by the Militia colonels and amateur militarists who pressed him to do more. They played little part in Canada or in the Conservative Party while Macdonald was alive. General Herbert, who had been in Canada less than a year when Macdonald died, wrote this description of his Military policy to theDuke of Cambridge:

> His views were very peculiar. Whilst upholding in the strongest manner political the idea of the integrity of Canada, as a portion of the British Empire, he would do nothing practically for the defence either of the Dominion or the Empire. He looked upon money, voted for militia purposes, only as a means of gaining political party ends, but he was honest enough to keep that use of it within strict limits, and consequently cut down the militia estimates to the lowest possible figure. He knew that at any time he could obtain an increased vote, but he also knew that any money so voted would not yield any corresponding efficiency but would merely add to party claims which would have to be satisfied from that source. 688

320. Sir John Abbott emerged after the death of Macdonald as a caretaker Prime Minister. He remained in office for a year and a half. Sir Adolphe Caron finally gave up his portfolio on 25 January 1892, having held it for ten years and three months. He was succeeded by Mac kenzie Bowell, now in his seventies and a somewhat mellower man than the intrepid foe of brigade majors of some twenty years before. The new Minister was faced with a sixteen page memorandum from the Governor General when he entered office. This document, almost certainly written in close collaboration with Herbert, was an attempt to make up for the lost time under Caron. It began with a suggestion that the system of command in the Department be brought up to date with that in the War Office. There were suggestions that boots should be sold at cost to the troops and that the cross belts and other old equipment should be abandoned. Stanley recalled that in 1889, he had arranged for Sniders to be sold to Canada for $1.00 apiece but

Caron had delayed for so long that the offer had fallen through. Now, something would have to be done. The Militia also needed heavy artillery as Herbert had already recommended. The old suggestion that permanent corps commissions be reserved for Royal Military College graduates was raised again. So was the virtue of permanent camps. A new proposal was a permanent school for Ottawa, both to be under the supervision of the Minister and Headquarters and to be available in case of trouble. There were elements in Hull, Stanley pointed out, which might be stirred by religion, politics or strike and "if not checked at once, they might defy control." The Governor General concluded with a stern warning to his elderly Minister:

> In conclusion, may I recall the fact that you are in Canada - as the Secretary of State for War is in the United Kingdom - the Minister responsible for the Defence of the country. I do not think that this was a point which was ever properly appreciated by your predecessor. It does not do to live in a "fool's paradise" in these days of great armaments. 689

321. Although Bowell had taken a considerable interest in Militia affairs as an independent member, he did not leave much of an impact as a Minister. This did not disturb Herbert who evidently did not seek the attentions of an energetic Minister. In 1883, the artillery had been made into a regiment. Middleton, for some reason, did not like the idea, and the other school corps remained independent and largely unco-ordinated. It seemed to Herbert that one of the ways of restoring their efficiency and morale was to give them a regimental system. In February 1892, he re-numbered the companies of the Infantry School Corps, running them in reverse order so that the old "D" Company became 1 Company and "A" Company at Fredericton became No. 4. Enlistments were to be for general service in any company.[690] This step was completed by an order in

council of 14 May 1892 which approved the titles of Canadian Dragoons and Canadian Regiment of Infantry for the mounted and infantry schools respectively. The same order in council rearranged the military districts. Prince Edward Island lost its independent status and was merged into M.D. 8. The counties of Ottawa and Pontiac were put into M.D. 4 which was largely made up of Eastern Ontario. M.D. 5 was given all of Montreal and the surrounding counties while M.D. 6, with headquarters at St. Jean, now was responsible for the Eastern Townships. M.D. 10 acquired the western end of Algoma including the Lakehead.[691]

322. In some areas, Herbert was forced to a halt. While it was possible to draw new boundaries for the districts so that they would be easier to control, it was much harder to reduce the number of units within them. In 1891, when he was appealing against the imbalance between rural and city units, a brand new city battalion, the 48th Highlanders, was authorized in Toronto.[692] Although he was able to find the funds to drill 1,000 extra militia in 1892, largely through allowing more local camps. He still felt that economies could have been made on transportation. Even his efforts to obtain small military libraries for the permanent schools and active militia units were at first frustrated.

323. The camps for 1892 took place chiefly in June and July. The system which Herbert had worked out the year before was largely repeated and once again the permanent corps were used for the bulk of the duties to allow the Militia the maximum opportunity for training. The General was able to visit most of the camps and his comments reflect an even greater displeasure than the previous year. While there was praise for the Toronto city attalions, other cities did not fare so well. The 7th Fusiliers of London, long an unsatisfactory regiment, was reported as "of no Value" and there was a question about even bothering to retain it. Of the 2nd Dragoons

"The Commanding Officer dies not know his duty and there is general disorganization." The Montreal battalions, with the exception of the Victoria Rifles, were all very weak and the 1st Prince of Wales Regiment was described as "useless". So were many of the other battalions in the District. The 6th Hussars were in such bad order that the General sent them home and called for the resignation of their colonel.[693]

324. On 5 December 1892, Sir John Abbott resigned as Prime Minister and his place was taken, as had been arranged, by Sir John Thompson. The new Prime Minister was both a Catholic and a Nova Scotian and it was necessary to give a better place to a representative of Ontario Orangeism like Mackenzie Bowell. He was promoted to the Department of Trade and Commerce. The new Minister of Militia was James Colebrooke Patterson. He had been born in Ireland and had spent many years at Windsor, Ontario. By profession, he was a lawyer and by avocation, a politician. Although he lost his seat in the election of 1891, he retained considerable influence through his control of the Conservative Union of Ontario and Sir John Abbott had brought him in as Secretary of State, arranging a seat for him in West Huron.[694] Feeling the need of all the Ontario support he could muster, Thompson advanced him to the Militia portfolio. Patterson was not a man with strong opinions about Canadian military policy but his correspondence suggests that he was as aware as some of his predecessors of the patronage potential of his department. His presence ensured that Herbert could continue without interference but without hope of strong ministerial backing.

325. Unaffected by ministerial changes, Herbert continued to urge on his reforms. By the middle of 1893, he could report a new barrack building at Fort

Osborne although the Engineer Branch refused to spend any more money on Tete de Pont barracks at Kingston, reporting them as so unsanitary as to be uninhabitable.[695] The Canadian Dragoons, Canadian Artillery and Regiment of Canadian Infantry were all given the title of Royal Regiments and the right to wear the Royal crown and cipher as a badge. This symbolic distinction was accompanied by a more practical advance through allowing a number of officers and non commissioned officers to attend courses of instruction in England. The year also saw the end of the old three batteries of artillery. "C" Battery was finally withdrawn from Esquimalt. Herbert had found that it was impossible to recruit sufficient men at the Coast and that men would have to be sent continually from the other two batteries. He also found that the little unit, far from supervision, had lapsed into habits which he found unmilitary. It was therefore brought back to Quebec and a new organization for the permanent artillery was worked out. There would henceforth be two garrison companies and a skeleton field battery at Quebec and a complete field battery at Kingston. This allowed the Militia artillery in Ontario to have easy access to a full field battery while the garrison artillery in Quebec and the Maritimes would have a chance to see comparable units functioning at full strength. To make space for the additional artillery and to remove the cavalry from an ussuitable station, "A" Troop of the Royal Canadian Dragoons was moved to Toronto.[696] None of this helped to solve the recruiting problem and it was also discovered, once a centralized administration was imposed, that many men who had been discharged as unsuitable from one unit were being recruited by another. On the other hand, the quality of the force was beginning to show a modest improvement. Out of a force of an established strength, of 966, there were only some 820 men on strength on 30 June

1893. However desertions, which had totalled 199 in the previous year, had fallen to 154. There was a small rise in the number of men who had served for more than three years -- from 250 in 1892 to 299 in 1893.[697]

326. Progress with the Militia was much more modest. Herbert evidently felt that he would have to show the public the state of its forces before the Government would be moved to do something about them. An Order in Council was passed at the beginning of 1893, at his instance, which required the submission of a list of establishments for the Militia to Parliament each year. In this way, members would see exactly how large a force of Militia was being maintained on paper and also its real state in numbers.[698] Having publicised these figures, the General then set out to show that in the Militia, there was one officer for seven privates. Indeed, the situation was even more absurd for when bandsmen, buglers, grooms, servants, waiters and cooks were withdrawn, many of whom were physically unfit for service, probably only 10,000 of the 19,856 privates would actually carry a rifle.[699] The only solution would be a vigourous programme of consolidation of units. Another aspect of the problem was revealed when Herbert reported that out of about 2,700 militia officers, 678 had no qualification and 135 were still serving with certificates obtained before the British departure.[700] The same Order in Council which provided for the publication of establishments also laid down that unqualified officers would hold their commissions provisionally and that they would not be appointed in future in any higher rank than second lieutenant. A final improvement for 1893 was the establishment of permanent training grounds although, in some districts, these were unsuitable for the purpose.

327. 1893 also saw major changes in the staff of a sort which should have aroused considerable interest in Parliament. The brigade majors were finally disposed of anf two new appointments were created at Militia Headquarters.[701] The initiative came from Herbert. In his view, the brigade majors had nothing to do. They had originally been appointed to supervise the Reserve Militia and subsequently, with reduced numbers, had served as staff officers for the Deputy Adjutants-General. In his view, even these officers had little enough to do. Only two brigade majors were retained - one at Montreal where Lieutenant Colonel Houghton, who spoke no French, had become the Deputy Adjutant-General, the other at Charlottetown as a sop to the Islanders. The remainder were dismissed. One was brought to Ottawa to become Adjutant-General. Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Matthew Aylmer was the first son of Lord Aylmer, a former Governor General of Canada who had settled in the Eastern Townships. He had entered the British Army but, after several years of unexciting garrison service, he resigned his commission and came to live in Canada with his father. He began his service in the Canadian Militia as the adjutant of his father's battalion and then worked his way slowly through the Militia staff from paymaster to brigade major and when he reached Ottawa at the age of 51, he could look back on twenty three years of plodding but devoted service. Herbert may have regarded Matthew Aylmer as a suitable colleague for Walker Powell. The appointment of Quartermaster General, authorized by statute ten years before, was also filled, by a rather more distinguished officer, Lieutenant Colonel Percy Lake. The new Quartermaster General was the son of a British officer who had settled in Canada. He had served in the Afghan Campaign and in the Sudan, had graduated with honours from the staff college and had spent some

years in the War Office and as assistant adjutant-general in the Irish Command. He was an able and energetic officer who was to have a considerable influence on Canadian military affairs.

328. The manner in which these changes were announced to the House of Commons was parenthetic evidence, if any were needed, that Patterson did not have a strong grasp of his department. The presentation of the annual annual militia estimates was always made more difficult, of course, by the bevy of members who demanded armouries for this place and an additional company for that but Patterson solved all such problems by granting the requests "when the money will be available". The reduction of the staff would save $5,000, an unexpected triumph but it is evident that he had forgotten the details. When he was prompted, he then forgot the difference in the duties of the brigade majors, the commandants of the schools and the deputy adjutants-general. He finally was reduced to admitting that his figures must be correct because they had been checked by the General. It was not impressive, even as a first performance, for the Minister. 702

MORE IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS.

329. The 1880s had seen an increase in emotional imperialism in the English-speaking parts of the British Empire. The Imperial Federation League was formed in the United Kingdom in 1884 and in the same year it had extended to Canada. Its leader in Toronto was Colonel George Denison, the commanding officer of the Governor General's Body Guard and author of a number of works on cavalry which had gained him world acclaim. Denison represented an extreme position in this, as in most of the many causes of his life, but imperial sentiments were a very real force both in

England and in Canada. In Canada, they might move in the direction of Imperial Preference but in the United Kingdom, it seemed preferable to think in terms of colonial participation in Imperial defence.

330. In the spring of 1887, a number of colonial representatives were in London to attend the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria. Arrangements had been made beforehand that a conference would be held in which important matters of common interest would be discussed. So far as the British were concerned, these were defence and communications. In the former question, they hoped to build on the offers of troops which had been made by several colonies at the time of the Egyptian crises of 1884-85. The Conference was the first attempt to discuss Imperial questions in a common forum and it afforded a fairly accurate foretaste of most of those which were to follow. While colonial delegations were anxious to reach agreement on matters of common concern which independent nations would have settled by treaty, there was a distinct reluctance to enter into binding commitments and nowhere more than in the realm of defence. This was particularly the case with Canada.

331. The two Canadian delegates to the 1887 Conference were Sir Alexander Campbell, Macdonald's confidant and a former Minister of Militia, and Sandford Fleming. In his opening address to the conference, Lord Salisbury, who presided, left no doubt that the question of defence was the major business of the delegates, particularly the sort of imperial defence which had been so lacking at the time of the war scare of 1878. It became evident, however, that apart from some modest concessions on the pay of British officers who might be loaned to the colonies, the British Government wanted the proposals to

came from the colonies themselves. They were to have a lengthy wait. When it was his turn, Campbell made a lengthy and somewhat flattering report on the state of the Canadian Militia. The construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway was drawn in as proof of Canada's devotion to Imperial defence. As for the British gifts to Canada, they did not seem so generous in his telling. The crown lands which had been passed over in 1870 had not realized a great amount in annual revenue. And then there was the Charybdis. "She could not steam and she could not sail", he told his fellow delegates, "so that there was no use trying to do anything with her. That discouraged us completely." Other colonies were not yet discouraged about naval defence and the Australian colonies entered into some agreements for the establishment of a squadron of their own. Canada, however, made no commitments and in the final report of the Conference, she should only be congratulated on having "an available force of active militia" of nearly 37,000 men.[704]

332. There were two places in Canada which were of particular concern to the British authorities: Halifax and Esquimalt. Halifax was their problem and a garrison was maintained there of British troops. Esquimalt, however, was left to the Canadians. It was evident that this was incompatible with any serious effort being made for its defence. The little battery of permanent artillery became steadily further reduced through desertion and wastage. The Militia equally languished. By 1893, all the various and exiguous companies had disappeared save four batteries of garrison artillery, three of them at Victoria, mustering for the annual inspection in December of 1892 only 10 officers and 137 other ranks. In 1885, the problem had led to negotiations between the Canadian and British Governments, part of which had been devoted to the recruiting of British pensioners for "C" Battery. Other parts of the scheme had included British provision of guns for fortifications.

General Middleton had set a minimum garrison for Esquimalt at about 500 men. With "C" Battery and the available Militia artillery, there would be no more than 260. The Canadians suggested that the British should provide a depot of 215 Royal Marine Artillery to fill the gap and that they should also contribute the ammunition for the guns. Although the request was reluctantly passed to the War Office by the Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, it was asking altogether too much from the British authorities and the matter of Esquimalt was allowed to drop.[705]

353. In 1889, the question was again raised in a despatch to the Governor General from England, It was passed to the Prime Minister but Macdonald was not prepared to give the question new consideration and again it was dropped.[706] On his arrival, Herbert became convinced that to continue to maintain "C" Battery from drafts from the other two batteries was not efficient and he was also anxious to bring the units of his small permanent force under his own control. Lengthy negotiations began with the British Government for a more satisfactory solution of the problem of providing troops for the naval base. In 1893, they were completed. The men of "C" Battery were withdrawn and the feeble force of Militia artillery was doubled.[707] Canada agreed to pay the Imperial Government $70,000 to build forts and to set up submarine mine defences and £42,000 for modern armaments. In addition, she was to make an annual contribution of $47,500 towards the cost of the British garrison. The first detachments of Royal Marine Artillery and Royal Engineers arrived in August, 1893, with more following during March 1894. Lieutenant Colonel Peters, who had commanded "C" Battery under Holmes, remained as Deputy Adjutant-General for M.D. 11 while Holmes was sent to Winnipeg.[708] With the establishment of this British garrison, the authority of the British officer commanding at Halifax was extended to the West

Coast for the Marines came under the Army Act when ashore.

354. Having organized his permanent corps into a regimental structure, Herbert began to look for further ways of making them efficient. Like others before him, he came to the conclusion that the best means would be to give the Canadians the advantage of serving with the British Army. With characteristic energy, Herbert set himself to preparing a lengthy memorandum which he submitted to the War Office in May, 1894. He began with an account of the Canadian Militia since the British withdrawal in 1870, pointing out the steady deterioration due to the lack of proper instruction and the pervasiveness of political corruption. The establishment of permanent corps had not fully made up the deficiencies for it, itself, lacked experience and training. His solution was to make its units interchangeable with those of the British Army so that it could serve abroad. This would have the effect of giving Canadians greater pride in their own forces while the British units which would be exchanged for the Canadians would provide an excellent example for the Militia. There were political advantages as well. The bonds between the two countries would be made stronger, British troops would wish to settle in Canada and their presence would open new fields for British capital.[709]

335. Herbert was not cast down when there was no response to his proposal. It lay before the Cabinet for the summer. In early October, he apparently read in the newspapers that Britain was planning an increase to the garrison of Hong Kong. Patterson was promptly approached and the idea was implanted in his mind that it would be a splendid stroke for Canada if she were to make the offer to supply the additional troops. Patterson evidently put it before his colleagues and quickly gained a somewhat lightly considered approval. When he emerged from the cabinet meeting, he asked Herbert to draft a telegram to the High Commissioner in London, embodying the offer. Herbert suggested that the message had better pass through the

Governor General's office, suspecting privately that it would be a more secure check on the Minister's work. On the following day, Herbert discovered that the telegrams had been sent both through the Governor General's office and to the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper. However neither telegram had gone in cipher. What was more astonishing was that they had not gone by cabinet order bur by the sole authority of the Minister. The text was uncompromising:

> Dominion Government desires to offer services of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry to the Imperial Government in the event of circumstances necessitating increase of Garrisons. Please ascertain from War Office the terms under which such an offer would be accepted. 710

Sir John Thompson discovered about the offer from the Governor General's secretary. The bewildered Thompson was given two choices - he could cancel to offer or he could ratify. Full of protests, he chose to ratify the offer and then settled back to await the appalling possibility that it might be accepted.

336. The telegram bewildered the Colonial Office. There had been no request for troops and there was no urgent need for them. 1894 was one of the more peaceful years of the late Victorian period. Sir Charles Tupper, however, understood the purpose of the message and took his responsibilities seriously. He was sufficiently aware of the interests of the Canadian Pacific Railway to know that the publicity could have as much value for the company as for Canada as a whole. As for accepting the offer, there was really not much danger. A polite reply was sent to Canada thanking her but explaining that the need for troops had not arisen. It was more difficult to know whether or not to publicize the offer. The Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office was convinced that the maximum advantage should be taken of the offer both to publicize the Empire and to work out firm procedures for the future. The Secretary of State for War, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, took a more restrained view. By the time the papers reached him, he

had been made aware of the circumstances behind the offer. He had found out that Patterson had acted improperly and, with some experience of his own generals, he was inclined to suspect that it was Herbert who was really at fault. For some time, the Colonial Office continued to protest that their version was correct because it coincided with that presented by the enthusiastic Tupper and they were only quietened by a copy of Herbert's own report on the arrangements which proceded the offer.[711]

337. The offer of troops for Hong Kong was an aberration, a serious cabinet fumble rather than a change in policy. It did mark a change, however, that Thompson could even have conceived of approving the offer once it had been made. It was an anticipation of the sort of military imperialism which was less then six years away.

## HERBERT IS OVERCOME

338. The Hong Kong affair did not help Herbert's stock in either London or Ottawa. The War Office was displeased that it had not been consulted and it was not properly grateful for the prospect of having 500 Canadians of doubtful efficiency presented to it. In Ottawa, the cabinet had its suspicions aroused. Patterson, too, did not last much longer at the Militia Department. His parliamentary performances did not improve wi with time although he was carried along by his competent sub-ordinate. On 25 March 1895, he was demoted to Minister without Portfolio and during the following summer, he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba. The new Minister of Militia was Arthur Rupert Dickey, the son of one of the Fathers of Confederation and, at 40, one of the youngest men to become Minister of Militia. Dickey was a Nova Scotia lawyer whose chief interest until he entered the cabinet appears to have been prohibition. He had served a few months as Secretary of State when he transferred to his new office.[712]

339. 1894 saw continued progress in some aspects of the Militia. Crime was reduced in the permanent corps while the number and quality of the recruits was increased. Two particular advances were made during the year. Small detachments from the Militia field batteries were assembled at Laprairie where officers, non-commissioned officers and gunlayers received intensive training from "A" Battery. Even more significant was the assembling of the four companies of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry at Levis. In addition, 162 volunteers from the Militia, of all ranks, attended the camp and were formed into two additional companies of the battalion. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Otter and under the close supervision of Herbert, the troops worked and drilled together for the first time. It was a lengthy job to mould four very different systems of discipline and administration into a uniform pattern. There was also a chance to modernize the thinking of officers and men. As Herbert observed:

> The ideas on military training which have been handed down traditionally in Canada, are those of a bygone age, antecedent even to the introduction of the breech-loader, and though the more recent changes, in certain forms of drill, have been adopted, the tactical requirements, on which these changes have been based, have been ignored. 713

When the camp was over, Herbert could feel that real progress had been made and that, with regular camps for the permanent force, the little army could achieve a high standard of efficiency.

340. It would have been astonishing if Herbert had been allowed to pursue his merciless course of reform without opposition. While there were many faults with the Canadian Militia, including the perpetual problem of political influence, Herbert shared the common belief among competent commanders that the main weakness was among his officers. He did not spare them from criticism. When Colonel Holmes took six months to send in a return, an angry observation was placed

on his file: "I have never read a report exhibiting a more complete absence of energy and life. If this is the condition of the Officer Commanding this District, I have little hope of the militia under his command becoming a living organization."[714] After the camp at Levis, the Commandant of the School at St. Jean received a severe rebuke for the condition in which the men of his company had left their lines. He was also warned against passing on the blame to a subordinate.[715] Among permanent corps officers, Herbert insisted on meticulous observation of the regulations. When Lieutenant Colonel Smith at London appointed an orderly room sergeant, he neglected to notify Headquarters. Promptly there was a series of messages from the General informing the Commandant that he was guilty of submitting a false return.[716] Colonel Peters at Victoria was treated to a categorical reprimand:

> It is but too evident however that this officer looks upon his appointment as a mere sinecure, that he lacks all interest in his duties, and fails to realize that any importance attaches to them.
>
> It is not sufficient for him to remain at Victoria, and to be satisfied with the routine, of little more than normal duties, which is all that there is occupy him there. He must, by constant and persistent attention, establish his influence on the mainland, and must lead, and direct, the instruction and organization of the units of Militia which are committed to his chargem and are solely dependent on him for guidance.
>
> At present he is neither looked up to by the Militia, with which he is not in touch, nor does he command any confidence from his superiors. 717

341. When officers failed to improve, they had to be removed. Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull of the Royal Canadian Dragoons had attracted his attention from the start. When his troop was moved from Quebec to Toronto, a serious deficiency in Government property was uncovered. Instead of arresting the quartermaster sergeant who was responsible, Turnbull tried to cover up the loss and gave the non-commissioned officer a discharge with an exemplary character. For this, Herbert demanded his resignation. When it was not forthcoming, Turnbull was

suspended. Herbert then proposed that the inefficient colonel should be removed but that he should retain his gratuities.[718] Instead, he was released from suspension by the Minister. Another officer whom Herbert managed to remove was Colonel Houghton, the Deputy Adjutant-General at Montreal. The statement of his faults was withering:

> His habits are indolent and intemperate, he has no knowledge of military duty and apparently no desire to learn. I am constantly obliged to call him to account for neglect of duty, and on one occasion brought him personally before Sir Adolphe Caron, then Minister of Militia, who warned him against a continuance in the course of neglect which he was then pursuing. He is not respected by the local militia force nor is he looked up to as a guide or instructor by them.

To Houghton, too, Herbert suggested generous treatment. He should be placed on the retired list with a gratuity of two years's salary, the standard terms for retired staff officers.[719] Thus Houghton, too, escaped for a little longer.

342. 1894 was the year that Patterson was persuaded to re-arm the Militia. After a warm debate, the British Army decided to adopt the Lee Metford,/a bolt action, magazine rifle. The Canadians, with the advice of Herbert, decided that the Martini Metford would be sufficient for the Militia.[720] It was simply a Martini Henry, a single shot rifle modified with the Metford barrel. Although it was hardly a revolutionary weapon, it satisfied military authorities by its simplicity and relative durability under rough treatment while Parliamentary experts were reassured by its familiarity. Although Martini Henrys had never been generally issued to the Militia, they had been held in store for target practice. 1000 of the rifles were purchased in 1893 and they were distributed to the permanent corps, Since the more modern bullet rendered almost all the old rifle ranges unsafe, an extensive rebuilding programme had to be started. This was, in fact, to be a major controlling factor in the adoption of the new rifle.[721]

343. The drill for 1894 had been planned as usual, with 12 day brigade camps in most districts and the city corps looking forward to drilling at their own armouries as usual. The adoption of a financial year which ran from 1 July to 30 June meant that the actual details had to be left until very late. However there were rumours that the Minister had other plans. Government revenues had not been satisfactory during the year as Canada was suffering the side effects of a depression in the United States. On 22 June 1894, Patterson rose in the House to announce that he was cutting $103,500 from his estimates for drill pay. The camps which had already been ordered for Ontario had been postponed for the year but now they were to be cancelled. There were to be no camps for the Militia until the following year. The excuse was the proposed purchase of rifles. "We cannot have both camps and rifles," he told the members, "and the militia would rather get the rifles and go without the camps for one season." He went on to explain that he was buying 8,000 of the Martini-Metfords from the British Government, spreading the payments over three years and that the 5,000 Martini-Henrys in store would also be converted. With all the additional costs and the expense of conversion, the amount to be spent on rifles came close to $100,000 but since the saving by not holding camps was $159,000, Patterson could still make his peace with the Minister of Finance.[722]

344. The sudden cancellation of the drill for almost all the rural corps meant that orders had to be issued quickly. This task fell to the Adjutant-General, and Herbert gave him a rough draft. The proofs of the orders came back on Friday and it was essential that they should appear in the Gazette on the following Saturday. Otherwise, they would be delayed for a weel, Herbert did not come in to the office on that day, as he was indisposed, and Walker Powell himself initialled the

order and sent it out. When Herbert returned to the office, he demanded to know why the proper procedure had not been followed.[723] Walker Powell, in comparable dudgeon, explained that since Herbert had been absent, the proof had been returned with orders to print.[724] Considering this to be an impertinent answer, Herbert ordered that Powell would be suspended, his office closed until further notice and the Quartermaster General, as the senior staff officer, would act as Chief Staff Officer.[725] This explosion was, of course, only the culmination of a long series of irritations which Herbert had felt towards his Adjutant-General. It was inevitable after twenty six years of conducting the affairs of the Department that Walker Powell should feel perfectly competent to issue orders without the supervision of a transient General Officer but Herbert would not stand for it. Only a few days before, he had discovered that Walker Powell had reversed a decision which the General had made in March. At that time, Herbert had sent him a characteristic order that he was to "have the goodness to bear in mind in future that you have, as Adjutant-General, no authority to give any decisions except 'by order' of the Major General Commanding".[726] The appointment of additional staff officers at headquarters may also have been a source of grievance to Walker Powell.

345. His suspension was ended by the Minister of Militia as soon as possible. The old officer was a popular and respected figure in Ottawa. His knowledge of the Department was encyclopaedic and his influence with parliamentarians and with the wide circle of Militia officers was enormous. Even Colonel Denison liked him.[727] By his attack on Walker Powell, Herbert opened the gates of anger which had been building up against him and all he had been trying to do in the Militia. On a supply motion on 17 July 1894, Herbert was attacked by members of both parties on the floor of the House. The debate was opened by Lieutenant Colonel David Tisdale who raised Walker

Powell's grievance and challenged the right of any British general to suspend an official of the Canadian Government. The broader basis of his attack on Herbert soon became clear. The General was demanding too high a standard from the Militia while forgetting that they had other concerns in the world besides soldiering.

> His criticisms are always harsh, his exactions are severe, his demands for minutiae in the force are exacting. I desire to say further that a man who properly understands the force and wishes to make a success of his command would always meet the officers and men in a spirit of conciliation, of instruction, and of encouragement, and of one of appreciation throughout.

Unless the General became acquainted with the circumstances of the country, the sooner he severed his connections with it the better.[728]

346. Tisdale was seconded by Major Sam Hughes Member from Victoria County. As a high ranking Orangeman, Hughes had already had occasion for an attack on Herbert.[729] During his inspection of the 65th Battalion in Montreal earlier in the year, Herbert had addressed the unit in French, praising the Zouaves Pontificaux as an embodiment of the fine military tradition of the French Canadian.[730] This delighted Quebec but provoked the Orange Lodges to fury. Hughes now had a second opportunity. He had no difficulty in judging that Herbert was very good at field manoeuvres but as a manager of men, he was a complete failure. To prove it, he brought forth a long recital of officers who had been injured by the General through not being promoted while others, all of whom had something against them, had been brought forward to displace the righteous. There were Captains Harston and Manley of the 10th Royal Grenadiers who had seen Captain Mason passed over their head. There was his dictatorial treatment of the officers of the 1st Prince of Wales Regiment of Montreal. Most terrible of all was the treatment of Colonel Lazier of the 15th Argyl Light Infantry of Belleville.

347. Colonel Lazier had commanded his battalion since 1876. His battalion had its inspection date postponed in 1893 from June until October. Now it happened that on the day in October on which the inspection was to take place, the local Conservatives were receiving the Prime Minister and a number of local members and they wished the use of the drill hall. Lazier asked for a postponement of the inspection as a matter of course and was astonished when it was not granted. Since Lazier had given up drilling in anticipation of a lengthy delay, he was far from ready to be inspected. He got no mercy from the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Colonel Cotton. The inspection took place and it was not a success. Lazier was even more discontented when he discovered that men whom he claimed for pay were struck off. He had failed to notice reductions in establishment which had been ordered in General Orders. Indeed, he claimed that he had received no notification. Not long after, Lazier left for Battle Creek, Michigan, for the sake of his health and from there, full of his persecution, he submitted his resignation.[731] Hughes was supported in presenting this sad example of Herbert's discipline by William Mulock, the Liberal member for North York, who demanded British justice for the unfortunate colonel.[732]

348. Unlike the majority of other Ministers of Militia, Patterson rose to defend his British general. While he refused to state whether military officers had the right to suspend, he did admit that the action might have been a little hasty. However, he pointed out that Herbert was not here to defend himself and insisted that no British officer would be a stranger in Canada. As for Colonel Lazier, the facts were that his battalion had fallen into a complete state of disorganization.* The year before, at the request of the officers, a large

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* This is borne out by the Inspection Reports for the battalion.

deficiency had been written off but this year, there was another just as large. Books had not been kept and regulations had not been observed. The caretaker in the armoury had not even been paid, although the allowancesfor that purpose had been drawn. When called to account, Lazier had replied in an insulting and insubordinate manner. The Minister hoped that his example would be of value throughout the force.

> The members of the militia force are under service. The privates are sworn in for a period of years, and the officers are there under obligation to carry out their duty under the Militia Act. and the rules and regulations of the service. They have got to live up to their obligations or retire from the service, for we are not going to have a mob and pretend that we have a militia. The work of the militia is not a camping-out like a Knights of Pythias excursion, and we want the distinction to be understood. 733

349. On 23 February 1895, Herbert obtained leave and returned to England. While he conducted some minor business for the Government, he was not expected to return and there were conflicting rumours about his position. Personal affairs had drawn him back to England and as the end of his leave approached, questions were asked in Parliament as to whether he would be back. The question had a little additional urgency since the camps which had been cancelled so precipitately the year before were suddenly authorized for June. The rural battalions which had been deprived the year before were given just over a month's notice to prepare themselves.[734] Herbert did, in fact, return,[735] but it was only for the month of July. His resignation took effect on 1 August 1895, and he promptly returned to England. In a valedictory address to the Militia, he gave acknowledgement to the new desire for efficiency and for qualifications which had arisen in the Militia. There was a paragraph of recognition for the rural militia and "the cheerful manner in which they responded to his efforts to raise the standard of instruction, sobriety, order and soldier-like behaviour..." There was special tribute to the officers and men of the permanent corps who had found him a demanding

but devoted master.[736] Once again Walker Powell found himself in acting command of the Militia.

350. Since Herbert's main concern had been with the permanent corps, it was unfortunate that the first act of the new Minister, R.B. Dickey, was to reduce their strength from over a thousand to eight hundred. Since the Government had been forced by public outcry to allow the annual training for 1894-95, a reduction in the permanent corps was one way of making a compensating reduction in the estimates. It was also enormously popular to judge from the reaction among members. A succession of speakers arose, very few of whom had anything good to say about the permanent troops. William Mulock spoke for those in the Militia who had been able to qualify while carrying on their normal daily work. Such men resented the necessity to attend schools and subject themselves to continuous military discipline in order to qualify for commissions. Frederick Denison, a member of the Denison clan, pointed out that while the Militia estimates had steadily risen over the years, the increases had almost entirely gone to pay for the permanent corps. Colonel O'Brien, although a Conservative, had little praise for his colleagues' management of the Militia. Not only had the uncertainty about the annual drill caused him great difficulty in turning out his battalion but the Government had broken the law by allowing the strength of the permanent corps to exceed 1,000. He, too, complained that the force was kept up as a standing army at the expense of the Active Militia.[737]

351. The member who had the most to say about the Militia was Major Sam Hughes. He blamed the permanent corps on the Liberals and suggested that the old cadet system should be revived. By this plan the schools would be systematically supplied with men from the Active Militia battalions who would be sent to be trained and qualified. Referring to the Levis

camp of the previous year, he insisted that the two companies of Militia were the equal of the permanent force companies within two weeks. There were other grievances of the rural militia. Hughes complained about the reduction of the number of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Militia. He was also angry that permanent corps officers were placed in charge of the training camps, often over Militia officers who were senior to them in rank. An example which must have particularly annoued Hughes was the appointment of his life-long enemy Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Buchan to command the camp at Niagara on the Lake.[738]

352. Although Dickey had hoped to make his entire savings from the permanent corps, he also found it necessary to make a further reduction in the amount of drill allowed the Militia. $80,000 was provided for the drill of the field batteries and the city corps and the Minister told the House that this would be sufficient for twelve days training.[739] In fact, the order only authorized eight days training and there was no provision for the rural militia at all.[740] The administration of the Department was evidently in disorder. The reductions which Patterson had so proudly announced the year before had to be covered with supplementary estimates. For two years in succession, the arrangements for the training camps were altered and rearranged without notice. It had also become evident that another military institution, the Royal Military College, was falling into an increasingly unsatisfactory state.

353. Some of the difficulties of the College were of long standing. The graduates of similar institutions in Britain and the United States were guaranteed military commissions in return for their specialized training. This was not the case for the Canadian cadets save for the Imperial commissions which were granted annually. By 1895, only eleven of the

officers of the permanent corps and staff were ex-cadets. A second problem, the limitation of the College to one language, had come no closer to a solution. There was also difficulty in making the College better known to Canadians at large.[741] With all these difficulties, enrolment seems to have been limited in great part to the sons of Militia officers and to the sons of the better off in the larger cities. As a result, the College was attacked for giving a heavily subsidised education to those who could best afford to provide it for themselves while there was also a complaint that the Canadian taxpayer was paying for officers for the British Army. In the management of the College, there were all the problems of political pressure and patronage to contend with. Catering and tailoring contracts were granted according to a patronage list and this did not encourage the most economical management.

354. In the summer of 1888, Major General Cameron was appointed Commandant. As has been mentioned, he was a retired officer of the Royal Artillery. He owed his appointment to the influence of Sir Charles Tupper. When he took command, a serious problem of the College was shortage of accomodation but this problem seems to have diminished during his tenure with the steady decline in enrolment. Cameron's reports were in the Selby Smyth tradition of rhetoric but they concealed declining standards of performance. As the standards of the College were set by itself, it is very difficult to know how the qualifications of graduates under Cameron compared with those of earlier classes or of graduates from similar institutions. In the fall of 1894, a young man was forced to leave the College for medical reasons as a result of an incident of "recruiting", the process by which the first year members were intiiated by the senior class. In his report, Cameron tried to give a more modest interpretation of the incident. "The case was described as one of extreme hazing - but <u>hazing</u> as properly understood implies the existence of a system in

which irresponsible authority is conceded by custom to the seniors over the juniors. Nothing of the kind prevails here."[742] This version did not pacify the newspapers nor did it convince those who knew the College. The outcry reached Parliament when the Military College was readily tied to the Military Schools as another institution which diverted money from the Active Militia.

355. Colonel Fred Denison, who had a son at the College, placed the blame directly on the Commandant and he moved an amendment that the vote for the College should be reduced by $3,163, the amount of Cameron's salary. In the course of the debate, it emerged that the enrolment at the College had steadily declined during his tenure. Moreover Cameron's claim that his appointment was for life was sustained by the spokesmen for the Government. In the hands of Geroge Casey, the civil service reformer, Cameron's reports were turned against him. The college was supposed to give an excellent education. The only real progress claimed by the Commandant was the size and weight of his young men. He obviously took a real pride in this fattening process. In the report for 1894, Cameron had written:

> No prize is assigned to this important department of college business. I may, therefore, here mention that had a prize been available, it would have been won by a most distinguished competitor, for he added to his chest breadth 5 3/4 inches, to his weight 89 pounds, and to his stature, 8 1/4 inches. 743

Other members complained that for the eleven officers then in the permanent corps, keeping the College in existence had cost $91,000 apiece. For the 58 cadets then at the College, there was a staff of 33, including a butler.[744] Colonel Amyot described the College as a school for emigrants and demanded its abolition.[745] The Minister of Militia could only reply that if the Commandant was old, the staff was young.[746] This did not pacify the members. The College continued to serve as a basis for lively criticism of the Government in and out of Parliament.

## GENERAL GASCOIGNE SEEKS PEACE

356. It was necessary for Herbert's vacancy to be filled. The extensive negotiations on personality and principle which had accompanied previous appointments did not occur on this occasion. The Government was far too preoccupied with other matters and Sir Mackenzie Bowell did not have the grasp of detail to be much concerned in it. His Minister of Militia was far too inexperienced and junior in the Cabinet to raise thi issue and the Governor General was the most unmilitary Lord Aberdeen. The new General Officer Commanding was Colonel William Julius Gascoigne of the Scots Guards. He was promoted to local major general on 17 July 1895 and took up his Canadian post on 19 September 1895. Gascoigne was described by the Tornnto Globe as "peculiarly well qualified for the post he occupies" but in comparison to Herbert, the compliment has a certain ring of irony. Born the son of a general in 1844, his career had been an undistinguished progress through the ranks of his regiment, interspersed with two periods of active service when he had accompanied battalions of his regiment to Egypt. His only previous connection with Canada had been to accompany General Lindsay as aide-de-camp in the spring and summer of 1870. His major connection with reserve forces had been to command a school of instruction for them in London for two years.[747] Gascoigne was evidently the least distinguished of all the officers who had been sent to Canada. He had not even Luard's claim to a gallant career on active service. His intention seems to have been to keep the peace, avoid dispute and enjoy his stay in Canada as completely as possible. It was not to be.

357. Previous General Officers Commanding had brought out their own aides-de-camp, under the right which had been established when the office was first set up. This had caused

angry comment in Canada among those who felt that excellent Canadian officers had been slighted. Gascoigne determined to avoid trouble by picking a Canadian officer for his staff. This led to a flood of applications for the post from an astonishing number of influential people. From the volunteers, Gascoigne picked Lieutenant Alexander MacLean from the 43rd Battalion.[748] The gesture started him on the wrong foot. The nationalists were hardly placated by such a minor appointment, those nominations had not been accepted were disgruntled while Ottawa hostesses were deprived of the society of a highly eligible young British officer.

358. If Gascoigne believed that he could avoid difficult situations, he was to be sweftly disillusioned. As a result of the unsatisfactory situation at the Military College, the Government finally established the Board of Visitors which had been envisaged in the original act setting up the College. Under the Adjutant-General, Colonel Powell, the Board consisted of two other officers, and of Sanford Fleming, the distinguished engineer and Duncan Macpherson of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The Board inspected the College in November. While all the members seem to have been agreed that affairs were not satisfactory, Flimeing complicated matters by submitting a minority report in which he condemned the whole curriculum of the College, protesting that it should not be offering instruction in subjects taught in civilian universities. The majority of the Board of Visitors submitted two reports. While not condemning Cameron personally, they came as close as they dared, recommending a fixed term of from five to seven years, to be filled by an active British officer of no more than the rank of lieutenant colonel. This report was made public. A second report, produced on the same date, was not. It stated bluntly that it was necessary for the well-being of the College that several of the staff be replaced by better men.

> The first of these is the commandant. This officer, it is clear, does not take that interest in his work and does not exercise that supervision over those under him that he should do. To this more than anything else appears to be due that lack of confidence in the college which seems to have spread throughout the country.. At all events, that is the feeling amongstthe staff and cadets and the board is satisfied that no real improvement can take place in the college until a change has been made in the commandant. 749

Such a report was a grave embarrassment to the Government, particularly since their leader in the House of Commons was Cameron's brother-in-law. General Gascoigne was asked to go down to the College and make a personal report.

359. On the last day of November, he went down to the College in full uniform, giving warning of his visit. He inspected two classes, saw the cadets on parade and at gymnastics and had another look at them during dinner. He looked over the buildings and asked for complaints. He received none. On his return, he asked the Minister to grant the young men an extra week for their Christmas holiday in recognition of his visit.[750] Then he settled down to write his report. Most of it was full of praise. There were some areas of criticism. The hospital was more like a prison cell, located in a dark basement, with hot water pipes passing along the ceiling. The cadets' hair was too long. He was emphatic that commissions in the permanent corps should be reserved to graduates. He placed great stress on the liberality of the British Government in granting Imperial commissions to the young men:

> The liberality is so extraordinary that I verily believe that if, in any way, the idea gained ground that this liberality was not properly made use of, it would at once be withdrawn sic any one who really studied what this home competition really was, how terribly it pressed on Young Englishmen, could hardly blame the Mother Country for withdrawing these commissions. 751

Unfortunately this was not all in his report. The staff was excellent with two exceptions. The French professor, M. Duval, was a hopeless incompetent in the General's view. The poor man had not even been able to keep order in his class in the General's presence. And the Commandant was not

appropriate.

> .... I cannot but think that after a certain lapse of time, any man loses that zeal, activity and interest which it is so absolutely necessary should be kept up in the case of the Officer in chief command of a Military Educational Establishment. Young men are especially quick to receive impressions and energy and great personal smartness of dress and appearance, are in my opinion essential to form a good commandant. 751

This sort of report was not the reassurance that the Government had sought and both Gascoigne's and the supplementary report of the Board was filed. Parliament was left to make what it could of the Board's first report.

360. As Gascoigne was preparing his report on the Royal Military College, a crisis was developing which was far more important to Canada than the future of General Cameron. After a dispute over the border of British Guiana, Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain. This led to an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine and the involvement of the United States. In December, President Cleveland addressed a message to Congress in which he declared it to be the duty of the United States to protect Venezuelan territory by war if necessary. In the violence of its tone, it was without precedent and Canadians suddenly felt themselves closer to war with their southern neighbour than at any time since the Trent Affair. They were helped in their sense of alarm by the statements of prominent American political and military leaders who hastened to assure their countrymen of a swift and easy triumph in the event of war. The Canadian government reacted urgently. Colonel Lake, the Quartermaster General was ordered to England by the Minister of Militia with authority to purchase the arms and equipment which the Militia so completely lacked. Orders were placed for 40,000 Lee-Enfield rifles and 2,300 Lee-Enfield carbines. Several batteries of twelve pounder guns were also ordered, together with ammunition and harness. All of this was done in the deepest secrecy and even when Parliament met, in a state of deep tension at the beginning