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July 1986

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12

BY AS FOR DHIST NDHQ

DATE: JUN 1989

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REPORT NO. 16
DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

1 April 1968

The Withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt

May-June 1967

Canadian Aspects

"When the war is over", said Winston Churchill in March, 1939, [after Hitler had moved into Prague,] "we must build up a League of Nations based upon organized force and not upon disorganized nonsense." Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters Vol. 1, p. 393.

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Canadian Aspects

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
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DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE
UNEF COMMAND STRUCTURE
15-31 MAY 1967



R E P O R T No. 16
DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

1 April 1968

The Withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt, 1967Aim and Scope

1. This report is an account of the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, (UNEF), which actually took place between 29 and 31 May, 1967. The withdrawal cannot be regarded in isolation because Canadian forces in Egypt were affected by many intricate channels of interest and sources of influence, or power. The Commanders of the Canadian Base Unit (C.B.U.) at Camp Rafah, and of the Air Transport Unit (115 A.T.U.) at Camp Marina, El Arish, were responsible to the force Commander, Major-General I.J. Rikhye of the Indian Army, in all matters pertaining to UNEF.¹ The force Commander was in turn responsible directly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U. Thant, of Burma² -- and the Secretary-General was accountable to the General Assembly and Security Council, in both of which bodies Canada had voting representation. On the other hand the Commander of C.B.U., who was Commander of the Canadian contingent, was also responsible to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, in all matters pertaining to Canadian Armed Forces.³ Further to this, the Commander of 115 A.T.U. was responsible directly to the Commander, Air Transport Command, for personnel and technical matters affecting the Air Transport Unit.⁴ Diplomacy, politics and public opinion all played a direct part in the withdrawal. The Canadian initiative in the concept of United Nations peace-keeping forces; Canadian participation in every peace-keeping venture attempted by the United Nations; Arab and Israeli attitudes to UNEF, to each other and to international political and military alignments; the position of the Powers and

international power blocs with regard to the situation in the Middle East -- these are some of the more important factors which have to be considered in order to gain a balanced picture of the withdrawal.

2. It is proposed, therefore, to describe the withdrawal of UNEF as a whole according to sources now available in Canada and the United Nations. The role played by Canadian elements will receive a certain emphasis in order to arrive at an assessment of what the withdrawal could mean to our concept of peace-keeping -- and of Canadian participation in peace-keeping.

Sources

3. This is not a history of UNEF, nor of the Canadian contingent in UNEF. It does, however, contain information which will be germane to the writing of such a history. There are several historical reports concerning peace-keeping which contain similar material. Report No. 94, of the Army Historical Section, which was written in 1960, describes the Canadian military participation in the creation of UNEF. Following the practice in that report, some of the more useful sources are mentioned at this point. A detailed bibliography is included among the Appendices.⁵

a. Secondary Sources

The number of secondary sources that have appeared since 1960, even if the choice is restricted to those bearing directly upon UNEF, is too large to permit mentioning all of them here. Three popular books have appeared since 1960, each throwing new light on the political and diplomatic origins of UNEF. These are Terence Robertson's Crisis, Anthony Nutting's No End of a Question and Hugh Thomas' The Suez Affair. The most definitive legal study of peace-keeping yet to appear is D.W. Bowett's United Nations Forces. It has been used extensively in the preparation of this report. The role of the Secretary-General in the withdrawal was of particular interest, and the most recent study of the office has also been consulted extensively --

The U.N. Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace by Leon Gordenker. In addition to these and other works published independently -- which are listed in the bibliography -- mention should be made of the publications of three organizations: The International Peace-keeping Organization, (IPKO), in Paris; the Brookings Institution, in Washington; and the Institute for Strategic Studies, in London. IPKO has produced a series of monographs on peace-keeping, as well as a bibliography and a documentation series, all of which are essential to a study of the subject. These are listed in the bibliography. The Brookings Institution has recently published Prospects for Peace-keeping by Arthur M. Cox, which makes some reference to the withdrawal of UNEF. Other publications of the Brookings Institution are listed in the bibliography. The Adelphi Papers of the Institute for Strategic Studies frequently touch upon peace-keeping. Several of these monographs have been consulted, the most important of which is Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967 by Michael Howard and Robert Hunter. Of the many articles which have been published, it is sufficient to mention at this point the International Journal, Winter issue 1967-68, which is devoted to the implications of the withdrawal of UNEF.

b. Primary

Published collections of documents have not been easily available in the past. E. Lauterpacht, The United Nations Emergency Force: Basic Documents is useful but incomplete. Rosalyn Higgins' U.N. Peace-keeping Operations - Documents and Commentary is due for publication in 1968, and will provide very complete information for all operations between 1954 and 1966. The documents published by IPKO are useful for providing information not usually available from U.N. sources. United Nations Documents of the "A" series record proceedings of the General Assembly and its committees; those of the "S" series record proceedings of the Security Council. Relevant documents in these series are listed in the bibliography. Some parliamentary discussion of peace-keeping will be found in Canada, House of Commons Debates.

Debates and parliamentary questions relevant to this report are cited in footnotes. Manuscript documents are not, on the whole, easily available for general research. Almost all in this report are classified by Canadian security regulations. Reference to the footnotes will indicate the sources for manuscript material.

Signs of International Tension, 1967

4. The international situation in May, 1967, was one of crisis and instability in several areas. The most significant crisis was the war in Vietnam, in which the United States was so deeply involved, and over which so much profound disagreement prevailed. There were moral and strategic differences between East and West power blocs, and between so-called "doves" and "hawks" in the West. Although differences in the West were less marked than the ideological split between Russia and China, both in the East and West there was a general loosening of alliance systems. At the same time a détente between the United States and Russia was in the third or fourth year of its growth. It has been suggested that Russia profited from the war in Vietnam by fostering the split in the West, and that when the Middle East crisis flared up the state of the East-West détente was shrouded in obscurity.⁶

5. The place of the Middle East crisis in this world picture can be described either as an eruption of local incidents into a crisis of world importance, or as the deliberate exploitation of instability in the area by Russia in order to achieve certain diplomatic advantages. An analysis of recent Soviet policy, based on evidence available in 1967, tends to favour the former view. The appearance of an independent policy-line in Rumania, not necessarily identical with that of Russia, together with an apparent development of a United States-Bonn axis, places the main sphere of Soviet interest in Europe.⁷ On the other hand, there are those who consider that Soviet influence was primarily responsible for the crisis in the Middle East, and that the United States had failed to give sufficient attention to the balance

of power in the Middle East.⁸ No matter which of these points of view is held, the Egyptian demand for withdrawal of UNEF appeared to have been unexpected.

6. The official explanation for the crisis as given to the U.N. General Assembly, was as follows. As in 1956, Arab-Israeli tension had been building up on the Syrian border. Over the past several months there had been a bitter dispute over the rights of cultivation in the Demilitarized Zone. These had given rise to armed clashes on several occasions, and the situation was aggravated for a number of reasons which the Secretary-General listed in his report to the Security Council of 19 May.

- a) El Fatah activities, consisting of terrorism and sabotage against Israel, served to inflame Israeli opinion. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon all disclaimed responsibility for this organization, but it continued to perpetrate incidents "with disturbing regularity."
- b) Belligerent statements from both Arab and Israeli sources were cited. "In recent weeks... reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that State statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines."
- c) Finally, there had been reports about troop movements and concentrations, especially on the Israeli side of the border, subsequent to 16 May. These reports were considered exaggerated.

But the Secretary-General stated that these events and the failure of UNTSO to find a solution to the problems on the Israeli-Syrian

border, were not looked upon as leading to a wider confrontation. He was foremost among those who described the Egyptian demand for withdrawal of UNEF as a complete surprise.⁹

7. There is more to this story than meets the eye. In the next three sections of this report the events and controversy surrounding the withdrawal demand are examined in some detail. The background to these matters deserves far more investigation than the scope of this report will permit. Some outstanding features of the background must, however, be mentioned here. As early as July, 1966, the Canadian embassy in Cairo warned of the Egyptian shift in attitude towards UNEF, and especially towards the Canadian contingent. The Israeli raid on Samu, in Jordan, in the fall of 1966 caused the ensuing Arab League conference to propose the withdrawal of UNEF, as well as the replacement of Jordanian with Egyptian officers in the Jordanian army. Neither proposal was carried out, but the Israeli-Syrian air battle of April 7, 1967 brought about a new Arab proposal for withdrawal of UNEF. This might not have come to anything if President Nasser had not received information that Israel was preparing a full-scale attack against Syria. The United Nations Secretariat was aware of the deteriorating situation. General Odd Bull, of the Mixed Armistice Commission, had given his warning as early as January. A study group of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace came to the conclusion "that the failure to act was not the result of lack of information." One participant was of the opinion that "the underlying problem here, as elsewhere, was miscalculation As the tempo of action and reaction increased, the magnitude of the responses escalated, and each side saw in the other's response the threat of worse to come." As was said in a paper presented to this study group, "The accurate reading of danger signals preceding an international explosion is not a highly developed art." These are the important facts -- the facts which dictated the conditions under

which withdrawal had to be carried out. The analysis that the facts demand includes the study of relations between Israel and the Arab world, between the Arab countries, and between East and West power blocs. Such an analysis will not, however, alter the over-riding fact that the Secretary-General was accurate in stating that the events of May, 1967, were unexpected.¹⁰


Events Leading to the Request for Withdrawal

8. The following description of events is based upon the Secretary-General's report to the United Nations General Assembly of 19 June 1967, supplemented with evidence from the dispatches of the Canadian ambassadors of Cairo and New York.^{10a} At ten o'clock on the evening of 16 May (Gaza time) a military courier, Brigadier Eiz-el-Din Mokhtar, handed Major-General Rikhye, in his headquarters at Gaza, a sealed envelope containing the following message from General Mohamad Fawzi, Chief of Staff to the U.A.R. Armed Forces.

To your information, I gave my instructions to all UAR Armed Forces to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these instructions our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders. For the case of complete secure [sic] of all UN troops which install O.P.s along our borders, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately. I have given my instruction to our Commander of the eastern zone concerning this subject. Inform back the fulfilment of this request.¹¹

Brigadier Mokhtar is said to have told Major-General Rikhye that it was intended to gain control of Sharm el Sheik and El Sabha that night.¹² Major-General Rikhye refused to comply with this message. As he pointed out it should have been directed to the Secretary-General. But he cabled to U Thant informing him of the message, and kept contingent commanders informed of developments. One and a half hours after Brigadier Mokhtar had delivered the message, Major-General Rikhye's cable reached the Secretary-General, who ordered that the UNEF position be


MAP 1



maintained and then sent for the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic. U Thant requested clarification of the situation and relayed his own views to the Government of the United Arab Republic. Not until noon (New York time) on 18 May was the official request for withdrawal made to the Secretary-General. This was answered seven hours later, and at that time instructions relating to the withdrawal of the force were issued to the Commander of UNEF. In the meantime, Egyptian forces had moved into position at several vital points along the Armistice Demarcation Line.

9. Major-General Rikhye had been aware of unusual military activity in the El Arish area at least since the afternoon of 16 May.¹³ Early in the morning of 17 May, thirty soldiers of the Army of the United Arab Republic occupied El Sabha in Sinai, where there was one section of Yugoslav troops in the observation post. Three Egyptian armoured cars were located near the Yugoslav UNEF camp at El Sabha, and detachments of fifteen soldiers each had taken position north and south of El Amr. In El Amr there were a Yugoslav platoon and company headquarters. Just after noon (Gaza time) the UNEF Commander reported that the observation post at El Sabha was now occupied by Egyptian troops, while the Yugoslav UNEF camps at El Qusaima and El Sabha were now behind the positions of the Army of the United Arab Republic. Although the United Arab Republic authorities soon gave orders to the Egyptians to evacuate the observation post, these orders were in effect nullified by an accompanying request to Major-General Rikhye, to withdraw the El Sabha post immediately to El Qusaima camp. Once again, it was pointed out that any such withdrawal required the authorization of the Secretary-General. Unabashed, General Fawzi relayed through his liaison staff a further request for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav detachments of UNEF in the Sinai within twenty-four

MAP 1a



hours, and from Sharm El Sheikh within forty-eight hours. As if to emphasize the meaning of his request, a "sizable detachment" of Egyptian troops was reported moving into the El Kuntilla area, about halfway between Rafah and Sharm El Sheikh. At El Kuntilla an observation post was manned by a Yugoslav platoon and company headquarters.

10. On 18 May the Army of the United Arab Republic continued this harassment on an increased scale. At El Sabha and a few hours later at El Kuntilla sentries were refused admission and forced out of the observation points. "They did not resist by force" stated U Thant, "since they had no mandate to do so."¹⁴ In the afternoon personnel at the water point at El Kuntilla received similar treatment, as did those at El Amr observation post, (which was manned by a Yugoslav company and platoon headquarters), El Amr camp, and the camp and observation post at Sharm El Sheikh. UNEF officers remained firm in opposing requests for withdrawal, and later in the afternoon the United Arab Republic forces apparently began to resort to threats. At half-past four (Gaza time) two artillery shells, considered to be ranging rounds from United Arab Republic artillery, were reported to have burst between the Yugoslav camps at El Qusaima and El Sabha. By this time the official request for withdrawal had been made to the Secretary-General. By the early forenoon of 19 May UNEF contingent commanders were aware that a withdrawal was to be carried out.¹⁵

11. It had been a period of uncomfortable uncertainty for United Nations Forces. It revealed a dangerous degree of euphoria among member countries of UNEF. U Thant in his report to the General Assembly on July 12 pointed to an actual decrease of incidents reported by UNEF. "Prior to 16 May," he said "there

was no indication of a deterioration along the line or of any developments likely to lead to a serious worsening of the situation."¹⁶ U Thant indicated the sober and shocked realization of the meaning of the latest events when he said to the Security Council on 19 May: "It is true to a considerable extent that UNEF has allowed us for ten years to ignore some of the hard realities of the underlying conflict. The Governments concerned, and the United Nations, are now confronted with a brutally realistic and dangerous situation."¹⁷

12. On the Egyptian side there was to be a similarly dangerous growth of euphoria in the weeks to come. For the moment, however, the United Arab Republic had succeeded in seizing the initiative. What lay behind the planning and execution of these events? A distinguished commentator has pointed to a psychological reason.

.... Nearly all the Arab States of today have been occupied by Western States, and those active in politics had grown up in contact with a western way of life and education which the occupation made seem superior to their own Only the Lebanon, where Westernized systems of education have longest roots, and Saudi Arabia, where Wahabism provides a moral core of certainty and which never knew an occupying Power, can be regarded as partial exceptions to the rule.¹⁸

This suggestion that the Arab nations were suffering from an inferiority complex seems to be supported by President Nasser's own explanation to Major-General Rikhe that "he had given thought over the years to the best way to re-establishing Egyptian sovereignty and also to restore the situation to what it was prior to 1956"¹⁹ But it has also been surmised by Randolph Churchill and his son Winston Churchill (who was in the area as a reporter during the six-day war in June) that Nasser had been

led to believe that an Israeli attack upon Syria was imminent.²⁰ If this was indeed the case, there were good strategic reasons for exposing Israel's southern flank by demanding the withdrawal of UNEF. If Israel attacked Syria, she would have to divert a good portion of her military strength to meet the Egyptian threat.

13. To succeed, whatever the underlying motive may have been, speed was of the essence to Nasser.²¹ Negotiation by itself would be slow -- the physical separation of Cairo and New York made for cumbersome diplomatic machinery. Nasser needed to give the Israelis minimum warning time of his intention to occupy UNEF's front line positions. Thus the decision to move was made on 13 May and events proceeded in lightning sequence thereafter.²² By commencing negotiations after, rather than before, taking military action, the distance between New York and Cairo was turned to advantage.²³ Before turning to the Secretary-General's decision to withdraw UNEF, however, it is necessary to review very briefly some legal and political questions raised by the withdrawal demand.

The Questions of Authority, Consent and Withdrawal

14. For many, the Egyptian demand for withdrawal was a rude awakening. Until May, 1967, it was the restraint of President Nasser that permitted the existence of an atmosphere capable of supporting a peace-keeping force. In 1964 Professor Hans Morgenthau, who represents the "realist" school of thought in international studies, warned that an international force was particularly vulnerable to disintegration if there ceased to be a consensus among member countries:

Even if an international police force appears at the beginning of a conflict to be a reliable and effective instrument of an international organization, it is still faced with an ever present threat to its reliability and effectiveness. An international police force may be politically

cohesive at the beginnings of a conflict on the basis of a community of sympathy and interests on the part of the nations to which its individual members belong. Yet it is a moot question whether and to what extent such a community of sympathy and interests can survive the initial stages of the conflict.... As the interests of the nations concerned change, so will the reliability of the respective contingents of the international police force to defend a status quo which may run counter to those interests. A multi-national military force ... is thus always threatened with partial or total disintegration. Its survival as a reliable and effective force depends upon the persistence²⁴ of the national interests on which it rests.

15. It can be argued with some force that the stage had been set for the disintegration of UNEF in the first two years of its existence. Crisis-impelled, improvised amid conflict and suspicion, the presence of the force depended on Egyptian consent.²⁵ The function of the force could never be any more than neutralization, or interposition. "The term 'police', which is often used with reference to international forces," writes one observer, "is both ambiguous and misleading. It is ambiguous because there is a great difference between police activities which are peaceful and police activities which involve the use of force. Domestically as well as in the international milieu, it is misleading because in either case the relation of the 'policeman' to the 'citizen' (whether law-abiding or delinquent) has nothing in common with the relation of an international force to a state or even a rebel group."²⁶ The force of this observation may be recognized when it is considered out of what frantic diplomatic activity UNEF took shape in 1956. As a result of that diplomatic activity the rivalry of the United States and Russia was illuminated, and UNEF was unmistakeably portrayed as an instrument designed to maintain the political balance in the Middle East.²⁷ As General E.L.M. Burns, the first commander of UNEF, told the Egyptian Minister

for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, " It was impossible to say how long the force would remain in the area, but as it was an emergency force, and linked to the situation described in the November 2 resolution, when that situation was liquidated the task for the force would be ended."²⁸

16. In drawing attention to the diplomatic background to the formation of UNEF it is well to keep in mind the resolution of 4 November, 1956, which obtained the consent of Israel, France and the United Kingdom to place the Force on Egyptian territory.²⁹ It is also significant that this was a General Assembly rather than a Security Council action, and that it was taken under Chapter VI of the Charter, (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) rather than under Chapter VII (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.) Thus UNEF was not formed to impose sanctions, and was not a suitable force for such a task. In 1956, Dag Hammarskjold emphasized this fact in his second and final report on UNEF. In 1958, he reaffirmed the position in even stronger terms. He was anxious to persuade Egypt that UNEF was not a potential instrument for further military operations against the U.A.R., or even for the enforcement of peace. At the same time, he stressed that the Force was more than an observer group. He thus stated that the United Nations disclaimed control of the territory in which the Force was stationed, and that it would respect Egyptian sovereignty. The way in which these principles were applied may be seen in the following excerpts from his report to the General Assembly of 9 October 1958.

... The deployment of the Force along the Israel-Egyptian armistice demarcation line and the international frontier south of Gaza, and in the Sharm el Sheik area, was not meant to and could not effect any change in their prior status juris; its sole purpose was to maintain quiet and prevent the recurrence of incidents. ... The Force is

paramilitary in character and much more than an observer corps, but it is in no sense a military force exercising, through force of arms, even temporary control over the territory in which it is stationed; nor does it have military objectives, or military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly.

... A United Nations operation must be separate and distinct from activities by national authorities.... A right of detention ... is extended to UNEF units. However, this is so only within a limited area where the local authorities voluntarily abstain from exercising similar rights.... The basic element involved [in the use of self-defence] is clearly the prohibition of initiative in the use of armed force.... The principles outlined above put UNEF on the same level, constitutionally, as UNOGIL, for example, qualifying it so as to make it an instrument of efforts at mediation and conciliation.³⁰

Hammarskjold had reached this position over the objections of Major-General E.L.M. Burns, the first commander of UNEF. "UNEF should not have to obey orders from an attacking party to withdraw," wrote the General." ... If it were known UNEF would remain passive or withdraw ... a coup which might only risk an order to the invading forces to withdraw with threat of sanctions might well be attempted." Mr. L. B. Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, agreed with Mr. Hammarskjold that UNEF should not have the right to fire on bodies of troops moving against U.N. positions.^{30a}

17. Implicit in the arrangements to create UNEF was the understanding that if consent was required to enter Egyptian territory, withdrawal of consent terminated the agreement. It is fairly clear that when UNEF was formed, it was anticipated that withdrawal of consent would be initiated by the General Assembly rather than the host country.³¹ Certainly the "good faith accord" as it was described by Hammarskjold in 1958, ruled out unilateral actions:

... The Government of Egypt declared that, when exercising its sovereign right with regard to the presence of the Force, it would be guided by

good faith in the interpretation of the purposes of the Force. This declaration was balanced by a declaration of the United Nations to the effect that the maintenance of the Force by the United Nations would be determined by similar good faith in the interpretation of the purposes.

... Were either side to act unilaterally ... and were the other side to find that such action was contrary to a good-faith interpretation of the purposes of the operation, an exchange of views ³² would be called for harmonizing the positions....

An elaboration of this position is contained in another "aide-mémoire", published for the first time on 19 June, 1967, in the New York Times. This describes in detail the negotiations leading to a further formula for withdrawal. But in the eyes of U Thant, as well as of his political and legal advisers, the problem of withdrawal remained unresolved in 1967. Precedents in other areas had met specialized situations -- the Congo and West New Guinea -- which did not apply to Egypt and which were therefore inconclusive.³³ There was also, as became evident on 17, 18 and 19 May, an incompatible view of the problem among member countries of UNEF and of the United Nations as a whole. It was the Canadian position -- which was not shared by some other members of the Force, let alone the Secretary-General -- that "... in giving its consent to the establishment of the Force the Egyptian Government accepted a limitation of its sovereignty, and that it is now the prerogative of the United Nations rather than of the U.A.R. Government to determine when the United Nations force has completed its task of restoring peace and when it should be withdrawn."³⁴

18. By 18 May these differences had been reduced to the status of mere legal niceties. President Nasser, as it has been shown, presented the Secretary-General with a fait accompli by placing his forces on the International Frontier. UNEF no longer functioned as an interpositionary or neutralizing force. In

U Thant's words, "It became impossible for the Force to perform any peace-keeping functions, in the sense of providing a buffer and deterring infiltrators, when troops of the United Arab Republic began to move up to the line on May 16, two days before the request for the withdrawal of the force was received by me."³⁵ This fait accompli raises two possibilities. Firstly, it may not have been possible without the tacit co-operation of the Yugoslav and Indian components of UNEF. There was of course no incorrect action by Yugoslav and Indian forces, but there is some evidence that President Nasser sounded out Yugoslav and Indian opinions through diplomatic channels before making this move. Thus he would have been aware that they accepted his view that UNEF had no option but to leave Egypt once the request for withdrawal was made.³⁶ Secondly, the Government of the United Arab Republic may have "conditioned" the Secretary-General to hamper his freedom of action. This suggestion was first made by Mr. George Ignatieff -- he learned that the reason for U Thant not responding to a request to appeal to Nasser on 17 May was that Mr. Mohammed Awad El Kony, the Egyptian representative in New York, had telephoned to inform the Secretary-General that such an appeal (which was foreseen) would be regarded as an unfriendly act and would be rejected. On 5 June the Canadian ambassador in Cairo reported that Major-General Rikhye believed Nasser had anticipated U Thant's decision to order withdrawal as soon as the request was received. On 19 June, the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly that on 18 May Mr. El Kony had made such a phone call as that described above and had influenced his decision. Undoubtedly, Egyptian pressure was exerted on U Thant.³⁷

19. In the final analysis the withdrawal of UNEF rested wholly on the fiat of the host country. As long as a significant portion of the Force, and the Secretary-General, supported

the Egyptian position there was nothing to hold the Force together. The necessary "community of sympathy and interests" had dissolved. As early as 1961 the absence of agreement on the juridical position was noted, and "... Requiring solution, above all, is the issue of withdrawal of the force from the theatre of operation and of the host state's prerogative in this realm."³⁸ In 1964 Major-General Rikhye had emphasised the slenderness of the thread which held UNEF together.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered so far in any UN military force has been the inability to weld national contingents into a truly international force. UNEF and ONUC are not really fully integrated forces. National contingents usually operate as separate units, and in order to make best use of them are given separate tasks. Joint operations tend to produce difficulties.

These difficulties start at the level of Force HQ. The development of UN forces has yet to reach a level where HQ staff can be fully integrated. No force HQ has so far functioned as a fully integrated single HQ. This position is further complicated by the presence of national liaison officers and contingent commanders who maintain channels with their governments either directly or through their consular staff located in the area of operations. Indeed, much depends on commanders, force commanders as well as contingent and unit commanders. Some individuals have done a lot towards achieving integration and developing a truly international force. However at present the problem remains unsolved.³⁹

It was remarkable that such a force could have survived so long, and entirely predictable that it would not long survive a serious test unless the original mandate were to be adjusted to meet changing needs. The Egyptian demand for withdrawal added another practical experience to the storehouse of knowledge in the realm of peace-keeping. Once more, as in every other peace-keeping operation, here was an example of "the gradual, even reluctant development of principles and procedures for the utilization of military force throughout the world organization -- crisis-impelled, unsteady and precarious in growth."⁴⁰

U Thant's Decision

20. Nikita Kruschev once said of Dag Hammarskjold that while there might be such a thing as a neutral country, there is no such thing as a neutral man. The Secretary-General's decision to accede to the request of the United Arab Republic was a personal decision. External influences may have been brought to bear in order to force his hand, but U Thant's personal background; his concept of the political functions of the Secretary-General; the degree of influence exerted by that office -- these also contributed to the events and decisions of 18 and 19 May.

21. U Thant's explanation of the decision is to be found in his reports of 19 June and 12 July 1967, to the General Assembly. It was largely a legal and constitutional explanation emphasizing three major points -- the agreement made between President Nasser and Secretary-General Hammarskjold in 1956, (the so-called "good faith" accord), the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic, and the limited functions of UNEF.⁴¹ His position is summarized best in his own words.

... If there should be serious doubts about the wisdom of [withdrawing a force when it is no longer welcome], ... it would be advisable to abandon altogether the notion of a voluntary peace-keeping operation and turn to consideration of enforcement type actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The two cannot be mixed. It should be added, however, that it is extremely doubtful that any of the peace-keeping operations thus far mounted by the United Nations would have been acceptable to the Governments of the countries in which they have been stationed if they had been originally envisaged in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter. There is no room at all for doubt about this as regards UNEF.⁴²

The argument is sound, but U Thant has been severely criticized for allowing the situation in the Middle East to deteriorate,

without personally intervening with President Nasser at a much earlier stage than he did, on 23 May. He has also been taken to task for taking executive action without first bringing the matter to the General Assembly or the Security Council. Attempts were made to take the matter to the General Assembly in the period of uncertainty between 17 and 19 May, but these attempts were resisted by the Secretary-General. It was then suggested that "quiet diplomacy" should be employed to head off disaster and to persuade the Secretary-General to take some initiative on his own part. "Hammarskjold by now would have been in Cairo" said the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, in conversation with Mr. Ignatieff.⁴³ The remark was gratuitous and beside the point. U Thant was not Hammarskjold. It is true that the Secretary-General had shown his intention of maintaining continuity in the office, and that in many respects he regarded Dag Hammarskjold as a model. But in other important respects U Thant's position differed from that of Mr. Hammarskjold.

22. An American scholar has recently produced a detailed study entitled The U.N. Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace.⁴⁴ This is a particularly appropriate examination because it takes the history of the office of Secretary-General up to the very eve of the Middle East crisis. The author contrasts the "sullen atmosphere around the office of the Secretary-General when Trygve Lie left it in 1953, and its brilliance after Dag Hammarskjold carried off the complicated manoeuvre that helped us to end the Suez crisis in 1956."⁴⁵ U Thant is shown to have maintained the prestige which Hammarskjold gave to the office, evincing in his various statements more solidity than "the intellectualized character of Hammarskjold's doctrinal exercises."⁴⁶ The office has evolved under three Secretaries-General into the head of a truly international, as opposed to

representative, civil service, independent of any movement or bloc. In this respect there has been virtually no difference, either in spirit or form, in the concept of an international Civil Service held by any of the holders of the office. There are two other facets in which there have been differences of degree and precise form -- the significant role in world politics and the important share the office should have in developing policies to maintain peace and security. Thus while U Thant shares Hammarskjold's vision of a world order, he is less sanguine as to the timetable by which such an order should be realized.⁴⁷ Like Trygve Lie he is highly sensitive to the Cold War. But he has gone farther than his predecessors in denouncing power politics. The use of force he regards as international anarchy. The alliance systems of East and West he considers a dangerous barrier to international understanding. A "concept of iron-clad alliances and a view of the world purely in terms of black and white was, in essence, the Western response to Stalinism."⁴⁸ What U Thant did accept wholeheartedly from Dag Hammarskjold was the concept of "preventive diplomacy", which Hammarskjold had developed under the authority of Article 99 of the Charter: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

23. The important differences in background of each Secretary-General have had considerable bearing on their concept of the office and their methods of conducting affairs. While Trygve Lie was experienced in politics, and had been closely associated with NATO before entering the United Nations, Hammarskjold had led the more sheltered life of a brilliant civil servant in Sweden. U Thant combines a Western education

with the experience of living under a colonial régime in Burma, including Japanese occupation during World War II. He has been in the United Nations since 1952, and in 1957 became the permanent representative for Burma. Thus he can be said to understand the viewpoint of nations which have experienced colonial régimes, and he has far more experience of the United Nations than did either of his predecessors. There has also been a subtle difference in the methods by which Hammarskjold and U Thant have enhanced the prestige of the office. While Hammarskjold indulged in more personal diplomacy than his successor, U Thant has shown himself a skilled practitioner of in-fighting at the United Nations. Both in 1961 and 1966 he imposed definite terms upon which he would accept re-appointment. Indeed, in 1966 he allowed himself to be entreated to remain after his normal term had ended. He argued that nobody was indispensable, and then stated at a press conference: "To be candid, I feel that I have found it increasingly difficult to function as the Secretary-General in the manner in which I wish to function, and secondly I do not subscribe to the view that the Secretary-General should be just a chief administrator, or in other words, that the Secretary-General should be a glorified clerk."⁴⁹ An important factor in U Thant's policies must therefore be that he has influenced the terms of his own appointment -- and the unprecedented deference which he has gained for himself is a direct result. At the same time, there are qualifications which must be observed in U Thant's basis for authority in the United Nations. It is most likely that he would have preferred to resign in 1966, until he discovered that General Ne Win was not prepared to offer a satisfactory post in Burma.⁵⁰

24. In thus suggesting some of the differences between various holders of the office of Secretary-General, it is

important not to forget that each in his own way has added to the powers and responsibilities of the office, enlarging often upon precedents set by previous Secretaries-General. "The existence of a precedent", writes Leon Gordenker, "always may serve as an argument against further innovation. As further practice revalidates precedents, the latter can harden sufficiently to prevent any retrogression without a great struggle. Or they can serve as the foundation for further expansion of influence."⁵¹ This certainly appears to have been confirmed by the experience of the United Nations with U Thant. And Mr. Hammarskjold himself enlarged upon his own precedents before U Thant came to the office.

25. The measures which the Secretary-General took upon receipt of the request for withdrawal are set down in his report to the General Assembly on 19 June.⁵² Having first insisted upon the correct procedure of directing all negotiations through the United Arab Republic representative at the United Nations, U Thant maintained constant touch with the representatives of countries providing contingents to UNEF. From the beginning, two of these countries, (Brazil and Canada), attempted to have the request discussed in the General Assembly. This appears to have influenced the Secretary-General to await clarification of the situation before making any positive response -- although he was not persuaded to proceed immediately to the Middle East himself. In the meantime, an aide-mémoire, that acknowledged the right of deploying Egyptian troops anywhere in United Arab Republic territory, but made clear that withdrawal of UNEF was regarded with apprehension, was passed to the representative of the United Arab Republic. Reference was made to the "good faith accord" between President Nasser and Dag Hammarskjold in 1956.⁵³

26. At noon (New York time) on 18 May the official request for withdrawal was received by the Secretary-General. During the afternoon this request was followed up with the telephone call already mentioned in paragraph 18, stating that any request for reconsideration would be rejected. At the same time, Mr. El Kony, the United Arab Republic representative, told U Thant that the efforts to delay response to the withdrawal request were regarded as efforts to make UNEF an "occupation force." In the early evening of 18 May a meeting of the UNEF Advisory Council and representatives of those countries who had contingents but were not represented in the council allowed the Canadian viewpoint to be put forward once more. But two member countries, (India and Yugoslavia), stated that they intended to comply with the request without reservation.⁵⁴ As a result of this meeting U Thant saw no alternative to complying with the United Arab Republic demand, and accordingly the letter reproduced as Appendix "B" was dispatched to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic. It will be seen that the Secretary-General made the important stipulation that withdrawal was to be "all or nothing". The Egyptian request allowed for the retention of UNEF in the Gaza strip. U Thant refused to consider this compromise -- if the force was not capable of surveillance on the International Frontier it was of no use to the United Nations.^{54a}

27. Clearly U Thant endured anxiety over the safety of the UNEF contingents in a deteriorating situation over which he had no control. He was able to sympathize with the resentment felt by the United Arab Republic over Canada's insistence that the presence of UNEF involved a limitation of Egyptian sovereignty. He was therefore faced with a dilemma. There were

two undesirable alternatives. If he should attempt to stop the United Arab Republic from continuing an operation already set in motion, he was led to believe that the Indian and Yugoslavian contingents would still withdraw. If UNEF was withdrawn, the stability of the Middle East was liable to collapse. But the retention of UNEF, especially in a truncated form, was no guarantee that stability would be maintained. Indeed, with the defection of the Yugoslav contingent, Cold War elements could well be introduced into what otherwise might be a purely local conflict. So much may be gathered from the Secretary-General's discussion of the "Main Points at Issue" in his report of 26 June.⁵⁵

28. On 19 June the New York Times, as it has already been mentioned, published an "aide-mémoire" dated 5 August 1957, prepared by Dag Hammarskjold for his files. This "aide-mémoire" described protracted negotiations by Hammarskjold with Nasser leading to an understanding that the United Nations would not withdraw UNEF, and the United Arab Republic would not order its withdrawal, until both parties had agreed that UNEF had completed its task. U Thant rejected criticisms based upon this newspaper report.⁵⁶ The "aide-mémoire" was entirely unofficial; conditions had changed drastically since it was prepared; and it did not alter the legal status of UNEF. Unsaid but possibly implied was the reminder that he did not feel obliged to operate by the methods which Dag Hammarskjold had found most congenial. But when all is said and done, U Thant's decision resulted not so much from legal precedents as political realities. The imminent collapse of UNEF from within indicated by the Indian and Yugoslavian representatives removed the essential condition of a successful peace-keeping force as defined by U Thant himself, when he said

that the difficulties "inherent in the pioneering nature" of such operations were offset by "the enthusiastic cooperation of Member States and by the spirit of comprehension of the officers and men of the contingents".⁵⁷ One wonders how Dag Hammarskjold would have responded to such a situation. It was he who said of "preventive diplomacy" that it was to "fore-stall international friction and to keep it off the agendas of other United Nations organs where it might become a Cold War issue. It includes some of the many kinds of arrangements which have been lumped together under the heading of 'United Nations presence'".⁵⁸

29. There is another political reality which has to be considered at this point -- the political strength of the Secretary-General within the United Nations. There is much to suggest that U Thant yielded under pressure. This must not be interpreted as a collapse brought about through personal weakness. The Secretary-General is governed by strong Buddhist principles which, as it has already been suggested, lead him to abhor violence in any form. Further, he is capable of remarkable self-control. Normally, such qualities would be distinct assets to a Secretary-General. In the situation which arose in May, 1967, they tended to be more in the nature of liabilities. He shied away from a positive role. A further consideration which must be emphasized was the delicacy of his position in the General Assembly. As it was suggested in a United Nations Study Group in January, 1968.

Reluctance to appeal to the Assembly was also based upon the fact that the issues posed to it would have been those of the right of a sovereign government to ask for withdrawal of UN forces from its territory and the right of the Secretary-General to order withdrawal. Clearly the right of a sovereign government could hardly be challenged, and it would have been most unfortunate to require a vote of confidence in the Secretary-General.⁵⁹

Contingency Plans

30. From its earliest inception, UNEF shunned the concept of withdrawal like the plague. General Burns during his service as Force Commander expressed the opinion that knowledge or discussion of a withdrawal plan could seriously prejudice the position of the United Nations in the eyes of either Egypt or Israel.⁶⁰ U Thant explained the absence of a withdrawal plan by referring to the essentially ad hoc nature of peace-keeping operations. The absence of planning and preparation expected of normal military procedures, in the Secretary-General's words "particularly causes some shock at first to well-trained military men and requires considerable adjustment on their part to very unfamiliar ways." He pointed out that before a withdrawal plan could be drawn up the conditions of withdrawal had to be clearly defined in the Force mandate. Such a mandate would have imposed a limitation of sovereignty, and it was unrealistic to expect host countries to allow such a limitation in the present unrefined state of international relations.⁶¹

31. There were further contributing factors which accounted for the absence of a co-ordinated withdrawal plan -- and these lay in the difficulty of conducting any joint operation in such a poorly integrated force. Major-General Rikhye has testified to the difficulties imposed by differences of language, traditions, training, equipment, doctrine and staff procedure.⁶² At the time of the withdrawal demand there were Canadian, Swedish, Brazilian, Indian and Yugoslav contingents in UNEF. There were some links between the Indian and Canadian contingents in the way of training, staff procedure, and of the officer level in language. Language presented no

problem with the Swedish contingent -- which was in any case smaller than the others. But the common ground between the Brazilian and Yugoslav contingents was almost non-existent -- and certainly all the differences were present in some degree between these two contingents and the rest of the Force. In February, 1967, Major-General Rikhye, (who was considered one of the most effective UNEF Commanders), instituted an operational research project to be carried out by UNEF.⁶³ The importance of this project was twofold. Firstly, it would make important contributions to future peace-keeping operations. Secondly, and of most immediate significance, it provided a means of bringing officers of different contingents together to solve mutual problems. Unfortunately, it was not started until it was too late, and thus all the weaknesses pointed out by Major-General Rikhye in 1964 were manifest in May of 1967. Indeed, they tended to reflect the lack of co-ordination among member countries at United Nations Headquarters.

32. Member countries of UNEF, and the Force Commander, were thus inadequately prepared for withdrawal when the demand came. This is not to say that they were blind to the possibility. In 1959, General Burns had prepared an evacuation plan for withdrawal across the beaches at Gaza. He had borrowed -- and later purchased -- a Landing Ship (Tank) from the United States Sixth Fleet to survey the beaches. It soon became clear that surf conditions would permit evacuation of only small parties under peaceful conditions, with the assistance of local authorities. The L.S.T. was later damaged by the surf and sold back to the U.S. Navy, and a jetty constructed in the area was wrecked by high seas.

Major-General Rikhye had been Chief of Staff to General Burns in 1959, and when Rikhye became force commander in 1964 he brought the evacuation plan up to date, providing the United Nations Secretariat with a copy.⁶⁴ This was no more than a general outline, and in 1967 the copy supposedly in the U.N. Secretariat could not be found.⁶⁵ The copy held in Egypt was only known to the Headquarters Staff of UNEF. The Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Remple of the Canadian Army, used the outline plan to provide the framework upon which he based his requests to New York for ships and aircraft, and for the timing of the withdrawal.⁶⁶ There was in addition to this little-known plan a written order for the procedures to be followed if hostilities broke out. Known as Emergency Plan Number One, it was designed to "provide maximum security to U.N. property, to members of UNEF, and other U.N. agencies and their dependents, whilst continuing ADL and IF tasks as long as possible." The contingents were to concentrate in designated security areas in the Gaza strip, where personnel were expected to be self-sufficient for about 30 days.⁶⁷

33. Since withdrawal was such a delicate subject, Canadian authorities were careful to respect United Nations wishes not to promulgate a withdrawal plan. Indeed, all discussions and papers on peace-keeping seemed to go out of their way to avoid the mention of withdrawal. If the requirement arose, it would have to be treated like any other peace-keeping operation. The philosophy on which the Canadian armed forces base their conduct of peace-keeping operations is summarized in the following excerpts from a paper entitled "Canadian Operations in Support of the United Nations."

15. ... it is a recognized fact that no two peace-keeping operations are alike ... such operations are usually, in the first instance, the primary concern of the Army. However, experience suggests that with minor exceptions, all U.N. operations involve our Army, Navy and Air Force....

17. It is easier to ready our Navy and Air Force units for U.N. operations than is the case for the Army. Although participation in sealift operations is not the type of operation normally undertaken in peacetime by the R.C.N., the role is, to some degree, compatible with the other peacetime missions of this Service. This situation applies to even a greater degree in the case of the R.C.A.F. where a peacetime mission of this service, particularly one involving Air Transport Command, does bear more than a little similarity to any other U.N. commitment involving the airlift of an Infantry Battalion Group either within the limits of our own country or overseas in support of our N.A.T.O. commitments....⁶⁸

34. In 1959, at the same time that Major-General Burns was considering his evacuation plan, a paper was written in National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa which laid down the broad principles of an evacuation of Canadian forces from Egypt. The recommendations were as follows:

- a. That any withdrawal plans under consideration at this HQ should not be on paper but verbal. These could be reviewed periodically to ensure that new members of the staff would be fully cognizant.
- b. Two plans should be developed, one for airlift and one for sea evacuation.
- c. Plans should not be formulated without the assistance and concurrence of General Burns HQ.

Signed D.M. Smith J. V. Allard
Air Vice-Marshal Major-General
Vice Chief of the Air Staff Vice Chief of the
General Staff. 69

There is no evidence that these recommendations were ever put into effect, or if they were, that such measures had survived. However, in 1964 Lieutenant-General G. Walsh, Chief of the

General Staff, ordered the preparation of a plan for the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent by air.⁷⁰ As in 1959, it was pointed out that withdrawal plans were supposed to be verbal. General Walsh, however, reasoned that any national contingent might carry out a unilateral withdrawal, and that a written plan for such an operation was fully justified. By 1967, many of the assumptions underlying this plan were no longer valid, and the plans eventually drawn up by Air Transport Command evidently did not make use of the earlier one. There is no evidence that the R.C.N. was ever aware of any withdrawal plan. Nor was the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations aware of a specific plan. Mr. George Ignatieff, the Canadian ambassador, was however under the impression that there was some plan for withdrawal by airlift, using R.C.A.F. facilities. This impression had been gained from his experience some years previously, while attached to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa.^{70a}

35. Air Transport Command was indeed the key to any withdrawal operation. Even if the command had no written contingency plan for this withdrawal, it did have a set of standard operating procedures which were used every day in normal operations. Air Commodore G.G. Diamond, the Commander of A.T.C. until March, 1967, had never been backward in advertising the high state of readiness in his command. It was only in February that he had made an oral presentation of the Commander's Annual Review to the Chief of the Defence Staff and officers at C.F.H.Q.⁷¹ This report dwelt upon the readiness for war, according to several "effectiveness indicators". The record in 1966 had been impressive in proving "that our operating concept is correct for meeting DND emergency demands quickly and effectively." Operation "Nimble", lasting over a four-month period, ensured the

airlift of petroleum products from Leopoldville to Lusaka and Ndole in Zambia. In Exercise "Winter Express" 1,000 troops, 197 vehicles and 100,000 pounds of freight were airlifted from Canada to Northern Norway and return. Air Transport Command was in the position of being able to offer remarkably precise information of the capabilities and limitations of its airlift resources. It was clear that in an emergency normal activities of the command would be disrupted for lack of aircraft, and that materiel deficiencies could limit the period of time over which emergency operations could be extended. During Exercise "Winter Express" most scheduled flights had been curtailed, and it had been necessary to divert two aircraft for the exercise from Operation "Nimble".

36. The Navy had no such means of forecasting its capacity for sealift. The role of Maritime Command is too broad to allow any such single-minded attention to transportation duties. A transport capacity with fast reflexes is the primary role of Air Transport Command -- the "modest additional sealift" envisaged by the White Paper on Defence in 1964 is well down the list of priorities for Maritime Command. The difference may be illustrated by describing the employment of the ships that were to be earmarked for sealift or associated duties. H.M.C.S. Kootenay and Saguenay had taken part in two advanced anti-submarine exercises and in Exercise "Maple Spring '67". Kootenay's historical report indicates the nature of this operation.

... During her 38 days on the exercise she was at sea 20 days, alongside 16 days and at anchor 2 days. She took part in 4 ASW exercises, including a 6 day tactical

exercise under command of Cancomflt. [Senior Canadian Officer Afloat, Atlantic] 6 underway replenishments, 3 gunnery shoots, 1 bombardment, 1 torpedo firing and 1 mortar firing. The majority of the time spent alongside was in San Juan, Puerto Rico where painting was the primary occupation.

Between January and May Kootenay steamed 16,158 miles in 70 days at sea.* H.M.C.S. Chaudiere followed much the same program, until in April she underwent special trials off Halifax to determine how silent it was possible to make an anti-submarine vessel. She was then involved in Centennial Year duties, including a visit to Montreal as Guard Ship at "Expo 67", before sailing for a cadet training cruise in European waters with a reduced ship's complement. H.M.C.S. Provider had participated in Exercise "Winter Express" in 1966 -- a useful experience of sealift -- and in several other exercises designed to improve her capability as a Fleet Support Ship. But in December 1966 she had entered refit in Saint John, New Brunswick, and was scheduled to begin her post-refit trials and work-ups on 21 May. This meant that the ship's company was for the most part composed of men who had joined in the previous month or so -- including the Commanding Officer.⁷²

Preparation for Withdrawal of the Canadian Contingent

37. There is a dreamlike quality to the events of 17 to 31 May. It is as though a film was being projected in slow motion, gradually transformed to normal speed and

* It is worth remarking as a type of "effectiveness indicator" for Maritime Command like those for Air Transport Command, that two delays in sailing time were the first such delays since Kootenay commissioned in February, 1959.

then accelerated to the pace of a Keystone Cops movie. In some respects, Canada was responsible for this change of pace. Uncertainty, brought about by surprise and an unwieldy command structure, imposed the early lethargy. In Ottawa, decisions were influenced by intelligence from the Canadian embassies in New York, Washington, Cairo, Tel Aviv and Beirut. Information was also received from the Canadian contingent in Egypt. Some of the intelligence and information received from these various sources was confusing because it was contradictory. In Egypt, C.B.U. and 115 A.T.U. prepared for withdrawal without the benefit of direct and constant communications with Canadian Forces Headquarters. This was a serious weakness, because there were no contingency plans and no standard operating procedures to work from. Under the circumstances, there was no satisfactory means of informing Colonel D.H. Power, Commander of the Canadian Base Unit and of the Canadian contingent in Egypt, of decisions made in Ottawa.

38. Confused military operations have sometimes been clarified by using an analogy made by the Duke of Wellington. He compared his campaigns to an old rope harness which could easily be mended by tying knots in the rope. When it is remembered how complicated the command structure of UNEF was, and how unsuitable General Rikhye considered the force was for joint operations, the need for a makeshift withdrawal plan -- one which could be repaired again and again -- becomes apparent. The pattern of events between 17 and 27 May reveals the evolution of such a plan.

39. The first indication that the withdrawal of UNEF might take place reached Ottawa on 17 May. From this time until late on 18 May the Canadian Government attempted to

prevent or delay the Secretary-General's decision to withdraw the Force. Precautionary measures were taken -- an assessment of personnel in Egypt; warning Air Transport Command; maintaining a high state of alert in the Operations Centre at C.F.H.Q. -- but no planning was begun until it was known that withdrawal was inevitable.⁷³ As soon as it became clear that a withdrawal would take place, planning commenced for the evacuation of the Canadian contingent by R.C.A.F. airlift.⁷⁴ The timing of the airlift would depend upon the time necessary for completing the task of the air support and logistic functions of UNEF.⁷⁵ On Friday, 19 May, Mr. Ralph Bunche of the U.N. Secretariat stated that military aircraft would not be able to land in the United Arab Republic.⁷⁶ General J.V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff, then ordered preparations to be made "in a discreet manner" for the possible evacuation of the Canadian contingent by sea. This operation, to be conducted by the R.C.N., was given the code name "Leaven".⁷⁷ Between Saturday, 20 May and Tuesday, 23 May, no further Canadian plans were made. At UNEF Headquarters, however, U.N. officials drew up a plan for the "orderly, dignified and not precipitate" withdrawal of the force.⁷⁸ Forty-five days were allowed, and commercial transportation was to be used. Canada, however, might be allowed to use R.C.A.F. aircraft.⁷⁹ The initial momentum of Canadian preparations had been checked, and the initial feeling of urgency had apparently subsided.

40. President Nasser disrupted this orderly tenor of proceedings by threatening, on 22 May, to declare a blockade on the Israeli port of Aqaba. On 23 May General Allard ordered Admiral J. C. O'Brien, the Maritime

Commander, to go ahead with Operation "Leaven".⁸⁰ At the same time, various means were sought to hasten the run-down of Canadian forces in Egypt.⁸¹ Simultaneously, in Cairo, U Thant on the advice of President Nasser ordered 115 A.T.U. to leave El Arish by 3 June rather than 30 June.*⁸² However, neither General Rikhye nor Colonel Power saw any need to accelerate the withdrawal of the rest of UNEF.⁸³ After two more days in which Arab-Israeli relations continued to deteriorate, and when, on 25 May, Nasser announced that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba would be re-instituted, the Canadian Government decided to make an official request that the withdrawal timetable be accelerated.⁸⁴ On 26 May the Canadian Permanent Representative in New York, Mr. Ignatieff, suggested in uncompromising language to the members of the U.N. Secretariat that UNEF should be withdrawn by about 9 June.⁸⁵ If this proposal was not accepted, Canada would be prepared to withdraw her contingent without regard to the overall plan. Before an answer could be given by the Secretary-General, Egypt, on 27 May, suddenly demanded the withdrawal of Canadian forces within 48 hours.⁸⁶ In order to understand the transformation which this request brought about, it will be necessary to examine in detail the Canadian preparations which have been outlined in this and the preceding paragraphs.

41. From the beginning, Canadian Forces Headquarters rather than Mobile Command assumed full control of the operation. The Director of Operations, Colonel H.H. Parker, acted as the principal co-ordinating officer. The Operations Centre was the most effective co-ordinating instrument available. Manned continually by a staff officer, several communications personnel and clerks, the Operations Centre received messages from all commands and,

* See para 54 below.

through External Affairs, from Canadian embassies. The facilities of directorates in C.F.H.Q. were easily available -- especially from the staff of the Director General of Intelligence and the Deputy Chief of Operations. Consultations could be made with the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Cabinet, almost at a moment's notice. Thus it was that the first decisions were made early on 18 May. The Director of Operations after consultation with the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, called a meeting of officers from his own directorate and from the Directorate of Movements. These officers were to prepare for a possible evacuation of the Canadian contingent of UNEF.⁸⁷ The principal result of this decision was a request to Air Commodore A.C. Hull, commanding Air Transport Command, to "review the distribution of aircraft with a view to quick action if withdrawal of the Canadian contingent is considered necessary."⁸⁸

42. At about ten o'clock in the evening (Ottawa time) of Thursday, 18 May, Air Marshal Sharp told the Director of Operations that withdrawal was now inevitable. The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff authorized planning for a withdrawal on an orderly basis, but directed that no execution of plans was to be allowed before the official government announcement had been made.⁸⁹ The Director of Operations accordingly released a message, which was dispatched about an hour later to the Commander of C.B.U. UNEF, requesting a plan of withdrawal that was to be in line with the overall plan for the withdrawal of UNEF. Canada's support role was to be taken into account, and this implied that Canadians would be among the last to leave. Major items of equipment were to be transferred to Cyprus, and the evacuation was to be based on El Arish, as long as the Commander, Colonel D.H. Power, could confirm that El Arish was available. Certain

information was essential to planning in Ottawa, and this Colonel Power was asked to provide -- the number of passengers, the amount and type of cargo to return to Canada or to be airlifted to Cyprus, and the expected date that the three Caribou aircraft on U.N. service could be released.⁹⁰

43. This message was designated "operational immediate", which should have ensured its rapid dispatch from Ottawa and early receipt in Gaza. In fact, it was not received by Colonel Power until six hours after it had been sent about 11 o'clock Thursday night, (Ottawa time).* By the time the message was received, late on Friday morning (Gaza time), various withdrawal procedures had already been put into effect. Arrangements had been made to evacuate the C.B.C. Concert Party which had been entertaining UNEF contingents; all requisitions on the Support Group from other contingents were cancelled; leaves were cancelled and travel restricted; and the six Canadians at Sharm El Sheikh were instructed to withdraw by road by 20 May.⁹²

44. For the Canadians in Gaza, Thursday, 18 May, had been a day of anxiety. In the small hours of the morning Colonel Power had had to report an incident in Camp Rafah in which a local civilian had been shot dead by two soldiers of the P.P.C.L.I. Guard Company. The man had been detected prowling in the vicinity of the U.N. Ordnance

* The frequent delays in communication were investigated by Colonel Power before he left Egypt. He found that the civilians employed by the U.N. for communications duties paid no attention to designations of priority, but merely dealt with messages in the order of their receipt.⁹¹

Company stores with quite patently larcenous intentions, and, as it transpired in the Board of Inquiry, with homicidal intentions at the moment of discovery. Fortunately, this incident was totally unrelated to developments on the International Frontier, and had very little if any effect on the position of the Canadian contingent.⁹³ Then, later on Thursday morning, a Canadian Caribou aircraft on service with the U.N. was harassed by two Israeli fighters. Major-General Rikhye was on board, as well as a Captain in the Egyptian army. The Canadian pilot, Flying Officer R. Simpson, was only able to make the El Arish landing field with difficulty. He later received a Queen's Commendation for bravery, and his co-pilot a Queen's Commendation for service in the air, as a result of this incident.⁹⁴

45. The uncertainties and anxieties which prevailed on the preceding days were somewhat relieved by the positive decisions which had to be made by officers in UNEF on Friday, 19 May. In answer to a request from Canadian Forces Headquarters the following distribution of Canadian personnel was reported.

| <u>Centre</u> | <u>Officers</u> | <u>O.Rs.</u> | <u>Dependents</u> ⁹⁵ |
|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| Gaza | 8 | 37 | 3 |
| Rafah | 45 | 469 | nil |
| El Arish | 12 | 96 | nil |
| Sharm el Sheikh | nil | 6 | nil |
| Beirut | 1 | 6 | 6 |
| Pisa | 1 | nil | nil |
| Cairo (on leave) | 1 | 15 | nil |
| Germany (on leave) | 2 | 1 | nil |
| England (on leave) | nil | 6 | nil |
| Alexandria (on leave) | nil | 1 | nil |
| Canada (on leave) | 1 | 83 | nil |
| <hr/> | | | |
| Total | 71 | 720 | 9 |

On Friday afternoon Major-General Rikhye received U Thant's instructions for withdrawal. The outstanding feature of these instructions was that the withdrawal was to be dignified, orderly and not precipitate. Following these instructions, the Commander of UNEF issued a brief order to contingent commanders.⁹⁶ Colonel Power, after consultation with Major-General Rikhye, then submitted an outline withdrawal plan to Canadian Forces Headquarters. The message containing this information was dispatched about 5:50 p.m., (Gaza time), and arrived in Ottawa about eight hours later at eight o'clock in the evening (Ottawa time).⁹⁷

46. The problems raised by withdrawal were perhaps more complex than Canadian planners in Ottawa first realized.* It was necessary to concentrate all contingents in preparation for withdrawal from the International Frontier and the Armistice Demarcation Line. This had to be carried out in several stages, and required well-organized logistic support.⁹⁸ About 2800 men and over 1000 tons of contingent stores then had to be transported about 140 miles to Port Said during the hours of darkness only. Presumably the reason for this was the Egyptian desire to preserve a veil of security over troop movements of the Army of the United Arab Republic. This reason seems to be supported by the fact that only limited amounts of rolling stock would be available to U.N. forces -- if Egyptian forces were making extensive use of the railways U.N. evacuation would not be able to go forward with

* Notwithstanding Colonel Power's appreciation of the understanding of the field situation by C.F.H.Q. Staff Officers, expressed in the interim report on withdrawal.

unlimited facilities. Such restriction of movement had, in any case, been imposed upon UNEF as a matter of course over the years. On 19 May UNEF personnel remained scattered and precariously situated among the large and belligerent groupings of the Army of the United Arab Republic in the Sinai Desert, and the Palestine Liberation Army in the Gaza strip. Not until 24 May was the entire force gathered within the Gaza strip and at El Arish.⁹⁹

47. In Ottawa it had seemed as though the withdrawal would be a fairly straightforward airlift of personnel from Egypt. Air Transport Command could meet the requirements without difficulty. On 18 May an immediate response had been made to C.F.H.Q.'s request for a review of the distribution of aircraft. Air Transport Command had submitted a comprehensive plan for the evacuation of, not just the Canadian contingent, but the entire Force. The intention was to airlift UNEF from El Arish to a safe haven in the Mediterranean area. On 19 May C.F.H.Q. had designated El Adem in Libya as the preferred safe haven, with Pisa, Italy, as an alternative.¹⁰⁰ The Director of Operations called two meetings on Friday, 19 May, to discuss the logistic implications of "a possible deliberate withdrawal" of the Canadian contingent. It was decided that a run-down of personnel was to take place; no more equipment was to be sent to the contingent until further notice, and arrangements for having equipment returned from Egypt would have to await a report from Colonel Power of what the requirements were. It was, however, reported by a representative from the Comptroller-General's department that there was no Canadian unit property in Egypt.¹⁰¹ This information

was later found to be incorrect, and as a result there was some difficulty in retrieving bulky stores.

48. At the same time that these deliberations were being made, several unsettling pieces of information began to filter into Canadian Forces Headquarters. Just after noon, (Ottawa time), a telephone conversation took place between Lieutenant-Colonel H. Trimble, the Canadian military representative at the Permanent Mission in New York, and the duty officer at the Operations Centre in Ottawa. Colonel Trimble revealed that there was as yet no UNEF withdrawal plan. Mr. Carey Seward, Deputy Director of General Services in the United Nations, who had been in charge of Field Operations Services in Egypt from 1950 to 1963, was about to leave for Gaza to work out a withdrawal plan that would "take days, maybe weeks, probably months to complete".¹⁰²

Two hours later it was learned from the Department of External Affairs that no military aircraft would be permitted to land in the United Arab Republic.¹⁰³ The evacuation would therefore be performed by commercially chartered ships and aircraft. Finally, at eight p.m. (Ottawa time) the outline withdrawal plan was received from Colonel Power and seemed to confirm the previous information. The withdrawal was to be conducted over a period of 45 days via Port Said. The rear party, consisting of Canadians and Norwegians, was to leave from either Port Said or Cairo on 3 July. The landing field at El Arish could not be used.¹⁰⁴

49. This was serious news. Not only would an operation using commercial aircraft be inordinately expensive, but should Egypt become a war zone there would be virtually

no chance of finding commercial aircraft prepared to enter Egyptian airspace. Moreover, Canadian peace-keeping operations were geared to the use of Air Transport Command. As a memorandum to the Minister for External Affairs pointed out: "In view of the emphasis which has been placed by the Government on the strategic air capability of the Canadian Armed Forces, it would be rather humiliating were it necessary for the Canadian Contingent to be evacuated from the UAR by civilian aircraft."¹⁰⁵ There was now a possibility that an almost totally defenceless Canadian force would be stranded in an area liable to erupt into hostilities. Thus it is not surprising that, towards the end of Friday afternoon and before the outline withdrawal plan had been received, General J.V. Allard, the Chief of the Defence Staff, personally initiated proceedings "in a very discreet manner" for a possible evacuation by naval vessels.¹⁰⁶ It will be recalled that the R.C.N. was supposed to be able to respond to peace-keeping requirements almost as easily as Air Transport Command.

50. It was for this reason that Maritime Command was now called into the planning process. Similarly Mobile Command was consulted because three CH113 "Voyageur" helicopters from that command were to be sent with the ships to lift Canadian personnel off the beach at the Gaza strip. However, Mobile Command contributed to the planning only until it was discovered that for several reasons the CH113 helicopters were not suitable for the task. Instead, CHSS2 "Sea-King" anti-submarine helicopters were eventually embarked in H.M.C.S. Provider.¹⁰⁷ The Chief of Staff, Operations, at Maritime Command, Commodore R.J. Pickford, informed C.F.H.Q. by message on 20 May that suitable ships

could be provided and sailed within 36 hours of the requirement being confirmed. The passage to the Eastern Mediterranean would take ten days. A note of warning was sounded here, however. Such a deployment of ships would be bound to cause speculation in the news media of Halifax, and it would be mandatory to issue a press release, giving the purpose of the operation. If it was necessary to disguise the purpose, a cover plan concerning exercises in the Mediterranean could be invented.¹⁰⁸

51. The uncertainty engendered by Friday afternoon's reports thus had two results in Ottawa. The momentum of preparations was abruptly reduced, but at the same time an alternative method of evacuation was being prepared. Little could be done now except to wait upon events and attempt to keep all interested commanders informed. Neither at C.F.H.Q. nor at UNEF Headquarters was there an unusual sense of urgency.¹⁰⁹ Even the anxiety evident at C.F.H.Q. on Friday seemed to subside over the weekend. The decision made on Friday, to withhold all replacements from C.B.U. UNEF, was cancelled later that day, and on Sunday a draft of key personnel was dispatched to Gaza.¹¹⁰ Following Colonel Trimble's telephone call, a message from the Permanent Mission in New York revealed that the restrictions on Canadian military aircraft had not emanated from the United Arab Republic but, most remarkably, from the U.N. Secretariat in New York.¹¹¹ The possibility of speeding up withdrawal still had to be kept in mind, but by Sunday this possibility appeared remote. Two reports from the Canadian military attaché in Tel Aviv over the weekend indicated that Israel was not preparing for immediate hostilities.¹¹²

The Canadian ambassador at Tel Aviv considered that Israel had been surprised at the speed and efficiency of Egyptian mobilization, and that she might want to recapture the political initiative from the United Arab Republic. At the same time, trusting in the assurance of the United States that the right of free navigation in the Straits of Tiran would be supported, Israel was trying to keep the crisis as low pitched as possible. It was unlikely, the ambassador reported, that Israel would attempt a pre-emptive strike.¹¹³ The Canadian military attaché in Cairo reported extensive military activity and restriction of non-military movement, and the Canadian ambassador there described a violent anti-American campaign in the news media.¹¹⁴ But if reports from Cairo were alarming, those from New York gave some reassurance. It was of little comfort when Mr. George Ignatieff, the Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, reported that the U.A.R. showed inflexibility in the present crisis. At the same time, Mr. El Kony, the United Arab Republic representative, placed strong emphasis upon the need for mutual restraint; and as long as the Egyptians refrained from interfering with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba there was still hope for future stability.¹¹⁵ In addition to these reports, it was known that U Thant was to fly to Cairo on Monday, 22 May. The influence of the Secretary-General was considerable. He could hardly bring about the revival of UNEF -- for that was totally dead now -- but at least he might be able to ease the tension.

52. In Egypt there was enough to keep everybody at C.B.U. busy, whether the withdrawal was to be immediate or delayed. So far matters appeared to be going well. The

C.B.C. Concert Party had finally been got away after a number of false starts; the convoy for withdrawal of the Canadians at Sharm El Sheikh arrived there; and it was considered aggravating but not too significant that the Rafah Beach was placed out of bounds on Saturday. In any event, the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff apologized and re-opened the beach on Sunday. It had been intended to withdraw the Canadians immediately from Sharm El Sheikh, but this became impossible when Major-General Rikhye ordered the convoy delayed until Tuesday, 23 May. On Monday detailed instructions for terminating operations at the Canadian Base Unit at Camp Rafah were issued, and these were based on the assumption that UNEF was to withdraw by 4 July. It was anticipated that the main body would leave Camp Rafah between 19 and 21 June, and that the rear party would depart for Canada about 30 June.¹¹⁶

53. At El Arish, 115 A.T.U. enjoyed a somewhat less isolated position than did the C.B.U. at Camp Rafah. This was bound to be the case because unit aircraft were constantly moving between various elements of UNEF, and, as on 18 May, were responsible for flying the Force Commander to and from his headquarters. At the Air Transport Unit, although the incident of 18 May had resulted in the temporary grounding of Caribou aircraft, and although all operations over Sinai had been terminated as of 19 May, no urgency governed preparations for withdrawal.¹¹⁷

54. President Nasser deliberately aggravated the crisis on 22 and 23 May. He is reported to have explained to U Thant that he timed the threat to declare a blockade

of the Strait of Tiran to occur before the Secretary-General's arrival. Nasser did not wish to "embarrass" the Secretary-General by giving him the opportunity of requesting a delay which the Egyptian leader had no intention of permitting.¹¹⁸ In the same series of meetings President Nasser was sharply critical of the Canadian attitude to withdrawal. His point of view may have been influenced by Prime Minister Pearson's warm welcome of the Israeli President, Zalman Shazar, to Canada on Sunday, 21 May. Nasser took this opportunity, at any rate, to warn that Canada had undermined her position in the Middle East and to hint at public disapproval -- a theme the Egyptians enlarged upon in the coming days. Wing Commander J.W. Fitzsimmons, Commander of 115 A.T.U., was present at some of the discussions and has recorded the change of plans brought about by President Nasser's remarks.

The undersigned flew Gen Rikhye to Cairo for his meeting with U Thant and President Nasser on 23 and 24 May. Whilst in Cairo the Commander held several discussions re the attitude towards Canadians and plans for withdrawal of Canadian UNEF troops. CO 115 took part in the discussions and kept the Canadian ambassador and Military Attaché informed. On 24 May it was decided that 115 should be the first unit to leave the UNEF area. The plan was that 2 aircraft would proceed to Beirut and one to Port Said -- the Beirut based aircraft to carry out evacuation of dependents from Gaza and the Port Said aircraft to be based as close as possible to Gaza (El Arish now being considered operational for UAR aircraft only) at the disposal of Commander UNEF and in support of the evacuation from Port Said of all UNEF personnel and equipment. On 25 May CO 115 and CAO UNEF returned to El Arish to initiate the action in support of that plan. Packing and sorting was done immediately with a target date of Marina (El Arish) close out of 3 June.¹¹⁹

55. The deteriorating situation indicated by President Nasser's statements had also prompted General Allard to prepare for an accelerated withdrawal. On 23 May he ordered the

Maritime Commander, Rear-Admiral J. C. O'Brien, to commence Operation "Leaven", as the naval evacuation was now designated.¹²⁰ The operation was to be in four phases. In the first phase, a task group consisting of H.M.C.S. Provider (a fleet support ship) Kootenay (a destroyer escort) and Saguenay (a helicopter destroyer) was to depart for the Azores under the pretence of carrying out anti-submarine exercises in the Eastern Atlantic. However, one cannot alert ships' companies for such unusual operations without the populace of a naval town such as Halifax being able to speculate upon the actual purpose of the cruise. Thus on Tuesday night Mr. Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence, informed the public on the evening edition of the C.B.C. television news that three ships were being sent to the Eastern Atlantic in case they were needed to help in evacuation of Canadian forces from Egypt.¹²¹ This was a considerable expansion of the statement he had made in parliament on Tuesday afternoon that a "national contingency plan" had been prepared in case the United Nations plan did not work.¹²² During the debate on the following day an exchange between the Prime Minister and Mr. Douglas Harkness, Minister of National Defence in a previous administration, resulted in a further expansion of this statement.

Mr. Pearson: ...There is the United Nations plan, which is a very carefully prepared plan for the evacuation of all members of the United Nations force. So far as we know, the United Nations authorities think that plan will be adequate, provided of course that the roof does not fall in.

Mr. Harkness: This is the trouble.

Mr. Pearson: That is the trouble, but they are very much aware of it and as a matter of urgency they are trying to bring their plans into line with that possibility. Meanwhile, as the Minister of National Defence has said, we

have moved three ships in that direction and have worked out an emergency plan which we hope and believe will take care of our people....^{122a}

56. In the second phase of Operation "Leaven" the task group would be routed to the Malta area, in phase three the ships would proceed to a "likely disembarkation area" off the Gaza strip, and in phase four they would embark UNEF personnel and proceed to a disembarkation port to be decided on later.¹²³ These instructions were enough to get the operation started, but left a great deal to the imagination. What was a "likely disembarkation area"? How many personnel and how much equipment would have to be taken off the beaches? The first point could be settled by the ship's officers with the aid of maps and charts. Regarding the second point, Commodore R.H. Leir, the Senior Canadian Officer Afloat, asked for an estimate of the sea lift required by H.M.C.S. Provider, while the Commanding Officers of the escorts wanted to know the amount and types of equipment to be embarked.¹²⁴ The reply indicated some of the perplexity that still surrounded the operation.

1. Comd...CBU...was requested on 19 May to advise types and quantities of cargo and passenger numbers. Until received only known factors for planning are as follows:

- (a) Present strength of CBU incl 115 ATU approx 720 all ranks. Each week of peaceful conditions commencing 28 May will see some reduction in this figure.
- (b) Evac of Embasssy staff Cairo cannot be discarded. Total number should not exceed 40.
- (c) There are no Cdn Vehicles in UNEF.
- (d) National Eqpt includes small quantities of cypher eqpt, messing eqpt and misc property. Evac of this eqpt desirable but if hostile conditions exist it is accepted such stores and eqpt might be destroyed.

(e) Personal baggage of service pers approx 100 lbs each. Evac of this item however desirable might have to be treated as per para (d).

2. Further details will be messaged when known.¹²⁵

As it happened, a series of circumstances made it unnecessary to send further details by message. But it soon became clear that neither Ottawa nor C.B.U. UNEF was fully aware of what was happening at either end of a long and maddeningly erratic line of communications.

57. Colonel Power was not aware of the latest developments in Ottawa and Cairo. As the decision was being made to commence Operation "Leaven", the Director of Operations at Canadian Forces Headquarters, Colonel H.H. Parker, sent a message to C.B.U. which was fraught with admirably restrained anxiety:

1. Appears here that imminent run down of force might make it possible to release some of your pers almost immediately, e.g. RCEME and RCE pers and possibly some of ATU Ground Staff.
2. We are prepared to arrange special flight or flights if you can clear their release with HQ UNEF.
3. Believe it desirable to reduce your strength as quickly as possible. What do you think?¹²⁶

To this Colonel Power made a reassuring reply. It was dated on 24 May, in the early afternoon (Gaza time).

1. Up to now there is no indication here of an escalated rundown. Plans still call for an orderly withdrawal. Situation may change on return of COMD UNEF from Cairo meeting with Secretary-General.
2. All units occupied with normal unit close down. Vehs and warlike stores are being turned in and prepared for shipment to UN DEP Pisa. This requires RCEME pers. Engr fully occupied making crates and packaging UN stores. RCAF Flts have increased. Although not confirmed by CO 115 A.T.U. who is away I doubt if they would reduce without reduction of commitment.

3. With tempo of work still high and all estb reduced by approx 10 percent by non return of leave pers any immediate reduction in view of above is impossible except as laid down in our [withdrawal plan].
4. So far Comd UNEF has been unable to convince UAR authority to allow use of El Arish airport for evacuation as this is now an operational field. Normal flts continue. UAR insist we use Port Said and arrangements are now being made to set up a staging camp there.
5. Appreciate your concern and prepared to evacuate at any time if we can be relieved of normal support group function.
6. Will keep you informed of any further developments.¹²⁷

58. Decisions now had to be made in Ottawa from a series of somewhat contradictory pieces of information. On Tuesday President Nasser's actions seemed to presage a military clash. But on Wednesday Colonel Power indicated everything was normal in Gaza, and no need for acceleration was seen. On Thursday, news arrived from the military attaché in Cairo that El Arish was in full use as an operational military base and no longer suitable for airlift operations -- according to a report from Wing Commander Fitzsimmons, Commander of 115 A.T.U.¹²⁸ The news from Cairo that arrived in Ottawa at about the same time as that from Gaza reflected the anxiety already shown in Wing Commander Fitzsimmons' report quoted above. It was clear to the Canadian ambassador in Cairo, and had been for several months, that Canada had become increasingly identified by the Egyptian government with "reactionary western countries". This had been more than confirmed in Egyptian minds when the Israeli President received such a warm welcome from Prime Minister Pearson during his visit to "Expo 67".¹²⁹ President Nasser reinstated the blockade of the Strait of Tiran on the next day, 25 May,¹³⁰ and the

Canadian Government decided to demand an accelerated withdrawal on Friday, 26 May. General Allard ordered the Maritime Commander to institute Phase II of Operation Leaven¹³¹ and the Canadian Cabinet in its morning meeting decided to ask the United Nations to speed up the evacuation of the Canadian contingent.¹³²

59. It was a coincidence which would not escape critics that these decisions followed close upon the visit of President Johnson to Canada on 25 May. It was widely believed that this visit was to precede a diplomatic offensive by Canada, Britain and the United States to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. President Nasser subsequently said Mr. Pearson had been "pushed" by the United States and had been plotting with that country to reopen the Gulf. He stigmatized the Canadian Prime Minister and President Johnson as "idiots" who had failed to learn the lesson of the 1956 Suez crisis and were in collusion to plan aggression against Egypt. Canada's suggestion that UNEF remain in Gaza after the withdrawal demand, said Nasser, "places Canada completely on the side of Israel and the United States, which has instigated Canada to oppose us." This point of view was echoed by Egyptian newspapers. There was also Canadian criticism of the timing and nature of the President's visit. Mr. T. C. Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, implied disapproval by asking Mr. Pearson in the House to give a report on the meetings. Editorial comment in the next few days was more specific. Under the heading Businesslike Peacekeeping the Globe and Mail suggested that such meetings would be taken as evidence that Canada lacked an independent foreign policy.

...While there is no question that we are intimately involved with our allies in the defense of North America and Western Europe, we will seldom be accepted in the developing world if we appear to be acting in that role as an agent for Washington or London.... The government's "quiet diplomacy" is unlikely to help our credibility as peacekeepers, especially when it seems to imply that Ottawa follows meekly in Washington's wake.

Mr. Gerald Waring wrote in the Vancouver Sun on 3 June that three faults were to be seen in recent Canadian diplomacy. The first was a failure to obtain or assess properly political intelligence from the Middle East; the second was that Mr. Martin and Mr. Pearson had "let their chagrin over the ouster of UNEF overcome their normal diplomatic caution"; the third was that earlier statements by these leaders "failed to take Arab sensitivities into consideration, and almost invited backlash."¹³³

60. Unfortunately, the time lag in messages made it difficult to keep Colonel Power informed of all decisions in reasonable time, or of the factors on which such decisions were based.¹³⁴ Much to his amazement, and to his considerable annoyance, he discovered on Thursday afternoon through a second-hand report of a C.B.C. radio broadcast that the naval task force had been formed and dispatched. He had been given no indication that such a force had even been contemplated¹³⁵ -- ironically the discretion surrounding Operation "Leaven" had succeeded in concealing it from the one person whom it would affect the most, although it had become common knowledge to the public in Canada. It was true that a message had been sent explaining all decisions taken by Headquarters, but this was only dispatched on Thursday afternoon -- before Colonel Power heard of the

radio report but nearly two full days after the intention to send ships had been announced on television. This message explained that the naval forces would be used only in the event of hostilities. The earliest date at which the ships could be off the Gaza strip was 4 June.¹³⁶ From the information available to Colonel Power from the Force Commander -- whom he continued to look to with the utmost correctness and loyalty as his bona fide operational commander -- the withdrawal situation remained unchanged. His message of 25 May describing the latest withdrawal plan agreed substantially with his previous plans, except for the earlier withdrawal of 115 A.T.U., now to take place on 4 June. In this, as in every report to follow until 27 May, he concluded his message with the assurance that the situation in Gaza was quiet and stable.¹³⁷ Then on 27 May he suddenly learned from Major-General Rikhye of a proposed change of plans which was even more aggravating than the news of the naval task force. In exasperation he sat down in the small hours of the morning (Gaza time) and composed the following message to be sent to Ottawa.¹³⁸

1. Commander UNEF received message from New York informing him that Canadian Permanent Representative has requested immediate evacuation of Canadian contingent as a result of request from Canadian Contingent Commander who is reported to have stated that this was in keeping with a UAR demand.
2. No record of any such request to C.F.H.Q. from this HQ exists. Request not understood. Our wires on evacuation have never been altered. I have advised Commander UNEF that unless otherwise directed there is no planned change in evacuation...
3. This situation very embarrassing for Comd Cdn Contingent. Please advise ASP.

A cry from the wilderness arrived in the Operations Centre in Ottawa shortly after midnight (Ottawa time) and was

answered about an hour later.¹³⁹ The embarrassment was regretted and the situation explained. Now Colonel Power learned for the first time that evidence received in Ottawa belied the tranquillity that he reported in Gaza -- that an accelerated withdrawal was considered to be necessary and that he was to do everything he could to meet a withdrawal date of 9 June. The message ended: "We understand fully your position but ask you to consult force Commander and arrive at earlier withdrawal date for Canadian Contingent."¹⁴⁰

61. The distortion of information received by Major-General Rikhye can probably be traced to the conversation which Mr. Ignatieff had with the Secretary-General's political and legal advisers in New York on 26 May. Mr. Ignatieff indicated that the UN. withdrawal plan was far too leisurely -- that Canada wanted to see a more rapid withdrawal and if necessary she would be prepared to withdraw her own forces according to her own, rather than United Nations plans. To this Mr. Bunche and Mr. John Vaughan, Director of General Services at the United Nations, retorted that U Thant intended a dignified, not a precipitate, withdrawal, and that there was no need to be concerned for the safety of Canadian forces since the prompt acceptance of President Nasser's demand had ensured the cooperation of U.A.R. authorities. Then Mr. Ignatieff told the U.N. Undersecretaries he had received information, from Canadian Forces Headquarters, that only a day or so before the U.A.R. had ordered the withdrawal of the Canadian air component from El Arish much more rapidly than originally planned. In fact, as Wing Commander Fitzsimmons indicates in his report, the U.A.R. had not ordered the withdrawal but persuaded U Thant that it might

be endangering the lives of Canadians at El Arish to keep them there any longer than necessary. The U.N. Secretariat was, however, not as well-informed as Mr. Ignatieff, and did not take issue with this statement.¹⁴¹ At any rate, Canada was now forcing the pace. An accelerated withdrawal plan had already been prepared by Air Transport Command, based on evacuation from Port Said and the use of Pisa as a safe haven. Two C130 Hercules aircraft could make two flights each daily, to evacuate 740 passengers in 11 flights. Yukon flights could carry passengers on to Trenton from Pisa.¹⁴²

62. Maritime Command had less welcome news. Phase II had been implemented and the ships were shaping a course for Gibraltar, but H.M.C.S. Saguenay suffered damage from heavy seas to her main anti-aircraft gun-mount which virtually destroyed her anti-aircraft defence capabilities. It was agreed to divert H.M.C.S. Chaudiere from a summer training cruise for cadets of the Regular Officers Training Plan in European waters, and to augment her ship's company with personnel to be air lifted from Canada to Malta. This was considered by Maritime Command to be a temporary measure. The ship was not in the "combat readiness" stage of the "cyclic system" adopted by the R.C.N. in 1964, and had been withdrawn from normal operations about a month previously to enter the maintenance phase. Thus immediate steps were taken to prepare H.M.C.S. Annapolis so that she could relieve Chaudiere as soon as possible. On 26 May a message to C.F.H.Q. announced the intention - which in naval parlance means that executive action will be taken without further orders -- to sail Annapolis on Sunday forenoon, 28 May. Some eight hours later, the Chief of Defence Staff personally authorized a message to Maritime Command stating that

the requirement in the Eastern Mediterranean was for H.M.C.S. Provider and two anti-submarine escorts. "Believe therefore", the message concluded, "you will not wish to sail ANNAPOLIS". Admiral O'Brien originated an answer saying that he wished to relieve Chaudiere by Annapolis "if timing permits".¹⁴³

63. There were undoubtedly certain disadvantages in the use of Chaudiere for this operation. The ship's complement had been reduced, according to the practice for all ships entering the maintenance phase -- this was an essential and valuable feature of the "cyclic system". Even though the crew was to be augmented by personnel flown out to Malta, the presence of cadets under training was not a desirable feature of a ship about to enter a situation so tinged with the unexpected as a peace-keeping operation. Moreover, one of the principle reasons for inaugurating the "cyclic system" had been to enable the same ship's company to work up to a peak of efficiency over a 16-month period. It would therefore be preferable to send Annapolis, which was in a better state of readiness, and to permit Chaudiere to complete the training cruise for which she was more suitably prepared. General Allard, however, was to continue to press for the retention of Chaudiere. Timing apparently was the important factor, although there is evidence that he received advice from the staff of the Director of Maritime Forces in Ottawa, that Chaudiere had certain advantages over Annapolis in the anti-aircraft weapons that she carried. Not having been built as or converted to a helicopter destroyer, her after 3"50 mounting had not been removed to make room for a helicopter hanger, and her forward mounting was a 3"70 weapon - which had a higher muzzle velocity, a faster rate of fire and more sophisticated gunnery control equipment than the sole

3"50 mounting fitted in helicopter destroyers. In the restricted waters of the Mediterranean she would perhaps be more useful than Annapolis.¹⁴⁴

64. When Admiral O'Brien's message arrived in C.F.H.Q. General Allard was asked if he was content with the answer. He advised that he would telephone the Admiral the following morning. The next day Colonel Parker telephoned Commodore Pickford to suggest delaying Annapolis' sailing by 24 hours, as there was no point in sailing the ship if the airlift of Canadian UNEF personnel had already begun. At this point, Commodore Pickford did not know whether the ship was to be sailed or not, and had to confirm the results of the telephone call between the Chief of Defence Staff and Admiral O'Brien. In fact, the operations log at C.F.H.Q. indicates that the call did not take place until the late afternoon of 27 May, when General Allard gave orders that the sailing of Annapolis was to be postponed indefinitely. Commodore Pickford then relayed the instructions back to Colonel Parker, in Ottawa.¹⁴⁵

65. After nine days of preparation for withdrawal the situation was now approximately as follows. The departure point would probably be Port Said.* There was now thought to be no hope of using El Arish, especially after Wing Commander Fitzsimmons' description of the military preparations there. If hostilities should break out, the Canadian Contingent would be taken off on as yet undetermined beach in the Gaza strip. The method of withdrawal

* Three advance flights with 20 passengers each would take personnel from Gaza to Nicosia for onward passage to Trenton. These would occur on 29 May, 5 June and 12 June.

would be by R.C.A.F. airlift, for which there was a practical plan. Once again, the alternative to this, which was considered to be a possibility if hostilities broke out, was sealift with the aid of "Sea-King" anti-submarine helicopters.¹⁴⁶ The date of the withdrawal was uncertain -- "as soon as possible" was as close as one could guess. A target date of 9 June had been mentioned, and the sealift could have commenced as early as 4 June.¹⁴⁷ There was still no detailed run-down of men and equipment to guide Air Transport Command in the type of airlift that would be required -- all planning was based on the one sure figure of 740 men with 100 lbs. of baggage each.¹⁴⁸ No mention had been made of the possibility that the naval task group might run into opposition during a withdrawal across the beaches -- but it was apparently implied in the insistence that the force have adequate anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defence.¹⁴⁹ No matter how diligent, such a naval force would have poor chances of survival against a determined aircraft or submarine -- and particularly against a surface-to-surface missile -- attack.¹⁵⁰ Perhaps it was fortunate that President Nasser took matters out of the hands of the Canadian planners on Saturday morning by his new demand to the Secretary-General for the "complete withdrawal and departure of Canadian Forces immediately and not later than 48 hours from the time my cable reaches you."

The Demand for Immediate Canadian Withdrawal

66. The Egyptian initiative of 27 May is described, like that of 18 May, in the Secretary-General's reports to the General Assembly.¹⁵¹ The texts of the Egyptian note and subsequent exchanges are reproduced in full as

Appendix "D". As these are self-explanatory only a brief summary of events related to the demand needs to be included in the body of this report. The Egyptian note of 27 May indicated that Canada's attitude, and the dispatch of destroyers, had inflamed public opinion to the point of hatred, so that Egypt was concerned for the safety of the Canadian forces and, perhaps even more, for the good name of United Nations Forces as a whole. The offer to transport the Canadian contingent to Cyprus was politely rejected in the Secretary-General's answer -- but otherwise, (with Canadian concurrence), it was agreed to withdraw the Canadians as quickly as possible. There was genuine concern that an Egyptian mob might cause uncontrollable violence in the Gaza strip. During the next two days firm arrangements for evacuation suddenly took shape. The place of withdrawal was named, (El Arish); and the time of commencing the withdrawal was established as the morning of 29 May. On that day Mr. Ignatieff was able to state in his reply to the Secretary-General's note of 27 May, "The Canadian Government is ready to commence the withdrawal as soon as the Secretary-General has concluded the necessary arrangements with the Government of the United Arab Republic for withdrawal operations."¹⁵²

67. Things are not always as they seem. The Egyptian request is a puzzling document, full of contradictions. Why the Egyptian government should have chosen this moment to vent its displeasure on Canada cannot be explained by ordinary logic. The clinching argument of the request was based on a half-truth. As the Canadian ambassador in Cairo had suggested, there had been a growing anti-Canadian feeling

for some time. But the fact that Canadian warships were on their way was known only to a few Egyptians in government circles. These few had accepted the information without so much as a raised eyebrow -- and the press had not breathed a word of this new development.¹⁵³ Thus at the time that mob hatred was supposed to be fulminating over the warlike approach of a Canadian naval formation, the mob did not even know of the existence of such a formation -- which might have given Colonel Power a little comfort.¹⁵⁴ That the Canadian government had procrastinated and delayed in the departure of UNEF was a charge easily refuted. Both the Secretary-General and Mr. Ignatieff made it clear that the Canadian government had not only adhered to the U.N. plans for withdrawal, but had attempted to speed up the timetable. At the same time, the associated Egyptian statement -- "We noted from the outset that the Canadian Government took an unfriendly position towards my Government" -- is probably the key to the Egyptian request. It was later reported by Mr. John Starnes, Canadian ambassador in Cairo, that the Egyptian request had been conceived in a moment of emotional stress. Mr. Starnes speculated that when the demand was made it may have seemed to the Egyptian Government that Egypt was losing her control of the initiative.¹⁵⁵ Seen in this manner, the demand appears as a facet of the Egyptian diplomatic offensive.

68. It is clear that the last thing the United Nations Secretariat wanted was to lose the logistic and air support for UNEF, provided by the Canadian contingent. If the specious argument concerning mob hatred had been left out of the Egyptian note the request would have been rejected -- or so we are led to believe in U Thant's note

of 29 May.

The Secretary-General wishes to emphasize what has been stated ... orally by Dr. Bunche, that the sole basis for his decision to accelerate the evacuation of the Canadian contingent of UNEF was the fear expressed by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic of possible hostile reactions on the part of the population of his country to the continued presence of Canadian troops and the Secretary-General's unwillingness to expose the Canadian troops to this risk....¹⁵⁶

The immediate result of rejecting the note would have been that the existing uncertainties as to place, time and method of departure would have persisted. But if the new development was thus fortunate for Canada, it was not fortunate for any other nation. If the new Egyptian demand had not been made the Canadian government might have been forced to withdraw its forces unilaterally without regard for the overall plan -- and there might well have been as a result comparisons with "perfidious Albion". On the other hand the Secretary-General might have accepted a Canadian plan for swifter evacuation, and have used Canadian airlift for the purpose. What would the Egyptian reaction have been to such a development? On the surface, Egypt should have been well-satisfied. The Canadian ambassador reported from Cairo on 30 May that "the uncharitable thought had crossed my mind that the U.A.R. Governments efforts to have the Canadian contingent removed so quickly might not have been unrelated to their realization that early removal of the Canadian contingent might make control of equipment and stores a good deal more difficult. ..."¹⁵⁷ As it was, she gave Canada --- and Canada alone --- the means of timely withdrawal. The method by which this was done merely added fuel to the fire of Arab-Israeli

tension, and thus in all likelihood made it possible for the "war" party in Israel to prevail over those who favoured moderation. Had Egyptian policy followed a more moderate course in this instance it is possible that hostilities would have been delayed at least until all United Nations Forces could have been withdrawn -- including the Indian contingent which, although regarded with favour by Egypt, suffered more than any other contingent from the war.

The Crystallisation of Canadian Plans

69. The new Egyptian demand was made known to C.F.H.Q. at 1300 hours, (Ottawa time), on 27 May.¹⁵⁸ While the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs were being informed, and the latter was making his way to Ottawa from his constituency in Windsor, Ontario,¹⁵⁹ the Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of Operations, Air Vice-Marshal F.W. Ball, concerted efforts to initiate an air-lift with the least possible delay. Air Marshal Sharp directed Air Commodore A.H. Morrison, Chief of Staff Operations, at Air Transport Command, to augment the C130 (Hercules) detachment in Europe; to move C130s presently on standby in Europe to Pisa; and to carry out executive action for withdrawal on the authority either of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff or the Director of Operations.¹⁶⁰

70. At the same time the Director of Operations telephoned Commodore Pickford at Maritime Command. After explaining the U.A.R.' demand, Colonel Parker suggested it was unlikely that the ships designated for Operation "Leaven" would pass beyond Gibraltar.¹⁶¹ It was less than an hour since a task group commander had been named for the

operation.¹⁶² Captain R.A. Creery, the commander of the 5th Escort Squadron, (now in the third or "combat ready" phase of the "cyclic system") had been selected instead of Commodore R.H. Leir, Senior Canadian Officer Afloat, who had been proposed in the original plan of 19 May. Captain Creery was supposed to report to Ottawa for a briefing and then fly in an Argus aircraft to Malta. In the aircraft with Captain Creery would go the draft of officers and men to bring Chaudiere's ship's company up to an operational complement.¹⁶³ The question of whether to carry out these plans was now discussed. Later in the afternoon, it was agreed to hold the sailing of Annapolis indefinitely and not to bring Captain Creery to Ottawa. But almost immediately this decision, concerning Captain Creery, was reversed.¹⁶⁴ When the official wording of the demand was read there was seen to be an ambiguity. U Thant had been urged "to order complete withdrawal and departure immediately and not later than 48 hours after ..." he received the cable. This could have meant that even if the order was given the withdrawal itself might not be immediate. Thus Captain Creery was ordered to come to Ottawa on Monday 29 May, and the Argus flight to Malta was ordered delayed for 24 hours.¹⁶⁵

71. Once again, there was a painful time lag in the reaction from the field. On Saturday evening, 27 May, two messages were received from Colonel Power. The first acknowledged a message of 25 May and listed new departure dates which bore no relation to plans for acceleration. This message took seven hours to reach Ottawa.¹⁶⁶ The second message acknowledged the information sent from Ottawa in the early hours of the morning. Here, the time lag was

fifteen hours between Ottawa and Gaza, and something less than four hours for the answering message.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, even the information that Colonel Power thought 9 June a reasonable target date was irrelevant to the new situation. Well before this message was received all Canadian commands had been officially briefed that withdrawal would probably take place from El Arish by airlift as soon as possible.¹⁶⁸

72. However, late on Saturday night, 27 May, Colonel Power was informed by General Rikhye of the new Egyptian demand.¹⁶⁹ Within an hour and a half of the briefing held at 0800 hours (Gaza time), on Sunday morning, an evacuation plan to meet the demand was submitted to C.F.H.Q. This message, relayed through 115 A.T.U., arrived in Ottawa some three hours later. Colonel Power estimated between 20 and 25 Hercules loads would be needed to evacuate personnel and cargo. He suggested the evacuation should begin on 30 May. According to this message the aircraft would be permitted to make use of El Arish.¹⁷⁰ The availability of El Arish was certainly welcome news, and it appeared to be confirmed by information from New York.¹⁷¹ Until official sanction was received from the United Nations, the Director of Operations decided not to proceed with an evacuation from El Arish,¹⁷² but shortly after noon (Ottawa time) on Sunday the official message was received at New York.¹⁷³ On the other hand, Colonel Parker was disconcerted to learn that Air Transport Command's estimate of 11 flights was only half the requirement estimated by C.B.U. UNEF. He despatched a personal message to Colonel Power.

... 1. Confused by your est of 20-25 Herc loads. At 68 pers per AC each with 150 lbs baggage we figure only 11 or 12 loads therefore your figures must include much eqpt.

2. Our info is that you have very little Cdn owned eqpt worth salvaging.

3. In your reply ... pls spell out answer to this conundrum.¹⁷⁴

73. The reply¹⁷⁵ came back about nine hours later. The plan had been drawn up hurriedly, and could have been in error. But ten years' accumulation of regimental and unit equipment, and the opportunity to purchase the contents of institutes at reduced cost, had permitted an accumulation of over 100 tons of stores, which would be available for airlifting as soon as the operation began. If this material could not be taken out it would have to be left behind or destroyed. In a further message¹⁷⁶ the following itinerary was proposed:

| | | | |
|-----|--------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| (1) | 29 May | 100 passengers | 63 tons cargo |
| (2) | 30 May | 408 passengers | 20 tons cargo |
| (3) | 31 May | ----- | 84 tons cargo |
| (4) | 1 Jun | 166 passengers | 10 tons cargo if necessary. |

Opposite this information in the copy of the message received in the Operations Centre at C.F.H.Q. an anonymous hand wrote in red ink "177 tons!!". The Vice Chief of Defence Staff ordered Colonel Parker to dispatch the following message to C.B.U. UNEF.

... est of 100 tons institute stores most disturbing. We have no intention of transporting bulk stores of assorted liquids or pianos or other furniture. What a man can carry in his baggage allotment is his business to decide but, bulk stores of canteen nature are not repeat not to be carried back. Same applies to barrack stores even if Cdn owned. Cost of transportation is just too great to justify. Must have detailed breakdown of any bulk cargo you propose to ship home by air. Do not repeat not start cargo on way to Canada without authority this H.Q.¹⁷⁷

Subsequently the misunderstanding which had caused this exchange was resolved. There was no intention to transfer bulk

canteen stocks, but it was planned to move, on a low priority, public and non public Canadian contingent stores and equipment that were needed by the Canadian contingent in UNFICYP to Cyprus.¹⁷⁸ C.F.H.Q. accordingly gave authority for one Hercules load of such cargo to be shipped to Cyprus, provided that this one load did not unduly delay the evacuation of personnel to Pisa.¹⁷⁹ In the end, three Hercules loads were required for the shuttle to Cyprus.¹⁸⁰

74. Evidently, the requirements for airlifting cargo were beyond expectations. This was partially owing to the urgency which now attended the evacuation. But it also betrayed a lack of knowledge in C.F.H.Q. as well as in Air Transport Command concerning the equipment which was owned by the Canadian contingent. It may even be said that the Commander of the Canadian contingent was not entirely aware of the equipment held, in that he did not submit an itemized account of the material to be airlifted until 29 May. This account¹⁸² specified only "hand baggage, MFO baggage, Contingent docus. and records". The Commander of 115 A.T.U. stated that an "amazing recovery" of equipment was achieved. Of an estimated inventory worth approximately \$1,000,000, items valued at \$125,000 and actually worth about \$50,000 had to be left behind. He described the operation as follows.

The first C130 arrived at 0930 local [29 May] configured for 68 passengers plus 5000 lbs of freight. No pallets* were available. It was found that all 5 aircraft

* To permit easy embarkation, disembarkation and compact storage of bulky stores, pallets provide a means of portable container which can be moved efficiently and rapidly after being packed.

in the air were configured similarly. It now became necessary to get people out even faster than planned if the aircraft space was to be utilized. Every available body who had his baggage at the airport was put on the first aircraft and Camp Rafah was requested to send passengers to fill the remaining C130s presently enroute. This procedure left us with a sparse handful of Service personnel to manhandle the equipment. On-site plans were to use the personnel to load 115 equipment on the first 4 aircraft and send the personnel out on the last two.¹⁸² In spite of the problems, the majority of RCAF equipment was moved to the airport for transportation when space became available.¹⁸³

Several major items of non-public funds equipment were sent to Cyprus,¹⁸⁴ together with aircraft towing tractors.¹⁸⁵

75. In other respects the withdrawal now became a clear-cut airlift operation. As soon as C.B.U. UNEF's plan was received on Sunday morning, 28 May, steps were taken to effect the necessary flight-planning and to cancel Operation Leaven.¹⁸⁶ The date of commencement was advanced from 30 May to 29 May when the United Nations secretariat asked if this would be possible, and when it was confirmed that El Arish would be available on that date.¹⁸⁷ At 1920 hours (Ottawa time) on 28 May the Chief of the Defence Staff ordered that the withdrawal of Canadian Forces in UNEF was to commence immediately.¹⁸⁸

The Organization of the Airlift

76. To understand the organization of the airlift it is necessary to retrace our steps to the beginning of the crisis. Reference has already been made to two different plans prepared by Air Transport Command. The first of these was submitted on 18 May,¹⁸⁹ on the assumption that 3,200 troops with 100 pounds of baggage each, as well as 75,000 pounds of emergency rations, would have to be airlifted from El Arish to a safe haven. Ten Hercules and two Yukon aircraft were to be

used, and the evacuation was expected to take a total time of three and a half days from the executive order, if a safe haven could be ensured at El Adem, in Libya, or at Iraklion or Saudha Bay, in Crete. This time would include 48 hours' notice to commence evacuation and a further 36 hours to complete the 50 programmed sorties. If, instead of these three safe havens, it was necessary to rely on Pisa, Italy, the total time required would be increased to five days. The further evacuation of the Canadian contingent to Canada was expected to take about three days, using four Yukon aircraft.

77. This plan was approved on 19 May.¹⁹⁰ The choice of a safe haven was governed by the availability of facilities and by political considerations. When the island of Crete was suggested, nothing but aversion to the idea was displayed in C.F.H.Q. It was desirable, if not essential, to select an airport where political and diplomatic considerations would not be liable to interfere with flying operations. Consequently, C.F.H.Q. selected El Adem, in Libya, as the preferred safe haven -- principally because there was a Royal Air Force Base there. The alternative was Pisa. It was not so close to El Arish, but like El Adem it was an airport already in frequent use for NATO and U.N. operations. It is important to observe that this withdrawal plan was approved only for "emergency" use.¹⁹¹ "Normal withdrawal is different", wrote a staff officer on his copy of the approval message. All the same, the support required was every bit as extensive as if the plan had been for a "normal" operation.

78. The requirements for this plan are of particular interest because they are typical, and would apply to most airlift operations. In the first place, there would have to

be overflight clearances* of Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Libya and Crete. Suitable accommodation had to be prepared for up to 200 airforce personnel, for personnel being withdrawn, and for the administration of operation, maintenance and air movement support elements. Ground transportation required was one half-ton truck, two station wagons and three "econoline type" vehicles from local sources at the airport.

The fuel required¹⁹² was, at Pisa, 440,000 gallons of aviation gasoline at a delivery rate of 16,000 gallons per hour. At El Adem 210,000 gallons at a delivery rate of 12,000 gallons per hour were needed. Teletype and commercial telephone communications with Canada, 24-hour weather forecasting and aircrew briefing services, in-flight meals for aircrew and passengers, were added requirements. All these facilities were sufficient only if UNEF provided its own marshalling and emplaning organization at El Arish, and if Army personnel either from C.F.H.Q. or UNEF were totally responsible for housing, feeding and ground transportation of UNEF forces when they reached the safe haven airport.

* Aerial law stipulates that national sovereignty extends to the air space above national territory. Unscheduled flights through such air space, particularly by military aircraft, must first be approved by the nations concerned. Some countries give clearance with no reluctance. Others, especially among the nations here listed, France, are often slow to give clearance. This must always be a factor in the strategic planning of air-lift. For instance Britain cannot be sure of clearance across Africa. As Neville Brown points out in his Strategic Mobility (London, 1963)¹⁶² "Newly independent African states are already reluctant enough to grant airflight permission and this reluctance is likely to grow. Meanwhile, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa can be expected to relate their policy towards aerial transits to the attitude displayed by Anglo-American spokesmen in the United Nations towards their racial policies. The problem is intensified by the fact that the states concerned are never prepared to grant others general and unconditional over-flight permission. Separate applications have to be made for each specific occasion."

79. In the period of calm which prevailed over the weekend no more was heard concerning this plan. But on Tuesday, 23 May, a revival of activity was heralded by the first message concerning the crisis between C.F.H.Q. and Air Transport Command in nearly four days.¹⁹³ The plan was then reviewed and on Wednesday morning certain modifications were proposed. The U.N. plan for withdrawal made it both inconvenient and unnecessary to evacuate the entire force. Air Transport Command was therefore ordered to prepare to withdraw about 740 Canadian personnel, and to expect about 12 hours' notice. Two Hercules were to be stationed at Pisa to be on 12 hours' standby effective 25 May. The alternative to Pisa was now to be another airport in Italy which was not specified,¹⁹⁴ and in accordance with U.N. and Egyptian desires the point of departure from Egypt was to be Port Said.¹⁹⁵

80. The alterations to Air Transport Command's original assumptions were fairly significant. Instead of a 545 mile flight from El Arish to El Adem, there was a 1475 mile flight from Port Said to Pisa. Port Said lacked some of the modern facilities available at El Arish. There was still no definite timetable to work on, while the following information must have enlivened the day of several staff officers: "Withdrawal plan still not available in NY but Secretariat informs us emergency plan is to use barges."¹⁹⁶ Working on the changed assumption Air Transport Command produced the plan for evacuation from Port Said which has already been described in paragraph 61.

81. Air Transport Command now began to adjust its operations for the airlift. A detachment under Wing Commander J.C. Wynn was set up at Pisa. Detachments at Lahr and Soellingen in Germany were also involved, since it was from

detachments of 435 and 436 squadrons at these bases that the first Hercules aircraft were to be procured; and subsequent aircraft would be routed through Lahr to Pisa. Scheduled flights were held back until the requirement of aircraft could be forecast accurately. Detailed flight planning was initiated at Air Transport Command.¹⁹⁷

82. By 27 May, with the new Egyptian demand for immediate Canadian withdrawal, the number of Hercules aircraft at Pisa was increased to six with 12 crews, a 14-man Mobile Air Movement Section (MAMS) team, two operations officers and 27 servicing personnel. Two "econoline" vehicles were being sent to the detachment, and a Yukon with two crews was to be dispatched to Pisa from Munich "when and if first Hercules departs Pisa on ops."¹⁹⁸ At this stage a new obstacle was encountered. Overflight clearances, always a problem, became difficult to obtain over the weekend. Eventually clearances were arranged through the Air Division in Germany, where the responsible staff officers had to be contacted at their residences, across the border in France.¹⁹⁹

83. On 28 May the point of departure was changed once again, when Egypt made El Arish available to the Canadian contingent for the withdrawal. Air Transport Command anticipated that General Allard would give the executive order that evening, and instructed Wing Commander Wynn to prepare for the first Hercules departure for El Arish at 0030 hours G.M.T. The date of commencement was left open, but it was considered that it would probably be 29 May.²⁰⁰ Following the first flight there were to be six subsequent flights daily, spaced one and a half hours apart. Five and a half hours flying time each way, and a one hour "turn around",

were estimated. Three Yukon flights daily would be provided,* to coincide with Hercules arrivals at Pisa and thus to permit immediate onward passage to Canada for UNEF personnel. The problem of overflight clearances, however, still gave cause for concern. Wing Commander Wynn later reported:

While I appreciate that the CHQ was doing all possible to expedite overflight clearances the picture at Pisa was most confusing. The first Yukon captain was briefed in Lahr to the effect that I would arrange his France overflight clearance. Of course I had no facility to do this and it made for a frustrating five hours trying to communicate with ATOC [Air Traffic Operations Centre] and/or Lahr. In the end I routed him over Swiss territory. While these observations seem insignificant in the overall picture, you will appreciate that this type of problem certainly adds to the confusion and frustration. I am sure that some more readily controllable means of obtaining these clearances is possible.²⁰¹

In fact, the French clearances were not received until nearly eleven o'clock (Ottawa time) on the morning of 29 May.²⁰²

In addition to this problem the detachment at Pisa was plagued with communications difficulties. The equipment available was inadequate, commercial telephone was "quite useless for both European and Trans Atlantic calls", U.N. Telex was available only by a "happy accident".²⁰³ The detachment commander had to solve this problem with a certain amount of ingenuity. Among the items of equipment brought into Pisa was a high-frequency single side-band set -- the 618(T) -- borrowed from Canadian Forces Base, Uplands. Not until the second day of the airlift could it be put into operation, and even then

* In the event, only two Yukon flights daily were provided.
(para. 93 below)

only on a "pirate" basis. Although far from ideal, (it weighed a staggering 900 pounds), it enabled the Pisa detachment to set up a relay system with 115 A.T.U. at El Arish so that airborne Hercules aircraft could report incoming loads, and thus permit planning for the loading of Yukon aircraft bound for Trenton. The message service between Gaza and Pisa was slow, and could not be relied on, so that as Wing-Commander Wynn observed, "Without the 618(T) portable rig we would have been in trouble." Thus it is true to say that there was never a direct rear radio link between El Arish and Air Transport Command. On 24 May it had been agreed that since 115 A.T.U. sometimes received messages critically late when they were addressed to C.B.U. in Rafah, all messages for the action of 115 A.T.U. should include Air Transport Command as an information addressee. But it was only when the "Heath Robinson" arrangement described above was put into effect that Air Transport Command could have bypassed the slow system of normal routing procedures.²⁰⁴ On the other hand, thanks to the routing of Telex by way of Four Wing at Lahr, when General Allard gave the order to begin the evacuation, there was but an hour's delay before the first aircraft took off from Pisa, bound for El Arish.²⁰⁵

Completion of the Canadian Withdrawal
from Egypt 29-31 May

84. The War Diaries of the Canadian Base Unit, and the messages that originated from Camp Rafah in the months and weeks preceding the withdrawal, give no indication that an emergency evacuation was expected. In a very real way, Rafah may be compared to the eye of a hurricane. A storm was hatched beyond the horizon of the Canadian camp, and as momentum increased the storm gathered intensity. In the meanwhile,

Rafah enjoyed a deceptive calm and the skies above, as in the centre of a tropical storm, remained unclouded. When the captain of a ship cannot avoid being caught in the eye of a hurricane, he must seek to steer his ship to safety through the least dangerous quarter of the storm. If he is fortunate, and has the necessary skill, he may succeed in this task with little or no damage to his craft. The analogy may be carried further. If he is subject to the demands of operational requirements circumstances may force the captain to press on through the area of least safety. If his ship is part of a naval formation which must adhere to a certain course and speed, only the specific permission of his commander will release him from the obligations of operational necessity to look to the safety of his ship. But in the last resort, he will always be justified in preserving the lives of his ship's company. Thus he must always be ready at a moment's notice to take the course which will satisfy the exacting demands of his profession to the highest degree. This was the position of the Commander of the Canadian contingent on 27 May.

85. When the "moment of truth" arrived, between 5 and 10 June, the storm burst upon the Gaza Strip, and particularly upon Camp Rafah.²⁰⁶ The Canadian Base Unit was spared the consequences of this situation for reasons that have already been explained. The speed and efficiency of the evacuation between 27 May -- when the first indication was given to the Commanders of C.B.U. and 115 A.T.U. -- and 31 May, are testimony to the operational readiness of the Canadian contingent. The manner in which obstacles were overcome reveals both the adaptability and efficiency of the organization.

86. Two main difficulties faced Colonel Power. The first was the conflicting nature of his primary objectives, which were to turn over the support function of the Canadian Base Unit to United Nation Authorities, and to transfer 600 men from Rafah to El Arish as quickly as possible. The second difficulty lay in the notorious restrictions placed upon the freedom of movement of UNEF. Similar difficulties affected Wing Commander Fitzsimmons, although to a lesser degree.

87. Examples of interference with the movement of Canadian forces in Egypt were legion. It is necessary to illustrate the nature of the problem with a few selected incidents. The first of these occurred on the evening of 23 May. Colonel Power, together with officers of several other contingents, were invited to a dinner given by the Egyptian Governor-General at Gaza. On the return trip to Rafah a road-block at Deir el Balah prevented Colonel Power from proceeding any further. Contact was made with the U.A.R. Liaison Staff, and while an officer from the staff was on his way to the scene all the other vehicles returning from the reception began to form up behind that of Colonel Power. In spite of all manner of persuasion, nothing would convince the authorities to lift the roadblock. Indeed, they feared that unless the vehicles left, the Egyptian troops might open fire, so little control did the Egyptian officers claim to have over their men. The cars, in convoy, retired to the officers mess of the Indian contingent nearby, whereupon it was found possible to lift the roadblock, and the "convoy" proceeded uneventfully to Rafah with an escort provided by the U.A.R. ²⁰⁷

88. The second incident occurred on Saturday, 27 May. Wing Commander Fitzsimmons was stopped 26 times between Rafah

and El Arish. His own description of the experience is noteworthy.

... Tanks and heavy equipment moving eastward filled the road and there could be little doubt at this stage that the UAR was prepared for war. At each stop the attitude of insistence on passage to return as Commander of a unit was adopted and after much dropping of high ranking military names and loud talking passage was reluctantly granted. The road blocks were manned by ranks varying from private to brigadier [and] the 45 kilometer journey took 2 1/2 hours.²⁰⁸

89. The third incident was at a much more critical time and really involved a series of interventions or mishaps. On Sunday, 28 May, it was necessary to dispatch a convoy of 30 trucks to El Arish with equipment for airlift to Cyprus and Pisa. After a minor delay this convoy proceeded at about two o'clock in the afternoon (local time).²⁰⁹ During the afternoon one of the trucks in the returning convoy caught fire and had to be abandoned.²¹⁰ On Monday morning, 29 May, at the very time when personnel were urgently needed at El Arish, the Egyptian authorities forbade the movement of any Canadian traffic outside the gates of Camp Rafah.²¹¹ When traffic finally started moving on Monday afternoon, three Canadian soldiers were injured in a shooting accident in one of the trucks bound for El Arish.²¹²

90. Even if such events seemed to be conspiring to frustrate the operation, in fact it was possible to accept the setbacks with some aplomb. Over the years, freedom of movement had been so restricted that the U.N. forces had learned to endure the irritations. Not only this, but relations with the U.A.R. Liaison Staff were good, and methods of clearing roads as quickly as possible had been developed by experience.²¹³ A telephone call to the U.A.R. Liaison Staff would be followed by the provision of an official escort

that was usually sufficient to ensure that the promised road clearance would be guaranteed.

91. The problem of handing over the support function was solved by forethought. Staff organization had resulted in the return of non-Canadian equipment to Ordnance Stores, and all that was required was to place these in the hands of the U.N. Field Service.²¹⁴ Unfortunately, the loss of Canadian Base Unit personnel was virtually irreparable and the subsequent withdrawal of other contingents was consequently hampered.²¹⁵ At Camp Marina, as at Camp Rafah, there was much equipment to be returned to Canada or transferred to Cyprus. This required long hours of hard work -- but at least this was better for morale than being left in a state of limbo. Packing at Camp Marina was started on 28 May, and involved 12 to 14 hours work each day for all personnel. At 0030 hours on 29 May the departure time was advanced from the evening of 31 May to 1700 hours on 29 May. The men were allowed to enjoy their rest until 0400 hours. At that time they were informed of the new plan, and were at work by 0500 hours. The manner in which these men and the equipment were evacuated has already been described.²¹⁶ By 1700 hours, only two transportation technicians of 115 A.T.U. were left in Camp Marina -- the remaining 94 had been evacuated together with 194 men from Camp Rafah.²¹⁷

92. The suggestion was put forward at about this time that round-the-clock operations be carried out. Because United Nations authorities considered this "touchy and dangerous" the idea was not pursued any further.²¹⁸ Nevertheless, all Canadian personnel, and nearly all items of equipment, were withdrawn from Egypt by the evening of 31 May. The statistics of this operation, the detailed figures of which are laid out

in Appendix "E", provide the most eloquent proof of success.²¹⁹ In approximately 25 working hours, eighteen flights of Hercules aircraft withdrew 700 men and 232,110 lbs. of equipment. The ultimate satisfaction lay in the fact that the Commander of the contingent, having obtained release from his other obligations, was able to withdraw his men without a fatal casualty and with relatively insignificant loss of equipment. He was the first to admit that the understanding of C.F.H.Q. staff officers played a large part in this success, and that Air Transport Command provided the visible means of success.²²⁰ But it should not be forgotten that preparedness in the field was an equally important factor.

Return to Canada and Completion of
the Withdrawal Operation

93. Once the evacuation from El Arish was underway, the important thing was to get most of the Canadian contingent back to Canada as soon as possible, particularly since there was no satisfactory accommodation in Pisa for personnel in transit.²²¹ Yukon flights were dispatched from Pisa only when they were loaded to capacity from incoming Hercules flights. On the first night there were more personnel than the Yukon flights could handle, so that 51 men from U.N. flight Six did not get away from Pisa until the evening of 30 May. They had been obliged to wait 23 hours in Pisa.²²² On the evening of 30 May there was a backlog of three men who had to wait nearly 22 hours at Pisa. With these exceptions, all personnel were airlifted out of Pisa by the two daily Yukon flights on the same day as their departure from El Arish. By 0845 hours (local time), 31 May, all these men had been returned to Canadian Forces Base, Trenton.^{222A}

94. There remained the problem of returning a backlog of 150,000 pounds of bulky cargo from Pisa to Trenton.²²³ A Hercules from 435 Squadron was ordered to provide cargo nets and pallets from Lahr²²⁴ on 1 June. With the aid of this equipment, the remainder of the cargo was withdrawn by a shuttle from Pisa to Trenton, using four Hercules aircraft.²²⁵ The last flight of this shuttle arrived in Trenton on 6 June -- bringing with it the last personnel and equipment belonging to the Pisa detachment.²²⁶

95. With the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June, there appeared to be a requirement for evacuating civilian personnel from the Middle East.²²⁷ The three Caribou aircraft from 115 A.T.U. had departed from Beirut on 3 June, and had reached Lahr on their return journey to Canada.²²⁸ A Hercules training flight was diverted to Cyprus and placed on 12 hours standby,²²⁹ while a charter plane would evacuate personnel to Cyprus from Lebanon. The plan for this operation, which never became necessary, was to evacuate civilians from Cyprus to Rome, where they would proceed to Canada in commercial aircraft. The Hercules was released from its vigil at Nicosia on 8 June.²³⁰

96. The last element of the Canadian contingent to UNEF returned to Canada on 20 June, when the three Caribou from 115 A.T.U. arrived in Trenton.²³¹ On 14 June a ministerial inquiry elicited from Air Transport Command²³² some of the statistics that are shown in Appendix "E". But even before this information became available, it was clear that Air Transport Command had proved its usefulness by retrieving the personnel of the Canadian contingent. As it has been demonstrated again and again in this report, the retrieval was by no means a foregone conclusion. In the eyes of the Government,

most of the credit was given to Air Transport Command. This is nowhere more evident than in the laudatory message sent by the Minister of National Defence on 8 June.

The Prime Minister has asked me to relay his congratulations to you for the exemplary manner in which A.T.C. completed our UNEF withdrawal. The way in which your command responded to this short notice operation and the manner in which you continued to meet your other commitments is something of which all Canadians have a right to be proud. Over the years A.T.C. has demonstrated initiative, imagination, flexibility and capability which is second to none. Your most recent operation has underlined this more firmly than ever. In our opinion A.T.C. sets a pace which is not degraded by short notice planning and implementation directives. We recognize clearly the example your airmen, N.C.O.'s and officers set under all circumstances and in particular during an emergency operation such as this. Canadians in all walks once again have been shown that A.T.C. is "versatile and ready".²³³

97. It was still necessary to organize the disbandment of the Canadian contingent. On 2 June the Director of Organization, Colonel J.O.A. Letellier, held a meeting to determine ways and means of achieving this object.²³⁴ Colonel Power estimated that a month would be required to complete the task. Thus the Comptroller General agreed to establish a Rear Party, Canadian Contingent UNEF, on 5 June, 1967. This included the Commander, Paymaster, Records Officer, Institutes Officer, Quartermaster, Administration Staff Officer and the four N.C.O.'s who were employed on these aspects of unit administration. Colonel Power returned to Beirut on 3 June in order to close out the contingent's bank account at Beruit, and to obtain receipts from the Commander of UNFICYP for the stores shuttled to Nicosia from El Arish.

98. At the same meeting Colonel Parker, Director of Operations, expressed his dissatisfaction concerning the information held on stores that Canadian contingents overseas possessed.

In [the] case of UNEF [state the Minutes of the Meeting] it was estimated at C.F.H.Q. that there would be somewhere in [the] nature of 10 tons of stores to be returned to Canada when in actual fact there were 116 tons not counting 3 Hercules loads shipped to Nicosia. DSupA [Director of Supply Administration] of C.T.S. [Chief of Technical Services] branch agreed, as a matter of priority, to obtain this information from other Overseas units such as UNFICYP, Tanzania and Ghana Training Teams, M.C.C.D. [Military Component Canadian Delegation] detachments, etc. and to work out a procedure for maintaining information up to date for planning purposes ... 235

99. On 16 August, 1967, Colonel Power, Wing Commander Fitzsimmons and Wing Commander Wynn attended the Staff Meeting of the Chief of Defence Staff. After hearing the reports of these officers, General Allard stated that" ... the operation had illuminated several weaknesses in the C.F.H.Q. organizational structure and that steps had been taken to remedy these deficiencies. The problems created by faulty communications, the split command, the difficulties of control experienced by C.F.H.Q. were recognized and corrective action had been initiated." The important statement was also made that

... The operation illustrated conclusively that the act of placing troops under the control of other than Canadian authority does not alter basic national responsibility which must be retained to secure their safety, proper direction, and to render them assistance when needed. 236

Withdrawal of the Remainder of UNEF²³⁷

100. No sooner had the Canadian Base Unit left Camp Rafah than looting by civilian inhabitants of the region began, while work and duties in the camp ceased. Brazilian troops were able to restore order to the situation in about

two days and most United Nations' property had been collected together before fighting broke out. The loss of air support was most inconvenient to the Force. A Misrair Antonov 24-B was obtained on charter but was only able to make three flights, on 2, 3 and 4 June, before the fighting broke out. Thereafter, UNEF had no air support.

101. As soon as the fighting started on 5 June the withdrawal of UNEF had to be stopped. Forces were concentrated at Camp Hill 88, Camp Delhi, Camp Rafah, and El Arish. An advance party of the Swedish battalion, with all their heavy baggage, had left by train for Port Said on the evening of 4 June. About half the Yugoslav battalion had left for home on 3 and 4 June. The Secretary-General issued personal appeals to the belligerents to ensure the safety of UNEF personnel and installations, but only Camp Tre Kroner escaped Israeli fire during the fighting. This was the area selected by General Rikhye for the concentration and embarkation of UNEF personnel, and at his request the U.A.R. had removed Egyptian troops from the area.

102. General Rikhye's emergency evacuation plan was to arrange for the immediate evacuation of the Force by ship from the Gaza beaches. The U.A.R. authorities were apparently willing to help in such an evacuation, but by 6 June Israeli authorities had taken over control. This resulted in arranging the evacuation of UNEF by sea from Ashdod, in Israel.

While it was preferable for UNEF to embark from Gaza, [states the official report] there were a number of factors militating against it. The Israel Army had yet to clear the northern part of the town, including the embarkation area. It was known that a number of Arab armed personnel, after discarding their uniforms but still retaining their

weapons, had disappeared among the local population in the area including the large refugee camp in the vicinity. All the motor boats and lighters had disappeared, and the fishermen remained in their homes and were inaccessible.²³⁸

103. Some of the experiences of the Indian and Brazilian battalions during the period of hostilities provide an indication of what the Canadian contingent might have endured if it had not been evacuated before the fighting began. Early on 5 June a supply convoy of the Indian battalion, although unmistakeably identified with U.N. markings, was attacked by Israeli aircraft, tanks and machine guns on the road between Rafah and Deir el Balah. Five Indian soldiers were killed. At about the same time the Indian companies located at Camps Chandigarh and Lucknow were ordered to withdraw to Deir el Balah. U.A.R. troops had moved away from the area, so that the Indian soldiers taking cover in trenches were directly confronted by Israeli tanks. In the afternoon, at Camp Delhi, Egyptian mortar fire brought down Israeli counter-mortar fire that killed three Indian soldiers and wounded 14 others. General Rikhye ordered the Indian battalion to withdraw to the beach, but the order could not be carried out because of continuous heavy shelling and mortaring in the area. The next morning an Indian officer evacuating two seriously wounded men to the hospital in Gaza ran over a mine, so that all three were killed. During the shelling of Gaza on 6 June three more Indian soldiers were killed, and two more were wounded. Six other Indian soldiers were wounded during the fighting, bringing the total of Indian casualties to 14 killed and 20 wounded.

104. The experience of the Brazilian battalion, which had taken over from the Canadians at Rafah, was described as follows in the Secretary-General's report of 12 July.

99. On 5 June, at 1130 hours, artillery fire was heard two to three kilometres from Rafah Camp. At 1135 hours Israel Defence Forces aircraft were bombing areas close to the camp, and from 1205 to 1600 hours there was an exchange of small arms fire outside the camp. One Brazilian soldier was killed by machine-gun fire in the Brazilian main camp at Rafah during this period. At 1610 hours the camp came under artillery fire. Between 1610 and 1810 hours large concentrations of troops and the landing of helicopters were observed near the camp. At 1810 hours the camp came under artillery and tank fire, and by 1900 hours Israel Defence Force tanks were inside the camp firing on the local UNEF civilian employees. By 2000 hours fighting in the area had stopped.

100. The Israel forces, on arrival in Camp Rafah, separated the United Nations international and military personnel from the United Nations local civilian staff. An Israel officer ordered the United Nations international and military staff, who had identified themselves as such, to lie on the ground where they remained until the morning of 6 June. Only the personnel of the Norwegian hospital unit and the patients there were unmolested. The commanding officer of the Norwegian hospital unit succeeded in providing blankets to the UNEF group who were forced to spend the night on the sand in the open without food and water. On 6 June, at about 0900 hours, the Israel officer in charge allowed this group to return to its normal quarters.

CONCLUSIONS

105. The outstanding feature of the withdrawal of UNEF is the complexity of the problems that have been raised. There have been several articles published concerning the withdrawal, which, because the sources used for this account were not available to the authors, have been restricted to fairly general conclusions. Some conclusions have been drawn by Canadian military authorities concerning the composition and equipping of forces.²³⁹ These conclusions have been based on reports submitted immediately after the event by various unit commanders and staff officers.²⁴⁰ The action that was taken as a result of these reports was certainly necessary -- but it must still be placed firmly in the category of first aid. The conclusions that are to follow may offer a fresh analysis, "stirring dull roots with spring rain".

Incompatibility of National with International Plans

106. As long as the international character of UNEF was respected, it was extremely difficult to co-ordinate national planning for withdrawal with the plans drawn up by the United Nations. Once the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent could be undertaken without regard for the requirements of UNEF as a whole, the operation was completed with relative ease and efficiency. It is evident, therefore, that the physical requirements for airlifting such a force can be met. On the other hand, political considerations in the crisis of 1967 added a new dimension to the situation -- a dimension that apparently had not been foreseen.* Previous experience, particularly in Egypt, the Congo and Cyprus, had indicated the ability of Air Transport Command and Maritime Command to conduct efficient airlift and sealift operations. A high degree of strategic mobility could then be said to exist in the Canadian forces. In 1967, however, a Canadian contingent of battalion size nearly found itself stranded between two active belligerents -- all the other contingents did become stranded, and some of them suffered needless casualties as a result. As far as the Canadians were concerned, it appeared for a time that Canadian military aircraft would not be allowed to land in Egypt. When this difficulty was overcome,

* The 1964 White Paper on Defence states in part (p.15): "The success of United Nations peace-keeping operations may depend upon the speed with which they can be established on the ground. Once there, they may be required to exercise authority with limited personnel in broad areas. Thus, there is a need for mobility as regards deployment, method of operation and logistic support. In most situations which can be foreseen, there is likely to be a need for highly mobile forces for ground observation, air surveillance, rapid transportation and reliable communications. These are among the United Nations requirements which Canadian forces have helped to meet in the past. [Author's italics]

Basic Assumptions Underlying National Plans.

108. It is clear that the government believed that the United Nations, rather than the host country, would impose the time and the terms of withdrawing UNEF. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated in the House, this rested upon the assumption that a limitation had been imposed upon Egyptian sovereignty.²⁴¹ As we have seen, this presupposed a consensus that did not exist, and by the evening of 19 May it was no longer possible to maintain this point of view. Thus the entire basis of national planning for withdrawal was undermined. If it had been possible to uphold the right of the United Nations to negotiate the terms of withdrawal the evacuation would have taken place in a leisurely fashion, under conditions stable enough to ensure the use of El Arish airfield for U.N. airlift operations. Thus a second assumption, that suitable airfields would be available,²⁴² followed naturally upon the first. This was fundamental to the preservation of strategic mobility. The third assumption, evident not only from the Canadian cabinet decision of 26 May, to demand accelerated evacuation of Canadian forces, but also from the withdrawal plan authorized by General Walsh in 1964, as well as the airlift plans drawn up during the crisis, was that withdrawal would be accomplished under peaceful conditions. This assumption was shared by UNEF headquarters, where even an emergency evacuation was only considered feasible for small parties of men unhampered by interference of any sort.²⁴³ In any case, the Canadian government could hardly authorize an emergency evacuation plan for the Canadian contingent unless it was also approved by United Nations authorities.²⁴⁴ General Burns made this clear in 1959.²⁴⁵ And as late as 24 May, 1967,

the Prime Minister continued to emphasize that the withdrawal would be conducted in accordance with United Nations plans. At this time however he made the important stipulation that certain national plans were now being inaugurated, only to be implemented "if the roof fell in".²⁴⁶ This was very different language from that held by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on 19 May, when it was still possible that U Thant would take the Egyptian demand for withdrawal to the General Assembly. The limitation of Egyptian sovereignty, as seen by the Canadian government, had in fact led to the third and final assumption, as well as to the second.

109. As soon as it became clear that these assumptions did not necessarily reflect the situation, no time was lost in improvising withdrawal arrangements which would meet the requirements both of the United Nations and the Canadian contingent.²⁴⁷ The first ambitious proposal to evacuate the entire force from El Arish had to be discarded when it became obvious, as early as 19 May, not only that the United Nations Secretariat had no intention of utilizing R.C.A.F. aircraft, but also that El Arish would not be available. It was at this time that General Allard decided to prepare for a possible withdrawal by sea. As it was later explained, sealift was only to be employed if hostilities had commenced before the withdrawal took place.²⁴⁸ And it was only when hostilities appeared likely that Operation "Leaven" was set in motion. Thus as soon as the assumption that Egyptian sovereignty was limited had been proved incorrect, it was assumed that airfields would not necessarily be available and that withdrawal might have to be undertaken on an emergency basis after hostilities had broken out. The decisions made at this time bore close similarity, in fact, to the recommendations contained

in the paper submitted by General Allard and Air Vice-Marshal Smith in 1959. Everything possible was being done to preserve the strategic mobility of the Canadian contingent.

110. At this point, it will be recalled, two favourable developments took place. Egyptian authorities revealed that they would offer no objection to the landing of military aircraft in their territory, and although El Arish was definitely not to be available for airlift operations Port Said could be used instead. Even though this entailed a fairly long overland movement from Rafah, the airfield appeared to be suitable and there appeared to be ample time to complete the withdrawal. The time factor became more critical after 23 May, however, because the actions and statements of U.A.R. authorities deepened the crisis. In fact, the insistence of the Canadian government on a Canadian withdrawal by 9 June and the decision by U Thant to evacuate the Air Transport Unit by June would only have resulted in a partial withdrawal before the six-day war began.²⁴⁹ In other words, the ability to preserve strategic mobility had passed out of the hands of the Canadian government. It was only the unexpected Egyptian demand for immediate Canadian withdrawal on 27 May that relieved the Commander of the Canadian contingent from his obligations to UNEF, and made a successful withdrawal possible under peaceful conditions, from the most suitable airfield. But for this, Canada would have been in the unenviable position of a man who owns a car for which there are no roads - of an eskimo with an electric refrigerator in his igloo.

111. It may be said with some truth, then, that the withdrawal of UNEF was in fact like all other U.N. peace-keeping operations - unpredictable and unique. As U Thant so clearly

stated to the U.N. General Assembly, peace-keeping operations cannot be planned like ordinary military operations. The Canadian doctrine as indicated in the paper cited in paragraph 33 also emphasises the fact that no two peace-keeping operations are alike. In the case of UNEF, two main factors prevented the preparation of an operation order for withdrawal which could have been put into effect as soon as it was needed. The first of these factors was the inability of Canadian military authorities to work in conjunction with U.N. military authorities. There was no military staff at U.N. Headquarters, and no agreement that would permit direct liaison between UNEF Headquarters and Canadian Defence Headquarters. The second factor was the requirement to keep all contingency planning for withdrawal -- whether deliberate or in an emergency -- at the verbal level. True, General Walsh in 1964 did authorize the preparation of a written plan for withdrawal of the Canadian contingent by R.C.A.F. airlift. But this was rationalized as a plan for unilateral withdrawal, in case such an eventuality should come about. It is noteworthy that in spite of General Allard's emphasis on the need for sealift if hostilities broke out, it is not at all clear that any officer in the R.C.N. was aware that such a specific role had been considered for the navy. Since 1963 joint army and navy exercises had been conducted on a regular basis, but the withdrawal of troops and equipment across open beaches had not been a feature of these exercises. Thus, even though Canadian military authorities, in the time-honoured custom of the profession of arms, expected the worst and tried to prepare for the worst, they could only be prepared for a situation that met the basic assumptions already defined. It is therefore desirable to examine these assumptions in greater detail.

Discussion of Basic Assumptions (1)The Legal Status of UNEF

112. Because it was fundamental to strategic mobility, as the foregoing argument has suggested, the assumption that Egyptian sovereignty was limited could be regarded as the most dangerous assumption to make. Yet it is difficult to see how it could have been avoided. Both the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Canadian permanent representative in New York, pointed out that Canada's interpretation was well known and had not been openly challenged.²⁵⁰ At the same time, this interpretation had not received enthusiastic endorsement from all the member countries of UNEF. Moreover, the Secretary-General made it clear in his reports to the General Assembly and Security Council that he placed more reliance on the political realities than the legal validity of a peace-keeping mandate.

113. As there was no assurance in the legal status of the mandate for UNEF, it would have been desirable to establish a force organization better adapted to the political conditions governing its existence. This is not the place to launch into a full discussion of the various possible solutions to this question - so much more is involved than the aspects of one withdrawal operation. It is permissible to notice, however, that in the light of the experience of UNEF the oft-recurring suggestion for an International Military Secretariat (or Military Staff Committee) at United Nations Headquarters has once again been made.²⁵¹ One of the objections to such a secretariat is that it could easily be turned into a pro-Western "Washington Club", suspected by the Afro-Asian bloc as yet another tool of imperialism.²⁵² Certainly under the present Charter valid difficulties may be found in the

unsuitability of a Military Staff Committee under the terms of Chapter VI; while Chapter VII, governing enforcement operations, is treated with deep suspicion. It may be questioned whether a Military Staff Committee would have been able to ensure the preservation of the strategic mobility of UNEF under the circumstances of the 1967 crisis. It would not have been able to control the timing of the demand, although it probably would have ensured a more rapid withdrawal after the demand was made. Even this would not have guaranteed completion of the operation before hostilities began.

114. It has been suggested that the special relationship between Egypt, India and Yugoslavia allowed President Nasser to pave the way discreetly for a withdrawal demand that could not be evaded or resisted by the Secretary-General. This leads to the speculation that one important legal aspect of UNEF received insufficient attention. As Mr. Albert Legault has said in his Research on Peace-Keeping Operations:

Current Needs and Future Status:

... The recommendations of the Assembly in this field acquires binding force only for those Members who have decided to implement them, and only because they are sanctioned by international agreements concluded between the Organization and the host country on the one hand, and between the Organization and the countries participating in the operation on the other.²⁵³

If it did not have the unfortunate connotation that there was a mutual foe, one might refer to this concept as an alliance. There certainly was a special political relationship which had been neglected for too long. When on 17 and 18 May the Secretary-General called meetings of representatives for the Member countries of UNEF, and of the UNEF advisory committee, the political aspects of UNEF were frankly discussed at U.N. Headquarters for the first time in many years. One might

perhaps go so far as to say that the withdrawal of UNEF points the way to the establishment of a formally constituted political committee of this nature, with a technical sub-committee to consider military problems. This might be along the lines of the British Committee of Imperial Defence, or of more recent organizations developed in World War II and in NATO. The Committee of 33, now sitting at United Nations Headquarters, may indeed provide the necessary precedent for such an arrangement. At the same time, it is perhaps necessary to recall once more that conditions have always varied widely in different peace-keeping operations, and that first hand knowledge of the situation "in the field" -- as for instance demonstrated by the Canadian delegation in Cairo several months before the withdrawal -- is not always given timely consideration.

Discussion of Basic Assumptions (2)
The Availability of Airfields

115. In addition to what has already been said, some further comments on the availability of airfields are relevant at this point. Reference has already been made to the concern of General Allard and his staff when permission for Canadian military aircraft to land in Egypt was apparently withheld. Even when this restriction was lifted, the necessity of using Port Said instead of El Arish imposed a number of uncertainties concerning the effectiveness of an airlift operation. Similarly, the principle criterion of airports to be selected as possible safe havens was that they should be bases of the Royal Air Force or reliable NATO allies. Commonwealth and NATO ties apparently carried considerable weight in this second assumption. This in itself was unexceptionable, but the availability of a suitable airport within the host

country itself depended upon the willingness and ability of the host country to co-operate.²⁵⁴ That Egypt could provide the airfield at El Arish was fortunate indeed. Again, stress must be laid on the fact that neither the Canadian government, nor the United Nations, had any say in the matter. But, as it will be reiterated at a later point in the conclusions to this report, the satisfactory relations between local U.A.R. authorities and the staff of the Canadian contingent may have facilitated the co-operation experienced at El Arish.

Discussion of Basic Assumptions (3)
Withdrawal before the Outbreak of Hostilities

116. We can only guess at the sequence of events had Egypt not demanded immediate withdrawal of the Canadians on 27 May. It is likely that 115 A.T.U. would have been able to withdraw by 3 June. The withdrawal of the Canadian Base Unit, on the other hand, would have been subject to severe implications. We know that General Rikhye planned to evacuate the force over the beaches at Camp Tre Kroner, near Gaza, if hostilities should break out. His hopes for the success of the evacuation could not have been too sanguine, in view of the dismal prospects foreseen by both himself and General Burns. In any event, the plan was wrecked by the speed of the Israeli attack, and evacuation was finally arranged through the Israeli port of Ashdod.²⁵⁵ Had Operation "Leaven" gone forward, the ships presumably would have arrived off Gaza on 4 June. Early on 5 June the realization would suddenly have dawned that the Israeli forces had attacked. Rafah and El Arish were, as we know, subject to severe assaults on the first day. Canadian forces at these points would have been pinned down -- or if they moved to the embarkation point would

have been subject to the same sort of attack as those in which 14 Indians were killed and 20 wounded. Providing the Canadian contingent eventually arrived at the embarkation point, it may be accepted that they would have been taken off by helicopter to the waiting ships - although it is questionable whether much of their equipment could have been brought out to the beaches. As we have seen, it seems most unlikely that this could have come about until the permission of the Israeli authorities had been granted. Indeed the presence of Canadian warships lying offshore could well have invited Israeli air attack, such as that carried out on U.S.S. Liberty.²⁵⁶ Such an attack would have received a warm response. It is impossible to say whether answering fire from Canadian ships would have warned off attacking aircraft or, what is more likely, goaded the aircraft into even more determined attempts.

117. There is little to be gained from such speculation, except that it does point to some of the considerations that need to be borne in mind in a withdrawal of this nature. Unless clear agreement can be reached with both belligerents, an evacuation after hostilities have started may have to be conducted under fire. In Egypt in 1967, discretion was the better part of valour, and the sensible course of action was to submit to Israeli direction to embark at the Israeli port of Ashdod after the six-day war was over. In the meantime the Canadian contingent would have been cut off, Air Transport Command and the Royal Canadian Navy would have been frustrated and hamstrung, and once again the strategic mobility of the force would have been seriously in doubt.

Possibility of Alternate Withdrawal Plans

118. R.C.A.F. airlift was the one satisfactory method of

withdrawing the Canadian contingent. The alternative methods were commercial airlift, or, in the case of war, evacuation over the beaches and sealift in vessels of the R.C.N. The objections to commercial airlift have already been mentioned -- its expense and the impossibility of obtaining commercial aircraft if Egypt became a war zone. The timetable of the U.N. withdrawal plan, even when it involved the use of Canadian military aircraft for the Canadian contingent, became unacceptable after 25 May. The restrictions of movement that would have been imposed by war, and the probable unavailability of any Egyptian airfield in this event, led to the preparation for a sealift operation. All the evidence points to the likelihood that even this would have been impracticable. Even so, it seems profitable to consider the merits of a sealift operation.

119. The most obvious difference between airlift and sealift is speed, especially when great distances are involved. In the withdrawal of UNEF, once the airlift began and in spite of the delays that preceded it, the movement of about 700 men and 116 tons of equipment (even though spread over a three day period) was completed four days before the naval task group was expected to arrive. It might easily be concluded from this that sealift was not a practical alternative to airlift, especially since Egypt was able to cast such a sinister light upon the dispatch of Canadian warships to the Mediterranean. The usual feeling about sealift is that it is complementary to airlift when the size of forces and the weight of equipment exceeds the capacity of available aircraft. The most recent published analysis of strategic mobility concludes:

Because their operations are likely to be little affected by adverse political changes and because they alone are able to exploit the

possibilities latent in nuclear power, it appears that the relative merits of ships as against aircraft as the means of delivery of mobile forces are likely to increase. Their relationship will remain an essentially complementary one, however, as both became progressively more able to apply weight with speed and flexibility....²⁵⁷

120. It is important not to overlook the advantages which sealift did in fact possess for the withdrawal operation of 1967. The ocean transit of the naval task group did not require special clearances. Even the inhospitable attitude of a nation to the shipping of another country -- such as that of the United States to vessels of the Russian fishing fleet -- cannot prevent ocean transit. This must be qualified by the conclusion already reached that previous arrangements need to be made with potential belligerents before approaching the area of conflict,²⁵⁸ and the fact that the planned activities of the ships depended upon the use of Gibraltar and Malta, indicating, as in the airlift, the significance of Commonwealth and NATO ties. In other respects, ships are virtually self-sufficient. They possess their own world-wide communications facilities, subject to no frequency restriction while the ships are in the open sea. Ships provide their own accommodation and ship-to-shore transportation. Refuelling presents no problem when a mobile replenishment vessel is present. Embarkation of men and equipment can be accomplished in one rather than about eighteen operations. If airfields had not been available, and a secure approach to shore could have been guaranteed, sealift would undoubtedly have been a feasible alternative to airlift. In the question of guaranteeing security, however, a great deal of doubt must prevail. It is difficult to see how such a guarantee could have been obtained at short notice, and the withdrawal by sea would

probably have had to be conducted under fire, as already suggested. The Canadian ships, especially since they had no air support, would have been very hard pressed if they had been required to do this.

The Political and Military Implications of Withdrawal

121. From the foregoing analysis it is possible to conclude that the strategic mobility of peace-keeping contingents cannot be achieved by the structure and composition of military forces alone. It may even be argued that to succeed in achieving true strategic mobility on this basis demands the ability and avowed intention to use force. In some instances such a course might be justified. In other cases, it would destroy the very objective for which a peace-keeping force was created. Thus, in addition to maintaining air and sea transport capabilities, the effectiveness of national forces engaged in peace-keeping must depend on the ability to recognize the optimum moment for withdrawal -- just as timely deployment of forces is essential to the initial success of a peace-keeping operation. It is in this way that the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967 indicates an added dimension to the concept of strategic mobility. When the function of a force, and of a national contingent within that force, is not to engage in military operations but to preserve political stability, it must never be placed in a position where the only alternatives are the use of military force (either in a punitive manner, to suppress conflict, or in self-defence which might possibly become a punitive action) or ignominious flight. These were the choices in May, 1967. For several reasons - the seizure of the initiative by Egypt; the lack of effective co-ordination between Canadian and U.N. military authorities; the swift passage of

events -- the maintenance of strategic mobility passed out of the hands of the United Nations and Canada and into the hands, first of Egypt, then of Israel. This is a euphemistic way of saying that strategic mobility was destroyed, in the same way that it would be destroyed if a defeated army was allowed to return home by a magnanimous victor. As in the Arab-Israeli war there is a principle involved here -- what Michael Howard and Robert Hunter have described as "The Clausewitzian principle of Political Context." "The Israeli High Command" they go on to say "knew it was not operating in a political vacuum."²⁵⁹ This may also have been true of UNEF, but the difference lies in the inability of the United Nations to tailor its methods or its forces to the political realities which led to the withdrawal.

122. One implication of this discussion is that UNEF should have been withdrawn long before 1967. It would be presumptuous to suggest when the Force should have been withdrawn, and whether it should have been replaced with, for instance, an observer mission analogous to the Mixed Armistice Commission on the Israeli-Syrian border, without first undertaking a careful historical study of the entire Middle East question between 1957 and 1967. Another implication is that the Force, having remained in the area, should have received a mandate for imposing military sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Secretary-General, in a passage already quoted (paragraph 21 above), stated that this was out of the question. This appears to have been a realistic point of view. A further possibility is that rather than attempting complete withdrawal, the Force should have complied with the original demand to leave the International Frontier, falling back on positions in the

Gaza Strip in accordance with Emergency Plan Number One.

U Thant himself rejected this alternative because UNEF would be performing no useful function unless it was actually situated on the International Frontier and the Armistice Demarcation Line. This was a logical decision, especially when it is recalled that the U.N. concentration areas were in tactical positions that were vital also to the Egyptian defence, thus inevitably were to bring down Israeli fire - and when it is realized that these U.N. positions were only prepared for defence against looters.²⁶⁰ The decision is, nevertheless, open to criticism, because it underestimated the speed with which events were to unfold.

123. Clearly, the method of withdrawal did not and could not meet the demands of the situation. In order to maintain the dignity of the United Nations, the withdrawal resembled a stately progress rather than a military deployment. There were no doubt difficulties of organization and administration which contributed to this insistence upon avoiding haste. It cannot be denied, however, that in effect the withdrawal was in danger of being replaced by yet another alternative - destruction of the Force. Enjoying the advantage of hindsight, it seems incredible that over the years a more thoroughly prepared withdrawal plan had not been devised. An apt comparison might be to an ostrich who buries his head in the sand and only when disaster is imminent takes to his heels.

124. Of course, if UNEF had been adequately armed, it might have been able to give a good account of itself in self-defence. The objections to this were however carefully stated by Dag Hammerskjold in 1958.²⁶¹ More recently, a French observer has stated:

Once one allows units to make use of their weapons, force and constraint are being used. From this point of view, limitation to cases of self-defence would not appear to be by any means sufficient. In troubled times, nothing is simpler than to put oneself into a legitimate state of self-defence; all that is necessary is to intervene between two factions who are killing each other, be hit a few times, and start hitting back.²⁶²

There is not enough precision in the definition of the principle of self-defence to make the distinction between "enforcement" and "peace-keeping".* It is possible, then, that if UNEF had resisted the actions of either belligerent in 1967, the subsequent withdrawal would have been interpreted as a defeat far more detrimental to the future of peace-keeping than a purely passive withdrawal will prove to have been.²⁶⁴ Future peace-keeping operations will no doubt be carefully assessed for their political and military implications before Canadian forces are committed. In order to avoid choosing the least undesirable of two such bad choices as implicit or explicit defeat, it will be necessary to find more efficient and realistic methods of preserving the initiative of the United Nations. There seems to be a requirement for much research into this subject, and for the wide promulgation of the fruits of this research among all potential participants in peace-keeping - both military and civilian.

* Even the precision displayed in U Thant's definition of self-defence for U.N. forces in Cyprus was irrelevant for forces in Egypt. A swedish study has reached the conclusion that there did exist a system for deciding when force could be used by military units in the Middle East, but that the system had serious defects.²⁶³

125. These are possibilities that deserve reflection. Behind them lurks the uncomfortable feeling that UNEF was, after all, a huge gamble. Gambling with men's lives has long been the responsibility and pre-occupation of statesmen. There is no dishonour in submitting to the hazards of the game, as military men do. "Something," said Lord Nelson, "must be left to chance," It is perhaps incumbent on both military and civilian leaders to pay closer attention to the rules of the game. Detailed knowledge of the amount of material overseas would have simplified the task of planning for sealift and airlift. More complete and continuous liaison between C.F.H.Q. and the Department of External Affairs might well have alerted the Canadian defence staff to the possibility of withdrawal before the crisis broke. In short, too much was left to chance.

Difficulties Encountered

126. The difficulties encountered were of two kinds. If a peace-keeping operation can be described in the traditional language of the military, we may distinguish between strategic and tactical difficulties. Those which come under the heading of strategy include the political measures which governed the timing of withdrawal, and the military measures which governed the composition and structure of forces. These matters have already been discussed, and it is possible to state here that military leaders had little or no control over such considerations. Although it was on military advice that the Canadian contingent was mainly composed of logistics support units, such advice resulted from the political impossibility of maintaining a well-balanced battalion of all arms.²⁶⁵ It may further be said from the previous analysis of "strategic" difficulties that military and political considerations were

not sufficiently complementary to guarantee the achievement of political objectives with military forces. The assertion may be repeated here that although the composition and structure of the Canadian forces may be adequate for the support of peace-keeping operations, this alone is not enough to ensure the peaceful termination of a peace-keeping mission.

127. The considerations which come under the heading of tactics remain to be examined. Reverting once more to some of the earlier conclusions, it is necessary to emphasise the confusion born of the incompatibility of national and international plans. For officers in the field, the only standard operating procedure was provided by Emergency Plan Number One. This plan made no allowance for a withdrawal beyond the planned tactical positions in the Gaza Strip and at El Arish. The commander of UNEF, and his headquarters staff, did have in their possession a general outline for the total evacuation of the force. This was translated into an operation order and disseminated to contingent commanders within a few days of the withdrawal order being given. The resulting plan bore no relation to the capabilities of Canadian armed forces. This might not have been so embarrassing to Canadian forces if there had been better communications between the commander of the Canadian contingent and Canadian Forces Headquarters.

128. It must be confessed that command relationships within the Canadian forces tended to break down under pressure. The Commander of the Canadian contingent was made responsible directly to the Chief of Defence Staff as soon as the withdrawal operation became imminent. This was understandable, since the administrative order placing the land component of Canadian forces in Egypt and Cyprus under the orders of the

Commander, Mobile Command, had only been promulgated a few days previously. On the other hand, the Commander of 115 Air Transport Unit continued to enjoy a triple relationship -- being directly responsible to General Rikhye for air support of UNEF, to Colonel Power for matters concerning Canadian forces in Egypt, and to the Commander, Air Transport Command, for matters concerning air force personnel and matériel. This situation was severely criticized,²⁶⁶ but if Air Transport Command had been equipped with satisfactory global communication systems the special relationship between 115 A.T.U. and Air Transport Command could well have expedited the exchange of information and assisted the Commander of the Canadian contingent.

129. When it became necessary to employ Maritime Command new difficulties arose. In the first place, there was absolutely no link between Maritime Command, nor even the ships that were dispatched on 23 May, and the commander of the Canadian contingent. It is probable that a communications plan could have been drawn up to permit efficient exchange of information as the ships approached Egypt. On the other hand, Maritime Command was deprived of the inestimable benefit, enjoyed in particular by Air Transport Command, of a long-standing interest in the personnel and equipment now awaiting evacuation in Egypt. Over the years Maritime Command had not shared in the regular rotation of troops to the Middle East; no naval units or even personnel (with the odd exception) had shared in the contribution to UNEF since the completion of Operation "Rapid Step" in 1957. Nor was there the close relationship that had grown up between Air Transport Command and C.F.H.Q. through the Directorate of Movements. Moreover, none of the senior

officers at C.F.H.Q. directly concerned in the operation -- the Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Deputy Chief of Operations or Director of Operations -- were naval officers. Indeed, there were times when Maritime Command and C.F.H.Q. appeared to be working at cross-purposes. When it became necessary to replace H.M.C.S. Saguenay, the eventual decision not to sail H.M.C.S. Annapolis was reached by a most circuitous method, and had to be relayed to the Director of Operations by Commodore Pickford in Halifax after a telephone call between General Allard and Admiral O'Brien.²⁶⁷ This was certainly an unsatisfactory way of conducting business. A less cumbersome method might have been possible if decisions could have been made at a lower level. For instance, the naval officer reporting on Operation "Leaven" stated:

... This operation proved conclusively that there is a definite requirement for a staff in CFHQ constituted to act as the agency for translating the policy decisions of CDS to the Commands. This staff must be constituted so as to be available 24 hours a day.²⁶⁸

Elsewhere it has been suggested that preliminary moves of naval units should be made frequently "on a relatively low authority". This, it was pointed out, would not necessarily involve political authorities.²⁶⁹ It must be remembered that the staff of Maritime Command is always aware of the immediate capabilities and limitations of available naval units, to a much greater extent than headquarters staff in Ottawa; and that transportation is not, as in Air Transport Command, the main function of the navy. It may be suggested that if a naval officer of Flag rank, in close touch with the operational situation in the fleet, had held one of the vital operational posts in C.F.H.Q., decisions concerning the use of sealift could have been made with more dispatch and efficiency.

130. Common to all these difficulties was the inadequacy of communications. The regulations for UNEF stated that the Commander: "shall make appropriate arrangements for the inclusion in the Force of such supporting units as may be necessary to provide for the establishment, operation and maintenance of telecommunications and postal services within the area of operations and with the United Nations offices." The status of forces agreement further stipulated that the use of frequencies was subject to Article 45 of the International Telecommunication Convention.²⁷⁰ This was to deprive the Canadian contingent of a direct rear communication link with Canada - apart from a single "ham" set which could be used for personal messages between Canada and individual members of the contingent. All official traffic had to be relayed through the Egyptian system of radio, telephone, telegraph or other means of communication by arrangement with the appropriate Egyptian authorities. This resulted in the delays which have been described in the exchange of information between the Canadian contingent commander and C.F.H.Q. The difficulties of communications between Pisa and Canada may be traced in part to a similar restriction of frequency usage. In fact, the High Frequency communications established there did contravene international regulations.* The equipment available for establishing this net was moreover rather unwieldy - the weight of the equipment alone

* There was hardly time to establish formal clearance for the use of certain frequencies. However, ships visiting foreign ports often obtain such clearances as a matter of form through naval and diplomatic channels.

was 900 pounds. This caused justifiable incredulity, and resulted in a memorandum by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff explaining to General Allard that such a situation was unlikely to occur again owing to the acquisition of modern equipment capable of world-wide communications.²⁷¹

131. The delays in obtaining overflight clearances, particularly from France, compounded the problem caused by inadequate communications. Unlike Maritime Command, Air Transport Command was given the opportunity of resolving this and other problems. It is probable that the navy would have been able to overcome the "tactical" difficulties of command and control, especially since the questions of overflight clearances and frequency restrictions would not have affected the operations of the naval task group. Whether the fundamental problem of guaranteeing the security of the naval task group could have been solved is less certain. In any event, developments were to provide Air Transport Command with the opportunity to overcome the difficulties, and the good fortune to have the ultimate responsibility of evacuating the Canadian contingent.

Factors of Success

132. The incontinent Egyptian demand for immediate Canadian withdrawal opened the way for a successful evacuation. This was exactly the type of operation for which Air Transport Command was best fitted. At the same time, when selecting a safe haven, it was fortunate that the airfield chosen was able to provide United Nations "Telex" services and the assistance of personnel in the American Army base at Camp Darby. In Egypt, it was equally fortunate that the Canadian contingent commander and the Air Transport Unit

Commander both enjoyed excellent relationships with the United Arab Republic liaison staff. Because of this, there was no difficulty in permitting an extension of the original 48 hour limit for the evacuation of Canadian forces. Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities were now persuaded to make the airfield at El Arish available. All these happy circumstances conspired to provide the basic necessities for a successful withdrawal.

133. Once the basic necessities were secured, success depended upon good staff work and efficient execution of orders. There was, it is true, some confusion over the amount and nature of bulky stores to be taken out. There was also the notorious restriction of movement imposed upon UNEF to hamper the transfer of personnel and equipment from Camp Rafah to El Arish. These difficulties were overcome with relative ease, especially when the Canadian contingent was released of all its obligations to UNEF. There would not have been the same success if Air Transport Command had not been so well-versed in the techniques of airlift. Nor would the difficulties have been surmounted if the Canadian Base Unit had not been so well prepared for sudden changes in plan. It may be said with justification, then, that the professional expertise of forces in the field was an essential ingredient of success.

134. The Director of Operations and his staff deserve full credit for the manner in which they brought together the various strands of intelligence, and disseminated vital information to elements of the Services. Just as professional expertise in the field was a major contribution to success, the quick reactions of the Operations Centre in Canadian

Forces Headquarters made the withdrawal operation possible. In the final analysis, however, such expertise would have been of no avail if suitable aircraft had not been available. It was a notable feature of the whole operation that on various occasions when a change in situation occurred, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Chief of Operations intervened personally to ensure that ships or aircraft were sent to strategic positions for immediate availability. Air Marshal Sharp and Air Vice-Marshal Ball, by virtue of previous service affiliations, were particularly alert to the requirements of Air Transport Command. In addition, there was a well-established liaison between the Directorate of Movements and Air Transport Command headquarters in Trenton. Consequently, as soon as the crisis in the Middle East became acute, aircraft were dispatched to the nearest available airfields on 12-hour standby. When the crisis reached every new stage, particularly on 27 May, a new disposition of aircraft was ordered by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. This rapport between C.F.H.Q. and Air Transport Command was unique and impressive. If any one fundamental reason is to be sought for the excellent response of the Canadian government to the Egyptian demand for immediate withdrawal, such a reason may be found in the remarkable orientation of the Canadian high command towards airlift operations.

The Significance of the Withdrawal of UNEF

135. These conclusions have been derived from the experience of only one short-lived phase in the history of a peace-keeping force that was the first of its kind, and, constitutionally, the only one of its kind. There has been no attempt

to compare UNEF with its successors in the Congo and Cyprus. Nor has it been compared with similar forces such as the Saar International Police Force in 1934-35 and UNTEA in West Irian in 1962. But although such a comparison would be most valuable,²⁷² this examination of the final days of UNEF can be said to have some intrinsic worth. Some of the difficulties of reconciling national and international responsibilities have been illuminated, and it has been suggested that both in the military and political spheres these difficulties might have been reduced. Some of the technical problems encountered during the withdrawal arose out of inadequate preparation, resulting from the concern of the Canadian government not to prejudice the success of UNEF. It may be that this was an unduly exaggerated concern. Certainly, the neglect of some simple logistic preparations did nothing to enhance the effectiveness of the Canadian contingent, and left the contingent vulnerable to a surprise demand for withdrawal. It may also be suggested that more close-knit liaison between Canadian diplomatic and military organizations might have led to a better awareness of politico-military developments in the Middle East, and thus to the greater security of the Canadian contingent. With regard to both airlift and sealift there were grounds for anxiety concerning the strategic mobility of a contingent engaged in peace-keeping operations. The preservation of such mobility, whether by sea or air, depended on co-operation of not only between Canadian and U.N. forces involved, but also of potential belligerents in the area. Even when this requirement was met, flexibility and professional competence of a high standard were necessary to complete the withdrawal successfully. It is not intended to deduce any operational

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laws from these suggestions. The writer realizes that some of these final statements bear an unusual resemblance to the so-called Principles of War. This is only partially intentional. As it became evident that the similarity was there, there seemed to be some utility in making the point more obvious. When the usually accepted principles are considered for their relevance to the withdrawal of UNEF, they can with one exception be found to have a useful application. The exception is "offensive action", which is defined in the version accepted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee as "the necessary forerunner of victory; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken victory is impossible." Even this principle, if applied to the measures taken (or not taken) by the United Nations over the years of UNEF's existence, can be seen to have considerable relevance.²⁷³ We may perhaps detect, like a phoenix arising out of the ashes of UNEF, a strategy for peace-keeping.

136. This report has been prepared by Lieutenant Commander W.A.B. Douglas.

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Director of History

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U Thant's letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, 18 May, 1967.

'Dear Mr. Minister,

Your message informing me that your Government no longer consents to the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on the territory of the United Arab Republic, that is to say in Sinai, and in the Gaza Strip, and requesting that the necessary steps be taken for its withdrawal as soon as possible, was delivered to me by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic at noon on 18 May.

As I have indicated to your Permanent Representative on 16 May, the United Nations Emergency Force entered Egyptian territory with the consent of your Government and in fact can remain there only so long as that consent continues. In view of the message now received from you, therefore, your Government's request will be complied with and I am proceeding to issue instructions for the necessary arrangements to be put in train without delay for the orderly withdrawal of the Force, its vehicles and equipment and for the disposal of all properties pertaining to it. I am, of course, also bringing this development and my actions and intentions to the attention of the UNEF Advisory Committee and to all Governments providing contingents for the Force. A full report covering this development will be submitted promptly by me to the General Assembly, and I consider it necessary to report also to the Security Council about some aspects of the current situation in the area.

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Irrespective of the reasons for the action you have taken, in all frankness, may I advise you that I have serious misgivings about it for, as I have said each year in my annual reports to the General Assembly on UNEF, I believe that this Force has been an important factor in maintaining relative quiet in the area of its deployment during the past ten years and that its withdrawal may have grave implications for peace.

With warm personal regards,

U Thant¹

Source: U.N. General Assembly, A/6730/Add. 3, para. 24.

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U Thant's instructions for withdrawal and
Major-General Rikhye's withdrawal order.

Cable containing instructions for the withdrawal
of UNEF sent by the Secretary-General to the
Commander of UNEF on 18 May 1967, at 2230 hours
New York time

The following instructions are to be put in effect by you as of date and time of their receipt and shall remain operative until and unless new instructions are sent by me.

1. UNEF is being withdrawn because the consent of the Government of the United Arab Republic for its continued deployment on United Arab Republic territory and United Arab Republic-controlled territory has been rescinded.

2. Date of the commencement of the withdrawal of UNEF will be 19 May when the Secretary-General's response to the request for withdrawal will be received in Cairo by the Government of the United Arab Republic, when also the General Assembly will be informed of the action taken and the action will become public knowledge.

3. The withdrawal of UNEF is to be orderly and must be carried out with dignity befitting a Force which has contributed greatly to the maintenance of quiet and peace in the area of its deployment and has earned widespread admiration.

4. The Force does not cease to exist or to lose its status or any of its entitlements, privileges and immunities until all of its elements have departed from the area of its operation.

5. It will be practical fact that must be reckoned with by the Commander that as of the date of the announcement of its withdrawal the Force will no longer be able to carry out the establishment functions as a buffer and as a deterrent to infiltration. Its duties, therefore, after 19 May and until all elements have been withdrawn, will be entirely nominal and concerned primarily with devising arrangements and implementation of arrangements for withdrawal and the morale of the personnel.

6. The Force, of course, will remain under the exclusive command of its United Nations Commander and is to take no orders from any other source, whether United Arab Republic or national.

7. The Commander, his headquarters staff and the contingent commanders shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure the continuance of good relations with the local authorities and the local population.

8. In this regard, it should be made entirely clear by the Commander to the officers and other ranks in the Force that there is no discredit of the Force in this withdrawal and no humiliation involved for the reason that the Force has operated very successfully and with, on the whole, co-operation from the Government on the territory of an independent sovereign State for over ten years, which is a very long time; and, moreover, the reasons for the termination of the operation are of an overriding political nature, having no relation whatsoever to the performance of the Force in the discharge of its duties.

9. The Commander and subordinate officers must do their utmost to avoid any resort to the use of arms and any clash with the forces of the United Arab Republic or with the local civilian population.

10. A small working team will be sent from Headquarters by the Secretary-General to assist in the arrangements for, and effectuation of, the withdrawal.

11. The Commander shall take all necessary steps to protect United Nations installations, properties and stores during the period of withdrawal.

12. If necessary, a small detail of personnel of the Force or preferably of United Nations security officers will be maintained as long as necessary for the protection of United Nations properties pending their ultimate disposition.

13. UNEF aircraft will continue flights as necessary in connection with the withdrawal arrangements but observation flights will be discontinued immediately.

14. Elements of the Force now deployed along the line will be first removed from the line, the IF and ADL, including Sharm el Sheikh to their camps and progressively to central staging.

15. The pace of the withdrawal will of course depend upon the availability of transport by air, sea and ground to Port Said. The priority in withdrawal should of course be personnel and their personal arms and equipment first, followed by contingent stores and equipment.

16. We must proceed on the assumption that UNEF will have full co-operation of United Arab Republic authorities on all aspects of evacuation, and to this end

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will be made by me to the United Arab Republic Government through their Mission here.

17. As early as possible the Commander of UNEF should prepare and transmit to the Secretary-General a plan and schedule for the evacuation of troops and their equipment.

18. Preparation of the draft of the sections of the annual report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly should be undertaken and, to the extent possible, completed during the period of the withdrawal.

19. In the interests of the Force itself and the United Nations, every possible measure should be taken to ensure against public comments or comments likely to become public on the withdrawal, the reasons for it and reactions to it.

Source: United Nations General Assembly, A/6730/Add. 3
26 June 1967.

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UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
HEADQUARTERS

PO 138

Gaza
19 May 1967

To: Distribution
From: Commander UNEF
Subject: Withdrawal of UNEF

1. Effective 1700 hours (LT) 19 May 1967 all UNEF Ops will be withdrawn. Troops will be concentrated in their camps and will cease to have any observation responsibilities along the ADL and IF and will cease to function as a buffer and as a deterrent to infiltration. From the time of withdrawal UNEF activities will be directed entirely to its own safety and welfare and the finalization of arrangements for withdrawal from the area. Detailed orders for withdrawal from the area will be issued separately.
2. The reasons for the termination of the operation are of an overriding political nature, having no relation whatsoever to the performance of the Force in the discharge of its duties.
3. The withdrawal of the Force will be orderly and must be carried out with dignity befitting a Force which has contributed greatly to the maintenance of quiet and peace in the area of its deployment and has earned widespread admiration.

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4. The Force has operated very successfully with cooperation from the government of the territory of an independent sovereign state for over ten years. All ranks shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure the continuance of good relations with local authorities and the local population.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has complimented the Force for its performance through the extremely difficult situation of the last few days. I know that nothing more could have been done by you to alter the outcome. I extend to all members of UNEF my personal thanks for your performance and continued support which has earned this praise.

I.J. Rikhye, Major-General
Commander UNEF

Source: W.D., H.Q. C.B.U. UNEF, May 1967.

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Documents concerning the demand for
immediate Canadian withdrawal,
26-29 May, 1967

Withdrawal of the Canadian contingent

67. On the morning of 27 May 1967 the Secretary-General received the following communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:

"Sir,

"I have the honour to bring to your attention a serious and grave situation resulting from the regrettable attitude of the Government of Canada, in connexion with the United Nations forces, to the withdrawal of which you have agreed upon the request of the United Arab Republic Government. From the beginning the Canadian Government has persistently resorted to procrastination and delay in the departure of these forces. We noted from the outset that the Canadian Government took an unfriendly position towards my Government.

"Furthermore, the Government of Canada took certain military measures, on which we have received definite information that some Canadian destroyers have already sailed towards the Mediterranean, an act which enflamed the public opinion in my country, to an extent that I fear that it already reached the point of hatred against Canada.

"In view of these serious acts and the light of the present situation in the Middle East, and desirous to prevent any probable reaction from the people of the United Arab Republic against the Canadian forces in UNEF, which may have undesirable reflection on the United Nations forces as a whole. I urge you to order the complete withdrawal and departure of the Canadian forces immediately, and not later than forty-eight hours from the time my cable reaches you.

"I hasten to inform you that our forces are ready to provide all the necessary facilities for the transportation of the Canadian forces, to the nearest possible place, namely Cyprus.

"Please, Sir, accept the assurance of my highest considerations.

Mahmoud Riad"

68. On the same day, after consultation with the Permanent Representative of Canada, the Secretary-General sent the following reply to Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:

"Excellency,

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your cable of 27 May 1967 in which you urge me to order the complete withdrawal and departure of the Canadian contingent in UNEF immediately and not later than forty-eight hours from the time of the receipt of your cable. As you know, the Commander of UNEF and United Nations Headquarters have been working on plans for the expeditious evacuation of UNEF, and these plans, of course,

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included the speedy withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. I deeply regret the circumstances which have led to the request for the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent as stated in your cable. To avoid any further aggravation of the situation, I have immediately instructed the Commander of UNEF to accelerate the evacuation of the Canadian contingent. I am sure you will understand that, while the Canadian Government and the Commander of UNEF will co-operate in implementing this evacuation as quickly as possible, it cannot be absolutely guaranteed that it will be fully completed within forty-eight hours of the receipt of your cable, although all concerned are agreed that the Canadian contingent shall be evacuated with the minimum delay possible. I note with appreciation your offer to provide transportation facilities if necessary to take the Canadian contingent to Cyprus. I do not believe, however, that Cyprus would be an appropriate destination for the Canadian contingent, and we are therefore arranging to evacuate it elsewhere. May I request you, Excellency, to take all possible measures to ensure that, for the very short period of time in which the Canadian contingent of UNEF remains on United Arab Republic territory, their status as members of UNEF will be fully respected and any unnecessary friction or unpleasantness avoided.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

U Thant"

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69. The Secretary-General, also on 27 May, addressed the following note to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the cable of 27 May 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic urging that an order be issued for the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Canadian contingent in UNEF. The Secretary-General in his cabled reply of the same date informed the Foreign Minister that the necessary instructions would be given.

"Reference is made to the statement in the message from the Foreign Minister to the effect that 'From the beginning the Canadian Government has persistently resorted to procrastination and delay in the departure of these Forces'. For the sake of clarification and accuracy it may be pointed out that, as indicated in the Secretary-General's reply, plans for the evacuation of the Canadian contingent were a part of the over-all plan and schedule for withdrawal of the Force formulated by the Commander of UNEF and United Nations Headquarters and that part of the schedule affecting Canadian troops had been accepted by the Canadian authorities and was being implemented without delay.

"However, in view of the warning in the communication from the Foreign Minister about a possible hostile reaction by the people of the United Arab Republic against the continued presence of Canadian troops in their territory, it was decided to abandon the original evacuation plan for the Canadian troops and arrange for their immediate departure.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic the assurances of his highest consideration."

70. On 27 May, at 2145 hours local time, Brigadier Eiz-el-din Mokhtar of the Armed Forces Headquarters in Cairo handed the following letter to the UNEF Commander:

"Major General Rikhye,

"Owing to the biased attitude of the Canadian Government towards Israel, the general feeling among the masses of the people and the Armed Forces became mobilized against Canadian policy, and being aware for the safety of the Canadian troops and for the reputation of the United Nations emergency forces, which have done their best in carrying out their task, we demand the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian troops from the United Arab Republic territory within 48 hours, and we are ready to give all facilities if required for their transport by air or any other means.

"With kind regards to yourself, I am,

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"Yours respectfully,

(Mohamed Fawzi)

FARIK AWAL: Chief of General Staff
U.A.R. Armed Forces"

71. On 27 May, the Secretary-General addressed the following message to the Prime Minister of Canada through the Permanent Representative of Canada.

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and has the honour to request him to transmit the following message to the Prime Minister of Canada:

'In view of circumstances which have developed in relation to the Canadian contingent of UNEF, the possibility of accelerating the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent from the area was discussed with the Permanent Representative of Canada on 26 May 1967. On the morning of 27 May I received a message from Mr. Mahmoud Riad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, on this same subject, the substance of which has already been communicated to you by the Permanent Representative of Canada. In the light of these developments and after consultations with the Permanent Representative of Canada, I have now given instructions to the

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Commander of UNEF that the Canadian contingent of UNEF should be evacuated from United Arab Republic territory as quickly as possible. I therefore request the Government of Canada to undertake urgently the necessary transportation arrangements to carry out this evacuation. I have made it clear in my reply to the message of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic that, while all possible efforts will be made to evacuate the Canadian contingent as soon as possible, it cannot be absolutely guaranteed that the evacuation can be completed within forty-eight hours. I have also asked him to take all possible measures to ensure that, for the short period of time in which the Canadian contingent of UNEF remain on United Arab Republic territory, their status as members of UNEF will be fully respected and any unnecessary friction and unpleasantness avoided.'

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Canada the assurances of his highest consideration."

72. On 29 May the Secretary-General received the following reply from the Permanent Representative of Canada:

"The Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's message

of 27 May 1967 to the Prime Minister requesting that the Government of Canada undertake urgently the necessary transportation arrangements to evacuate the Canadian contingent from United Arab Republic territory as quickly as possible. The Secretary-General explained that this request stemmed both from the discussions initiated by the Permanent Representative of Canada on 26 May concerning the possibility of accelerating withdrawal of the Canadian contingent and the request of the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic of 27 May, the substance of which was communicated to the Permanent Representative of Canada.

"The Permanent Representative has been instructed to say that the Canadian Government has acted on the Secretary-General's request to provide transportation for the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. The Canadian Government is ready to commence the withdrawal as soon as the Secretary-General has concluded the necessary arrangements with the Government of the United Arab Republic for withdrawal operations.

"The Permanent Representative of Canada is also instructed to record with the Secretary-General that the Canadian Government does not accept the reasons advanced by the United Arab Republic authorities in justification of the request that the Secretary-General order immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. The reasons advanced are without foundation in fact and are based on a regrettable misunderstanding by the United Arab Republic of Canadian policy. For example, timing of withdrawal of the Canadian contingent was part of the evacuation plans developed by the United Nations; as the Secretary-General has indicated in his note, the Canadian

Government has already, on 26 May, questioned the timetable in these plans and had requested that the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent be expedited.

"While it is acknowledged that some of the considerations advanced by the United Arab Republic Government in support of their request for the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent are beyond the competence of the United Nations, the Canadian Government assumes that nothing which is or may have been said in the communications with the United Arab Republic authorities in this connexion could be construed as indicating that these reasons have been accepted by the Secretary-General."

73. The Secretary-General replied to the Canadian note of 29 May on the same day as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Permanent Representative's message of 29 May 1967 concerning the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent of UNEF. The Secretary-General notes with appreciation that the Canadian Government has acted upon his request to provide transportation for the immediate withdrawal of the Canadian contingent.

"The Secretary-General wishes to emphasize what has been stated to the Permanent Representative orally by Dr. Bunche, that the sole basis for his decision to accelerate the evacuation of the Canadian contingent of UNEF was the fear expressed by the Foreign Minister of

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the United Arab Republic of possible hostile reactions on the part of the population of his country to the continued presence of Canadian troops and the Secretary-General's unwillingness to expose the Canadian troops to this risk. The Permanent Representative of Canada has also already been informed of the position of the United Nations as conveyed to the authorities of the United Arab Republic concerning the over-all plan for the evacuation of UNEF, of which the evacuation of the Canadian contingent was a part. It has been pointed out to the authorities of the United Arab Republic that the part of the original United Nations plan affecting the Canadian contingent has been accepted by the Canadian authorities and was being implemented without delay, and that the present plan for the immediate evacuation of the Canadian contingent was decided upon only because of the warning from the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic mentioned above.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Canada the assurances of his highest consideration."

Source: United Nations General Assembly, A/6672,
12 July 1967.

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APPENDIX "E"
to Report 16

Details of the withdrawal
of personnel and equipment
from El Arish

(Flight numbers refer to Hercules aircraft unless otherwise indicated. Departure times are from El Arish, at El Arish local time.)

| <u>Flight</u> | <u>Departed</u> | <u>Passengers</u> | <u>Freight(lbs)</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| 29 May | | | | |
| UN 1 | 1025 | 55 | 5597 | |
| 2 | 1010 | 61 | 8230 | |
| 3 | 1640 | 60 | 6984 | |
| 4 | 1411 | 0 | 19260 | |
| 5 | 1450 | 61 | 8345 | |
| 6 | 1625 | 51 | 6621 | |
| | | | | Back log end of first day: 51 passengers, 63,967 lbs. |
| 30 May | | | | |
| UN 7A | 0900 | - | Shuttle to Nicosia with freight. | |
| 8A | 1045 | - | " " " " | " " |
| 7 | 1725 | 27 | 19201 | |
| 8 | 1550 | 9 | 21714 | |
| 9 | 1235 | 64 | 7275 | |
| 10 | 1410 | 30 | 19367 | |
| 11 | 1440 | 70 | 9378 | |
| 12 | 1830 | 0 | 13120 | |
| | | | | Back log end of second day: 1 passenger, 115,026 lbs. |

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| <u>Flight</u> | <u>Departed</u> | <u>Passengers</u> | <u>Freight(lbs)</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| 31 May | | | | |
| UN 13A | 1915 | - | | Shuttle to Nicosia with freight. Total freight shuttled to Nicosia 59,966 lbs. |
| UN 13 | 1445 | 1 | 23039 | |
| 14 | 0935 | 68 | 9608 | |
| 15 | 1210 | 40 | 13659 | |
| 16 | 1320 | 34 | 11221 | |
| 17 | 1500 | 0 | 17621 | |
| 18 | 1610 | 29 | 11820 | Including Colonel Power, Commanding C.B.U. UNEF. |
| <u>Caribou</u> | | | | |
| 5231) | 29/1900 | 29 | - | Including crews and last A.T.U. personnel (except for two transportation technicians) transferred to Beirut. |
| 5322) | | | | |
| 5320 | 31/1745 | 11 | - | 1. Last Canadians to leave including: pilot, W/C Fitzsimmons. Lt.- Col. W. Remple, Senior Canadian Army Officer, H.Q. UNEF. Lt.Cdr. G.J. Maloney, D.I.S. Officer. W/C W. Cunningham, A.S.O. Gaza. Seven others including rear party of C.B.U. UNEF and crew of aircraft. |
| | | | | 2. This aircraft was stationed at Beirut as of 29 May. |
| TOTAL | | 700 | 232,110 | |

Note 1. Equipment left behind

- 2 Allis Chalmers Generator Sets (serviceable)
- 2 Cummings Generator Sets (worn out)
- 1 Refueller (aircraft) (serviceable)
- 1 Refueller (aircraft) (unserviceable)

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1 Small H.F. Set
- Mess and kitchen equipment)
- Tools, engine stands, ground) (Not worth removing)
 handling equipment.)

Note 2. Equipment transferred to Cyprus:

Refrigerators
Sports Equipment
Ham Radio Set
Aircraft Towing Tractors

Note 3. Normal Operations Disrupted:

Service flights cancelled - three Yukons, nine Hercules.
Service flights delayed - one Hercules.
Service flights altered - one Yukon.
(Configuration changed to carry passengers only)
Special flights cancelled - four Hercules.
Training flights cancelled - one Hercules.
Training flights terminated - one Yukon.

Sources: S 1326-3118/115

[112.302.005 (D2)]
[112.302.005 (D4)]
[112.302.009 (D6)]
[419.009 (D28)]

(Especially Pisa detachment messages 29 2216Z May, 01
0330Z, June, Hercules 10324 message 20 1345Z May, Air
Transport Command message SOOPS 602 of 30 May, and
SOOPS 112 of 14 June.)

APPENDIX "F"
to Report 16

Details of the airlift of UNEF personnel from Pisa to Trenton, 29 May to 1 June 1967.

(all times G.M.T.)

| <u>Yukon</u> Flight | Arr. Pisa | Dep. Pisa | Arr. Trenton | Passenger Load | Loads Transferred From <u>Hercules</u> Flights | Backlog at Pisa | Remaining at Pisa |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|--|------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 (UN 6247) | 29/1300 | 29/1840 | 30/1000 | 116 | UN1(55) UN2(61) UN4(0) | Nil | |
| 2 (UN 6248) | 29/1600 | 29/2040 | 30/1130 | 121 | UN3(60) UN5(61) | UN6(51) (remained overnight) | |
| 3 (UN 6249) | 29/1900 | 30/1830 | 31/0825 | 129 | UN6(51) UN8(9) UN9(39) | UN9(25) | |
| 4 (UN 6250) | 30/2100 | 30/2302 | 31/1300 | 119 | UN9(25) UN7(27) UN11(67) UN12(0) | UN11(3) (remained overnight) | |
| 5 (UN 6251) | 31/1500 | 31/1630 | 01/0725 | 116 | UN11(3) UN14(68) UN15(40) Nil | (Note 1) | 115 |
| 6 (UN 6252) | 31/2035 | 31/2215 | 01/1245 | 91 | UN13(1) UN16(34) UN17(0) Nil (UN18(29)) | (Note 1) | |
| Total Passengers | | | | 692 (Note 1) | 660 | | |

Note 1: 5 extra passengers in Yukon 5 and 27 extra passengers in Yukon 6 were presumably picked up during the stop-over at Shannon during the return flight.

Source: [112.302.009 (D6)]

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REFERENCES

1. E. Lauterpacht, The United Nations Emergency Force: Basic Documents. (New York 1960), 34-43, Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force, Feb 20/57, para. 12.
2. Ibid.
3. "Transfer of Responsibility the Canadian Contingent United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) Land Component and the Canadian Contingent United Nations Force in Cyprus (CCUNFICYP)". Effective 15 May 67, this was to incorporate the forces named into Mobile Command. The Transfer was not carried through to completion. O 1901-0120/41 (DOps) of 13 Jul 65; F 1901-0120/30 (DO), F 1901-4700/00 of 8 May 67, [112.301.006(D1)].
4. Historical Summaries 115 A.T.U. 1 Jan to 31 Dec 66, S 1326-3118/115; Historical Reports 1 June 58 to 31 Dec 64, Organization Order 8.12, Appendix "C" dated 13 Feb 61, para. 3c., 9-200-115 Vol. 1.
5. See Appendix "A".
6. John C. Campbell "Soviet-American Relations: Conflict and Co-operation". Current History Vol. 53, No. 314, October 1967, p. 198. See also Gladwyn Jebb, Lord Gladwyn, Halfway to 1984, (New York 1967) 1-26. He divides the post-war years into three periods -- in the last period President Kennedy's "two pillars" policy governs the east-west détente as well as the practicability of the United Nations as a world authority; cf. PERMISNY telegram No. 1379/20 May. Report of meeting between Mr. Paul Martin and Mr. Goldberg. It was the opinion of Mr. Goldberg, the United States Ambassador in the United Nations, that the U.S.S.R. was interested in actually diverting United States effort away from Vietnam, [419.009(D29)].
7. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Military Policy at the Fifty Year Mark" Current History Vol. 53, No. 314, October 1967, p. 244.
8. Cf. The Illustrated London News. Issues between 3 June and 12 Aug 67, articles by Peter Kirk, Jon Kimche, Sir Arthur Bryant. See also Lt.-Gen. Sir John Glubb "The Arabs and the West" The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol. LXXXV, No. 2, January 1968, 170-180.
9. United Nations Security Council, Report by the Secretary-General, 19 May 67, S/7896.

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10. The following sources should be consulted for further discussion of this problem. Published articles and books must be regarded with caution because the authors have not been able to cite classified documents. International Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Winter 1967-68, especially: E.L.M. Burns, "The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping"; Leonard Beaton, "The Great Powers Abdicate"; Oran R. Young, "Intermediaries and Interventionists: Third Parties in the Middle East Crisis"; Leonard Binder "The Middle East Crisis: A trial Balance", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XXIII, No. 7, September 1967; Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peace-keeping (Washington, the Brookings Institution 1967); Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World. The Crisis of 1967, (London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, No. 42, 1967.); Lt.Gen. Sir John Glubb "The Arabs and the West", The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol. LXXXV, No. 2, January 1968, 170-180; The Institute for Strategic Studies -- Sources of Conflict in the Middle East (London, Adelphi Paper No. 26, March 1966.); CAIRO telegram 180/1968, [112.302.009(D7)]; CAIRO telegram 482/66, [951.009 (D69)]; Summary of interview with Mr. George Ignatieff, Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, S-3451-7; Summary of interview with Major-General I.J. Rikhye, former Commander of UNEF, [112.3H1.001 (D19)]; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Study Groups concerning the Middle East Crisis, 1967, [956.009(D132)].
- 10a. United Nations General Assembly, A/6730 dated 26 June (a duplication of A/6669 published on 19 June), [417.009(D29)]; V-3451-7 Vols. 6 and 7.
11. A/6730/Add. 3, para. 5; CAIRO telegram to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Starnes to Martin) 689/5 June, V-3451-7 Vol. 6.
12. The Canadian ambassador in Cairo later gained an impression which he could not be sure of, that the decision to gain control of these points only came later. In view of subsequent developments it is doubtful whether this impression was correct, ibid.
13. Possibly as early as 14 or 15 May, ibid., 115 A.T.U. Commander's Report, 22 June, S1326-3198/115.
14. A/6730/Add. 3, para. 16; It was the opinion of Colonel Power that if Canadian troops had been in the same situation they would have tried to resist -- probably with unfortunate results for them in view of the Egyptian preponderance, [112.3H1.001 (D18)].

15. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log, 19 May, serials 1-9, [419.005(D1)].
16. United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary-General 12 Jul 67, A/6672, para. 35, Annexes II to V.
17. United Nations Security Council, Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 19 May 67, S/7896, para. 15.
18. D.C. Watt "The Arab Summit Conference and After", The World Today, Vol. 23, No. 10, October 1967.
19. CAIRO telegram to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Starnes to Martin) 605/25 May, [419.009(D29)], Summary of interview with Major-General Rikhye, [112.3H1.001(D19)].
20. Randolph and Winston Churchill, The Six Days War (Heinemann, London, 1967); cf. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World ...; Lt.Gen. Sir John Glubb "The Arabs and the West"; Summary of interview with Major-General Rikhye, [112.3H1.001(D19)]; E.L.M. Burns, "The withdrawal of UNEF ..." and Oran R. Young, "Intermediaries and Interventionists ..." tend to discount the strategic reasons.
21. CAIRO telegram 689/5 June, V-3451-7 Vol. 6.
22. Ibid.
23. As it is pointed out elsewhere in this report (para. 18 below) there is reason to believe that Nasser made some discreet diplomatic probes towards India and Yugoslavia to be sure of their support before he began the operations of 16 to 19 May.
24. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Political Conditions for a Force" in Lincoln W. Bloomfield, International Military Forces, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964), 180. cf. Stanley H. Hoffman (ed.) Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960) pp. 29-53.
25. D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces -- A Legal Study (New York, 1964). Foreword by Lord McNair, Q.C., ix-xi; Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience with Military Forces, (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1964) 54; Stanley Hoffman, "Erewhon or Lilliput?

-- A Critical View of the Problem" in Lincoln Bloomfield, International Military Forces, 191-192; United Nations General Assembly, Second and Final Report by Mr. Hammarskjold on the Plan for a United Nations Force, 6 Nov 56, A/3289, reproduced in Historical Report No. 94, Appendix "E".

26. Stanley Hoffman, "Erewhon or Lilliput? ..." loc. cit.
27. Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London, 1967), 142; Terence Robertson, Crisis (Toronto, 1964), passim; Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience with Military Forces. 50; Historical Report No. 94, para. 98.
28. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, (Toronto 1962) 201. For the text of the resolution of 2 November see Historical Report No. 94, Appendix "D".
29. United Nations General Assembly A/3512 [Question of Israeli Consent]; Resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 Nov 56, A/3302; D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, 414.
30. United Nations General Assembly, Second and Final Report ... A/3289; Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, 9 Oct 58, A/3943; Leon Gordenker, The U.N. Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace, (London 1967) 242-3; D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, 426. See also E. Lauterpacht, The United Nations Emergency Force: Basic Documents.
- 30a. Commander UNEF to Secretary-General, 27 Mar 57; L.B. Pearson, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 29 Mar 57, [653.003(D26)].
31. William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York 1957), 18; Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience ..., 62.
32. United Nations General Assembly, Summary Study ... of the Force, A/3943, paras. 157-8; cf. Aide-mémoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, 20 Nov 56, A/3375.
33. New York Times, 19 June 67, article by Max Frankel; Leon Gordenker, The U.N. Secretary-General ..., 282-284. Mr. Lester Pearson stated in the House of Commons, "... I am not being critical of the Secretary-General because I have no doubt that on an examination of the documents one would come to the

conclusion that what he did was right in terms of the documentary evidence. There was a special arrangement made between Mr. Hammarskjold and president Nasser. I objected to that arrangement at the time because I thought it might cause a lot of trouble in the future." Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 112, No. 12, 24 May 67, p. 534.

34. Statement by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, ibid., No. 9, 18 May 67, 465-467; Notes on verbatim record of UNEF Advisory Committee, 5 p.m. 18 May 67. Mr. Ignatieff stated that in June 1960, when there was trouble on the Armistice Demarcation, the Canadian government "... placed on record with the Secretary-General its view that the withdrawal of the force should be considered only in the event of large-scale hostilities which rendered it incapable of discharging the functions assigned to it without undue risk; and, secondly, that the ultimate responsibility for the decision to withdraw or curtail under these conditions or changing conditions rested with the United Nations, acting through the Security Council or the General Assembly." [112.3H.006(D7)]; See also DL 1206/18 May to PERMISNY and DL 1207/18 May, Cadieux to PERMISNY, [419.009(D29)].
35. United Nations General Assembly, Special Report by the Secretary-General, 19 June, A/6730/Add. 2, 26 June 67.
36. CAIRO telegram 689/5 June, V-3451-7, Vol. 6.
37. PERMISNY telegram 1494/29 May, [419.009(D29)]; CAIRO telegram 689/5 June, V-3451-7, Vol. 6; United Nations General Assembly Report by the Secretary-General, 19 May, A/6730/Add. 3, para. 22, article by Juan de Onis, New York Times, 20 June.
38. Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, (New York, 1961) 65.
39. Major-General I.J. Rikhye, Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, (Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 9, London, 1964), 9.
40. Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience ..., 145.
41. United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary-General, 19 June 67, A/6730, 26 June, para. 12; Report by the Secretary-General, 12 Jul 67, A/6672, para. 22.

42. A/6672, para. 22.
43. PERMISNY telegram 1358/19 May, [419.009(D29)].
44. Leon Gordenker. See above, note 30.
45. Ibid., preface, x.
46. Ibid., 81.
47. E.G., his address of 13 June 63 at Cambridge Massachusetts on "A United Nations Stand-by Police Force" reproduced in Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience....
48. Gordenker, The U.N. Secretary-General ..., 71-72
49. Press Conference of 19 Sep 66 cited in ibid., 60.
50. For description of the background and appointment process of the Secretaries-General see ibid., pp. 50 et. seq; Summary of interview with Mr. George Ignatieff, S-3451-7.
51. Gordenker, The U.N. Secretary-General ..., 86.
52. A/6730/Add. 3.
53. A/6730, paras. 6 and 7; Report of the Secretary-General on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force, Nov 20, 56, A/3375; Secretary of State for External Affairs to PERMISNY (telegram) 18 May, Washington telegram 1864/19 May, PERMISNY telegrams 1348 and 1358/19 May, [419.009(D29)]; Notes on verbatim records of meetings held with the Secretary-General, 17 and 18 May, [112.3H1.006(D7)]
54. Ibid.
- 54a. A/6730 para. 6 (c) (iv).
55. A/6730/Add. 3, paras. 31-51.

56. PERMISNY telegram 1779/19 June, [112.302.009(D7)]. The article by Max Frankel claimed that Hammarskjold had prepared this "aide mémoire" for U.N. files, and that he had given a copy to Mr. Ernest E. Gross. According to Mr. Gross, Hammarskjold had been determined that the history of his negotiations with Nasser should be preserved. Nasser denied knowledge of the "aide-mémoire", and there is no question that it was not a public document. U Thant was justified in rejecting the legal force of the document. Nevertheless it does throw light on the essential difference between the methods of the two Secretaries-General.
57. Address by U Thant at Cambridge, Massachusetts, 13 June 63. Quoted in Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience ..., 150.
58. Cited in Leon Gordenker, The U.N. Secretary-General ..., 76. But see also the author's footnote: "This term, more often than not, refers to the execution of instructions given to the Secretary-General by another organ and not to his own diplomatic initiative. An example would be the establishment by the General Assembly of the United Nations Emergency Force and its instructions to employ it. Because it covers so much, the term describes little.", ibid., 352.
59. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, UNSG3-68, 14 Feb 68, United Nations Study Group, resumé of meeting of 23 Jan 68, [956.009(D132)]. See also Summary of Interview with Mr. George Ignatieff, S-3451-7.
60. HQTSG 2001-120/41 (DMO&P 1A) 30 Jan 64, "Evacuation Plan Middle East", [112.302.01(D1)]; "Evacuation of Canadian Forces in UNEF" 28 Jan 59, [112.3M2(D702)].
61. United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary-General, 12 Jul 67, A/6672, paras. 2 and 10.
62. Major-General I.J. Rikhye, Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces. (Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 9, London 1964).
63. UNEF letters OR122 dated 13 Feb and 7 Mar 67. [419.009(D30)].
64. Summary of interview with Major-General Rikhye, [112.3H1.009(D19)]; Notes on verbatim record of meetings with the Secretary-General, 17 and 18 May 67, [112.3H1.006(D7)].

65. Summary of interview with Mr. Carey Seward, United Nations Deputy Director of General Services, [112.3H1.006(D8)].
66. Interview with Major-General Rikhye, [112.3H1.001 (D19)].
67. Contingency Plans, [112.302.01(D1)].
68. "Canadian Operations in Support of the United Nations", [112.302.002(D1)].
69. "Evacuation of Canadian Forces in UNEF", 28 Jan 59, [112.3M2(D702)].
70. HQTSG 2001-120/41 (DMO&P 1A), 30 Jan 64, [112.302.01 (D1)].
- 70a. Summary of Interview with Mr. Ignatieff, S3451-7.
71. S1326-4900/00.
72. Sources for these naval activities are: Historical Report, H.M.C.S. Kootenay, S1326-DDE 258; Historical Report, H.M.C.S. Saguenay, S1326-DDH 206; Historical Report, H.M.C.S. Chaudiere, S1326-DDE 235; R.C.N. Pink Lists, 1966 and 1967.
73. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, 1710Z 17 May, serial 1, 1805Z 17 May, serial 2, 1300Z 18 May, serial 7, [112.302.005(D2)]; Memo to the Minister of National Defence, 18 May 67, V-3451-7, Vol. 6.
74. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, 0200Z, 19 May, serial 24, 1300Z, 19 May, serial 31, [112.302.005(D2)].
75. C.F.H.Q. Messages Ops 1323 of 19 May to C.B.U. UNEF, [410.009(D29)], folio 26.
76. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, 1835Z, 19 May, serial 35, [112.302.005(D2)].
77. 2000Z, 19 May, serial 37, ibid.; "Report on Operation LEAVEN", [112.302.005(D1)].
78. See Appendix "C"; U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General 18 May, A/6730, Add. 3.

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79. PERMISNY telegram 1364/19 May, [419.009(D29)].
80. "Report on Operation LEAVEN", [112.302.005(D1)]; C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serials 91 to 94 and 97, 1825Z, 23 May to 0107Z, 24 May, [112.302.005(D2)].
81. C.F.H.Q. Message Ops 1338 of 23 May to C.B.U. UNEF, folio 142, Air Transport Command message SOOPS 931 of 24 May to C.F.B. Uplands and External Affairs, [419.009(D29)], folio 143.
82. 115 A.T.U. Commander's Report, 22 June 67, S1326-3118/115.
83. C.B.U. UNEF Message Ops 117 of 24 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D29)], folio 159.
84. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log 261530Z May, serial 139, [112.302.005(D2)].
85. PERMISNY telegram 1459/26 May, [419.009(D29)], folio 233.
86. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, 12 Jul 67, A/6672, para. 67.
87. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log 1300Z, 18 May, Serial 7, [112.302.005(D2)].
88. "Memo to Minister of National Defence", 18 May 67, V-3451-7 Vol. 6.
89. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log 190200Z May, Serial 24, [112.302.005(D2)].
90. C.F.H.Q. Message Ops 1323 of 19 May to C.B.U. UNEF, [419.009(D29)], folio 26.
91. Interim Report on Withdrawal and Close-out of UNEF, [112.302.005(D1)].
92. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log 19 May, serials 1-11, [419.005(D1)].
93. Serial 31, 200410Z May, ibid.; [112.3H1.001(D18)].

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94. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serials 13 and 14, 181750Z and 181850Z May, [112.302.005(D2)]; Air Staff Officer (ASO) Gaza Message Air 696 of 18 May to C.F.H.Q. The attached minute from DOps to the Minister of National Defence reads: "... CDS has asked me to suggest to External Affairs that a strictly Canadian protest be made to Israel -- they knew perfectly well that these are Canadian planes. H.H. Parker Col. 18 May 1405 hrs. I agree. PH.", [419.009(D29)]; See also Canadian Gazette, 16 Sep 67, 2355, [112.301.006(D1)].

95. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log, serial 2, 190450Z serial 9, 190020Z, [419.005(D1)]; C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 100 of 19 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D29)], folio 49.

96. United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary-General 19 June, A/6730/Add. 3; See Appendix "C" for U Thant's instructions, and Major-General Rikhye's order; W.D., H.Q. C.B.U. UNEF, May 1967, Annex "D", 19 May.

97. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log, serial 27, 191550Z, May, [419.005(D1)]; C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serial 42, 200001Z, May, [112.302.005(D2)].

98. This was apparently done on the lines of the Emergency Plan for UNEF. At 1645 (Gaza time) the planned code-word was received by C.B.U. -- "WARNING ORDER OF SUNBEAM". There is no evidence that the Emergency Plan was followed in toto. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log, serial 26, 191445Z May, serial 44, 201240Z, [419.005(D1)].

99. United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary-General, 12 Jul 67, A/6672, paras. 61-66.

100. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 181 of 18 May and 185 of 19 May to C.F.H.Q. (not numbered); C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1324 of 19 May to Air Transport Command, [419.009(D29)], folio 50.

101. "Notes on a Co-ordinating Meeting to discuss A&Q implications of withdrawing C.B.U. UNEF and A.T.U. 115 Canada"; "Notes on a Second Co-ordinating Meeting . . ., V-3451-7, Vol. 6.

102. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serial 32, 191635Z, May. [112.302.005(D2)].

103. Ibid., serial 35, 191835Z, May.

104. Ibid., serial 42, 200001Z, May.
105. Department of External Affairs, "Memorandum for the Minister", 22 May 67, V-3451-7 Vol. 6, [951.009(D67)].
106. Planning was to commence immediately by telephone between Commodore R.J. Pickford, Maritime Command, Major Hall-Hamperson, Mobile Command, and the Director of Operations, Colonel Parker, serial 37, 192000Z, May, [112.302.005(D2)].
107. "Report on Operation LEAVEN", 6 June 67, [112.302.005 (D1)].
108. Ibid., annex "A"; Maritime Command message COSOPS 240 of 20 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D28)]; Mobile Command message D082 of 20 May to C.F.H.Q., 1419.009 (D29)], folio 66. The ships to be sent would be H.M.C.S. Provider (Fleet Support Ship), Restigouche and Kootenay (Destroyer Escorts, to provide anti-submarine and anti-aircraft escort potential) formed into Task Group 302.5 under the command of Commodore R.H. Leir, Senior Canadian Officer Afloat. The arrangements were modified in several respects during the next week, until the operation was cancelled.
109. E.g., C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1326, (Sitrep for 19 May) " ... There is no cause at this time to contemplate a hasty withdrawal. Every indication is that this should be orderly administrative movement of force out of UNEF area spread over reasonable period of time." [419.009(D29)], folio 65.
110. C.F.H.Q. Ops 1326 and Ops 1333 (Sitrep for 21 May) ibid., folio 107.
111. PERMISNY telegram 1364/19 May, ibid.
112. TEL AVIV telegram 365/19 May, CFA TEL AVIV telegram 110/67 of 20 May, ibid.
113. TEL AVIV telegram 366/21 May, ibid.
114. CAIRO telegram 548/19 May, 561 and 562/20 May, ibid., folios 92 and 99.
115. PERMISNY telegram 1320/20 May, ibid., folio 103.

116. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log, serials 43-97, 20-22 May [419.005(D1)]; Administrative Order No. 1, issued 22 May, [419.006(D2)]; information from Colonel Power, [112.3H1.001(D18)].
117. 115 A.T.U. Commander's Report 22 June 67, S/1326-3118/15; CFA CAIRO telegram 25 May, [419.009(D29)], folio 224.
118. CAIRO telegram 605/25 May, ibid., " ... Nasser had explained to U Thant that when he had learned he intended to visit Cairo he had decided to proceed immediately with early plans ... to control the Strait of Tiran. As Nasser put it, '... a request from the Secretary-General to avoid such action ... would be embarrassing.'"
119. 115 A.T.U. Commanders Report, S/1326-3118/115.
120. Telephone call by Director of Operations to Commodore Pickford. The Chief of Defence Staff and Deputy Chief Operations, Air Vice-Marshal F.W. Ball were present. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serial 91, 231825Z, May, [112.302.005(D2)].
121. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 112, No. 12, Wednesday 24 May, 521. (Mr. Paul Hellyer in answer to Mr. D.S. Harkness).
122. Ibid., No. 11, Tuesday 23 May, 466. (Mr. Paul Hellyer in answer to Mr. J.G. Diefenbaker.)
- 122a. Ibid., No. 12, Wednesday 24 May, 535.
123. "Report on Operation LEAVEN", [112.302.005(D1)].
124. CANMARCOM message INT 774 of 24 May, [419.009(D28)].
125. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1345 of 24 May, [419.009(D29)], folio 166.
126. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1338 of 23 May, ibid., folio 142.
127. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 117 of 24 May, ibid., folio 159.
128. C.F.A. CAIRO telegram 24 May, ibid., folio 172.

129. CAIRO telegram 585/24 May, ibid., folio 175.
130. United Nations General Assembly Report by the Secretary-General, 19 June, A/6730/Add. 3, para. 29.
131. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log serial 135, 261500Z, May, [112.302.005(D2)].
132. Ibid., serial 139, 261530Z, May.
133. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 112, No. 14, Friday 26 May 67, 601-2, (Mr. L.B. Pearson in answer to Mr. T.C. Douglas.) Montreal Star, 26 May 67, article by K.C. Thaler datelined London, England for report on anticipated diplomatic offensive; For President Nasser's reaction to the meeting see Associated Press, Ottawa Citizen, Montreal Gazette, Toronto Globe and Mail, article by Anthony Westall, all of 29 May 67; for editorial comment see Globe and Mail, 29 May and Vancouver Sun, 3 June 67.
It should be added that the Egyptian reaction to President Johnson's visit had been preceded by Egyptian and Soviet opposition to the meeting of the Security Council sponsored jointly by Canada and Denmark on 24 May. See Howard and Hunter, Israel and the Arab World..., 22. The relevant official documents are S/7902 and 7905; S/PV 1341 and 1342.
134. Interim Report on Withdrawal and Close-out of C.B.U. UNEF, [112.302.005(D6)].
135. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 130 of 25 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D29)], folio 198a.
136. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 396 of 25 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ibid., folio 181e.
137. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 129 of 25 May to C.F.H.Q., ibid., folio 184.
138. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 136 of 27 May to C.F.H.Q. ibid., folio 241.
139. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1357 of 27 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ibid., folio 242.
140. Ibid.

141. PERMISNY telegram 1459/26 May, ibid., folio 233.
142. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 913 of 25 May to C.F.H.Q.; SOOPS 190 of 25 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ibid., folios 190, 213.
143. CANMARCOM messages CUROPS 082 of 26 May to C.F.H.Q. CUROPS 091 of 26 May to Chaudiere, C.F.H.Q. message OPS 1351 of 26 May "From CDS" to CANMARCOM, message COMD 001 of 27 May to C.F.H.Q., CUROPS 117 of 27 May to C.F.H.Q., ibid.; "Report on Operation LEAVEN", Annex "A", [112.305.005(D1)].
144. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, 26 May, serial 138, "DMFORS consulted concerning implications of damage to gun"; Serial 141, telephone call Parker/O'Brien to discuss replacement of Saguenay in view of lack of A/A armament. Deployment of Chaudiere also discussed, [112.302.005(D2)]; information from Lt.Cdr. W.R. Stebbings, Directorate of Maritime Operational Requirements, Surface, (DMFORS): Historical Report, H.M.C.S. Chaudiere, SI326-DDE 235; R.C.N. Pink Lists, 1967.
145. CANMARCOM message COMD 001 of 27 May, minute, [419.009(D29)]; C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, 27 May, serials 157, 167, 168, [112.305.005(D2)].
146. C.F.H.Q. message OPS 376 of 26 May (Sitrep for 26 May); OPS 1342 of 24 May to Air Transport Command; OPS 1354 of 26 May to Air Transport Command, [419.009(D29)], folios 226, 208 and 230; "Report on Operation LEAVEN", [112.302.005(D1)].
147. C.F.H.Q. message OPS 1357 of 27 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ("... For your guidance, UN New York were requested to have CANCON withdrawn by 9 June 67."), OPS 396 of 25 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ibid., folios 242 and 181e.
148. See note 142 above.
149. See notes 143 to 145 above.
150. It is not without significance that the Senior Canadian Officer Afloat, Commodore R.H. Leir, was a Midshipman in H.M.S. Prince of Wales when that ship and Repulse were sunk by Japanese air attack in 1942.
151. United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary-General, 12 Jul 67, A/6672, paras. 67-74. See Appendix "D".

152. See Appendix "D".
153. CAIRO telegram 608/26 May, 626/28 May, 631/28 May, 1494/29 May, [419.009(D29)].
154. See para. 60 above.
155. CAIRO telegram 965/14 July 67, [112.302.009(D7)].
156. See Appendix "D".
157. CAIRO telegram 653/30 May, [419.009(D29)].
158. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serial 164. Telephone call from Mr. John Hadwen, Special Assistant to Mr. Paul Martin, [112.302.005(D2)].
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid., serial 166, 1400 hours., 27 May.
161. Ibid.
162. CANMARCOM message CUROPS 106 of 27 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D29)], folio 253, "Report on Operation LEAVEN", Annex "A", [112.302.005(D1)].
163. Ibid.
164. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, 27 May, serials 168, 169, 170, [112.302.005(D2)].
165. Ibid., serial 170.
166. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 142 of 27 May to C.F.H.Q. [419.009(D29)], folio 276.
167. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 144 of 27 May to C.F.H.Q. 282048 hrs. (Ottawa time), ibid., folio 278.
168. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1366, action Training Command; information Maritime Command, Mobile Command, Air Transport Command, Leaven Task Group; (Sitrep), ibid., folio 273; C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serials 177, 178, Sitrep passed to the Vice Chief of Defence

Staff and Chief of Defence Staff by telephone at 1755 hrs. and 1800 hrs. (Ottawa time), [112.302.005(D2)].

169. C.B.U. UNEF Operations Log, serial 229A, 0600Z, 28 May. Commander C.B.U. attended Force Commander conference to discuss evacuation of Canadian contingent, [419.005(D1)]. Withdrawal of 115 A.T.U. ... Commander's report. He was informed at midnight, 27 May by A.S.O. Gaza, thus it is probable that Colonel Power received the information at about the same time, S1326-3118/115.
170. 115 A.T.U. message Air 729 of 28 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D29)], folio 301.
171. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serial 182, 0725 hrs. (Ottawa time) 28 May. At 0740 hrs. a telephone call to New York indicated a garbled message had been received by the U.N. the night before stating that El Arish could be used. [112.302.005(D2)].
172. Ibid., serial 183, 0815 hrs. (Ottawa time) 28 May.
173. Ibid., serial 189, 1220 hrs. (Ottawa time) 28 May.
174. C.F.H.Q. message 1370 of 28 May to C.B.U. UNEF, [419.009(D29)] folio 306.
175. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 153 of 28 May to C.F.H.Q., received 2052 hrs. (Ottawa time) 28 May, ibid., folio 336.
176. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 155 of 28 May to C.F.H.Q., ibid., folio 339.
177. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1390 of 29 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ibid., folio 338.
178. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 159 of 29 May to C.F.H.Q. ibid., folio 352A.
179. C.F.H.Q. messages Ops 337 and Ops 1392 of 29 May to C.B.U. UNEF, ibid., folios 352 and 353.
180. See Appendix "E".
181. C.B.U. UNEF message Ops 159 of 29 May, (419.009 (D29)].

182. This does not appear to be in accordance with the plan suggested in C.B.U. UNEF's message Ops 155 of 28 May to C.F.H.Q., ibid., folio 339.

183. S1326-3118/115.

184. "Accounts. Public Funds - in good shape and auditable. Non-Public Funds - PX items were all sold or auctioned. Liquor destroyed. Major NPF items ... sent to Cyprus." ibid.

185. A.T.U. 115 message Air 753 of 30 May to C.F.H.Q. and Air Transport Command, " ... Tractors should go to Nicosia with a priority over NPF stores." [419.009 (D29)], folio 391.

186. C.F.H.Q. Operations Log, serials 185, 186, 0845 hrs. (Ottawa time) 28 May, [112.302.005(D2)]; "Reports on Operation LEAVEN". Annapolis' sailing orders were finally cancelled at this time but Captain Creery still came to Ottawa for his briefing on Monday, 29 May and Operation "Leaven" was not finally cancelled until 2300 hrs. (Ottawa time) on Monday night. [112.302.005(D1)].

187. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 524 of 28 May to C.F.H.Q., PERMISNY telegram 1488/28 May [419.009(D29)], folios 320, 333.

188. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1381 of 28 May, ibid., folio 326.

189. Air Transport Command message SOOPS of 18 May to C.F.H.Q. [112.302.009(D2)].

190. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1324 of 19 May to Air Transport Command, ibid.

191. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 185 of 19 May to C.F.H.Q., ibid.

192. The type of gasoline was JP4.

193. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1334 of 23 May to Air Transport Command, ibid.

194. C.F.H.Q. message DMov[?] of 24 May to Air Transport Command, ibid.

195. C.F.H.Q. message Ops 1342 of 28 May to Air Transport Command, ibid.
196. Ibid.
197. Air Transport Command messages SOOPS 194 of 25 May, 195 of 26 May, SSOPS 85 of 26 May, SOOPS 998 of 26 May, 999 of 26 May, 502 of 26 May, 515 of 27 May, ibid.
198. Air Transport Command message SSOOPS 86 of 26 May to U.N. detachment Pisa, ibid.
199. C.F.H.Q. draft message Ops 1364 of 27 May, not sent, ibid.; Information from Air Transport Command.
200. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 524 of 28 May to C.F.H.Q., ibid.
201. Memorandum 3030-38(SSOP) dated 7 June 67 by Wing Cdr. J.C. Wynn to Chief of Staff Operations, Air Transport Command, "UNEF Evacuation Pisa Detachment", [112.302.009(D7)].
202. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 535 of 29 May to U.N. Detachment, Pisa, [112.302.009(D7)].
203. Memorandum by Wing Cdr. Wynn, [112.302.009(D7)].
204. Ibid.; Memorandum 3030-38 (SOAM3) dated 7 June 67 by Sqdn. Ldr. C.H. Patrick to Wing Cdr. Wynn, ibid.; Air Transport Command message COSOPS 82 of 24 May to C.F.H.Q., [419.009(D29)], folio 181d.
205. Photograph of State Board, C.F.H.Q. Operations Centre, [112.302.009(D6)].
206. The damage to Camp Rafah is illustrated in Paris Match, No. 949, June 1967. See also United Nations General Assembly, A/6672, paragraphs 99-100.
207. Information from Colonel Power, [112.3H1.001(D18)]. See also UNEF Operations Log, serial 113, 231940Z, [419.005(D1)].
208. Report on Withdrawal of 115 A.T.U., 22 June 67. S1326-3118/115.

209. UNEF Operations Log, serials 239, 240, 28 May, [419.005(D1)].
210. Ibid., serials 256, 257, 258, 28 May.
211. Ibid., serial 278, 29 May.
212. Ibid., serial 315, 29 May.
213. Information from Colonel Power, [112.3H1.001(D18)].
214. W.D., H.Q. C.B.U. UNEF, May 1967, Annex "D", Administrative Order No. 1 dated 20 May, [419.006 (D2)].
215. United Nations General Assembly, A/6672, paragraphs 75-77.
216. See paragraph 69 above.
217. S1326-3118/115.
218. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 536 of 29 May and Minute: "ATOC advised that UN not too receptive to this idea. It is considered touchy and dangerous. However, U.N. prepared to attempt night operation clearance if Canada is insistent. We are not - so daylight is to continue. DFR." [419.009(D28)].
219. Sources for these statistics are given in Appendix "E".
220. "Interim Report on Withdrawal and Close-Out of C.B.U." [112.302.005(D6)].
221. Memorandum 3030-38(SSOP) of 7 June 67. [112.300.009(D7)].
222. Accommodation was provided in the Gymnasium of the U.S. Base at Pisa, Camp Darby, ibid.
- 222a. See Appendix "F", "Details of the airlift of UNEF personnel from Pisa to Trenton, 29 May - 1 June."
223. Pisa message 205 of 1 June to Air Transport Command, ([112.302.009(D2)]).

224. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 665 of 1 June to 435 Sqdn, Namao, ibid.

225. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 112 of 8 June to C.F.H.Q., ibid.

226. Photographs of C.F.H.Q. Ops Centre State Board, [112.302.009(D6)].

227. Air Transport Command message COMD 22 of 6 June to C.F.H.Q. from Commander for V.C.D.S., [112.302.009 (D2)].

228. Photograph of C.F.H.Q. Ops Centre stateboard, [112.302.009(D6)].

229. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 778 of 7 June to R.A.F. Base Nicosia. [112.302.009(D2)].

230. External Affairs message DL20 of 7 June to Nicosia, ibid.

231. S1326-3118/115.

232. Air Transport Command message SOOPS 112 of 14 June to C.F.H.Q., [112.302.119(D2)].

233. C.F.H.Q. message V.C.D.S. 72 of 8 June to Air Transport Command, [112.302.009(D3)].

234. Note to file "Close out UNEF Cdn Contingent" 2 June 67, [112.302.009(D4)].

235. Ibid.

236. C.D.S. Minutes Staff Meeting 18/67 of 16 Aug 67. Minute dated 21 Aug.

237. The details of this part of the withdrawal are omitted here. For a full description, reference should be made to the following United Nations documents: S/PV. 1347 and S/7930 with Add. 1 of 5 June 67; A/6672 of 12 Jul 67. The last named document is the source for the material in this section.

238. Ibid.

239. See Paragraph 94 above. C.D.S. Minutes Staff Meeting 18/67 dated 21 Aug 67.

240. "Report on Operation LEAVEN", [112.302.005(D1)]; "Withdrawal of Canadian Contingent UNEF - Lessons Learned", [112.302.005(D5)]; "Interim Report on Withdrawal", [112.302.005(D6)]; Memoranda, reports and messages, [112.302.009(D7)].

241. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 112, No. 9, 18 May 67, 465-467. See Paragraph 17 above.

242. Messages concerning airlift, [112.302.009(D2)], passim.

243. Summary of Interview with Major-General Rikhye, (112.3H1.001(D19)].

244. See footnote 69 above.

245. "Evacuation Middle East" January 1964, [112.302.01 (D1)].

246. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 112, No. 12, 24 May 67, 535.

247. See Paragraphs 49 to 51 above.

248. See footnote 136 above.

249. Wing Commander Fitzsimmons was forecasting completion of 115 A.T.U.'s withdrawal by 3 June, S1326-3118/115.

250. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 112, No. 10, 19 May, 416-20; note 34 above.

251. E.L.M. Burns, "The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping," International Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Winter, 1967-68.

252. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peace-keeping, (Brookings Institution, Washington, 1967), 25, 73-4, 76; Albert Legault, Research on Peace-Keeping Operations: Current Status and Future Needs, (International Peace-Keeping Organization, Monograph No. 5, September 1967, 44-46; D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, 358; United Nations General Assembly, U.S.S.R. Memorandum on U.N. Peace-keeping, A/6641, 11 Apr 67.

253. Legault, Research on Peace-Keeping Operations ..., 13.

254. Neville Brown, Strategic Mobility (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963), 7-8 points out "...Potential trouble spots are much more numerous outside Europe than within it. Furthermore, the problems they present must be evaluated against the background of a steady expansion of military strength, and especially of the power to interdict against sea and air communications, on the part of many secondary powers."

255. See paras. 101-104 above.

256. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967. (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 26, 1967), 38.

257. Brown, Strategic Mobility, 254-5.

258. Since World War II the only prevention of movement by sea has been "the illegal Egyptian refusal of passage through the Suez Canal to Portuguese warships en route to aid the Goa garrison against the Indian attack," ibid., 7-8.

259. Israel and the Arab World..., 41.

260. Interview with General Rikhye, [112.3H1.001(D19)].

261. U.N. General Assembly, A/3943.

262. Guy de Lacharriere, "La Polémique sur les opérations des maintien de paix des Nations Unies," Politique Etrangère, No. 4, 1966, 328, cited by Legault, Research on Peace-Keeping Operations..., 12.

263. U.N. Security Council, "Aide-mémoire concerning some questions relating to the function and operation of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus," 10 Apr 64, S/5653; Kjell Goldmann, The United Nations in Arms. The Use of Force by U.N. Military Forces in the Middle East. (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1966. Mimeo graphed.).

264. E.L.M. Burns in "Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping", argues that enforcement is necessary, but admits that it would require participation by Permanent Members of the Security Council.

265. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli.

266. "Withdrawal of Canadian Contingent UNEF, Lessons Learned", V-3451-7(DOps) of 22 June 67, [112.302.005(D5)].

267. See paragraph 64 above.

268. "Report on Operation LEAVEN", [112.302.005(D1)].

269. "... Lessons Learned," [112.302.005(D5)].

270. Regulations for UNEF, art. 24; U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General concerning the status of the ... Force in Egypt, 8 Feb 57, A/3526, paras. 29 and 30. See Lauterpacht, United Nations Emergency Force: Basic Documents.

271. Memorandum, V.C.D.S. to C.D.S., V-3451-7 (DAFSR) 13 Jul 67, [112.302.009(D7)].

272. Some sources for a possible study of this nature are as follows: Francis P. Walter, History of the League of Nations, (Oxford 1952), Vol. II, Chap. 49; Sarah Wambaugh, The Saar Plebiscite (Cambridge Mass., 1940); League of Nations Journal, 1934, esp. nos. 6, 9 and 12; Report of the Commander-in-Chief, International Force in the Saar..., 26 Oct 35, [952.003(D37)]; Historical Report No. 4, Canada and Peace-keeping Operations; Paul Van der Vour "The United Nations In West Irian: A Critique, " International Organization (Winter, 1964), 53-73; External Affairs Bulletin, XV, (June 1, 1963) 240-243; Historical Report No. 8, Canada and Peace-keeping Operations. The Congo 1960-64; Yashpal Tandon, "Consensus and Authority behind United Nations Peace-keeping Operations." International Organization, Vol XXI, No. 2, Spring 1967, 254-284; Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peace-keeping.

273. cf. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Initiatives by Delegations and the Secretary-General during the Middle East Crisis 1967," UNSG2-68, 18 Jan 68; "Initiatives by the Secretary-General," UNSG 12-67, 20 June 67, [956.009(D132)].