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HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

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Canadian Participation in Allied Operations,
Murmansk 1918-1919

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Jan 60

Canadian Participation in Allied Operations,
Murman, 1918-1919

1. The reasons for the despatch of Allied troops to Murmansk -- in the Murman Area -- the composition of the British force and the Canadian contribution, have all been examined (Report No. 82, "Operations in Northern Russia, 1918-1919," Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, 20 Oct 59). That Report deals with operations in the Archangel sector only, and it is now necessary to give a brief account of developments in Murman, describing in particular the Canadian role.

TASKS

2. The immediate task of the "Syren" force,* which arrived at Murmansk on 23 June, 1918 under the command of a British officer, Maj.-Gen. C.M.M. Maynard, (Ibid.) was to prevent the occupation of the ports of Murmansk and Petchenga by the Germans, or by the Finnish troops co-operating with them. (Major-General Sir C. Maynard, The Murmansk Venture, (London, 1927), 13.) A German army of 55,000 men under General von der Goltz was in Finland ostensibly to counteract Russian Bolshevik

*A Canadian party of 92 officers and N.C.O's sailed from Leith, Scotland for Murmansk on 17 September 1918 to reinforce the "Syren" force (Report No. 82, Hist Sec (G.S.), A.H.Q.)

forces which had invaded that country during January 1918 (Report No. 82), and in addition, some 50,000 "White Finns" were acting under the orders of the German commander. (Maynard, Murmansk Venture, 13.) Strong detachments of these forces were pushing northwards, and it seemed certain that the German aim was to seize one or both of the ports for use as a submarine base (Ibid.).

Murmansk was ice-free throughout the year, was connected by rail with Petrograd, and possessed already many of the conveniences required for a submarine base.

Petchenga, though difficult of access on the land side, and partially ice-bound during the winter months, could nevertheless be utilized for submarines during a portion of the year. Both were so situated that submarines operating therefrom would find our North Sea mines no bar to their activities in the Atlantic -- and that just at a time when the transportation of American troops to France would be in its full tide. (Ibid., 3.)

3. A further task of the Murmansk force was to pin down the German army in Finland for as long as possible, thus preventing it from reinforcing the Western Front. (Ibid., 13.) The "Syren" force consisted of 600 British infantry, plus a machine gun company and a half-company of Royal Engineers; in addition, some 500 Royal Marines who had landed during April and May, came under Maynard's command. (Report No. 82). Local forces would have to be raised if this task was to be fulfilled, and "it was therefore part of the duty of the commander at Murmansk to organize and train local troops to supplement the expeditionary force." (Maynard, 13.)

4. A factor which would undoubtedly affect the tasks of the force was the attitude of the Soviet Government. (Ibid., 25.) The first landings by marines at Murmansk had been made at the invitation of the Soviets.

(Ibid., 13.) The Communists, still smarting from the terms of Brest-Litovsk, had no wish to see Germans and anti-Bolshevik Finns in possession of that port. Nor had any objections been raised by the Soviets to further Allied landings in June. (Ibid.) Maj.-Gen. F.C. Poole, who was Commander-in-Chief of all Allied troops in Northern Russia until the middle of October*, had arrived at Murmansk in May. (Ibid., 13, 128.) Poole advised Maynard on 8 June that he had been informed by members of the Murmansk Soviet (Council) that Lenin had instructed them by telegram to warn the Allies to quit Murmansk; Allied occupation, said Lenin, was in contravention of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. A little later Trotsky (then Soviet Minister for War) had wired ordering the Council to eject the Allies by force. Despite this, Poole had received no official intimation of the severing of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Government and the Allies; officially there was no state of war between them. (Ibid., 26-7.) There was, however, evidence of increasing Soviet hostility (Ibid., 25.) and "if, in addition to Germans and Finns, we were to be called upon to deal with the armed forces of Bolshevik Russia, we were likely to find our hands more than sufficiently occupied." (Ibid.)

THE SITUATION AT MURMANSK, JUNE 1918

5. Murmansk -- "a mere collection of log-built houses" -- lay on the eastern shore of the Kola Inlet, some 30 miles from the Arctic Ocean. Before the First World War it did not exist. Kola, a fishing village at the head of the Kola Inlet, some six miles distant, was

*Independent commands were then set up, under Maynard at Murmansk, and under Maj.-Gen. W.E. Ironside at Archangel.

the only inhabited centre in that area. The new port came into being to handle war stores loaned to Russia by the Allies, and a railway had been constructed from Petrograd to it during the early war years.* The railway ran due south from Murmansk for 150 miles to Kandalaksha, at the southern shore of the Kola Peninsula on the White Sea, thence a similar distance, still southerly, through the district of Karelia to Kem, an ancient town on the western shore of the White Sea. From Kem it continued, still south, through Soroki -- Segeja -- Maselskaya to Medvyejya Gora at the northernmost tip of Lake Onega. The railway then followed the western shore of the lake as far as Petrozadavodsk, where it continued to Petrograd across the neck of land between Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga.

(Ibid., 11, 22-23. John Hindevad, "A Saga of the North", The Legionary,^{March} 1937, p. 4 [map].) The Finnish border ran from north to south roughly parallel with the railway; at Kandalaksha it was 50 miles distant, and at Kem, 140.

(Maynard, 31-2.) Finland had no port on the Arctic Ocean; the Finnish border encountered the Norwegian some 50 miles before reaching the sea. The prospect of seizing either Petchenga or Murmansk was, therefore, alluring to the Finns. Norway had a common frontier with Russia at a point 20 miles north-west of Petchenga, which in turn was about 75 miles north-west of Murmansk. (Hindevad, Saga of the North", March 1937, Map.) The country itself was bleak in the extreme. "Except for some small scrub near the fringe of firs there was no vegetation. Nor indeed could such be hoped for, since the whole Murman Area is devoid

*By prisoners under Canadian engineers loaned to Russia for the purpose. (Captain J.K. Nesbitt, "The Syren Party", 2, G.A.Q. file 10-28.)

of soil in which even the homely radish could flourish. It is a region of tundra, akin to coarse peat; and for mile after mile, from Murmansk almost to the shores of Lake Onega, there is no sign of cultivation -- nothing but tundra and the eternal forests of pine and fir." (Maynard, 23.)

6. Maynard found, in his opening conversations with Poole, that the present distribution of Allied troops (excluding the force which he himself had brought) was as follows:-

Murmansk: 150 Royal Marines
400 Serbians (nearly all sick).
150 Russians and Poles (just enlisted).
Kandalaksha: French Artillery Group (ill-equipped and many sick).
Serbian battalion (many unfit).*
Finn Legion** (of little use at present).
Kem: 250 Royal Marines.
250 of the Serbian battalion.
Fetchenga: 150 landing party from H.M.S. Cochrane.

(Ibid., 28.)

The British commander had, after deducting the sick and totally untrained, approximately 2,500 all ranks -- including the "Syren" force -- with which to oppose 100,000 German and White Finnish troops. Nor was this all, for there was "a prospect amounting almost to a certainty, that... two Russian Red Guard divisions... would be added very shortly to the list of my opponents," and in addition, "although the local [Murmansk] Council might declare for us, there were certain to be strong anti-Ally elements in the town and along the railway --

*This battalion had fought its way north through Russia from Odessa. ("Report, Canadian SYREN Party", 13 Dec 18, H.S. file 37-8-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112.)

**"At Kandalaksha were collected 500 scurvy-stricken Red Finns, who had been driven out of their country by the Whites. Their tendencies were probably Bolshevik; but they would certainly be ready to oppose the White Finns, and perhaps the Germans." (Maynard, 27.)

to say nothing of the 500 armed and truculent sailors of the Russian warships in harbour." (Ibid., 28-9.)

7. It seemed to Maynard that his task "might be regarded with justice as 'somewhat in the nature of a gamble,'" but the odds "were not so overwhelmingly against us as a mere comparison of numbers seemed to indicate." From Kem no road suitable for military traffic ran northwards; the only serviceable tracks from the Finnish frontier debouched on the railway at Kandalaksha and Kem. During the summer months "the boggy tundra would preclude the movement of any but small bodies of troops, and thus an enemy advance in strength from the south or south-west must be confined either to the railway or to one or more of the several water-routes leading by lake and river to the Kola Inlet." These rivers, running through wild and inhospitable country, were tortuous and rapid. Special boats would be required to negotiate them, "in all likelihood, an insurmountable difficulty"; it was assumed by Maynard, with reasonable confidence, that any strong advance must come by the railway. (Ibid., 30.) Hence he concluded that to hold Murmansk, he must hold the railway as far south as possible. He accepted this violation of a principle of war -- his small force would be split -- for he realized that his "best chance of frustrating a massed attack by Germans and Finns lay in fighting a series of delaying actions, under conditions favourable to ourselves." These conditions would be supplied by the nature of the country and the railway itself. (Ibid., 30-31.)

The railway crossed innumerable streams and rivers, spanned by bridges up to nearly 200 yards in length -- and all were built of wood. A few bundles of straw and dry branches,

a liberal supply of paraffin, and a box of matches would suffice for the destruction of any one of them. And their reconstruction, even if unhampered by us, would entail in many cases weeks and perhaps months of labour. For the majority of the rivers were swift-flowing and deep, and many were spanned by no other bridge from source to mouth." (Ibid., 31.)

8. Maynard decided that Poole's selection of both Kandalaksha and Kem as the two main defensive centres on the railway had been sound. Both were possible concentration areas for hostile forces and use as such must be prevented. Furthermore, these towns could be reached from the White Sea, and thus their garrisons need not have to depend entirely on railway communications; "the command of the sea, that asset of inestimable worth, was ours." (Ibid., 31-2.) "With these posts held, and strengthened, as I hoped they would be shortly by the arrival of Allied contingents, we should have a reasonable chance of preventing Murmansk falling into German hands, so long as summer conditions prevailed." (Ibid., 32.)

9. The Soviet attitude could upset these calculations. A Bolshevik force at Kem would be "bad enough; if at Kandalaksha, it would be doubly serious; and if at Murmansk itself, it might well prove the death-blow to all our hopes." (Ibid., 33.)

10. Petchenga was considered by the Force Commander to be of secondary importance; access to it on the land side would be extremely difficult. In any case, Maynard had not sufficient troops to reinforce it at present, and thus he decided that its garrison would only be strengthened at urgent call. (Ibid., 29.)

OPERATIONS, JUNE - NOVEMBER, 1918

11. Having arrived at a plan, Maynard left Murmansk on 27 June to inspect the railway and its garrisons as far south as Kem. He took with him a Russian-speaking intelligence officer, two other staff officers and, as escort, a platoon of British infantry. The journey was important: it forced Lenin to show his hand. Fifty miles north of Kandalaksha, Russian railway officials unsuccessfully attempted to delay the British train. At Kandalaksha itself the reason became clear. A trainload of Bolshevik troops, with engine attached and steam up, was about to leave for the north. Though outnumbered eight to one, the British commander bluffed his Bolshevik counterpart into inaction until Serbian reinforcements arrived from the local garrison. Maynard gathered from his altercation with the Bolshevik commander that other Red Guards were following up this leading detachment. He therefore left the Bolshevik train under guard of the Serbs, increased his escort by fifty men from the Kandalaksha garrison, and continued on to Kem, which he found thronged with Red Guards from two recently arrived trains. At Kem the Allies had 500 men, a naval 12-pounder gun, and an improvised armoured train; to these were added the escort from the British train, now numbering 100. "There was therefore no doubt regarding our power to detain the Red troops" who complied with orders to detrain. Maynard ordered the officer commanding at Kem "not to allow any Bolshevik troops to proceed towards Murmansk without definite orders." He then returned to Murmansk via Kandalaksha where he learned "as an undeniable fact that the Red Guards ... encountered ... were but the advanced guard of a large Bolshevik force ...

concentrated with the express object of attacking the Allies and driving them from Murmansk." On receipt of this information, Maynard ordered the Bolshevik troops at both Kandalaksha and Kem to be disarmed. (Ibid., 39-51. "N.R.E.F., General Staff, G.H.Q., SYREN" [Diary], June 1918, H.S. 37-8-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112) He took further action: first, he reinforced the Kem garrison by two British infantry platoons and a machine gun section; second, Red Guard detachments at various localities between Murmansk and Kem -- ostensibly to safeguard the railway -- were also disarmed; finally, Maynard ordered a search for weapons at Kem, Kandalaksha and intermediate villages. Including the arms taken from Red Guards, some 10,000 rifles, 60 machine guns, and large quantities of ammunition were confiscated. Germany now had no ally within the gates of Murmansk. (Maynard, 51-3. N.R.E.F. diary, June and July, 1918.)

12. The outcome of Maynard's actions was three-fold. The Bolsheviks ceased to move north -- instead, leading contingents withdrew to Soroki, burning bridges as they went. Despite "no official break in our relations with the Soviet Government... there was rupture, open and unmistakable...." And lastly, the Murmansk Soviet decided "definitely and openly to sever relations with Moscow and espouse the Allied cause." (Maynard, 52-3. N.R.E.F. diary, 29 Jun 18.)

13. Maynard returned to Murmansk from his first journey down the line on 3 July. The next day, after discussions with Poole and the Murmansk Soviet (whereby he gained a free hand to take any military measures possible to combat a Bolshevik-German-White Finn combination), he started out again to make a more detailed

inspection -- this time with no escort, "convincing proof of our military poverty." (Maynard, 57. N.R.E.F. diary, 3 and 4 Jul 18.) At Kem, Maynard held a recruiting drive which was not immediately successful. There he learned that Bolshevik troops at Soroki had commenced a series of outrages against all suspected of Allied leanings. A British naval vessel, H.M.S. Attentive, with a detachment of the Finn Legion, had been sent from Kandalaksha. Maynard left Kem for Soroki. Several smaller bridges had been sufficiently repaired to permit the passage of a light locomotive and coach, but a few miles from Soroki, a bridge of 80-foot span had been completely destroyed. Here, the British commander abandoned the train, crossed the river by small boat, and resumed his journey on a derelict railway trolley, by means of which on 8 July, he made "an unheralded and somewhat inglorious entry into the outskirts of Soroki." The appearance of the British warship, he found, had been enough for the Bolsheviks -- the majority had retreated south. British sailors and the Finns combed out the few that remained. Maynard decided to garrison Soroki, using for this "the invaluable but long-suffering Serbian battalion," to be followed by the armoured train from Kem as soon as the railway had been repaired. His decision was based on the necessity of securing recruits for Russian units -- it was only by rendering life secure in the large towns and making Allied influence felt that he could hope to do this. On the 14th, Maynard arrived back in Murmansk (Maynard, 58-63. N.R.E.F. diary, 4-14 Jul 18.) So far, von der Goltz had made no move. Raiding parties from Finland -- which had reached the railway in June -- had been withdrawn (Maynard, 63.) This inactivity, in all likelihood, could be attributed to exaggeration in the reports of enemy agents.

In the early autumn for example, though my whole force had not then reached a total of 6000, papers were found on a German agent instructing him to ascertain the number of divisions on the Murmansk side, together with the names of their respective commanders. (Ibid., 64.)

Whatever the reason, it was highly satisfactory to Maynard, who was thus afforded a breathing-space in which to raise and train local units and to expand those already raised. Of the former, the Karelian* Regiment was organized towards the end of July; the latter units consisted of the Slavo-British Legion (made up of local Russians, enrolled by General Poole) and the Finn Legion. (Ibid., 27, 64-5.)

My chief concern for the moment was to enlist and give rudimentary training to sufficient numbers to ensure the establishment of an effective outpost system pushed out towards the frontier of Finland. This was accomplished within a surprisingly short period, the Finn Legion at Kandalaksha and the Karelian Regiment at Kem soon reaching a strength enabling them to watch all likely lines of advance and later on, to take a chief part in repelling attacks by considerable bodies of White Finns under German leadership. (Ibid., 65.)

14. General Maynard now visited Petchenga, travelling by sea. (N.R.E.F. diary, 22 Jul 18.) He found it to be a tiny village consisting of huts and a substantially built monastery at the extreme head of the harbour. Its defences were entrusted to H.M.S. Cochrane -- in harbour -- and a landing party from the vessel in the monastery buildings, which had been held successfully against a recent White Finn raiding party. No roads led

*Karelia is the name given to the tract of country lying roughly between the railway and Finland, from Kandalaksha on the north to Lake Onega on the south. Though coming originally from the interior of Russia, its people have developed a most independent spirit, regarding themselves almost as a nation apart. The Karelian Regiment was open for enlistment to Karelians only, and its strength rose eventually to over 4000. (Ibid., 65.)

to the village, communications being mere tracks, the best of which ran to the Norwegian frontier. The nearest railway centre in Finland was 250 miles away. There were no shipping facilities whatever.

To capture Petchenga... would demand the equipment and despatch of an organized force, with guns, engineering material, and an immense quantity of supplies, since none ... could be obtained on the spot. What this would have entailed, with the nearest rail-head 250 miles away, and no roads available for other than the lightest of wheeled transport, was fairly easy to calculate; and one hour's examination of the locality convinced me that von der Goltz would not waste men and material in a real effort to establish himself at Petchenga. Had the place held out any attractions as a submarine base, I might have been left in some doubt. But... it was inconceivable that such a base could have been established... without years of toil and concentrated labour, which must include the construction of 250 miles of railway.... To me it seemed certain that if Germany were really bent on acquiring a North Russian base, she should and would concentrate against Murmansk. With Murmansk in her possession, Petchenga, if she desired it, was hers for the asking. (Maynard, 67-8.)

Maynard concluded that the existing naval garrison, reinforced perhaps by a small party from Murmansk and backed by Cochrane's guns, would be sufficient to deal with any attack likely to be made. (Ibid., 68.)

15. On 30 July, with a landing force of about 1500 (including the Poles from Murmansk, 100 marines and a portion of the machine gun company "borrowed" from Maynard) General Poole sailed for Archangel -- which he succeeded in taking* (Ibid., 55. N.R.E.F. diary, 30 Jul 18.) -- leaving Maynard in command at Murmansk.

16. Towards the close of July, work began on two major projects: a defence scheme for Murmansk, and on preparing accommodation. (N.R.E.F. diary, 1 Aug 18.)

*See Report No. 82.

The latter was needed for reinforcements requested by Maynard, as well as by the ever-increasing numbers enlisting in local units. The demand for buildings, furthermore, would be increased by changed dispositions at the onset of winter; for, from November on, the whole country would be passable for enemy troops, and no longer could reliance be placed on the railway as the main line of advance. Any future alteration of dispositions again meant building. Local workers, under the supervision of British sappers, took these tasks in hand. The defence scheme, to counter a break-through of German forces to the northern seaboard -- a major Bolshevik attack was discounted -- provided defences barring likely lines of advance in summer or winter. Vantage points were selected sufficiently far forward to prevent the enemy from bringing effective fire to bear on the port. On these, and the provision of mobile reserves, the scheme depended. The final plan, based on a garrison of 3000, was as follows:

<u>DEFENCE POST</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
RASTIKENT	30 miles from Murmansk on the Tulema river.	OBSERVATION PARTY.
LOPARSKAYA	25 miles from Murmansk, along the railway.	100.
KOLA	At a point commanding the railway and the Tulema river.	2000.
NEAR MURMANSK	Western shore of the Kola Inlet (to hold	SMALL PARTY.

<u>DEFENCE POST</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
NEAR MURMANSK (cont'd)	a bridgehead to cover Allied landings from Murmansk. Troops landed would then hold the enemy in check until the Kola reserve could be brought up).	
DROVANOI	A village between Kola and Murmansk.	Infantry Company (On skis, for reconnaissance).
MURMANSK	In the town.	Remainder of force, for guards, and to quell local disturbances. These troops, with naval parties, formed the general reserve.

(Maynard, 72-3, 82-6.)

In addition, the plan included a rallying point for all troops should the Allies be forced to evacuate Murmansk. For this Maynard selected Alexandrovsk, at the mouth of the Kola Inlet. From it, the Allied commander would be well placed to prevent the use of Murmansk as a submarine base; the telegraph cable from Scotland came ashore there, and thus communication with England and Archangel could

be maintained; further, the little port possessed anchorage facilities, and some buildings for accommodation and storage. Supplies, stores, and ammunition for 2000 men for a month were collected and housed. By early October the whole defensive system, though not yet completed, had progressed sufficiently to be utilized in case of need. (Ibid., 83, 86.)

17. During the second week in August, reports reached Murmansk of large enemy concentrations along the Finnish frontier with, it appeared, Kandalaksha and Kem as the immediate objectives. Though no Allied reinforcements had as yet arrived, Maynard determined to take the offensive. He based his decision on two factors; first, local recruiting had been brisk -- the Finn Legion now numbered 800, and the Karelian Regiment stood at 1200 -- and secondly, von der Goltz's apparent misapprehension of Allied strength must be fostered. An active policy was imperative. The German commander must have actual evidence that "we were ready and willing to try conclusions with his army." (Ibid., 88-90.)

18. ... [The local troops were] totally ignorant of modern warfare, and their ideas of discipline were more than vague. But they could use their rifles in a fairly workman-like way; they were ready to obey orders according to their lights; and were accustomed to travel with a minimum of food and impedimenta. Moreover, as they were fed, clothed, and housed on a scale contrasting vividly with the want and privation of many months past, they were fully content with their lot. Added to this, the Finns were thirsting for a chance of paying off old scores on the Whites, who had driven them with such ruthless ferocity from their homes; whilst the Karelians, staunchest of patriots, would be fighting to rid their country of an invader. (Ibid., 89.)

19. The embroilment with the Bolsheviks was disconcerting, for it increased Allied difficulties by

compelling a portion of a meagre force to be employed otherwise than against the main enemy. There was however, one favourable element even in this -- the Bolsheviks, "unlikely to belittle the strength of the force which had compelled them to evacuate hurriedly the whole Murman Area", would tend to mislead the German commander still further in over-estimating his opponent. (Ibid., 90.)

20. Operations, accordingly, were ordered as follows:

- Kandalaksha - A mobile column, composed of Karelians and Finns (with such backing of Allied troops as could be spared) would operate towards the Finnish frontier.
- Kem - Ditto.
- Soroki - 150 British and Serbian troops would operate southwards against the Bolsheviks.
- Petchenga - The existing garrison would be stiffened by adding 200 Serbians (who had been convalescing at Murmansk, now fit).* These men were subsequently trained as gunners.

(Ibid., 90-91.)

21. It is now necessary to follow the fortunes of the three operations first listed and which all commenced during the third week in August. The reinforcing of Petchenga merely rid Maynard's mind, so far as possible,

*The remaining Serbians at Murmansk, too sick to hold out any hopeful prospect of early recovery, were evacuated to England.

of anxiety regarding its safety while Allied troops were engaged elsewhere. To deal first with Soroki, we find that the three weeks' dash south was ordered for three reasons; first, in the absence of both an efficient intelligence service and planes, it was to establish what Bolshevik forces had been concentrated between Soroki and Lake Onega; second, by so doing, it would further mislead the Germans, causing them to assume the Allies had a sufficiency of troops to warrant an attack on two fronts; thirdly, it was to deceive the enemy still more by allowing false orders -- referring to large formations to be employed in an Allied offensive on all fronts, scrupulously compiled by Maynard himself -- to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. These orders, when passed over to the Germans (on which the Allied commander had shrewdly counted), subsequently proved successful. The risk in launching this tiny force far to the south against unknown odds proved to be justified. Bolsheviks, encountered 20 miles south of Soroki, were driven back ten miles onto their supports. The Allied column then attacked these main positions boldly; after suffering heavy casualties the Bolsheviks withdrew, leaving behind quantities of stores and ammunition. They were pursued for 20 miles and finally reached the shelter of Povyenets, a small port on the northern shore of Lake Onega, 130 miles south of Soroki. The Bolshevik force was estimated at an infantry battalion, with 200 cavalry but no artillery. Thus, the sally had achieved its purpose; further, it was considered unlikely that the Bolsheviks in that area, "after the rough handling they had received, would make any aggressive effort for some time to come." (Ibid., 91-3.) Meanwhile the columns

from Kandalaksha and Kem had advanced towards the Finnish frontier. From the very start, both experienced difficulties with the supply system; such tracks as existed were even worse than reported, rendering wheeled transport valueless; pack animals were unavailable. The only solution was to follow the waterways where possible, but shortage of boats and swift currents precluded efficient use; stores over much of the way had to be manhandled by civilian carriers or the troops themselves. Even at first, when numbers were small and bases within a score of miles, it was sufficiently difficult; before the close of operations, local enthusiasm had swelled the strength of the columns -- Kandalaksha to more than a thousand, and Kem to double that figure -- adding to the difficulties. "That these were overcome, and an unbroken series of victories gained, speaks volumes for the grit and determination of Finns and Karelians alike, and for the fine fighting qualities of the handful of British officers and N.C.O.'s who led them." (Ibid., 94-6.)

22. The Kandalaksha column, consisting of Finns and led by a Canadian (Maj. R.B. Burton)* encountered White Finns during the second day of its move direct towards the frontier. The column made steady headway during weeks of desultory fighting in a waste of forest, lake, and bog. The Finn Legion everywhere mastered their White compatriots, who, after many reverses, finally withdrew behind their frontier. Burton then turned south-west towards the Karelian column from Kem

*One of 5 officers contributed by Canada to the "Elope" party, destined for Archangel. In view of his employment with the Finn Legion he was left at Murmansk. (Report No. 82, Hist Sec (G.S.) A.H.Q.)

to clear the intervening country of enemy troops. On 3 October he fought a decisive action on the western shore of Lake Pyavozero against the last formed body of the enemy in northern Karelia, routed them, and drove them back across the border. (Ibid., 97.)

23. The Kem column (under a British officer), advanced along the northern bank of the Kem River. It was opposed by White Finn Guards, but steadily pushed them back in minor engagements to their advanced base at Ukhtinskaya. There, on 11 September, a "miniature pitched battle" ensued. For some time the issue remained in doubt, until the Karelians contrived a turning movement across country deemed to be impassable. This decided the issue; the enemy, completely routed, abandoned the base with ammunition, rifles, trench mortars, and machine guns. The column then concentrated on clearing central Karelia of the enemy, effected early in October following a second battle fought on 21 September at Voknavalotskaya, 130 miles west of Kem, close to the frontier; there the enemy lost between 200 and 300 in killed alone, machine guns, trench mortars, 600 rifles, ammunition, 30 boats, and several hundred pairs of skis. (Ibid., 96-7.)

24. The columns inflicted losses on the enemy estimated at 2000. German officers and N.C.O's found amongst the dead led Maynard to conclude that von der Goltz, like himself, had refrained from throwing in his own regulars; he had used, instead, local troops under German leadership. It was likely "that his Finn auxiliaries had been sent forward to feel the way for him and obtain, if possible, a foothold on the railway. Had they met with success, the chances were that they would have been

followed up by German troops, and a determined effort made to drive us from the Murman Area." (Ibid., 97-8.)

25. The results of the Karelian offensives were out of all proportion to the size of the forces used; most important was the effect on Allied morale of an unbroken series of victories. The White Finns, on the other hand, "having been badly mauled and driven back continuously for weeks, would be unlikely to show any great enthusiasm for an offensive." Secondly, local forces had been more than doubled; some 3000 were now fit to give a good account of themselves. Thirdly, vital ground had been gained -- organized opposition to a German advance could now be established from 30 to 100 miles from the railway. Moreover, this country would be "almost unknown to German soldiers; transport arrangements for a European force of any size would need elaborate preparations; and the ground lent itself to the guerrilla type of warfare favoured by my levies." For the present, the safety of Murmansk was assured. (Ibid., 98-9.)

26. Offensive operations in Karelia, as we have seen, lasted from the third week in August until early in October. At the end of August, Maynard gave thought to the winter. The outcome in Karelia was not then clear. With the enemy in such preponderating strength, victory hardly seemed likely; the best that could be hoped for was to impose delay on the enemy, and it seemed "almost certain that my two columns must be driven back eventually." This would of course give the enemy a hold on the railway, preventing the supply or extrication by rail of Allied garrisons at Kem and Soroki; and if late enough in the season (the end of September

brought hard frost and snow), no succour could be brought through the frozen White Sea. Prudence dictated the immediate retirement of the Kem column, and its movement to Kandalaksha with the garrisons at Soroki and Kem whilst there was still time. "The Kandalaksha column could then be strengthened greatly, and Kandalaksha itself (the main gateway to Murmansk) made doubly secure." Militarily, in face of heavy odds, the security of Murmansk demanded this course of action before the threat to the railway became a fact and the White Sea closed to shipping. (Ibid., 100-102.) Maynard, however, decided otherwise.

27. Strategically unsound as the retention of the southern posts might be, other considerations indicated that they should be held. First, the loss of a vast recruiting ground would destroy Allied hopes of re-constituting an appreciable Russian front against the Germans; even the Karelian troops might defect when faced with transfer north. Secondly, for the inhabitants of Kem, Soroki, and other smaller towns it would be utter calamity -- Bolshevik retribution would ensue with savage ferocity. Finally, all officials co-operating with the Allies at Murmansk and down the line would be against evacuation. There could be no compromise between two such alternatives; and events justified the bolder. (Ibid., 102-103.)

28. Contemplation at this time of winter conditions and the unrestricted movement they would bring, led the Allied commander to another decision -- to construct and man the defensive line at Murmansk. Troops available fell short of the "absolute minimum" of 3000 for this -- even when the Italian Expeditionary Force of 1200, "due to arrive shortly" -- was taken into consideration. Only

one solution presented itself, the complete evacuation of Petchenga and the utilization of its garrison (now 500, made up of Serbs, British sappers, and the landing party from Cochrane) at Murmansk. The War Office, influenced by the Admiralty, objected to this and promised reinforcements. Accordingly Maynard asked for one infantry brigade, three batteries of field artillery, two machine gun companies, and one trench mortar battery. His estimate was accepted without demur; but due to shipping difficulties the first contingent (including the Canadian contribution) did not reach Murmansk until 26 September, and the last (the brigade headquarters and two infantry battalions) arrived a fortnight after the armistice, when "all danger of a German attack was at an end." The Italians arrived on 3 September but succumbed to the climate almost immediately. The net increase in strength during September did not permit Maynard to man the Murmansk defences fully; a Finnish attack on 28 September against the Petchenga outposts on the Norwegian frontier caused him to reinforce that garrison with half the 11 R. Suss. R. and one machine gun company (almost all his first British reinforcements), and a fortnight later he added for patrol work 60 French skiers. Thereafter Petchenga ceased to cause anxiety, even after Cochrane was withdrawn at the end of October "lest she might get frozen in." (Ibid., 101, 104-106.)

29. The situation at Murmansk now came under the influence of events outside Russia. As October passed, it became evident that the German army in Finland was being reduced; this, indeed, had started in September. The great Allied offensive in France -- completely unexpected by Maynard -- compelled the German command to

detach troops from the north to replace casualties on the Western Front. By the middle of October "von der Goltz's army was so denuded as to preclude all thoughts of aggressive action on his part"; the armistice in November saw the successful completion of the initial Allied tasks. (Ibid., 107, 109.)

30. It is now desirable to sum up Allied achievements at Murmansk to November 1918; subsequent embroilment with Soviet Russia will be dealt with separately. First and foremost, then, the use of either Murmansk or Petchenga as a German submarine base was prevented. Without a footing on the North Russian seaboard, Germany could not increase the toll of Allied shipping, at that time largely concerned with conveying American troops to Europe. The Murmansk force was equally successful in its second task. After the Russian collapse in 1917, 54 German infantry divisions were transported from east to west during the nine months from September 1917 to the end of May 1918. "The stream ceased abruptly with the first landing of the Allies at Murmansk" -- no movement during June, July, and August. Over this period Maynard's small force, by means of bold operations and deceptive measures, tied down the German army in Finland, stopping the probable transfer of some 40,000 reinforcements, "at a time when the war's final issue was still shrouded in uncertainty, and none could say how much or how little was needed to tip the scale of fate." Eight German divisions were withdrawn from Finland in September and October, after attempts to seize the North Russian ports had finally been abandoned; but by then it was too late for them to influence the final struggle. The strategic policy of Allied intervention at Murmansk

received ample vindication in the success of a mere handful of troops, who had "done more to assist in the overthrow of Germany than could have been accomplished by many times their number employed in any other theatre of the war." (Ibid., 110-112.)

OPERATIONS AFTER THE ARMISTICE - THE CANADIAN ROLE

31. The Canadian party (92 officers and N.C.O's), commanded by Lt.-Col. J.E. Leckie, sailed from Leith, Scotland, on 17 September and, as we have seen, reached Murmansk nine days later. The group consisted of infantry, machine-gun and artillery personnel, who were required to act first as instructors, and later for regimental or administrative duties in units raised for a special mobile force being formed from Allied contingents and local levies. (Report No. 82.) They were all "adventurers of the deepest dye, for had they not just volunteered, when volunteering was out of date, to go on an expedition to an unknown destination where the one important qualification was to be unmarried and without dependents?" ("The Syren Party", G.A.Q. file 10-28.)

32. Immediately on arrival the Canadians were ordered to Maynard's main defensive position at Kola, where "log huts were being efficiently built for us by Russian carpenters who did marvellous work with axe and adze." They found the major part of the Expeditionary Force at Kola, then consisting of General Maynard and his staff (which included Sir Ernest Shackleton of Antarctic fame) detachments of Royal Engineers, the 11 R. Suss. R., two batteries of British field artillery, a General Hospital (which moved to Murmansk) a machine-gun company,

a Serbian infantry battalion and two companies of Italian infantry. (Ibid. Maynard, 129.)

33. Later in the year, a detachment of about 180 husky dogs, under a Canadian officer, arrived at Kola, but the dogs were not a success. Apart from "their mournful howling, which they kept up every night," they were unaccustomed to reindeer, and "the end of the huskies as suitable transport came the first time our dogs met reindeer on the same trail. I was not there but I believe there were a lot of them, and the melee [sic] that followed... [made] Headquarters decide quickly and absolutely that the dogs must go." ("The Syren Force"). A party of two officers and six men, all Canadians, went up the Tulomar River in October to cut birch logs for sleigh runners. The return journey which called for the negotiation of rapids in overladen boats was especially hazardous, rendered even more so by the disappearance of their Finn guide -- with half the rum ration. Sleighs were constructed later; Lapp reindeer teams were mobilized for the transport of troops and supplies throughout the country. (Ibid.) Seven mobile columns, each about 200 strong, were in process of formation; Maynard called upon the Canadians to train them in the use of weapons, skis and snow-shoes. (Ibid. Maynard, 162. Letter, Lt.-Col. Leckie to Lt.-Gen. Sir R.E.W. Turner, 14 Oct 18, H.S. File 37-8-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112.)

34. Allied policy towards operations in Russia after the armistice was singularly lacking. Were the Allies to withdraw from Murmansk now that the original aims, so well achieved, were no longer valid? In the absence of any instructions, Maynard had to predict what

the future plan might be. He was well aware that ice had sealed Archangel in for the winter; Allied troops, whether they liked it or not, must remain there until the spring. Under such circumstances the Allied grip on Murmansk would continue to be an obvious military necessity. He was certain, therefore, that his force would not be recalled immediately, whatever the final Allied decision might be. Whether this, when forthcoming, favoured evacuation as soon as circumstances permitted, or provided for intervention on a larger scale, it could not alter the present position to any marked degree. A state of war with the Bolsheviks -- though not declared -- did in fact exist and must continue, it seemed, as long as the Allies remained on Russian territory. (Maynard, 124, 143.)

Up to the present, such action as I had taken against them had been solely with a view to preventing them from hampering my operations against von der Goltz; now, unless our own safety were endangered, I should fight them only in order to assist the loyalists in their endeavour to establish themselves more firmly in the Murman Area: but fight them I must, if occasion demanded, just as I had fought them previously (Ibid., 143.)

35. These considerations left Maynard clear as to his course of action -- "I must consider the interests of the anti-Soviet movement in my own area as my chief concern, and do my best to enable it to stand alone as speedily as possible" (Ibid.) and this entailed a movement southwards, pushing back the Bolsheviks as it went. A Russian army capable of standing on its own was needed; for this there would have to be men, and men could only be found in sufficient numbers by extending the recruiting ground to the south. But an immediate start was not possible; time was required to effect new dispositions,

to organize transport, and to complete training. Maynard expected to be ready by the middle of February 1919; he contemplated no move before then unless forced to do so by enemy action. (Ibid., 143-6, 162-3.)

36. Meanwhile, in an effort to enrol more Russians, the North Russian Government ordered general mobilization. The Slavo-British Legion (Russian) at Murmansk numbered but some 400 men. Throughout the whole occupied area there were few able bodied Russians not employed in one or other of the various local civilian services. The mobilization scheme -- which "worked smoothly and well... [and which] was far less unpopular than most of us anticipated" -- did, however, reveal a superfluity in one or other of the civilian services, so that the area between Murmansk and Soroki in all yielded about 3500 recruits. The paucity of numbers indicated still further the need for a southerly advance. (Ibid., 144-5.) Soroki, the most southerly Allied garrison, would be the jumping-off point for this, and on 12 Nov 18 the Canadian contingent was transferred there from the defence-line at Kola. Lt.-Col. Leckie assumed command of all Allied troops at Soroki on arrival, and was promoted Colonel. (Hundevad, April 1936. Letter, Col. Leckie to Lt.-Gen. Turner, 13 Dec 18, H.F. File 37-8-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112.)

37. The Bolsheviks forced Maynard to act before February. In January, news of a Bolshevik concentration south of Soroki reached Murmansk, "more with the object of securing adherents and spreading Red propaganda than as a threat against Soroki." In this area, the Allies themselves hoped to secure many recruits;

thus it was against their interests to allow the Red Army to continue. The most important villages in the area were Undozero and Rugozerski, both west of the railway; the latter (a Bolshevik advanced headquarters) was 60 miles west-south-west of Soroki. A mobile force of 200 Karelians -- under Canadian command -- was ordered forward with the object of reconnaissance, and the clearing of Rugozerski at the discretion of the commander (Capt R.D. Adams) after he had assessed the strength of the opposing troops. Rugozerski could not be left in Red occupation during the move down the railway (planned for February) with the capture of Segeja as its object; if not attended to now, it must be cleared as part of the Segeja operations -- a complication Maynard was anxious to avoid. (Maynard, 164-5.)

38. Local information gave the Bolshevik strength at Rugozerski as about 150; the Allied force surrounded the place on 16 Jan 19 and attacked, killing or capturing the whole garrison at a cost of six wounded. "All their headquarters papers fell into our hands, and these were found to shed a very considerable light on the situation on our front." The village was retained under Karelian garrison. For this exploit, Adams, the first Canadian to be decorated, in this theatre won the M.C. (Ibid., 165-6. Letter, Col. Leckie to Lt.-Gen. Turner, 10 Mar 19, H.S. File 37-18-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112.)

39. The situation at Archangel at this time caused concern. On 19 January the Bolsheviks launched a vigorous attack, forcing Ironside to evacuate Shenkursk.*

*See Report No. 82.

The War Office called upon Maynard for troops by the overland route, Soroki -- Onega -- Archangel, and in all two British battalions (the 6 and 13 York. R.), and a machine-gun company (the 280th) were sent. "Out of the 5000 Britishers shipped to me originally, 1000 only would remain in my theatre,* half of whom were claimed at the time by Petchenga." Reindeer could not be used for the move, for no moss on which these animals subsist lay along the route from Soroki to Onega. Horse-drawn sledges were therefore employed, but as few were available, men could be sent in parties of 300 only, and "much time was lost unavoidably whilst the horses made their return journeys to Soroki." Fortunately, Maynard's responsibility for transportation ended halfway along the route, where Ironside took over. Under the Arctic conditions prevailing, "a due share of credit for its success [was apportioned] to the officers of the Canadian Contingent" whose experience proved invaluable. (Ibid., 167-171. Report, Col. Leckie to Lt.-Gen. Turner, February 1919, H.S. File 37-8-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112.) This depletion in the strength of the Murmansk force called for a further redistribution of troops; the men of the 11 R. Suss. R., (and the Canadians) left the Petchenga garrison during March for the southern sector, making the first leg of the journey to Murmansk by reindeer sledge. (Maynard, 171. "The Syren Force".)

40. No cancellation of the February offensive resulted from the weakening of the Murmansk force. "By February my preparations were complete, and I was as well placed to commence my movement then as I should be in March or April." (Maynard, 172.) In fact, Maynard

*Of the reinforcements from England which reached Murmansk in the autumn, one battalion and a battery had already been transferred to Archangel. (Maynard, 168.)

turned the reinforcing of Archangel to his own advantage; the offensive, to be successful, must depend on surprise, and rumours were deliberately fostered that preparatory concentrations of troops and transport at Soroki were again occasioned by reinforcement of the Archangel sector. (Hundevad, October 1936.) The Bolsheviks, far from expecting an offensive were "proclaiming that they would drive us shortly into the sea." (Maynard, 172.) Though vital to the Allies that the new anti-Bolshevik Russian force should be expanded, there were, besides this, other compelling reasons to drive southwards. In the first place, it was important not to lose the initiative to the Bolsheviks; and secondly, Maynard was anxious to test his preparations and training for winter mobile work on the enemy -- "we were backing the mobility of our men and transport to outwit the Bolshevik in his own country." (Ibid., 172, 173-4.)

41. The enemy's main forward garrison (numbering about 400) was at Segeja, on the railway some 70 miles south of Soroki. The intermediate villages were Olimpi, Onda, and Nadvoitskaya, the Bolsheviks having detachments at the two latter places. The bridges between Olimpi and Onda had been destroyed during the earlier Bolshevik withdrawal; but those between Lake Onega and Soroki were intact, so that the Bolsheviks -- unlike the Allies -- could bring up reinforcements rapidly by train from Maselskaya and other points on the railway north of the lake. Surprise was thus essential. (Ibid., 173.)

42. The Allied plan called for four columns. One was to operate right of the railway from Soroki, and one left (with Sumski Posad, a village 20 miles east of

Soroki on the White Sea, as its jumping-off place); both columns to capture Segeja. Two smaller columns were to capture Nadvoitskaya and Onda respectively. The total Allied force numbered 600, of whom 200 were in reserve. Canadians took a major part in the operations; Col. Leckie was in command; Maj. L.H. Mackenzie led the Segeja column jumping-off from Soroki; Maj. Alfred Eastham commanded the Nadvoitska column; Capt. J.W. Hunter was in charge of transport arrangements at Soroki, and Capt. Adams of those at Sumski Posad. Finally, other Canadian officers and N.C.O's were sprinkled throughout all columns consisting of British, French, Russians, and Serbians. (Ibid., 173-174. Hundevad, October 1936. Report, Leckie to Turner, February 1919.)

43. Maj. Mackenzie had the most difficult rôle. It was important that a 400 foot bridge at Segeja should be captured intact -- and if a frontal attack were made at Onda, it was feared that the Bolsheviks would withdraw and destroy it. Segeja, Onda and Nadvoitskaya would, therefore, be captured simultaneously, which meant sending Mackenzie's column more than a hundred miles through unmapped forests, over frozen lakes and snow-covered, trackless tundra, in weather that was "pitilessly cold, the temperature dropping to over 40 degrees below zero, with a biting wind and heavy snow-squalls." (Hundevad, October 1936. Maynard, 175.)

44. Leckie's first move was made on 15 Feb 19 -- the column from Soroki to Sumski Posad, and thereafter the remaining columns at prearranged intervals. Moving across country to carry out simultaneous attacks was extremely difficult under the prevailing conditions. The attack on Onda failed to materialize. "With skis deep

sunk in newly fallen snow, and in face of the tearing blizzard, the Serbians ... struggled gamely on, but were forced to abandon the attempt when still some miles from their goal." Eastham, however, captured Nadvoitskaya on schedule; and the Onda garrison, hearing shots to its rear, withdrew hurriedly down the line into the hands of his waiting troops. Segeja fell the same day -- 18 February -- with its bridge intact, and half the defenders killed or captured. Before the attack, a Russian patrol breached the railway south of the town, covering the dismantled track with machine-guns. A train-load of Bolshevik reinforcements from Maselskaya, forced to halt at this place, met a "withering outbreak of fire" and pulled back hastily. The Allies repulsed a Bolshevik counter-attack next day, and no further Bolshevik effort developed here. Known enemy losses were 200 killed and prisoners -- those in the train were not assessed, but few could have escaped -- at a cost to the Allies of one killed and ten wounded. "The recruiting area had been extended by over 3000 square miles; the Bolsheviks had been taught a most salutary lesson..."; the newly-enlisted Russians had emerged with high credit; and the feasibility of winter operations had been amply demonstrated.* Furthermore, the captured bridge was of great importance in view of a possible continued advance later. For these operations, both column commanders, Mackenzie and Eastham, were awarded the D.S.O. (Maynard, 174-8. Report, Leckie to Turner, February 1918.)

*It was, however, found that "machine-guns in this weather are only fit to be used in strongpoints where they can be kept warm." Dog sleighs were employed operationally for the first time, and proved useful for messages. (Report, Col. Leckie to G.O.C. 237 Inf. Bde., 26 Feb 19, H.S. File 37-8-1B, Folder 6, Drawer EE-112.)

45. February brought political problems with the Karelians and the Finns. Briefly, the Karelians, having tasted independence, wanted more of it. Accordingly, they submitted a case for "self-determination" to the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Murmansk, who in turn referred the matter to the representative of the North Russian Government. The official attitude displayed no sympathy with Karelian aspirations -- Karelia was an integral part of Russia, and such it should remain. The Karelians received refusal sullenly; they would discourage recruiting, and they would not serve under Russian officers. This latter threat was disturbing, as Maynard proposed to extend the force under Russian administration before the Allies should withdraw. A compromise was arrived at whereby Russian officers would be gradually introduced; the regiment as a whole would remain under British control, with a British commanding officer for each battalion. Thus the matter reached a temporary settlement, but it left a feeling of discontent and gave rise to future disaffection. (Maynard, 179-183. N.R.E.F. diary, 11 Mar 19.)/ ^{The} Finn Legion, on the other hand, composed as it was of Bolshevik Finns, had been useless to Maynard since the armistice. It could not be employed against the Soviets and there was the possibility that at any time it could constitute a real danger. The Legion was anxious to return to Finland. Maynard was equally anxious to see it go -- he had insufficient troops to disarm the men -- but he first required guarantees from the Finnish Government that there would be no reprisals against them. Negotiations with Finland were protracted and unsatisfactory. The Legion planned to mutiny early in April, destroy two bridges at Kandalaksha, and then move south to join the Russian Bolsheviks; Maynard,

forewarned, mustered a force of British infantry and marines and arrested the ringleaders. Unexpectedly, no punishment was meted out: the offenders were instead granted safe passage to join the Soviets. This magnanimity, with a promise to send an Allied delegation from Murmansk to Helsingfors to help speed repatriation, kept the Legion quiet until it finally returned to Finland on 1 September 1919. The Canadian commander of the Legion, Lt.-Col. Burton, accompanied his troops and was present in Finland as "prisoner's friend" at a form of court-martial before which every legionnaire appeared. A few were given prison terms, but the majority -- thanks to Burton's representations -- proceeded to their homes in peace. (Maynard, 183-9, 206-213. Hundevad, March 1937. N.R.E.F. diary, 7-9, 11, 24, 29-30 Mar; 20 May; 29 Aug; 1 Sep 19.)

46. As at Archangel, and for the same reasons, the morale of even Allied contingents suffered during the first three months of 1919;* there were cases of insubordination. "The Great War was over, and others were being demobilized, and according to the mens' views, snapping up the best civil billets, whilst they, banished in a forsaken wilderness, were risking their lives for a cause not directly concerned, so far as they could see, with the welfare of their country." (Maynard, 190-191.) The prevailing atmosphere of disorder, dissatisfaction, and lawlessness in Northern Russia at that time, did not, however, affect the Canadians adversely "... never had our men been more contented with life. Compare

*See Report No. 82.

the lot of the average citizen of a country during times of peace, whether he be a city clerk or a country farmer, with a soldier under conditions such as existed with us at this time. My heart pounds as I write, in fact it is this comparison and the memory of those joyous adventurous days which prompts me to tell those who care to read these lines that to join a gentlemanly conducted campaign of this sort surpasses all other occupations for a young man of normal health and spirits." ("The Syren Party".)

47. With the coming of March it began to seem that the trials of winter, and their effect upon most of the troops, had nearly passed. The temperature rose above freezing point for the first time in three months. But before spring arrived to cheer the troops, one further anxiety had to be contended with. Bolshevik agents, judging the time propitious for a coup d'état, planned simultaneous risings at Murmansk and other centres; the Finns and Karelians would mutiny and in concert with these events, an attack would be launched from the south. The Allied intelligence system was by now working efficiently. On 23 March, the Russian authorities -- Allied troops were not to lend active assistance unless called on -- pounced on the known leaders. Deprived of leadership, the insurrection and mutinies fizzled out. The military attack became "a half-hearted endeavour to drive us from Segeja, made on April 7th, and frustrated with ease." (Maynard, 198-206, 214.)

48. In April, the Allies resumed the offensive in the form of an attack on Urosozero, a village on the railway some 20 miles south of the southernmost Allied garrison, Segeja. A Canadian (Maj. Peter Anderson)

commanded at the latter place. He knew that the Bolsheviks had received considerable reinforcements, and that concentrations were starting to arrive at Urosozero with a view to capturing his post following the abortive attack on the 7th. Faced with this threat, Anderson decided on a bold course. Judging that every hour was of importance, he himself attacked on 11 April, using his armoured train, and a total force of less than 100, including men of the new Russian army. Though heavily outnumbered, the assailants achieved complete success, killing 50 of the enemy, and capturing 40 with much booty (including two field guns) at a cost of one killed and five wounded. The Commander-in-Chief, himself a man of vigour and determination, did not reprove Anderson for launching the enterprise without consent; instead, Anderson was promoted Lt.-Col. and awarded the D.S.O. (Ibid., 216-7. Hindevað, December 1936.) In accordance with the policy of never withdrawing from any territory once it had been won, Urosozero was garrisoned. Neighbouring hamlets now had to be cleared of Bolsheviks to protect the approach to the village; this the newly raised Russian Rifle Regiment successfully accomplished. (Maynard, 217-8.)

49. The advances of February and April had extended the recruiting ground, but not sufficiently if the Russian armies were to stand alone with any prospect of success after Allied withdrawal. The regions acquired were still bleak tundra, sparsely populated. Further south cultivated soil supported a sturdy peasant class. An advance of another 50 miles might produce several thousand recruits who would welcome the chance of turning

against their Bolshevik oppressors, and events proved these hopes well founded. It would secure other advantages. The occupation of Medvyejya Gora and the adjacent town of Povyenets (both on Lake Onega) would block the only avenues of approach to the north; the front would be shortened due to the proximity of the Finnish border on this line; and finally, the offensive might relieve enemy pressure on the Archangel sector. The internal situation in the Murman Area was now quiet. Up-country garrisons could be reduced. Furthermore two British infantry companies (one of the K.R. Rif. C. and one of the Midd'l R.) which had been sent out in response to Maynard's appeal when the mutiny of the Finn Legion seemed inevitable, reached Murmansk on 17 April. Two companies of American railway troops had arrived on 25 March, relieving all anxiety for the maintenance of the railway system. In all, Maynard could count on some 3000 troops for the operation -- including 1000 British, 700 French, Serbians, and Italians, 1000 Russians, and about 500 Karelians and Russians in composite units. The War Office, reluctant to permit any further offensive action, sanctioned the undertaking in view of the highly beneficial results to be achieved. (Ibid., 219-222, 224. N.R.E.F. diary, 25 Mar 19.)

50. On 1 May the advance began in three columns, moving on a front of 60 miles, and was to be carried out in two bounds -- from Urosozero to Maselskaya and from Maselskaya to Medvyejya Gora. The right column, consisting of the Olenetz Regiment (a Russo-Karelian unit) had the task of clearing the western and southern shores of Lake Segozero, acting as a flanking guard. The centre column in which Col. Leckie commanded a group of 100 British

marines, 100 Russians, 30 Americans, 30 Canadians and sections of British and French artillery, was to advance rapidly down the railway. Meanwhile the left column (Russian) would follow the Vojmosalmi -- Povyenets road. The centre column captured Maselskaya on 3 May after 48 hours' continuous fighting. The enemy, whose communications on the west of Lake Segozero were now threatened, withdrew rapidly, pursued by the right column. The left column, after stiff opposition, reached a point 20 miles east of Maselga. A pause to repair the railway and replenish stores was broken on 11 May by an unsuccessful Bolshevik attack on the right column. (Maynard, 227-8. "The Syren Party".)

51. On 15 May the advance continued on a frontage reduced to 35 miles. The entire centre column came into action at once against a strong covering party, which it dislodged. Next day the same column encountered a series of trenches which, because marshy ground precluded turning movements, it had to attack frontally. The Midd'x and K.R. Rif. C. companies, supported by fire from railway trucks, carried the position. By 19 May, the column was within five miles of Medveyja Gora; but enemy resistance was strong, including greatly increased artillery fire. Trotsky, a captured order revealed later, had forbidden any retirement. Enemy gun fire, though heavy, was inaccurate. Our guns, firing from the railway, proved more effective and enabled the columns to continue forward. Medveyja Gora fell on 21 May; three days earlier, Povyenets had fallen to the eastern column. The final objectives gained, positions were consolidated. (Maynard, 228-230. N.R.E.F. diary, 15-21 May 19.)

52. These operations had been undertaken during the spring thaw, under conditions totally unfavourable to the advance. A postponement, however, would have brought an enemy lake flotilla into open water ready to act in co-operation with his land forces -- which would have rendered the Allied task more difficult. Having arrived at the port while the lake was still ice-bound, Maynard had time to organize artillery defence and construct bases both for vessels and seaplanes (expected at the end of May) without disturbance, which he pushed forward. Six motor-boats and two steam-launches brought down by rail had been launched by the first week in June; by that time seaplanes had arrived. At the end of May, following a limited advance of eight miles, artillery to guard the entrance to the bay was in position -- none too soon, for on 8 June a Bolshevik flotilla approached the port. The Allied flotilla, covered by coastal guns and aided by seaplanes, dispersed it, turning "a possible reverse into a victory, the moral effect of which alone had a value almost immeasurable." (Maynard, 230-5. N.R.E.F. diary, 4-8 Jun 19.)

53. There was still no Allied declaration of policy towards Northern Russia. At the beginning of March the British Government brought the question forward once again, and pressed for withdrawal as soon as the climate would permit. Although no decision was taken, the War Office (with Cabinet authority) informed both Maynard and Ironside that "in all probability, Archangel and Murmansk would be evacuated during the coming summer." (Maynard, 237-8.) It was then March, and with the date of probable evacuation given as some time during the summer, there might be but three months left for Russian

forces to prepare to stand alone. An increase in fighting strength was necessary. (Ibid., 244.) By early July, with the addition of the newly gained recruiting ground, the Russian army had doubled to a strength of 5000 men. (Ibid., 264, 266.) A Russian officer (General Skobeltsin) arrived from Archangel on 6 June 19 to take over command of all Russian troops in the Murman Area. (Ibid., 261. N.R.E.F. diary, 6 Jun 19.)

54. During April, May, and June, the tangled skein of local politics again caused Maynard anxiety. Reports reaching the Allied commander at the end of March indicated that on 10 April the Karelians would rise, proclaim separation from Russia, and demand incorporation with Finland.* It appeared that Finland was prepared to give the Karelians active assistance. "The whole position was kaleidoscopic. Six months previously my Karelians had opposed the White Finns strenuously and had served me well...." Now it appeared that the Allies must reopen operations against the White Finns with the Karelians their allies, for the interests of the North Russian Government must be paramount, and this project of annexation could in no way be permitted. Finnish incursions began early in April, armed parties crossing the frontier west of Lake Onega, south of the Allied line. Maynard could "only presume that the Finns hesitated to advance by a more northerly line for fear of encountering Allied troops." Synchronized with this penetration by Finns was

*Karelia had belonged to Finland until annexed by Peter the Great. Though Karelia desired complete independence, there seemed little likelihood of this. Incorporation with Finland was a second choice, but offered a better prospect of fulfilment, as it would meet with Finnish support.

an epidemic of desertions from the Karelian Regiment, "many of the men contriving to get away with their arms, and making invariably for the Finnish frontier." On 26 April the situation became clear. Five thousand White Finns, (reportedly volunteers) assisted by local Karelians, began to advance on the Bolsheviks at Olonetz and Petrozavodsk, some 100 miles south of the Allied front. This was by no means distasteful. Instead of a rising against the North Russian Government -- and therefore against the Allies -- it seemed that an unexpected ally had been acquired against the Bolsheviks. The latter, however, checked the White Finnish advance. The Finns then made overtures for the Allies to co-ordinate movements with them, but in view of North Russian suspicions, Maynard -- though he personally welcomed the suggestion -- requested assurances from the War Office concerning Karelia's future; provided these were given, certain stipulations must be met as to how the Finns would be employed. The reply, received on 26 June, came in the form of a message from the White Finn commander. He would co-operate in accordance with Maynard's proposal, but "all Russian and Finn troops should be withdrawn sufficiently far to ensure that they should not come into contact with... White Finns." Finnish intentions were obvious: the omission of Red Finns from forthcoming operations was understandable; but the proviso concerning Russians could have only one interpretation -- Karelia was to come under Finnish sway, and Russians must have no part in driving out Bolsheviks. Maynard could not co-operate under such terms. Red Finns need not be employed, but Russian troops must play a part in any further advance. He replied to this effect, expressing the hope, nevertheless, "... that our respective forces would work in friendly

conjunction." (Maynard, 251-8. N.R.E.F. diary, 12 May; 3, 10-11, 13, 20, 26 and 27 Jun 19.)

55. The Allies did in fact advance from Medvyejya Gora. White Finn troops found in some of the outlying villages caused Maynard unending trouble until "Bolshevik successes drove the whole volunteer rabble back into its own country." The troubles of which he complained were efforts to undermine the loyalty of Karelians to the North Russian Government and terrorizing villagers who failed to be swayed, combined with looting. During the first week in July, the entire volunteer force had withdrawn. "The Bolshevik army had shown itself the less inefficient of the two." (Maynard, 258-9. N.R.E.F. diary, 3, 9, 11-12 Jul 19.)

56. On 2 July the Finnish Government approached the Allied Commander openly. It had been decided to replace volunteers with regular troops -- could Maynard join them west of Petrozavodsk within a fortnight? This might now be feasible, as Finland had waived her claims to Karelia pending future settlement by plebiscite. Such plebiscite, it seemed to Maynard, could only take place after Allied withdrawal; he could do nothing to prevent it. His immediate interest lay in co-operation with the Finns. "I should have felt bound to fall in with the proposal had it been within the bounds of practicability." But it was not. War Office instructions restricted any further advance to Russian troops only and these were "not yet ready for a move on so large a scale." (Maynard, 259. N.R.E.F. diary, 11 Jul 19.)

57. The Finnish regulars, "if sent at all", accomplished "nothing". White Finns ceased to be a factor

in the military situation. But the three month episode had one important effect -- the doubtful attitude of the Karelian Regiment, through widespread desertion, compelled Maynard to disband it. This was done on 20 May, its members being offered other employment; a Labour Battalion (unarmed) and Frontier Guard were "well to the front in popularity." (Maynard, 256-7, 259. N.R.E.F. diary, May 1919; "Instructions for the Reorganization of the Karelian Regiment," Appendix M.)

58. In July Maynard received definite orders for the evacuation of all Allied troops from Murmansk before winter set in, but the withdrawal began long before this. All French troops left at the beginning of June. Orders arrived on the 7th to hold all Royal Marines in readiness for embarkation. Two days later, the immediate return of the Canadian contingent was called for but it remained, however, until August;* both companies of American railway troops left at the middle of July; and finally, all British troops who had arrived at Murmansk before 1 Feb 19, were placed under orders to leave before the end of August -- an order affecting the original infantry and machine gun companies, and a large part of the administrative services. (Maynard, 238, 264. N.R.E.F. diary, 4 and 7 Jun; 5, 8 and 11 Jul 19.)

*Maynard protested against the withdrawal of Canadians at this juncture, stating that their departure would jeopardize the safety of British and Allied troops. He promised to release them as soon as possible. (Tel Churchill to Borden, 21 Jul 1919, Borden Papers, P.A.C. file OC 518(2).) The next day, the Canadian Government agreed to their retention. (Tel C.G.S. to Secretary of State for War [Churchill], 22 Jul 1919, ibid.)

59. Meanwhile, following the capture of Medvyejya Gora, the line was consolidated, while the building-up of Russian forces proceeded. Col. Leckie had assumed command of Allied troops at Povyenets which was undamaged, and its whole garrison was billeted "in comparative luxury." Both towns were within the fringe of an agricultural district, and thanks to Maynard's foresight, green vegetable seeds had been obtained from England. "Our main crops were lettuces, and mustard and cress. These grew fast and well, and enabled an occasional all-round issue to be made" -- a welcome change for men with whom "green food has been, for months on end, nothing more than a tantalizing dream." (Maynard, 267-270. "The Syren Party".)

60. On 3 June, the comparative quiet was broken by an uprising of the inhabitants of the northern part of the Shunga Peninsula (some 20 miles due south of Povyenets across the lake, and 40 miles south-east of Medvyejya Gora by land) against the Bolsheviks, and an appeal for assistance and arms. Russian troops at Medvyejya Gora -- where advanced positions were now established across the railway 8 miles south -- were not yet organized. Maynard decided to send 400 Russians by water from Povyenets with rifles and ammunition for the local people. The risks were great. Bolsheviks had superior naval force; the rising might have been quelled, necessitating an opposed landing; and even if a foothold was successfully gained, in the absence of land communications, future supplies could be sent only by boat. "Once again however the future interests of the Russian army swung the scale in favour of the enterprise" -- the Shunga Peninsula promised to be a fruitful recruiting-ground, and indeed, so proved.

The Povyenets force landed without opposition on 4 June, and won a small victory which "proved the commencement of a widespread anti-Bolshevik movement which played an important part in subsequent operations, and yielded eventually a very large number of recruits [2000] for the northern Russian army." (Maynard, 271-2. N.R.E.F. diary, 3-4 Jun 19.)

61. This operation resulted in another, again entrusted to local forces -- the opening-up of communications with Shunga by land, which entailed an advance of from 10 to 15 miles. The plan called for an attack by newly-raised Russians on Siding 10, the next place of importance down the railway between Medveyejya Gora and Kyapeselga, supported by the well-tried Olonetz Regiment on the right. The latter did well, but the new Russian troops, who bolted under fire, failed to take their objective. It seemed to Maynard that this "contemptible show" might shape the whole future of the new Russian army. Victory could not be left with the Bolsheviks; confidence must be restored. "It would mean the employment of Allied infantry, but this could not be helped. I could only trust that my sin would be pardoned when the circumstances were made clear to those at home." This time three columns were used: the Olonetz Regiment on the right, reinforced by British and Serbs; a railway column, almost entirely British; and on the left, another column, largely Russian under Canadian leadership, with orders to gain touch with the Shunga force. On 13 June Maynard launched the attack. Siding 10 fell without Allied loss, largely due to the accuracy of artillery. Both the right and left columns made good progress, but land communications were not yet assured as enemy guns at Dianova Gora

commanded the coast road. Accordingly, Maynard determined to press south along the whole line west of the lake. On 20 June the right column captured Kartashi; the railway column arrived at the outskirts of Kyapeselga on 4 July; the left column made junction with the Shunga force on 25 June, and went on to capture Dianova Gora and Unitza on the 28th. (Maynard, 273-6. N.R.E.F. diary 11-13, 17, 20 and 28 Jun 19.) Leckie infiltrated a party of 70 men, under a Canadian officer, to the rear of the Bolshevik positions. "When Colonel Leckie developed his attack, the garrison of Dianavagora [sic.] retired, and as they came down the road in two's and three's some of them dragging machine-guns on wheel mountings [we] ... captured them all and had a pretty gang of Bolsheviks and equipment to hand over.... In the afternoon with motorcycle mounted machine-guns and a few men we captured Unitza [sic.], another village to the south-west." ("The Syren Party".) On the night of 5/6 July, the three columns combined to attack Kyapeselga, from which the Bolsheviks were driven in confusion. The reaching of the Kyapeselga line enabled communications with the Shunga Peninsula to be fully established by land. (Maynard, 276. N.R.E.F. diary, 6 Jul 19.)

62. Russian interests now dictated the course of action. The present line, blocking all main approaches from the south, was excellent. Maynard decided to hold it firmly; to continue the Russian offensive in the Shunga Peninsula thereby increasing the flow of recruits; and finally to break up Bolshevik preparations for a northward advance by frequent raids "on a bold and extensive scale by land, air, and water." (Maynard, 277-280.)

63. Fighting continued on the peninsula for many weeks. The Bolsheviki employed Red Finns, who proved to be tenacious opponents. With the establishment of land communications, however, Allied guns were brought in and soon neutralized the fire of enemy ships. Throughout July the North Russians held their own, in August the tide turned in their favour. Tolvoya, the main town on the peninsula, fell on 3 August to a combined attack by North Russians and the Allied lake flotilla, now strengthened by the addition of six submarine-chasers. (Maynard, 278, 284. N.R.E.F. diary, 18 Jul; 3 Aug 19.)

64. Raids, made by small parties behind the enemy lines, were effective. One of these, which took five days from 18 July, succeeded in destroying the railway bridge across the Suna river near its mouth, 35 miles south of the Allied line. Another resulted in the capture of the commander of an enemy brigade, his staff, 50 other prisoners, and the breech block of a 3-inch gun. Planes attacked the docks and rail centre at Petrozavodsk, and also enemy vessels on the lake in conjunction with the Allied flotilla. In July and August the total enemy losses in ships amounted to four sunk, either by bombs or gunfire, and three captured --

(i) The 300-ton twin-screwed steamer Silni with an armament of two 3-inch guns, one 3-pounder, and 6 colts.

(ii) A small armoured destroyer mounting two 3-inch guns and two machine-guns in revolving turrets.

(iii) An armed tug.... (Maynard, 280-6.

N.R.E.F. diary, 18 and 30 Jun; 1, 3, 5, 11 and 23 Jul; 3 and 5 Aug; 17 Sep 19.)

65. This, besides being a period of continuous fighting, was also one of preparation. Recruits were flowing in; training, both operational and administrative,

proceeded so as to make them self-supporting in all branches. "It is hardly too much to say that the eviction of the Reds from the Shunga Peninsula and its occupation by Allied troops were mainly responsible for raising the loyal Russian forces to a strength sufficient to enable them to undertake single handed, with a reasonable prospect of success, the defence of the territory already won by them with Allied assistance." (Maynard, 272, 286.)

66. A disturbing incident occurred on 20 Jul 19, when Russian troops holding the Onega section of the Archangel front mutinied and handed over the entire district to the Bolsheviks.* Not only did this threaten Maynard's extended communications from Murmansk to the south: it also drove an effective wedge between the Murmansk and Archangel forces, severing all land communications. Maynard despatched two small forces to bar incursions against his vital railway:-- one based on Sumski Posad (which advanced to Nyukhotskoe on the White Sea in the direction of Onega) and the second concentrated at Povyenets and Vojmosalmi -- the latter place about midway between Povyenets and Nyukhotskoe -- with strong patrols forward. Additional troops were found for Soroki by evacuating Petchenga on 25 July. An attempt to recapture Onega, made on 1 August by Ironside, failed. The town remained in Bolshevik hands throughout August. The date fixed for evacuation of Allied troops was drawing close, and the North Russian Government insisted that the port should be regained before the Allies left. Another attempt made on 30 August, again from Archangel, consisting of a naval bombardment and a feint at landing

*See Report No. 82.

troops failed to intimidate the Bolsheviks into immediate withdrawal; eight days later, however, they set the town on fire and withdrew. On 10 September, Russian forces from Archangel marched in unopposed. (Ibid., 288-293. N.R.E.F. diary, 22, 23 and 25 Jul; 3 and 8 Aug; 8 and 11 Sep 19.)

67. Lord Rawlinson arrived in North Russia from the War Office on 9 August with the task of co-ordinating Allied withdrawals from the Archangel and Murmansk sectors.* With him came reinforcements for Murmansk -- a battalion of Royal Marines and a French contingent of 600 infantry and machine guns. Other reinforcements, the 1 E. Surr. R. the 86 and 135 Btys., R.F.A., two companies of the 19 M.G. Bn., and the 55 Fd. Coy. R.E., arrived on 27 August. However, as the Italian contingent in its entirety of 1200 and the original British expeditionary force sailed for England on 10 August "the month saw no gain in Allied numerical strength." The anti-Bolshevik Russian army, however, now totalled between six and seven thousand (exclusive of Karelians), with two field batteries and engineer units. Russians manned half the boats of the flotilla, and the training of air pilots was well advanced. "It had become a force with which the Bolsheviks would have to reckon seriously." (Maynard, 294, 296. N.R.E.F. diary, 29 Jun; 7-9, 17 and 27 Aug 19.)

68. In compliance with the War Office order directing that all British troops who had arrived in North Russia prior to February 1919 were to be returned

*See Report No. 82.

to England before the end of August, the Canadian contingent sailed from Murmansk on 22 Aug 1919. (Hundevad, March 1937.)

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE AND WITHDRAWAL

69. Rawlinson, on 11 August, urged the North Russian Government to abandon Archangel and to concentrate all Russian forces on the Murmansk front, where they could threaten Petrograd, and would have at their backs an ice-free port. Maynard, doubting the possibility of a successful fight on both fronts, agreed. Political reasons led the government to reject the proposal -- no victories gained along the Murmansk-Petrograd railway would compensate for the loss of Archangel. (Maynard, 296-8.)

70. Maynard's evacuation plan consisted of an offensive to gain the line of the Suna river, some 20 miles from Petrozavodsk, immediately prior to withdrawal, and until this could be mounted exploiting success in the Shunga. The latter resulted in the whole peninsula being cleared of Bolshevik forces by the end of August. This not only gave a fresh impetus to recruiting, but also rendered the left flank secure for the projected offensive to the Suna. The timing of this was left to Rawlinson. The withdrawal from Murmansk could not precede that from Archangel, now set at the last week in September. The final decision was that the Suna offensive would start at the middle of September, and that Murmansk would be evacuated in the first week of October. (Ibid., 299-302. N.R.E.F. diary, 31 Aug 19.)

71. The offensive entailed an advance of 35 miles. No Allied troops, Rawlinson stipulated, should operate south of the Nurmis River, some ten miles from the final objective. The object of the advance was twofold -- first to strike a blow which would facilitate the handing over the front to anti-Bolshevik Russians and which would prevent the enemy from interfering with Allied withdrawal, and secondly to inflict such casualties as would render the Bolsheviks incapable of an early resumption of the offensive. Surprise, however, was lacking. Allied evacuation had been proclaimed in newspapers. The blow at Archangel, with similar objects, having already fallen, the Bolshevik commander opposing Maynard could reasonably assume that he, too, would shortly face attack. Thus preliminary operations designed to outflank Bolshevik garrisons failed, and there was no time to organize other attempts. Accordingly, on 14 September, the final offensive was launched along the whole front with a strength of 9000, two-thirds of whom were Russians. On the 18th, British troops occupied the line of the Nurmis -- "beyond which no Allied units were permitted to operate" -- and Skobeltsin, the Russian commander, decided to postpone further offensive action until he was firmly established here.

The Bolsheviks had been hustled and hammered for three days, and their casualties had been extremely heavy.... In prisoners alone they had lost 1000, besides large quantities of supplies, rolling stock and war material.... In addition the Nurmis afforded a satisfactory line of defence.... By the 25th the transfer of the flotilla, of R.A.F. machines, and of all war material in the forward zone had been completed, and Skobeltsin and his army stood alone to champion the cause of loyal Russia.
(Maynard, 302-309. N.R.E.F. diary, 14-18 Sep 19.)

The evacuation of Allied troops ended on 12 October, when the last troopship cast off her moorings, and swung into the tide of the Kola Inlet. (Maynard, 310.)

CONCLUSION

72. The sequel to the withdrawal of the Allies from Northern Russia has been described in Report No. 82. Anti-Bolshevik opposition crumbled soon after Allied departure. On 21 Feb 20 Soviet rule, accompanied by its customary excesses, was re-established at Murmansk and over the whole of the White Sea region. It has been seen that as a strategic move against Germany the intervention at Murmansk was successful and amply justified; subsequent embroilment with Bolshevik Russia must be regarded as thing apart. At the outset, Moscow raised no objection to the enterprise, and even sanctioned it for the defence of Murmansk. It was in the Allies' interests that there should be no break in relations with the Bolsheviks, since the only object was to prosecute the war against Germany. That the rupture occurred was solely due to the machinations of the Bolshevik leaders. The question remains whether it was politic, despite this rupture, to continue operations against the Bolsheviks after the overthrow of Germany. Allied policy was singularly lacking -- nowhere was public opinion sufficiently strong to support armed intervention on a decisive scale. Without aim, Allied assistance to the North Russian counter-revolution proved a failure; but support within the means available could not be withheld, for otherwise North Russian forces, which had ably assisted the Allies

against Germany, would have been left unprotected after the armistice. It was obviously right to build them up into a force capable of protecting themselves before Allied evacuation. That this meant continued operations against the Bolsheviks was unavoidable; in fact the operations were undertaken with justification, leading, as they did, to the strengthening of anti-Bolshevik elements in Northern Russia to a scale which promised a fair chance of success. (Ibid., 109-110, 151.)

... our action at Murmansk in common with that in other parts of Russia can give rise to no feeling of self-reproach, and to one only of regret -- namely, that the help we gave fell short of that required to throttle in its infancy the noisome beast of Bolshevism (Ibid., 311.)

73. This Report was compiled by Capt
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