Short Bursts:
The Removal of the Seven Section Battle Drills from BMQ (part 2)

Solutions for Early Training in Seven Section Battle Drills
by Dr. James Dillard II and MBdr Alec Rembowski

(continued from part 1)

In the case of the Seven Section Battle Drills, the new Primary Reserve (PRes) Basic Military Qualification-Common (BMQ-Common) course has been truncated, resulting in losing vital soldier skills and potentially reducing the soldiering ability of the graduates of this course. The removal of the Basic Military Qualification-Land (BMQ-Land) forced its course material to either be backdropped onto BMQ-Common or forwarded to the Developmental Phase One (DP1) trade specific courses. A Training Plan Review Board (TPRB) for BMQ-Common worked to incorporate the seven section battle drills previously taught on the BMQ-Land course.^{Footnote 1}   They reduced and condensed the content into what is now taught as “react to enemy fire.”^{Footnote 2}  The previous Short Burst article titled, The Canadian Army’s Fable of the Progressive Hen aimed to convince the reader that the removal of the seven section battle drills from Canadian Army PRes training hinders soldiers development and readiness to deploy on combat operations, especially in the face of growing international conflicts where Canadian Army reservists may find themselves in contention with peer, near-peer, and non-state adversaries. This article will highlight three possible solutions that will allow soldiers to learn the seven section battle drills early in their careers to better prepare for combat operations.

BMQ-Common – A New Broken System

The lack of time provided to the BMQ staff highlights the dangers of shortened lessons in education. Some studies suggest it is beneficial to have shorter lessons, or “chunking” the data into short blocks of information. However, these same studies also suggest that when the information is complex or critical, such as the seven section battle drills, which may save a soldier’s life, students prefer more time be spent on these important topics.^{Footnote 3}

Ultimately, the removal of BMQ-Land has caused a competency gap in new soldiers. Without being effectively taught the seven section battle drills, reservists are at greater risk of becoming casualties if they become engaged by enemy fire because they do not have an effective instinctive reaction to contact and cannot logically progress through minor opposition.^{Footnote 4}  Though this decision could lead to dire consequences and lost lives for soldiers, the Canadian Army retains the capability to reverse the curricular alteration by enacting new training standards that incorporate all the seven section battle drills on PRes BMQ-Common, restoring the BMQ-Land course to its pre-2021 form, or completely repurposing BMQ-Common and reviving and enhancing BMQ-Land.

Option One – Incorporating the Seven Section Battle Drills on BMQ-Common

The first and easiest way to incorporate the seven section battle drills back into the BMQ training is to assemble a new TPRB and try to better incorporate the seven section battle drills into the BMQ-Common Qualification Standards/Training Plan (QS/TP). Ideally, it would reflect a similar period allocation to the “navigation” training periods, which are ten periods of lectures and five in the field.^{Footnote 5}  This would cause a time constraint particularly on the BMQ-Common Field Training Exercise (FTX). This could fundamentally change the intent and expectations of the BMQ-Common FTX, but would have to be considered to ensure that the seven section battle drills are fully incorporated in the BMQ-Common QS/TP.

Option Two – The Return of BMQ-Land to the Canadian Army

The second way to reintegrate the seven section battle drills into new soldiers is to bring back BMQ-Land to the Canadian Army’s curriculum to its pre-2021 state. If the Canadian Army were to reinstate the BMQ-Land course, it would need to resemble the course before the changes made in 2021.^{Footnote 6}   This would maximize the number of army soldiers who would receive this training as students. It also enables that some of the instructors are drawn from the Infantry Corps who poses these fundamental combat skills, such as the seven section battle drills.

Option Three –Repurposing BMQ-Common and reviving BMQ-Land

The third and most altering option is completely repurposing the BMQ-Common to a tri-service course like regular force equivalent. Then revive the BMQ-Land course to address all the army specific skills in isolation. This could mean that BMQ-Common would not have a FTX and instead culminate with the C7 rifle range and CBRN Gas Hut. This would consolidate all Canadian Army Forces (CAF) reservists across the three branches: Army, Navy, Air Force into one joint standard before separating into training specific to their own branches. 

This would likely significantly shorten the BMQ-Common course while expanding the time necessary for the BMQ-Land course by “chunking” all the army specific skills to the BMQ-Land course, including “navigation” and the seven section battle drills. This curriculum would culminate in a FTX that would be hybrid of the current BMQ-Common and the old BMQ-Land course. This option would be the most disruptive to the current Canadian Army training system. However, it would allow new PRes soldiers to interact with fellow students and instructors from the other branches of the CAF, strengthening tri-branch comradery. It would also consolidate all the army field specific training onto an army specific course before the students diverge on their DP1 trade specific courses.

Conclusion

In a time of destabilizing situations on the international stage, and militaries faced with budget constraints and aligned orders to do more with less, every soldier becomes a critical part of the whole. Whether regular or reserve forces, combat or support services, every soldier must possess all the basic soldiering skills to engage and survive in combat with peer, near-peer and non-state adversaries. The Canadian Army needs to expect that they may have to generate forces for international operations, such as the Canadian-led multinational enhanced Forward PResence Brigade in Latvia, that increasingly rely on the PRes and require adequate training in basic soldiering skills such as the seven section battle drills.^{Footnote 7}  The authors argue that with the current curriculum template, Canada’s operational capabilities and international credibility with its strategic partners could face potential setbacks.

 

About the Authors

Dr. James Dillard II is a medically-retired United States Coast Guard Public Affairs Specialist. After retirement, he entered academia earning a Master of History and a Doctor of Education from the University of Houston Clear Lake. He then completed a Master of Strategic Studies and is currently pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in Strategic Studies both from the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security, and Strategic Studies. When not pursuing academic interests, he enjoys exploring Canada with his wife, reading and watching fiction and non-fiction, and building and collecting Lego.

MBdr Alec Rembowski is a Canadian Army reservist with 1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field Artillery Regiment. Following joining the PRes in 2015, he obtained a Bachelor of Arts from Dalhousie University. He is currently a graduate student working towards obtaining a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies. Between September 2023 to August 2024 MBdr Rembowski was employed at the 41 CBG Battle School instructing on BMQ and BMOQ courses.

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This article first appeared online in the Short Bursts section of the Canadian Army Journal (August 2025).