The emphasis which the Minister of Labour's announcement places on decentralization and the creation of regional controls can mean nothing else. From what the Minister was able to describe, it means a return to something akin to the original plan.

As National Selective Service was first organized, decentralization in the administration of policy and enforcement of regulations was its very core. Ottawa was to have been simply the co-ordinating and policy-making instrument. In this respect it was based on the British plan, and on British experience. That plan was submitted last August, and, although the Minister later professed to have never seen it, it was rejected by the Unemployment Commissioner, then and still in charge of the local offices.

When Mr. MacNamara took over the direction of Selective Service decentralization stopped. He followed a reverse procedure, with everything being drawn under centralized control of the Labour Department, until even the name National Selective Service itself had virtually disappeared. That it could not work was soon apparent. That it has not worked is tragically plain. That it will function any better after reorganization is asking a lot of a little. And nowhere is there any indication that the Government has yet screwed up its courage to make it work.

*On 17 Dec 42 representatives of the Department of National Defence, Department of Labour, Department of Munitions and Supply and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board had discussed the organization of Industrial Mobilization Survey Committees to study the possibility of withdrawing workers from essential industries for service in the Armed Forces with the least possible disturbance to production. After a trial survey had been conducted in the Toronto area steps were taken to establish committees in five of the 13 Administrative Divisions (London, Toronto, Kingston, Montreal and Quebec) to investigate the possibility of replacing physically fit men of military age by women or unfit men. Such surveys were subject to review every (cont'd on next page)
Human nature is often able to defeat the purpose of regulations and this was a case in point. Employers neither wished to see their plants disorganized nor production taper off and thus often closed their eyes to the fact that 'key' employees were not always complying with either the Mobilization or Civilian Regulations of National Selective Service (147). Thus the Sixth Compulsory Employment Transfer Order of 25 Aug was a definite attempt to "get tough" with both industry and labour. Irrespective of whether they were married or single or covered by the Mobilization Regulations men between the ages of 16 and 40 inclusive in a lengthy list of employments had to register with an Employment Office and be available for transfer to higher priority work (148). A report on the transfer of labour under the first six Compulsory Employment Transfer Orders noted that (up to 14 Sep) a total of 75,878 men had been interviewed, 11,109 had been transferred to more essential industry, 11,722 had been given permits to return to their old jobs indefinitely, while 42,359 were given temporary permission to return to their old jobs of the remainder 6,086 cases still were under review, 498 had joined the Armed Forces and 1060 had ceased employment. This report concluded:

The number of persons granted permits to return to previous employment appears, at first sight, to be very high in proportion to those transferred, but an attempt has been made where possible not to cause too great hardship to either employer or employee. Married men and single men supporting dependents are not directed to employment involving a change of residence, and married men are not compelled to accept a lower rate of remuneration. Moreover, although an attempt is made to persuade men who have been discharged from the Armed Forces to accept employment in high priority industries, they are not compelled to do so. Finally preferential treatment is given to certain key men in establishments subject to the transfer orders.... (149)

With the official adoption of the "PULHEMS" system of medical examination* on 1 Oct 43 it was possible to

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*The new system showed the physical, mental and emotional capabilities of an individual as:

P. Physique - This included development, height and weight, his potential capacity to acquire physical stamina with training. It was his capacity for work. Under "P" was included the Cardiovascular System, Respiratory System, Digestive System, Neurological System (Organic), Integumentary System.

U. Upper Extremities - Functional use of hands, arms, shoulder girdle and upper spine.

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(cont'd on next page)
employ more adequately the personnel already serving within the Canadian Army. For example, men with flat feet could be employed in an operational area in many tasks which did not involve marching. With the introduction of the PULHEMS system a number of these could be graded fit for service in an operational theatre: drivers now could have a category as low as 3333321 (1 and 2 had become the same under the "S" factor). The pamphlet Physical Standards and Instructions - 1943 set forth the ages and PULHEMS profiles acceptable for overseas service. (Canadian Army Routine Order 4011 of 19 Jan 44 further stipulated that only in very exceptional circumstances should a soldier be despatched overseas after attaining his 44th birthday and that generally speaking the maximum age for despatch should be a year less than that specified for the particular employment.)

It was decided at this time that the upper age limit for enlistment or enrolment should be the 38th birthday and that the minimum acceptable PULHEMS profile should be "2222222". As Mr Ralston pointed out in a letter of 20 Oct to the Minister of Labour it was not desired, however, to remove men aged 38 from the callables classes as it might later be necessary to raise the age limit again (150). As a result, therefore, Divisional Registrars merely were advised to discontinue sending call-up notices to men who already had passed their 38th birthday (151). It had been the practice to discharge N.R.M.A soldiers when their medical categories fell below "B-1" but not to discharge volunteers if their services could be utilized unless they became totally unfit (category "E") (152). Men with a profile lower than 2222222 could be enlisted for service, as tradesmen in Canada, but only on the authority of a District Officer Commanding.

229. It was at this time also (25 Sep) that the R.C.A.F. and Army were able to resolve their earlier differences (see para 219) and agree upon a joint recruiting programme for the balance of the year 1943 (153). It was subsequently agreed that the much smaller needs of the Navy could be met also, since recruiting publicity would feature the "Fighting Services" and not build up one at the expense of the others (154). An Army representative would be attached to R.C.A.F. recruiting centres and vice-versa; the R.C.A.F. would enlist no ground personnel with an overseas medical profile; the Army would refer all prospective recruits interested in flying to the R.C.A.F., if physically fit for aircrew; the R.C.A.F. would permit the voluntary transfer to the Army of all non-flying personnel with a satisfactory PULHEMS profile; the Army would permit men to transfer to the R.C.A.F. if suitable for aircrew.

(cont'd from page 100)

L. Lower Extremities - Functional use of feet, legs, pivots and lower spine.

H. Ears and Hearing.

E. Eyes and Eyesight.

M. Mental capacity - Intelligence.

S. Stability - Emotional.

There were give grades under each factor, each grade being indicated by a number. A grade 1 under all factors indicated that a man was fit for duty in any theatre of operations but a grade 3 indicated fitness on a job that did not call for excessive

(cont'd on next page)
or for ground duties if their medical profile was too low for overseas military service (155). Not until 7 Feb 44, however, was the overall picture regularized by Order in Council. Then, on 24 Feb the Air Member for Air Personnel had to advise the Adjutant-General that curtailment of enlistments in the R.C.A.F. no longer made it necessary to participate in a joint recruiting programme (156).

230. Even a casual glance at the following statistics is convincing evidence that the Army's needs had not been met by enlistments and enrolments during the latter part of 1943:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Enlistments</th>
<th>Transfers from N.R.M.A.</th>
<th>N.R.M.A. Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4495</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3920</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>4069</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>2079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>4521</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>3794</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>2028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3682</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2375</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What did ease the situation is discussed in the following section.

vii - Reduction of the Army in Canada, 1943

231. Following the Cabinet War Committee's approval of a Canadian Army Programme for 1943 (see para 179) steps were taken in Ottawa to study the extent to which the tentative 'manpower ceiling' suggested for the Army in Canada could be formalized by reductions in both the home war establishments and operational troops (157). In a memorandum addressed to the Minister of National Defence on 28 Mar 43 the Chief of the General Staff proposed reductions in both but explained that it would be impossible to create a 'ceiling' for the reinforcement training stream and the disposal wings of District Depots due to the variable nature of their intake and output (158). The actual strength of the Army in Canada on the previous day had been:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>N.R.M.A.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational units</td>
<td>3840</td>
<td>35441</td>
<td>37113</td>
<td>72554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home War Establishments</td>
<td>8541</td>
<td>62302</td>
<td>5588</td>
<td>67890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcements</td>
<td>4795</td>
<td>67548</td>
<td>21646</td>
<td>89194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.W.A.C.</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>9252</td>
<td></td>
<td>9232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17303</strong></td>
<td><strong>174523</strong></td>
<td><strong>64347</strong></td>
<td><strong>238870</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, there were 461 officers and 7592 other ranks (6472 G.S. and 1120 N.R.M.A.) serving elsewhere in the North American Area.

(cont'd from page 101)

or prolonged strain and where living conditions were favourable. Grade 4 indicated, as a rule, that an individual was fit for duties of a light and sedentary nature (home base profile). Grade 5 showed a man as being unfit for any kind of army duty.
232. Not until 7 May, however, was the Chief of the General Staff able to recommend that the number of operational troops serving throughout the North American Area could be reduced to 77,000 all ranks after 1 Sep 43 (159). After this date the Home War Establishment should not exceed 92,500 of whom not more than 80,000 could be soldiers (6194 would have to be civilians and the balance members of C.W.A.C.). This latter reduction would be achieved by paring 10 per cent from all establishments except those of the Veterans Guard of Canada and the permanent establishment of Training Centres. (Physically fit G.S. personnel could be withdrawn in greater numbers in order to complete the Canadian Army Overseas by 1 Sep 43.) As the Chief of the General Staff was careful to point out to the members of the Cabinet War Committee on 13 May, however, it was really only a "paper" cut since the existing establishments were nothing near their authorized strength.

233. On 15 May General Stuart placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee a plan whereby the number of Infantry units engaged on operational duties in the North American Area might be reduced from 44 to 35 rifle battalions and from three to one machine gun battalions (160). He further recommended that No. 1 Garrison Battalion (composed of personnel who were "slow learners" or somewhat unstable) stationed at Niagara should be disbanded. The final recommendation submitted to the Cabinet War Committee and approved on 18 Jun called for the despatch of three battalions overseas as "formed units" of reinforcements (so that they did not count against the overseas manpower ceiling!), the disbandment of six which would still have a "first" battalion on active service and the conversion of the others to airfield defence battalions (absorbing the independent companies hitherto employed as such)\(^*\). Although the disbandment of these units would not do much to conserve manpower (except on paper, General Stuart pointed out that it would permit certain continuing units to be strengthened.

234. In practice, it had also been decided within N.D.H.Q. to eliminate from the manpower ceiling the one month's reserve of reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas to be available in Canada after 31 Mar 44 (see para 182). Again, this was only a paper cut, although there is evidence to support the view that those at N.D.H.Q. considered that an equivalent number of N.R.M.A. soldiers could be made available should the contingency arise (182).

235. During April orders had been issued for the withdrawal of 600 G.S. soldiers from units in each of Atlantic and Pacific Commands for despatch overseas as reinforcements and an N.D.H.Q. telegram of 3 May had authorized the withdrawal of the remaining G.S. personnel suitable for overseas service from all Infantry battalions, except for a cadre of 80 men per unit. Although complying with this order Maj.-Gen. G.R. Pearkes (G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command) replied on 9 May that the failure to replace successive withdrawals was causing him "increased concern" since it was becoming difficult to meet commitments (163). (Infantry units were considerably below establishment and N.R.M.A.

\(^*\)While agreeing that the Canadian garrison of Newfoundland might be decreased to two battalions of Infantry due to the improved strategical picture and the possibility of the American garrison being reduced, the United States War Department was insistent that, should it ever become necessary to increase the island's garrison, the Canadians would have to restore at least their original force before the United States commitment would be increased. Implementation was somewhat delayed (161).
personnel later had to be transferred from other brigades to the units selected for the expedition to Kiska.) Due to the change back from three to four rifle companies per battalion in the Canadian Army Overseas it proved necessary on 27 May to authorize a further withdrawal of infantrymen from units and establishments in Canada.

236. An A.G. Branch circular letter of 1 Jul instructed District Officers Commanding to put into effect the manpower reductions suggested by Brigadier R.G. Whitelaw's Committee on Reorganization of Home War Establishments (appointed 8 Mar 43) pending its Report and the issue of revised establishments (164). Surplus personnel were to be despatched overseas as reinforcements for their own corps if medically fit, employed in another corps or discharged to civilian life if no suitable employment was available in Canada. Representatives of the Directorate of Organization found, however, that misinterpretation of instructions in certain Military Districts had resulted in surplus men being retained, while some officers were unable to envisage having to work with drastically curtailed staffs. First withdrawals from the H.W.E. in M.D. No. 10 had produced approximately 174 men, of whom 83 were fully trained soldiers. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the Officer Commanding C.I.T.C. (A-15) at Shilo reported that he had received 70 applications for agricultural leave since the order decreasing establishments had become common knowledge (165).

237. The task of working out the further reductions consequent upon the decision taken by the Cabinet War Committee on 21 Jul that home defences should be reduced (see para 224) fell on Colonel J.H. Jenkins (Director of Military Operations and Plans and second Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence). In addition to curtailing the number of operational units in Canada Colonel Jenkins considered that the size and number of coast defence and A.A. units* could be decreased (166). Approval had to await the return of the Chief of the General Staff from Europe and the conclusion of the "QUADRANT" Conference at Quebec (167). Furthermore, "in view of the obligations of Canada to co-operate with the United States in joint defence" it was considered desirable to obtain the acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any reductions were authorized (168).

238. When Colonel Jenkins' memoranda were given approval by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 27 Aug General Stuart stressed the point that these reductions were to be considered as a basic cut and that additional reductions would be considered from time to time in the light of the then current situation" (169). Establishments for operational troops (all ranks) were shown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Previously Authorized</th>
<th>Reductions Already Made</th>
<th>Remaining Operational Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coast Defence</td>
<td>8,150</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>6,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A. Defences</td>
<td>13,950</td>
<td>2,655</td>
<td>10,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ops Tys</td>
<td>65,215</td>
<td>16,728</td>
<td>48,487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For example, he recommended that anti-aircraft artillery units should be withdrawn from Sault Ste Marie, Quebec City and Ile Maligne (Shipshaw power development).
239. When the proposals came before the Cabinet War Committee on 31 Aug General Stuart pointed out that the recommended "paper" decrease of 20,000 all ranks would mean an actual decrease of only 14,000 since the operational units were under strength. "A" category G.S. soldiers would be made available for overseas service and their places taken in continuing home defence units by N.R.M.A. soldiers. Lower category personnel who could not be absorbed in continuing units would be returned to civilian life and the civilian labour force. In his submission to the Minister of National Defence on the previous day General Stuart had included the following warning:

The reductions proposed are of such magnitude that in my opinion it is necessary for the Government to be prepared to expect a major call on the machinery it has set up to give rehabilitation assistance to those returning to civil life.

I submit also that the Army in Canada when reduced by these and subsequent reductions should not be called upon to provide men whenever and wherever a manpower shortage exists elsewhere. In other words, I ask that the Army in Canada be regarded as an "essential industry". (171)

240. The recommendations approved by the Cabinet War Committee called for the disbandment of the 7th Division and the retention of merely one training brigade group on the East Coast to give a further four weeks advanced [i.e. unit] training to reinforcements before they proceeded overseas. On the West Coast, however, General Stuart considered that it would be necessary to retain a strategic reserve:

(a) As a trained force for future offensive commitments in the Pacific Theatre of operations.

(b) As a potential source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army overseas.

(c) To meet any unexpected deterioration in the situation.

As a result of the favourable impression made by the Kiska Force on United States military and naval authorities, it is likely that Canada would be invited to co-operate with United States forces in further operations against the Japanese in the North Pacific Area. We would be placed in a difficult position if we were obliged to refuse because of lack of trained troops and it must be borne in mind that if present units were disbanded it would take from six to eight months to organize and train new units for such operations. It might reasonably be expected that Canada would be asked to contribute at least two tactical groups for a larger operation and it would be necessary to have a third such group trained and available

*The net reduction in strength of G.S. personnel serving in operational units in Canada between 8 Sep and 10 Nov 43 was only 4,198 other ranks and the V.C.G.S. advised the Adjutant-General on 1 Dec that only 25 per cent of these had been transferred to the reinforcement stream (170).
for reinforcement purposes. It must be remembered that the main sea and land forces of Japan are not as yet contained in specific theatres by comparable forces of the United Nations. As long as this condition remains we must retain the means to meet a possible deterioration in the Pacific. (172)

Therefore, three infantry brigade groups of four battalions each (equivalent to regimental combat teams) on the American tactical model were retained, along with a certain number of divisional troops as a continuing 6th Division. The 8th Division as such, including its 21st Brigade at Valcartier, was disbanded. Counting infantry units on coast defence duties there would still be 16 battalions in Pacific Command and nine in Atlantic Command when the reorganization was completed.

The timing of the public announcement was unfortunate: in addition to receiving a certain amount of unfavourable newspaper comment in Canada a very unfavourable impression was created by isolationist and anti-British newspapers in the United States, where Congress was debating a bill to conscript fathers and news of the setback at Salerno had just been made public (173).

Strangely enough, at this time senior Army officers considered that substantially all the N.R.M.A. personnel of the 13th Brigade presently in Kiska would volunteer for "general service" should further operations be undertaken in the Northern Pacific. Prime Minister King was not interested in this supposition, however, and had cautioned the members of the Cabinet War Committee at its second meeting of 31 Aug that substantial manpower commitments should not be made in Pacific Command merely to meet possible American requests for co-operation. Canada would find herself committed beyond her capacity should she invite requests of this kind. While agreeing generally with this proposition the Minister of National Defence pointed out that Canada would be expected to participate in the continuing war against Japan, which would necessitate the retention of trained soldiers on the west coast.

The disposal of over-age and low category personnel might be dealt with first since in most cases they were to leave the Army completely, in what was really a first step towards demobilization. In the case of the G.S. soldier return to civilian life might involve personal economic hardship and, in any event would give the general public the false impression that the Army no longer was interested in recruiting men for overseas service (174). For surplus Officers and N.C.O.s who had not reached retirement age there was, as yet, no way by which they could be retired or discharged and still receive rehabilitation benefits. Furthermore, they would then become liable for compulsory military service as privates if they were within the prescribed age group. Before the end of the year, however, arrangements were made with National Selective Service whereby officers and other ranks released from the Army would be called for compulsory military service only upon a written request had been made by the Divisional Registrar to the D.O.C.'s Representative (175).

Five Officers Survey and Classification Boards were established to replace the existing Officers Selection, Promotion, Reclassification and Disposal Board in screening the

*One French-speaking battalion was retained for each of the 13th and 14th Brigades and two for the 15th Brigade.*
18,694 officers serving in Canada and adjacent territories (176). Some 9,292 were presumed to be of an age and category acceptable for overseas service, even though they might have reached a rank not acceptable by the Canadian Army Overseas which had consented, however, to take one captain for every eight reinforcement lieutenants (177). In practice a number of officers already had dropped a rank in order to obtain overseas service. The Board working the Maritime Provinces found, for example, that better than 80 per cent of the officers serving with coast defence units were of an age and category acceptable for overseas service: in one location where morale was particularly low 97 officers had requested interviews in an effort to obtain an overseas posting (178).

245. In addition to the 5000 odd officers surplus to establishments there was the problem of dealing with the accumulated surplus of reinforcement officers. The sudden discovery early in August that there then were "sufficient potential officers under appraisal or in production and in reinforcement stream to provide estimated surplus by end of Apr 1944" had led to the drastic curtailment of such training (CMHQ Report 156 and AHC Report 37). The loan of junior officers to the British Army had been discussed by the Adjutant-General whilst visiting the United Kingdom during October but it was not until the following March (1944) that the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval. The loan of 1500 officers was authorized but the maximum volunteers obtainable fell far short of that number and only 673 eventually saw service on the "Canloan" scheme (CMHQ Report 145).

246. The first step towards disposing of the "other ranks" surplus had been taken as early as 22 Jul 43 (179). The Adjutant-General's Branch had despatched a circular letter to all Districts and Commands stressing the urgency of withdrawing 10,000 trained soldiers, in addition to the number already being withdrawn each month for despatch overseas, in an effort to complete the Canadian Army Overseas to its authorized ceiling by 1 Sep. Amended instructions issued on 17 Sep directed that category A-1 men waiting despatch overseas should be remustered to new corps, if necessary, to meet the following ratio: 47 per cent Infantry, 41 per cent Canadian Armoured Corps and the balance for Reconnaissance units of the latter. Men with medical category "A-2" were to be remustered to the R.C.A.M.C. (180). Where necessary conversion training was to be undertaken in eastern Canada. Due to the overall shortage of skilled personnel overseas, however, tradesmen would proceed in their original corps. In order that men who had earned promotion in Canada might proceed overseas as reinforcements without having to revert to the status of private soldier an arrangement was accepted by C.M.H.Q. whereby the following proportions might be despatched (181):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number of Privates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.O. II</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Sgt</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only after the concurrence of C.M.H.Q. in each instance, however, could a Warrant Officer Class I be despatched overseas. Effective 1 Dec further difficulties were placed in the way of promotions for warrant and non commissioned officers in order to lessen the advantages of remaining in Canada.

247. On 10 Nov a further quota of tradesmen, specialists and general duty other ranks was sought: Military Districts which could not complete their quotas of tradesmen or specialists would make up the balance with general duty soldiers suitable for service with infantry or Armoured units. N.R.M.A.
personnel were to be trained to take the places of tradesmen despatched overseas but this would take time (182). There was the additional fact that many of the G.S. soldiers withdrawn from the Home War Establishment had never completed advanced, or even basic, training and would require varying amounts of instruction before being acceptable as reinforcements. Thereafter, remustering became a continuous programme and new grain was provided for the mill by the disbandment of the Airfield Defence Battalion on the west coast and further cuts in coast defence units.

248. Mention should also be made of the saving in manpower which had resulted from the introduction of the "Link" training plan during August. Under this scheme all men destined as reinforcements for the same corps proceeded from District Depot to a common Training Centre and continued to serve with the same group during the whole of their training. Stated simply:

(a) Certain Basic Training Centres will be linked to specific Corps Training Centres. The corps concerned are C.A.C. (less Recce), Inf and R.C.A.M.C.

(b) In the case of other Corps—C.A.C. (Recce), R.C.A., R.C.E., R.C. Sigs, R.C.A.S.C., R.C.O.C. and C. Pro C., it will be possible to carry out both basic and corps training in the respective Corps Training Centres (183)

As a result of the introduction of this consolidated training organization it was possible to close 11 Training Centres and reduce the number of companies in a further 11 Basic Training Centres. Canadian Army Routine Order 3862 of 1 Dec decreed that henceforth all voluntary enlistments would be into a General Service Corps: this would enable training quotas for the several corps to be adjusted more quickly to meet changing needs.
PART III – PREPARING FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS

(1) Completing the Canadian Army Overseas

249. The adoption of British establishments and organization in January 1943 necessitated considerable changes within First Canadian Army. Two Infantry battalions had to be obtained from Canada to permit the reorganization of the two armoured divisions. Three armoured regiments made surplus (in practice those of the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade sent over from Canada) were disbanded and their personnel counted as reinforcements. Both continuing Army Tank Brigades were reorganized into armoured brigades (minus the motor battalion), to facilitate possible interchange or replacement of the single armoured brigade remaining in each armoured division. The reduction of the number of rifle companies in an Infantry battalion from four to three was short lived (largely as a result of the personal intervention of Prime Minister Churchill) but the work of restoration was delayed by the shortage of reinforcements in the Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units (C.M.H.Q. Report 168). Although these had been depleted by the need to replace the casualties incurred at Dieppe (see para 121) and to despatch the 1st Canadian Infantry Division to the Mediterranean (see para 347), it must be remembered that the adoption of British rates of wastage (see paras 147-152) now made necessary the provision of a larger Infantry reinforcement pool. Effective 1 Feb 43, the Infantry Reinforcement Units had been reorganized on a territorial basis (C.M.H.Q. Report 153): personnel now belonged to a Canadian Infantry Corps (General Order 466 of 3 Dec 42) and could be posted to any unit of any division if necessary, although territorial affiliations, at least, would be maintained as far as possible (1). Therefore, on 7 May Brigadier R.B. Gibson (D.O.G.S. (A)) who was overseas on a liaison visit from N.D.H.Q. was induced to send back a personal telegram to the Chief of the General Staff urging that the provision of Infantry reinforcements should be given the highest priority and that all suitable men undergoing basic training for the next two months (unless earmarked for C.A.C. or R.C.A.M.C.) should be diverted to that Corps (2). In a further effort to ensure that the pool of Infantry reinforcements should be complete by 1 Sep 43, when the Canadian Army Overseas was supposed to reach its 'manpower ceiling', permission was sought and obtained for the despatch overseas as "formed reinforcements" of The Lincoln and Welland Regiment and The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, the only two Infantry units which did not contain N.R.M.A. personnel (because they had been on garrison duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica) (3). Subsequently The New Brunswick Rangers arrived overseas, also earmarked as reinforcements. There being no need for a further battalion of "lorried" Infantry, Les Voltigeurs de Québec was removed from the First Canadian Army order of battle in an effort to reduce by half the shortage of 2,282 French-speaking Infantry reinforcements. Lesser changes were made in the other Arms and Services of First Canadian Army. Due to the depletion of "timber stands" in Scotland 10 of the 30 Canadian Forestry Corps companies were returned to Canada, minus those of their personnel who were of an age and medical category fit for service in the Field Force (C.M.H.Q. Report 117). This resulted in the 'manpower ceiling' being reduced to 232,736 all ranks. It was late autumn, however, before all these steps had been completed.

250. As General Stuart had taken care to point out to the Adjutant-General in a memorandum of 8 Apr 45, there were two plans:
... First, there is the plan to complete the Army as a whole and its reinforcement pools. Secondly, and of equal importance, we must ensure that the portions of the Army which may be operationally employed between now and the date of completion of the whole Army are fully provided and reinforced.

While the normal shortage return might tell us that we need 10,000 Infantry by 1 Sep, it may be a matter of high priority to supply say 3,000 Infantry reinforcements by a date which will fit in with the operational employment of a portion of the Army overseas prior to 1 Sep (4).

251. For some time it had been realized that the existing men overseas were not always being employed to the best advantage, even though personnel selection officers had removed the more obvious cases of square pegs from round holes. A "job analysis" had been worked out for the British Army so that if any unit was found to have a higher proportion of "high grade personnel" than was required to make it efficient the surplus was transferable to units which were short. When such standards were applied to Canadian units without modification, however, they showed too large a proportion of both high and low calibre personnel. Moreover, there was still an overall deficiency of tradesmen and specialists in the Canadian Army Overseas (5).

252. A survey had indicated that nearly 35,000 men would be found to be more than 35 years of age or possessing a medical category lower than "A": unlikely in either instance to be able to withstand the rigours of operational service (16). Since First Canadian Army was biased in favour of fighting formations, there were fewer places to put over-age, low category or illiterate personnel than in the British Army which, because of manpower and shipping limitations was committed to provide a proportion of the "tail" for First Canadian Army (see para 178). By early March 1943 Personnel Selection Officers, working under C.M.H.Q. direction, had recommended the transfer of better than 1300 other ranks to the General Pioneer Companies* (1130 actually had been transferred), 383 young "A" category men from the Canadian Forestry Corps (187 transferred to combatant duties) and 457 men who were not suitably employed within the 5th Canadian Armoured Division (7). The solution envisaged by Brigadier A.W. Beament (D.A.G., C.M.H.Q.) was compulsory posting and transfer of men under the following headings:

*Towards the end of March 1942. No. 1 Canadian General Pioneer Company had been formed to absorb approximately 100 illiterates and men with a low mental standard who were unable to absorb the training necessary to produce efficient fighting soldiers. Over-age and low category officers and N.C.O.s. were selected to administer and "mother" these men who had been "kicked around" and made to feel they were not wanted by their original units. The project was so successful that the formation of a second company was authorized on 2 Jun 42. Three further companies were authorized in November 1942 and in the following April an increment was added to Headquarters, C.R.U., to administer the five companies. A sixth company was added in May 1943. It should be noted that these men had a low "M" factor; whereas the men employed later in Special Employment Companies had been given a low "S" rating (C.M.H.Q. Report 164),
(a) The withdrawal from units of surplus tradesmen and military specialists in cases where overall shortages exist in such trades and specialties.

(b) The withdrawal of a proportion of personnel of superior intelligence from those units which have marked excesses of personnel of this calibre, and the withdrawal from units of personnel whose civilian background fits them for trades or specialties in which they are not at present employed, and the training of such personnel in the trades and specialties for which their natural ability or civilian background fits them (8).

253. General McNaughton gave his approval to this recommendation and issued a directive on 5 Apr 43 authorizing compulsory transfers and cross-postings to be carried out by 2nd Echelon of First Canadian Army and C.M.H.Q. Records. The directive stressed the "immediate necessity for adopting a policy designed to effect the employment of every individual in that capacity for which he is best suited by reason of his physical and mental capacity, his training and his natural aptitude" (9). Continuing, General McNaughton's directive stated:

I fully appreciate that this policy will to a degree cut across the lines of individual preference and will affect to some extent the control that an Officer Administering or an Officer Commanding has over personnel of his Corps or unit. It is inevitable that it will result in the removal from units of men whose loss will be felt. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, however, I am convinced that this action is necessary for the well-being of the Army as a whole, and I therefore expect all Commanders loyally to accept my decision and to do all things in their power to facilitate this necessary adjustment.

254. A meeting held at C.M.H.Q. on the following day (7 Apr) concluded that the majority of those selected for transfer would be acceptable to another Corps only after training (10). As an initial step towards the adjustment of tradesmen and specialists in field units it was considered that 2nd Echelon should cross-post within each Corps. In view of its greater surplus of personnel to requirements it was considered that the R.C.A.S.C. should be dealt with first. The Canadian Forestry Corps would be asked to furnish 150 men per month for transfer to Armoured Corps, Artillery or Infantry where the need was greatest. The problem of over-age and low category personnel could not be settled, however, until more information was available on the policy to be adopted towards functional categorization (see para 228). It was for this reason that Brigadier G.B. Chisholm (D.G.M.S.) and Colonel W. Line (Director of Personnel Selection) were then visiting the Canadian Army Overseas. They were told by Brigadier Beamant (during the course of a further meeting on 20 Apr to decide what PULHEMS profile should be the minimum for each trade and type of employment in the Field Force) that, although a commanding officer would want every man in his unit to be completely fit in every way, such would not be possible due to the manpower shortage:

We are so short of manpower that we have to employ every man—what we are striving for is not perfection which is not obtainable, but
a profile which will allow us to employ as many men as possible (11).

During the summer the work of re-classification was carried out within the four divisions remaining in the United Kingdom and the other units of First Canadian Army. In the case of Field Artillery it was found that generally speaking there was a surplus of driver mechanics while the greatest deficiencies were surveyors and regimental signallers (12). R.C.E. Officers complained that certain Personnel Selection Officers were continuing to recommend the transfer of men for training in such overcrowded trades as mining (13). The situation as regards tradesmen still remained acute, even after allowance had been made for those who might qualify after remustering and training. In a memorandum addressed to the Minister of National Defence on 26 Jul the Adjutant-General complained that the Canadian Army Overseas was endeavouring to provide itself with a higher percentage of tradesmen than the British Army (14). Another factor complicating the despatch of tradesmen overseas was that, as a result of the earlier instructions which until 1942 had permitted only volunteers to be given trades training, many now had ranks too senior for absorption overseas (this condition was overcome during the autumn (see para 246)). It would appear, if the C.M.H.Q. requirements were justified, that almost one third of the annual volunteers enlisted should be trained as tradesmen; however, it took about nine months to change the output of the reinforcement training stream and even then the composition of First Canadian Army was not firm.

Actually, authority already had been given (3 Jul 43) for the establishment of a Canadian Army Standing Committee on Trade Qualifications and Entitlements under the chairmanship of Maj.-Gen. G.R. Turner (the Director of Trades Training was sent over from N.D.R.Q. to serve as the Canadian member) to explore the possibility of:

(a) Eliminating certain tradesmen.

(b) Substituting tradesmen of lower classification for tradesmen of higher classification in the same trade.

(c) Substitution of prescribed trades by allied trades in places where the latter are easier to obtain (15).

(On 14 Oct the Turner Committee reported to General McNaughton (a copy going direct to the Adjutant-General who was visiting the United Kingdom) but more urgent matters delayed consideration of its recommendations on a "Senior Staff level" until late December. Only on 5 Jan 44 did General Stuart direct that certain of its recommendations be implemented. These included the substitution of new establishments for tradesmen, the institution of new trades and the amendment of certain existing ones).

Officers at C.M.H.Q. had hoped that personnel who were over-age, of low medical category, illiterate or otherwise undesirable, might be returned to Canada and replaced. However, a request that the 'manpower ceiling' should be shown in two parts—those fit for service in the Field Force and those fit for limited service in the United Kingdom only—had resulted in the following reply being despatched from Ottawa on 4 Jun:
We realize that a gradual dilution of your force is being caused by personnel becoming over-age and lowered in category. In our projections... we allowed for the return to Canada of such personnel at the maximum rate of 1500 per month during the first 8 months of 1943. To date the rate of return has been less than half that amount.

The need for return of men is twofold: (1) it allows you to replace where necessary considerable numbers lower category men with those of higher category and at the same time not exceed the ceiling. (2) It enables the return of these men to essential occupations in Canada thereby easing the net drain on manpower. We know you will appreciate this drain is assuming serious proportions.

On 3 Jul, during one of General Stuart's visits to the United Kingdom, General McNaughton reviewed the manpower situation in the light of two assumptions which had been made in a recent C.M.H.Q. telegram (26 Jun):
(a) That the War Office was willing and able to provide the remainder of the units necessary to make a properly balanced force, including several previously considered as a Canadian commitment.
(b) That N.D.H.Q. was willing and able to replace men overseas who by reason of age, medical category, or mental capacity could not be absorbed in the proposed composition.

General McNaughton pointed out that the decision made at the recent Washington Conference ("TRIDENT") to launch Operation "OVERLORD" with a target date of 1 May 44 would give the Canadian Army Overseas several months, following its completion to 225,000 all ranks, in which the casualties would be less than the 5,000 reinforcements to be despatched monthly. That time could be used for the replacement of unsuitable personnel. The question was raised again on 4 Aug, during the visit of the Minister of National Defence, but settlement was left until autumn when the Adjutant-General would be visiting the Canadian Army Overseas.

A telegram of 17 Sep from Ottawa emphasized the official view:
We are at one with you in wishing that the Canadian Army should be streamlined as to age, physical and mental category to the great extent our manpower resources will allow, but you will realize that after 4 years of war activities our resources of young fit men are not by any means inexhaustible.

During the course of his later visit to the Canadian Army Overseas the Adjutant-General told an "A" Branch Conference at C.M.H.Q. (28 Oct) that Canadian manpower was not unlimited and that industry and agriculture were increasing their demands upon it. He stressed the desirability of making the best use of all those then overseas for, "if a man is not suitable here to do a useful job, it is likely he will have to be discharged on return to Canada" (21). With 100,000 all ranks despatched overseas in the preceding 12 months the question presented...
itself whether it would still be possible to get a replacement 
better than the man who was being sent back.

260. On 13 Sep 43 instructions had been issued for 
all units to compile nominal rolls of personnel who did not 
conform to the existing standards of age and medical category 
for service in the field; those who although physically fit 
were considered unsuitable because of low mentality, illiteracy 
or a disability which had not resulted in a lower medical cat-
gory; and those who, while they did not conform to the stan-
dards established for age and medical category, were fit to be 
taken into battle. For those in the third category, the follow-
ing certificate was to be signed by the unit commanding officer:

Notwithstanding that the above personnel do NOT 
qualify under the present age or medical standards, 
I consider them fit for active service and cer-
tify that I am prepared to take them into battle (22).

Personnel coming under the first two headings were to be posted 
to the newly authorized No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre where 
they would be interviewed and classified as: fit for employment 
in field units of their own corps; fit for employment in field 
units of another corps; fit for employment in a static unit; 
return to Canada.

261. No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Unit began to function 
at Algonquin Camp (6 C.I.R.U.) on 3 Oct with a staff of personnel 
selection and medical officers (including a psychiatrist). Ac-
cording to the directive given, personnel for return to Canada 
should be category 'C' or lower, over 45 years of age, or un-
suitable because of instability or low mentality (or both) (23). 
A deciding factor was, however, not whether a man was performing 
his present duties acceptably but whether they could not be done 
as well or better by a man whose age and medical category would 
permit of utilization as a reinforcement.

262. Work proceeded slowly (50 per day), until author-
ity was received on 30 Dec to carry out reallocation following 
merely an expression of opinion by a medical officer as to a man's 
probable PULHEMS profile (rather than a complete medical board) (24). 
At the beginning of 1944 it was estimated that the static and 
reinforcement units contained approximately 10,000 all ranks 
"unfit for the field" (25). Since it would be impossible for 
all these men to pass through the Reallocation Centre authority 
was granted for unit selection committees to despatch direct 
to No. 1 N.E.T.D. ** for return to Canada all those whom they 
considered unsuitable for further employment in the Canadian 
Army Overseas and who had, in addition, a PULHEMS profile con-
taining one or more gradings as low as '4' (26). Until 31 Mar 44, 
when the policy was reviewed, only personnel for whom it was 
considered there might be available further employment overseas 
were despatched to No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre. By this 
time, some 8017 of the estimated 10,000 border-line types in 
the static and reinforcement units had been seen by unit selec-
tion committees (27).

(11) Operational Forecasts and Reinforcement Flow

265. "In view of the fact that the operational employ-
ment of the Cdn Army Overseas, which constitutes the largest 
part of the Canadian military forces, is dependent upon the

*Composed of the administrative officer, records officer, 
personnel selection officer and medical officer.

**No. 1 Non-Effective Transit Depot.
strategic direction of the War Office, which will also govern
the employment of British troops," Brigadier N.E. Rodger (B.G.S.,
C.M.H.Q.) informed the War Office on 11 Mar that it was considered
"essential that the same forecast of activity should be used by
the British and Canadian authorities for the purpose of long
term calculations" (28). His letter emphasized that the War
Office forecast of activity for North-West Europe should be made
available for Canadian planners at an early date.

Unofficially, Brigadier Rodger had been advised
as early as 6 Mar that the existing forecast for North-West
Europe was as follows:

1943 - two months intense, two months normal,
remainder "quiet".

1944 - three months intense, six months normal,
remainder "quiet".

You are doubtless fully informed of the size of
the Canadian forces likely to be available for
operations. I must, however, sound a note of
warning that experience in the Middle East and
elsewhere has convinced us that it is unsound
to apply such activity rates to the total forces
in a theatre. For the purpose of estimating
probable wastage I would hazard the suggestion
that calculations might be based on three-fourths
of the total forces available being involved in
"intense" and "normal" activity for the above
periods (29).

The War Office studies of wastage were still in the draft stage
but Brigadier Rodger was advised on 20 Mar that the above fore-
cast related to the activity anticipated for 10 divisions in
1943 and 15 divisions in 1944. Having regard to the projected
operations in which the First Canadian Army might be involved,
the War Office strongly recommended that the Canadian Army
should consider three-quarters of its force engaged at these
activity rates (30). In order to reduce this forecast to "round
numbers" for First Canadian Army, however, C.M.H.Q. recommended,
and N.D.H.Q. approved, the following (31):

1943 - one month "intense", two months "normal",
nine months "quiet".

1944 - three months "intense", five months "normal",
four months "quiet".

With the participation of the lst Canadian In-
fantry Division and the lst Canadian Army Tank Brigade in the
conquest of Sicily General McNaughton's hopes for an all-
Canadian Army received a setback. Planning proceeded during
the summer of 1943 on the assumption that these troops would
be returned to First Canadian Army in time to participate in
the assault on North-West Europe, but even General McNaughton
began to fear for a time that the 21st Army Group might be
merely a "facade" and that the British Government had no in-
tention of embarking upon a costly invasion of North-West
Europe (32). The Canadian Government decided to gamble on the
British view prevailing and managed to get the balance of a
Canadian Corps despatched to Italy. (C.M.H.Q. Report 182)
This shattered General McNaughton's dream of an all-Canadian
Army: an additional administrative "tail" was necessary and
the logistical problems of distance were introduced to confuse
the manpower problem further.
British manpower was strictly limited and General McNaughton was able to advise N.D.H.Q. on 28 Oct that F.F.C. 36 had "ceased to have any validity as basis of plans" and that a new Field Force table, based on "realistic figures" was being prepared at the War Office (33). Plans for the forthcoming invasion of North-West Europe by an American-Anglo-Canadian Force were well advanced and General McNaughton considered that General Paget's proposal to place the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade under the command of 1st British Corps for the actual assault would have to be accepted. A C.M.H.Q. telegram of 5 Nov contained a new War Office activity forecast for 1944, revised as a result of the decisions reached at the "QUADRANT" Conference:

Mediterranean Theatre: First two and two thirds months intense. Next five months normal. Last four and one third months quiet.

North West Europe: First three months quiet. Next two and two third months intense. Next five months normal. Last month and one third quiet (34).

When this information was sent back to Ottawa on 5 Nov it was pointed out further that:

... intense period Mediterranean occurs first quarter year and for continental operations during second quarter with consequent high average monthly wastage over first half year. The figures for the overseas holdings of three months rfts at intense rates plus monthly flow of rft stream cover the estimated demands....

However having regard to the fact that above basis of operations in two theatres splits rfts allowing less flexibility than operations from single base I suggest you will not want to cut monthly rfts below present basis and recommend you plan to continue for 1944 at the rate of 5000 per month as heretofore (35).

Furthermore, War Office experience had now borne out the fact that 50 per cent of total casualties could be counted as "recoverable" after six months (see para 154).

267. Worried as to whether First Canadian Army could continue in the Order of Battle as a mixed Anglo-Canadian formation under command of a Canadian officer, the Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff proceeded to the United Kingdom by air to discuss matters with Generals Brooke and Paget. Agreement was reached that Headquarters, First Canadian Army might be retained: a British corps would be placed under command and a British staff element added. Although General McNaughton no longer was acceptable as an Army Commander agreement was reached that his successor should be appointed by the Canadian Government after consultation with the British Government (C.M.H.Q. Report 182).

*It was planned that General McNaughton should remain in Command of First Canadian Army until an acceptable successor was available [i.e. General Crerar who had gone to the Mediterranean to obtain operational experience commanding 1st Canadian Corps] but ill-health forced him to relinquish his post, effective
268. During this time reliability of the British rates of wastage also became subject to question. The Adjutant-General raised the first doubts in a memorandum of 18 Oct addressed to the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. (36). Thereupon, General Montague sent two officers to the War Office for the latest information. On 25 Oct they reported:

The reply was that the rates had proven to be reliable. He [Lt.-Col. H.L. Chesshyre, S.D. 4] produced charts and graphs which he keeps on this subject, which showed an extraordinary degree of accuracy in most respects. During the operations in Sicily and Italy, the infantry rate is shown to be extremely accurate. Artillery, including AA at the old (high) rates of wastage proved to be more than adequate. R.A. casualties were also less than estimated.

On the whole the actual casualties related to estimated, average well. During the Sicily operations, they were over the peak, with a definite lag following, an approach of the two lines, following that with a further touch over the peak at time of Salerno.

Colonel Chesshyre would not comment on any higher degree of casualties from sickness in Mediterranean, as his figures did not sub-divide battle casualties from sickness (37).

(This information was included in a memorandum of 7 Nov answering several questions raised by the Adjutant-General (38).

269. On 1 Dec Brigadier A.W. Beaumont raised the question again, in a letter from Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 15th Army Group, suggesting that Infantry casualties had been higher than the calculated wastage rates (based on the North African campaign) and that the proportion of Officer casualties also was higher (39). On 15 Dec Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale (B.C.S., C.M.H.Q.) replied:

...Statistics show that for the British Forces in the Mediterranean from 1 Aug 43 to the present time the forecast of casualties as represented for all Arms combined closely approximate actual wastage. We have obtained from the War Office copies of charts and graphs, which are carefully checked and kept up to date. From these it is apparent that while the trend is closely followed there is, in fact, a substantial margin of safety as between forecasts and actual incidence of casualties. These charts also show a break-down by Arms and the same conclusion applies to each.

For example, in the case of Inf, estimated casualties as at 18 Nov 43 were approximately 20% greater than actual. Therefore, I feel that your fears may be allayed....

So far, there is, as you say, insufficient evidence or info upon which to build up an accurate forecast of a purely Cdn trend, but gradually as time goes on we will be able, by following the...