the men might be opposing and even firing upon friends and relations.[270]

121 Naturally, Parliamentarians also felt concern. One member insisted that the lesson the Grand Trunk strike was the value of the rural militia and quoted a report by the colonel of the 15th Battalion that many of his men had even refused to turn out.[271] The session of 1879, after the Conservatives had returned to power, debated a bill presented by Mackenzie Bowell which would have allowed the Government to pay for transportation and certain other costs of cases of aid to the civil power which were not localized, as, for example the Grnad Trunk strike which had extended from Montreal to Sarnia.[272] The Bill would have been a clear improvement over the existing statutory position so far as the Militia were concerned and it would have gone no farther, in fact that the previous Government's advance of $10,000 to cover the cost of transporting and maintaining the troops gathered in Montreal for the threatened Orange riots.[273]

122. The Bill was promptly opposed by David Mills, the late Minister of the Interior, who compared it to paying for juries and insisted that the responsibility had to rest exclusively with the provinces. The Federal Government could go no farther than to convey the Militia to the borders of provincial authority. The discussion collapsed into an attempt to recall Liberal wickedness in resisting the Orangemen and nothing more came of the suggestion for a time.[274] Responsibility still remained to be clarified.

THE MANITOBA FORCE

123. The two Schools of Gunnery were not the only full time Militia in the Dominion. With the arrival of Captain Scott's little force in November, 1871, the total authorized strength

of the Manitoba Force became 300 men. When Robertson Ross inspected them in the summer of 1872, as part of an extended tour of the West, he found that there were only 243 all ranks but more were sent that year to bring it up to strength and a detachment of 25 gunners was authorized. Their main trouble was accommodation for they were quartered in dilapidated buildings rented to them by the Hudson's Bay Company. Colonel Robertson Ross changed the uniform from the dark rifle green to the red coats of the remainder of the Militia. He also recommended that a police force be established but only if a military force was also maintained as a support in case of trouble.[275] His suggestions were evidently heeded for by the following year, the little force had been housed in wooden huts of its own, its numbers had been maintained and it had been kept busy - quelling riotous railway workers, guarding Ambrose Lepine and other prisoners, escorting the Governor General in his negotiations with the Ojibewa and fighting a fire which destroyed the Legislative Buildings. The composition of the force was altered to allow for a battery of artillery.[276]

124. A total of 156 men were needed in 1873. These were recruited on the same terms as their predecessors - $12 per month for privates, uniform, rations and quarters provided. Each officer and man who completed a full engagement of two years was to be entitled to 160 acres of Manitoba land. The men of this draft were selected from the Gunnery Schools and from the two Maritime districts. Preference was to be given to "young farmers or skilled mechanics who, in addition to respectability of character, are desirous of settling in Manitoba."[277] The young men from the Maritimes proved as satisfactory as their predecessors from Ontario and Quebec although it was noticed

that they tended to succumb to the severe climate rather more often.

125. At the end of 1873, the formation of the Northwest Mounted Police was authorized, due in large part to the recommendations arising from Robertson Ross's report after his long trip through the West in 1872. In the summer of 1874, the new force trekked west from Winnipeg to begin its distinguished career. Meanwhile, the men of the Provisional Battalion had been demonstrating its ability to cross the prairie by an impressive march from Winnipeg to Qu'Appelle and back. The force of two companies, about 120 men, set out from Winnipeg on 17 August 1874 and reached Qu'Appelle 24 days later, having covered 351 miles in 101 hours of marching. The return march was done in 17 days. It was an impressive performance. While the men were relieved of their packs, they carried their rifles, 60 rounds of ammunition, canteens, bayonets and haversacks. Prairie marching is not easy -- in wet weather, the soil sticks to one's feet and in dry weather, feet slip on the grass. In summer, there is also the problem of very hot weather. Nevertheless, Osborne Smith reported that his men actually seemed to thrive on their exertions and that they gained in health and marching powers. Perhaps this was due in some part to his own careful arrangements and evident common sense.[278]

126. The arrival of the Mounted Police meant that much of the purpose of the Manitoba Force as the sole symbol of the Dominion's power had been taken from it. Its continued duty as a sort of police force for the Manitoba Government could hardly serve as a justification either and at the end of 1874, it was ordered to be drastically reduced.[279] The new establishment was for a

small battery of artillery of 50 all ranks and a battalion of 150. The service cannot have been popular for on the terms of the reduction being announced -- two months pay and a sum equivalent to their transportation to their District of enlistment, over 200 applied and preference in discharge was given to those with the best character and longest service. By the time Selby Smyth reached Winnipeg in the summer of 1875, the force had again been cut in half and actually consisted of only a few men, most of the men's time having expired. The General strongly objected to any further reductions, referring to the arrival of the Sioux around Portage Leprairie.

> The withdrawal of troops at present at Winnipeg would cause a feeling of alarm and insecurity, and I am led to believe might result in a disturbance among the cosmopolitan and as yet only partially settled population of that young but thriving province. 280

In his report for the year, Osborne Smith as usual reported discipline to be excellent. Another draft had been organized in July, this time recruited from all districts. This time, the pay of private was set at $13.00 per month, a small increase and in selection it was desirable that "a portion of them be mechanics and men having other callings than that of labourer."[281] 92 men were required which, for a force not much in excess of 100 meant that almost all the older members of the Force had left it.

126. In 1876, the force was again reduced to a mere 50 men, half artillery and half infantry. It also became clear that all was not as well as had been reported in or out of the force. The paymaster was dismissed for shortages in his accounts.[282] Lieutenant-Colonel Masson, a member of Parliament and an ex-Brigade Major, reported that he had visited the Force and found two men who did not even know how to load their rifles. It was not their

fault. The men were employed in drawing wood and water. It also emerged that many of the men had continued to re-enlist in the hope that they would acquire a land grant for each enlistment. When it was settled that there would only be one, they felt defrauded.[283]

127. Complaints also circulated in Manitoba. An angry letter in the Daily Free Press of Winnipeg from an ex non-commissioned officer complained that the volunteers were chiefly employed on fatigue work. He went on to comment on the equipment and rifles. The knapsacks were so old and rotten, he reported, that it was not uncommon for one to fall from a man's back as he marched out for guard duty. He noted that the march to Qu'Appelle had been possible only because the equipment had travelled in waggons.[284] The men who were removed in 1876 seem to have felt particularly aggrieved. One of them, Charles William Allen, had been a pa master sergeant and was their spokesman. In a letter to Macdonald, he explained that he was a Conservative although he had been forced to find a job with the Free Press, and that a commission or committee to investigate the grievances of the Volunteers would certainly do Mackenzie harm.[285] At a meeting in Winnipeg on 3 July 1876, presided over by the Mayor and supported by John Schultz and Senator Gerard, the men complained that the previous autumn, their land grants had been worth $120 - $160 and a discharged volunteer could dispose of them for from $85 - $110. Now, they were told that the maximum value for the next twelve months would be $50. When they had been given an opportunity to take their release, they had not been informed in the decline in value. Nominally, they had been engaged for twelve months. They wer dismissed at seven day's notice without any means of disposing of their warrants.

Even if they wished to use them for settlement, the season was already too far advanced.[286] Having failed to get an answer from the Government, the men then turned to the Opposition[287] but it could offer them little beyond sympathy.[288]

128. The end for the Force came in 1877. Throughout the winter of 1876-77, a small detachment consisting of Ensign Street and ten men maintained the quarantine regulations imposed by the Manitoba Government to attempt to restrain a smallpox epidemic which was then ravaging the Indian bands and the struggling Icelandic community on the shores of Lake Winnipeg. It was a disagreeable duty performed in the most arduous climatic conditions. On 3 August 1877, the remainder of the forces, some 54 officers and men, was disbanded.[288] The services of this little force were not particularly dramatic but they did demonstrate the hardihood and endurance of the Canadian soldiers of that age.

THE WAR SCARE OF 1878

129. In 1877, war had broken out between the Russian and Turkish Empires. By the following year, Great Britain grew steadily nearer the posibility of being involved in war with Russia to preserve her somewhat unappealing ally and Canada found herself involved in a situation for which she was almost totally unprepared, a war in which Russian cruisers might make attacks on her two coasts and on her merchant shipping. Apart from Halifax, the coast was defenceless. In 1876, the Militia Reports indicated that apart from the Garrison Artillery in Saint John, there were few other really efficient corps.[289] In Sydney, there were guns but no gunners.[290] Elsewhere, there were gunners but no guns. More important, almost all the guns available were smoothbores, useless

against ironclad ships. At Quebec, there were a few experimental 7-inch breechloaders of a primitive design, but they were the only artillery, Selby Smyth, reported, capable of disputing the passage of an ironclad.[291] In that year, 10 rifled guns were ordered for Quebec and 6 for Saint John.[292] By the following year, both orders had been delivered but the platforms were only then under construction. With the encouragement of its artillery officers, the Government accepted an offer by Sir William Palliser to conduct experiments with a view to converting its 400 old smoothbores into rifled cannon.[293]

130. In 1877, Colonel Irwin, the Inspector of Artillery for Ontario, pointed out once again how useless it was to expect the garrison artillery to be efficient when in many places it trained only on the same basis as the rural infantry - in alternate years - and when many batteries were without guns. He proposed the elimination of such batteries. Related to the artillery were the engineers. They, too, had no more training than the infantry save that they were allowed to train annually. In 1877, there were four companies in existence, including Colonel Scoble's in Toronto. Of the two companies in Montreal, one had virtually ceased to exist and in Saint John, the little company was really the creation of its captain, Henry Perley, an enthusiast who seems to have devoted himself wholly to the service. In 1880, he was appointed to be "Engineer Officer at Headquarters" and his company rapidly made up its mind that it could not continue as engineers without him and eventually became part of the 62nd Battalion. In the summer of 1878, a new company of engineers was formed at Charlottetown and in 1880, Perley was replaced in New Brunswick by a possibly even more enthusiastic Militia engineer, D.A. Vince, who

organized the Brighton Company of Engineers. This still left a total force of under 200.[294]

131. Apart from guns and men, there were few fortifications and they were not in the best of repair. Selby Smyth had recommended the formation of a small force of engineers to keep the works repaired for as early as 1873, Colonel French had found them to be crumbling away.[295] The responsibility for repair rested with the Department of Public Works, whose engineers had no particular training in the peculiar problems of fortifications and whose policy was even more governed by the best principles of political patronage then was that of the Department of Militia and Defence.

132. Finally, it now mattered that Lieutenant Colonel Houghton's efforts in British Columbia had been so unavailing. In 1877. In that year, he had managed to find a total of 7 officers and 88 men at his inspection. 11 of the men were in the band. There were two 24 pounder brass guns but the wheel had fallen off one of them and the carriage of the other was too rotten to be safe.[296] The real problem was that British Columbia was far from Ottawa and its appeals received little attention. The population of the province was small, wages were high and there were very few with the leisure to devote to military activities.

133. Through the winter and spring of 1878, Canada passed through the unaccustomed excitement of a war scare. There was real alarm on the Eastern coast when the Russian steamer Cimbria sailed into a Maine port with a cargo of rifles guns and a very large crew. Ship owners feared that privateers would be the result of this voyage and began to press the Government for action to protect

their property. The real excitement was on the West Coast where the British naval base at Esquimalt was almost completely unprotected. For some time, Selby Smyth had been trying to persuade the British to lend a number of guns which had been in store in the dockyard but to no avail. Suddenly, they were released. Colonel Irwin was despatched to the West Coast to supervise the establishment of the new batteries and to work out a plan for the defence of Victoria and Esquimalt. Very temporary batteries were set up, the expense of labour in the province apparantly deterring any more substantial work. The Royal Navy provided the labour to move the guns to their new sites. A battery of 50 men was authorized [297] for the ten guns and had been organized by Houghton by the time Irwin arrived. Twice a week in the evening, he was able to instruct them but it was evident that if the guns were to be properly cared for, a more permanent arrangement would be necessary. Irwin urged that a small force of Canadian or Royal Marine Artillerymen should be employed in the hope that they could also train the local artillery and improve the defences.[298]

134. In the crisis, the British Government had formed the Colonial Defence Committee, an interdepartmental meeting of narvl and military officers, which made recommendations on the defences which would be necessary in the event of war. For Eastern Canada, it proposed batteries for Saint John, Sydney, Charlottetown and Pictou with a total cost of about 50,000 pounds. When Selby Smyth was invited to give his views, he pointed out that the Committee had not judged the temper of his government. Instead of the Committee's plan which called for some 38 guns of heavy calibre, he suggested that 17 converted, rifled 64/32 pounders would be a more realistic proposal, a contribution

which did not please the Committee since it could not recommend such an inferior gun. As a result, none were ordered, and Selby Smyth was driven to attempting to persuade his government that his won judgment was sound while, at the same time, attempting to get them to buy the more powerful funs recommended by the British.[299]

135. By 1878, with the encouragement of the Canadian artillery officers, Palliser's experiments in converting smooth bores to rifled cannon had satisfied the authorities and the attractive possibility of making over the stock of cannon inherited from the British now seemed close to realization. A contract was made that year with the Canada Engine Works in Montreal to do the work. To encourage the good will of the Canadians, the Pallisers had presented two of their guns to the Government and they had been mounted on the Citadel. Selby Smyth was enthusiastic about their generosity and about the prospects for an armament industry in Canada.[300]

136. There was close communication with London throughout the period of the crisis as the Canadian Government sought practical assurances that the promises of 1865 and 1871 would be fulfilled. Canada had made no provision for naval defence although she then possessed a large merchant fleet and Alfred Jones asked the Governor General that the Royal Navy provide a fleet of fast cruisers to protect the Eastern coast.[301] The Admiralty faced too many demands of its own and its answer a month later was that "it is only reasonable to assume that the Canadian Government will avail themselves of their own resources for the protection of Canadian ports and shipping."[302] The same philosophy prevailed in the Colonial Defence Committee's deliberations and Mackenzie complained to his brother that he was getting telegrams daily about the state of their

defences. On 22 May 1878, the Cabinet agreed to spend $10,000 to protect the Atlantic coast but in June, the Congress of Berlin gathered and the crisis had passed. When the formal proposals of the Colonial Defence Committee arrived, they could be viewed in a more restrained mood and the Cabinet was encouraged by the cautious advice of Selby Smyth and his warning that the powerful guns proposed would demand permanent garrisons. It was decided to do something for Saint John and Sydney but "in view of the probable peaceful solution of the threatened Russian war," the batteries at Charlottetown and Pictou were deferred.[303] Nothing was done either about an Admiralty suggestion that in the event of an outbreak of war, the Dominion should take up and arm steamers for her own protection and that therefore she should keep some guns in storage.[304]

137. All of Canada's concern was not devoted to her ocean coasts. There were many offers of service and several prominent citizens wished to form regiments.[305] In New Brunswick, the enthusiastic Colonel Maunsell proposed to form a brigade and reported that most of the units in his district which were in any state of organization had volunteered their services.[306] Even the Prime Minister seems to have considered sending a Canadian contingent in the event of an emergency occurring although he made it clear that the Canadians would have to serve in their own units.[307] There were also many new offers to form militia units. Selby Smyth was only moderately in favour of this enthusiasm for, as he pointed out, the best trained of the officers and men would have gone off, leaving the Militia disorganized and battalions denuded of their few remaining qualified personnel. He was also pleased by the offers of service from private personnel but he pointed out that

most of these people appeared to lack any notion of how much training they would need to be fit for service.[308]

138. At moments of crisis, the Government's collective mind could never stray far from the Fenians. In addition to being suspected of formenting the Orange-Catholic battles in Montreal, it was anticipated that they would renew their invasions in the event of any war with Russia. The Prime Minister's brother Charles was the city clerk of Sarnia, a town close enough to the border to be nervous. He was told that the Government was sending guns and ammunition to Sarnia, Windsor, Fort Erie and Brockville and that Government boats were ready to put out at an hour's notice. There is no evidence that this in fact happened but the Prime Minister's excitement seems to have been real enough. The Fenians were said to have $49,000 in the bank, to have organized several companies and to have secret lodges in Toronto and Montreal. Behind them was the vast mass of unemployed men in the Unite States, to whom a raid on Canada would provide "real enjoyment".[309]

THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT

139. Mackenzie had not much longer to bear such anxieties. In the September elections, the Liberals were badly defeated and Sir John A Macdonald was asked to form a government on 9 October 1878. The new Minister of Militia was Lieutenant Colonel Louis Masson, from Terrebonne. Masson had earlier been a Brigade Major and he was the first Minister to have had any serious military experience. However, he also had the heavy responsibility of representing Montreal in the persistent battle of patronage with Quebec and the strain for a man in weak health was too much. For much of his time in office Masson was sick.

140. Although defence had not been a major issue in the election of 1878, the Conservatives had made as much capital as they could from Liberal reductions and they had promised better treatment of the militiamen and, of course, a reduction in the costly and extravagenat staff. Macdonald, while in opposition, had come to support Selby Smyth's suggestions for the establishment of a small permanent force and during the Russian crisis of 1878, he had proposed to the Governor General that the moment might be opportune to introduce it.[310] The following October, in his first official interview with Lord Dufferin, he had suggested that the programme of his new government would include the formation of three small battalions.[311] In his report for 1878, obviously directed at the new cabinet, Selby Smyth announced that for $2,000,000 annually, he could create a good force although it would have to be purely military and relieved from political influence.

> ... it should be understood that troops or companies cannot be raised merely to please some local community without any practical view as to the need of that particular force in that place.... It is I think my duty to submit that political pressure of this kind should be resisted, and that the force should not be overcrowded by raising corps to please communities, costing money which is much required to maintain the force that is absolutely wanted for the defence of the country, ... 312

He also had practical suggestions for the reduction of the staff. M.Ds 3 and 4 and M.Ds. 5 and 6 could both be combined and Prince Edward Island could be put in with New Brunswick, leaving only a staff adjutant on the Island. However, the headquarters staff would have to be increased.

> The beginning and the end of the present headquarter staff, the sole representative is the attentive and painstaking Adjutant-General, for a large force spread over the Canadian Dominion with nearly as many square miles as the whole of Europe, and everything connected with the every day work, which embraces every imaginable description of subject, both of organization, discipline and supply, passes through him to the General Officer. 313

141. As with most governments, an early enthusiasm for reform was soon dissipated. Only 20,000 men were authorized to drill for the year, and that merely at local headquarters. The drill period was only 12 days and those who established camps could do their service in 6 days, each of six hours drill. The pay for the year was the same as the pervious year, $1.00 for officers and 50¢ for other ranks, with 75¢ authorized for horses. To make up quotas for each district, the same priorities were to be applied. The staff remained unchanged although the Royal Military College at last received its full complement of professors. There had also been money to establish three schools for instructors temporarily at Toronto, Montreal and Saint John and nine sergeants had been added to the establishment of "A" and "B" Batteries for this purpose.[314] The Government, with its interest in the Northwest, had already agreed to establish militia units in the Territory, a decision strongly praised by Selby Smyth, who also felt that the Indians were certain to become difficult with the extinction of the buffalo herds and that the Police should be moved into forts which would be mutually defensible.[315]

142. Another development, in which the additional instructors were to have a part, was authority for the organization of drill in educational institutions. For the first time, complete regulations were issued and an attempt was made to develop military instruction in schools and colleges. The attempt was very modest. A total of 74 companies were authorized and the Government would lend rifles, bayonets, belts, ball bags and bayonet frogs. Drill books would be provided free of charge and an instructor would be paid for a month during any year. In return, the institution wishing to establish a company would sign a guarantee for the equipment and arms,

provide suitable storage for them, form a company of boys over 14 years old and drill it regularly and make sure that the members of the company provided themselves with uniform. The drill and training in military evolutions, tactics and gymnastics were to be a regular part of the curriculum and suitable days and hours would have to be allotted for their performance. These and other conditions were published in July of 1878.[316] A little later, the uniform was laid down to be a scarlet, blue, rifle green or grey Norfolk jacket, blue, black, green or grey trousers and a forage cap or shako. "Clothing of any pattern worn by cadets or soldiers in foreign countries will not be approved."[317] For all these instructions, drill associations in schools appear to have been a passing fancy both for the military authorities and for the public. Some of the Deputy Adjutants-General in 1879 reported that there were applications to form companies but with a few execptions in M.D. 1 and M.D. 7, none seem to have materialized and the cadet movement had to wait another two decades to be born.

PROPOSALS FOR A PERMANENT FORCE

143. As Sir Edward Selby Smyth's term drew to a close it became evident that there was one project on which he had set his heart more than any other - the formation of a Canadian permanent force which could also help the Empire. In 1878, he had put forward his proposals in a tentative fashion, pointing out the advantages which such a force would have in putting down riots, strikes and other disorders, in employing the graduates of the Royal Military College and in providing instructors for the Militia.[318] He knew that the Prime Minister was a supporter of an increased permanent force, and in his final report, he hopefully presented a detailed scheme for the establishment

of three schools, each of 100 men, at Toronto, Montreal and Quebec. As an alternative, 100 men could be added to each of the Artillery Batteries, 75 to act as infantry and cavalry and the remaining 25 to serve as artificers in maintaining the fortifications.[319] An additional school at Quebec seemed necessary because of the numerous calls for aid to the civil power - a riot had occurred that year between French and Irish workers at the shipyards and one man had died.[320]

144. Another idea was to raise three battalions in Canada. After six months, six of the eight companies would be sent to England and the two remaining in Canada would recruit two more and serve as a depot. After three years, the men would begin to return to Canada to serve out the remainder of a six year engagement. Selby Smyth anticipated that Canada could, by then, find men for six battalions. He also suggested that the cost would rest very lightly on Canada since Britain would be paying for half the force while it was in her service.[321]

145. Yet a further scheme proposed by Selby Smyth may have been more within the financial means of Canada since it demanded a substantial British contribution. A Royal Canadian Reserve would be formed, consisting of 7 battalions with a total of 56 companies. Each company would be attached to an existing infantry battalion of the Active Militia. There would be one battalion in Nova Scotia and in New Brunswick, two in Quebec and three in Ontario. Each battalion would train annually at Imperial expense. The men would be enrolled for six years to serve anywhere in the world. They would be paid 6d a day plus training pay when in camp. When the battalions were called out on service, the men would be treated on the same terms as British army reservists.[322] This scheme enlisted the

the support of the Governor General, Lord Lorne, who suggested to the cabinet that it would have an excellent moral effect on the rest of the world and on the Empire itself to see all the colonies so united in the defence of the Mother Country.[323] A little later, Sir Patrick MacDougall, now promoted and commanding the garrison at Halifax, was asked to report the scheme to the War Office in the course of a visit to the United Kingdom.[324] Selby Smyth also brought his arguments to bear on the cabinet. He admitted that Canada might not be rich enough to afford permanent regiments but his scheme would be a beginning. It would also attract favourable publicity from the British press, a question of some concern to a Government trying to raise money in the United Kingdom. He admitted that there would be problems. Some of the men would move to the West. In other cases, employers would refuse to let their men go. However, if the force was recruited from the farmer and artisan classes, there would be less trouble for such men were reliable. It was useless to fear that such a scheme would denude the country of its young men in time of war for if Britain was at war with a first class power, they would go in any case. Moreover, the 6d a day pay would bring money into the rural districts, always a concern for thoughtful ministers. The General was also anxious that the officers and non-commissioned officers should be Canadian. "I object in the first place to the introduction of Imperial officers merely because I know they would not be favourably accepted and that the force in general would work against them with great local influence." He also had no use for any idea of bringing out British non-commissioned officers for his Reserve. Some had been sent out during the Trent Affair and most of them, he believed, had gone bad, released from the restraints of discipline. To provide Canadians, however, there

would have to be the military schools he had advocated but with the Royal Canadian Reserve in operation, he anticipated that Britain might be able to contribute to them.[325]

145. During this period, the British Army was finding increasing difficulty in finding sufficient men to fulfill its commitments. The many changes of the Cardwell era could do little to raise the traditionally low status of those who served in the ranks while the short service created a new pressure for recruits. Selby Smyth was no admirer of the new system[326] but his scheme had been an attempt to fill the gap which it had created in British military manpower. The attempts were to continue. In 1858, the grave shortage of troops caused by the national uprising in India had led to the formation of the 100th Royal Canadian Regiment of Foot. The new regiment was raised in Canada but it was part of the British Army. Within a few years, it ceased to obtain any recruits from Canada or to retain any ties with its land of origin. In 1880, plans were being made to "territorialize" the British infantry regiments so that they would be connected by title and by the location of their depot with the area from which most of their recruits would come. The idea arose of localizing the 100th Regiment once again in Canada. The Adjutant General, Sir Charles Ellice, approved of the idea, provided it was feasible financially and politically but these were serious obstacles. It was pointed out that there would be the expense of transporting the Canadians from Canada and, six years later, transporting them back again. The Canadians would also probably want more pay than the British soldier.[327] The comments of Sir Edward Selby Smyth were invited. He had then retired from his Canadian post and had the leisure to reply at even more

than his usual length, rehearsing most of the schemes which he had offered the Canadian Government during his service there.

146. The difficulties which he foresaw were largely those of control and expense. Supposing that a Canadian regiment was sent to Britain and an Imperial regiment was sent to Canada, would it be as much under the control of the Canadian Government as the Canadian battalion would be under the British. The Canadians would wish to use the battalion to suppress internal disturbances and they would certainly not give up their own troops unless they were certain that the replacements would be equally available for this duty. The Canadian battalions would only be available for three years service overseas and this would be a hinderance to their being sent to India. Finally, the British would have to bear the financial cost. Selby Smyth's experience in Canada had convinced him, as he warned the War Office, that the difficulties of raising regulars in Canada would not easily be surmounted. When he had made his tentative proposals, they had been opposed in every newspaper from Halifax to the Great Lakes. The opposition was founded partly on fears of the cost and partly on the suspicion that an expensive regular force would sap the resources available for the Militia.

147. Selby Smyth did favour the placing of the depot for the 100th Regiment in Canada. If the depot was allowed to serve as a school of instruction for the Canadian militia, it would certainly be a better source of recruits than lawless and rebellious Ireland. It would be a comparable offer for other ranks to the already generous gift of commissions to graduates of the Canadian military college. Selby Smyth announced that he had been reliably informed that Canadians were some of the best

soldiers in the United States regular army and they would undoubtedly welcome a chance to fight under their own flag.[328]

148. Selby Smyth's proposals and others relating to a Canadian contingent were referred to the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad[329] which had been created as a result of the crisis of 1878. There they languished.

149. The proposal to bring the 100th Regiment back to Canada was not yet dead nor was it really to die until the regimental silver had been deposited at the Royal Military College of Canada after its disbandment in 1922. A year later, Sir Patrick MacDougall, still commanding in Halifax and struggling to keep his garrison from being further reduced, presented a new scheme. The British system of linked battalions meant that one battalion was in England while the other was abroad, generally in India. MacDougall's scheme was that the battalion in Halifax would be the home battalion of the 100th while the other battalion might be in England, in India or elsewhere. When the other battalion was in India, the home battalion in Halifax would be authorized to increase its strength to 900 men and would have to provide drafts but when the other battalion was in England, it would be responsible for its own recruiting and the Halifax battalion could be reduced to 850 men. If, at any time, the battalion at Halifax was also required for overseas service, its place could be taken by a battalion of Canadian militia specially embodied for the purpose. The title of the new regiment was to be the Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment and its men would be recruited on the same terms as British regulars but they would be returned to Canada on the completion of their service whereupon, MacDougall predicted,

they would become the best of recruiting agents.

150. Once again, there were financial misgivings. According to the Financial Secretary, MacDougall's proposal included the suggestion that an Imperial battalion would be permanently stationed in Canada at Imperial expense. It had only to be stated in that way to be condemned. Secondly, he had no great love for the increased establishments which were sought. The strength of the battalion at Halifax would not be allowed to exceed the strength authorized for the garrison. Finally, there would be an additional cost of transportation to India and the Indian Government would not pay it. Perhaps the main objection, raised by several who contributed their minutes, was that men simply could not be got for the rates offered unless the regiment was to be filled with what the Permanent Under-Secretary delicately described as "loafers and mean whites".[330] However, no possibility of obtaining recruits could be ignored and the Colonial Office was asked to discover from the Canadian Government whether it believed that recruits would be forthcoming. Six copies of a memorandum reciting the attractions of service in the Army were included.[331] There is no record of a Canadian reply but a Government which was spending money to entice immigrants to fill the country was unlikely to look favourably on any project to draw able bodied men away. The Colonial Office also wondered who was to pay for the Canadian militia who were to replace the battalion at Halifax if it were called away.[332] This, the War Office replied, would fall on the Canadians only in the event of a European War or one which directly affected the safety of Canada.[333]

151. The crisis which was affecting British military manpower in 1882 and which encouraged them to make such proposals was the very large military commitment involved in garrisoning Egypt. The Egyptian War and the

accompanying international crisis had brought Canadian militia officers once again to offer their services - almost invariably as officers and almost invariably at the head of their gallant bands of militiamen - and it had also brought renewed pressure on the Canadian Government to make a definite contribution. On 22 July 1882, Lord Lorne tried to persuade Macdonald to offer to garrison Halifax during the Egyptian occupation - then envisaged as a very temporary affair but due to last for over eighty years. He suggested that the duties of the infantry in the garrison could be taken over by four Canadian Militia battalians embodied for the purpose.[334]

152. Macdonald's reply offers a revealing and important insight into his attitude both to defence and to Imperial military contributions:

> On looking over the Militia Act, it would seem that the contingency has not arisen when the Militia can be called out for actual service. This can only be done in case of War, invasion or insurrection, or danger of any of them. Now England is not at War, nor is there any danger of invasion or insurrection. War may ultimately grow out of the present Egyptian complication but we cannot say that there is any present or immediate danger of it. There is certainly no danger of the War reaching Canada.
>
> As a matter of policy, I am inclined to think that any action on the part of the Government would be premature.
>
> The Country would, it appears to me, look with disfavour on our people being called away from their peaceful pursuits in consequence of the Eastern imbroglio. The Canadians can be trusted to do their share if the Mother Country were engaged in any serious war but it would be well to leave the initiative to the enthusiasm of the people.
>
> The action of the Government would be supported by the general voice of the country, offers of service would come from all quarters, as they did during the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny and the late impending war with Russia. Then would be the time for the Government to take advantage of the aroused loyalty of the people and go to parliament for the creation of a nucleus of a standing Army.

> I have no doubt that just now the Opposition press would come out loudly against the embodying of a Force in consequence of an obscure quarrel in a remote country with which Canada has no concern, and it might give an impetus to the cry for independance.
>
> Besides, if the Halifax garrison were once removed at our request, we have no security that they would be returned to us. At all events, real emergency and our request in this case would be quoted as a precedent.
>
> In case England were really engaged in a War, the true course it seems to me would be for H.M. Government to state in a despatch written in an ad captandum style the necessity for withdrawingthe troops, and that H. Majesty is well assured that she can trust to the well known loyalty of Her Canadian subjects not only to provide for the Defence of that Dominion but to aid the Mother land in the struggle. this would surely "bring down the House" & secure a warm response.335

153. Lorne was not satisfied with this assessment of the Canadian political situation and complained about Canadians waiting for an Imperial request. As he was possibly more concerned with British and world opinion than with Canadian feeling, he stressed the value such an offer would have if it came unsolicited. However, if it was necessary, he would approach the Imperial Government to send an appropriate message.[336] This was not what Macdonald wanted. If such a request came before the Canadians were prepared for it, it would be necessary to summon Parliament at a time when there was no apparent need and, indeed, when the situation in Egypt looked to be solving itself without need for outside assistance. The Prime Minister really wanted to use the crisis as a moment to create a Canadian permanent force and he did not want his plan to be set aside by any premature move.

> My own opinion has been ever since 1866 (the time of the first Fenian Raid) that we should have a regular force embodied and not to be obliged to trust to our Volunteer Force exclusively.