Lessons on Fighting Reconnaissance from Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE 21

by Captain Miles Smith

INTRODUCTION^{Footnote 1} 

Upon return from Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE (Ex MR) 21, the members of what is now called “D Squadron” of Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) [LDSH (RC)] hung a memorial group photo beside the entrance to their lines. The photo’s caption was “The Last Reconnaissance Squadron,” as the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) officially retitled its squadrons as “cavalry” from reconnaissance or tank. The RCAC distributed a letter to all RCAC commanding officers in August 2021 explaining the cavalry concept. The letter stated that the cavalry concept “represents a conceptual pathway from the provision of a limited and narrow dual-stream direct fire and furtive reconnaissance combat support capability to a single, cohesive, mounted, close combat manoeuvre force.”^{Footnote 2} 

The document underlined that the sole role of cavalry forces is to defeat the enemy in mounted close combat. It emphasized that all squadrons were to have a homogenous structure organized according to the “principle of four” to provide more combat power for this role: four armoured fighting vehicles per troop and four troops per squadron.^{Footnote 3}  No enablers are included in this organization. The letter did allow for a naming distinction between light cavalry squadrons equipped with tactical armoured patrol vehicles (TAPV) and light armoured vehicle (LAV) 6.0s and heavy cavalry squadrons equipped with the Leopard 2. However, the letter mandated the rescinding of separate tank and reconnaissance doctrine to be replaced by a common document, making the employment of these squadrons platform agnostic. Further, the RCAC aspires to equip TAPVs and LAV 6.0s with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) to enhance their combat power to fill this combat-oriented role.^{Footnote 4} 

Despite this shift, the group of officers and soldiers employed tactics on Ex MR 21 that the RCAC will find valuable to examine. This case study will highlight the experience of the LDSH (RC) reconnaissance squadron during Ex MR 21 to present salient lessons for consideration while the shift to cavalry is being implemented within the RCAC. The scope of this article is limited to the implications of renaming reconnaissance squadrons to cavalry squadrons, emphasizing manoeuvre-focussed offensive and defensive operations over combat support enabling operations.^{Footnote 5}  For simplicity, the term cavalry in this article refers to light and medium squadrons equipped with the TAPV and LAV 6.0, and excludes tank squadrons. The arguments contained within are not necessarily extended to tank squadrons, which would require a far broader examination and scope.

This article argues that the RCAC must reconsider the emphasis on homogenous squadrons and the mounted performance of tasks at the expense of dismounted expertise. Doing so will ensure subunits are trained and equipped with the skills and capabilities required to succeed in their new role as cavalry on the battlefield. Underpinning this argument is the experience of a real squadron engaged against a motivated and thinking opposing force (OPFOR) under as realistic conditions as can be provided in a training environment. First, examining the problem facing the squadron on Ex MR 21 will provide the context. Second, dissecting the experience on Ex MR 21 will demonstrate the vital importance of a dismounted capability, lethal anti-armour systems, integral airborne sensors, and dedicated indirect fire support. Third, the discussion will conclude with suggestions for improvement in tactics, organization, and doctrine. This article seeks to support its arguments through primary evidence from weapons effects simulator (WES) GPS map overlays, excerpts from orders, and accounts of experiences from those in the squadron who were present on Ex MR 21.

BACKGROUND – AN APPRECIATION OF THE PROBLEM

It is useful to comprehend three aspects of the problem facing the squadron. First, the context of the exercise and the concept of operations provides an understanding of what the squadron was supposed to accomplish, against what enemy, and with what resources. Second, the concept of battlefield density is crucial to understand how the squadron accomplished its task. Third, the risk to light reconnaissance forces as a function of the tempo of the battle highlights the challenges in assigning a comparatively lightly equipped element a dramatic mission task verb against a heavy mechanized enemy force. 

The Situation

Ex MR 21 saw two successive iterations of 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI) and 2 PPCLI battle groups (BG) facing off against the other in the Wainwright training area. The friendly BG for each iteration was largely defending under the command of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) HQ. The brigade provided higher control and retained full command over the brigade reconnaissance squadron, whose frontage matched that of the BG. The squadron’s employment straddled the definition of close and medium reconnaissance, as it was employed by a formation but operated strictly within the area of interest of the BG in front of the integral BG reconnaissance platoon.^{Footnote 6} 

The composition of the squadron mirrored that of a “light cavalry squadron,” equipped predominantly with TAPVs with some Coyotes and LAV 6.0s. However, the squadron was organized into three six-vehicle troops, each composed of three two-vehicle patrols. This was a variant of the 2008 reconnaissance squadron organization outlined in Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance. This gave the squadron the ability to disperse smaller patrols across its frontage rather than remain concentrated in troops of four as the cavalry concept prescribes.

Although the OPFOR was not allocated real Leopard 2s, a company of OPFOR LAV 6.0s had their WES systems programmed as T-90s. Perhaps the simplest way to explain the task and the problem the squadron faced during Ex MR 21 is in the officer commanding’s (OC) own words. Major Dan Gray explained:

Our task, which we should expect more of if we are transitioning to cavalry, was to identify and destroy enemy reconnaissance, identify the main body (implying we had to do something with the vanguard and lead element), and destroy the enemy recon-strike complex. This all had to be done while minimizing friendly force casualties because we were a limited resource and expected to be in place for 3+ days. These are not tasks that a TAPV or troop of TAPVs can accomplish, especially in the terrain we were operating in, where the only cover is rolling hills with no trees and limited vegetation (the badlands). Identification of enemy elements was easy to do with the optics of the TAPV along with layered MUAS [miniature uncrewed aerial systems], but you can’t simply sit there and allow the enemy to bypass you because they will kill you.^{Footnote 7} 

The squadron was ordered to accomplish a task that it was simply not equipped nor augmented for, especially when potentially facing elements of a company of T-90s. The 1 CMBG commander directed the squadron to shield the preparation of the main defensive area and, if required to do so, engage in mounted close combat. The squadron was tasked to take advantage of any opportunity to seize the initiative. A critical consideration of the mission was to avoid decisive engagement and preserve combat power for follow-on tasks.

Summarizing the situation, consider the following: first, the brigade commander’s concept of employment for the squadron was no different than what is being proposed by the cavalry concept. Ex MR 21, therefore, provides an example of a tactical environment where an armoured reconnaissance squadron was tasked to conduct offensively-oriented tactical security tasks similar to what the cavalry concept envisions for cavalry squadrons. Second, the difference between the force design of a cavalry concept squadron and the squadron employed on Ex MR 21 is that the cavalry concept would organize the squadron in four troops of four vehicles, remove the squadron’s option to conduct tasks dismounted, and arm vehicles with a mounted ATGM capability. The experience of Ex MR 21 will provide an opportunity to examine the merits of these proposed changes.

Battlefield Density

U.S. Brigadier General Curtis Taylor, drawing on his own extensive armoured reconnaissance experience, defines battlefield density as “a measure of the amount of energy a reconnaissance force must apply to distinguish a threat from its surrounding environment.” This measure is a combination of obscuration from terrain and enemy observation capabilities.^{Footnote 9}  During Ex MR 21, squadron operations occurred in an environment where the key limiting factor for mounted forces was low battlefield density. When operating in the sparse Wainwright badlands against an OPFOR equipped with thermal sights, night vision equipment, and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), a static vehicle-mounted screen would be easily detected and would have stood little chance of meaningfully engaging the enemy to achieve the intent of the 1 CMBG commander. During the counter-reconnaissance and screening tasks assigned to the squadron, staying undetected until within anti-armour range was vital. Figure 1 shows Taylor’s linear relationship between the effectiveness of surveillance and battlefield density.

A TAPV or LAV 6.0 is simply too visible in the terrain of the Wainwright badlands to avoid detection. Naturally, dismounted personnel are far more difficult to detect, and the utility of this difference cannot be understated for cavalry forces. Stephen Biddle, a professor at Columbia University who served on strategic assessment teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan, noted the following in his analysis of Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan:

[…] In March 2002, an intensive pre-battle reconnaissance effort focused every available surveillance and target acquisition system on a tiny, ten-by-ten kilometre battlefield. Yet fewer than 50 percent of all the al Qaeda positions were ultimately identified […] In fact, most fire received by U.S. forces in ANACONDA came from initially unseen, unanticipated al Qaeda fighting positions.^{Footnote 10} 

Here, detection was difficult despite the availability of drones, thermal and satellite imaging. Biddle is referring to dismounted enemy fighting positions, not vehicles. Regarding vehicles, Biddle noted that “Taliban combat vehicles and crew-served weapons on hillsides west of the Balkh River could be identified from observation posts (OP) on the Koh-i-Almortak ridge line some 4–5 kilometres distant.”^{Footnote 12}  That is crucial and shows that advanced surveillance assets could easily detect enemy vehicle positions but not enemy dismounted positions.

Risk to Reconnaissance Forces as a Function of Tempo

Taylor defines another metric, tempo, as the rate of military action or combat decision-making. An increased tempo drives a requirement for faster action from reconnaissance.^{Footnote 13}  There is a threshold for both battlefield density and tempo where stealthy, slow reconnaissance is feasible. Reconnaissance forces require time and space to be effective against enemy manoeuvre forces. If stealth is not an option because of the combination of low battlefield density and high tempo removing time and space, respectively, cavalry forces must be prepared to fight to achieve their mission.^{Footnote 14}  That poses a risk to lighter reconnaissance forces, shown in Figure 2.

Although Taylor expressed this concept in the context of information-gathering in offensive reconnaissance operations, the same applies defensively. Light forces, especially dismounted, cannot operate without severe risk of being overrun by a heavily armoured enemy pushing at a high tempo. The combat power of the enemy was assessed to be far greater than what the reconnaissance squadron possessed. The TAPV, while possessing excellent optics, simply does not have the armour, firepower, or mobility to engage in a mobile battle against tanks. The 25-mm armament and protection of the LAV 6.0 and Coyote are not significantly better. The squadron was, therefore, certainly a light reconnaissance asset relative to the combat power of the enemy BG.

The squadron second-in-command, Captain Thomas Gray of The Royal Lancers (Queen Elizabeth’s Own) [UK], identified the crux of the issue facing the squadron. In his assessment of the situation, neither time nor space was afforded to the squadron on Ex MR 21 because of the tempo of the enemy advance:

Without two of their key requirements (time and space), how do they (the squadron) fight to provide sight to ground forces? The answer is increased aggression within the cavalry. There is more to the counter-recce battle than just blinding the enemy’s eyes. Whilst this is hugely beneficial for friendly forces, counter-recce will also significantly slow down the enemy force. This will allow time for cavalry squadrons to go to work. Secondarily, it will force the enemy force to utilize UAS to screen ahead, giving information on likely enemy routes and direction of travel.^{Footnote 15} 

The enemy’s awareness that the reconnaissance squadron was lightly equipped was turned against the enemy force. As Captain Gray explains, “Having performed our estimate, we came to the conclusion that their recce (reconnaissance) would be lightly supported, saving a majority of their fighting power for their main force. Secondly, we assumed that their recce couldn’t perform a detailed search and would instead look for safe routes rapidly, under armour.”^{Footnote 16}  Thus, although the squadron expected that the tempo of the enemy advance would be high, the initial enemy elements would be only small packets, and the enemy’s ability to distinguish a threat from its environment would be degraded.

To summarize the appreciation of the problem, the squadron needed to first detect the enemy without being detected, on a low-density battlefield, in the presence of enemy UAS. Once done, the squadron needed to strip enemy lead elements while preserving friendly combat power for subsequent engagements. Finally, the squadron needed to either slow the tempo of the enemy to match their battlefield mobility or employ methods that allowed them to cope with the tempo of the enemy’s advance while maintaining contact during the withdrawal. All of that needed to be accomplished with a severe capability deficit as a squadron of mostly TAPVs facing potentially a battalion (-) equipped with main battle tanks. However, the squadron did identify an opportunity to achieve local parity against the enemy reconnaissance elements, and the effectiveness of enemy surveillance for concealed forces would be low.

DISCUSSION – WHAT TO DO? THE EXPERIENCE OF EXERCISE MAPLE RESOLVE 21

Given that appreciation, Major Gray explained the squadron’s chosen course of action:

Our solution was to create dismounted tank hunting teams (THT) based on four pers with Carl Gustavs. We had limited access to ATVs and Tac Hel for movement/infiltration, and they had a fall back plan to the nearest OP. Their task was to destroy recce and vanguard elements as they advanced toward the main screen line. The enemy had done their estimate and were looking for Coyotes and TAPVs (which were easy to find in that terrain) but were not looking for/could not find small, well-placed THTs. These teams were extremely effective in hitting the enemy before they could be seen and caused attrition, chaos and a lack of SA (situational awareness)/recce for the enemy. These teams were extremely effective, destroying 30+ vehicles throughout the exercise. Since we had limited resources and dismounted teams are slow by their nature, it required detailed terrain analysis to identify the two or three likely manoeuvre axes, which is where we would set up the teams.^{Footnote 17} 

The innovative employment of combined arms teams between dismounts and vehicles completely changes the estimate. Small, dismounted THTs capitalized on their low signature to ambush the enemy and temporarily slow their tempo. As Captain Gray alluded to in his comments, the shock of encountering those teams and their devastating effects achieved enough of a DISRUPT (or, in some cases, a localized FIX) to slow the enemy’s advance in a way that the easily observed vehicles of the squadron could not. Aggression and ambush allowed the squadron to temporarily dictate the tempo. That was complemented by their ability to then remount vehicles and keep pace with the overall tempo of the enemy advance. In that way, the THTs achieved a disproportionate effect by combining a stealthy, slow dismounted capability with a nearby fast yet detectable mounted capability that could not fight effectively on its own. Figures 3–5 show an overview of one example of these THTs in action during Ex MR 21.

The vehicle-mounted ATGM capabilities that the RCAC are pursuing would not do much to help in the fight against tanks here either.^{Footnote 18}  Although the terrain was open and enemy vehicles were also relatively easily detected on account of the low battlefield density, they were not easily engaged as the undulating terrain presented fleeting opportunities for destruction. This is emphasized in later pages with Figure 8. It cannot be forgotten that most vehicle-mounted ATGM systems require the firing platform to be static or near-static, demand longer acquisition times than laying a gun, are slow firing, have limited extra ammunition and emit a prominent firing signature. The same is true for ATGMs in the dismounted role. However, at range, dismounted teams are far less visible and more difficult to return effective fire against.

In Figures 3 and 4 that precede, note the engagement ranges shown. Opposing forces are nearly joined before an engagement begins, certainly below 1000 m. A long-range engagement, even with vehicle-mounted ATGMs, would struggle to achieve a DISRUPT, let alone a FIX or DELAY. The shortcomings of the TOW system below 1,000 m are well documented within the Army (see endnote).^{Footnote 19}  In these reports from both operations and scientific experiments, the overwhelming conclusion is that the Army does not have an effective capability between 400 m and 1,000 m to reliably destroy enemy armour. Main battle tanks are excluded from this statement, naturally. The capabilities of the 84 mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifle and TOW missile systems both leave much to be desired in terms of lethality, detectability, and overall performance.

Troop leaders were enabled with significant freedom on how to employ their THTs, allowing them to adapt their employment to the circumstances on the ground. In some cases, troop leaders opted to site them near their OPs to provide additional direct fire anti-armour capabilities, while others pushed their THTs further forward as a separate element. For Captain Scott Veale, a troop leader in the squadron, the real value was the additional firepower to augment capability in patrols. The surveillance operators who may otherwise have been idle during the battle were amalgamated from each crew to form a THT.^{Footnote 20}  In all cases, THTs themselves were afforded significant freedom to site their positions. Notably, officers in the RCAC are not trained in the employment of dismounted anti-armour weapons. The record of decision for the draft qualification standard of the new troop leader course contains two notable questions: “Are we going to maintain hand-held anti-armour weapons within the Corps?” and “In a reconnaissance context, (dismounted) anti-armour weapons do make sense; for the Corps restructure (to the cavalry concept), does this make sense?”^{Footnote 21}  Given the experience on Ex MR 21, the answer to both questions should be a resounding “yes.”

A robust dismounted capability equipped with anti-armour weapons is only one part of the larger equation. The use of integral sensors at the troop level, most notably MUASs, was critical to ensure that the teams were placed along the enemy axis of advance. While the appreciation of the ground could coarsely place the THTs, the MUAS ensured that they were finely adjusted. In the words of Captain Alex Schofield, a troop leader in the squadron during Ex MR 21, “We had noticed that the BGs were massing in waiting areas and then pushing forward quickly along easy-to-track routes. We were able to combine MUAS feeds to find the targets and define them––based on this information, the (tank hunting) team would move to a new location if it was close enough/feasible. The MUAS proved to be critical to this execution.”^{Footnote 22}  She continued to state that the MUAS was so important to the success of this tactic that troops coordinated to ensure near-constant coverage of the line’s frontage when others had to land to recharge.^{Footnote 23} 

For a cavalry squadron operating independently, indirect fire support, or lack thereof, is another important consideration. Doctrine minces no words in asserting that indirect fire is crucial to successful counter-reconnaissance and, indeed, almost any operation undertaken by reconnaissance forces. That is especially so when the squadron is not augmented with other manoeuvre arms.^{Footnote 24}   After-action review (AAR) analysis by Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) personnel shown in the figures 5A and 5B demonstrates the difficulties that cavalry elements will face without a well-integrated indirect fire capability. Noting the time of first contact in Figure 4, 21 minutes elapse between enemy forces being within 100 m of the THT and the first rounds falling in Figure 5A— not effective, unsurprisingly, as the AAR noted, because of the time required for the guns to receive the information and fire and the rapid tempo of the enemy advance. The second fire mission 10 minutes later, shown in Figure 5B, was successful as, by that point, the enemy elements had been fixed. The current solution for a brigade reconnaissance squadron operating forward is to attach a forward observation officer (FOO) and designate a dedicated brigade source of indirect fires. However, a cavalry squadron employed as a regular manoeuvre element in a brigade group may not be afforded the luxury of dedicated support from limited indirect assets at all times.

Note the integral indirect fire capability, FOO, and even a military intelligence analyst attached within the order of battle (ORBAT) shown in Figure 6. One of the salient observations from the reconnaissance squadron attached to Op ATHENA Roto 1-08 was that a minimum of one trained intelligence analyst should be integrated within the squadron headquarters to provide support.^{Footnote 25}  Although this is perhaps not as vital as the addition of organic indirect fires, it is yet another example of the importance of enablers that our preeminent ally believes a cavalry squadron requires for it to successfully perform its role. By extension, these organic enablers could be what truly differentiates an RCAC cavalry squadron from a similarly equipped mechanized infantry company using LAV 6.0s.

Snipers are another important enabler that are potentially available to cavalry squadrons. Although friendly snipers detached from the BG were operating along the same screen line, the brigade attached them under tactical control (TACON) to the squadron.^{Footnote 27}  This command relationship meant that the squadron could only coordinate their movement and not assign missions or tasks. Despite being assigned nearly identical roles in the brigade intelligence collection plan, the squadron could not control the snipers in any way except for coordination of movement and location to enable them to conduct their tasks.^{Footnote 28}   Integrating these organically into the squadron would be similar to the practice of US cavalry within infantry brigade combat teams, where each troop (equivalent to a Canadian squadron) contains a sniper section of three detachments––identical to the snipers attached to the squadron during Ex MR 21.^{Footnote 29}  In American cavalry doctrine, the role of the sniper is to provide precision fire and also to “observe, collect, and provide critical, detailed information. Examples include snipers providing overwatch during a dismounted portion of zone reconnaissance or adding depth to a screen in complex terrain.”^{Footnote 30}  No doubt, the squadron would have made excellent use of the additional capability while arrayed in a screen in the complex terrain of the Wainwright badlands. 

Captain Scott Veale noted that the snipers operating in the same area provided utility in their ability to provide a close definition of the enemy and maintain contact through layback patrols, although Captain van Heerden lamented the fact that the snipers were only attached TACON.^{Footnote 31}  Although reporting from the snipers contributed to squadron situational awareness, the inability of the squadron to direct how they went about their mission, combined with the requirement to support their insertions, meant that they were a burden more than an asset. If they were attached under operational control (OPCON), meaning the squadron could assign them limited tasks, or were organic to the squadron, their employment could have been better integrated into the squadron scheme of manoeuvre.^{Footnote 32}   

Recommendations – Toward the Future

The question now facing the RCAC is whether cavalry squadrons will be sufficiently resourced to fill their new roles or whether they will find themselves in a similar situation to the squadron on Ex MR 21. This subunit was equipped and resourced for screening and surveillance but asked to perform tasks of a combat manoeuvre element. Without changes to the cavalry concept, acknowledging both the need for dismounts and the fact that not all tasks are not platform agnostic, future squadrons will have very similar experiences. As the arguments above illustrate, the number of vehicles in a troop or patrol would have had almost no effect on the outcome of the battle due to the general dearth of capability. The squadron suffered heavy casualties throughout the exercise but, without the creative use of dismounted THTs synergized with MUASs and indirect fire, “it would have been two-to-three times worse, and we’d have done no killing,” in the assessment of the OC.^{Footnote 33} 

Equipping cavalry squadrons with heavy direct fire weapons in the style of an AMX-10RC or Centauro, as has been proposed within the RCAC, would address the mounted direct fire deficit but not the lack of dismounted capability and the inability to conceal large vehicles on a low-density battlefield. In any environment where vehicles would be easily observed from both ground observation and uncrewed aerial systems, having more heavily armed vehicles is not necessarily the solution nor is it realistic, given that the TAPV and LAV 6.0 were just procured. Although heavier combat-purposed vehicles may cope better with sustained high-tempo operations, their use in a screen line is dubious, given the general lack of heavy forces in the Canadian Army. Resource allocation is zero-sum; a commander would be unwise to commit their decisive forces to what should be an economy-of-effort task, leading to the “reconnaissance paradox” as coined by John J. McGrath in his study “Scouts Out!” and shown in Figure 7.

As a Leopard 2 tank troop leader on the same exercise, the author’s own experience showed that heavier vehicles alone are not the solution. While attached to a company of Zulu^{Footnote 35}  infantry LAV 6.0s, the lack of available dismounts when arrayed in a guard line in the Wainwright badlands was acutely felt. Despite having significant direct firepower available in the form of Leopard 2s and LAV 6.0s, the key challenge was to observe and engage approaching enemy forces without being first detected and engaged oneself. A single dismounted soldier with binoculars on a crest would have drastically altered the conduct of that mission, let alone incorporating integrated THTs with anti-armour weapons. On several occasions, enemy dismounts were able to infiltrate through the line, and enemy vehicles could not be engaged until the last moment through careful route-finding in defilade. Figure 8 illustrates that in detail from the perspective of the reconnaissance squadron. Note the enemy vehicles in defilade at the centre of the image, no more than 1.2 km from the screen line. Despite the low battlefield density and lack of vegetation, the undulating terrain made engagements very difficult to prosecute. An in-depth examination of the organic integration of infantry within a tank squadron is beyond the scope of this article, but this example shows that heavier vehicles alone cannot compensate for the lack of dismounted capability. The RCAC must reintroduce a dismounted capability for cavalry squadrons.

One way to solve the issue of availability and responsiveness of indirect fires discussed in the previous section is to integrate a source of indirect fires within the cavalry squadron. That exists within American cavalry squadrons with organic 120 mm mortars (see Figure 6). Although there are myriad factors affecting the responsiveness of indirect fire, a dedicated asset would also ensure continuous support on demand for the squadron regardless of where it is employed. Figure 9 shows a dismounted THT forcing the deployment of the enemy vanguard from the line of march, temporarily halting the enemy battalion (-)’s advance.^{Footnote 36}  The column is then struck in depth. Providing an organic indirect asset would ensure that this scenario is repeatable, regardless of the distance from conventional batteries behind the main defensive area. Further, the use of assets organic to the squadron would prevent unmasking the brigade’s valuable tube artillery assets. The RCAC must investigate the incorporation of organic indirect assets within cavalry squadrons.

If equipped with the right weapons, dismounted THTs also have the potential to be far more potent than their current capabilities suggest. Exercise FUSILIER RECIPROQUE was studied by Defence Research and Development Canada to determine infantry anti-armour capability in the absence of air and main battle tank support. Unsurprisingly, the study noted the same identified shortcomings of the Carl Gustav and TOW missile systems but also tested the allocation of C14 command-detonated “off route” rocket-propelled mines along with traditional magnetic anti-tank mines.^{Footnote 37}  As expected, they both significantly augmented the anti-armour capabilities of the dismounted infantry but are currently only available to engineers in the Canadian Army.^{Footnote 38}  The RCAC must provide dismounted cavalry soldiers with the option of using both on- and off-route mines to increase squadron effectiveness and tenacity.

The anti-armour weapons available to cavalry squadrons must also be updated. Having deployed with the Carl Gustav to Op IMPACT, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment found the weapon unsuitable in combat beyond 300 m.^{Footnote 39}  The subsequent statement of requirements to procure a replacement made it clear that the TOW system was similarly unsuitable because of its immobility when not vehicle-mounted. Instead, the Javelin and Spike systems were suggested for their portability, lethality, and, perhaps most importantly, their fire-and-forget capability.^{Footnote 40}  That would allow cavalry soldiers to be exposed for a minimum amount of time before returning to cover and would have doubtlessly changed the calculus of the squadron’s experience on Ex MR 21. Although this article has explored some considerations for anti-armour weaponry, the crux of the argument is largely weapon agnostic if the squadron possesses an organic anti-armour capability that can be directed by dismounted soldiers at a minimum and while mounted in vehicles as a nicety. The RCAC must prioritize the acquisition of these weapons for use in dismounted and, if possible, mounted roles.

While direct fire ATGM systems have accompanied cavalry since the inception of the BMP-1 and M2 Bradley, a truly forward-looking solution would explore the addition of non-line of sight (NLOS) missiles and loitering munitions, which would further reduce the signature of forward dismounted elements while maintaining, if not increasing, their lethality. A detailed discussion of these capabilities is certainly beyond the scope of this article.

CONCLUSION

Thomas Friedman once stated that a vision without resources is a hallucination; likewise, a reconnaissance squadron reorganized without robust organic capabilities is not a cavalry squadron in any way but name. Having first examined the problem that the LDSH (RC) reconnaissance squadron faced, how it adapted to perform the task, and finally, how to incorporate and capitalize on the lessons from Ex MR 21, it should be clear that Canadian Army cavalry requires structural changes to its capabilities to function the way the RCAC envisions. The capabilities of tank squadrons and cavalry squadrons are not the same, nor are their optimal roles on the battlefield: cavalry doctrine must not be platform agnostic. While there are certainly tactical tasks that are complementary, attempting to impose a redundant universal structure would leave cavalry unable to provide decisive battlefield effects with the crucial economy of force.

This article largely focused on the LDSH (RC) Reconnaissance Squadron’s ad hoc use of dismounted anti-armour teams during Ex MR 21, clearly demonstrating the utility of dismounted forces to a cavalry squadron. Although Ex MR 21 exposed the shortcomings of a platform-neutral doctrine employing the TAPV in a cavalry role, the experience also showed that more capable vehicles alone are not the correct solution. High tempo operations necessitate the use of vehicles; however, their vulnerability to detection in low battlefield density environments exposes a niche where dismounted soldiers are required for a squadron to be effective. Further, the RCAC must avoid the “reconnaissance paradox” by creating only heavily equipped cavalry forces that would be better utilized as standard combat manoeuvre elements. The benefit of organic indirect fires and MUAS integration at the lowest level were also discussed, and the RCAC must push for these capabilities within cavalry squadrons. The RCAC certainly must continue to pursue the acquisition of anti-armour systems, albeit for use in both dismounted and mounted roles. While more advanced direct fire systems would be a boon, the RCAC must not neglect exploring the acquisition of mines, NLOS missiles, and loitering munitions to achieve the same effect.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain Miles Smith served as a tank troop leader in A Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians), during Ex MR 21. He is currently posted to the Army Technical Staff Officer Program studying capability development at the Royal Military College of Canada.

This article first appeared in the April, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (20-2).