The latter are not sufficiently trained for an emergency and being principally composed of the higher order of artisans and yeomanry are too valuable to be away from their avocations for any length of time. If there was a present danger of ar, we might be able to induce Parliament to embody some Regiments for permanent service.

They would not only always be ready for work, but if well officered and disciplined would form a standard up to which our Volunteers would work.

With this object I should like to wait with patience for the occasion when the country would go with the increment. It would be a pity if the first step in that direction was met with coldness or opposition.

P.S. I am not quite sure that my colleagues as a whole, would agree with me as to having a standing force. 337

Lorne's reply was that he did not think that the British 338 would now ask for troops. Macdonald was left to wait for an occasion when he could spring his idea on an excited country.

THE MARINE MILITIA

154. The Act of 1868 had provided for a Marine Militia to include the seafaring men of the Dominion. Some gestures had been made toward creating most of the other proposed components but nothing was done about the Marine Militia. In 1865, the British Parliament had passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act which authorized colonies to maintain navies and permitted the employment of officers and men of the Royal Navy to assist. Canada, however, had not taken up the offer. The gunboats on the Great Lakes which have already been mentioned. were manned by civilian crews hired for the season, while the guns were manned by men of the Garrison Artillery, a civil-military arrangement reminiscent of the early days of the Royal Navy. It was not tested by action. When the gunboats were disposed of, the only force remotely resembling a navy in the Dominion's possession was the motley collection of vessels operated by the Department of Marine and Fisheries.

The provision of the Militia Act provid-155. ing for Marine Militia did produce a number of units which were gazetted but nothing was done to encourage them. In the remustering of 1868, the sole naval company to survive Confederation, the Hamilton Naval Company, refused to be transferred and so was dropped. In Halifax, a naval brigade of four companies under a major was formed but at the end of 1870, it was turned into a second brigade of garrison artillery. There were two other companies formed in Bonaventure County in Quebec in February, 1869, and a third company was formed at Carleton in the same county later but none of the three companies seem to have been equipped or trained. There were no references the them in the inspection reports and in the reduction of the Militia to 30,000 in 1874, they disappeared. The only assistance which seems to have come from the Royal Navy for the Canadian Militia in this period was the loan of the services of a petty officer to instruct the Nanaimo Rifle Company in 1874.

156. The Russian war scare of 1878 presented Canada with a particularly acute naval problem. Ship owners were well aware of what the Alabama had accomplished during the American Civil War in just one cruise. Her efforts and those of other Confederate commerce raiders had contributed to the destruction of the United States merchantile marine. The Russians could be expected to be even better provided; hence the alarm when the Russian ship Cimbra put into Ellsworth Maine with allegedly the men and guns to fit out a large number of privateers. Selby Smyth appears to have originated the suggestion that the Royal Navy should station a fleet of lightly armed, fast steamers in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of 342 Fundy to counter this threat. The Canadian Government

General to press the need on the British Government.

The Admiralty was not enthusiastic. They could certainly not guarantee that a few raiders, particularly if fitted out in the United States, might not get loose and it was up to the Canadians to use their own resources to protect their ports and shipping. They suggested that the British Government might lend guns and arm Canadian vessels but 344 that, of course was not under their charge. The Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, passed this news back to Canada in July and recommended to the Governor General that his Government might do much good by taking up and arming its own fast ships and that it should have a few 345 guns in storage for this purpose.

157. In his report for 1878, Selby Smyth echoed this British suggestion and in a further report, submitted just a little later, he went on to propose an even more ambitious approach to naval defence. Canada, after all, was a maritime country, with a population of seafaring men in excess of 90,000 and some 6,500 registered vessels. At the same time, the winters made fishing impossible. The Royal Navy was disposing of a number of old ironclads and it might be prepared either to present one or two to Canada or to sell them at a very low price. Armed with a few moderately heavy guns, they would serve as blockships for coast or harbour defence. At the same time, they could serve as training ships for Volunteers or for lads. During the summer, the ships could cruis and during the winter, they could be tied up in various Maritime ports and be used to train the local fishermen and sailors.

158. Three and a half months later, when the Cabinet discussed the proposal, the traditional argument was raised against it. Ministers were "of the opinion

that the present state of the Finances of the Country does not render this an opportune moment for bringing the subject before Parliament." However, when affairs had improved, they anticipated that the matter would be raised again and they suggested that one or more of the provinces might 347 be interested in the educational aspects of the scheme.

A year and a half later, Canada acquired 159. H.M.S. Charybdis. Whose initiative provoked the gift is a little unclear. The Official History of the Naval Service of Canada states that the request came from the Canadian cabinet through the Governor General, Lord Lorne, on 8 October 80 but four days later, Lorne wrote to Macdonald to tell him that the offer of a ship by the Admiralty should not be refused. Seeking to reassure the Prime Minister, he advised him that accepting the ship implied nothing. However it could be used as a training ship, it would be seizing the initiative from the Maritime Provinces The Admiralty offered the and it would be popular. Charybdis, an elderly steam corvette, which had just returned from seven years and which was not considered to be worth There was a brief dispute over the terms. refitting. The British Government said that it was lending the ship but the Canadians had no wish to be obliged to return her if they were to spend any money on rebuilding the vessel for their own purposes. At last the Colonial Secretary explained that the gift was called a "loan" to discourage other colonies from demanding warships as well.

The new acquisition was not a success. The Canadian covernment sent a retired Royal Navy officer to england to collect her. He decided that she would be suitable as a training ship but his chief engineer reported that the boilers were practically worn out and that the ship could not undertake a voyage across the North Atlantc

in winter. The Canadian Government paid for repairs and the Charybdis was sailed into Saint John harbour early in 1881. Once there, she broke loose and damaged shipping in the harbour. Later, two citizens fell from a rotted gang-plank and were drowned. It was discovered that the ship was hard to manage and would require a large and therefore expensive crew. Finally the Royal Navy was persuaded to take their gift back and she was towed around to 353 Halifax. She was not forgotten, however, and the Charybdis became a slogan to bedevil both the Government and anyone who might ever suggest that Canada should again start its own navy.

FRENCH SPEAKING CANADIANS AND THE MILITIA

- 161. Finding a place for both nations in Canada's armed forces has been a perennial problem of Canadian military policy since Confederation. It had not been solved by making the first Minister of Militia and Defence French Canada's spokesman in the Cabinet. The appointment seems to have ensured that French Canadians would play a prominent part in the Civil Branch and until after the Second World War, the Deputy Minister was a French-speaking Canadian. Although the original military districts were planned on a geographical basis, it was soon established that M.D. 6 would include only French-speaking units, including the one French-speaking city unit in Montreal, the 65th Battalion. Its staff officers, and those of M.D. 7 in Quebec City were and remained French-speaking with few exceptions. In 1892, the two districts in the Montreal area were reorganized once again on a geographical basis.
- 162. French Canadian militia units suffered under particular difficulties. In a military system which was intended to resemble that of Great Britain as closely as

which would appeal to French Canadians as such. In the course of a centry, there can be no doubt that differences in outlook, tradition and method have developed but at this period in particular, there was no encouragement for such differences. More important were the pradtical difficulties, French speaking members of the Militia were obliged to receive most of their instruction in English. The social structure and the customs of the French Canadian society did not encourage voluntary militia service.

These were among the points which General 163. Lindsay made in a lengthy report to the Governor General on the militia he had observed around Montreal. In particular he was concerned at the relatively poor turnout of the French Canadians. The number in the ranks was well below their proportion of the population. While many of them served with English-speaking corps, three entirely French Canadian regiments, the Chasseurs, the 64th and the 65th each had a nominal strength of 335 other ranks but they had turned out 113, 95, and 150 respectively. In the battalion raised in Quebec for the Red River expedition, only 77 of the 350 other ranks were French Canadians although over half of the officers were French speaking. Moreover, in the Fenian crisis earlier in the year, Lindsay had found the French Canadian battalions so badly trained, he had kept them back to drill instead of sending them to the frontier. The battalion from Three Rivers was the finest French Canadian unit he had seen but he found that many of the men had never been taught how to load a rifle and that the men could not even be deployed from column into line. Admittedly one problem was that the commands were in English and that they then had to be explained in French. This meant that the French-speaking battalions could never become as efficient as the English. At the

same time, he clearly felt that the fault lay with the staff officers in the province who must become sufficiently conversant with military knowledge to inspire the confidence of Militia officers. The implication is plain that such a situation did not then exist. Since the officers then on the staff remained for some years thereafter, it seems equally fair to assume that the situation cannot have seriously changed.

The difficulties of the French Canadian 164. militia do not seem to have been altered by the departure of the British garrison. The Deputy Adjutants-General of M.Ds. 6 and 7 continued to be among the most urgent in their plea for the introduction of the ballot as the only way of maintaining their corps up to strength. de Lotbiniere Harwood of M.D. 6 reported in 1871 that he had been told by several well to do men that they would willingly serve if they were obliged to do so but that they could not afford to leave their businesses if no one else had to bear the burden. The same plea was again made the following year and Colonel D'Orsonnens, one of Harwood's Brigade Majors, reported that the officers at camp that year were dispirited from their failures in recruiting. Many of the men in camp had been out for the past fourteen The other problem was the lack of instructors and qualified officers. The reduced numbers in intermittent camps after 1872 seems to have solved the problem of recruiting enough men but it aggravated the problem of training them properly.

^{*} Indeed, the Deputy Adjutants-General began reporting offers of units which they could not accept. [Report, 1873, p. 19, 1877, p. 34]

In 1873, the Schools of Military Instruction in the province were closed, presumably to be replaced by the services of the Schools of Gunnery at Quebec but 359 four years later, the loss was still being regretted.

The following year, Colonel Duchesnay, the Deputy Adjutant-General at Quebec proposed very modestly that a depot of drill books be established at Ottawa and the officers be permitted to buy them for their own use. When officers were checked for their errors, they assured him that they were anxious to attend a School and improve their know-360 ledge. Selby Smyth himself saw a company of French Canadians drilling in a field.

The officer was doing his utmost with his company, but he was, to use an expression known in the army "knocking them about". The men had no steadiness, no preliminary drill; they got through a few company formations in a perfunctory fashen, but it seemed to me that if they had to be made use of, confusion would have resulted.

... Here, too, I noticed the absence of proper means for protecting the Government arms and clothing; hardly one tunic was complete in buttons; the trousers were of various patterns and material; boots with high heels and pointed toes that would have lamed the men in a few miles over a muddy road; the arms but tolerable, and some of the locks out of order; there were no slings, no snap caps, and I think I missed some ramrods; the sights of these rifles if examined, would, I am sure, have been found defective. But this is the fault of the existing system not of this particular officer, and I believe could only be possible in an independent company. 361

It was unfortunate that independent companies were common among the French Canadian militia. For all their weaknesses in training and equipment, it was possible to find a spirit which did not seem to exist elsewhere. In 1876, when Colonel Harwood arrived to inspect one of the companies of the St. Hyacinthe, he discovered that a fire the day before had laid waste much of the town, including the house of the captain, containing all the arms and equipment. The men had to be inspected outside.

It was a bitter cold night, the men were half clad and shivering. They had no arms and there was no space for any kind of movement.

I counted 2 officers and 28 men. .

The captain said the balance of his men were away, some working in the States, others with farmers away in the country. I then, after addressing a few words to them, dismissed the company, which gave three hearty cheers for the Queen.

It was a pitiful sight to see such a lot of fine young men totally ruined, some having lost their houses and homes, with all their clothing, others all they had in the world. 362

The organization of the two Gunnery Schools 166. was a means of producing instructors and trained men for at least a part of the Militia. "B" Battery in Quebec City was commanded by Colonel Strange but two of his three original officers were French Canadians as were over half his men. Strange was impressed by his men, finding them inured to the hardships of winter and trained to the rough engineering tasks of the logging camp. The ability of the Battery to provide French-speaking instructors was limited both by its size and by the language of the bulk of its original instructors. The Quebec Field Battery, which for some time won high praise, seems to have been able to take advantage of the School and in one year, in the absence of all of its officers, three from the School filled their place. However, garrison artillery did not thrive in Quebec despite extensive fortifications which would have needed their services in the event of an emergency. In 1880, "B" Battery was exchanged with "A" Battery in Kingston. The exchange was particularly unpopular with the men in "B" Battery who were now predominantly French Canadian and who found themselves torn from friendly and familiar surroundings and set down in a city where their language was not spoken. For the first time, desertion be-365 came a serious problem.

167. The other great advance in training during the seventies was the foundation of the Military College.

Reference has already been made to the difficulty the entrance examinations provided for French-speaking candidates. By 1879, the entrance examination regulations permitted answers in either language and provided that:

The Standard of knowledge of English required from French speaking candidates for the present will be: To write and speak English sufficiently to understand and be understood in that language.366

This remainde the standard until 1914 and after. Needless to say, if French Canadian officers were wanted in the Canadian Militia and in Canadian military affairs generally, this was not good enough. Few if any French Canadian schools or colleges in Quebeo were designed to produce graduates with the grounding in mathematics and sciences required for the entrance examination. Few, if any, directed their students towards the heavily technical education to be obtained at the College. Only one class in Quebec can be excepted - the heavily assimilated and self-consciously aristocratic French families of Quebec and Montreal were prepared to send their sons to the Royal Military College and into military careers. By 1900, 255 cadets had graduated from the College: ten were French Canadians. Their names explain their background: two Joly de Lotbinieres, two Panets, and du Plessis, a Gaudet and a Boucher de Boucherville. If commissions in the permanent corps were to be reserved for graduates of the college, a promise often made and, as time passed, more frequently kept, it meant that the officers would not represent French Canada adequately.

A further disadvantage for the French Canadian units of the Militia was that almost all of them were
rural corps, sharing the disadvantages of rural corps throughout the force of infrequent camps and scanty training. It
was unfortunate that there were only two city battalions,
the 65th Carabiniers Mont-Royal of Montreal and the 9th

Voltiegurs of Quebec, While both regiments had their vicissitudes, they were on an equal footing with their rivals among the English-speaking city battalions.

In 1879, a group of French-speaking Montreal-168. ers proposed to raise a new regiment, to be dressed in Zouave uniform. This Franco-Algerian costume had been so popular some decades before that a number of American militia units had adopted it. Above all, it had been the uniform of the French Canadian Papal Zouaves of 1868-70, a force of volunteers which had gone to Italy to help protect Rome against French attacks. This military episode had been almost bloodless but it was the one expedition organized and undertaken by French Canada completely on its own and the Zouaves had acquired a particularly strong place in the minds of most French Canadians. The proposal had the immediate and strong support of the new Minister, Louis Masson, both as the spokesman for Montreal in the Cabinet and as one who was anxious to strengthen the place of French Canada in the Militia. The remainder of his colleagues had no objection.

169. The opposition came from the Horse Guards and particularly from the Duke of Cambridge. Whatever the strength of their personal prejudice against a somewhat flamboyant uniform, the British officials stuck to the principle that the militia of both Britain and Canada were to be dressed in uniform as like those of the regulars as possible so that an enemy encountering them would not know whether he was facing irregulars or well disciplined professionals. Not only would / Zouave uniform not be British, its grey colour would allow it to be confused with a common colour among Canada's most likely enemy, the soldiers and militia of the United States. In making this point, Lord Lorne also recalled a similar corresponde ence in 1875 in which the War Office had taken the same

370 position.

the opposition to the proposed regiment's uniform. His position was made worse by the assumption in Montreal that 371 the new corps would be organized with its uniforms. A further aggravation for Masson was that he felt that his health to be failing at a time when his ability to get results for his Montreal friends was in such question. He offered to change the colour to rifle green if that would 372 suit the British authorities. This did not sway the Governor General.

The dispute was a minor one and it would be 171. easy to exaggerate the importance of this venture into a specifically French Canadian military dress; one may even be relieved that such a singularly inappropriate costume did not find a foothold here. Nonetheless, the attitude of the British military authorities and their allies in the Canadian Militia Department showed that little would be done to widen the character of the Militia to suit the wishes of French Canada. This was in contrast to the approval, even the enthusiastic support for Canadian units which adopted the wildest extravagance of British military dress. Selby Smyth delivered a stern rebuke to those who criticized the Governor General's Foot Guards of Uttawa for adopting the full dress uniform of the Coldstream Guards. Possibly even more absurd for Canadian conditions were those regiments which struggled to obtain Highland dress. Unless the British should plan to station Highlanders in Canada, any militia regiment. so attired would be promptly distinguished as such. They would certainly be more conspicuous than Zouaves in scarlet, blue or rifle green.

A NEW GENERAL AND A NEW MINISTER

172. On 25 November 1879, Masson told Macdonald that he could not continue. Ill health had plagued him throughout his period in office and Departmental work had suffered. Although his resignation followed closely on his disappointment in the Zouave business, there is no reason to believe that it was the cause. Masson himself wrote:

You may rest assured that it is not without deep regret that I have to take this determination and separate myself from colleagues with whom I have been in such complete accord. 375

In fact, he did not separate himself completely for when the resignation was accepted on 16 January 1880, it was only to transfer Masson to become President of the Council while Macdonald's friend, Sir Alexander Campbell, was promoted to the Militia Department from his previous post as Postmaster-General. Even this arrangement did not last. Before the end of the year, Masson had again resigned because of his health although his subsequent political career carried him through the Canadian Senate and the Quebec Legislative Council to become Lieutenant Governor of his native province. Campbell also returned to the Postmaster General's Department before the end of the year.

Although he had left the Militia Department, Masson was responsible for introducing a new Militia Acts Amendment Bill to the House of Commons in 1880. There were four proposed changes. The enrolment which had been supposed to take place in 1881 was postponed until 1882. Authority was sought to call out the Militia on other occasions than war or national emergencies. The crime of impersonating a militiaman was to be extended to cover anyone instead of merely other ranks who were actually with the force. Finally, there was to be authority to

establish can teens on service or in camp when local ordinance did not forbid them. While the first and third proposals were not particularly controversial, the second gave members a considerable scope to reveal their view of the Militia and the fourth gave them a pleasant opportunity to discuss the morals of others.

174. The problem which the first amendment was intended to solve appears to have arisen as a result of an incident in London, Ontario on 10 September 1879. During the first visit of Lord Lorne and Princess Louise, a reception was organized in the City Hall. A guard of local militia was placed around the building, chiefly for show but also with strict orders to allow no one to pass until the vice-regal party had entered. One of the sentries was a man named Thomas Bond who had served for eleven years in the British Army and who seems to have taken his duties very seriously. When Judge Davis approached to enter, he was promptly ordered back. He was followed by Chief Lallery of the London Police, in full uniform and accompanied by several ladies. Bond was not impressed and, when Lallery proceeded to bypass him, he brought his rifle, with bayonet fixed, to the position of the charge. Lallery then knocked the rifle out of his path and went in. Bond was arrested, tried by Judge Davis and fined \$1.00 with \$2.85 costs. The case was appealed and a jury reversed Davis's decision but the judge refused to order costs on the grounds of a preverse verdict. In explaining the case to Headquarters, the local Deputy Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor had pointed out that both Lallery and Bond were hot headed men but that his sympathies were with the Chief of Police, "a capital officer and very strict and won't soften to the ways of the Aldermen and easy going folks and so he has got many enemies." Taylor certainly had no sympathy for Bond but the dispute

drew considerable public attention to the Militia.

The amendment was presumably designed to protect sentries like Bond in the future. It was also a protection and an authority for guards called out to protect armouries as had occurred on several occasions during riots in Montreal and Quebec. Again in London an incident was quoted in which a sentry, posted on the armoury, had tried to arrest a man who was loitring nearby. The man had resisted and had eventually taken the sentry to court where the sentry was fined. The Liberals in opposition opposed the extension of this sort of power to the Militia. Constabulary was a provincial responsibility and David Mills, the Opposition's legal critic, wished to keep the military and the constabulary roles of the Militia quite distinct. Although the Prime Minister suggested that the bill was quite harmless, Mills and Blake pointed out the dangers of the liberty of the subject in denying a citizen appeal to a court simply because he had disobeyed the orders of a militia colonel or captain. It soon emerged that the Government was seeking to clarify its right to call out militia in addition to the right already possessed by magistrates. There then developed a dispute about the legal obligations of the Militia. Several M.Ps. tried to force the Government to solve the perennial enigma that a soldier could be shot for disobeying orders and hanged for obeying them.

176. There was little political capital to be made from trading charges about tyranny with reminiscences about Mackenzie's role in suppressing the Orangemen in 380 least. The debate on canteens brought a different band of contributors. They were led by the ardent prohibitionist George Ross from Middlesex West, a future Ontaric Minister of Education. Ross was opposed to canteens in

any form and although he acknowledged that the canteens was to keep the young men from straying into the towns, even a moderate supply of drink in the camps would lead the troops into excess. It was in vain that Masson pointed out that his Bill had the support of the "temperance gentlemen" in the Senate, that it would not set up canteens where the Temperance Act was in forde and that it would keep the men under better control where it was not. Ross persisted with an amendment to remove the repugnant clause. He was supported by several other members. A Montreal member suggested that the idea had come from Headquarters and not from the commanding officers who knew better the temptations to which young men were prone. Before long, liquor had been blamed for everything from the reluctance of pure young men to join the Militia to the atrocities allegedly then being committed in South Africa and Masson withdrew the section without a vote.

177. Masson also supervised the estimates for the year. For the first time there was a strongly argued proposal for a reduction of the whole force to 20,000 men, to be drilled longer and at better pay. The suggestion came from Fred. W. Strange, Member from North York and an officer of the Queen's Own Rifles, who had provided himself with figures to show that such a reduction would cut expenditure by \$175,000 a year, most of which could 382 then be used to increase the drill pay. The suggestion, of course provoked considerable opposition, led, very mildly, by Masson himself, who gave generous praise to both city and rural Militia. "The country does not regret the amount spent on its volunteers, and it would be a great difficulty for the Minister of Militia to make any reduct-Why it was difficult became evident as a succession of members arose to address their constituents, to demand the usual reductions in the staff and increases in

the pay and numbers of their local militia supporters.

178. Selby Smyth's five year term as General Officer Commanding expired in the spring of 1880 and on 31 May 1880, he officially laid down his appointment and returned to England. His service in Canada had largely been a matter of watching the decay of the Militia but he seems to have accepted the limits of his position as an adviser rather than as a creator of policy. His advice was extensive, moderate and often very sound. More than most of his successors, he was aware of the indifference of the Canadian Government to military expenditure and he was content to produce grandiose plans and to content himself with fitting in a few extra instructors in odd places. His lengthy reports are his only real memorial in Canada. Selby Smyth made his annual account into a lecture on militarism which grew longer and more rhetorical each year. He took space to advance a wide variety of personal causes, the most interesting being a causeway between Newfoundland and Labrador which would cut off the Labrador current, warm the water of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and change the climate of eastern Canada. In return for allowing him scope for these ponderous essays, the Canadian Govenment was not much bothered by trouble in the Militia. The few enemies Selby Smyth made, including George Denison, it might have been hard to avoid making. That he did not make very many is proven by the apparent ease with which he was accepted as military commander by two successive governments.

If Selby Smyth gave general satisfaction in Canada, he was less satisfactory to the British and before his departure, the Colonial Secretary, Hicks Beach, raised the possibility of combining his duties with those of the British general commanding the garrison at Halifax.

This possibility was considered by the cabinet and found to be inexpedient. Apart from the belief that the duties of looking after the Militia were a full time occupation in themselves, and that the Militia would be discontented and doubtful that they would get as much attention as before, there was the question of conflict of authority. An officer working with the Militia and under the Canadian Government would be more likely to adopt its policies faithfully than if he was also the servant of the British Government. The Canadians were obviously growing more conscious of their own interests. Above all, the senior military officer at "alifax had continued to have the additional responsibility of serving as Administrator when the Governor General was away. This was an anomalous situation in itself, as Macdonald pointed out in 1881 when the temporary office nearly fell to a colonel at Halifax. The Canadian Government refused to recommend a situation when its subordinate, the officer commanding its Militia, would also become its superior as the replacement for the Governor General.

180. Instead, the British authorities had to set about obtaining a second General Officer Commanding. They had the advantage of Lord Lorne's advice on the qualities of his successor. The candidate should have tact, a record of bravery and experience with volunteers. Above all, he should have a large personal fortune. "An officer who could afford hospitality would have great influence among the militia officers in other than merely military respects." The first to be offered was Lieutenant General Arthur Hardinge, but he was refused by Macdonald. The choice then fell on Major General Richard Laurd. When the Canadian appointment had been considered some six years before, two officers who were eventually to hold the appointment had been considered. They were Laurd and Colonel Frederick

Dobson Middleton. Of Luard, The Duke of Cambridge had written:

... a good officer who has seen a good deal of service. He has been Assistant Inspector of Volunteers and therefore has a good deal of experience in this respect, but I don't think his temper is as good as that of Colonel Middleton, though I daresay he would do the work well, being an active and intelligent man. 391

If Luard was short of temper, there was no question of his courage. He had served in the campaigns in the Crimea and in China and had been mentioned in despatches as the 392 first man to scale the walls at Canton. Perhaps the real reason that his name was chosen by the Duke in 1880, however, was a certain desire to see him out of the country. In order to qualify for a pension, Luard needed two more years of service and so he was looking for employment.

There is also some evidence that he was due to succeed to the colonelcy of his regiment and that there were other, 393 more desirable claimants for the honour.

181. In addition to his temper, Luard had another disadvantage; he was a poor man. Not only could he not undertake to keep up a fashionable establishment in Ottawa, he was even obliged to bargain with the Canadian Government for better financial arrangements. This angered the Canadians and placed the Governor General in an embarrassing position. Not only was there a question about the General's financial position, there was also a growing suspicion of his qualifications, prompted by private letters and newspaper reports from England. Inard's request that his fare and that of his family and servants was rejected should be paid in advance/and he was warned a little bluntly that if he did not wish to accept the Canadian terms, he could return to his half pay of 25 shillings a day and another officer would be found.

Luard accepted the ultimatum and on 1 August 182. 396 four months after the Order 1880, he arrived in Canada in Council appointing him had been passed. His arrival coincided with a number of changes in the Militia. The order to switch "A" and "B" Batteries between Kingston and 398 and was completed on whebec had gone out on 7 May 1880 16 June 1880. Captain Oscar Prevost and fifteen other ranks capable of instructing in French were left in Quebec to assist "A" Battery. Another change which was almost certainly due to Luard's insistence was an almost complete shifting of the staff in the districts. Three of the oldest Deputy Adjutants-General were retired and every one of the others was ordered to be moved. Two of the Brigade Majors were promoted to Deputy Adjutant-General and a third was ordered to take over the duties of that office in Prince Edward Island. The move was to be complete by 1 April 1881 and the officers were entitled to their personal transport expenses and hotel bills while en route, a baggage allowance of 1,000 pounds and two months pay to cover their Other incidental expenses. Those going a distance of over 500 miles were entitled to three months pay.

without pain. The two French speaking Deputy AdjutantsGeneral managed to get their exchanges cancelled but they
alone were successful. Colonel Osborne Smith preferred to
401
resign rather than leave Winnipeg to come to Montreal.

To take advantage of this opportunity to reduce the staff,
Lieutenant Colonel Taylor who had been sent to M.D. 9 in
Halifax was given charge of all three Maritime provinces.

All the districts were given a brigade major save M.Ds. 10
and 11 which had none and M.D. 5 which had two, one French
402
and the other English speaking.

Colonel Wily, the Director of Stores and Keeper of Militia 403
Properties became superannuated at his own request.

An engineer officer was added, Captain Henry Perley, whom the Department of Public Works had transferred from Saint John and who was to take charge of the growing amount of engineer work to be done by the Militia Department for itself.

185. Luard did not waste much time in making his personality felt by the Militia. He was also made aware of some of the difficulties which would confront him. The training season was over by the time he had arrived but it was possible to inspect some of the city battlaions and a few rural corps which were late with their drill. There was provision in 1880 for the drilling of 21,000 men and 404 for holding of brigade camps on an optional basis.

Luard's opinion of the Montreal battalions had been sufficiently outspoken for the Montreal paper to describe him as "an old scold" but he was apparently more impressed with what he found in Toronto and thereby won the approval 405 of the local press.

with the perennial problem of discipline in the Militia

The officers of the Militia were understandably conscious of the sacrifices they felt called upon to make and they were ill-disposed to accept criticism. If they took umbrage at a rebuke or at a disciplinary limitation, they could resign. If they did not resign, they had quick recourse to a friendly newspaper or a sympathetic Member of Parliament. Sometimes, they were Members of Parliament already and Selby Smyth himself had used his annual report 406 to urge them to have more to say on behalf of the Militia. Militia officers also felt the narrow basis of their

authority. Shortly after his arrival, Luard had to deal with a case in which a lieutenant commanding a company had struck one of his men. It turned out that the man had been rebuked on parade and afterwards had started an altercation with his officer about who had been right.

407
Luard ordered both to be dismissed from the Militia.

187. Another problem which was common in all battalions but which was most prevalent in the richer city corps was the tendency of the officers to regard themselves as members of a gentlemen's club in which the Colonel was merely the president. They were encouraged in this view by the many social affairs centring on their regiment, the funds and subscriptions which were forever circulating and the existence of social rivalries which carried over from outside life. Such an atmosphere made intrigues against unpopular commanding officers seem normal, however subversive such proceedings would strke more professional officers. Such a state of affairs had plagued the 10th Royal Regiment of Toronto an the later years of Selby Smyth's command as a number of officers applied pressure to remove Colonel Stollery from the command. The result was a situation in which the unit fell into disorder and was nearly disbanded. complete reorganization and a different list of officers managed to restore it. In the process, the affairs of the regiment were canvassed in the newspapers, in Parliament and among the Cabinet. In his last report, noting that he had found no record of a court martial against an officer of the Canadian Militia, Selby Smyth had tried to remind officers that such conduct was against the Articles Since these disputes often involved officers of considerable political influence, there was a certain hazard involved for a General to go any closer in tackling disciplinary problems than Selby Smyth's menacing. generalizations.

One of Luard's first encounters with this 188. sort of problem was a series of charges against Major Kennedy of the Winnipeg Field Battery by one of his lieutenants. The accusations largely dealt with fraudulent payment of men who had not been present at drill. The charges were dealt with personally by the Minister, Sir Alexander Campbell, as one of his last acts in office. In lengthy opinion, written in his customary judicial manner, he acknowledged that six out of seven charges were proven although there were extenuating circumstances. One was that Kennedy had not used the latest forms with their printed warning against paying men who had not performed drill. Another was that the high wages in Manitoba made it difficult to obtain men. It is hard to avoid the impression, however, that Kennedy was a man of considerable political influence and while he might be warned, he could not be punished.

In preparing his first Report, Luard decided that there was much to criticize and little time to be lost. His first observation was that although the city corps were doing well and making the best use of their opportunities and money, the rural corps, for all their excellent material, could not get by with thirty hours of drill every other year. \$75,000 was spent on 9,600 city militia and \$100,000 on 27,000 rural militia. For an officer who was to be characterized as the very model a of/traditional British major general, Luard had common sense views about dress. Accepting the principle that the Canadians should look as much as possible like the British Army, he still asked for brown leather and an end to the messy, inefficient but extremely traditional pipeclay.

He regretted that the Canadian cavalry had been dressed in Hussar uniform and suggested that a plain blue uniform would be cheaper and more suitable. He also wanted the cavalry to be equipped and trained with rifles. Finally, he asked that a soft cap be adopted which might look like a helmet from a distance but which could not be crushed and which would offer some protection from the sun. In the field of equipment, Luard pointed out that the Snider rifle was a weapon of the past and asked for something better. Those do not seem to be the urgings of a military mossback.

on 8 November 1880, Sir Alexander Campbell was replaced by a new Minister who promised to be as energetic as the new General. Adolphe Caron was a Quebec lawyer, the eldest son of a onetime lieutenant governor of his province and married into the Baby family. He had been in Parliament since 1873, representing Quebec County and the Militia and Defence portfolio was his first chance of cabinet office. Caron was only 37 when appointed.

Although his predecessor, Louis Masson, objected to his 414 appointment on grounds of seniority, other members of the Cabinet soon came to have considerable respect for him.

Early in March, Caron had to present his first estimates and, although the questioning was hardly severe, he appeared able to handle himself competently. Although he had to answer criticism raised on behalf of some of the displaced staff officers, he was greatly helped by having good news about drill pay. In the previous year, the orders had allowed the men to draw pay only for the time that they were in camp, excluding sunday, when they were allowed only rations, and the days of coming and going. For 1881, 17,000 men were to train in camp for 12 days and they would be paid for every one of them. Only one

member rose to demand a reduction of the staff and the main fire was drawn by a British Columbian who demanded a pair of armouries for a corps which had mustered one officer and sixteen men the year before of a total strength 415 which he claimed to be over 120.

192. During the summer, Caron visited several of the camps which he had authorized and found that all was well. From Quebec, he reported happily to the Prime Minister:

a big lift in 1883. That is what I am trying to work. My general is not exactly gifted with diplomatic tact but I hape we can pull through. The forces are in good spirits. 416

Luard, as he indicated, was his one problem. At the camp at London, the General had caused an awkward scene. The 27th "Lampton" Battalion came from a rural district of Ontario with little cash to spare for military trimmings. Its commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Robert Campbell, a fairly prosperous farmer from Watford, who was proud of the uniform he had purchased for himself at Sarnia. When Luard inspected the battalion, he was in a bad temper. Before the whole battalion, he rebuked the colonel for failing to pay compliments properly. Then he began to criticize the state of his dress. The furious and humiliated colonel rode off to camp headquarters and submitted his resignation. In the ensuing storm, he was persuaded to withdraw it but strong feeling was raised against the General. The Toronto Telegram, even while suggesting that Luard had been even worse used than Campbell in the controversy, took the chance to suggest that the 478 time had come for a Canadian officer to command the Militia. Even the Governor General appreciated the bad impression that the General was making:

I fear General Luard has been making himself unpopular by unnecessarily nagging cirticism, and I shall take an opportunity while in the East Provinces to tell him so.

Caron, on the other hand, "is doing his work very well,
419
and seems happier than the most victorious Field Marshal".

193. Luard was able to give praise when he felt it to be due and he continued to have a high respect for the basic material of his force.

The militia man of Canada appears to have one sterling merit - regularity of conduct. From all reports made to me, I gather that he is eminently sober, willing and intelligent. It follows, therefore, that all the Militia of Canada wants is sufficient instruction under qualified teachers and for a sufficient period, to become most valuable troops. 420

He was also able to attract the sympathy and the support of the relatively limited number of officers who were making a serious study of military affairs and who were working sometimes almost full time to make their battalions efficient. One of these was Lieutenant Colonel W.D. Otter of the Queen's Own Rifles, the young commanding officer of the Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto. Luard's satisfaction with this corps was in marked contrast with his opinion of most of the rest of the Militia and the two men were soon in private correspondence, with Luard describing his problems and plans. Satisfactory relations with a few officers like Otter, who lacked political influence, was inadequate compensation for Luard's declining standing with the rest of the Militia and with a Government which was coming increasingly to regard him as a liability.

As Luard's stock fell, that of Caron was rising in the estimation both of himself and others. At Christmas, he received a letter from Lord Lorne, then in England, reporting the opinions circulating around the still continuing Royal Commission on Colonial Defence.

Lorne had been speaking with Erskine Childers, Gladstone's

Secretary of State for War "He as well as other ministers here naturally think your office no unimportant one, for by the ability for self defence the value Canada places in her present political connection must be determined."

Caron was invited to produce schemes for coast defence in and for torpedo corps and for a policy of dovetailing 422.

British and Canadian military policy.

With this sort of respect being paid to his 195. opinions, Caron proceeded with a growing confidence. When he faced Parliament in 1882, he could offer more good news to the members. Since Osborne Smith had not been replaced and since Colonel Laurie in British Columbia had resigned as well as a few other staff officers, it was possible to make a saving of \$4,600 in the staff. He was able to turn the tables on George Ross, who had not bothered to check his facts and he had been able to explain to Cartwright that the delay in producing the modified old cannon at Montreal was due to a wise and cautious Government's waiting on developments in the United Kingdom. There was a certain amount of difficulty in explaining to the Opposition that the scarlet cloth for the uniforms could not be manufactured economically in Canada and there was a slight disquiet that the greatcoats were manufactured in Kingston Penitentiary rather than by honest capitalists but there was the compensation of hearing Timothy Anglin deliver a National Policy speech.

196. The trouble began three weeks later when Caron presented the remainder of his estimates. Before

^{*} Torpedo corps were the latest craze for cheap and easy coast defence. Torpedoes, now known as mines, were an army responsibility and engineers were specially trained to set and maintain them. The cheapness of the equipment gave it a long life in Canadian defence thinking.

discussion could begin, Alexander Mackenzie arose and set the members to debating a somewhat interesting event of the previous summer. The brigade camp for M.D. 3 had been held on a large farm owned by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Ross of the 16th Battalion, a former Liberal Member of Parliament. Although the camp was under the command of the Deputy Adjutant-General for the District, Lieutenant Colonel Henry V. Villiers, Ross had been left in charge for the day. On the authority of the Minister, the local Member, James S. McCuaig, had been authorized to establish a canteen in the camp. A man named Heffernan was sent to establish it. Although Heffernan explained to Ross that he had the authority of the Minister of Militia, the colonel was furious and sent an officer and sixteen men to remove him. One report was that the troops had fixed bayonets and charged the wretched sutler who turned and fled. The canteen was dismantled and thrown over the fence.

197. This incident was revived with added relish because there had been an investigation of the incident, as a result of which Colonel Ross was officially censured in Militia General Orders, the first time such a punishment had ever been meted out. Since the General had only recommended in his report that Ross should be reprimanded in the presence of two officers, someone had determined on a more exemplary punishment. That person could only be Caron. The only mitigating feature was that he had provided that no liquor would be allowed to be sold in the canteen but even that was suspect to a few. The debate was not particularly serious and it was conducted through the last hours of a Wednesday evening session when some members at least had equipped themselves to endure a temperance debate but it was also the first

occasion on which Caron had met censure as a Minister 424 and he did not evidently enjoy it.

Ross affair, relations between the Minister and the General were becoming impossible. Luard would probably have resigned his appointment if he had the choice but he needed several more months of service before he could be confirmed in his rank. Otherwise, he would be forced into a financially disastrous retirement. He explained to Otter that he planned to take his three months leave and go to England in the spring of 1882, hoping that matters might improve in his absence. "Only by going away can 425 I pass the time safely," he explained rather sadly. He began his three months leave in April, planning to 426 return at the end of June.

The Government, however, had no desire for his return, Seeing the situation, the Governor General himself wrote to the Duke of Cambridge to suggest the necessity of finding another place for Luard while he was in England. The indignation against the individual was giving a new force to the old cry that the position should be held by a Canadian. The Duke was unable to oblige and in his reply merely emphasized the necessity of having an Imperial officer in Canada. Having made this gesture. Lorne had to patch up matters as best he could. In a letter to macdonald, he suggested that the fault had not been all on one side.

If General Luard be retained or another officer appointed, one thing is always desirable, and that is the leaving as far as possible of all matters of military discipline to the general. I have rejoiced to see the great interest Mr. Caron takes in his work. I wd. advise that at military gatherings in camp, etc. he shd. leave the military authorities entirely alone. On the other hand, the general must not expect to have power of dismissal or appointment, but that in all things not belonging to the handling of

troops, his duty is fulfilled when he makes a representation to the Minister.... 427

Macdonald reluctantly agreed that Luard would not actually be removed but he did not see any end to the dispute between the general and his minister. If the Duke could make another effort to get him placed, the Frime Minister agreed to get him a handsome allowance. Macdonald's real preference would have been for the newly promoted Major General Strange. The late Inspector of Artillery had been promoted by seniority to be a general officer at about the same time as he was forced, by the Royal Warrant of 1881 to choose between forfeiting his pension and quitting the Canadian service. He had opted for his pension with some reluctance and had set out for the Rocky Mountains, intending to establish a ranch. If Strange was out of the question, Macdonald hoped that instead of an elderly general, it would be possible to get a young staff colonel with a future, who might be given the local rank of Major General.

200. Lorne evidently proposed Strange to the Horse Guards but the Duke of Cambridge would not approve 430 of a retired officer. Since there was no alternative, Luard had to return from his leave. Lorne seems to have made his point fairly strongly with the British authorities, warning them that the return of Luard might risk the whole appointment but since they had not taken the warning, he could only suggest to Macdonald that there be some clearer definition of their respective spheres of authority. The recommendations of the General on discipline would be brought before the Minister and if he did not. concur, they would be passed to the Cabinet. Caron would also leave all talking to troops on parade about their appearance to the General.

These little mistakes which have culminated in estrangement between the Minister & General might easily have been avoided and are in truth only the result of a little trop de zèle in both, and the subordinate has pressed his views a little too pertinaciously on a superior who on his partt has been a little inclined to leave the General too little military scope. 432

Macdonald may have taken this description of the conflict as a little too sanguine but he undertook to warn the Minister about the limits of his responsibilities. On the other hand, he hoped "that with Your Excellency's good counsels, the General will draw his salary and deserve it 433 by doing as little as possible." A few weeks later, after a cabinet meeting and a few private conversations, Caron was reported as "a sadder and wiser man". If Luard would only draw his salary and wink at a few irregularities common among irregular troops, all would be well. On the other hand, the attitude of the Duke of Cambridge had provoked a certain indignation in the cabinet. As Macdonald observed in reporting their reactions:

It is better that Luard should return as I don't think that either the Ministry or Parliament will acquiesce in the claim that the Commander of our Militia Forces is simply a bit of Horse Guards patronage.

The truth is that the appt of a man like General Luard and the objection to an able officer like Strange are not calculated to increase our confidence in the selection from home of the Commander of our Forces. In case of European Complications, volunteers for service would probably be looked for in Canada and in such case it would be highly expedient to have an officer in Command able to arouse the enthusiasm of our Militia force. 434

Ituard only returned to Canada on 7 August
435
1882 although the Government does not seem to have resented his prolonged absence. A few days after his return,
he called on the Prime Minister and they agreed that he
was to call upon him at any time that a clash was imminent
and before the correspondence got started. Having met
both sides, Macdonald still felt that Luard wanted tact.

On the other hand, Caron had not paid much attention to him nor had he "shown that deference which is due to the 436 General's rank, age or experience."

THE CARTRIDGE FACTORY

Canadians of both parties resented the money 202. that was spent in England for uniforms, arms and equipment for the Militia. However the creation of industries to supply the force was difficult when the amounts were so small and the needs so specialized. Even small requirements could present difficulties. The Canadian-made tent poles issued in the early seventies were made of the wrong wood and snapped regularly. In one camp, fence 437 rails were adapted to replace them. Another requirement was uniforms. While Canada could manufacture greatcoats and, after some failures, trousers, the heavy scarlet cloth used in British style uniforms was too difficult to be produced economically. This had led to the discussion in the 1883 Parliament.

strategic argument for Canadian production and that was ammunition. The manufacture of artillery was beyond Canada's means and even the project undertaken by Gilberts' Montreal Engine Company to create rifled cannon out of smoothbores proved abortive. Ammunition, however, was a possibility. Colonel French, the first commander of the Gunnery School at Kingston was enthusiastic about the possibilities of establishing a powder factory in Canada. The many buildings obtained from the British would offset the higher labour costs and, in any case, children could 438 be used for many of the operations. Colonel French, however, was ahead of his time and guns and ammunition continued to be imported from Britain.

204. In 1878, as part of a revived interest in

In the possibility of War, Selby Smyth discovered that for each Snider rifle in the country, there were about 150 rounds of ammunition. Since the Snider was being replaced in England, there would soon be no more coming from the Royal Arsenal and Canada would have to look elsewhere for her ammunition. His answer was to recommend a reduction in the ammunition allowance for the annual training. This was not completely unsound for a variety of reports indicate that with no musketry instructors, the men simply fired their rifles at the required ranges and in the general direction of the target and called it By this time, there was a powder factory at a day. Hamilton and it was approached to see if it would undertake to manufacture ammunition for the Snider. It considered it at length and eventually said no, seeing no profit in it. Selby Smyth had no recourse but to recommend that the Government should build its own cartridge factory. The cost would be defrayed by letting the current small reserve run down for they could then be manufactured more cheaply than they could be bought in England. For a site, he suggested Quebec for although it was farther from the centre of population than the other possible choice, Kingston, it had buildings, it had the men of the battery should it need extra labour in an emergency, it had a railway running down the North Shore of the Saint Lawrence and it had the protection of the fortress. It was also about as far from the American border as could be managed.

evaded unless the Government preferred to provide the Militia with completely new rifles and perhaps because it had been suggested that the factory be established at Quebec, the Cabinet approved the idea on 22 December 1879.

\$31,300 was appropriated to buy the equipment and arrangements were made to send an officer to England to be trained at the Royal Arsenal. The officer proved to be the same Captain Oscar Prevost who had been left behind in Quebec by "B" Battery as a French instructor. His background suggests that he would be an unusual choice to make a success of such an enterprise, as he was trained as a lawyer and had proven sufficiently prominent in the profession to be invited to become a partner to Adolphe Chapleau, the prominent bleu. Possibly this connection had kept him in the Government's mind. Prevost may have been a political choice but he was also a good one and the Cartridge Factory became his creation.

206. Prevost spent a year in England, learning the processes of the Royal Arsenal and ordering machinery. In the spring of 1881, he returned to Canada but his work was just beginning. There were buildings in Quebec as Selby Smyth had said, but they were in very bad condition and many of them were unsuitable. Prevost was faced with a long delay while extensive repairs were made and new structures were put up. This took two years and might never have been accomplished without the support of Adolphe Caron. His enthusiasm for the Factory endured considerable testing during Parliamentary sessions but as a wise Member of Parliament, he was also aware that he had obtained a valuable prize for his district.

207. Only in October, 1882, did any manufacturing begin. Even then, there were delays. The additional appropriation had not allowed for spare parts and these had to be manufactured by the Factory itself. The machines themselves seem to have been very faulty. Prevost and the Canadian Government seem to have been very badly fooled by the British firm which supplied them. One of the bullet machines lacked a spring without which it would not feed.