Sabiá virus: Infectious substances pathogen safety data sheet

Section I – Infectious agent

Name

Sabiá virus

Agent type

Virus

Taxonomy

Family

Arenaviridae  

Genus

Mammarenavirus

Species

Mammarenavirus brazilense

Synonym or cross-reference

Sabiá virus; Brazilian mammarenavirus; SABV; SPH 114202 virus; Brazilian hemorrhagic fever; São Paulo hemorrhagic fever.^{Footnote 1Footnote 2Footnote 3}

Characteristics

Brief description

Sabiá mammarenavirus belongs to Clade B of the New World mammarenaviruses, also known as the “Tacaribe serocomplex”^Footnote 3. SABV is an enveloped, pleomorphic, negative sense, single-stranded RNA virus^Footnote 3. The genome of SABV is bi-segmented and consists of two linear RNA segments approximately 7.1 and 3.4 kilobases in length, respectively^Footnote 4. Virions measure 50-200 nm in diameter^Footnote 3.

Properties

The SABV genome encodes four proteins: nucleoprotein (N), glycoprotein precursor (GPC), RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (L), and zinc-binding protein (Z)^Footnote 5. Mammarenaviruses use an ambisense coding strategy whereby mRNA for the N and L proteins are transcribed from genomic RNA and mRNA for the GPC and Z proteins are transcribed from anti-genomic RNA^Footnote 6. Virus replication occurs in the cytoplasm of host cells^Footnote 6. Mature virions are released via budding from the plasma membrane^Footnote 6. Transferrin receptor 1 is the host cell receptor for virus entry^Footnote 7.

Section II – Hazard identification

Pathogenicity and toxicity

SABV is the causative agent of Brazilian hemorrhagic fever^Footnote 2. Disease begins with gradual onset of influenza-like illness. Symptoms include fever, malaise, myalgia, sore throat, cough, and headache with gastrointestinal involvement (e.g., epigastric pain, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea) in some cases^{Footnote 1Footnote 8Footnote 9Footnote 10Footnote 11}. After about 1 to 2 weeks, hemorrhagic (e.g., bleeding gums, hematemesis, conjunctivitis, shock) and/or neurological (e.g., drowsiness, tremors, tonic-clonic seizures, difficulty walking) manifestations may develop^{Footnote 1Footnote 2Footnote 10Footnote 11}. Three of the five reported cases of Brazilian hemorrhagic fever have been fatal^{Footnote 10Footnote 12}. Death occurred within 2 to 3 weeks of symptom onset^{Footnote 1Footnote 10Footnote 12}.

Epidemiology

Five cases of Brazilian hemorrhagic fever have been reported to date^{Footnote 10Footnote 12}. Three cases were naturally acquired and occurred in São Paulo, Brazil in 1990, 1999, and 2020, respectively^{Footnote 1Footnote 10Footnote 12}. The remaining two cases occurred in a laboratory setting in 1992 and 1994^{Footnote 9Footnote 13}.

Host range

Natural host(s)

Humans are accidental hosts. The primary host in nature is unknown; however, rodents are a suspected host^Footnote 8.

Other host(s)

None.

Infectious dose

Unknown.

Incubation period

7 to 14 days^{Footnote 8Footnote 9}.

Communicability

The primary route of infection with SABV remains unclear, but is thought to be inhalation of aerosolized infectious particles^{Footnote 1Footnote 8Footnote 9Footnote 12}. Excreta and secreta of infected rodents are the suspected source of infectious aerosols in naturally acquired cases^{Footnote 8Footnote 12}. Person-to-person transmission of SABV is presumably possible (i.e., via direct contact with body fluids or aerosols from infected individuals) but has not been demonstrated to date^Footnote 9.

Section III – Dissemination

Reservoir

The natural reservoir host has not been identified but is likely a rodent, based on evidence that many other New World mammarenaviruses are maintained in rodent reservoirs^Footnote 8. To date, humans are the only species from which SABV has been isolated in nature^{Footnote 12Footnote 14}.

Zoonosis

Human infection is thought to occur through direct contact with infected rodents or their excreta and secreta^Footnote 15.

Vectors

None.

Section IV – Stability and viability

Drug susceptibility/resistance

Ribavirin has shown efficacy in treating human SABV infections^Footnote 9. ST-193, a benzimidazole derivative, showed in vitro activity against viral entry^Footnote 16.

Susceptibility to disinfectants

Enveloped viruses are readily inactivated by most detergents and disinfectants, such as 2% glutaraldehyde, 1% sodium hypochlorite, 70% ethanol, and quaternary ammonium compounds^{Footnote 17Footnote 18Footnote 19}.

Physical inactivation

Mammarenaviruses are inactivated by heat (60°C for 1 hour), pH below 5.5 or above 8.5, and exposure to UV and/or gamma irradiation^{Footnote 8Footnote 20Footnote 21}.

Survival outside host

Survival of SABV outside the host is unknown. Infectious virus shed in the excreta and secreta of infected rodent hosts is a known source of environmental contamination by mammarenaviruses^Footnote 22.

Section V – First aid/medical

Surveillance

SABV can be identified by isolation and culture of the virus from blood of infected individuals^{Footnote 1Footnote 9}. Viral RNA can be detected by reverse transcription PCR and viral antigen can be detected by indirect immunofluorescence assay or enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)^{Footnote 1Footnote 9Footnote 23}. Antibodies against SABV in patient serum can be detected by ELISA, virus neutralization assay, complement fixation assay, and indirect immunofluorescence assay^{Footnote 1Footnote 9Footnote 14Footnote 24}.

Note: The specific recommendations for surveillance in the laboratory should come from the medical surveillance program, which is based on a local risk assessment of the pathogens and activities being undertaken, as well as an overarching risk assessment of the biosafety program as a whole. More information on medical surveillance is available in the Canadian Biosafety Handbook (CBH).

First aid/treatment

Supportive treatment to manage dehydration and bleeding symptoms^Footnote 1. Intravenous ribavirin is effective in treating SABV infection when administered early in the course of illness^Footnote 9.

Note: The specific recommendations for first aid/treatment in the laboratory should come from the post-exposure response plan, which is developed as part of the medical surveillance program. More information on the post-exposure response plan can be found in the CBH.

Immunization

No vaccine is available.

Note: More information on the medical surveillance program can be found in the CBH, and by consulting the Canadian Immunization Guide.

Prophylaxis

Post-exposure prophylaxis with ribavirin may reduce the severity of disease^{Footnote 9Footnote 25}.

Note: More information on prophylaxis as part of the medical surveillance program can be found in the CBH.

Section VI – Laboratory hazard

Laboratory-acquired infections

Two laboratory-acquired infections have been documented^{Footnote 1Footnote 9Footnote 13}. In 1992, a laboratory technician developed influenza-like illness following exposure to SABV^{Footnote 1Footnote 13}. Infection likely occurred via the aerosol route and seroconversion was demonstrated. The patient was treated with intravenous fluids and recovered. In 1994, a researcher working in a university-hospital laboratory was exposed to SABV infectious aerosols following leakage of virus-infected cell culture fluid during high-speed centrifugation, which led to a confirmed infection^Footnote 9. The patient was treated early in the course of illness with ribavirin and recovered.

Note: Please consult the Canadian Biosafety Standard (CBS) and CBH for additional details on requirements for reporting exposure incidents. A Canadian biosafety guideline describing notification and reporting procedures is also available.

Sources/specimens

Blood, necropsy tissues, throat washings, and urine^{Footnote 1Footnote 8}.

Primary hazards

The primary exposure hazard is inhalation of airborne or aerosolized infectious material^Footnote 9. Direct contact of virus with damaged skin or mucosa also poses a risk of infection^Footnote 22.

Special hazards

None.

Section VII – Exposure controls/personal protection

Risk group classification

SABV is a Risk Group 4 human pathogen and a Risk Group 4 animal pathogen^{Footnote 26Footnote 27}. It is also included on the Security Sensitive Biological Agents (SSBA) List^Footnote 27.

Containment requirements

Containment Level 4 facilities, equipment, and operational practices outlined in the CBS are required for work involving infectious or potentially infectious materials, animals, or cultures.

Note: There are additional security requirements, such as obtaining a Human Pathogens and Toxins Act Security Clearance, for work involving SSBAs.

Protective clothing

The applicable Containment Level 4 requirements for personal protective equipment and clothing outlined in the CBS to be followed. The use of a positive-pressure suit or use of a Class III biological safety cabinet (BSC) line is required for all work with RG4 pathogens.

Note: A local risk assessment will identify the appropriate hand, foot, head, body, eye/face, and respiratory protection, and the personal protective equipment requirements for the containment zone must be documented.  

Other precautions

All activities involving open vessels of regulated materials are to be performed in a certified biological safety cabinet (BSC) or other appropriate primary containment device. Centrifugation of infected materials must be carried out in closed containers placed in sealed safety cups, or in rotors that are unloaded in a biological safety cabinet. The integrity of positive pressure suits must be routinely checked for leaks. The use of needles, syringes, and other sharp objects to be strictly limited. Open wounds, cuts, scratches, and grazes are to be covered with waterproof dressings. Additional precautions must be considered with work involving animal activities.

Section VIII – Handling and storage

Spills

The spill area to be evacuated and secured. Aerosols must be allowed to settle for a minimum of 30 minutes. Spills of potentially contaminated material to be covered with absorbent paper-based material (e.g., paper towels), liberally covered with an effective disinfectant (e.g., 1% sodium hypochlorite), and left to soak for an appropriate amount of time (e.g., 10 minutes) before being wiped up. Following the removal of the initial material, the disinfection process is to be repeated (CBH). Individuals performing this task without a positive pressure suit, must wear PPE including particulate respirators (e.g., N95 or higher). Disposable gloves, impermeable gowns and protective eye wear are to be removed immediately after completion of the process, placed in an autoclave bag, and decontaminated prior to disposal (CBH).

Disposal

All materials/substances that have come in contact with the regulated materials must be completely decontaminated before they are removed from the containment zone. This can be achieved by using decontamination technologies and processes that have been demonstrated to be effective against the regulated materials, such as chemical disinfectants, autoclaving, irradiation, incineration, an effluent treatment system, or gaseous decontamination (CBH).

Storage

Containment Level 4: The applicable Containment Level 4 requirements for storage outlined in the CBS are to be followed. Pathogens, toxins, and other regulated materials to be stored inside the containment zone.

Inventory of Risk Group 4 (RG4) pathogens in long-term storage to be maintained and to include:

• specific identification of the pathogens, toxins, and other regulated materials
• a means to allow for the detection of a missing or stolen sample in a timely manner

Section IX – Regulatory and other information

Canadian regulatory information

Controlled activities with SABV require a Human Pathogens and Toxins licence , issued by the Public Health Agency of Canada^Footnote 27. SABV is a non-indigenous animal pathogen in Canada; therefore, its importation requires an import permit, issued by the CFIA^Footnote 28.

Note: that there are additional security requirements, such as obtaining a Human Pathogens and Toxins Act Security Clearance, for work involving SSBAs.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of applicable designations, regulation, or legislation:

• Human Pathogen and Toxins Act and Human Pathogens and Toxins Regulations
• Health of Animals Act and Health of Animals Regulations
• Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations

Last file update

2020

Prepared by

Centre for Biosecurity, Public Health Agency of Canada.

Disclaimer

The scientific information, opinions, and recommendations contained in this Pathogen Safety Data Sheet have been developed based on or compiled from trusted sources available at the time of publication. Newly discovered hazards are frequent and this information may not be completely up to date. The Government of Canada accepts no responsibility for the accuracy, sufficiency, or reliability or for any loss or injury resulting from the use of the information.

Persons in Canada are responsible for complying with the relevant laws, including regulations, guidelines and standards applicable to the import, transport, and use of pathogens in Canada set by relevant regulatory authorities, including the Public Health Agency of Canada, Health Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Environment and Climate Change Canada, and Transport Canada. The risk classification and related regulatory requirements referenced in this Pathogen Safety Data Sheet, such as those found in the Canadian Biosafety Standard, may be incomplete and are specific to the Canadian context. Other jurisdictions will have their own requirements.

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