Canadian officer should have been given the distinction.[992] but Hutton had no reason to be unhappy with the choice. Stone was directed to make himself responsible for carrying out the practical details of the artillery organization suggested by the Defence Committee Report of 1898, including the regrouping of existing units of garrison artillery to provide a second regiment for Montreal. Hutton also felt that Saint John, New Brunswick, deserved more attention than the Committee had given it.[993] On 17 July, Stone was informed that he was also to act as an Inspector of Artillery and to take a particular interest in the permanent batteries, some of which were in bad order. "A school of gunnery should be organized without delay upon the ashes of that which exists" he was informed.[994] Stone did not accomplish all that he was asked to do in the first year but a number of alterations in the organization of the garrison artillery brought a standard organization for all the regiments. The field artillery profitted from a competitive camp at Deseronto in which eleven batteries participated. Due to the lack of modern equipment, the practice of both permanent and Militia garrison artillery units was less valuable than that of the field artillery but all showed an evident improvement as a result of the year's training.[995]

HUTTON'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE GOVERNMENT

484. If Hutton's difficulties had been limited to occasional sniping from the press, it might have been that he would have swept all before him. In fact, the coldness and lack of co-operation of which he had complained since his arrival continued. The new Deputy Minister proved to be no ally and the friction with the civil branch of the Department continued. Early in February, Hutton submitted an estimate of the increase in the estimates which would be necessary to carry out the recommendations in his 1898 report.

For the current year, there was to be an increase of $128,000, chiefly to pay for four additional days of drill for the Militia but with smaller sums to pay for additional staff officers and to move "B" Squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons from Winnipeg to Kingston. For public works, he wanted $373,000, almost half of which would pay for barracks and a range at Montreal. For other purposes, he wanted $525,000, mostly for new artillery and to help to organize a naval militia and to provide it with a training ship.[996] This list was ignored. Another foray into the territory of the civil branch was organized a few days later when Hutton complained to the Minister that the Chief Superintendent of Stores refused to apply the Imperial regulations for the care and maintenance of military stores. It was necessary that he be brought promptly to comply with them for large quantities of artillery and other stores would soon be arriving.[997] Again no notice was taken of his protest. Both areas of dispute were revived at the end of April when Hutton discovered that only $20,000 instead of $375,000 had been placed in the Public Works budget for the Militia Department.[998] A week later, he was furious to discover that a memorandum he had sent to the Deputy Minister on the care of saddlery had been referred to the Chief Superintendent of Stores for his comments. In an angry letter to the Minister he announced flatly: "I do not desire the remarks of gentlemen in the civil branch upon technical matters of military efficiency." The incident pointed out again the necessity of transferring the Stores Department to the supervision of the military authorities.[999]

485. Departmental disputes were not the only or even the chief source of exasperation to the General. What provoked his indignation more than anything else was the

prevalence of political influence, particularly in questions of military discipline. A number of instances had occurred shortly before his own appointment. On 15 July 1897, Brevet Captain Oscar Pelletier had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and given command of M.D. 7. On 15 February 1898, Major Robert Cartwright was appointed to the newly revived position of Assistant Adjutant-General. These officers were efficient and capable but the Opposition suspected that both these junior officers owed their selection to the fact that one was the son of the Speaker of the Senate and the other was the son of the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Politics had governed at least two of the appointments to the Yukon Force as well, Major Talbot, the Paymaster and Major Bliss, the Supply and Transport Officer. Hutton's first problem occurred when Major Talbot appeared in Ottawa in November, having left the Yukon Force under circumstances which Hutton considered as "irregular" and with a clear intention not to endure a Yukon winter. Hutton's first decision was to dispense with his services, his second, to return him to duty. Both decisions were complicated by the fact that Talbot's brother was a Liberal Member of Parliament who promptly brought the weight of his influence to bear. This created a dispute between Hutton and the Minister which was fully reported in the newspapers and which aroused considerable comment from Conservative editorial writers. Hutton had to rescind his order when the Minister eventually produced a letter from Colonel Evans, commander of the Yukon Force, praising Talbot's work and explaining that he had been sent to Ottawa to make a special report to the Minister. Nothing could persuade Hutton, however, that the tardy explanation had not been extorted from Evans by political pressure.[1000] The dispute reminded the Ottawa Citizen, normally a supporter of the Government, of the previous difficulties between Generals and the

Government. After recalling difficulties of Luard, Herbert and Gascoigne, the newspaper warned that if Hutton went, all would be lost in the Militia since the officers would become politicians in uniform as they were in the United States.[1001] The Montreal Gazette took a different view, suggesting that the differences proved the need for a Canadian officer who would know the limits of his power. Otherwise, there was bound to be a struggle between the General and the Minister whenever the former tried to interfere with politics. The Gazette thought that Colonel Aylmer, the Adjutant-General, would be an excellent choice.[1002]*

486. Actually all was not finished with the Talbot affair. It emerged in Parliament that Talbot had not only been drawing the pay of his rank for service in the Yukon but had also been collecting his salary for his normal employment as a Government clerk in Quebec. This was a very clear offence and Hutton's original decision was sustained.[1003] Major Bliss was also in trouble. In November, 1898, Colonel Evans had been prevailed upon to send a glowing testimonial of his services to Ottawa but at that very time the management of the supplies and their transfer to the Yukon from Skagway was

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* In May, Colonel Aylmer was sent to England at the Minister's behest to visit British military establishments and thus broaden his military experience. Hutton was opposed to this visit. In a letter to Sir Redvers Buller, the British Adjutant-General, he asked that Aylmer be given a few opportunities around Aldershot. Aylmer, he explained, had no experience and was "quite useless". Buller was asked to report on Aylmer and "point out how impossible it is for a man of his maturity to learn anything." To Aylmer himself, he sent a curt letter through Foster, reminding him that he had ignored military etiquette by failing to call on the General Officer Commanding before his departure and ordering him to keep a diary of his movements and of the instruction he received. M.G. 21, HU Vol. 1, 75, Hutton-Buller, 14 May 1899; RG 9 II B 1 599, Hutton - Chief Staff Officer, 26 July 1899.

actually in difficulties for which Bliss was felt to be responsible. When, at Evans' behest, Hutton sought to have Bliss removed, he found himself frustrated by Evans' own letter of recommendation.[1004]

487. Another incident which occupied some of Hutton's time was reminiscent of the disputes which had caused Gascoigne so much difficulty. Lieutenant Colonel Francis B. Gregory commanded the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment of Canadian Artillery, a unit of garrison artillery at Victoria. In the course of a dispute with his own commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Prior, a Conservative Member of Parliament, and after some criticism of his battalion in the press, Gregory called a meeting of his officers and men to have them express an opinion on his command. Such a procedure was contrary to military regulations and Lieutenant Colonel Peters, the District Officer Commanding, directed that the meeting be cancelled. Gregory went ahead with the meeting for Peters evidently had little influence. Hutton was obliged to enforce discipline from his desk in Ottawa. Although the General was prepared to administer no more than a severe reprimand for such defiance of military discipline, Gregory felt that he had committed no offence at all and he used his political influence to prove it. In this case, Hutton held firm although his position had been weakened by the mistakes of Lieutenant Colonel Peters. The unfortunate officer on the spot, seeking to avoid arousing the anger of a local magnate, had tried to investigate Gregory's offence only through interviewing officers who had been present at the meeting. He had avoided asking questions of Gregory himself.[1005] In the case of both Evans and Peters, Hutton had found that Canadian officers were not prepared to join him in his fight against political influence. They were aware that,

while the General's post was temporary, they would be left in Canada to face the vagaries of political fortune.

488. However annoying the other cases of political interference had been, Hutton was convined that the question of Colonel Domville was the most important. If he could settle it to his satisfaction, he believed that he would establish a lasting and vital precedent. Lieutenant Colonel James Domville was a prominent merchant of Saint John, New Brunswick. He had long been engaged in the West Indies trade and his personal fortune had risen and fallen with its course. He had been president of the Maritime Bank of Canada and its bankruptcy had ruined him[1006] as well as providing a vital case in Canadian constitutional law. Like men, another wealthy Canadian, he had devoted considerable attention to the Militia and had been for years one of the best known and respected officers in his province. He was the founder and first commanding officer of the 8th New Brunswick Hussars from 1881. In 1884 and in 1896, he volunteered the services of his regiment for the campaigns in the Soudan. Even more important, Colonel Domville was a Member of Parliament, first for the Conservatives from 1872 to 1882 and then, having changed to the Liberals and having failed twice in bids for re-election, for King's County from 1896.[1007] Domville was an eccentric and sometimes a violent personality, a strong imperialist and a formidable opponent.

489. The difficulty with Domville began with the regulations governing limitation of tenure of command. Since he had held the command of his regiment for sixteen years when they were promulgated, he was plainly one of the officers against whom they were designed. Moreover his regiment had suffered from neglect in recent years.

Unfortunately the situation was complicated by the fact that Domville's second-in-command, Major Alfred Markham, was a prominent local Conservative to whom Domville had taken a violent dislike. To fight his removal, Domville turned to his political friends. To Laurier, he addressed a lengthy series of complaints and accusations. Markham had been guilty of setting fires at Sussex Camp, he reported, and the General Officer Commanding of the day had recommended his dismissal. Only when Domville had been in England had Markham been promoted and only despite his protests. His major had also been guilty of plotting against him in the Conservative Party. As for himself, Domville complained that he had made his regiment effective after twenty years and he had no intention of turning it over to an incompetent like Markham who was even older than himself. (Domville was then 56). Moreover, the political consequences would be suicidal:

> ...the Regiment and its connections cover a vote of at least five hundred now, and the votes of those who may be brought into the Regiment. It controls all the patronage of the Regimental Camp at Sussex, buildings, stables, armoury, forag e and rations.

He had never made political use of it but now it would be turned over to his bitterest political opponent.[1008] Domville supported his case with letters from other recently deposed colonels who warned that it would be impossible to get suitable officers to take up such unrewarding and expensive jobs for a mere five years. Others complained that they, too, had no suitable successors.[1009]

490. Borden, to whom the letter was referred, replied to each charge as categorically as he could. Markham had been promoted to brevet rank because he was entitled to it by length and service and there had been no reason to discriminate against him because he was a Conservative. As for the charge that he had set fires, Markham had not the slightest connection with them. Borden said that the story

was too long to trouble the Prime Minister but Markham had been required to write a letter afterwards in which he regretted the incident and promised loyal support to his commanding officer. Domville had used this letter to suggest that Markham was responsible for the fires. The real problem, as Borden saw it, was that Domville did not like the principle of limitation of tenure of command, but other good Liberals had accepted it and had resigned without making difficulties. The regulations allowed an extension in exceptional circumstances but Domville had already had the advantage of such an extension.[1010] Besides, as Borden added in a letter a few days later, Domville's term only expired in July of 1898.

491. The problem of Domville's retirement was inherited by Hutton. The Government had retreated from the firm position it had adopted in February, 1898, and Domville, himself, had found further reasons to prolong his stay. Major Markham had formulated charges of financial malversation against him and, although Gascoigne had urged him to withdraw them, he had persisted. The matter was raised by the Conservatives in the House of Commons[1011] and Domville insisted that the whole matter be referred to the Public Accounts Committee in order that his name be cleared. The matter became one which reflected on the reputation of the Government as a whole and to insist on the removal of Domville at such a time would have been interpreted by the Opposition as a proof of want of confidence. Hutton was determined that Domville should go. The Colonel had been involved in a number of business ventures in the Yukon which Hutton described as "most irregular and unbecoming for an officer". He was also "addicted to drink" and had been more or less drunk in the House of Commons on several occasions.[1012] During the fall and winter of 1898-99, Domville was in England and Hutton took advantage of his absence and of the technicality that he had

not obtained permission from the Militia Headquarters to go abroad to transfer the stores and equipment of the 8th Hussars to Major Markham. On his return, Domville was furious to discover what had been done and promptly wired the Minister to demand that further action be suspended. Borden at first held firm but then he agreed that Domville's retirement should not be announced until after the local elections in New Brunswick. In April, Domville won another delay by insisting that the hand-over should be suspended until the Public Accounts Committee examining the regimental funds had made its report.[1013] These delays were completely unsatisfactory to Hutton. He insisted to Borden that Domville was a bad officer who had done nothing about the reports of malversation of funds when they had originally been brought to his attention and that he must go. This brought the matter to the attention of the Cabinet which had no particular desire to arouse Domville and which tended to be annoyed at Hutton both for raising the matter and then for dictating to the Government. The matter was finally referred to the Governor General[1014] who backed his General and who worked out a compromise. Since the Public Accounts Committee, dividing on party lines, found Domville not guilty of the charges which had been made against him, he was restored to his command until August, 1899 when he was transferred to the Retired List. As for Markham, Hutton recommended that he be permitted to succeed to the command of the Regiment on condition that he would agree to retire at the end of the year.[1015] By that time, he would be too old to command a cavalry regiment. Instead, Markham's succession to command was purely symbolic. Having been gazetted to the command, he was promptly transferred to the Reserve of Officers. Major H. Montgomery Campbell, a friend of Domville, succeeded Markham.[1016]

492. Hutton was convinced that it was vital to carry the Domville affair to a satisfactory conclusion. There would be incalculable symbolic value in proving that a Liberal Member of Parliament could be made to follow a military regulation that he did not like. He was very grateful for the Governor General's support:

> As regards the Domville affair if I may be allowed to say so, Your Excellency's firm stand has done more to restore discipline & real efficiency into the Canadian Army than all the humble efforts of myself & others. This political interference wire-pulling is a very Upas-Tree which must inevitably wither up all that is good, sound and really valuable in an Army. 1017

493. In fact, the Domville case was important but its real consequences were not what Hutton had hoped. The cabinet was not grateful to him for raising the affair and it was very far from conceding that matters of discipline could be ruled out of its areas of concern. In Parliament, Hutton had acquired an energetic and noisy enemy who could serve as a rallying point for the other interests he was offending. On 1 June 1899, Domville introduced a private member's bill to amend the Militia Act to clarify the subordinate relationship of the General to the Minister and to provide that the appointment could be held by a Canadian.[1018] Although he did not have an opportunity for a second reading of his bill, he had a chance during the discussion of estimates to say what he thought of "noisy militarism" and officers of the Wolseley school. Each general, he complained, had spent much of his time in condemning his predecessor. "One is for buttons and another is for shooting, another is for tattoos, another is for cavalry, another for mounted infantry. Now, which is right?"[1019] Domville might not be a particularly influential or respected member but he was the first to be a firm enemy of the General. He was not to be the last.

494. The Domville affair received some notice in the press. The Ottawa Tribune interpreted the Colonel's temporary reinstatement as a victory for political influence.[1020] and the Ottawa Journal, also a Conservative supporter, characterized Domville's demand for a Canadian General Officer Commanding as "rank rubbish". It pointed out that Domville himself had been born and educated in England and had been trained in commercial practices in the Barbadoes. Hutton, the paper insisted, needed protection from "the narrow gauge partisans and conceit-swollen or super sensitive militia pomposities" who had driven out his predecessors.[1021] The Saint John Daily Record, more sympathetic to a local man, agreed with Domville that Canada had had about enough of British officers commanding the Canadian Militia.[1022]

THE PROPOSAL TO CAPTURE ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

495. On 2 June 1898, the command of British troops in Canada had passed to Lieutenant General Lord William Seymour. The new commander had begun his service as a midshipman with the Royal Navy during the Crimena War. Afterwards, he had joined the Coldstream Guards. When he came to Canada, he was the fifth most senior lieutenant general in the British Army, an officer of limited abilities but of boundless energy. His appointment to command the little garrison at Halifax with its one battalion of regulars and its two companies of artillery was a source of disappointment and frustration to him since it was likely to be his last active employment. Thus he sought ways to extend his authority and to exert his influence. He gladly accepted Hutton's request that the British garrison should play a more active part in training the units of Canadian Militia which were to be assigned to the fortress in the event of war. Hutton and Seymour were already friends from earlier service together. It happened

that the Commander in Chief of the North American and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy was an officer with as much energy as Seymour and considerably more ability. Vice Admiral Sir John Fisher was also spending a frustrating period in command of a force which seemed beneath his abilities.

496. In October, 1898, war between Great Britain and France as a result of the Fashoda incident appeared imminent. Both Fisher and Seymour felt a quickening of enthusiasm and both looked about them to make their plans for the onset of hostilities. Their attention was focussed on the two French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. In February, 1898, Captain M.A. Bourke R.N. had visited St. Pierre in H.M.S. Cordelia and his report was the basis for their interest. He reported that the islands were undefended save for fifty armed gendarmes and a rumour of five hundred rifles somewhere on the island. The sole importance of the place was that one of the British cables from Newfoundland to Nova Scotia passed through St. Pierre and that others passed close by. There was also a French cable from Brest to St. Pierre. The capture of the island would save the British cables. It would also secure the coal supply of the small French squadron which escorted the annual fishing fleet and allow it to be destroyed.[1023] On the basis of this intelligence, Fisher persuaded Seymour that a small force should invade the islands at the outbreak of war. In great secrecy, two field guns were loaded on H.M.S. Cordelia and Colonel Collard of Seymour's staff paid a visit to Sydney and decided that the mail packet Bruce would be suitable to carry the landing party.[1024] On 26 October 1898, Fisher told Seymour that war was imminent between Britain and France and 200 infantry and a detachment of artillery were ordered to be held in instant readiness at Halifax.[1025] Seymour estimated that it would take three hours to get his men entrained, six more hours to get them to Sydney

and that within twelve hours of the declaration of war, the expedition would be sailing from Sydney harbour. Within twenty four hours, St. Pierre would be in British hands.[1026] As a further measure of readiness, Seymour sent a telegram to the Governor General, Lord Aberdeen, reminding him that according to the Militia Act, Seymour would take command of the Militia in the event of war and asking him whether he anticipated any internal disturbances in Canada as a result of a declaration of war. He also asked him whether, when St. Pierre and Miquelon had been safely occupied, he could expect Canadian Militia to reinforce or replace the original landing party. Aberdeen's reply was only mildly reassuring. He did not think that there were any districts in Canada where disaffection had actually taken shape but that in the large towns of Montreal and Quebec, "there is a certain element of rowdyism not exactly of the street, but of a certain class, which might be ready to demonstrate against British authority in the event of hostilities between England and France." As for the employment of Canadian Militia on St. Pierre and Miquelon, difficulties were likely to arise since it was a new departure and the step was certainly contrary to the intentions of the Militia Act.[1027] By the time this reply was received, war was no longer imminent, but Seymour sent a report of what he had planned to obtain a somewhat belated approval from the British authorities.

497. The news of Seymour's initiative was received with interest and even approval at the War Office. Colonel Sir William Everitt of the Military Intelligence Department suggested that Captain Bourke's report was inaccurate in some respects. There was another British cable which did not pass near St. Pierre. On the other hand, there were three French cables across the Atlantic and the two which crossed St. Pierre could easily be cut by landing parties.[1028] The real importance

of the capture of the island would be to cut off communication between France and the North American continent. Seymour was asked to bring his information up to date, perhaps making use of the British employees of the United States Cable Company who were stationed on the island. The second concern of the War Office was that the garrison of Halifax should not be reduced at the outset of war. This made it even more vital that Canadian Militia be involved in the scheme, both to replace the British force which would be withdrawn and to proceed later as a garrison for the two French islands. In this connection, Lord Aberdeen's intimation of limitations on foreign service for the Militia was important. It was even more important, as Everitt pointed out, because one feature of the defence scheme proposed by the Leach Committee was that the Canadian Militia should occupy the right bank of the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario to Lake St. Francis at the outbreak of war. If the Canadian Militia was not allowed to serve abroad, this part of the plan was in jeopardy. For both these reasons, it was necessary for Seymour to obtain a clarification of the position of the Canadian Militia and it was suggested that this could best be done through the Governor General. Finally he was advised that his assumption that he acquired the command of the Militia on the declaration of war was erroneous. The command had to be transferred by order in council.[1029] The War Office also approached the Admiralty to obtain its approval of the plan.

498. Both the War Office and the Admiralty were satisfied that Aberdeen's doubts about the legality of overseas service for the Canadian Militia were unfounded. Section 79 of the Militia Act provided that "Her Majesty may call out the Militia or any part thereof, for active service either within or without the Dominion, at any time

when it appears advisable so do so by reason of war, invasion or insurrection, or threat of any of them."[1030] To Sir Evelyn Wood, it seemed quite clear that this permitted the Militia to be used abroad. On 22 March 1898, Seymour sent Colonel Everitt a lengthy personal letter in which he gave further explanations of the situation. He had just returned from Ottawa where he had met the Governor General. Lord Minto shared his predecessor's view that the Canadian Militia was rasied only for home defence and he was sustained in this view by several old letters from Sir John A. Macdonald which he had received during his previous period in Canada. When Seymour had come back to Halifax, Fisher had pressed a further recommendation on him, that Canadian Militia should participate, in an expedition against the French island of Martinique. For military reasons alone, Seymour, replied, this was out of the question. As far as further information about St. Pierre was concerned, he had entertained the Governor of the island a few weeks before. The official had spoken "quite openly and honestly for a Frenchman" and had clearly indicated that his island remained defenceless. Seymour was even more convinced of the advantages of the plan since they might even capture the 200 vessels of the French fishing fleet.[1031]

499. Despite his own misgivings, Minto had accepted Seymour's request to determine the attitude of the Canadian Government. On 25 March 1899, after Seymour had returned to Halifax, he wrote to Laurier, explaining that he felt that it would be beyond the intention of the Militia Act to allow the Militia to serve outside Canada in the event of war. This did not mean war with the United States, he explained nor did he question the right of the Queen to call out the Militia in event of war in or out of the Dominion. What he wished

from the Prime Minister was a clarification of the right to use the Militia outside Canada in the event of war with European powers. It did not seem that Section 79 had been framed with the possibility of a European war in mind. He had no doubt that in the event of such a war, there would be offers of troops but he wished to distinguish between what he called "sentimental affairs" and commitments which could be relied upon.[1032] On 27 March 1899, he met with Laurier and to his astonishment discovered that the Prime Minister gave the broadest possible interpretation to Section 79. This opinion was shared by the Minister of Justice, David Mills and by the Minister of Militia. As Minto hastily recorded after their conversation, Laurier had said that "it would be quite within the rights of the Imperial Government in case of war to order Canadian troops to any of the French Islands, such as St. Pierre, Miquelon or Martinique, and equally to order above troops to any part of the world in time of war." The only limitation Laurier suggested was that it might not be wise to move French Canadian troops although it would certainly be within the legal rights of the Imperial Government to do so.

> He has no doubt that when the Act was framed, the possibility of moving Canadian troops out of the Dominion did not occur to the framers, that such a thought never entered their heads, and that they had only in view the possibilities of war with the United States - and the possible necessity of crossing the United States frontier - but all the same, whatever the original intention of the Act may have been, he considered it quite clear now as to the right possessed by the Imperial Government to utilize Canadian troops for service anywhere beyond the Dominion in the case of war. 1033

500. To Minto, this was an unexpected reversal of Canadian policy. He had based his own position on the stand Macdonald had adopted in 1885 over the question of Canadian volunteers for the Sudan. He could not resist the temptation to read a letter from the earlier prime minister in which Macdonald had made it clear that any troops for overseas service which the British Government wished from Canada would

have to be raised as part of the British Regular Army under arrangements like those made for the 100th Regiment.[1034] Laurier did not change his stand but continued to hold to his position that the Imperial Government in time of war could order the Canadian Militia where it pleased. On 1 April 1899, Minto passed on the Canadian policy to Seymour, adding for his own sake a further explanation of why he, himself, had thought that Macdonald' policy still stood. Hutton had tried to explain the difference by suggesting that Macdonald was referring to expeditions while Laurier was referring to full scale war[1035] but Minto was convinced that no such distinction existed in the Conservative premier's mind. The only explanation was that the position taken by Laurier fitted the particular circumstances and he warned Seymour that Canadian reaction could be relied upon to vary with political conditions. He also added a military observation that no Canadian Militia unit would be fit for service as such although a collection of selected volunteers might be satisfactory.[1036]

501. All of this news was passed back to the War Office, with Seymour carefully endorsing Minto's two reservations. Although Fisher had been replaced on the North American station, Seymour / now felt able to proceed with more detailed planning, confident that the Admiralty approval which had been obtained on 3 February 1899[1037] would also apply to Fisher's successor.[1038] The War Office agreed, being delighted with Laurier's support. Sir William Everitt recommended that the Colonial Office be moved to send a letter of thanks to the Canadian Government, expressing gratitude for its loyalty and explaining that the question had been raised because the basis of Canadian defence rested on the ability to move troops across the American frontier. There had been no intention of using Canadian troops in another hemisphere.[1039] Lansdowne passed

on this request, amplifying it a little incautiously to get the Colonial Office to explain to the Canadians that the doubts had arisen over the employment of Canadian troops to occupy islands in which Canadian interests were directly affected.[1040]

502. The essence of the St. Pierre and Miquelon expedition was that it must be both swift and secret. Since confirming Canadian participation had meant revealing at least the intention to the Canadian cabinet, secrecy had been gravely compromised. Major General F.W. Stopford, the Assistant Adjutant-General suggested that the plans be rewritten and that they be kept separate from the main defence scheme for Halifax,[1041] a document with a relatively wide distribution. Seymour was directed to produce a definite scheme and not merely a statement of what he had planned in the past. Since the Canadian Government had no objection to the movement of its troops, it could have no objection to confidential arrangements being made with Hutton.[1042]

THE HUTTON-MINTO-SEYMOUR QUARREL

503. Working out a plan for the St. Pierre-Miquelon operation demanded the close co-operation of Seymour, Hutton and Minto. Through a series of misunderstandings and differences, aggravated by the personality of Lord William and Hutton, the good relations which had previously existed suddenly deteriorated during the summer of 1899. The quarrel between Seymour and Hutton and later with Lord Minto was a distraction in the background of the more important differences which were developing between Hutton and the Canadian Government.

504. On his arrival, the relations between Hutton and Seymour had been extremely cordial. In a welcoming letter on the announcement of his appointment, Seymour gave a

friendly warning about the difficulties of working with colonial governments. "I say this against myself for there is no one I would rather see in that position than yourself."[1043] Once in Canada, the advice continued. In February, Seymour spent a few days with the Huttons at Earnscliffe. In March, he gave a mild warning about placing too much stock in the Canadian press and added his opinion that Laurier was probably one of those who was opposed to military reform.[1044] In April, there was a slightly stronger warning about Hutton's speeches. When he had been in Ottawa, Seymour had been approached by a prominent Canadian with the warning that Hutton was pushing them too hard.[1045] There were more such letters, reflecting a sympathetic and respectful relationship.

505. Into this atmosphere of cordiality came two points of difference. The first occurred when Seymour was asked by the Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office, Major-General Neville Lyttleton, to obtain confidential reports on Lieutenant Colonel Kitson and Lieutenant Logan, to British officers who were then on the staff of the Royal Military College.[1046] The General Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Troops in Canada had never been sent such a request before and it was a stupid mistake on Lyttleton's part. Nonetheless, Seymour set about obtaining them. He also asked Lyttleton whether he would be responsible for supplying confidential reports on Hutton and other Imperial officers serving with the Canadian Militia.[1047] Lyttleton said that he should and that there was no reason why he should not even make a report on Hutton.[1048] To make a confidential report on an officer was an assumption of military authority over him, something which had never been claimed for the British general at Halifax before. Seymour, however, was the man to stake such a claim. A correspondence was opened with

Hutton to obtain the reports but Hutton had little difficulty in gaining the support of the Governor General for the view that the Imperial officers with the Militia were none of Seymour's business.

506. The affair of the confidential reports was further complicated by a dispute over Colonel Foster, the Quartermaster-General of the Canadian Militia. Before he had been given his Militia appointment, Foster had been in the Intelligence Department of the War Office and had been responsible for the preparation of a secret report on Canadian defence. One copy was deposited at the War Office and a second copy was retained, without authority, by Foster himself. Before he came to Canada, Seymour had a chance to see the copy of the report in London but once in Canada, he decided to refresh his memory. At a dinner at Government House in May, 1899, he asked Foster to let him look at his copy. Foster agreed and arranged to transmit it via Major Lawrence Drummond, the Governor General's Military Secretary. After some time, the report had not arrived and Seymour repeated his request. A somewhat abashed Foster explained that he had received a hint that since he should not have kept a copy, he had no right to show it to anyone else. This annoyed Seymour and he repeated his request. Again he was refused, this time in the more decorous terms that the Governor General had retained the report for his own perusal.[1049] This made Seymour angry and he directed Hutton to have it handed over, warning that he could give a direct order if he chose, since he had undoubted authority over all Imperial officers in Canada. "I am not easily moved to anger, but the moment I feel that I am being played with, I strike pretty hot."[1050] This was a second assertion of a principle which Hutton felt that he could not accept. Inperial officers serving with the Militia were subordinates of the Canadian Government, not of Lord

William's, and they came under his personal authority. He chose to back up Foster, pointing out the extreme secrecy of the report although insisting that he meant no discourtesy by this refusal.[1051] Seymour would not be placated. On 27 June 1899, the basic issue was brought out when Seymour declared that Foster was failing to acknowledge him as his military superior in Canada and the representative of the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief.[1052] Hutton replied with some surprise, stating that he had had no intimation from the War Office that the position of officers in self-governing colonies had been so changed.[1053]

507. On the issue of confidential reports, Hutton was more cautious. He would gladly submit confidential reports through Seymour if that was the correct channel of communication; he wanted no disputes about that. First, however, he must ensure that it was the correct procedure through reference to the Governor General.[1054] Minto, for his part, drafted a lengthy memorandum on 15 July 1899, pointing out that for his part the two commands, the Militia and the garrison at Halifax, were entirely distinct. The Imperial officers with the Militia were paid by the Canadian Government and had nothing to do with the commander at Halifax. Finally, he drew attention to a counter-charge of Hutton, that Seymour had not been referring to him properly. In recent letters, he had adopted the practice of addressing Hutton as "Colonel (local Major General)" which was improper.[1055] After a tentative effort to make peace at the cost of an abject apology from Foster, Seymour returned the whole correspondence to the War Office on 8 August 1899, complaining of the secret reports, the confidential reports and, above all, of Minto's support for Hutton and his failure to treat Seymour as his real military adviser.[1056]

508. The correspondence reached the War Office as the South African crisis was developing rapidly and staff officers had no time to devote to such a problem. Seymour waited in vain for a reply. Since Minto repeatedly said that he would abide by the decision of the Secretary of State for War, the lack of a reply seemed to suggest that Seymour's contention had not been upheld. Throughout the fall, the unhappy General at Halifax tried to restore the previous good relations without success. He resented the accusation that he had tried to interfere with the Militia but he was anxious to play some part in the preparations for the South African War. As a soldier, he shared the frustration of being far from the seat of the war. He felt increasingly left out of things. Early in October, the Governor General spent a few days in New York. Customarily, the General Officer at Halifax acted as Administrator when the Governor General was out of the country but for such a short absence, Minto did not feel it necessary to call up Seymour. The elderly General was bitterly hurt by what he regarded as a slight.[1057]

509. The plan to deal with St. Pierre and Miquelon was a partial casualty of the dispute. It was also affected by the views of Fisher's successor, Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Bedford, who had no enthusiasm for it at all. Seymour was converted to the view that it would be enough to send a cable steamer, escorted by a warship, to cut the cables on both sides of the island and join them to the British cable at Port aux Basques. A landing party from the warship would capture the able bodied males of the population and convey them to Halifax where they would be "out of harm's way".[1058] This reply was not what the War Office had requested. Sir John Ardagh, the Director of Military Intelligence and a friend of Hutton, also held Seymour responsible for a number of leaks

in the secrecy of the plan. Since he felt that it would still be useful to have a plan to seize the islands early in any war with France, a scheme must still be prepared. To restore its secrecy, he proposed that a public letter, marked Secret, be sent to Hutton which he might "confidentially" communicate to the Canadian Ministers, telling them that the scheme had been entirely abandoned. Thereafter, nothing more in writing would be passed to the General Officer Commanding the Militia and his accuaintance with the scheme must remain verbal. The landing parties would be concealed in the Halifax Defence Scheme as part of the reserve.[1059] The necessary letter was sent to Hutton on 26 January 1900.[1060] By the time it had arrived, Hutton had gone and the invasion scheme seemed even more hopeless. As Seymour reported on 26 February 1900, the admiral on the station was absolutely opposed to the operation. The battalion of regulars was being replaced by a battalion of Canadian Militia. General Hutton had been removed under circumstances which made the Canadian Government very suspicious of initiatives by Imperial officers. Enthusiasm had certainly suffered.[1061] The St. Pierre-Miquelon operation returned to the shadows.

510. So long as Hutton remained in Canada, he remained the focus of Seymour's indignation, while the Governor General remained the possible intermediary to be brought over to his side. To Minto he sent repeated letters, explaining his prerogatives and the authority which had been vested in him by Queen's Regulations.[1062] He also criticized Hutton for the difficulties which he was raising with the Canadian Government.[1063] In return, Hutton continued to insist on the independence of his Imperial officers and their right to be addressed by their Militia rank.[1064] On 6 December 1899, having still received no answer to his letter of the previous August, Seymour sent a further

collection of complaints and supporting documents to the War Office, asking specifically that the Governor General be informed "authoritatively" that Seymour was his military adviser and the senior military officer in Canada.[1065] To this bundle of correspondence, he received a bare acknowledgement, encouraging him to send a third letter on 28 December 1899, complaining most particularly of Hutton's insubordination.[1066]

511. Hutton's departure early in February was the occasion for a fourth letter of complaint from Seymour, in which he accused Hutton of having acted and spoken in an improper manner on the occasion of his resignation.[1067] It was also the occasion for an attempt to return to the good graces of the Governor General. In a letter to Minto of 19 February 1900, he strongly denied that he had ever tried to frustrate Hutton's efforts to develop a military spirit in Canada and called on Minto for the friendship which all Englishmen should have in such a crisis.[1068] The Governor General would still not accept Seymour's claims and he had a charge of his own when he discovered that the General had directed a letter to the Canadian Secretary of State dealing with the provisional Militia battalion being sent to Halifax.[1069] This was a chance for Minto to assume the offensive and to demand that all letters to the Canadian Government must be passed through him. This led to a total break down and, on 8 March 1900, Seymour asked to be relieved of his command on the grounds that only one of his letters had even been acknowledged and the Governor General's actions made his position impossible.[1070] His resignation was prompty accepted on 11 March 1900 with the request that he continue in his post until a successor could be found.[1071] Resignation seemed to increase the flow of letters from Seymour. Three letters were written before the end of the April, repeating the old charges and advancing new

ones. In his final letter for March, he insisted that he could not defer his resignation any longer unless he obtained an expression of regret from the Governor General for having encouraged insubordination.[1072] The War Office had been attempting to delay him with the explanation that his lesser points could not be settled until the larger question of the relative position of the two General Officers Commanding had been worked out, and that was an issue between the War Office, the Colonial Office and Canada. The letter of 30 March 1900 persuaded the War Office to be a little sharper and it advised Seymour flatly that he could turn over his command to the next senior officer as soon as the inspection reports were completed.[1073] At the end of May, he was ready to go and he announced that he was resigning because he had failed to get the support of the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief in carrying out their orders.[1074] To Minto, in a letter on the eve of sailing, he announced that he would be demanding an inquiry on his return and that he would accuse Hutton of falsifying a document with intent to mislead if his demand was refused. He was prepared, he warned, to lay down his commission if justice were not afforded him.[1075]

512. Seymour returned to England in the melancholy position of a man with a grievance which no one wants to hear. On 23 July 1900, he finally saw Major General Coleridge Grove, the Military Secretary who, as Seymour recognized, only wanted to hush the matter up. Seymour was asked to go away for three weeks to forget about it. He spent it writing further memoranda. Then he returned for a second interview, only to meet a further delay of ten days.[1076] Having finally heard and sorted out such of Seymour's grievances as he could understand, Grove decided that he might be happy if a letter was sent to Minto backing Seymour's right to ask for confidential reports of Imperial officers while carefully avoiding

any assertion that Hutton had been obliged to provide them.[1077] However, as even Grove acknowledged, nothing was likely to pacify Seymour and even when the letter to Minto had been carefully drafted and sent, the General returned to the attack, supported by six peers and four general officers whom he had persuaded of his grievances.[1078] There was no alternative but to grant Seymour an interview on 28 September 1900 with Lord Lansdowne, Lord Wolseley and Coleridge Grove all present. After a lengthy session of listening to grievances, the Secretary of State declared that the matter was closed[1079] and Seymour's subsequent efforts to raise further grievances were turned down.[1080]

513. Seymour's own military career was not at an end. By a twist of fortune, when Lord Roberts returned from South Africa, he appointed him Military Secretary. When Hutton returned from South Africa, his future career was at the mercy of his somewhat unbalanced enemy. To Seymour's credit, he did not stand in the way of the offer to Hutton of the command of the Militia in Australia.

514. The importance of Seymour's quarrel was its constitutional implication of the control of the Canadian Militia and, in particular, of the British officers serving with it. The lengthy delay in dealing with the respective authorities of the two British generals in Canada was only partly due to the preoccupation with the South African War and the difficulties of British inter-departmental communication. To some degree, there was also the hope that the two officers might forget their differences. The real difficulty, for the War Office, was its wish to obtain the confidential reports. They never supported Seymour's claim to see Foster's report. In a War Office memorandum, it was suggested that the two commands would be considered as distinct and that the General Officer Commanding the British troops in Canada would be

informed by the Minister of Militia through the Governor General of the state of the Canadian Militia. The Imperial officer commanding the Militia would report on the officers under him to the General Officer Commanding at Halifax. This final pronciple created the most difficulty. The Canadian Government wished the reports to emanate from the Minister of Militia when requested by the Imperial authorities. Lord Minto suggested that they pass through his Militafy Secretary direct to the British Government without either the Canadian Government or the General Officer Commanding at Halifax seeing them. Chamberlain objected to this proposal, insisting that the Canadian Government should at least have a look at the reports. The War Office's final proposal was that the General Officer Commanding the Militia should prepare two copies of the report, passing one through the Governor General's Military Secretary and retaining a copy which he would show the Canadian Government only if requested to do so.[1081] The question seems to have been solved by the departure of both Hutton and Seymour for no firm system was authorized.

HUTTON AND THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT

515. The growing crisis in South Africa during the spring and summer of 1899 had attracted considerable attention in Canada. The possibility of a war against the Boer republics aroused just those elements of the Canadian population that had been excited by the Diamond Jubilee of 1897. Their excitement had been sustained by Kitchener's successful campaign in the Sudan in 1898-99, with its triumphat climax at the Battle of Omdurman. In the House of Commons, Colonel Sam Hughes had moved:

> That in the opinion of this House, having in view the growth and development of Canadian trade, the assisting to perfect the union of Great Britain and her colonies and the maintaining the commerce, prestige and integrity of the British Empire, Great Britain should be given authority to enroll a brigade of Canadian officers and men for the Imperial service abroad, and that Canadian seamen should be afforded opportunity of serving in the British navy.

The detail of his proposal was that Britain should raise a brigade of five battalions in Canada to serve for periods of enlistment of five or seven years at British rates of pay. On conclusion of their service, the Canadian Government would provide the veterans with land, a cottage and a few cows. Hughes' speech was a mixture of self-advertisement and imperialist enthusiasm. At one point he recalled how, as a school teacher, he had spent a Saturday afternoon painting a map of England bright red.

516. Although Hughes' speech was violently imperialistic, it had also strongly anti-British overtones. He complained that the main objection to his scheme in British military circles was that it would upset War Office routine. He maintained that the only battles of the War of 1812 in which the British had been defeated had been those when Canadians were not there to support them. He announced flatly that Canadians would not serve in a British regiment under the sort of discipline imposed by British officers. On the other hand, he was sure that the French Canadians would loyally support such a scheme:

> We find, also, that all the native races in the countries governed by Great Britain are loyal to the British Empire. We have only to remember, in that regard, the famour Indian mutiny, to find that, in these tremendous temptations, the native races have stood true to British interests, and that, as often as the Empire is threatened, these races are as true to the civilization of Britain as are those of her own race and blood.

To prove it, he quoted from a speech by Mayor Prefontaine of Montreal.[1082]

517. Borden's reply to Hughes was to congratulate him on his sentiments and to recall what the Government had done to foster British recruiting in Canada. The first priority, however, was to perfect the organization of the Canadian Militia.[1083] After a further defence of his shceme and of the

virtues of military life in teaching habits of discipline and industry, Hughes agreed to withdraw his motion.[1084]

518. Hutton's view of Hughes' motion was much the same as Borden's. For him, too, the first priority was the Canadian Militia. Shortly after his arrival, he had helped to put an end to the programme of exchanges of permanent force units which had been recommended at the Colonial Conference of 1897 and which Gascoigne had carried into effect. When it was proposed to exchange Canada's only full strength field battery with a comparable battery from the Royal Artillery, Hutton argued that the Canadian battery was needed for the training of the Militia and that there should be no exchange.[1085] He had also been lukewarm about the project of recruiting for the British Army in Canada. Finally, he had no use for political soldiers of whom Hughes was an archtype. He had even sought to exert a little clumsy pressure on Hughes to keep him from bringing forward military subjects in the House of Commons. This infuriated the independent colonel and, without mentioning Hutton be name, he took care in introducing his resolution on an Imperial Service Brigade to lay down all the justifications for his right to criticize any aspect of the Militia Department including the General Officer Commanding.[1086]

519. To Hutton's main scheme of reforming the Canadian Militia, the trouble in South Africa came almost as an unwelcome diversion. In July, Chamberlain suggested to Lord Minto that there should be an offer of troops from Canada and that it should be made soon.[1087] Minto promptly conveyed the suggestion to Laurier, adding, as Chamberlain had suggested, that the offer should be spontaneous and not merely an answer to hopes expressed in England. Having made the overture, he could hardly expect it to be anything else. However Laurier was not prepared even to answer British hopes. He replied that

he did not think that it / would add to the strength of imperial sentiment in Canada to assume part of the burden of imperial military expenditures save in case of the most pressing danger.[1088] On 13 July, the matter was briefly debated in the House of Commons, with Sam Hughes again taking the strongest of imperialist positions, demanding that Canada should take positive action in face of the attitude of the Transvaal Government. In this view, he was supported by his leader, Sir Charles Tupper. At that stage, Laurier merely hoped that the trouble would subside[1089] but, on the last day of the month and under pressure from his English-speaking supporters, he introduced a motion of sympathy with the efforts of the British Government to secure "full possession of equal rights and liberties for British subjects residing in the Transvaal." The motion was seconded by the Conservative George Foster and passed unanimously, with members rising and singing the British National Anthem.[1090]

520. During July, Dr. Borden had shown considerable enthusiasm for a contingent for South Africa. Hutton had taken the precaution of preparing a plan for a Canadian contingent which he had shown to the Governor General[1091] and then to the Minister.[1092] The scheme had then been filed in case it was needed. During the first two weeks of August, Hutton was on leave at Saratoga in New York State. When he returned, Parliament had been prorogued and the cabinet had dispersed for its holidays. By the beginning of September, its members were returning to Ottawa. Before he left for his inspection of the Militia camps in the Maritimes, Hutton had a number of discussions with Borden about the possibility of a Canadian contingent for South Africa. On 3 September 1899, there was a long conversation with the Minister in which a number of long standing problems were worked out. Once again, they agreed on the numbers and composition of the contingent and Borden was given a copy of the plan.[1093] On the following day,