Report of the Expert Panel on Modern Federal Labour Standards

The changing nature of work

The future of work and changes to the nature of work are topics that have received tremendous interest from policymakers, elected officials, academics and the general public in recent years. At the 2018 G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, world leaders agreed that creating an inclusive future of work is a top priority, especially against a backdrop of tremendous technological change that will create new opportunities but also pose significant risks of dislocation and distributional challenges (G20 Summits, 2018). Other recent reports from international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have also focused on the impacts of the changing nature of work and its implications for policymakers and existing regulatory and legislative frameworks (World Bank, 2019; ILO, 2019; OECD, 2018).

Studies estimating the impacts of automation due to advances in artificial intelligence and robotics are produced on a regular basis. Estimates range from fewer than 5% of current jobs being automated, all the way up to more than 40% of existing Canadian jobs becoming obsolete within the next 10 to 20 years (Manyika et al., 2017; Johal & Thirgood, 2016; Lamb, 2016).

Yet, many of these concerns are founded upon the possibility of what might happen rather than the reality of what’s actually happening. In the face of widespread media attention to the claim that many workers in Canada are turning to the platform economy (often referred to as the sharing economy) and using firms such as Uber and Airbnb to earn additional income, a 2017 survey by Statistics Canada found that only 0.3% and 0.2% of Canadians, respectively, had offered peer-to-peer ride services and private accommodation services (Statistics Canada, 2017).

Estimates of the size of the so-called "gig" economy of on-demand, contingent workers are also highly variable and largely dependent on definitional issues (for example, online versus offline work) and availability of reliable data. In a study of platform-based work in the United States, Katz and Krueger found that work through online intermediaries accounted for only 0.5% of workers in 2015 (Katz & Krueger, 2019). The scope of gig work in the FRPS is even less clear, as the major platforms are typically under provincial or territorial jurisdiction.

What is clear, however, is that over the course of the past several decades, there are some trends in the labour market worth noting. These include the following.

There has been a decline in the unionization rate in Canada, from 37.6% in 1981 to 30.1% in 2018. This has been predominantly driven by a drop in private sector unionization rates (which stood at 15.9% in 2018, compared to 75.1% in the public sector) (Statistics Canada, 2018; Statistics Canada, 2019a).

Wage stagnation has had a significant impact on many workers in Canada. Overall median household income in 2017 constant dollars has increased from $52,200 in 1976 to only $59,800 in 2017 (a 14.6% increase over 41 years) (Statistics Canada, 2019b). The decline in real average incomes for households over the past 40 years in the lower three deciles of the income distribution is particularly stark when set against the significant gains for the top three deciles, though wage growth has picked up since the turn of the century (Johal & Yalnizyan, 2018; Riddell, 2018).

Income inequality persists in Canada, and has hit a plateau at or near record highs over the past decade (OECD, 2019). After-tax income inequality (comparing the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile) for non-seniors doubled between 1976 and 2015 (Johal & Yalnizyan, 2018).

Increases in non-standard forms of work persist in Canada and many other advanced economies. Non-standard work (including part-time, temporary and self-employed with no employees) accounts for 60% of job growth in OECD countries since the mid-1990s (OECD, 2015). In Canada, the incidence of non-standard work increased from the 1970s through the early 1990s but has subsequently been relatively stable. Part-time employment (which was 12.5% in 1976 and stood at 18.7% in 2018) (Statistics Canada, 2019c) and temporary employment (which stood at 8.6% in 1997 and 11.3% by 2019) figures demonstrate the magnitude of the increase in the past 40 years.

There are a number of complex and inter-related drivers of declining unionization rates, wage stagnation, income inequality and the rise of non-standard forms of work which are beyond the scope of this report. However, clearly globalization, public policy choices around taxation and redistribution, new forms of technology and corporate practices such as outsourcing, franchising and sub-contracting are among the contributing factors that can be identified (Weil, 2011; OECD, 2011).

Implications for labour standards

The changing nature of work has many implications across a range of policy and regulatory domains. When firms engage in complex sub-contracting arrangements to sell goods or deliver services, which firm in the chain is primarily responsible for adhering to relevant regulatory standards? What factors should determine whether someone is an independent contractor and should tax treatment influence such choices? If your employee sends work emails on their "personal" time should they be compensated in some way for having done so, or are they exercising their own choice and preferences?

How does the changing nature of work impact labour standards in particular? The Panel argues there are four main implications that should be noted:

The blurring of lines between categories is becoming increasingly problematic. Whether the blurring of work and personal time, of contractor and employee, or of federal versus provincial/territorial jurisdiction, a range of distinctions that once were relatively clear have become murky over time as work arrangements evolved and new ways of working emerged. In some ways this is not surprising, as categories created in the 1960s by policymakers and politicians would have seemed logical, not foreseeing the advent of smartphones in every pocket nor corporate structures involving multiple parties regulated at different levels (for example, a federally regulated firm using temporary help agency employees who are regulated at the provincial level).

The distancing of some workers from employment standards protections is a significant implication of the so-called "fissured workplace". As firms employ a more complex web of sub-contractors, outsource more functions and use strategies such as franchising to deliver services more efficiently, workers are increasingly distanced from the firm that actually profits from their endeavours as well as the protections of labour laws (Weil, 2011). The rise of independent contractors as a well-recognized and often-utilized component of today’s labour market is perhaps the clearest example of firms attempting, in some cases, to divest themselves of certain responsibilities and obligations (for example, avoidance of payroll deductions such as CPP and EI) through misclassification—recognizing that some workers themselves prefer to be deemed independent contractors, often for financial reasons.

Some workers are falling behind as the cost of living increases but wages fail to keep up, while at the same time, access to benefits becomes increasingly tenuous. The rise of income inequality in Canada and other advanced economies has shone a spotlight on the challenges many workers face in meeting basic needs such as shelter, food and taking care of their and their families’ health expenses, whether dental care or purchasing pharmaceuticals. Re-thinking what living wages and benefits in the 21st century ought to be, is critical, with 3.7 million Canadians living in poverty (ESDC, 2018b), 6 million Canadians unable to afford basic dental care and many unable to access necessary mental health services (CAHS, 2014).

The impacts are not felt equally amongst different types of workers. In particular, precariously employed or vulnerable workers are less likely to be paid a living wage, have access to benefits and be secure enough to advocate for their rights, whether wages earned but not paid, or being compelled to work too many hours. Women, people with disabilities, visible minorities, recent immigrants, temporary foreign workers, workers with less education and single parents are all more likely to be employed in precarious forms of work (Noack, et al., 2011; Block & Galabuzi, 2011; Cranford, et al., 2003; PEPSO, 2015). Understanding the distributional impacts of well-designed or poorly-designed labour standards on these types of groups (including the intersections of different identity factors) is an important step to developing approaches that are effective for all in a diverse and fluid labour market.

Snapshot of the federally regulated private sector

It is important to note some of the key characteristics of the FRPS in Canada. The sector is composed of 18,000 employers, 915,000 employees and 80,000 self-employed workers (see Figure 1 for a more detailed breakdown). These numbers do not include those related to governance activities on First Nations reserves.

Figure 1 - Text version

This graphic shows the number of different types of employees in the federally regulated private sector, as well as the number of employers and non-standard workers. The three categories are: standard employees who are covered by Part III of the Code, non-standard employees who are covered by Part III of the Code, and non-standard workers who are not covered by Part III of the Code. There are also employers who are subject to Part III of the Code, and self-employed workers who are not covered by or subject to Part III of the Code.

• Total employees 915,000
• Total employers 18,000
• Total self-employed workers 80,000
• Permanent employees 865,000
  • Of those permanent employees, 790,000 are full-time employees and 75,000 are part-time employees
  • Of those permanent, part-time employees, 53,000 are voluntary and 22,000 are non-voluntary
• Temporary employees 50,000
  • Of those temporary employees, 32,000 are full-time employees and 18,000 are part-time employees
  • Of those temporary, full-time employees, 5,000 are seasonal employees, 20,000 are term or contract employees, and 7,000 are casual employees
  • Of those temporary, part-time employees, 3,000 are seasonal employees, 11,000 are term or contract employees, and 4,000 are casual employees
• Self-employed workers 80,000
  • Of those self-employed workers, 20,000 are self-employed with employees and 60,000 are self-employed without employees
  • Self-employed workers with employees are subject to Part III of the Canada Labour Code as employers, but not as employees. Self-employed workers without employees are not covered by Part III of the Canada Labour Code.

• Source: 2015 Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey; 2017 Survey of Employment, Payroll, and Hours; 2018 Labour Force Survey; and Labour Program, Workplace Information Research Division estimates.
• † These individuals are not subject to Part III of the Canada Labour Code as workers, but as employers.

It is worth noting that 790,000 of the 915,000 employees (or about 85%) are full-time and permanent employees, while the remaining 125,000 are in "non-standard" forms of work (meaning part-time and temporary). In addition, there are 80,000 self-employed workers who are not protected by labour standards under Part III of the Code (red boxes in Figure 1).

Geographically, the majority of employees work in Ontario (39%), Quebec (20%) and British Columbia (13%) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 - Text version

This graphic is a map that illustrates how employees in the federally regulated private sector are spread across Canada, excluding the territories. There is no data available for the territories.

• BC 13%
• Alberta 12%
• Saskatchewan 3%
• Manitoba 4%
• Ontario 39%
• Quebec 20%
• Atlantic provinces 8%

• Source: Labour Program, Workplace Information and Research Division estimates based on the Survey of Employment, Payroll, and Hours (2015, 2017); Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey, 2008; and Labour Force Survey, 2013–2017.

Larger employers are predominant in the sector, with firms having 100 or more employees employing 87% of all employees (see Figure 3). The highest proportion of employees in these large firms work in banking (28%), telecommunications and broadcasting (16%) and road transportation (16%). By firm size, there are many more small firms in the sector; 85% of employers have fewer than 20 employees (see Figure 4). Table 1 provides a breakdown of employers by province and industry.

Figure 3 - Text version

Employees	Percentage
1 to 5 employees	2%
6 to 19 employees	3%
20 to 99 employees	8%
100 or more employees	87%

• Source: Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey, 2015.

Figure 4 - Text version

Employees	Percentage
1 to 5 employees	66%
6 to 19 employees	19%
20 to 99 employees	11%
100 or more employees	4%

• Source: Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey, 2015.

• Source: Workplace Information and Research Division estimates based on the Canadian Business Patterns (2015, 2017); and Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey, 2015.
• * Proportions are based on 2015 FJWS.

The proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements in the FRPS is 34% (ESDC, 2019), which is much higher than coverage in Canada’s private sector at approximately 16% (Statistics Canada, 2019a). The proportion of workers engaged in standard work (at 85%) is also higher than the Canadian average, including both the private and public sector (71%) (ESDC, 2019).

There are a number of diverse groups of people who are engaged in non-standard work, at varying proportions, which are outlined in Table 2.

• Source: 2015 Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey; 2017 Survey of Employment, Payroll, and Hours; 2018 Labour Force Survey; and Labour Program, Workplace Information Research Division analysis.
• * Proportions are based on 2015 FJWS.

When compared to workers in the rest of Canada, workers in the FRPS tend to have better working conditions (for example, wages, access to benefits), are more likely to be male, and are slightly older and more likely to be unionized.

Principles informing the report

The following principles guided our work, whether at the consultation phase, the research and writing phase, and most importantly at the deliberation phase, when we sought to achieve consensus on our recommendations.^{Footnote 4} Those principles are:

Decency at work: This is the fundamental idea that labour standards must provide a basic floor of decency for workers, such that they receive sufficient wages to live on and are not deprived of wages or benefits to which they are entitled nor compelled to work unreasonable hours, nor are they subject to harassment or discrimination or unwarranted dangers in the workplace (ILO, n.d.).

The market economy: Labour standards ought to allow workers to benefit from and participate in Canada’s market economy while also providing employers with a level playing field.

The workplace bargain: Labour standards ought to respect the rights of employers and workers to negotiate the terms of their relationship, provided that those terms do not derogate from basic labour standards.

Inclusion and integration: All workers, regardless of individual circumstances, should be afforded the full protection of relevant labour standards, as well as human rights legislation, and the distributional impacts of standards should be considered closely (for example, using a GBA+ lens).

High levels of compliance: Developing standards that parties will comply with is critical to ensuring trust in the system, overall respect for laws, and a level playing field for employers.

Clarity: Labour standards should be clearly, simply stated and information explaining standards should be easily available to workers and employers.

Circumspection: Labour standards should be developed and implemented to avoid unintended adverse consequences for workers or employers, and incremental or gradual changes are more likely to avoid such intended consequences.

Evidence-based: Analysis and advice informing the report is based on available, reliable data and input from stakeholders and experts.

The Panel’s approach

The Panel undertook a three-phased approach to its work between February 2019 and June 30, 2019, though the phases were overlapping and not sequential.

Phase 1 (issue identification and scoping) involved initial meetings and discussions with the Labour Program to determine the precise scope and mandate of the Panel and ensure the right issues would be explored.

Phase 2 (engagement) involved targeted engagement across Canada, building upon the Labour Program’s 2017–2018 consultations, with a range of workers, civil society groups, unions and labour organizations, employers and employer organizations, experts and other stakeholders. In total, meetings were held with over 140 individuals and organizations (see Annex D for a full list of stakeholders). Face-to-face meetings with stakeholders were held in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Halifax and Winnipeg, and a number of bilateral meetings and calls were held with other stakeholders during the engagement phase.

Phase 3 (research and writing) involved research undertaken by the Panel, Secretariat and our research assistants and writing up the Panel’s findings and recommendations in the final report. We would like to thank the Secretariat, headed by Executive Director Margaret Hill, and our research assistants for their hard work, patience and timely efforts (see Annex E for a list of Secretariat staff and research assistants). All errors and omissions in the final report are the responsibility of the Panel.

In the course of the Panel’s work, there were some key limitations that need to be flagged. Foremost amongst all of these was time; a three-and-a-half month, part-time engagement for Panel members was challenging. There were many issues we would have sought to explore in more depth, and a number of stakeholders we would have sought to engage with in a more comprehensive way, had we more time to carry out our work (for example, meeting with more workers, greater dialogue with Indigenous organizations and First Nation communities). Due to time pressures, it was also impossible to formally engage with external experts to conduct novel research on these issues, and we were therefore limited to discussing the issues with experts based on their understanding of the issues at the time.

A second key limitation, which we address in more detail in the report, is data. We were unable to access, whether for time, resourcing or general availability reasons, some key data that would have been beneficial to understanding the issues we studied. This limitation was particularly challenging for us in the context of the request that we deploy a GBA+ lens to our work (for example, considering distributional impacts of potential recommendations on different groups such as women, Indigenous people, racialized minorities, new Canadians). The section on data and our recommendations therein detail some of the specific gaps and constraints that we encountered.

Having set out those limitations, we are comfortable with the recommendations we have made in the report (see Annex A for a full list of recommendations). Where we are of the opinion that certain areas require more in-depth study and examination, we have flagged those issues. It is also clearly noted where we lack sufficient information or data to make an informed recommendation.

We are grateful to the federal government for seeking our impartial advice on these issues, which are of utmost importance to workers and employers in the FRPS. We also are aware that many of these issues will be, or are already, relevant to workers and firms regulated by the provinces and territories. We hope that our advice and analysis can be beneficial in that context as well.

Sunil Johal (Chair)
Toronto, Ontario

Richard Dixon
Ottawa, Ontario

Mary Gellatly
Toronto, Ontario

Dalia Gesualdi-Fecteau
Montreal, Quebec

Kathryn A. Raymond, Q.C.
Halifax, Nova Scotia

W. Craig Riddell
Vancouver, British Columbia

Rosa B. Walker
Winnipeg, Manitoba

What’s the issue?

Minimum wages are the lowest wage rates that employees can legally pay their employees and are a core labour standard. Setting such a floor can be justified by appeal to notions of basic fairness or justice. It can also be an effective way of achieving other policy objectives such as reducing income inequality and/or poverty as well as ensuring that the benefits of economic growth are more equitably shared.

However, increases in minimum wages can also have adverse consequences, potentially reducing employment opportunities or hours of work for low wage workers, raising the prices of goods and services and lowering the competitiveness of firms that hire low wage workers.

Choosing the optimal minimum wage, as well as how to adjust it over time, represents a delicate balancing act that takes account of the costs and benefits to society of each option.

Minimum wage policy has recently received increased emphasis as an important component of labour market and social policy. This change reflects several developments. One is the rise in wage and income inequality in many developed countries since the late 1970s/early 1980s. A related phenomenon is the highly unequal sharing of the benefits of economic growth over the past four decades. For example, based on income tax data the real (inflation-adjusted) market income of the bottom 90% of Canadian income earners increased by a meagre 2% over the period 1982 to 2010, whereas real market income of the top 10% rose by 75% and by 160% for the top 1% (Lemieux & Riddell, 2016). The shares of market income earned by the top 1% and the top 0.1% also rose substantially over this period. The extremely uneven sharing of economic gains has led to much greater emphasis on policies that may promote equitable growth, including higher minimum wages.

A third factor contributing to increased attention to minimum wage policy is growth in the size of the low wage labour market relative to the workforce as a whole. This growth in part reflects greater polarization of Canada’s (and other countries’) labour market—more workers at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution and fewer jobs with middle income salaries (Green & Sand, 2015; Beach, 2016).

An additional factor contributing to increased attention to minimum wage policy is a growing body of research that concludes that the adverse consequences of minimum wages—specifically the magnitude of disemployment effects—are not as large as previously believed. This new research began with the influential work of Card and Krueger (1994; 1995) that challenged traditional views about the consequences of minimum wages. Although there remains considerable debate about the size of disemployment effects from increases in minimum wages much subsequent research has largely supported Card and Krueger’s conclusion that moderate increases in minimum wages need not have adverse effects on low wage employment.

The substantial body of subsequent analysis that has followed their work also resulted in a rich body of evidence on minimum wages and their effects. This has resulted in greater understanding of the role minimum wages may play in reducing wage and income inequality and combating poverty, as well as other consequences—good and bad—of minimum wages. This body of research and evidence has also resulted in some countries such as the United Kingdom (in 1998),^{Footnote 5} and Germany (in 2015) implementing their first national minimum wage, as well as greater public and policy attention being paid to minimum wages in countries that introduced minimum wages many years ago.

Low wage and minimum wage earners in the FRPS

Based on the 2015 Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey (FJWS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the Labour Program estimates there were 42,000 employees in the FRPS earning the minimum wage in the province in which they worked in 2017, amounting to 5% of all FRPS workers. This compares to 7% of employees earning the minimum wage in Canada as a whole (excluding the territories, for which data are not available) in 2017.

Compared to Canada as a whole, minimum wage workers are more likely to be found in full-time standard employment in the FRPS (71% versus 41% for Canada as a whole) and long-term employment (50% versus 16%). In the FRPS, as in other Canadian jurisdictions, minimum wage earners are over-represented in non-standard types of work. Nearly a quarter (24%) of part-time FRPS employees earn minimum wage yet they represent only 10% of the FRPS workforce.

Similarly, temporary workers constitute 16% of minimum wage employees yet make up only 5.5% of the workforce. Minimum wage employment is concentrated in road transport (31%), air, rail and maritime transport (26%), and banks (21%).^{Footnote 8}

In terms of the labour market dimensions contributing to vulnerability of workers, minimum wage work in the FRPS has some unique features. Minimum wage earners in the FRPS are older (76% are 25 years and over) than the rest of Canada (42% are 25 years and over). Immigrants are slightly more likely to earn minimum wage in the FRPS (33%) than in the rest of Canada (30%) (ESDC, 2019).^{Footnote 9} Fifty-six percent of minimum wage earners in the FRPS have college, trade and university degrees compared to 31% that have a high school education or less.

Employees in the FRPS are generally well-paid. However, about 10% earn low wages, compared to over 20% for Canada as a whole; for example, the Labour Program estimates that 67,000 employees earned $15 or less in 2017 (ESDC, 2019). The distribution of low wage employees among FRPS industries is set out in Figure 5 . Low pay is often associated with smaller employers. In the FRPS, however, 71% of low pay employees work for firms with more than 100 employees.

Figure 5 - Text version

Industry	%	Number
Banks	27%	26.5
Air transport	13%	12.7
Rail & maritime transport	4%	4
Road transport	32%	31.9
Postal services & pipelines	7%	7.1
Telecommunications & broadcasting	12%	11.9

• Source: Labour Force Survey, January 2018 to February 2019.

Low income is not experienced equally. As Figure 6 shows, 45% of women experience low pay while they only make up 39% of FRPS employees. Similarly, temporary employees make up only 5.5% of employees in the FRPS but are twice as likely to earn low wages. Employees with low pay are less likely to be unionized (17%) than employees as a whole (34%). Low pay in the FRPS is not a feature of youth employment, as 80% of such employees are 25 years old and over. Nor is it confined to entry level or new job holders, as 38% have been with their employer for one to four years and 35% for five or more years.

Figure 6 - Text version

Demographic	Proportion earning low wages	Proportion of FRPS workforce
Women	45%	39%
Aboriginal	5%	4%
Temporary	12%	5.5%
Immigrant	30%	28%

• Source: Tabulations by the Panel based on LFS 2018 and 2019 microdata. The FRPS cannot be precisely identified in the LFS, so estimates are the Panel’s best approximation. See recommendations relating to data in Chapter 7 on cross-cutting issues.

Three of the four provinces with the highest concentration of federal undertakings are at, or moving towards, a $15 per hour minimum wage threshold (Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario). These jurisdictions encompass over half (64%) of FRPS employees.

What the research says

Minimum wages can have numerous effects on labour market outcomes. In choosing the appropriate minimum wage at a point in time and adjusting it over time it is important to take account of both the positive and negative effects. Doing so will facilitate finding the "sweet spot" where substantial benefits are obtained without imposing unnecessarily high costs. There will always be tradeoffs involved with a particular minimum wage level, as there are costs and benefits associated with any option.

We summarize below what is known about the consequences of minimum wages. We focus in particular on Canadian studies, as well as some relevant studies from the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), countries with labour market institutions similar to Canada’s.

Minimum wage policies in other jurisdictions

Over 100 countries now have minimum wage policies. There are two general approaches to minimum wage regulation. Minimum wages can be set at a national or sub-national level through legislation that applies to all employees with some exceptions, such as age. This is generally the current practice in Canada, as described earlier.

Alternatively, wages can be set sectorally or through extension of union contracts, with minimum pay most commonly being between 60% and 70% of average wage rates. Countries with this type of minimum wage system include Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Iceland and Italy. Countries that determine wage rates collectively tend to have more generous wage floors and less overall income inequality, but this relies on high union coverage (McBride & Muirhead, 2016).

With declining union densities in many countries, in some jurisdictions the model of collective wage setting is being replaced by national statutory minimum wage systems. Ireland, the UK and, more recently Germany, have all introduced common statutory minimum wages in response to declining union density and other factors (McBride & Muirhead, 2016).

What we heard

During the consultations, we heard from non-unionized workers and unions that a common minimum wage for FRPS workers would be welcomed. They said that a common federal minimum wage would level the playing field for employees of Canada-wide companies to bargain wages based on one floor rather than the uneven patchwork of minimum wages pegged at provincial and territorial rates.

We also heard from unions that establishing wage grids in collective agreements for Canada-wide collective agreements would be easier when based on one common wage floor rather than accommodating, say, a low minimum wage of $11.06 in Saskatchewan and a higher minimum wage of $15 in neighbouring Alberta. From their perspective, a common federal minimum wage would remove unfairness and inequality amongst FRPS workers who earn differing minimum wage rates based on the province or territory in which they work.

Unions, workers and some experts supported a universal federal minimum wage, generally at a rate of $15 per hour, because it could improve the lives of precarious workers, increase employment stability, reduce turnover and decrease the gender pay gap. Many workers and unions said they view a federal minimum wage as an anti-poverty measure and the federal government should help lift individuals out of poverty and show leadership for provinces and territories to follow. Workers and unions noted that when contracts are flipped in certain sectors, such as airports, workers are routinely brought down to the minimum wage. As such, a federal minimum wage that was higher than the provincial rate would benefit these individuals in such circumstances.

The status quo approach, that is, to leave the federal minimum wage pegged to provincial and territorial minimum wage rates did receive support from most employer groups. It did not receive support from unions, workers, labour organizations or civil society groups.

In consultations with employers and their employer organizations, the response to a common minimum wage was more mixed. Many large FRPS employers said minimum wages were not a significant issue for them because few or no employees earned minimum wage in their firm or industry. However, some employers noted that wage rates should be viewed together with pensions and other benefits offered by a company.

Some employers and employer organizations expressed concern that a federal minimum wage rate set higher than some provincial/territorial rates may increase pressure for minimum wage increases at the provincial and territorial level, particularly in jurisdictions with lower minimum wages. Some employers said a common minimum wage would create inequalities among people doing similar jobs but receiving different minimum wage rates (federal and provincial/territorial). Some suggested a higher wage floor in the FRPS could improve employee recruitment.

Conclusions and recommendations

More is known today about the impacts (both positive and negative) of minimum wages increases than ever before, due in large part to a significant amount of new research in recent years. This research demonstrates how minimum wage hikes have impacted particular jurisdictions and generally supports the notion that earlier estimates of adverse impacts on employment tended to be over-stated, though younger and low-skilled workers may be negatively impacted and firms in export sectors could also face challenges. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that minimum wage hikes can play a role in mitigating income inequality.

However, there is no easy way to model what the precise impacts of minimum wage increases on employment levels, consumer prices, competitiveness of firms and a range of other issues would be in a particular jurisdiction such as the FRPS in Canada. These uncertainties are particularly challenging given the unique labour markets and economies within each province and territory in a country as large and economically diverse as Canada. Findings from Hungary, the UK or the US or even Canada are not easily transferable to the specific context of the FRPS.

Against this backdrop, the Panel believes there are better approaches than the status quo approach of pegging the federal minimum wage to provincial/territorial rates.

Status quo

The status quo approach can—and often does—result in long periods of time in which the minimum wage in some provinces/territories remains unchanged and is allowed to steadily decline in purchasing power terms. These periods are often followed by a rapid and large increase in the jurisdiction’s minimum wage, usually after a change in government, and the increase translates into increases in the federal minimum wage. These "roller coaster" patterns are evident to some extent in all provinces and territories and particularly in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia.

Figure 7 summarizes the behaviour of the average real minimum wage in Canada measured in constant 2018 dollars since 1970.^{Footnote 15} It shows clearly that provincial minimum wage rates have taken the average minimum wage on a path resembling a roller coaster ride. Although the average minimum wage is currently at a historically high level, in purchasing power terms it is only about 10% higher than its level in the mid-1970s, despite more than four decades of economic growth over that time period.

Figure 7 - Text version

This graphic shows the historical path of the real average minimum wage in Canada, adjusted to 2018 dollars, from 1970 to 2018. The average wage has risen and fallen over these years.

In 1970, the minimum wage was just over $8 per hour. It climbed until the mid-1970s, when it peaked around just less than $12 per hour. It then fell until the late 1980s, when it dropped back to around $8 per hour. Since the mid-1980s, the minimum wage rose again during the early 1990s to around $9 per hour, fell during the early 2000s back to $8 per hour, and has since climbed steadily, to around $13 per hour in 2018.

The line shown on the graphic is jagged and not smooth, suggesting that even within these broader shifts, the average minimum wage has continued to rise and fall slightly, within the range of approximately one dollar.

• Source: Tabulations by the Panel using monthly information on provincial minimum wages weighted by monthly LFS employment data. Adjustment for changes in the cost of living is based on the Consumer Price Index.

Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the behaviour of real minimum wages in individual provinces over the 1970–2019 period, divided into larger and smaller population provinces. There are noteworthy differences across provinces in minimum wage behaviour, especially among the larger population provinces. In several provinces (for example, British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario) there are extended periods of time in which the minimum wage remains fixed and thus falls steadily in terms of purchasing power. For example, British Columbia (BC) had the highest minimum wage among larger population provinces in 2002 but the BC minimum wage was not adjusted until 2011. During this period the real minimum wage was steadily eroded by inflation, resulting in BC having the lowest minimum wage among large provinces. Although less pronounced, extended periods in which minimum wages were not adjusted in nominal dollar terms and thus allowed to decline in purchasing power terms are evident in smaller population provinces.

Figure 8 - Text version

This graphic shows the behaviour of real minimum wages in the large provinces between 1970 and 2019, adjusted to 2018 dollars. These provinces include British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and Alberta.

The graphic shows the path of the provincial minimum wages over those years. While each provincial line is slightly different, each follows a generally similar path. The minimum wages of each province rose during the 1970s to a high of between $11 and just over $13 per hour. These wages then fell after the mid-1970s to a low in the late 1980s to between just less than $7 per hour and over $8 per hour.

Since the 1990s, the real minimum wages of BC, Ontario and Quebec have generally risen to a range of between just less than $12 per hour to just less than $13 per hour today. In Alberta, the real minimum wage departed from the other large provinces during the 1990s and early 2000s as it continued to remain at a rate of approximately $7 to $8 per hour. Since the mid-2000s, the real Alberta minimum wage has climbed to just less than $15 per hour.

The lines represent the real minimum wage, and the declining values are related to declining purchasing power because the provincial minimum wage was fixed during that time and eroded due to inflation.

The lines shown on the graphic are jagged and not smooth, suggesting that even within these broader shifts, real minimum wages have continued to rise and fall slightly, within the range of approximately one dollar.

• Source: Tabulations by the Panel using monthly information on provincial minimum wages weighted by monthly LFS employment data. Adjustment for changes in the cost of living is based on the Consumer Price Index.

Figure 9 - Text version

This graphic shows the behaviour of real minimum wages in the other provinces between 1970 and 2019, adjusted to 2018 dollars. These provinces are Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan.

The graphic shows the path of the provincial minimum wages over those years. While each provincial line is slightly different, each follows a generally similar path. The minimum wages of each province rose during the 1970s to a high of between $10 and just below $13 per hour. These wages then fell after the mid-1970s to a low in the early 1990s to between just below $7 per hour and under $8 per hour.

Since the 1990s, the real minimum wages of these provinces have generally risen to around $11 per hour today.

The lines represent the real minimum wage, and the declining values are related to declining purchasing power because the provincial minimum wage was fixed during that time and eroded due to inflation.

The lines shown on the graphic are jagged and not smooth, suggesting that even within these broader shifts, real minimum wages have continued to rise and fall slightly, within the range of approximately one dollar.

• Source: Tabulations by the Panel using monthly information on provincial minimum wages weighted by monthly LFS employment data. Adjustment for changes in the cost of living is based on the Consumer Price Index.

Also evident in these figures is the pattern of rapid and large increases in the provincial minimum wage that follow these extended periods in which minimum wages remain unchanged. In the Panel’s view this does not represent good public policy toward minimum wages. Lengthy periods in which minimum wages remain unchanged and are steadily eroded by inflation reduce the living standards of low wage workers, increase income inequality and contribute to poverty.

The large subsequent increases in the minimum wage impose difficult adjustments on employers of low wage labour. They are also disruptive to consumers who need to adjust to the changes in the prices of goods and services produced using low wage labour relative to other goods and services.

As indicated earlier, a number of provinces and territories now have in place minimum wage setting mechanisms that adjust wage rates relative to the CPI on an annual basis. These mechanisms will likely moderate the roller coaster patterns seen over recent decades in those jurisdictions. However, it is also possible that they could be reversed or overturned at some future date, which would increase the risks of returning to rapid changes after long periods of dormancy. It should also be noted that the three of the four most populous provinces do not have any system of regular adjustments (namely, British Columbia, Quebec and Alberta).

An additional disadvantage of the status quo minimum wage policy is that it is not as effective as possible in improving the earning power of minimum wage earners and reducing income inequality. This can be seen by reviewing minimum wage rates relative to prevailing wages. Figure 10 plots the relationship between provincial minimum wages and provincial median wages as of January 2019, together with the fitted relationship between the two (the solid line).

Saskatchewan currently ranks as Canada’s second highest wage province yet has a relatively low minimum wage as is evident in Figure 10. Newfoundland also has a minimum wage that is low relative to its median wage. Because the minimum wage rates in these jurisdictions are low relative to prevailing wages, they could likely be increased without risking significant adverse consequences.

Figure 10 - Text version

This graphic shows the relationship between the provincial median wage and the provincial minimum wage, as well as a regression line fitted to this relationship.

Provinces above the line have a low minimum wage relative to their median wage. Provinces below the line have a high minimum wage relative to their median wage.

The order of provinces above the line, from high minimum wage to low minimum wage, is as follows: Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan.

The order of provinces below the line, from high minimum wage to low minimum wage, is as follows: Ontario, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

While Saskatchewan has a high median wage, its minimum wage is among the lowest. On the other hand, Alberta has the highest minimum wage and the highest median wage. Nova Scotia has both the lowest median wage and the lowest minimum wage. The median and minimum wages of Quebec, British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta are generally closely related, as indicated by their proximity to the regression line shown on this graphic.

• Source: Median wages from January 2019 Labour Force Survey. Minimum wages from Government of Canada, Minimum Hourly Wages for Adult Workers.

The Panel is guided by the principle that standards, such as the minimum wage, should provide decency and wages sufficient to live on. We also believe that minimum wage policy should play a role in reducing income inequality. As discussed previously, research from several countries, including that of Fortin and Lemieux (2015) for Canada, concludes that changes in minimum wages play an important role in reducing inequality, particularly at the low end of the wage distribution.

Recommendation 1: The Panel recommends that a freestanding federal minimum wage be established and adjusted annually.

Options

Recommendation 2: The Panel proposes two options for setting the federal minimum wage:

1. A common federal minimum wage in all provinces, benchmarked at 60% of the median hourly wage of full-time workers in Canada; and
2. A minimum wage set at 60% of the median wage in each province.

While both of these options have potential benefits and drawbacks, which we outline below, the members of the Panel are in agreement that the ultimate decision on which option should be pursued ought to be subject to a full, vigorous discussion by Cabinet and take into account consultations with a broad range of stakeholders, some of which (including provincial and territorial governments) we were unable to speak with due to time constraints.

The Panel unanimously agreed that at least one of the approaches set forward is preferable to the status quo, though some members of the Panel did not agree that a particular option was preferable to the status quo.

Option 1: Common federal minimum wage in all provinces and territories

The approach

Arthurs (2006) observed that no worker should be paid so little that, after working at a full-time job for a full year, they will still find themselves with less money than they need to live at or above the poverty line. Option 1 would be intended to lift a person working full-time, full-year out of poverty by benchmarking a common federal minimum wage at 60% of the median hourly wage of full-time workers.^{Footnote 16 Footnote 17} This would currently translate into a rate of $15 per hour.

The proposed benchmark sits at the current highest provincial/territorial minimum wage of $15 per hour in Alberta, and just above the rates in Ontario ($14), British Columbia ($13.85), Northwest Territories ($13.65) and Nunavut ($13).

For lower wage jurisdictions, raising the federal floor would be significant if done at one time. While the actual numbers of employees and employers affected would be quite small, an increase of this size could have significant localized effects. Therefore, the increase in the federal minimum wage in these regions which would experience more than a $3 per hour increase would be phased in over two steps to reach the goal of 60% of the national median hourly wage (see Table 3).

Table 3: Proposed phase-in for federal minimum wage (Option 1)

FRPS hourly minimum wage rates as of June 2019		2019 Step 1			2020 Step 2
		$ Increase	% Increase	Rate	$ Increase	% Increase	Rate
Alberta	$15.00	$0	0	$15	$0	0	$15
Ontario	$14.00	$1.00	7%	$15	$0	0	$15
British Columbia	$13.85 ($14.60 June 2020; $15.20 June 2021)	$1.15	8%	$15	$0	0	$15
Northwest Territories	$13.46	$1.54	11%	$15	$0	0	$15
Nunavut	$13.00	$2.00	15%	$15	$0	0	$15
Yukon	$12.71	$2.29	18%	$15	$0	0	$15
Prince Edward Island	$12.25	$2.75	22%	$15	$0	0	$15
Quebec	$12.50	$2.50	20%	$15	$0	0	$15
Manitoba	$11.35 ($11.65 Oct 2019)	$1.83	16%	$13.18	$1.82	14%	$15
Nova Scotia	$11.55	$1.75	13%	$13.30	$1.75	13%	$15
New Brunswick	$11.50	$1.75	13%	$13.25	$1.75	13%	$15
Newfoundland & Labrador	$11.40	$1.80	16%	$13.20	$1.80	14%	$15
Saskatchewan	$11.06 ($11.32 Oct 2019)	$1.97	18%	$13.02	$1.97	15%	$15

• Source: Provincial and territorial minimum wage rates as of June 2019; calculations by Panel.

Potential benefits of Option 1

A federal $15 minimum wage would bring Canada in line with many other advanced economies and trading partners. The UK minimum wage is currently at $14.14 (CDN) and is slated to go up to 60% of median wages by 2020. There are strong moves in the US to increase the minimum wage and, averaging across all of these federal, state and local minimum wage laws, the effective minimum wage in the United States will be $11.80 ($15.84 CDN) an hour in 2019 (Tedeschi, 2019). Comparable economies such as Australia and New Zealand are at $17.51 (CDN) and $15.06 (CDN) respectively with New Zealand committed to move to $17.72 (CDN) by 2021.

A common federal minimum wage benchmarked to 60% of median wages would enable the federal government to take a leadership role alongside countries such as the UK in working to reduce low pay and income inequality. FRPS employees could see the percentage of low pay earners fall as has been the case in the UK.^{Footnote 18}

The implications of this policy on a national basis are two-fold. First, there would be a direct and, in some cases significant, impact on labour costs for FRPS employers. Second, there would be both a draw upwards on provincial/territorial minimum wages as well as fairly large differences between federal and provincial/territorial minimum wages in low wage provinces/territories.

There is a case to be made that the FRPS operates in markets characterized by natural or regulatory constraints on competition which provide capacity to absorb wage increases (Arthurs, 2006). As such, federally regulated businesses are not as susceptible to pressures of globalization and movement offshore in pursuit of lower labour costs.

Canada’s FRPS is largely comprised of domestic non-tradable goods and services and may be less subject to the effects of minimum wage increases experienced by more export-oriented firms (Harasztosi & Linder, 2017). Nevertheless, some industries such as trucking and airlines are relatively more exposed to international competition and the global supply chains of some other industries may also mean some level of disruption due to a minimum wage hike, particularly in lower wage provinces.

According to Labour Program data, the Atlantic provinces together represent relatively few FRPS employees (8% or 73,200). Only 10% of these workers currently earn less than $15 per hour and would see a wage increase. The impact of the proposed wage increase across the Atlantic provinces would be experienced by 7,320 employees. A similar pattern holds for Saskatchewan and Manitoba (approximately 550 and 1,460 individuals, respectively, would see an increase). With the exception of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island (which would see an overall wage increase of less than $3 per hour), the increase in the federal minimum wage would be phased in over two steps in these lower wage regions.

Large increases to the minimum wage are not without precedent in Canada. In May 2011, the BC government raised its minimum wage by 28% in one year. Ontario recently raised its minimum wage by 21%. Fears of layoffs in both provinces have proved to be largely unfounded.

A common federal minimum wage would also serve to reduce competition between provinces and territories for federal undertakings on the basis of low wages. There could, however, be some increased risk of competition between federally and non-federally regulated employers. Given the low incidence of employees in the FRPS earning less than $15 (approximately 7.4% in 2017), competition between federally and provincially/territorially regulated employers would be focused in the bottom segment of the labour market. The majority of employees earning less than $15 work for large firms that are, in general, better positioned to adjust to a higher wage floor.

The proposed federal minimum wage would impact those industrial sectors with lower wages and those workers at the lower wage levels of industries with broader wage structures. Table 4 demonstrates that employees in the transport sectors (air, rail and marine, and road transport, respectively) will experience the most direct increases in wage rates compared to other sectors. Those employees in road transport, banking, telecommunications and broadcast will experience potential spillover effects on their wage rates as they sit just above the proposed minimum wage rate.

Table 4: Incidence of wage rates for FRPS industries

Sector	Current minimum wage (pegged at provincial rates)	Minimum wage at $15 >$15	Earning $15 to $17
Overall	3%	6.3%	7.6%
Air transport	6%	13.5%	7.4%
Rail & maritime transport	5%	11.8%	1.6%
Road transport	4%	8.4%	35.4%
Postal services & pipelines	2%	4.5%	9.5%
Banks	3%	4.9%	30.3%
Telecommunications & broadcasting	3%	5.8%	11.4%
Other	2%	2.6%	4.6%

• Source: Tabulations by the Panel based on LFS 2018 and 2019 microdata. The FRPS cannot be precisely identified in the LFS. Estimates are the Panel’s best approximation.

Table 5 illustrates the incidence of current minimum wage earners, as well as those who would see their wages brought up to $15 and those earning $15 to $17 per hour who would potentially experience spillover effects.

Table 5: Incidence of wage rates for certain groups of FRPS workers

	Current minimum wage (pegged at provincial rates)	Minimum wage at $15 >$15	Earning $15 to $17
Overall	3%	6.3%	7.6%
Women	4%	8.5%	10.1%
Immigrants	3%	6.1%	8.1%
Temporary	7%	13.0%	15.7%
Part-time	3%	17.2%	21.3%
Aboriginal	4%	7.5%	8.3%

• Source: Tabulations by the Panel based on LFS 2018 and 2019 microdata. The FRPS cannot be precisely identified in the LFS. Estimates are the Panel’s best approximation.

As employers adjust wage schedules in line with a minimum wage increase, they may adjust wages just above the minimum wage to restore former wage differentials to maintain recruitment, retention and morale (Gunderson, 2005). Evidence for Canada is provided by Fortin and Lemieux (2015) who find that there may be increases in the 5th and 10th percentiles of wage distribution but that above the 15th percentile there is no significant impact.

As discussed above, low wages are not experienced equally. More precarious workers will benefit more from the proposed minimum wage increase than employees overall. As such, the proposed federal minimum wage benchmarked to 60% of median wages will move Canada forward in its goals for equity-seeking communities.

As discussed above, minimum wage increases since the mid-2000s have generally increased the floor of wages across the country and contributed to compression of wages at the bottom. Raising the floor will not reduce that wage compression, but it will be a draw from productivity gains going to the top rather than from the middle of the income distribution.^{Footnote 19}

The federal government has a social policy role to take action to reduce income inequality. While the overall impact will be quite small given the small size of the FRPS and the lower proportion of employees earning less than $15 compared to the provincial and territorial jurisdictions, it will provide a lead and best practice for economic development of the nation. Raising the floor will contribute on the demand side of the economy which is 54% of the economy and would be unlikely to impact on the investment side.^{Footnote 20}

Potential drawbacks of Option 1

The principal concern around this option relates to potential adverse consequences for both employers and FRPS workers in regions with low prevailing wages. These concerns are heightened by the magnitudes of the implied overall minimum wage increases in these regions, ranging from 30% to 35% in four of the five lowest wage provinces, and 22% in Prince Edward Island (PEI). There would also be a large gap between the provincial/territorial and federal minimums going forward. This additional labour cost could also increase the incentive for FRPS employers to contract out work to contractors with lower labour costs regulated by the provinces and territories.

Whether a meaningful decline in employment would occur in the FRPS is uncertain, and would depend in part on whether firms could pass along higher costs to consumers. The low wage regions trade with other regions in Canada as well as the US and elsewhere. Accordingly, the ability of regional producers to pass along their higher costs in the form of higher prices may be limited. There may also be other potential adverse consequences for regional competitiveness.

Another concern is the impact on low skilled workers. Some US research (Clemens, Kahn, & Meer, 2018) has found that employers will respond by raising their hiring standards, thus reducing employment opportunities for the least skilled. In the lowest wage provinces, 25% or more of the workforce earns less than $15. Jobs that pay $15 are highly desirable and would likely attract more skilled workers who are more likely to be hired over their unskilled counterparts, which would harm the least skilled.

A final unintended consequence could be that provincial and territorial governments will be pressured to raise their minimum wages beyond what regional conditions can support.

Option 2: Variable federal minimum wage in each province and territory pegged to median wages

The approach

This approach would peg the federal minimum wage in each province and territory at a fixed percentage of the median wage in each province and territory. For the purposes of discussing the advantages and disadvantages of this option, 60% of the median is chosen as an example. This would currently mean a minimum wage ranging from a low of $11.77 in New Brunswick to a high of $16.04 in Alberta.

The federal government could choose a more ambitious target such as 65% of the median wage, or a lower level such as 55% of the median wage.

Potential benefits of Option 2

Option 2 is intended to lift a person working full-time, full-year out of poverty, by benchmarking the federal minimum wage at 60% of the provincial or territorial median hourly wage. Like Option 1, it would contribute to advancing the objectives of the federal Poverty Reduction Strategy.

Another important advantage of this option is that it takes account of regional differences in labour market conditions and wages. The median of the wage distribution is generally higher in provinces and territories with higher prevailing wages and lower in lower wage provinces and territories. Indeed, because it represents the wage rate earned by the person in the middle of the wage distribution, the median wage is often used as a simple measure of prevailing wages in a region.

Large wage differences across regions are an enduring feature of Canadian labour markets. Substantial differences in rates of unemployment, employment and labour force participation, as well as wage rates and employment income, exist and generally persist. Table 6 shows the average and median wage by province in 2018. There are clearly large differences in prevailing wages across provinces. Both the average and median wage in the highest wage province (Alberta) are approximately 40% greater than that in the lowest wage province (PEI).

A similar picture emerges if one compares the highest wage provinces as a group (Alberta and Saskatchewan followed by BC and Ontario) to the lowest wage provinces (PEI, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Manitoba). Within jurisdictions, there are also important wage differences between major cities and rural areas.

This option also treats FRPS employees working in different regions fairly. They would receive wages at the same level relative to non-FRPS employees in the province or territory in which they work, in contrast to the status quo where employees in the FRPS are well paid relative to other workers in some provinces/territories and poorly paid in others.

A central challenge for federal minimum wage policy is whether and how to take account of differences across regions in prevailing wages. In setting the minimum wage for their jurisdiction provincial governments clearly pay attention to prevailing wages—the provincial minimum wage is lowest in the low wage provinces and highest in the high wage provinces (see Table 6 and Table 7). There are powerful economic reasons for doing so: any specific minimum wage (such as $15 per hour) is likely to be too high for some regions (that is, the benefits of such a high minimum wage are not large enough to justify the associated adverse consequences) and too low in others (that is, the benefits of raising the minimum wage would outweigh the associated adverse consequences).

Table 6: Average and median wages by province, 2018

Province	Median	Mean
Newfoundland	$21.54	$25.55
Prince Edward Island	$19.10	$22.23
Nova Scotia	$19.95	$23.46
New Brunswick	$19.62	$22.75
Quebec	$22.02	$25.45
Ontario	$23.40	$27.37
Manitoba	$20.93	$24.51
Saskatchewan	$24.46	$27.46
Alberta	$26.75	$30.87
British Columbia	$23.54	$26.71

• Source: Tabulations from Labour Force Survey public use microdata.
• Note: Mean and median are averages of monthly data, July 1, 2018 and December 1, 2018.

Table 7: Minimum wage and 60% of median wage by province, 2018

Province	Provincial minimum wage	60% of median wage	Difference
Newfoundland	$11.40	$12.92	$1.52
Prince Edward Island	$12.25	$12.25	$0.00
Nova Scotia	$11.55	$11.98	$0.43
New Brunswick	$11.50	$11.77	$0.27
Quebec	$12.50	$13.21	$0.71
Ontario	$14.00	$14.04	$0.04
Manitoba	$11.35	$12.56	$1.21
Saskatchewan	$11.06	$14.68	$3.62
Alberta	$15.00	$16.04	$1.04
British Columbia	$13.85	$14.12	$0.27

• Note: Provincial MW as of June 1, 2019. Median wages based on monthly LFS data July 2018 to December 2018.

Table 7 shows the provincial minimum wages as of June 1, 2019, 60% of the provincial median wage and the difference between the two. Because 60% of the median is a relatively ambitious target, this choice results in a federal minimum wage that exceeds the provincial minimum wage in all jurisdictions except PEI. At the present time, given prevailing wages and provincial minimums, most upward adjustments are less than $1.00. Larger increases would occur in Manitoba ($1.21), Newfoundland ($1.71) and Saskatchewan ($3.62). These three provinces (especially Saskatchewan) stand out as provinces with a low minimum wage relative to the prevailing median wage.

An advantage of Option 2 for setting the federal minimum wage is that it results in a larger gap between the federal minimum and the provincial minimum in provinces with low minimum wages relative to their median wage. These are the provinces in which the minimum wage can be increased the most without risking adverse consequences.

A key beneficial feature of this option is that it would result in more stability over time in the federal minimum wage compared to the more erratic behaviour displayed by provincial minimum wages during recent decades with the status quo. The paths of the provincial minimum and 60% of the provincial median wage for three provinces are shown in Figure 11 to Figure 13 for illustrative purposes. Both series are adjusted for changes in the cost of living.

Figure 11 shows the Ontario experience since 1997. Between 1999 and 2003 the minimum wage declined substantially in real terms resulting in a widening gap between the minimum wage and 60% of the provincial median wage. This was followed by substantial increases in the real minimum wage during the 2003 to 2010 period, eliminating the gap by 2010. Since 2010 the minimum wage and 10th percentile have followed very similar paths.

Figure 11 - Text version

Year	60% Median wage	Provincial minimum wage
1997	$13.28	$10.11
1998	$13.15	$10.01
1999	$13.26	$9.84
2000	$13.43	$9.58
2001	$13.50	$9.34
2002	$13.21	$9.14
2003	$13.24	$8.89
2004	$13.38	$9.08
2005	$13.47	$9.26
2006	$13.22	$9.44
2007	$13.79	$9.55
2008	$13.84	$10.01
2009	$13.99	$10.85
2010	$13.81	$11.52
2011	$13.55	$11.41
2012	$13.81	$11.24
2013	$13.78	$11.13
2014	$13.83	$11.39
2015	$14.23	$11.66
2016	$14.10	$11.73
2017	$14.11	$11.71
2018	$14.10	$14.00

• Source: Minimum wages from Government of Canada, Hourly Minimum Wages in CANADA for Adult Workers; monthly provincial employment from Labour Force Survey.

Alberta’s minimum wage (Figure 12) followed a more erratic path than 60% of the median, which increased significantly over the 1997 to 2018 period. The decline in the minimum wage from 2000 to 2004 resulted in a large differential between the provincial minimum wage and what the federal minimum wage would have been if set equal to 60% of the provincial median wage. This gap was maintained until the recent substantial hikes in Alberta’s minimum wage starting in 2015.

Figure 12 - Text version

Year	60% Median wage	Provincial minimum wage
1997	$11.73	$7.38
1998	$12.28	$7.45
1999	$12.24	$8.12
2000	$12.31	$8.25
2001	$12.48	$8.05
2002	$12.53	$7.87
2003	$12.46	$7.66
2004	$12.75	$7.52
2005	$13.39	$7.81
2006	$13.94	$8.56
2007	$14.45	$8.78
2008	$14.84	$9.70
2009	$15.31	$10.14
2010	$15.12	$10.08
2011	$15.36	$10.02
2012	$15.79	$10.43
2013	$16.29	$10.66
2014	$15.99	$10.69
2015	$16.44	$11.01
2016	$16.21	$11.90
2017	$16.73	$12.83
2018	$16.34	$13.95

• Source: Minimum wages from Government of Canada, Hourly Minimum Wages in CANADA for Adult Workers; monthly provincial employment from Labour Force Survey.

Like Ontario and Alberta, BC’s minimum wage (Figure 13) declined in purchasing power terms for a lengthy period (2002 to 2010) and the gap between 60% of the median wage and the provincial wage grew substantially. Large increases in the BC minimum wage followed in 2010 to 2012, narrowing the gap. Since 2012, both series have followed similar upward paths.

Figure 13 - Text version

Year	60% Median wage	Provincial minimum wage
1997	$14.17	$10.33
1998	$14.84	$10.39
1999	$14.65	$10.27
2000	$14.26	$10.10
2001	$13.95	$10.46
2002	$14.41	$10.67
2003	$13.94	$10.39
2004	$13.76	$10.20
2005	$13.47	$9.97
2006	$13.75	$9.78
2007	$13.70	$9.57
2008	$14.03	$9.35
2009	$13.99	$9.32
2010	$14.43	$9.16
2011	$14.09	$9.60
2012	$14.20	$10.96
2013	$14.34	$11.13
2014	$14.35	$10.92
2015	$14.54	$10.87
2016	$14.34	$11.00
2017	$14.73	$11.27
2018	$14.40	$12.11

• Source: Minimum wages from: Government of Canada, Hourly Minimum Wages in CANADA for Adult Version; monthly provincial employment from Labour Force Survey.

A clear conclusion from these figures (and corresponding figures for the other seven provinces) is that setting the federal minimum wage equal to 60% of the provincial or territorial median wage would result in greater stability over time in the federal minimum wage. Although there may occasionally be unusual periods in which the median wage declines from one year to the next in inflation-adjusted terms, these do not necessarily imply that the dollar value of the median wage declined. In any event, a simple fix for such an eventuality would be to adopt the policy that the level of the federal minimum wage can increase over time but not decrease.

This option also has the advantage of treating FRPS employees working in different provinces and territories fairly in the sense that their minimum wage would be set at the same point in the prevailing wage distribution relative to non-FRPS employees in the provinces or territory. To some extent this also accounts for differences in the cost of living across regions because living costs (especially housing) tend to be lower in lower wage provinces than in higher wage provinces.

Potential drawbacks of Option 2

As we heard during our engagement activities, setting the federal minimum wage at 13 different provincial and territorial median wage rates may be confusing and administratively complex for both employers and employees, particularly so for national companies that operate undertakings that are both federal and provincially/territorially regulated.

This option suggests that provincial/territorial prevailing wages provide a better indicator of the cost of living differences for which a federal minimum wage should account. Canada’s official poverty line sets out the income requirements based on cost of living in 50 regions across the country.^{Footnote 21} This absolute measure of poverty demonstrates that, for low wage earners, the cost of living is shaped by living costs associated with living in the largest cities in the country or in smaller towns or rural areas. For example, the highest poverty lines are in communities of less than 30,000 in Alberta, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, PEI, and Saskatchewan.^{Footnote 22} A common federal minimum wage based on a national or cross-country median wage may be better able to account for these factors contributing to Canada’s poverty levels.

Finally, linking a federal minimum wage to provincial/territorial medians rather than a national median may unintentionally reproduce provincial/territorial income inequality dynamics. Income inequality is, in part, due to the top sectors of the labour market extracting higher "rents" or wages than the lower sectors of the labour market which have seen real wage growth of about 2% over recent decades. These inequalities are reflected in prevailing or median wages. Averaging median wages over a national rather than a provincial/territorial basis may better moderate this factor.

Non-standard work: Trends in the federally regulated private sector

Federal labour standards are based on the assumption that standard work, meaning work that is full-time, permanent and part of an employment relationship with one employer (ILO, 2016), is the norm. However, as the nature of work changes, a small but significant and potentially growing portion of workers are engaged in non-standard work, or work that differs from standard employment (ILO, 2016).

Non-standard work is generally understood in terms of a proliferation in the forms of employment. It covers a broad spectrum of workers, including part-time, temporary and temporary help agency employees, as well as dependent and independent contractors (see Figure 14).

Figure 14 - Text version

This graphic shows the spectrum of labour standards protection across forms of work, with full protection on the left-most end and no protection on the right-most end. On the left, with full protection of labour standards, is the permanent, full-time employee. This worker is considered to be in standard work. All other forms of work offer fewer protections than standard work and are considered to be non-standard forms of work. From the left, following the permanent full-time employee, these forms of work include: the permanent, part-time employee; the temporary, full-time employee; the temporary, part-time employee; the temporary agency employee; the dependent contractor; and finally, the independent contractor with no labour standards protection.

Non-standard forms of work that are common in the gig economy (also called the "on-demand" economy or "platform" economy),^{Footnote 24} such as gig work, task-based work and zero hours contracts (contracts with no guaranteed hours), fall along different points of the spectrum and many workers do not fit neatly in one category. If they work under multiple contracts, it is possible that many different labels would apply at the same time.

Non-standard employment accounts for approximately a third of total employment in Canada (Busby & Muthukumaran, 2016; Randstad, 2017; Bank of Canada, 2019). After rising significantly in the 1980s and 1990s (OECD, 2018; ILO, 2016; Fudge & Vosko, 2001; Atkinson & Meager, 1986), the overall share of non-standard forms of work that we can easily measure (namely, part-time, temporary or term contract and own-account self-employed) has stabilized and persists as a feature of the labour market. This "period of relative stasis" has been described as "persistent precarity" (Noack & Vosko, 2011).

Workers aged 18 to 24 are overrepresented in this category, with 58% of them occupying a non-standard job (Bank of Canada, 2019; Noiseux, 2012). Women are more likely than men to engage in non-standard work (Crane, 2018; Fudge & Vosko, 2001; Cranford et al., 2003a; Zeytinoglu & Muteshi, 2000). Workers from provinces with historically high unemployment rates are also overrepresented (Bank of Canada, 2019; OECD, 2018), as are workers with disabilities (Schur, 2002, regarding American workers), and racialized workers (Cranford et al., 2003b).

Similar labour force features can be observed in the FRPS, but on a smaller scale. Based on the 2015 Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey (FJWS), about 15% of employees in the FRPS are not in full-time permanent jobs (ESDC, 2019b). This compares to 29% of employees in Canada overall.

Based on Labour Program analysis of the 2015 FJWS, the 2017 Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the 2017 Survey of Employment, Payroll, and Hours (ESDC, 2019a), about 10% of all FRPS employees work part-time, compared to 18% of all employees in Canada. An estimated 5.5% of FRPS employees are in temporary work, with about half of them in term or contract employment and the rest in either seasonal or casual employment. In Canada overall, temporary employees constitute 14% of all employees.

In 2018, over 20% of temporary employees earned low wages while 9.3 % of permanent employees earned low wages in the FRPS.^{Footnote 25 Footnote 26} Lower income for temporary workers can be attributed in part to fewer or less secure hours of work. Women comprise 39% of all FRPS employees, but 53% of part-time employees. In 2017, the greatest proportion of temporary employees worked in banks (25%), followed by telecommunications and broadcasting (16%), miscellaneous industries (16%), road transport (13%) and postal services and pipelines (13%).^{Footnote 27} Even though temporary work can be well paid or provide a stepping stone to more permanent jobs, it tends to be lower paid and with fewer benefits than full-time permanent work (ILO, 2016).

Moreover, there are approximately 80,000 self-employed workers in the FRPS who are not protected by labour standards under Part III of the Canada Labour Code (Code).^{Footnote 28} Although no precise data are available, these workers are likely a mix of independent and dependent contractors and, possibly, employees. When employees are misclassified as independent contractors, sizeable costs and risks are shifted onto workers who are deprived of labour standards protections (Carre, 2015; Donahue et al., 2007).

Non-standard work is the result not only of changes in the nature of workers’ forms of employment, but also the shift from a hierarchical unit of production to a decentralized firm structure. The interaction between employers’ search for flexibility, the globalization and financialization of economic activities and the acceleration of technological transformations have, in recent years, profoundly changed the way work is organized (Stone, 2006).

The "flexible firm" is articulated around three axes: numerical, functional and financial flexibility (Atkinson & Meager, 1986; Burrows et al., 1992). Essentially, employers seek to increase or decrease their workforce as quickly as needed while minimizing the financial burden caused by wages and other employer benefits. As a result, many employers focus on core competencies and outsource other activities (Mercure, 2001).

David Weil (2014) describes this process as "fissuring". It allows firms to benefit from the work of employees without directly being considered by labour law as their employer. Fissuring includes offshoring, subcontracting and the use of temporary help agencies, and is a key factor in work featuring low wages, non-compliance with core workplace statutes, limited benefits, more contingent employment, greater risk exposure and weakened bargaining power for the job-holder.

Fissuring can lead workers to experience labour market insecurity and precarity (Standing, 1997; Vosko, 2005). Vosko (2010) has provided the most comprehensive definition of precarious work, which is characterized by some combination of uncertainty, low income and limited social benefits and statutory entitlements. She argues precarious work varies and is shaped by employment status (employment or self-employment), form (hours, tenure and duration of work), dimension of insecurity (degree of uncertainty, degree of regulatory coverage, control over the labour process itself, working conditions, wages, and collective bargaining agreement coverage), social context (occupation, geography, industry) and social location (gender, social status, citizenship status).

Other scholars suggest precarious work is characterized by a lack of numerous related securities that extend beyond the terms of work itself, such as labour market security, or full employment; job security, or retention and advancement; work security, or health and safety rules; skill reproduction security, or training and upgrading; income security, or assurance of a stable income and inclusion in the social safety net; and representation security, or a collective voice and the right to strike (Standing, 2011). Thus, a greater number of such cumulative insecurities may result in more precarious work. While precarious work and non-standard work are not interchangeable concepts, the first should be seen as a possible consequence of the latter.

In the Canadian context, the fissuring of the workplace makes it even more challenging to determine whether an employer’s operations are regulated by the federal government or covered by provincial or territorial labour legislation. For instance, are employees hired through a temporary help agency to work in a federally regulated undertaking protected by the Code or subject to provincial/territorial jurisdiction? According to the 2015 FJWS, federally regulated businesses reported paying 60,000 temporary workers through an employment agency. They are not counted in the FJWS as they are not considered employees of the federally regulated firm, and mostly worked in postal services and pipelines (66%). Other temporary agency workers were reported in banking (13%), telecommunications and broadcasting (10%), and road transport (8%). Nearly all (95%) were reported in firms with 100 or more employees.

Canadian courts have recognized that labour relations, including labour standards, are presumed to be a provincial/territorial matter. The federal jurisdiction applies only by way of exception.^{Footnote 29} In addition to the clear cases of "direct jurisdiction"—for example, a worker directly employed by a bank (under federal jurisdiction as per 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867) will be regulated by federal legislation—the federal government also has jurisdiction over someone who works for an enterprise that is "an integral part of a federally regulated undertaking".^{Footnote 30} The Supreme Court has termed this concept "derivative jurisdiction".^{Footnote 31} To determine whether derivative jurisdiction applies, the court must assess "the essential operational nature of a work, business or undertaking […] to determine if that ongoing nature renders the work integral to a federal undertaking".^{Footnote 32}

The focus of the analysis is on the relationship between the related business, the subcontractor, and the federal operation that is said to benefit from the work provided by the employees of the related business. The analysis is twofold: the effective performance of the federal undertaking must be dependent on the services provided by the related business and vice versa, and providing those services must be core to the activities of the related business itself.^{Footnote 33} The jurisdictional determination will in turn determine the legal framework applicable to the employees.

This is not an insignificant matter given differences often exist between federal and provincial/territorial regimes. Further, given the increasing use and complexity of fissuring, the determination of jurisdiction can become a major challenge. This also likely explains why very little data is available to map the reality of workers in the FRPS employed in such "fissured" workplaces. Several related businesses, such as subcontractors and temporary help agencies, will be provincially/territorially regulated.

Governments have approached the consequences of non-standard work through a variety of mechanisms, such as reducing the economic incentives for employers to hire on a temporary or contract basis and establishing limits on the length of temporary forms of employment.

The European Union (EU) has long promoted improvements in quality of work for part-time, term/contract and temporary agency employees. Directives on fixed-term, part-time and temporary agency employment have been passed in the last two decades.^{Footnote 34} In general, these Directives state that workers cannot be treated less favourably than comparable full-time workers solely on the basis of their employment status.

In April of this year, the European Parliament passed a Directive titled Transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union (2019) that builds upon the 1999 Directive on fixed term work and the 2008 Directive on temporary agency work.^{Footnote 35} The 2019 Directive is aimed at updating and extending the information on employment-related obligations and working conditions. Employers are required to provide information to workers about the working relationship, schedules, right to request more secure employment and to have other (parallel) employment and protection from dismissal if they make a complaint. The Directive applies to all employees, including workers in casual or short-term employment, on-demand workers, domestic workers and platform workers.

The 1999 EU Directive on fixed-term work also requires countries to introduce one or more of the following measures relating to the terms of temporary contracts: objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships; the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts and relationships; and the maximum number of successive renewals.^{Footnote 36}

Non-standard work has wide-ranging implications for workers, employers (whether they rely on non-standard workers or not) and society in general. It is important to note that not all workers in non-standard work face the same challenges (Rodgers & Rodgers, 1989). Part-time, temporary and temporary agency employees are formally covered by labour standards protections. However, workers who are not employees, or are not considered to be employees, are not protected by basic labour standards. For some, non-standard work can offer flexibility, enabling them to meet personal and family obligations and find better work-life balance, especially in the case of part-timers (ILO, 2016). Others are vulnerable to low income and overwork. Girard (2010) notes that there is generally a lack of studies on the effects of self-employment, temporary employment and multiple jobs holdings on family life.

Employers include non-standard workers in their workforces for different reasons and this can have impacts for them as well as those employers who do not rely on non-standard workers. Some employers, particularly those with 24/7 operations, emphasized during our engagement activities that certain types of non-standard work (for example, temporary, part-time) are necessary to enable them to operate (for example, during peak periods) and remain competitive. This is in line with research by the OECD (2018) and ILO (2016) that indicates that non-standard work can help employers remain competitive and increase profits by allowing them to build a flexible and agile workforce. However, non-standard work also makes for an uneven playing field amongst competitors (De Stefano, 2016) and increases employment churn.

There is research pointing to broader societal implications of non-standard work in the labour force (De Stefano, 2016). These include lower home ownership and fertility rates, both of which could have negative societal consequences (ILO, 2016). The literature on the economic impacts of non-standard work highlights labour market segmentation^{Footnote 37} (ILO, 2016) and increased inequality (OECD, 2015). It is also recognized that the lightened tax burden of certain employers leads to tax loss. The misclassification of employees as independent contractors causes, in the United States alone, annual losses of tax revenue in the billions of dollars (National Employment Law Project, 2012).

Non-standard work and Part III of the Code

Part III of the Code applies to, and in respect of, employees employed in or in connection to any federal work, undertaking or business (including employees of Crown corporations and excluding the federal public service). Part III is the only labour standards legislation in Canada that does not include a definition of "employee". Recent changes to Part III set a precedent for extending protections to some workers (that is, beyond employees), both in terms of coverage and effective access to such protections.

Part III does not currently treat independent contractors as employees. In the application of Part III, binary determinations of whether someone is a true employee (who would be covered by Part III) or a true independent contractor (who would not be covered by Part III) are therefore made on a regular basis by workers and employers and, when complaints are brought forward, on a case-by-case basis by Labour Program inspectors, adjudicators and the courts.^{Footnote 38}

Part I (Industrial Relations) of the Code does recognize the existence of "dependent contractors" and treats them as employees. In particular, Part I defines a "dependent contractor" as:

1. the owner, purchaser or lessee of a vehicle used for hauling, other than on rails or tracks, livestock, liquids, goods, merchandise or other materials, who is a party to a contract, oral or in writing, under the terms of which they are:
   1. required to provide the vehicle by means of which they perform the contract and to operate the vehicle in accordance with the contract; and
   2. entitled to retain for their own use from time to time any sum of money that remains after the cost of their performance of the contract is deducted from the amount they are paid, in accordance with the contract, for that performance;
2. a fisher who, pursuant to an arrangement to which the fisher is a party, is entitled to a percentage or other part of the proceeds of a joint fishing venture in which the fisher participates with other persons; and
3. any other person who, whether or not employed under a contract of employment, performs work or services for another person on such terms and conditions that they are, in relation to that other person, in a position of economic dependence on, and under an obligation to perform duties for, that other person

The rationale for providing dependent contractors with rights under Part I stems from arguments put forward by Harry Arthurs in the 1960s (Arthurs, 1967). Arthurs argued that dependent contractors should not be excluded from collective bargaining simply because their employment relationship did not resemble a traditional employer-employee relationship. A key point was that collective bargaining is a means of correcting a power imbalance and, because dependent contractors occupy the same labour market space as employees, they should be eligible for unionization.

The Code also offers certain protections to both union and non-union employees when a business or part of a business is sold, leased, merged or otherwise transferred. Part I allows a bargaining agent to continue to represent its unionized employees after such a sale or transfer, and allows the collective agreement to remain in place until it expires. This is known as "successorship rights".^{Footnote 39} The new employer is bound by the existing collective agreement.

Part III provides that, when a federal work, undertaking or business, is transferred from one employer to another, the employment of employees is deemed to be continuous, notwithstanding the transfer. This is referred to as "continuity of employment".^{Footnote 40} Continuity of employment is required to establish and retain entitlement to protections and benefits under Part III that are only granted after completing a period of continuous employment with the same employer (for example, unjust dismissal, sick leave, bereavement and parental leaves and termination pay).

Until recently, neither of these provisions applied when a contract was retendered. This is commonly referred to as "contract flipping". Under the amendments to section 189 made in the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2 (BIA 2), continuity of employment will now be protected when a contract is retendered and the second employer becomes responsible for carrying out any federal work, undertaking or business, or part of one. It will also be protected when the work was previously regulated at the provincial or territorial level.

BIA 2 also made other important amendments to Part III to:

• Prohibit employers from paying part-time, temporary, causal or seasonal employees a lower wage than other employees simply because of their employment status if they are doing substantially the same work under similar conditions, unless the difference in rates of pay are based on objective factors (for example, seniority, merit);
• Require employers to provide all employees, regardless of their status, with information about labour standards requirements, their conditions of employment and promotional opportunities; and
• Prohibit temporary help agencies from charging a fee to an employee in connection with assigning the employee to perform work for a client and paying an employee at a lower rate than the rate paid by the client to its employees.

When implemented, these changes are expected to reduce economic incentives for employers to use non-standard forms of employment.

The recent changes will also improve access to entitlements for those covered by Part III by: eliminating the continuous employment requirements for general holiday pay, sick leave, maternity and parental leave, leave related to critical illness and leave related to death or disappearance of a child; and reducing the continuous employment requirement for three weeks of paid vacation from 6 years to 5 years. This will assist temporary, seasonal and casual employees in becoming eligible for statutory entitlements. The Expert Panel notes, however, that the concept of "continuous employment" is not defined in the Code.

Other changes introduced through BIA 2 will help prevent misclassification and protect misclassified employees. Specifically, an employer will be prohibited from treating an employee as if they are not their employee in order to avoid their obligations under Part III or to deprive the employee of their rights under Part III. Moreover, if in any proceeding in respect of a complaint made under Part III the employer alleges that the complainant is not their employee, the burden of proof is on the employer.

The Expert Panel believes it is important to observe that the intent element sets the initial burden of proof on the shoulders of the employee, who must establish the employer’s intent to avoid obligations or deprive the worker of their entitlements under the Code. Nevertheless, this amendment is likely to send a signal to employers and workers about misclassification and, in that sense, is proactive.

The BIA 2 changes received Royal Assent in December 2018 and are coming into force as necessary regulations are put in place.

Finally, Part III has recently been amended to provide greater protection for individuals in the FRPS in another form of non-standard work, namely unpaid internships.^{Footnote 41} This was done through Bill C-63, the Budget Implementation Act, 2017, No. 1, which received Royal Assent in December 2017. Once in force, which is anticipated to be in 2020, the new provisions will prohibit unpaid internships in the FRPS unless they are part of an educational program and make sure, through regulations, that any unpaid interns whose internships are part of such a program and who are unpaid receive labour standards protections appropriate to this type of non-standard work. The changes will come into force as soon as necessary regulations are in place.

Taken together, these changes introduced as part of the federal government’s modernizing federal labour standards agenda make important strides to better address non-standard work. However, there is still more to be done.

What we heard

During our engagement activities, we heard differing views about the extent to which non-standard work is a problem in the FRPS. We also heard a range of ideas that could be pursued related to this issue, with significant agreement on the need for more education and better guidance.

Some employers emphasized that certain types of non-standard employment are necessary to enable them to operate and remain competitive, and that they sometimes use non-standard employment forms as a recruitment and retention tool. For example, it can allow them to accommodate workers nearing retirement or attending school. According to some employers and employer organizations, people in non-standard employment are usually professional, highly skilled contractors who choose such work because it is lucrative.

Unions told us that some people are struggling in the FRPS. We heard from one civil society group that precarity forces people to live in poverty or spend more on healthcare and housing, and that this struggle has an impact on employers’ bottom lines. We also heard that it can contribute to anxiety, burnout and the inability to plan for life decisions such as buying a home. We heard that these issues impact certain groups, such as immigrants, youth, women, visible minorities, trans and gender-diverse people, differently.

It was noted in a roundtable with civil society groups and worker associations, for example, that immigrants, youth and women are overrepresented in non-standard work forms and arrangements. Youth spoke of "a new normal" where some work excessive hours at multiple precarious jobs. Indigenous organizations told us that there is a trend towards more contract work in their communities, often driven by government funding agreements, and that workers who do such work typically have irregular hours and no benefits.

Participants proposed a range of ideas related to this issue that tended to fall under the following themes: coverage of Part III, definitions of key terms, education and guidance, and rules around specific issues.

Conclusions and recommendations

We set out here two sets of recommendations in response to the questions we were asked to address. The first set pertains to who should be covered by labour standards and the second to how to ensure non-standard workers have effective access to these standards.

The "right to disconnect" and the changing nature of work: mapping the issue

A key function of statutory labour standards has been the setting of boundaries between work and non-work time. Historically, such standards were seen as necessary to balance competing interests over who controls a worker’s time (ILO, 2011; Berg et al., 2014; Berg et al., 2004). This balance included protecting employees from excessive hours and safeguarding their need for rest, recovery and time for personal responsibilities (Paulin, 2008).

These labour standards emerged in a context that was specific to industrial society, involving what is referred to as standard work. However, with globalization and financialization of the economy, the transition from an industrial society to a service-based society, and the increasing accessibility of information and communication technology tools, work is no longer always tied to a physical location and many firms have adopted diversified working time practices (Berg et al., 2004; Berg et al., 2014).

Many employers require a flexible workforce that is available around the clock in order to meet demand and remain competitive in today’s global economy. In some workplaces, constant availability and connectivity is simply a part of the workplace culture. During our engagement activities, we heard from employers that flexibility is key to accommodate time zone differences, continuous operations and employee control over their work hours. Implicit or explicit workplace expectations drive employees to stay connected to work via email or messaging apps, and to send or reply to work-related messages at any time (Vallée, 2010).

Mobile devices such as cell and smartphones, tablets, laptop computers, email, instant messaging and communication apps make it possible for employees to perform actual work beyond usual work hours or outside the usual workplace or worksite(s). Some employers provide employees with mobile devices at the employer’s cost and allow their use for personal calls and messaging both at work and after hours. In other cases, employees will use their personal devices for professional purposes. In 2017, mobile networks covered approximately one quarter of Canada’s geographic land mass and reached 99% of Canadians while the mobile services penetration rate reached 85.7% (CRTC, 2018).^{Footnote 82}

The increased availability of mobile technologies has also led to the emergence "third time" (also known as "standby" or "on-call" time), during which employers require employees to remain connected and available beyond usual work hours or outside the usual workplace or worksite(s) in case of need (Vallée, 2010; Vallée & Gesualdi-Fecteau, 2016; Coiquaud, 2016).

The effects of ubiquitous information and communication technology tools in a work-related context are varied. On one hand, workers increasingly use technology to set up flexible work arrangements so they can create a more satisfactory work-life balance (EuroFound & ILO, 2017). Flexible work arrangements allow employees to permanently or temporarily alter their work schedule, the number of hours they work or the location where they do their work, or to take leave from work to meet personal responsibilities. Telework, which generally entails working offsite, appears to contribute to higher staff retention, improved employee performance (as a result of fewer interruptions) and higher productivity (partly because employees work more unpaid hours).^{Footnote 83}

On the other hand, engaging in e-communications for work purposes outside of work hours has been associated with poorer employee recovery from work and increased work-life interference, higher levels of burnout and increased health impairments (Derks & Bakker, 2014; Fenner & Renn, 2010; Arlinghaus & Nachreiner, 2014; Barber & Santuzzi, 2014; Dembe, 2005).^{Footnote 84} The feeling that employees cannot "switch off" interferes with their ability to recover from work. Research also suggests that extended "workplace telepressure" can be detrimental to family life because the work performed outside of the workplace or worksite(s) is done in addition to work performed on the employer’s premises (Ojala et al., 2014).

Thus, mobile devices and technology blur the boundaries between work time and personal time. The results of our GBA+ analysis on this issue indicated that, although both genders are likely to suffer the repercussions of such blurring, its effect is likely to be more pronounced on women (EuroFound & ILO, 2017; Sullivan & Lewis, 2001; Hilbrecht & Lero, 2014). In Canada in 2015, women spent 33% more time than men on unpaid work activities and are likely to be unavailable for after-hours work which can have an impact on accessing promotions or better jobs (Working Families & Bright Horizons, 2019; Hilbrecht et al., 2008).^{Footnote 85}

Ensuring effective work-time boundaries in the digital era

The nature and scope of a right to disconnect cannot be conceptualized without considering statutory labour standards respecting the duration of work.^{Footnote 86} Yet research suggests that existing labour standards are likely insufficient to ensure effective boundaries between work and personal time. Currently, all federal, provincial and territorial labour standards laws stipulate that hours worked in excess of standard hours must be paid at an overtime rate and provide rules on rest periods and maximum hours. Some jurisdictions (Alberta, Northwest Territories and Nunavut) also impose a limit on the number of hours that an employee can agree to work or be required to work by their employer in a day.

What we heard

During our engagement activities, we heard divergent opinions on three general themes: flexibility, compensation and management.

Conclusions and recommendations

Greater access to mobile devices and technology has contributed to the blurring of work-time boundaries. These boundaries have become increasingly porous because employees often perform work outside the workplace after their regular hours or are asked to remain available or to alter their lifestyle and activities for a potential demand for work from their employer. Such blurring can infringe the workers’ autonomy, ability to enjoy personal and family life, and increase stress and other health risks due to the intensification of work requirements. Research shows that women not only work more unpaid hours than men, but also spend more time on unpaid care activities, which may limit their ability to obtain recognition and advancement at work. From a GBA+ perspective, our recommendations apply to all workers, but women in particular may benefit from clearer boundaries around work and non-work time.

Recommendation 14: The panel does not recommend that there be a statutory right to disconnect at this time.

The Panel believes that a statutory right to disconnect would currently be difficult to operationalize and enforce. Part III already provides entitlement to overtime for services required by the employer beyond certain hours of work. Part III also provides some restrictions around the duration of work. These provisions, in part, help to provide a framework to address the negative aspects of this issue. Nevertheless, the Code does not define what is deemed work. Given the blurring of boundaries described above, the absence of such a definition generates ambiguity about what work is for employers, employees and labour standards officers responsible for enforcing labour standards.

Recommendation 15: The Panel recommends that employers subject to Part III consult with their employees or their representatives and issue policy statements on the issue of disconnecting.

These policies should be tailored to the specific context of each workplace. However, the goal is to ensure that statutory labour standards pertaining to work time are interpreted and implemented accurately. We believe that employers and employees would be aided by a standardized definition of deemed work in the Code in creating these policies. The policy should clearly define the boundaries between work time and non-work time and address how labour standards protections are being respected.

Recognizing that there are a variety of different types of businesses in the FRPS, with different service requirements (for example, 24/7 businesses operating across six time zones), each policy will likely be different. Any policy should include clarifying expectations around such elements as emergencies, incident management, protecting 24/7 operations, safety related issues including investigations, overtime scheduling, work hours scheduling/bidding, dispatching activities (particularly in trucking), online training after hours, general work assignments for contract workers and other specific industry-related issues where work obligations require the monitoring of one’s mobile device. The policy should also address non-essential emails that are sent out after hours and the expectations around response times for these.

It is in the interest of employers to have well-developed policies about e-communication and related expectations in the workplace. We heard repeatedly that the way employers address this issue is an emerging workplace engagement and employee retention issue.

Recommendation 16: The Panel recommends that Part III include a statutory definition of "deemed work".

Considering how firms and employees rely upon mobile technologies, defining deemed work is necessary to ensure that employees have effective access to the statutory protections applicable to the duration of work. Determining the circumstances under which employees are deemed to be at work, regardless of worksite(s), enables employees to be compensated for all time spent at the behest of the employer. Clarifying what constitutes deemed work is also required to ensure effective access to rest periods.

The definition should be based on the principle that work includes the time when an employee is effectively at the behest of the employer at or outside the workplace or worksite(s). Employees should be deemed to be at work "when providing services required or permitted by the employer". Undergoing training required by the employer, whether such activities are performed at or outside the workplace or worksite(s), should also be considered deemed work. Clear statutory language defining deemed work is necessary to ensure that workers can effectively access labour standards protections related to the duration of work. The Expert Panel believes that the enforcement of labour standards would be assisted by a definition of deemed work.

Recommendation 17: The Panel recommends that Part III provide a right to compensation or time off in lieu for employees required to remain available for potential demands from their employer.

Such "standby" periods are not currently addressed in Part III, except where the employee is effectively called in and is required to report to the workplace. In such cases, an employee is entitled to a minimum of three hours of regular wages. The Code requires no compensation for other work obligations outside of "recognized" work hours. This recommendation draws from the idea of "astreinte" set forth in the French legislation.

It should be emphasized that the obligation to be available for potential demands from the employer often does not require that the employee be physically tied to the workplace. However, the requirement to remain available and be immediately able to work impairs the right of employees to a private life. Often the obligation will constrain employees to stay in a specific geographical location nearby. Being available to work in the FRPS usually includes being unimpaired by alcohol or drugs. Such obligations have implications for workers’ autonomy and their entitlement to breaks from workplace obligations.

Nevertheless, periods during which employees are required to remain available to work, or on standby, should not count as rest periods for the purposes of Part III. That said, we recognize that there may be a need for exceptions to this recommendation in circumstances in which public health or safety would be adversely affected.

Recommendation 18: The Panel recommends that further research be undertaken to evaluate the impacts of increases in work intensification through e-communications and related productivity requirements in the FRPS.

Research shows that work intensification, including working, being on standby or on-call to do work outside of normal working hours is likely to have an impact on work-life balance and employees’ health, particularly mental health. The research we recommend would be useful for the purposes of assessing impacts on workers’ health and the ability of workers to meaningfully access labour standards protections, and the effectiveness of these standards in protecting workers’ health.

The research should also assess the effectiveness of our recommended voluntary, policy-based response to provide reasonable parameters for a right to disconnect in private federal workplaces. This research should also seek to evaluate the demographic groups, worker categories or sectors in particular that face work intensification.

What’s the issue?

Benefits, including statutory minimums such as annual vacations as well as employer-provided benefits such as medical and retirement savings plans (including pensions), make a crucial contribution to the personal and financial security of Canadian workers. Access to these types of benefits has traditionally been based on full-time and long-term employment with one employer.

As the nature of work continues to evolve and workers shift between employers more frequently and are more commonly engaged in non-standard forms of work (for example, part-time and temporary employment and contract work or self-employment), access to benefits can become more challenging and, in some cases, workers may have no access to benefits.

Gaps in Canada’s public provision of benefits have continued to emerge in recent years. The Canada Pension Plan (CPP), for example, would pay a maximum amount of $1,134.17 per month to someone age 65 in 2018, but few low-income or part-time workers would come close to actually receiving this amount. The average monthly amount for new CPP recipients is, in fact, only $673.

Even combined with the Old Age Security payment and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) for low-income seniors ($1,500 currently), many will fall short of the average expenditures ($2,611) for retirees in Canada (Press, 2016). The effects of the GIS claw-back on CPP income and the challenges for those who have not lived in Canada for most of their lives, and will not qualify for the maximum OAS, paint an even more challenging picture for Canadians planning for retirement (Milligan & Schirle, 2016; Busby & Muthukumaran, 2016).

A 2015 Wellesley Institute study found that one-third of working Canadians do not have medical benefits coverage through their employer, with coverage rates particularly low for women and part-time employees (Barnes & Anderson, 2015). Canada is the only country that provides universal healthcare without also providing universal drug coverage with a patchwork of limited programs at the provincial level (Morgan & Daw, 2012).

Mental health issues cost the Canadian economy over $50-billion a year, yet few services are covered by Medicare (CAMH, n.d.). Only 6.2% of dental expenditures in Canada are covered by governments (CDA, 2017), while six million Canadians avoid visiting a dentist each year due to costs and particular access challenges experienced by vulnerable groups (CAHS, 2014).

There are also significant questions around the distributional impacts of inadequate benefits. For example, women are more likely to live in low-income households than men, though this gap has narrowed in recent decades (Fox & Moyser, 2018). Furthermore, women face particular challenges when it comes to saving for retirement such as the gender pay gap, fewer years in the workforce and living longer on average than men (Garnick, 2016). Recent immigrants also face particular challenges when it comes to retirement savings, such as residency requirements for the OAS and lower earnings than their Canadian-born counterparts (Marier & Skinner, 2015).

The federally regulated private sector picture

Given these gaps in the public health-care system, employer-provided benefits play an increasingly important role for many workers in meeting their needs and helping them overcome unexpected challenges. What is the situation for workers in the FRPS?

The most recent Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey (2015) paints the following picture:

• 88% of employees have worked for the same employer for more than a year and 38% have worked for the same employer for 10 years or more;
• 32% of employers offer pension plans to their employees (large employers—83% and small employers—28%); and
• 47% of employers offer employment-related benefits to their employees, with those employing five or fewer employees about three times less likely to offer benefits than those employing 100 or more employees (35% versus 99%).

An analysis of 231 collective agreements done for the Panel by the Labour Program using the Negotech database shows:^{Footnote 112}

• Part-time employees are usually provided with benefits pro-rated to their hours of work with a minority of agreements excluding part time employees from all benefits;
• Casual and temporary employees generally do not receive benefits such as pension savings plans, medical and group insurance or leaves; and
• Seasonal employees tend to be entitled to receive benefits only during the time they work, but can elect coverage during the period of their seasonal lay off if they continue to pay the associated costs.

According to the 2014 Longitudinal and International Study of Adults (LISA),^{Footnote 113} participation in an employer-provided pension plan is more common in the FRPS than in Canada overall. Approximately 33% of employees in the FRPS participated in an employer-provided Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), 21% participated in a Deferred Profit Sharing Plan (DPSP) and 53% participated in an employer-provided pension plan.^{Footnote 114} In Canada, approximately 20% of employees participated in an RRSP, 5% in a DPSP and 37% in an employer-provided pension plan.

Lastly, according the Conference Board of Canada 2015 Benchmarking survey, 29% of all employers (not just those in the federal private sector) provide benefits to permanent part-time employees, assuming the employee meets a preset working time threshold.

In an online public survey launched as part of the Labour Program’s 2017–2018 Modern Federal Labour Standards consultations, 95% of individual respondents said that keeping their benefits was very important to somewhat important when changing jobs. About 37% said that employees should be able to keep their benefits when they switch jobs.

It is also important to note that as part of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2 that received Royal Assent in December 2018, eligibility periods for a number of leaves will be eliminated and the eligibility period for a third week of annual vacation will be reduced from 6 to 5 years. These changes will have a positive impact on employees who change jobs often.

Generally speaking, we can observe that large employers in the FRPS offer benefits to their permanent, full-time staff, and many employers with unionized workforces also offer benefits to their part-time staff. However, few casual or contract staff are entitled to benefits. The composition of the FRPS, with more permanent, full-time employees and more unionized workplaces than Canada overall, means that workers in the FRPS are better positioned with respect to benefits than their counterparts in provincially and territorially regulated sectors.

But, broader trends in the growth of non-standard work mean that this situation may not last. Nor do the overall numbers and averages do anything to improve the situation of those workers in the FRPS who currently have limited or no access to benefits, which includes the roughly 60,000 self-employed workers in the FRPS who have no employees and no access to benefits at all unless they purchase them independently, if they can afford to do so.

Against this backdrop, should the federal government take steps to enhance access to benefits in the FRPS and/or improve benefit portability? If so, what measures should be considered? If not, why not?

What the research says

Traditionally, the concept of benefits is one that attaches to an employment relationship. If someone switches employers, they take advantage of the benefits (or lack thereof) offered by their new employer, and have no linkage with the plan from their former position. Some jurisdictions and researchers are starting to explore the notion of a new approach to benefits, which recognizes increasingly rapid and frequent shifts between employers and jobs. This approach, often called "portable benefits" would sever the relationship between benefits and employer and create a new relationship between benefits and employee.

While the issue of "portable" benefits is a relatively new one, which has arisen as a result of the rise in non-standard work, there are some historical antecedents. As outlined below, some workers in certain sectors such as the arts or shipping have been engaged in temporary, contract and part-timework of a type for many decades and shift frequently between employers. Approaches to benefits recognizing this type of work have matured and evolved around their needs.

In terms of statutory minimums, there is limited research on this topic. In Australia, long service leave (an additional vacation entitlement after a certain period with an employer) is portable in some industries. In a 2017 McKell Institute Report, Markey et al. made the case for national portable long service leave in all of Australia. The case was made in part by arguing that workers are increasingly remaining in the workplace at older ages and this makes it more important for employees to have a period of recovery (long period of leave) partway through their working life.

At the same time, they observed that workers are highly mobile and three-quarters stay with their employer for less than 10 years, meaning that only a small portion of workers have access to the leave. They also noted that women are less likely to be able to access the leave because they are less likely to be employed with one employer for 10 years or more. The authors identify a number of possible benefits of expanding portable long service leave to all workers, including in areas such as worker retention, equity, mobility and flexibility/productivity. The main potential disadvantage to this approach is the cost to employers.

In Canada, little research has been conducted to date on the issue of portability of benefits. The Mowat Centre (Thirgood, 2017) proposed a potential future-state scenario where all workers had access to paid leave (such as vacation and sick leave) and other benefits (for example health and retirement) through a portable benefit account funded by employer contributions pro-rated to the hours a worker has put into the organization. It was noted that this idea would require federal provincial cooperation to be practicable. A 2019 report jointly issued by the Aspen Institute and Canada’s Common Wealth (Mazer et al., 2019) explores the feasibility of portable non-employer retirement benefits as a supplement to existing single-employer models and the welfare state.

With reference to portability, in a 2016 report for the Aspen Institute, Rolf, Clark and Watterson Bryant argued that the existing social safety net in the United States was insufficient for workers in the 21st century. As a solution, the authors made a case for a portable benefits scheme that could take different forms, but would be portable, pro-rated and universal. Hanauer and Rolf (2015) proposed a "Shared Security Accounts" model that would provide American workers with a universal system for benefits funded by a contribution from employers and online platforms equivalent to 25% of the worker’s compensation.

A similar recommendation was made in a report by Strom and Schmitt (2016) with their model being administered through payroll deduction and likely pro-rated based on the amount of work done for an employer. In both of these studies there were also differing suggestions as to voluntary or mandatory participation, the scale of the portability (within a workforce, industry or all employers) and who contributes and at what amounts.

In Canada, Johal and Thirgood (2016) have described portable benefits as a transformational change that Canadian public policy makers could consider in our changing labour market. Johal and Cukier (2019) have also set out a range of policy and program considerations that must be considered as organizations or governments contemplate establishing a portable benefits model.

A survey of self-employed American workers conducted in 2017 found strong support for portable benefits, with 81% thinking such an approach was a good idea and only 7% thinking it was not a good idea. However, the survey did not specify who would pay for the benefits, which may inflate the support to some extent (Krueger, 2017).

What we heard

During our engagement activities we heard from unions, workers and organizations representing workers that access and portability should be considered two distinct areas of concern. We also heard that while access to benefits poses a serious challenge for non-standard workers, portability of benefits presents an opportunity for more equitable workplace practices.

We heard from workers and organizations representing workers that many different types of non-standard workers lack access to benefits, especially casual employees and gig workers; as well as temporary, part-time and contract employees, even in some unionized environments. They also told us that the development of portable benefits plans that are attached to and follow the worker would be helpful for employees in high turnover, precarious positions; older workers who may lose their jobs and benefits at a later life stage; marginalized workers; and workers juggling multiple jobs.

Some unions and worker organizations told us they believe equal pay for equal work, regardless of job status, should extend to benefits, although non-standard workers could be provided benefits on a pro-rata basis. Some worker advocates suggested portable benefits could be standardized, so any employer contributions would be the same. Another group suggested a model of legally regulated benefits structured with different levels of coverage, providing some consistency and predictability for workers and employers, and another suggested sectoral-based benefits.

A few organizations noted that some unions have portable benefits plans that workers pay into along with their dues. Though most organizations and workers we talked to agreed portable benefits would help many workers, several unions and worker organizations noted that they would be administratively complex, costly and difficult to implement between separate employers.

A few unions and worker organizations noted that universal benefits (for example, pharmacare) would eliminate some of the risk workers face when they lose or lack benefits, and relieve employers of some of the costs of private plans. We also heard that many pension plans are by their nature portable, and the CPP was offered as an example of a universal and portable plan in which all employees and employers make contributions and the plan remains attached to the worker, not the workplace.

Experts noted that voluntary, opt-in benefits insurance schemes can be prohibitively expensive for many workers, and often have low uptake for this reason. Experts also told us they thought there was a need to create a new system of social protection that was universal and not dependent on the standard employment relationship, which is no longer a reality for many workers. Experts said the CPP pension model could potentially be applied to benefits.

Indigenous organizations told us that some workers in Indigenous communities, particularly younger ones on temporary contracts, do not have pensions or benefits. We also heard that many are amongst the first generation of more highly-skilled workers in their families and they lack access to advice and resources to help them plan for retirement. To address this, it was recommended that individuals as young as high-school age be provided with more opportunities for education about the importance of pensions and benefits for themselves, their families and their communities.

For their part, employers and employer organizations told us there was some support for a new approach to benefits, but that they had concerns regarding potential costs and practical application.

Employers told us that access to benefits varies by workplace. One employer said they provided full benefits to its part-time workers but was moving to a pro-rated system. Some told us temporary employees have some, but not all, benefits, and that casual employees can voluntarily pay into the general employee plan, although take-up is low. One told us that part-time employees are not provided benefits, but their starting wage is generous. Some employers said they do not offer benefits to employees if they do not expect to have a long-term employment relationship. Another told us that if any requirement to offer benefits to all employees were introduced employers may stop offering benefits due to escalating costs.

We heard that access varied across sectors. In trucking, some employers told us the majority of drivers have standard benefits packages and owner-operators can buy into a separate plan. In banking, we were told that benefits are seen as an element of competitive advantage in recruitment though they were not offered to all employees. Some airlines said they offered benefits to part-time employees and some did not. One employer association told us that benefits are negotiated in collective bargaining, while another said that small and medium enterprises require the ability to negotiate working conditions such as benefits to remain competitive.

We heard from Indigenous organizations that some larger band councils offer group benefit plans, but can sometimes only afford to pay a small portion. They told us that smaller ones often do not have the funds to cover any benefits. In addition, they noted that public insurance and pension legislation varies by region, adding additional complexity.

In general, employers told us that pensions and benefits should be kept separate because of how these plans are structured. One major employer organization told us that portability of benefits between employers would be administratively difficult and that employees should pay into a system independent of their employers. We also heard from some employers that the benefits providers may place additional restrictions on who can be covered by the plan. Others told us they had received advice from actuaries that multi-employer plans were not feasible.

Another employer organization said portability between employers would increase costs to employers who may not be able to afford it and would create problems with hiring. One employer noted that benefits packages are inconsistent across employers, making portability difficult, and that a standardized set of benefits would hinder competition in the labour market. Another noted that having different sets of benefits among employees in the same enterprise results in workplace inequities.

Several said they would support opt-in, voluntary, employee-paid benefits plan that were external to employers who would not be expected to contribute, and one suggested that non-standard workers could be provided a tax credit to offset costs. However, other employers noted that portable benefits plans are only economically feasible if the plan is mandatory.

Experts agreed that voluntary insurance schemes are expensive and suffer from adverse selection and that, to appropriately scale any universal benefits for non-standard workers, the program would likely have to be mandatory. Academics also provided some innovative models for our consideration as well as examples of pilot programs that are currently being considered. They too suggested expanding CPP or creating a benefits plan modeled on CPP.

Best practices and innovative concepts

A number of viable best practices and innovative concepts with respect to the provision of benefits exist in other jurisdictions and throughout the Canadian working landscape. The Panel has identified a number of these through research and engagement and highlighted the merits of some of these models below for consideration when developing benefits frameworks, whether overall or for individual sectors.

Broadly speaking, the spectrum of benefits provision involves two extremes, as measured by level of employer to government involvement. At one end is the private provision of benefits by employers, with scope and coverage being determined by employers based on affordability and a range of other factors such as the importance of such benefits in recruiting or retaining staff. At the other end of the spectrum are universal and state-administered programs such as the CPP and Medicare. For reasons outlined later in this section, the Panel did not make recommendations related to either of these approaches.

The more complex, "in-between" area is the focus of the initiatives outlined below, as the Panel believes these models are the most practical and feasible to explore for the purposes of this report. They represent some mix of contributions by employees and/or employers, or different administrative models which capture the challenges of workers moving between multiple employers during their working life or working on newly emerging technology platforms (for example, the gig economy).

Conclusions and recommendations

Portability of benefits

Beyond and apart from the issue of access to benefits is the notion of portability. Should workers have the ability to carry benefits with them from job to job, rather than have those benefits reside with the employer and cease to have value for the employee upon commencing a new role? In a rapidly changing world of work where workers will likely be changing jobs more frequently, the idea of decoupling benefits from the employment relationship has merit. The federal government’s recent introduction of the Canada Training Benefit is an example of this type of "take it with you" benefit that does not rely upon a continued term with an employer. Similarly, a number of pension plans can facilitate the carry-over of a pension through negotiated reciprocal transfer agreements.

The advantage of portable benefits plans for workers in non-standard jobs, especially those who are also in precarious working environments, is that they would receive some medical, health and retirement coverage with a reduced cost through scale (that is, by workers joining together rather than individuals relying on private schemes). From a political and fiscal perspective, this approach also avoids any significant level of public investment that would accompany more transformational expansions to Medicare, CPP and other programs. Finally, portable benefits plans could be designed with optional rather than mandated contributions from employers.

The Panel also sees advantages in the ability of a portable benefits model to provide certain types of health and retirement benefits to workers without regard for their employment status. Recognizing that workers in precarious forms of employment or non-standard forms of work tend to have far less access to these types of benefits, there is also an economic argument that paying for coverage in some form now will reduce societal costs in the long run, in areas such as medical and social services costs.

One key issue that must be raised in the context of a portable plan is whether the plan should be mandatory or optional. The former could be viewed as an unfair intrusion into the spending decisions of individuals with limited means, while the latter is known to be not nearly as effective in terms of take-up rates (Service, 2015). This is an issue which bears further study and consultation to assess the preferences of workers who might benefit from the plan and weighing potential lower take-up rates against less scale and higher costs.

We should also be reminded that in 2006 Harry Arthurs recommended the following in his report entitled Fairness at work: Federal labour standards for the 21st century:

"Vulnerable workers, especially temporary, part time, agency and autonomous workers, are often ineligible for the benefits (drug, dental or disability insurance, and pensions) provided by employers to the full-time, permanent workforce. Workers of all kinds employed by small firms are also unlikely to have the access to such benefits, as are the proprietors of these firms themselves. The federal government should investigate the feasibility of establishing a public or private sector 'benefits bank', which would assist vulnerable workers and small businesspersons to secure coverage."

Given the strong sentiment expressed by employers during consultations that new mandated approaches to benefits would be unaffordable, the potential unintended consequences of mandating enhanced access to benefits and the relatively better position of the FRPS with respect to benefits provision than Canada generally, we believe that a "benefits bank" or "portable benefits" plan is the best short-term step to explore that would be of value to workers in the FRPS who are not currently in receipt of benefits or sufficient benefits.

Recommendation 22: The Panel recommends that the federal government explore, through stakeholder consultations and research, the potential development of a portable benefits model for workers in the FRPS.

The government should consider the following key elements in its research and consultations on a portable benefits model:

• Convene a group of workers, organizations that support workers and unions, experts (pension and benefit) and employers to work through key strategic considerations that would underpin the development of a portable benefits plan for the FRPS, or that could potentially be part of a broader national portable benefits scheme (for example, working with the not-for-profit sector model currently under development);
• Separately decide strategy for benefit options and strategy for pension saving plans. Included in this would be a review of what benefits would be covered and what pension model makes sense; and
• Consider potential overlap and duplication with other similar plans (for example, the Saskatchewan Pension Plan which is a defined-contribution plan open to any Canadian or the broad range of private schemes), and whether providing enhanced opportunities to contribute to CPP may be an option.

The following key questions should be considered during the review:

• Should employee contributions be mandated or optional? If optional, should the default assumption be ‘opt-in’ to drive higher take-up rates? How would issues around adverse selection impact opt-in plans?
• How could employer participation be incentivized?
• How would a portable plan interact and play out in workplaces with collective agreements?
• Who would qualify? How are entitlements accumulated and tracked?
• Who manages the system? An independent, third party body would seem to be the best approach, but a host of options exist.
• How can technology be leveraged to support these programs?
• What are the barriers to implementation and what could be the unintended consequences of this proposal?

As an interim step, workers, unions and other worker organizations, employers and employer organizations and the federal government may wish to engage in discussions with other portable benefits plans which are being explored and established in Canada, such as the Common Good plan for non-profit sector workers. This could avoid the administrative complexity of setting up a new plan and might provide a quick option for workers seeking to enhance their access to benefits.

The federal government can play a leadership role in undertaking further research on these issues and, where warranted, potentially investing in the start-up costs associated with establishing portable benefits plans, whether specific to the FRPS, or more broadly applied programs. These types of costs would be prohibitive for the types of workers who are traditionally not covered by existing benefits programs and public funding to set up these programs could clearly be justified as an investment to forestall or avoid downstream costs for governments in areas such as social services and healthcare.

Developing solutions that would address key gaps for workers in the FRPS would be a starting point, but developing solutions that work for all Canadians should be the ultimate goal of federal policy incursions in this space.

What’s the issue?

In 1970, Albert O. Hirschman argued in a landmark book that people have three choices in the face of an objectionable state of affairs: leave, complain or stay. "Exit", "voice" and "loyalty", as he termed them, are interconnected. Voice is a way to change the situation, rather than escape it. Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) later applied the concepts of exit and voice to the labour market, contrasting the market response of individual exit (that is, quitting to find more satisfactory conditions elsewhere) and the non-market response of collective representation to alter undesirable working conditions.

Freeman and Medoff (1984) argued that a central role of unions in the labour market is to provide the employees they represent with collective voice regarding workplace conditions. Collective voice has been increasingly seen as an essential means for individual workers to address what the Supreme Court of Canada has stated to be "the presumptive imbalance between the employer’s economic power and the relative vulnerability of the individual worker."^{Footnote 122}

A fundamental rationale for collective voice is that many features of the workplace have the characteristics of "public goods". In the context of the workplace, the concept of public goods can range from health and safety to appropriate levels of heating or air conditioning, working in a congenial and supportive environment, or being able to complain without fear of reprisal about arbitrary or inappropriate treatment by a supervisor.

A widely accepted principle of resource allocation is that obtaining the optimal amount of a public good requires collective rather than individual decision making (Olson, 1965). In other words, if we rely on the choices made by employers and employees individually (for example, via the exit response) there will be too few resources devoted to promoting optimal working conditions.^{Footnote 123}

Voice mechanisms can yield benefits for both employers and workers. For instance, access to collective voice mechanisms ranks high amongst the factors that encourage employee retention, along with good wages and access to training (Spencer, 2017; Batt et al., 2002). It has been shown to improve job quality (Piasna et al., 2013) and reduce exit behaviours, including quit rates (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Various studies suggest that it can lead to improved compliance with labour laws (Vosko, 2013; Fine, 2013). Others emphasize it is intrinsically good because it promotes a commitment to democracy in the workplace (Bryson et al., 2013).

During our engagement activities, virtually all participants saw a clear link between collective voice on labour standards and harmonious relations in the workplace. A number of employers and some experts emphasized that in today’s tight labour market providing opportunities for collective voice is imperative for attracting and retaining top talent. Some participants underscored the connection between exercising voice and workers needing to be aware of their rights in order to do so, especially if they are in non-standard jobs. Others emphasized the important role that collective (and individual) voice can play in compliance and enforcement on labour standards issues.

There are "competing meanings" to the concept of "employee voice" (Dundon et al., 2004; Budd, 2014). Voice has been defined by McCabe and Lewin (1992) as the combination of two elements: the expression of complaints and grievances and the participation of employees in the decision-making processes of the organization that have repercussions on working conditions. Lewin and Mitchell (1992) draw a distinction between mandated voice (for example, through legislation) and voluntary voice (for example, through collective bargaining or employers’ human resource practices). Budd (2014) has advocated for an "inclusive" definition that sees voice as "expressing opinions and having meaningful input into work-related decision-making" (see also Budd, 2004; Befort & Budd, 2009). He says that voice must nevertheless also be capable of reaching instrumental ends or "one can seriously question whether it is true voice" (Budd, 2004).^{Footnote 124}

The Panel sees the concept of collective voice as combining two complementary facets, namely the ability of workers to collectively express their views and to have a say in decisions affecting their working conditions, such as wages, leave entitlements, scheduling and health and safety, without risk of reprisal. Collective voice should also be viewed as a process of identifying and learning to promote shared goals.^{Footnote 125} From a labour policy perspective, collective voice mechanisms should allow employees to contribute meaningfully to such a process.

Collective voice in the federally regulated private sector

The traditional mechanism for collective voice is unionization. Part I of the Code is therefore intrinsically about collective voice because it establishes the legal framework for unionization. Based on the Wagner Act model of industrial relations,^{Footnote 126} it sets out the key elements of the collective bargaining regime for employees and employers in the FRPS, including provisions regarding the right to form and join unions, union certification, collective agreements, dispute resolution, strikes and lock-outs.

Figure 15 shows the ongoing decline in the percentage of employees in the FRPS covered by a collective agreement based on data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).^{Footnote 127} The union coverage rate has fallen from over 40% in the late 1990s and early 2000s to 34% in 2018. Nonetheless, union representation in the FRPS is substantially higher—more than double—that in Canada’s overall private sector where union coverage dropped to about 16% in 2018 (Statistics Canada, 2018). The rate of decline in the FRPS is also less than that in Canada’s total private sector, where union coverage fell by approximately 25% compared to 17% in the FRPS.

Figure 15 - Text version

Year	Coverage %
1997	41%
1998	42%
1999	41%
2000	41%
2001	40%
2002	39%
2003	40%
2004	39%
2005	38%
2006	37%
2007	37%
2008	37%
2009	36%
2010	36%
2011	36%
2012	36%
2013	36%
2014	34%
2015	33%
2016	33%
2017	35%
2018	34%

• Source: Panel estimates based on Labour Force Survey microdata, 1997–2018.

Based on the 2015 Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey (FJWS), the proportion of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement in the FRPS varies significantly by sector (see Figure 16). It ranges from a high of about 77% of employees in the rail transportation sector to a low of 1% of employees in the banking sector.

Figure 16 - Text version

Industry	%
Air transport	51%
Rail transport	77%
Road transport	19%
Maritime transport	40%
Postal services & pipelines	74%
Banks	1%
Feed, flour, seed & grain	12%
Telecommunications & broadcasting	42%
Other	35%
Total FRPS	34%

• Source: 2015 Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey.

Data from the 2017 LFS suggests that, as shown in Figure 17, union coverage rates are much lower for temporary employees in the FRPS (about 24%), as well as for employees earning less than $15 per hour (about 21%) and those earning exactly the minimum wage (about 17%). In Canada’s provincially/territorially regulated private sector union coverage rates are also much lower for these types of workers. In the FRPS, women have lower rates of coverage (around 27%) than men (around 38%), in contrast to Canada as a whole where unionization rates for women exceed those for men, largely because of the substantial representation of women in the highly unionized public sector (Card et al., 2018).

Figure 17 - Text version

Group	Covered by a collective bargaining agreement	Not covered by a collective bargaining agreement
Temporary employees	24%	76%
Part-time employees	32%	68%
Earning <$15/hr	21%	79%
Earning the provincial minimum wage	17%	83%
Men	38%	62%
Women	27%	73%
Total FRPS	34%	66%

• Source: 2017 Labour Force Survey.

There is a substantial body of research on the extent of unsatisfied demand for union representation in Canada and elsewhere (Riddell, 1993; Freeman & Rogers, 1999; Bryson et al., 2005). According to several surveys, between one-third and over 40% of non-unionized workers in Canada report that they would like to join a union if they had the opportunity (Campolieti et al., 2011; Gomez, 2016). The extent of unsatisfied demand is largest in sectors with low rates of union coverage, such as retail trade and financial services. Evidence indicating that there is unsatisfied demand for unionization—the "representation gap"—has been a common factor in calls for union renewal through "organizing the unorganized", especially since the 2000s (Kumar, 2008; Rose, 2008).

At the same time, the desire for alternative, non-union models of collective representation is high. Using 2014 data, Gomez (2016) estimated that 73% of Canadian workers are either definitely or probably willing to participate in an employee organization other than a traditional union that discusses workplace issues with management. In comparison, just under 40% would prefer to belong to a union. In addition, there are reasons to believe that support for non-union mechanisms for collective voice is higher amongst some groups, such as millennial workers who now make up the largest cohort in the Canadian workforce, have high expectations about being engaged in the workplace and are more likely to opt for "exit" when they are unhappy in the workplace (Hawkins et al., 2014).

We also underscore the importance of looking at the Code as a whole when considering opportunities to enhance collective voice. Other types of mechanisms for collective voice beyond unionization and collective bargaining are found to some extent in both Part II (Occupational Health and Safety) and Part III of the Code.

Part II requires employers in the FRPS (and the federal public service) with 20 or more employees to establish joint workplace health and safety committees to implement and monitor hazard prevention programs, deal with complaints and investigations and participate in decision-making about changes that may impact health and safety. When the employer has 300 or more employees, the committees must also develop health and safety policies and programs. At least two employees must sit on each committee and employees must make up at least half of the total membership. In organizations where employees are not represented by a union, the employee members must be selected by the other employees. Employers with fewer than 20 employees must have a health and safety representative (rather than a committee).

Part III of the Code has historically provided minimal mechanisms for workers to express their collective views on working conditions: employers are required to consult with workers on the development of sexual harassment policies; and joint planning committees must be established to deal with group terminations. While there is also a requirement for employers to consult with workers on the development of sexual harassment policies, this will be moved to Part II when amendments to the Code included in Bill C-65, which received Royal Assent in October 2018, come into force.

What we heard

Participants in the Panel’s engagement activities offered divergent views on the extent to which there are gaps in opportunities for collective voice for non-unionized workers on labour standards issues in the FRPS and, if there are, how they could be addressed. While there was general agreement that collective voice is vitally important, different reasons were given for why.

We heard from some unions and workers, in particular, that being able to raise concerns about labour standards issues in the workplace is not enough. For them, meaningful collective voice also entails active listening by the employer and having action taken in response to concerns that have been raised. We also heard from a range of stakeholders that, in providing our advice, we should carefully consider the kinds of issues where collective voice is or should be exercised, such as on statutory labour standards only or on working conditions more generally.

There were two quite polarized schools of thought on whether there is a need to address gaps in opportunities for collective voice for non-unionized workers. Some participants, mainly employers, told us that there is no problem, that sufficient voice mechanisms are already in place. They pointed to mechanisms such as "open door" policies, employee surveys and affinity or resource groups as good examples, in addition to unionization. A few noted that, in unionized workplaces, unions often speak on behalf of all workers, including those who are not union members. In non-union workplaces, several employers indicated it should be left up to the employer and workers to agree on the best way for concerns to be addressed collectively.

On the other hand, we heard from almost all unions and workers and many experts that enhancing opportunities for collective voice for non-unionized employees and, to a less extent, workers in general, should be an urgent objective. Any type of collective representation other than a union, they said, lacks the certified monopoly to represent and negotiate on behalf of employees. For some, the preferred approach is to address barriers to unionization and thereby improve access to collective bargaining and representation for non-unionized workers. Several unions and experts argued for extending non-standard workers’ access to collective bargaining, for example at the sectoral level.

Others told us that in addition to addressing barriers to unionization or in the absence of change to the current legislative framework for collective bargaining, there is a need to give serious consideration to collective voice mechanisms that complement unionization. We often heard that non-standard workers especially, who are less likely to be unionized, should have a clear right to take action collectively to improve their terms and conditions of employment without fear of reprisal.

There was some support for joint employer-worker committees that would operate within a prescribed statutory framework and ensure collective representation on enforcement and compliance issues related to labour standards. However, we heard from a variety of stakeholders that labour standards are far more contentious than occupational health and safety, an issue for which workers and employers are likely to share a common interest. Unions and workers’ representatives expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of joint committees in non-unionized workplaces. Some also mentioned that these committees are often "employer dominated" and cannot adequately redress the power imbalance.

Others urged us to reflect on mechanisms such as sectoral approaches where union coverage rates are low. We were also asked to consider different ways that workers and third-party advocates could be "nudged" to work more closely together to express and resolve labour standards issues.

Indigenous representatives spoke to us about the importance of culturally sensitive voice mechanisms. Several noted that while non-unionized band employees may express workplace concerns on social media, at band meetings or by filing human rights or labour standards complaints, grievances have also more recently been handled at the community-level by redress committees.

Conclusions and recommendations

Driven primarily by the benefits of collective voice, debate about the future of unions and the challenges faced by non-standard workers seeking to exercise collective voice, several additional non-union collective voice mechanisms are now discussed. This review of collective voice for non-unionized workers is timely as the Supreme Court has given clear guidance on this issue. In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada, the Court stated that the constitutionally protected right of freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms "stands as an independent right with independent content, essential to the development and maintenance of the vibrant civil society upon which our democracy rests".^{Footnote 128}

Through its research and engagement activities, the Panel has identified a number of models and frameworks that would permit workers to exercise collective voice. In assessing them it is important to take into account whether the mechanisms are statutory or non-statutory, whether they operate in the workplace or are external to it and whether they apply generally or are sector/workplace specific.

Their degrees of independence from the employer and whether they ensure a level of protection against reprisal for those who participate should also be considered. In addition, the capacity of workers to support or use different voice mechanisms and the relationship of the mechanisms to formal collective bargaining are key. Finally, the effectiveness of the models in terms of ensuring workers are heard and concerns are resolved needs to be considered.

Recognizing their potential value to overall enterprise performance, a significant minority of non-union firms have put in place forms of collective voice. Lipset and Meltz (2000) surveyed U.S. and Canadian adults about features of their workplaces and found that about 20% of non-union employees in each country worked in an enterprise with some form of collective representation other than a certified independent union, such as self-directed work teams and other initiatives that involve employees in discussions on compensation and benefits, or health and safety.

These types of non-union employee representation differ substantially in their form, function, subject matter, mode of representation, extent of power and degree of permanence (Taras & Kaufman, 2006). A commitment to employee input into decision making is also typically a feature of "high performance workplaces" (Kochan & Osterman, 1994).

In our engagement activities we also learned of channels such as annual surveys, whistleblower hotlines and quality circles that allow employees to express their views and make complaints and suggestions, especially in large organizations. Many of these channels provide individual voice rather than collective voice. Even though they can be valuable, especially if there is no fear of reprisals and suggestions and complaints are acted upon, we focus here on initiatives that are likely to provide collective voice to a broader array of workers and workplaces.

Anti-reprisal protection for concerted activity

Studies show that many workers are unlikely to speak out about problems in the workplace if they do not have access to collective voice mechanisms because they fear reprisal. This is particularly true for non-unionized workers and those in non-standard work, as well as women. For instance, using survey data collected in 2005, Lewchuk (2013) concludes that "the precariously employed were six to seven times more likely to report that raising health and safety issues would have negative employment consequences".

In the United States, section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides non-supervisory employees, both union and non-union, with the right to engage in "concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection". As defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, "mutual aid and protection" includes employees’ efforts to "improve current terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lots as employees through channels outside the immediate employee/employer relationship"^{Footnote 135}

The Act does not limit the manner, time or place in which employees engage in "concerted activity". While section 7 lists workers’ protected rights, section 8 makes it unlawful for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7". The employer’s conduct will be considered as retaliation if it tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the NLRA and "demonstrating motive or actual coercion is therefore not generally required" (Rogers & Archer, 2016). Sections 7 and 8 were introduced when the NLRA was enacted in 1935.

Section 7 of the NLRA protects concerted activities by unionized workers and non-unionized workers, whether they are seeking to unionize or not (Rogers & Archer, 2016). The spectrum of protected concerted activities is wide and includes concerted complaints or grievances presented to employers regarding compensation, benefits or working conditions, as well as informal discussions between employees about their working conditions (Fullerton & Millman, 2008). The protected activities must generally be undertaken by two or more employees seeking to improve their terms or conditions of employment.

Thus, two or more employees addressing their employer about improving their pay will be exercising their right to protected concerted activity. However, the protection can also extend to the actions of one employee, on the condition that such actions have "the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or [have] some relation to group action in the interest of the employees." ^{Footnote 136 Footnote 137} Section 7 will apply when an employee speaks to his employer on behalf of one or more co-workers about improving workplace conditions (NLRB, n.d.). Non-union work stoppages and walkouts are generally protected,^{Footnote 138} unless they are "unlawful, violent, […] in breach of contract [or] "irresponsible" because they threaten property damage" (Rogers & Archer, 2016). Section 7 has been interpreted to extend the "Weingarten" rule (that is, that an employee in a unionized workplace may request the presence of a union representative at an investigatory interview which employee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action) to cover employees in non-union workplaces.^{Footnote 139}

The use of social media is, to a certain extent, protected by section 7 as employees have the right to address work-related issues and share information about pay, benefits, and working conditions with coworkers on Facebook, YouTube, and other social media. To be protected, the use of social media must have some relation to group action, or seek to initiate, induce or prepare for group action, or bring a group complaint to the attention of management (Neylon O’Brien, 2011; Bemberg, 2018).

For instance, an employer's decision to dismiss an employee who posted a comment on Facebook encouraging a terminated colleague to hire a lawyer and sue the company was over-ruled by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The Facebook comment was found to be a protected concerted activity that did not interfere with the employer’s operations.^{Footnote 140}

However, complaints that are made publicly and are maliciously false will not be protected.^{Footnote 141} Many employers have social media policies that aim to limit what their employee may publish. When such policies are found to be overly broad (that is, when they prohibit lawful activities either explicitly or by being too vague), the NLRB can order the employer to rescind or modify them.^{Footnote 142}

Protected concerted activities provide statutory protection against reprisals for employees wishing to collectively voice concerns. This form of collective voice is independent from the employer who is required to not interfere. The American experience suggests that it can be useful in circumstances in which employees face particularly egregious working conditions and are otherwise unable to bring about change or improvements.

For example, in a leading 1962 case (NLRB v. Washington Aluminum) workers had complained about the cold temperatures in the facility during the winter. ^{Footnote 143} On a particularly cold day workers arrived to find the plant completely unheated and seven walked out. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the NLRB’s ruling that the company’s termination of these workers was unlawful. Similarly, in a more recent case a group of restaurant workers who had been terminated after protesting working conditions appealed to the NLRB which ordered them reinstated (Greenhouse, 2015).

A search on Lexis Advance US conducted in March 2019 yielded 8,993 NLRB cases dealing with section 7, going back as far as 1935. Although this is a small number over a period of more than 80 years, the number of cases per year has grown substantially in recent years during a time when private sector unionization has also fallen sharply. Figure 18 plots the number of cases per year over the 1935 to 2019 period. The number has increased significantly over the past two decades.

Figure 18 - Text version

Dates	Number of cases
1935–1939	396
1940–1944	487
1945–1949	24
1950–1954	42
1955–1959	45
1960–1964	102
1965–1969	187
1970–1974	430
1975-1979	916
1980–1984	854
1985–1989	445
1990–1994	443
1995–1999	329
2000–2004	335
2005-2009	753
2010–2014	1806
2015–2019	1565

• Source: Panel analysis of NLRB/Lexis Advance US.

However, it is important to note that the number of cases related to section 7 is likely to understate the importance of this provision because of the "threat effect"—employers who are aware of the law and previous interpretations by the courts will adjust their behaviour in order to be in compliance and avoid a costly lawsuit.

Unlike some other mechanisms, the NLRA protection for concerted activity has the advantage of having been available and used in the United States, a country that shares many commonalities with Canada’s labour relations system. It is unclear whether the collective voice achievable with the support of such a protection might develop into more sustained collective activity, such as achieving union representation. Nevertheless, adopting a protection for concerted activity might be helpful for workers in the FRPS with particularly poor working conditions.

Recommendation 25: The Panel recommends introducing a protection for concerted activities in Part III of the Code.

Our recommendation regarding this protection is two-fold. First, Part III should state that employees have a right to participate in concerted activities. Second, employees who have been dismissed, suspended, laid-off, demoted or otherwise disciplined because they have exercised their right to concerted activity should be protected against such reprisals.^{Footnote 144} Adding a protection for concerted activity to Part III would also likely enhance workers’ willingness to join participatory initiatives channelled through community organizations. The Panel views this right as a potentially useful incremental change to Canada’s labour relations system in the FRPS and one that would bring the Code more in line with recent Supreme Court interpretations of the guarantee of freedom of association in section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Enforcement and compliance

What we heard

Issues related to compliance and enforcement were raised a number of times during the course of the engagement activities.

One union told us that no enforcement system that relies on individual employees to bring forward complaints will operate effectively without union support. They said that, while proactive enforcement should be a focus, its effectiveness largely depends on the will of the government to expend resources to fund it. In terms of awareness, we heard that it is hard to find information about the Code on the Government of Canada’s website. We also heard that there are barriers for workers trying to access officials in the Labour Program who can answer their questions or assist them with filing a complaint. Indigenous organizations told us that their communities do not have the resources to educate workers about labour standards.

Several workers’ representatives have also told us that the information about federal labour standards as well as the process to lodge complaints is opaque and hard to access.

We heard a range of views from compliance and enforcement staff with the Labour Program, which helped to inform a number of our recommendations from the perspective of those who are on the ground and see how the "rubber meets the road" in terms of interpretation of difficult issues, how firms and workers perceive and interpret standards and a range of other key insights.

Enforcement staff told us that triangular employer-employee relationships are sometimes mediated through shell companies that have no assets but hire and pay the employee, while day-to-day control over the employee’s work is controlled by the real company.^{Footnote 172} The concept of "related employers" could help with payment collection in these types of cases. This approach has typically only been applied in the longshoring industry which historically has had multiple employers due to the nature of work (though few complaints are made, due to the heavily unionized nature of the sector).

In addition to raising the issue of a lack of awareness among small employers in particular, employers also expressed concern about regulatory burden. One group of employers told us that, as all levels of government layer on new regulations, businesses have to contend with more compliance and reporting requirements. They cautioned that if the burden is too high, employers will stop hiring people directly for certain types of work and will use a service provider instead.

We heard some ideas for how to address issues around compliance and enforcement. One union recommended the development of strategic enforcement programs and sector mapping. One employer organization recommended taking an "education before enforcement" approach. One worker association recommended a plain language guide to federal labour standards. We also heard a suggestion for making online information more accessible and easy-to-understand and removing barriers to accessing officials (for example, by extending service hours so workers can call the Labour Program outside of typical work hours). To address the regulatory burden, one group of employers recommended a "smarter" approach to regulation that would address inconsistencies between federal departments and different jurisdictions, among other things.

Several agreed that a prevailing "information gap" and lack of clear statutory language about federal labour standards created awareness problems that may lead to systemic violations, and that clearer language and the development of resources and guidelines for employers and workers could help address this challenge.

Conclusions and recommendations

The Panel notes that the Labour Program must have adequate resources to enforce labour standards—recent investments in this regard are promising, but must be sustained and potentially enhanced to ensure that the Program can properly deal with complaints and undertake more proactive enforcement and compliance-related activities.

Data

Policy research and analysis—and future policy development—on the five issues we examined face significant data challenges. In carrying out our mandate to provide the Minister with evidence-based advice and recommendations, we were limited in our ability to accurately assess the nature of the FRPS and changes over time, as well as the impacts of potential policy measures on employers, workers and the Canadian economy. Similarly, the Labour Program is limited in its ability to analyze and monitor the FRPS, key current and emerging federal labour standards issues and the outcomes of the many recent amendments to Part III of the Code.

Monitoring and review

The federal government took important steps in 2018 to modernize Part III of the Code to better reflect the realities of the 21st century workplace and address issues faced by workers and employers. We hope that this report and the recommendations of the Panel can also help address the five issues we were asked to explore. However, it is important that these reviews are conducted regularly and that results are used to inform policy and legislative development in a regular fashion.

Ad hoc reviews and those occurring infrequently with large gaps of time since the last such exercise run the risk of the Code falling significantly out of step with the realities of the labour market, and not keeping pace with the types of issues facing employers and workers. As the prospect of technological change driven by artificial intelligence and further automation looms, there is a strong likelihood that the pace of change in Canada’s economy and labour market will continue to accelerate. This only underscores the critical nature of regular, periodic reviews of the Code to ensure its provisions are updated. Regular reviews would also benefit stakeholders, both employers and workers, who would be less likely to face radical shifts in legislation and regulation driven by long periods between reviews or to deal with lengthy phases in which key issues go unaddressed.

The Panel believes it is critical that a regular, independent review process be established to ensure newly-introduced standards—including any stemming from this report—are meeting policy objectives, are interpreted as intended, and are complied with and effectively enforced.

Recommendation 39: The Panel recommends that the federal government regularly review progress on modernizing federal labour standards and protecting those in precarious forms of work while maintaining a level playing field for employers. Such a review should be conducted every five years.

Context

Federal labour standards were established in the 1960s, when workers could often expect a full-time, secure job with benefits and decent wages. Over 50 years later, ever-increasing global competition, rapid technological changes and socio-demographic shifts have fundamentally altered the way businesses operate and the way Canadians work. Federal labour standards have not kept up.

Today, many Canadians struggle to support their families in part-time, temporary and low-wage jobs, often working several jobs to make ends meet and continually juggling their responsibilities at work and outside of work. They may also lack access to labour standards protections, as well as benefits, have unpredictable incomes and worry about losing their job and finding the next one. Though employees in the federally regulated private sector are more likely to be covered by a collective agreement and have full-time, permanent employment than those in industries regulated by the provinces and territories, still about two-thirds (or 610,500) are non-unionized and rely on federal labour standards for their basic protections and about 160,000 are in temporary employment or other forms of non-standard work.

The Government of Canada is committed to modernizing federal labour standards to reflect the realities of the 21st century workplace and protect vulnerable Canadians across the country working in the federally regulated private sector. As a first step, Part III of the Canada Labour Code was amended in 2017 to introduce a right to request flexible work arrangements; create new unpaid leaves; place limits on unpaid internships; and strengthen compliance and enforcement. These amendments will come into force as soon as necessary regulations are in place.

As a second step, the Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour (hereinafter the Minister) held consultations between May 2017 and March 2018 on what a robust and modern set of federal labour standards should include. As noted in the What We Heard report released in August 2018, the consultations identified a number of areas, such as scheduling, eligibility periods, personal leave, equal treatment, misclassification and termination of employment, where there was sufficient evidence and consensus for the Government to move forward with proposed legislative changes. These changes were included in the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2, which was tabled in the House of Commons on October 29, 2018 and received Royal Assent on December 13, 2018.

At the same time, the consultations revealed that further study was warranted on five important issues related to the changing nature of work and the future of workers in the federally regulated private sector:

• Work-related e-communications outside of work hours;
• Labour standards protections for workers in non-standard work;
• Access to and portability of benefits for those who change jobs frequently or who spend part of their working life in non-standard work;
• The ability of non-unionized workers to join together to express their views and have a say in decisions affecting them ("collective voice"); and
• The federal minimum wage.

These issues merit further study because less evidence is available and there are divergent views on possible policy responses. They also raise fundamental questions about the principles underpinning federal labour standards.

Mandate

The Minister has established an independent Expert Panel to:

• Examine the five issues identified in the 2017–2018 consultations as meriting further study;
• Hold consultations with stakeholders, experts, the public and others on the issues; and
• Submit a report to the Minister providing evidence-informed advice and recommendations regarding the issues and any related matters by June 30, 2019.

The Expert Panel will operate at arm’s-length from the Government and provide independent advice. It will operate transparently and in a manner reflecting the Government of Canada’s policy on Open Government.

Composition

The Expert Panel consists of 7 members, including a Chair, named by the Minister. Members will:

• Contribute their expertise and personal knowledge to the work of the Panel and participate on the Panel in a personal capacity and not as representatives of any organizations with which they are associated; and
• Work collaboratively and, to the extent possible, seek to reach consensus.

The Chair is responsible for overall management of the Expert Panel and will:

• Chair meetings of the Panel and guide members towards consensus when making decisions;
• Lead development and drafting of the Panel’s report;
• Act as a public spokesperson for the Panel; and
• Act as the principal liaison for the Panel with the Secretariat supporting it and provide the Secretariat with regular updates on the Panel’s work.

In the event that any member of the Expert Panel resigns or is unable to continue as a member, the remaining members will constitute the Expert Panel unless the Minister decides to replace the member.

Issues

The Expert Panel will examine the following five issues.

Consultations

The Expert Panel will consult and engage with workers (both employees and non-employees), employers, experts, civil society groups and Canadians, especially those with experience in the federally regulated private sector, in order to deepen its understanding of the five issues and receive feedback on potential recommendations, as well as to foster broader dialogue and strengthen the evidence base for future policy-making.

It will also ensure that meaningful consultation opportunities are accessible to different groups, including people with disabilities, Indigenous peoples and low-wage workers.

Report

The Expert Panel will submit a report to the Minister by June 30, 2019 designed to inform the Government’s thinking about next steps to modernize federal labour standards with respect to the five issues.

The report should provide an overview of the Expert Panel’s work (including how it has applied GBA+ analysis), outline the Panel’s key findings and present its advice and recommendations to the Minister.

The Expert Panel’s advice and recommendations should address, with justifications, the extent to which each of the five issues is of concern in the federally regulated private sector, appropriate legislative and/or non-legislative responses and key considerations from an implementation standpoint. The Panel may also wish to offer advice and recommendations regarding areas for further research, analysis and/or policy development, data gaps and approaches for filling them, results measurement and other matters related to the five issues.

If the Expert Panel is not able to reach consensus on its advice and recommendations, this should be noted in the Panel’s report, with accompanying reasoning.

Secretariat

The Expert Panel will be supported by a Secretariat housed within the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development Canada. The Secretariat will provide assistance with respect to operational activities, as well as research and consultation.

Annex C: Biographies of Panel members

Annex D: Organizations and experts consulted

The Expert Panel engaged with employers and employer organizations, unions, worker organizations, civil society groups, Indigenous organizations, federal Crown corporations, experts and individual workers. In addition to the 88 organizations listed below, approximately 30 individual workers (including young workers) and a group of small businesses participated in roundtable meetings with the Panel in Montreal, Toronto, Halifax, Vancouver, Ottawa and Winnipeg or by teleconference. The Panel also received 14 written submissions. The Panel held meetings in-person and by teleconference with about 24 experts across the country.

Annex E: Members of the Secretariat to the Expert Panel on Modern Federal Labour Standards

Margaret M. Hill, Executive Director

Jacinthe Bergeron, Senior Project Management Specialist

Meagan Curran, Policy Analyst

Nadia Demers, Administrative Officer

Pablo Gutiérrez, Research Assistant

Allison Hunwicks, Research Assistant

Marie Kwan, Junior Policy Analyst

Zoe McKnight, Policy Officer

Geneviève Richard, Research Assistant

Chapter 1 - Introduction and overview of the Expert Panel’s work

Arthurs, H.W. (2006). Fairness at work: Federal labour standards for the 21st century. Gatineau, QC: Government of Canada. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1166&context=reports.

Block, S., & Galabuzi, G.E. (2011). Canada’s colour coded labour market. Wellesley Institute. Retrieved from https://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Colour_Coded_Labour_MarketFINAL.pdf.

Canadian Academy of Health Sciences (CAHS). (2014). Improving access to oral health care for vulnerable people living in Canada. Accessed from http://cahs-acss.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Access_to_Oral_Care_FINAL_REPORT_EN.pdf.

Cranford, C., Vosko, L.F., & Zukewich, N. (2003). Precarious employment in the Canadian labour market: A statistical portrait. Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society, 3, 6–22. Retrieved from http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volume3/pdfs/cranfordetal.pdf.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2018a). What we heard: Modernizing federal labour standards. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/employment-social-development/campaigns/labour-standards/1548-MLS_WWH-Report_EN.pdf.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2018b). Government of Canada introduces legislation to take concrete action to reduce poverty in Canada [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/news/2018/11/government-of-canada-introduces-legislation-to-take-concrete-action-to-reduce-poverty-in-canada.html.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2019). A portrait of the federally regulated private sector. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/federally-regulated-private-sector.html.

G20 Summits. (2018). G20 leaders’ declaration: Building consensus for fair and sustainable development. Retrieved from http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-leaders-declaration.html.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2019). Global commission on the future of work: Work for a brighter future. Retrieved from https://www.ioe-emp.org/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=135117&token=0fba9bfff378675a79e9e23b8a56c1180801a6ea.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (n.d.). Decent work. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm.

Johal, S., & Thirgood, J. (2016, November 22). Working without a net: Rethinking Canada’s social policy in the new age of work. Mowat Centre. Retrieved from https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/working-without-a-net/.

Johal, S., & Yalnizyan, A. (2018). Race to the top: Developing an inclusive growth agenda for Canada. Mowat Centre. Retrieved from https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/race-to-the-top/.

Katz, L., & Krueger, A. (2019). The rise and nature of alternative work arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015. ILR Review, 72(2), 382–416. Available from https://scholar.harvard.edu/lkatz/publications/rise-and-nature-alternative-work-arrangements-united-states-1995-2015/.

Lamb, C. (2016). The talented Mr. Robot: The impact of automation on Canada’s workforce. Brookfield Institute. Retrieved from https://brookfieldinstitute.ca/report/the-talented-mr-robot/.

Manyika, J., Lund, S., Chui, M., Bughin, J., Woetzel, J., Batra, P. … Sanghvi, S. (2017). Jobs lost, jobs gained: What the future of work will mean for jobs, skills, and wages. McKinsey Global Institute. Retrieved from https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages.

Noack, A.M., & Vosko, L.F. (2011). Precarious jobs in Ontario: Mapping dimensions of labour market insecurity by workers’ social location and context. Law Commission of Ontario. Retrieved from https://www.lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/vulnerable-workers-call-for-papers-noack-vosko.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2018). The future of social protection: What works for non-standard workers?. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/social/the-future-of-social-protection-9789264306943-en.htm.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2019). Income inequality. OECD Data. Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2015, May 21). In it together: Why less inequality benefits all. Retrieved from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2011). An overview of growing income inequalities in OECD Countries: Main findings. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf.

Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario (PEPSO). (2015). The precarity penalty. Retrieved from https://pepso.ca/documents/precarity-penalty.pdf.

Riddell, W.C. (2018).The labor market in Canada, 2000–2016. IZA: World of Labor. Available from https://wol.iza.org/articles/the-labor-market-in-canada.

Statistics Canada. (2017). The sharing economy in Canada. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/170228/dq170228b-eng.htm.

Statistics Canada. (2018). Unionization rates falling. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2015005-eng.htm.

Statistics Canada. (2019a). Union status by industry. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410013201.

Statistics Canada. (2019b). Distribution of market, total and after-tax income by economic family type, Canada, provinces and selected Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1110023701#timeframe.

Statistics Canada. (2019c). Job tenure by type of work (full- and part-time), annual. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410005101.

Status of Women Canada, Government of Canada. (2017). GBA+ research guide. Retrieved from https://cfc-swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/guide-en.html.

Weil, D. (2011). Enforcing labour standards in fissured workplaces: The US experience. The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 22(2), 33–54. Retrieved from https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/career-services/David%20Weil%20Enforcing%20Labour%20Standards%20in%20Fissured%20Workplaces.pdf.

World Bank. (2019). World development report 2019: The changing nature of work. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available from https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-1328-3.

Chapter 2 - Federal minimum wage

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Allegretto, S., Dube, A., Reich, M., & Zipperer, B. (2017). Credible research designs for minimum wage studies: A response to Neumark, Salas and Wascher. ILR Review, 70(3). 559–592. Available from https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Credible-Research-Designs-for-Minimum-Wage-Studies.pdf.

Arthurs, H.W. (2006). Fairness at work: Federal labour standards for the 21st century. Gatineau, QC: Government of Canada. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1166&context=reports.

Autor, D.H., Manning, A., & Smith, C.L. (2016). The contribution of the minimum wage to US wage inequality over three decades: A reassessment. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(1), 58–99. Available from https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20140073.

Baker, M. (2005). Minimum wages and human capital investments of young workers: Work related training and school enrolment. Government of Canada Skills Research Initiative - Working paper series 2005 B-04. Available from http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/395369/publication.html.

Baker, M., Benjamin, D., & Stanger, S. (1999). The highs and lows of the minimum wage effect: A time series cross-section of the Canadian law. Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), 318-350. Available from https://econpapers.repec.org/article/ucpjlabec/v_3a17_3ay_3a1999_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a318-50.htm.

Banting, K., & Myles, J. (2015). Framing the new inequality: The politics of income redistribution in Canada. Retrieved from https://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/aots5-banting-myles.pdf.

Beach, C.M. (2016). What has happened to middle-class earnings in Canada?. In D. Green, W.C. Riddell, & F. St-Hilaire (Eds.), Income inequality: The Canadian story (pp. 157–176). Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. Available from https://irpp.org/research-studies/what-has-happened-to-middle-class-earnings-in-canada/. 

Brochu, P., & Green, D.A. (2013). The impact of minimum wages on labour market transitions. The Economic Journal, 123(573), 1203–1235.. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ecoj.12032.

Burkhauser, R., Couch, K.A., & Glenn, A.J. (1996). Public policies for the working poor: The earned income tax credit versus minimum wage legislation. In S. Polachek (Ed.), Research in Labor Economics Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.

Cameron, B. (2006). Social reproduction and Canadian federalism. In M. Luxton & K. Bezanson (Eds.), Social reproduction: Feminist political economy challenges neo-liberalism (pp. 58–87). McGill-Queen's University Press.

Campolieti, M. (2018). Effects of minimum wages on employment dynamics and prices in the restaurant sector: Canada, 1983-2016. Canadian Public Policy, 44–341. Available from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/716958.

Campolieti, M. (2015). Minimum wages and wage spillovers in Canada. Canadian Public Policy, 41(1), 15–34. Available from https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/cpp.2013-060.

Campolietti, M., Fang, T., & Gunderson, M. (2005). Minimum wage impacts on youth employment transitions, 1993–1999. Canadian Journal of Economics, 38(1), 81–104. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00270.x.

Campolieti, M., Gunderson, M., & Lee, B. (2012). The (non) impact of minimum wages on poverty: Regression and simulation evidence for Canada. Journal of Labor Research, 33(3), 287–302. Available from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12122-012-9139-8.

Campolieti, M., Gunderson, M., & Riddell, C. (2006). Minimum wage impacts from a prespecified research design: Canada 1981–1997. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 45(2), 195–216. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2006.00424.x.

Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB). (2017, September 28). $15 minimum wage a job killer for Ontario's youth [Press release]. Available from https://www.cfib-fcei.ca/en/media/15-minimum-wage-job-killer-ontarios-youth-cfib-report.

Clemens, J., Kahn, L.B., & Meer, J. (2018). Dropouts need not apply: The minimum wage and skill upgrading. UC San Diego Economics Working Paper. Available from https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~j1clemens/personalResearch.html.

Cominetti, N., Henehan, K., & Clarke, S. (2019). Low pay Britain 2019. Resolution Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2019/05/Low-Pay-Britain-2019-report.pdf.

Card, D., & Krueger, A.B. (2017). Myth and measurement and the theory and practice of labor economics [Book review]. ILR Review, 70(3), 826 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793917696309d.

Card, D., & Krueger, A.B. (2000). Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the fast food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American Economic Review, 90(5), 1397–1420. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677856?seq=1 - page_scan_tab_contents.

Card, D., & Krueger, A.B. (1994). Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the fast food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American Economic Review, 84(4), 772–793. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118030?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Card, D., & Krueger, A.B. (1995). Myth and measurement: The new economics of the minimum wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cominetti, N., Henehan, K., & Clarke, S. (2019, May 30). Low pay Britain 2019. Resolution Foundation report. Available from https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/low-pay-britain-2019/.

Cowburn, A. (2019, May 10). Jeremy Corbyn pledges to extend Labour's ₤10 per hour minimum wage to under 18s. The Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/minimum-wage-hourly-jeremy-corbyn-labour-pledge-under-18-a8908561.html.

Clemens, J., Kahn, L.B., & Meer, J. (2018). Dropouts need not apply: The minimum wage and skill upgrading [Working paper]. University of California: San Diego. Available from https://econ2017.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2019/04/pdf_seminar_Clemens_Kahn_Meer_Dropouts_Meer.pdf.

Dickens, R., & Manning, A. (2004). Spikes and spillovers: The impact of the national minimum wage on the wage distribution in a low-wage sector. Economic Journal, 114(494), C95–C101. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3590310.

Dube, A. (2017a). Minimum wages and the distribution of family incomes. IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series No. 10572. Available from http://ftp.iza.org/dp10572.pdf.

Dube, A. (2017b). Minimum wages and the distribution of family incomes in the United States. Washington Center for Equitable Growth. Available from https://equitablegrowth.org/minimum-wages-and-the-distribution-of-family-incomes-in-the-us/.

Dube, A. (2017c). The long-run impact of minimum wage research: A case study [Book review]. ILR Review, 70(3), 818-823. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793917696309b - articleCitationDownloadContainer.

Dube, A., Lester, W.T., & Reich, M. (2010). Minimum wage effects across state borders: Estimates using contiguous counties. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4), 945 –964. Available from https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2010/Minimum-Wage-Effects-Across-State-Borders.pdf.

Dufour, M., & Russell, E. (2015). Why isn't productivity more popular? A bargaining power approach to the pay/productivity linkage in Canada. International Productivity Monitor, 28, 47–62. Available from http://www.csls.ca/ipm/28/dufouretal.pdf.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2018). Opportunity for all: Canada's first poverty reduction strategy. Available from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/poverty-reduction/reports/strategy.html#h2.12.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2019). Federal minimum wage: Issue paper. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/federal-minimum-wage.html.

Employment Standards Act, 2000 S. 23.1(4). Available from https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/00e41#BK42.

Fortin, N.M., & Lemieux, T. (2015). Changes in wage inequality in Canada: An interprovincial perspective. Canadian Journal of Economics, 48(2), 682–713. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/caje.12140.

Fortin, N.M., & Lemieux, T. (2000). Income redistribution in Canada: Minimum wages versus other policy instruments. In W.C. Riddell & F. St-Hilaire (Eds.), Adapting public policy to a labour market in transition (pp. 211–248). Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 

Green, D. (2015). The case for increasing the minimum wage: What does academic research tell us?. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Available from https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/BC Office/2015/04/CCPA-BC-Case-for-Incr-Minimum-Wage_0.pdf.

Green, D.A., Riddell, W.C., & St-Hilaire, F. (2016). Income inequality: The Canadian story, Volume V. Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. Available from https://irpp.org/research/income-inequality-the-canadian-story/.

Green, D.A., & Sand, B.M. (2015). Has the Canadian labour market polarized? Canadian Journal of Economics, 48(2), 612–645. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/caje.12145.

Gunderson, M. (2005). Minimum wages in Canada: Theory, evidence and policy. Federal Labour Standards Review Commission. Retrieved from: https://worthwhile.typepad.com/gunderson_2005_survey.pdf.

Hansen, S.B. (2001). The impact of a low-wage strategy on state economic development. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 1(3), 227–254. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40421430.

Harasztosi, P., & Linder, A. (2019). Who pays for the minimum wage?. American Economic Review [Forthcoming]. Available from https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20171445&&from=f.

Heisz, A. (2016). Trends in income inequality in Canada and elsewhere. In D. Green, W.C. Riddell, & F. St-Hilaire (Eds.), Income inequality: The Canadian story (pp. 77–102). Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. Available from https://irpp.org/research-studies/trends-in-income-inequality-in-canada-and-elsewhere/.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2016). Global wage report 2016/17: Wage inequality in the workplace. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_537982.pdf.

Kahn, L.M. (2017). Myth and measurement by David Card and Alan B. Krueger: Introduction to a Retrospective Symposium [Book review]. ILR Review, 70(3), 813–831. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793917696309.

Krueger, A.B. (1994). The effect of the minimum wage when it really bites: A reexamination of the evidence from Puerto Rico. Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper #330. Available from http://www.nber.org/papers/w4757.

LaRochelle-Côté, S., & Dionne, C. (2009). International differences in low-paid work. Perspectives on Labour and Income, 10(6), 5–13. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75-001-x/75-001-x2009106-eng.pdf.

Lemieux, T. (2017). On myth and measurement [Book review]. ILR Review, 70(3), 823–826. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793917696309c.

Lemieux, T. & Riddell, W.C. (2016). Who are Canada's top 1 percent?. In D. Green, W.C. Riddell, & F. St-Hilaire (Eds.), Income Inequality: The Canadian Story (pp. 103–156). Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

MacDonald, D., & Nilsson, E. (2016). The effects of increasing the minimum wage on prices: Analyzing the incidence of policy design and context. Upjohn Institute working paper 16-260. Available from https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/260/.

McBride, S., & Muirhead, J. (2016). Challenging the low wage economy: Living and other wages. Alternative Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research, 27, 55–86. Available from http://www.alternateroutes.ca/index.php/ar/article/view/22393.

Morissette, R., & Dionne-Simard, D. (2018). Recent changes in the composition of minimum wage workers. Insights on Canadian Society, Statistics Canada. Available from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75-006-x/2018001/article/54974-eng.htm.

National Employment Law Project (NELP). (2018). Raises from coast to coast in 2019. Available from https://www.nelp.org/publication/raises-coast-coast-2019/.

Neumark, D., & Wascher, W. (2017). Reply to credible research designs for minimum wage studies. ILR Review, 70(3), 593–609. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793917698429?journalCode=ilra.

Neumark, D., & Wascher, W. (2000). Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the fast food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment. American Economic Review, 90(5), 1362–1396. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677855?seq=1 - page_scan_tab_contents.

Onaran, O., & Obst, T. (2015). Wage-led growth in the EU15 Member States: The effects of income distribution on growth, investment, trade balance, and inflation. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 40(6), 1517–1551. Available from https://academic.oup.com/cje/article-abstract/40/6/1517/2875714?redirectedFrom=fulltext.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2019). Wage levels. OECD Data. Available from https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/wage-levels.htm.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2018). Rising employment overshadowed by unprecedented wage stagnation. Available from https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/rising-employment-overshadowed-by-unprecedented-wage-stagnation.htm.

Reich, M., Allegretto, S., & Godoey, A. (2017). Seattle's minimum wage experience 2016–16. Center on Wage Employment and Dynamics. Available from https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Seattles-Minimum-Wage-Experiences-2015-16.pdf.

Reich, M., Allegretto, S., Jacobs, K., & Montialoux, C. (2016). The effects of a $15 minimum wage in New York State. Center on Wage Employment and Dynamics. Available from https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2016/The-Effects-of-a-15-Minimum-Wage-in-New-York-State.pdf.

Riddell, W.C. (2018). The labor market in Canada, 2000–2016. IZA: World of Labor. Retrieved from https://wol.iza.org/articles/the-labor-market-in-canada.

Savage, M. (2019, May 5). Philip Hammond plans world's highest minimum wage. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/may/05/hammond-increase-minimum-wage-low-pay.

Schacht, K., & Argüeso, O. (2019, January 1). Germany's minimum wage is barely above the poverty line. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-minimum-wage-is-barely-above-the-poverty-line/a-46797781.

Sen, A., Rybczynski, K., & Van de Wall, C. (2011). Teen employment, poverty, and the minimum wage: Evidence from Canada. Labour Economics, 18(1), 36–47. Available from https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-index-wellbeing/sites/ca.canadian-index-wellbeing/files/uploads/files/teen_employment_poverty_and_the_minimum_wage-evidence_from_canada.pdf.

Stewart, M. (2012). Wage inequality, minimum wage effects and spillovers. Oxford Economic Papers, 64(4), 616–634. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/41683136?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Tedeschi, E. (2019, April 24). Americans are seeing highest minimum wage in history (without federal help). The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/upshot/why-america-may-already-have-its-highest-minimum-wage.html.

UK Department for Business, Energy, & Industrial Strategy. (2016). National living wage (NLW). Policy paper. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-living-wage-nlw.

UK Low Pay Commission. (2019). 20 years of the national minimum wage: A history of the UK minimum wage and its effects. Available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790910/20_years_of_the_National_Minimum_Wage_-_a_history_of_the_UK_minimum_wage_and_its_effects.pdf.

Chapter 3 - Labour standards protections for workers in non-standard work

Arthurs, H.W. (1967). Developing industrial citizenship: A challenge for Canada’s second century. Canadian Bar Review, 45(4), 786–830. Available from https://cbr.cba.org/index.php/cbr/article/view/2654.

Atkinson, J., & Meager, N. (1986). Changing working patterns: How companies achieve flexibility to meet new needs. London: Nedo. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269690425_Changing_Working_Patterns_How_Companies_Achieve_Flexibility_to_Meet_New_Needs.

Bank of Canada. (2019). The size and characteristics of informal ("gig") work in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/san2019-6.pdf.

Becker, T., & Rajwani, A. (2016). The sharing economy and the future of work. Ryerson University.

Burrows, R., Gilbert, N., & Pollert, A. (1992). Fordism, post-Fordism and economic flexibility. In Gilbert, N., Burrows, R., & Pollert, A. (Eds.), Fordism and flexibility. New York: St-Martin’s Press. Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-1-349-13526-4%2F1.pdf.

Busby, C., & Muthukumaran, R. (2016). Precarious positions: Policy options to mitigate risks in non-standard employment. C.D. Howe Institute. Retrieved from https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary%20462_0.pdf.

Carre, F. (2015). (In)dependent contractor misclassification. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://www.epi.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification/.

Canadian Labour Congress. (2019, April 30). CLC Submission to the Expert Panel on Modern Federal Labour Standards.

Crane, E. (2018). Non-standard work and access to unemployment benefits in Canada: Assessing policy options. Retrieved from http://summit.sfu.ca/system/files/iritems1/18015/etd10687_ECrane.pdf.

Cranford, C.J., Vosko, L.F., & Zukewich, N. (2003a). The gender of precarious employment in Canada. Relations industrielles, 58(3), 454–482. Retrieved from https://www.riir.ulaval.ca/sites/riir.ulaval.ca/files/2003_58-3_4.pdf.

Cranford, C.J., Vosko, L.F., & Zukewich, N. (2003b). Precarious employment in the Canadian labour market: A statistical portrait. Just Labour, 3(2003 Fall), 6–22. Retrieved from https://justlabour.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/justlabour/article/view/164/163.

Das Acevedo, D. (2018). Unbundling freedom in the sharing economy. Southern California Law Review, 91(5). 793–838. Retrieved from https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/2018/07/05/unbundling-freedom-in-the-sharing-economy-article-by-deepa-das-acevedo/.

De Stefano, V. (2016). The rise of "just in time workforce": On-demand work, crowd work and labour protection in the "gig-economy". ILO Conditions of work and employment series No. 71. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_443267.pdf.

Donahue, L.H., Lamare, J., & Kolter, F. (2007). The cost of worker misclassification in New York State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=reports.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2019a). A portrait of the federally regulated private sector. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/federally-regulated-private-sector.html.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2019b). Federal labour standards protections for workers in non-standard work. Retrieved from: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/protection-workers-nonstandard.html.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2018). Employment Insurance monitoring and assessment report for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2016 and ending March 31, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/ei/ei-list/reports/monitoring2017.html.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2017). Determining the "real employer" – IPG-068. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/laws-regulations/labour/interpretations-policies/real-employer.html.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2016a). Determining the employer/employee relationship - IPG-069. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/laws-regulations/labour/interpretations-policies/employer-employee.html.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). (2016b). Evaluation of the employment insurance special benefits for self-employed workers. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development.

Fong, F. (2018). Navigating precarious employment in Canada: Who is really at risk?. Chartered Professional Accountants Canada. Available from https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/the-cpa-profession/about-cpa-canada/key-activities/public-policy-government-relations/economic-policy-research/rise-precarious-employment.

Fudge, J. (2012). The precarious migrant status and precarious employment: The paradox of international rights for migrant workers. Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 34(1), 95–132. Available from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1958360.

Fudge, J., & Vosko, L.F. (2001). Gender, segmentation and the standard employment relationship in Canadian labour law, legislation and policy. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 22(2), 271–310. Retrieved from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0143831X01222005.

Girard, M. (2010). Effects of non-standard work on the work-family balance: A literature review. McGill Sociological Review, 1(2010 January), 46–58. Retrieved from https://www.mcgill.ca/msr/volume1/litreview.

Goldring, L., & Landolt, P. (2013). Producing and negotiating non-citizenship: Precarious legal status in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Hardy, T., & Howe, J. (2015). Chain reaction: A strategic approach to addressing employment non-compliance in complex supply chains. Journal of Industrial Relations, 57(4), 563–84. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022185615582240?journalCode=jira.

Hill Notes. (2018). Precarious employment in Canada: An overview. Library of Parliament. Retrieved from https://hillnotes.ca/2018/11/21/precarious-employment-in-canada-an-overview/.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2016). Non-standard employment around the world. Available from http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_534326/lang--en/index.htm.

Johal, S., & Thirgood, J. (2016). Working without a net: Rethinking Canada’s social policy in the new age of work. Available from https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/wp-content/uploads/publications/132_working_without_a_net.pdf.

Mercure, D. (2001). Nouvelles dynamiques d’entreprise et transformation des formes d’emploi : du fordisme à l’impartition flexible. In J. Bernier, R. Blouin, G. Laflamme, P. Verge, & F. Morin (Eds.) L’incessante évolution des formes d’emploi et la redoutable stagnation des lois du travail. Sainte-Foy : Presses de l’Université Laval.

Mitchell, C.M., & Murray, J.C. (2016). Changing workplaces review. Special advisors' interim report Ontario Ministry of Labour. Retrieved from https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/about/cwr_interim/.

Nakache, D., & Kinoshita, P.J. (2010). The Canadian temporary foreign worker program: Do short term economic needs prevail over human rights concerns?. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

National Employment Law Project. (2012). Independent contractor misclassification imposes huge costs on workers and federal and state treasuries. Retrieved from https://nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IndependentContractorCosts1.pdf.

Noack, L.A., & Vosko, L.F. (2011). Precarious jobs in Ontario: Mapping dimensions of labour market insecurity by workers’ social location and context. Law Commission of Ontario. Retrieved from https://www.lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/vulnerable-workers-call-for-papers-noack-vosko.pdf.

Noiseux, Y. (2012). Le travail atypique au Québec : Les jeunes au coeur de la dynamique de précarisation par la centrifugation de l’emploi. Revue multidisciplinaire sur l'emploi, le syndicalisme et le travail, 7(1), 28–54. Retrieved from https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/remest/2012-v7-n1-remest0308/1012695ar/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2019). Taxation and the future of work. OECD Taxation Working Papers No. 41. Retrieved from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/taxation-and-the-future-of-work_20f7164a-en.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2018). The geography of non-standard work. In Job creation and local economic development 2018: Preparing for the future of work. Retrieved from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264305342-en.pdf?expires=1559337940&id=id&accname=ocid43014084&checksum=E8C849363480ECE6FE6B0ED6912347A1.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2015). In it together: Why less inequality benefits all. Available from http://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-en.htm.

Ontario. (2017). The Changing Workplace Review—An Agenda for Workplace Rights. Final Report. Retrieved from https://www.ontario.ca/document/changing-workplaces-review-final-report.

Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario (PEPSO). (2015). The precarity penalty: The impact of precarious employment on individuals, households and communities—and what to do about it. PEPSO, McMaster University and United Way Toronto. Retrieved from https://pepso.ca/documents/precarity-penalty.pdf.

Randstad. (2017). Workforce 2025. Retrieved from http://content.randstad.ca/hubfs/workforce2025/Workforce-2025-Randstad-Part1.pdf.

Ramesh, B.P. (2004). 'Cyber coolies' in BPO: Insecurities and vulnerabilities of non-standard work. Economic and Political Weekly, 39(5), 492–497. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414585.

Rawling, M.J. (2006). A generic model of regulating supply chain outsourcing. In Arup, C. (Ed). Labour law and labour market regulation: Essays on the construction, constitution and regulation of labour markets and work relationships (pp. 520–541). Sydney, AU: Federation Press.

Rodgers, G., & Rodgers, J. (1989). Precarious jobs in labour market regulation. The growth of atypical employment in Western Europe. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gerry_Rodgers/publication/43604402/inline/jsViewer/575580d608ae0405a57536fd.

Schur, L.A. (2002). Dead end jobs or a path to economic well being? The consequences of non‐standard work among people with disabilities. Behavioral Sciences & The Law, 20(6), 601–620. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bsl.512.

Sorgner, A., Fritsch, M., & Kritos, A. (2014). Do entrepreneurs really earn less?. Discussion Paper Series. No. 8651. Retrieved from http://ftp.iza.org/dp8651.pdf.

Standing, G. (2011). The precariat. The new dangerous class. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Standing, G. (1997). Globalization, labour flexibility and insecurity: The era of market regulation. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 3(1), 7–37. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/095968019731002.

Statistics Canada. (2019). Temporary employment in Canada. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190514/dq190514b-eng.htm.

Stone, K.V.W. (2006). Flexibilization, globalization and privatization: Three challenges to labour rights in our time. Osgoode Hall Law Review, 44(1), 77–104. Available from https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1312&context=ohlj.

Trudeau, G. (2017). Aspects constitutionnels du travail salarié. JurisClasseur Québec Rapports individuels et collectifs du travail.

Vosko, L.F. (2010). Managing the margins: Gender, citizenship and the international regulation of precarious employment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vosko, L.F. (2005). Understanding labour market insecurity in Canada. Montreal-Toronto: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Vosko, L.F., Noack, A.M., & Tucker, E. (2016). Employment standards enforcement. Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Labour to support the Changing Workplaces Review of 2015. Retrieved from https://cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/sites/cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/files/research-projects/Vosko%20Noack%20Tucker-%206A%20-ESA%20Enforcement.pdf.

Vosko, L.F., Noack, A.M., & Thomas, M.P. (2016). How far does the Employment Standards Act 2000 extend? An empirical analysis of archival and statistical data. Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario. Retrieved from https://cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/sites/cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/files/research-projects/Vosko%20Noack%20Thomas-5-%20ESA%20Exemptions.pdf.

Vosko, L.F., Thomas, M.P., Grundy, J., Tucker, E., & Gellatly, M. (forthcoming). Closing the employment standards enforcement gap: Improving protections for people in precarious jobs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Weil, D. (2014). The fissured workplace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weil, D. (2010). Improving workplace conditions through strategic enforcement: A report to the Wage and Hour Division. Retrieved from https://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf.

Zeytinoglu, I.U., & Muteshi, J.K. (2000). Gender, race and class dimensions of nonstandard work. Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, 55(1), 133–167. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23078116?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Chapter 4 - Disconnecting from work-related e communications outside of work hours

Arlinghaus, A., & Nachreiner, F. (2014). Health effects of supplemental work from home in the European Union. Chronobiology International, 31(10), 1100–1107. Available from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.3109/07420528.2014.957297.

Barber, L.K., & Santuzzi, A.M. (2015). Please Respond ASAP: Workplace telepressure and employee recovery. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 20(2), 172–189. Available from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25365629.

Belkin, L., Becker, W.J., & Conroy, S. (2016). Exhausted, but unable to disconnect: After-hours email, work-family balance and identification. Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2016(1). Available from https://journals.aom.org/doi/10.5465/ambpp.2016.10353abstract.

Bell, D., Otterbach, S., & Sousa-Poza, A. (2012). Work hours constraints and health. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 105/106, 35–54. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23646455?&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Berg, P., Appelbaum, E., Bailey, T., & Kalleberg, A.L. (2004). Contesting time: International comparisons of employee control of working time. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57(3), 331–349. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/001979390405700301.

Berg, P., Bosch, G., & Charest, J. (2014). Working-time configurations: A framework for analysing diversity across countries. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 67(3), 805–837. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793914537452?journalCode=ilra.

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). (2018). Communications Monitoring Report. Retrieved from https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/policymonitoring/2018/cmr3d.htm.

Code du travail, France § L2242-17 (2018). Retrieved from https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000037389726&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072050&dateTexte=20190620&oldAction=rechCodeArticle&fastReqId=69640338&nbResultRech=1

Code du travail, France § L3121-9 (2016). Retrieved from https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000033020484&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072050&dateTexte=20190620&fastPos=2&fastReqId=1638401223&oldAction=rechCodeArticle

Coiquaud, U. (2016). The obligation to be available: The case of the trucking industry. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 32(3), 322–343. Available from https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=IJCL2016017.

Dembe, A.E. (2005). Long working hours: The scientific basis for concern. Perspectives on Work, 8(2), 20–22. Available from http://www.lerachapters.org/OJS/ojs-2.4.4-1/index.php/LERAMR/article/view/2826.

Derks, D., & Bakker, A.B. (2014). Smartphone use, work-home interference, and burnout: A diary study on the role of recovery. Applied Psychology, 63(3), 411-440. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2012.00530.x.

Derks, D., Van Duin, D., Tims, M., & Bakker, A. (2015). Smartphone use and work-home interference: The moderating role of social norms and employee work engagement. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 88(1), 155–177. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/joop.12083.

Employment and Social Development Canada. (n.d.) Hours of work – Canada Labour Code, Part III - Division I - 802-1-IPG-002. Interpretations, policies and guidelines. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/laws-regulations/labour/interpretations-policies/hours-work.html.

EuroFound. (2017, October 9). Spain: AXA recognises workers’ right to turn phones off out of working hours. Retrieved from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2017/spain-axa-recognises-workers-right-to-turn-phones-off-out-of-working-hours.

EuroFound the International Labour Office (ILO). (2017). Working anytime, anywhere: The effects on the world of work. Retrieved from https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1658en.pdf.

Fenner, G.H., & Renn, R.W. (2010). Technology-assisted supplemental work and work-to-family conflict: The role of instrumentality beliefs, organizational expectations and time management. Human Relations, 63(1), 63–82. Available from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0018726709351064.

Fontaine, L.L. (2017, January 7). Réforme du droit du travail français : une vraie déconnexion?. Le Devoir. Retrieved from https://www.ledevoir.com/opinion/libre-opinion/488644/reforme-du-droit-du-travail-francais-une-vraie-deconnexion.

Gratton, L. (2016). Révolution numérique et négociation collective. Droit social, 12, 1050–1067. Available from https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5771081.

Harter, J. (2014, September 9). Should employers ban email after work hours?. Business Journal Gallup. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/175670/employers-ban-email-work-hours.aspx.

Hasham, A. (2012, June 26). Lawsuits over denied overtime pay against CIBC, Scotiabank to go ahead. Toronto Star. Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/06/26/lawsuits_over_denied_overtime_pay_against_cibc_scotiabank_to_go_ahead.html.

Hilbrecht, M., & Lero, D.S. (2014). Self-employment and family life: constructing work-life balance when you’re ‘always on’. Community, Work and Family, 17(1), 20–42. Retrieved from https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-index-wellbeing/sites/ca.canadian-index-wellbeing/files/uploads/files/hilbrechtleroself-employmentconstructingbalance2014.pdf.

Hilbrecht, M., Shaw, S.M., Johnson, L.C., & Andrey, J. (2008). ‘I’m home for the kids’: Contradictory implications for work-life balance of teleworking mothers. Gender, Work and Organization, 15(5), 454–476. Available from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2008.00413.x.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2011, August 26). Working time in the twenty-first century. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/travail/whatwedo/publications/WCMS_161734/lang--en/index.htm.

Kiladze, T. (2014, July 24). Scotiabank settles class action on overtime pay. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/scotiabank-settles-class-action-on-overtime-pay/article19757488/.

Kimmel, L. (2014, April 14). Envious of the e-mail ban in France? You can do the same. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/leadership-lab/envious-of-the-e-mail-ban-in-france-you-can-do-the-same/article17967049/.

Krause, R. (2018). "Always-on": The collapse of the work-life separation in recent developments, deficits and counter-strategies. In E. Ales, Y. Curzi, T. Fabbri, O. Rymkevich, I. Senatori & G. Solinas (Eds.), Working in Digital and Smart Organizations. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Available from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-77329-2_11#citeas.

Lum, F. (2013, December 18). Class action against BMO Nesbitt Burns to proceed. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/class-action-for-unpaid-overtime-against-bmo-nesbitt-burns-to-proceed/article16040864/.

Mettling, B. (2015). Transformation numérique et vie au travail. Ministère du Travail. Retrieved from http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport_mettling_-transformation_numerique_vie_au_travail.pdf.

Moulton, D. (2017, April 11). The problem with a ‘right to disconnect’ law. The Lawyer’s Daily. Retrieved from https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/2859.

Ojala, S., Nätti, J., & Anttila, T. (2014). Informal overtime at home instead of telework: Increase in negative work-family interface. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 34(1/2), 69–87. Available from https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/IJSSP-03-2013-0037.

Paulin, J.-F. (2008). Les temps soustraits au pouvoir. Semaine Sociale Lamy Supplément, 1340.

Ray, J.-E. (2016). Grande accélération et droit à la déconnexion. Droit social, 11, 912–920. Available from https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5730994.

Secunda, P. (2018). The employee right to disconnect. Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, 8(1). Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3116158.

Statistics Canada (2015-2016). Daily average time spent in hours on various activities by age group and sex, 15 years and over, Canada and provinces. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=4510001401&pickMembers%5B0%5D=1.1&pickMembers%5B1%5D=3.1&pickMembers%5B2%5D=4.2&pickMembers%5B3%5D=5.1.

Stich, J.-F., Tarafdar, M., Stacey, P., & Cooper, C. (2019). Appraisal of email use as a source of workplace stress: A person-environment fit approach. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 20(2), 132–160. Available from https://aisel.aisnet.org/jais/vol20/iss2/2/.

Sullivan, C., & Lewis, S. (2001). Home-based telework, gender, and the synchronization of work and family: Perspectives of teleworkers and their co-residents. Gender, Work and Organization, 8(2), 123–145. Retrieved from http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~tkennedy/Courses/2P26/Sullivan%202001.pdf.

Vallée, G. (2010). Les nouvelles formes d’emploi et le ‘brouillage’ de la frontière entre la vie de travail et la vie privée: Jusqu’où va l’obligation de disponibilité des employés?. Lex Electronica, 15(2), 1–34. Retrieved from https://www.lex-electronica.org/files/sites/103/15-2_vallee.pdf.

Vallée, G., & Gesualdi-Fecteau, D. (2016). Setting the temporal boundaries of work: An empirical study of the nature and scope of labour law protections. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 32(3), 344–378. Available from https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=IJCL2016018.

Vasagar, J. (2013, August 30). Out of hours working banned by German labour ministry. The Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/10276815/Out-of-hours-working-banned-by-German-labour-ministry.html.

Véricel, M. (2017). Astreintes : caractère substantiel des conditions légales de leur institution. Revue du droit de travail, 12, 804–806. Available from https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6260242.

Volkswagen turns off Blackberry email after work hours. (2012, March 8). BBC. Retrieved fromhttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16314901.

Working Families & Bright Horizons (2019). Modern families index 2019. Retrieved from https://www.workingfamilies.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/BH_MFI_Report_2019_Full-Report_Final.pdf.

Chapter 5 - Benefits: Access and portability

Arthurs, H.W. (2006). Fairness at work: Federal labour standards for the 21st century. Gatineau, QC: Government of Canada. Available from https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1166&context=reports.

Barnes, S., & Anderson, L. (2015). Low earnings, unfilled prescriptions: Employer-provided health benefit coverage in Canada. Available from http://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Low-Earnings-Unfilled-Prescriptions-2015.pdf.

BC Maritime Employers Association (BCMEA). (n.d.). Collective agreements. Available from http://www.bcmea.com/resources/collective-agreements/.

Bickis, I. (2019, May 30). Are you on speaking terms with your old pensions? Ignoring them could cost you. Financial Post. Available from https://business.financialpost.com/personal-finance/are-you-on-speaking-terms-with-your-old-pensions-ignoring-them-could-cost-you.

Busby, C., & Muthukumaran, R. (2016). Precarious positions: Policy options to mitigate risks in non-standard employment. Available from https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary%20462_0.pdf.

CAAT Pension Plan. (n.d.). DBplus: A new defined benefit design for those who work part-time or on contract. Available from https://www.caatpension.on.ca/en/members/dbplus-new-defined-benefit-design-those-who-work-part-time-or-contract.

Canadian Academy of Health Sciences (CAHS). (2014). Improving access to oral health care for vulnerable people living in Canada. Available from http://cahs-acss.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Access_to_Oral_Care_FINAL_REPORT_EN.pdf.

Canadian Dental Association (CDA). (2017). The state of oral health in Canada. Available from https://www.cda-adc.ca/stateoforalhealth/_files/thestateoforalhealthincanada.pdf.

Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH). (n.d.). Mental illness and addiction: Facts and statistics. Available from https://www.camh.ca/en/driving-change/the-crisis-is-real/mental-health-statistics.

Code du travail, France § L1243-8.

Common Good. (2018). Common good retirement plan. Consultation paper. Available from https://www.commongoodplan.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/common-good-consultation-paper-7aug18-1.pdf.

European Council, Council of the European Union. (2019, February 13). Pensions: Council confirms agreement on Pan-European pension product [Press release]. Available from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/13/pensions-council-confirms-agreement-on-pan-european-pension-product/.

Fox, D., & Moyser, M. (2018). Women in Canada: A gender-based statistical report (the economic well-being of women in Canada). Statistics Canada. Available from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/89-503-x/2015001/article/54930-eng.pdf?st=8rvCTaP-.

Garnick, D. (2016). Income insights: Gender retirement gap. The Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association (TIAA). Available from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888911.

Gruber, J. (1994). The incidence of mandated maternity benefits. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 622–641. Available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118071.

Hanauer, N., & Rolf, D. (2015). Shared security, shared growth. Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, 37(Summer 2015). Available from https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/shared-security-shared-growth/.

Health Canada. (2019). A prescription for Canada: Achieving pharmacare for all, final report of the advisory council on the implementation of national pharmacare. Available from https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/images/corporate/about-health-canada/public-engagement/external-advisory-bodies/implementation-national-pharmacare/final-report/final-report.pdf.

Johal, S., & Cukier, W. (2019). Portable benefits: Protecting people in the new world of work. Available from https://ppforum.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Portable-Benefits-Protecting-People-in-the-New-World-of-Work-PPF-JAN2019-EN-1.pdf.

Johal, S., & Thirgood, J. (2016). Working without a net: Rethinking Canada’s social policy in the new age of work. Available from https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/wp-content/uploads/publications/132_working_without_a_net.pdf.

Krueger, A.B. (2017). Independent workers: What role for public policy. Moynihan Lecture: Princeton University. Available from https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01tt44pq514/3/615.pdf.

Law Commission of Ontario. (2012). Vulnerable workers and precarious work: Interim report. Available from http://www.lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/vulnerable-workers-interim-report.pdf.

Lizée, M. (2018). New DB plans with guaranteed benefits and fixed employer contribution: a viable option for the 21st Century?. Available from https://www.acpm.com/ACPM/The-Observer/2018-Issue-2/Industry-Insider/ARTICLES-OF-INTEREST/New-DB-plans-with-guaranteed-benefits-and-fixed-em.aspx.

MacDonald, B. (2019). Filling the cracks in pension coverage: Introducing workplace tax-free pension plans. Available from https://www.ryerson.ca/nia/white-papers/filling-the-cracks-in-pension-coverage.pdf.

Marier, P., & Skinner, S. (2015). The impact of gender and immigration on pension outcomes in Canada. Canadian Public Policy, 34(1), S59–S78. Available from https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/cpp.34.Supplement.S59.

Markey, R., Parr, N., Kyng, T., Muhidin, S., O’Neill, S., Thornthwaite, L., & Ferris, S. (2017). The case for a national portable long service leave scheme in Australia. The McKell Institute: Macquarie University, Centre for Workforce Futures. Available from https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/EDJSCommittee/Sub_01_12062015_The_McKell_Institute.pdf?.

Mazer, A., Weisstub, J., Li, G., Rademacher, I., Mitchell, D., & White, B. (2019). Portable non-employer retirement benefits: An approach to expanding coverage for a 21st century workforce. Available from https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2019/02/Portable-nonemployer-retirement-benefits.pdf?_ga=2.131650314.429844907.1558271443-948175477.1558271443.

Milligan, K., & Schirle, T. (2016). The pressing question: Does CPP expansion help low earners?. Available from https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/e-brief_241.pdf.

Mitchell, M.C., & Murray, J.C. (2017). The changing workplaces review: An agenda for workplace rights. Available from https://files.ontario.ca/books/mol_changing_workplace_report_eng_2_0.pdf.

Morgan, S.G., & Daw, J. R. (2012). Canadian pharmacare: Looking back, looking forward. Healthcare Policy/Politiques de Santé, 8(1), 14–23. Available from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3430151/.

National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA). (2019). Family medical care plan. Available from https://www.nebf.com/fmcp/planhighlights/Overview/.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2015). In it together: Why less inequality benefits all. Available from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en.

Press, K. (2016, February 17). Retirement now report. SunLife Financial. Available from https://www.sunlife.ca/ca/Tools+and+Resources/Money+and+Finances/Saving+for+retirement/Retirement+now?vgnLocale=en_CA#.

Province of Alberta. (2018). Alberta Blue Cross. Available from https://ab.bluecross.ca/government-plan/government-plan.php.

Province of British Columbia. (2019). Fair pharmacare changes in 2019. Available from https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/health/health-drug-coverage/pharmacare-for-bc-residents/who-we-cover/fair-pharmacare-plan/fair-pharmacare-changes-in-2019.

Régie de l’assurance maladie Québec (RAMQ). (n.d.). Prescription drug insurance. Available from http://www.ramq.gouv.qc.ca/en/citizens/prescription-drug-insurance/Pages/amount-to-pay-prescription-drugs.aspx.

Rolf, D., Clark, S., & Watterson Bryant, C. (2016). Portable benefits in the 21st century: Shaping a new system of benefits for independent workers. Available from https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/portable-benefits-21st-century/.

Service, O. (2015, November 10). Automatic enrolment and pensions: A behavioural success story. The Behavioural Insights Team. Available from https://www.bi.team/blogs/automatic-enrolment-and-pensions-a-behavioural-success-story/.

State of California. (2019). CalSavers: Individual retirement account (IRA). Available from https://www.calsavers.com/.

State of Illinois. (2019). Illinois Secure Choice: State-sponsored retirement savings program. Available from https://www.ilsecurechoice.com/home.html.

Stride Health. (n.d.). Stride health insurance. Available from https://www.stridehealth.com/health-insurance/guide/how-health-insurance-plans-work.

Strom, S., & Schmitt, M. (2016). Protecting workers in a patchwork economy. The Century Foundation. Available from https://tcf.org/content/report/protecting-workers-patchwork-economy/?agreed=1?.

Summers, L.H. (1989). Some simple economics of mandated benefits. The American Economic Review, 79(2), 177–183. Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and First Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. Available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1827753.

Taylor, M., Marsh, G., Nicol, D., & Broadbent, P. (2017). Good work: The Taylor review of modern working practices. London: Great Britain, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. Available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627671/good-work-taylor-review-modern-working-practices-rg.pdf.

Thirgood, J. (2017). What if you could take it with you? A portable benefits scheme for all Canadian workers. Available from https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/what-if-you-could-take-it-with-you/.

UNIFOR. (n.d.). Canadian freelance union services. Available from https://www.canadianfreelanceunion.ca/services.

Chapter 6 - Collective voice for non-unionized workers

Adams, R.J. (2008). From statutory right to human right: The evolution and current status of collective bargaining. Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society, 12(Spring 2009), 48–67. Available from www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volume12/pdfs/05_adams_press.pdf.

Adams, R.J. (1986). Two policy approaches to labour-management decision making at the level of the enterprise: A comparison of the Wagner model and statutory works councils. In W.C. Riddell (Ed.), Labour-Management Cooperation in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Arthurs, H.W. (2006). Fairness at work: Federal labour standards for the 21st century. Federal Labour Standards Review. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1166&context=reports.

Assemblée nationale du Québec. (2016). Briefs tabled under the order to the committee « Special consultations and public hearings on Bill 53 ». Retrieved from http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/CET/mandats/Mandat-36133/memoires-deposes.html.

Batt, R., Colvin, A.J.S., & Keefe, J. (2002). Employee voice, human resource practices, and quit rates: Evidence from the telecommunications industry. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55, 573–594. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/hrpubs/4/.

Beatty, D.M. (1987). Putting the charter to work: Designing a constitutional labour code. Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Befort, S.F., & Budd, J.W. (2009). Invisible hands, invisible objectives. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Bemberg, N. (2018). The legal standard for determining employee disloyalty under section 7 of the NLRA. Wake Forest Journal of Law and Policy, 9(1), 117–134.

Benjamin, D., Gunderson, M., Lemieux, T., & Riddell, W.C. (2017). Labour Market Economics. 8th edition. Whitby, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Bernard, E. (1995). Canada: Joint committees on occupational health and safety. In J. Rogers & W. Streeck (Eds.). Works Councils: Consultation, Representation and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (pp. 351–374). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bernier, J. (2018). Vers un véritable régime d’extension de conventions collectives. In J. Bernier (Ed.), Le régime des décrets de convention collective au Québec. Quel avenir?. Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais.

Bogg, A., & Estlund, C. (2014). Freedom of association and the right to contest: Getting back to basics. In A. Bogg & T. Novitz (Eds.), Voices at work: Continuity and change in the common law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bryce, G.K., & Manga, P. (1985). The effectiveness of health and safety committees. Relation Industrielles, 40(2), 257–283. Available from https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ri/1985-v40-n2-ri1139/050133ar.pdf.

Bryson, A., Gomez, R., Gunderson, M., & Meltz, N. (2005). Youth-adult differences in the demand for unionization: Are American, British, and Canadian workers all that different?. Journal of Labor Research, 26(1), 155–167. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24096425_Youth-Adult_Differences_in_the_Demand_for_Unionization_Are_American_British_and_Canadian_Workers_All_That_Different.

Bryson, A., Gomez, R., Kretschmer, T., & Willman, P. (2013). Workplace voice and civic engagement: What theory and data tell us about unions and their relationship to the democratic process. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 50(4), 965–998. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol50/iss4/8.

Budd, J.W. (2014). The future of employee voice. In A. Wilkinson, J. Donaghey, T. Dundon & R.B. Freeman (Eds.), The Handbook of Research on Employee Voice. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.

Budd, J.W. (2004). Employment with a human face: Balancing efficiency, equity and voice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Campolieti, M., Gomez, R., & Gunderson, M. (2011). What accounts for the representation gap? Decomposing Canada-US differences in the desire for collective voice. Journal of Industrial Relations, 53(4), 425–449. Retrieved from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022185611409111.

Canadian Heritage-Patrimoine Canadien. (2002). Evaluation of the provisions and operations of the Status of the Artist Act. Volume I: Final Report. Retrieved from http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CH44-86-2002E.pdf.

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Choko, M. (2017). Le travailleur derrière le produit artistique : la protection de « l’artiste » dans ses rapports de travail avec les personnes qui retiennent ses services en vertu de l’interprétation donnée à la loi sur le statut professionnel et les conditions d’engagement des artistes de la scène, du disque et du cinéma. Les Cahiers de droit, 58(1–2), 203–239. Available from https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/cd1/2017-v58-n1-2-cd03066/1039837ar/.

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Chapter 7 - Cross-cutting issues

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