Tactical C4ISR: Lessons from the Front

by Major Jan Kool, CD
For a term that is used so often, “C4ISR” is remarkably ill defined. It seldom appears in NATO or Canadian doctrine, and most definitions tend to merely list its seven components, from which the abbreviation is formed: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Most discussions of C4ISR revolve around technology: the satellites, radios, servers, sensors and software that military forces use or should be using to train and fight battles. This focus on technology naturally prioritizes the “computers and communications” part of the definition over the “command and control” part. This is problematic. Command, specifically command philosophy, is the essential component of C4ISR, and should be treated as such. Divorcing command and control (C2) from C4ISR also minimizes the importance of control, which can be thought of as the processes and procedures by which a commander and their staff direct, coordinate and organize military forces to achieve tasks. If the aim is effective C2 of military forces, minimizing command philosophy and control procedures to focus on technology is risky. At least until artificial intelligence matures, technology cannot direct itself. It is also susceptible to damage, running out of batteries, or otherwise being denied or disrupted.

This article aims to provide C2-centric insights into C4ISR applied to the tactical level in a multinational context. It argues that, while C4ISR must enable decision making, it must also be resilient to human or technical faults. Resiliency is best achieved by inverting the traditional way of looking at C4ISR, which tends to focus on physical systems. Instead, one must first set the culture, then establish the procedures, and lastly integrate the technology. John Boyd preached something similar when railing against the over-technicalization of the United States Air Force in the 1980s: “People, ideas, hardware—in that order.”^{Footnote 1}  In the same vein, there is a famous quote, often attributed to Peter Drucker: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” One problem, as this article lays out, is that hardware and technology can shape culture just as easily as culture can shape technology. A narrow focus on technology, without retaining Canada’s hard-earned but malleable culture of mission command as vital ground, may erode our ability to C2 against a peer or near-peer adversary who is capable of attacking or disrupting our physical systems.

The lessons in this article are drawn from the experiences and analysis of the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Latvia (eFP BG Latvia) headquarters (rotation 20-02, hereinafter referred to as Task Force BEAST), and from experimentation conducted by 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG) since September 2022, which led 2 CMBG to be named the Canadian Army (CA) champion for dispersed C2. When the first draft of this article was written in early 2021, the world was a much different place. Russian had not yet re-invaded Ukraine, and many in the West still viewed the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) as twelve feet tall. For instance, some practitioners and western defence analysts believed that Russia had mastered its reconnaissance fires complex and was capable of detecting striking targets in depth—especially C2 nodes—rapidly and often.^{Footnote 2}  Russia’s record in Ukraine since February 2022 has moderated that view. The RFAF is again life-sized, capable at times of detecting and striking targets rapidly, though its dynamic targeting is normally slow and ineffective.^{Footnote 3}  Russia’s command remains centralized and its plans fragile. If anything, Russia’s struggles to achieve tactical excellence only prove the premise of this article: that warfare is as complex and adaptive as it has ever been and that our systems for commanding and managing land forces therefore need to be as resilient as possible.

For practicality, this article follows the familiar format of discussing each component of C4ISR sequentially. To avoid falling into the same trap as some previous writing on the subject, it takes a broad view of C4ISR and places each component in context within a system of systems, influenced by culture, procedures and technology. These components, when aggregated, describe how a military seeks to achieve information superiority over its adversary, make decisions on how to fight its battles, and manage its forces during battle.^{Footnote 4}  The article steers clear of purely technical solutions to modern C2 problems. Its argument is premised on the belief that warfare is a time-competitive, violent competition between two or more complex adaptive systems and will therefore remain largely unpredictable.^{Footnote 5}  It states that complete clarity of the battlespace is impossible and not worth pursuing, and that current or emerging technology is not capable of completely dissipating the fog of war. Barring an unprecedented technological leap in quantum computing and artificial intelligence, these two statements will be valid for some time. While the pursuit of clarity of the battlespace is seductive, it relies heavily on systems that are fragile and susceptible to exploitation by adversaries. It also erodes a cultural foundation of mission command: being able to operate effectively in conditions of uncertainty and chaos. The consequence of a system’s denial in combat is more than the loss of the capability it provides; commanders and staff risk becoming dependent on its use, may be disposed to micromanagement, may be distracted from building resilience in training and will become less comfortable with uncertainty and chaos.

To be clear, this is not an argument against technological improvement or digitization. It does not demand that computer screens be thrown out in favour of acetates and grease pencils, though it does suggest that staff keep their acetates and grease pencils handy just in case. Connectivity and digitization are needed to fight at the tempo required to survive and win a modern conflict.^{Footnote 6} 

By incorporating new systems and programs (i.e. SITAWARE) as part of its dispersed C2 experimentation, 2 CMBG HQ produced a better plan in half the time, compared to its already quick planning cycle using older digital and analog tools. With more practice and with adoption at different echelons allowing for the recycling of products, 2 CMBG believes that it can double its speed again. In battle, who acts first often wins, so this increase in planning speed represents a significant increase in 2 CMBG’s fighting power. This article accepts that the CA must digitize quickly, but warns that it should do so carefully. New technologies and procedures must be adopted, but the focus should remain on a healthy command culture and resiliency.

The CAF also recognizes the vulnerability created by “finely tuned” or exquisite systems. The Pan-domain Force Employment Concept (PFEC) states,

Our adversaries will seek to deny us our advantages, attacking capabilities like the space-based geo-location that enables precision strike and the networks that allow us to effectively C2 our forces. […] While finely tuned and therefore fragile capabilities provide us with a competitive advantage, the adversary will inevitably attempt to deny us that advantage.^{Footnote 7} 

The PFEC dictates that the CAF must be ready to operate in a degraded environment, be prepared to operate in conditions of ambiguity, and build our systems to be resilient.

COMMAND

As argued in the introduction, the proper application of mission command should be the foundation of any C4ISR system that seeks to be resilient. Mission command is normally described as the decentralized execution of military operations based on subordinate commanders’ initiative and understanding of the higher purpose of the operation.^{Footnote 8}  This allows military forces to react to unforeseen setbacks or opportunities without necessarily requiring direction or permission from higher command. Mission command, therefore, can have less detailed plans and requires less coordination during execution. This contrasts with detailed command, which seeks to impose order and certainty on the battlefield by limiting the latitude of subordinate commanders to make decisions. Detailed command normally involves a large amount of coordination around a central plan dictated by a higher headquarters, with decision making centralized at the top of the structure. Operations executed by militaries who culturally adhere to a detailed command philosophy are generally less flexible and less adaptable, and can be more easily overwhelmed by rapid tempo or a changing situation, as changes to the plan require far more coordination and direction.^{Footnote 9} 

When applied correctly, mission command is resilient. It cannot be jammed, run out of batteries, or be dropped and broken. It is also very difficult to apply correctly, which is why many militaries opt to pursue detailed command rather than mission command as a command philosophy. Mission command requires highly skilled leaders who are bound together by trust and mutual understanding. It is fundamentally an expression of culture and personality throughout the operations process and thus varies from country to country and leader to leader. This is very apparent within the Canadian-led eFP BG in Latvia, where, aside from cultural and language frictions, the rank and experience level at which command is exercised changes from company to company depending on the sending nation. For instance, for armies that follow the regimental system, the company command is given to majors (OF-3) with 10 to 14 years of experience. For most NATO countries that adhere to the continental system, company command is given to captains (OF-2) with 4 to 8 years of experience. Achieving a high level of trust and mutual understanding is thus made more difficult. Given this context, the eFP BG acts as a microcosm of larger formations. Its challenges remain the same as a multinational brigade, division or corps on a different scale. Therefore, in some ways, the lessons identified in the article are applicable to higher formations.

Fostering trust is a matter of command culture. Trust is built through leadership, socialization and training. It is essentially team building and is the purview of the commander. On the other hand, mutual understanding is a challenge that extends from culture to procedures to processes. Standing NATO standardization agreements (STANAG) and joint doctrine and publications (Allied Joint Publications and Allied Tactical Publications) provide the foundation for mutual understanding. As with trust, mutual understanding can be built through training and socialization. This is more difficult in a multinational context, where everyday frictions are multiplied and amplified by language and cultural barriers.

Culturally and procedurally, the production of short written orders combined with high-quality graphical overlay orders helps in building flexibility, breaking down language and cultural barriers, and bridging experiential gaps. Importantly, it also significantly increased battle procedure speed, as did throwing PowerPoint-driven staff briefs in the burn bin. As Jim Storr notes in his recent book Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, orders have become too long, too complicated and too slow to be useful. Both TF BEAST and 2 CMBG found that by eliminating briefs, following a staff-supported estimate process and creating short orders, they were able to increase precision, reduce errors and save time for subordinate commanders. In place of formal briefings (i.e. information brief, mission analysis brief, and decision brief), 2 CMBG staff instead provided on-call and as-needed informal planning updates to the Commander, facilitated when emissions control (EMCON) states allowed by videoconferencing to remain dispersed. The creation and mass printing of acetate traces in the field requires additional capability and capacity in the BG or brigade headquarters, though it was found that using SITAWARE simplified and sped up the orders creation process significantly. SITAWARE also has the benefit of being digitally shareable, on top of simplifying printing to-scale traces. Finally, to further speed up battle procedure, both 2 CMBG and TF BEAST had as a goal that all orders and command support products be useful two levels down, with shared digital copies and enough physical copies for subordinate commanders to adapt and push to their subordinates.

CONTROL

Control can be described as the process by which a commander and their staff direct, coordinate and organize military forces to achieve tasks.^{Footnote 10}  Control is manifested in how the staff manages the actions of manoeuvre, fires, sensors and sustainment on behalf of the commander.

This control is conducted in the command post (CP) and is enabled by analog and digital means. Control nodes are natural high-value targets for the adversary; therefore, to achieve resiliency, the first challenge of control involves staying alive and remaining in the fight. Here, it is helpful to use the analogy of the survivability onion (by layers of protection): first, avoid high-risk areas; if you have to be there, avoid being seen; if you are seen, avoid being targeted; if you are targeted, avoid being penetrated; if you are penetrated, mitigate the damage caused; if you are killed or captured, avoid being a liability to your team. This concept, as applied to CP survivability in a threat environment based on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is found at Figure 1. The tension with CP survivability measures is that each makes control harder to maintain. Obvious examples are the requirement to move, which often takes time and effort away from managing the battle, or the requirement to mask or limit emissions, which prevents communication between elements.

The second great challenge of control is how to gain and use information properly to assist timely decision making. The goal is to achieve an informational advantage over the adversary, so that our decisions more closely match and influence reality than their decisions do, at a faster rate. This is usually referred to as having “information superiority,” which includes the sufficiency and quality of information, its relevance to upcoming decisions, and the speed at which it is attained. Too much information, especially unfiltered data, can be counter-productive. Information saturation can lead to decision paralysis, in which commanders and staff are unable to sift through the information they have and identify the relevant pieces in time to act before the enemy does.^{Footnote 11}  To gain an information advantage, then, one needs just enough good information to make a rapid decision. How much is “just enough” will vary from commander to commander, will depend on the quality of the battle staff, and is likely correlated with the cultural acceptance of mission command in an organization.

Information in operations is often sorted into two categories. First, there is the common operational picture (COP), which is knowledge of where people and things currently are and what they are doing. The second category is the “running estimate,” which is the collective and ongoing assessment of capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, intentions and other important information about the various factors in the operating environment. Together, the COP and the running estimate maintained by the staff provide the information that enables a commander to use both intuitive and rational analysis to make decisions.

John Boyd’s Decision–Action Cycle, known to many as the “OODA Loop” for the continuous process in which individuals and systems observe, orient, decide and act on a problem, is illustrative. If an enemy sighting provides part of the “observe” stage of the decision–action cycle, the COP and the running estimate provide the critically important “orientation” stage. Both the running estimate and the COP are ideally kept in both analog and digital forms, with the most critical aspects of the running estimate posted in the CP for everyone to see and the remainder stowed digitally in an easy-to-use database. TF BEAST identified the problem that years of collected data was inaccessible because it was not stored or organized coherently. To solve the problem, TF BEAST created and populated a wiki database built on the SharePoint site of the Canadian Deployed Mission Network (CDMN), which it called eFPedia. Inspired by the Orion database created within Joint Task Force Afghanistan in the late 2000s, this database contained the bulk of the running estimate, with pages on everything ranging from the local hospital in a key town, to the Russian T-72B3M tank, to engineer bridge assessments. 2 CMBG has since expanded on this concept and, with the help of the General Dynamic Mission Systems analysts with Project X, have created an improved application using Wikimedia, called Battlepedia. This, in addition to the geo-referenced data management capabilities inherent in SITAWARE, represents a significant improvement over current practice.

COP at its root is the knowledge of the enemy’s disposition, derived from reports of forces in contact, sensors and educated guesses, and the knowledge of friendly forces’ disposition, which is derived from situation reports. The second part of this equation is where digitization and technological advancement promises the most return but is also where the greatest hazard lies. The allure of instantaneous and complete knowledge of one’s forces on the battlefield comes with risks. The most obvious is that the so-called blue force trackers continuously emit a signal that may be exploited by the adversary’s electronic warfare (EW). It is unlikely that the enemy can locate every emitter in the battlespace, and, if they could, much of the information collected would be misunderstood or misinterpreted and could even lead to information saturation and decision paralysis of the enemy commander. In addition, blue force trackers can be designed to be difficult to detect or to manipulate their signatures to blend in with their surrounding environment. Nevertheless, blue force trackers remain vulnerable to adversary disruption, denial and exploitation. The idea that forces can hide in plain sight—that if everyone on the battlefield is transmitting, the adversary will be overwhelmed with information—is true some but not all the time. While it is true that multiple EW hits may oversaturate the adversary’s recce-fires complex, the adversary will still glean valuable information from knowledge of friendly force groupings and movement. Even if the adversary cannot use EW for targeting, they will use it to inform decision making. When Ukraine launched its surprise attack that retook the Kharkiv region in September 2022, they did so by masking the presence of combat-ready brigades that had been trained and held in reserve for the purpose. If those brigades had been transmitting blue force tracker data, they might have been detected. It may be easy to hide a CP in a brigade’s worth of emissions, but it is more difficult to hide a brigade’s worth of emissions in nothing.

The second risk blue force tracking poses is to command culture. Seeing icons on a digital map is not the same as understanding their situation. False certainty on friendly force disposition may lead to micromanagement, as senior commanders second-guess their subordinates who are on the ground and likely have a better sense of the problem. Even where the senior commander can make a better decision than the local commander, doing so undermines the distributed nature of mission command decision making, where speed is achieved when multiple decisions are made rapidly by many actors. This potential threat to mission command is highlighted in the NATO doctrine: “[W]ith technological development, equipment that improves the ability to monitor what is happening may also increase the temptation and the means to try to direct action. Equipment that facilitates or encourages detailed command of subordinate units may undermine mission command.”^{Footnote 12}  Blue force trackers provide more than “just enough” information for decision making, risk enemy detection, and may detract from healthy mission command.

This article’s skeptical position on blue force tracking is by now clear. It contrasts with the view of most practitioners: in a 2014 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)- sponsored working group of current, former and future commanding officers, the participants indicated their desire for automated blue force tracking down to platoon level.^{Footnote 13}  However, the level of fidelity desired by the DRDC study participants does not actually require continuous ultrahigh frequency (UHF) transmission, with its associated risks. In addition, there was limited understanding of adversary EW capability in 2014 compared to the present day. To clarify, this is not an argument against digitization below the battalion level. On the contrary, there are benefits of an integrated digital system such as Argus or SITAWARE down to platoon, section and even soldier level. The ability to push small data packets to commanders, including text, images and overlays, enables the application of mission command by allowing the clear transmission of intent. Chat functions cut down on lengthy voice transmissions. Graphical orders transmitted via data increase mutual understanding, and as receiving stations are not emitting, security is increased for most users. However, these systems do not need to be transmitting constantly to gain maximum benefits of digitization. Disabling persistent blue force tracking functions—or throttling them to send positional information only on request, for instance—will leave some situational awareness unharvested. Still, the benefit to security and the focus of commanders will more than outweigh this loss.  2 CMBG HQ’s experience with SITAWARE on UNIFIED RESOLVE 2023 clearly demonstrated the advantages of digital COP. The G2 and the G3 each reported that they were able to make faster, better decisions and recommendations than with a pure analog COP system. As this was a computer-assisted exercise blue force tracking was artificial, with sub unit positions entered manually into SITAWARE by exercise control.

This simulated throttling blue force data at the sub unit level, supporting the argument that fidelity below sub unit is not always required at the brigade level. Importantly, the G3 maintained a physical map table as a backup to their digital systems, for redundancy in case of system failure.

COMMUNICATIONS

Users often have unrealistic expectations of what military communications should be able to do. This is not helped by familiarity with cellular phones and the popular depiction of military communications in action films, which suggest that an earbud can give secure voice communication around the globe under any conditions. No tool does every job, and all available tools have some drawbacks. Some systems are light and mobile, but easy to detect and limited in range, and they do not carry data well. Others are heavy and static, but have longer or unlimited ranges and are more difficult to detect. Some are easy to use, and some require a significant amount of expertise. Some are compatible with our allies’ systems, while others are not, despite numerous STANAGs on the subject. All systems are vulnerable in some way, including satellite communications, which rely on space hardware that may not be available in a major war.^{Footnote 14}

The electromagnetic spectrum is contested, and NATO’s adversaries have invested significantly in this field. Rather than more stable communications, Western forces should expect increasing disruptions. The adversary will find emitters with uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and ground-based EW sensors and strike them with artillery, sometimes without any other sensor in the loop.^{Footnote 15}  Alternatively, they may jam friendly C2 nodes at key moments or simply use the information to template our ground manoeuvre and inform the adversary’s own decision–action cycle. Very high frequency nets are most vulnerable to this sort of detection, as are commercial means of communication, particularly cellular-based signals. Unfortunately, these two methods—command net radio and cell phones—are those with which NATO forces are most comfortable and which enable C2 the most.

However, the news is not all bad. A basic understanding of how EW works and the range and capabilities of the adversary’s EW systems allow planners to prescribe flexible EMCON measures that enable friendly forces to utilize the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) when it provides a relative advantage over the adversary, and switch to other means when it does not. This understanding also allows a commander to make a clear-eyed decision when and where the relative advantage of openly communicating is with the friendly force, even when the risk of detection and fires is high. Decoys, proper siting of emitters, power setting discipline, using data instead of lengthy voice messages, frequency hopping, and using proper voice culture are measures for mitigating the EW threat. All of them should be reinforced at all levels of communications training. Improvement has already occurred in some areas. For instance, the CA has revitalized its use of signals dispatch riders, field phones and HF radio. On other side of the technological spectrum, CA signallers are increasingly familiar with Tactical Satellite thanks to experience with eFP Latvia. 2 CMBG’s CP experimentation with a meshed nodal structure, enabled by MPU-5 mesh radios using short-range UHF signal, allows for dispersal of C2 nodes. This system allows for open communication between mobile nodes with reduced (though not eliminated) threat of detection, while harvesting the security benefits of dispersion. These networks are self-healing and self-propagating. This increases resiliency within C2, by eliminating large static headquarters that are easily targeted.

As always, the best way to maintain resiliency is to reinforce mission command. Simple, flexible plans executed by commanders and units that are comfortable operating in uncertainty, trust each other, and are enabled to make decisions do not require exquisite communications networks to be successful. Like COP, the movement towards increased data and more communications systems can threaten mission command if the core tenets of mission command are not cautiously safeguarded. Commanders and staff must be comfortable not having persistent, on-the-move communications and large amounts of data. This requires training, education and a healthy culture of trust among commanders and staff.

COMPUTERS

Computers enable commanders and staff to redirect time and energy from lower- to higher-order thinking by performing simple tasks for them. When networked, computers form what NATO refers to as a communication information system (CIS). NATO doctrine identifies two dangers associated with the use of CISs. The first is not taking full advantage of the capabilities provided by CISs. The second is being overtly reliant on those capabilities.^{Footnote 16}  These two dangers are in tension with each other. Although this tension can be mitigated by making CISs as simple and resilient as possible, it cannot be fully resolved. As anyone who has attempted to set up their home Wi-Fi or add a printer to DWAN can attest, networks can be fragile even in the best of conditions. In field conditions, the challenges are amplified. In addition to having to deal with extreme environmental conditions, networks require clean power and access to a data bearer (usually a satellite), both of which come with difficulties of their own. Also, the more they are relied upon, the more networks will be targeted by the enemy.^{Footnote 17}

Maintaining a field deployable network (CDMN) in Latvia in 2020 was a challenge. Bandwidth was limited, hardware was bulky and outdated, software was not fit for purpose, data bearers were at times unreliable, clean power was a challenge, and the network did not integrate with the Latvian brigade’s systems, despite ostensibly being a federated mission network. Despite these challenges, workarounds were found for most problems, and CDMN provided the BG with a reasonably effective CIS and a secure way of transmitting and storing large amounts of data with a small EMS footprint. It was the venue for all BG planning and was the repository for the data within the running estimate (eFPedia).

2 CMBG’s C4ISR experimentation with its own deployed network (dubbed the Experimental network, or X-NET) has dramatically improved on the eFP BG experience. Improved hardware included PacStar servers, improved CF-33 laptops, high-capacity printer/scanner/copiers, and videoconferencing equipment; improved software includes SITAWARE, BattlePedia, Teamspeak teleconferencing, and Jitsi videoconferencing software; improved data bearers included the MPU-5 radio. Taken together, this network provided a virtual environment that effectively replicated in-person collaboration. It allowed, for instance, more frequent command engagement during planning, as the commander was only a button-press away. It was also more resilient. For example, SITAWARE was uploaded onto multiple servers that updated each other. When communications were disrupted between nodes, the local node network still functioned, allowing planners to rapidly produce high-quality physical copies of orders and overlays as a last resort.

The term “digital divide” is used to describe the level at which the force is enabled with networked data. This is a contentious topic, with traditionalists arguing that networked data is distracting and belongs at and above the battalion level. In contrast, the futurists argue that networked data is enabling and belongs down at the soldier level. The CAF has embraced the futurist approach with the purchase of two systems: Thales’s Tactical Battle Management System, which is part of the Capability Pack TOPAZ project and includes vehicle-mounted radios and computers,^{Footnote 18}  and Rheinmetall’s Argus soldier system, which is part of the Integrated Soldier Systems project and includes soldier-portable radios and computers.^{Footnote 19}  These systems are designed to provide dismounted and mounted commanders and soldiers with blue force tracking, and the ability to send and receive images and overlays. Both systems constantly emit on the UHF band, which, while at low risk of EW ground-based detection, is detectable by airborne EW sensors.^{Footnote 20}  These programs should be advanced with caution, with the ability to throttle data transmission, and with the aim of integrating them into systems such as SITAWARE at the battalion and brigade headquarters level.

INTELLIGENCE

This section focuses on two pressing issues: ground analysis and intelligence collation. Ground analysis is an area that can be significantly improved with computer assistance. The traditional method of drawing features, lanes, objectives, canalizing ground, approaches, rate, and approaches, and key terrain and vital ground (FLOCARK) on a map is valuable and should not be discarded. That noted, 2 CMBG HQ found the geomatics tools present in SITAWARE, including elevation data, 3D rendering, and satellite imagery, to be very useful. On Ex UNIFIED RESOLVE 23, 2 CMBG HQ was able to create intervisibility traces much more quickly and with far more fidelity than by analyzing topographic maps. This was an extreme improvement from TF BEAST, where ground analysis was done on a map and by leveraging a member’s tablet with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Android Precision Assault Strike Suite application installed.

Information management is an area ripe for improvement. Poor information collation means that information is unavailable when required or takes too long to find. Both scenarios detract from achieving information superiority. As noted previously in this article, TF BEAST determined that three years’ worth of accumulated tactical data, information and knowledge in the eFP existed in traditional digital folders across several systems, in printed copies of slides such as the Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment slideshow, or within intelligence reports or intelligence summaries. This made recall of information difficult or impossible, especially in the field. Poor collation renders a large portion of the analysis conducted by the S2, the S4, the S5, Engineers and the S9 unusable. The solution to this problem for TF BEAST was eFPedia, which was further improved by its successor TF WOLVERINE (eFP BG R21-01). 2 CMBG HQ and Project X then developed BattlePedia in January 2023, which used improved software and programming. The potential for this program is limited only by imagination. With some investment, at some point in the future, the entirety of the CAF could be contributing to a single level 2 database for a variety of current or potential theatres of operation. This would reduce the time required to achieve information superiority if the CAF is given a new mission.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

The impact of the massive sensor advantage enjoyed by Azeri forces over their Armenian counterparts in the Second Nagorno–Karabakh conflict has driven academics and practitioners to re-evaluate the importance of sensors as a predictor of battlefield success.^{Footnote 21}  The ongoing war in Ukraine has shown that it is still possible to hide from sensors, but that it is becoming more difficult. Conversely, improvements in our own sensors give us a relative advantage by improving our COP and information advantage. To frame it using Boyd’s decision–action cycle, surveillance and reconnaissance assets are what “observe” the adversary, allowing the fundamental steps of the cycle (orient, decide and act) to occur first and faster than the adversary’s cycle. Those that see first can act first, and acting first usually grants initiative. Holding initiative, the slippery yet intuitively understood concept, is the likeliest path to victory.

The CAF can adapt in order to plug its surveillance and reconnaissance capability gap culturally, procedurally and structurally. The tactics and types of tasks that the BG reconnaissance and sniper platoons use and are assigned to complete should be reviewed to include layback observation posts (OP) in the defence. This tactic of saturating an enemy’s avenue of approach with layback sniper and infantry recce OPs was used with great effectiveness by the eFP BG but is not supported by CAF doctrine.^{Footnote 22}  Persistent covert human observation on named areas of interest in the adversary’s rear allows a unit to confirm adversary intentions and influence their depth with artillery, mortars and, in some cases, direct fires or laying of anti-tank mines. In the case of snipers, the engagement of high-value targets at range in depth is predicted to have an outsized disruptive effect on the adversary’s physical capabilities and morale. The risks of leaving forces concealed behind enemy lines are high but can be mitigated with solid evasion and medical plans that may rely on civilian infrastructure. The infantry reconnaissance platoon’s organization should be reviewed to better suit it to these activities. For instance, a two-soldier fireteam cannot persistently observe an objective, but a three-soldier fireteam can. The current focus on conducting infantry reconnaissance from armoured vehicles comes with a training bill and a heightened chance of detection. It would be better if at least part of the infantry recce platoon was equipped with light all-terrain vehicles and improved dismounted sensors to allow it to better infiltrate or exfiltrate an objective area. The use of armoured vehicles for reconnaissance should perhaps be left entirely to the armoured corps.

Next, there should be a wider integration of sensors at the unit level. The mini uncrewed aerial systems (MUAS) currently held at the brigade level in Canada should be pushed down to the BG level, equipping each unit with its own systems. This would drastically increase the number of MUASs available in the brigade and close the capability gap with the adversary. The larger RQ-21 Blackjack small UASs currently held at the division level should be reorganized to the brigade level with either the armoured or artillery regiments, further increasing the sense capability closer to the fight.

Electronic sensors can be improved as well. Canadian Light Electronic Warfare Teams have a limited range, making their current employment on an EW baseline less effective. However, when used in layback patrols with infantry recce and snipers, they could look deeper and provide more meaningful information. This would come at a cost of additional fieldcraft training but would likely be worth it. Lastly, the CAF should look to optimize an EW payload for the RQ-21 Blackjack. This would provide a final layer of capability to CAF EW and match adversary capability.

Innovation can help close the sensor advantage with the adversary. One idea comes from Ukraine, where volunteers created and maintained a system of surveillance cameras which monitored most of the line of contact in the Donbas.^{Footnote 23}  Networked and closed-circuit television camera systems throughout Latvia, including security and traffic cameras, could be leveraged as ad hoc sensors until they become non-functioning. Aside from existing infrastructure, commercially available portable hunting cameras could be used down to the platoon level to provide local remote surveillance.

CONCLUSION

Without the intention to adopt an anti-technology or anti-futurist posture, this article highlights some hazards and asserts that C4ISR cannot be a series of technological solutions to what is, and will remain, a wicked problem. In a complex adaptive system, exquisite technology will be fragile and vulnerable to exploitation. Modern technology, which may appear as a solution to eliminate uncertainty in the operating environment, can make it harder for the soldiers to cope with an all-but-inevitable loss. For C4ISR systems to be truly resilient, the CA must focus on culture first and reinforce the philosophy of mission command in every aspect of the profession, from field training and garrison activities to administrative authorities. Next, the CA must build resilient procedures that are simple and redundant. This includes how the forces produce and publish orders, store and manage information, and design and use communication and data networks. Lastly, it is valuable to incorporate technologies that give the CA an advantage over the adversary. The technologies should work in a degraded or denied operating environment, their use must not put the CAF at increased risk, and their loss should not lead to paralysis.

To reinforce the central argument, it is pertinent to conclude with an anecdote: A commander finds themselves in a communications-denied, uncertain, and chaotic situation. They ask themselves, “where are my subordinates?” An appropriate response to the questions is this: “If the soldiers have been appropriately trained in mission command and are comfortable operating in ambiguity, they will be precisely where they need to be.”

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Jan Kool, CD, is an infantry officer of The Royal Canadian Regiment currently serving as G5 of  2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. He deployed to Kandahar in 2011, to Ukraine in 2018, and to Latvia with TF BEAST as OC Combat Support and Battle Group Plans Officer (S5) in 2020. He has a B.A. (Honours) in International Relations from Western University and has recently completed his M.A. in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, where his thesis focused on approaches to Security Force Assistance missions. He is currently attending the USMC Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia.

This article first appeared in the April, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (20-2).