Appearance before the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-People’s Republic of China Relationship (CACN) CSIS Opening Remarks February 6, 2023

Introduction

Mr. Chair, Members of the Committee, good evening. I am Michelle Tessier and I am the Deputy Director, Operations for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I would like to thank you for inviting me here today in support of the Minister and Director, and will be pleased to answer your questions.

Foreign Interference

As the Minister and my colleague noted, the case this Committee is studying is under close investigation by the RCMP. While I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot get into specifics in order to protect our sources and methods, CSIS endeavours to support our partners to the best of our abilities, across all manner of foreign interference investigations.

CSIS investigates and provides advice to the Government on threats to the security of Canada, such as foreign interference. We take any allegation of foreign interference seriously, and have several longstanding and emerging foreign interference investigations across Canada. As always, close alignment with the RCMP on national security matters is critical.

Foreign interference is covert and malign activity undertaken by a foreign state to advance its national interests to the detriment of Canada’s. These activities threaten Canada’s democratic institutions, policy process, economy, communities, and free press.

Foreign interference can take multiple forms. Threat actors may attempt to elicit sensitive information from those they perceive to have access and influence, cultivating relationships with these individuals over a long period of time. Threat actors may aggressively threaten or coerce their targets into acting in a certain way; this is a common activity impacting Canada’s diverse communities. Other techniques include illicit financing, cyber attacks, espionage, and disinformation campaigns.

A number of foreign states engage in these activities. For example, China’s attempts to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world have been well-reported in open sources. To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China. Their activities can instill fear and silence dissent in Canadian communities and communities around the world.

What Canadians Can Do

Countering foreign interference requires a whole-of-Canada approach. Those threatened often lack the resources to defend themselves or are unaware that they can report these activities to Canadian authorities, including CSIS.

This also requires an understanding of the threat. We have prioritized outreach and engagement with communities across Canada to build awareness and resilience. Last year, CSIS’ “Foreign Interference and You” publication outlined (in several languages) concrete ways that Canadians can defend themselves against foreign interference. Our goal is to strengthen individual resilience and protect Canadians and their interests.

Canadians can be assured that CSIS and the Government of Canada take these threats very seriously. Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.

To conclude, foreign interference is a rising challenge for the whole of our society. However, I want to ensure this Committee that CSIS is steadfast in its commitment to keep all Canadians safe. With that, I am happy to take your questions. Thank you.

Key Messages

CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

• Since its creation, CSIS has investigated foreign interference and espionage threats to Canada. These threats are not new, although they are increasing in complexity and scope.
• We take seriously any allegation of foreign interference in Canadian communities of the nature with which this study is concerned.
• Foreign states engage in hostile activities to advance their national interest to Canada’s detriment. They target Canada’s institutions and democratic processes; its economy and innovation; communities; and public discourse, including the media.
•  In our most recent Public Report, CSIS noted that the intimidation or coercion of communities in Canada by hostile state actors constitutes a threat to Canada’s social cohesion, sovereignty, and national security.
• Certain state actors, such as the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s open democracy to further their own national interests.
• Foreign states or their proxies also threaten and intimidate persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours. These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• CSIS uses the full authorities of the CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the lives and well-being of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities. CSIS may also use its threat reduction mandate to counter foreign interference.

Recent media reporting concerning PRC police stations

• CSIS takes seriously any reporting of foreign interference. While I cannot speak to specific investigations, I can assure the Committee that we are actively investigating foreign interference activities across Canada.
• While CSIS’s work normally takes place outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.
• CSIS uses the full authorities of the CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the privacy of Canadians, or intimidate and threat Canadian communities.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is following threat-related activity closely, advising the Government of Canada, and will not hesitate to use our full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.

Operational questions

• Of course, as you know the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians.
• That said, we remain committed to our continued engagement with your colleagues on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), where we can discuss important classified issues.

Media Reporting on Foreign Interference

• CSIS cannot speak to specific claims of journalists, but I can assure the Committee that we take our mandate to advise Government seriously; it is at the core of our mandate.
• CSIS cannot discuss here confidential discussions with the Prime Minister, Ministers, or Cabinet. However, CSIS regularly briefs senior officials across the Government of Canada on threats to the security of Canada, as defined in the CSIS Act, including foreign interference.
•  As a member of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, CSIS worked closely with partners in efforts to raise awareness, investigate and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections.
• CSIS’ role is to provide timely, relevant advice in line with the Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service. CSIS cannot comment further on policy considerations or the advice it shares with Public Safety and the Government of Canada.
• However, both in 2019 and in 2021, the Panel of senior civil servants responsible for the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol determined that the Government of Canada did not detect foreign interference that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, or that warranted public communication.

Foreign Agents Registry

• Foreign states use a range of methods to influence policy-making in Canada and promote their national interests.
• CSIS participates in discussions within the security and intelligence community as to what tools are needed to protect Canada’s national security and sovereignty.
• We also engage with our close partners to discuss their experiences in dealing with similar issues of foreign interference.
• CSIS cannot speak to specific questions of policy or possible legislative proposals.

Targeting of Canadian Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups in order to influence their opinions or behaviours, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• CSIS has and continues to invest significant effort into building relationships with individuals, communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust. In times of crisis, we offer our support and our commitment to work in partnership to help protect and safeguard individuals in communities across Canada.
• While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from harm and intimidation.
• CSIS uses the authorities under CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the privacy of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is following threat-related activity closely, advising the Government of Canada, and will not hesitate to use our full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.

On PRC specifically:

• To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China.  China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political, and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• The PRC uses its United Front Work Department (UFWD) in Canada and around the world to stifle criticism and manipulate Canadian communities.
• The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.
• When individuals in Canada are subjected to such tactics by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.

Research Security

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for persistent and sophisticated threat activity by state actors.
• We know that foreign states, including China, Russia, and others, target Canadian businesses, academic and research institutions to advance their interests to the detriment of Canada’s technological progress and future prosperity.
• CSIS is working closely with partners to ensure that Canadian entities are aware of the threat environment and have the information they need to make informed decisions and implement pre-emptive security measures.
• This includes providing advice on research security threats, including how sensitive sectors can be targeted by entities with links to hostile activities by state actors.
• We aim to build resilience through risk assessment programs, such as the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, and through direct engagement and outreach to post-secondary institutions and affiliated associations.

Harassment on university campuses

• Canada’s academic institutions are centres of excellence that rely on open, creative, and collaborative environments to innovate and develop understanding of critical global issues. 
• Some foreign intelligence services and government officials, including of China, exploit this culture of openness to monitor and coerce students, faculty, and other university officials.
• In some instances, students are pressured to participate in activities, such as demonstrations and reporting on other students, which are covertly organized by a foreign power. Universities can also be used as venues for “talent-spotting” and intelligence collection, in specific circumstances.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups or students studying in Canada, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to our collective security.

Addressing Anti-Asian Hate in Canadian Communities

• Unfortunately, we have seen anti-Asian hatred on the rise in Canada, and many Canadians communities increasingly face threats stemming from IMVE.
• CSIS has seen how the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated xenophobic narratives, resulting in tragic and fatal consequences for some Canadian communities.
• Xenophobia and racist hatred is intolerable in Canada.
• CSIS is strongly engaged on this issue, and engages stakeholders within Canadian communities to ensure threats are thoroughly investigated and when possible, reduced. 
• CSIS expresses sincere support for Chinese and Asian-Canadian communities who face ongoing acts of harassment and violence that have increased over the course of the pandemic.
• Our cultural mosaic is all the richer because of the presence of Chinese-Canadians across Canada, in large cities and in small towns dotting every corner of this country. 

FoxHunt/Skynet

• Certain foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies.
• These states, such as the People’s Republic of China, may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as proxy agents to assist them in conducting various forms of threat activities.
• States may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals outside their country ostensibly in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts or to bring criminals to justice. These tactics can also be used as cover to silence dissent, pressure political opponents, and instill a general fear of state power, no matter where a person is located.
• When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals may not have the means to protect themselves or may not know they can report these activities to Canadian authorities.
• The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can coerce individuals to submit to foreign interference.
• When individuals in Canada are subjected to such harassment, manipulation, or intimidation by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies and actions, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• Canadians can rest assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference very seriously and uses the authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, reduce, and advise the Government of threats.  Our goal is to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

United Front Work Department (UFWD)

• While we do not publicly comment on, confirm, or deny the specifics of our investigations and methodologies, open sources have noted that United Front Work Department activities of the Chinese Communist Party incorporate co-opting elites, persuasion, and facilitate espionage.
• The PRC uses its United Front Work Department (UFWD) in Canada and around the world to stifle criticism and manipulate Canadian communities.
•  The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference. When individuals in Canada are subjected to such tactics by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• Again, I want to assure members that CSIS is actively investigating foreign interference and espionage and views efforts by any organization to clandestinely influence or deceive individuals as a threat to national security.

Parliamentary Security

• Violent rhetoric, both online and in-person, targeting elected officials represents a deeply concerning threat to public safety and an area of focus for CSIS.
• CSIS works with law enforcement partners to thoroughly investigate and advise the Government of Canada on threats to elected officials that reach the threshold set out in section 2 of the CSIS Act.
• CSIS intelligence and analysis helps to support the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre’s role in bolstering Parliamentary security.   
• Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is a complex and constantly evolving threat. It has the potential to grow, lead to more acts of serious violence, and cause further erosion of trust in our institutions of government.
• The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated xenophobic and anti-authority narratives. Many IMVE threat actors have adopted conspiracy theories about the pandemic in an attempt to rationalize and justify violence.
• These narratives have contributed to efforts to undermine trust in the integrity of government and confidence in scientific expertise.
• While aspects of conspiracy theory rhetoric are a legitimate exercise in free expression, online rhetoric that is increasingly violent and calls for the arrest and execution of specific individuals is of concern.

Modernizing CSIS authorities

• CSIS’ authorities must remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• Keeping pace with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.
• However, these decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the CSIS Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, and relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Foreign Interference in Canada - General

Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat?

Key Messages

• Foreign Interference is one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security because it undermines Canadian sovereignty, national interests and values.
• Foreign interference is a complex modern threat. States employ foreign interference activities against a range of Canadian interests, including the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, economy and long-term prosperity, foreign policy and military, social harmony, and fundamental rights and freedoms.
• It is also a national threat. It targets all levels of government as well as communities across Canada.
• Foreign interference activities encompass a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media, and sophisticated cyber tools.
• This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.
• In 2021, CSIS released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic Process. As this report shows, foreign states and their proxies target politicians, political parties, and electoral processes in order to covertly influence Canadian public policy, public opinion and ultimately undermine our democracy and democratic processes.

Foreign Interference Manifestations

Democratic institutions

• Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new.
• Hostile activities by certain state actors, such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
• Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.
• For instance, state-sponsored cyber threat actors use computer network operations to interfere with elections. 

Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.

Media

• Both traditional media outlets, such as publications, radio and television programs, and non-traditional media, such as online sources and social media, can be targeted to advance a foreign state’s intent.
• Mainstream news outlets, as well as community sources, may also be targeted by foreign states who attempt to shape public opinion, debate, and covertly influence participation in the democratic process. 

Techniques Used to Conduct Foreign Interference

• The first and most important step you can take as an elected official is to be aware that you and your staff are of immediate and constant interest to certain hostile state actors seeking to interfere in Canada’s democratic and electoral institutions and processes. You should also be aware of how they target you and their tradecraft.
• In July 2021, CSIS released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process. If you have not already done so, I invite you to consult it.
• A section of this report serves to inform the public of the techniques foreign states use to conduct foreign interference. They include from elicitation, cultivation, coercion, illicit and corrupt financing, cyber attacks, as well as disinformation and espionage.
• Elicitation is when a targeted individual is manipulated into sharing valuable information through a casual conversation.
  
  • For example, a threat actor could knowingly seek to provide someone with incorrect information, in the hope that the person will correct them. A threat actor may also share some form of sensitive information with the individual in the hopes that the individual will do the same − a technique referred to as the “give to get” principle.
  • How to avoid it: Be discreet, avoid “over-sharing”, and assume public conversations are monitored.
• Cultivation: Effective threat actors seek to build long-lasting, deep, and even romantic relationships with targets.
  
  • These relationships enable the manipulation of targets when required, for example, through requests for inappropriate and special “favours”.
  • Establishing a relationship first comes via cultivation, all while the threat actor’s affiliation to a foreign state is not readily known. Shared interests and innocuous social gatherings are often leveraged for cultivation, and it begins with a simple introduction with the end goal of recruitment over time.
  • How to avoid it: Be aware and keep track of unnatural social interactions, frequent requests to meet privately, out-of-place introductions or engagements, gifts and offers of all expenses paid travel, and odd attempts to seek employment with your office.
• Coercion such as blackmail and threats are two of the most aggressive types of recruitment and coercion.
  
  • If a threat actor acquires compromising or otherwise embarrassing details about a target’s life, they can seek to blackmail the person. Sometimes, blackmail or threats may occur after a long period of cultivation and relationship-building. A threat actor may also attempt to put someone in a compromising situation, just to blackmail the person later.
  • Threat actors may also use covert operations, such as intrusions, to steal or copy sensitive information and later use that information to blackmail or threaten the individual. 
  • How to avoid it: Avoid sharing compromising details or personal information with untrusted individuals, both in-person and online. Avoid placing yourself in compromising situations, and seek assistance if someone seeks to threaten or blackmail you.
• Illicit and corrupt financing are inducements that may occur innocuously via a simple request for a favour.
  • For example, a threat actor may ask a target to “pay someone back” or relay money to a third party on their behalf.
  • Political parties and candidates may also receive funds (e.g., donations) seemingly from a Canadian, though this may have originated from a foreign threat actor.
  • How to avoid it: Be aware of inappropriate requests which involve money, and question the source of suspicious donations or “gifts”.
• Cyber attacks: Threat actors can compromise electronic devices through a range of means. Socially-engineered emails (i.e., spear-phishing emails) can trick the recipient into clicking a specific link thereby sharing details about their devices, or can potentially introduce harmful malware into their systems.
  
  • These cyber attacks enable threat actors to collect potentially useful information (e.g., voter data, compromising information about a candidate) that can be used in a foreign influenced operation.
  • How to avoid it: Practice good digital hygiene. Use strong passwords, enable two-factor authentication, don’t use untrusted applications, and don't click on links or open attachments unless you are certain of who sent them and why. Avoid mixing personal and professional devices.
• Disinformation: Threat actors can manipulate social media to spread disinformation, amplify a particular message, or provoke users (i.e., “troll” users) when appropriate to serve their interests.
  
  • A growing number of foreign states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence as part of their daily business. These online influence campaigns attempt to change voter opinions, civil discourse, policymakers’ choices, government relationships, the reputation of politicians and countries, and sow confusion and distrust in Canadian democratic processes and institutions.
  • How to avoid it: Be critical of what you are consuming online, careful what you share (or repost from others), and take note of unexpected online interactions.
• Espionage: While distinct threats, foreign interference and espionage are often used together by foreign actors to further their goals.
  
  • For instance, information collected or stolen through espionage can be very useful in planning and carrying out a foreign influence or public disinformation campaign.
  • How to avoid it: Follow security of information protocols, don’t disclose information to individuals who don’t have a reason to access it, and be discrete about how you handle sensitive information.
• If you ever feel like you or your staff are being targeted by a hostile state or state-linked threat actors, please contact us. We are here to help as much as possible, whenever we can.

Disinformation campaigns

• With regard to state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, CSIS has observed social media being leveraged to spread disinformation or run foreign influenced campaigns designed to confuse or divide public opinion, or interfere in healthy public debate.
• Foreign states attempt to manipulate social media to amplify societal differences, sow discord, and undermine confidence in fundamental government institutions or electoral processes.
• They may use a coordinated approach to amplify a single narrative while also promoting inflammatory content. Foreign states may also use cyber-enabled tracking or surveillance of dissidents, those who challenge their rhetoric, or do not support their interests in Canada.
• Such behaviour can lead to threats or blackmail if the individual fails to cooperate.
• In fulfilling our crucial mandate, CSIS developed publicly available resources on foreign interference, which were published in a range of foreign languages in order to ensure that vulnerable communities can access threat information in their language of choice.
• CSIS continues to engage with Canadian communities, advocacy groups, businesses, industry associations, academic institutions, and all levels of government (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous) to ensure they are aware of the national security threats facing our country and give them the information they need to protect their interests.
• These efforts are aimed at listening, better understanding the communities that we serve, establishing trusted relationships, and conveying threat-related information to increase awareness and resilience to foreign interference in particular.

Hotlines

• As is common in large, multicultural countries, Canadian communities are subject to clandestine and deceptive manipulation by foreign states. This is foreign interference. CSIS and the RCMP actively investigate this threat to our national security.
• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
• Should individuals ever be concerned for their personal safety and security, it is essential that they contact their local police for immediate action.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

FI in Canada – Democratic Institutions

CSIS role in election security, including in Canada’s DI, CEIPP, P5

• CSIS is responsible for investigating and advising the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to national security.
• CSIS distinguishes between overt – and sometimes aggressive – lobbying, and clandestine or deceptive interference activities. Clandestine foreign interference activities can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes.
• CSIS has longstanding investigations into specific threat actors who are suspected of targeting Canada and Canadians through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means.
• As a member of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, CSIS worked closely with partners in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections.
• While I cannot provide more detail on specific cases, CSIS takes all allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state very seriously.
• Indeed, CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada in relation to the election, and provided classified briefings on these threats to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel – the CEIPP, and the Panel of 5, or P5.
• In some instances CSIS also provided classified briefings to cleared political party members.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol lays out a simple, clear and impartial process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a federal election. Under the Protocol, a public announcement would only occur if the Panel determined that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

General Election 44 (2021) & 43 (2019), and recent media reports

• Although Canada’s electoral system is strong, foreign interference can erode trust and threaten the integrity of our democratic institutions, political system, fundamental rights and freedoms, and ultimately, our sovereignty.
• As indicated in our public report on foreign interference threats to Canada’s democratic process, CSIS continues to observe steady, and in some cases increasing, foreign interference activity by state actors.
• Foreign interference directed at our democratic institutions and processes can be effective ways for foreign states to achieve their immediate, medium or long-term strategic objectives.
• These activities can pose serious threats to Canadians both inside and outside Canada, and threaten Canada’s prosperity, strategic interests, social fabric, and national security.
• Given the nature of today’s geopolitical environment, we assess these activities will almost certainly intensify. As such, addressing foreign interference requires sustained efforts and the right tools.
• However, both in 2019 and in 2021, the Panel of senior civil servants responsible for the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol determined that the Government of Canada did not detect foreign interference that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, and that warranted public communication.  

If pressed on China

• We know that certain foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies.
• These states, such as the People’s Republic of China, may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as proxy agents to assist them in conducting various forms of threat activities.
• CSIS uses its full authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the lives and well being of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China. China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political, and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• Of course, as you know the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians.
• That said, we remain committed to our continued engagement with your colleagues on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), where we can discuss important classified issues.

If pressed on other countries

• Multiple foreign states, including Russia and Iran, continue covert attempts to gather political, economic, and military information in Canada. They also continue to monitor and intimidate Canadian communities in support of their own strategic goals.
• CSIS does not publicly comment on, confirm, or deny the specifics of our investigations and methodologies. However, Canadians can rest assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference very seriously and uses the authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, reduce, and advise the Government of threats. Our goal is to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

Elections at other levels of government (provincial & municipal)

• Foreign interference affects all levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal) and targets all facets of Canadian society, including civil society, communities, media, voters, political parties, candidates, elected officials and their staff, and elections themselves.
• That is why CSIS routinely engages with all levels of government (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous), as well as Canadian communities, advocacy groups, businesses, industry associations, and academic institutions to ensure they are aware of the national security threats facing our country. By doing so, CSIS ensures that they have the information they need to protect their interests and our collective national security.
• CSIS delivers these briefings to promote awareness of foreign interference and the actions of hostile actors in order to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.

Defensive briefings

• CSIS routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders, including government and public officials to discuss potential threats to the security and interests of Canada, and to provide briefings regarding specific threats.
• To further support the resilience of our democratic institutions and processes, CSIS has provided numerous elected officials, at all orders of government in Canada and across political parties, with security awareness briefings.
• Notably, in recent federal elections, CSIS provided classified briefings to some cleared political party members in order to promote awareness of state-sponsored foreign interference and strengthen individual security practices.
• As you can expect, I cannot discuss the specifics of our interactions with organizations or individuals.
• The information CSIS discloses on these threats, both in briefings to parliamentarians and officials and publicly, must be balanced with our commitment to transparency and the need to protect national security by safeguarding our sources and methods.
• However, Canadians can be assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference seriously and is making use of the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and take measures to reduce this threat.

Threat reduction measures

• CSIS’ threat reduction mandate provides an important tool for the Government of Canada to respond to threats.
• While I can’t get into specifics, CSIS may take threat reduction measures when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada or Canadians.
• As previously indicated, CSIS monitors threat-related activity closely, advises the Government on these threats, and uses its full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security, if necessary – while meeting its legal obligations and respecting Canadians’ rights.

Espionage and Economic Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed by state-owned enterprises and their investment in Canada?

Key Messages

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for state actors seeking to gain information, intelligence, and influence to advance their own national interests through hostile means.
• Canada’s abundance of natural resources, advanced technology, human talent, and expertise makes us a world leader in many sectors. We have powerful allies with whom we enjoy close economic, security, and defence relationships.
• All these factors make Canada, Canadians, and Canadian companies a target. CSIS assesses that a number of state actors seek to conduct espionage and interfere in our economy and critical sectors in particular.
• CSIS’ 2021 Public Report makes clear that foreign interference and espionage are persistent and increasing in some areas, such as Canada’s economy and critical sectors.
• This activity can occur through the foreign acquisition of and/or investment into sensitive Canadian intellectual property and technology, which may directly threaten Canada’s economic prosperity and national interests.
• In fact, CSIS is seeing an increased risk of foreign interference and espionage due to the extraordinary effort of Canadian businesses and research centres during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, CSIS is conducting outreach and working with these organizations to ensure that their work and proprietary information remains safely in their control.

On CSIS’ role in the Investment Canada Act

• CSIS continues to support Government of Canada national security reviews under the Investment Canada Act, and provides advice on national security threats associated with certain foreign investments and acquisitions. 
• This advice is limited to intelligence and analysis relating to threats to the security of Canada.
• Part IV.1 of the Investment Canada Act sets out national security provisions which are used to assess proposed or implemented foreign investments into Canadian businesses.
• The Governor-in-Council may take into account a number of factors related to national security, including; the potential impact of the investment on the security of Canada’s critical infrastructure; the potential impact on the supply of critical goods and services; and the potential impact of Canada’s defence capabilities and interests, to name a few.

Responsive

• While I cannot comment on any specific advice CSIS has provided or on any specific transactions, I would note that it is ultimately within the prerogative of the Governor in Council to allow, disallow or impose mitigation measures on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security. The perspectives of multiple partners and their relevant areas of expertise inform these decisions.

Research Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed to Canada’s research and intellectual property?

Key Messages

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for persistent and sophisticated threat activity by state actors.
• Foreign states target Canadian businesses as well as academic and research institutions to advance their interests to the detriment of Canada’s technological progress and future prosperity.
• Foreign states seek to acquire Canadian technology and expertise by using a range of traditional and non-traditional collection tradecraft, including by targeting academic research and conducting computer network operations against entities to gain access to proprietary information.
• Certain sectors, including biopharma, health, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology, and aerospace, face particularly heightened threat activity.
• Emerging technology in these sectors is vulnerable to espionage by state actors.  Academia and small start-ups are attractive targets because they may have a less-developed security awareness culture and fewer protections in place.
• We are especially concerned about threat activities in this realm conducted by China, and to a lesser degree Russia and other states.
• CSIS is working closely with partners to ensure that Canadian entities are aware of the threat environment and have the information they need to make informed decisions and implement pre-emptive security measures.
• For example, CSIS participates on the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group, led by Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada, with other government partners and Canadian universities and research institutions.
• Key results of this work can be found on the Government of Canada’s Safeguarding your Research portal, which includes threat briefings, checklists for stakeholders, national security guidelines for federally funded research partnerships, and other resources.
• Our recent outreach to post-secondary institutions and affiliated associations is an example of how CSIS is connecting with stakeholders to ensure Canadian interests are protected. CSIS has leveraged its expertise and footprint in every region of the country to launch a nationwide outreach initiative to raise awareness of the risks of economic espionage.
• The objective is to build resilience in key sectors, including biopharmaceutical and healthcare industries and businesses – and by extension protect the interests of all Canadians. 
• This initiative has already had an important impact. We have briefed more than 200 organizations and 1,000 individuals who are now well-informed about the possible threats and have the tools to protect themselves, their research, and their employees.

PRC specific

• In our 2021 Public Report, we reported that the PRC relies on non-traditional collectors of intelligence – individuals without formal intelligence training who have relevant subject matter expertise (i.e. scientists, business people) – and other non-transparent means of conducting interference in Canada.
• The PRC’s Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) seeks to exploit the collaborative, transparent, and open nature of Canada’s private sector, universities and colleges using scholarships, sponsored trips and visiting professorships to recruit individuals to advance PRC objectives.

If pressed on joint Ministerial announcement

• CSIS will continue to work closely with partners to provide advice on research security threats, including how sensitive sectors can be targeted by entities with links to hostile activities by state actors.

Online Safety

Key Messages

• The use of online fora to carry out activities that are either harmful to Canadian society, illegal or of national security concern is growing.
• There are real threats to Canadians from harmful, illegal and national security threat activities online. This includes terrorist and violent extremist propaganda, abhorrently violent content, child sexual exploitation material, and hateful content targeting women, racialized individuals/groups and the LGTBQ2+ community.
• I can assure you that CSIS takes these threats seriously and we investigate threats to the security of Canada, including those in the online space.
• This also points to the need for CSIS to have the appropriate tools and authorities to investigate online threats, while protecting privacy rights.

Five Eyes response to harmful online content

• CSIS works closely with international partners, particularly the FIVE EYES: Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US, to better understand and confront online threats.

U.S. response

• The Biden Administration refers to IMVE as “domestic violent extremism” or “domestic terrorism” and has recently identified this threat as a priority. When referring to white supremacists, the US use the term “racially motivated violent extremism.”
•  As part of the PM-POTUS Roadmap, Canada and the US are working closely on countering IMVE, including their manifestation and proliferation in online spaces. This is primarily achieved by sharing information on threats, including those related to foreign interference and in the context of COVID-19.

UK response

• In 2010 the UK set up the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit to work with private sector actors to take down webpages that violate UK terrorism laws.
• The unit has successfully supported the removal of thousands of URLs.

NZ response

• In the wake of the tragic attack in Christchurch in 2019, New Zealand introduced new legislation in 2020 to block violent extremist content online and put in place other safeguards.
• Based on the recommendations made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch attack, New Zealand changed its terminology to “IMVE” referred to as Identity-Motivated Violent Extremism with the white supremacist threat termed as White Identity Violent Extremism.

Australian response

• Australia established its eSafety Commissioner as an independent statutory office under its Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015.
• Though initially established to protect children online, the Act was expanded in 2017 to enhancing the online safety of all Australians to confront cyber-bullying, the non-consensual sharing of intimate images, and illegal content, namely online child sexual abuse.
• Following the 2019 Christchurch attacks, Australia created new offences in its Criminal Code relating to abhorrent violent material. This is defined as any audio/visual material depicting any of the five listed acts, two of which include a terrorist act leading to serious injury or death and a threat to violence.
• The Commissioner also has the mandate to protect Australians from accessing material that promotes, incites, or instructs in, terrorist acts or violent crimes. As such, following the Christchurch attack, the Commissioner gave direction to Internet Service Providers to temporarily block websites providing access to the perpetrator’s video and manifesto.
•  The Commissioner also works closely with law enforcement regarding illegal online content, and of note, Australia’s legislation makes it a criminal offence for internet service providers to not report illegal and abhorrently violent online content to law enforcement.
• Earlier this month, March 2021, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization announced it would also stop using the terms “left wing” and “ring wing”, and instead use Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism – akin to Canada’s terminology

COVID-19 Disinformation online

• State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.
• COVID-19 has had a profound impact on our country and the world. This uncertain environment is ripe for exploitation by threat actors seeking to advance their own interests.
• State-sponsored information manipulation utilized by certain states to undermine the rules-based-international order is of particular concern. These states are manipulating information to sow doubt about the origins of the virus and the means required to counter it; to discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 while casting their own as superior; and to erode confidence in democratic values and human rights.
• This includes leveraging ideologically-motivated fringe narratives and conspiracies to polarize societies and undermine trust in democratically elected governments.
• Disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices, including information on the COVID-19 pandemic.
• While Canadian security agencies and law enforcement cannot discuss specific investigations, we can say that the Government of Canada coordinates with hundreds of domestic and foreign partners on threats to national security, and actively investigates all threats of foreign interference to support a whole of Government collective effort to respond.
• As CSIS noted in its 2021 Public Report, recent state-sponsored manipulations – such as disinformation – have sought to reshape or undermine certain narratives about the origins of COVID-19 and the how to counter it.
• Such attempts to sow doubt and discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 seek to erode confidence in Canada’s values of democracy and human rights.

Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

Issue: How is CSIS engaging with external stakeholders, including on cyber threats?

Key Messages

• CSIS is committed to engaging with industry, academia, civil society, and communities.
• These efforts are focused on building bridges between CSIS and Canadians, listening, and supporting a common understanding of the national security threats we face.
• In order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
• This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage.

Modernizing CSIS Authorities

Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?

Key messages

• As you may know, the CSIS Act benefited from some much needed updating through the passage of the National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59). I thank Parliament for its support in achieving this much needed revision to our legislation.
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern era.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• CSIS’ work throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has made it even clearer that the private sector's partnership in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.
• However, section 19 of the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders.
• This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality. 
• Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.

On specific amendments

•  These decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Intelligence and Evidence

Key Messages

• CSIS and the RCMP collect information for different purposes. Under its mandate, CSIS collects intelligence to advise the Government on national security threats, whereas the RCMP collects evidence to prosecute offences. Sharing intelligence to inform evidence collection presents unique challenges.
• While sensitive CSIS intelligence may be relevant to criminal investigations and legal proceedings, its use for those purposes carries risk, including CSIS’ ability to protect and recruit human sources and its relationships with partners.
• Recognizing the need for better operational collaboration, the RCMP and CSIS had proactively a third party conduct a review of intelligence and evidence issues, and since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.
• This is a complex environment and addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.

CSIS Screening

Issue: What is CSIS’ security screening mandate? What are the different screening authorities under the CSIS Act? What is CSIS’ role in advising Government on security assessments?

Key Messages

• CSIS’ security screening program is Canada’s first line of defence against terrorism, extremism, espionage, and proliferation.
• Upon request from other departments, CSIS’ security screening mandate supports government clearance processes and immigration-related security screening.
• High standards are applied across the board to support the integrity of these processes and to prevent national security threats from materializing.
• Though it supports an important element of the decision-making process, I must emphasize that CSIS provides advice to requesting departments; it does not make the decision on whether to grant, deny or revoke a security clearance, nor does it determine an individual’s eligibility or admissibility to Canada.

Government security screening mandate

• Under its mandate for Government Security Screening, CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who seek employment with the Government of Canada. This advice may also be provided to some provincial governments and other organizations, when employment requires individuals to have access to classified information or sensitive sites.
• Under reciprocal screening agreements, CSIS also provides security assessments to foreign governments, agencies and international organizations on Canadians seeking to reside and work in another country.
• On request, CSIS, in conjunction with other federal partners, conducts security checks of elected officials who are being considered for appointment as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and all Order in Council appointments.

Possible recourse action when a clearance is denied or revoked

• Individuals who have been denied a clearance or have had their clearance revoked can make a complaint to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
• CSIS fully participates in the complaints process.

If pressed on specific complaints:

• I cannot comment on specific complaints, due to privacy concerns and to the nature of the proceedings.

Duty of candour and accountability

Key Messages

•  As our Director has stated since the first En Banc decision became public, protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.
• Importantly, the issue raised by the En Banc decisions has now been addressed with the passage of the National Security Act 2017, which provides CSIS with a limited justification framework to conduct activities that would otherwise constitute offences.
• The potentially illegal activities involved in this case are, in fact, routine intelligence collection activities, used around the world by national security and law enforcement agencies to investigate terrorism and keep people safe, such as: paying a source for information, or providing a cell phone to a source to assist them in undertaking their work.
• CSIS has taken concrete steps to address the Court’s concerns, which include proactively commissioning reviews conducted by external partners to ensure that CSIS duties are conducted in accordance with the law.
•  The Service has also taken concrete steps to improve organizational awareness. Additional training is being provided to employees to enhance internal understanding of CSIS’ role and its obligations to the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians.
• CSIS has also welcomed and cooperated fully with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s review of the En Banc decisions, as requested by the Ministers of Public Safety and Justice.
• In addition to these measures, I would like to reiterate that CSIS works hard to protect our country and Canadians from a wide range of national security threats. The Court has acknowledged this and recognized that the consequences of failure are significant.

Workplace Culture and Diversity & Inclusion

Key Messages

• CSIS acknowledges that discrimination and racism still exist within Government workplaces, including CSIS, which can result in or fail to prevent disadvantages for some groups.
• Let me reiterate that there is no place in Canada for Islamophobia, Antisemitism, or hate in any form.
• The Service understands that when it comes to diversity, inclusion, and bias sensitivity, organizations should continuously seek to improve strategies and innovate with our policies.
• That is why CSIS is committed to working to ensure its workplace is free from bias, discrimination, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• For example, in 2020, CSIS published its internal Code of Conduct on its public website for the first time. This is an important step in our commitment towards a healthy and respectful workplace, and shares our values to the public.
• More recently, we released internally our comprehensive Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategy – and will share it publicly in short order in the new year.
• To ensure the integrity of our workforce, CSIS provides its employees with a wide range of training (including mandatory training) related to unconscious bias and cultural competency, as well as foundational learning promoting knowledge and behaviours associated with respect, diversity and inclusion.
• More recently, we released internally our comprehensive Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategy – and will share it publicly in short order in the new year.
• Each and every CSIS employee is responsible for ensuring that their actions, behaviours and decisions are inclusive and respectful and that any instances of exclusion, bias, or disrespect – systemic or otherwise – are addressed.
• Operationally, CSIS does not employ racial profiling. CSIS targets threats, not groups. Profiling is not only unethical but it also does nothing to further our mission and national security investigations.
• Simply put, systemic racism exists in Canada. It is something that cannot be tolerated within any part of Canada’s national institutions, including ours.

Workplace Climate

• Just like the people of Canada, we are a diverse and inclusive workforce. Our diversity allows us to reflect Canadian society, better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect, and gives us better tools to collect relevant and accurate intelligence.
• Our Director and entire leadership team is committed to working to ensure that CSIS is a workplace free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• It is clear that senior management will continue to be accountable in demonstrating leadership and commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace; the safety and security of our operations depend on this.
• A safe and healthy workplace is a successful workplace and contributes to national security. We take the greatest pride in the exceptional quality of our workforce. Our people are CSIS’ most valuable resource.

Promotion of diversity and inclusivity

• CSIS is taking deliberate steps to increase diversity and inclusion across the Service. That is why in 2019 CSIS established its Gender Based Analysis+ Unit (GBA+) to further ensure its policies and operations are bias-free and evidence-based.
• CSIS employees speak more that 117 languages and dialects, with 67% of employees speaking both official languages.
• CSIS’s workforce in 2021 was 49% female and 51% male.
• In 2021, 19% of CSIS employees identified themselves as Visible Minorities, 2% as indigenous and 5% as persons with disabilities.
• CSIS has released internally our comprehensive Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategy – and will share it publicly in short order in the new year.
  • The Strategy was informed by a variety of data sources, which collectively represent the experiences of CSIS employees.
  • It puts forward a clear action plan which commits the Service to address a number of recommendations made by CSIS employee-led working groups.
  • The action plan includes measurable objectives, including but not limited to, dedicated executive career opportunities for visible minorities, Indigenous peoples, and persons with disabilities; building diversity, equity, and inclusion accountability into annual performance reviews; new mandatory training; an annual diversity and inclusion conference held at our national headquarters; and new physical spaces for cultural practices.
• CSIS recently launched an Intelligence Officer recruitment campaign aimed at increasing representation amongst employment equity groups and focusing recruitment efforts across Canada to draw on talent pools outside of the National Capital Region.
• Other steps include numerous targeted initiatives intended to increase overall representation of diverse groups in the Service, address gaps in specific occupational categories, and establish and entrench expectations for a bias-free, respectful organization.
• CSIS also works proactively with employment equity groups, fosters mentorship programs internally to support diverse employees in preparing for competitions, and has a diverse Talent Acquisition and Student Hiring team, with resources dedicated to ensuring diversity. We are in the midst of building a new, comprehensive and multi-year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy as well as an Accessibility Strategy that are both built on research and consultations with employees.
• As an agency, we are committed to working to ensure that CSIS’ workplace is free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• To this end, the task of creating a respectful workplace has been built into the performance evaluations of each and every employee and CSIS has revised its Code of Conduct to clearly outline expectations. Comprehensive training equips employees to meet these requirements.

Actions taken

• As a result of the 2017 Toronto Region Workplace Climate Assessment, I can say emphatically that we have made improvements to our internal processes, so that all our employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• That is why I have taken concrete steps to strengthen the cultural values of our workplace, this includes:
  • Adding enhanced mandatory training for supervisors and a common performance objective for all CSIS employees and executives on promoting a healthy workplace,
  • Launching The Respect Campaign to re-enforce the importance of respect in our working relationships,
  • Renewing our Code of Conduct and making it a condition of employment, and
  • Holding numerous informal meetings and town halls at our offices across the country to discuss any concerns employees may have about their workplace climate.
• Our employees are always encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal and all of our managers are required to act promptly on any issues brought to their attention, and if necessary, request a formal investigation.
• Our renewed leadership training for managers is focused on fostering the   right competencies to ensure strong supervisory and people management skills at all levels, and to ensure managers exhibit the Service’s values and ethics through all of their actions and behaviour.
• CSIS will continue to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects our Code of Conduct which includes respect for people, democracy, integrity, stewardship and professional excellence.
• As the trust of Canadians is essential in order for CSIS to fulfill its mandate, I am committed to keeping Canadians informed on our progress to address these issues.

PRC Balloon Incident

Key Messages

• CSIS is concerned by any activity that threatens Canada’s national security and sovereignty.
• CSIS is mandated to investigate all threats to the security of Canada, and in doing so works closely with our allies.
• Canada’s intelligences agencies are working with American partners and continue to take all necessary measures to safeguard Canada’s sensitive information from foreign intelligence threats.
• While I cannot get into specifics on any given incident, we know that China and other state actors seek to conduct espionage and gain covert access to the sensitive proprietary information of Canada and our allies.
• CSIS will continue to investigate and identify espionage threats to Canada’s national interests, and will work closely with domestic and international partners to address them.

Espionage

• CSIS is mandated by the CSIS Act to investigate, advise, and take action on threats to the security of Canada, include espionage.
• Canada is an advanced economy and an open and free democracy. We also have powerful allies with whom we enjoy close economic, security, and defence relationships.
• All these factors make Canada and Canadians a target for state actors seeking to gain information, intelligence, and influence to advance their own national interests through hostile means.
• Espionage efforts are at levels not seen since the Cold War. Today, CSIS assesses that a number of state actors engage in espionage activities not only to acquire government secrets, but also cutting-edge technology and research.

Hotlines

• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including espionage.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”