Pay Department would presumably have experience in banks. Only the Medical Service and the Engineers would require considerable special personnel and equipment. A further change would be to ensure a uniform establishment in all militia units of all arms, so that they could be grouped into formations and assigned a fixed proportion of administrative services.[894]

444. The reception of Hutton's report was generally favourable. "Bystander" in the Montreal News was exceptional when he wrote: "No, General Hutton, we do not want a Canadian Army in the accepted military sense," and went on to explain "Our business is to conquer nature by silent, honest toil. He who encourages the passion for militarism is no true friend of Canada."[895] The Toronto Saturday Night was also perturbed, pointing out that all the people of Canada could not save their country from a serious onslaught from the South and that such proposals would only excite the Americans.[896] Other editors were less apprehensive. "General Hutton scores a Bull's Eye" cried the headline of the Galt Daily Reporter, and warned the Government that if it did not put the General's recommendations into effect, it should abolish the Militia and put the Doukhobors on guard.[897] More influential papers like the Toronto Globe and the Montreal Star were more cautiously favourable. The Mail and Empire warned darkly that all the suggestions would not be taken up and the Liberal press had been directed to refer to it as Hutton's report, not the Minister's.[898] The Manitoba Free Press concentrated on one item, the proposal to remove the Royal Canadian Dragoons from Fort Osborne Barracks. Such a lack of judgement on the part of the General was enough to condemn the rest but there was the hope that if Hutton were to visit Winnipeg, he might revise his opinion.[899]

445. The report itself was important. In the later difficulties which terminated his career in Canada, Hutton was to claim that his report had been distorted and ignored. It is probably true that the Government had considerable reluctance in proceeding with sections dealing with the powers of the military staff and particularly of the General Officer Commanding while Hutton and his successors remained in the Militia Department. The other sections of the Report might almost have been a blueprint for the reforms which were to be virtually completed before Borden left office.

## POLITICS AND THE MILITIA

446. Hutton's conviction that politics was the dominating evil in the Militia came to occupy a central position in his thinking. Since he was seeking to advance a policy which was more that of the British than of the Canadian Government, his activities must in any case have generated friction. The question of political interference aggravated relations between the Minister and the General. It also served as a smokescreen behind which issues of constitutional significance were fought out. The fact that politics played a large part in the Militia was no secret. It was equally no secret that political considerations, as opposed to efficiency, economy or other more publicly acceptable motives, played an important part in most Government operations from the Department of Public Works to the Intercolonial Railway.

447. When political parties are not separated on serious issues of ideology or principle, some basis for allegiance must be found. By reserving offices, honours and all the benefits and favours at its command to its friends, a Government can hope to cement loyalties and inspire new allegiances. For patronage to thrive, a number of pre-requisites must be found.

There must be an atmosphere of acceptance for the view that to the victors belong the spoils. It is even more important that efficiency or technical expertise is not demanded from the appointee. Thus, in our own age, a postal master or a senator may be appointed through patronage but an engineer or a foreign service officer will only be chosen after a rigourous examination. Finally, the attractions of the appointments must not be too great. When the honour or appointment is a real prize, competition becomes too keen and, instead of making a reliable supporter of the appointee and his relatives, one makes a host of enemies from those who are disappointed. As is evident from the correspondence of politicians, patronage is misery, not pleasure, to bestow.

448. In the period from 1867 to 1900, the Canadian Militia fulfilled almost all the conditions for a patronage system. The rewards of office were almost entirely intangible. Rural militia officers might pocket their allowances without giving service in return but the allowances were very small. More serious militia officers would be heavily out of pocket for their services but men will pay notoriously heavily for status. The men in the ranks, as well, might give up $1.00 a day for the 50¢ of a Militia private. The pay of the staff officers was equally low. Nor was the Militia expected to be efficient for, beyond periodic excursions in aid to the civil power, its political masters had no serious purpose for it. The idea of using it as a defence force against the United States was too fatuous to occur to anyone but Militia officers and their friends and to patriots on the Queen's Birthday. There was one limitation to politics in the Militia: It was not considered correct to proclaim it publicly. Since the British, on whom the Canadians sought to model their military institutions, had reputedly eliminated politics from the armed services,

it would have been improper to indicate that Canadians had not. When incidents were brought into the open, there could be expressions of indignation and reproach. In 1904, with the Liberals under warm attack for a particularly open use of their influence, David Tisdale, the former Conservative Minister of Militia could tell the House of Commons that he had:

> ...
>
> ... never heard of the slightest attempt to introduce politics in any manner whatever into the administration of the Militia Department during the long years of the Conservative Government! [900]

449. There were, in fact, many ways in which political influence could be of advantage in the Militia Department, from obtaining appointments in the permanent corps to the awarding of contracts to supply the summer camps. Even the authorization of new militia units was regarded as a political honour to the favoured area. In 1882, Macdonald was approached with a request to establish a battalion in Essex County. Major J.R. Wilkinson, after congratulating him effusively on his election victory and informing him that "We did our duty in Essex by electing members for the Commons" went on to remind him of a long standing promise to allow a battalion which had already been organized to be accepted. "We have been faithful as a part in the Conservative cause and should be recognized."[901] Unfortunately for this claim, M.D. 1 which included Essex County, was already well over its quota of men and the Government felt unable to meet the demand.[902] In neighbouring M.D.2, however, where a preponderance of city units meant that rural units might train only every three years, the 10th Royal Grenadiers of Toronto demanded two additional companies. At the behest of the battalion's influential commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Grasett, the Prime Minister asked Caron to oblige.[903]

450. Both parties, when in office, made careful use of patronage lists in allotting contracts. Even in the crisis of the Northwest Rebellion, party faithful demanded their rights. The bulk of the supplies in the Northwest could only be furnished by the Hudson's Bay Company, the single organization large enough to meet the unexpected demand. James Wrighley, the Company's commissioner in Winnipeg, was unpopular with local Conservatives and they did their best to persuade the Government to give them preference. Through Amos Rowe, a prominent local politician and a friend of Mackenzie Bowell, they pressed their claims. At his behest, Caron ordered that the purchase of horses be left to one Jack Benson.[904] Local officials seem to have been careless for Rowe reported angrily that the bread and biscuit contract had fallen into the hands of "Grits, and bad ones at that." Instead, it must be given to Thomas Chambers, a good Conservative and a friend of Colonel Kennedy of the 90th Rifles.[905]

451. On more routine occasions, there was no such carelessness. Each year, militia camps were shifted from place to place despite the inconvenience to the force and unsuitability of many of the camping grounds in order to satisfy the claims of local merchants. In larger matters, there was also consideration. In 1891, a year when the Opposition found much evidence of corruption, the militia clothing contracts came under close scrutiny. For some years, there had been complaints about the quality of the clothing issued to the men and yet the contracts had continued to be given to the firm of W.E. Sanborn of Hamilton, a Conservative senator. Then it was switched to the clothing factory of Bennett Rosamonde at Almonte. Rosamonde was an equally prominent Conservative who entered the House of Commons later the same year.[906]

452. While General Officers Commanding might have little legitimate complaint about the allotment of contracts on a political basis, they were directly concerned when political influence was brought to bear in the making of appointments and in influencing the course of discipline. Most officers of the staff and the permanent corps owed their initial selection to their political influence and it must have seemed reasonable as well as necessary that they should continue to advance their careers by the same means. In 1881, when the Staff Adjutancy of the Royal Military College became vacant, there was pressure that it be filled by a Canadian officer and Captain J.G. Holmes of the School of Gunnery in Kingston made his way to Ottawa to advance his own claims. Not only could he claim twenty years service in the Militia but also, he pointed out, his father was a life long Conservative who had never asked a political favour.[907] Holmes did not get the post. Nor did a fellow applicant, Major J.W. Lewis, who had been recommended by six Members of Parliament and who advised the Prime Minister that the Government, with its $4,000,000 surplus "may safely do just as they please."[908] Instead, the appointment was given to Major S.C. McGill, a son of Peter McGill of Montreal, who held the post for over seventeen years.

453. When the Royal Military College had been established, it was declared that it would be the source of officers for the Canadian Militia and it might have been expected that the Commissions in the permanent corps would be reserved for its graduates. This proved too difficult to achieve for commissions were popular rewards for the sons of the more prominent supporters. By 1889, six of the subalterns in the permanent corps were graduates of the College but twenty were not. Under the Liberals, the proportion was improved but each vacancy remained a cause for vigourous campaigning. The College itself could be a source of difficulty when candidates for admission

failed their entrance examination and proud and disappointed parents could bring pressure to bear. Ministers of both parties seem to have resisted this pressure fairly consistently although regretfully. In 1889, W.B. Scarth, the Member for Winnipeg, demanded a second try for his son, enlisting the support of Mackenzie Bowell. "Caron has often driven a coach and six through the Militia Act & Military Schools", Bowell suggested, and he might stretch a point for Scarth.[909] Caron, who seems to have become firmer about such matters as he grew older in his Department, stood firm, although he found it distressing that old friends "should imagine that if I could help their sons legitimately I would refuse to do so."[910] Laurier also used his influence on behalf of applicants for the College. In 1899, when he was in Washinton, Laurier wrote to Borden to let in a young man whose mother was a personal and a political friend with a considerable influence in the County of Megantic.[911]

454. The main difficulty of any patronage system from the viewpoint of the politicians who must administer it is that it breeds more discontent than satisfaction. For every favour which is granted, there are more which must be refused and supporters who may be alienated. In 1882, there was a struggle for the ill-paid and almost superfluous post of Deputy Adjutant-General in British Columbia. A number of prominent Conservatives, including the Roman Catholic Bishop of Hamilton lent their support to the claims of Major Alexander Moore of the 13th Battalion, Edward Furlong of Toronto reported that Moore had "all sorts of certificates from all sorts of military schools"[912] and that he was both solid politically and a Roman Catholic in faith, both of which made him suitable. He was also Irish. The Prime Minister was moved chiefly by Bishop Crimmon's intervention to add his support to Moore's appointment[913] but it was not found possible to appoint him. In 1887, when the new Infantry School was opened in London, a vacancy for

captain was sought by Major John Gray of the Toronto Field Battery. Since he was elderly* and had no infantry experience, the appointment would hardly have been suitable but it was strongly pressed by Toronto Conservatives. One correspondent wrote from the Albany Club that "There seems to be a fear that Caron will be inclined to appoint some young man who had done nothing in the way of party work - this would not be liked."[914] While Gray was not given the appointment he wanted, he was made Brigade Major later in the year.

455. Armouries were perhaps the most conspicuous form of political favour and, as meeting halls, they could themselves serve a political function. For several years in succession, the member for Brantford rose in the House of Commons to complain that the roof and two walls of the local armoury had collapsed. Although the town eventually agreed to pay half the cost of repair, nothing was done until 1889. Even then, there was a certain amount of ingratitude. A correspondent wrote to Macdonald:

> The Col. of the Battalion here announced at our Sons of England Dinner that Mr. Paterson M.P. had wired him of the $10,000 in supplementary estimates for the drill shed. I took him up and said see what our good Conservative Govt. has done for Brantford notwithstanding our member opposed the Ministry. [915]

Two years later, Toronto saw an election promise fulfilled when it, too, received a new armoury but the pleasure was considerably reduced when the contract was given to an Ottawa firm. There was a demand that the second lowest tender, from a Torontonian, should be accepted and the possibility of cheap French-speaking labour being imported provoked an outcry.[916] The Liberals also used armouries with an eye to their political effect. In 1900, the Liberal Minister of Public Works, accompanied by a small political and military entourage, arrived at Saint Thomas, Ontario, ostentatiously turning the sod for a new armoury. Three days after his visit, Saint Thomas returned a Conservative and that was the last that was heard of the new building.[917]

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* He seems to have been over fifty at the time.

456. Politics were deeply involved with the Militia Department's decisions on matters great and small. This did not particularly disturb most people, who did not believe the Department's work to be particularly vital and who had little basic respect for the Department's officials. When defence came to assume a more serious place in national life, such tolerance became less easy.

## REPATRIATING THE 100th REGIMENT

457. The rising mood of imperialism in the nineties led to a revival in Canada of the old proposal of providing a battalion of Canadians for the British regular army. This idea developed into the proposal that the old 100th Regiment should be repatriated to Canada to serve as the Canadian contribution. These suggestions paid little heed to the character of the 100th as it had developed in the years since it had left Canada. In 1872, when British infantry battalions were territorialised, the 100th had been associated with the 109th Regiment, a unit which had originally been part of the East India Company's army. The new title of the regiment was the Prince of Wales Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians) with its depot at Birr. The 100th provided the 1st Battalion. Although the Regiment's magazine was called the Maple Leaf and the traditions of the Regiment paid considerable respect to Canada, the men were almost entirely recruited in Ireland and none of the officers had even served in Canada.[918]

458. The first specific proposal for the repatriation of the 100th Regiment came from the City of Toronto; in May of 1896, the City Council drafted a petition which expressed regret that the name of the 100th had been changed and asked that it be changed back to the Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment and that a recruiting depot should be established in Canada. This petition was signed by the Mayor, Robert F. Fleming, and forwarded to the Dominion Government.[919] It was one of the first concerns of the new Liberal Government at the end of June, 1896

and its only action was to refer it swiftly and without comment to the British authorities.[920] When the proposal reached the War Office early in August, it aroused considerable interest. It was recalled that in 1893 the policy had been adopted that Canadians might be recruited in Canada for the battalions serving there and that they might be recruited in England for battalions serving at home but that men might not be recruited in Canada for regiments serving abroad. However desirable it might be to have Canadians, there was fear of the travelling expenses of recruits and the difficulties which might arise should the Leinster Regiment be full and the recruits sent elsewhere. Finally, to suit the law as it then stood, pensioners and reservists who had completed their service would be obliged to live in the United Kingdom and this might not be popular. In the face of these difficulties, the Adjutant-General, Sir Redvers Buller, decided that it was a choice between sentiment and economy and, in the circumstances, economy should prevail. Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of War and a former Governor General, was inclined to agree, doubting moreover that recruits would ever be forthcoming in Canada. Both viewpoints were opposed by Lord Wolseley, the Commander in Chief. "Are we ever to risk a little money to foster a feeling of Loyalty in our Colonies?" he asked, and pressed for the establishment of a depot at Toronto, only providing that the Canadian Government should be asked to provide the barrack accommodation. He did not fear too many recruits from Canada but if there were, he would divert the Irish stream. It would be up to the Canadians to make the scheme a success for if men were not forthcoming, the depot would be closed. If recruits did come forward, he was prepared to rename the regiment and even to link two Canadian Militia battalions

t it. Under Wolseley's persuasion, Lansdowne decided to investigate the possibilities of the scheme, on condition that the Canadians should provide the barracks and also the medical and commissariat arrangements for the depot. But first he would have to be satisfied that the offer was made by responsible people. It was only then that it was noted that the petition had not been accompanied by the comments of the Canadian Government or of Lord Aberdeen, the Governor General. The War Office reply, therefore, was a request to know whether the suggestion reflected the will of the Canadian people generally and whether the Canadian Government would be willing to give the scheme any practical support. If the demand was serious, the Canadians were informed that there were tentative plans to establish a depot at Toronto or at some other town in Canada on condition that Canada furnished the barracks and other services.[921]

459. The British reply was sent back to Canada in November and nothing more was heard. In May of 1897, a memorial was prepared by a number of ex-officers of the old 100th Regiment who were in Ottawa including Senator Boulton, Brown Wallis and Lieutenant Colonel MacPherson, the Director of Militia Stores. It made detailed suggestions about the title, badges and uniform of a repatriated 100th Regiment. This memorial was also forwarded to the British authorities.[922] The authors of the memorial were full of ideas about designs for collar badges and belt buckles but they had little suggestion about how recruits were to be persuaded to join. There was still no official indication of interest from the Canadian Government until March, 1898, when Lord Aberdeen passed on a letter from the Department of Militia and Defence explaining that no had yet been received the / correspondence which had been conducted with Toronto on the subject of providing barracks.[923]

460. Pending some Canadian action, the War Office appears to have made its own decision to move. It was encouraged by a recommendation written by Captain Matthew Nathan of the Royal Engineers, an Intelligence Officer at the War Office who pointed out that while the forty million inhabitants of the United Kingdom were providing 114,000 troops overseas, the ten million white colonists were providing none. A battalion at Halifax could feed recruits to one of the three battalions maintained in the West Indies. Three battalions in Canada could provide for the whole West Indies garrison. If the system was extended to all the colonies, 13 home battalions would be freed from providing drafts and could serve as an expeditionary force in case of need. As for Canada, with a population of six million, the 1,400,000 French Canadians and the 200,000 Indians might have to be ignored but 6,000 men could easily be raised from the remainder. Nathan recognized the problem that Canadians would be unlikely to join for the miserly British pay of a shilling a day but if an allowance was necessary because of the high cost of living, it would be reasonable to ask the Canadian Government to pay it. The battalions would be Imperial, with British officers and Canadian rank and file, but Canadians who had been trained at Sandhurst would be appointed where possible. Nathan maintained that his proposal was much more important than the other suggestion for involving the colonials, the exchange of small units of permanent troops. Canada could only spare a battery of field artillery and this would hardly make any difference.[924]

461. The 1st Battalion of the Leinsters was then stationed at its depot at Birr. It had returned to Ireland in 1895 after seventeen years in India and its officers and men looked forward to a lengthy stay at home station. On

5 April 1898, without any warning, the battalion received notice that on or about 24 April 1898 it would be sailing for Halifax. The announcement came as an astonishment to all members of the regiment. Although its magazine, the Maple Leaf, had stressed Canadianism, it had not been taken seriously by more than a few of the editorial staff and the idea of repatriation aroused no enthusiasm from the mass of officers and men. It also happened that the 2nd Battalion of the Leinsters, the old 109th, was at Halifax where it had spent only seven months. The decision to move the 100th had been provoked by the outbreak of the Spanish American War. The War Office decided to send an extra battalion to the West Indies but rather than send the 1st Leinsters, it was agreed that the 2nd Battalion would be sent back to a station it had left only a few months before. The 1st Battalion would go to Canada to try its luck with the repatriation scheme. There could hardly be a better example of planning being conducted without consultation with those most affected. The 2nd Battalion was furious to be moved after a very short period and after spending considerable sums to purchase winter clothing and furniture for their new station. So was the 1st Battalion, whose plans and arrangements were similarly disrupted. As for Canada, it also had little notice of the scheme and when the 1st Battalion sailed into Halifax on 4 May 1898, expecting an uproarious welcome, it was met by a couple of staff officers and a handful of stevedores.[925]

462. Having sent the 100th to Canada, it remained to find it Canadian recruits. From the first, the prospects were poor. Ivor Herbert, who was called upon for an expert opinion, suggested that the most likely recruiting ground would be in the large industrial cities and that those most likely to enlist would be "disappointed immigrants, anxious

to get away from Canada, or reluctant immigrants on the look-out for a job." The best men, in rural areas such as Megantic, the Gaspe or Cape Breton Island, would not be obtained by ordinary means. So far as he was concerned, it was a step backward.[926] Undaunted, the War Office decided that since there were twelve Military Districts in Canada, each District Officer Commanding would be authorized to attest recruits and to have them medically examined. Once he had accepted the recruit, the man would be sent at public expense to Halifax to join the regiment.[927] The real encouragement for the recruiting scheme came from Chamberlain, who was anxious to test the potential of the Colonies as a field for recruiting. The response from Canada was favourable. On 17 August 1898, Chamberlain was informed that the Canadian Staff would be instructed to co-operate in every way and he was requested to provide a supply of recruiting posters.[928] By the middle of October, the War Office advised the Colonial Office that a case of recruiting posters and a large supply of the necessary forms had been sent direct to the Deputy Minister of Militia in Ottawa. Pending a decision on the depot in Toronto, recruits were to be sent direct to the Leinsters In Halifax.[929]

463. By the end of 1898, it seemed evident that hope of recruiting large numbers of Canadians in the Leinsters was largely futile. In mid-November, Lord William Seymour, commanding the British garrison at Halifax, sent an alternative proposal to the War Office. The five or six men who had joined had not been made particularly welcome in the regiment and it was evident to Seymour that Canadians did not want the Leinsters and the Leinsters did not want Canadians. Evidently the Commander in Chief at Halifax had not been informed of the negotiations about repatriation. His own view was that there would be no difficulty in raising

1200 men for a specifically Canadian regiment but that they would not join an Irish regiment. He suggested that a decision be reached quickly as the best recruiting season was approaching, when the men returned from harvesting in the West.[930] Seymour's note revived interest in the War Office. General Sir Evelyn Wood, who had become Adjutant-General, was anxious to give a chance to any attempt to raise a battalion in Canada. He proposed that a start should be made by raising a Canadian company. If men did not come forward in sufficient numbers, the company could be left in Canada until it had wasted away.[931] Lord Wolseley was also enthusiastic about a Canadian battalion but he was also determined that the Canadian tradition of the 1st Battalion of the Leinsters should not be lost. He favoured cutting off further drafts to the battalion from Ireland, the adoption of more Canadian badges and battle honours and a request to the Canadian Government to contribute sufficiently to the pay of the men to make recruiting financially attractive.[932] Lord Lansdowne shared the enthusiasm of his officers but he was sufficiently experienced to take a realistic view of the likelihood of Canadian official support. He had no illusions about the political influence of the members of the Repatriation Committee and he knew a little about the self-advertisement of Canadian military imperialists. Nor was Lord William Seymour a safe guide to Canadian opinion. Finally, Halifax was hardly a suitable place to raise a Canadian battalion since the Maritimes were really very remote from the rest of the country.[933] Wolseley continued to press for an experiment in Canadian recruiting. He acknowledged that the low pay was putting a high price on patriotism but since they could not get enough men in England at that rate of pay, they would simply have to try elsewhere. Both he and Wood were also anxious to make the attempt as a way of disarming the public criticism which accused them of

failing to make any effort to involve the colonies. If the experiment failed, the odium would at least be transferred from the War Office to the colonies.[934]

464. The earnest discussion in London had been unaccompanied by any notification from Canada. Only in February was a report of the Canadian cabinet received in London. It was hardly encouraging. While there was no difficulty in carrying out the recruiting scheme proposed by the British, there was also no barrack accommodation at Toronto. However, this difficulty was not urgent so long as the Leinsters were stationed in Canada. It was evident that the Canadian Government would be no more than a passive spectator of British recruiting efforts. The Cabinet report was accompanied by a memorandum from Hutton to his Minister. Although he had not been asked his opinion of the probable success of the scheme, Hutton made it clear that Canadians were unlikely to join a regiment which was known to be both Irish and Catholic. What would be possible, in view of the military spirit he had found in Canada, would be to recruit for regiments which were then on active service in Egypt, India and South Africa. He was sure that enough men would never come forward to join any single regiment and that to establish a depot in Toronto would be a waste of money.[935]

465. Lord Lansdowne had also been provided with a report from Colonel Lake, who was then on the staff at the War Office. With his experience in Canada, Lake was able to explain what happened to Toronto's original petition for the depot. The only available accommodation in the city was Stanley Barracks, then fully occupied by the permanent force. The Cabinet had decided that since Toronto would gain something over $100,000 a year from the presence of the depot, it should make a contribution to the erection of additional buildings. This proposal was put to the City

Council but, despite repeated reminders, there was no reply. As for an attempt to repatriate the Leinsters, Lake was convinced that it would be a failure. The battalion had made a poor impression on its arrival in Halifax. It would be better if an attempt was made to raise a battalion in Canada officered by Canadians in the British service. Even then, it was doubtful that sufficient recruits would be obtained. There were many in Canada who thought that it would be possible but they were all very vague about how many would be required annually under a short service system. Although the permanent force private was paid almost twice as much as a British private, it had still proven impossible to keep a permanent force of 850 men up to strength.[936]

466. This information did not cause the War Office to give up hope. Lansdowne now acknowledged that if recruiting was to be a success, it must be dissassociated from the Leinsters. At the same time, he was averse to any general recruiting, anticipating that only stray immigrants and broken down Canadians would be attracted. He accepted a suggestion that a nucleus of a Canadian regiment should be formed from the Leinsters and that Canadian officers in the Army should be invited to volunteer for it. While admitting that Halifax was unsuitable, it was the only place available.[937] Wolseley saw no difficulty in the scheme, particularly if Canada would pay the "graceful compliment" of augmenting the pay of the rank and file to the level of the United States Army.

> If we would now make this experiement in an honest and liberal spirit we cannot fail to graft on to our Regular Army the fighting instincts & national sentiments of the Loyal Canadian people. This would be of great military value to our Army & of immeasurable national importance to our Empire.
>
> I can think of no more certain means of binding together into one strong bundle round England as a core the outlying suckers of our scattered Empire.[937]

On 20 July 1899, the principles were worked out at a meeting in Lord Lansdowne's office attended by the senior military and civil officials involved. The Canadians in the Leinster Regiment would provide the nucleus of a new regiment to be trained and maintained at Halifax. The title of the regiment would be the Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment and it would have Niagara as a battle honour on its colours. Four places would be chosen as recruiting depots and buildings would be provided by the Canadian Government. The men were to be recruited for either three or five years with the colours with the balance of twelve years in the reserve. In the explanation to be sent to Canada, it was agreed that considerable emphasis would be placed on the desire to establish a closer military connection and to preserve the historic title of Royal Canadian Regiment. On the other hand, no reference was to be made to the liability of the battalion for general service overseas.[939]

467. By the time the British proposal had reached Canada, the South African War had broken out and there were more urgent concerns for military authorities in both countries. Hutton forwarded his own suggestions to the Minister on 25 September 1899, acknowledging that few would be likely to come forward at the low rate of pay but putting forward his opinion that a few would join if there was a specifically Canadian title. He was not clear whether the officers would be British or Canadian but half the appointments should be held by the Minister for allotment among Militia officers whom Hutton could recommend.[940] The matter was considered briefly in the Cabinet on 2 November 1899 but the Minister's view was that little progress would be made.[941] This discouraging answer, in company with Hutton's suggestions, was returned to England and the entire correspondence was field for the duration of the war.

468. This should have been the end of the repatriation question. It was not. With the war in South Africa, all British regular regiments were required for action. Since Halifax was a relatively untroubled garrison, it was proposed to replace the Leinsters with a Militia battalion from Britain, the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers. The Leinsters were thoroughly elated at the news.[942] However four days after the battalion had received notice of its move, Lord Lansdowne received a telegram from Lord Minto asking him not to send the Lancashire Fusiliers for the Minister had decided that the moment for repatriation had arrived. An Order in Council had been passed authorizing repatriation on the basis of two battalions being formed, one for Halifax and the other for service in England or in the British Empire. The officers would come from the Royal Military College, Kingston and the men would be recruited on British terms and rates of pay. All that would be required from the Leinsters would be a nucleus of 100 men.[943] This meant that the movement orders for both the Leinsters and the Lancashire Fusiliers had to be suspended until the text of the Canadian Order in Council was received. On 24 January 1900, Lord Minto followed his telegram with a more cautious explanatory letter. Borden had been converted to the repatriation scheme on learning that the depot of the regiment would be in Canada, not in Ireland. The Minister's desire to officer the regiment entirely from Canadian sources might not be entirely free from a desire for political patronage while as a Nova Scotia representative in the Cabinet, he would also be doing a service for his province. It was the Minister who had obliged him to send the telegram of the 16th.[944] The text of the Order in Council laid down the details. The suggestions of the Repatriation Committee about details of uniform were faithfully reproduced but the cost was to be borne by the British Government. As for the present 1st

Battalion of the Leinsters, apart from its nucleus, the men might be drafted out and sent elsewhere.[945]

469. Whatever the political dividends to be gained for Borden through his tardy conversion, the effect on the Leinsters at Halifax was severe. Seymour at Halifax sent an furious angry complaint to the Secretary of War. The first he or the men of the regiment had learned of the Canadian decision was a report in a Halifax newspaper. The Army was being used as a political stalking horse by the Canadian Government. When he had questioned Hutton about the decision, he had been informed that the whole scheme was a political manoeuvre to divert public criticism of the Government for its lukewarmness in supporting Britain in South Africa. The whole affair was unfortunate, both for the war effort in South Africa and for the Leinsters whose discipline, he reported, had become exemplary when it was reported that they were to go to the front.[946] These observations convinced the British authorities that the Canadians were not in earnest over repatriation and Lansdowne agreed reluctantly that the Leinsters should be brought back to England. Lord Wolseley, desperate for troops, agreed, suggesting that a battalion of Canadian militia might be accepted at Imperial rates for the Halifax garrison, with the Canadian Government making up the difference between Imperial and Canadian rates of pay.[947]

470. On 25 March 1900, the Leinsters sailed for Liverpool, putting an end to an ill-conceived and ill-considered scheme which, as Herbert had observed, was a step backward. The battalion had not wanted to come to Canada and it was overjoyed to leave. Its place was taken by a hastily assembled provisional battalion of Canadian Militia. Perhaps embarrassed by its conduct in seeking to hold up the Leinsters, the Canadian Government agreed to pay the full expenses of the battalion of Canadians.

## PROGRESS IN MILITIA REFORM

471. Having presented his blueprint for reform with his first report, General Hutton returned to the task of providing the personal direction and leadership necessary to bring it about. On 7 December 1898, there had been a major change in the hierarchy of the Department with the appointment of a new Deputy Minister. Colonel Charles Eugene Panet had been Deputy Minister since 1875 and although he was a Liberal appointment, Borden regarded him as a major impediment to the reform of the Department. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Borden spoke of the old man's senility and decaying mental energies.

> The mistakes that are constantly being made, the forgetfulness and carelessness that are displayed, are insufferable. The only wonder is that some really alarming blunder has not been committed. ....The old man's heart is in the right place. He is a loyal and true friend. He is honest and does his best to guard the expenditure of the Department. But he is not the man he was and he has failed lamentably within the two years during which I have been his chief.[948]

The old man did not lack the energy to fight for his job. In fact, it had already been offered to another, Lieutenant Colonel Louis Felix Pinault of the 9th Voltigeurs of Quebec, a friend of the Prime Minister. Panet discovered who his successor was to be and accused Pinault unfairly of intriguing against him. Pinault, himself a Liberal of some influence, was embarrassed by the accusation, particularly when it was repeated in the newspapers.[949] The original understanding had been that he would be appointed at the end of the 1898 session but nothing happened and he sought a definite decision. Panet, in turn, obtained the support of Senator Sir Charles Pelletier, one of the most senior Liberals, a cabinet minister under Mackenzie and Speaker of the Senate under Laurier. Pelletier was a man of great influence whose son Oscar had already had a distinguished career as an officer in the permanent corps. All of this created a minor family crisis for the

Liberals, with Pinault demanding a decision, Panet announcing to the press that he would not be resigning, Senator Pelletier refusing to give way and Borden pleading for an efficient Deputy.[950] The new Deputy Minister was a man of forty six, a veteran of the Northwest Campaign with the 9th Voltigeurs and a barrister. He had been a Liberal member of the Quebec legislature since 1890. Pinault was an energetic and competent man who could be trusted to pay full attention to the political implications of decisions made in the Militia Department. He could not be counted upon as an ally for Hutton.

472. Although he devoted much of January to the preparation of his report, it did not occupy his full time. With the support of the Governor General, he organized the Officers' Association of Canada, arranging that the first lecture to the members in Ottawa would be addressed by Captain C.F. Winter on lines which he personally approved.[952] The 7th Fusiliers in London, perennially the most unsatisfactory of the city infantry battalions, remained a problem. Hutton finally decided to dissolve the battalion and then to create a new 7th with new officers and, hopefully, a new spirit. This was accomplished in February.[953] A development which reflected the growing activity of Militia Headquarters was the appearance of Militia Orders at the beginning of February. Hitherto, General Orders had been published approximately monthly, in two sections. The first dealt with changes in Militia regulations and with orders for camps, courses of instruction and other matters of policy. The second section dealt with appointments, promotions and retirements. The new Militia Orders were intended to appear daily and to deal with matters of greater detail. In fact, they were sent out only twice a week. There were directions for reports to be submitted, clarifications of the regulations

and announcements of the movements of the General Officer Commanding. The two sets of orders continued to be issued separately.[954]

473. At the beginning of February, Hutton was in Kingston to address the fourteen officers who attended the first Militia Staff Course.[955] He also had a chance to inspect the 47th Battalion, a rural unit which had been trained, two companies at a time, at Fort Henry during January. The reporter of the Kingston Whig was most impressed with the visiting General, comparing him to Sir Wilfred Laurier in magnetic personality and declaring that "it does not require a judge of character to note the fact that he is a thorough gentleman and a soldier."[956] On 5 February, Hutton addressed the Dominion Rifle Association, recommending that they modernise their practices, using smaller bullseyes, disappearing and moving targets and mass firing.[957] On the 9th, there was a speech to the Artillery Association in which Hutton deplored the lack of technical knowledge among the gunners and reported that he had sent officers to study at Shoeburyness.[958] On the 11th, he was in St. Jean for a "non-political dinner" arranged by Israel Tarte, Borden, who also attended, pointed out the value of military schools to the community but Hutton issued a direct invitation to French Canadians to take a more active interest in the Militia. No people had ever become truly great, he told his listeners, merely by the cultivation of land and pastoral pursuits.[959] On the 13th, his ball at Earnescliffe was described as the event of the week, lasting until 3.00 a.m. on the following morning. Hutton was becoming a public personality. On 3 March 1899, he spoke at a dinner of Militia sergeants in Toronto, and aroused cheers by his promise to create a Canadian Army soon. He took a risk with his Toronto audience when he explained that by a national army, he meant

one in which English and French Canadians were united but he restored delight when he announced that he wanted an army to participate not merely in the defence of Canada but in that of the Empire as well.[960]

474. Hutton's activities were not limited to speeches. On 14 February 1899, the twelfth Militia Order warned officers and staff of the permanent corps and those who aspired to high command that the Major General considered it essential that instructors and staff officers should:

> ...more especially acquire a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of the French language, and the Major General suggests that all those who are unable to read or speak French with fair facility should take an early opportunity of making good this defect.[961]

On 10 March 1899, orders were issued for all Militia units to select a regimental march before the end of April.[962] On 15 March, arrangements were announced for the Imperial garrison at Halifax to conduct a provisional school for the local Militia.[963] At the end of the month, Hutton spent several days inspecting Militia and permanent corps units in Montreal and Quebec. On 28 March, a forecast of the summer's training was published, an advance notice which had always been lacking in previous years. Officers of the permanent corps were given notice that in future they would be expected to reach the same level of qualification as in the Imperial Army.[964]

475. Hutton's activities did not pass without considerable controversy in the press. The Toronto Evening Star backed Hutton warmly, declaring that "so long as a civilian is at the head of the department, the militia regiment will be regarded as a medium of social prestige rather than as a military arm."[965] The Montreal Daily Witness was equally enthusiastic, supporting Hutton in his efforts to make Parliament spend money on military matters and to arouse the people in a time of profound peace. It also hoped that his

provision for bilingual officers would be made obligatory.[966] Some other newspapers differed sharply. Referring to Hutton's speech to the Toronto sergeants, the Toronto Telegram questioned his right to call for an army above politics and religious denominations. It also ridiculed his suggestion that a Militia with new rifles, Oliver equipment and twelve pounder guns could be paralyzed.[967] The Ottawa Citizen warned that the cost would not be small when the General had all that he wanted.[968] The Bobcaygeon Independent sturdily maintained that the real question was whether any military force at all was needed. "Who is the militia to fight? The whole arrangement is an absurdity and the country could well be spared the expense of maintaining so costly an extravagance."[969] On 5 April 1899, the first meeting of the Association of Militia Officers was held in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons. Hutton, as President, presided over the thirty six officers who attended and Lord Minto also was present. In reporting this gathering, the Toronto World on the following day announced that Hutton's speech showed that he was an agent of the Imperial government and that this showed that the Colonial Office was at the bottom of his schemes for reorganization. "It looks as if General Hutton had been sent out to sound the gong and had Minto, a military man also, to ring the bell."[970]

476. A major concern for Hutton was the standard of instruction being offered to the Militia. During April, detailed qualifications for instructors in the various arms were worked out and published.[971] It also seemed important to him that his officers be better trained. Having established that all the Militia was to be trained in the summer of 1899 and that it was to be concentrated in large camps, he arranged voluntary three day courses for commanding officers of infantry

battalions and cavalry regiments. These courses were conducted at three centres for cavalry officers and six centres for infantry officers and consisted of practical and theoretical instruction.[972] A more ambitious scheme was the staff ride which he arranged for three days at the end of May. The staff ride was primarily intended for the candidates of the Militia Staff Course but other Militia Officers were invited to participate. It consisted of a prolonged tactical exercise through the Niagara peninsula, with men of the permanent corps acting as a skeleton cavalry brigade and infantry division. The bulk of the arrangements were made by Lieutenant Colonel Kitson of the Royal Military College but Hutton acted as Director of the ride and as Chief Umpire.[973] It was the first time such an undertaking had ever formed part of Militia training in Canada and it was watched with a mixture of amusement and fascination by both the general public and many Militia officers.[974] At the end, Hutton judged the experiement a success. There had been innumerable mistakes, he told Minto, but these and the general ignorance of the country had made the exercise all the more realistic. With that experience, he was satisfied that if the Government would only put political and denominational prejudice aside, their programme of military reform would be accomplished.[975]

477. With the conclusion of the staff ride, Hutton had less than a week before the summer camps began. The troops at each camp were to be organized as a division with Hutton as the division commander. The first was held at London at the beginning of June. From there, he moved on to the M.D. 2 camp at Niagara and from there to Laprairie. The final camp for the early summer was held at Levis for the men of M.D. 7. At each camp, a similar pattern was followed. A divisional staff was formed of a mixture of permanent force and Militia officers. A rigourous programme of instruction

was laid down, imposing a pace of work that had never been known before. In the course of each camp, the cavalry were practised in an outpost exercise and the infantry in an attack. The artillery was trained separately by a team of officers and instructors under Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Stone, the British officer whom Hutton had brought to Canada to assume command of the artillery. After each camp, the General's observations were published as orders. At Niagara, the Governor General attended the final review.

478. At each camp, Hutton's comments were similar. The men were commended for their achievements but they were also reminded that true discipline could not be acquired in a mere twelve days and that the training period should be extended to the sixteen days permitted under statute. The most unsatisfactory situation was found at the camp at Levis. Hutton had already made an effort to remedy the lack of French speaking instructors in the Militia. He had followed up his warning in February with arrangements for examinations to be held for officers and non-commissioned officers who would be able to qualify as interpreters in either French or English.[976] Realization of this policy remained in the future. At Levis, he could observe the consequence of the lack of instruction of French-Canadian officers and non-commissioned officers. As they did not know how to instruct, they were unable to command. Hutton placed the responsibility squarely on the staff and the permanent corps. For the future, he was optimistic:

> The French Canadian Troops have, for many years, suffered from want of a proper appreciation but it is earnestly hoped that, by increasing interest of the General Public in the importance of National Defence and by the patriotic zeal and military enthusiasm of the troops themselves in another year the standard of military efficiency will more adequately maintain the great historical traditions of French Canadian Military achievements. 977

These comments were appreciated by the French press which reported on the camps in fuller detail than usual. By giving a special significance to the church parade during the camp, Hutton attracted much sympathy from Quebec and Montreal papers.[978] The camps throughout Eastern Canada provided considerable newspaper copy and the incidents of military life were reported in detail. Both Borden and Hutton received praise from many quarters for their decision to ban canteens from the camps and editors were satisfied that this meant that liquor had been banished from the Militia.[979] Another innovation of the General had a fortunate effect. For the first time, Amusements Committees were set up in the camps to plan entertainment for the men after training had ceased. These were particularly popular at the two camps in Quebec where prizes were offered for the best singing.[980]

479. Hutton's attention was not reserved for the training of the Militia. With some difficulty, funds had been made available to concentrate the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry at the Rockcliffe Ranges near Ottawa. This was only the second occasion that the men of the Regiment had served together. From the middle of July until the end of August, the permanent force men were worked hard under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Otter. On 2 August, in company with the two battalions of the Ottawa Brigade, a night attack was practised with some success.[981] By the time the practical training was over, Hutton found a very considerable improvement in smartness and efficiency. He even had praise for the instructors although he observed that several officers and non-commissioned officers had obviously been too long at one station and the commanding officer must be careful to move them more regularly from place to place.[982] The last duty of the troops was to serve as markers and fatigue

party for the Dominion Rifle Association meeting at the end of August. During the camp, the Regiment was honoured by the appointment of Lord Wolseley as its Honorary Colonel.[983] At the end of the camp, a fifth company was organized and established as No. 5 Regimental Depot at Quebec.[984] This was an obvious attempt to bring practical assistance to bear on the problem of the French Canadian Militia.

480. This problem was approached in other ways as well. The 89th Battalion had been particularly involved in abuses and Hutton decided to make an example of it. One of the company commanders had taken more railway tickets than he had brought men to camp and he was suspected of keeping the difference for his own use.[985] Captain Lebel of the same regiment had been absent from drill and his excuses, when called for, were flimsy. Again an example was to be made of him by dispensing with his services.[986] In the face of an outcry, Hutton held firm. "It is a matter of great importance," he explained to Pinault, "as the discipline of the French Canadian Troops is at a very low ebb..."[987] The Commanding officers of the 64th and 86th Battalions were advised to resign because of the state of their battalions, despite many years of service.[988] When the affairs of the 89th Battalion were examined, it was discovered that several officers had signed false transport warrants but by that time, Hutton was deep in other matters and it was decided that a severe reprimand would be sufficient. The offence was evidently so common as not even to be considered an offence.[989]*

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* It was also alleged to be common for units from Southern Quebec to make up their strength from stevedores on the docks of Montreal. (Debates, 20 June 1896, 5419)

481. On 30 August 1899, Hutton officiated at the opening of the Toronto Industrial Exhibition. He had a chance to make what he later felt to have been his best speech in Canada. It was, in fact, the most rhetorical of his speeches on the Canadian Army, combined with a passionate advocacy of militarism:

> Our pastimes, our cricket, our football and our manly games may, and undoubtedly have done much for the manhood of the Empire. There is, however, something greater, higher, nobler, in a nation's life which athleticism does not teach. It is the profession of arms when undertaken upon its true lines, which inculcates the spirit of discipline of mind and body, the subordination of self to a noble end, the love of country and honour to God. These are qualities which constitute the warlike strength of a people and become the true reflexes of their moral and mental vigour. 990

482. From Toronto, Hutton returned briefly to Ottawa and then set out to tour the camps in the Maritimes. On the way, he had another opportunity to inspect the Montreal city corps and the permanent corps at Quebec. At Montreal, he ammounced plans for a military tattoo for the city to which the Militia and representatives of British and foreigh armies would be invited. All that would be required would be a guarantee fund of from $15-20,000. The idea was picked up with some interest by the Montreal newspapers.[991] In the Maritimes, Hutton reproduced the pattern of activity which he had created in the Ontario and Quebec camps and continued to preach his various doctrines. On 23 September 1899, he returned to Ottawa.

483. Several other areas of training progressed outside Hutton's immediate supervision. Chief among them was the training of the artillery. His immediate solution to the technical backwardness of the Canadians was to introduce a British officer, Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Stone, who became the officer commanding the Canadian Artillery on 1 June 1899. The appointment aroused criticism on the grounds that a