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Canadian Participation in the
United Nations Emergency Force

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Canadian Participation in the
United Nations Emergency Force

SCOPE OF REPORT AND MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. This report presents a survey of Canadian participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was raised in November 1956 at the time of the Suez Crisis. Only that portion of the story which relates to the evolution, raising and despatch of the force has been considered in detail, for the later employment of UNEF does not appear to differ substantially from that of any other force with a similar role under similar conditions. The unique features of the United Nations Emergency Force, on the other hand, all emerged during the time of actual crisis. From the Canadian point of view the crisis may be said to have lasted between 29 October, when Israel invaded Egypt, and 24 November, when the first Canadian troops landed on Egyptian soil.

2. Although the greater portion of the Report deals with matters which were peculiarly Canadian, it has been necessary to include a comprehensive outline of the events leading up to the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force. This was unavoidable, since, without such background information, many of even the minor decisions on organization, dress, or logistic support would be incomprehensible. The reason, for instance, why Swissair rather than the United States Air Force had to be used to fly men and equipment from Italy to Egypt, why British military stocks on Cyprus could not be used, or why the provision of some distinctive form of head-dress became a matter of urgency was in each case rooted in the political background of the crisis. Similarly, the haste which marked the recruitment of the force, the exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council from participation, the different types of contingents supplied by contributor nations, and many other fundamental considerations were primarily political in origin. (It may also be added that, insofar as Canada was concerned, virtually all the difficulties and delays experienced owed their existence to causes which had little to do with the organization or functioning of the Canadian services, but which were inherent in the political circumstances surrounding the entire operation.) However, once it was decided that the Report should deal at all with the international background of the Suez Crisis, it soon became apparent

that the subject was far too complex and controversial to lend itself to any cursory treatment. To omit certain facts would, in effect, be to tell lies. Since the creation of UNEF in November 1956 was the first -- and so far the only -- time that the United Nations Organization has raised an integrated force of its own, as distinct from national contingents operating primarily under the military direction of a Great Power, the precedents set by politico-military decisions are likely to be extremely important. Consequently the details of joint international planning, and of the force's terms of reference, command structure, and logistical support are of special significance.

3. The principal source materials available fall naturally into two distinct categories: open sources and certain classified departmental files. The open sources deal chiefly with the political background of the crisis, the actions taken by the United Nations Organization, the actual military activity in Egypt, and the decisions of the Canadian Government. These open sources include the following: Documents on International Affairs 1956, a publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which contains in convenient form most of the relevant published documents on the crisis; the official record of the Canadian House of Commons debates for the Fourth (Special) Session which lasted between 26 November 1956 and 8 January 1957; publications of the Department of External Affairs, and especially its book Canada and the United Nations 1956-57; a history of UNEF, A United Nations Peace Force, compiled by William R. Frye under the auspices of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Sir Anthony Eden's Memoirs, over half of which is concerned with Middle East problems and the last 160 pages of which deals exclusively with Suez crisis; various books -- some of which are eye-witness accounts -- on the military aspects of the invasion of Egypt; certain articles in periodicals and the daily press. When newspaper accounts are quoted as sources for developments outside of Canada, the syndicated news service, as well as the journal, has been listed wherever possible. It is probably worth mentioning in this regard that the large news agencies -- Reuters, Associated Press, United Press, and Canadian Press -- did an admirable job of reporting throughout the Suez Crisis. As additional information has been made available, it has become evident that the contemporary reporting of newspapermen was frequently more accurate, and less misleading, than some of the official communiqués issued by the nations involved.

4. Undoubtedly much source material relevant to this portion of the present Report has not yet been made available. Neither Israel nor any of the Great Powers involved have opened their archives for the period. We have not -- to take two obvious examples -- any record of

what transpired between Prime Minister Eden, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau during their five-hour conference at the Hotel Matignon in Paris on 16 October, nor do we possess minutes of the decisions reached by Mollet and Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion when they met secretly at Villacoublay Airport near Versailles on 22 October. Of course, the subject of these talks is not altogether beyond conjecture, but it is probably profitless to speculate as to what extent -- if at all -- still undisclosed information may change the general outlines of the story which emerges at present. Thus the present history must be a purely tentative study since any definitive report necessarily presupposes a more complete disclosure of the policy of the Governments concerned.

5. The classified sources dealing with Canadian participation in UNEF relate almost exclusively to the military planning, organization, despatch and support of the Canadian contribution to the force. They include the following: the Diary of the Canadian Army Liaison Team sent to New York to co-operate with the United Nations Secretary-General; special files compiled by the office of the Chief of the General Staff where much of the relevant material has been assembled; the minutes of Army Council and Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings; and various other classified departmental files.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE SUEZ CRISIS

6. The last days of October and the early days of November 1956 were filled with tragic and violent events. Although the violence occurred in two widely-separated portions of the globe, neither of which was near to Canada, yet this country, as a member of the United Nations Organization and of the British Commonwealth, inevitably found itself involved. Indeed, it is indicative of altered circumstances that, whereas a generation ago in Canada the two crises would have been unlikely to do more than awaken sentiments of moral indignation among a few internationally-minded citizens, in 1956 the Canadian Government played a not-inconspicuous part in the channeling of world opinion, all three of the Canadian armed forces were directly effected, and the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force became responsible for a continuing military commitment.

7. To see the Suez incident in its proper perspective and to understand the intensity of the emotions it invoked, it is necessary to recall the events which immediately preceded it. The first major international crisis of the year began in Budapest on 23 October when a spontaneous uprising of university students was transformed in a matter of hours into a massive rebellion against the Communist puppet regime in Hungary. Within four days the capital and most of Northern and Western Hungary had fallen under the control of the rebels. The Hungarian

Communist Government, in a series of desperate attempts to placate its people, abolished the secret security police on 27 October; promised far-reaching economic reforms the following day; and on 30 October a new Prime Minister, Mr. Imre Nagy, announced the abolition of the single-party system, the formation of a coalition Government, and early free elections.¹ Simultaneously there was unrest in Poland, partially generated by sympathy for the Hungarians but largely due to purely internal considerations.² As a result of developments in Poland, the Soviet Union was forced to transfer troops from East Germany to the neighborhood of Warsaw. Yet tension was mounting in East Germany itself, where memories of the abortive rising of 17 June 1953 were still sharp and bitter, and to these evidences of satellite discontent were added demonstrations and protest meetings in Rumania. Accordingly, on 30 October, in an attempt to prevent the Hungarian Rebellion from spreading, the Soviet Government announced its willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of all its military forces from the countries of the Warsaw Pact.³ By 31 October all Soviet troops had pulled out of Budapest.⁴

8. These events in Central Europe were not unconnected with the subsequent outbreak of fighting in the Middle East, and the two situations interacted on one another through the mediums of world opinion and Great Power interest, before, during, and after the actual bloodshed in Egypt. On Monday, 29 October 1956, six days after the first revolt of a Soviet satellite, the state of Israel, suddenly and without formal statement of her intentions, invaded Egypt.* The Hungarian Rebellion formed the background -- and, some have not hesitated to say, the catalyst -- of this Israeli attack.⁵ Israel would probably have attacked Egypt in any case, for she held this necessary to her own survival as a state, but when the outbreak of the Hungarian revolt engaged the full attention of both the Soviet Union and the United States, the opportunity seemed too good to miss. Two days after the struggle for national independence began in Budapest,⁶ Premier Ben-Gurion ordered the Israeli mobilization. In fact, this proved to be a psychological blunder of the first magnitude, for it estranged the considerable sympathy which Israel might otherwise have enjoyed in the United States and in those Western nations who were not the de facto allies of Israel. At all events, while the attention of the free world was fixed hopefully on the satellite states behind the Iron Curtain, the new outbreak of violence in the Middle East divided Western counsels,⁷ imposed serious and possibly enduring strains upon the British Commonwealth of Nations,⁸ and by preventing

*Israel was still technically in a state of war with Egypt, since only an armistice, and not a peace treaty, had been signed on 24 February, 1949. Thus the Israeli invasion was legally a breach of the armistice agreement rather than a de facto declaration of war.

the United Nations from giving its undivided attention to the struggle in Hungary, allowed the Soviet Union to re-impose its domination over that country with less serious diplomatic opposition and loss of prestige than could otherwise have been possible.⁹ The fate of Hungary would probably have been the same in any case, but the Suez crisis was certainly welcomed by the Soviet Union as a convenient distraction.

9. The Israeli invasion of Egypt came as a climax to a long series of lesser crises in the area. Prior to the Second World War, Palestine had been a mandated territory under a British administration which reported to the League of Nations in Geneva. Between 1919 and 1939 a steady flow of Jewish immigrants entered the country, encouraged to do so by the World Zionist Organization. By 1936 immigration had increased the Jewish population of Palestine from 80,000 to 400,000 out of a total population of 1,300,000.¹⁰ This rate of increase so seriously alarmed the indigenous inhabitants of the area* that they, together with their fellow Arabs in neighboring states, demanded that an early end should be made to the influx of Jews. Zionists throughout the world, on the other hand, demanded that much larger quotas of Jewish immigrants be authorized.

10. No solution acceptable to both sides could be discovered, but between 1939 and 1945 the problem of Palestine sank into relative insignificance. However, as the Second World War drew to a close, both the Jews and the Arabs began to prepare for civil war within the mandated territory. Jewish immigration also increased considerably, far exceeding the quotas laid down, but a substantial body of Western opinion, deeply sympathetic to the Jews because of the sufferings they had endured in Nazi-dominated Europe, was inclined to be tolerant of -- and in some cases even to welcome -- this migration. The World Zionist Organization now began to press for the establishment of an independent Jewish state, and in the early summer of 1945 Jewish terrorists began to attack members of the British forces attempting to control the illegal immigration. For their part, the Arabs, who had been prepared to accept the existing Jewish inhabitants of Palestine as citizens of a unitary, or even a federal, Palestinian state, were determined to resist by force the establishment of a separate Jewish nation in the centre of the Arab world.

*From one point of view, of course, the Jews themselves were the indigenous inhabitants of the area, although the last time a Jewish state had existed in Palestine had been 70 A.D. and even then it existed as a Roman province.

11. There followed a long period of increasing terrorist activity by the Jewish secret societies Irgun and the "Stern Gang", and by the semi-secret Haganah, which was climaxed on 22 July 1945 when the Zionists bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people.¹¹ The Arabs attempted to retaliate in kind, but they had neither the organization, the arms, nor the financial backing to make their terrorism effective. As a result, thousands of Arabs were driven out of the area, and their land given to Jewish immigrants. A special committee of the United Nations investigated the problem, but could not reach a unanimous decision. The majority report, however, called for the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, and the United Nations General Assembly adopted this report on 29 November 1947 by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions. Among those nations which abstained was Britain, the mandatory power.

12. When the British mandate in Palestine officially ended on 14 May 1948, the state of Israel was proclaimed simultaneously by the Jewish National Council and the General Zionist Council at Tel Aviv. A provisional Israeli Government, established under Premier David Ben-Gurion and President Chaim Weizmann, was promptly recognized by a number of nations, including both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the five Arab neighbors of Israel, (Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) refused to admit the validity of Israel's national claims, and later in the month war broke out. Israel soon defeated the forces ranged against her, and although the first United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated in September by Zionist gunmen, the United Nations finally arranged an uneasy truce which left Israel occupying considerably more territory than she had claimed at the outbreak of the war. A United Nations Truce Supervision Organization was established to observe and report upon any violation of the armistice.

13. On 11 May 1949, Israel joined the United Nations and on 14 December of the same year, ignoring a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly for the internationalization of Jerusalem, the Israeli Government moved to that city from Tel Aviv.¹² Border clashes and incidents continued to occur, and in spite of a Tripartite Declaration signed in 1950 by the United States, Britain and France, guaranteeing the status quo of the Palestine Armistice lines, the efforts of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization were unable to bring real peace. The Arabs felt that territory which was rightfully theirs had been stolen from them by violence, while the Jews felt themselves surrounded by hostile neighbors who would not admit that their new state had any basis in equity or in international law.

14. In December 1955 Israel staged a large-scale military raid against Syrian army positions in retaliation for a shooting incident on Lake Tiberias.¹³ As a result, on 19 January 1956 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning Israel for what it termed a "deliberate violation" of the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of 15 July, 1948, of the armistice agreement, and of Israel's obligations under the charter of the United Nations. Expressing "grave concern" at Israel's failure to comply with its obligations, the Security Council warned that, if there were further infractions, the Security Council would have to consider what other measures would have to be taken.¹⁴ On 5 April the Israelis shelled Gaza and, although hostilities were halted by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, reprisal raids by Egyptian-trained Arab refugees from Palestine continued for several weeks.¹⁵ Violence also flared up on the frontier between Jordan and Israel, resulting in Jordan appealing to the Security Council in mid-October and entering on 24 October into a mutual defence pact with Egypt and Syria.¹⁶ These tensions, together with Israel's determination to clear out the bases on Egyptian soil which were being used for terrorist attacks on the lives and property of Israelis, were given as the cause for the invasion of 29 October. Undoubtedly also, contributory motives were the Egyptian refusal to allow Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aquaba; Israeli territorial ambitions on Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and the Tiran and Sanafir islands in the Gulf of Aquada; and Israel's fears that the Arab nations, some of whom were obtaining large quantities of arms from the Communist Bloc, would eventually become too strong for her.¹⁷

15. Ever since Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, in retaliation for the withdrawal of American financial help in building the High Dam at Aswan, the British and French Governments had expressed apprehension about the rights of the users of the waterway.¹⁸ The British Government was not consulted beforehand as to the withdrawal of American aid, and consequently had no opportunity for criticism or comment.¹⁹ Although President Nasser agreed to compensate the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company (which, he pointed out, was by the terms of the concession of 1865 an Egyptian limited company), and although he promised that Egypt would "maintain freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal",²⁰ these assurances did not satisfy the British and French who claimed that the Egyptians would not be competent to operate the waterway and that Nasser's promise of maintaining freedom of shipping would not be kept.²¹ Nevertheless, in spite of the resignation -- at the instigation of the Suez Canal Company -- of virtually all the non-Egyptian employees of the Company (including pilots), the Canal remained open and functioned efficiently until hostilities actually broke out. On 30 October,

indeed, Sir Anthony Eden estimated that the value of shipping then on passage through the Canal was about £ 50 million, exclusive of cargo.²²

16. Yet the issue of the Suez Canal was not the only, nor perhaps even the basic, motivation of British policy in 1956. Ever since early 1955, when Nasser had clearly assumed the leadership of Pan-Arab nationalism, an influential section of British political opinion had felt that Britain's entire position in the Middle East was being steadily undermined. This conviction hardened when in March 1956 King Hussein of Jordan rejected membership in the Baghdad Pact and dismissed Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion. Under Prime Minister Suleiman Nabulsi, Jordan strengthened her relations with Egypt and Syria, and when, on 22 October, the anti-British party won a sweeping victory in Jordan's general election, some British political observers feared lest Arab unity under Nasser's leadership would destroy Britain's influence throughout the Middle East.²³

17. France, for her part, had built the Suez Canal and took an historical pride in it. Furthermore, Mr. Mollet's Socialist Government felt a kinship with and sympathy for the socialist experiment in Israel. Much more important than these considerations, however, was the psychological climate resulting from the fact that ever since 1945 France, too, had seen her position as a colonial power steadily diminish. In Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, and -- bitterest of all -- in Indo-China, new nationalisms had triumphed and the French Empire had contracted. Now, quite apart from the nationalization of the Suez Canal, France had a serious cause of quarrel with President Nasser, since she claimed that Egypt was supplying arms, equipment and moral support to the Arab nationalists fighting for independence in Algeria.

THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH ULTIMATA

18. Late in the afternoon of Monday, 29 October, an Israeli parachute battalion of "X" (Sharon) Brigade was dropped in the vicinity of the Mitla Pass, some 120 miles inside Egyptian territory. At sunset of that day the remainder of "X" Brigade, having crossed the Egyptian frontier, attacked Kuntilla in a drive to link up with the isolated Israeli battalion, and after dark another Israeli brigade crossed the frontier and advanced towards Quesisima.²⁴ No authoritative statement of final Israeli military objectives has been published, but it seems reasonable to suppose that these included at least the destruction of Egyptian forces deployed east of the Suez Canal, the seizure of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and Sharm-el-Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aquaba. With these achieved, Israel might, under the circumstances of the time, reasonably hope for a political settlement with Egypt which would be favourable to Jewish ambitions.

19. On 30 October, some 18 hours after the first Israeli violation of Egyptian territory, Britain and France presented an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt demanding that fighting should cease within 12 hours (by 6.30 a.m. Cairo time the same day, Tuesday, 30 October.) Israel was enjoined to halt her forces 10 miles to the east of the Suez Canal, and Egypt was ordered to withdraw her forces 10 miles west of the Canal.²⁵ The Suez Canal is situated entirely within Egyptian territory and at the nearest point is 138 miles from the Israeli border. Britain and France also stated that they intended in any case to despatch forces to the key positions of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez in the Canal Zone to protect their vital interests.^{26*}

20. In London, in the presence of French Foreign Minister Pineau, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirpatrick, handed the joint ultimata to the Egyptian Ambassador and the Israeli chargé d'affaires. The United States Government was informed of this action but was not asked to support it or to participate in any military operations. President Eisenhower, who was in the midst of a presidential election campaign, actually learned of the Anglo-French decision to intervene from a news-ticker.²⁷ Prior to the Anglo-French action there had been no consultation with any Commonwealth Country nor was the Canadian Government informed until just prior to the official announcement being made in the British House of Commons.²⁸

21. Egypt immediately rejected the ultimatum and President Nasser ordered mobilization.²⁹ Premier Ben-Gurion announced that Israel would accept the ultimatum on condition that Egypt also did.³⁰ Meanwhile Israeli armour continued its advance towards the Mitla Pass where the parachute battalion had been dropped the previous afternoon and Israeli reconnaissance detachments reached Abu Agueila, some 30 miles inside Egyptian territory. The Egyptians began to block the Canal by sinking ships in the waterway and by destroying bridges, dropping them across the channel.³¹

WORLD REACTION TO THE INVASION OF EGYPT AND CONTINUING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

22. On Tuesday, 30 October, in the United Nations Security Council, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations Secretary-General, offered to resign his office, saying that he could not continue to serve unless "all members honour their pledge to observe all articles of the charter".³² In the Middle East itself, Major-General E.L.M. Burns, the Canadian Chief

*The texts of the joint Anglo-French ultimata to Israel and Egypt are to be found at Appendix "A".

of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, said that he knew nothing of the Jewish attack except what he had learned from a news broadcast. Late that night, by a vote of 270 to 218, the British House of Commons approved Prime Minister Anthony Eden's decision to use force in the Suez Canal Zone.

23. Meanwhile, that same evening, in the United Nations Security Council in New York, the United States presented a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, for Israeli troops to return within their own borders, and for all outside powers to refrain from the use of force in the area.³³* When the ballot was taken, the Soviet Union voted with the United States and five other council members. Australia and Belgium abstained on the grounds that their delegates had received no instructions from their Governments. Britain and France vetoed the resolution. This was the first time in the history of the United Nations that Britain had used the veto. Another similar resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also vetoed by Britain and France.³⁴ Later in the evening Mr. L.B. Pearson, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, in a public statement expressed his regret that Britain and France had acted as they had and described as "most deplorable" the split in the United Nations Security Council between Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other.³⁵ During this day too, British warships appeared in the Eastern Mediterranean, and British and French paratroop forces were reported standing by on Cyprus, 250 miles north of the Canal.

24. On Wednesday, 31 October, the Canadian Government placed a ban on all shipment of arms to both Israel and Egypt (although at this time the only scheduled order was one for 24 F-86 Sabre jets for Israel), and Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced that the Canadian Parliament might be called into special Emergency Session.³⁶ That same day President Eisenhower, despite the imminence of the presidential election, which some had believed would prevent him from taking a firm stand, stated in a nation-wide radio and television broadcast that he considered the British and French decision "had been taken in error" and that it could "scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed".³⁷ He declared, however, that there would be no United States involvement in the hostilities and that he had no plan for calling a special session of Congress.³⁸ Public opinion polls, press comment, and statements by leaders of both political parties indicated a solid basis of support for the President's stand.³⁹

*The text of the United States resolution is to be found at Appendix "B".

The American attitude to the Suez crisis, was thus strikingly different from the United States' policy at the outbreak of the Korean War, but then, of course, the situation also differed. In 1950 the Government of the nation whose territory had been invaded had appealed to the United States for help; and in 1956 the invading forces had been Communist rather than the allies of the United States. In both cases, however, the United States exerted its influence against the invaders.

25. In the United Kingdom opinion was far from as unanimous as it appeared to be in the United States. When the invasion of Egypt was debated in the British House of Commons, the Speaker of the House, for the first time in many years, found it necessary temporarily to suspend the session because of disorder. A Labour Party member, Mrs. Bessie Braddock, pointed her finger at the Government Ministers and declared: "Every one of you can be branded a murderer!"⁴⁰ Nevertheless, a Labour Party motion censuring the Anglo-French "resort to armed force" against Egypt was defeated by 323 votes to 255. Later, outside the House of Commons, a crowd, estimated to consist of some 10,000 people, demonstrated against the Government's action and was dispersed by baton-swinging mounted police. In the House of Lords, Doctor Geoffrey Fisher, the Archbishop of Canterbury, said that Christian opinion in Britain was "terribly uneasy and unhappy" over the invasion of Egypt.⁴¹

26. On 31 October, the French cruiser, Kersaint, which happened to be lying just offshore from Haifa, opened fire on the Egyptian destroyer, Ibrahim El-Awal, and the Royal Navy cruiser, H.M.S. Newfoundland, shelled and sank an Egyptian frigate in the Gulf of Suez. French fighter aircraft, manned by French pilots, patrolled the skies over Israel; French fighter-bombers attacked columns of Egyptian reinforcements moving up through Sinai; and French airmen flew re-supply missions to the Israeli paratroops near Mitla. On the evening of this day British bomber aircraft based on Cyprus struck at Egyptian airfields. The British reported that they met no resistance in the air and only weak anti-aircraft fire from the ground. Subsequently a number of other targets, including military concentrations and communications in or leading to the Canal Zone were also bombed; a prison in Cairo was struck; and illustrated leaflets attacking President Nasser were dropped. The British also successfully attacked the radio station from which Cairo's "Voice of Arabia" broadcasts were transmitted.⁴² Israeli forces, spearheaded by armour and paratroops and strongly supported from the air, continued to advance without serious co-ordinated opposition deep into Egyptian territory in the Sinai desert. On the morning of 1 November the French cruiser Georges Leygues, which happened to be lying just offshore from Rafah, shelled Egyptian Army positions.⁴³

27. On Thursday, 1 November, Premier David Ben-Gurion rejected proposals for stationing foreign troops, "no matter how called", on Israeli territory or in any areas occupied by the Israeli army. This was in effect a declaration that Israel would oppose the sending of a United Nations international force to the Sinai Peninsula or the Gaza Strip -- areas which were being invaded and occupied and which Israel had every intention of annexing. The Israeli Parliament by a vote of 83 to 3 supported Premier Ben-Gurion's stand on the international force. During the course of this debate, Premier Ben-Gurion announced that Israeli casualties to date amounted to 150 dead, 700 wounded, and 20 captured, and he added that more than 5,000 Egyptians, mostly members of the units which had been caught by the surprise attack in the Sinai Peninsula, had been taken prisoner. No figures on Egyptian casualties had yet been announced from Cairo.⁴⁴

ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

28. As tension continued to mount, the Canadian Cabinet held its second emergency meeting in two days. On 1 November too, Mr. Pearson left Ottawa for the Emergency Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly which had been called on the insistence of the United States over British and French protests. The reason for calling the General Assembly was that, since the days of the Korean War, the procedure of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution could be invoked, whereby a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly could override a veto in the Security Council.

29. Apparently Mr. Pearson originally hoped that a United Nations police force could be authorized, consisting in large measure of the British and French troops who were already in the area. According to William R. Frye, the aim of this suggestion was not to lend respectability to the Anglo-French action but to take at their face value British and French statements that their purpose was to separate the belligerents and protect the Suez Canal.⁴⁵ Mr. Pearson soon found, however, that the temper of the Afro-Asian bloc and of both the United States and the Soviet Union made any such suggestion impractical.

30. On Thursday in the General Assembly, the United States proposed that "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agreed to an immediate cease-fire .. withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines ... desist from raids ... and observe scrupulously [the armistice terms]."^{46*}

*The full text of the United States resolution is to be found at Appendix "C".

The vote came after midnight on Friday, 2 November, with 64 nations supporting the American resolution and five (Britain, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand) opposing it.⁴⁷ Canada, in company with the Union of South Africa, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and Laos, abstained. According to Mr. Pearson, the reason why Canada abstained on this important vote, despite the provisions for a cease-fire and a withdrawal, was that "the resolution did not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for making progress towards a peace settlement or for any improvement in the situation which had preceded the outbreak of fighting". Nevertheless, Mr. Pearson, speaking to the resolution, suggested the formation of an international police force to operate in the invaded area, in spite of Israel's prior rejection of such a solution.⁴⁸ In Ottawa, Government sources spoke of the possibility of Canada contributing a battalion group of about a thousand men to such a force.⁴⁹

31. On Saturday, 3 November, the Canadian Cabinet met again in emergency session to consider a report from the Minister of External Affairs. Later in the day the Prime Minister told the press that there was growing support for the Canadian suggestion of a United Nations Police Force. The urgent need of some such force was emphasized by the announcement of an Israeli spokesman (inaccurate and premature, as it later transpired) that the Israeli army had now occupied all the Sinai Peninsula.⁵⁰ On Sunday, 4 November, in a nation-wide television and radio broadcast, Prime Minister St. Laurent told the Canadian people that the crisis in the Middle East had strained the Western Alliance and the Commonwealth more than any other event since the Second World War.⁵¹

ORGANIZATION OF A UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

32. At United Nations Headquarters, at Lake Success, the Emergency Session of the General Assembly was still continuing, and in the course of the morning of 4 November Mr. Pearson presented a resolution calling for the creation of an international police force. The Canadian resolution read:

The General Assembly
Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolution 997(ES-I) of 2 November 1956 [the original cease-fire resolution adopted by the General Assembly]
Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in

accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution.⁵²

33. Mr. Pearson's suggestion won strong support from United States Delegate Henry Cabot-Lodge, and was rapidly approved by a vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions, including the nine members of the Soviet bloc and Egypt. In another resolution, sponsored by India and 18 other Afro-Asian delegates and passed by a vote of 59 to 5 with 12 abstentions, the General Assembly requested Secretary-General Hammarskjold to implement the cease-fire and to tender a report to the General Assembly.⁵³

34. Mr. Hammarskjold at once convened an informal planning group consisting of Canada, Norway, Columbia and India. The plan which emerged was to establish a "United Nations Command" under Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns, the chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. General Burns was to be authorized

to organize a small staff by recruitment from the observer corps of the Truce Supervision Organization of a limited number of officers, drawn from countries which are not permanent members of the Security Council; that, further, General Burns [was to be] authorized, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to recruit directly from Member States, with the same limitation, the additional number of officers of which he may be in need; and that the Secretary-General should be authorized to take such administrative measures as would prove necessary for the speedy implementation of this decision.⁵⁴

After this had been approved by the General Assembly, it was intended to proceed with the formation of a contingent.

35. While the formation of a United Nations Command was being debated by the General Assembly, further appeals were made to the belligerents to stop the bloodshed. In a cable to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Secretary-General pointed out that the General Assembly "did not accept the decision on the establishment of a United Nations Force as a condition for the cease-fire", and again requested that all military operations should cease immediately. Similar cables were sent to Egypt and Israel.⁵⁵ Britain replied that the idea of a United Nations international force was "warmly welcome", but added that the composition of the staff and

contingent of the force "would be a matter for discussion". Meanwhile, the British note added, "certain Anglo-French operations with strictly limited objectives are continuing".⁵⁶ Egypt replied that she was willing to accept the cease-fire,⁵⁷ and Israel answered with a list of five questions relating to the acceptance by Egypt of conditions which would be considered necessary preliminaries to any truce.⁵⁸

36. The General Assembly met again on the evening of 4 November, and after midnight the setting-up of the United Nations Command was introduced as a resolution sponsored jointly by Canada, Colombia and Norway. The vote was 57 to 0 in favour with 19 abstentions.^{59*}

THE ANGLO-FRENCH LANDINGS AND THE CEASE-FIRE

37. While this was going on at Lake Success a joint Anglo-French armada of more than 100 ships, which had at some previous time been marshalled at London and Marseilles and moved from there to Malta and Cyprus, sailed towards the Canal Zone. Six days had elapsed since the rejection of the Anglo-French ultimatum by Egypt. The force at Malta, which was composed mainly of armour and Commandos, had set sail for Port Said on the night of 30 October. The distance from Malta to Port Said by the shortest route is 936 miles and the shortest time in which the journey could be completed was six days.⁶⁰

38. On 4 November too, as the Anglo-French fleet weighed anchor in Cyprus, another development occurred. In Hungary, which the world had all but forgotten for the past seven days, the Soviet divisions, which had been withdrawn from Budapest on 31 October, returned.⁶¹ Russian tanks and infantry, supported by waves of aircraft, suddenly attacked on a broad front from the Carpathian foothills to the Austrian border. In Budapest the fighting was bloody but brief as the Hungarian Freedom Fighters, equipped with small arms and home-made gasoline bombs, proved unable to resist the Russian armoured assault.⁶²

39. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt began early on the morning of Monday, 5 November. Paratroops dropped in the area north of the Suez

*The text of the joint resolution is to be found at Appendix "D".

Canal Zone at first met only light opposition and easily seized Gamil Airport west of Port Said.⁶³ French sources reported at least 70 Egyptians killed in the initial assault, and fighting increased in intensity later in the day.⁶⁴ In the late afternoon the Cyprus Headquarters of the Anglo-French invasion force announced that the garrison in Port Said had surrendered, but this claim was withdrawn shortly afterwards, and fighting continued.⁶⁵

40. Meanwhile Mr. Pearson told the United National General Assembly in New York that the Canadian Government would recommend Canadian participation in the United Nations international force.⁶⁶ On the same day, in Ottawa, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced that a special session of Parliament would be held to approve the expenditure of funds for a Canadian contribution to the United Nations force, and promised that such a special session would be convened within 10 days of a Cabinet order designating a Canadian military unit for duty in the Middle East.⁶⁷ Government sources in the Canadian capital, however, emphasized that no Canadian troops would be sent to the Middle East until they could be landed on Egyptian soil without fighting.⁶⁸

41. On the evening of 5 November, events took a more ominous turn. Soviet Premier Bulganin addressed a personal appeal to President Eisenhower for joint Soviet-United States action to halt the fighting in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union also directed blunt notes to Britain and France, warning them that it was prepared to use force to end their invasion of Egyptian territory. President Eisenhower at once replied to Mr. Bulganin, pointing out that the suggestion of joint United States-Soviet intervention was "an obvious attempt to divert world attention from the Hungarian tragedy" and terming the proposal for joint action "unthinkable". The introduction of new forces into the Middle East would violate the United Nations Charter, President Eisenhower stated, and it would therefore be "the duty of all United Nations members, including the United States, to oppose such effort".⁶⁹ This was presumably of some comfort to the Governments of Britain and France who were being addressed in very belligerent terms by the Soviet Union. In his letter to Sir Anthony Eden, for instance, Mr. Bulganin said:

In what situation would Britain find herself if she were attacked by stronger states, possessing all types of modern destructive weapons? And such countries could, at the present time, refrain from sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain and use other means -- for instance, rocket weapons. Were rocket weapons used against Britain and France, you would, most probably, call this a barbarous action. But how does the inhuman attack launched by the armed forces of Britain and France against a practically

defenceless Egypt differ from this?

...We hope that at this critical moment you will show due common sense and draw the appropriate conclusions.⁷⁰

42. In a separate but similar note, Bulganin also warned the Israelis that their invasion of Egypt "puts in jeopardy the very existence of Israel as a state" and went on to say that "the Soviet Government is at this moment taking measures aimed at stopping the war and curbing the aggressors. We appeal to the Government of Israel to come to its senses before it is too late and halt the military aggression against Egypt".⁷¹ In the note to M. Mollet of France, Mr. Fulganin stated: "The Soviet government is fully determined to use force in order to smash the aggressors and restore peace in the East".⁷² At the same time Soviet propaganda agencies spoke of the raising and despatch of Russian "volunteer" forces to aid the Egyptians. Although technically, the Soviet notes were no more than unusually strong diplomatic protests, they were in fact universally regarded as actual threats.⁷³ Indeed, many ultimata which have resulted in war have been worded more temperately. In this connection it is interesting to note that when Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khruschev visited Indian Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi later in the month they informed him that at the time of the fighting in Egypt they believed a new world war was breaking out.⁷⁴ Such a war, of course, could only have occurred if the Soviet Union had permitted it to, for Russia had no vital interests at stake at Suez. The situation was therefore in no way comparable to those involving Berlin or Hungary.

43. Between Monday, 5 November, and early Tuesday, 6 November, Mr. Hammarskjold and his staff prepared another major paper, the principal conclusion of which was that the proposed United Nations Emergency Force should not be used as a means of exerting political pressure on Egypt. "It follows", the Secretary-General's report stated, "from its [UNEF's] terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict".⁷⁵ Britain, France, and Israel protested vigorously against this judgement, but feeling in the General Assembly was running much too high for these protests to be regarded.⁷⁶ In addition to the threatening notes from the Soviet Union, considerable pressure was being exerted on Britain, France, and Israel by the United States and by world opinion. Later on 6 November the British and French Governments agreed to a cease-fire on the basis of the Hammarskjold report, stipulating certain conditions, not all of which were, in fact, met.⁷⁷ As a consequence, the Anglo-French forces, which had progressed about a quarter of the way down the Suez Canal from Port

Said, halted their advance some two miles north of El Kantara. Hostilities in Egypt officially ended at midnight 6 November, G.M.T.

AUTHORIZATION OF A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

44. The United Nations Emergency Force became a legal entity at 7 p.m. on Wednesday, 7 November, when the General Assembly adopted Mr. Hammarskjold's report by a vote of 64 to 0 with 12 abstentions.⁷⁸ As it was designed on the basis of the Hammarskjold report, UNEF possessed certain distinctive characteristics.* In the first place, the Great Powers were specifically forbidden to participate, and the Secretary-General rejected British and French attempts to take part in deciding the composition of the staff and contingents. The main reason for this was the undoubted desire of a majority in the General Assembly to prevent Britain, France and Israel from obtaining political bargaining assets under United Nations auspices, but there was also a strong feeling that the Soviet Union should be kept out of the Middle East if this were at all possible, and that no precedent of allowing Great Power participation should therefore be set.⁷⁹

45. Secondly, the political control of the United Nations Emergency Force was placed to a high degree in the hands of the Secretary-General. Mr. Hammarskjold was given an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, but the responsibility for decisions remained with the Secretary-General who was answerable only to the General Assembly.

46. Finally the United Nations Emergency Force, although paramilitary in nature, was not to have military objectives. "It would", Mr. Hammarskjold said, "be more than an observers corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed".⁸⁰ In spite of British and French efforts to have the United Nations Emergency Force stationed in the Canal Zone until a political agreement had been reached, it was ruled that UNEF would have "no functions" in this area once the fighting had stopped. As Mr. Hammarskjold told the Advisory Committee, the "very basis and starting point [of UNEF was] recognition by the General Assembly of the unlimited sovereign rights of Egypt".⁸¹ The General Assembly would reserve for itself the determination of the tasks of the emergency force, its composition, and its administration, but it

*The full text of Mr. Hammarskjold's second and final report is to be found at Appendix "E".

would "be limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognized international law".⁸²

THE FINANCING OF UNEF

47. The Secretary-General laid down the following "basic rule" on the financing of the force: "...a nation providing a unit would be responsible for the cost of the equipment and salaries, while all other costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United Nations".⁸³ In practice this rule was modified by the provision that a contributing state should pay all expenses (except food) which would in any case have been incurred by the upkeep of its contingent, while the United Nations, by a special levy on member states, would pay such expenses as were directly attributable to the fact that the troops were serving overseas rather than at home. Thus the U.N. was to pay such expenses as transportation, special equipment, and extra pay for overseas duty. Even this modification met with objections, however, until the United States came forward with a plan by which the first \$10,000,000 would be levied according to the regular scale of assessment on member states and the balance for the first year -- too optimistically estimated at \$6,500,000 -- would be met, half by the United States and half by voluntary contributions.⁸⁴

48. Canada's share of the initial \$10,000,000 assessment was \$315,000, or 3.15 per cent. The cost of UNEF to Canada has been proportionate to this figure for each twelve-month period since 31 December 1957, but this does not represent the total bill to the Canadian taxpayer. In addition to paying part of the cost of its UNEF contingent, Canada has helped to finance two other United Nations projects directly attributable to the unstable situation in the Middle East. Even prior to the invasion of Egypt, Canada was the fourth largest contributor, through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, to the support of the 900,000 Arab refugees who were driven out of Palestine in 1948 and whom Israel had since refused to re-admit. Up to May 1957 Canadian contributions for Arab refugee relief totalled \$4,500,000 in cash and kind.⁸⁵ Furthermore, on 1 February, 1957, the House of Commons voted to provide a loan of \$1,000,000 for the interim financing of clearance operations in the Suez Canal. This clearance was done under United Nations' auspices, because Egypt refused to allow British and French salvage companies to proceed with the work, but the equitable repayment of the costs involved has ever since remained a matter of international controversy.

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PRELIMINARY ORGANIZATION
OF UNEF

49. Although the situation, which had looked desperate on 5 November, was appreciably improved by the evening of 7 November, the fear of a major war had not yet entirely receded. In Peking, the Egyptian Ambassador to Red China was informed that 280,000 Chinese had "volunteered" to "drive the aggressors" out of Egypt, and Moscow Radio was announcing that "tens of thousands" of Russians had similarly "volunteered".⁸⁶ With these alternatives opening out before it, the Egyptian Government now delayed permission for the United Nations Emergency Force to enter Egyptian territory, and since the General Assembly had specifically required that this consent be obtained before its troops were landed in the Middle East, a dangerous impasse developed. Egypt professed to be suspicious of the intentions behind UNEF -- a suspicion which, presumably, was not allayed by British, French, and New Zealand press references to the emergency force as a weapon of political pressure on Egypt.⁸⁷ A steady stream of Soviet propaganda tended to increase Egyptian doubts.

50. Accordingly, General Burns was despatched to Cairo from Jerusalem to discuss matters with President Nasser. Egypt required reassurance on a number of points. Where would the United Nations force be stationed? How long would it stay on Egyptian territory? What would be its composition? What would its duties be? General Burns in his talks with President Nasser and Mr. Hammarskjold over the long-distance telephone was able to allay many of Egypt's fears, but although on 5 November President Nasser had given approval in principle to "a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities", Cairo was now in no hurry to agree to the entry of UNEF.⁸⁸

51. Thus the cease-fire did not end the Suez crisis. In the United Nations, delegates from many countries felt that the world had drawn close to a catastrophe and that, although a breathing-space had been vouchsafed, some considerable danger still remained. This undoubtedly accounts for the atmosphere of extreme urgency which surrounded the building up of the United Nations Emergency Force. On 4 November when the Secretary-General had met the delegates of Canada, Colombia, India, and Norway (L.B. Pearson, F. Urrutia, A.S. Lall, and Hans Engen) all had agreed to co-operate and had expressed the belief that their Governments would supply troops. Later that same day Canada, Colombia and Norway put their offers in writing, and New Zealand also indicated a willingness to contribute to the force.⁸⁹

52. On 5 November, Sweden, Denmark and Pakistan had offered contingents, and on 6 November similar offers had been made by Finland, Ceylon, India, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Before long the list of nations who wished to participate included Burma, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Iran, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Ecuador, the Philippines, Peru, Afghanistan, Laos and Chile. In all, 24 countries offered to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force, and the principal task of the co-ordinator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, the Under-Secretary of the United Nations, was to select the numbers required without offending those countries whose offers were "not activated".⁹⁰

53. This proved no easy task. The New Zealand delegation was angered when it was informed that its country's troops would not be required, but New Zealand had consistently voted with Britain and France throughout the crisis, a circumstance which hardly made its offer acceptable to Egypt. A similar situation prevailed in the case of Pakistan. Mr. Hammarskjold would have liked to have had a Pakistani contingent, if for no other reason than because it would have included an excellent military band, but the Prime Minister of Pakistan had publicly attacked President Nasser, so Pakistan soldiers could not be considered suitable.⁹¹ At this time, it must be remembered, President Nasser had not yet given permission for any United Nations Force to land on Egyptian territory and the United Nations General Assembly had been quite specific that the force was to go to Egypt only with Egyptian consent.

PRELIMINARY CANADIAN PLANNING FOR A CONTRIBUTION TO UNEF

54. Canada, as one of the nations which had offered a contingent and as an original sponsor of the resolution calling for the creation of a United Nations Emergency Force, was almost uniquely anxious to assemble troops in time. Probably this was not unconnected with the fact that the Canadian position contained an inherent ambiguity -- the Canadian Government "deplored" the Anglo-French intervention but at the same time was deeply disturbed by the evident rift which that intervention had caused in the Commonwealth. Feelings were running high both in Canada and the United Kingdom. On the one hand, in Canada the Government was already being attacked both for siding with President Nasser against Britain and for not taking a more unequivocal stand against the Anglo-French invasion, while in Britain appeals for Commonwealth unity did not prevent sharp criticism of Commonwealth members who had not rallied behind the United Kingdom. Mr. William Deedes, the British Under-Secretary for Home Affairs, for instance, told a Conservative women's conference that, as a result of the Suez crisis, "at least we have discovered where

our friends lie in the Commonwealth".⁹² This official's views may not have been truly representative of British Government opinion, but they were indicative of at least a segment of British public opinion. For all these reasons, therefore, the Canadian Government was anxious to see the crisis settled speedily and in a way which would reflect the maximum credit on Canada.

55. On 6 November a meeting was held in Ottawa under the chairmanship of the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney, to begin planning for an immediate Canadian contribution to UNEF. Those present were Mr. R.B. Bryce, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet; General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee; Mr. F.R. Miller, Deputy Minister of National Defence; Lieut.-General H.D. Graham, the Chief of the General Staff; and Mr. J. Leger and Mr. G. Ignatieff, of the Department of External Affairs.⁹³ It was reported that the United Nations Secretary-General was considering a force of about 10,000 men to be raised from nations other than the Permanent Members of the Security Council. Mr. Pearson was quoted as having told the Cabinet that speed in deciding upon a Canadian contribution was essential, since Soviet satellite states, notably Poland, were, already offering contingents. It was held to be important that Canadian troops should be available at the earliest possible moment. General Foulkes, however, pointed out that further information from General Burns would clearly be required before planning for a Canadian contribution could proceed, and he went on to suggest that consideration would have to be given to the logistic support of the force. This comment of General Foulkes' was to set the tone for the Canadian Army's future planning for the United Nations Emergency Force. Canada from the very outset -- and alone among the contributor nations -- was to evince a realistic interest in the prosaic details of administration and supply. General Foulkes went on to point out that it would obviously be impossible to depend upon United Kingdom sources of supply, although these would be most readily available through Cyprus. Therefore it might be necessary to explore the possibility of Naples being used as an advance base for the support of the force. So far as can be ascertained, this was the first suggestion that an advanced base should be established in the Naples area and it appears probable that General Foulkes' suggestion was communicated to Dr. Ralph Bunche by members of the Canadian Army Liaison Team at their first meeting with him on 8 November.⁹⁴ Certainly Dr. Bunche recommended just such an advanced base, specifying the Naples area as a suitable site, when he met the Secretary-General on the evening of 8 November. In any case, apart from the administrative advantages which would accrue from this step, three other important considerations recommended an advanced base in Italy

to Mr. Hammarskjold. The nations which had been asked to contribute troops as a matter of urgency could now get their contingents moving, a most desirable development from the political point of view; the available American airlift facilities could be used for the major portion of the journey; and finally, a certain amount of pressure could be exerted on Egypt to admit the United Nations Emergency Force merely by the fact of having that force standing by just across the Mediterranean.

56. During the course of the meeting on 6 November, the Minister of National Defence decided to send two Canadian Army Liaison Officers to New York to ascertain what General Burns would require. On General Foulkes' suggestion, it was also agreed that a senior military representative be appointed to the Permanent Canadian Mission in New York and that this officer would include in his functions continuing liaison with the Secretary-General. The Minister informed the meeting that he would recommend to the Cabinet that Canada's initial contribution should consist of a battalion group of between 1000 and 1500 men who would be ready to leave in 10 days or two weeks.⁹⁵

57. That evening at a special meeting of the Army Council, the Chief of the General Staff reported that the Government had agreed to the Minister's recommendations for sending a battalion group to the Middle East, but added that, pending discussions with General Burns, the exact size and composition of the force could not be determined.⁹⁶ If the men of the Canadian contingent could go to the Middle East with only their personal weapons, the C.G.S. estimated that the contingent could leave Canada in two weeks, but he added that if a western unit were selected it would take longer. After discussion, the Army Council decided that the Canadian Army's contribution would be based upon the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, then stationed in Calgary.

58. On 7 November the Canadian Government authorized a press release which stated that a battalion group, self-contained and capable of operating independently, would be Canada's contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force. In addition to the Canadian contingent of battalion strength, the force would be augmented by ordnance, army service corps, medical and dental detachments. This offer, however, would be subject to adjustment after consultation with the United Nations commander, General Burns. The press release further stated that the Government was prepared to have this force flown to the Middle East by the R.C.A.F. and that it was proposed to use the aircraft carrier H.M.C.S. Magnificent to transport vehicles and stores and to provide a temporary floating base for the Canadian contingent for rations, medical supplies, ammunition, fuel, and a limited amount of accommodation.

stores. H.M.C.S. Magnificent would also provide a small hospital to accommodate the sick and injured in the force, as well as space for a force headquarters and the communications network between the force and Canada.⁹⁷

59. On this same day, while H.M.C.S. Magnificent was steaming in the River Clyde in Scotland, her captain received instructions to cancel his previous orders and to proceed at once at "maximum safe speed" to Halifax, Nova Scotia, in order to become the troop transport and headquarters ship for the Canadian UNEF contingent. After refuelling at Greenock, the Magnificent sailed early on 8 November.⁹⁸

60. In the meanwhile the newly-appointed senior Army Liaison Officer, Brigadier C.G. Leech, Director General of Plans and Operations, had arrived at United Nations Headquarters, but had as yet been unable to confer with General Burns who was still in Cairo. With Brigadier Leech were Colonel T.A. Johnston, the Director of Administration, and Colonel K.H. McKibbin, the Director of Quartermaster General Operations and Planning. The composition of this Canadian Army Liaison Team, on which all three branches of the service were represented, was undoubtedly responsible for the weight which the Canadian opinion henceforth carried in the Secretary-General's Military Advisory Group. The Canadian team was composed of senior and experienced officers whose previous appointments at Army Headquarters ensured that they were fully in touch with the capabilities and resources of their branches. A study of the work of the Military Advisory Group leaves the strong impression that the Canadian contribution to joint planning was valuable out of all proportion to Canada's numerical representation.

61. In General Burns' absence the Canadian Army Liaison Team met with Dr. Bunche on the morning of 8 November. Also present at this meeting were General John B. Coulter, U.S. Army (retired), the Acting Military Adviser to the Secretary-General; Mr. G.S. Murray, the First Secretary of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations; and civil and military representatives of Colombia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Dr. Bunche explained that the task of UNEF would be to deploy between the Suez Canal and the former Israel-Egypt armistice demarcation line. General Burns would be replaced as the United Nations Truce Supervisor, and UNEF would not supplant the existing truce organization but would be additional to it. The Canadian Army Liaison Team at once raised the question of logistic support for the force and asked to what extent the United States would assist in airlifts, shipping, transport and supplies, but no answers to these pertinent queries were immediately available. A recommendation was presented from the U.N. Clinic that all troops leaving

for the Suez Canal area should be immunized against smallpox, cholera, typhus, typhoid and paratyphoid A and B. Before the meeting adjourned, Mr. Hammarskjold joined it for a short time and spoke briefly on the urgency of having at least token forces in Egypt without delay. At the latest, the Secretary-General declared, advance parties should be on the ground by Saturday, 10 November.⁹⁹

62. In Ottawa on 8 November a warning order was sent from Army Headquarters regarding the move of the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and its administrative increment.¹⁰⁰ On the afternoon of this same day, at another special meeting of the Army Council, the C.G.S. directed the Vice-Chief of the General Staff to complete arrangements for a rapid move to Halifax of the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada.¹⁰¹ The move of the battalion was given the code-name "RAPID STEP", and the move of the administrative increment, which was to be by air and most probably in advance of the main body, was given the code-name "BROAD JUMP".¹⁰²

63. Meanwhile the Secretary-General sent an urgent message to General Burns in Cairo, stressing the need for getting United Nations troops on the ground speedily and asking what would be the most useful composition of an advance party. Mr. Hammarskjold inquired whether 50 or 100 officers and men from Canada or one of the Scandinavian countries, or the same from each, would be useful. He also asked whether such an advance party could be maintained from local resources, when it could land, and what arrangements could be made to clear its landing.¹⁰³ Mr. Pearson saw Mr. Hammarskjold's message before it was despatched and agreed to its contents.¹⁰⁴ Late on 8 November the United States agreed to fly advance party groups to the area.¹⁰⁵

64. That evening in Ottawa, at another emergency meeting of the Army Council, the Chief of the General Staff decided that, if a Canadian advance party was required, he would utilize officers from the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, and service officers. The group would consist of 15 infantry officers, 10 service officers, 25 N.C.O.s., and 50 men.¹⁰⁶ During the same meeting it was also reported that the first group of officers and men from the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, would be ready to be airlifted from Calgary to Halifax on 12 November.

65. Although an unmistakable atmosphere of urgency surrounded all these preparations, the C.G.S. was careful to remind the General Officers Commanding the various military Commands across Canada that the "whole operation is of a preparatory nature and is subject to cancellation or alteration after United

Nations Headquarters has heard from General Burns".¹⁰⁷ Since the task of UNEF was to be restricted to police duties, the Chief of the General Staff ruled that only personal weapons would be carried by Canadian troops going to the Middle East and that "appropriate" G1098 stores (less vehicles) would support the force.¹⁰⁸

66. On 9 November the Military Advisory Group at United Nations Headquarters were informed that General Burns wished advance parties from all units of battalion size to arrive in Egypt as soon as possible. He specified that each of these advance parties should be 40 - 50 strong.¹⁰⁹ Norway, Denmark, and Colombia stated that they could despatch advance parties immediately, and accordingly arrangements were made with the United States Air Force for the Danish and Norwegian contingents, appropriately armed and equipped, to be flown to the temporary staging area in Italy. Other advance units from Canada, Colombia, Finland, India and Sweden were scheduled to proceed to the staging area shortly thereafter, some of them within 48 hours. The Swiss Government agreed that DC-6 aircraft from Swissair should transport personnel from the staging area in Italy to Egypt itself, since United States military aeroplanes were prohibited from landing in Egypt by the General Assembly's resolution excluding Great Powers participation in UNEF.¹¹⁰

67. It was already becoming apparent, however, that the logistic support of the United Nations Emergency Force was going to pose problems, since virtually all offers to provide troops mentioned only infantry. The Canadian offer was the sole exception and that only to the extent that the Canadian force was to be self-supporting. Indeed, it became clear during the course of discussions on 9 November that certain of the other countries offering troops could not provide even their initial equipment, particularly vehicles, let alone support their contingents.¹¹¹ This together with the fact that General Burns had not yet had time to assess the requirements, made it impossible to reach any firm decisions on the organization and support of the force,

68. On 10 November the military representative of India joined the discussions and informed the Military Advisory Group that his country was willing to provide an infantry battalion of approximately 800 all ranks. The United States Air Force agreed to airlift an advance party from India to Italy when details were worked out, Canada was asked to supply two light aircraft and two helicopters for UNEF, and Mr. David Vaughan, the United Nations Administrative Officer, asked if it would be possible for Canada to provide distinguishing shoulder patches for the entire force on repayment. (As it turned out, neither of these requests resulted in provision action being taken). At this meeting the Canadian Army Liaison

Team presented a paper to the Military Advisory Group outlining the problems which would have to be solved before planning could proceed further.¹¹² This Canadian contribution was apparently an important turning-point in the discussions of the Military Advisory Group, for it laid down for the first time firm principles to guide joint action.

69. Three main points were made in the Canadian paper:

- (1) the location, responsibility and functions of the Main Base would have to be determined in order to plan the size of support units in the theatre, since the level of supplies held in the area would depend on this factor. The United States, with bases in the Mediterranean, had offered to provide anything except troops. The United States should therefore be asked to accept responsibility for the Main Base. The Main Base should provide ordnance, quartermaster and signal stores, base repair facilities, a base hospital, air evacuation of casualties from the Main Base to the country of origin, leave centre arrangements, and canteen stores.
- (2) It was recommended that Headquarters and Support Units should be consolidated for all units in the force, since it would certainly be unsound and might be impossible for components of each country to be self-supporting. Since the command would probably be mainly English-speaking, Headquarters and Support Units should, in the main, be English-speaking. All countries should provide liaison officers to Headquarters.
- (3) For logistical reasons, the size of the force should be fixed and any additional contributions should be organized as a separate force. Contributor nations should be asked which portions of the force they could contribute.¹¹³

All the military representatives of the various contributor nations supported the proposals set forth in the Canadian paper, and in fact most of the proposals were actually carried out, although not precisely in the way the Canadian Government had anticipated. United States resources were extensively used in the administrative support of UNEF; headquarters and Support Units were consolidated, the support units being in the outcome largely provided by Canada; the headquarters and signals establishments were in the main English-speaking;* and the size of the force was fixed. It is

*A diagram of the Headquarters and command structures of UNEF is to be found at Appendix "F".

possible that the nature of the Canadian team's first important contribution to joint planning made an impression upon United Nations officials and the representatives of other contributor nations which was not without its effect when the time came seriously to assess the logistic requirements of the United Nations Emergency Force.^{114*}

EGYPTIAN DIFFICULTIES ABOUT A CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION

70. While international planning was thus being facilitated in the United Nations Building in New York, the Canadian Army's national planning continued in Ottawa. At a special meeting of the Army Council held on the evening of 9 November, the Adjutant-General reported that the assembly of personnel for the Canadian contingent was proceeding smoothly, although a sizable number of officers, particularly from the services, were being rejected for medical reasons. If the age limit for foreign service was reduced to 18, there would be 942 all ranks of the main body available. The Chief of the General Staff announced that the Government had imposed a ceiling of 1300 on Canada's contribution to UNEF. Furthermore, the strength of the advance party (BROAD JUMP group), which was assembling at London, Ontario, and Longue Pointe, Quebec, on six hours notice to depart, had been reduced from 100 to 50, and even this group would not proceed until further notice.¹¹⁵

71. The reason for this postponement in the despatch of a Canadian advance party was that Egypt was privately raising difficulties about accepting Canadian troops. On 10 November the Secretary-General discussed this matter over the telephone with Mr. Pearson, who then spoke to the Minister of National Defence, asking him to delay the departure of the Canadian group by 24 hours.¹¹⁶ The ostensible reason given by Egypt for her doubts about Canadian troops was that their British-style uniforms might easily be mistaken for those of the United Kingdom forces. This, it was felt, might result in unfortunate incidents. The Canadian Army Liaison Team, after discussing this problem with Dr. Bunche, suggested that distinctive armbands might be supplied and that helmets and web belts might be painted white.¹¹⁷ (In the event, the United Nations had considerable difficulty in obtaining a distinctive form of U.N. head-dress in time for issue to the first troops. Finally a supply of 1000 American-style helmet liners were discovered in a United States supply depot in Leghorn. These were hurriedly sprayed with light blue dye and issued to troops at the Naples airport).¹¹⁸

72. It soon transpired, however, that Egypt's

*A copy of the Canadian paper is to be found at Appendix "G".

objections to a Canadian contingent were not caused solely by the similarity of Canadian and British Army uniforms. The "difficulties" raised by President Nasser were of a more fundamental nature and not to be circumvented by means of a little blue dye or white paint. Yet the Canadian Government was extremely anxious that they should somehow be circumvented. Certainly any suggestion that President Nasser was dictating terms to Canada would have embarrassing repercussions in domestic Canadian politics, for by no means all the Canadian people disapproved of the Anglo-French invasion. Yet, in spite of a severe military defeat, Egypt was in a strong bargaining position. Hostilities had ceased, with neither the Anglo-French nor the Israelis having secured all their objectives; the overwhelming majority of United Nations members were strongly sympathetic to Egypt; the two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were on record as supporting the Egyptian position; if "volunteers" from the Communist bloc did indeed arrive in sufficient numbers, the invaders of Egypt, far from their bases and holding a vulnerable beachhead, would be in a dangerous military position; Egypt for her part, of course, could hardly have looked forward with confidence to any renewal of hostilities; and finally, the United Nations had specifically guaranteed the integrity and sovereignty of Egypt in the very resolution which had called the United Nations Emergency Force into being.¹¹⁹

73. Unfortunately, when Mr. Pearson flew to New York to discuss the problem with Omar Loutfi, the Egyptian delegate, it was discovered that Egypt would indeed have "certain difficulties" about accepting Canadian troops as part of UNEF.¹²⁰ In the first place, in the United Nations General Assembly Canada had adopted a position midway between that of India and the Afro-Asian bloc and that of Australia and New Zealand. No matter how much the members of the Canadian delegation deplored the Anglo-French action in the corridors and lobbies of the United Nations, the fact remained that on 2 November, when the vote had been taken on the resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, Canada had abstained. Furthermore, after the threats of Soviet intervention with "volunteer" forces, some Egyptians wondered whether the Canadian-sponsored move to create an emergency force was any more than a face-saving formula to protect the British and French from the full consequences of their actions. Accordingly, Egypt was certainly opposed to Canadian infantry participating in UNEF. None of this, of course, was ever openly said, but the implication was too obvious to be overlooked. Some Canadian newspapers and some Opposition members of parliament were to draw it again and again in the days ahead.¹²¹

74. The Egyptians meanwhile claimed that they were not opposed in principle to Canadian participation in UNEF and reiterated that they were not attempting to dictate conditions, but they argued that there were serious practical problems involved. Would the Egyptian

people understand the replacement of British soldiers by Canadians? Not only were the uniforms the same, but they spoke the same language, and even the name of the proposed unit -- "The Queen's Own Rifles" -- increased the likelihood of mistakes in identification.¹²²

75. The Secretary-General announced on 12 November that Egypt had agreed to the entry of the United Nations Emergency Force, but this announcement proved to be premature. Egypt still had some doubts. On 13 November Mr. Pearson saw Mr. Hammarskjold and emphasized how important it was that a firm stand should be taken on this point. The Secretary-General, convinced that Egypt would eventually consent to the entry of Canadian troops, expressed the hope that "Canada would go right ahead" with its plans for a contribution".¹²³

76. There was, in truth, little else that Canada could do. A portion of the advance party, consisting of 35 all ranks, had already been despatched by air to Naples. The 12 officers and 23 other ranks of the BROAD JUMP group, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G.K. Wade, the Commanding Officer Canadian Base Unit Middle East, had left Halifax in three R.C.A.F. aircraft on the night of 12 November. They took with them, besides personal arms and kit, two quarter-ton trucks, two quarter-ton trailers, wireless equipment, and a water purification kit.¹²⁴ On the same day in Ottawa a Joint Operations Room was established under the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans for the movement of the main body. The Army provided officers from each of the three branches and officers were attached from both the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force.¹²⁵

77. On 14 November, the Secretary-General finally received a cable from Cairo allowing him to order the UNEF into Egypt. The first troops, an advance party of 45 Danes, actually landed at Abu Suweir air-field, some 10 miles west of Ismailia, Egypt, on the morning of 15 November.¹²⁶ If Egypt had been willing to accept them sooner, the first United Nations soldiers could have been in position on 10 November, only three days after the UNEF was officially authorized.

78. This remarkable speed was made possible by the conjunction of five circumstances. First, and probably most important, were the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjold and his staff who worked devotedly, often for 18 hours and more each day. Secondly, there was the very real fear of many delegates that, unless United Nations troops were soon landed in Egypt, the situation might take a turn for the worse, Soviet volunteers might arrive, and a major war might result. (This fear, incidentally, was not by any

means confined to the delegates at Lake Success. As late as 14 November, Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham, the Canadian Chief of the General Staff, expressed the opinion that this was the most serious crisis since the Second World War.)¹²⁷ Thirdly, some of the nations offering troops were able to assemble their contingents very rapidly. They did this, it is true, by the simple expedient of sending their soldiers to the theatre of operations unsupported and sometimes virtually unequipped, trusting that the United Nations Organization would somehow take care of such matters as food, petrol, transport, ammunition, and supplies. Yet if these nations displayed a certain improvidence in their military planning, perhaps this was counter-balanced by their enthusiasm for world peace. Fourthly, the United States, although prevented by the General Assembly's resolution from being a contributory power, was able to supply Super-Constellation and Skymaster aircraft from its Air Force and Military Transport Service resources to airlift men and supplies to the advanced base. Fifthly, on 9 November, the Government of Italy, only 12 hours after receiving the request, was able to place Capodichino, the airport of Naples, at the service of the United Nations.

79. However, even Cairo's agreement on 14 November to admit UNEF was not unconditional. The Egyptian cable specified that, if the sovereignty of Egypt was fully respected and if conditions were as Hammarskjold had outlined, permission was granted for "the arrival of UN forces which have been the subject of mutual understanding between us".¹²⁸ The Canadian contribution obviously did not fall into this category, so the Secretary-General, after communicating with General Burns, flew to Cairo in an attempt to solve the remaining difficulties.

80. On 15 November Mr. Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate at the United Nations, informed Mr. Pearson that he and his Government were trying to remove Cairo's doubts about Canadian participation. Help from such a quarter was likely to have some influence, for both Krishna Menon and the Government he represented had from the beginning been most outspoken critics of the Anglo-French invasion. Later the same day Krishna Menon again sought out Mr. Pearson in the delegates' lounge and informed him that Egypt had agreed to Canadian participation in the form of air transport and a field ambulance unit.¹²⁹ From Cairo Mr. Hammarskjold made a similar report.

81. Mr. Pearson, however, did not consider this an acceptable compromise. In Canada preparations had been going on apace for the despatch of the infantry battalion and its supporting units to Egypt. Not unnaturally, these preparations had been given a considerable amount of publicity. Only two days before what appeared to be Cairo's final offer, H.M.C.S. Magnificent had docked in Halifax, after having battled her way across the Atlantic through

heavy storms.¹³⁰ Work had immediately begun to refit the ship for her new task, and teams of dockyard workers together with the ship's company laboured around the clock to install the 598 bunks required in the aircraft hangar space, to load accommodation stores, supplies, food and gasoline, and to secure 217 military vehicles to the flight deck.¹³¹ The 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, which had been brought up to strength in trade and rank by a number of cross-postings from the 2nd Battalion, had begun to move to its concentration area in Halifax on 13 November, being transported there by 19 R.C.A.F. aircraft earmarked for the purpose.¹³² Within little more than 48 hours the entire battalion had assembled and was ready to embark upon the H.M.C.S. Magnificent.¹³³ At the same time the Canadian Base Unit Middle East had been hastily collected at Longue Pointe, Quebec.¹³⁴ It consisted of a headquarters and records section, together with engineer, signal, service corps, medical, dental, ordnance, electrical and mechanical engineer, pay corps, provost, chaplain, and public relations detachments, totalling in all 28 officers and 252 other ranks.¹³⁵ Supplies of all kinds had begun to reach Halifax for loading on the Magnificent. By 14 November 44 carloads of freight had been offloaded and another 73 were east of Montreal, moving towards Halifax.¹³⁶ In the light of all these well-publicized preparations, Egypt's difficulties in accepting the Canadian contribution were extremely disturbing.

82. General Burns, who arrived in New York from Cairo on 16 November, told Mr. Pearson at lunch that day that he had threatened the Egyptians with his resignation if they raised serious and sustained objections to Canadian personnel. That evening Mr. Hammarskjold reported from Cairo that the Egyptians were arguing that, by accepting Canadian air transport, they had accepted a Canadian contribution to UNEF, and the Secretary-General stated that he was pessimistic about obtaining any further concession at the moment. On the morning of 17 November, however, a joint statement was issued in Cairo on behalf of Mr. Hammarskjold and the Egyptian Government. This statement mentioned administrative personnel for the first time and said in part:

Canada is welcome as a country from which elements of the UNEF may be drawn. It is felt that the most important contribution that could be given at the present stage from that country would be air support in the transport of troops from Italy and for the current functioning of the UNEF in Egypt.... The question of ground troops could best be considered when UNEF can assess its needs at the armistice line. The present situation seems to be one where it is not a lack of troops for the immediate task but of possibilities to bring them over and maintain their lines of communication. That is a cause of worry.¹³⁷

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN
LOGISTIC PLANNING

83. On 16 November General Burns talked matters over with Brigadier Leech in New York, saying that he very much appreciated Canadian assistance to date but that he could not suggest any change in the composition of the Canadian contingent until he had studied the whole problem more fully.¹³⁸ The next morning General Burns attended a meeting of the Military Advisory Group and outlined the organization of his force at that time. The UNEF, he said, was planned to be based upon two brigade groups each of three battalions. These battalions would come from Canada, India, Denmark and Norway, Colombia, and Sweden and Finland. Since only five of the projected six battalions had so far been offered, there would be room for an additional infantry unit. General Burns stated, however, that he proposed to employ a proferred Yugoslav force in a reconnaissance role.¹³⁹

84. Insofar as the support elements of UNEF were concerned, the Canadian delegation informed the Military Advisory Group that a Canadian Army Headquarters study of the communication requirements indicated a need for approximately five officers and 175 other ranks. The transport requirement for the force was estimated to be three to four transport platoons with a total of 90 to 120 vehicles. Of this, the Canadian contribution would include a transport platoon of 30 vehicles and the Swedish contingent a transport platoon of 12 vehicles, although the vehicles themselves might have to be provided by the United Nations. India had offered two composite supply platoons and Canada had offered the equivalent of one, which together should be adequate to handle ammunition, petroleum products, food, and other service corps supplies. The Norwegian offer of a medical company, together with the Canadian and Yugoslav medical contribution, was considered adequate. For engineering requirements the Canadian contribution of 53 personnel (composed mainly of field engineering and road construction personnel) was considered sufficient, at least for the time being. The Indian offer to provide two brigade sections of an Ordnance Field Park would probably be enough to deal with most ordnance stores except for non-common-user items. It was agreed that mail for the force should come through United Nations channels to Force Headquarters and that each country would provide a postal element to handle its own mail from there. General Burns stated that he did not wish to consider the provision of a Mobile Laundry and Bath unit at that time.

85. Thus requirements were established for signal personnel, for transport, and for repair and maintenance facilities. The composition of UNEF

would have to be more definite before the complex question of providing communications for a multi-lingual force could be solved, but it was arranged that requests for additional transport and workshop elements should be sent to countries who had already offered assistance. (The same day, as it happened, General Burns suggested to General Graham that Canada might be asked to provide all the force's signal communications forward from force headquarters to battalions, while some other nation might be requested to provide rear link communications from force headquarters to the Main Base.)¹⁴⁰ The Canadian delegation then tabled details of the major equipment to be taken to Egypt by the Canadian infantry battalion and base unit, and other representatives were requested to prepare similar tables for their contingents so that a consolidated staff table could be prepared.¹⁴¹

86. On the morning of Sunday, 18 November, the Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier Leech discussed over the telephone a new suggestion regarding the Canadian contribution to UNEF. After further conversations with the Secretary-General, Mr. Pearson had suggested that the Canadian Base Unit Middle East should proceed to Egypt immediately by air to assist in providing support for the entire United Nations Emergency Force. This was a compromise which would be acceptable to Egypt and which would, at the same time, allow Canada to participate in UNEF from the outset. The Chief of the General Staff, however, had informed the Minister that the suggestion was not a practical one, since the Canadian base unit had been designed to provide support for only one infantry battalion, and since, furthermore, all the equipment of the base unit had already been loaded on the Magnificent. The personnel of the base unit, if they proceeded by air to the Middle East, would be useless without their equipment.¹⁴²

87. Nevertheless the C.G.S. had apparently been thinking along somewhat similar lines himself, for as early as 13 November, when there had still been considerable doubt as to Egypt allowing Canadian troops to enter her territory at all, he had ordered that planning should begin on an establishment to operate an advanced base in the Middle East. The basis of the plan had been that the base, which would be stocked with 15 days' supplies, would support a United Nations force of some 5000 personnel and 500 vehicles. Under this tentative plan, no Canadian personnel would operate at any time outside their own enclosed compound, but UNEF units would come into the compound to draw supplies. In the early stages a ship would be used to hold the stores until such time as tented or other accommodation became available.¹⁴³ In addition to this type of planning, General Graham also directed all General

Officers Commanding to carry out, by means of unit records, an assessment of the effective strengths of major units. Far from believing that the period of danger had passed, the Chief of the General Staff was of the opinion that the Army must prepare itself for possibly serious eventualities.¹⁴⁴

THE CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION

88. During the course of the forenoon of 18 November the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff decided that they should fly to New York that day for consultations with General Burns. Accordingly, a meeting was arranged with the UNEF commander for nine o'clock that evening. The conference took place as planned and after an hour long discussion in which General Burns outlined the situation and detailed the requirement for an R.C.A.F. transport squadron, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff decided to remain in New York until Monday so that they might see Mr. Pearson and determine what the Secretary-General could tell them of his latest talks with President Nasser.¹⁴⁵

89. The next day there were a number of meetings to discuss the nature of Canada's contribution to UNEF. The Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff talked with Dr. Bunche in the morning and later met with Mr. Pearson. At noon General Burns and Mr. Hammarskjold met with the Military Advisory Group, and early in the afternoon the C.G.S. and the C.A.S. met Mr. Pearson and General Burns.¹⁴⁶ At this latter conference General Burns gave Mr. Pearson the following letter:

Dear Mr. Pearson:

After having studied the organizational position of the United Nations Emergency Force and discussed it with officials at United Nations Headquarters and the group of representatives of the contributing nations, including Canada, I have come to the conclusion that the most valuable and urgently required contribution that Canada could make to the Force at the present moment would be to supply an augmented transport squadron of the R.C.A.F. to lift the troops assembling at Naples to Egypt.

It would also be of great assistance if the administrative elements of the Army contingent could go forward at an early date in order to help in organizing the administration at the base of the Force in Egypt.

At present, the numbers of infantry coming forward are very disproportionate to the offers of administrative and technical units required to create an effective force and hence I am suggesting the above to you as the priority items of Canada's very valuable contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force.

Very sincerely yours,

E.L.M. Burns, Major-General.¹⁴⁷

90. Mr. Campney, the Minister of National Defence, was informed of this development by telephone and advised that the departure of the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, would have to be delayed. That evening in Ottawa, when General Graham met with the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the Director of Military Operations and Plans to inform them of what decisions the day had brought forth, he mentioned that General Burns would want the Canadian infantry battalion at a later date.¹⁴⁸ On 20 November the Government passed an Order-in-Council authorizing Canadian servicemen, not exceeding 2500 in number at any one time, to be employed in the Middle East as members of the United Nations Emergency Force.¹⁴⁹

91. This meant, among other things, that Lieutenant-Colonel Wade and his advance party, who were waiting in Naples, could now move to Egypt on the orders of the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force.¹⁵⁰ However, the advance party at Naples contained five officers and 11 other ranks from the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, and strict orders were given that these personnel would not, under any circumstances, move from Italy without specific instructions from the Chief of the General Staff.¹⁵¹

92. Although the decision not to employ Canadian infantry at that time was certainly a disappointment to the Canadian Government, United Nations officials did their best to soften the blow. On 20 November Finnish General Ilmari Martola, the newly-appointed Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, issued the following press release on Canada's contribution:

The willingness of the Government of Canada, as a participating country, to provide initially and immediately to the United Nations Emergency Force supporting elements which it most urgently needs is a great boon to the Force in this early stage of its development.

The UNEF is a unique kind of military force but, even so, basic rules of military organization apply. Even a non-fighting army cannot be all infantry -- it must have support, and this being a force built from voluntary offers of states, we must hope to get the necessary supporting elements from those

states best able to provide them.

Canada is especially well prepared to afford this kind of assistance to the force and precisely in those directions where the need is most acute -- air transport and administrative elements.

The Canadian Air Transport Squadron, for example, will render invaluable service to the force in the vital airlift from Naples to Egypt, thus avoiding a potentially serious bottleneck at Naples. Administrative units, such as medical units and signal corps, are also badly needed and are warmly welcomed from Canada.¹⁵²

THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT REACHES EGYPT

93. On the same day that the Order-in-Council was passed, the Royal Canadian Air Force began despatching aircraft servicing personnel to Capodichino, Italy.¹⁵³ The next day the first four aircraft of the R.C.A.F. transport squadron (which was eventually to consist of 12 C-119 aeroplanes) left Canada and began landing in Italy on the morning of 24 November.¹⁵⁴ On 21 November General Burns officially notified the Canadian Government through the United Nations that he required Canadian Army service elements to proceed to Naples at once.¹⁵⁵ The troops in question were standing by at Longue Pointe on 12 hours notice to move, but since there was some question as to whether or not they could be accommodated in Italy, they were not sent forward until the evening of the next day.¹⁵⁶ Then a party of 16 officers and 126 other ranks were flown out of Dorval Airport in aircraft of the R.C.A.F. Transport Command.¹⁵⁷ They were composed of detachments from Engineers, Signals, Army Service Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Ordnance, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Pay, Postal, Chaplains and Provost Corps.¹⁵⁸ They took with them only a minimum of personal weapons, ammunition, and baggage and just enough equipment for them to be able to begin work at their destination.

94. On 24 November the R.C.A.F. began its airlift of men and supplies from Capodichino to Egypt. The flights were staged through Souda Bay, an airport on the island of Crete. The first Canadian troops of the advance party arrived at Abu Suweir on the evening of 24 November and were accommodated in temporary Egyptian barracks adjoining the Swedish contingent.¹⁵⁹ The movement of personnel and supplies continued throughout the next few days until by 27 November the last of the Canadian Army elements which had been requested by the United Nations as an initial contribution had left Canada. By 6 December there were 278 Canadian Army personnel in Egypt.¹⁶⁰

THE 1ST BATTALION, THE QUEEN'S OWN
RIFLES OF CANADA, RETURNS TO CALGARY

95. On 4 December the Chief of the General Staff informed the Army Council that he was expecting a Cabinet decision shortly as to whether the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, would proceed overseas or return to Calgary. Major-General G. Walsh, the Quarter-master-General, reported that if the decision was taken to return the battalion to its depot, the movement of troops would take a week or 10 days and the shipment of stores somewhat longer. An outline plan for back-loading had already been prepared.¹⁶¹ Meanwhile, General Burns in Cairo was already requesting further Canadian administrative help, consisting of an additional signal unit of 180 men, a communications and observation air squadron of about 300 men, a workshop of 150 men, and two more transport platoons of about 100 men.¹⁶² General Burns now suggested, too, that Canada might be able to supply an armoured reconnaissance unit of about 200 men. The total of these troops would be approximately that of a battalion, and if they could be sent out by the Magnificent they would greatly increase the effectiveness of UNEF.¹⁶³ Thus it was obviously not political pressure alone -- or perhaps even chiefly -- which determined the final nature of the Canadian contribution. Whatever may have been the original reasons for delaying the departure of the Canadian infantry battalion, it is undoubtedly true that the need for Canadian administrative support was very real.

96. The decision not to send the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, to Egypt, but to accede instead to General Burns' request for additional supporting and reconnaissance units appears to have been taken at a Cabinet meeting on 5 December.¹⁶⁴ A press release drawn up the following day stated:

Major-General Burns states that the detachments of [maintenance, support and communications personnel] which have already been sent from Canada have filled a most important and essential role in the rapid build-up of the United Nations Emergency Force and now, as additional infantry units arrive in the Middle East from other countries, there is developing a need for more signals, servicing and maintenance units.

He has accordingly requested, and the U.N. has authorized, the despatch by Canada of a signals squadron of approximately 150 all ranks, a R.C.E.M.E. workshop of about 150 persons and two transport platoons of 120 all ranks.

In addition to these Army personnel, General Burns has asked that, upon completion of the airlift between Naples and Egypt, which is now being carried out by the R.C.A.F., an air component for communications and observation be established by Canada in the Middle East as a part of UNEF. The number of R.C.A.F. personnel involved in this operation will be between 250 and 300,

In addition to the above mentioned Army and R.C.A.F. contributions, there will be a small number of Canadian officers employed on the staff of General Burns' headquarters.

When the foregoing personnel are despatched to the Middle East, the Canadian Army and air force component of the UNEF will comprise over 1000 service personnel.

The Canadian army component as stated above, with vehicles and equipment necessary for them to perform their tasks, will be despatched in H.M.C.S. MAGNIFICENT before the end of the month.

Because of Canada's comparatively favourable position among the nations contributing forces to the UNEF it is apparent that requirements for the support elements so necessary to round out and weld the UNEF into an effective and efficient force can best be supplied by Canada.

The number of these specialists to be provided by Canada has now reached the point where we are about in balance, so far as numbers are concerned, with the other contributing nations. It is desirable from the U.N. point of view to preserve this balance and as a result it now appears doubtful whether an infantry unit will be required from Canada. For this reason it has been decided to return, at least for the time being, the 1st Q.O.R. of Canada to their home station. This will be done during the next few days.¹⁶⁵

97. The foregoing press release was not issued on 6 December, however, because the Government first wished to clear its contents with United Nations Headquarters.¹⁶⁶ This was done by 10 December, the announcement was issued, and action promptly taken to return

the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada to Calgary, to unload H.M.C.S. Magnificent, and to ship the new elements to the Middle East.¹⁶⁷ When the order to return the infantry battalion to its home station went out the next day, General Graham was careful to explain to the troops the reason for the change of plan.¹⁶⁸ Personnel of the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, were granted leave from the point nearest their homes on the route back to Calgary and were instructed to report back for duty by 3 January 1957.¹⁶⁹

CONCLUSION

98. The return of the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, to its depot marked the virtual end of Operation RAPID STEP. By now a somewhat calmer atmosphere prevailed in the Middle East, and it began to be possible to assess the situation. On the whole, the Canadian services had shown to good advantage. Faced with a new and unprecedented situation, the Army had at short notice mustered a special force, complete with an adequate support element; the Navy had transformed its aircraft carrier into an effective transport and headquarters ship; and the R.C.A.F. had been able to provide the necessary airlift facilities in time. More important, perhaps, than this, Canada's contribution to the Military Advisory Group in the United Nations had been a crucial one.

99. In summarizing the lessons learned from the operation, all three of the Army's branches in Headquarters Western Command agreed that RAPID STEP had generally gone very smoothly. The General Staff reported that a unit mobilization plan, worked out in detail with a check list of action to be taken should be available for all units; that some strain had been placed upon communication facilities because of the over-classification of messages; and that steps should be taken to ensure that in future Commands be supplied with adequate maps for intelligence briefings. The "A" Staff suggested that in another operation of this sort only ranks and trades of supporting elements should be detailed by Army Headquarters, leaving the selection of individuals to the Command or Headquarters involved. The "Q" Staff reported that early information should be provided as to the establishment on which the unit would operate, the scale of issue or equipment table authorized, and the policy to be followed concerning clothing credit. None of these recommendations, however, implied that any serious difficulties had been encountered.¹⁷⁰

100. Yet to members of the general public matters appeared in a somewhat different light. They saw a Canadian infantry battalion hurriedly brought up to strength and rushed by air to a port of embarkation, there to wait for days on end, only to be sent home again. Not unnaturally, the public was inclined to view this procedure critically, the more so since the entire atmosphere during this period tended to be charged with emotion. Especially in cases where political and military considerations are closely entwined, such criticism, of course, is often indiscriminate. The qualification, which the Chief of the General Staff was always careful to stress in his messages to Commands, that all plans were provisional and subject to alteration when General Burns' requirement became more clearly known, was not perhaps communicated to the press or the public with sufficient emphasis. If there had not been so much publicity given to the despatch of the Queen's Own Rifles, a great deal of later criticism might have been avoided. Yet, from the military point of view at least, Operation RAPID STEP was certainly a success.

101. The same, unfortunately, could not be said of the broader, international picture. By the middle of December, Israeli and Anglo-French forces were still on Egyptian soil; the Suez Canal was thoroughly blocked; vital oil pipelines leading to the Mediterranean had been cut; and the Soviet Union had greatly increased its prestige in the eyes of the Arab Nations.¹⁷¹ By 21 November, however, one-third of the French force had left Egypt, and the British Government agreed to withdraw one battalion from Port Said "as an indication of its intentions".¹⁷² Both the French and the British attempted to impose conditions for the withdrawal of their troops, the French insisting that an adequate U.N. force be on hand to see that the cease-fire was strictly observed in the Port Said area and the British proposing somewhat wider conditions. In the British House of Commons, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd declared that the build-up of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt would have "an important relationship to the phased withdrawal of our own and the French troops. There are, however," he went on, "other important matters to be considered, such as the speedy clearance of the Canal, and the negotiation of a final settlement with regard to the future operation of the Canal".¹⁷³ On 24 November the U.N. General Assembly "noted with regret and concern" that foreign troops remained in Egypt and called on Britain, France, and Israel to "comply forthwith" with its earlier resolutions regarding the evacuation of Egyptian territory.¹⁷⁴ Pressure for such an unconditional withdrawal continued to be applied, and on 3 December Mr. Selwyn Lloyd announced that Britain and France would evacuate Port Said without delay.¹⁷⁵ The withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt was completed by 22 December.¹⁷⁶

102. Israel remained adamant. It had been her avowed intention to keep both the Sinai Peninsula

and the Gaza Strip, incorporating them into the Israeli State, and now only the most intense pressure from the United Nations could force her to abandon these ambitions.¹⁷⁷ Such pressure, however, was forthcoming. After the cease-fire the U.N. General Assembly, in four separate resolutions, called on Israel to withdraw its troops from Egypt, but without result.¹⁷⁸ On 2 February the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the United Nations Emergency Force to be stationed on both sides of the armistice line, but so far Israel has refused her permission for this and accordingly the resolution has never been implemented.¹⁷⁹ Finally, certain Asian and African states drafted a resolution recommending sanctions against Israel. This resolution was not put to the vote when the General Assembly debate on the Middle East resumed on 22 February 1957, but on 8 March Mr. Hammarskjold announced that Israel had at last agreed to give up the Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.¹⁸⁰

103. Meanwhile, three new units for the Middle East, No. 56 Canadian Signal Squadron, No. 56 Canadian Transport Company, and No. 56 Canadian Infantry Workshop, had been authorized on 17 December.¹⁸¹ On 29 December, H.M.C.S. Magnificent at last sailed for Egypt, loaded with equipment for the Canadian contingent and carrying 407 Canadian soldiers from the new units. Among the most important items of supply aboard the aircraft carrier were 154 vehicles and 78 trailers.¹⁸² With the arrival of these additional troops on 12 January, the Canadian contingent in Egypt and Italy was brought up to a strength of over 1000 all ranks and that of UNEF as a whole to more than 4700.¹⁸³ On 4 March, 1957 the number of Canadian servicemen actually in Egypt totalled 843, including 55 members of the R.C.A.F.¹⁸⁴

104. The Canadian contingent in UNEF was split between three locations. Most of the detachments remained at Abu Suweir where they performed their administrative tasks, but the engineers, signals, legal and headquarters detachments were stationed at El Ballah, and four officers and 10 other ranks remained at the advanced base in Naples.¹⁸⁵ In March a Canadian armoured corps unit, No 56 Canadian Reconnaissance Squadron R.C.A.C. composed of 105 all ranks, was transported to Egypt by air. The unit's vehicles, 29 Ferret Scout cars, arrived shortly afterwards by sea.¹⁸⁶ An additional 40 reinforcement personnel were also flown to the Middle East in March, and, in spite of continuing requests from the United Nations for additional specialist personnel of various kinds, the Canadian Government then decided to make no further contribution of man-power to the United Nations Emergency Force.¹⁸⁷ Towards the end of November 1956, Brigadier Leech and Colonel Johnston had returned to their posts at Army Headquarters in Ottawa, reducing the strength of the Canadian Army Liaison Team in New York to one officer. He was replaced in this appointment by Lieutenant-Colonel F.N. Pope


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who remained as liaison officer with the United Nations until 25 March 1957. At that time the appointment was discontinued.¹⁸⁸ At the time of the first rotation of the Canadian contingent in the autumn of 1957, the strength of the Canadian Army portion of UNEF was somewhat reduced.¹⁸⁹

105. Since November 1956 there have been four annual rotations of Canadian personnel in UNEF, and by the beginning of 1960 some 280 officers and 3000 other ranks had seen service in the Middle East. On the whole, their tasks have so far been uneventful, although there have been 13 fatal casualties to Canadian personnel in the theatre and the total number hospitalized for all reasons has amounted to 825, a high proportion of the force.¹⁹⁰ There is as yet no indication that a permanent settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors is likely or that the United Nations Emergency Force will be able to disband in the foreseeable future.

106. This report, prepared by Major D.J. Goodspeed, was completed in January 1960. It was stencilled in June 1961.



(G.W.L. Nicholson) Colonel
Director Historical Section

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APPENDIX "A"

Communication addressed by
Britain and France to Egypt,
30 October 1956.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have taken note of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. This event threatens to disrupt the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, on which the economic life of many nations depends. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are resolved to do all in their power to bring about the early cessation of hostilities and to safeguard the free passage of the Canal. They accordingly request the Government of Egypt:

- (a) to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air forthwith;
- (b) to withdraw all Egyptian military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal; and
- (c) in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal by the ships of all nations and in order to separate the belligerents, to accept the temporary occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.

The United Kingdom and French Governments request an answer to this communication within twelve hours. If at the expiration of that time one or both Governments have not undertaken to comply with the above requirements, United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

A similar communication has been sent to the Government of Israel.

Communication addressed by
Britain and France to Israel,
30 October 1956.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have taken note of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. This event threatens to disrupt the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, on which the economic life of many

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nations depends. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are resolved to do all in their power to bring about the early cessation of hostilities and to safeguard the free passage of the Canal. They accordingly request the Government of Israel:

- (a) to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air forthwith, and
- (b) to withdraw all Israel military forces to a distance of ten miles east of the Canal.

A communication has been addressed to the Government of Egypt requesting them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces from the neighbourhood of the Canal, and to accept the temporary occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.

The United Kingdom and French Governments request an answer to this communication within twelve hours. If at the expiration of that time one or both Governments have not undertaken to comply with the above requirements, United Kingdom and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

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APPENDIX "B"

Draft resolution submitted to
the Security Council by the
United States, 30 October 1956.

The Security Council,
Noting that the armed forces of Israel have
penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in
violation of the General Armistice Agreement
between Egypt and Israel.

Expressing its grave concern at this violation
of the Armistice Agreement,

1. Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw
its armed forces behind the established
armistice lines;
2. Calls upon all Members:
 - (a) To refrain from the use of force
or threat of force in the area in
any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations;
 - (b) To assist the United Nations in
ensuring the integrity of the
armistice agreements;
 - (c) To refrain from giving any military
economic or financial assistance to
Israel so long as it has not complied
with this resolution;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the
Security Council informed on compliance with
this resolution and to make whatever recom-
mendations he deems appropriate for the
maintenance of international peace and
security in the area by the implementation of
this and prior resolutions.

APPENDIX "C"

Resolution of the
General Assembly,
2 November 1956.

The General Assembly,

Noting the disregard on many occasions by
parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agree-
ments of 1949 of the terms of such agreements,
and that the armed forces of Israel have
penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in
violation of the General Armistice Agreement
between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,

Noting that armed forces of France and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are
conducting military operations against Egyptian
territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is
now interrupted to the serious prejudice of
many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these
developments,

1. Urges as a matter of priority that all
parties now involved in hostilities in
the area agree to an immediate cease-fire
and, as part thereof, halt the movements
of military forces and arms into the area;
2. Urges the parties to the armistice agree-
ments promptly to withdraw all forces be-
hind the armistice lines, to desist from
raids across the armistice lines into
neighbouring territory, and to observe
scrupulously the provisions of the armis-
tice agreements;
3. Recommends that all Member States refrain
from introducing military goods in the area
of hostilities and in general refrain from
any acts which would delay or prevent the
implementation of the present resolution;
4. Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effec-
tive, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal
and restore secure freedom of navigation;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to observe
and report promptly on the compliance with
the present resolution to the Security Council
and to the General Assembly, for such further
action as they may deem appropriate in accordance
with the Charter;
6. Decides to remain in emergency session pending
compliance with the present resolution.

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APPENDIX "D"

Resolution of the
General Assembly,
4 November 1956.

The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of
facilitating compliance with its resolu-
tion 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,
Requests, as a matter of priority, the
Secretary-General to submit to it within
forty-eight hours a plan for the setting
up, with the consent of the nations con-
cerned, of an emergency international
United Nations Force to secure and super-
vise the cessation of hostilities in
accordance with all the terms of the
aforementioned resolution.

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APPENDIX "E"

Second and Final Report by
Mr. Hammarskjold on the plan
for a United Nations Force,
6 November 1956.

1. In resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, concerning an emergency international United Nations Force, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, as a matter of priority, to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of such a Force in order to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956. In pursuance of this request I have the honour to submit this second and final report.
2. In my first report on this matter, submitted on 4 November 1956 to the General Assembly, I gave an account of the initial consultations with delegations and submitted for consideration a proposal for the immediate establishment of a United Nations Command for the purpose in question. A draft resolution sponsored by Canada, Colombia and Norway based on this report, was adopted by the General Assembly on 5 November 1956 (resolution 1000 (ES-I)).
3. In my first report, I touched briefly on various questions which would arise in setting up the projected United Nations Force. After further consideration and consultations, I have the honour to submit herewith the conclusions which I have been able to reach within the short time at my disposal.

QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE

4. An emergency international United Nations Force can be developed on the basis of three different concepts:
 - (a) It can, in the first place, be set up on the basis of principles reflected in the constitution of the United Nations itself. This would mean that its chief responsible officer should be appointed by the United Nations, and that he, in his functions, should be responsible ultimately to the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. His authority should be so defined as to make him fully independent of the policies

of any one nation. His relations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations should correspond to those of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

- (b) A second possibility is that the United Nations charge a country, or a group of countries, with the responsibility to provide independently for an emergency international Force serving for purposes determined by the United Nations. In this case it would obviously be impossible to achieve the same independence in relation to national policies as would be established through the first approach;
- (c) Finally, as a third possibility, an emergency international Force may be set up in agreement among a group of nations, later to be brought into an appropriate relationship to the United Nations. This approach is open to the same reservation as the second one, and possibly others.

Variations of form, of course, are possible within a wide range, but the three concepts mentioned seem to circumscribe the problem.

- 5. In the decision on the establishment of the United Nations Command, on an emergency basis, which the General Assembly took on 5 November 1956, the Assembly chose to follow the first of the three types mentioned in paragraph 4 above. The second type was that followed in the case of the Unified Command in Korea. There is no precedent for the use of the third type, but it would seem to represent one of the possible forms for implementation of the suggestion in the replies of 5 November 1956 of the Governments of France and the United Kingdom to my request for a cease-fire. In attempting to work out a plan for setting up an emergency international United Nations Force, I have based my considerations on the legal situation created by the decision in principle of the General Assembly, implied in the request of the Assembly to me to submit within forty-eight hours a plan for such a Force, and in its later decision to establish a United Nations Command, in implementation of this first resolution.
- 6. In its resolution 1000 (ES-I) on the United Nations Command, the General Assembly authorized the Chief of Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to recruit officers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or directly from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council.

This recruitment procedure affords an important indication of the character of the Force to be set up. On the one hand, the independence of the Chief of Command in recruiting officers is recognized. On the other hand, the principle is established that the Force should be recruited from Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council. The first of these elements in the new approach has an important bearing on the character of the whole Command. It may be in this context that the Franco-British proposal, to which I have already referred, may imply that the question of the composition of the staff and contingents should be subject to agreement by the parties involved, which it would be difficult to reconcile with the development of the international Force along the course already being followed by the General Assembly.

7. Resolution 998 (ES-I), in which the General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan for the international Force, gives further guidance. Thus, it is said that the Force should be set up on an 'emergency' basis. The situation envisaged is more clearly defined in the terms of reference of the Force (resolution 998 (ES-I)) which are 'to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms' of the General Assembly resolution of 2 November 1956.
8. A closer analysis of the concept of the emergency international United Nations Force, based on what the General Assembly had stated in its resolution on the matter, indicates that the Assembly intends that the Force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict. It is further clear that the General Assembly, in its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, by the reference to its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November, has wished to reserve for itself the full determination of the tasks of this Emergency Force and of the legal basis on which it must function in fulfilment of its mission. It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the Force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956.
9. Functioning, as it would, on the basis of a decision reached under the terms of the resolution 337 (V) 'Uniting for Peace', the Force, if

established would be limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognized international law. While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country. This does not exclude the possibility that the Security Council could use such a Force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. I would not for the present consider it necessary to elaborate this point further, since no use of the Force under Chapter VII, with the rights in relation to Member States that this would entail, has been envisaged.

10. The point just made permits the conclusion that the setting up of the Force should not be guided by the needs which would have existed had the measure been considered as part of an enforcement action directed against a Member country. There is an obvious difference between establishing the Force in order to secure the cessation of hostilities, with a withdrawal of forces, and establishing such a Force with a view to enforcing a withdrawal of forces. It follows that while the Force is different in that, as in many other respects, from the observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, it is, although para-military in nature, not a Force with military objectives.

QUESTIONS OF FUNCTIONS

11. The question of determining the functions of the emergency international United Nations Force has been dealt with in part in the preceding paragraphs. It is difficult in the present situation and without further study to discuss it with any degree of precision. However, the general observations which are possible should at this stage be sufficient.
12. In the General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I) the terms of reference are, as already stated, 'to secure ... the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms' of resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956. This resolution urges that 'all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement

of military forces and arms into the area'; and also 'urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements'. These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956. The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. Its functions can, on this basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines established in the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel.

QUESTIONS OF SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

13. Time has so far not permitted the necessary technical studies. It is therefore not yet possible to say what should be the size of the Force. In my first report, I pointed out that the situation is likely to involve two stages: the first one when certain immediate tasks have to be fulfilled, the second one when somewhat different tasks, although within the framework set out in paragraph 12 above, will fall upon the Force. It is likely that the size of the Force will require some adjustment to the development of the tasks. Further study of such matters is required, and I have invited the Chief of the United Nations Command, General Burns, to present his views urgently.
14. It is not possible at this time to make any proposals as to the general organization of the Force beyond those clearly following from resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956. General experience seems to indicate that it is desirable that countries participating in the Force should

provide self-contained units in order to avoid the loss of time and efficiency which is unavoidable when new units are set up through joining together small groups of different nationalities. The question requires additional study and is obviously closely linked to the condition that various Member States will provide sufficiently large units. The difficulty in presenting a detailed plan of organization need not delay the establishment of the Force. It is likely that during the first period, at all events, the Force would have to be composed of a few units of battalion strength, drawn from countries or groups of countries which can provide such troops without delay. It is my endeavour in the approaches to Governments to build up a panel sufficiently broad to permit such a choice of units as would provide for a balanced composition in the Force. Further planning and decisions on organization will to a large extent have to depend on the judgement of the Chief of Command and his staff.

QUESTIONS OF FINANCING

15. The question of how the Force should be financed likewise requires further study. A basic rule which, at least, could be applied provisionally, would be that a nation providing a unit would be responsible for all costs for equipment and salaries, while all other costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United Nations. It is obviously impossible to make any estimate of the costs without a knowledge of the size of the corps and the length of its assignment. The only practical course, therefore, would be for the General Assembly to vote a general authorization for the cost of the Force on the basis of general principles such as those here suggested.

QUESTIONS OF RECRUITMENT

16. Time permitted me to discuss the question of participation in the Force with only a limited number of Member Governments. Offers of assistance in writing so far received are annexed to the present report. In cases other than those covered by the annexed letters, the question of participation is under consideration by the Governments. It is my hope that broader participation will be possible as soon as a plan is approved so that a more definite judgement may be possible concerning the implications of participation. The reactions so far received lead me to believe that it should be possible

to meet quickly at least the most basic need for personnel. The possibilities, as finally established, may call for an adjustment later of the size and organization of the Force in relation to what would in principle be the most satisfactory solution.

GENERAL QUESTIONS

17. In my first report it was stated that the later stage in the development to which I referred in paragraph 13 above 'is likely to correspond to a period where the functions ... should be viewed in the light of efforts over a longer range'. While mentioning this point I reserved my right to elaborate the consideration briefly dealt with. After further reflection, I would not for the present wish to go beyond what I have said on the subject in previous parts of the present report, especially concerning the functions of the Force. It would be premature to express views on problems likely to arise after the immediate crisis is past.
18. On several matters mentioned above it has been necessary to leave the question open. This is explained in part by a lack of time and in part by the need for further study. I suggest that these open matters be submitted to exploration by a small committee of the General Assembly; this body, if established, might also serve as an advisory committee to the Secretary-General for questions relating to the operations. On the other hand, on all points where a decision of significance to the further development of the plan seems possible now, the General Assembly should proceed to action forthwith.
19. I am fully aware of the exploratory character of this plan in many respects. Time is vital and this is some excuse not only for the lack of detail in this first approach but also for decisions by the General Assembly reached in more general terms than is customary. If the Force is to come into being with all the speed indispensable to its success, a margin of confidence must be left to those who will carry the responsibility for putting the decisions of the General Assembly into effect.

APPENDIX "F"

Staff Paper Presented by
Canadian Army Liaison Team
to U.N. Military Advisory
Group, 10 Nov 56.

The following three points should be clarified before definite planning can be completed for the UN Force in the Middle East:

- (a) responsibility for a main base,
- (b) responsibility for Headquarters and support units in the theatre,
- (c) a limitation on the size of the force.

These three points are amplified in the following paragraphs.

1. Main Base

- (a) The location, responsibility and functions of the main base must be known in order to plan the size of support units in the theatre, because levels of supplies held in the theatre will depend on this.
- (b) The USA has offered to provide anything except troops. The USA has bases in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the USA is the logical country to be responsible for the main base.
- (c) The main base should provide:

Ordnance, quartermaster and signal stores

base repair

base hospital

air evacuation of casualties from the main base to countries of origin

leave centre arrangements

px supplies

- (d) UN would have to provide sea lift and airlift to theatre.

2. Headquarters and Support Units


- (a) These should be consolidated for all units in the force. It is obviously unsound and perhaps impossible for components of each country to be self-supporting.
- (b) Since command will probably be in the English language, Headquarters and support units should, in the main, be English speaking.
- (c) No countries have offered to provide Headquarters or support units. Therefore, countries should be asked what Headquarters or support elements they could provide. These need not all be English speaking. For example, transport and perhaps medical units could be provided by non-English speaking countries. In addition, there will be a need for liaison officers from all countries at the Headquarters.

3. Size of force

- (a) As the force grows, so the load on support units grows. Therefore, the commitment for countries providing separate units will grow with force. Countries providing support units may not be in a position to increase their contribution. Therefore, the size of the force should be fixed and additional contributions organized as a separate force.
- (b) Instructions should be sent out regarding the type of additional contributions needed. Obviously the force cannot all be infantry. Someone must provide Headquarters and support elements. The organization of the force should be decided first; then countries should be asked what portion of the force they can contribute.

PROPOSED HEADQUARTERS

APPENDIX "G"



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