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REPORT NO.100

HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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by Joe for DHist NDHQDate: 7 AUG 1986

Operation "JUBILEE" : The Raid on Dieppe,
19 Aug 42.

Part I : The Preliminaries of the Operation.

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SECRET

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Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42.

Part I: The Preliminaries of the Operation.

1. This Report is the first part of an historical record of the very important combined operation at DIEPPE, carried out on 19 Aug 42 by a force which, in its military component, was in great part Canadian, and whose Military Commander was Major-General J.H. Roberts, M.C., G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div.
2. This "hard, savage clash" (as Mr. Churchill called it in Parliament on 8 Sep 42) was by far the largest actual operation in which troops of the Canadian Army Overseas have yet participated. During the operations in France in June, 1940, only one Canadian Brigade Group actually crossed the Channel; and it had no contact with the enemy. The DIEPPE operation was to all intents and purposes the first occasion on which troops of the Canadian Army Overseas went into battle; although certain individuals, such as the two interpreters supplied by the Saskatoon Light Infantry during the Norwegian campaign, had been in action, and a detachment of the Carleton and York Regiment, embarked for a small cross-Channel raid (see Report No. 81), had been under fire but did not land. Approximately two years and eight months had passed since the arrival of the first flight of 1 Cdn Div in Britain before troops of the Canadian Army in this theatre met the enemy on the field.
3. Apart from having this special significance for the Canadian Army, the DIEPPE enterprise was the largest of the succession of combined operations which have been directed against the enemy-occupied coast of Europe from the British Isles since the collapse of France in 1940. It involved two infantry brigades and large numbers of other troops, including an army tank battalion. This was the first occasion on which tanks had been employed in a Combined Operations raid. It was also, incidentally, the first battle in which a Canadian tank unit has ever been engaged.
4. It is clear that this operation will be of great interest to the Canadian Official Historian. The writer accordingly has dealt with it at considerable length. His object has been to place before the Official Historian, so far as is possible at the present time, all the material which he is likely to require to enable him to prepare for post-war publication an adequate narrative of this operation. Accordingly, he has gone into somewhat greater detail than is actually likely to be put into print in the final history. The Official Historian can easily reject such material as seems to him non-essential.
5. Both in preparation and in execution, DIEPPE was an extraordinarily complicated operation, and the mass of documentary material relating to it is proportionately large. The operation was preceded by a very long course of detailed planning and training, and it seems essential to take note

of these matters as well as of the actual events of the raid. Moreover, the story of the action of the Canadian troops is ~~only one part~~ ^{part} of the picture, though perhaps the most important part. British military forces were also involved; and the enterprise would of course have been quite impossible without the aid at every point of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The operation, furthermore, extended over a large area, and even in its narrowly military aspect resolved itself into at least five distinct episodes, each of which requires separate treatment.

6. The interest of the Canadian Official Historian will of course centre upon the action of the Canadian troops. It would be absurd, however, to attempt to tell the Canadian story as something quite separate from that of the British elements of the force. The procedure proposed for the present Report is as follows. The writer will attempt to tell the whole story of the raid; but he will deal with the action of the Canadian Army, which is his special responsibility, in greater detail than with other aspects. He is fortunate in having at his disposal the narrative already compiled by the Combined Operations Recorder, Mr. H.A. St.G. Saunders, and printed as C.B.04244, Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid, 1942. His own comparatively brief account of the actions of the Royal Navy, the Special Service Brigade troops and the Royal Air Force is at many points based upon this narrative or the Appendices attached to it. In compiling the account of the action of Canadian units, on the other hand, the writer has done his utmost to examine every relevant piece of written evidence, and has interviewed many individuals, from private soldiers upwards. He has also made a special attempt to compile a full account of the preliminaries of the operation, with special attention here too to Canadian aspects. It is with these preliminaries that the present Report deals. The actual events of 19 Aug 42 will be dealt with subsequently.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATION

7. It is worth while in the beginning to recall very briefly the general war situation as it existed in Europe during the summer of 1942; for an understanding of this will be essential to historical assessment of the DIEPPE operation.

8. Since the withdrawal of the British troops from France in June of 1940, the German Army has been in occupation of the whole western coastline of Europe from the North Cape to the Pyrenees. In the British Isles there has been assembled a large Allied army, including a growing Canadian component and latterly reinforced by strong United States forces. In training and in equipment this Allied army may be said to have become steadily more formidable since the period immediately following the collapse of France, when the Canadian Force commanded by General McNaughton was for a time the only military body in the United Kingdom capable of a campaign against an invading army (1). This powerful Allied force has for many months confronted the German garrisons in France and the Low Countries, just across the English Channel.

9. On 22 Jun 41 Germany attacked Russia, and since that time the greater part, though by no means all, of German military resources have been employed in the tremendous

(1) This force was subsequently absorbed by 7 Corps (also commanded by General McNaughton), which included British and New Zealand as well as Canadian troops.

struggle which has raged on the Eastern Front. In these circumstances the apprehension of a German invasion of the United Kingdom which was current during the twelve months following DUNKIRK has very largely ceased to exist. While such an event is certainly still possible, consideration of it has been replaced, to a large extent, in the public mind and probably in the minds of Allied commanders, by the question of the possibility of what is popularly called a "Second Front" in Western Europe; in other words, an invasion of the Continent by British and Allied forces based upon the British Isles. Within the United Kingdom, and in other Allied countries also, there has been during recent months loud popular clamour for such a "Second Front", and the British Government has allowed it to be known that such a development is a definite part of the Allied strategy; though in the nature of things it is not proposed to announce times and places in advance, and it is intended to base decisions upon the facts of the military situation rather than upon the extent of public demand. It should also be noted that the Russian Government has made no secret of its desire for an attack on the Germans in Western Europe; in October, 1942, Premier Stalin went so far as to give to an American newspaperman a statement to the effect that a second front held "a very important place, one might say a place of the first rate" in Soviet estimates of the current situation (Daily Express, LONDON, 5 Oct 42).

10. An important speech delivered in the House of Commons on 11 Nov 42 by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom serves to illuminate the general situation in the summer of 1942. As reported in The Times of 12 Nov, Mr. Churchill said in part:

The attack which will be made in due course across the Channel or the North Sea requires an immense degree of preparation, vast numbers of special landing craft, and a great army trained, division by division, in amphibious warfare. All this is proceeding, but it takes time. Of course, should the enemy become demoralized at any moment, the same careful preparations would not be needed. (Laughter.) Risks could be run on a large scale, but this is certainly not the case at the present time.

11. The Prime Minister proceeded to recall the fact that the German army in France is "as large, apart from the Home Guard, as ours in Great Britain"; and he further referred to "the immense fortifications erected along the Channel and North Sea coasts" and to all the difficulties attendant upon sea crossings in the face of opposition. Having sketched the nature of the problem of cross-Channel attack, he proceeded:

It would have been most improvident for us to attempt such an enterprise before all our preparations were ready. They have very greatly advanced. Enormous installations have been and are being brought into existence at all our suitable ports, but no one would have been justified, nor indeed would it have been physically possible, to have made an effective invasion of the Continent during the summer or autumn of 1942.

12. The Prime Minister mentioned that earlier in the year (see The Times, 12 Jun 42) a joint communique had been issued by the United Kingdom with the United States and Russia which spoke of a second front in Europe in 1942. He said that one object of this was to deceive the enemy, and

added, "In June I gave the Russian Government a written document, making it perfectly clear that while we were preparing to make a landing in 1942, we could not promise to do so."

13. The Prime Minister went on to observe that, "Meanwhile, whether or not we were going to attack the Continent in August, September, or October, it was of the utmost consequence to Russia that the enemy should believe that we were so prepared and so resolved". Only in this way had it been possible to draw and keep at least 33 German divisions in the West.

14. The Prime Minister then discussed the great new enterprise which began with the British and American landings in French North Africa on 8 Nov 42. He explained that during his own first visit to WASHINGTON following the entry of the United States into the war, President Roosevelt had "favoured the idea that French North Africa was specially suitable for American intervention in the Western theatre". Mr. Churchill added:

This view was fully shared by us. However, it was clearly the duty both of Britain and of the United States to exhaust every possibility of carrying more direct aid to Russia by means of a liberating descent upon France. Both plans were therefore studied by the Staffs with the utmost attention, and preparations were made for both possibilities, either alternatively or simultaneously.

15. The final result of these discussions and preparations was stated by Mr. Churchill in the following terms:

.....As the year advanced it became clear that the provision of landing craft would not be on a sufficiently large scale to enable a heavy intervention to take place across the Channel in the favourable weather months of 1942.

General Marshall, the head of the American Army, with which is included the American Air Force, paid two visits to this country, the first in April, the second in July; and on the second occasion he was accompanied by Admiral King, the Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy. It was decided on this second occasion to hold the enemy on the French shore and to strike at his southern flank in the Mediterranean through North Africa. In this decision the British and American Staffs were wholly united, and their views were shared and adopted by the President and the British War Cabinet.....Orders for the North African expedition were accordingly issued at the end of July.

16. This authoritative summary provides at least part of the background for the DIEPPE operation. The narrative which follows will make it clear that this operation was conceived as early as April of 1942; in other words, preparations and planning for it were going forward at a time when, on Mr. Churchill's showing, it was not yet wholly certain whether or not an actual invasion of Western Europe was to be attempted during the summer. The operation as finally carried out in August, following the Anglo-American consultations in July, must presumably be interpreted in the light of Mr. Churchill's statement that one part of the general plan was "to hold the enemy on the French shore". It must also be remembered that on 8 Sep 42 Mr. Churchill told Parliament that the DIEPPE raid was "a reconnaissance in force", with the object of getting "all the information necessary before launching operations on

a much larger scale"; it was, he said, "an indispensable preliminary to full-scale operations" (The Times, 9 Sep 42). This aspect has an obvious importance. The only document touching upon it, and bearing a date prior to that of the operation, which has yet been seen, is Lord Louis Mountbatten's letter to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (11 May 42) asking approval for the Outline Plan. The G.C.O. then wrote:

2. Apart from the military objective given in the outline plan, this operation will be of great value as training for Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" or any other major operation as far as the actual assault is concerned. It will not, however, throw light on the maintenance problem over beaches.

It is important to remember that the DIEPPE raid was the first opportunity offered to British forces for testing tank landing craft in action.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DIEPPE AREA

17. The town of DIEPPE lies on the coast of Normandy some 67 miles from the port of NEWHAVEN in Sussex, from which a line of cross-Channel steamers operates to it in peacetime, and which was one of the ports at which the raiding force embarked for the operation. DIEPPE's population is given in the Blue Guide to Normandy (Second Edition, 1928) as 24,658, "including the garrison". The town is in normal times "a seaport, fishing harbour, and fashionable watering-place".

18. DIEPPE is situated at the mouth of the River D'ARQUES, which flows into the Channel through a valley with a flat floor which in the region of DIEPPE is something less than 1,000 yards wide. The mouth of this river has been improved by the construction of jetties and basins to provide a harbour described as "commodious and deep", which is well equipped with cranes. Railway lines radiate from DIEPPE towards LE HAVRE, ROUEN and PARIS.

19. The coast in the DIEPPE area consists in the main of steep cliffs generally unscalable by landing parties. Immediately to the west of the town these reach a height of 91 metres, and there is a similar though less lofty headland to the east. Although the only really large gap in the cliff barrier is that at DIEPPE itself, where a distance of about 1,500 yards separates the east and west headlands, there is an accessible beach at POURVILLE, about 4,500 yards west of the harbour entrance, where the River SCIE flows into the Channel through a flat-bottomed valley similar to that of the ARQUES though not so broad. At PUIITS, about 2,000 yards east of the harbour entrance, there is a much narrower gap in the cliffs, occasioned by a gully which extends inland for about three miles in a generally easterly direction. In peacetime both POURVILLE and PUIITS are fashionable resorts, each possessing a number of hotels.

20. The town of DIEPPE itself is fronted by a broad Promenade, Esplanade or Plage, nearly 200 yards wide, and extending from the harbour entrance westward for more than 1,000 yards. At the western end of this Promenade, lying between the beach and the front of the town proper, is the large white Casino, lying close under the western cliff. On a step of this cliff to the south-west of the Casino is the old Castle. A prominent landmark on the front of the town roughly half way between the harbour entrance and the Casino is "the large Tobacco Factory" with its two tall chimneys. Behind the eastern half of the town lie the various basins of the harbour. Of these, one, the Bassin Berigny, has

evidently in recent years been filled in and converted into a public park. On many maps it still appears in its former state. Both in the east headland, immediately above and to the east of the harbour entrance, and in the west headland immediately to the west of the Casino, there existed before the war certain caves called the Goves or Gobes, "inhabited by a few survivors of the cave-dwelling age" (Blue Guide, Normandy, p.16). Most of DIEPPE's fashionable hotels stand in the street called the Boulevard de Verdun, which runs along the front of the town, and look out across the grassy Promenade and the beach beyond it to the sea. This Promenade and beach, once dedicated to idleness and pleasure, were the scene of desperate fighting on 19 Aug 42.

21. Forming the seaward edge of the Promenade or Esplanade is a wall which at most points rises not more than about two feet perpendicularly above the beach. The beach itself is composed of large "shingle", the stones being in some cases about the size of a man's fist. It is rough and irregular in contour. The slope, it appears, varies from about 1:7 to 1:4. (See the Report by Major B. Sucharov, R.C.E., dated 2 Sep 42 : C.M.H.Q. file 55/OPS/41.)

22. The foregoing description, which should be studied in conjunction with the coastline photograph of the model of the area, will make it clear that the DIEPPE region offered important natural obstacles to an attack from the sea. The sequel will show that the Germans, during their occupation of it from June, 1940, down to the time of the attack in August, 1942, had constructed artificial defences which, supplementing these natural advantages, had the effect of rendering DIEPPE a decidedly strong place.

THE PLANNING OF THE OPERATION

23. The narrative of the operation provided in C.B.04244 indicates that the question of an attack on DIEPPE was first examined by the "Target Committee" of Combined Operations Headquarters "early in April, 1942". This was shortly after the execution of the largest previous enterprise undertaken by C.O.H.Q., the raid on ST.NAZAIRE (23 Mar 42). About the middle of April the Planning Staff of C.O.H.Q. began work on an Outline Plan. This work was directed by Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N., who subsequently was the Naval Force Commander for Operation "JUBILEE".

24. It was agreed at once that although DIEPPE was not believed to be heavily defended, a large force, estimated at as many as six battalions, would be required for a raid on so considerable a place. The use of tanks in support was also considered "very early".

25. In the first instance a frontal assault on DIEPPE was not contemplated. The Planning Staff considered instead landings on the flanks, at QUIBERVILLE to the west and CRIEL-SUR-MER to the east. It was believed that tanks landed on the former might be able to seize the ST.AUBIN aerodrome and the high ground south and south-west of DIEPPE.

26. On 14 Apr 42, representatives of the General Staff at G.H.Q. Home Forces joined the planning syndicate in accordance with standing procedure for the planning of raids as then in effect. It would appear from C.B.04244 that during the next few days the combined planners produced two alternative plans. One provided for a frontal attack against DIEPPE itself, supplemented by two flank attacks at PUIITS to the

east and POURVILLE to the west, and by attacks by parachute and airborne troops on two heavy batteries of coast defence guns situated near BERNEVAL, five miles to the east of DIEPPE, and near VARENCEVILLE, four miles to the west. In essence, this was the plan finally agreed upon for Operation "RUTTER", and actually employed, after some alteration, in Operation "JUBILEE". The other plan provided for no frontal assault, but was based upon landing two battalions at PUTTS and two at POURVILLE, while another battalion would land with a battalion of tanks at QUIBERVILLE, and two other battalions would be kept in hand as a floating reserve.

27. On 18 Apr 42 the Vice Chief of Combined Operations (Major-General J.C. Haydon) presided over a meeting which was also attended by the D.C.G.S. and B.G.S. (Plans) Home Forces and the G.O.C. Airborne Division. After discussion, this meeting arrived at the conclusion that a frontal assault on DIEPPE would have to be included, and that this attack should be preceded by flank attacks against the two heavy batteries at BERNEVAL and VARENCEVILLE and by a heavy air bombardment.

28. A further meeting to consider plans for the proposed operation (now known by the code name "RUTTER") was held on 25 Apr 42, with the Chief of Combined Operations, Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, in the chair. The D.C.G.S., Home Forces, was again present. At this meeting the Army representatives explained the reasons leading them to favour a frontal attack. It was pointed out that if a force were landed as far from DIEPPE as QUIBERVILLE it would be difficult to achieve surprise against the town itself; while furthermore tanks put ashore there would have to cross two rivers (the SAANE and the SCIE) en route to DIEPPE. This would necessitate arrangements for seizing the bridges to prevent their being demolished. In addition it was believed that DIEPPE itself was probably held only by "a single low-category Battalion", though this was supported by a considerable number of guns. It is interesting to note that "the Naval Planners still expressed doubt about the frontal assault, but not on Naval grounds". It was urged, apparently to allay their doubts, that it was proposed to provide an air bombardment "of maximum intensity" just before the assault, "and it was thought that the defence would be too confused by it and by subsequent attacks from low flying aircraft to be in a position to offer stout or prolonged resistance".

29. This meeting agreed upon the nature of the Outline Plan for the operation, following the lines above described, and incorporating a frontal assault preceded by a heavy air bombardment.

30. As noted below (paras. 56 ff.) Canadian officers became associated with the work of planning on 8 May 42. On 11 May the Outline Plan for the operation was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by the Chief of Combined Operations, who informed the Committee in his letter that the plan had the concurrence of the G.O.C.-in-C., South Eastern Command. On 13 May, in a letter to the three Force Commanders, the C.C.O. apprised them that the Committee had approved the plan (Documents from H.Q. 2 Cdn Div).

31. The Outline Plan itself will be found printed virtually in full in the text of C.B. 04244 (para. 24). A few points only will therefore be noted here. Quotations are from the actual text of the Plan as communicated to H.Q. 2 Cdn Div.

32. It will be observed that the plan begins with the statement "Intelligence reports indicate that DIEPPE is not heavily defended". The objects of the raid were to be the destruction of defences in the DIEPPE area, the installations at the aerodrome of DIEPPE-ST. AUBIN, directly south of the town, and of R.D.P. stations, power stations, dock and rail facilities and petrol dumps. It was also proposed to remove for our own use invasion barges believed to be in the harbour, to obtain secret documents from the Divisional Headquarters believed to exist at ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE, and to capture prisoners. It was proposed to employ for this purpose a Naval Force including about six small destroyers of the "Hunt" class, the shallow-draught gunboat "Locust", seven infantry landing ships, and a great number of small craft. The Military Forces were to include "two infantry brigades with Engineers; up to a battalion of Army tanks and airborne troops". The Air Forces were to consist of five squadrons of support fighters, one squadron of fighter-bombers, and "sufficient bombers to produce extensive bombardments on selected areas and targets, to provide carrying aircraft for parachutes and tugs for gliders if possible". This meant "approximately 150 bomber sorties".

33. The operation would be jointly commanded by Naval, Military and R.A.F. Force Commanders, nominated respectively by the Admiralty, the C.-in-C. Home Forces, and the A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter Command. The Naval and Military Force Commanders would be carried in a destroyer, and would be accompanied by a liaison officer from the R.A.F. Force Commander, who would himself operate from a headquarters in England.

34. The plan provided for two infantry flank attacks to the east and west of DIEPPE, as already outlined, the force landed to the west having the special task of capturing the aerodrome. Simultaneously with these flank attacks parachute troops would be dropped to attack the Divisional Headquarters and the coastal and anti-aircraft batteries in the area. The use of glider-borne troops was also envisaged in the event of tugs for gliders being available.

35. Thirty minutes after the flank attacks the frontal assault would be put in by "up to 2" infantry battalions and up to thirty Army tanks. One infantry battalion in L.C.P.(L)s would be held in floating reserve, while the remaining armoured fighting vehicles would be available to land either at DIEPPE or to the west of the town.

36. It was further provided that during the night preceding the assault a heavy bombing attack would be delivered against the dock area, beginning "at a time suitable to Bomber Command" and ceasing not later than one hour before the beginning of nautical twilight, that is, an hour and a half before the assaults on the flanks. Provision was also made for Hurricane bombers to attack the beach area of the town immediately before the frontal assault. Fighter support against anti-aircraft and coast defences and beach defences was provided for, as was fighter cover during the frontal assault and the part of the re-embarkation taking place in daylight. It may be worth noting that the original Outline Plan as communicated to the Force Commanders by the C.C.O. on 13 May included "low level bombing by Blenheims" immediately before the Hurricane attack. This element in the plan, and the two squadrons of low-level bombers provided to carry it out, were eliminated by the C.C.O.'s amending letter of 15 May (Documents from H.Q. 2 Cdn Div).

37. It was also noted that the Naval Forces might be required to give close support to the troops.

38. It would be necessary to establish and hold a perimeter around DIEPPE; and all troops would be re-embarked from DIEPPE, either over the beaches or from inside the harbour.

39. The earliest suitable date for the operation was 20-21 Jun; but it could be carried out on "any of the six nights following".

40. It is convenient in this place to note some of the later developments affecting the plan for Operation "RUTTER".

41. As it was considered that the aerial bombardment was an important element in the plan as drafted, and as there was a Cabinet ruling to the effect that targets in Occupied France could only be bombed "when weather conditions are such that accurate attack can be expected", a minute was sent to the Prime Minister on 19 May observing "that this restriction had already proved a hindrance to Combined Operations". This had been the case during the raid on ST. NAZAIRE on 28 Mar 42, when bombers were prevented from acting because cloud conditions prevented them from seeing the dock area which was their objective. It was explained that, since such conditions might recur, the Chiefs of Staff hoped that the existing ruling (based presumably on the desire to avoid causing casualties among the French population) might be relaxed so far as Combined Operations were concerned. On 1 Jun, the Chiefs of Staff were informed in reply that the Prime Minister was still opposed to the indiscriminate bombing of French towns at night, but that an exception would be made in the case of a coastal raid (C.B. 04244, para. 21).

42. Although this permission had removed one obstacle to the use of heavy aerial bombardment, the planners themselves shortly afterwards decided to delete such bombardment from the plan. This decision was made on 5 Jun 42 at a meeting attended by the "Executive of Combined Operations" (acting for the C.C.O., then in the United States), the three Force Commanders, and the G.O.C.-in-C., South Eastern Command. It will be noted that the abandonment of the project for a high-level bombardment preceding the assault removed from the plan an element of offensive strength which had apparently been used to overcome the objections of the Naval planners to the project of a frontal assault (para. 28, above). It is therefore essential to note the reasons for this action. As summarized in C.B. 04244, they were as follows:

The Air Force Commander was of the opinion that the bombing of the port itself during the night of the assault would not be the most profitable way to use bombers and might only result in putting the enemy on the alert. In the view of the Military Commander the destruction of large numbers of houses and the setting of a considerable portion of the town on fire, would probably prevent the tanks from operating in streets choked with debris. As an alternative to high-level bombing the Air Force Commander proposed that diversionary bombing attacks should be made on Boulogne and the aerodromes at Abbeville-Drucat and Crecy. In view of the strong opinions held by the Air Force and Military Commanders high-level bombing was abandoned in favour of diversionary air attacks which, it was considered, would occupy the attention of the German R.D.F. organization, and might put out of action for some hours two aerodromes which the enemy would certainly wish to use during the operation. It was also agreed that cannon Fighters should attack the beach defences and the high ground on either side of Dieppe and that the German Divisional Headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille should be bombed.

The accuracy of this account has been confirmed by General Roberts.

43. The actual record of this matter in the minutes of the meeting, as issued in amended form by C.O.H.Q. on 18 Jun 42, runs as follows :

AIR PLAN

5. Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory proposed, and the meeting agreed, that air bombing of the port itself during the night of the assault would not be the most profitable way of using the bombers, as a raid which was not overpowering might only result in putting everyone on the alert. As an alternative he proposed bombing BOULOGNE, with 70 aircraft, with a view to creating a diversion there, and he proposed also the bombing of CRECY and ABBEVILLE aerodromes between 0230 and 0400 hours. It was emphasised that the movement of our aircraft in the vicinity of ABBEVILLE and CRECY would tend to occupy the R.D.F. organisation at DIEPPE and might put out of action, at least for some hours, two aerodromes which the enemy would wish to use during the day of the operation.

6. It was agreed that cannon-fighters should attack the beach defences and the high ground on either side of DIEPPE, as the first flight of landing craft were coming in to land. It was also agreed that air action would be taken against German Headquarters in ARQUES at 0440.

In the event, it may be noted here, the diversionary raid on BOULOGNE was not made, and a day instead of a night attack was made on the ABBEVILLE aerodrome. Neither C.B. 04244 nor any documents seen by the present writer throw light on the change of plan.

44. It was agreed that "a small Naval demonstration in the BOULOGNE area would be most valuable, as it might take the enemy's attention off the convoy", and steps were taken to arrange this accordingly (Minutes of Meeting 5 Jun).

45. The Detailed Military Plan for Operation "RUTTER", a very long document, bore the date 20 Jun 42. A considerable number of amendments were subsequently issued.

46. Except where otherwise noted, the account of the early planning given above (paras. 23-44) derives entirely from C.B.04244. The Combined Operations Recorder informs the writer that this narrative contains all the details available in writing concerning the early stages of planning.

FIRST CANADIAN INFORMATION OF THE PROJECT AND CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING

47. The earliest record which has been found of Canadian information of the project for the raid relates to an interview which took place at 1000 hrs on 30 Apr 42 at H.Q. First Cdn Army between Generals McNaughton and Montgomery.

48. General Montgomery then visited General McNaughton and explained that he had been approached by Home Forces with a proposal for a raid on DIEPPE. Conditions of light and tide would be favourable for such an operation during the week commencing 21 Jun 42. The troops required were one infantry division to be selected from the South Eastern Command. General Montgomery stated that he had been "pressed to agree to a composite British and Cdn Force". He had replied "that it was

essential to maintain unity of command and that in his opinion the Cdn tps were those best suited". G.H.Q. Home Forces had accepted this view; and G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps had already been approached and had nominated 2 Cdn Div for the operation.

49. These arrangements were confirmed by General McNaughton, subject to the details of the plans being satisfactory and receiving his approval. It was agreed that General Montgomery should proceed with the preparation of plans and advise the G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div so that he might start work on planning with the G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div was to take part in Exercise "TIGER" (see Report No. 75) and thereafter would move to the ISLE OF WIGHT for training. This information was at this time known only to the following officers: at South Eastern Army, General Montgomery, his B.G.S., and one officer performing the duty of liaison with the G.O.C.; at First Cdn Army, General McNaughton and Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson (G.S.O.1 (Ops)); at 1 Cdn Corps, General Crerar and his B.G.S., Brigadier Simonds; and at 2 Cdn Div the G.O.C. (Major-General J.H. Roberts, M.C.), his G.S.O.1 (Lt.-Col. C.C. Mann), and such other officers, on a most limited scale, as were necessary for planning.

50. Paragraphs 47-49, above, are based on a longhand memorandum of the conversation between Generals McNaughton and Montgomery, dictated to Lt.-Col. Henderson by General McNaughton at 1600 hours on 30 Apr 42: "RUTTER" file, 8-3-4/ Ops, Appendix 22 to War Diary, "G", H.Q. First Cdn Army, September 1942.

51. On this same date (30 Apr 42), Training Instruction No. 9 was issued by H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps. As noted in Report No. 70 (para. 17), this instruction was a sequel to Training Instruction No. 7 (see Report No. 70, paras. 13 to 15, and Report No. 86, paras. 20 ff.). This instruction No. 9, which laid down a programme of Combined Operations training beginning with 2 Cdn Div and continuing with 1 Cdn Div and 3 Cdn Div in that order, was in fact simply security cover for training for Operation "RUTTER".

52. On 5 May 42 G.H.Q. Home Forces issued to the various Commands in the United Kingdom a new directive on the subject of Raids, specifying the procedure to be adopted for co-operation between G.H.Q. and the C.O.C. This directive (HF. 00/86/G. (Plans)) provided for decentralization by the C.-in-C. Home Forces. The procedure outlined was that any proposal for a raid would be submitted in outline to the C.-in-C. If the C.-in-C. agreed with the C.O.C. (who was responsible to the Cabinet for all raids on the Continent) that authority should be given for further study of the project, the C.-in-C. would decide upon the Command from which the troops were to be found, and would delegate responsibility for the operation to the Army Commander concerned. The Army Commander would then be at liberty to decide whether he would "retain control himself or delegate not below a Divisional Commander". An Outline Plan would then be prepared by the combined Planning Staffs of G.H.Q. and C.O.H.Q. together with a staff officer nominated by the Army, Corps or Divisional Commander concerned, who would himself attend important meetings and be responsible for concerting the plan with the C.O.C. If the Outline Plan was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, Force Commanders would be appointed, and these with their staffs would work out the detailed plan in LONDON.

53. When the detailed plan had been approved, the directive proceeded, the Force required for any operation in France or the Low Countries would move to the ISLE OF WIGHT

for final concentrated training with the R.N. and R.A.F. Here military training and operational plans, etc., would be under the supervision of the selected responsible military officer, while combined training with other services would be under the C.C.O., represented by Rear Admiral Combined Operations. The last paragraph of the directive ran :

8. The actual authority to despatch the expedition will normally be one of the Naval O's.-in-C. Once the force has sailed command will be exercised jointly by the three force commanders, but the selected Army, Corps or Divisional Commander will continue to be the responsible military authority in this Country and will, in conjunction with such officers of the R.N. or R.A.F. as may be appointed, take any steps that may be necessary to reinforce the expedition or to keep it supplied.

54. This letter was signed by Lt.-Gen. J.G. des R. Swayne, C.G.S., Home Forces, and a copy was communicated to H.Q. First Cdn Army. (Copy on 1 Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div ("Raids by Cdn Tps - 2 Cdn Div"), now at Records Office, ACTON).

55. On 7 May 42 General Swayne wrote to General McNaughton with reference to the forthcoming operation, remarking that he had heard that General McNaughton had agreed to the use of Canadian troops and that he had been told of the general nature of the operation. General Swayne observed that it was of course desirable to "keep to a minimum the number of officers who know of the details of the operation". He proposed, he said, to send information to General McNaughton from time to time personally, and if he desired any amplification at any time, the Planning Staff at G.H.Q. would be at his disposal. General Swayne inquired whether General McNaughton agreed to this procedure or had any other proposals. His letter concluded:

General Montgomery will be responsible for providing the Canadian Corps and the 2nd Canadian Division with such information as they require, since he is the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief selected by the Commander-in-Chief to prepare the outline plan in accordance with the procedure given in HF. 00/66/G. (Plans) dated 5th May, copy of which was sent to your Headquarters.

(File 8-3-4/Ops.)

56. On the following day General McNaughton replied to General Swayne as follows:

MOST SECRET

8-3-4/Ops

HQ First Cdn Army

8 May 42

Dear General Swayne

I have your letter MOST SECRET HF. 00/525/G. (Plans) dated 7 May 42.

1 I confirm my consent to the selection of 2 Cdn Div with certain attached troops from 1 Cdn Corps for operation 'RUTTER' of which I have been generally informed by Lt.-Gen. Montgomery, GOC.-in-C SECO.

2. Confirming our conversation yesterday, I intend to keep in touch with this matter by establishing close liaison with you, and for this purpose I have detailed Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson, GSO 1 Operations First Cdn Army to maintain contact with whoever you may indicate. Lt.-Col. Henderson will keep me informed, and if the situation at any time so requires, I will get into direct touch with you.

3. Also I today instructed Lt.-Gen. Crerar, Commanding 1 Cdn Corps to keep me fully posted from his end as a matter of information, it being understood that all executive action in connection with the preparations would continue to follow the chain of command - GHQ Home Forces -- SECO -- 1 Cdn Corps -- 2 Cdn Div.

4. The Commander 2 Cdn Div under 1 Cdn Corps has now been authorized to proceed with the preparation of plans accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) A.G.L. McNaughton.

Lt.-Gen. J. Swayne, CBE

GHQ

Home Forces

57. On this same date (8 May 42) Canadian officers joined in the work of planning the proposed operation. Lt.-Col. (now Brigadier) C.C. Mann, G.S.O. 1, 2 Cdn Div, carried the main burden of detailed planning on behalf of General Roberts, the Military Force Commander, and from this time until the operation was carried out he worked extremely long hours, in LONDON and elsewhere, at this task. Lt.-Col. Henderson was similarly active, and maintained liaison with the planning staff on behalf of the G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army "by means of numerous trips to G.O.H.Q. and G.H.Q. Home Forces". ("Supplementary Notes" to War Diary, "G", H.Q., First Cdn Army, September 1942; and information from Brigadier Mann.)

58. On 11 May 42 the Outline Plan for Operation "RUTTER" was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (above, para. 30). It will be noted that Canadian officers had begun to share the work of planning only after the Outline Plan had been completed and the broad lines of the operation thus laid down. Nevertheless, as Brigadier Mann remarked to the writer on 18 Nov 42, the Outline Plan was no more than its name implied, and a great deal of planning yet remained to be done.

59. It is of interest to note that the first task of the G.S.O. 1, 2 Cdn Div, was to make an appreciation of the Outline Plan for the benefit of the Military Force Commander. Lt.-Col. Mann's "Observations upon the Outline Plan" (undated : included among documents received from H.Q. 2 Cdn Div) remarked that "The question of the right point at which to land A.F.V. in this operation is the outstanding feature of the Plan", and his appreciation is largely concerned with this matter. He discussed the question of a possible landing at QUIBERVILLE (above, paras. 26 and 28) but decided that the effect of the river obstacles was to limit the landing of A.F.Vs. to the area between the SCIE and the ARQUES. With reference to "Beach No. 5" (evidently that at POURVILLE) he concluded that this might be useful as a landing-place for later flights of tanks, but not for an initial landing. Of the plan for landing the A.F.Vs. on the main beach in front of DIEPPE, Lt.-Col. Mann wrote in part :

Such a plan, on the face of it, is almost a fantastic conception of the place most suited to land a strong force of A.F.V. It is, however, well worth evaluating with an unbiased mind.

Advantages.

- (a) It, if successful, puts the A.F.V. in easy striking distance of the most appropriate objectives for their employment.
- (b) Surprise.
- (c) Would have a terrific moral effect on both Germans and French.
- (d) Could be most easily supported by infantry and R.E.
- (e) Control and information will be from front to rear, and difficulties of co-ordination to surmount obstacles, and deal with resistance would be the more easily met.

It was further argued that by landing on the main beach the supply of ammunition for A.F.Vs., and of engineer stores for support of A.F.Vs. and for demolition tasks, could be co-ordinated on a workable plan; while the Navy considered it best to re-embark the force at one place only. The proposed plan had "the advantage of simplicity"; and it was the best choice with respect to the withdrawal phase, as a rearguard action to cover re-embarkation would almost certainly be necessary.

60. The disadvantages of the plan were recognized. It involved "attacking the enemy frontally", and at a point where penetration was obstructed and engineer effort was required; while "the danger of failure to penetrate through DIEPPE, after the heavy air bombardment" had also to be taken into account. Lt.-Col. Mann, however, pointed out that in an English coast town a similar attack would have good prospect of success "providing the engineer tasks were suitably dealt with"; and he recalled that the known strength of the DIEPPE garrison was only two companies of infantry not of the best quality, plus some divisional troops. The final section of his appreciation ran as follows :

Conclusion.

In spite of an initial adverse re-action to the proposal to land A.F.V. on DIEPPE front, it seems to have a reasonable prospect of success, and offers the best opportunity to exploit the characteristics of A.F.V. in this operation.

If A.F.V. were omitted from the operation it could still be very useful, but the likelihood of success in regard to the destruction of the aerodrome would be greatly reduced.

In regard to the withdrawal phase, a proportion of A.F.V. as part of the Rear-guard will materially strengthen the rear-guard at a time when enemy re-inforcements may be deploying for counter-attack with the object of preventing our withdrawal.

I am in favour of adopting the outline plan.

THE TRAINING PROGRAMME BEGINS

61. On 13 May 42 the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the Outline Plan for Operation "RUTTER", and also accepted the proposal of the C.-in-C. Home Forces that Canadian troops should be employed. The Military and Air Force Commanders were formally appointed at this meeting: General Roberts being the former, and Air Vice-Marshal (subsequently Air Marshal) T.L. Leigh-Mallory, C.B., D.S.O., being the latter. No Naval Commander was appointed at this time, as it was intended to appoint Rear Admiral T.B. Baillie-Grohman, C.B., D.S.O., who was not then in England. This officer was subsequently appointed, on 1 Jun. (C.B. 04244, para.20).

62. On the same day on which the Chiefs of Staff gave this formal approval to the operation, G.H.Q. Home Forces issued instructions for training reliefs in the ISLE OF WIGHT, involving the move of the Canadian troops detailed for the operation from their stations in Sussex to the assigned training area. The movement was to take place on 18, 19 and 20 May. (File 3-3-1-2 Div.) This arrangement necessitated cancelling the plan adopted earlier (see Canadian Corps Training Instruction No. 9) for the participation of 2 Cdn Div in Exercise "TIGER". In this exercise 2 Cdn Div (except for 5 Cdn Inf Bde, the Divisional Artillery, and certain other units, which remained in Sussex, and did not participate in either the training or the raid) was replaced by 3 (Br) Div, which took 5 Cdn Inf Bde under command (see Report No. 73).

63. The code name for the move to the ISLE OF WIGHT was "SIMMER", and by this name the training programme which followed was generally referred to.

64. On 15 May 42 General McNaughton wrote as follows to General Swayne:

B-3-4 Ops

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL

15 May 42

Lieut.-General J.G. des R. Swayne, C.B.E.,
G.H.Q. Home Forces.

With reference to our conversation this afternoon:

1. I confirm that I accept the outline plan for Operation 'RUTTER' as approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
2. I confirm that I authorize the Canadian Commander to proceed with detail planning.
3. It would be appreciated if you would obtain for me a copy of paper giving outline plan of this operation as approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, this paper to be held by you to my order, for reference as I may require, and in any event to be handed to me on completion of operation, for transmission by me to my Government.
4. I suggest that in future Combined Operations involving Canadian troops, the outline plan should be placed before me before submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and that the Chiefs of Staff Paper should show that in giving

their approval they take note of my acceptance; also that I should be included in the distribution list.

(Signed) A.G.L. McNaughton
Lieut.-General
G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army
and
Senior Canadian Combatant Officer
in the United Kingdom

65. On 18 May 42 H.Q. 2 Cdn Div arrived in the ISLE OF WIGHT and opened at OSBORNE COURT, COWES. The same day 4 Cdn Inf Bde arrived in the island, and the following day 6 Cdn Inf Bde (War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, May 1942). 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn (Calgary Regiment) arrived on 20 May, as did the R.C.E. detachments designated to participate ("Programme of Movement", Appendix to Movement Order issued by G.H.Q. Home Forces).

66. It had at one time been proposed that the training should be divided between the ISLE OF WIGHT and NEWHAVEN; but H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps requested that arrangements should be made to have the whole Force trained at the ISLE OF WIGHT, and this was successfully arranged (note by Brigadier Simonds on note to him from Brigadier Chilton, 6 May 42; file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div).

67. The units of the Force immediately began an intensive programme of preliminary training designed to harden the men and otherwise prepare them for the arduous work ahead. The programme included, for the infantry, embarkation and beaching, assault courses, unarmed combat, training in the use of Bangalore torpedoes, speed marches, etc., etc. The syllabus will be found in C.B. 04244, para.30. The tank battalion worked with tank landing craft from the beginning. The Engineers trained with the infantry in assault work, and many personnel were sent away for special courses; while there was also instruction in weapon training and tactics. The work of the Force generally during the first week was somewhat hampered by necessary cancellations and changes; particularly in connection with boat work. The Report on Training for the period ending 28 May (War Diary, SIMMER FORCE, H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, May - Jul 42) runs in part as follows:

Although the condition of the men is reasonably good, the assault courses and speed marches have shown that there is a great improvement to be made in this direction. In the speed marches units are able to do five miles in 45 mins but took from 1½ hrs to 2 hrs to do the remaining 6 miles. In the Assault courses tps were able to complete the course but were, in many cases, unable to fight or fire effectively when finished.

68. During the succeeding week, 29 May - 6 Jun, the training went more smoothly. There was very active tank work, including co-operation with infantry, tank schemes including landing and re-embarkation, in which various beaches on the ISLE OF WIGHT were used, and the use of a tank firing range. The report on the work of this week generally states :

The condition of the men has improved and better results have been secured from speed marches but it has become evident that in the short time available, trg to the standard required on a bn basis is not possible without sacrificing other valuable trg.

(Report on Trg, period 29 May -
6 Jun, War Diary, SIMMER FORCE,
H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, May - July 1942.)

69. It was planned that when preliminary training was complete the plan for the operation should be tested, and the troops practised, in a large-scale exercise, simulating the actual projected operation, on a sector of the English coast resembling as closely as possible the DIEPPE area. The area selected was that about WEST BAY and BRIDPORT on the coast of Dorset.

70. Preliminary training on a battalion basis having been carried as far as could be done in the limited time available, a warning order for the proposed exercise, which was known by the code name "YUKON", was issued on 7 Jun 42, announcing that it would be held commencing 10 Jun. "General Exercise Instructions" dated 8 Jun explained that the exercise would be a Combined Operations exercise in combination with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. "2 Cdn Div will be 'the assaulting force' on a part of the South English coast and the local tps will act as the enemy." Operation Order No. 1 for "YUKON", undated but probably issued on 9 Jun, outlines the "Intention" as follows:

2 Cdn Div Raiding Force will seize WEST BAY, destroy objectives in WEST BAY and BRIDPORT, destroy enemy aerodrome at 9114, exploiting to BRADPOLE 9115 to capture Div HQ The Force will re-embark at WEST BAY and return to I.O.W.

71. It will be observed that the WEST BAY - BRIDPORT area represented DIEPPE. The "aerodrome at 9114" represented the aerodrome of DIEPPE-ST.AUBIN, and BRADPOLE represented ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE.

72. The Operation Order provided for the employment of three companies of Paratroops against the flank batteries. These were to land half an hour after Zero (sic) (two companies in the areas 8714, 8614 and 8713, west of BRIDPORT, and one company at 9309, east of BRIDPORT). At Zero the South Saskatchewan Regiment was to attack on GREEN BEACH (at BURTON FRESHWATER at the mouth of the river BRIDE, east of BRIDPORT) and the Royal Regiment of Canada on BLUE BEACH to the west of BRIDPORT. RED and WHITE BEACHES were at the mouth of BRIDPORT harbour, WHITE being to the east. Here the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish were to land one hour (sic) after Zero, simultaneously with the first wave of tanks. On GREEN BEACH, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada were to land one hour after Zero and capture the aerodrome. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal were to be a Floating Reserve for GREEN, WHITE and RED beaches and to act as a rearguard to cover re-embarkation. (Papers on Exercise "YUKON", War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August, 1942.)

73. Exercise "YUKON" took place accordingly on 11 and 12 Jun, the whole operation being rehearsed as much as possible in the exact manner in which it was proposed to carry it out on the French coast. This exercise was witnessed by Generals Paget, McNaughton and Crerar, who watched the troops landing at dawn on 12 Jun.

74. While planning and execution were on the whole considered to have been satisfactory, certain serious faults appeared during the exercise. The worst of these were that "the two flanking bns were landed at the wrong beaches" and "the TLCs were lost and arrived 1 1/2 hrs late" (undated memorandum (14 Jun ?) by Lt.-Col. Henderson, file 8-3-4/Ops, War Diary, "G", H.Q. First Cdn Army, September 1942, Appx. 22). In the case of the Royal Regiment of Canada, "the assault craft landed some two miles to the west of their proposed landing beach", and the South Saskatchewan Regiment was put ashore three-quarters of a mile from the proper place (War Diaries of these units, 12 Jun 42).

75. As Lord Louis Mountbatten had been absent in the United States at the time of the exercise, he had not himself witnessed it or been able to form personal impressions. On his return, however, he decided that it was necessary to postpone the operation (which, it will be recalled, had been proposed for the week commencing 21 Jun) until a further exercise could be held. Lt.-Col. Henderson's memorandum on this matter (para. 74, above) contains the following passages:

2. CCO had not witnessed the exercise as he had returned too late from USA and felt that he could not therefore assess the responsibility for the errors. It was pointed out that

- (a) there was considerable risk of loss of security
- (b) the men were trained up to a high pitch and there was danger of them going stale.

CCO insisted that further rehearsals were essential - and the date was set for 6 Jul 42

3. This was explained to the Army Comd by Maj Gen Roberts at 1900 hrs 14 Jun. The Army Comd concurred in the CCO's decision.

76. These arrangements were confirmed by a meeting held at Combined Operations Headquarters on 15 Jun and attended by the C.C.O., the G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, and the three Force Commanders. It was agreed "that a second full scale exercise should be held on June 22/23", and that the operation would take place "on the first favourable date between 3/4 July and 8/9 July, both inclusive" (Minutes of Meeting).

77. In consequence of these events and decisions, the Canadian force remained in the ISLE OF WIGHT, and the second exercise, known as "YUKON II", was carried out on 22-24 Jun on the same terrain as before. Lord Louis Mountbatten was present on this occasion, as were also Generals Paget, McNaughton, Montgomery and Crerar. The landings took place at dawn on 23 Jun. This exercise was considered more successful than its predecessor; although the Essex Scottish noted, "A.L.C's lose direction and we are late in landing", the Royal Regiment was able to record, "On this occasion the landing was effected at the proper beach, and all went smoothly and according to plan" (Unit War Diaries, 23 Jun 42). It was felt that the Army component's work had been on the whole very satisfactory. Military officers felt, however, some anxiety over certain defects appearing on the naval side, and General McNaughton wrote formally to General Montgomery, as the responsible military officer, as follows (23 Jun 42) :

Today the C-in-C Home Forces expressed to me his opinion that in the Exercises YUKON I and YUKON II two major faults were apparent, which he said were

- i The lack of precision in place and time in bringing the landing craft to the particular beaches to which they had been directed in the plans.
- ii The insufficiency of the smoke cover provided for the approach of the landing craft to these beaches.

He suggested to me that these points needed correction, and I fully share his view.

78. General McNaughton remarked that in both these matters remedial action lay clearly with the naval service, and therefore requested that General Montgomery take them up with the appropriate naval authorities. He asked to be advised at the earliest possible date as to the action taken. General McNaughton signed this letter in his capacity as Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army in the United Kingdom. (File 8-3-4/Ops.)

79. On 24 Jun 42 General Montgomery replied to General McNaughton, to the effect that he was attending to the two points mentioned and would let him know the result.

80. On the same day, General Paget wrote to General Montgomery remarking that "YUKON II" had revealed "three important points which called for action". These were (a) the need for better navigation arrangements "in order that the landing craft may arrive at the right place and at the right time"; (b) arising out of (a), the need for more accurate timing of the various phases of the operation, e.g., "the failure to synchronise the approach of the T.L.C. with the attack of our fighters"; (c) the use of smoke. General Paget remarked that there had been serious errors in respect to both (a) and (b) in both exercises; and he added, "Our use of smoke is very amateurish". He requested General Montgomery to take these matters up. (Copy of letter on file 8-3-4/Ops.)

81. General Montgomery took steps accordingly. On 1 Jul 42 he wrote at length to General Paget in answer to this letter, remarking that he had explored the points raised with the C.C.O. and with the three Force Commanders, with the following results. In the matter of arrangements for navigation, an accurately located "mark ship" was being provided on the British side of the Channel, from which it was "a straight run in"; there were to be three special R.D.F. ships, one on each flank and one in the centre; and the flank parties were to be led in by two special officers with expert local knowledge of the coast. General Montgomery wrote, "I am satisfied that these arrangements should ensure accurate navigation. None of these existed in YUKON 1 and YUKON 2."

82. With respect to the action of close-support fighters, General Montgomery informed the C.-in-C. that arrangements had been made for close co-ordination with the action of the troops on the centre beaches. This would be done "by observation, and by controlling the squadrons with R/T from the H.Q. ship". As for smoke, the C.C.O. had attached to the force "his own smoke expert who has handled the smoke on other expeditions"; while there would be support landing craft with 4-inch mortars, and destroyers, which could project smoke where required, while "a number of smoke-ships" had been made available.

83. General Montgomery told the C.-in-C. that he had spent the whole of 30 Jun on the ISLE OF WIGHT checking over the entire operation with the Force Commanders. He now wrote :

I am satisfied that the operation as planned is a possible one and has good prospects of success, given :-

- (a) Favourable weather.
- (b) Average luck.
- (c) That the Navy put us ashore roughly in the right places, and at the right times.

84. General Montgomery wrote further :

3. In an operation of this sort I regard "confidence" as an essential ingredient for success.

I am now satisfied that, throughout the Force, Commanders, Staffs, and Regimental Officers have confidence in the combined plan and in the successful outcome of the operation.

I say "now", because there was a moment when certain senior officers began to waver about lack of confidence on the part of the troops - which statements were quite untrue. They really lacked confidence in themselves.

You may be interested to see certain notes I gave to Roberts regarding training. I considered it necessary to add an extra para 9 to these notes. The matter has been firmly handled.

Paragraph 9 of the notes referred to spoke of the need for confidence and "infectious optimism", permeating "right down through the Force, down to the rank and file".

85. General Montgomery's letter concluded:

4. Mountbatten, myself, and Leigh-Mallory will be together at 11 Fighter Group H.Q., during the whole operation.

The Battle once begun can be influenced only by the use of air power, and that is therefore the best place for us.

He added a postscript:

P.S. The Canadians are 1st Class chaps; if anyone can pull it off, they will.

86. General Montgomery sent a copy of this letter to General McNaughton. (File 8-3-4/Ops.)

87. On 3 Jul 42 General Crerar, G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps, wrote to General McNaughton on the prospects for the operation and on General Montgomery's letter of 1 Jul just quoted. This, he remarked in his initial paragraph, had evidently been written in compliance with an instruction from C.-in-C. Home Forces that in such an operation the Army Commander finding the force was personally responsible to the C.-in-C. for the suitability of the arrangements. General Crerar continued :

2. I spent yesterday with Roberts. He and his Brigadiers expressed full confidence in being able to carry out their tasks - given a break in luck. There was previously some doubt as to the ability of the Navy to touch them down on the right beaches. That has now pretty well disappeared, although I told Roberts that 100% accuracy should never be expected in any human endeavour, and that some error might be expected, and should be then solved by rapid thinking and decision.
3. I agree that the plan is sound, and most carefully worked out. I should have no hesitation in tackling it, if in Roberts' place.
4. I also agree that, once launched, the operation can only be influenced by Air Power. In the circumstances of para. 1, above, Montgomery probably considers that

he is bound to be at Fighter Group HQ - and would like to be there, anyway. I don't dispute this, but I consider that you, anyway, if not myself, have also a responsibility and should have been included in this group.

88. General McNaughton immediately spoke to General Swayne on the telephone expressing the same view as General Crerar on the presence of a Canadian officer at Fighter Group H.Q., and wrote on the same day to General Paget with respect to General Montgomery's letter :

I now have the reports of Comd 1 Cdn Corps and I am satisfied that all arrangements for Operation are in order and that this operation may now proceed.

With reference to the last paragraph of General Montgomery's letter above referred to. It is my view that, having regard to the particular Canadian responsibility in this matter and to maintain the proper channel of command to the Canadian units involved, Lt.-General Crerar, Comd 1 Cdn Corps, should be with the group of Senior Officers of the three services at Fighter Group who appear to be charged with the exercise of command in this operation.

89. On 4 Jul General Swayne wrote to General McNaughton to the effect that he had discussed this point with the C.-in-C. He said that there was actually "no room for any more at the Group Headquarters", but apart from this the C.-in-C. considered that it would be wrong for General Crerar to go there. "There can only be one man in command of the operation", he wrote, "and Montgomery will see to it that he keeps Harry Crerar in hourly touch with the situation."

90. On the following day General Paget himself wrote to General McNaughton, in part as follows:

For operation RUTTER I made Montgomery responsible to me in accordance with my instruction contained in H.F. 00/66/G Plans of 19th May 1942. I understand that in agreement with Crerar he decided to retain command of the operation himself. In these circumstances I do not think that Crerar should be at Fighter Group H.Q., as he will not be exercising command in the operation, though of course he will be kept fully and frequently informed of what is happening.

91. In the meantime, however, General Crerar had discussed the whole question very fully with General Montgomery. The discussion began over the telephone on the morning of 4 Jul, and was continued at General Montgomery's headquarters, which General Crerar visited the same afternoon. General Crerar's memorandum of this latter conversation contains the following paragraphs :

4. I opened by informing Commander, S.E. Army that he was making a mistake in attempting to treat the problem of command of Canadian troops as a simple military issue, capable of solution along strictly British channels of command when, in fact, it was a complicated problem, and one involving national policies and Imperial Constitutional relations.

It was true that the Canadian Corps had been placed "in combination" with S.E. Army and that operationally, and through me, the troops comprising the Canadian

Corps were under Lieut.-General Montgomery. That situation, however, did not for one moment imply that I could be divested of my responsibility through Lieut.-General McNaughton to the Canadian Government in respect to the manner in which those troops were committed to actual operations. No agreement between C.-in-C., Home Forces, the C.C.O. and himself, or policy laid down by the Chiefs of Staff Committee could affect this constitutional position. In order to illustrate this point in a general way I suggested that the position of C.-in-C., Home Forces, in respect to Lieut.-General McNaughton and the Canadian Army in the U.K. was very similar to that occupied by Field Marshal Foch in relation to Field Marshal Haig and the B.E.F. in the last war.

92. General Crerar showed General Montgomery a copy of General Swayne's letter to General McNaughton dated 4 Jul, and remarked that the statement that there would be "no room" was not convincing, and that the letter "obviously failed to take into account the really important factor which I had previously explained to him concerning separate Canadian responsibility". General Crerar urged General Montgomery not to regard this issue as "a simple and narrow military problem". He felt that if this attitude was maintained the issue would be "raised to the highest political levels" and the decision would go against the view apparently maintained by Generals Paget and Montgomery. "I urged that this attitude be reconsidered at once for I could foresee nothing but harm to our relationships and to co-operative effort on the part of all the Empire forces should it be maintained."

93. General Crerar's memorandum of the conversation concludes:

7. Throughout the conversation, which went on for over an hour, Lieut.-General Montgomery was most frank and friendly and during the course of it obviously gained a wider appreciation of the issues that were at stake. Towards the termination he stated that in view of what I had said to him he intended to ring up Lieut.-General McNaughton and suggest that he accompany him to Headquarters, 11 Group, and be with him during the course of the intended operation. He also stated that he would be glad if I, as Commander of the Canadian Corps, could also be with him. He thanked me for my frankness and for the explanation which I had given which had put a different light on the question at issue.

94. Immediately after General Crerar left his Headquarters, General Montgomery telephoned General McNaughton, as he had promised, and informed him that he had invited General Crerar to join him at Fighter Group H.Q. He now invited General McNaughton also, and the invitation was accepted. (General McNaughton's pencilled memorandum of the conversation, 2000 hrs, 4 Jul 42.)

95. On 6 Jul General McNaughton answered General Paget's letter of the previous day's date, and described the discussion which had taken place between Generals Crerar and Montgomery and its results. He wrote in part :

As regards the officers to be at Fighter Group H.Q. during the operation, I am not particularly concerned as regards myself, although, for obvious reasons, I would like to see this end of the work at first hand. I do, however, think that Crerar should be present because the Canadian troops taking part are under his command and he therefore should not be excluded.

96. All the documents relating to the discussions summarized in paras. 87-95, above, are to be found on file 8-3-4/Ops.

FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION "RUTTER". ITS CANCELLATION

97. After Exercise "YUKON II", with its relatively favourable results, General Roberts on 27 Jun called a conference of all the officers of his raiding force. His opening words were: "We have waited over two years to go into battle against the Germans. The time has now come when we are going in". He then outlined the plan of operations, and from that time the "briefing" of the officers of the various units in the roles for which they were intended proceeded. (Memorandum by Lieut. F. Royal, who was present at the conference. See also War Diaries, R. Regt.C. and Essex Scot., for this date.) Notes on the conference indicate that the actual name of the town to be raided was not mentioned; that great emphasis was laid upon the importance of security; and that Lt.-Col. Mann warned officers that "other ranks are not to be informed until on board ship." (Notes on Meeting Held Informing Edas about Forthcoming Operation "RUTTER" : 1430 hrs - 27 Jun 42).

98. As it was now intended that the operation should take place on 4 Jul or immediately thereafter, most of the troops were embarked on 2 Jul (some remaining ashore until the 3rd), and for nearly a week from this time the units were sealed on board the ships which were to carry them across the Channel (Unit War Diaries: see especially R. Regt.C. and "Simmerforce" R.C.E., Group 2). After embarkation, the men were told that what had hitherto been referred to as Exercise "KLONDIKE I" was in fact to be an actual operation. General Roberts visited the ships and repeated the announcement. "As all ships were sealed, steps were at once taken to put all ranks in the picture. For security reasons, only officers had known that an actual operation was to be undertaken, and no one, other than the senior officers, knew the destination" (War Diary, R. Regt.C., 2 Jul 42). On 3 Jul, Lord Louis Mountbatten also visited the vessels and addressed the men on the operation. The weather, however, was unsuitable for attempting the enterprise that night. The next morning news was received that the operation had again been postponed for twenty-four hours on account of weather. "As the operation was largely dependent on paratroops and a very large scale of air support, the weather required must be ideal" (War Diary, R. Regt.C.).

99. On the morning of 5 Jul a conference was held between the Naval and Military Force Commanders and their staffs, and Air Commodore Cole, representing the Air Force Commander. Information had been received that the weather was too unsettled to permit the expedition to sail that night, and that in addition it was likely to remain unsettled for the next forty-eight hours. The conference accordingly was faced with the likelihood that the operation could not be carried out on 6 or 7 Jul, but that 8 Jul was possible. A further element in the situation was the fact that the German 10th Armoured Division was now reported to be stationed at AMIENS, only about eight hours from DIEPPE. Under the existing plan, the operation, if executed on 8 Jul, would have lasted for two tides, and withdrawal would not have begun until 1700 hrs. It was now considered necessary to revise the plan, placing it on a one-tide basis, which would permit all the troops to be re-embarked by 1100 hrs. Revision was carried out accordingly. General Roberts was of the opinion that the

full programme of demolitions could still be completed under the new short time-table, as practice had increased the speeds attained by the engineers. The later stages of the plan were somewhat abridged; but the time of landing and the early stages remained as already arranged. It was agreed that, given favourable weather, the modified plan, known as "RUTTER II", would be carried out on the morning of 8 Jul. As tide conditions would not be satisfactory on 9 or 10 Jul, it was further agreed that 8 Jul was the last possible date for the operation.

100. Information of these decisions was immediately sent to General Crerar, and General McNaughton received the information from General Montgomery at 1215 hrs. (Memoranda concerning the conference, file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, and memorandum by Lt.-Col. B.H. Darwin, 8 Jul 42, of discussion between Generals McNaughton and Montgomery, file 8-3-4/Ops.)

101. In consequence of the decisions taken at this Sunday morning conference, the units were informed that on Monday (6 Jul) all ranks would go ashore for conditioning marches and that the operation would take place on Wednesday morning. The first part of this programme was duly carried out, the troops being given route marches ashore (the routes being "planned to avoid Cdn camps and towns as far as possible") and subsequently returning to the ships (War Diary, R.Regt.C.; and see 2 Cdn Div order for Exercise "XLAX", dated 5 Jul 42).

102. At about 0615 hrs on the morning of 7 Jul four enemy aircraft delivered an attack against landing ships of the force lying in YARMOUTH ROADS near the west end of the SOLENT. Four 500-kilo bombs were dropped, and the attack achieved considerable success. Both H.M.S. "Princess Astrid" and H.M.S. "Princess Josephine Charlotte" were hit and badly damaged. The troops on board both ships were mainly from the Royal Regiment of Canada. "Fortunately, in both cases, the bombs passed completely through the ships before exploding, and only four minor casualties were suffered in the Battalion" (War Diary, R.Regt.C.). (Cf. C.B.04244, para.36. R.Regt.C. Diary substitutes, apparently by a slip, the name "Prince Albert" for "Princess Astrid". S.Sask.R. was on the former vessel, and this unit's Diary makes no reference to bombing.) This attack in itself, however, was not enough to cause postponement of the operation; arrangements were hastily made to move the Royals to COWES for embarkation in H.M.S. "Glengyle"; and it was still hoped that the operation might proceed. (Information from Brigadier Mann, 18 Nov 42; War Diary, R.Regt.C.)

103. The naval decision, however, was that the weather was such that the operation could not be carried out with success on 8 Jul. It was therefore cancelled; the Royals were turned back before reaching COWES; and Brigadier Chilton (B.C.S., South Eastern Command) in advising General Crerar of the decision, wrote on the same day:

2. The troops will be got off the ships today and after that it will probably be impossible to maintain security. The Army Comd has therefore recommended to the powers that be that the operation be off for all time.

(File Ops 3-3-1-2 Div.)

104. The disembarkation of the troops took place on 8 Jul, and subsequently the units returned from the ISLE OF WIGHT, where they had spent some eight weeks, to their normal stations in Sussex (War Diary "Simmerforce", R.C.E. Group 2.). The Royal Regiment returned to the mainland on 12 Jul (Unit War

Diary). The security precautions which it had been possible to maintain during the troops' stay in the Island were now of necessity relaxed, though the men were strictly cautioned against mentioning that an operation had been contemplated. During their sojourn there, mail had been unit-censored (see Report of Field Censors (Home) on Canadian Army mail, period 19 May - 2 Jun 42 and succeeding periods). During this time the letters written were apparently quite discreet, for the following is an extract from the ISLE OF WIGHT Censorship Report for the week ending 13 Jun 42, as forwarded to C.M.H.Q.:

7. Mail written by Canadian soldiers was examined under separate arrangements; it was all unit censored and very few excisions were necessary.

The letters were extremely discreet and only by two implications was it possible to discover the location of these troops.

Most writers stressed that they were on some special job and that censorship prevented them disclosing any details.

105. The report of the Field Censors (Home) on Canadian Army mail during the period 19 Jun - 3 Jul 42 makes the comment with respect to the ISLE OF WIGHT mail that "some writers state that they will give details when they return from where they are at present stationed". This did in fact take place on a considerable scale, for the similar report for the period 19 Jul - 3 Aug makes the following remark :

.....Regarding Canadians who were recently serving in the Isle of Wight, it may be said that there is a continuity of censorable matter, regarding operations on the Island, being written after the lifting of Unit Censorship.

Numerous submissions on the subject, giving full details, have been made.

It would not appear, however, that these are instances of deliberate attempts to disclose information after unit-censorship ceased, but rather in the nature of a mistaken idea that it would be permissible to write once the expected operation did not take place and they had returned to their regular camps.

These extracts serve to illustrate the reasons which had led General Montgomery to recommend that, once the troops had left the ISLE OF WIGHT, the operation should be abandoned "for all time".

106. On 11 Jul 42, General Montgomery wrote to the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps in appreciation of the good work done by the troops during the training period. He remarked that the organization and conduct of the training, and the staff work in connection with the operation, had been "on a very high level"; and his letter continued :

2. The decision to cancel the operation must have been a bitter disappointment to all commanders, regimental officers, and other ranks. The raiding force had been trained up to a high standard of efficiency, and I have no doubt whatever that, given average luck and fair weather, the operation would have been carried through with all that elan and dash which has always been so typical of the Canadian troops.

But the weather was bad at the time and the R.Navy decided that the operation could not proceed.

General Montgomery asked General Crerar to convey to General Roberts and his force his appreciation of the good work done, and his regrets that the operation had to be cancelled. (File 8-3-4/Ops).

107. On 14 Jul 42 newspapers in Canada were permitted to publish reports of the manner in which a Canadian force in Britain had lately gone through an intensive programme of Combined Operations training. Mr. Ross Munro, a correspondent of the Canadian Press, had been present throughout the training programme, and the account which he now wrote, and which was passed by the British censorship, gave an accurate description of the training in general terms. Mr. Munro wrote in part :

Six battalions of infantry, supported by armored elements, engineers, signals and miscellaneous units, set a new height in shock-troops training for the military forces in Britain.

Infantry and armored vehicles poured ashore in the light of the early dawn, terrifying the inhabitants of the district with the realism of their dress rehearsal....

Some time ago the Canadians were brought secretly to camps near this port and from the crack-of-dawn reveille to nightfall trained in all the complexities of combined operations. (Globe and Mail, Toronto, 14 Jul 42.)

108. On 16 Jul 42 the same news was published in the morning newspapers of Britain. Some of them gave great prominence to the story. All these accounts quoted a description by "a Canadian war correspondent with the force" who had called the training "a prelude to what may be major military operations on the European coast". At least one of the published accounts mentioned the names of some of the infantry units participating (Daily Telegraph, 16 Jul 42).

109. Shortly after these accounts were published, steps were taken to re-mount the operation.

REVIVAL OF PROJECT FOR THE OPERATION, AND CHANGES IN PLAN AND ORGANIZATION

110. The operation was revived in the middle of July, about a week after it had been abandoned with every appearance of finality. The precise reasons for, and the circumstances of its revival are not fully indicated in documents seen. The account given in the notes for Brigadier Mann's lecture on the operation may be quoted:

A week or so later the Government decided that it was necessary to carry out an operation at once and obviously the only operation which could be mounted on short notice was the raid on DIEPPE.

The Government accepted the very strong possibility that our intentions to operate against them earlier in the summer would have been discovered by the enemy but considered that the risk was a reasonable one, provided that the Forces were not again concentrated beforehand, as there was nothing to indicate that the Germans knew the destination of our former plans although it was certain that they would know we had been planning something.

(Lecture Notes: The Combined
Services Raid on DIEPPE, 19 Aug
42.)

111. It seems probable that one element in the political decision to re-mount the operation was the desirability of some action in the West to divert enemy pressure from RUSSIA, and to meet the views of the Russian Government, which, it would appear, was anxious for raiding operations there if a full-dress invasion was impossible. Other important factors have been noted above (para. 15).

112. The earliest reference which has been found to the revival of the operation is in a note in the War Diary of Lt.-Gen. A.C.L. McNaughton under date 14 Jul 42, stating that the General discussed with Lt.-Col. Henderson the recent special training of 2 Cdn Div, and that "Information was received from Comd 1 Cdn Corps that 2 Cdn Div would probably re-commence that training. Lt.-Col. Henderson therefore rejoined 2 Cdn Div staff".

113. At 1500 hrs on 16 Jul 42 a Force Commanders' Meeting was held, at which General Roberts, Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory and Captain Hughes-Hallett were present, as was also for a time the C.C.O. The plan of the revived operation, which was now to be known as "JUBILEE", was discussed, and certain general principles laid down. (Minutes of Meeting in War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August, 1942, Appx. 53; see below, paras. 130-33.)

114. At 1800 hrs on the same day (16 Jul) a discussion was held between General McNaughton, Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, and General Roberts. In the course of this meeting, the details of the proposed operation were laid before General McNaughton. He thereupon agreed to instruct General Roberts to proceed with plans and preparations, and did so at once.

115. More than one question relating to higher organization arose during this conversation. The C.C.O. said that during the previous preparations it had appeared that the Naval Commander-in-Chief, PORTSMOUTH, was not in the best position to act as Supreme Commander and discharge the responsibility of despatching the expedition. The C.C.O. thought that he should himself undertake this responsibility in place of Admiral James, and General McNaughton observed in reply that he had no objection to this but that the matter was one for the C.-in-C. Home Forces and the Chiefs of Staff Committee to decide. The arrangement actually made, as laid down in the Combined Plan for Operation "JUBILEE", was that the decision whether the operation was to take place would be made "by the Chief of Combined Operations, the Commander in Chief, PORTSMOUTH, and the Force Commanders in consultation". (Cf. C.B.04244, para.39.)

116. During the same discussion General McNaughton stated his intention of asking the C.-in-C. Home Forces to place the military command on a different basis from that for "RUTTER". His memorandum of the meeting runs in part as follows:

....In reference to the military channel of command I said I would ask General Paget to agree to General Crerar being named as the responsible military officer to co-ordinate and if this were done I would arm him with appropriate authority as regards the use of Canadian troops.

4. I told Lord Louis Mountbatten that the detailed proposals for the Operation when prepared would be subject to my approval in the same way as C.-in-C. Home Forces and Chiefs of Staff Committee had approval for operations of British troops.

117. It was agreed that the Combined Headquarters should be at SOUTHAMPTON until the expedition sailed, and thereafter at the R.A.F. station at UXBRIDGE. Lord Louis Mountbatten gave General McNaughton the list of people knowing of the project for the operation. It numbered at this time only 20 names, including that of the C.C.O. himself and the other members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

118. On this same evening General McNaughton telephoned G.H.Q. Home Forces and requested a meeting with General Paget the following day to discuss the operation. (Memorandum by General McNaughton, 25 Jul 42, file 8-3-5/Ops, H.Q. First Cdn Army.)

119. On the evening of 17 Jul General McNaughton had the meeting which he had requested with General Paget, "and it was agreed that channel of command would run C.-in-C. Home Forces - Comd 1 Cdn Army - Comd 1 Cdn Corps - Comd 2 Cdn Div". General McNaughton told General Paget that the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps would be named as the responsible military officer under the terms of the Home Forces letter of 5 May 42 mentioned above (para. 52). The C.-in-C. Home Forces said that he would write to the G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command advising him of the arrangements made. (Memorandum by General McNaughton, 20 Jul 42, file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, now at ACTON.)

120. It will be noticed that these arrangements placed the military channel of command on an entirely new basis, with the G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command playing no part in the operation.

121. On 24 Jul 42 General Swayne wrote formally to South Eastern Command informing the G.O.C.-in-C. of the new arrangements:

.....C.-in-C. has made the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army, the military officer responsible for the conduct of raiding operations to be carried out by troops under his command.

(Letter HF/00/66/G (Plans);
file 8-3-5/Ops.)

122. On 25 Jul 42 General McNaughton wrote to General Montgomery requesting that Major G.M. Rees, of General Montgomery's staff, who had been a valuable member of the Planning Staff for "RUTTER", might remain "with the group at C.C.O. Headquarters", "to provide continuity in the intelligence work". On 27 Jul General Montgomery replied, saying that he had given this matter careful thought. Major Rees had been his own personal representative. "Now that you have taken over responsibility", he wrote, "I suggest it is best that I should cut right clear; it is not suitable or desirable that I should have a representative in the party who reported direct to me on what was going on.....It might lead to trouble." On 28 Jul 42 General McNaughton replied, accepting General Montgomery's view, and informing him that a Canadian officer would take over from Major Rees. (Correspondence on file 8-3-5/Ops.)

123. On 27 Jul 42, General McNaughton wrote formally to General Crerar, in part as follows:

2. In accordance with the provisions of GHQ, Home Forces letter HF/00/66/G (Plans), dated 5 May 42, I hereby detail you as the responsible military officer

for operation JUBILEE, and I direct that you place yourself in contact with GCO to concert plans therefor. Participation in this operation by elements of 2 Cdn Div and of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn is authorized.

3. HQ First Cdn Army (BGS) will be kept fully informed of the progress of plans. So long as the troops involved remain under the operational command of SECO, Comd SECO will also be kept informed.

(File 8-3-5/Ops.)

124. Immediately upon receiving this formal authorization, General Crerar took steps to inform the C.C.O. that he was at his disposal for a meeting (memo by Brigadier Penhale, 28 Jul 42; file 8-3-5/Ops). On 30 Jul General Crerar attended a meeting at the C.C.O.'s office to discuss plans for the operation, and thereafter proceeded to make arrangements to facilitate and co-ordinate preparations (letter from General Crerar to General McNaughton, 11 Aug 42, file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div).

125. On 25 Jul 42 Lord Louis Mountbatten had called General McNaughton, "and said that the Prime Minister and the War Committee of the Cabinet had approved Operation J in general principle; no date or place had been communicated to the Cabinet".

(File 8-3-5/Ops.)

126. In the meantime, planning had been resumed. As Admiral Baillie-Grohman was no longer available, it had been necessary to appoint a new Naval Force Commander. This was Captain Hughes-Hallett, who had been concerned in the enterprise from the beginning (see above, para. 23) and was now appointed by the First Sea Lord on the proposal of the C.C.O., who felt that at this late date it was essential to appoint an officer acquainted with the project (C.B. 04244, para. 44). On the Army side, Lt.-Col. Mann had been promoted Brigadier and appointed B.G.S., 1 Cdn Corps, as of 13 Jul 42. Almost immediately afterwards, General Roberts asked General Crerar to lend Brigadier Mann in order that he might continue for "JUBILEE" the role which he had played in planning for "RUTTER" (information from Brigadier Mann, 18 Nov 42). General Crerar agreed, and Brigadier Mann accordingly devoted himself exclusively to "JUBILEE" during the month that followed.

127. The Combined Plan for the operation was issued under date 31 Jul 42. It contained a number of fairly fundamental changes as compared with that for "RUTTER". In particular, it had been decided to abandon the use of paratroops for the assaults on the flank batteries, Commando units of the Special Service Brigade being substituted. The employment of paratroops was difficult from two points of view. First, ideal weather conditions with comparatively little wind were necessary for the use of parachute troops, and it was quite possible that if the operation entirely depended upon the occurrence of such conditions, it might never take place at all. Secondly, and possibly less important, it was now proposed to brief the units concerned for their roles in the operation only just before it took place; and paratroops required, the G.O.C. Airborne Div had reported, a minimum of four days for briefing (C.B. 04244, para. 38).

128. In the interest of security, it had been determined, as noted above, not to concentrate the force before the raid, but to move the units direct to their ports of embarkation and embark them on the evening of sailing. This was possible as a result of the intensive training programme which the

units had previously undergone, which obviated further special training; and it had the special advantage of enabling the expedition to sail from a number of separate ports, thereby preventing the assembly at any single point of a very large group of landing ships and craft such as had been gathered at the ISLE OF WIGHT for "RUTTER", and had almost certainly attracted the interested attention of the enemy (see para.102, above).

129. A further important change was the decision that, whereas for "RUTTER" all units had been carried in infantry landing ships and transferred to landing craft only when the vicinity of the objective was reached, for "JUBILEE" certain units would make the whole Channel crossing in landing craft. This method was applied to the Cameron Highlanders of Canada, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, and No.3 Commando, all these units being carried in Personnel Landing Craft, Large (LCP (L)), formerly known as R-boats. This made possible a still larger degree of dispersion before embarkation.

130. The minutes of the Force Commanders' Meeting on 16 Jul (para.113, above) throw light on the motives of the planners in some of these particulars, as well as on procedure. On the question of the use of paratroops, it was noted that the possibility of employing them was to be considered, but any proposals would not be communicated to Airborne Div "until about a week before the operation". Discussion produced the conclusion that it was "most improbable that any useful targets could be found for the Airborne Division under the conditions of light that will prevail, and it was provisionally decided to abandon the idea of using them."

131. Briefing, it was decided, was to be deferred "until the last possible moment, which should not be until the operation is definitely about to take place". There was to be no repetition of the events of July. Naval and Military Commanding Officers would, however,

be warned in the strictest confidence that an emergency operation is being planned for August and may be ordered to take place at short notice. They will be informed that the same personnel will participate as in the case of "RUTTER", although the objectives will be different

(Brigadier Mann informs the writer that in the event "there was never any suggestion of inferring that the objective would be different and the briefing was done on the exact and original model of DIEPPE".)

132. The Commando side of the operation was to be separately planned. The officers in charge of the two Commando landings were to report to General Roberts at an early date, and to be "responsible to him for their plans". The Commandos, indeed, were in a very special position in this operation. They prepared separate operational orders (Lord Lovat's for No. 4 Commando will be found in War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 58); there is little reference to them in the Detailed Military Plan; and in the Order of Battle of the raiding force they were shown as "Under Command from Landing" only (Combined Plan, Appx "B").

133. It is of special interest that at this meeting on 16 Jul there was further discussion of the question of aerial bombardment. It was proposed that the operation should now take place during one of two periods (18-23 Aug and 1-7 Sep):

In neither period is the state of the moon satisfactory from the point of view of night bombing, and Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory stressed the fact that accurate bombing of the houses on the sea front could not possibly be guaranteed. If bombing is to be carried out at all, it should be timed to take place as late as possible, i.e. as close as possible to the time of landing. Alternatively, it was suggested that it might be better to dispense with the bombing, and to rely entirely on supporting fire from the destroyers. A final and definite decision on this point is still to be made.

(Minutes of Meeting).

FINAL STAGES OF PREPARATION

134. The units of the force to be employed were informed of the revival of the operation only at a comparatively late date, and even then the knowledge of the project was restricted to senior officers. The War Diary of the Royal Regiment of Canada states under date 18 Aug 42 that the Commanding Officer, Adjutant, and Company Commanders had known of the project "for the past ten days". Major Law, Camerons of C., states that the similar group of officers of his unit learned of the project on or about 14 Aug, when they were summoned to H.Q., 2 Cdn Div for what was supposedly a routine cloth model demonstration, but turned out to be a conference on the proposed operation. During the week preceding the operation, the senior officers of units concerned "attended numerous conferences at Divisional Headquarters in the Operations Room where a large scale model of the DIEPPE area had been constructed" (War Diary, R.Regt.C., 18 Aug 42). One of the early briefing sessions, at which the senior R.A.F. officers concerned were present, took place in the garden of "A" Mess, H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, "with very careful security arrangements". Generals McNaughton and Crerar paid visits on this occasion, and the former spoke briefly to General Roberts and the officers (information from Brigadier Mann).

135. By way of cover for the operation, orders were issued for certain exercises and demonstrations which would adequately explain the preparations being undertaken. On 10 Aug 42, H.Q. 2 Cdn Div issued orders for a Combined Operations demonstration by 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, which would afford an adequate pretext for the extensive measures taken by this unit, including the waterproofing of its tanks (War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 17). On 13 Aug 42, H.Q. 2 Cdn Div issued an order for three Movement Exercises to be known as "FORD I", "FORD II" and "FORD III", which were to last "for a month commencing 15 Aug 42" (*ibid.*, Appx 29). "FORD I" in fact covered the arrangements for the movement of units to the embarkation ports. Another exercise, known as "POPSY", served to cover other phases of the preparations (War Diary, R.Regt.C., 18 Aug 42).

136. Since the time when General McNaughton had designated him as Military Officer responsible for the operation, General Crerar had been actively engaged in supervising the preparations. He had conferred with the C.C.O. and the Air Force Commander, and on a number of occasions with General Roberts and Brigadier Mann. On 11 Aug 42 he reported on these matters to General McNaughton. His letter concluded:

4. I have today gone over in detail the plans for the Exercise, as now agreed to by the Naval, Army and Air Force Commanders and am satisfied that the revisions made in respect to the previous exercise plans add, rather than detract, to the soundness of the plan as a whole.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that, given an even break in luck and good navigation, the demonstration should prove successful.

(File Ops 3-3-1-2 Div).

137. On 14 Aug 42, General McNaughton met Generals Crerar and Roberts, and with them "went over the plans for Operation JUBILEE". On the same day he wrote formally to General Crerar:

I now confirm that I am satisfied with these plans and with the arrangements made in all respects, and I sanction the participation therein of elements of 2 Cdn Div, 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, and other attached Canadian personnel as detailed by you.

(File Ops 3-3-1-2 Div).

General McNaughton explained to the present writer on 13 Mar 43 that while he took full responsibility for the operation, this was on the general basis of his confidence in the officers concerned. In practice, the actual control over the planning exercised by either General Crerar or himself had been very slight.

138. The preliminary order for sailing the expedition on the night 18/19 Aug was issued at 1000 hrs on 17 Aug, after careful consideration of the weather forecasts, and consultation between the C.C.O., the three Force Commanders and the Commander-in-Chief, PORTSMOUTH. The forecasts were "not very favourable", but it appeared that conditions would be even less satisfactory on succeeding days. (C.B.04244, para.46.)

139. On this day, 17 Aug, the C.C.O. and the Force Commanders held a final conference at the R.A.F. station at TANGMERE. During this conference there was further discussion of the possibility of a preliminary bombardment by heavy bombers. The Combined Operations Headquarters narrative states (para.47) :

The Military Force Commander remained of the view that the destruction which it would cause would make the passage of tanks through Dieppe very difficult, if not impossible, and, the decision not to carry out such a bombardment was therefore maintained.

General Roberts himself comments as follows on this passage and on the general question of bombing (18 Mar 43) :

The original plan for bombing envisaged two or three minor bombing raids on DIEPPE, prior to the operation. As these had not been carried out, it was felt that a large scale attack, probably inaccurately placed, would merely serve to place the enemy on the alert. This was a considerable factor.

At all stages it was insisted that bombing could only be carried out by night, and inaccuracy, rather than accuracy, was guaranteed.

MOVEMENT TO PORTS AND EMBARKATION

140. Orders to carry out the arrangements for the operation already made with the senior officers of units were issued on the morning of 18 Aug 42. The Royal Regiment of Canada received the message, "The show is on" from the Brigade Major, 4 Cdn Inf Bde, at 1000 hrs (unit War Diary).

141. During the afternoon of 18 Aug, the units moved by mechanical transport from their stations to the ports of embarkation. There were a number of cases of delay due to the late arrival of troop-carrying vehicles, but none of these had serious consequences (see, e.g., War Diary, R.Regt.C., and information from Major A.T. Law on Camerons of C.). Traffic control arrangements were admirable, and the convoys, once away, were able to move at high speed to their various destinations.

142. Knowledge of the actual operation projected was limited to a small group of officers in each unit until the very last moment. The situation is exemplified by the following extract from the War Diary of the Royal Regiment of Canada, under date 18 Aug 42:

4068. On arriving at the ports, troops embarked on their respective parent ships by 1900 hours, and for the first time, knew definitely that they were to engage in an operation. Maps and air photographs were distributed to all ranks, and the details of the raid which were similar to the "Simmer" Operation, were explained to all personnel.

4069. In the meantime, the rear party of about 250 Other Ranks under the command of Capt. G.M. MacLachlan, believed that the rest of the Unit was on a two-day exercise.

143. Every endeavour had been made by Lt.-Col. R.D. King (A.A. & Q.M.G.) and his subordinates to ensure sound administrative arrangements at the ports. In general they seem to have been successful, though officers of the Camerons have complained that the additional equipment and stores which they picked up at NEWHAVEN had not been properly sorted or cleaned, or (in the case of demolition stores) labelled (information from Major, now Lt.-Col., A.T. Law, confirmed by other officers of the unit).

144. The arrangements for the movement and embarkation of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, with its Churchill tanks, require special notice. This unit began active preparation for the operation on 13 Aug, and the following day orders were issued for the embarkation of tanks to commence on the evening of 15 Aug. These instructions, however, were cancelled on 15 Aug.

145. On the evening of 16 Aug six troops of tanks left the unit lines at SEAFORD, SUSSEX, for a move by road by tank transporter to GOSPORT, a western suburb of PORTSMOUTH, where they were to be embarked on tank landing craft. The same evening the unit's beach party left for NEWHAVEN, where the remainder of the tanks were to be embarked.

146. On the evening of 17 Aug the main body of tanks left SEAFORD and proceeded under their own power to NEWHAVEN, where embarkation on tank landing craft immediately began.

147. Through the night of 17/18 Aug the work of embarking "ammunition, personnel, tanks, carriers, Scout Cars and Blitz Buggies" continued. It was completed by 0630 hours: the men then rested until noon. After dinner they completed the water-proofing of their tanks.

During the afternoon, word was received by all ranks that this exercise was to be an actual operation against Dieppe, a strongly fortified town on the French Coast... By 2100 hours, all vehicles were ready and crews were waiting impatiently for the landing craft to leave harbour.
(War Diary, 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn)

148. The actual distribution of units by ships and ports was as follows. No. 4 Commando embarked on H.M.S. "Prince Albert" at SOUTHAMPTON. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry embarked on H.M.S. "Glengyle" at SOUTHAMPTON. The Royal Regiment of Canada embarked chiefly on H.M.Ss. "Queen Emma" and "Princess Astrid", both at PORTSMOUTH, but the attached party of the Black Watch of Canada embarked on H.M.S. "Duke of Wellington" at SOUTHAMPTON. The Essex Scottish were divided between H.M.S. "Prince Charles" at PORTSMOUTH and H.M.S. "Prince Leopold" at SOUTHAMPTON. The South Saskatchewan Regiment embarked on H.M.Ss. "Princess Beatrix" and "Invicta" at SOUTHAMPTON. 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, as already noted, was embarked on tank landing craft, partly at GOSPORT but chiefly at NEWHAVEN. Of the units carried in landing craft, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal embarked on L.C.P. Group 7 at the small port of SHOREHAM, Sussex, (where a school building was used for briefing); while the Cameron Highlanders of Canada embarked on L.C.P. Group 6 at NEWHAVEN, and No. 3 Commando on L.C.P. Group 5, also at NEWHAVEN.

149. It will be noted that four ports (five, if GOSPORT be counted separately from PORTSMOUTH) were employed for embarking the force. Six infantry landing ships sailed from SOUTHAMPTON and three from PORTSMOUTH. A number of tank landing craft also sailed from the latter port. From NEWHAVEN came more tank landing craft and two L.C.P. Groups. One L.C.P. Group came from SHOREHAM.

150. The details of movement and embarkation stated above will be found in Appendix "C" of the Detailed Military Plan for the operation. Additional details are given in unit War Diaries. The Detailed Military Plan appears to make no provision for the move of six troops of tanks to GOSPORT, but War Diary of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn indicates that this took place on 16 Aug, as stated above.

DETAILS OF NAVAL FORCE

151. The Naval Force participating in the operation, as listed in C.B.04244, was as follows:

Type of Craft	Number	Names of Larger Vessels and Remarks
Destroyers	8	"Ferne", "Brocklesby", "Garth", "Albrighton", "Bleasdale", "Berkeley", "Calpe"; Polish destroyer "Slazak".
Gunboats	1	"Locust".
Sloops	1	"Alresford".
Chasseurs	7	(Fighting French).
Infantry Landing Ships (I.S.I.)	9	See above, para. 148.
Steam Gunboats (S.G.B.)	4	
Motor Gunboats (M.G.B.)	12	
Motor Launches (M.L.)	16	
Tank Landing Craft (L.C.T., Mark 3)	24	
Flak Landing Craft (Large) (L.C.F. (L))	6	
Support Landing Craft (Medium) (L.C.S. (M))	8	
Mechanized Landing Craft (L.C.M., Mark 1)	7	
Assault Landing Craft (L.C.A.) (armoured)	60	
Personnel Landing Craft (Large) (L.C.P. (L)) (unarmoured)	74	

The total of ships and landing craft was thus 252, not including the vessels of the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas, which were employed to clear the way.

152. It will be noted that no vessels larger than destroyers were included in the force. The main gun-power of the Naval Force was provided by the destroyers. The "Hunt" class destroyer is an unusually small type, displacing 904 tons, mounting four 4-inch dual-purpose guns and eight smaller ones, and having a designed speed of 27.5 knots (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1941, p.54). H.M.S. "Alresford" is listed in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1941, as a "Fleet Minesweeper", mounting one 4-inch gun and displacing 710 tons, and H.M.S. "Locust" as a "River Gunboat", mounting two 4-inch guns and one 3.7-inch howitzer, and displacing 585 tons (p.76).

153. Details of Order of Battle and strength of the Military Force are given in an Appendix. The total personnel strength of the Canadian Army component on embarkation, as calculated by Records, C.M.H.Q., was 305 officers and 4,658 other ranks.

154. Before sailing, the infantry landing ships rigged disguises giving them the appearance of merchant ships. The first ship to clear the gate of the PORTSMOUTH defences was H.M.S. "Queen Emma", carrying part of the Royal Regiment of Canada. She passed through at 2125 hrs (Report of her Commander, Appx 2.A to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander). The first L.C.T. with tanks of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn on board left NEWHAVEN harbour at 2130 hrs, and the harbour was clear by 2330 hrs (War Diary, 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, 18 Aug 42).

C.P.S.

(C.P. Stacey) Major,
Historical Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy 1/2	-	N.D.H.Q. (D.H.S.)
3	-	H.Q. First Cdn Army (P.A. to G.O.C.-in-C.)
4/5	-	C.M.H.Q. (Hist)
6	-	C.O.H.Q. (C.O.R.)
7	-	Spare.

Krypton Extra Strong

With reference to para. 125, page 29, above, it may be noted that General McNaughton's memorandum of his interview with Lord Louis Mountbatten of 25 Jul 42 contains the following paragraph:

2. It appears that Stalin had cabled the Prime Minister asking what was being done to distract the Germans by raiding. The Prime Minister had been very pleased to be able to reply indicating action was in hand and in consequence he had approved the highest priority in preparation for J_____.

(File 8-3-5/Ops.)

(To be inserted in copies 1,2,3,4 and 5 only.)

APPENDIX "A"

ORDER OF BATTLE
MILITARY FORCE - OPERATION "JUBILEE"

NOTE

1. The Order of Battle which follows derives mainly, so far as the Canadian component is concerned, from a return prepared by Records Office, C.M.H.Q., at 31 Dec 42, and based upon an earlier survey by Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/1/2). This has been discussed with Records and as a result amended in certain minor particulars. A few officers who were present at the operation were omitted from the original list. Every effort has now been made to include every Canadian officer, including those present as observers.
2. Figures of embarkation strengths are probably not wholly accurate, as some units were not certain, to a man, of their strength for the operation. It is doubtful, however, whether more accurate figures than these can ever be obtained. There has been considerable discrepancy between figures from Records and those from 2nd Echelon; but as all documents concerning the operation are now concentrated at Records and their survey has been reviewed with a view to the greatest possible accuracy, Records figures have been accepted here.
3. The arrangement of Canadian formations and units in this Order of Battle is based upon that adopted in the secret Overseas Routine Orders which are published from time to time notifying the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas.
4. Details of British and Allied units involved derive from information supplied by Combined Operations Headquarters, having been obtained by those Headquarters from H.Q. Special Service Brigade. H.Q. S.S.B. were however unable to provide embarkation strengths; but the reports supplied contained some information on this point, including strength of the R.M. Commando. Strength for 4 Commando is that given in Notes from Theatres of War, No.11; that of 3 Commando derives from the round figures in the Report of Commander Wyburd (Appx 7 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander). Strength for Allied units is that given in C.B. 04244, para. 51. No great reliance in detail can be placed upon any of the figures given apart from those for the Canadian Army.

ORDER OF BATTLE
MILITARY FORCE - OPERATION "JUBILEE"

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>EMBARKATION STRENGTH</u>		<u>SENIOR OFFR PRESENT</u>
	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>OTHER RANKS</u>	
<u>I. CANADIAN :</u>			
<u>(a) 2 Cdn Div : Units</u>			
H.Q. 2 Cdn Div	8	4	Maj.-Gen. J.H. Roberts, M.C.
2 Cdn F.S. Sec	1	7	Lieut. H. MacMillan
H.Q. 2 Cdn Div Engrs	4	9	Lt.-Col. L.F. Barnes
7 Pd Coy R.C.E.	4	133	Capt. J.E. Bright
11 Pd Amb R.C.A.M.C.	9	116	Lt.-Col. G.L.M. Smith
H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde	6	3	Brigadier S. Lett, M.C., R.D.
R. Regt. C.	26	528	Lt.-Col. D.E. Catto
R.H.L.I.	31	551	Lt.-Col. R.R. Labatt
Essex Scot.	32	521	Lt.-Col. F.K. Jaspersen
H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde	6	6	Brigadier W.W. Southam
Fus. M.R.	31	552	Lt.-Col. D. Menard
Cameron of C.	32	471	Lt.-Col. A.G. Gostling
S. Sask. R.	25	498	Lt.-Col. C.C.I. Merritt
<u>(b) Attached Tps : Units</u>			
14 Cdn Army Tk Bn (Calgary Regt)	32	385	Lt.-Col. J.G. Andrews
<u>(c) 2 Cdn Div : Detachments</u>			
8 Cdn Recce Regt (14 H.)	5	4	Lt.-Col. F.A. Vokes
4 Pd Regt R.C.A.	3	20	Capt. G.A. Browne
5 Pd Regt R.C.A.	1	-	Capt. W.J. McCutcheon
6 Pd Regt R.C.A.	1	-	Capt. H.B. Carswell
3 Lt A.A. Regt R.C.A.	9	236	Major C.R. Ostrander
2 Pd Coy R.C.E.	-	90	
11 Pd Coy R.C.E.	1	57	Lieut. T.B. Doherty

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UNIT	EMBARKATION STRENGTH		SENIOR OFFR PRESENT
	OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS	
1 Fd Pk Coy R.C.E.	1	23	Lieut. H.L. Watts
2 Cdn Div Sigs	5	59	Lt.-Col. J.D. Macbeth
Tor. Sect. R. (M.G.)	5	120	Lt.-Col. G.S.N. Gostling
2 Cdn Div Amn Coy, R.C.A.S.C.	1	37	Lieut. C.W. Bath
2 Cdn Div Ord Wkshop	-	7	
2 Cdn Div Ord Fd Pk	-	3	
2 Cdn Pro Coy	2	39	Capt. K.H. Stevenson
4 Cdn Inf Bde H.Q. Def Pl 1		7	Lieut. F.D. Gooderham
6 Cdn Inf Bde H.Q. Def Pl 1		12	Lieut. E.J. Norris
R.H.C.	4	107	Capt. A.L. MacLaurin
Calg Highrs	1	21	Lieut. F.J. Reynolds

(d) Attached Tps : Detachments

H.Q. First Cdn Army	2	2	Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson
H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps	5	1	Brigadier C.C. Mann
3 Cdn Div Int Sec	1	-	Lieut. I.T. Burr
1 Cdn F.S. Sec	-	1	
11 Cdn F.S. Sec	-	5	
1 Cdn Army Tk Bde Sigs	1	13	Major G.M. Rolfe
11 Cdn Army Tk Bn (Ont.R.)	1	-	Lieut. J.H.B. MacDonald
12 Cdn Army Tk Bn (Three Rivers R.)	1	-	Major C.B. van Straubenzee
61 L.A.D. (C) (14 Cdn Army Tk Bn)	1	4	Capt. W.S. Hunt
4 Bn R.C.E.	1	-	Lt.-Col. G.H. McTavish
1 Mech Equip Coy R.C.E.	-	5	
2 Rd Const Coy R.C.E.	-	1	
2 Lt Fd Amb R.C.A.M.C.	1	-	Lt.-Col. K.A. Hunter

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UNIT	EMBARKATION STRENGTH		SENIOR OFFR PRESENT
	OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS	
C.M.H.Q.	1	-	Lieut. F. Royal
1 Cdn Engrs Reinf Unit	1	-	Major B. Sucharov
1 Cdn Gen Reinf Unit	1	-	Lieut. M. Morgan
TOTAL	305	4658	
TOTAL ALL RANKS		4963	

II. BRITISH :

No. 3 Commando	about 460 all ranks	Lt.-Col. J.P. Durnford-Slater, D.S.O.
No. 4 Commando	245 all ranks	Lt.-Col. The Lord Lovat, M.C.
Royal Marine Commando "A" 18	352	Lt.-Col. J.P. Phillipps

III. ALLIED :

No. 10 Commando (Inter-Allied)	18 all ranks	
1st U.S. Ranger Bn	50 all ranks	

GRAND TOTAL
(approximately)

6108 All Ranks