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REPORT NO. 136

HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Canadian Operations in Sicily, July - August 1943

Part II: The Execution of the Operation by 1 Cdn Inf Div.  
Section 3: Special Aspects of the Sicilian Campaign.

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MAY 4 1945



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Canadian Operations in Sicily, July - August 1943

Part II: The Execution of the Operation by 1 Cdn Inf Div  
Section 3: Special Aspects of the Sicilian Campaign

1. The main operational story of 1 Cdn Inf Div in the Sicilian Campaign has been told in Reports 127 and 135. In these Reports it was often impossible to make more than passing reference to the part played by the "supporting arms", while less still was said of the administrative services. In this Report an attempt will be made to deal with these subjects and several miscellaneous matters which it has been impossible to deal with elsewhere. It is a very large field and no one arm or service can be treated in the detail it deserves.

THE SUPPORTING ARMS

(a) Armour

2. The work of 12 Cdn Tks (Three Rivers Regiment) has been dealt with in the general story of operations of 1 Cdn Inf Div, while that of the rest of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade has been described in Report 132. The Divisional Reconnaissance Squadron has perhaps received less notice since its role was limited by the mountainous nature of the country. Moreover, it will be remembered that only "A" Squadron of 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) came out with the Division and took part in the Sicilian campaign. The patrol work of this Squadron on 20, 30 and 31 Jul and 1 Aug has already been noted in Report 135 as well, as has their one main action, west of ADERNO on 5 Aug. Another incident involving this unit perhaps merits some notice, although it has little to do with the main story of the Division.

3. It may be remembered that during the advance towards ENNA, a small town called AIDONE about six miles to the north-east of PIAZZA ARMERINA was by-passed by the Canadian Division. This proved to be one of the few places in the island where trouble occurred after the tide of battle had passed by. On 30 Jul a bridge was blown in the vicinity (395678) cutting an important route to the ENNA district and forcing heavier traffic on the alternate routes. A Field Security sergeant from 30 Corps Headquarters, the only Allied representative on the spot, was having some trouble with the population. So on 2 Aug an armoured car section from 4 Cdn Recce Regt was sent back to AIDONE "to make a show of force and to indicate to the populace that the divisional commander was annoyed to say the least with their conduct". The situation was restored in the town, several arrests were made and a gang was set to work rebuilding the blown bridge. The completion of this task is described in a rather colourful account submitted by 4 Cdn Recce Regt:

All afternoon the Canadians were offered assurance of angelic behaviour in AIDONE for evermore and efficient and loyal guards against sabotage, and also a plea that the soldiers would not kill the townsfolk nor the air force destroy them as so many feared. Towards evening the Canadian officers left their final message of what the fate of the town would be if anything happened again to "anger the Canadian General and make him send men, who want to be fighting Germans, back to AIDONE to do the work which the town authorities should do and must do from now on". The Intelligence Sergeant was delighted with the new set-up for his task. The armoured car section left AIDONE, their job completed and sped back to their front line duties.

(Hist Sec file Sicily/4 Cdn Recce  
Regt/C/D, August 1943.)

4. Mention might also be made of an innovation put in practice by the Reconnaissance Squadron while in Sicily. The Squadron considered that as a result of their few contacts with the enemy their armoured cars (1) had proved to be "hopeless". According to the Squadron War Diary they were "too heavy and unmanoeuvrable and were a sitting bird for enemy guns." The carriers, on the other hand, were much more satisfactory since they were more easily manoeuvred and offered a smaller target. Therefore to increase the carriers' fire power the Squadron "borrowed" some .5 Browning machine guns from 12 Cdn Tks and installed them on the carriers. (W.D., "A" Sqn, 4 Cdn Recce Regt, 28 Jul.)

(b) Artillery

5. The part played by the Royal Canadian Artillery in all the main actions of the Sicilian campaign has already been outlined in Report 135. There is little that can be added, because the Artillery Diaries are generally brief and there are no "special accounts" from Artillery officers. It has been noted that 7 Med Regt, R.A., operated with 1 Cdn Inf Div for most of the campaign, and, in mountainous country where targets were sometimes out of range for the field artillery, it played an important part. 142 Fd Regt (S.P.) R.A., was another useful addition to the Divisional Artillery, and because of its mobility it was used extensively during the advance. Towards the end of the campaign it left the Division, but during this latter period 165 Fd Regt, R.A., and later 457 Lt Bty (3.7 hows) came under the Division's command. (W.D., H.Q., R.C.A., 1 Cdn Inf Div, July and August 1943.)

6. On 31 Jul, the C.R.A. (Brig Matthews) sent a memo to the commanding officers of all his Artillery units concerning the work of the Artillery up to that time. In it he said:

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- (1) According to Maj. C.A.N. Harvie, S.D.(W), C.M.H.Q. the armoured car used in Sicily was the "Fox" which is no longer employed in an operational role. On the Fox, see Report No. 113, Historical Officer, C.I.S. (paras 81 - 82).

Recent employment of Fd and Med Arty on a Divisional basis has brought forward many complimentary remarks for the "Gunnery" from all quarters. I would like Commanding Officers to assure (sic) that all ranks RCA and RA know that their support has been timely and effective and is greatly appreciated by the Infantry.

Referring particularly to the concentrations and barrages prior to the capture of AGIRA, Comd 30 Corps and GOC 1 Cdn Div have both expressed their admiration of our application of fire under somewhat difficult circumstances. I would like all ranks to know that I am highly pleased, not only with the fire on large scale, but also with the countless spirited independent actions conducted by OP's, also the efforts put forward by Signal personnel, Drivers and Gunnery which on many occasions required great resourcefulness and bravery.

The action of the A Tk and LAA Btys has also been highly commendable and they have both secured the confidence of the Formations of which they are presently under command.

(W.D., 1 Cdn Fd Regt., Appx 4)

7. The work of the Artillery was summed up in a somewhat more homely manner in an account in which one of the field batteries commented: "During the month the guns had their ups and downs but managed to throw a satisfactory amount of H.E. at the Axis, receiving small doses in return." (W.D., 3 Cdn Fd Regt July, Appx 17). 3 Cdn Fd Regt received one of these "small doses" near NISSORIA when their regimental gun area was shelled by the enemy on 25 Jul resulting in 13 casualties (*ibid.*, 25 Jul). It might also be noted that a tragic accident on the last day of the campaign resulted in 29 casualties, when a Mitchell bomber crashed and burned on the 2 Cdn Fd Regt Command Post (W.D., 2 Cdn Fd Regt, 6 Aug.).

8. 2 Cdn L.A.A. Regt did not have a great deal of anti-aircraft firing during the campaign, owing to the Allied air superiority in the theatre. There were, however, occasional raids by small numbers of enemy planes on the Pachino beaches, near ISPICA, LEONFORTE, NISSORIA, CATENANUOVA and north of the Salso. Incomplete reports indicate that at least 10 planes were brought down by the Canadians, six of them by the L.A.A. guns of this unit. (1 Cdn Inf Div Int Log, 26 Jul, serials 929, 953, 958 and 965, 28 Jul serial 96 and 2 Aug serials 455 and 470; W.Ds., H.Q., R.C.A., 1 Cdn Inf Div, 12 Jul, 3 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp, 30 Jul and 2 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, July and August; the latter diary seems to be incomplete in its operational information, probably because the Regiment was generally broken up, with its batteries under command of various formations.) As already indicated,

the Canadians were also attacked on several occasions by Allied aircraft. Indeed, 1 Cdn Inf Bde was bombed about the same hour on three successive afternoons, 3, 4 and 5 Aug, by American planes. On 5 Aug, the Brigade Headquarters Diary commented, "Everyone getting rather annoyed at this and we'll start shooting next time". (W.D., H.Q., 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 3, 4 and 5 Aug)

(c) Engineers

9. The highlights of the Engineers' work in Sicily have already been noted in the operational story -- the bridging of the ravine south of LEONFORTE, the crossing of the Dittaino at CATENANUOVA, the crossings of the Salso and the Troina, and the road building in the rugged country north of REGALBUTO. There were also many jobs of a more routine nature that always kept the Engineers busy. At least 16 road craters and six bridges or culverts were repaired along the axis of the Division's advance. The enemy demolitions were skilful but the road was always opened within a matter of hours after the sappers had begun their work. Bulldozers were employed in much of this work, and in some places oil drums were used in repairing culverts. At least three Bailey bridges were built during the campaign, while fords were constructed across several other rivers. Some road blocks were also cleared, mostly during the first week after landing. A certain number of minefields were discovered and cleared or marked -- near PACHINO, MODICA, CALTAGIRONE, VALGUARNERA, AGIRA, and in the CATENANUOVA valley where they were most numerous. Most of these mines were Tellers No. 2, but reference is also made to a German armour piercing wooden mine, "quite a dirty one with a release ignitor easy to neutralize once detected" (Lt.-Col. Walsh, C.R.E., to Brig. Melville). One night, according to the C.R.E., the Germans "sneaked in and laid mines after we cleared" (*ibid.*). Some trouble was experienced in detecting Tellers buried more than 30 inches deep. The Polish detector in use at that time was said to be not sensitive enough, and a considerable number of replacements were required. There were not many booby traps, "just enough to keep us alert" according to Lt.-Col. Walsh. A high percentage of the Engineers' time was, of course, spent in clearing and maintaining roads and developing new roads and by-passes, e.g. south of VALGUARNERA, south of AGIRA, and south and north of REGALBUTO. Routes also had to be cleared through towns, such as CALTAGIRONE and REGALBUTO, that had been badly bombed. (Hist Sec file Sicily/1 Cdn Inf Div/RCE/C/F Histories of 3 and 4 Cdn Fd Coys and 2 Cdn Fd Pk Coy, July - August 1943; File P.A. 1-14-1, Lt.-Col. Walsh to Brig. Melville, a letter delivered by Col. Henderson and received 9 Aug 43; W.D., 1 Cdn Fd Coy, July - August 1943; W.D., H.Q., R.C.E., 1 Cdn Inf Div for July and August 1943 is of little use to the Historian since it is but a catalogue of messages -- mostly administrative -- received and sent by this Headquarters each day.)

10. During much of the campaign the Field Companies were under command of the Brigades and not infrequently the different platoons were under command of separate infantry battalions. The C.R.E. was not satisfied with this set-up and in reporting to the Chief Engineer First Canadian Army he commented: "A main trouble is that bdes always want a fd coy -- a sec and recce party is usually sufficient and remainder of coy kept under CRE's control. Have sold G.O.C. at las I think. Can get more work done and support bdes more easily that way." (Lt.-Col. Walsh to Brig. Melville, *op.cit.*)

11. The Field Park Company was also kept very busy supplying the Field Companies with materials for all their jobs, in repairing equipment and in making numerous signs. (History of 2 Cdn Fd Pk Coy, July - August 1943, op.cit.)

(d) Signals

12. When it was decided to send 1 Cdn Inf Div to the Mediterranean, the Divisional Signals were faced with many problems owing to the differences between a Canadian divisional signals and a British Middle East divisional signals. During the planning period, Lt.-Col. J. H. Eaman, Officer Commanding 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs, visited Cairo in order to get as much information as possible from the Eighth Army and 30 Corps Planning Staffs. He found that in the Middle East considerably more use was made of wireless and that different methods were employed in the use of communications equipment generally. Moreover at that time Signals in the M.E.F. were responsible for the distribution and supply of code signs and various codes in use in that area. There were also many differences in R/T procedure which had to be mastered before the Division went into action. To carry out all these extra duties it became apparent that it would be necessary to ask for an increment to the establishment of 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs. This was refused at first since the War Office considered it unnecessary, but eventually it was authorized by C.M.H.Q. before the Division left England. (Hist Sec file Sicily/HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div/R.C.Sigs/C/D, Account by Lt.-Col. J. H. Eaman.)

13. Another important change involved equipping the Division with British wireless sets. 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs had just been issued the new Canadian No. 19 set, which in a Canadian division was to be used on a considerably greater scale than was the British No. 19 set in a British Division. But because the supply of Canadian No. 19 sets at that time was not sufficient, and because of maintenance difficulties in a division which would be operating in a British corps, it was decided to adopt the British establishment of wireless equipment which involved replacing the Canadian sets by British No. 19, 21 and 22 sets. The Canadian Signals personnel had never used the latter two sets so that this step meant much last-minute training with entirely new equipment. (ibid.) It was also difficult to try out all the communications involved in a combined landing operation prior to leaving England. According to Lt.-Col. Eaman, "The main difficulties were the great dispersion of units and formations with their Sigs sections and detachments, the availability of Naval craft and aircraft, and, to some extent, the availability of wireless sets etc., to be used to replace any that were likely to be damaged in practice landings". (ibid.)

14. Signals were particularly unfortunate when the three M.T. ships were sunk in the Mediterranean during the voyage to Sicily, for these ships were carrying considerable quantities of signals equipment and some key R.C. Sigs personnel. According to Lt.-Col. Eaman, most of the equipment to be used by the Divisional Headquarters following the landing was lost and this was the reason that the Operational Headquarters remained on H.M.S. "Hilary" for the first two days after the initial landing. (Account of Lt.-Col. Eaman, op.cit.) Nor were the arrangements for beach signals found to be very satisfactory. It was found that on the assault it was impossible for the hand-carts carrying the No. 22 sets to keep up with the Battalion Headquarters (W.D., 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs, 9 Aug ).

15. Wireless was the chief means of communication throughout the campaign, but in the early stages some difficulty was experienced in keeping in touch with the brigades due to the long distances the sets had to work and the rugged nature of the country. Many wireless sets had been lost during the sinkings and as a result, redistribution of sets had been necessary. These sets were on the air the whole time and maintenance was very difficult due to lack of spares, but as the campaign progressed, 30 Corps gradually made good these losses as well as many other deficiencies in signals equipment. (Account of Lt.-Col. Eaman, op.cit.; W.D., 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 24 and 25 Jul.)

16. The use of line was limited initially by lack of equipment and personnel, and by a warning from the C.S.O., 30 Corps, that Signals were to get along with as little cable as possible. Further difficulties in this respect were listed by Lt.-Col. Eaman:

Another difficulty which obtained almost throughout the campaign was the very adverse conditions for the laying and maintenance of lines. This was due principally to the Division's single axis of adv and the impossibility in most places to lay cable cross country which meant that vehs such as carriers, 3-ton lorries, etc., passed over the cable thereby cutting it off. Another reason was the tortuous nature of the roads which meant that in order to connect two HQs by cable anything up to 50% or more cable had to be laid on. A third difficulty consisted in the amazing propensities of the Sicilian for taking unto himself lengths of cable for his own use. In addition, there were a considerable number of definite cases of sabotage. It was only towards the end of the campaign that comms began to approach the quantity which had been planned from the outset. The CSO 30 Corps replaced the wireless vehs we had lost as best he could, but we never did have our full complement of G1098 eqpt.

(Account of Lt.-Col. Eaman, op.cit.)

17. At times line was laid between Main and Rear Divisional Headquarters -- which according to the Camp Commandant were generally six to ten miles apart -- and on 22 Jul the first line came in from 30 Corps Headquarters. During the period in which ASSORO was used as a Command Post to direct the battle on NISSORIA, line was also laid and maintained between this point and Divisional Headquarters. Finally, in the last week of the campaign line was laid to all brigades. On 3 Aug the Signals War Diary again reported that a line had arrived from 30 Corps which also gave them communication to 78 Inf Div. On the whole, it seems that line was used more within the Divisional Artillery than in the rest of the Division. On arrival in the MILITELLO-LENTINI rest area more permanent line communications were, of course, established. (W.D., 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs, 17, 19, 22, 26, 30 and 31 Jul, 1, 3, 7, 12 and 13 Aug.)

18. The Signals War Diary reports that the 38 set used by the infantry battalions was considered to be "practically useless except for patrol work." It was said that it was too large to carry in forward areas and that "any hard knocks or heat put it out of alignment." The No. 18 set was reported to be much superior but its range was limited and companies using it not infrequently got out of communication with their Battalion Headquarters. (ibid., 9 Aug)

19. In concluding his account given to the Division's Historical Officer, Lt.-Col. Eaman noted several lessons that had been learned from the campaign. The increment authorized for a Divisional Signals was fully justified "in that wireless communications for the services were vital to div maintenance particularly with regard to the ASC." He claimed further that a third cable detachment was necessary "if anything approaching the number of lines required was to be laid and maintained." He said that it was found to be necessary to establish a small signal office for the C.R.A. and to have at least one cable detachment working full time on Divisional Artillery line communications (2). Moreover, he said "if, as was almost always the case during the campaign, more Arty Regts are to be placed under the CRA a second cable det must be found to provide the increased line comm necessary." Other suggestions made by Lt.-Col. Eaman included the use of some lighter form of cable-laying vehicle in rugged country, a greater use of jeeps by despatch riders and the provision of a third operator on wireless sets which were required twenty-four hours a day. (Account of Lt.-Col. Eaman, op.cit.)

(e) Brigade Support Groups

20. When 1 Cdn Inf Div invaded Sicily, the Saskatoon Light Infantry consisted of a Battalion Headquarters and three Brigade Support Groups. The Headquarters was attached to Divisional Headquarters and its function was purely administrative, while the Brigade Support Groups operated independently with their respective brigades. Each Support Group had a Machine-Gun Company armed with Vickers M.H.Gs. and a Mortar Company armed with 4.2-inch mortars. Each Group was mechanized and its chief function was to support the infantry in attack and defence, with weapons heavier than the small arms used by the infantry battalions. In Sicily the Support Groups' role was limited by the terrain, but they took part in most of the main actions. Often the companies were split up into platoons supporting separate battalions so it becomes impossible to trace a coherent story of the Battalion or even of each Group as a whole. The fact that Support Battalions were later reorganized into Machine-Gun Battalions would seem to indicate that the Brigade Support Group organization was none too satisfactory.

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(2) The word Artillery is omitted from the account but since the preceding and following sentences both deal with Artillery communications it is obvious from the context that this is what he meant.

THE "A & Q" PART IN THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

In a tale of war the reader's mind is filled with the fighting. The battle -- with its vivid scenes, its moving incidents, its plain and tremendous results -- excites imagination and commands attention. The eye is fixed on the fighting brigades as they move amid the smoke; on the swarming figures of the enemy; on the general, serene and determined, mounted in the middle of his staff. The long trailing line of communications is unnoticed. The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the observer; nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thousand miles of rail, road, and river, the convoys are crawling to the front in unnoticed succession. Victory is the beautiful bright-coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed. Yet even the military student, in his zeal to master the fascinating combinations of the actual conflict, often forgets the far more intricate complications of supply.

Winston S. Churchill in The River War, first published 1899.

21. The "A & Q" story in Sicily has been told in considerable detail by Lt.-Col. W. P. Gilbride, A.A. & Q.M.G., 1 Cdn Inf Div, in a lengthy account given to the Division's Historical Officer. It will be remembered that this account was drawn on extensively in the part of Report No. 126 which dealt with the "A & Q" Planning for the invasion of Sicily. Since there seems to be little point in paraphrasing such a complete report, it is extensively quoted below. In order to make this extract more readable most of the abbreviations used by the Historical Officer have been eliminated. Following this general summary of the "A & Q" story short sections will be added dealing with details of the work of the various services. Lt.-Col. Gilbride's account is in part as follows:

... The landing was carried out according to plan. The major difficulty was the lack of adequate roads for getting in and out of the Beach Stores Depot.... (He goes on to tell of the arrangements made for the use of DUKWS as described in Report 126, para 122.)... It was these DUKWS that enabled the beach groups to unload a large tonnage of stores in the time that they did. When casualties started to appear on the beaches Medical Units were given priority. These units operated most effectively and in particular it was found that the Jeep ambulance proved to be a tremendous success. The Beach Dressing Stations were cleared to hospital ships with very little delay.

Aside from organizing Advance Divisional Headquarters with no communications nor vehicles and improvising as best we could, our main problem on landing was to deal with Prisoners of War which fairly flocked in by the

thousands. A Prisoner of War cage was brought along with us and these prisoners were put in this cage which was sited on the beach after which the prisoners were evacuated to NORTH AFRICA as quickly as possible. Some of these Prisoners of War while awaiting embarkation were being used to assist on beach duties.

The advance of the Division went more rapidly than anticipated during the planning stage and we were at RAGUSA on 'D' plus 3 when in actual fact according to our original plans we had expected to be preparing an attack on ISPICA starting on 'D' plus 5 with the ultimate object of attacking RAGUSA. Fortunately our administrative arrangements had been flexible enough to compete with this rapid movement, the greatest problem being that no stores were unloaded on 'D' day as expected. While units had a day's compo ration on their vehicles as well as emergency 48 hours rations, they had to draw on 'D' plus 1 for rations to be consumed on 'D' plus 2 if they were to retain their reserve rations. We had RCASC vehicles standing by at the supply dump filling up with rations as they were off-loaded on the beach. For the first day or so until the RCASC transport was available we were using unit first line transport to draw from the beach installations. We had to off-load our defensive stores in ammunition vehicles as soon as it became apparent that they were not immediately needed in order to have vehicles available for hauling petrol for tanks, and rations and supplies for the long Line of Communication that was rapidly developing.

During the first two or three days few of the A & Q Staff had any sleep at all and very little opportunity to sit down to meals....

We had arranged with the DA & QMG 30 Corps to include on the Administrative Order that landing reserves for a particular formation should be placed in a formation dump in the Forward Maintenance Centre for the use of that formation. This was not done with the result that we never saw the stores that Corps took over and it was only with the greatest difficulty that we were eventually able to get any of them.

We started to run into considerable numbers of enemy vehicles and equipment at this stage and soon formed an enemy vehicle and equipment section at REME and Ordnance to get these operating in short order. During the first few days of the operation we moved very rapidly with some of the units riding on captured horses, mules and enemy transport. During our attack on CALTAGIRONE it became apparent that the enemy was fighting a

rear guard action and that unless we were adequately provided with means of transport to maintain contact with him we would lose our advantage and grant him the opportunity to dig in. It was suggested to the GOC that we could lift at least one Battalion, if required, which would enable us to pursue the enemy much more rapidly. Meanwhile it had been arranged with CRASC to round up enemy transport to lift a Brigade... When it was decided that we would attack CALTAGIRONE..... It was decided that on this particular day troops would be moved by transport for we had assumed that our vehicles held by Corps would arrive by at least 1800 hours. They were not actually returned for six days; however, by scrounging about and providing transport to lift the entire 2 Cdn Inf Bde we were able to create a bulge on the Eighth Army front which was commented upon even in the news broadcasts over the air.

It was apparent when 2 Cdn Inf Bde approached PIAZZA ARMERINA that enemy resistance was stiffening and we thereupon began to pile up our ammunition. This was needed in some quantity by the time we had reached VALGUARNERA but we had sufficiently built up our requirements and our artillery were able to fire a programme and after that we never failed to replace the ammunition. At AGIRA the artillery put on a heavy concentration of fire consisting of 328 rounds per gun of 25 pounder ammunition for four field regiments and medium ammunition for four (3) medium regiments and by midnight on the day of the barrage we had 400 rounds per gun on hand with 75 rounds per gun en route from F.M.C. Although we were to build up ammunition supplies for a terrific artillery battle to break through the enemy crust around Mt. ETNA, we had had enough ammunition on hand so that we could stop drawing from F.M.C. and began to use our transport to assist Corps to bring up Expeditionary Forces Institute supplies.

Corps had opened their first F.M.C. at PALAZZOLO and subsequently moved to SCORDIA, but the length of the round trip almost entirely over mountainous roads (the distance by round trip was about 225 miles) necessitated the RCASC to use a continuous running method which we had planned, i.e. - driver crews would bring in their vehicles to the workshop party where individuals were detailed to check the tires, fill the radiators, petrol tanks, etc., doing maintenance on the lorries for an hour or so when a fresh crew would take over the vehicle and carry on with the work. In this way we sometimes had as many as three lifts in 24 hours from individual vehicles.

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- (3) This seems to be an error; only one medium regiment supported the Division at AGIRA (see Report 135, para 131).

During this whole period the REME people were repairing vehicle casualties which included tanks that had been holed or hit by mines. The Medicals were doing a first class job of evacuating casualties and always having their medical facilities within easy reach of the troops and Ordnance were making long and tiresome trips back to the beach in order to get needed parts and equipment. It was only by being very difficult that we got Corps and Army to release controlled weapons and stores to us from the landing reserves which we ourselves had originally brought from ENGLAND. During this period it was extremely difficult to bring up reinforcements since we could get no one to move them for us. We had to use our limited ASC resources to send the vehicles back to the beaches, the DAAG, Major F.E.D. Wallace, having personally gone to arrange the movement of reinforcements. The additional reinforcements were not despatched from NORTH AFRICA to SICILY as demanded or promised.

... On 'D' plus 5 the DAA & QMG 30 Corps was asked to take a hand in the matter of kitbags and to move our reinforcements and kitbags to SIRACUSA ....it was not until about 29 Jul that these were, in fact, moved, and notwithstanding that strong guards were placed on the baggage by 4 Bn C.B.R.D. ....considerable pilfering took place in the railway yards.....

After the capture of REGALBUTO the Edmn R. were despatched to the hills on the left flank in an independent role which had a great deal to do with the enemy evacuating ADERNO. Their sole method of maintenance was by mule transport and a mule pack transport team by CRASC, the Staff Capt. BRASCO 2 Cdn Inf Bde, and a mule officer. Pack saddlery proved invaluable at this stage. We had about 300 mules which were withdrawn from the whole of the Division, 3 Cdn Inf Bde having about 40 which they made use of in some of their engagements. The only pack saddlery existing in SICILY was that which we brought with us and a quantity was loaned to 30 Corps to assist in the Maintenance of 78 Div. The pack saddlery and muleteers had been brought from base and were on hand when required.

A great deal of difficulty occurred in the handling of EFI stores since Regimental Funds Board had tied up all but two shillings per man of the units' funds and also since Canadian Commanding Officers had no imprest accounts with which they could purchase the goods, it was important in view of the short notice given before the drawing was to take place to collect the money from individuals in advance. Because of this I had to accept responsibility for some \$20,000 advanced from the Field Cashier with which to purchase the stores, and when the goods were distributed it was found that by holding back 5% of the 10% discount given by NAAFI that £118 profit was made which was distributed to units on the basis of their purchases...

Towards the conclusion of the Sicilian campaign we put on a drive on the turnout and dress of troops, on the cleanliness of the tactical signs on vehicles and of clearly-marked and sufficient unit signs. At the conclusion of the campaign the whole Division was ordered to proceed to a concentration area centred about LENTINI to re-organize, refit, and to lay plans for the next stage of the campaign, i.e. - the invasion of ITALY. In order to move the Division to the new area a programme was laid on in the best tradition of Staff College exercises with Traffic Control Points, colour routes, advance parties, W/T wireless points, start points, dispersal points and block timings..... we left behind in the old area an administrative post whose duties were to check the cleanliness of the unit areas which had been vacated. This was done in the space of a week. At all times on vacating an area we endeavoured to leave it in a sanitary condition with no litter lying about so that at all times the reputation of the Canadians would be maintained for leaving areas clean and habitable. We had previously to that formed an "ad hoc" salvage unit with seventy to eighty other ranks and 10 lorries to engage in salvage duties. This unit went over the whole Divisional area and returned available salvage for which 30 Corps was extremely pleased.

...

The area which was allotted to us for our re-equipping and the planning for the invasion of ITALY was known to be highly malarial but was the only location suitable and we made the best of it, siting the formations and units on high ground to as great an extent as was possible and put on a terrific drive for malarial control and malarial discipline. This included the issuing of mepacrine on Officer parades and taking disciplinary action for the non-compliance of the precautions laid down, e.g. - the rolling down of sleeves, wearing slacks and applying anti-mosquito cream after sundown. Careful charts were kept on malaria and malaria centres were set up with proper microscopic facilities for immediately checking smears from suspected cases. Also an extensive programme against malaria by sign posts set up all along the roads and lanes through which troops of the Division were likely to pass. ... Anti-malarial control units were put on a full time basis and a Divisional malarial officer with the rank of Major was appointed in addition to the malariologist attached to Division.

The results of this campaign were very effective until after we had been sitting in the area for about three weeks when cases of malaria commenced to increase and 30 grains of quinine were then issued to each individual over a three day period. This had excellent effects and reduced the number of cases almost immediately.

During the re-organizing phase the GOC laid special stress on civil relationship sending a letter out on the subject which was distributed down to platoon commanders. This letter made it quite clear that no misbehaviour on the part of our troops would be tolerated and that their standard of discipline and relationship with the civilian population would be the same as for that in the U.K. Each town was made the responsibility of the nearby formation or unit and ceremonial guards were mounted daily in each of these towns. Large out of bounds signs were posted at the entrances to the towns and only troops with signed passes and duly stamped with the orderly room stamp to certify that they were on duty were allowed within the towns.

A Thanksgiving Church Parade was held.... and subsequently broadcast throughout CANADA. This Church Parade, held under the auspices of both Protestant and Roman Catholic padres was very well received by the troops.

During the rest period this Division left 30 Corps and came under 13 Corps and had to conform with new administrative procedure. We had previously received a letter from the DA & QMG 30 Corps that never had a formation come under their command which fitted in with doing things their way as quickly as we had. Throughout the whole period that we were under command 30 Corps we had been on the outside rim of the wheel and had continually to travel further than the other formations in the Corps.....

(a) Army Service Corps

22. R.C.A.S.C., 1 Cdn Inf Div, had a very heavy job in Sicily since the Division was continually on the move and since the rugged nature of the country made driving difficult. Moreover, R.C.A.S.C. vehicles were frequently used for troop carrying purposes which put an additional strain on them. The Lines of Communication were very long -- about 120 road miles by 20 Jul according to the Diary of H.Q., 1 Cdn Div, R.C.A.S.C. According to the same War Diary for 23 Jul:

Driving conditions here are appalling, what roads there are are being powdered into dust of considerable depth and in most cases we are not using roads but tracks made earlier in the advance. It is impossible to use lights on the vehicles and there is no moon until the early hours of the morning. This makes driving conditions very hard. Considering the enormous mileage which the R.C.A.S.C. have put on since the opening of the campaign, it is pleasing to note that only 14 vehicles have been off the road with exceptionally few casualties in vehicles."

Numerous twists and turns and the presence of steep cliffs dropping down from the sides of the roads accentuated these hazards. On 21 Jul this Diary reported that the round trip to F.M.C. took 17 hours, while at times it was also necessary to return the entire distance to the beaches. (W.D., H.Q., 1 Cdn Div, R.C.A.S.C., July 1943.)

23. A further extract from the Service Corps War Diary, which is apparently written by Lt.-Col. Pease himself, serves to illustrate the Service Corps' routine during the campaign:

We are again in the fortunate position of having two days rations in 1st line transport and a further 2½ days with the 2nd line, plus the normal daily draw. This has meant a lot of planning and possibly a little over work, but in view of the whole phase of operations, it is necessary to have on hand in the front area as large a quantity of all commodities as can be safely handled. Lines of communication are very lengthy and we are unable to foresee what may happen at the back on the roads. The daily average consumption of petrol is at the present 20000 galls: plus DERV and lubricants. On top of this we are maintaining fully the daily normal draw. Ammunition is quite an item on its own especially in view of the long hauls, but the move fwd of the Field Maintenance Centre will do much to relieve this situation. It has been necessary to institute relief drivers for all vehicles on the road and we are still using maintenance crews from Workshops platoons in the Company areas when the vehicles roll back to area. This is enabling us to roll a full 20-22 hrs per day. This is, in a lot of cases, time enough for just one round trip.

It has been necessary to replace a number of 1st line vehicles from 2nd line to help the line regiments out while their vehicles are VOR., temporarily. I am more than satisfied with conditions in general. Workshops have been reverted to their original companies for the time being. All transport is a pool, but I have found it advisable to set up each company to handle one commodity. I find this works very well and more especially so from an accounting point of view. The men get accustomed to the items and handle same expeditiously. There have been times recently when I have had to handle the whole supply for the Division and attached troops with only 28 vehicles. It has been done satisfactorily and on time despite terrific difficulties which have been recounted.

(ibid., 23 Jul.)

24. Towards the end of the campaign, 1 Cdn Inf Div Mule Transport Company was formed. Personnel were drawn from 4 Bn, 1 C.B.R.D., and supervised by trained Canadian and British muleteers, including three experienced officers. According to the

Service Corps War Diary, by 10 Aug this Company had 202 mules, 41 horses and one donkey. The Diary goes on to say that:

While AMGOT was contacted in the first place, before we commenced requisitioning animals on A & Q instructions, no subject of price was discussed. We therefore requisitioned the animals and left it to AMGOT to ease off any complaint or make adjustments. We made no contracts of any description. Our action was to take the animal and give a requisition note in exchange. The forage for the animals has been taken from captured enemy dumps and issued according to scales in force. All the mules requisitioned by us were taken in the area ENNA to REGALBUTO. The number of animals requisitioned by forward units is not known to us, nor are the conditions under which the animals were taken. (4)

(W.D., H.Q., 1 Cdn Inf Div, R.C.A.S.C.,  
10 Aug 43.)

In addressing this Company on 11 Aug, the C.R.A.S.C. told them:

It was not anticipated early in the campaign that a Mule Company would have to be used on an organized basis such as had caused them to come into being. It was greatly through their endurance and patience with untrained rough animals, some of them in poor condition, requisitioned from all corners in a great hurry, that the 2nd Cdn Inf Bde has been able to make such a brilliant series of moves, flank and frontal which eventually made it possible to drive the enemy in retreat from the hills.

(*ibid.*, 1, 3 and 11 Aug; W.D., A.A. & Q.M.G., Rear H.Q., 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1 Aug.)

(b) Ordnance and R.E.M.E.

24. The background to the Ordnance and R.E.M.E. story has been covered in Lt.-Col. Gilbride's account quoted above. This is not the place to go into technical details regarding R.C.O.C. and R.E.M.E. services but reports by Lt.-Col. D.G.J. Farquharson (A.D.O.S.) and Lt.-Col. J. K. Bradford (C.R.E.M.E.) are included in appendices "A" and "B" to this report.

(4) The local inhabitants did their best to prevent this requisitioning by bandaging up the mules' legs and inserting stones in the bandages to make the animals limp and appear useless (W.D., H.Q., 1 Cdn Div, R.C.A.S.C., 3 Aug). Their fears were probably not unfounded to judge by some of the requisition receipts that were presented them. (See W.D., Seaforth of C., July, Appx 24.)

(c) Medicals

26. It is unnecessary to go into the history of the R.C.A.M.C. in this campaign in any detail since that Corps has an Historical Officer of its own who will doubtless deal with the subject. It may be said, however, that the Medicals gave very good service throughout despite difficulties due to loss of equipment and shortages of some supplies. Except in the first 24 hours after landing, the Field Ambulances were under command of the A.D.M.S. and the Field Ambulance Headquarters operated on a Divisional level "working in conjunction with a FDS, which had FTU and FSU's attached, this forming an Advanced Medical Centre". (W.D., A.D.M.S., 1 Cdn Inf Div, August 1943, Appx 51, Report on Employment of Medical Units in Sicilian Campaign.) The Report quoted above goes on to say that "the leapfrog system was used". One of these Medical Centres opened from five to eight miles behind the front line while further back a second Medical Centre continued to admit sick and minor injuries that overflowed from the first. Finally, one Field Ambulance was kept continually on wheels in reserve and was ready to go forward on short notice. (ibid.)

27. At first sections of the Field Ambulances followed in support of battalions. Then, in order to keep up, the three sections with a brigade formed a company operating a car post near Brigade Headquarters and maintaining contact with both Regimental Aid Posts and Brigade Headquarters. Modified jeep ambulance cars and personnel were sent forward in support of R.A.Ps. as required. (ibid.)

28. At first a Field Surgical Unit was attached to a Forward Field Dressing Station but it was soon discovered that these units were much more efficient when two were attached to an F.D.S. thereby allowing the surgical teams to work on shifts of 12-hours each. (ibid.)

29. The evacuation of casualties from Divisional level to Corps and from there to general hospitals was greatly hampered by the lateness in bringing ashore the Motor Ambulance Convoy and also by the fact that too few ambulance cars were provided. (ibid.)

30. It is interesting to note that for the first time in a Canadian infantry division the Medical Corps used wireless communications (R/T). According to this report, "it has proven such a valuable asset that we have often wondered how Field Ambulances could hope to function properly without wireless". (ibid.)

31. Regarding the evacuation of casualties, the report says that it was estimated that 5% of all casualties would be held on the island. "In actual fact 12½% of all casualties admitted to Field Ambs were held and returned to units in from 3 to 7 days. These figures are aside from those held in CCSs or 5 Cdn Gen Hosp.". (ibid.)

32. 5 Cdn Gen Hosp landed in AUGUSTA on 19 Jul after a long voyage which had been broken both at ALGIERS and at MALTA. On their arrival, enemy aircraft dropped two bombs which fell some 60 yards from the ship and the same night just after they had disembarked, a petrol ship in the harbour was hit and burnt

in another enemy air raid. Another ship carrying two-thirds of the hospital's G.1098 equipment and all their I.1248 stores was hit and sunk the following morning. On 29 Jul the unit took over from 21 (Brit) C.C.S. two buildings in SIRACUSA containing 200 beds. By 3 Aug they had over 600 patients, mostly British, and were attempting to have Canadian casualties directed to them. (Hist Sec file Sicily/1 Cdn Inf Div/RCAMC/C/D, Account by Maj. A.R. Tanner, Registrar, 5 Cdn Gen Hosp.)

33. Meanwhile, Col. C. H. Playfair, A.D.M.S., 1 Cdn Inf Div, hearing of the hospital's loss of equipment, managed to send 67 lorry loads of captured Italian medical stores which enabled it to operate as a large C.C.S. (ibid.)

34. On 12 Aug, the hospital closed down in SIRACUSA having looked after approximately 600 Canadian and 2400 British troops since 29 Jul. During the week of 5 Aug, they took over a large modern tuberculosis sanatorium in CATANIA. The building was in a very bad condition owing to enemy demolitions but in ten days the Royal Engineers performed wonders in making it habitable and by 15 Aug the building was occupied by the unit. On 17 Aug they took over 368 patients from 14 (Brit) Fd Amb and on 18 Aug opened as a general hospital with 200 beds plus a 200 bed expansion. By 22 Aug they again had over 600 patients all in beds. By that time they had sufficient equipment to operate as a general hospital. (ibid.)

(d) Provost

35. The biggest jobs that fell to the Divisional Provost Company in Sicily were traffic control and road discipline. It was found that the training in England, which had placed an emphasis on traffic control in rear areas, was unrealistic. During operations, Provost personnel were needed most urgently in the forward areas to get the "F" Echelon vehicles through without causing unnecessary traffic jams. "B" Echelon vehicles were left to provide their own traffic control in the rear areas. The fact that Canadian drivers had trained for so long in England made it difficult to make them use the right hand rule of the road which was in force in Italy. To re-educate them in this matter and generally to improve road discipline, numerous signs were erected all along the axis of the Division's advance. Many of the signs were humorously worded and they attracted the more attention since they were the only signs in English to be read. As a result of this programme road discipline greatly improved. (Hist Sec file Sicily/H Q 1 Cdn Inf Div/O/D, Account by Major N. Cooper, A.P.M., 1 Cdn Inf Div.)

36. Towards the end of the campaign when a town was captured, the fighting troops felt they had cause for celebration and were prone to consume such "Vino" as could be found. A considerable number of cases of drunkenness and a certain amount of crime resulted which according to the A.P.M.'s account, taxed the Provost resources considerably. It sometimes happened that when a town was still under fire or when fighting was still taking place in the vicinity, signs would be posted placing the town out of bounds to all ranks until order could be restored and AMGOT took over. (ibid.; for further details see this Account.)

37. Prisoners of war presented a serious problem, especially in the first week of the campaign during which the Division was faced by a deserting Italian army, and during this period an average of about 1,000 to 1,500 prisoners of war passed through the Division's hands in a day. No. 222 (Brit) P.W. cage was under command of the Division at this time and was of very great assistance. But fighting troops were moving forward so fast that they had no time to bother with prisoners of war and as a result hundreds of prisoners often were turned over to a single Provost man on traffic control duty. It became necessary to establish staging posts between the front line and the P.W. cage which were manned by three or four Provosts who had to guard, feed, and escort hundreds of prisoners often as far as 40 or 50 miles to the P.W. cage. It often happened that one Provost N.C.O. on a motorcycle would herd as many as 1,000 prisoners down the road; at times it would be necessary for him to stop and herd them into a field in order to clear the road for traffic. As the operations progressed further into the interior a Canadian P.W. cage was established and manned by Provost personnel and a system of evacuation put into force with the assistance of the C.R.A.S.C. who allowed these prisoners to be transported to the rear on vehicles returning to F.M.C. (ibid.)

38. Throughout the campaign and especially in the rest period following it, the Divisional Provost Company was taxed to its utmost to perform all its duties so that it became necessary to increase its establishment from six to nine sections. This change was approved by General McNaughton during his visit to the Division late in August. (ibid.)

#### MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

##### (a) Security

39. The Divisional Security Section worked closely with the Civil Affairs Officers assigned to the divisional area during the campaign. Immediately following the occupation of a town, the local authorities were interviewed and if considered satisfactory were instructed to carry on with local administration. Arrangements were made to help solve immediate problems of maintaining law and order, providing water and electricity, etc. Files were searched in various government offices with a view to tracking down prominent Fascists who might create trouble, and several arrests were made. But often, for lack of any alternative, former members of the Fascist party were left in office for the time being provided they were willing to co-operate. Capt. W.A.C. Cooper, Divisional Security Officer, in an account given to the Divisional Historical Officer gave the following description of their entrance to VALGUARNERA which may be considered typical:

VALGUARNERA was undoubtedly one of the worst towns entered as it had been heavily shelled by both sides. The local people, with few exceptions, had fled to the country. The exceptions were the looters, ragamuffins and thieves who, having nothing to lose, had stayed behind to see what they could gain. Thus we were met by a crowd of evil-looking, unshaven, unwashed, smelly looters, milling around in the square. The people who owned property began to return in the next few

days. The C.A.O. (5) managed to get the town functioning, and as it was a small place there were no arrests made there. Two or three men spoke English, having been in America. One of them, Christopher Trouata, the local barber, was quite helpful. He had an honourable discharge from the U.S. Army.

(Hist Sec file Sicily/1 Cdn Inf Div/L/D,  
Notes by Capt W.A.C. Cooper, F.S.O.,  
1 Cdn Inf Div.)

40. Many of the towns were practically deserted when first entered by the troops but soon afterwards civilians would start returning. REGALBUTO, however, had been so badly damaged that according to Captain Cooper, it seemed as though most of the population had decamped for good. Some few returned to dig their belongings out of the debris. (ibid.)

(b) Public Relations

41. The Public Relations organization for the Canadian operations in Sicily has already been described in Report No. 126 para 112. Since General Simonds had requested that a Senior P.R. Officer accompany the Divisional Headquarters, Major C.W. Gilchrist had been appointed P.R.O. for the expedition. Two sections each including a conducting officer and two correspondents were attached to 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde. It will be remembered that a Film and Photo Unit was also attached to 1 Cdn Inf Div under command of the P.R.O. Other correspondents, conducting officers and P.R. personnel came out on follow-up ships and arrived in North Africa a week after the campaign had begun. (Hist Sec file Sicily/1 Cdn PR Det/C/D, Account by Maj. C. W. Gilchrist.)

42. The first press accounts out of Sicily on D-day were by Ross Munro of the Canadian Press and Peter Stursberg of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Major Gilchrist had arranged to send these stories by wireless from H.M.S. "Hilary" to MALTA, after they had been officially censored on board the ship. Due to a misunderstanding they were given "immediate" priority and as a result the Canadian correspondents "scooped" the world with their despatches. (ibid.)

43. These two correspondents went ashore with the troops on D-day and wrote further lengthy accounts of the first day's operations which Major Gilchrist himself brought back to MALTA by minesweeper where they were quickly censored and sent out by cable on 12 Jul. (ibid.; these despatches will be found in Canada's Weekly, 16 Jul 43. Ross Munro's story was widely published in the British Press.)

44. Numerous delays, however, prevented the P.R. "reinforcement group" arriving in Sicily before 12 Aug, too late to see the Canadian troops in action. By this time the Canadian P.R. detachment in Sicily had swollen to 76 all ranks. It may be noted that Lt.-Col. C. S. Wallace, D.D.P.R., First Cdn Army, had been handling Canadian P. R. problems at A.F.H.Q. during this period. (ibid.)

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(5) Civil Affairs Officer.

45. Other publicity problems arose as a result of Canadian participation in the invasion of Sicily. The original plans for the release of information concerning the landings in Sicily caused some concern to the Canadian Government. On 5 Jul General Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington intimating that in his initial communique, to be issued from Algiers at 0300 hrs on D Day, he intended to state, "Allied Forces under command of General Eisenhower began landing operations on Sicily early this morning". A proposed supplementary message to Frenchmen of Metropolitan France was to include a reference to the "Anglo-American armed forces". (C.M.H.Q. file 4/Sicily/1, Tel. NAF 277, 5 Jul 43, Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff.) According to a statement by the Canadian Prime Minister in the House of Commons at Ottawa, on 15 Jul, "As soon as these statements came to my notice, and to the notice of the Minister of National Defence (Mr Ralston), we immediately communicated with the Military Authorities in Great Britain, pointing out that since we knew our forces were participating, Canada should be specifically mentioned". (Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates House of Commons, Vol V, 1943, 15 Jul, Statement by the Prime Minister in reply to a question by Mr. M. J. Coldwell. An extract from this statement as reported by the British High Commissioner to the Dominions Office, Tel. No. 1713 is filed in 4/Sicily/1, but it is incorrectly dated 14 Jul.)

46. Since General Eisenhower was responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington the "Military Authorities in Great Britain" could do nothing to settle the matter (*ibid.*, "Memorandum prepared in the Office of the High Commissioner, London, regarding references to Canadian participation in Invasion of Sicily", para. 7). Therefore, on 8 Jul, Mr. King turned to Washington. In his statement referred to above he says "...I got in direct touch with the President of the United States and pointed out that I thought that it was an extraordinary thing that a communication should go from General Eisenhower without any mention of the participation of Canadian troops. The President said at once that he agreed entirely with the point of view I had taken, and that he would see to it that General Eisenhower was instructed to include mention of Canadian troops in the communiqes he sent out. General Eisenhower was so instructed". (Prime Minister's Statement, *op.cit.*) Mr. King went on to say:

...an announcement was made by military headquarters in the United States which carried out the undertaking which the President said he would see was carried out. There was an announcement from Military Headquarters at Washington that Canadian British and United States troops had made an attack upon Sicily. That arrived at a late hour, just immediately after midnight on Friday. When I heard the announcement made I felt that there was no obligation on my part which would bind me further not to make an announcement to the Canadian people. I immediately made the announcement which I had hoped I would have had the chance to make to this House of Commons before it adjourned on Friday night.

(*ibid.*)

47. It may be noted that in the end General Eisenhower's initial communique from Algiers was issued in the form forecast on 5 Jul (above, para 45) and referred simply to "Allied Forces"; but the supplementary message to the French people made specific reference "To Canadian as well as to British and American troops" (ibid. and "Chronological notes on arrangements for initial publicity of Canadian participation in Sicily Operation", a Memorandum on the same file signed by Brig. N.E. Rodger.)

48. There also seem to have been some misapprehensions over 1 Cdn Inf Div's place in the Eighth Army. There was really no secret about the matter for early press reports indicated that the Canadian Division was part of the Eighth Army (see Canada's Weekly, 16 Jul, quoting a despatch by Peter Stursberg, 13 Jul, entitled "Welcome to the Eighth Army"). On the other hand, newspaper reports and official communiqués did frequently refer to the Canadian "force" as if it were separate from the British and American "forces". For instance, on 14 Jul, an A.F.H.Q. communique announced that "contact was made between American and Canadian forces" while on 15 Jul, "The Times" referred to the "Canadians to the right of the Americans" ("The Times", 15 and 16 Jul). At any rate, General Montgomery did not consider the method as satisfactory. In a letter to General McNaughton on 26 Jul, General Montgomery referred to this matter as follows:

I cannot imagine why it is not announced that the Canadians are in the Eighth Army. The Germans know this quite well and must be highly amused at the efforts made to make them think the Canadians are a separate Army. The 1st Div are extremely angry that in the world news they are not linked with the Eighth Army. Perhaps you can have this adjusted.

(C.M.H.Q. file 3/Sicily/1/4, Extract of letter from Gen. Montgomery G.O.C.-in-C. Eighth Army to Lt.-Gen. McNaughton G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army, 26 Jul 43.)

About the same time, General Montgomery also took the matter up with General Alexander saying:

Canadian Div are most angry that in all B.B.C. and other reports they are treated as if they were not in Eighth Army (.) All Dominion troops have always been proud to be in Eighth Army and the thing is quite absurd and is not understood or liked by the Canadians (.) Can you please put matter right (.)

(W.D., Main H.Q., Eighth Army, July, Appx "Z".)

A second message from General Montgomery to General Alexander on 6 Aug seems to indicate that the matter was cleared up satisfactorily. In it the Army Commander said of the Canadians:

They definitely do not repeat not want to be nominally independent (.) They consider that the present method by which they are referred to as Canadian troops of the Eighth Army is quite satisfactory (.) This makes it clear that the Canadians are in the Eighth Army and that they are very proud of this fact and do not repeat not want any other arrangement .

(ibid. for August.)

(c) Historical Section

49. Report No. 126 para 114 referred to the fact that in Sicily for the first time a Canadian Division was to go into action with an Historical Officer and a War Artist attached. The work of Capt. A. T. Sesia, the Historical Officer with the Division may be judged by the numerous references to accounts collected by him throughout all the Reports on Sicily. Extracts were made from these accounts after they were sent back to England and circulated throughout the Canadian Army for information. Lt. W. A. Ogilvie, the official War Artist, made a large number of very fine paintings and sketches while on the island, covering all phases of the campaign. These are most successful in illustrating the type of country in which the Canadians were operating and in recording for Canadians of the future the atmosphere of the campaign.

CANADIANS IN NORTH AFRICA

50. In Report 126, paras 99 to 111, reference was made to certain Canadian G.H.Q. and L. of C. units which were to be sent from the United Kingdom to North Africa to serve Canadian fighting troops in Sicily. It is impossible to include a history of all these units in the present report but it seems desirable to note their arrival in the Mediterranean theatre and their subsequent locations. These miscellaneous units arrived at PHILIPPEVILLE, Algeria, on 10 Jul and a week after their arrival Lt.-Gen. McNaughton and Lt.-Gen. Stuart visited them. At a conference with Major-General H. M. Gale and Major-General C. E. Miller and several Canadian senior officers, it was decided to allocate these units as follows:

- (a) Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1 Echelon - attached to 15 Army Group.
- (b) Canadian Section G.H.Q. 2 Echelon - under command Philippeville Sub-Base Area for local administration.
- (c) 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot (less 4 Bn) - under command Philippeville Sub-Base Area for local administration.
- (d) 1 and 2 Canadian L. of C. Provost Sections - under command 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot.
- (e) 15 Canadian General Hospital - under command Philippeville Sub-Base Area for local administration.
- (f) 1 Canadian Convalescent Depot - under command Philippeville Sub-Base Area for local administration.
- (g) Detachment 1 Canadian Army Base Post Office - attached for all purposes to No. 6 Base A.P.O.
- (h) 1 Canadian Dental Company (less detachments) - to remain under 1 C.B.R.D. for local administration and maintenance until required in Sicily.
- (i) 1 Canadian Public Relations Detachment; a central camp to be created for Canadian P.R. personnel under the administration of Cdn Sec GHQ 1 Ech.

(W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, Att: H.Q.  
15 Army Gp, 10 Jul 43 and Appx "A",  
Minutes of Conference 17 Jul at H.Q.  
Tunis district.)

51. Dissatisfaction was expressed by General McNaughton at the original location of 15 Cdn Gen Hosp and arrangements were made to transfer it to a more healthy locality. (ibid.)

CONCLUSION

52. The above is but the briefest outline of the work that constantly went on in support of the fighting front. It is impossible to go into further detail, but it is hoped that enough has been told to indicate the vastness and the complexity of the work necessary to support but one division in battle on an overseas front. Undoubtedly because there was only one Canadian Division in Sicily the overhead in L. of C. and G.H.Q. units was top heavy, but shortly the Canadian force in the theatre was to be rounded out to a full Corps. These developments will be dealt with in later Reports.

53. This Report was prepared by Capt. J. B. Conacher, R.C.Sigs.

J.B. Conacher

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel,  
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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.

APPENDIX "A"

Ordnance Memorandum on Operation "HUSKY"

(W.D., A.D.O.S., 1 Cdn Inf Div, Aug 43, Appx 6.)

1. Losses during Voyage

(a) 25 pdrs, 6 pdrs, 40 mms, 17 pdrs:-

Serious, but these were soon replaced from NA. (Replacement was NOT a ME but rather a War Office responsibility).

(b) Vehs

Very serious, as only a few were replaced and these were old desert 4x2 Vehs, in bad condition and without tools or camouflage nets. Also replacements were largely Dodges etc and we had no spares. (Replacement here appears to be again a War Office, and not a ME responsibility.)

(c) Amn

Not serious. There was at all times an ample sup of all types and natures.

(d) Cooking eqpt and other G1098

At first this was not serious, as units were on "Compo" were adaptable and were able to improvise; By the time bulk rations were being issued, some eqpt for cooking had been obtained. At present units are all right, but it has taken all the new cooking eqpt on the island. There are many useful but not essential items which will never be obtained, until we are in a firm base for some time.

2. Demand and Issue during early stages

During the first few days there were no demands. This was fortunate, as stores were landed much more slowly than had been expected over Beach 57. It was a poor maint beach (shoals) and eventually Corps was forced to allot to us Beach 56 formerly allotted to 51 H Div. Amn, unlike stores, came in on wheels in "Ducks" over Beach 57 during first days and was stacked and camouflaged in Dumps by the OBDs.

When stores did come off the ships in volume, they went on both beaches. There was some confusion, as the majority went to Beach 56 Dump, which became crowded. We had foreseen the possibility of having to use Beach 56 in London and ADOS had suggested that as it was impossible to know how much would go into each beach and that it would be advisable to allot space for all stores to each OBD; then on voyage out OBDs could form Location Indices (which provide exact weight and size of each package) plan a complete depot for all Landing Reserves. This was not done and in consequence one was crowded and the other was empty.

The advance was much faster than had been anticipated and when stores were needed units were miles from the Beaches. At one time L of C was 160 odd miles. Tpt, both unit and Div RCASC was very short due to sinkings and losses. Rds were few and bad, in places only tracks. Army tpt had not landed. Corps tpt was partly landed, but able to provide very little help. Until the Div went into reserve for refitting south of Catania "make shifts" had to be resorted to as follows

Vote 9 spares - dealt with under Div Sec and Sub Pk hereafter

Vote 7&8 - Only essentials were issued (units were most reasonable in demands) and brought up by (a) unit tpt some unit would provide a truck or even two trucks and a BOWO or one of ADOS staff would take Veh to Beach and bring up essentials for the gp to which the unit belonged). (b) by Corps which was able to convoy up some engines and pack saddlery (c) by RCASC tpt whenever a lorry could be borrowed by ADOS and sent down with a storeman or (d) by one lorry from NA replacement vehs which ADOS had at all times. The difficulty was that at one time a trip took two to three days incl issue and loading.

3. ADOS Staff

Staff did not land until D + 3, with the exception of ADOS and OO, who landed on D day. As Div had advanced by this time and tpt was so scarce it was not until D + 6 that personnel caught up and office (sic) functioned fully. However, up to this time the main Ord work was Offr liaison and infm of actual landings of stores. Storemen and WOs were at all times busy on trips to beach. Other personnel were not overworked. Constant touch had to be kept with BOWOs and Div Sec.

4. Div Sec

Div landed on D3 and by D7 its vehs were off and it was functioning (to it was att a det of the Tk Bde Sub Pk for 12 Cdn Army Tk Bn). It was located in Adm Area, some 10-25 miles from the front with only first line repair holdings. There was no link between it and the base. Div Sec accepted all demands for Vote 9 spares from units other than Wksp, and sent at least one truck back to the base each day, unloading its ground stores for this purpose. It on the whole did a magnificent job and all ranks worked very hard. REME contended that in these unusual conditions, the Stores Secs must be based on Div Sec. This was of course untenable as each Wksp Stores Sec has approximately the same number of personnel and Vehs as the Div Sec. Therefore Div Sec was instructed not to sup Stores Secs except in occasional and emergency circumstances.

5. Fmn Sub Pk

Sub Pk was not fully landed until D + 3. and Corps delayed giving it orders to move until D + 17. It was then in 30 Corps area near Mineo, which was a satisfactory position as it was half way on the Adm L of C. Sub Pk was instructed that even if it became non-mobile it was to concentrate on drawing from the beaches. The unit was not as great a help as had been hoped. It needed time to get adjusted, was a Cdn unit in a British Corps and seemed a bit behind. It is now (under 13 instead of 30 Corps) a Div unit and this should and in fact has improved matters. Loss of 9 lorries loaded and 1 jeep (shipped back to NA) were a severe handicap to Sub Pk.

## 6. Base Units

The OBDs, particularly Ann Secs, were good. However, by D + 19 OBDs (like the rest of the Beach Gps) were withdrawn. Plan had been for the AOD to open on D 60 on a well organized and proper basis, while maint until D 60 would be through OBDs with stores from LR's or BMPs. When all OBDs of all Divs were withdrawn, a large number of partially used LR's and the BMPs were pooled and dumped in the AOD staff, which was simultaneously trying to set up an AOD. The result was loss of efficiency and time from forced packing up on beaches, tpt delays to Siracusa under difficult rly or MT conditions, necessity for so resorting after arrival and scarcity of personnel in AOD to do both jobs. Also AOD personnel did not have as detailed knowledge of the contents of the LR's as the OBDs had had. There should be unless absolutely necessary no interference with the maint gps until the AOD is fully set up. It cannot be expected to do a job unless it is permitted to organise fully.

As far as 1 Cdn Div was concerned, the pooling and dumping was a particularly heavy loss not only was our L of C the longest, but our LR's were much larger and went for the whole Army instead of one Div. We lost more than we gained by pooling.

## 7. Landing Reserves

(a) Waterproofing, both of contents and lists of contents was excellent. There was no loss from emersion or damp. The lessons of "Torch" had been learned.

(b) Packing was also excellent. Another carton was used around two or three cartons, so if one carton broke the other was there. There was no mixing and waste, as there was on "Torch". Only a few of the boxes were damaged and this was not enough to hurt the stores.

(c) Location Indices, particularly the Weedon ones were excellent and where properly used were invaluable. Careful instrs should be given to all Ord personnel and to unit QMs on the way to use these Indices. On "Husky" it was done by ADOS letter but this in a few cases did not get down to QMs and also a few QMs did not study it and the Indices properly.

No. 3 Coln of the Chilwell Indices was not always correct.

## 8. Scalings

There were practically no items demanded, which were not contemplated by Ord in the LR scales. However, some items (MT electrical eqpt particularly) had to be ruled out, as they were not physically available in England. One real mistake was made in respect to Bofors Platforms.

If Ford Scout Cars are on a Force there should be spare rear ends as there were several casualties from this.

Many items were not properly scaled, for these rds and this climate. Examples:

Cont'd

- (a) Norton tires and tubes which are very short.
- (b) Norton spares of all kinds which are short.
- (c) Jeep tires and tubes - very short.
- (d) In fact tires and tubes of all kinds should be carefully reconsidered.
- (e) Radiators for 3 tonners, both Ford and Chev are in short sup.
- (f) Charging set parts are scarce.
- (g) Number 18 Wireless sets need frequent replacement and more sets and less parts would be better.
- (h) A large stock of battle batteries should be held by Sub Pk. Units use up to 300 per month in very active ops.

9. Soap

Soap was a difficult problem. Due to the fact that EFI had not opened units used up their soap for personal use of men and personal laundry and consequently were short even for messes, kitchens, etc. In the circumstances (dirt, dust, heat, strain etc) this was quite understandable and every attempt was made to have Ord issue personal soap. This has been arranged now on a small scale. As much soap as possible should be with a unit, LRs should be scaled for personal soap (at least for the first few weeks) and particular attention should be paid to Fd Amb. These units often have to use very dirty places and a lot of cleaning is necessary. Many anxious hours were spent every few days "scrounging" soap for our Ambs, either from Army Reserves or Civilian sources.

10. Camouflage Nets

Camouflage nets should be in excess of present scale. All replacement Vehs seem to come up without a net. Also in action they are easily destroyed or lost. Scale of two per veh would not be at all excessive.

11. Paint

Paint on a much larger scale is required by all units. A lot of time, petrol etc is lost if rds are not very well marked and units sign posted. All Eighth Army Units have a huge number of signs of all kinds and it is a real help. We have been able to sup from civilian sources but this may not always be the case, and it is suggested that Fd Pk Coy RCE, Wksp and in fact all units should have a larger est for paint. Camouflage paint has not yet been required in volume except for the guns.

12. Operation of Sub Pk

The Sub Pk, under Eighth Army WE, is not the same as ours. Att is copy of letter from DDOS on this matter (not included). We are operating now under 13 Corps and Sub Pk is now a Div Units. This has improved matters, as far as morale, control and efficiency is concerned. No change is likely for our Sub Pk and in present form should operate well.

13. Anti-Malarial Eqpt is very necessary. Nets MUST be dyed for camouflage. It is difficult to do this in the fd by unit or personal arrangement.

14. Units and OBDs must be warned to watch carefully their packs, kit bags, unaccompanied G1098 eqpt and stores. The amount that was stolen (probably by navy) on the beach could not be exaggerated and Ord has of course to replace, although the tpt over and on the beach, where loss occurred was a Beach Gp responsibility.
15. Razor Blades fall into same category as soap.
16. Replacement of Controlled Stores under ADOS. ADOS demand on G(SD) and when release is given ADOS makes distribution and issued to units through Sub Pk. It is difficult to get in daily notice from SCs of battle casualties, but on the whole the procedure works well and replacement of essential items is made quickly.
17. Replacement of Sig Eqpt in Eighth Army is done by Sigs - both demand and sup.
18. Veh replacement is done by Q ADOS and G(SD). ADOS should keep records of all vehs. This has been an impossible task to date as with losses of so many vehs there has necessarily been so much reallocation and lendings. There is also the question of losses from enemy action and requisitioning by units of enemy vehs. It looks as if there will have to be returns of some kind as each period of rest commences with a "state" maintained at other times. Q demands to replace casualties on G(SD). G(SD) allots to Div, Q to units and Q or ADOS notify units to pick up from Corps or Army Veh Pk. On present refitting veh Sec of Sub Pk is att to Army Pk for Div issues. After Sub Pk landed it picked up Vehs from Corps and issued to units in same way as system in England.

Before Sub Pk landed, when there was an unusual allotment (vehs for replacement of sea losses sent direct from NA to the Div with reinforcement personnel as dvrs) ADOS ran a small Veh Pk in 'dm Area and (sic) issued to units on "Q" allotment, careful records being kept of makes, types, cont numbers etc for rescaling of fd pks later.

20. Refitting in between ops will no doubt be always difficult. Details of present refitting will follow, but certain gen observations are:

(a) One must expect most refitting to be when fmn is far from a large Base and/or before Base if fully organized. Therefore for most items only bulk demands and bulk issues can be expected. Ord staff should be particularly well trained in bulk demands and bulk breaking. In England we have all been spoilt by detailed issues from depots. If a simple and inflexible "drill" were laid down for demanding in bulk and breaking bulk for all types of stores (not only Vote 7) it would be invaluable. We have had to do that trg and settle on a drill here.

(b) The same applies for automatic issues which are so often called for in planning. There should be a similar "drill" here involving forms, showing units and their personnel and full veh WE, so that if say 100% Veils Mosquito are required for assaulting tps and 12% for other tps, 100% coverage for shirts angola and 1 shaguls per veh, it is easy to work out a demand and a distribution list for the dump.

(c) Ord clerks, even when recently qualified with high standards, have no typewriting. This is essential. Higher fms want copies of everything.

(d) Trg in fd message writing is needed. It appears simple but clerks seem to need a lot of practice before being able to do it even fairly well.

(e) It is probably not possible to obtain a small visidex cabinet for essential Vote 7 and 8 stores but same would be invaluable to refer to on each refitting. As it is one has to rely on memory for provisioning and what happened the last time.

(f) Ord Storemen at Div HQ should be trained as dvrs. These storemen who could drive were a great help in the trips to the Base.

21. Vehs under ADOS control are really necessary for carriage and tpt of emergency stores. They could go in to an operation loaded with essentials, such as 120 small packs filled (we had a Coy truck knocked out 50 miles from Base and the coy was without small packs) buffer oil, a few battle batteries, socks, water bottles, corks for water bottles, eyeshields (invaluable for dvrs on dusty rds) etc. They could then be issued for emergency issues and would be invaluable until the "bock" system operates. ADOS 51 H Div, who has had experience in France, ME and Here, says he depends entirely on RASC lorries allotted for Ord stores, which his CRASC turns over to him completely. He says he then has liaison between himself and Base, gets more eqpt up and does it more quickly and avoids pilfering and opening of packages (to see what is inside) on the route up.

22. Salvage is in Eighth Army not an Ord matter exclusively and there are no Div units. We found one most necessary. In one Bde we organized one out of LOB personnel and very lately had an Ad Hoc unit formed out of reinforcements - an offr and one sec of 10 men to look after Div Tps and operate a dump on main L of C at which RCASC lorries called - bde secs of ten men and one three tonner to follow units into recently occupied coy areas, pick up eqpt, see BOWO and SC in case reissues were required and to haul remainder to a/m dump. Limited experience shows this to be most satisfactory and a lot of valuable eqpt, apart from pure salvage, was obtained.

If responsibility is placed on units alone to look after salvage, there is sure to be failure of salvage discipline and one cannot blame units, who in the heat of active ops have to dump eqpt.

Enemy amn was too big a problem for any such salvage unit to tackle and has to be left to Corps, but it can at least be guarded until Corps takes over and then no ready sup of amn for guerillas will be available.

The Salvage unit however MUST have tpt.

APPENDIX "B"

REPORT ON REME SERVICES IN SICILY  
10 July to 13 Aug 43

(Hist Sec file 1 Cdn Inf Div REME/C/F)

1. WATERPROOFING

1. Several adverse factors were expected to increase the percentage of veh failures over the beaches due to drowning. These were as follows:

- (a) Waterproofing was done by unit personnel under necessarily thinly spread REME supervision.
- (b) Waterproofing was applied for two minute wading at 2'6" only.
- (c) It was found that the ports of embarkation were in some cases nearly two hundred miles from the concentration area, and Movement Control was not able to provide a transit centre where units could stop for the time necessary to do stage two as well as stage three waterproofing. Units had to travel this distance with stage one and two completed and then had approximately one day to complete stage three and check the condition of their previous work. The danger of loosened waterproofing and overheating was accentuated by drivers proceeding at rates of speed far in excess of the 25 m.p.h. permitted.
- (d) Beaches were expected to be rocky with considerable depth of water between false beaches and shore line.

2. Despite this and although between 20 and 30 percent of the vehicles required assistance in reaching shore, the actual percentage of vehicles out of action for a period of 24 hours due to drowning was approximately 5%. Vehicles beyond the capability of the Beach Detachment to repair were about 1%.

3. It was found that after total immersion for 2 - 3 hours, the battery was the first part to fail. The majority of stalled vehicles were running after a short period of drying in the hot sun without further attention. Those left for periods of up to 12 hours totally immersed were reclaimed after the engine had been torn down and cleaned and after all lubricant and petrol had been changed. Although these latter instances fortunately did not occur with any frequency, sufficient were experienced to show that a vehicle is not seriously damaged due to immersion of this length of time.

4. The Beach Detachment found that a great deal of their work could have been avoided by the extension of the exhaust to a height of at least six feet, and the careful waterproofing of all places where it is rusted through. While this extension is not ordinarily necessary in instances where it is possible to keep the engine running, deep wading will inevitably result in vehicles stalling in a high percentage of cases, when water may back up into the engine block.

5. Too high a percentage of vehicles were found to have water leaking into their petrol tanks. It is felt that sealing of filler caps and breather caps should receive further attention.

6. No difficulty was experienced with Fords. Special attention had been paid to removing radiators and waterproofing distributors and generators before embarkation, and it is considered that this paid dividends in view of the experience with these vehicles in the NORTH AFRICA landing.

7. While the number of vehicles with open generators as compared with those sealed according to British practice is not known, there was no noticeable difficulty that could be attributed to this cause. No instances are known of the driver flushing out the open type with Pyrene. The hot sun and sea air blowing through the open machine was sufficient to dry the part thoroughly.

8. Failures due to salt water corrosion have not yet been evident to date except for a small percentage of brakes.

9. It is felt that the landing reserves should contain a higher percentage of brake parts and ignition parts to permit of substitution if this corrosion failure continues. At present landing reserves appear to be based on desert maintenance requirements.

10. The general result of waterproofing was most satisfactory and would show that in hot climates the present system is adequate and capable of being performed by unskilled men with nominal supervision.

## 2. RECOVERY OF DROWNED VEHICLES

Three Scammels and one D 8 were assigned to each beach. Scammels were used in preference to Macks or Diamond T recovery lorries as the former were fitted with half-track chains. Material assistance was given by two recovery tanks which had been fitted up in ENGLAND by 12 C.T.R. from three spare Shermans.

DUK'S were not employed to their fullest extent on recovery as they were required for rapid unloading of stores. They were used on several occasions for recovery of lighter vehicles and it is recommended that due to their speed and facility of action, at least two be assigned to each beach in future for recovery alone.

The Naval Le Tourneau cranes were of little use for Army Recovery.

## 3. BEACH REPAIRS

Beach REME detachments were occupied, in the main, in stripping and cleaning salt water from engine assemblies, and in checking ignition parts. REME establishments appear to be quite adequate and the Canadian increment was unnecessary. If occasion arises after landing, it is recommended that increments be supplied from the Advance Workshop Detachments.

## 4. CONCENTRATION AFTER LANDING

Units require very little REME assistance during concentration in assembly areas. De-waterproofing was carried out by units following the instruction sheets issued on board ship. LAD's and unit fitters supervised the operation.

AWD's did not have an opportunity to function effectively as only one landed in adv of main shops due to inability to land all personnel before ships sailed from anchorage. This AWD, however, assisted in clearing roads and repairing vehicles that had failed from salt water immersion after leaving the beach area.

It is recommended that AWD's be brought ashore on same priority as main WS's and that initial repair and recovery be carried out by LAD's and attached fitters.

#### 5. LAD's

LAD's and unit fitters did excellent work in first line repair and refitting of captured equipment for unit use. The work of LAD's was limited to some extent by the reluctance of units to bring them forward.

#### 6. ADVANCED WORKSHOP DETACHMENTS

AWD's were assigned to each Bde. They were reduced slightly from normal in order to increase mobility and conform to two 14 man Compo ration packs per day. Establishment is given in Appendix "A".

These units operated in front of A Echelon immediately behind the F Echelon vehicles and were several times under enemy shell and mortar fire. In consequence, roads were cleared promptly of derelicts and light repairs completed as vehicles were damaged. In addition unit cannibalization of abandoned vehicles was retarded to some extent. The AWD's primary purpose during the advance was road clearance and emergency repairs.

During the pause between bounds, AWDs cleared the forward area and worked back toward the workshops. In this period they also searched for enemy vehicles and technical equipment in forward areas.

It was intended to have one officer in this unit act as Recovery Officer for the Brigade. In practice, Brigades did not want an additional officer in their battle HQ and usually called the LAD officer forward from A Echelon for consultation when required. The additional officer was withdrawn to the wksp where his services were of greater value.

AWDs moved forward under instructions from Brigades but it was necessary for the O i/c AWD to press forward and select his new site for confirmation by Staff Captain. The responsibility for contact is on the AWD rather than on the Brigade.

#### 7. BRIGADE WORKSHOPS

Two Inf Bde Wksp on 90% of complete scale were available. In addition, a detachment of the Tk Bde Wksp was formed to supervise 2nd Ech repairs of the Tk Regt and SP Regt.

The Inf Bde Wksp were leapfrogged and it was common practice to leave one in the Admn Area and move the other forward on the axis of advance.

The Detachment Tk Bde Wksp was attached to the Inf Bde Wksp nearest the Tank Area.

All 2nd Echelon shops were kept constantly active. A record of work completed is given in Appendix "C".

AWD personnel were brought back into their corresponding shop at intervals and replaced in order to give as many personnel as possible experience in forward areas.

REME and CRASC repair and recovery services were pooled for emergency work. Personnel of the two Corps set an excellent example of teamwork and I should like to express my appreciation of the assistance given REME in this regard.

8. 3rd Echelon Wksps

Full use could not be made of 1 Inf Tps Wksp after its arrival with the Tk Bde Convoy as 30th Corps had provided no workshop of its own and the one shop serviced both Divisions and the Independent Bde. 3rd Echelon repair was carried out to a large extent in 2nd Echelon wksps.

9. SUPPLY OF PARTS

Provision of W.O. on the basis of NORTH AFRICA requirements was inadequate. The most serious inabilities were in ignition parts, which suffered the more heavily in a wet landing. The rocky nature of the roads and the difficulty in patching due to the high ambient temperature, caused an acute shortage in inner tubes, particularly those of motorcycles. One other serious inability was in wireless parts.

Conferences are being held between Wksps and OC Corps Fd Pk with a view to preparing scales of parts for the next operation that will be adequate for demand expected.

Workshop Stores Sections also filled several hundred indents for emergency parts for LADs and units. No justified demand was refused in order that vehicles might be put back on the road by any means as rapidly as possible. This ate into the reserve provisioned by the Wksps before embarkation and as bulk indents had to be sent back 30 miles to Corps Sub Pk for requirements, stocks were difficult to maintain under the rapid turnover. It is suggested that consideration be given to providing a forward element of the Corps Sub Pk to give more rapid service to Wksps.

10. COMMUNICATION

Due to lack of available wireless sets, all communications between HQ CREME, Workshops, and AWDs was by DR. In consequence time lags of 3 hours in period between sending message and receipt of answer were common.

It is suggested that a 7 station net would not be too much as rapid communication re recovery and movement would then be available both to wksps and AWDs.

11. CANNIBALIZATION

Unit cannibalization is a serious problem and attempts are being made on an Army level to solve it. Even though AWDs worked closely behind forward units, derelicts, particularly Z casualties left without drivers, were stripped in a very short time. It is difficult to estimate the number of equipments denied to the force due to this practice.

12. ENEMY EQUIPMENTS

A considerable number of enemy equipments were put into service, particularly MT., by forward tps and REME services. The policy was established of repairing only those requiring up to 2nd Echelon repairs.

Only one new equipment was discovered, a 30 cwt, fully tracked all purpose, load carrier. This machine is of 1943 manufacture and has several ingenious features. One complete vehicle was built up from the three damaged ones found and has been reported on by Army Technical Staff.

13. MORALE

Morale in all REME units was high and all ranks most enthusiastic. Confidence was established when it became evident that principles learned and followed in exercises in U.K. were equally effective in action. Officers almost without exception showed an increased sense of responsibility and marked improvement in leadership. In consequence work done was good and output high.

Sgd (J.K. Bradford) Lt-Col.  
CREME 1 Cdn Div

JKB/JPG  
23 Aug 43

See Appendices "A", "B" and "C" on next page.

REPORT ON REME SERVICES IN SICILY (continued)

APPENDIX "A"

COMPOSITION OF INF BDE A.W.D.

Officers	2	Fitters MV	4
Armt Art MV	1	Welders	1
Armourer	1	Storemen	2
Dvr Mechs	6	Gen Duties	1
Electrician	1	M/Cyclist	1
Fitters	2	Cook	1

APPENDIX "B"

SUMMARY OF REME ORGANIZATION  
Sicilian Campaign, 1943

<u>Personnel</u>		
HQ CREME		20
1 CIB Wksp RCOC		196
2 CIB Wksp RCOC		194
Det Tk Bde Wksp		78
No. 1 LAD		16
No. 2 LAD		16
No. 3 LAD		15
No. 7 LAD		10
No. 8 LAD		10
No. 9 LAD		10
No. 13 LAD		8
No. 14 LAD		14
No. 15 LAD		14
No. 60 LAD		25
No. 68 LAD		6
No. 2 LAA Wksp		22
Attached unit armourers and fitters RCOC		<u>44</u>
TOTAL	698	- 27 offr
1 Inf Tk Wksp	<u>171</u>	- 5 offr
	869	32 offr
		671 ORs
		166 ORs
		837 ORs

Killed in action - Sgt Zavitz, C & Y Armourer  
Pte Snow, West NSR, Fitter MV  
Pte Smith, 14 LAD, Electrician

APPENDIX "C"

WORK DONE BY 2ND ECH SHOPS

	<u>"A" Vehs</u>	<u>"B" Vehs</u>
Recovered	11	155
Received	54	597
Repaired	46	500
Backloaded	8	77