Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems Sandbox 2024

The UAS landscape is rapidly evolving. The rapid increase of availability, affordability, complexity, and capabilities of UAS systems is posing increasing threats to the DND/CAF and our defence and security partners. Potential adversaries are also adapting UAS designs to evade current CUAS capabilities, by reducing the UAS visibility, minimizing radio-frequency emissions, increasing autonomy, operating at higher velocities, etc., thus rendering the current CUAS approaches obsolete. Proposed solutions to this challenge should take into account not only what is available and a threat today, but also emerging UAS and CUAS capabilities and how they might be detected, defeated, and/or exploited tomorrow.

CUAS was identified as one of the priorities in Canada’s 2017 defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) which stated: “As the development of remotely piloted systems increases… Canada will require the appropriate capabilities to identify and defend against these burgeoning threats.” (page 73).

The Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) is leading the CUAS effort, coordinating with the Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). The information presented in this IDEaS CUAS challenge represents a blending of characteristics of interest to one or more of the services, as well as the RCMP.

The following CAF projects have a direct interest in CUAS systems and the results of this challenge:

• Canadian Forces Land Electronic Warfare Modernization (CFLEWM). CFLEWM is upgrading the Army’s Mobile Electronic Warfare Teams in Light and Armoured platforms. While dedicated CUAS capabilities are out of scope for CFLEWM, a beneficial outcome would be to understand how multi-role EW Sense and Attack capabilities can contribute to the CUAS fight, and how dedicated CUAS sensors could be integrated into the EW sensor network.
• Land Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Modernization (Land ISR Mod). Land ISR Mod is investigating capabilities that are capable of providing sensor systems for the purposes of targeting. This project is mandated under SSE Initiative #42 and is funded. This project is in Options Analysis transitioning to Definition.
• Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems (CUAS). A specific CUAS initiative is investigating CUAS systems capable of defending critical infrastructure, vehicles, and personnel from Micro and Mini UAS. This project is not funded at this time, and consequently an intended date for any future procurement cannot yet be stated.

Essential outcomes

Aside from addressing the challenge in an overall sense, there are no specific detailed essential challenge outcomes at this time.

Desirable outcomes: Integration into an external command and control system

The UAS threat is only one threat amongst many that CAF must constantly consider in a layered operational environment. While a singular CUAS system may be quite capable, if its information and control cannot be integrated into a common command and control structure its functional utilization is diminished, requiring additional human resources to manually fill that gap, which reduces both efficiency and effectiveness of the system and the deployed force.

It is desirable that the utilized external command and control system is one already in use by the CAF, such as Link 16, Sensing for Asset Protection using Integrated Electronic Networked Technology (SAPIENT), Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2), All Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance Information Exchange (ASTERIX), NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS), or Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

Operational scenarios

The UAS threats occur in a variety of operational scenarios, five of which are of specific interest to defend against. It is desirable that a solution addresses as many of these as possible, each to the maximum extent possible:

• Operating base. Defending a Forward Operating Base (FOB), airfield, or VIP conference location in which a CUAS system can be in a static location once deployed, and where equipment size and power consumption is not a major issue. The perimeter of the area to be defended is a circle with a 2.5 km radius. The combined location and quantity of the systems used must be located within that circle with an effective range extending beyond that perimeter in all directions to prevent the UAS from approaching the perimeter.
• Mobile vehicle. Defending a mobile vehicle force element such as a patrol of five vehicles, in which the CUAS system must be vehicle-mounted and powered for mobility, creating a defensive bubble around the vehicles while on the move.
• Dismounted personnel. Defending a small element of 12 dismounted soldiers or a VIP group in an isolated location, in which case the CUAS system and its power source must be “Person Portable”. Ideally also operating while the group is on the move, creating a defensive bubble around the group.
• Urban environment. Operating in urban scenarios such as complex and cluttered infrastructure, obstacles, and electromagnetic environments. The area to be defended is a major city downtown location and a square of 4 x 4 city blocks, with office towers up to 10 stories high on some or all of the blocks to be defended.
• Naval environment. Defending a RCN frigate sized ship that is (i) underway in littoral waters that vary from large straits to confined entries to harbours; and (ii) alongside a dock or anchored in a harbour. The equipment will have to contend with obstacles such as the ship's superstructure, the unique electromagnetic environment surrounding the ship, the various speeds and movements of a ship, a variety of coastal, urban, and port landscapes, and it will have to withstand prolonged exposure to the marine salt environment.

The general methodologies for achieving CUAS effects can be characterized as:

• Active detection, in which the CUAS system is transmitting a signal in order to detect the UAS (such as radar), which has the disadvantage of potentially revealing the location of the transmitter, depending on the technology used.
• Passive detection, which conceals our own position and relies on detecting the UAS from effects it generates (such as visual detection, electronic signatures, audible noise, etc.).
• Soft-kill neutralization, using means such as radiofrequency effects or other methods to deter, disable, take over, or otherwise mitigate the UAS.
• Hard-kill neutralization, using ammunition, nets, entanglers, missiles, lasers, microwave devices, or other means to physically disable the UAS.

DND/CAF is open to receiving all types of solutions, however technologies and concepts of the most interest and with an increased likelihood of being selected are those that can leapfrog currently known prototypes and capabilities as outlined in annex A of the Applicant Guide.

Utilization of a method that is substantively different than any other means of detecting and defeating drones, such that it would fill a niche in a layered CUAS approach of multiple capabilities. Current known methods include but are not limited to:

Detect:

• Radar
• Acoustic
• RF Signal

Defeat:

• RF Jamming
• Nets
• Small arms ballistic projectiles

Selection emphasis in the following technology areas can be expected provided their performance is relevant. Even if these technology areas are previously known, improvements in these areas are of interest:

• Interceptors.
• Hard-kill solutions, particularly proximity munitions, and directed energy such as lasers and microwaves.
• Beyond line-of-sight capability.
• Networks of low-cost sensors.
• Systems already designed for integration into external command and control systems.
• Tracking and defeating swarms of UAS.
• Detecting and defeating LTE/5G controlled UAS.