Short Bursts – Reflections from Latvia III:                                                                Manoeuvre Warfare in the Current Operating Environment

by Rebecca Jensen, Ph.D

Editor’s Note:
The Canadian-led Multinational Battle Group in Latvia, Task Force Paladin (TF Paladin), includes forces from ten sending nations, as well as 438 members of the Canadian Army. Interoperability has seldom been pushed to this level, nor at this scale. In order to align TF Paladin’s approach to training and preparing to fight, the commanding officer (CO), LCol Jean-Francois Labonté, began the rotation with a weekend long meeting for leaders. After half a day of briefings on the current operating environment, small groups were tasked with developing maxims that fit under the CO’s motto, “We Fight.” This article is part of the Short Bursts Series: “Reflections from Latvia,” which delves into some of these maxims, what they mean in practice, and why they are important.

Disperse to Survive

Early in the Russian war on Ukraine, news coverage frequently reported upon the destruction of large Russian headquarters and formations. The transformation of Ukrainian targeting techniques meant that shortly after such a high value target was identified, it could be struck with long range fires. As Ukraine has acquired increasingly long range and precise fires, they have become even more adept in this regard, forcing Russian forces to disperse. Of course, Russia as well as all the militaries studying this war have learned and adapted. Long range precision fires, such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, currently in use in Ukraine) can destroy targets with great accuracy from a distance of hundreds of kilometres. This capability comes at a cost, though, with individual rockets costing about $200,000 Canadian Dollars, and in some cases much more. The platforms that launch the missiles cost millions of dollars each, and when rocket artillery is fired, it risks becoming exposed.

A key to survival is to avoid creating the sorts of targets that are cost-effective for the use of long-range precision fires, and the easiest way to achieve this is through dispersion. Spreading a force across a large area makes elements of the force harder to detect, and also less likely to be considered high value targets when detected. This also increases deception, helping larger elements and command posts appear to be smaller or generic. This is simple but not easy. The resupply and force protection of many dispersed elements is more intensive in terms of logistics, labour, and time compared to a smaller number of larger groupings. TF Paladin is continuously refining its approach to dispersion, in order to make the force more survivable while also remaining highly effective. However, this creates the challenge of how to concentrate in order to strike and fight offensively.

Concentrate to Strike

While dispersion increases survivability and is a strong defensive measure, combined arms manoeuvre and moving to the offensive requires concentration of friendly forces. A notable feature of the Ukrainian fight against the Russian invasion has been a successful, albeit costly, breaching operation that is not fully exploited afterwards. This is often because massing the troops, equipment, and supplies needed to exploit a breach takes time, and creates a window of vulnerability in which the enemy can attack with long range precision fires.

In light of this, the challenge remains as to how to mass effects without necessarily massing forces, or alternatively, how to create a window in which a force can be safely concentrated in order to exploit an advantage. The latter is still being developed by the US military, and in particular, the Army Futures Command. This command is developing the concept of ‘convergence,’ or synchronizing effects across all domains in which the enemy, for a pocket of space and time, is unable either to detect massed forces, to strike them, or both. While this shows great promise, it requires capabilities and platforms largely absent in most of the NATO forces. The former approach, of massing effects without massing forces, is more feasible today. Preparatory and supporting fires, electronic warfare, and recce elements can provide some protection for NATO forces as they prepare to exploit a breach or go on the offensive. Historically, we have seen the example of the “bite and hold” approach used by the British in both world wars, in which small scale exploitations were supported by fires and then incrementally turned into defensive positions. While intensive in terms of munitions, it allowed for consistent progress in small steps that had a larger cumulative effect.

Never Stall

TF Paladin is being actively tracked by Russian forces, as are other NATO forces in the Baltics. This will only intensify if Russia actively engages NATO in theatre. Momentum and initiative are thus essential. Staying on the move supplements dispersion as an aspect of survivability, and while this increases the burden on sustainment, being hard to find and fix preserves fighting power. Given the need to move, communicate, and coordinate and at times with analog tools, this is no easy task. It requires mission command, the empowering of subordinate commanders to exercise their own judgment and take the initiative within the parameters established by the TF Paladin CO. In a multinational battle group like TF Paladin, this means establishing strong relationships built on understanding and trust, which can be a challenge even within a single army. Even before TF Paladin’s rotation, the leaders of the battle group and all the sending nations have worked to create and maintain these relationships. This can look like symbolic unity, such as designing the Task Force crest together, and social functions at which soldiers of all ranks get to know their counterparts from other sending nations beyond the work setting. It also means shared training, not just for the Task Force as a whole but also at lower levels. This includes travelling together to nearby NATO states for training in varying conditions and with different skills.

Never stalling also has a cognitive dimension. Sub-unit commanders cannot simply be effective at understanding their immediate responsibilities and mission; they must also continuously revise their understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of TF Paladin as a whole, and the most likely threats they could face. Ongoing professional development, often informal, supports this cognitive momentum. Many leaders in the TF Paladin have found that working and training together has not only made them better at their jobs, but also provided valuable insights into how their counterparts from other nations train and fight. These insights have laid the groundwork for changes and improvements that they will take back to their own countries at the end of their rotation.

Right Place, Right Time

Counterinsurgencies and small wars of the post Cold War period featured relatively low densities of forces, engaged in what was often called ‘low intensity conflict'.’ In these missions, commanders had significant leeway in how and where they engaged, since deconfliction (at least at a physical level) was less pressing, and the capabilities of the enemy were significantly inferior to their own. We will not have the same freedom of action in a conflict between NATO and Russia. Ensuring that every part of the task force is in the right place, at the right time, in order to carry out their task is vital, as is the awareness of when the plan invariably changes after contact. Deconflicting and coordinating forces in space and time is key to avoiding fratricide. Longstanding tools such as clearly communicated control measures are important here.

Given a very multinational Task Force where communications can be more complicated or less reliable than in a force drawn from a single country, TF Paladin’s leadership has provided broad and easy to understand guidance regarding areas of responsibility. This guidance is robust and simple enough to be useful, even if communications are intermittent or unavailable. More broadly, clear intent coupled with a simple concept of operations is essential, so that even with the inevitable friction and fog of war, each component of the task force can ensure that their efforts support the mission and contribute to achieving the objective. This approach builds upon mission command and the relationships discussed earlier.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Rebecca Jensen is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and an Assistant Professor at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. She is currently deployed to Latvia as advisor to the commanding officer of TF Paladin, the Multinational Battle Group, LCol Jean-Francois Labonté.

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This article first appeared online in the Short Bursts section of the Canadian Army Journal (February 2025).