

vacancies for which working pay was allowed. All ranks were allowed a daily ration but it consisted chiefly of 1 lb of bread, 1 lb. of meat and 1 lb. of potatoes with smaller quantities of barley, coffee, tea, cheese, sugar, salt and pepper.<sup>621</sup> These conditions might have been acceptable if there had been better provision for the married men.

Colonel Turnbull reported that he did not enlist their service. The same restraint could not apply to his instructors and, to the evident surprise of the Government, <sup>marrage</sup> seems to have been quite common throughout the Permanent Corps. It was the custom in the British Army to provide rations and quarters for a proportion of the married men - up to 10% of the strength - but repeated urging from the commanders of the permanent corps could not bring the Canadian Government to follow suit.<sup>622</sup> Nor could they persuade the Government to introduce pensions for either staff officers or members of the permanent corps. This was, if possible, more serious for quite apart from the cruel effect on the officers and men it ensured that older soldiers would cling to their positions long after they were fit for them while younger men would have no encouragement for a career. The failure to provide for the soldiers was a little more glaring because pensions had been provided for the men of the Northwest Mounted Police and a superannuation system had long been in effect for the civil service.<sup>623</sup>

293. The grievances did not come exclusively from the men. They began at the very top when the British Government determined to cut off all pay to British officers serving in the colonies. Even retired officers, drawing their pensions, would lose it if they were employed by colonial governments and this caused General Strange to lose his pension when he took part in the Northwest Campaign



of 1885.<sup>624</sup> For Middleton, who had been receiving regimental pay while in Canada, it was a serious blow for the \$4,000 paid by the Canadian Government was by no means as much money as he had received as a Colonel in the British Army while his expenses were rather larger.<sup>625</sup> Other Canadian officers were more completely dependent on their own Government. In 1889, the Prime Minister received a pamphlet from Captain A.J. Wilson, one of the original officers of the Gunnery Schools. It was seventeen years since Wilson had been appointed to the School and he was still receiving exactly \$3.50 a day. The pamphlet, he said, was not his work, but it highlighted many of the same complaints. Except for lieutenants, the pay of Canadian officers was less than for corresponding ranks in the British and American armies. The pay in Australia was almost double the Canadian rate. The difference was accentuated by the lack of pensions for the Canadian force.\* Another grievance was that officers in the Canadian permanent corps had no seniority over non-permanent Militia officers. In contracts, British regular officers were given seniority by statute and when any came to Canada, they were also given an automatic step in rank.<sup>626</sup>

\* Comparable Rates of Pay for Permanent Officers

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>American</u>
Major General	\$ 4,000	\$ 5,222	\$ 7,500
Colonel	2,600	3,547	3,500
Deputy Adjutant-General	1,200	2,660	3,000
Lieutenant Colonel	1,440	1,600	3,000
Major	1,095	1,424	2,500
(after 4 years)	1,277	,	2,750
Captain	1,095	1,029	1,500
(after 4 years)	1,277		1,980
Lieutenant	730	606	1,600
(after 4 years)	912	697	1,760

MG 26 A 1 (c) 329, 148919, "Notes Relating to Standing of Permanent Corps, Canadian Militia".



294. The Government showed itself little disturbed by these complaints. After all, as the eloquent testimony of Caron's files proves, there was no lack of applicants for the humblest commissioned vacancy in the permanent corps and if men did not like the service, they could always go elsewhere. The Deputy Minister's little summary at the front of the Militia Report was sufficient for any busy man to read. While it gave a muffled echo to some of the more urgent recommendations concealed within, its tone was of pride and optimism in an efficient and economical force. In his report for 1887, Panet informed his Minister that "as we enlarge the sphere of our operations under your direction, it is clearly proved that the military system of the Dominion is steadily increasing in efficiency."<sup>627</sup> In the following year, Panet could report that Canada's military fame had spread throughout the world. Blue books and the Regulations and Orders for the Militia had been exchanged with the principle colonies and there had even been a request from India for the design of the Red River Cart. The Governor of Jamaica had sent one of the officers of his Militia to attend one of the schools.<sup>628</sup> In the following year, the inspection of the General Officer Commanding was reported as highly satisfactory although there was a slight anomaly a little later in the report when there was a gentle warning that money would have to spent on the walls of the Citadel at Quebec or they would be a danger to the inhabitants living below.<sup>629</sup>

295. If readers of the report wished further comforting information, of a rather more domestic kind, there was always a lengthy account of "A" Company at Fredericton by Colonel Maunsell. Although undoubtedly helped by local economic conditions, Maunsell was able to keep his men by good man management and by an evident enthus-



iasm. In 1888, when comparable figures were given, he had only 3 deserters. The next lowest was "D" Company at London with 9. "A" Company was the first to attend camp with the other Militia units. Its colonel was strong for temperance and he was supported by his famous Sergeant Major, Thomas McKenzie. In 1885, he had formed a Temperance Club with 95 members and in the following year, it received a fresh impetus after being addressed by the visiting Mayor of Toronto: "as a result, many (seventy one) names were at once added to the list of members".<sup>630</sup> Maunsell also sought to keep his men in barracks by making it as attractive to them as possible. He arranged lectures by the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Leonard Tilley, and soon had a library of 300 books, largely donated by the Tilleys, by the Bishop and by the Chief Justice of the province. The atmosphere described by Maunsell sounds almost utopian: "The recruit should be made to feel that the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Company are his friends and protectors, and to consider the barrack room his 'home'".<sup>\* 631</sup>

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\* Another but almost equally favourable picture of the life at the School in Fredericton has been left by Thomas McKenzie, the first sergeant major. A British veteran who came out to Canada and who devoted the remainder of his life as a drill instructor to the Militia, McKenzie had hoped to become the first adjutant but had to be content with a lower position. It was he who was the founder of the unit's lodge of the Sons of Temperance and he served as its first deputy grand worthy patriarch. He points out that failure to provide rations for the wives and children of the married men was a very serious difference between the Canadian and the British service. Married men could only keep their families on 40¢ a day if their wives did the washing of the single men. The married men were also employed by the officers.



296. The Royal Military College in this period did not share the idyllic progress at Fredericton. In 1886, Colonel Hewitt finally returned to England, leaving the institution firmly founded but with continuing difficulties of cramped accomodation and facilities. His successor was Colonel John Oliver of the Royal Artillery, a professor at the College since September, 1877. Oliver had had an adventurous career before coming to Canada but he seems to have been willing to settle in the country and, in 1880, he had married a lady of Kingston. He was 52 when he became commandant. He appears to have been a fairly energetic officer and in his first year, he could report an increasing number of applications from parents seeking to enroll their sons.<sup>632</sup> Two years later, he announced that courses in simple surgery were being given to the cadets by the Sergeant Major. At the same time, progress had been made in having the College diploma recognized as at least a partial fulfillment of a university degree. The major deficiency for a fuller academic qualification was Latin.<sup>633</sup> In 1888, Oliver, having been promoted and retired as a Major General, gave way to Major General D.R. Cameron.<sup>634</sup> In this, there was something strange, for Camefon was also a major general and retired. He was also the son in law of Sir Charles Tupper.<sup>635</sup>

#### THE DOWNFALL OF GENERAL MIDDLETON

297. His achievements in the Northwest Campaign of 1885 had been the making of General Middleton's reputation. They were also to be the source of his downfall.

298. During the campaign, Middleton had shown himself to have many of the highest qualities of a soldier. His energy was astonishing for a man of sixty. He did not spare himself in reconnoitring, he was tireless in checking



on piquets and scouts and he made himself responsible for a great variety of jobs which should have been left to his staff. At the same time, he almost completely failed to evoke the loyalty and appreciation of his men. They sensed that his precautions were a reflection of his mistrust. Moreover, as George Needler wrote, years after the campaign: "his willingness to do so much himself easily passed over into a too obvious desire to assume the credit for everything himself."<sup>636</sup> Middleton's conduct of the campaign has been described as "marked with undue deliberation and hesitancy".<sup>637</sup> His own apprehensions about his own ill armed, ill trained and ill ordered force are in striking contrast with his contempt for the fears of others, particularly of the officers of the Mounted Police. Middleton also made enemies by his appointment to his staff of officers who had originally been with the British Army like Lord Melgund, Lieutenant Colonel Van Straubenzie and S.L. Bedson.

299. If Middleton had returned to England in 1885, his reputation might well have gone with him. Posterity might say that the campaign could have been completed far more quickly but contemporary opinion was surprised that it was over so soon. However Middleton served on in Canada. He received his knighthood, his promotion and his \$20,000. His officers continued to wait. Meanwhile, those with grievances against the General managed to give them wider and wider publicity. Major General Laurie, who claimed seniority over Middleton and who was certainly better connected in the Conservative Party, had a bitter grievance that he had been left to manage supplies along the lines of communication. Colonel Houghton, another officer with sound connections, was convinced that, as Deputy Adjutant-General of M.D. 10, he should have commanded the expedition. A variety of officers, and most particularly Lieutenant



Colonel George Denison of the Governor General's Body Guard, were apparently aggrieved that they were not in Batoche to lead the final charge in person.<sup>638</sup>

300. The malcontents were fortunate in having a martyr in the person of the officer who had led the charge, Colonel Arthur Williams. The commanding officer of the Midland Battalion in Middleton's force was felt to have been largely responsible for the almost spontaneous dash which captured Batoche and somewhat embarrassed the General. Middleton had not been particularly grateful for the exploit and later, when Williams fell sick, the General showed him little sympathy. When Williams died a short time after the battle, the critics were prepared to describe Middleton as a major contributing cause. Other disputes about seniority and prestige might be of interest only in militia messes but Williams had been the popular Conservative member for East Durham since 1878. The discussion of the circumstances of his death added a discord to the general chorus of approval at the successful end of the campaign.

301. The publication of Middleton's report in 1886 provoked further attacks from those who accused the General of being neither fair nor frank in his description of the campaign. The real grievance was that apart from the generous treatment of the General and a K.C.M.G. for the Minister, there were no honours or awards for either military or civil subordinates. When T.C. Casgrain raised the question of rewards at the end of the 1885 session, Macdonald had assured him that the matter was out of the hands of civil authorities and that it would be up to the military commanders to make their recommendations.<sup>639</sup> When no medals were forthcoming, it was natural that the deprived Militia officers blamed "Old Fred" for keeping the glory to himself.



The accusation was unfair. Only on the eve of his departure could Middleton reveal that he had presented a list of nominations to the Prime Minister and to Sir Adolphe Caron on his return from the Northwest. At that time, they had rejected his suggestions on two grounds: that only two or three C.M.Gs. could be recommended and the remaining officers would be jealous and that neither of the two French Canadian commanding officer, Ouimet or Amyot, were included. Later, Middleton had pressed the claims at the time of the Jubilee celebrations of 1887 but again without success.<sup>640</sup>

302. The awards question created a continuing bitterness against Middleton among many Militia officers. It is difficult to know what he could have done. If he had included either Amyot's or Ouimet's name for a C.M.G., the list would have become absurd. The former had commanded a battalion with considerable alarm and not a little financial mismanagement<sup>641</sup> while the latter had left his regiment as it set out under Strange and, after a hurried trip back to Montreal, was finally persuaded to take command at Edmonton.<sup>642</sup> Caron's honour had come as a result of a hint from the British Government at the same time that it suggested that only two or three C.M.Gs. would be forthcoming for the campaign. Lord Lansdowne felt that one of them should go to Colonel Powell. There were others who clamoured more directly for attention. Having been informed by a War Office friend that he would get a K.C.M.G. if the Canadian Government would only recommend it, General Strange addressed himself in characteristic fashion to the Prime Minister:

I am already the most distinguished Imperial officer that ever served in Canada - distinguished by not having been years ago given the distinction of 3 or 4 letters that have fallen the lot of every officer of rank who has ever served Canada from Col. Irvine to Col. Hewett.<sup>643</sup>

It was all to no effect.



303. At the end of 1887, Middleton had been placed on the retired list of the British Army. Normally, this would have meant that he would have had to vacate his Canadian appointment since the Militia Act required that the command be held by an officer on the active list, but the Canadian Government asked that he should be kept on. This was to prove unfortunate for him. Although he had lost some of his reputation for military competence thanks to the attacks of his brother officers, his personal honour had not been impugned. The Canadian Military Gazette was later to maintain that the General had set his face against "the race of boodlers and jobbers",<sup>644</sup> Unfortunately, even this reputation was to be forfeited.

304. Even in the session of 1887, David Mills of the Liberals had accused Middleton, S.L. Bedson and the Indian Agent, Hayter Reed, of plundering \$7,000 worth of furs from a Battleford half-breed named Charles Bremner. Since he had no evidence at the time, no more could be said. When Middleton was taxed with the matter, he denied all knowledge. The suspicions did not subside, however, and with mounting pressure and growing accumulation of evidence, the Government conceded a Select Committee during the session of 1890. Even Middleton had come to admit that it was desirable.

305. The Committee discovered that Bremner had been a prisoner in Poundmaker's camp near Battleford. When he escaped, he was carrying a Mounted Police rifle and this caused him to be suspected as a rebel and to be sent to Regina. When he was released by order of the Department of Justice and returned to Battleford, the trouble began. He discovered that his stock of furs, which had been seized by the Police on his arrest, had disappeared. He carried



his case to several Members of Parliament but, because Middleton and others denied everything, he got no satisfaction. Somehow he persevered and with the aid of a few Liberal members, notably James Lister, a few of the details fell together. It finally emerged that Middleton had directed Hayter Reed to make up several bundles of the furs, reserving the best for himself. To satisfy the Mounted Police inspector, a note was dictated, one version of which directed that the matter be kept quiet. Later, the instructions were withdrawn but the inspector insisted that he must have a receipt. He was provided with a copy of the original note but this time there was no mention about the matter being kept quiet. Middleton had to admit dictating the letter to Reed but he also maintained that as a commander of a victorious force, he had a right to confiscate. He also insisted that he knew nothing of what had become of the furs. He had noticed a bundle on the steamer carrying him home but had been informed that they were a gift from well-wishers. He had presumed that the kind donors wished to remain anonymous and, in any case, they had disappeared during the voyage. The General did agree to pay for his share of the furs - about \$1,630. The Committee chose to condemn Middleton for taking the furs but it did not determine whether Middleton or Reed had insisted in the original note that the matter was to be kept quiet. There was another lead that Middleton had given furs to a furrier in Ottawa but Middleton's explanation for this was that the furs involved had been neither from Bremner's supply nor from the mysterious gift package but from a third source of his own.<sup>645</sup> He also recalled a telegram from Sir Adolphe Caron asking him to bring back souvenirs of his own selection for "Sir John, Sir Hector and himself."<sup>646</sup> The furs, he implied, were his response to this open-hearted invitation.



306. . By 1890, the excitement and the sense of triumph of the campaign had worn off. The Northwest Rebellion was no longer a matter for self-congratulation for the Government. Middleton no longer had claims to favour. There was sharp language in the Committee's unanimous report. The confiscation had been "unwarrantable and illegal." Middleton had acted under "an unfortunate misconception as to his power." His own appropriation of the furs had been "highly improper". Hayter Reed had since returned the furs but there had been nothing from Middleton.<sup>647</sup>

307. The Report of the Select Committee was debated on 12 May 1890. For over two hours, Edward Blake poured out a mixture of learning and invective upon the unfortunate General while the Government held back its skirts to avoid the sparks. From a large accumulation of legal and military precedents, he belaboured his listeners with learning on plunder, booty, rebels and confiscations. Occasionally the speech stretched towards a parody of Burke on Warren Hastings. Then it was brought back to earth with a quotation from one or other of the General's more pompous statements to the Select Committee such as:

I thought I was the ruling power up there owing to the state of the war, that I could do pretty much as I liked as long as it was within reason.

Blake did not hold Middleton responsible merely for his portion but for the whole of Bremner's furs and he demanded in the most uncompromising terms that Middleton, and not the Government, should pay every cent.<sup>648</sup>

308. If Blake was attacking the Government, this was a tactical error for it ensured that they would be able to escape the blame for their servant's crime. They took prompt advantage of the opportunity. Caron went so far as to invite members to consider extenuating services in a man who



had done good service to the country and that Middleton had promised to make good his "error of judgement".<sup>649</sup> The Prime Minister had less trace of forgiveness. While he:

....would be charitable enough to believe that the confiscation of goods was an error of judgement, but as to the appropriation of the goods, it seems to me that it was not an error of judgement. It was an illegal and improper act and cannot be defended.<sup>650</sup>

Even this seemed palliation to some Opposition members like Peter Mitchell. He demanded that an example should be made of the General, that he should be dismissed, sent home to be cashiered and compelled to refund the price of the furs.<sup>651</sup> E.G. Casoy, the Civil Service reformer, called the act "violent theft."<sup>652</sup> The members on both sides did not entirely forget poor Bremner. As the very last business of the session, they agreed that the Government would not be liable to compensate him and that all efforts would be devoted to making Middleton "atone".<sup>653</sup>

309. As for Middleton, he was not repentant. Indeed, he believed himself aggrieved. He maintained to Otter that he had been far too busy in the Northwest to be concerned with such things. He had only remained in Battleford for a very short time, planning his dispositions before setting out in pursuit of Big Bear.<sup>654</sup> He believed that he had been forfeited to appease French Canadian supporters of the Government<sup>655</sup> although it had been men like Blake, Lister, Mills and Mitchell who were his most merciless pursuers in the House. On 30 June 1890 he submitted his resignation,<sup>656</sup> having held on a little longer to avoid any impression of giving way before his attackers and thus admitting their charges. Since 1887, he had been a lieutenant general on the retired list and his military career was over. In accepting his resignation, Caron allowed himself a restrained expression of gratitude for, as he explained cautiously



to the Prime Minister: "I feel that as a commanding officer<sup>656</sup> of the Force, he has been a success."

306. It was a bitter disappointment for Middleton to be driven from Canada. With his Canadian wife and his six years of service in Canada, he had practically determined to make his home there. In the few remaining weeks in the country, he attempted to rally sympathy for himself, finally publishing a "Farewell Address to the People of Canada" in which he presented his side of the Bremner scandal and the problem of honours. This did not restore his reputation. His protestations of innocence were ridiculed - in some cases unfairly - while by publishing his list of recommendations, he aroused the anger of that vast majority of potential recipients who felt that they<sup>657</sup> had been offered too little. He promptly returned to England where he was cordially received by the Duke of Cambridge<sup>658</sup> and passed into retirement. In his last years, Queen Victoria appointed him to be Keeper of the Crown Jewels in the Tower of London and it was there that he died in 1898.

#### GENERAL HERBERT AND A CHANGE OF PACE

307. Middleton's departure brought renewed pressure for the command of the Canadian Militia to be placed in the hands of a Canadian. There was no proof that a Canadian officer would be any more popular or any more scrupulous than General Middleton but there was a feeling that he might be more amenable to Canadian feeling. The strength of this pressure aroused considerable alarm among imperialist circles in Britain and when there was considerable delay in announcing the new appointment, Lord Lorne and the Duke of Connaught, both then staying at Osborne, took it on themselves to offer a little paternal



advice to the Canadian Prime Minister. The Duke had heard that Colonel Herbert had been recommended to succeed Middleton and he endorsed him warmly. The Canadian force required a military man at its head with a thorough knowledge of his profession. There was excellent material in Canada but the officers required careful training. 659

Lord Lorne was a little less blunt. While granting that a "son of the soil" should one day have the command, it would be better not to break a link with "Home" until Canadians had had time to gain in rank and experience.

That political and party influence must touch Army as well as other Administrative Departments we all know but I believe that men of both parties may profitably for themselves and their country endeavour by all means to keep matters of Defence outside the action of political exigencies. I know this was your view and I wd submit that to allow the Imperial people to have a voice in nominating for the acceptance of the Canadian Govt an officer of military reputation is one safeguard for Canadian party leaders that may allow them to choose a man for military aptitude alone. There is but one wish here, namely to choose for yr approval the best man who can be got. For such a high Federal command, I shd like to see the Canadian Govt. asking £200 or £300 to help in the payment of the officer named, but this may be difficult. That you will reconsider the matter and for the time take a man recommended by the Imperial Govt. is the earnest wish of all here who so much value our close allegiance. 660

308. This somewhat maudlin appeal was unnecessary for Macdonald had no intention of taking any other than an Imperial officer. In his replies to these two correspondents, he made his own view clear. To Connaught, he offered a blunt statement of what Canada wanted:

Our sole desire is to get an officer qualified for the position not only on account of his military attainments but from his ability to deal with an irregular force. 661

To Lord Lorne, he went into rather more detailed explanation:

I am very sorry for General Middleton and did what I could to save him, but he acted foolishly and I fear there is more trouble in store for him. The consequence of his faux pas has been that the press have been calling for the appoint-



ment of a Canadian officer without reference to the War Office or Horse Guard. The government has no sympathy with this cry nor, so far as I know, have the leaders of the Opposition. All we want is to get an officer fit for the position and I am personally opposed to the appointment of anyone who is believed by the Imperial Military authorities to be unfit. 662

309. Some time before Middleton had even resigned, the Duke of Cambridge had determined upon a successor. Since Middleton had been on the retired list since the end of 1887 and had continued in Canada at the special request of the Canadian Government, it was not surprising that some thought had been given to an appropriate replacement. The new man was Colonel Ivor Caradoc Herbert of the Grenadier Guards. Rather more than most of his brother officers in the Brigade of Guards, Herbert was an enthusiastic, educated and experienced soldier. He had the attributes of manner and fortune which might have been expected of a member of one of England's most distinguished families. He was a Roman Catholic in religion and spoke French well. He was forty years old, active and energetic. It would have been hard to find an officer in more complete contrast with those who had filled the post before. It would have been equally hard to find one who more fitted the qualifications as they had been revealed during fifteen years. 663 Of course, there could be difficulties in such an upright man. Lord Stanley, the Governor General, had himself been an officer in the Grenadier Guards in his youth and had subsequently served as Secretary of State for War. He therefore knew his man when he advised the Prime Minister that:

From what I have heard, I think he would be a man who would insist on things being smart, and who would not hesitate to speak out his mind in the public interest of the service, to those to whom he was answerable officially. He would be led but not driven. I believe he has private means beyond the average, and he would certainly find re-employment at home, so he would probably throw up his appointment if his assent either tacit or



expressed, were asked either to neglect of discipline, or to diversion of the money voted by Parliament from the service for which it was given! 664

310. Macdonald refused to be hurried even in the acceptance of such a paragon. He was annoyed that the selection had been made by the Commander in Chief and widely publicised in the British military press before the Canadian Government had even been consulted.<sup>665</sup> The pattern for the appointments of Luard and Middleton had been that the Commander in Chief had put forward a short list of suitable officers from whom the Canadian Government had made its choice. Macdonald was determined that this procedure would be followed in this case. The Governor General, sharing the alarm lest a Canadian should be nominated, hastened to support his Prime Minister. Other appointments were brought forward, including Colonel Cavaye, the Duke of Connaught's military secretary, General Hewett, the late Commandant of the Royal Military College at Kingston and Colonel Robinson, the son of a former Canadian Chief Justice.<sup>666</sup> It was this delay which provoked such alarm at Osborne.

311. Negotiations began in early July and by the middle of September, Stanley felt that they had lasted long enough. At the beginning of that month, the Duke of Cambridge had written to indicate that he accepted the principle of Canadian selection although he continued to press Herbert's claims. The only officer against whom the Duke was adamant was a fifth possibility, Major General Cameron.<sup>667</sup> Evidently Tupper's son-in-law was regarded as rewarded well past his merits with the command of the Royal Military College at Kingston. Stanley had his own objections against Hewett. "R. Engr. officers are not always good in dealing with men - whatever they may be



with materials, & they are apt to be "'faddy'".<sup>668</sup>

Macdonald finally made way, having won his point, and Herbert assumed command of the Canadian Militia on 5 December<sup>669</sup> 1890.

312. Unlike his predecessors, Herbert could depend from the outset of his appointment on the close support of the Governor General. As one who still regarded himself as a soldier, Lord Stanley had taken an interest in the Canadian Militia from his arrival in 1888 and he looked forward to Herbert as a means of restoring its efficiency. Before the new General had even been appointed, Stanley had sought to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the failings of the force:

The law is excellent, the personnel on the whole is good but in arms, equipment and, above all, discipline, there seems to me to be very much to be desired. No one, so far as I know, wishes to see Canada a great military country - no one would wish to see the Estimates largely increased - but do allow me to impress on you how strongly I feel that if it were capable of development, even a smaller force than you have would be preferable, if it could be made efficient, to what you have now. I do not vouch for the statement - for I don't possess the requisite knowledge - but you must be aware that it is openly said that the disposal of the money voted for the Militia is not always that for which it is voted, nor is it influenced only by considerations of the well-being of the force, or of its proper equipment. ...

Let me repeat therefore, that I hope the New General will have a chance given him - I have set & always will set, my face against the Dominion Govt. being asked for too much, but I should be grievously wanting in my duty, if I were to pretend that things were satisfactory at present. If we do not keep our eyes open and our hands fairly ready, we may have a bitter awakening some day. 670

313. The Government had had warning of the aggressive leadership it had obtained. Herbert's first act was to announce that he would take no responsibility for the Militia Report for 1890. It was left to Colonel Walker Powell to write it, compile it and send it to the printer.



His next act was to make a close examination of the state of the permanent corps. The results were alarming. The authorized strength in other ranks was 966. Although they were maintained by the Government to serve as instructors and as models to the rest of the Militia, Herbert discovered that over half of them had less than two year's service. Well over a quarter were employed in duties not connected with instruction. When the non-commissioned officers engaged in regimental duties were also subtracted, Herbert calculated that there were about 10 men available as extra instructors for the Militia. Of this force, 152 men had deserted during the year although 32 of them had subsequently returned. In a year, there were 128 court martial convictions.<sup>671</sup> Herbert also worked out that the great majority of the men who re-enlisted did so because they were holding the positions with the higher rates of daily pay. Since these were limited in number and since there was no provision for increasing pay with service, the system would not cure itself.<sup>672</sup>

314. He also discovered that the unit with the most unsatisfactory reputation was the Mounted Infantry School at Winnipeg. After its initial burst of enthusiasm, it fell steadily into a less and less satisfactory conditions. Middleton described Taylor as "an honest, well-intentioned and hard working man" but much afflicted by two or three useless officers.<sup>673</sup> In the fall of 1890, conditions had become so bad at the School that complaints were made and Walker Powell was obliged to set out on his own visit of inspection. In his report, he told of very little, beyond the decrepitude of the buildings, the expense of their heating and the lack of light available.<sup>674</sup> Taylor's own report gave clearer evidence



of the state of the units when he admitted that only four men had re-enlisted and nineteen out of a strength of under a hundred had purchased their discharge.<sup>673</sup> Deciding that the Adjutant-General had not done enough, Herbert set out for Winnipeg in early February to see for himself. His conclusion was that the entire school would have to be changed. "The condition in which I found it was such that no measure short of complete and radical reorganization could have been of any avail."<sup>676</sup> Colonel Taylor died not long after the inspection, another officer was obliged to resign his commission<sup>\*</sup> and two others were transferred to other schools as rapidly as possible. The Mounted Infantry was given a new title, the Canadian Mounted Rifle Corps, a new uniform and a new organization.<sup>677</sup>

315. Back in Ottawa, Herbert once more went after fundamentals. Court martial sentences struck him as being unreasonably long and he told his officers so in a lengthy General Order. "... Punishment should be the necessary and not the excessive vindication of military discipline, since an error on the side of excess, is calculated to cause a feeling of discouragement in the young soldier."<sup>678</sup> From now on, court martial returns were examined closely and by the General himself. The instructions for the camps for 1891 also show his personal attention and a remedying of some of the old grievances. Instead of having to wait until after their first night in camp to receive rations, the men could be given food.

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\* The officer who was compelled to resign was Lieutenant James Bremner, the son of Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Bremner of Halifax, a supporter of Sir John Thompson. The Father's passionate correspondence on behalf of his son gives a vivid, if ex parte view of the social life of Canadian Permanent Corps officers in this period.



on the first day of camp. All ranks were to be provided with two blankets each and small allowances were given to companies and batteries to purchase their own camp kettles. The target practice was again revised so that the only range from which the men would have to fire standing would be 100 yards. The most striking change was the introduction of a point system for the performance of units in camp, with marks for drill, discipline, care of arms and equipment and cleanliness of dress and regimental lines.<sup>679</sup> Another major change was that the units<sup>680</sup> to drill were selected by the General himself.

316. It was unfortunate after these careful arrangements that the camps were all held in August and September, for it was never as satisfactory for the rural battalions as June. Herbert managed to see most of the units in camp and many of the city corps during the year. He was not impressed with what he had seen. Some battalions received high praise. The 30th Battalion from Wellington County was evidently worth the 25¢ extra per man which the County spent on it. The 42nd Battalion was reported as one of the best rural battalions the General had seen. For most, however, there was blunt criticism of a sort which had obviously long been due. Uniforms and rifles were dirty. Men were claiming pay for utterly unsuitable horses. Although the infantry schools had been in existence for seven years, there were still few qualified non-commissioned officers in rural battalions<sup>681</sup> and in French speaking units there were almost none. Herbert also complained that money was wasted in training the Militia through the annual shifting of camps. He claimed that he could train more men without increasing the estimates simply by cutting out wasted transportation. In paying the men, he felt that the worst of the British



Volunteer and Militia systems had been combined. In the former, as he explained, a capitation grant was paid to units for having efficient members, while in the latter the militiaman himself received a daily rate of pay. He had discovered that in some Canadian city corps, the militiaman was required to sign over his pay to the regimental company fund, an agreement which was not legally binding and which had been successfully challenged. He wished that this system should be made general and backed by law. In rural corps, he found that the allowances given to captains for drill instruction and for the care of arms were not looked upon as payment for service but as prerequisites to meet the considerable expenses of recruiting their companies every other year. This situation, also, he wished to be recognized.<sup>682</sup>

317. Middleton had seen virtue in clinging to the Snider. Herbert did not. At best it was an obsolete weapon and those he found in the hands of the Militia had both sights and rifling completely worn out. There were Martini Henrys in store, held chiefly for marksmen, and he recommended that they should be issued. The only problem was to insure that they would be properly cared for. Even in the armouries which had a government caretaker, the military authorities had no control over him. The equipment was also obsolete and rotten. There was not a battalion which could turn out fully equipped on a given day, he reported; there was not a battalion whose boots would stand one month's active service and there was not a regiment of Cavalry nor a battery of artillery whose harness would last even that long. The eighteen field batteries were armed with the 9 pounder rifled muzzle loader, which he felt to be satisfactory, but there was no heavy artillery at all. The old guns handed over by the British in 1870



were out of service. In clothing, he found that some units  
got more than their share while more <sup>683</sup> got none.

317. As the Deputy Minister said a little plaintively in his part of the annual report for 1891, "... the Major General has made himself conversant with the minutest details, good and bad, of our present system; '....' He had not stopped with the Militia. The barracks of the permanent corps were largely unsatisfactory. He could only add a personal emphasis to what Walker Powell had said about Fort Osborne in Winnipeg the year before by calling them "... Wholly unfit for occupation by any troops, in the climatic conditions which exist at Winnipeg." As for Tete de Pont Barracks at Kingston, they were host to a series of epidemics of diphtheria and typhoid fever and  
<sup>684</sup> should be abandoned. Herbert naturally made himself an immediate advocate for a pension system for the staff and permanent corps. He was shrewd enough to approach the question with an eye to future savings. The excessive proportion of recruits was expensive while a force of aging and trained pensioners would be available as caretakers and as instructors for the Militia. Pensions were not to be separated from efficiency for otherwise pensioners would tend to rise in rank to the highest possible pensionable level and then become a permanent burden to the country.

Appointments on the permanent staff of the Militia are already, in some degree, regarded in the light of pecuniary rewards for past services, rather than as offices, involving duties for which energy, activity and technical knowledge are essential requisites. 685

318. There were other questions which Herbert did not leave for his Report but took directly to the Governor General. Within a few months of his arrival, he had lodged a determined protest against a practice of long standing in the Department - the reference of questions of



discipline to the Minister. It was a violation of the statute which made the military head responsible for discipline and matter of military administration. It made the Minister a court of appeal over the General's head. All of this was passed along to Macdonald with a gentle suggestion from the Governor General:

I do not know if you mean to move Caron, in course of other Cabinet changes - you once thought of doing so. In that case, I earnestly trust, as I said to you in a letter of July last, that the new Minister will be a man who has some practical knowledge of the Militia force, that he will be a man who can be trusted to administer the votes granted by Parliament with honesty and impartiality & that he will leave details of military discipline to the officer who is charged with it under the statute. 686

Caron was evidently concerned with every aspect of departmental business which might be described as patronage, even the nomination of officers to Boards of Survey to condemn worn out stores. This degree of interference brought another letter of protest from the General through the Governor General to the Prime Minister. Stanley's kindly excuse for passing on the point was his desire to relieve the Minister from a mass of detail. At the same time, if the General was reduced to a cypher, it would be unlikely that the Canadians would ever get or keep the services of any officer worthy of the name. 687

319                    On 6 June 1891, Sir John A Macdonald died. On the Militia, as on every other institution of the Dominion which he had helped to create, his influence was difficult to measure. He was not a simple man and his thoughts about the exiguous military forces which he had allowed to survive were not always the same. The small permanent force which he had once considered to <sup>be</sup> necessary had come into being but there were few other military developments to his credit. Like his countrymen, he gave military affairs a low priority and was largely unmoved