methods adopted at the War Office, to draw upon our own experience in arriving at any future estimate of our own purely Cdn requirements. We have, in fact, already commenced to construct graphs based upon casualty returns and these, in time, will build up to show a reasonably good picture of events (40).

270. Due to the favourable shipping conditions expected during the last three months of 1943, it had been proposed to continue the reinforcement flow of 5,000 per month, in case shipping space might become limited later and in spite of the fact that the original agreement had contained a reservation that the despatch of reinforcements subsequent to September need not total 5,000 per month unless justified by battle wastage (41). As a result of the lowered operational forecast of activity now issued by the War Office and the delay in committing the balance of First Canadian Army to active operations, the Adjutant-General came to believe, however, following his own return to Canada from the United Kingdom, that the Canadian Army could be kept up to strength during 1944 by the monthly despatch overseas of only 4,000 reinforcements (42).

271. The C.M.H.Q. estimate of casualties for 1944 was 75,000 all ranks, of whom 50 per cent would be recoverable after six months, thus leaving only 37,500 to be found by replacement from Canada. After adding a further 2,000 to compensate for the 4,000 casualties expected during November and December 1943, and replacing 6,000 "unsuitables" to be returned to Canada, the total required for 14 months (the end of 1944) would be about 45,500. In a telegram of 3 Dec despatched to the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. who were still in the United Kingdom, the Adjutant-General and V.C.G.S. stated:

It is therefore evident that the despatch of 70,000 at the rate of 5,000 per month for 14 months would be greatly in excess of net requirements to 31 Dec 44 now projected.

... most intense casualties will be suffered during the months of April, May and June but even at the end of that time the immediately available pool would still be maintained at a minimum of 19,500 with an additional provision of 6,500 to cover normal non-effective as well as a further 24,600 recoverable casualties in hospital or convalescence becoming available over a period of 6 months. You will note that by 31 Dec 44 the immediately available would be up to almost full strength with over 12,000 recoverable casualties still in hospital or convalescence plus 6,500 normal non-effectives (43).

They suggested the despatch overseas of only 4,000 reinforcements per month for 14 months (i.e. 56,000) subject to a further reduction in the late months of 1944 "should actual casualties suffered be materially below present estimates".

272. In the opinion of those at C.M.H.Q. the adoption of such a policy would result in reinforcement holdings becoming dangerously low during the months of June, July and August 1944. In a memorandum of 11 Dec the B.G.S. (Brigadier Penhale) suggested to General Stuart that, with troops serving in two distinct theatres of operations, there would be less flexibility and more chance of the reinforcement flow being interrupted by sea communications (44). Brigadier Penhale believed that the reinforcement holdings in the United Kingdom should exceed the
allowable total by 7,000: in practice this would be offset by the actual number of non-effectives, for whom an allowance of 6655 was made under the "manpower ceiling" (7,000 further "un-suitables" being slated for return to Canada through No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre).

273. The proposal favoured by those at C.M.H.Q. was the provision of an uneven flow of reinforcements—5,000 during each of the first six months—so that at no time should the reinforcement pool fall below a figure equivalent to 50 per cent of the calculated reserve of three months' reinforcements at the "intense" rate of wastage—and 3,000 for each of the last six months. The total number despatched overseas would remain at 48,000—the figure recommended to Mr Ralston and the C.G.S. by the Adjutant-General. Such a solution would not greatly disorganize the Training Centre organization in Canada and would allow these establishments to "run down" during the last half of 1944, consequently freeing personnel from the permanent establishments for overseas service. (Once the training organization was so curtailed, however, it might be hard to increase the reinforcement flow during 1945.) Summing up, Brigadier Penhale had written:

... the General Staff have indicated that in their opinion "a safe level" of our total holdings could within reason be accepted as being a figure equivalent to 50% of total calculated wastage for 3 months at Intense rates. This figure of 50% has been arbitrarily arrived at, after due consideration of the size of the force, together with the normal incidence of casualties likely to be incurred by a formation in heavy fighting, or total loss of one or more transports. No exact data is available to support this view, but experience recalls that a formation such as a Division may lose anything up to 30% or 40% in a single operation extending over a period of a few days only. Nevertheless, I feel that a modification of present policy on this basis could safely be accepted with the reservation that it may become necessary later due to operational misfortunes to review the whole question.

Such a review, I feel, in any event should be made not later than Apr 1944, which would be in sufficient time to allow for any preliminary work involved in changing the basis of provision during the latter part of the year from 3,000 per month to some other figure.... (45).

274. On 26 Dec General Stuart assumed the appointments of Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q.* and acting Army Commander (until General Crerar should have received some operational experience in Italy) but two periods of hospitalization, and an intervening trip to Italy prevented him from attending to this problem personally until 19 Jan 44. On that day he despatched the following answer to the V.C.G.S. in Ottawa:

... I am satisfied that our requirements will be covered by 48,000 at rate of 4,000 per month. Will review again in April.... (46).

Thus did the Canadian view prevail over that expressed by those who had been handling the problem overseas.

*Major-General P.J. Montague vacated his appointment as Senior Officer to become Major-General in charge of Administration (M.G.A.)
275. Lulled into a false sense of security the Minister of National Defence made the following statement to the House of Commons on 14 Feb:

With regard to reinforcements, I have a very brief statement which will put the matter clearly. I am glad to be able to say that notwithstanding the fact that a part of the army has been fighting since July, the reinforcement pool overseas is well up to the planned original full strength. This pool was that which was estimated to be adequate to meet battle casualties, and the supply can and will continue to be replenished by the despatch of further reinforcements from Canada as required.

There is one qualification to be made. It is very difficult to match supply with requirements of all different types of tradesmen. Thirty-five per cent of the army today are in the different trades, of which there are over 200, many of which are highly specialized. It is a constant battle to get from the population of this country, or for that matter of any country, so large a percentage of skilled men, particularly bearing in mind the needs of war industry. The adaptability of young men is such, and the presence of tradesmen throughout the army is so general that I think that we can be confident we shall always be able in time of emergency to meet the need (47).

276. There were a number of points which required clarification, however, even though it was not considered at this time that they had a really serious bearing on the reinforcement situation. As early as 19 Jan, the day General Stuart’s telegram had approved the 1944 monthly reinforcement flow, General Montague (now Major-General in Charge of Administration, C.M.H.Q.) had written to General Sir Archibald Nye (V.O.I.G.S., War Office) explaining the Canadian Army’s manpower difficulties in part as follows:

The situation as it exists in Canadian Forces Overseas is complicated to the extent that provision must now be made for Canadian participation in two theatres of operations. This development was not foreseen in deciding upon the detailed composition of the First Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, at which time a small contingency reserve of personnel was provided to ensure some degree of flexibility within the total ceiling imposed by the Canadian Government. You will also readily understand that this ceiling represents a maximum figure, which we may not exceed, and which, according to our direction, will not under any circumstance be increased (48).

The ‘contingency reserve’ (of 3200 men) had been dissipated by calls from the Canadian component with the Central Mediterranean
Force* and C.M.H.Q. proposed its restoration by corresponding cuts from the Canadian component of the 21st Army Group: three Engineer battalions, two (of the four) R.C.A.S.C. general transport companies and one L.A.A. regiment. Such a reduction, plus the saving to be obtained from the reorganization of the divisional support battalions should restore a 'contingency reserve' of 3200 men—the minimum number considered feasible for an Army which would be operating in two distinct theatres of operations (5).

*Writing to General McNaughton on 27 Nov 43, the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q. had pointed out his own understanding that...

"the arrangements with the War Office under which Cdn tps were despatched to the Mediterranean theatre visualized that Cdn provision of L of C tps would be restricted to the provision of hosps, L of C provost and base rft units. " General McNaughton agreed and an A.F.H.Q. request for the formation of Base Censor Sections to deal with Canadian mail was turned down. Then, on 18 Dec, General Montague despatched the following telegram to General Crerar in Italy:

I. Must draw your attention to continued requests for increases to establishments Cdn Sec I Ech and other base and L. of C. details now being received from Beamant. Realize many of these of small dimension but accumulative effects now achieving serious proportions. For your info since base installations originally approved and set up in theatre total personnel involved in new demands received amount to 228 offrs and 1342 ORs of which more than 60 percent are apparently required for base and L. of C. details for which the British are responsible.

II. You will agree approved policy and imposed manpower ceiling does not allow large build up for base and L. of C. installations and that with small contingency reserve of manpower available we cannot approve additions without corresponding reductions elsewhere.

III. Situation extremely complicated by necessity of providing for two theatres. Needs of both must be carefully weighed in balance before granting approval either in principle to many recommendations received. While doubtless general requirements discussed with you feel I must request that you with Beamant exercise careful scrutiny upon all new and unforeseen demands already made and which in future may be requested.

IV. Earnestly desire to provide you and your tps with best possible services but feel you must appreciate no present prospect of obtaining authority to increase overall manpower ceiling. Can assure you every effort being made here to increase working margin and availability of personnel by reduction static establishments, review of attachments and cutting out non essential units.

In reply, General Crerar protested that the only increases in the establishment of 1st Echelon, for which Brigadier Beamant had sought his approval, had totalled 27 all ranks. He

(cont'd on next page)
277. As early as 31 Dec 43, however, the War Office had turned down a request from A.F.H.Q. that additional R.C.E. units should be provided as G.H.Q. troops in Italy, if this was to be done "at the expense of 21 Army Group" (51). Overriding priority had been given to North-West Europe and the Canadian attempts to reduce its commitment for that theatre were strongly opposed, particularly since the British Army was short of technical personnel. The final agreement was a compromise so far as manpower was concerned. The Canadian Army would still provide three Engineer battalions and the four general transport companies that General Montgomery deemed essential. The Canadian Army also would provide the large L. of C. Signals. The 2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment (mobile) R.C.A. was retained (for service with a British A.A. Brigade), the balance of the Canadian A.A. Brigade (including three L.A.A. regiments) was disbanded and the personnel placed in the reinforcement pool, since the British had plenty of surplus A.A. units which had been employed on A.D.G.B. (Air Defence of Great Britain). The Royal Montreal Regiment also became surplus to requirements, but arrangements eventually were made to retain it in the order of battle as the First Canadian Army Headquarters Defence Company (C.M.H.Q. Report 168).

278. On 1 Feb 44 the War Office had advanced the suggestion that C.M.H.Q. should place a definite limit on expansions requested for the Canadian Force in the Mediterranean in view of the higher priority that must be accorded pending operations in North-West Europe (53). By 4 Feb the general outline of such a scheme had been worked out and General Stuart was able to send the following telegram to General Crerar and Brigadier Beament in Italy:

... Troopers [War Office] have represented strongly that we must take account prejudice composition of Cdn component of 21 Army Group... Troopers meeting similar but more complex situation by imposition of manpower sub ceiling in respect of theatres within which comd concerned is given liberty of action to make use of personnel at his discretion. I suggest for your consideration we institute similar arrangement to govern Cdn allocations of personnel.

Proposal is to establish for each theatre a sub-ceiling based on summation of W.Es. of authorized units plus approved rfts which for C.M.F. is placed currently at two months holdings. Within this limit comd will be given liberty to utilize personnel in accordance with his appreciation of operational factors availability and nature of service to be added.

(cont'd from page 121)

suggested that General Montague visit Italy for a personal discussion of that and other matters. General Crerar subsequently informed Brigadier Beament that he considered "CMHQ must remain responsible for organization of Cdn Sec 1 and 2 Echs, and all that comes under you. I shall indicate the 'Service' that I want, but I am not going to deal any more than I can help in the detailed ways and means this involves". (There was the further fact that Canadian units in the Mediterranean found it necessary to adopt the Middle East establishments favoured by the Eighth Army) (49).
Above would be combined with power to force command within this approved ceiling to form temporary units on existing Cdn or Brit W.E. or on provisional organizational tables. Personnel required for such units would count as rfts unless later authorization granted for conversion to permanent basis. All ranks and trades groupings to be temporary and surrendered on termination or disbandment.

To satisfy N.D.H.Q. requirements and in order to secure organizational uniformity and control in respect of theatre priorities full details would be advised this H.Q. and confirmation granted under C.G.S. 60. It will be understood that should priorities change or resources increase units and additions established on temporary basis could be reconstituted as permanent addition to theatre after full authorization by this H.Q. under C.G.S. 139 in which event appropriate transfer from contingency reserve to theatre sub-ceiling would be made (54).

279. General Montague went out to Italy to see for himself why there were so many demands to form additional units for the 'tail' and to explain further the implications of the proposed 'manpower sub-ceiling'. After looking over the situation he telegraphed General Stuart on 8 Feb that "experience of fighting here recently indicates disproportionately high casualties of infantry general duty personnel" (55). The British Adjutant-General (Sir Ronald Adam) having visited Italy and expressed similar views it was believed that steps were being taken at the War Office to amend wastage rates.

280. The overall question of wastage and the adequacy of the reinforcement pool grew even more acute (see paras 285 and 291) and on 19 Feb, four days before General Crerar's concurrence in the proposed 'manpower sub-ceiling' was sent from Italy (56), a further telegram was despatched from C.M.H.Q. pointing out that due to the higher priority of North-West Europe and the arrangement whereby only 4000 reinforcements per month would be despatched from Canada during 1944 (57) it would be necessary for Canadian troops in Italy to operate with "one month's holdings at intense rates from end of March" (when the latter theatre was expected to pass from "intense" to "normal" operations) (58). Henceforth, C.M.H.Q. would review the matter monthly and would "take into consideration your actual casualties and forecast of your activity and availability of reinforcements considering other theatre and other pertinent factors". It was pointed out that, even if the period of "intense" activity was extended, the units of 1st Canadian Corps could still be reinforced until the end of April. Sufficient reinforcements would be provided to make up the existing deficiency to one month's holdings at the "intense" rates of wastage.

281. General Crerar and Brigadier Beamant protested this line of reasoning. The former had expressed the opinion that "it would be most dangerous to reduce reinforcement holding this theatre below two months intense" (59); the latter pointed out that convoys now sailed only at 36-day intervals, whereas originally they had been monthly, and argued that holdings should be the equivalent of two and a half months wastage at "intense" rates—a period equivalent to approximately twice the convoy interval (60).

282. The lack of reinforcements in the United Kingdom made acceptance of the C.M.H.Q. policy inevitable, however, and
on 13 Mar 44 a telegram was despatched to A.A.I. (Allied Armies in Italy had replaced the term Allied Central Mediterranean Force) setting forth the Canadian 'manpower sub-ceiling' for that theatre. Although the exact number could not be determined, the basis for the 'ceiling' was firm:

(a) The WE requirements of all units currently or subsequently approved for inclusion in the composition of Cdn tps serving in Mediterranean Force.

(b) One month's holdings for this force based on one mos wastage at intense activity calculated on the approved Cdn rates of wastage of personnel as applied to the approved current composition of the force both as to WEs and as to units (61).

For the time being it was estimated that the 'ceiling' should total approximately 61,483 all ranks (56,308 against W.Es. and 5,175 reinforcements). This telegram continued:

Further in order to enable the Comd of the Force to meet temporary or emergency conditions he is permitted to authorize as temporary provision within the approved manpower sub-ceiling W.Es. and units required subject to the following conditions:

(a) Such authorizations if of a permanent nature to be referred to CMHQ where if concurred in as such will be ruled as an authorized addition to the force and covered by appropriate transfer of manpower from contingency reserve to the sub ceiling for the Force.

(b) Such authorization if of a temporary nature only will be advised to CMHQ stating date of inception, purpose of formation, manpower involved, expected duration and subsequently the actual date of termination.

(c) Personnel involved in such temporary authorizations are to be counted against rfts for the theatre until such time as authorized as a permanent provision within the force or termination of the temporary authorization (62).

In order to distinguish between these "temporary authorizations" and the similar GSD 602 units in the United Kingdom they became known as "GS 778 units", from the originator's number of this telegram.

283. On 24 Mar General Stuart followed this up with a letter to the Officer i/c Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon (then Brigadier E.G. Weeks), laying down the basis for calculating non-effectives. This question had been bandied about since 7 Jan but now the percentages which could be shown as non-effectives against the "X" List (see Appendix "J") were laid down (65):
Summarizing, the latter concluded:

... your reinforcement requirements, as from the end of March, will be based on one month's wastage rate, plus non-effectives, the total of which will be determined by applying the allowable percentages against component parts of the "X" list as shown above, plus estimated wastage between date of submission of bid and estimated arrival, and less estimated recoverable casualties in the same period (64).

Further objections from Italy were made but they were disregarded (65). In order to reassure the new Corps Commander, however, the following C.M.H.Q. telegram was despatched on 30 Mar to Brigadier Weeks:

Inform Comd l Cdn Corps we will endeavour at all times to ensure that your rft holdings do not fall below equivalent of one month at intense rates approx. This policy will take into account convoy turnaround, actual strengths and other relevant factors such as recoverable casualties and will result frequently in your total exceeding two months' requirements. Our assessment of your bids will be based upon projection of these considerations in the light of our monthly review. You will appreciate however that with operational priority now accorded European theatre and arrivals from Canada at fixed monthly rate this policy may require modification from time to time (66).

The real reason for such action had been confirmation of the C.M.H.Q. fears, earlier ignored by General Stuart (see paras 272-4) that the reinforcement pool would reach a dangerous low during June 1944. According to a memorandum submitted by Brigadier Penhale as early as 3 Feb its size would be only 15,522 during June (67). The despatch of further reinforcements from Canada and an increased number of recoverable casualties would subsequently boost it but, during the months it remained below 40,762 both theatres would have to accept a reduction in holdings (see para 280).

As of 22 Feb officers in "A" Branch at C.M.H.Q. produced figures considerable at variance with those produced by the G.S. Branch for Brigadier Penhale (68). There were 3,165 officers and 22,951 other ranks available in the United Kingdom as "effective" reinforcements, plus 80 officers and 2723 other ranks who were unfit, although approximately half might be employed in static units. Should the reinforcement pool drop below a "safe" level it would still be possible to draw men from G.S.D. 602 units and increments to reinforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'X' List</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>% Chargeable Against Rfts</th>
<th>% Allowable as non-effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>P.O.W.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Detention and FP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unposted Rfts</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Courses in theatre</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seconded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>For return UK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other non-available</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Lt.-Gen E.L.M. Burns had taken over command of 1st Canadian Corps on 20 Mar 44.
units to a total of approximately 650 officers and 6400 other ranks. By making the necessary adjustments on paper it was argued that 35,000 all ranks should be available by 1 Mar. On that day, the reinforcement holdings in Italy should total 13,000. Estimated casualties for the summer were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N.W.E.</th>
<th>C.M.F.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>8759</td>
<td>7628</td>
<td>16,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>8759</td>
<td>7628</td>
<td>16,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>7159</td>
<td>2075</td>
<td>9,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3955</td>
<td>2075</td>
<td>6,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should the flow of reinforcements from Canada remain constant, the reinforcement pool would decrease from 38,782 in May to 26,395 in June, 21,161 in July and 19,131 in August.

287. That same day (22 Feb) General Stuart replied to an N.D.H.Q. suggestion to despatch only 10,000 reinforcements from Canada during the first quarter of 1944 with the information that:

My agreement that the 1944 replacements would total some 45,000 despatched at the average rate of 4,000 per month was based on the assumption that the actual strength of the Canadian Army Overseas at 31 Dec 43 would, after making due allowance for non-effective included in the "X" List and some 6,000 estimated non-employables, approximately equal the approved manpower ceiling of 232,756 (69).

Out of a gross strength of 244,443 all ranks on 31 Dec 43, however, only 227,685 were found to be available for unrestricted employment against the current 'manpower ceiling' of 232,756 all ranks. General Stuart considered that officers at N.D.H.Q. had been calculating 'recoverable casualties' wrongly: only those of the first six months could be counted as recovered during the last six months of the year. Thus the 'recoverable casualties' from 1943 and the first six months of 1944 would be 24,548 all ranks. With 1944 casualties estimated at 75,115 it would be necessary to supply 50,567 reinforcements from Canada. Since the end of 1943 had seen an actual deficit of 5051 effectives, it would be necessary to supply 55,618 rather than the 45,500 estimated in Ottawa. There were the further problems of time lag and the fact that a considerable number of the reinforcements would need four to six weeks refresher training following their arrival from Canada.

288. The possibility of the War Office creating a "double intense" rate for the assault formations participating in Operation "OVERLORD" was mentioned and then General Stuart continued in explanation:

The situation as represented in this letter is based upon the best information obtainable and is in accordance with methods of calculation used by the War Office. In this regard, it is a matter of satisfaction to note that forecasts presently employed as compared with active overall casualties incurred in C.M.F. have been substantially accurate, with a satisfactory margin of safety. Viewing the problem according to arms of the services, the picture is still favourable although the possible exception arises in the case of the Corps of Infantry, in which most of
the casualties have been incurred. It is hoped that sufficient detailed information resulting from experience gained will soon permit the construction of graphs which will show clearly Canadian trends. It is proposed to construct these as soon as casualties for February are known.

In the foregoing calculations, some concern may arise at the over-all picture as it may appear in July 1944, when, if the worst case is considered, the reinforcement pool will have dropped to no more than one month's holdings for each theatre. However, this will depend on the timing of future operations, which cannot presently be stated, and any delays will be reflected in the improved figures which would result. Furthermore, with full knowledge of the manpower situation in Canada, and as far as can be foreseen at present, I am satisfied that a total of 48,000 reinforcements at the rate of 4,000 per month inclusive January to December 1944 will satisfy our requirements, subject to a monthly review of the situation which in view of changing circumstances I feel now to be necessary.

This letter was followed by the despatch of a similarly worded telegram of 25 Feb.

289. In his reply of the following day the V.C.O.S. promised that an additional 2,000 reinforcements would be despatched to bring the total to 12,000 for the first quarter of 1944, provided that shipping could be made available during March. In conclusion he reiterated:

We are planning to despatch total of 48,000 reinforcements during 1944. It must be appreciated however that the number despatched during each calendar month will depend on shipping available within that month.

290. It was only after considerable discussion, however, that the War Office took the necessary action to increase the Canadian Army's allocation of shipping space so that 12,910 all ranks could be despatched from Canada during the first quarter of the year.

(111) Last Minute Changes Before D-Day

291. Existing reinforcement holdings were disturbing when broken down on a corps basis. In the case of Infantry there was a deficiency of 24 officers and 9,057 other ranks against a surplus of 13 officers for Infantry (Motor) battalions and two officers and 57 other ranks employed in G.S.D. 602 units. When reinforcement holdings for all corps were added together there was a surplus of 329 officers and a deficit of 11,620 other ranks, against which it was possible to show 349 officers and 10,087 other ranks serving in the temporary G.S.D. 602 units. Brigadier W.F. Bostock (A.D.A.G. (A.), C.M.H.Q.

*Although General Stuart was in the picture as regards the 21st Army Group "key" plan he explained to Mr Ralston in a telegram of 24 Feb 44 that tactical planning for the "follow-up" First Canadian Army could not be started until that of the assaulting armies had been completed (C.M.H.Q. Report 102).
argued, in a memorandum of 13 Mar 44 that, if it were possible to disband all the G.S.D. 602 units, the overall deficit could be reduced to some 1500 other ranks; against this it would be possible to count as reinforcements (on paper) a further 2000 men on the P.E. (Permanent Establishment) of Reinforcement Units.

Although the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., was willing to make drastic cuts in the G.S.D. 602 units and recommend the remustering of all surplus personnel to make up deficiencies in Infantry and R.C.A.S.C., he considered that a longer view should be taken of the situation and no action initiated unless justified by conditions applicable at a later time (i.e. 1 May 44). Furthermore, he directed that:

... no communication concerning rfts is to be despatched out of CMHQ to Defensor [N.D.H.Q.], 21 Army Group or anywhere else without being seen by him. This restriction relates to policy aspect and overall position rather than any routine returns, etc., which may have to be despatched.

On 16 Mar a reinforcement estimate was supplied for General Montgomery in order that he might make an appreciation of the overall situation within 21 Army Group. On paper it was possible to show, by raiding G.S.D. 602 units and from the current reorganization of the Reinforcement Units that there were 890 officers and 1790 other ranks over and above requirements. Of course, however, this was permitting the reinforcement pool in Italy to dwindle to one month's wastage at "intense" rates.

The following extract from General Montgomery's reply of the following day is of considerable interest:

2. An analysis of the figures in this paper indicates that although the Canadian Reinforcement situation appears to be numerically satisfactory, it is evident that steps must be taken to make this reinforcement personnel more readily available in the arms in which requirement exists, than is at present the case. Three factors which prejudice the situation appear to be:

(a) reinforcements attached away;
(b) reinforcements posted to establishments of G.S.D 602 units; and
(c) surpluses in some arms and deficiencies in other arms.

3. With regard to sub-paragraph (a) and (b), I hope that as many personnel as possible will be placed in the training stream at an early date, so that they may be available and battle-worthy when required.

4. Regarding sub-paragraph (c), I note that in your letter, you state that it is the intention to remuster surpluses into corps where deficiencies exist. As you point out, the largest of these deficiencies is in infantry, and in the light of proposed operations, this deficiency is most serious.

*Compare with the situation existing in April 1943 when it had been decided to start reallocation with the R.C.A.S.C. in view of its greater surplus of personnel to requirements (see para 254).
Considering the rigorous training which remustered personnel must undergo before they will be fit to take the field as reinforcements, I sincerely hope that everything possible will be done to expedite this remustering and re-training process (77).

295. General Stuart was again in hospital and not until 24 Mar was he able to despatch the following reply to General Montgomery:

I would point out that the condition you refer to is in active process of being rectified. The status of 602 units is under constant review and action is being taken regarding absorption of surpluses to assist in meeting deficiencies. Every effort will be made by this means and by direct shipment of reinforcements from Canada to make good deficiencies in the infantry arm by target date (78).

296. A telegram to Ottawa of Saturday 25 Mar suggested, however, that even after the current reinforcement draft arrived from Canada there would still be a shortage of 5,000 infantrymen:

Army Gp now estimate that casualties in Inf during initial phases will be higher than usual intense wastage rates and this has been brought out in the operations to date in Italy. Consider therefore that we must have available our full rft pool of gen duty Inf when action starts.

As far as possible propose to endeavour adjust by remustering general duty CAC and Arty of which we have a surplus but this will involve time due to conversion courses.

Observe your future despatches include 1750 CAC 820 R.C.A. and 800 Engrs. Request that where these are not... tradesmen being despatched to fill vacancies... [as requested] they be replaced and gen duty Inf other ranks sent instead (79).

297. Therefore, while awaiting a reply, authority was issued by the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q. on 28 Mar for 2000 general duty personnel (1000 R.C.A., 500 R.C.E. and 500 C.A.C.) to be remustered to Infantry and despatched to Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units for training (80).

298. Due to the delayed appointment of an Army Commander and the imminence of the long-awaited invasion of North-West Europe there already were a number of high level questions awaiting answers and the receipt of this telegram over the week and merely created more speculation in Ottawa. In his reply of Tuesday, 28 Mar the Adjutant-General expressed himself as being "very disturbed" and added that Mr. G.S. Currie (Deputy Minister) and Brigadier J.A. deLalanne (D.A.G. (A)) were leaving that day by air for London (81). The C.M.H.Q. proposal for remustering was accepted and it was suggested that the portion of the 1750 C.A.C., 820 R.C.A. and 800 R.C.E. personnel which would have to be sent forward due to the inability to replace them by general duty Infantrymen at this late date should be remustered also. Continuing, the telegram stated:
... Appreciate difficulties of remustering overseas but if pool to be at full strength when action starts this method appears to offer quickest means all circumstances considered.

Although I appreciate the prudence of proposal that pool should contain the full 3 months intense when continental action starts it must be pointed out that plans for reinforcing as agreed G.S. 1205* made no such provision.

The first intimation that casualties in infantry during initial phases would be higher than intense rates was conveyed in para eleven of C.M.H.Q. letter 1/WASTAGE/2 (SD 1) dated 22 Feb 44 and received here 1 March.*

In my memorandum to Senior Officer dated 18 Oct 43 I asked quote are the present War Office casualty rates considered satisfactory for estimating future battle casualties or has recent experience indicated that these should be revised unquote. His reply was as follows fyle 1/MANPOWER/2 (ADAQ (A)) dated 17 Nov 43 quote This question has been checked with the War Office who have found the accuracy of the rates has been borne out most satisfactorily during recent operations in the Mediterranean. In a graph checking the casualties incurred against those estimated it is found that actual casualties exceeded the average estimated during the period of Sicilian operations, subsequently dropped off during the period prior to the Italian operation, then approached the estimated rate, exceeded it for a short period during the Salerno operation, and now is running close to the estimated rate. Analyzed by arms at the War Office, their rates have proved very accurate in most cases. In artillery casualties were lighter than expected also in arm corps. One result has been to lower the rate on AA arty. It is proposed to investigate Canadian experience of casualty rates at 1 Jan 44 to see whether any discrepancy arises in our experience. unquote.

We are making every effort to speed up output from infantry training stream and in view of indicated higher rates of wastage will continue to make allocations to infantry but it is vitally important for future planning that we be given latest rates of anticipated wastage at earliest possible moment (82).

299.

By this time General Stuart had turned over command of First Canadian Army to General Crerar and was able to give closer attention to his duties as Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., and endeavour to improve its co-ordination functions with N.D.H.Q. In other words, he hoped to introduce the Ottawa viewpoint to Officers who had been overseas long enough to get somewhat out of touch with the Canadian scene. A telegram of

*This refers to the telegram Generals Letson and Murchie despatched to the Minister of National Defence and C.G.S. on 3 Dec 43 estimating the overseas requirement for 1944 as 4,000 reinforcements per month rather than 5,000. This proposal had been accepted by General Stuart (see paras 271-4).

**See paras 287-9.
1 Apr'to General Murchie (V.C.G.S.) in Ottawa explained his views:

I must point out that there are two sides to this question. At CMHQ we are merely an advanced element of NDHQ. In the past CMHQ has not understood and has not been sufficiently sympathetic to the broad problems and repercussions other than military that face NDHQ. CMHQ has concentrated on a presentation of the administrative military problems confronting the CAO. In some cases this presentation has been unnecessarily alarming. NDHQ, on the other hand has I think tended to emphasize the broader aspects of the problem at issue. Both of these are perfectly natural developments and both are perhaps aggravated by the fact that the two parts of NDHQ are 3000 miles apart. The problem is not only to reconcile the figures involved but of greater importance to reconcile the two points of view. Representatives from NDHQ are now here and are engaged in the process of attempting to broaden the viewpoint of CMHQ in order to bring it as close as possible to that of NDHQ. I am confident of success at this end provided there is some give and take at both ends. CMHQ has at times been unnecessarily alarming in its presentation of alleged facts and I suggest that NDHQ has perhaps been unnecessarily violent in its unexpressed but implied reactions (83).

30C. About the manpower discussions held at C.M.H.Q. during early April Brigadier deLalanne later wrote:

Throughout my conversations I was cognizant of an attitude of not wishing to commit too much to writing—with which I was quite satisfied, provided we could agree verbally, but explained that I could not possibly make any intelligent report without having some general idea of what was expected of us. Further conversations brought out the point that while lack of definite information and question of Security were contributing factors—the most pertinent reason for hesitation to commit figures and facts to paper seems to be the feeling that they can only be estimates and hence would only open the door for criticism or blame later if they turned out in actual experience later to be far off the mark. I have tried to impress upon all concerned that naturally we consider all projections as estimates and fully appreciate all the contingencies, but pointed out that if C.M.H.Q. do not furnish the data on which to plan for the future—N.D.H.Q. must do so on less complete information (84).

30L. Before he left for overseas the Adjutant-General Brigadier deLalanne (on 26 Mar) to:

... explore the possibility of now getting into effect the plan which was suggested by General Stuart almost a year ago, namely, that we should take some of the battalions now composed largely of N.R.M.A. personnel, ship them Overseas as a unit, and use them as battalions in reserve, or as reinforcement battalions. It would, of course, be necessary to tell them that they
eventually would be broken up but that an effort would be made at least to keep platoons together.

Let me have C. of S. reactions to this, as it is certainly one way in which we might get a lot of N.R.M.A. to go active (85).

This was followed by a telegram to General Stuart suggesting that a large proportion of the N.R.M.A. personnel of the four infantry battalions of the 13th Brigade, recently returned from Kiska, might volunteer for overseas service if they could be despatched from Canada in formed units. It was pointed out that "these units composed of well trained and seasoned soldiers would be most acceptable as immediate additions to Inf pool" (86). The following day, 29 Mar, General Stuart signalled his acceptance, on the same basis as the previous year (see para 249), adding that he would like the brigade headquarters as well (87).

302. The whole question of despatching these and additional formed units also to be used as reinforcements was discussed in Ottawa on Sunday 16 Apr, during the course of a conference on recruiting attended by all D.Os.C. and G.Os.C. A telegram despatched to General Stuart following the meeting included the following:

"... It is realized that trained NRMA soldiers in units represent quick rft asset. Desire on part of all ranks in units to remain together makes it difficult to obtain individual volunteers for service overseas so long as unit remains in Canada. Considered opinion of all D.Os.C is that large groups of NRMA personnel would volunteer for overseas service if permitted to go as units. This applies particularly to French speaking units. Generals Renaud and LeClerc and Brig Blais have given assurance that substantial number French speaking volunteers can be made available if this course permitted and that this is only possible immediate method of tapping that source of reinforcements..." (88).

303. Brigadier Penhale (D.O.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) urged acceptance, since it was important to obtain French-speaking reinforcements at once (see paras 442-4). While it would be difficult to absorb Officers and N.C.Os. and it would be more convenient to break up units immediately on arrival, there was the question of "maintaining faith" with these recent converts to general service. However, these units could be placed in additional camps, administered by their own officers, and exist as "draft finding" units for C.R.U. Carried to a "logical conclusion" such units, including those already accepted with the 15th Brigade, would constitute the nucleus of a collective training organization and C.R.U. at last could become merely a holding organization for preparing overseas drafts (89). The telegram of acceptance despatched to Ottawa on 18 Apr expressed the hope that some French-speaking units might be despatched before the latter part of May and that all officers and other ranks should be of an age and category for service in an operational theatre (90).

304. An earlier meeting at C.M.H.Q. on 14 Apr had produced the admission that one month's reinforcements were tied up in G.S.D. 602 units. Another month's reinforcements were attached to all units of First Canadian Army. Brigadier deLalanne pointed out that during the early days of Operation "OVERLORD" it would be hard to meet all demands from the Canadian
component of the 21st Army Group (91). Existing forecasts, taking no credit for recoveries from the "X" List, indicated a shortage of 6282 general duty Infantrymen; thus there really was a reserve equal to only 1.9 months wastage at "intense" rates, instead of three months. In his telegram to Ottawa reporting the meeting Brigadier deLalanne had stated:

Forecast of position by Arm and Service at end of each month to 31 December 1944 has now been made based as a first trial on shipment of Rfts by Arms in proportion to average monthly wastage. Forecast deals with bodies only that is it does not deal with individual trades. On this basis it shows satisfactory overall picture in all major corps other than Inf Meds and Army Service. Not practicable to subdivide Arty by type in forecast overall. situation satisfactory and Arty Survey only type likely to show deficiencies.

Forecast made is being reviewed by officers here and when agreement reached will discuss extent to which shipping must be adjusted to correct situation revealed. Possibility of remusterings will be taken into account.

Will then be able to advise you of required shipments by Arm to end December subject of course to review in light of actual casualties and possibility of change in composition of forces....

... Forecast indicates Inf OR position as at 29 February 1944 will remain more or less unchanged to end May. After that reserve in hand will drop to low point of 0.8 months intense wastage at end September and then increase to 1.9 months at end December. Recoverable casualties still in hospital will be in addition to these numbers. To extent adjustments of remusterings mentioned above are carried out reserves in hand will be increased (92).

305. In order to care adequately for the continuing accommodation and maintenance problems facing C.M.H.Q. and to avoid sending home low category personnel who could be usefully employed in the United Kingdom as guards, artisans and pioneers, Mr Currie and General Stuart reached an understanding on 15 Apr that an addition of 2100 men should be added, provisionally, to the 'manpower ceiling' and that three Construction Companies might be retained on a temporary GSD 602 basis (93).

306. When it came time for the Deputy Minister to return to Canada Brigadier deLalanne, who was remaining behind to obtain the latest information on the reinforcement problem, furnished him with a memorandum (dated 18 Apr) outlining the progress made. Brigadier deLalanne believed that the detachment of 1st Canadian Corps from First Canadian Army had worried and confused the Officers dealing with the manpower overseas (94). With the approach of a "target date" after years of waiting they were concentrating their attention on the immediate problem of how many men would be on the spot ready to fight, and were ignoring such long term considerations as the return of "recoverable casualties" to action during the closing stages of the campaign, Brigadier deLalanne noted that:

While we have never anticipated that Rft Pools will at all times be at full strengths—Arm by
Arm and Trade by Trade—there seems to have been a growing tendency Overseas during the last few months, as indicated in cables and letters, to a feeling that Reserves presently available are insufficient to meet likely losses in future operations.

This feeling is, no doubt, due, in large part to the fact that, in round numbers, one month's reinforcements are employed in GSD 602 units or attached elsewhere for employment, instead of actually being at the Reinforcement Units. Representatives of Corps seem either to ignore the fact that such personnel are intended to be equally as available, if required, as if they were at Reinforcement Units, or to be dubious of their actual availability (95).

He also emphasized that statistics being compiled at both C.M.H.Q. and N.D.H.Q. ignored "normal wastage", for which allowance would have to be made.

307. The high rate of illness in the Italian theatre of operations also had depleted the pool temporarily although such convalescence would be more rapid than that from wounds. Again, there had been a continual increase in the percentage of tradesmen within the Canadian Army Overseas, with the result that the present breakdown was:

| Tradesmen | 41.3 per cent |
| Specialists | 21.3 per cent |
| General Duty | 37.4 per cent |

100.0 per cent

Casualties would not be heavy among tradesmen, but, since many of them belonged in the older age group, normal wastage would be higher than among general duty soldiers. Other points emphasized in the memorandum were:

Present output from the training stream in Canada is insufficient to meet our commitments for Overseas. Hence considerable portion of Drafts must consist of withdrawals from Army in Canada. The latter are not always in the arm, trade or specialty required and hence re-training and sometimes re-allocation is necessary.

Intake into the Army has been falling off during recent months. Many who offer themselves for enlistment are rejected by reason of the fact that they cannot make the rigid standards that have been set.

C.M.H.Q. advise that they have practically "scraped bottom" in finding suitable personnel for training in any of the trades (incl. the newly created ones) in which there are still deficiencies. In this connection there seems to be a very mistaken view that we have an unlimited number of highly skilled or potential tradesmen in Canada or that they can easily be obtained from Industry—for the asking (96).

308. Brigadier deLalanne specified four problems as requiring action. First, the G.S.D. 602 units should either be disbanded or included within the authorized composition of the
Army. In round numbers the 'manpower ceiling' provided for 184,000 men in units and 42,000 reserves: in other words, one man in reserve for every 4 1/3 men in units (not counting the three per cent allowance for non-effectives). This ratio was upset by maintaining close to 15,000 men in G.S.D. 602 units. Secondly, a shipping programme should be adopted which, in conjunction with the remustering being carried on overseas, would even out the reserves as between corps. Thirdly, he considered that the shortage of French-speaking infantrymen might be overcome by the despatch overseas of Le Régiment de Hull of the 15th Brigade (see paras 329-337). Finally, there was the question of tradesmen but this was not a matter of grave concern. Most units' war establishments provided a more than adequate scale of tradesmen and units could function efficiently with fewer than the number authorized (see para 256). After all, the real need was fighting men. Naturally, he was not in a position to express an opinion upon the adequacy of the existing scales of activity and rates wastage but he was worried by a related point:

I am, however, concerned as to whether the rates of recovery used by the British and adopted by us are entirely applicable to our situation. It has been assumed up to date that 50% of our Gross Casualties will be recovered for service with the Canadian Army in the European Theatre, i.e. including static units in U.K. I have asked that inquiry be made as to whether the British include in the recoverable portion all those who would normally be re-employed (a) within their active theatres or, (b) within these and the U.K. From the reply received, it appears that the latter is the case and we are therefore, in all probability, counting on too high a rate of recovery for service overseas in view of the relatively small number of Canadian static units in U.K. as compared with British training and servicing establishments.

On the other hand, we do not take credit in our projection for any recoveries until six months after they have become casualties, although some recoveries may be expected earlier. Further, the despatch of 4,000 reinforcements per month represents provision of 64 1/2 of average gross casualties as against the 50% of gross casualties which have been assumed to be dead wastage in so far as future employment in the European Theatre is concerned (97).

Not until the beginning of June was this point clarified, and even then "formal confirmation" could not be obtained from the War Office. A telegram despatched to N.D.H.Q. on 3 Jun stated that the War Office had adopted the assumption that of the 50 per cent recoverable casualties one quarter would return in the fourth month, one half in the fifth and the balance in the sixth month. Although recoverable within six months for further military service this did not imply that all could return to operational duties (see para 155). It was considered at C.M.H.Q. that the 55 per cent "recoverable for operational employment" suggested by Brigadier deLalanne was as large a proportion as it might be possible to expect (98).

General Stuart took advantage of the Deputy Minister's return to Canada to send a memorandum to Mr Ralston, outlining the difficulties being encountered with the existing system of computing the 'manpower ceiling' (99). Originally the
system had been sound (when General Stuart was in Ottawa) and had allowed General McNaughton sufficient leeway to build an Army within clearly defined limits. Now, however, it was becoming too difficult to estimate accurately the number of men who would be passing through Reallocation Centres and the varying number of replacements who would be required to maintain the fighting formations at full strength during the coming months. General Stuart considered, therefore, that the 'manpower ceiling' should be revised so as to include only the war establishments of units serving with 21 Army Group, in Italy and under the command of C.M.H.Q. It had now become obvious that insufficient resources had been allowed for the maintenance services which would have to be performed by C.M.H.Q. troops after First Canadian Army left the United Kingdom (see paras 170 and 305). In other words, it would not be possible to do away with all the work being done by G.S.D. 602 units. Therefore Mr Currie's acquiescence had been obtained for an increase of 2,100 men to the 'manpower ceiling'. Moreover, with a more extensive use of members of the C.W.A.C. as replacements for men General Stuart no longer believed that they should be counted against the 'manpower ceiling' (see para 181). Since they were, however, he suggested that the ceiling might be raised another 2,000 to offset their employment. These proposals, he stressed, were "an adjustment only and do not mean one additional man being sent to the U.K. from Canada".

311. These views were expanded by Brigadier Penhale in a memorandum of 8 May for Brigadier de Langle to take back to the Adjutant-General: only the Field Force, C.M.H.Q. and static units in the United Kingdom, miscellaneous units related to the administration of the Field Force and units formed to meet some temporary requirement (hitherto known as G.S.D. 602 units) should be counted against the 'manpower ceiling' while personnel in the reinforcement stream or returning from the field for disposal should not be so counted (100). Certain details had to be worked out, however, before General Stuart would be ready to make an official submission for such changes (101).

(iv) The Home Front, 1944

312. Unlike previous years there was no point in setting forth a definite Canadian Army Programme for 1944. Part of the Army was engaged in Italy and the remainder was preparing for the long awaited invasion of North-West Europe. Therefore, Mr Ralston's speech to the House of Commons on Friday, 11 Feb 44 was more a description of what Canadian troops were doing in Italy, based on observations made during his visit, and what they planned to do in North-West Europe, plus an explanation of the "McNaughton incident" which had raised quite a furor in the press. Speaking again on 14 Feb (Monday) Mr Ralston discussed the N.R.M.A. situation, the administrative 'tails' overseas and the reinforcement situation, which he considered to be satisfactory (see para 275). He hoped to have 60,000 men suitable for overseas service in the reinforcement training stream by the end of March and to send them overseas at the agreed rate of 4,000 per month. This would, Mr Ralston pointed out:

... deplete the number in the training stream. Therefore, to safeguard the future, we are budgeting for an intake of 40,000 general service plus 2,000 N.R.M.A. personnel to release general service personnel, or a total of 62,000 from the total Canadian manpower pool for 1944-45. If we achieved this intake of an average of 4,000 general service men per month it would see
us at the end of the fiscal year with reinforcement pool overseas maintained at adequate strength, and it would see us with sufficient men in training centres to fight on during 1945.

In the last three months our intake of general service men averaged a little over 3700. For January it was almost 4000. What the future will be I do not know, but certainly efforts will be steadily put forth to maintain this January rate. If recruiting should materially fall off it will begin to affect the numbers dispatched overseas in the later months of the fiscal year 1944-45 and should find us at the end of March, 1945 with the pool maintained overseas, but with the number of general service men reduced approximately by the amount of deficiency in that intake. As a further backlog we have in Canada well over 60,000 N.R.M.A. personnel, of which number perhaps 50,000 could be made available for overseas service if emergency arose and necessary action were taken (102).

313. Mr Ralston's letter of 6 Mar to the Minister of Labour was not quite so optimistic in tone. Although the Army programme for the fiscal year 1943-44 had called for the enlistment or enrolment of 8,500 per month nothing like that number had been obtained. The deficiency had grown larger as the year had progressed and only a drastic curtailment of home defences had made it possible to meet overseas commitments. The decline in peak industrial employment, started late in 1943, was gaining momentum but a considerable number of older men and women—the less efficient workers—were being laid off first and the real problem was to determine a method whereby physically fit young men could be made surplus to continuing employment and available for military service. Despite Mr MacNamara's (Deputy Minister of Labour and Director of National Selective Service) promise that sufficient men would be called to provide 5,000 recruits per month the Department of National Defence considered that a more definite commitment was necessary for the fiscal year 1944-5. Thus Mr Ralston's letter went on to point out:

When this was agreed on, I emphasized that we would want this number of 8,500 kept up but, as I have had to point out since then, there has been a very substantial deficiency. In fact we obtained only 75,000 instead of the 102,000 (8,500 per month for 12 months) which were called for in the earlier part of the year. I, on several occasions, pointed out this deficiency and asked for improvement. Increased numbers were not forthcoming but because of the fact that the intense activity which had been forecasted did not take place; and also due to the fact that it was possible to reduce the establishment of the Army in Canada I did not make an immediate issue of the matter.

This year our requirements, as we estimate them, will be 5,000 per month, making a total of 60,000 for the fiscal year 1944-45. I have been somewhat undecided as to whether to keep on requisitioning 8,500 per month with the idea that you would call up a larger number and thus be certain to get the 5,000 per month; or whether I should requisition the 5,000 per month, with an intimation that this is the minimum which we
must have and leave it to you to decide how many should be called up in order to fill that requisition.

I have decided for the present to requisition the net number of 5,000 per month. In doing this I want to point out that, with the prospect of all our forces overseas being engaged at an early date, it is most essential that our requirements of that number be met in full each month, in order to ensure that the activities of the Army are fully sustained.

This means that you will have full responsibility for deciding how many are to be called up in order to meet these monthly requisitions in full; I understand the matter has been talked over between Brigadier Nash and Mr. MacNamara, and that Brigadier Nash is assured that the cutting down of the requisition from 8,500 to 5,000 per month will in no way curtail your call-ups, but that the call-ups will be of sufficient number to make full allowance for all contingencies and give us a net of 5,000 enrolled and enlisted in the aggregate each month. I cannot impress upon you too strongly the necessity for this objective being attained each month, and I count on you to do everything to achieve that (103).

In his reply of 15 Mar Mr Mitchell admitted this failure but gave the following excuse:

During the last six months the Army, Navy and Air Force have obtained 65,021 men. During this period to obtain the foregoing result National Selective Service has sent Orders-Medical to 184,971 men. During this period the Army obtained 34,040 men. To attain 5,667 men per month for the Army we had to call 184,971 men (104).

In order to meet the 1944-5 requirements of 98,000 for the three Armed Forces it would be necessary to find approximately 8200 men per month and Mr Mitchell did not know how that could be done. Apart from the boys who would reach the age of 18 1/2 during the year it would be necessary to draw on men working in war and essential civilian industries, married men in Quebec who had not been called (because Reception Centres were not able to handle them) and delinquents produced by the checking system used by National Selective Service (see Appendix "E") Mr Mitchell added that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain certain essential civilian services, among which he listed the processing of cattle in meat packing plants, milling flour for British contract, lumbering, base metal mining and farming. He maintained that National Selective Service was doing a good job but that he was "not in a position to give you the unqualified assurance asked for in the last paragraph of your letter" (106).

*The D.G.M.S. office maintained that the major problem was providing sufficient French-speaking medical personnel. Whenever civilian doctors had been engaged there had been a tendency for the rejection rate to rise. It was hoped to increase the number passing through the Army Reception Centre for M.D. No. 5 from 3500 to 4000 per month (105).
Mr Ralston was annoyed by this answer and replied on 1 Apr as follows:

You say that "No stone has been left unturned to meet the demand". I, of course, have to accept that, but can I suggest that there are some stones that, while they may have been turned, have, perhaps, not been turned all the way over, under which there will be found quite a number of prospective recruits.

If the ratio of wastage, above mentioned, has to be accepted and cannot be reduced, then it follows logically that more men will have to be called to obtain the number required. (This is a proposition of mine with which you are familiar, and which I think still holds good.) This brings up the question of where these men are to be found.

First of all it seems to me that the number of defaulters is strikingly large. In the return you tabled in the House on March 27th, it was indicated that of 453,458 men who had been ordered for Military Training, only 220,765 had reported. The difference (232,693) presumably contains a large number of defaulters. I am informed that the figure some months ago was 125,000 but it may have been reduced or increased during the intervening months. This, I respectfully suggest, calls for even more aggressive measures of enforcement.

Secondly, postponements could now, I should think, be very materially decreased due to the change-over in Industry from production on capital account to production for replacements, which would result in a reduction in employment rolls.

It also seems that more stress might be placed on the opportunities in the Army to men who are being laid off from employment in industry. At the present time, when men are going out for a job, the burden is on your Department to find employment for them, and the reference is nearly always employment in some other industry. I suggest that those fit could profitably be required to consider, as prospective employment, a job in the Army.

There are still those in the designated classes who have not yet been called at all. Apparently the bulk of these are married men in the Province of Quebec. My information is that the Registrars in Montreal and Quebec have refrained from calling these men because the Boards automatically grant them postponements on compassionate grounds, for the reason that there are still some single men not called. You will probably have some information on this.

Finally, there are those who reach the age of 18 1/2 this coming year. On your own figures, these numbers gross 108,000 a year. You estimate a yield from this source of about 48,000. My information is that the yield in U.S. from 18 1/2 year olds is 60 to 65% after deducting hardship.
cases, students, etc. I would suggest therefore that a yield figure of 60,000 or 55% of that part of the manpower pool would be a conservative estimate (107).

He suggested that at least 50,000 of those called had never reported and estimated that there should still be 459,702 men available for call, or 38,510 per month. He admitted that medical rejections did exceed acceptances but, except for Quebec, by only very small margins. The tremendous backlog in Quebec had been created as a result of "abnormal rejections" by civilian practitioners and the consequent number of revision medical examinations made necessary. It was, however, the National Selective Revision Boards (partially staffed by the R.C.A.M.C.) and not the Army Medical Boards which had been unable to handle this backlog. The Army was taking steps to expand its examining facilities. In conclusion he called for a more strenuous effort:

With regard to the point about manpower generally, I have comparative figures for U.K., U.S. and Canada. The percentage of population in the Armed Forces in Canada does not, to say the least, exceed in any particular the percentage in the U.K. and U.S. As a matter of fact, according to these figures, the U.S. percentages are somewhat higher even under current conditions and will be higher yet with their projected programme.

Impending events force me to stress once more the vital necessity of providing the Army requirements in full. If you feel that in the light of the above observations, you still feel yourself unable to give me the assurance of providing requirements for the current year in full, then I would request that the manpower question should be brought before the Manpower Committee in order to review policies and methods regarding manpower (109).

316. Mr. Mitchell's reply of 15 Apr denied most of these accusations (110). He claimed that there were only 14,077 men unaccounted for and that men in industry were not transferred to other civilian employment, when laid off, unless they had some special skill and were needed in a high priority industry.

*Recruiting procedures had been simplified by the establishment of Army Reception Centres (see para 199), but the following statistics, for the four week period ending 8 Apr 44, suggest that certain Divisional Registrars were not calling sufficient men to allow for medical rejections (108):
Apart from the 65,021 men accepted for the Armed Forces during the period 1 Sep 43-29 Feb 44, his Department showed the following disposition:

(a) Number of men found unfit by private physicians and Army doctors 83969
(b) Men excepted from Mobilization Regulations 8377
(c) Postponements granted 57332
(d) Not available, i.e. outside Canada, dead, in jail, etc. 9709
(e) Presumed delinquent cases created 58626

**GRAND TOTAL** 218013

(f) Delinquents located 86222

**Net TOTAL** 131791

A certain number of the 18 1/2 year old youths already had been enlisted into the R.C.A.F. and about half of those physically fit would become airmen. It had been estimated that about 38 per cent of this age class would be found to be medically unfit and a further 13 per cent would be granted postponement as agricultural workers and students.

317. Mr Mitchell blamed the situation in Quebec on poor management in the early days. Although the population was almost as large as that of Ontario there were only two Mobilization Boards against the latter's four. Latterly National Selective Service had been requisitioning more men than the R.C.A.M.C. could cope with: i.e. more than 700 per day in Montreal. Once again he suggested forming labour battalions; in addition to N.R.M.A. personnel, uniformed conscientious objectors, non-declarant aliens (see Appendix "B") and Japanese and Chinese could thus be employed on essential civilian work. In this way there would be no question of taking citizens out of industry and allowing aliens to remain. In conclusion, however, he assured Mr Ralston that "not only is the Labour Department doing its best but that everything within the bounds of possibility is being done" (111).

318. Although he refused to accept the Department of Labour argument that army organization in the province of Quebec was at fault, Mr Ralston seems to have been satisfied with Mr Mitchell's promise to provide the necessary men. The proposal to form labour battalions was another matter, however, and Mr Ralston's letter of 30 Apr reminded the Minister of Labour that:

... this possibility has been considered fully on several occasions. As I stated in the House, the H.D. personnel in Canada who are of suitable age and category are potential reinforcements should the need arise and the necessary action be taken. As such they must be kept in constant training. Our experience with the Forestry and Railway troops and Port Batallions has demonstrated the difficulties encountered with respect to labour relations, wages, hours and conditions of work. I mention these points, not with any desire to withhold co-operation, but as an illustration of the administrative difficulties which would be faced with this whole matter of labour battalions.... (112).
319. It might be mentioned that a more adequate utilization of the men being recruited, and those already in the Army, followed the action taken to reduce still further the Training Centre organization. Moreover, the decision to increase the allocation of G.S. recruits to Infantry from 50 to 68 per cent (at the expense of Armoured Corps and Artillery) had made it necessary to alter the Link Training Plan system introduced only during August 1943 (see para 248). On 30 Mar General Murchie sent his proposals to the Minister of National Defence; for the next few months the training intake should consist of 7000 (4000 G.S. recruits, 2000 G.S. withdrawals from units in Canada and 1000 N.R.M.A. enrolments) which would produce 4000 G.S. trained reinforcements for despatch overseas and sufficient G.S. personnel with lowered medical category and N.R.M.A. soldiers to provide for the needs of home defence and the Home War Establishment (113). After minor details had been ironed out the Minister of National Defence gave his approval (114). Over the next few months five Basic Training Centres and one Advanced Training Centre were closed and the capacity of a further six Basic and three Advanced Training Centres was reduced (115). The capacity of the Officers' Training Centre (Brockville) already had been drastically reduced. All of this resulted in a considerable saving in administrative and training personnel.

320. Actual intake, by enlistment and enrolment, for the first three months of 1944 was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voluntary Enlistments</th>
<th>Conversion from N.R.M.A.</th>
<th>N.R.M.A. Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>3804</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>2145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3015</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>1858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the week ending 1 Apr the Directorate of Army Recruiting estimated that voluntary male enlistments had decreased about 59 per cent from the same period in 1934 (116). The Adjutant-General already had decided that in order to maintain the required flow of reinforcements overseas, further withdrawals would have to be made from Atlantic and Pacific Commands in the numbers in which replacements (N.R.M.A. and low category G.S. soldiers) could be made available (117). Following a conference with the several D.Os.C. and G.Os.C. at Ottawa (11-15 Apr) he gave his approval for a "gloves off" recruiting campaign which would include a distinct effort to persuade N.R.M.A. soldiers to "go active" (118). Preparations got under way at once, even though the Army Commander had refused to provide a message to give weight to his campaign and had pointed out:

Firstly, it is not my opinion that the majority of the personnel forming the Canadian Army Overseas would support the view expressed.... Indeed if a vote were taken a reverse opinion might well be the majority's decision.

Secondly, the matter of a voluntary vs a conscripted Canadian Army has become a political issue in Canada. Whatever my personal views might be it is highly undesirable that the expression of them at this juncture and having regard to my position as Commander in Chief should become a matter for acrimonious debate at home or within the Canadian Army Overseas (119).
Although it had been common knowledge for some time* not until 10 Apr was it disclosed publicly, by the Minister of Labour during a press conference, that the N.R.M.A. call-up machinery was inducing men to volunteer for "general service". According to The Ottawa Journal of that date:

"The call-up serves a double purpose," said Mr MacNamara. "When a man knows he is going to be called he usually tries to enlist in the Navy or Air Force. If he isn't taken by them he is available to the Army, if fit to meet medical requirements."

With the needs for home defence further reduced it was obvious that more vigorous attempts should be made to convince the N.R.M.A. members of the Canadian Army to volunteer for overseas service. That recruiting propaganda was being directed at these different groups was evident as the campaign proceeded, particularly from outbursts such as General Pearkes was reported to have made in British Columbia. One such was reported on 24 Apr 44 as follows:

"No man should wear 'that khaki uniform' unless he is willing to wear it anywhere", Major-General Pearkes, general officer commanding-in-chief of Pacific Command, said in an address here Saturday to a group of Pacific coast rangers.

"Many young soldiers are quite satisfied to say they are doing their duty by defending this coast," General Pearkes said. "That is not 100 per cent service."

"The appeal has gone out to every soldier to volunteer heart and soul to support his comrades who now are ready to launch the invasion." (121)

On the other hand, four days later (26 Apr) the Quebec Provincial legislative assembly approved the following resolution by a vote of 55 to 4:

... that this House reaffirms its unyielding disapproval of sending recruits overseas, following a recent speech by the Minister of National Defence, Mr Ralston, who declared that if it becomes necessary it could be done by taking appropriate measures" (122).

On 8 Jun The Ottawa Journal reported the previous night's radio address of Brigadier James Mess (D.A.C. (C) in charge of the recruiting campaign) as follows:

I want to appeal to several classes of young men in Canada who are still waiting—God knows what for. They are to be found in industry. They are pretending that their conscience is clear because they prefer to consider themselves as indispensable. They have been deferred for this or that reason, or are hiding away in the

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*A study of 30 Nov 43 had indicated that of 196,681 G.S. personnel 38 per cent had enlisted entirely of their own volition: eight per cent had volunteered between the time of receiving an Order-Medical Examination and that examination, 10 per cent following medical categorization, 19 per cent before reporting to a Training Centre, while the remaining nine per cent was indeterminate (120).
bush and making themselves scarce.

I challenge each and every one of those men to stand before a mirror, look at himself and put the questions, 'Is my conscience clear?' 'Am I really indispensable?' 'Should I not take my proper place at the side of my brother Canadians and let some older man, some woman, do this job that may not, after all, be very intricate or very important?' 'What shall I answer when this war is over when I am asked where did I serve?' 'What shall I say—I didn't have to go, I wasn't needed, I was indispensable behind a plow or in a factory?'

... You are a man and you cannot hide behind a petticoat, whether it be your wife's or your mother's....

... Your decision to get into the King's uniform for general service to become trained, skilled and tough, is yours to make in this hour of dire emergency.

325. Mention already has been made of the further withdrawals ordered from Pacific and Atlantic Commands (see para 320). As early as 2 Feb the Adjutant-General had instructed that all G.S. personnel, up to and including the rank of corporal, should be withdrawn from Pacific Command (it was believed that there should be upwards of 1200 in the 6th Division alone) and placed in the reinforcement stream for service overseas (123). Actual survey disclosed that 1764 men (including 780 tradesmen and 114 specialists) actually were available but, in his reply of 7 Feb, General Pearkes pointed out that if these soldiers were withdrawn all at once:

... the operational efficiency of the units will be adversely affected in a manner out of all proportion to the numbers withdrawn because nearly all the individuals concerned fill key positions such as signallers and other specialists, tradesmen and junior N.C.Os. (124).

326. Since such a step would be tampering with the operational efficiency of the 6th Division the question was placed before the Minister of National Defence on 21 Mar (125). The C.G.S. pointed out that this division's role, as defined on 31 Aug 43, was:

(a) As a trained force for any future commitments which may be undertaken in the Pacific Theatre of operations.

(b) As a potential source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas.

(c) To meet any unexpected deterioration in the situation (126).

General Pearkes had been informed that the three roles had equal importance. Continuing, however, General Murchie wrote:

The 6th Division is composed largely of N.R.M.A. personnel and if a decision is eventually reached to employ such personnel on service outside of Canada, it seems logical that they should be used in the theatre where our main effort is
being made, and it is unlikely that they will be employed in a subsidiary theatre so long as the main effort still requires a continuous flow of reinforcements. On that basis the early employment of a Brigade Group or Groups of 6th Division, in offensive operations outside of Canada, appears unlikely and the withdrawal of the remaining General Service personnel in these units may be accepted.

On the understanding, therefore, that the deterioration in morale can be accepted and that we will not be called upon for commitments in the Pacific theatre until suitable replacements have been made available and trained, I am prepared to concur in the Adjutant-General's recommendation that this personnel be withdrawn and recommend accordingly.

Mr Ralston gave his approval, provided that N.R.M.A. soldiers were trained as replacements (127).

327. Similarly, it was planned to withdraw 3000 G.S. soldiers from units and establishments in Atlantic Command (1400 by 22 Apr and 1600 by 7 May) (128). (During late April the United States War Department agreed to the Canadian garrison of Newfoundland being reduced by a further infantry battalion (129).

328. Modification had followed almost at once. The C.M.H.G. agreement of 29 Mar to accept the 13th Brigade as a formation, introduced another phase in the campaign to obtain trained volunteers for overseas service (see para 301). The Adjutant-General proceeded to Pacific Command at once to ascertain whether sufficient N.R.M.A. soldiers would volunteer (since the idea had been discussed only with General Pearkes and not with unit commanders). On 31 Mar the Adjutant-General telegraphed General Murchie to the effect that all G.S. personnel in the 6th Division should be posted to this brigade, rather than proceed overseas on individual drafts (130). Agreement was despatched the following day (131).

329. Steps were taken at once to encourage N.R.M.A. personnel to volunteer for "general service". If this should prove successful it was planned to extend the offer to other home defence units. As the case for conversion was supposed to stand or fall on the attitude taken by members of the 13th Brigade, however, several paragraphs are devoted to this story. They are based on a lengthy report of 2 May submitted by Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, then commanding the 13th Brigade, to General Pearkes.

330. Brigadier Macklin wrote that when he had visited the 13th Brigade at Kiska in Mid-December 1943 it had appeared to be "a well trained Bde Gp with high morale, and the men were in fine physical condition and excellent health" (132). Complete staff changes had been made following their return to British Columbia. Leave had been granted to all ranks and a considerable number (eight per cent of Le Régiment de Hull) had failed to return. The lowering of morale was attributed to a deep-rooted belief among the men that they would never be sent to fight, and an "intense desire" to return to the factory or farm, instead of the more usual type of complaints about bad food, bad quarters, bad clothing and lack of amusements. The request for 140 'Canloan' officers strengthened this belief, and officers did not know whether to go or stay. The reinforcements eventually received had gained the same listless attitude as a result of sitting around District Depots or Training Centres.
One of the unit padres went so far as to claim that there was a complete absence of any spiritual or moral driving force among the men.

When the recruiting campaign got under way on 30 Mar the several commanding officers had seemed confident of obtaining sufficient voluntary enlistments to ensure success. In addition, "Active" personnel from the remaining units of the division were to be allotted to units of the 13th Brigade as follows: The Prince Edward Island Highlanders and The Royal Regiment of Canada (3rd Battalion) to The Rocky Mountain Rangers; The Oxford Rifles and The Prince of Wales Rangers to The Canadian Fusiliers, The Winnipeg Light Infantry and The Prince Albert Volunteers to The Winnipeg Grenadiers (3rd Battalion), and Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent and Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke to Le Régiment de Hull; those of the 31st (Alberta) Reconnaissance Regiment, R.C.A. and R.C.E. units would go to any of the four battalions as needed.

Brigadier Macklin noted that when he spoke to the men of The Canadian Fusiliers and The Rocky Mountain Rangers on 31 Mar he got a good reception from the few G.S. soldiers but:

On the other hand the response of the NRMA men, and of a large proportion of the NRMA NCOs was very disappointing. There was no great rush to enlist, and although officers at once began to interview their companies and platoons, by evening less than 100 men had volunteered from each of the two English-speaking battalions in Vernon. Figures received from the Winnipeg Grenadiers indicated about the same result.

In the Le Régiment de Hull matters were even worse. This unit had, to begin with, no more than a mere handful of active personnel, probably not more than a dozen among its other ranks. Practically all the NCOs, and even two acting CSMs, were NRMA men. These Warrant Officers and NCOs gave little or no support of any kind to their Commanding Officer, and not more than a handful of soldiers enlisted after the Commanding Officer's appeal (133).

The (Roman Catholic) Chaplain (H/Lt.-Col. A.J. Schimmowski) visited the Brigade on 4 Apr but had to confess that the resistance of the men was "amazingly strong" and that he had reduced more than one man to tears without persuading him to enlist for overseas service. Other Chaplains worked diligently but with little success. Major Paul Triquet, V.C., was sent to harangue Le Régiment de Hull on 11 Apr but persuaded only a couple of dozen men to enlist.

Enlistments continued at a rate of 10-15 per day in the English-speaking units while 40-50 vociferous obstructionists from each were sent away ("anti-recruiting influences") and placed in a camp by themselves; there they were subjected to a rigorous training schedule "but nothing resembling persecution". In Le Régiment de Hull two acting C.S.Ms. were sent back to depots in their permanent ranks and a number of N.C.Os. were reduced because they would not volunteer. (Brigadier Macklin)

*Although NRMA personnel could enlist for general service only as private soldiers, Routine Order 3631 of 18 Sep 43 provided that they could be given back their acting rank immediately (but not confirmed) at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.
considered that the practice of promoting N.R.M.A. soldiers to be N.C.O.s had been detrimental). With the arrival of drafts from other units of the 6th Canadian Division a number of men became convinced that the Brigade actually was going overseas and changed their minds about enlisting. When the special recruiting effort came to an end on 19 Apr the total active strength of the Brigade was 1973, made up as follows: Brigade Headquarters 37, Brigade Signals 77, Defence Platoon 24, The Canadian Fusiliers 471, The Rocky Mountain Rangers 579, The Winnipeg Grenadiers 484 and Le Régiment de Hull 295. On 1 Apr there had been only 370 G.S. soldiers in the Brigade: 676 had been induced to "go active" and 927 had been transferred from elsewhere. On 24 Apr a further 100 'bad actors' were transferred away. By 1 May some 800 members of the Brigade had enlisted and enough additional G.S. soldiers were transferred to raise the total "active" strength to 2452.

Apart from actual combat the 13th Brigade had experienced all the rigours of active service and no other formation in Canada stood as good a chance to "go active". The following paragraphs from Brigadier Macklin's Report are his considered reasons why this attempt met with such limited success:

... If there ever had been outward distinction between the volunteer and the N.R.M.A. soldier in these units it had long since disappeared. I had hoped that it would not re-appear but this hope was not fulfilled. The instant the announcement was made that 13 Infantry Brigade would mobilize on a volunteer basis the active personnel mentally ranged themselves in a body on one side and the N.R.M.A. ranged themselves on the other, and the gulf between them widened and deepened daily.

On the other hand we started with a cadre of officers and N.C.O.s, and a few men whose highest ambition was to get to grips with the enemy in the shortest possible time. The disappointment of this group at the obvious reluctance, not to say outright refusal, of the N.R.M.A. soldiers to enlist was intense. The feeling rapidly changed from disappointment to scorn, and even to anger, mingled with incredulity.

I feel sure that this feeling is strongest among the rank and file of the men themselves. It is not too much to say that the volunteer soldier in many cases literally despises the N.R.M.A. soldier. And it is an interesting psychological fact that when an N.R.M.A. man enlists he frequently changes his own attitude to his former comrades with startling and even amusing suddenness and completeness.

The volunteer feels himself a man quite apart from the N.R.M.A. man. He regards himself as a free man who had the courage to make a decision. He seldom takes the trouble to analyze the manifold reasons put forward by those who won't enlist. He lumps them all together as no more than feeble excuses masking cowardice, selfishness and bad citizenship. In many cases no doubt he is right. In others he may be wrong, but the fact remains that the antipathy between these two classes of soldiers starts right in the barrack room. The rift is there all the time.