Fighting Like a Wolf : Short Reflections from JPMRC 26-02

Short burst by Capt Tim Gallant

At the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center’s (JPMRC) 26-02 exercise just outside Fairbanks, Alaska, Colonel Chris Brawley, commander of 1/11 BCT (Task Force Wolf) and endearingly known as Wolf 6, gave 3 RCR their brigade’s critical task: to infiltrate through 16 kilometres of muskeg while temperatures dropped below -40 degrees Celsius.^{Footnote 1}  How did a Canadian battalion conquer a route and seize the enemy’s southern flank, achieving what was deemed a Herculean task (one that two other American battalions attempted and failed to achieve)? 3 RCR’s success at JPMRC should be considered a case study in effective command, grounded in two integral foundations: a command‑and‑control framework that could be defined as “directive control,”^{Footnote 2}  and a planning process that adhered to the idiomatic expression “sound by doctrine, not bound by doctrine.”

Command is an essential element in the utilization of force and remains shaped by the commander’s eternal problem—uncertainty—despite the increased reliance on disposable and easily accessible uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) as well as the proliferation of data processing and AI systems. Uncertainty, as one theorist once put, is the “central fact that all command systems cope with.”^{Footnote 3}  Command structures can never have perfect understanding of the endless factors of combat and must therefore choose to either increase the command structure’s information capacity or reorganize in order to operate comfortably with degraded information. In articulating a framework of command structures, the British scholar Martin Samuels reformulates this problem, which he terms the “knowledge gap,” as the difference between what the commander knows and what the subordinates know. This reframes the problem: Are higher headquarters comfortable with their subordinates knowing more about the local situation? Are they comfortable assuming that their subordinates will know more, or will they attempt to extract this information from them? Samuels further complements the picture by identifying two other gaps: the “alignment gap” (the difference between what the subordinates are expected to do and what they actually do), and the “effects gap” (the difference associated with commanders’ decisions to intervene—or not intervene—in the actions of their subordinates in order to correct perceived discrepancies between the actions being taken and the effects sought). Considering each gap as an operational dichotomy and combining them creates eight potential manners of command.

Table 1: Eight Manners of Command^{Footnote 4}  
 

Throughout JPMRC 26-02, several American intelligence, signals, and fires soldiers were attached to 3 RCR, which provided the battalion with access to the US Maven Smart System, an AI‑assisted command and control platform. This enabled not only a rudimentary BLUEFORCE tracker, but also multiple daily interactions with Wolf 6 via the American Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). As a result, the main command post maintained an excellent understanding of the brigade commander’s intent, our flanking unit’s disposition, as well as a common understanding of the enemy. It fundamentally enabled the commanding officer (CO) of 3 RCR to know more about the intricacies of the frontline than the very subordinate company commanders fighting at the frontline. Subordinate commanders were always delivered a task and a purpose, and orders were written to be “short, clear, specific, and complete,” avoiding all “meaningless expressions and figures of speech.” This method enabled their understanding but also provided them with the ability to utilize their initiative as they perceived the situation.^{Footnote 5}   In addition, in contrast with the style of command that characterized the flanking American battalion commanders, who remained within their mobile command posts, the CO of 3 RCR was forward with their subordinates, providing themself with an immediate understanding of the front, and enabling themself to intervene where they saw fit. These conditions (availability of communication technology, skillful order formulation and immediate commander presence) enabled 3 RCR to adopt the “directive control” framework. This manner of command enabled flexibility and agility, contributing to the battalion’s success against opposing force elements on several occasions. Conversely, the American battalions operated in a framework closer to “logistic control,” where less room is allowed for subordinates’ initiative. Compared to the directive control of the Canadians, this restricted the agility and freedom of manoeuvre of the American companies. For instance, when opposing forces established a blocking position at a key intersection, one battalion’s companies individually assaulted this objective sequentially, with each being defeated in detail over the course of two days.

The other aspect of 3 RCR’s success was a novel approach to planning, one which privileged analog over digital methods. The presence of a white board in a shared space made all key planners meet at a point where collaboration, discussion, and debate could occur. Planning staff adhered to the adage that “technology makes us dumb,” and instead of focusing on  producing checklists and other planning products, planners utilized paper copies of their running estimates that they brought to the white board to engage in active deliberation. Shortcuts were sought, briefings were shortened, and key information was delivered to the commander in an understandable and digestible manner. Although it became a running joke within the command post, viewing the battalion’s planning process as the free‑spirited, creative expression of jazz music is a useful analogy. In this analogy, what the Canadian Army teaches at career courses such as the Army Operations Course (AOC) can be considered classical music, where every instrument, whether planner or cello, is meticulously refined to perfection, placed in the exact right place and played at the exact right time. This method may provide a perfect product, but 3 RCR’s planning team adhered to a different adage, that “perfect is the enemy of good.”^{Footnote 6}  Instead of staff college perfection, 3 RCR relentlessly insisted upon effectiveness and on dealing out the right information at the right time to enable the right decision. This jazz did not devolve into punk. Doctrinal forms of planning, such as the core principles of mission analysis, were still adhered to. In other words, 3 RCR’s approach to planning amounted to a conscious decision to refine and shorten the AOC standard to ensure its relevance and timeliness. This enabled staff to swiftly produce both a detailed time estimate for the arduous infiltration and a detailed analysis to staff the driver requirements of the complex assortment of light over snow vehicles, banded vehicles, and all‑terrain vehicles. Staff provided the science of movement so that the commander could focus on the art of manoeuvre, effectively delivering the checkmate move that won the exercise not only for the battalion but for the entire brigade.

The experience of 3 RCR in Alaska demonstrates that directive control can be a highly effective manner of command when applied under the right conditions. Reliable and redundant communications, concise orders and proactive subordinates all combined to narrow the knowledge, alignment, and effects gaps. Crucially, the battalion leadership allowed doctrine application to bend to operational tempo, creating a command environment in which effectiveness became the cardinal value. With ever-increasing command and control capabilities, as well as the omnipresent surveillance of the battlefield by UASs and other sensors, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that subordinates will have superior knowledge of the tactical situation than their commanders. With that in mind, battalion and brigade staff should consider how a command framework of directive control may benefit mission effectiveness when enabled by simplified planning processes. In the unique and utterly rewarding experience of fighting along Task Force Wolf, 3 RCR showed the effectiveness of its approach, ultimately winning the respect of our American allies and bringing home valuable lessons.

About the author

Captain Tim Gallant is an infantry officer currently employed as the operations officer with 3rd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (3 RCR). He has deployed twice, first as a platoon commander with 2 RCR to Latvia with Op REASSURANCE Roto 9, and then as a company second‑in‑command for the United Kingdom Training Element with Op UNIFIER Roto 17. He holds a Bachelor of Arts with a joint major in Philosophy and Political Science from St. Francis Xavier University and a Master of Arts in Military Studies from American Military University.