

- (a) The requirements of the Cdn Army Overseas should be tabled with the War Office for inclusion in the British Supply programme. It would then be for the British authorities to co-ordinate with the Department of Munitions & Supply the items which should be made in Canada.
- (b) The Cdn Army Overseas should bid through L.M.A.B. for all its requirements including those manufactured in the North American area, and including those manufactured in Canada (possibly excepting vehicles) (324).

Furthermore, once First Canadian Army was committed to battle it would be forced to adopt more and more types of equipment that could be maintained through a single British supply channel. In view of the imminence of active operations there seemed little doubt that the Canadian Army henceforth would have a higher equipment priority and receive a better allocation through the London Munitions Assignment Board (325).

187. Moreover, in this last connection it should be noted that the strategical role envisaged for First Canadian Army had undergone considerable change. No longer could it be assumed that the Canadian Army might operate as a self-contained force. On 10 Jan 43 General McNaughton had informed his senior subordinates that First Canadian Army would have to be prepared to "contribute the maximum effect against the enemy whenever and wherever it was required" (326). The special Canadian establishments would have to be abandoned and the Army trained and organized so that it might take its place, in close co-operation with British formations, against the "belly of the enemy". On occasion it might be necessary to place Canadian divisions under the command of a British Corps or have British divisions under the command of a Canadian Corps. The target date for operations in North-West Europe was set for 31 Aug 43 - should there be a crack in German morale - but it was probable that raids might be mounted earlier against U-Boat bases on the Atlantic coast. By 1 Oct at the latest, allowing for delays, General McNaughton hoped to have the build-up of First Canadian Army completed (C.M.H.Q. Report No. 182).

188. During early February 1943 the presence in the United Kingdom of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Stuart, and Mr H.J. Carmichael, Chairman of both the Production Board, Department of Munitions and Supply and the Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee (Army), made it possible for a closer integration of supply matters to be discussed.

189. On 9 Feb General Lethbridge and Brigadier D. Campion (now Director of Army Requirements at the War Office) met with General Stuart at C.M.H.Q.; the B.G.S. and G.S.O.1(S.D.) also were present. General Stuart opened the discussion by agreeing in principle that the requirements of the Canadian Army must be tabled in a manner that conformed to the procedure followed in bidding for allocations of finished military stores. Therefore, the requirements of

the Canadian Army Overseas should be submitted to the War Office by C.M.H.Q.; those of the Canadian Army in the North American Area from U.S. production should be submitted in Washington by N.D.H.Q. C.M.H.Q. would inform N.D.H.Q. of all requirements submitted to the War Office and N.D.H.Q. would inform C.M.H.Q. of Canadian home requirements in respect of Canadian and American production.

190. General Lethbridge pointed out that the strategic plan produced at the Casablanca Conference now made it possible, for the first time, to prepare a complete statement of the total requirements of all the United Nations. Brigadier Campion considered that once such a statement was available the various production bodies should decide in what parts of the world munitions should be obtained in order to economize on shipping. It was believed, however, that the dangers of "double provision" could be avoided if Canadian production schedules were tied in with those of the British Group of Nations and the finished military stores made available for shipment anywhere. General Stuart then suggested that the existing backlog of equipment awaiting shipment from Canada might be issued to complete deficiencies of the Canadian Army at home; all future production then could be made available for assignment. General Lethbridge considered that such a request likely would be granted. With respect to bidding procedures those present agreed that:

- (a) Requirements of the Cdn Army Overseas from both U.S.A. and Cdn production with certain exceptions as agreed upon would be bid for at the L.M.A.B. and included in the bidding cable from London to Washington. The B.A.S. would then endeavour to secure an assignment either from Washington or Ottawa.
- (b) The requirements of the Cdn Army in Canada from U.S.A. production would be passed from Ottawa to the Canadian Army Staff, Washington, and the bid placed in Washington by the Canadian representative in co-operation with the British Army Staff. Such assignments as were made to Canada in this manner would not be subject to confirmation at L.M.A.B. (327).

It was further agreed that the list of continuing items the Canadian Army Overseas should still receive direct from Canada be kept to a minimum.

191. The War Office telegram to the British Army Staff in Washington, explaining the suggested procedure, included the following paragraphs:

...It has always been Canadian policy to provide equipment for all their forces. When Canadian overseas forces request provision of any item direct from Ottawa assignment of Canadian production they have agreed inform L.M.A.B. who will advise you. They have agreed to restrict

such items to a minimum and as far as possible to types peculiar to Canadian forces. Canadian B Vehicles continue however remain outside assignment machinery and will continue to be shipped direct to Canadian forces overseas from Canada....

Canada is making and may continue to make equipment for Canadian Army Overseas. If Canadian Army overseas is supplied from another source, the amount of Canadian deliveries due to their Army overseas would be divertible to other theatres in compensation as directed by L.M.A.B.

Since total empire production including the whole of Canadian production is set against the "overall" empire requirements as calculated by the War Office there should be no danger in theory of over provision in above arrangements. The real danger arises from imminence in certain cases of satisfaction of total requirements of empire and its allies. We hope however that in continuing production to maintain Canadian forces overseas, Canada will consult Ministry Supply to guard against that possibility (328).

192. Meanwhile, Mr Carmichael was discussing with officials at the Ministry of Supply the question of further integrating Canadian and British production. On 14 Mar General McNaughton and Mr Carmichael agreed that the former's responsibility should be limited to ensuring that the requirements of the Canadian Army Overseas were tabled in London and that N.D.H.Q. was so informed. It would then be the responsibility of the Departments of National Defence and Munitions and Supply in Ottawa to determine whether these requirements should be met from Canadian, British or American production, taking account of the need to conserve shipping (329).

193. During the latter part of March Brigadier W. Mavor, D.M.G.O.(B) at N.D.H.Q., arrived in the United Kingdom to study the question of what items of Canadian production then on order were still required by the Canadian Army Overseas and what disposition might be made of the balance (330). By now it was very evident that the manpower situation was such that First Canadian Army could not expect to have a separate Canadian base organization; therefore, the maintenance of a separate supply pipe line from Canada to the forward units was no longer feasible. On 5 Mar 43 the War Office had proposed that in order to avoid duplication - and dual lines of supply in an active theatre - Ordnance, Engineer and Medical stores should be held in joint depots in the United Kingdom and overseas theatres. On 3 Apr Brigadier Mavor told a meeting at Headquarters, First Canadian Army that he hoped the War Office could be persuaded to take over existing orders for stores and equipment being provided from Canada to ensure that there would be a continuing supply of these items for issue to Canadian units. General McNaughton considered that the War Office should be requested

to maintain a supply of such items in R.A.O.C. depots by the expedient of continuing to place orders in Canada. All were agreed, however, "that confidence should be placed in the War Office proposals to handle Canadian pattern stores" (331).

194 On 6 Apr Brigadier Mavor summed up his investigations in a long telegram to the Master-General of the Ordnance. In order to complete the equipment of the Canadian Army Overseas at the earliest possible date, C.M.H.Q. had placed demands on British depots for practically all its deficiencies, supported, where necessary, by bids at the London Munitions Assignment Board. Only where Canadian items were definitely superior, or more readily available, was shipment still being sought from Canada. Brigadier Mavor considered that it was impracticable to continue to ship Canadian technical and general stores to Canadian depots in the United Kingdom because:

- (a) The requirements are and have been most urgently required and therefore time in transit and uncertainty of deliveries are paramount factors.
- (b) Vital importance economy of shipping.
- (c) Manpower ceiling does not permit sufficient ordnance personnel being allotted to hold all requirements in Cdn BOD. In fact recent conference with Army Comd agreed that all items except A and B vehicles should be held in British depots.
- (d) Insufficient storage space to hold all Canadian equipment and unlikely that further accommodation can be requisitioned or constructed (332).

He understood that the War Office had already included the requirements of the Canadian Army Overseas in its total empire statement and that the Ministry of Supply had placed contracts around the world on this basis (except for Canadian "A" and "B" vehicles). Brigadier Mavor suggested that the problem was one for the Minister of National Defence to discuss with the Department of Munitions and Supply. As a result of informal talks at the War Office he recommended that the Ministry of Supply should be asked to take over the undelivered portions of orders placed by the Department of National Defence on behalf of the Canadian Army Overseas and that orders in equal amounts should be cancelled by the Department of National Defence; that is, except for vehicles and other agreed items of continuing Canadian supply. Brigadier Mavor then envisaged the following bidding and provision procedures for the Canadian Army Overseas:

- (a) C.M.H.Q. will bid at L.M.A.B. for all requirements of C.A.O. (excluding vehicles). Shipments would be made to British Central Ordnance Depots.

- (b) Provision on all the above excluding vehicles and other agreed exceptions will be made by Troopers and Splymin. [War Office and Ministry of Supply].
- (c) Provision of vehicles and other items agreed as continuing Cdn supply will remain responsibility of Defensor [N.D.H.Q.].
- (d) Consider that the following provisos should be included if proposed policy is adopted.
 - (i) That C.M.H.Q. should have the right to claim first priority on Canadian production assigned to L.M.A.B. by C.M.A.C. (Army).
 - (ii) That Splymin should take over all outstanding orders placed by D.N.D. with Munitions and Supply (excluding the agreed exceptions) on behalf of C.A.O.

Coupled with this, he suggested the following procedure for handling Canadian production:

- (a) D.N.D. would bid for Canadian Army North American Area.
- (b) The U.K. would bid for Empire requirements exclusive of Canadian Army North American Area but inclusive of C.A.O.
- (c) The U.S. would bid for monthly deliveries against W.S.L. orders.

The provision action behind such bidding (excluding the agreed exceptions) would be:

- (i) D.N.D. would make provision for the Cdn Army North American Area only by placing orders with D.M. & S.
- (ii) W.O. would make provision for Cdn requirements exclusive of Cdn Army North American Area by tabling these requirements with Splymin who would place orders on D.M. & S. or elsewhere in accordance with world production plan.
- (iii) The U.S. would provision by placing orders through W.S.L.

195. On 13 May a telegram was despatched from C.M.H.Q. advising that the War Office had agreed officially to the proposed bidding procedure. The following items would not be bid at the London Munitions Assignment Board:

- (b) Provision on all the above excluding vehicles and other agreed exceptions will be made by Troopers and Splymin. [War Office and Ministry of Supply].
- (c) Provision of vehicles and other items agreed as continuing Cdn supply will remain responsibility of Defensor [N.D.H.Q.].
- (d) Consider that the following provisos should be included if proposed policy is adopted.
 - (i) That C.M.H.Q. should have the right to claim first priority on Canadian production assigned to L.M.A.B. by C.M.A.C. (Army).
 - (ii) That Splymin should take over all outstanding orders placed by D.N.D. with Munitions and Supply (excluding the agreed exceptions) on behalf of C.A.O.

Coupled with this, he suggested the following procedure for handling Canadian production:

- (a) D.N.D. would bid for Canadian Army North American Area.
- (b) The U.K. would bid for Empire requirements exclusive of Canadian Army North American Area but inclusive of C.A.O.
- (c) The U.S. would bid for monthly deliveries against W.S.L. orders.

The provision action behind such bidding (excluding the agreed exceptions) would be:

- (i) D.N.D. would make provision for the Cdn Army North American Area only by placing orders with D.M. & S.
- (ii) W.O. would make provision for Cdn requirements exclusive of Cdn Army North American Area by tabling these requirements with Splymin who would place orders on D.M. & S. or elsewhere in accordance with world production plan.
- (iii) The U.S. would provision by placing orders through W.S.L.

195. On 13 May a telegram was despatched from C.M.H.Q. advising that the War Office had agreed officially to the proposed bidding procedure. The following items would not be bid at the London Munitions Assignment Board:

- (a) Common items required from Canada on grounds better quality.
- (b) Common items required from Canada on grounds insufficient allocation from IMAB.
- (c) Items ex-Cdn production peculiar to Cdn Army.
- (d) A and B vehicles ex-Cdn production.
- (e) Vehicles, motorcycles and engineer stores including tractors ex-U.S.A. production(333).

Any of the above exceptions that were assignable in either Ottawa or Washington were to be bid for by an N.D.H.Q. representative on behalf of the Canadian Army Overseas; the British Army Staff representative would merely support the Canadian bid in Washington for items from American production (see para 150).

196. Meanwhile, a joint War Office-C.M.H.Q. committee was studying the proposed merger of British and Canadian supply channels for Ordnance, Engineer and Medical stores. A meeting held at the War Office on 27 May agreed in principle to the following policy, which was subsequently approved by General McNaughton:

1. That stocks in the UK of Canadian pattern Ordnance stores with certain exceptions as enumerated in note below will be transferred and held in bulk by British Depots, issues from these depots to be made in detail to Canadian forces in the UK and in bulk to Canadian and British Base Depots in a theatre of War. Canadian stocks in the UK of Engineer and Medical Stores will not be transferred to British Depots but will be retained under Canadian Control. When operations commence these Engineer and Medical stores will be supplied to Canadian formations abroad through British base depots in this country and abroad.

NOTE. A vehicle depot will be retained by the Canadian Forces in the UK to handle those A & B Vehicles which remain Continuing Canadian supply. A limited MT Spare Parts Depot will be retained to hold Ram Tank Spares, "A" Vehicle Armament and Spares, Special Tools and to provide spare parts service for the CBOW [Canadian Base Ordnance Workshop]. Also a Canadian sub depot for assemblies.

2. That certain distinctive Canadian pattern stores which it is desirable should continue to be supplied from Canada shall be included in the appropriate sections of British vocabularies under the heading of "Canadian Section or Sub Section"....

3. Canadian depots that may be provided abroad will be used primarily to maintain Canadian Forces. In addition, however, these depots will be prepared to maintain any British formations or units which may be allocated to them for maintenance.
4. Should Canadian formations or units be allocated for maintenance permanently or temporarily to British depots in the field such depots will hold a stock of Canadian pattern stores. These stores will normally be reserved for issue to Canadian forces only but in an emergency either British or Canadian type stores will be issued according to availability irrespective of the nationality of the receiving unit.
5. In order to simplify the maintenance problem when Canadian and British formations operate from a common base as a part of a single force it is highly desirable that the equipment used by each should be of common pattern. Therefore it should be a cardinal principle that insofar as possible each type of stores or articles of clothing provided should be equally suitable for issue to British or Canadian units. This can be effected if British designs are in future accepted for Canadian forces and if where little difference in specification exists and no spare parts problem is involved existing stocks of British and Canadian patterns are merged under one vocabulary designation (334).

197. On 26 Jun General McNaughton advised C.M.H.Q. that it was now accepted policy that "First Cdn Army shall be organized and equipped in accordance with the War Office pattern for British Armies. Only a comparatively few items of eqpt are reserved as continuing Cdn supply" (335). In most cases, War Office equipment policy would apply to the Canadian Army Overseas without review; C.M.H.Q. would apply War Office changes in policy without prior reference to First Canadian Army. Only in instances where British policy was at variance with accepted Canadian practice should reference be made to the General Staff at Headquarters, First Canadian Army.

198. Although questions of policy were involved the Minister of National Defence does not seem to have been advised as to what was being planned until early June. Mr Ralston's views were finally conveyed to Generals McNaughton and Montague in a telegram of 16 Jun. Although the Minister of National Defence was impressed by the practical advantages - conserving shipping and manpower and eliminating dual lines of supply in an operational theatre - this telegram pointed out that:

At the same time he feels that a major matter of policy is involved since under the proposed arrangement Canada will appear to be divesting herself of responsibility for provisioning CAO in respect of the majority of items of equipment and supply and to be leaving CAO to depend on

UK for such items. While it is true that if the service provided by the WO proved unsatisfactory request could be made for provision action from Canada it might not be possible at that time to readjust Cdn production to meet the situation quickly. Therefore any idea that CAO would by the proposed arrangement be able to get the best of both worlds might well prove elusive (336).

Therefore, the following proposals were advanced:

- (a) The responsibility for all provision action for the CAO would rest with the War Office except in the case of items of continuing Cdn supply....With this exception all items would be submitted as requirements to the WO which would assume responsibility for provision and take the necessary action to supply.
- (b) Consequently NDHQ would take no further provision action for the CAO except in respect of items [of continuing Canadian supply] unless specifically [sic] by CMHQ. Whether any such specific request could be met would depend on whether the production situation here which might have been altered in consequence of the arrangement could be adequately readjusted again.
- (c) Since NDHQ cannot escape responsibility if provision were not forthcoming it is essential that CMHQ ensure that effective provision action is taken by the WO for the CAOS immediate and future needs. This is vitally important.
- (d) Therefore it is essential that necessary machinery be set up at CMHQ for liaison with Troopers to ensure that above is done. It should also be borne in mind that NDHQ has a responsibility to Cdn industry therefore CMHQ should keep DM and S London advised at all times.
- (e) If you require assistance in setting up machinery we are prepared to send you competent officers conversant with provision to establish machinery mentioned in para 3(c). Please advise.
- (f) A list of stores previously requisitioned for CAO on Odn production and which under this policy would be surplus to Cdn requirements would be given to DM and S in Canada who would negotiate direct with M of S as to their being taken over by UK.
- (g) Bidding procedure to remain as at present arranged....

- (h) The list mentioned in clause (f) would not include any item which you have requested as continuing Cdn supply...and for provision of which NDHQ would be responsible and would take provision action.
- (i) The methods of accounting and financial adjustment involved in the proposed arrangement are under discussion but have not been completely worked out and the arrangement would therefore be subject to a satisfactory solution of those problems which arise particularly because of mutual aid legislation.

199. The reply despatched by Generals McNaughton and Montague on 4 Jul agreed that the above proposals formed the only practicable solution; but it was emphasized that the repeatedly changing role of First Canadian Army necessitated re-equipment, for which the only source was the War Office. However, the following assurance had been received on 25 Jun:

War Office accepts responsibility for meeting Cdn demands and therefore by implication for ensuring that stocks in a theatre are sufficient to meet the needs of the Cdn and Brit forces engaged therein. As regards meeting your demands I can only assure you that Cdn units will be treated pari passu with British units. Any shortfalls in a particular type of equipment would of course re-act equally on both armies and I am sure you did not intend to seek an assurance that Cdn Army demands would under all circumstances be met 100% (337).

200. R.C.O.C. provision officers would be located in British Central Ordnance Depots to check provision action made on behalf of the Canadian Army Overseas and to act as liaison with C.M.H.Q. In the case of items of continuing Canadian supply they would forward demands to C.M.H.Q. for transmission to Canada. N.D.H.Q. was requested to provide three such provision officers. Endeavouring to justify the new procedure, this telegram continued as follows:

Based on our experience with British Central Ordnance Depots in the past 12 months we feel that we can count on securing satisfactory service in filling our demands. In the past three months particularly we have had to draw heavily on them for issues of controlled stores and they have given us excellent service and co-operation. This has in large measure been possible by the considerable improvement in the supply situation....

...it is true that the service provided by the special Cdn Group of British Field Stores at Aldershot was far from satisfactory leading up to our recommendation to form a Cdn Base Ordnance Depot. This was due primarily to the fact that the

British were attempting to serve us from a separate sub-depot at Aldershot that did not form a part of their Central Ordnance Depot Organization, and at the same time this sub-depot was endeavouring to handle a considerable number of items as Cdn supply. The agreement that the number of items of continuing Cdn supply are to be restricted permits the incorporation of these items in stocks of British Central Ordnance Depots....(338).

201. The adoption of the "capitation" rate for maintenance requirements made it no longer necessary to check repayment vouchers covering stores, so there would not be a large amount of paper work connected with the new procedure. Due to manpower restrictions it had been decided, if the War Office would agree, not to mobilize a Canadian Advanced Ordnance Depot in the proposed theatre of operations but to use British base installations. The personnel of the existing Canadian Base Ordnance Depot would be utilized in the continuing, modified Central Ordnance Depot and as reinforcements.

202. A further telegram of 15 Jul proposed that the War Office should take over all Canadian stores already in Canadian depots at an agreed amount, based on British vocabulary prices; also, all forthcoming shipments from Canada on the same basis. Thereafter, all issues to Canadians would be paid for either under the capitation rate for maintenance or as initial equipment. Where the equipment had been given the British as Mutual Aid, the amount would be balanced against the Canadian account for further stores and equipment. Payments by the Canadian Treasury would be a British credit against the Mutual Aid fund (339).

203. The Minister of National Defence was not happy about these negotiations, however, and discussed the whole matter with Generals McNaughton and Montague during his visit to the United Kingdom. During the course of a meeting at C.M.H.Q. on 4 Aug, also attended by General Stuart who had arrived back from the Mediterranean, Mr Ralston sought assurance that items of continuing Canadian supply received into R.A.O.C. depots in the United Kingdom would be issued exclusively to the Canadian Army Overseas: and that no diversion of such stores would be made without first securing Canadian agreement. He was told that such an assurance had been given during discussions with the War Office but that verification would now be sought. Mr Ralston also wanted assurance that munitions assigned in Ottawa to the Canadian Army Overseas should reach that destination. According to the memorandum of this meeting:

He was informed that the whole organization of assignment and distribution of eqpt for the United Nations was predicated on "Q" making proper delivery of equipment assigned by "GS" and there was no reason to believe that the procedure would fail in the case of eqpt assigned by Ottawa. Nevertheless DQMG intended to arrange a follow-up system to ensure delivery as quickly as practicable to the Cdn Army Overseas.

General McNaughton pointed out that this whole arrangement, which involved the placing of our requirements with the War Office, was predicated on the inherent right of reversion to placing all orders or any particular requirement on NDHQ in the event of our failing to achieve satisfaction or fair treatment through the War Office channels (340).

204. On 10 Aug Major-General C.A.P. Murison, Deputy Quartermaster-General (Army Equipment) at the War Office, confirmed in writing that "stores of continuing Canadian supply held on behalf of Canadian Forces in this country will be issued exclusively to Canadian units and that no use will be made of such stores for British troops without first obtaining your agreement." (341) However, as General Montague's letter of 9 Aug had conceded, "no similar guarantee can be given when stores of continuing Canadian supply reach a theatre of war overseas in which British and Canadian troops are operating together, although every effort will be made to reserve such stores for Canadian units."

205. A Canadian Army Requirements (London) section was established within the C.M.G. Branch at C.M.H.Q. to co-ordinate the provision of all types of equipment for the Canadian Army Overseas and to ensure that existing channels with the War Office and N.D.H.Q. were effectively used. This C.A.R.(L) section took over most of the functions hitherto performed by the Canadian Army Requirements Committee (342). The actual tabling of bids with the London Munitions Assignment Board, through the War Office, remained a General Staff responsibility, however, devolving upon representatives of Staff Duties (Weapons) at C.M.H.Q. In addition to the Army Assignment Sub-Committee's monthly meeting to deal with major items of controlled stores, the following meetings were held monthly at the War Office and generally required the presence of a Canadian representative:

D.C.S. Allocation and Bidding Meeting
Infantry Allocation and Bidding Meeting
R.A.C. Allocation and Bidding Meeting
Artillery Allocation and Bidding Meeting
Signals Allocation and Bidding Meeting
"B" Vehicles Allocation and Bidding Meeting
Engineer Stores Allocation and Bidding Meeting
Branch Priority Meeting
Army Ammunition Allocation Meeting (343)

206. Negotiations were soon concluded between the Department of Munitions and Supply and representatives of the Ministry of Supply in Ottawa as to which contracts for munitions now surplus to the requirements of the Canadian Army Overseas would be taken over for the British Government and which Canada would have to dispose of herself (344).

207. During October 1943 the task of transferring Ordnance stores from Nos. 2, 3 and part of 5 Sub-Depots to the appropriate British Central Ordnance Depots was completed; the remainder of the Canadian Base Ordnance Depot was reorganized into an M.T. Technical Stores Company to hold a three months' supply of parts for the Canadian Base

Ordnance Workshop and other special spares not common to the British Army, a Vehicle Company to receive, hold and issue "A" and "B" vehicles arriving from Canada or returned from field units, and a boot Repair Shop. (Early in 1944 this unit was re-designated No. 1 Canadian Central Ordnance Depot and the vehicle company reorganized into five self-contained vehicle reserve depots.) (345) Acceptance at the higher levels had been made easier by the Canadian Government's desire to have the balance of a complete army corps despatched to the Mediterranean, which action wrote finis to the dream of a self-contained Canadian Army in the field (C.M.H.Q. Report 182).

208. Proposals to limit further the number of items of continuing Canadian supply (see Appendix "B") met with limited success during the autumn of 1943. Although it was agreed that American-produced heavy engineer equipment and "A" vehicles should be deleted from continuing Canadian supply and bids placed at the London Munitions Assignment Board, it was considered that, for the present at least, "B" vehicles from both American and Canadian production should still be obtained through N.D.H.Q. auspices (346). During the course of a meeting at Headquarters, First Canadian Army on 9 Nov, the Master-General of the Ordnance was told that the overall vehicle situation would have to be cleared before pooling with the British could be considered. General Young agreed that actually it was easier for the Canadian Army Overseas to obtain its requirements for American-produced vehicles under the existing arrangement. It had been agreed earlier during his visit that any changes in the list of items of continuing Canadian supply should be made by mutual agreement between C.M.H.Q. and N.D.H.Q., in view of the fact that provision action in Ottawa would most likely be affected (347).

(ix) Supply Procedure in Italy and North-West Europe

209. For their supposedly short stay in the Mediterranean the equipment of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade had been augmented by the War Office to bring it to Eighth Army standards (348). The Force was equipped with Canadian-built "B" vehicles and universal carriers but Sherman tanks were provided from British stocks. The supply of Ordnance, Engineer, Medical and Dental stores and office machinery in the theatre was a British responsibility. Requirements for items of continuing Canadian supply (including "B" vehicles) were to be demanded through theatre channels from the War Office, whose provision directorates would request C.M.H.Q. to ensure that sufficient quantities were made available to British Central Ordnance Depots in the United Kingdom for despatch to the Mediterranean. As a temporary measure, monthly maintenance quantities of boots ankle, "Canada" badges, unit titles, distinguishing patches and cap badges were forwarded automatically to the Central Ordnance Depot at Branston for outward transmission until definite demands should be received through normal British provision channels (349). Canadian units indented for warlike stores direct to their formation's Ordnance Field Park, which carried stocks of spare parts for M.T., armament, signal,

wireless, engineering equipment and small arms, as well as complete wireless sets and small arms, to meet what were to be constant demands. Once the whole Force was ashore and the Ordnance Beach Detachments had disappeared, bulk demands for artillery equipments, clothing and general stores were sent periodically by the formation R.C.O.C. staff to the British Advanced Ordnance Depot; upon receipt the R.C.O.C. personnel at once broke bulk and made detailed issues to units. Vehicles were ordered forward from the vehicle company attached to the Advanced Ordnance Depot, to make good unit casualties reported to formation headquarters, and delivery generally was effected at an Ordnance Field Park (350).

210. By the time it was decided to despatch the remainder of the 1st Canadian Corps to Italy the agreement to merge British and Canadian supply channels was being put into effect. In order to conserve shipping, it was now agreed that most of the units would take with them only their personal scale of clothing, equipment and weapons (plus binoculars, watches, compasses, 2-in. mortars and Bren guns) and would take over the equipment relinquished by the British formations returning to the United Kingdom (351). Arrangements were made for a two months' maintenance supply of boots ankle, "Canada" badges, unit titles and other peculiarly Canadian items of personal equipment for all units to be forwarded at once from the Central Ordnance Depot at Branston, along with a sufficient quantity of battle dress to provide a second suit for the personnel already serving in the Mediterranean (352). In practice, however, most of the equipment left in Sicily for the incoming Canadian units was badly worn after long service with the Eighth Army; included, moreover, were many two-wheeled drive vehicles which were considered quite unsatisfactory, by Canadian standards, for service in a theatre of war (353). After considerable pressure had been exerted to hasten the necessary re-equipment from the limited resources available in the theatre, an arrangement was concluded whereby 3500 Canadian "B" vehicles were despatched from the United Kingdom and deducted from the total that were to have been provided from Canadian sources for the returning British formations (354).

211. In the face of rumours drifting back to Ottawa early in 1944 to the effect that Canadian troops in Italy were being issued with British clothing and equipment, C.M.H.Q. was requested to investigate and thereafter provide a monthly statement of any deficiencies (355). In a further telegram of 27 Mar 44 the Master-General of the Ordnance stressed that, since over 10,000 Canadian four-wheeled drive "B" vehicles had been shipped from the United Kingdom, there was no justification for British two-wheeled drive vehicles being issued to Canadian units in Italy. Furthermore, he was not happy about the procedure whereby the War Office was recognized as being responsible for provisioning to such an extent that equipment available in Canada could not be shipped to Italy, when the items were not those recognized as being "continuing Canadian supply". His telegram went on to point out:

We appreciate advantages of single lines of communication but feel that you are inclined to consider ultimate provisioning responsibility as resting with Troopers rather than with NDHQ and CMHQ....

...Apparently you have no direct information as to equipment state of CMT but are depending on Troopers who have not supplied or cannot supply this advice. Understand information on personnel is relayed directly to CMHQ from Cdn forward echelons in Italy. Query why this cannot be done also in case of equipment since there is Q representation in the Mediterranean (356).

212. A reply could not be despatched from C.M.H.Q. until 19 Apr. The Corps Commander had reported that deficiencies and defects of vehicles were not so serious as to prejudice the successful outcome of operations; however, General Burns would like to have 2679 additional Canadian "B" vehicles and universal carriers to replace the still remaining British vehicles. Equipment returns were consolidated at Headquarters, Eighth Army and not by Canadian Corps, of other corps. Since it was not practicable to have units make duplicate returns it was recommended that the British figures should be accepted (357).

213. It was subsequently agreed that 2750 Canadian "B" vehicles should be despatched to replace the British vehicles held by the 5th Canadian Armoured Division and that 5750 further Canadian vehicles should be despatched to provide a maintenance reserve in A.A.I. until the end of 1944. This last was to be a Canadian responsibility as long as Canadian troops should remain in the Mediterranean. In order to conserve shipping space from the United Kingdom, however, arrangements were made to ship 7000 crated "B" vehicles direct from Canada to the Mediterranean; only the remainder, chiefly vehicles with special technical equipment, were sent forward from the United Kingdom. C.M.H.Q. provided special tools and parts and an officer to supervise the assembly of these vehicles at British depots in Italy (358).

214. On the assumption that a five months' stock of other items of continuing Canadian supply must now be available in Base and Advanced Ordnance Depots, during February 1944 the War Office had requested the Central Ordnance Provision Office, Middle East to start submitting its requirements so that an end might be made to the existing practice of making automatic monthly shipments from the United Kingdom. There seems to have been some misunderstanding by Central Mediterranean Force as to the need to submit demands for its future requirements of items of continuing Canadian supply, however, and a last automatic shipment had to be ordered forward from the United Kingdom during April 1944 to ensure that sufficient stocks would be on hand until the prescribed procedure should be working properly (359).

215. Meanwhile, last minute preparations were being made for what was left of First Canadian Army to participate in the invasion of North-West Europe. Back on 7 Aug 43 the A.C.I.C.S. had directed that First Canadian Army should continue to state its requirements for controlled stores and bid direct on the War Office: at the same time, First Canadian Army should receive equal priority with other formations of the new 21 Army Group (360). Not until 18 Jan 44, and in response to a Canadian suggestion, did Headquarters, 21 Army Group propose the adoption of the following procedure for the provision of War Office controlled stores to First Canadian Army:

- (a) 21 Army Group advise War Office of total group requirements, showing Canadian requirements as a separate item, with a copy to Headquarters First Canadian Army (SD).
- (b) On being notified by 21 Army Group that War Office agree to the demand, First Canadian Army request CMHQ to take provision action in respect of the Canadian requirements shown, quoting the reference of 21 Army Group's demand to War Office.
- (c) CMHQ take provision action for Canadian requirements as shown by 21 Army Group, advising the War Office that the demand is in accordance with 21 Army Group's statement of Canadian requirements.
- (d) War Office release to CMHQ in accordance, where necessary, with priorities laid down by 21 Army Group (361).

216. This system of obtaining controlled stores through C.M.H.Q. was soon seen to be somewhat cumbersome and the A.Q.M.G.(A.E.) at Headquarters, First Canadian Army recommended that it would be more simple to deal direct with Headquarters, 21 Army Group for all requirements except items of continuing Canadian supply (362). There was general agreement that such a procedure would be necessary once First Canadian Army left the United Kingdom (363). It was pointed out by the B.C.S. at C.M.H.Q., however, that Headquarters, First Canadian Army would have no further contact with No. 1 Canadian Central Ordnance Depot: Canadian vehicles would be released in bulk to the War Office to meet operational requirements and would be issued to Canadian units from British depots (364). Only on 15 May 44 was it possible for the War Office to advise Headquarters, 21 Army Group that the following procedure should be adopted forthwith:

- (a) All First Canadian Army requirements for controlled stores, incl "A" and "B" vehicles, will, where the automatic replacement of stores and vehicles on agreed scales is involved, be forwarded to 21 Army Group through "C" channels. If provision is considered inadequate, "C" First Canadian Army will advise G(SD) who, if circumstances so require, will request SD 21 Army Gp to alter the priority of allocation of the stores or vehicles concerned.

- (b) Requirements for release of controlled stores over and above unit entitlements as shown in A.F.sG. 1098, W.Es. or agreed scales, will be forwarded to 21 Army Group through SD channels with notification to Q (AE) First Canadian Army.
- (c) With regard to items of continuing Canadian supply, 21 Army Group will advise War Office of the bulk requirement, and War Office will request CMHQ to supply from Canadian stocks or to arrange provision.
- (d) The right to appeal to War Office through CMHQ is reserved, if First Canadian Army consider that supply through 21 Army Group is inadequate or otherwise unsatisfactory. The following procedure will be used:
 - (i) Unless directly advised to the contrary by First Canadian Army, CMHQ will presume that 21 Army Group is taking all necessary steps to maintain First Cdn Army entitlements of vehicles and equipment.
 - (ii) If First Canadian Army considers that the provision action taken by 21 Army Group for the Canadian portion of the force is inadequate, CMHQ will be advised, stating details.
- (e) All statistical controlled store deficiency reports produced by 21 Army Group will show requirements and holdings of Cdn fms separately.
- (f) L.M.A.B. entitlement sheets as compiled by CMHQ, showing First Canadian Army deficiencies will be discontinued. Requirements of First Canadian Army will no longer be shown separately on L.M.A.B. Agendas, but will be bulked with those of 21 Army Group. The bulk allocations and issues will then be made against these requirements (365).

217. At the insistence of General Crerar a further paragraph (g) was added to the above procedure by the War Office on 15 Sep 44, after the concurrence of the interested parties had been obtained:

- (g) When First Cdn Army states a requirement for a type of eqpt not in demand by 21 Army Gp, or of a purely Cdn sup, that requirement will be stated directly to C.M.H.Q., with a copy to 21 Army Gp. C.M.H.Q. will make the necessary Cdn investigations and recommendations in respect to the requirement and will forward it to the War Office for information of all concerned (366).

218. What would appear to have been the last fly in the ointment was an attempt during the autumn of 1944 to have the holdings of Canadian and British "B" vehicles within 21 Army Group pooled. Canadian officers were aware, however, that 21 Army Group possessed a surplus of two-wheeled drive (4x2) British vehicles and considered that this was merely another attempt to palm off inferior vehicles on First Canadian Army. As it was, there had been instances when Canadian four-wheeled drive vehicles held in the theatre as reserves for Canadian formations had been issued to British units, irrespective of the fact that no case of operational necessity had been decreed at the highest level (367). General Crerar registered his opposition when advised of the proposal and instructed the Deputy Director of Ordnance Services for First Canadian Army that Canadian vehicles shipped to North-West Europe on Canadian account must not be issued to British formations without consulting the Army Commander's staff: "Any releases authorized during an emergency were to be notified to the Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1st Echelon for record and future recovery in kind if possible" (368). The existing procedure was continued. Canadian "B" vehicles were moved forward from No. 1 Canadian Central Ordnance Depot in accordance with staff tables prepared at the War Office against the requirements submitted by Headquarters, 21 Army Group. En route to, or at, the port of shipment from the United Kingdom such vehicles entered the British pipe-line. Ultimately they reached a British Vehicle Reserve Depot, where a Canadian liaison officer was stationed to observe and report upon their disposition (369).

CONCLUSION

219. With the coming of victory the problems involved in producing and allocating munitions of war could be shelved for the time being at least. On 31 Dec 45 the duties and functions of the Department of Munitions and Supply were taken over by a newly created Department of Reconstruction and Supply and the task of disposing of the stocks of munitions considered surplus to the requirements of Canada's continuing Armed Forces was accelerated by the War Assets Corporation. Within five short years, however, many of the wartime equipment problems began to re-appear, as Canada contributed forces for the United Nations' intervention in Korea and pledged herself to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That, however, is another story.

220. This Report was compiled by J. Mackay Hitsman.

J. Mackay Hitsman
(C. P. Stacey) Colonel
Director, Historical Section

APPENDIX "A"

CANADIAN MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS COMMITTEE (ARMY)

SCHEDULE OF ASSIGNABLE ITEMS (370)

Section I of this Part is a list of items subject to assignment by the Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee (Army) as of August 31, 1943. As stated in the Precis this list is subject to expansion by the inclusion of other items at the request of any interested claimant where such item involves two or more claimants.

Section II of this Part is a list of those items which have at some time been dealt with on an assignment basis by the Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee (Army) but which by mutual agreement have been deleted from the Assignable List. It should be pointed out also that if and when the occasion should arise, these items upon request are capable of being recalled to the Assignable List.

SECTION I

SMALL ARMS

1. Bren Light Machine Gun
2. Snipers Rifle
3. Rifle No. 4 Mk. I
4. Carbine Machine Sten Mk. II
5. Bomb Thrower 2" Mk. I
6. Trench Mortar 2" Mk. II
7. Magazine Bren Mk. II (100 rd.)
8. Browning .30 Cal. M1919A4 M.G.

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION

9. .303" Ball Mk. VII and Mk. VIIZ
10. .303" Tracer "G" Mk. I and Mk. II (Long Trace)
11. .303" Tracer "G" Mk. IV and Mk. VI (Short Trace)
12. .303" A.P. "W" Mk. I
13. .303" Incendiary "B" Mk. VII
14. .380" Ball Mk. II
15. 9 MM Ball
16. .55" Boys A.P.

SECTION I (Cont'd)

SIGNALS

17. R.B. Sets
18. Wireless Sets No. 19
19. Installation Kits (Truck and Ground) for #19 Set
20. Wireless Set Canadian No. 43
21. Wireless Set Canadian No. 9
22. Charging Set 300 Watt
23. Lamps Signalling Daylight
24. Switchboard 10 Line U.C.
25. Receivers A.R. 88
26. R.W.G. Equipment (SCR 588)
27. Ames II (RW/M Equipment)
28. Telephone D Mk. V
29. Wireless Set No. 58 Mk. I
30. Fullerphones Mk. IV
31. Receivers CR 103
32. Transmitters AT 3

INSTRUMENTS

33. Computers DZ (Craig Computers)
34. Altimeter AYC (RA/AL)
35. Dial Sights No. 9
36. Computers Height No. 2 Mk. I
37. Clinometers Field Mk. VI
38. Clinometers Sight Mk. IV
39. Binoculars 6 x 30
40. Binoculars 7 x 50
41. Compasses Prismatic Liquid Mk. III
42. Range Finder No. 12 Mk. VI

SECTION I (Cont'd)

GUNS

43. 40 MM Bofors Equipments
44. 40 MM Bofors Loose Barrels
45. 3.7" A.A. Equipments
46. 3.7" A.A. Loose Barrels
47. 6 Pdr. Tank and A/T Guns Mk. III

GUN AMMUNITION

48. 40 MM H.E.
49. 25 Pdr. H.E.
50. 6 Pdr. A.P. (and A.P.C.B.C.)
51. 3.7" A.A. H.E.
52. 3" Mortar Bomb H.E.
53. 2" Smoke Bomb B.T. (AFV)
54. 2" Smoke Bomb M.L.
55. 75 MM Smoke
56. Grenade Hawkins No. 75

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

57. Universal Carriers
58. Scout Cars
59. Armoured Cars
60. 25 Pdr. S.P. Mounts
61. 15 cwt. Armoured Personnel Trucks

SECTION II

Items which have been assigned upon occasion by the Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee (Army) but which by agreement have been deleted from the List.

SMALL ARMS

1. Rifle Boys A/T Mk. I

SECTION II (Cont'd)

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION

2. 22" Ball
3. .455" Revolver Mk. VI
4. 20 MM Hispano H.E.I.

SIGNALS

5. Reception Sets AR 77 and AR 77E
6. Syko Cyphers

INSTRUMENTS

7. Telescopes Sighting No. 32 Mk. I
8. Directors No. 7 Mk. II
9. Sights 3" Mortar
10. Range Finder No. 2 Mk. IV and Mk. VI
11. Range Finder No. 13 Mk. II
12. Tubes Vent Electric .5" (classed with instruments for brevity)

GUNS

13. 6 Pdr. A/T Carriage
14. 25 Pdr. Gun and Carriage
15. 25 Pdr. S.P. Gun (now dealt with as S.P. Mount)

GUN AMMUNITION

16. 2 Pdr. A.P.
17. 4.2 Trench Mortar Bomb, H.E.
18. Grenades No. 77 (filled w/p)
19. 25 Pdr. Smoke

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

20. Light Recce. Cars
21. Military Landing Craft

APPENDIX "B"

LIST OF ITEMS OF CONTINUING CANADIAN SUPPLY (371)

GROUP I

ITEMS OF CONTINUING CANADIAN SUPPLY TO CANADIAN DEPOTS IN U.K.

(A) Vehicles & Associated Equipment and Stores.

All A and B Vehicles (list attached) and Ram Spares with the exception of certain items as follows:-

A vehicle spare parts except Ram Tank spare parts
B vehicle spare parts
Certain types of M.T. vehicles agreed with Director of Mechanization (marked on list attached).

Special M.T. Tools (Vehicle, Workshop and Fitters)

(B) Technical Stores.

All vehicle armament and vehicle armament spares for "A" vehicles being supplied.

Generators AC-DC 250 watt. (ZL Mach Lorries)
Generators Homelite X-ray 2.5 KW (Dental Lorries)

(C) General Stores.

Nil.

(D) Engineer Stores.

D/4 Tractors.
D/7 Tractors
Auto Patrol Caterpillar 112
Auto Patrol Adams 412
Graders 5 Ton Richardson
Graders 2½ Ton Richardson
Excavators Dominion 350
Excavators Browning
Ditchers Barber Green
Sheeps Foot Rollers 11'
Moto Cranes - Lorrain
Rippers or Rooters
Rollers Tandem 5-7 ton
Scrapers Carryall (6yd) Letourneau D/7 Model L
Scrapers Carryall (8yd) Letourneau D/7 Model LS
Scrapers Carryall (4yd) Letourneau D/4 Model X
Electric Welders
Transporters 8 ton
Transporters 16 ton
Transporters 20 ton
Angle Dozers D/4

GROUP I (Cont'd)

Hysters D/4
 Power Control Units D/4
 Angle Dozers D/7
 Hyster D/7
 Power Control Units D/7

Engineer Tunnelling Equipment.

VEHICLES OF WHICH REQUIREMENTS FOR CANADIAN ARMY (OVERSEAS)
 ARE SUPPLIED FROM CANADA

("A" VEHICLES)

APPROVED TYPES

Armoured Cars	Tanks Cruiser (Ram only)
Armoured Command Vehicles ϕ	Tanks Command (Ram only)
Carriers Universal	Tanks Recovery (Ram only)
Carriers 3-inch Mortar	Tanks Bridge Laying ϕ
Carriers Armoured O.P.	25-pdr S.P. Tracked ϕ
Carriers Wheeled	S.P. Ammunition Carrier
Scout Cars Universal	S.P. Command Post
Armoured Demolition Vehicles ϕ	Rotatrailers.

("B" VEHICLES)

APPROVED TYPES

Motorcycles Solo Light ϕ	Lorries 3-ton G.S. (Refrigerator)
Motorcycles Solo Heavy	Lorries 3-ton G.S. (Slave Battery)
Cars 5-cwt	Lorries 3-ton Ambulance
Trucks Heavy Utility Personnel	Lorries 3-ton Disinfecter
Trucks Heavy Utility Personnel (Comp)	Lorries 3-ton Derrick
Trucks Heavy Utility Wireless	Lorries 3-ton C.W.D. Laboratory \times
Trucks Heavy Utility Ambulance	Lorries 3-ton Air Support Control
Trucks Heavy Utility Machinery "ZL"	Office
Trucks 15-cwt G.S.	Lorries 3-ton Dental
Trucks 15-cwt Office	Lorries 3-ton Surgery
Trucks 15-cwt Personnel	Lorries 3-ton Bulk Petrol (800
Trucks 15-cwt Water	Galls)
Trucks 15-cwt Machinery "KL"	Lorries 3-ton Battery Storage
Trucks 15-cwt Wireless	Lorries 3-ton Machinery "D-1"
Trucks 15-cwt Fitted for Wireless	Lorries 3-ton Machinery "I"
Lorries 3-ton 134" Wireless	Lorries 3-ton Machinery "I-30"
Lorries 3-ton 134" Signals	Lorries 3-ton Machinery "J"
Lorries 3-ton 134" Signals	Lorries 3-ton Z.P.I. Stores
(W/Penthouse)	Lorries 3-ton Troop Carrying
Lorries 3-ton 134" Dump	Vehicle ϕ
Lorries 3-ton G.S.	Lorries 4-ton A.P.F.
Lorries 3-ton G.S. (W/Penthouse)	Lorries 4-ton Z.P.I.
Lorries 3-ton G.S. (Office)	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery "A"
Lorries 3-ton G.S. (Medical)	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery "B"
Lorries 3-ton G.S. (Stores)	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery "F"
Tractors Breakdown Light	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery "L"

("B" VEHICLES)
APPROVED TYPES (Cont'd)

Tractors Breakdown Medium	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery "Z"
Tractors Breakdown Heavy	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery CZ
Tractors Artillery Light	(Radio)
Tractors Artillery Medium	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Machinery RE
Tractors 3-ton for semi-Trailer	7½ KW
Tractors 5-ton for semi-Trailer	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Stores
Tractors Tracked "D-8"	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel X-Ray
Tractors Tracked "D-4"	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Bacteriological
Transporters 8-ton	Laboratory ∅
Transporters 16-ton	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Petroleum
Transporters 20-ton	Laboratory ∅
Transporters 40-ton	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Camera ∅
Transporters Recovery 40-ton	Lorries 3-ton 6 wheel Processing ∅
Trailers 10-cwt G.S.	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel Machinery "M"
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel G.S.	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel Machinery
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Gas Welding	RE 25 KW
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Water	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel F.B.E.
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Compressor	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel S.B.G.
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Pole	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel Pontoon
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Bolster	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel G.S.
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Sterilizer ∅	Lorries 4-ton 6 wheel Crane
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Generator	Lorries Command Vehicles ∅
Wireless 2 K.W.	Lorries 10-ton 6 wheel Printing ∅
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Generator	Lorries 10-ton 6 wheel Photo-
9 KW	mechanical
Trailers 15-cwt 2 wheel Workshop	Lorries 10-ton 6 wheel Breakdown ∅
Servicing	Trailers 4 wheel Pigeon Loft ∅
Trailers 2 wheel Generator 22 KW	Trailers 4 wheel Motor Boat
Trailers 7-ton 6 wheel Lt.Recovery	Trailers 4 wheel Machinery Grind &
Trailers A.P.F.	Brake
Trailers Z.P.I.	Trailers 4 wheel Machinery 60-ton
	Press
	Trailers 20-cwt G.S.
	Semi-trailers 6-ton G.S.
	Semi-Trailers 10-ton G.S.
	Semi-Trailers Bulk Petrol (...Calls)
	Semi-Trailers Laundry (Canadian)
	Trailers Laundry Sets (British) ∅

∅ Complete vehicle from War Office.
* Cdn chassis, body from War Office.

GROUP II.

ITEMS OF CONTINUING CANADIAN SUPPLY TO BRITISH ORDNANCE DEPOTS

(A) Vehicles & Associated Equipment and Stores

Nil

(B) Technical Stores

Ronson Lighters. No further requirements anticipated after delivery of present order.

Belts Linesman. Bell Telephone Type

Climbing Irons Klein type

Readers Map Electric

Wireless Set C.27

Wireless Set C.9 Mk.0 spares only

Wireless Set C.9 Mk.I and Mk. II

Wireless Set C.19 Mk.II spares only

Wireless Set C.19 Mk.III Vehicle Equipment

Station Sets as follows:

Spare

Carrier

Scout

Truck Ground and Training

Armoured O.P.

Recce

C43/19/34

19HP/19/34

Wireless Set C.33 spares only. No further requirement of sets after delivery of present order.

Wireless Set C.43

Wireless Set C.58 Mk.0 spares only

Wireless Set C.58 Mk.I -

Reception Set VRL (CR106). Possibility of adopting AR88

Reception Set R103 (Karadio)

Amplifiers C.19

Wavemeters TE.149 spares only. No further requirement of Wavemeters after delivery of present order.

Multi Airline Stores. Delivery of present order to be

completed with probable further requirement now under consideration.

(C) General Stores

Berets Knitted Khaki

Bootees Operating

Caps Mechanic

Boots Rubber High

Overalls Combination Black

Bonnets Irish

Caps Comforter

Buttons G.S.

Buttons Rifle Regiment

Badges Cap

Battledress Blouses

Battledress Trousers

Boots Ankle

GROUP II

(C) General Stores (Cont'd)

Boots Ankle C.A.C.
Boots Leather High
Shirts Woollen
Drawers Woollen
Socks
C.W.A.C. Clothing
Containers Light Respirators.

REFERENCE NOTES

References are numbered consecutively throughout. Files are those of the Navy, Army and Air Divisions of the Central Registry of the Department of National Defence, the wartime Canadian Military Headquarters in London, England, personal ones of General A.G.L. McNaughton while G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army and miscellaneous ones now in the possession of the Historical Section (GS); these last bear the prefix (H.S.). War Diaries are referred to by the letters W.D.

1. Table by Professor R.G.D. Allen quoted in H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply. (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series) (London, 1955), p. 428.
2. (CMHQ) 1/Conf/12/3: Wade to Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, 12 Oct 43; Memorandum, War Office Controlled Stores, 4 Aug 43.
3. (H.S.) 314.009 (D24): Memorandum, Procurement & Assignment, 28 Apr 43.
4. John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces (United States Army in World War II, The Army Service Forces) (Washington, 1954), p. 13.
5. Colonel C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War, The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. I) (Ottawa, 1955), pp. 20-26.
6. J. Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials (History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series) (London, 1953), pp. 41-42.
7. Stacey, Six Years of War, op. cit., pp. 24-26.
8. Ibid.
9. Hall, North American Supply, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
10. Reports of the Department of National Defence, Canada, for the fiscal years ending March 31, 1936-1940 (Ottawa, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940).
11. J. de N. Kennedy, History of The Department of Munitions and Supple, Canada in the Second World War, Vol I, (Ottawa, 1950), p. 4. See also Report of the Department of National Defence, Canada, for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1940, p. 7.
12. (CMHQ) 1/Non Div/2: Massey to Burgin, 25 Sep 39.
13. Robert MacGregor Dawson, Canada in World Affairs, Two Years of War 1939-1941 (Toronto, 1943), p. 14.

14. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1939, Second Session, p. 172.
15. Dawson, op. cit., p. 287.
16. Lieut.-General Sir Ronald M. Weeks, Organization & Equipment for War (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 85-86.
17. Dawson, p. 16. and Hall, North American Supply, pp. 15-17.
18. Hall, North American Supply, pp. 114-115.
19. (Navy) N.S. 1014-1-3, vol. 1: Chiefs of Staff to the Minister, 17 Sep 39, Appx "A", and N.S. 1017-10-22, vol. 1: Memorandum of Meeting held in the office of the Acting Deputy Minister (Naval and Air), 7th December, 1939 regarding naval construction programme. Also see Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Its Official History, Vol. II, Activities on Shore during the Second World War (Ottawa, 1952), p. 51.
20. Kennedy, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 5.
21. Tucker, op. cit., pp. 444-445.
22. (Navy) NSC 8200-355, vol.1: Memorandum re Meeting held in Room 201, House of Commons, Ottawa, 8 p.m., June 25th, 1940.
23. Ibid: Minutes of a meeting held on July 5th, 1940 in the Office of the Hon. C.D. Howe to consider the matter of producing in Canada all naval requirements....
24. Ibid: Howe to Macdonald, 15 Jul 40.
25. History of the British Admiralty Technical Mission in Canada, p. 8. (Mimeographed copy among the small number of files of the wartime Department of Munitions and Supply now being held by the Public Archives of Canada)
26. Kennedy, Vol. I, p. 26. Also see Leslie Roberts, C.D., The Life and Times of Clarence Decatur Howe (Toronto, 1957) for some interesting statements about the wartime activities of the Minister of Munitions and Supply.
27. (RCAF) HQS 15-9-59, vol. 2: Sheard to C.A.S., 21 Sep 42; Tackaberry to Lydford, 22 Aug 42. Also see correspondence on HQS 15-9-59, vol. 1.
28. (RCAF) HQS 60-1-5, vol. 2: Cypher No. 1786, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa to High Commissioner for Canada in London, 13 Nov 41.
29. Ibid: Also other folios on this file.
30. Kennedy, Vol. I, p. 8.
31. (CMHQ) 1/Supply/1: Webb to Secretary, High Commissioner for Canada, 12 Apr 40.
32. (CMHQ) 13/1 Div/1: Loggie to Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 30 Oct 39.

33. W.D., G.S., H.Q., 1 Cdn Div: 22 Nov 39.
34. (CMHQ) 1/Non Div/1: Notes on Director's Meeting War Office, 31 Oct 39. See also (CMHQ) 1/Headquarters/5: Loggie to Senior Officer, 15 Apr 40.
35. (D.M. & S.) 1-1-204, vol. 1: DesRosiers to Campbell, 5 Dec 39; Campbell to DesRosiers, 5 Dec 39. (Among the files of the Department of Munitions and Supply now in the custody of the Public Archives of Canada.)
36. (CMHQ) 1/Finance Can. U.K./1: Whittle to Loggie, 12 Jul 40.
37. Ibid: Rivers-Macpherson to Senior Officer Ordnance Services, C.M.H.Q., 27 Feb 40. See also (CMHQ) 6/RCOC/6: Loggie to O.A., R.C.O.C., N.D.H.Q., 12 Jun 40 and W.D., 2 Det R.C.O.C. (Overseas) M.T. Depot: May-October, 1940.
38. (CMHQ) 13/1 Div/1: Loggie to Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 17 Jan 40.
39. Ibid: Brown to Loggie, 19 Jan 40.
40. (D.M. & S.) 1-1-204, vol. 1: Report by Harrison and Bromley on their visit to England, 4 Mar-6 Apr 40.
41. (CMHQ) 1/Headquarters/5: D.D.A.R. to Secretary, High Commissioner for Canada, 24 Mar 40.
42. (D.M. & S.) 1-1-204, vol. 1: Report by Harrison and Bromley on their visit to England, 4 Mar-6 Apr 40.
43. (CMHQ) 1/Supply/1: Massey to Eden, 1 Apr 40.
44. (D.M. & S.) 1-1-204, vol. 3: Harrison and Bromley to Howe, n.d.
45. W.D., Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.: April 1940, Appx D, Notes on Conference held at Treasury, Whitehall, 26 Apr 40.
46. Ibid: May 1940, Appx "A", Notes on Conference held in the office of the Secretary of State for War, 1900 hours, 3 May 40.
47. (CMHQ) 1/Supply/1: Pearson to Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 15 Jul 40.
48. (CMHQ) 1/Conf/3/2: Proceedings of the Fifth Monthly Meeting with Dominion Liaison Officers held in Room 044, War Office at 2.30 p.m. on Monday, 8th July 1940.
49. (CMHQ) 1/Release Equip/1: Tel GS 911, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Crerar, 15 Aug 40.
50. Ibid: Memorandum of a meeting at the War Office on 30 Aug 40.
51. (Army) HQS 6754-1: Cypher D 524, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 Aug 40.