Review of the Conflict of Interest Act - November 19, 2025

Opening statement

Introduction

Democracies worldwide are under pressure. Social media, disinformation, polarization, a string of health and financial crises – all contribute to this pressure.

That being said, according to organizations like the OECD and Freedom House, Canada is doing better relative to the rest of the world.

Why? In part at least because Canada has a deep-rooted culture of integrity – integrity of public office holders and of the public service. That culture of integrity is the basis on which strong democracies are built. That’s Canada.

While culture is hard to measure, we see concrete proof of it everywhere. In our rules, laws and processes – all Canadian public servants are subject to a rigorous Values and Ethics Code.

And most relevant today: the Conflict of Interest Act. This Act plays an important role in reinforcing our culture of integrity.

The work of this Committee plays an important part. It’s about Parliament ensuring the Conflict of Interest Act is effective in upholding the transparency and accountability that contributes to Canada’s democracy.

Prime Minister’s screen

Like every other public office holder since 2007, the Prime Minister is subject to requirements under the Conflict of Interest Act.

In addition, the Prime Minister and the Ethics Commissioner have agreed to and published a Public Declaration of Agreed Compliance Measures, which includes a Screen and blind trust.

As you heard from the Ethics Commissioner, the blind trust and the Screen are in place to promote transparency and public confidence in decision making.

In Canada, screens have been in place for many years in public and private institutions and under governments of different political stripes.

Remember: The Conflict of Interest Act and tools like the Screen are in place to enable the government to attract people with diverse backgrounds – including from the private sector – while ensuring integrity in decision-making.

How it works

We have put in place a rigorous process to implement the Screen – validated with the Ethics Commissioner.

First, policy decisions that might trigger the Screen are identified and reported to senior management of departments and agencies as they arise.

Then, departments and the Privy Council Office conduct a robust case-by-case due diligence.

At that point, if there appears to be even a remote possibility that the Screen may be needed, it is immediately put in place. Why? To always err on the side of caution.

To ensure the principles underlying the Screen are consistently applied, we developed a comprehensive assessment tool that provides a framework to assist in the analysis. I am happy to table the tool for the Committee.

Government officials receive rigorous training across the public service, especially in relevant departments.

Both the assessment tool and training materials were thoroughly reviewed and validated with the Ethics Commissioner.

The Deputy Secretary of Governance at PCO then makes a recommendation on the Screen’s application.

As Administrator of the Screen, I review the recommendation and take a decision.

All advice from the public service on the full range of issues for the Prime Minister comes through me – a broad perspective critical in my role as Administrator. I regard this role as a duty – an important duty.

Finally, decisions are shared with the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff – the second Administrator – for concurrence and immediate implementation.

Cases

While the Conflict of Interest Act does not require disclosure of how the Screen is applied, I want to share as much information as possible with committee members and Canadians.

There were 13 cases for which we have decided whether the Screen should be applied.

Each of the 13 files – without exception – has been validated by the Ethics Commissioner.

In 7 cases, the Screen was not applicable – according to the principles in the assessment tool validated by the Ethics Commissioner.

5 did not have direct interaction with the companies in the Screen. And 2 were tax measures of general application.

In 6 cases, the Screen was applicable. On these issues, the Ethics Commissioner was clear: the Prime Minister must not be aware of the file until a decision is final and public.

Otherwise, it undermines the purpose of the Screen itself. This is the case with 4 of the 6 cases in which the Screen applies. Two files are now public where a final decision has been made.

I am sure you will have some questions on these files. I would be happy to talk about that and the process in more detail.

Conclusion

We have built a rigorous system.

It is applied with great attention and caution.

The public service is keenly aware of our responsibility to always ensure the integrity of the Prime Minister's Office institution.

I look forward to hearing your questions and reviewing your recommendations later.

Overview of review of Conflict of Interest Act by ETHI

The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics is conducting a review of the Conflict of Interest Act. Witnesses including the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, ethics commissioners from other jurisdictions, academics, journalists and senior public servants were questioned on the effectiveness of current legislation and related codes in addressing conflicts of interest, potential areas of improvement for Act, and the implementation of the Prime Minister’s ethics screen. Several themes emerged from questions.

1. Amendments to the Act Regarding Apparent Conflicts of Interest

Committee members questioned witnesses about the distinction between apparent and actual conflicts of interest and whether the Conflict of Interest Act should explicitly prohibit both. Their questions focused on how appearance of conflict is treated in other jurisdictions, what operational definition could apply, and whether prohibiting apparent conflicts would risk excessive subjectivity.

Witnesses were asked how the public’s perception of impropriety could be better reflected in legislation without unfairly penalizing legitimate conduct. Some pressed witnesses to clarify if a standard such as what a reasonable person might perceive could be applied in statute. They also asked whether the difference between moral and legal obligations could be codified through stronger guidance, rather than left to interpretation by the commissioner. While there were nuanced views, witnesses generally support the Commissioner’s recommendation to amend legislation, so it addresses apparent conflicts.

2. Independence and impartiality of oversight

Members probed the degree of independence of ethics oversight bodies. Their questions asked witnesses to identify weaknesses in how the Ethics Commissioner is appointed. Witnesses noted the requirements for appointment were typically more stringent than for other similar positions to ensure the commissioner enjoys the confidence of all parties.

Committee members also requested examples of how other jurisdictions structure independent oversight. For instance, they asked whether the U.K. or certain provinces provide statutory guarantees that the ethics commissioner’s decisions cannot be overridden or influenced by ministers.

Some questions focused on impartiality and whether the commissioner’s dual role as adviser and enforcer risks undermining neutrality. Others examined whether a separation of advisory and investigative functions would produce fairer outcomes.

3. Effectiveness of ethics screens and blind trusts

Committee members focused on how ethics screens and blind trusts function in a practical way, probing whether these tools effectively prevent conflicts. They also questioned if current rules were adequate given the breadth of the Prime Minister’s screen and also in light of his deferred compensation.

Witnesses were asked about the establishment of screens and how they are used, the administration and monitoring of screens, transparency, and possible recourse if a screen fails or is not triggered when it should be.

Ontario Commissioner Cathryn Motherwell noted that screens are typically arranged on her office’s advice and implemented by the Cabinet office, which oversees recusals when issues arise. Committee members asked whether such an arrangement leaves too much to self-regulation, given that the commissioner’s office does not audit or verify compliance after setup. While there was support for the use of screens as tools to prevent conflict of interest, especially from regulators, some witnesses and opposition party committee members suggested screens were subject to abuse and should not be relied on. Additionally, some called into question the independence administrators who ensure the screen is properly applied while serving at the pleasure of the reporting public officer who is subject to the same screen.

On blind trusts, members questioned how effective they are in insulating office holders from knowledge of their investments, many noting there are typically few changes made to the holdings after the trust is created. They asked whether a trust truly prevents influence if the holder remains aware of general asset categories, and whether complex ownership structures can render the trust mechanism ineffective. Opposition party committee members questioned a number of witnesses on the desirability of requiring complete divestiture upon taking office. While some witnesses, like Duff Conacher were supportive of this proposal, insisting it contributed to transparency and simplified enforcement, others questioned the necessity for such a measure and noted a requirement may discourage individuals from seeking office, which is counter to the objectives of the Act.

The questioning in this area focused on developing safeguards, such as written triggers for screens and periodic audits of trust arrangements, to prevent reliance on personal assurances.

4. Principles-based and rules-based regulation

Members asked questions about the merits of principles-based versus rules-based regulation. They asked witnesses, including the U.K.’s Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Daniel Greenberg, to explain how a system guided primarily by broad ethical principles can be enforced consistently without statutory rules.

Members inquired how discretion is exercised in the U.K. model: who determines whether a principle has been breached, what precedents exist, and how fairness is maintained when fewer formal definitions exist. They also asked whether Canada’s more detailed, rule-heavy framework encourages “box-ticking” rather than moral reasoning, and whether a hybrid system could be devised.

Through these questions, MPs sought guidance on whether the Canadian Act could integrate flexible ethical principles without sacrificing predictability or procedural fairness.

5. Transparency, public trust, and political accountability

Members’ questions frequently focused on the relationship between transparency and public confidence in the ethics regime. They asked witnesses to specify what types of disclosure should be made public to demonstrate that the Act is working as intended.

Several Committee members asked how transparency obligations could be broadened without breaching privacy or confidentiality protections, and whether other legislatures publish anonymized advisory opinions or recusal notices. The recurring question was how to reassure Canadians that ethics rules are being applied consistently.

During discussion of the Prime Minister’s ethics screen, members also asked questions about implementation: Who determines when a screen is triggered? What documentation is created? and How can Parliament verify that a recusal occurred? Opposition members and some witnesses were generally critical of the use of screens. Witnesses with experience in administering screens were supportive of their use but noted their limitations.

Opposition members and several witnesses were highly critical of “general application” provisions that allow a reporting public officer to participate in decisions that apply to a broad class of individuals, claiming it was a “loophole” to the law. Duff Conacher asserted on several occasions that this provision was used to evade the provisions of the Act in 99% of cases, though no evidence was provided.

6. Enforcement and sanctions

Members questioned the adequacy of the Act’s penalties and enforcement mechanisms, including how fines, investigative powers, and reporting obligations in Canada measure against those in provincial or international systems. Several witnesses criticised the absence of sanctions for the more serious infractions in the Act. Guy Giorno, a former Chief of Staff to a Prime Minister, was particularly critical, noting: “You can make the penalties for minor infractions 6,000 times bigger, but as long as officials can get away with breaking the 40 most important rules, fiddling with the minor rules actually makes things worse” because “it sends a message that the big rules aren’t taken seriously and get to be ignored.”

Witnesses, particularly those exercising a regulatory function, were asked whether existing fines have a deterrent effect given the salaries of senior officials, and whether alternative measures, such as suspension, loss of privileges, or graduated penalties, might better align accountability with responsibility. They also asked about enforcement independence: who decides whether to prosecute or refer cases, and whether the commissioner’s limited power to impose sanctions weakens compliance.

The questioning revealed a support for increasing penalties to make enforcement credible, ensuring that ethical breaches carry tangible consequences rather than reputational costs alone. Regarding sanctions, former Clerk of the Privy Council Michael Wernick suggested the committee “might want to review the array and the ladder of sanctions available.” The ethics commissioner for Quebec, who has the power to recommend sanctions to the legislature up to removal, used the regime in her province to illustrate options that could be included in such a structure.

7. Complexity and modernization needs

A consistent line of questioning dealt with how modern financial and corporate structures challenge the Act’s enforcement. MPs asked witnesses to explain how holdings in foreign subsidiaries, offshore trusts, or pooled investment funds can obscure a public office holder’s beneficial interests.

Members inquired whether adopting concepts from the Income Tax Act, would better capture indirect ownership. They asked for examples of real-world structures that could evade current disclosure requirements and what statutory definitions would close those loopholes.

Further questions examined how to balance administrative feasibility with completeness: if every complex financial interest must be reported, what mechanisms could simplify compliance without weakening transparency? These technical questions aimed to ensure that modernization proposals were both legally sound and practically enforceable in the era of global finance.

8. Education, guidance, and culture of ethics

MPs asked witnesses to elaborate on the role of education and regular engagement in fostering ethical conduct. They wanted to know whether mandatory annual meetings between MPs and the Ethics Commissioner, common in several provinces, lead to better compliance.

Questions also explored how commissioners should deliver guidance: should advice be formalized in writing or remain confidential and contextual? Should anonymized advisory opinions be published to create precedent? Members sought ways to make ethics guidance more consistent, proactive, and transparent without chilling open consultation.

These inquiries reflected a shared interest in prevention through education, ensuring that ethical awareness is continuous, not reactive.

9. Public and private sector balance

Members’ questioning often explored how the Act affects recruitment and participation in public office. They asked witnesses to clarify whether strict conflict of interest rules discourage qualified individuals, particularly those with private sector backgrounds, from entering government service.

Conversely, MPs also asked how to prevent private-sector experience from translating into undue influence once in office. They probed whether divestment, recusal, or trust requirements are sufficient to manage such risks. Some questions sought models for ensuring fairness: could temporary waivers, blind trust validation, or structured cooling-off periods strike the right balance?

This theme of questioning highlighted Parliament’s broader challenge, how to protect public confidence without deterring capable professionals from serving.

PM COI process – How do we implement the screen

1. PM COI screen and its purpose

A. What is it?

The Screen is part of the Compliance Measures agreed to by the Commissioner and the PM. These were made public on July 10, 2025.

The Commissioner determined that a Conflict of Interest Screen (Screen) was an appropriate preventive compliance measure to prevent conflicts of interest.

The PM and the Commissioner agreed to implement a Screen to prevent any opportunity to further the PM’s interests or to improperly further those of Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation and Stripe Inc, and any company owned or controlled by them, of which the PM is aware, as listed in an annex to the Screen (Appendix Summary Statement).

The Screen was negotiated by the PM’s private counsel and the Commissioner.

The Screen applies to any direct engagement by the Companies with the Government of Canada, including meetings with the Companies, decisions regarding a financial grant or contribution to the Companies and contracts with the Companies.

• The Screen may also apply to matters impacting the sectors in which these Companies operate.
  • real estate/infrastructure projects, mortgage insurance, the airline industry, the nuclear industry, the renewable energy sector and the credit card industry.

The Screen is jointly implemented by the Clerk and the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff. The Administrators are supported by the Deputy Secretary to Cabinet (Governance).

2. Implementation of the Screen

A. What is it?

The Screen is managed on a day-to-day basis within PCO Governance.

The preparation of a note, a policy initiative, a proposal, an update or other similar document in a department or agency destined for the PMO or the PM may trigger the application of the Screen.

A request for a meeting with the PM may also trigger the application of the Screen.

Departments and agencies use an Assessment Tool to determine whether the Screen applies. There is departmental senior management review before any materials are provided to PCO (Governance).

• By way of examples,
  • the Major Projects Office has an ongoing monitoring process in place for all active projects under review and consideration.

They have resources who provide guidance to analysts managing projects and maintain a database of when and how the Screen has been considered.

They provide an update to PCO Governance every 2 weeks and reach out regularly with questions.

• PCO and the Department of Finance also have a monitoring process for all budget-related proposals.

Departments provide PCO Governance with a completed Template and background information.

PCO Governance conducts and completes due diligence on the possible application of the Screen.

PCO Governance reviews the materials provided, raises questions, seeks additional information, clarifications and documents as may be required, and may conduct additional online searches.

PCO Governance then prepares a recommendation for the Clerk.

The Deputy Secretary of Governance reviews the recommendation and conducts her own due diligence before approving the recommendation.

Recommendations are forwarded to the Clerk for review and approval.

Assuming no additional information is required, the Clerk’s decision is forwarded by his office to the PM’s COS for review and concurrence.

Once reviewed and approved by the PM’s COS, the document is returned to PCO Governance for further implementation.

Decisions on the Screen are communicated to departments and agencies for action depending on the decision made:

• For negative decisions, there are no additional steps required by departments and agencies.
• For positive decisions, departments and agencies must ensure that documents are properly identified as being subject to the Screen and are not discussed or shown to the Prime Minister (see below).

Departments and PCO are required to maintain a robust documentary record for all recommendations.

PCO Governance maintains a database of its activities. This includes an evergreen case management tracker and key documents relating to each situation considered from intake to final decision.

For positive recommendations:

• The Screen is applied on a precautionary basis, as soon as the analysis indicates something that may trigger the screen and pending decision by the Administrators
• All documents (emails, notes, etc.) are clearly marked as being subject to the PM’s COI Screen and the notation “Subject to the PM’s COI Screen - Not to be shown to the PM”.
• Departments must provide documents supporting the steps taken on positive recommendations to PCO (Governance). These will be provided to the Commissioner if requested.
• Where the Screen applies, PCO uses the Acting Ministers Minute, and items requiring decision are forwarded to Minister Leblanc for decision.

It is important to note that it is the Commissioner who ultimately decides whether there is a real or potential conflict.

Roles and responsibilities of key players

The Commissioner and his office

The Honourable Konrad W. von Finckenstein, C.M., K.C. was appointed Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (Commissioner) on March 5, 2024, for a seven-year term. He served as Commissioner for six months on an interim basis from August 2023 to February 2024.

Prior to his appointment, he was an Assistant Deputy Minister, Business Law, with the Government, a Judge of the Federal Court, the Commissioner of Competition and the Chair of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission.

The Commissioner is an independent Officer of the House of Commons. He is independent of the government of the day and non-partisan. He is responsible solely to Parliament and not to the government or an individual minister. His office belongs to Parliament itself.

He is appointed under the Parliament of Canada Act by the Governor in Council after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the House of Commons.

The Commissioner reports to Parliament through the Secretary of the Treasury Board. Policy amendments would be led by the Treasury Board.

The Commissioner is appointed for a renewable seven-year term and may only be removed for cause by the Governor in Council on address of the House of Commons.

The Commissioner is responsible for administering the Conflict of Interest Act for public office holders, reporting public officer holders and the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

His mission is to help elected and appointed public officials avoid conflicts of interest.

His Office informs public office holders and Members about what they must do to comply with the regimes, through direct communications and a range of education and outreach activities.

His Office guides reporting public office holders and Members through the compliance processes.

He and his Office give confidential advice and direction tailored to individual situations. Members and public office holders often ask the Office for advice about how to arrange their affairs to comply with the Act and the Code, and how to deal with various situations, such as whether they may accept certain gifts.

In addition, confidentiality extends to other aspects of the Commissioner’s work. His Office conducts examinations related to complaints in private, prepares reports for Parliament without confidential information and neither the Commissioner nor his employees are compellable witnesses in a proceeding.

The Commissioner’s decisions are final except for limited judicial review on grounds of jurisdiction. He is not bound by prior Commissioner’s decisions.

There has been an Ethics Counsellor since 1994 and a Commissioner since 2004.

It is the Commissioner who decides whether there is a real or potential conflict of interest.

Administrators

You hold the two most senior positions with the public service and the PMO and therefore have command of both.

All matters destined for the PM are ultimately reviewed by at least one of you considering your positions.

• As Clerk, all material from the public service destined for the PMO or the PM should come through you and/or your office.
• As the PM’s COS, all materials from MINOs and the PMO destined for the PM should come through you and/or your office.

You have a macro level perspective on all government priorities, planning, initiatives and issues and therefore the ability to flag matters that may require the application of the PM’s Screen.

In your absence, your Deputy Clerks and Deputy Chief of Staff should be briefed and can liaise with PCO Governance.

You are jointly responsible to ensure that reasonable processes are put in place to consider whether the Screen applies.

Based on the information provided to you, you decide whether the Screen applies.

Your decision can be reviewed by the Commissioner, if necessary.

Although the PM’s Screen is somewhat unique given its scope, the government, and in particular PCO, has extensive experience providing guidance and in assisting Minister’s and their office with the administration of their Screens. The PM’s Screen is not a new occurrence. There are multiple Ministers with active Screens in place.

Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet - Governance

As Deputy Secretary, Mala Khanna, is responsible for the day to day management of the Screen.

She is responsible to:

• Develop and implement measures allowing for the determination as to whether the Screen applies.
• Make a recommendation, based on information and evidence, as to whether the Screen applies.
• Provide support to PCO, PMO and departments and agencies in their consideration as to whether the Screen applies.
• Engage with the Commissioner, as may be required.
• Ensure a strong documentary record.

Deputy heads

Deputy Heads are responsible to ensure that reasonable processes are put in place within their respective departments and agencies to consider whether the Screen applies.

Primer on the Conflict of Interest Act

Outline

1. The Conflict of Interest Act (Act)
2. How does the screen relate to the Act
3. What is a conflict of interest?
4. The rules
5. The compliance measures
6. Administration and enforcement

1. The Conflict of Interest Act (Act)

The Act is a unique statutory scheme in a highly political context. In the Act, Parliament has entrusted the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (Commissioner), as an Officer of Parliament, with examining whether public office holders have contravened the conflict of interest rules and reporting back to the Prime Minister, parliamentarians, and the public.

The Act plays an important role in fostering accountability and trust in Canada’s democratic institutions. The Commissioner is an independent Officer of Parliament who is mandated to determine the measures necessary to avoid conflicts of interest and examine alleged contraventions of the COIA’s substantive ethical obligations.

History

The Act was introduced in 2006 as part of the Federal Accountability Act to increase public trust in government.

The Act was enacted after multiple attempts from the 1970s to the 1990s to introduce ethics legislation in Parliament.

From 1994, there was an Ethics Counsellor with a primarily advisory role in relation to the ethics guidelines for Cabinet ministers of the time and the Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders (Public Office Holder Code).

In 2004, the Commissioner replaced the Ethics Counsellor and was tasked with administering both the Public Office Holder Code and a then newly-created Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (MP Code).

With the coming into force of the Federal Accountability Act in 2007, the Commissioner’s role expanded to include both the MP Code and the Act’s provisions for public office holders. Although the Act was built upon existing ethical rules and principles espoused in the Public Office Holder Code, the enactment of the Act created, for the first time, a statutory regime governing the ethical conduct of public office holders.

Key definitions

• Private interest does not include an interest in a decision or matter that is of general application or that affects a public office holder as one of a broad class of persons.
• Public Officer Holder means (a) a minister of the Crown, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, (d) certain Governor-in-Council appointees….
• Reporting Public Office Holder means a public officer holder who is (a) a minister of the Crown, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, (c and d) certain Governor-in-Council appointees….

The Act has four parts

• Part 1 sets out the conflict of interest rules.
• Part 2 sets out the compliance measures.
• Part 3 sets out post-employment obligations.
• Part 4 sets out administration and enforcement measures.

2. How does the screen relate to the Act

Section 29 of the Act grants the Commissioner the authority to determine the appropriate measures by which public office holder shall comply with the Act and to try to achieve agreement with the public office holder.

The Commissioner and the PM made a Public Declaration of Agreed Compliance Measures.

The Screen is part of the Agreed Compliance Measures.

The Commissioner determined that the Screen was an appropriate preventive compliance measure.

The Screen furthers the purposes of the Act as outlined in section 3:

• (b) minimize the possibility of conflicts arising between the private interests and public duties of public office holders and provide for the resolution of those conflicts in the public interest should they arise
• (c) provide the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner with the mandate to determine the measures necessary to avoid conflicts of interest and to determine whether a contravention of this Act has occurred

The Screen helps preserve public confidence in decision-making by public office holders and promotes transparency.

3. What is a conflict of interest? (section 4)

The concept of conflict of interest is at the heart of the regime.

Section 4 of the Conflict of Interest Act defines a conflict of interest as follows:

• For the purposes of this Act, a public office holder is in a conflict of interest when he or she exercises an official power, duty or function that provides an opportunity to further his or her private interests or those of his or her relatives or friends or to improperly further another person’s private interests.

The definition of conflict of interest in section 4 includes real and potential conflicts of interest. It does not include apparent conflicts of interest.

4. The rules (sections 6 to 19)

Section 5 requires every public office holder to arrange his or her private affairs to prevent them from being in a conflict of interest.

Sections 6 to 19 set out the governing rules. The rules relate to decision-making, abstention from voting, preferential treatment, insider information, influence, outside employment, gifts, travel, contracting, prohibited activities, fundraising, divestiture of controlled assets and employment.

Of these, the following sections are of particular significance to the PM’s Screen:

• Section 6(1) – (decision-making) - No public office holder shall make a decision or participate in making a decision related to the exercise of an official power, duty or function if the public office holder knows or reasonably should know that, in the making of the decision, he or she would be in a conflict of interest.
• Section 6(2) – (Voting) - No minister of the Crown, minister of state or parliamentary secretary shall, in his or her capacity as a member of the Senate or the House of Commons, debate or vote on a question that would place him or her in a conflict of interest.
• Section 7 – (preferential treatment) - No public office holder shall, in the exercise of an official power, duty or function, give preferential treatment to any person or organization based on the identity of the person or organization that represents the first-mentioned person or organization.
• Section 8 – (insider information) - No public office holder shall use information that is obtained in his or her position as a public office holder and that is not available to the public to further or seek to further the public office holder’s private interests or those of the public office holder’s relatives or friends or to improperly further or to seek to improperly further another person’s private interests.
• Section 9 – (influence) - No public office holder shall use his or her position as a public office holder to seek to influence a decision of another person so as to further the public office holder’s private interests or those of the public office holder’s relatives or friends or to improperly further another person’s private interests.
• Section 19 expressly stated that compliance with the Act is a condition of a person’s appointment or employment as a public office holder.

5. The compliance measures

Section 21 requires a public office holder to recuse themselves from any discussion, decision, debate or vote on any matter in respect of which they are in a conflict of interest.

Section 25 states that where a reporting public office holder has recused themselves to avoid a conflict of interest, the reporting public office holder shall, within 60 days after the day on which the recusal took place, make a public declaration of the recusal that provides sufficient detail to identify the conflict of interest that was avoided.

Section 27 requires a reporting public office holder to divest themselves of controlled assets within 120 days after appointment and sets out the requirement for blind trusts.

Section 29 grants the Commissioner the authority to determine the appropriate measures by which public office holder shall comply with the Act and to try to achieve agreement with the public office holder.

Section 30 states that the Commissioner may order a public office holder, in respect of any matter, to take any compliance measure, including divestment or recusal, that the Commissioner determines is necessary to comply with this Act.

6. Administration and enforcement

a. Administration

• The Commissioner can provide confidential advice to public office holders with respect to their obligations under the Act.
• The Commissioner can conduct an examination where a request has been received that a public office holder have contravened the Act, or on his own initiative.
• The Commissioner shall maintain a public registry.

b. Enforcement

• Every public office holder who contravenes certain provisions between subsection 22(1) and 27(7) of the Act commits a violation and is liable to an administrative monetary penalty not exceeding $500.

Assessment tool on the application of the Prime Minister’s conflict of interest screen

This Assessment Tool provides a framework and template to assist analysts in PCO and in departments to assess whether a particular discussion with the Prime Minister, or decision-making by the Prime Minister, should trigger the Prime Minister’s Conflict of Interest screen. The analysis would result in a recommendation to apply or not the screen and would be shared with the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, as administrators of the screen. Finally, it sets out responsibilities of PCO officials.

1. The framework to be used

A. The screen

For ease of reference, the relevant sections of the Prime Minister’s screen are the following:

• The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and I have agreed that a conflict of interest screen is an appropriate compliance measure, aimed at preventing any opportunity to further my interests or to improperly further those of Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, and Stripe Inc., and any company owned or controlled by them (“the Companies”) of which I am aware on the date that my blind trust was established. Annex A is a list of all of the Companies of which I am aware.
• This screen will prevent me from giving preferential treatment to any of the Companies while I exercise my official powers, duties, and functions as a reporting public office holder.
• This screen is administered by my Chief of Staff and by the Clerk of the Privy Council to ensure that I am neither made aware of nor participate in any official matters or decision-making processes involving the Companies’ interests. I may, however, participate in a discussion or decision on a matter that is of general application or that affects the Companies’ interests as a member of a broad class of persons unless those interests are disproportionate to the other members of the class. (Emphasis added).

B. How to conduct the analysis

To conduct the analysis, contextual information related to the companies that are subject to the screen and the sectors of the Canadian economy that warrant specific attention is set out below. This is followed by a list of questions to guide the analysis as to whether the screen should be applied.

(i) Part A: Matters that must be included in the screen

Any direct engagement by Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, or Stripe Inc and the companies listed in Annex A of the Prime Minister’s Conflict of Interest Screen. (collectively, “the Companies”), or any person or entity acting on their behalf, with the Government of Canada (e.g., contracting for goods and services, applications for funding) will routinely and automatically be included in the screen and not discussed with or provided to the public office holder. The screen will also apply to: (i) meetings with known subsidiaries of the Companies; (ii) decisions regarding a financial grant or contribution to known subsidiaries of the Companies; and (iii) contracts with known subsidiaries of the Companies.

(ii) Part B: Matters requiring assessment

The private interests of the Companies captured by the Prime Minister’s Conflict of Interest screen are largely concentrated in a small number of sectors. If the Prime Minister, or Cabinet, are required to discuss or exercise decision-making in such areas, whether it be in relation to the creation/revision of government policies or new Government of Canada initiatives, an assessment is required, on a case-by-case basis.

Conversely, such an assessment is not required if decisions are taken solely under the authority of a given Minister, and not discussed at Cabinet (e.g., decisions on partnering on specific projects or entering into targeted grants and contributions agreements).

The sectors that warrant specific attention are:

• Real estate: policy/spending discussions and decisions impacting real estate or infrastructure projects owned by one or more of the Companies as a proposed contractual counterparty to the Government of Canada or recipient of a grant or contribution from the Government of Canada.
• Mortgage insurance: policy/spending discussions and decisions related to the mortgage insurance industry, including issues such as the dollar amount cap of mortgages for which banks are able to secure insurance. Particular attention should be paid to potential implications for Sagen MI.
• The airline industry: policy/spending discussions and decisions related to issues such as investments in airlines/aviation; airline ownership rules/industry consolidation as well as fare pricing.
• Expansion of the nuclear industry: policy/spending discussions and decisions related to measures to grow the nuclear sector including investments in nuclear capacity. Particular attention should be paid to potential implications for Westinghouse Corporation. 
• Expansion/investment in the renewable energy sector (Solar / Wind / Hydro): policy/spending discussions and decisions related to extending / expanding renewable tax credits in this area (particularly any “bespoke” renewable tax credits) as well as large-scale investments in the renewable energy infrastructure given the number of companies covered by the screen that operate in this sector.
• Credit card industry: policy discussions/investment decisions related to interchange fees or credit card-related merchant fees or policy decisions directly impacting the payments sector. Particular attention should be paid to potential implications for Stripe Inc. 

Changes to tax policy are generally understood to be of a general application and/or benefitting a class of persons. The majority of potential tax changes are not expected to be the subject to the screen unless they benefit a class of persons and there is a disproportionate benefit to the Companies.

(iii) Conducting the analysis

The following questions guide the analysis required, which must be documented in the template developed for this purpose.

Threshold question

1. What is the Prime Minister’s involvement / What decision is being sought from the Prime Minister / What matter is he being asked to discuss or engage on?

The Prime Minister must himself be engaged or the matter will be brought to a forum that includes the Prime Minister himself. A detailed description of the Prime Minister’s involvement and the matter/issue in question is necessary, as it lays the groundwork for the full analysis.

Part A: Matters that must be included in the screen

2. Does the decision or discussion involve direct engagement between Brookfield Asset Management, Brookfield Corporation, Stripe Inc. or any of the Companies listed in Annex A and the Government of Canada (e.g. contracting for goods and services, applications for funding, meetings)?

If the answer is yes, this kind of direct engagement automatically triggers the application of the screen. No further analysis is required.

If the answer is no, proceed to Part B.

Part B: Matters requiring assessment

3. Are the interests of one of the Companies involved in the decision or discussion, and if so, in what way?

The interests of one of the Companies should be directly engaged (e.g., policy / spending / investment decisions or discussions relate to a Company and one of the six sectors; financial benefits would flow from a decision that creates new market opportunities).

If the answer is no, meaning that the interests of the Companies are not involved, the screen does not need to be triggered, and no further analysis is required.

If the answer is yes, meaning that the interests of at least one of the Companies is involved, proceed to the next question.

4. Is the decision or discussion in relation to a matter of general application?

If the answer is yes, meaning that the matter is of general application, the screen does not need to be triggered, and no further analysis is required.  

If the answer is no, meaning that the matter is not of general application, proceed to the next question.

5. Does the decision or discussion involve the interests of at least one of the Companies as a member of a broad class of persons or entities?

If the answer is yes, meaning that the matter applies to a broad class, the screen may not need to be triggered unless there is a disproportionate interest or benefit to one of the Companies. Proceed to the next question.

If the answer is no, meaning that the matter does not apply to a broad class, proceed to question #7.

6. If the decision or discussion applies to a broad class, is the interest / benefit of at least one of the Companies disproportionate to those of the other members?

If the answer is no, meaning that the interest is not disproportionate as compared to others, then the screen does not need to be triggered and no further analysis is required.

If the answer is yes, meaning that the interest is disproportionate as compared to others, then proceed to question #7.

7. If the decision or discussion is (1) not of general application and does not apply to a broad class or (2) there is a disproportionate interest / benefit despite being applicable to a broad class, is there a direct link between the Prime Minister’s involvement and the opportunity to further one of the Company’s interests?

If the answer is yes, this kind of direct engagement automatically triggers the application of the screen. The screen should be triggered if the Prime Minister knows, or reasonably should know at the time the decision is made, that it will create an opportunity to further the Companies’ interests.

If the answer is no, meaning that there is no direct link, then the matter is too remote and the screen does not need to be triggered and no further analysis is required.

Examples to assist with the assessment required under Part B of the Screen.

General application: To help answer questions of whether a decision or discussion is one of general application.

• If the decision or discussion applies to an undetermined group of people or companies, then the matter is of general application.
• If the decision or discussion applies to a regulated activity and to an identifiable group, then the matter is not of general application.
• If the decision or discussion applies to a particular entity, person or group of entities or persons, or to a particular situation then the matter is not of general application.

Broad class: To help answer questions of whether a decision or discussion applies to a broad class.

• If the decision or discussion applies to a larger number of entities or people, who may have different characteristics, but share at least one important characteristic, such as teachers, homeowners, lawyers, financial services companies, etc., then the matter applies to a broad class.
• If the decision or discussion applies to a small group, then the matter does not apply to a broad class.
• If the decision or discussion applies to a larger group, but one of the Companies has a disproportionate interest /benefit (*), then the matter does not apply to a broad class. A disproportionate interest /benefit refers to an imbalance in proportion to others.
• An example: The mortgage insurance sector in Canada is comprised of two main players, one of which is subject to the Prime Minister’s conflict of interest screen (Sagen Mortgage Insurance Company of Canada). As it is not possible to conclude that a matter involving mortgage insurance relates to a broad class of persons, such matters will trigger the Prime Minister’s conflict of interest screen, in accordance with the Clerk’s decision as administrator of the screen.

2. Template

The Template on the following page must be used to record the outcome of the analysis.

[Classification]

[Title]

Overview (max. one paragraph)

• Summary of the issue (one sentence).
• Identify the position – whether the screen applies (one sentence).
• Why does the screen apply (one sentence).

Analysis (max. 2 pages)

Demonstrate how the issue relates to the screen relying upon the analytical framework

• Explain the Prime Minister’s involvement?
• Does the decision or discussion involve direct engagement between any of the Companies listed in Annex A and the Government of Canada?
• Are the interests of one of the Companies involved in the decision or discussion, and if so, in what way?
• Is the decision or discussion in relation to a matter of general application?
• Does the decision or discussion involve the interests of at least one of the Companies as a member of a broad class of persons or entities?
• If the decision or discussion applies to a broad class, is the interest / benefit of at least one of the Companies disproportionate to those of the other members?
• If the decision or discussion is (1) not of general application and does not apply to a broad class or (2) there is a disproportionate interest / benefit despite being applicable to a broad class, is there a direct link between the Prime Minister’s involvement and the opportunity to further one of the Company’s interests?

Decision

Do you concur that this issue [engages/does not engage] the application of the Prime Minister’s conflict of interest screen?

Your decision is sought by Click or tap to enter a date.

For positive recommendations, we have applied the screen on a precautionary basis, pending decision.

3. Responsibilities of PCO officials

A. Part A – Matters that must be included in the screen

Deputy Secretaries at PCO identify files for which the screen likely automatically applies and initiates the following steps:

• Alerts the Deputy Secretary Governance (screen-filtre@pco-bcp.gc.ca) who proactively, if necessary, engages the Deputy Secretary Operations to ensure that Cabinet documents and other related materials are not inadvertently shared with the Prime Minister pending formal implementation of the screen.
• The Deputy Secretary Governance engages the screen administrators.
• The responsible Deputy Secretary works with screen administrators through the Deputy Secretary Governance to direct the matter to the alternate decision-maker, if necessary (see “Alternate Decision-Maker” section below).

B. Part B – Matters requiring assessment

If the file falls into one of the sectors, the responsible Deputy Secretary must assess, with departmental experts and legal advice as needed, whether the activation of the Screen may be warranted using the framework and template.

The Deputy Secretary must present their recommendation as to whether the screen applies and rationale to the Deputy Secretary Governance, for discussion with the screen administrators for final validation. The Deputy Secretary Governance may consult the Commissioner on the screen administrators’ behalf, taking care not to reveal Cabinet Confidences. The screen may be applied on a precautionary basis, pending the administrators decision. If the screen administrators agree, the screen must be applied.

The responsible Deputy Secretary will ensure that all work products related to the file are marked with appropriate designation to identify that the screen is being implemented. They will then inform the Deputy Secretary Operations to ensure any Cabinet documents are also marked accordingly.

The responsible Deputy Secretary works with screen administrators through the Deputy Secretary Governance to direct the matter to the alternate decision-maker, if necessary (see “Alternate Decision-Maker” section below).

C. Determining alternate approval

Where the screen is applied to a matter requiring the Prime Minister’s sole approval, the matter will be referred to another minister using the Acting Ministers’ Minute.

Where the screen is applied to a matter for discussion/decision by Cabinet, the Acting Ministers’ Minute will apply. For a Cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister, the Vice-Chair will assume the role of Chair for any matters covered by the screen. In the event of the vice-chair’s absence, the chair role is determined using the Acting Ministers’ Minute. Recusal under the Conflict of Interest Act requires the Prime Minister to remove himself physically or virtually from the meeting or discussion where the matter is being decided, lest his mere presence be seen to influence the decision of other public office holders.

Committee logistics

Layout of the room

Background on committee

Summary

Committees are parliamentary bodies made up of members of Parliament. They address issues referred to them by the House or those within their mandate. There are standing, legislative, special, and joint committees.

They are mandated to review laws, departmental operations, expenditures, and policies, and undertake studies within the scope of their specific mandate. The House frequently refers matters like bills, reports, estimates, and order-in-council appointments to committees.

Their membership reflects party standings in the House. Committee members can question witnesses and vote. Chairs, elected by the members, preside. Committees are supported by clerks, who provide procedural advice and organize meetings, and analysts, who prepare documents, notes, and reports. Witnesses appearing before committees present their views and answer questions.

Committees organize their work independently and present their findings and recommendations to the House in reports. These reports may request a government response and may include supplementary or dissenting opinions.

Introduction

A committee is a body made up of members of Parliament, or members and senators in the case of joint committees, selected to consider any issue referred to them by the House or related to their mandate. There are different types of committees: standing, legislative, special and joint. Most are standing committees.

Standing committees are established by the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. They are called “standing” because they are automatically renewed at the start of each parliamentary session.

The Standing Orders establish 25 standing committees and two standing joint committees and provide their mandates.

Committee mandates

Most standing committees are mandated to oversee one or more government departments and are charged with the review of the statute law referred to them by the House, departmental operations and expenditures and the effectiveness of departments’ policies and programs.

Committees are free to initiate any study related to their mandate. The House can also ask them to consider matters through orders of reference.

The House almost systematically refers the following matters to standing committees:

• bills;
• issues requiring in-depth consideration;
• reports and other documents tabled in the House pursuant to a statute;
• estimates, which include the funds requested for government programs and activities;
• non-judicial government appointments; and
• the failure of the government to respond to petitions and to questions on the Order Paper within a given time frame.

Committee membership, leadership and staff

The number of members of standing committees is established in the Standing Orders. However, motions can be adopted to amend the Standing Orders with regard to committee membership for the duration of a Parliament. Party representation on committees reflects the standings of recognized parties in the House. A committee’s members are listed on the home page of its website.

Hierarchical diagram of standing committees’ membership roles.

Various key players help carry out committee work. They include:

• Committee members - They are entitled to question witnesses, move motions, vote and be part of quorum.
• Substitute members - They can replace permanent members in one or more meetings and have the same rights as the members they are replacing.
• Members who are not committee members - Any member can attend a public committee meeting and participate in its proceedings at the discretion of the committee, but cannot move motions, vote or be part of quorum.
• Associate members - They can act as substitutes and be named to subcommittees.
• Chairs - They are elected by the members of the committee and chosen from among the government members of the committee with the exception of four standing committees and one standing joint committee where the chairs are chosen from the official opposition. The chair serves as the presiding officer of the committee and the spokesperson through whom all matters are channelled.
• Vice-chairs - They are two per committee and they are elected by the members. The first vice-chair is chosen from the official opposition members of the committee, and the second vice-chair from an opposition party other than the official opposition, except for the five committees chaired by the official opposition. A vice-chair presides over meetings when the chair is absent.
• Committee Clerks - They are non-partisan and independent officers of committees who provide procedural advice and organize committee meetings. They perform their duties and responsibilities under the direction of the committee and its Chair.
• Analysts - They are specialists in the subject area considered by the committee; their work includes preparing background documents, briefing notes and draft reports.
• Witnesses - They are interested groups and experts who provide an opportunity for members of the committee to hear different views on any matter the committee might be considering.

Organization of business

Committees have a lot of latitude in how they organize their work. They determine their schedules based on the orders of the House and their members’ interests. A committee can study a number of questions at the same time.

For each study, committees can decide how much time they will spend hearing witnesses, how many witnesses they wish to hear from, and which witnesses will appear before them. Committees can also decide to request briefs from groups and individuals who may be unable to appear as witnesses in person or by videoconference.

Before a committee can begin its work, the members of the committee must elect a chair. This occurs at the first meeting of the committee, which is referred to as the “organization meeting.” During this meeting, the committee often elects the vice-chairs and establishes its own rules of procedure for the duration of a session of Parliament.

Here is the usual order of business for a committee study leading to a report:

Physical setting, types and conduct of meetings

Meetings are usually held in one of the designated committee rooms that are located throughout the parliamentary buildings. These rooms are specially outfitted with electronic equipment for the recording, broadcasting and simultaneous interpretation of the proceedings, as well as remote participation.

Here is an example of a typical committee room setup:

Every meeting:

• the chair calls a meeting to order once quorum (the minimum number of members required) is present;
• if there are witnesses, they will make introductory remarks, which are then followed by rounds of questioning from the members of the committee; and
• members can also discuss other matters.

Most meetings are held in public; however, committees can sit in camera (in private) and usually do so when studying draft reports or discussing future business.

Members may participate in committee meetings either in person or remotely, as long as they are within Canada. They all count toward quorum. Only the member chairing the meeting is required to participate in person.

From time to time, committees travel outside the Parliamentary Precinct to hear evidence, hold consultations or visit locations in connection with their studies. To hold such meetings, committees must obtain the authorization of the House and the approval of the Liaison Committee, which releases the necessary funds. Members must participate in meetings in person when committees are travelling.

Reporting of activities and deliberations

Notice of meeting

The members and the public are informed of the Chair’s intention to convene a meeting by means of a notice. A notice is sent via email to every member of the committee as well as the member’s staff. The notice is also published on the Internet on the committee’s website. The notice outlines the purpose, location and time of the meeting, as well as the witnesses (if any) and the informal agenda.

Broadcast of committee proceedings

All committee meetings, except those held in camera, are broadcast live over the Internet in both official languages on ParlVu, the House of Commons' webcast service. Televised meetings are also broadcast on the Cable Public Affairs Channel (CPAC) and on the internal House of Commons television channels.

Evidence

Shortly after a meeting has been held, the unofficial transcripts (commonly known as the “blues”) are available for committee members and staff. These unedited transcripts are prepared in the language that was spoken by the participants at the meeting. The official transcripts (translated and edited) are published as soon as possible after the meeting as the Evidence on the committee’s website, usually within 10 calendar days.

Minutes of Proceedings

The Minutes of Proceedings are the official record of business that occurred during a meeting of the committee. The committee clerk prepares the Minutes and publishes them online as soon as possible after a meeting.

Reports

Presenting a report to the House is the way a committee makes public its findings and recommendations on a particular topic. Reports are also available online.

The committee can ask the government to respond to its recommendations within 120 calendar days after the presentation of the report. In addition, pursuant to the Standing Orders, dissenting or supplementary opinions (i.e., a brief text providing additional comment) may be attached to subject-matter reports.

Websites and social media

Committees share information on their website and on X. Check in regularly on ourcommons.ca and follow them @ HoCCommittees.

For more information

• House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, 2017
  • Chapter 20, Committees
• Standing Orders of the House of Commons
  • Chapter XIII, Committees
• Guide for Witnesses Appearing before House of Commons Committees, Committees Directorate
• Guide for Submitting Briefs to House of Commons Committees, Committees Directorate
• Committees Website

For questions about parliamentary procedure, contact the Table Research Branch:

• 613-996-3611
• trbdrb@parl.gc.ca

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How the meeting will unfold

Mandate of the Committee

The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics studies and reports on matters referred to it by the House of Commons, or on topics the Committee itself chooses to examine under its mandate. It is a permanent committee established by the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. Bills, departmental activities and spending, and other matters related to the general subject matter of the Committee may be referred to it.

Under Standing Order 108(3)(h), the Committee’s mandate is to study matters related to reports of:

• the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada
• the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
• the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada
• the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner pursuant to the Conflict of Interest Act

Committee operating procedures

Witness’ opening statements: 5 minutes

Questions Round 1

1. Conservative: 6 minutes
2. Liberal: 6 minutes
3. Bloc Québécois: 6 minutes

Questions Round 2 (and subsequent rounds)

1. Conservative: 5 minutes
2. Liberal: 5 minutes
3. Bloc Québécois: 2.5 minutes
4. Conservative: 5 minutes
5. Liberal: 5 minutes

Anticipated TBS-Related Activity – 45th Parliament

• Access to Information and Privacy Acts
• Ethical standards relating to public office holders

Committee bios

Committee members

Bio of the members of the committee

Chair

John Brassard (Barrie South - Innisfil, ON) - Conservative

1st Vice-chair

Linda Lapointe (Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC) - Liberal

2nd Vice-chair

Luc Thériault (Montcalm, QC) - Bloc Québécois

Members

Michael Barrett (Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON) Conservative

Michael Cooper (St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB) - Conservative

Gabriel Hardy (Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC) - Conservative

Leslie Church (Toronto—St. Paul's, ON) - Liberal

Gurbux Saini (Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC) - Liberal

Abdelhaq Sari (Bourassa, QC) - Liberal

Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics – Debate Structure - 45th Parliament