The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization

by Dr. Lester W. Grau & Dr. Charles K. Bartles

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Armed Forces put a great deal more emphasis on artillery, or the “God of War,” than other armies do. While the West has been shifting efforts from artillery and other conventional aspects of war in favour of counterinsurgency, Russia has been consistently pursuing artillery modernization, as its economic resources allow. The war in Ukraine has proved the adage that the Russian Army is an artillery army with tanks: Russia has fought this conflict artillery-heavy and manoeuvre-light. Ukraine, which lost considerable artillery in the first months of the conflict, has been unable to replace it and has had to substitute with large numbers of personnel. In this conflict, artillery reconnaissance has changed from primarily ground reconnaissance to ground, air and space reconnaissance and highly accurate targeting. Artillery must fire and move rapidly to survive. Canada, like other North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, is concerned with European security and how to handle it. Canadian defence planners are dealing with these changing issues and looking to existing and future artillery systems as part of the solution.

Like many other nations, Russia is now considering the role of robotics in the armed forces.  Although Russia was a relative latecomer to the uncrewed air vehicle (UAV) endeavour, it has since made significant advances and was the first to successfully employ UAVs for artillery purposes. Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform— the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module. The Soviet T-62 was the last Russian tank to have a four-person crew. The introduction of a robotic autoloader eliminated the job of the loader, and subsequent tank crews consisted of three people. The robots supporting the 2S35’s auto-loading uncrewed turret should allow a reduction in crew size. Russia is also considering effective ways to use robotic technology to support the 2S35 by using UAVs and uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) to provide reconnaissance and logistically support 2S35 fires. In early July 2022, Russian state-run media reports claimed that Russia has introduced the 2S35 in the war in Ukraine although the development remains unsubstantiated by credible sources at the time of writing.^{Footnote 1} 

This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics. It is important to note that the 2S35 Koalitsiya has yet to enter combat in Ukraine. This may be because Russia has only a battery of 2S35s that is still undergoing testing to determine the system’s capabilities and to work out any remaining bugs and determine how the 2S35 can best be integrated into the force. In addition, Ukraine has reportedly captured many Russian weapon systems fully intact. The capture of an intact 2S35 would be a boon for Western intelligence and a major public embarrassment for Russia. 

HISTORY OF THE KOALITSIYA PROGRAM

Although the Soviets produced several 152 mm self-propelled howitzers (including the 2S3 Akatsiya, the 2S5 Giatsint-S and the 2S19 Msta-S), their characteristics were believed to be inferior to those of the self-propelled artillery systems being fielded, or expected to be fielded, by foreign armies, such as the Crusader (the United States), the PzH 2000 (Germany), the AS90 (the United Kingdom), and the K9 (South Korea). To remedy this situation, Russia laid plans in the early 1990s to create a rapid-firing 152 mm self-propelled artillery system for use in division-echelon artillery. The system would specifically be designed to attack personnel and destroy tactical nuclear weapons, artillery and mortar batteries, tanks and other armoured vehicles, anti-tank weapons, air defence and anti-missile defence assets, control points, and field fortifications, and to impede reserves in the enemy’s defensive depth.^{Footnote 2} 

As the Burevestnik Central Scientific Research Institute (TsNII Burevestnik) [Центральный научно-исследовательский институт (Буревестник)], located in Nizhny Novgorod, is the primary designer of tube artillery systems for the Russian Armed Forces, it was assigned responsibility for designing the project. At the same time, the Ural Transport Machinery Factory (Uraltransmash) [Уральский завод транспортного машиностроения (Уралтрансмаш)], in Yekaterinburg, was responsible for the manufacturing. Both entities were eventually subordinated to UralVagonZavod [УралВагонЗавод] in Nizhny Tagil, the same corporation that produces the limited-production T-14 Armata. In 2016, UralVagonZavod was incorporated into the State Corporation for Assistance to Development, Production and Export of Advanced Technology Industrial Product (Rostec) [Государственная корпорация по содействию разработке, производству и экспорту высокотехнологичной промышленной продукции (Ростех)].^{Footnote 3} 

From the project’s inception, the howitzer was envisioned to have an uncrewed turret, as TsNII Burevestnik was already conducting research on uncrewed weapon modules. However, due to Russian economic turmoil in the 1990s, the project did not reach full steam until the early 2000s. The project’s eventual name, the Koalitsiya or Coalition, can be traced back to TsNII Burevestnik. The Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (MMAD MD RF) likely used the name because the system was intended for use by a “coalition” of organizations in the defence ministry, including the ground forces and coastal defence artillery, and is even being considered for use on naval vessels.^{Footnote 4}  The prototype developed for the project was a heavily modified Msta-S howitzer with a unique double barrel, over-under design. Apparently, the prototype was deemed unfeasible and was abandoned in favour of a more conventional design in 2010.^{Footnote 5}  The MMAD refined its guidance, tasking TsNII Burevestnik to develop tracked and wheeled variants of a single-barrelled Koalitsiya howitzer and a wheeled transport-loader vehicle (TZM) to support them. By 9 May 2015, Uraltransmash had produced the first batch of what would come to be known as the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV (2С35 Коалиция-СВ) tracked self-propelled howitzers. Although there have been some significant modifications to the 2S35’s internal components, the external appearance has changed little since the initial fielding. By 2020, wheeled and towed variants were in testing.^{Footnote 6}  This capability is to be mounted on a variety of tracked and wheeled vehicles, which suggests that the Koalitsiya-SV is following the same design pattern as other Russian military combat vehicles. It is likely an innovation furthered for the benefit of the Russian Defence Ministry but also a selling point on the lucrative international arms export market. In 2016, it was announced that ten 2S35s would be field tested in the Western Military District’s 1st Tank Army.^{Footnote 7} 

CAPABILITIES OF THE 2S35 KOALITSIYA-SV

Armament

Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret. This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles. The Koalitsiya-SV’s rate of fire is so rapid that Major General Alexander Dragovalovsky, the Deputy Commander of the Missile and Artillery Troops, stated that “A single Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled gun is worth an entire artillery battery.”^{Footnote 8}  Although Dragovalovsky’s statement is undoubtedly an exaggeration, the improved characteristics are certainly quantitively superior to those of contemporary Russian howitzers. Dmitriy Semizorov, the general director of Uraltransmash, offers a more realistic comparison of the 2S35’s capabilities with those of foreign analogues: [translation] “by the range of fire—1.3 to 1.7 times, the accuracy of fire—1.5 to 3 times, the rate of fire—1.5 times, and the time it takes to accomplish the combat mission— 1.5 to 3 times.”^{Footnote 9} 

The 2S35’s loading system handles the charges and projectiles separately, allowing the fire control system to select the best combination of charge(s) and projectiles for the mission, and includes a liquid cooling system for the barrel to facilitate the higher rate of fire.^{Footnote 10}  This loading system feeds a 2A88 cannon equipped with a microwave ignition system that ensures a uniform detonation of the propellant charge to increase muzzle velocity and accuracy. This system can employ traditional 152 mm projectiles and a reportedly new family of projectiles designed specifically for the 2S35. In addition to conventional projectiles, the 2S35 also may employ base bleed and rocket-assisted projectiles (RAP) technology. There has been some conflation in reporting the range of the 2S35 regarding the use of these different technologies, but a range of 29 km for traditional 152 mm projectiles, 40 km for base bleed assisted projectiles, and up to 100 km for RAP projectiles appears reasonable.^{Footnote 11}  The Koalitsiya-SV can fire several projectiles in rapid succession and, by varying the barrel trajectory, have them arrive simultaneously on target, a capability known as multiple rounds simultaneous impact (MRSI). Based on various Russian mass media reports, Janes has assessed that the 2S35 could at least conduct an eight-round MRSI at a range of 30 km.^{Footnote 12}  The 2S35 is capable of firing a wide range of munitions, including HE-FRAG projectiles, cluster projectiles with anti-tank submunitions, electronic warfare (EW) jamming, and satellite navigation-guided munitions.^{Footnote 13} 

Robotic technology is found not only within the 2S35 but also on it. The 2S35 is equipped with a 6S21 Remote Controlled Turret Module (DUBM) [дистанционно управляемых модулей вооружения (ДУМВ)], also designed by TsNII Burevestnik. This roof-mounted, remotely operated turret has a 12.7 mm KORD machine gun with guidance actuators, a laser range finder, closed-circuit television for aiming and situational awareness, and 200 rounds.^{Footnote 14}  The equipping of the 2S35 with a DUBM is in keeping with current trends in the Russian Armed Forces to put DUBMs on large weapon systems (such as howitzers and tanks) as secondary weapons and on armoured personnel carriers, armoured cars and support vehicles as a primary weapon system. DUBMs are viewed as beneficial not only for crew protection but also from an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) perspective, as they are equipped with a variety of sensors which far exceed the capabilities of the human eyes and ears of a crewed turret. Another benefit is that DUBMs such as the 6S21 can reportedly engage low-flying and low-speed aircraft and UAVs. Although the 62S1 has not reportedly been in use during Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, other DUBMs, such as the Arbalet-DM mounted on the Tigr-M, are routinely seen.^{Footnote 15} 

Fire Control

There has been little information released about the 2S35’s fire control system. Still, it is likely a variant of the automated guidance and fire control system (ASUNO) [автоматизированной системы управления наведением орудия (АСУНО)] or a similar system. The ASUNO is now installed on a new tube, and rocket-launched artillery systems and modernized variants of systems such as the 2S1 Gvozdika, 2S3 Akatsiya, S24 Tyulpan, 2S19 Msta, 2S5 Giatsint-S, 2S7M Malka, Tornado-G and Tornado-S.^{Footnote 16}   The ASUNO functions by transmitting data, via wired or wireless means, between battalion and battery command and observation posts, the battalion fire control post, and organic and attached artillery reconnaissance subunits. It collects, processes, stores and outputs data on the position, status, ammunition supply level and meteorological conditions of batteries and individual artillery pieces and uses that information to create firing solutions. The ASUNO includes an onboard computer, a gyroscopic heading and attitude indicator system, gunner’s and loader’s displays, a gun commander’s display, a sight, a digital elevation sensor, and other equipment, ensuring automated gun laying and proper gun orientation.  

The ASUNO provides a day/night, all-weather capability to fire in a dispersed combat formation at the firing position. Perhaps the ASUNO’s most remarkable improvement over its predecessors is the speed of the system in calculating firing solutions. Not only does this improve support for the combined-arms battle as a whole, but it also increases battlefield survivability for the artillery systems themselves. This is especially important due to modern counterbattery location technology. If the enemy is equipped with this technology, an artillery unit must displace after firing for only 1–2 minutes.

Regarding the organizational aspects of the ASUNO, Russian sources state that it significantly reduces the workload of senior battery officers and gun commanders because the receipt of target data and the creation of firing solutions is done automatically. Senior battery officers and gun commanders can see the firing settings on the display monitor and monitor the accuracy of gun laying. In addition, digital mapping technology has been incorporated into ASUNO to provide better situational awareness.^{Footnote 17} 

Mobility and Protection

The Koalitsiya-SV is based on a T-90 tank chassis and therefore shares many of the T-90’s mobility and protection characteristics. The 2S35 weighs approximately 48 metric tons and will likely have a maximum speed of 60 km/h, an operational range of around 550 km, and the ability to snorkel across water crossings. The 2S35 can also launch smoke grenades and produce smoke by burning fuel in its exhaust if necessary. Although the 2S35 is currently being built on the T-90 chassis, there are plans for its use on the new Armata chassis.^{Footnote 18} 

THE FUTURE OF ARTILLERY AND ROBOTICS IN THE RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES

Expected Roles of Robotics in the Russian Ground Forces Russian interest in artillery modernization is occurring at a time of rapid technological advances, especially in robotics.^{Footnote 19}  The Ground Forces envisage that robotics could support the following activities:

• Conducting a breakthrough of a deliberate enemy defence.
• Supporting defensive operations by using robotics in screening zones.
• Providing covering fire for advancing and suppressing enemy weapon systems.
• Artillery reconnaissance and logistics support.
• Handling dangerous munitions and conducting ordnance disposal in normal and dangerous conditions.
• Casualty and vehicle evacuation.
• Engineer reconnaissance, mine laying, mine clearing and obstacle removal.
• Radiological, chemical and biological reconnaissance.
• Laying of smokescreens in enemy zones of fire.
• Delivering munitions and petroleum, oils and lubricants in enemy zones of fire.
• Providing security at borders, unit deployment areas, facilities, mountain passes and road intersections.^{Footnote 21} 

It is important to note how Russia classifies different types of robotics. The Russian Armed Forces terminologies vary, but generally the terms “robotic complex” (RTK) and “mobile robotic complex” (MRK) refer to remotely controlled robotic devices (although there may be some limited artificial intelligence [AI] capability), while “robotic systems” (RTS) refers to autonomous or semi-autonomous devices. Command and control (C2) of these devices is usually provided by a mobile command post (MCP).^{Footnote 22}  In general, Russia still works primarily with remote controlled–level technology, but advances in AI will permit the eventual fielding of autonomous/semi-autonomous–level systems. Russia is taking a two-pronged approach to creating these types of robotics. The first approach is to modify existing crewed platforms (T-72, Armata) and alter them so that they can be controlled remotely.^{Footnote 23}  One reason that the control panel of the new Kurganets-25 infantry fighting vehicle is reportedly based on a computer joystick is to facilitate possible robotization.^{Footnote 24}  The second approach is to produce platforms specially designed for autonomous and semi-autonomous operations, such as a military robotic complex (RTK VN).^{Footnote 25}  Besides using UAVs (as mentioned above), Russia already had some experience with robotics on the battlefield. In 2018, Russia reportedly field tested an Uran-9 RTK uncrewed combat vehicle in Syria with mixed results, causing some Russian experts to speculate that such technology would need to mature for at least another 10–15 years before being fully ready for the battlefield, despite earlier official announcements that all deficiencies had been corrected.^{Footnote 26} 

Figure 1 lays out a future Russian attack by a motorized rifle brigade as the central part of a three-brigade attack on a defending brigade. What is interesting is the new Russian symbology for UGVs and their mobile command posts. On the right side of the layout, there are two reserves of UGVs between the MRLS battalion and the two forward howitzer battalions. Since the howitzer battalions have their own robots for ammunition resupply and howitzer reloading, those reserves are positioned to aid in mine clearing, strong-point reduction, and exploitation. In the middle of the layout, the Russians are attacking using UGVs in defence breakthrough, fire suppression, artillery reconnaissance, mine clearing, and evacuation of wounded personnel and damaged vehicles. On the left of the layout, UGVs are used for fire suppression, artillery reconnaissance and resupply. The layout also shows UAVs, which are controlled by their own mobile command posts.

Robotics and Artillery

The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.^{Footnote 27}  An interview with TsNII Burevestnik’s General Director, Georgiy Zakamennykh, sheds some light on this thinking: 

[TRANSLATION] “An inevitable follow-on from increased specifications and performance is increased complexity of artillery weapons…. There is also a definite trend toward robotics, accompanied by the development and delivery of remote control algorithms…. So an artillery system can be controlled remotely—the operator’s location is not of fundamental importance…. We will only be able to talk of a robot having artificial intelligence when it shows it can autonomously form an algorithm for it to proceed correctly in an unfamiliar situation, that is, one not foreseen in its preinstalled scenarios. That is still in prospect— it’s attractive but also unsafe.”^{Footnote 28} 

Zakamennykh’s comments are interesting for several reasons. The first is that he evidently considers uncrewed turrets an essential step toward robotization. Given that the first step toward this effort was the autoloader technology developed first for the T-64 tank (although non-digital), it can be argued that Russia has undoubtedly chosen to employ an evolutionary over a revolutionary strategy for this purpose. The second point of interest is his view on the needed level of AI in relation to the current level available. Due to this situation, Zakamennykh does not believe that robotics is capable of autonomous operations yet.

Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively incorporate this developing technology into the force and support it. The Mikhailovskiy Military Artillery Academy is considering how to adjust force structure and the Table of Organization and Effects of current howitzer battalions to incorporate new artillery systems and robotic systems.

CURRENT RUSSIAN ARTILLERY STRUCTURE

Currently, most Russian self-propelled artillery battalions are based on three artillery batteries, with each battery having six artillery pieces (18 artillery pieces per battalion). The self-propelled artillery battalion’s capability to lay fires (quantity, distance and targeting) depends significantly on the type of self-propelled artillery piece with which it is equipped, the means of reconnaissance and C2, and the logistics capability, as seen in Figure 2. In terms of the targeting of fires, the Russian self-propelled artillery battalion relies on reconnaissance assets to find targets and a C2 system to relay targets from the reconnaissance assets, conduct mission planning, and create firing data. Although there are several different C2 systems, they all function similarly.

The artillery battalion and battery commanders are typically co-located with the supported manoeuvre commander to relay calls for fire to the artillery, or they are on the battlefield, calling for fire on targets of opportunity. Artillery commanders have command observation post (COP) vehicles with appropriate communications, navigation and sighting gear to fulfill this function. The chief of staff provides the fire control for artillery units for battalions, and the senior battery officer (the senior platoon leader) does so for batteries. These officers, not the commanders, are the ones actually co-located with the artillery, providing them with targets and firing data. They staff fire direction centre (FDC) vehicles to fulfill this function. The FDC vehicles are equipped similarly to the COP vehicles but are designed to function as FDCs. That means they usually have less or no sighting equipment and more fire control equipment, and they may be on a chassis more suitable to functioning as an FDC than as a COP conducting artillery reconnaissance on the battlefield.^{Footnote 31} 

Aside from the artillery battalion and battery commanders’ COP vehicles, the self-propelled artillery battalion has few other organic reconnaissance assets that can provide targeting data, only an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-4M Deyteriy or PRP-4A Argus) in the fire control platoon. Due to limited organic reconnaissance capabilities, Russian artillery battalions can and often do leverage other reconnaissance assets in the brigade to provide targeting data. Targeting information from signals intelligence (SIGINT) sources can be provided by the SIGINT company in the brigade’s reconnaissance battalion or by the brigade’s electronic warfare company. Perhaps the most high-profile reconnaissance asset leveraged by Russian artillery battalions is the UAVs in the brigade’s UAV company.^{Footnote 32}  Although these UAVs are used for target designation, they are multifunctional by design. Their employment for artillery use is weighed against other priorities, as these UAVs also fulfill EW, SIGINT, signal retransmission, and battlefield awareness missions. To alleviate the demand for UAV support in Russian artillery regiments and brigades, there are plans to give these formations dedicated UAV companies.^{Footnote 33} 

In terms of quantity of fires, on the lower end of the spectrum, older systems such as the 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika can fire 4–5 rounds per minute. The higher systems, such as the 2S19, can fire 7–8 rounds per minute, and modifications of the 2S19, such as the 2S19M2, can fire up to 10 rounds per minute. Given these rates of fire, the self-propelled artillery battalion has little in the way of organic logistics support to replenish these systems. The artillery batteries primarily rely on the trucks in the battalion’s support platoon to fulfill this task, as well as on the higher headquarters logistics support battalion for external support.

Proposed Russian Artillery Structure

The Russian Armed Forces’ interest in robotics is not limited to the technological aspects but also encompasses the organizational aspects of how robotics can best be integrated into the Russian military units and formations.^{Footnote 35}   Given the automated qualities that the 2S35 already possesses and the Russian military’s extensive experience using UAVs for targeting, it would be no surprise if the artillery troops became an early adopter and a testbed for robotic vehicle employment and organizational integration. Russian military theorists are already pondering what future structural changes will be needed to fully use the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV and other robotic technology that is, or soon will be, available. Colonel A. N. Aristarkhov of the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy has offered one view of how this robotic integration may occur in a 2S35 self-propelled howitzer battalion.^{Footnote 36}    

Before expanding on Aristarkhov’s proposed artillery battalion organizational structure, it is pertinent to discuss the exact role of that proposed battalion.When initially designed, the 2S35 was intended to serve as division-echelon artillery in the division’s artillery regiment. However, around 2009, during the “New Look” reforms, most ground forces divisions were reformed into brigades. This resulted in the new brigades usually having only two self-propelled artillery battalions, one multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) and one anti-tank battalion. Although the ground forces have reconstituted a few divisions and now have at least twelve of them, recent mentions of the 2S35 state that they are currently not intended to serve in divisional artillery regiments but rather in the artillery brigades assigned to Combined Arms Armies, Army Corps or Russia’s one Tank Army.^{Footnote 37}   

Although there is no standardized artillery brigade structure in the Russian Armed Forces, these artillery brigades typically consist of a combination of heavy MLRS (220 mm) battalions, heavy tube artillery (S24 Tyulpan, 2S7M Malka) and standard self-propelled and towed howitzer battalions. The self-propelled and towed howitzer battalions are structured identically to the howitzer battalion in the brigades. Although the 2S35 will be a considerably better weapon system than its predecessors, there is no intention that the 2S35 will become the standard artillery piece in the Russian Ground Forces. This is because Russia handles its artillery modernization process as it does other modernization programs: instead of opting to replace or upgrade all of a given weapon system, the Russians generally prefer to incrementally improve a portion of the force.^{Footnote 38}  Notably, any changes resulting from the war in Ukraine are unlikely to be implemented in the middle of the conflict.

Colonel A. N. Aristarkhov’s vision of a 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled artillery battalion differs substantially from the current structure. Most notably, these battalions would be built around three artillery batteries, with each battery having eight, instead of the current standard of six, artillery pieces (24 artillery pieces per battalion). One piece of information lending credence to this belief in an eight-gun artillery battery is a May 2020 Russian media report that the Central Military District had received eight 2S35s, the same number that Aristarkhov proposed.^{Footnote 40}

The combination of the 2S35’s higher rate of fire and the increased artillery battery size means that these battalions will have significantly more combat power than a 2S19M2 battalion. As will be seen, the other modifications of this battalion generally concern the reconnaissance aspects of laying fires and the logistical aspects of supporting a rapid-firing 24-artillery-piece battalion.

In terms of reconnaissance, Aristarkhov proposes organic UAV and UGV assets at both the battalion and battery levels. As the battalion-level UAVs and UGVs are specifically designated as “reconnaissance,” they may be intended for longer-range reconnaissance and of a different variety than the UAVs and UGVs in the batteries. The provision of organic UAVs is a significant capability improvement, and locating those assets at the COP/FDC level would make sense, as that is currently where attached UAV crews are usually located. One notable aspect is how small the UAV squads are intended to be. Considering that one of the three personnel in the three-person squad is probably just a driver, this leaves only two crew members to staff the UAVs and UGVs. Therefore, it is likely that these systems are intended to be autonomous or at least semi-autonomous.

In terms of logistics, significant changes have been made to the organizational structure to support the battalion’s capability to expend greater amounts of ammunition. A dedicated support platoon has been added that will operate transport-loader vehicles (TZM). The 2S35 will be the first Russian howitzer to have a dedicated TZM. Usually, TZMs are associated only with larger missile systems, but the 2S35’s higher rate of fire likely necessitates its use. The platoon also has UGVs that will likely provide some sort of logistical support, as the Russian Armed Forces have been keenly interested in the use of robotics for that purpose.^{Footnote 41}

Aristarkhov’s proposed 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled artillery battalion is certainly ambitious and has likely incorporated lessons learned from Ukraine and Syria. It raises the question of why the Russians would want more tubes in a battalion when the new system can fire so much faster and so much farther. The Russian army believes that it is better to destroy and disorganize an enemy at a distance rather than have to do so with tanks and infantry in close combat. The Russians have long been an artillery army that prefers to inflict maximum damage prior to close combat. They have developed effective precision fires but still practise mass fires to destroy areas and create psychic terror. Soviet casualties in World War II were staggering, and the Russian Federation preferred to expend projectiles rather than lives and weapon systems, if possible. More tubes that fire more rounds per minute give the manoeuvre commander more options and reduce losses from counterbattery fire. Robotic interface and, eventually, autonomous robots provide even more options.

CONCLUSION

The Russian Federation has taken an evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary, approach to robotics. The Russians are developing AI technologies to support semi-autonomous UAV and UGV operations, but these developments are also in tandem with their efforts to develop robotic technologies to reduce crew sizes of crewed vehicles. The Russians do not yet envisage a battlefield with autonomous uncrewed systems managed by just a few human controllers. A more likely scenario is Russia’s evolutionary approach to robotics that will lead to a gradual increase in the number of robotic systems on the battlefield. The fielding of large uncrewed vehicles, such as howitzers and tanks, is not yet feasible, but if current trends continue, such systems may reach some sort of trial phase in the next 10–15 years.

The Russian Armed Forces perceive robotics to be more than just weapons and reconnaissance platforms and believe that they also have a role in reducing crew sizes, providing logistical support, handling hazardous materials and enhancing manoeuvres. This leads to perhaps the most interesting aspect of Russia’s development of robotics and artillery, which is not the technological breakthroughs but the organizational aspects. As previously mentioned, despite being “late” to the UAV game, the Russian artillery community has been the most successful at employing UAV technology, despite having less technically sophisticated systems. Due to Russia’s strong theoretical basis for robotic employment, the best lessons likely to be learned from Russian robotics will not stem from the technological innovations of the scientists and engineers in the design bureaus, but from the force design planners in uniform.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Lester W. Grau is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served the U.S. Army for 57 years, retiring as an infantry Lieutenant Colonel and continuing service through research and teaching in Army education. His on-the-ground service included military assignments in Europe, South Vietnam, Korea and the Soviet Union, as well as civilian research in Afghanistan, Iraq and Russia. His primary research language is Russian. He is the author of 18 books and more than 250 articles on tactical, operational and geopolitical subjects.

Dr. Charles K. Bartles is an analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His specific research areas include Russian and Central Asian military force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted professional development, and security assistance programs. Chuck is also a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserve who has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq and served as a security assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in addition to carrying out a variety of imagery and space operations assignments.

This article first appeared in the April, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (20-2).