Briefing Materials for CSIS' Appearance Before the Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights
Table of Contents
Issues Related to the Study
- Workplace Culture and Diversity & Inclusion
- Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism
- Key Messages
- Threat landscape
- Rise of IMVE threat in Canada
- Online threat environment
- Gender-driven IMVE
- Terrorist listings
- On specific groups being investigated
- Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism
- Canadian Extremist Travellers
- Afghanistan
- Freedom Convoy 22
- CSIS mandate; s.2(c) and 2(d) definitions
- Anti-authority movements and conspiracy theories
- Diagolon
- Protests and funding
- FC22 and way forward
- CSIS Screening
General Issues
Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights
November 28, 2022
5:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Key Messages
- As I mentioned in my opening remarks, and as our Director stated in his recent speech at the University of British Columbia, there is no place in Canada for Islamophobia, Antisemitism, or hate in any form.
- The combination of major disruptive events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media, and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an environment ripe for exploitation by influencers and extremists.
- Both online and in the real world, the hateful rhetoric associated with these ideologies is becoming normalized, and is seeping into the mainstream.
- Violent extremism, whether it is religiously motivated or ideologically motivated, continues to represent a serious threat to public safety.
- While ideologically motivated violent extremism, commonly referred to as IMVE, represents a threat to all Canadians, the sense of fear is particularly acute for Indigenous Peoples, people of colour, religious minorities, members of the 2SLGBTQI+ communities.
- In recent years, Service resources have been shifting towards the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, to counter its rise. As our Director publicly stated earlier this year, approximately 50% of our counter terrorism resources are now dedicated to investigating IMVE.
- CSIS cannot counter these threats alone, and that is why CSIS has prioritized engagement with community leaders, members and advocacy groups in our commitment to ensure the safety and security of all Canadians.
- We must also acknowledge the trust deficit that exists with certain communities, which is why we are focused on building bridges between CSIS and Canadians, listening, and supporting a common understanding of the national security threats we face.
- As an operational agency charged with protecting all Canadians, CSIS must reflect the diversity of Canada. Diversity in all its forms helps us better understand the communities we protect and their unique concerns.
- CSIS is committed to working to ensure its workplace is free from bias, discrimination, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
Impacts of islamophobia on the threat landscape
- The threat from IMVE is constantly evolving, fuelled by extreme views around race, gender, power and authority. A particular subset of IMVE centers on xenophobic and is linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism, and ethno-nationalism.
- Canada is not immune to acts of violent extremism; Individuals in Canada are exploiting this environment by spreading violent rhetoric online and some have engaged in violence.
- Since 2014, IMVE related attacks have resulted in 26 individuals who have been killed and 40 injured on Canadian soil.
- As you all remember, last year on June 6th in London, Ontario, we saw the threat itself in a tragic attack where four members of the same family were run down and killed because of their faith. Quite simply, this act was despicable and has no place in our society.
- And before this attack, we all remember the January 2017 attack at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City.
- I want to reassure this committee and all Canadians that CSIS uses its full authorities under CSIS Act to investigate threats to the lives and well being of Canadians, and Canadian communities.
- Of course, as you know the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians.
- That said, we remain committed to our continued engagement with your colleagues on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), where we can discuss important classified issues.
Duty of Candour
- As our Director has stated since the first En Banc decision became public, protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.
- CSIS has taken concrete steps to address the Court’s concerns, which include proactively commissioning reviews conducted by external partners to ensure that CSIS duties are conducted in accordance with the law.
- The Service has also taken concrete steps to improve organizational awareness. Additional training is being provided to employees to enhance internal understanding of CSIS’ role and its obligations to the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians.
Diversity, equity and inclusion
- To ensure the integrity of our workforce, CSIS provides its employees with a wide range of training (including mandatory training) related to unconscious bias and cultural competency, as well as foundational learning promoting knowledge and behaviours associated with respect, diversity and inclusion. Instructors with our Learning and Development branch, who are key influences for new Intelligence Officers, are required to complete unconscious bias and GBA PLUS training to advance their understanding of bias, diversity, and intersectionality, and integrate these principles in the content and delivery of training.
- As part of the onboarding of all new employees the following mandatory courses are include:
- Workplace Violence Prevention
- Harassment and Violence Prevention for employees (C-65)
- Values and Ethics
- Creating a Respectful Workplace
- Bias Awareness
- Employee code of conduct
- In recent hiring cycles, student applications were sought and prioritized from the Federal Student Work Experience Program inventories of students who self-identified as either Indigenous or Persons with Disabilities.
- In February 2021, CSIS employees formalized a BIPOC Network. The network shares information and experiences, and provides a platform to advance the interests of, and improvements for, racialized and Indigenous employees.
- CSIS's Deputy Director of Operations — the most senior operational leader in the organization — stepped forward to become the Service's Diversity and Inclusion Champion. Her role is to ensure that the voices of employees are heard at senior management tables, that our organization increasingly integrates diversity and inclusion considerations into our day-to-day work, and that we hold ourselves accountable for taking action towards a better, inclusive, more equitable workplace and workforce.
Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement
- CSIS is committed to engaging with industry, academia, civil society, and communities.
- These efforts are focused on building bridges between CSIS and Canadians, listening, and supporting a common understanding of the national security threats we face.
- In order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
- This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage.
Increasing diversity and inclusivity in outreach
- CSIS acknowledges that conversations, policy and legislative deliberations, and public communications on national security matters have traditionally been limited to a relatively small and exclusive cadre of government officials whose experiences and backgrounds have not always been reflective of those whose safety we are mandated to protect.
- In acknowledging these realities, the Service recognizes that change and modernization are required if Canada is to properly respond to today’s multi-faceted national security challenges.
- That is why CSIS is committed to engaging with those who have felt or been excluded from discussions on national security matters in the past, and to drawing on diverse sources and perspectives in carrying out its mandate.
- For example, we have made important progress in forging positive and productive relationships with institutions and organizations representing the interests of Canadian Muslims, and we continue to engage at various levels.
Engagement with Heritage Canada and transparency
- CSIS is also a regular participant and contributor to Department of Canadian Heritage-led efforts to evolve and expand the Canadian Anti-Racism Strategy, and the Minister of Canadian Heritage highlighted CSIS outreach efforts as a ‘best practice’ in the 2021 Annual Report of the Operations of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act.
- Not related to Islamophobia specifically, but on the broader importance of engagement, the two co-chairs of the National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS TAG) had some nice things to say about the Service’s outreach efforts during an appearance on the Intrepid Podcast earlier this summer:
- “Transparency is hard… you need people with specific skillsets… and the reality is that the type of skills to do that well are not common in government because it is not a type of activity that has been emphasized. You need specialized engagement units where these skills are fostered, where training is done, and with appropriate mandates. There’s a unit at CSIS, the Academic Outreach & Stakeholder Engagement unit that does this very well now; in many ways they are the role model. Basically my main criticism of that unit is that they are too small. There should be more of them because generally-speaking they do their job quite well.” (Thomas Juneau, co-chair NS TAG).
- “We have seen incredible progress at CSIS; the Academic Outreach program has been around for several years and they are doing incredible work.” (Dominic Rochon, co-chair NS TAG).
Specific stakeholder engagements
- With regard to which stakeholders and partners CSIS has engaged or is engaging with, particularly within racialized communities, CSIS disclosure of these engagements has been guided by the preferences and priorities of stakeholders.
- In instances where trust is being built, it is important to give dialogue and relationships the opportunity to grow outside the public eye.
- CSIS practice is to defer to its stakeholders with regard to whether and when our relationships are made public; establishing long-lasting relationships of trust sometimes requires discretion.
- We have made important progress in forging positive and productive relationships with institutions and organizations representing the interests of Canadian Muslims, and we continue to engage at various levels, but our focus is not on public reporting of these relationships.
Online Safety
- The use of online fora to carry out activities that are either harmful to Canadian society, illegal or of national security concern is growing.
- There are real threats to Canadians from harmful, illegal and national security threat activities online. This includes terrorist and violent extremist propaganda, abhorrently violent content, child sexual exploitation material, and hateful content targeting women, racialized individuals/groups and the LGTBQ2+ community.
- I can assure you that CSIS takes these threats seriously and we investigate threats to the security of Canada, including those in the online space.
- This also points to the need for CSIS to have the appropriate tools and authorities to investigate online threats, while protecting privacy rights.
Workplace Culture and Diversity & Inclusion
Key Messages
- CSIS acknowledges that discrimination and racism still exist within Government workplaces, including CSIS, which can result in or fail to prevent disadvantages for some groups.
- Let me reiterate that there is no place in Canada for Islamophobia, Antisemitism, or hate in any form.
- The Service understands that when it comes to diversity, inclusion, and bias sensitivity, organizations should continuously seek to improve strategies and innovate with our policies.
- That is why CSIS is committed to working to ensure its workplace is free from bias, discrimination, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
- For example, in 2020, CSIS published its internal Code of Conduct on its public website for the first time. This is an important step in our commitment towards a healthy and respectful workplace, and shares our values to the public.
- More recently, we released internally our comprehensive Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategy – and will share it publicly in short order in the new year.
- To ensure the integrity of our workforce, CSIS provides its employees with a wide range of training (including mandatory training) related to unconscious bias and cultural competency, as well as foundational learning promoting knowledge and behaviours associated with respect, diversity and inclusion.
- Each and every CSIS employee is responsible for ensuring that their actions, behaviours and decisions are inclusive and respectful and that any instances of exclusion, bias, or disrespect – systemic or otherwise – are addressed.
- Operationally, CSIS does not employ racial profiling. CSIS targets threats, not groups. Profiling is not only unethical but it also does nothing to further our mission and national security investigations.
- Simply put, systemic racism exists in Canada. It is something that cannot be tolerated within any part of Canada’s national institutions, including ours.
Workplace Climate
- Just like the people of Canada, we are a diverse and inclusive workforce. Our diversity allows us to reflect Canadian society, better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect, and gives us better tools to collect relevant and accurate intelligence.
- Our Director and entire leadership team is committed to working to ensure that CSIS is a workplace free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
- It is clear that senior management will continue to be accountable in demonstrating leadership and commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace; the safety and security of our operations depend on this.
- A safe and healthy workplace is a successful workplace and contributes to national security. We take the greatest pride in the exceptional quality of our workforce. Our people are CSIS’ most valuable resource.
Promotion of diversity and inclusion
- CSIS is taking deliberate steps to increase diversity and inclusion across the Service. That is why in 2019 CSIS established its Gender Based Analysis+ Unit (GBA+) to further ensure its policies and operations are bias-free and evidence-based.
- CSIS employees speak more that 117 languages and dialects, with 67% of employees speaking both official languages.
- CSIS’s workforce in 2021 was 49% female and 51% male.
- In 2021, 19% of CSIS employees identified themselves as Visible Minorities, 2% as indigenous and 5% as persons with disabilities.
- CSIS has released internally our comprehensive Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategy – and will share it publicly in short order in the new year.
- The Strategy was informed by a variety of data sources, which collectively represent the experiences of CSIS employees.
- It puts forward a clear action plan which commits the Service to address a number of recommendations made by CSIS employee-led working groups.
- The action plan includes measurable objectives, including but not limited to, dedicated executive career opportunities for visible minorities, Indigenous peoples, and persons with disabilities; building diversity, equity, and inclusion accountability into annual performance reviews; new mandatory training; an annual diversity and inclusion conference held at our national headquarters; and new physical spaces for cultural practices.
- CSIS recently launched an Intelligence Officer recruitment campaign aimed at increasing representation amongst employment equity groups and focusing recruitment efforts across Canada to draw on talent pools outside of the National Capital Region.
- Other steps include numerous targeted initiatives intended to increase overall representation of diverse groups in the Service, address gaps in specific occupational categories, and establish and entrench expectations for a bias-free, respectful organization.
- CSIS also works proactively with employment equity groups, fosters mentorship programs internally to support diverse employees in preparing for competitions, and has a diverse Talent Acquisition and Student Hiring team, with resources dedicated to ensuring diversity. We are in the midst of building a new, comprehensive and multi-year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy as well as an Accessibility Strategy that are both built on research and consultations with employees.
- As an agency, we are committed to working to ensure that CSIS’ workplace is free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
- To this end, the task of creating a respectful workplace has been built into the performance evaluations of each and every employee and CSIS has revised its Code of Conduct to clearly outline expectations. Comprehensive training equips employees to meet these requirements.
Actions taken
- As a result of the 2017 Toronto Region Workplace Climate Assessment, I can say emphatically that we have made improvements to our internal processes, so that all our employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
- That is why I have taken concrete steps to strengthen the cultural values of our workplace, this includes:
- Adding enhanced mandatory training for supervisors and a common performance objective for all CSIS employees and executives on promoting a healthy workplace,
- Launching The Respect Campaign to re-enforce the importance of respect in our working relationships,
- Renewing our Code of Conduct and making it a condition of employment, and
- Holding numerous informal meetings and town halls at our offices across the country to discuss any concerns employees may have about their workplace climate.
- Our employees are always encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal and all of our managers are required to act promptly on any issues brought to their attention, and if necessary, request a formal investigation.
- Our renewed leadership training for managers is focused on fostering the right competencies to ensure strong supervisory and people management skills at all levels, and to ensure managers exhibit the Service’s values and ethics through all of their actions and behaviour.
- CSIS will continue to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects our Code of Conduct which includes respect for people, democracy, integrity, stewardship and professional excellence.
- As the trust of Canadians is essential in order for CSIS to fulfill its mandate, I am committed to keeping Canadians informed on our progress to address these issues.
Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)
Issue: What is ideologically motivated violent extremism? What is CSIS’ role and assessment of this threat?
Key Messages
- CSIS takes the long standing threats of religiously, politically and ideologically motivated violent extremism very seriously.
- The uncertain environment caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic is ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
- It is important to understand that extremism can stem from a range of motivations and personal grievances and is driven by hatred and fear and includes a complex range of threat actors.
- IMVE can stem from a range of ideologies and is driven by hatred and fear. These ideologies can be:
- xenophobic and linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism, and ethno-nationalism;
- anti-authority and targeted at governments and law enforcement;
- gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny; and
- based on other grievances without clear affiliation to an organized group or external guidance.
- Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including, books music, and of course, online discussions, videos and propaganda. Those holding extremist views often attempt to create a culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by leveraging an online audience in an attempt to legitimize their beliefs and move from the fringes of society to the mainstream.
- As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in the CSIS Act.
- As such, CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. While the internet is filled with racist, bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of ‘awful but lawful’.
Threat Landscape
- Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is a complex and constantly evolving threat. It has the potential to grow, lead to more acts of serious violence, and cause further erosion of trust in our institutions of government.
- IMVE is often driven by a range of grievances and ideas from across the ideological spectrum. The resulting worldview consists of a personalized narrative that centre on an extremist’s willingness to incite, enable and / or mobilize to violence.
- These last few months and years have shown the threat that IMVE represents in Canada The combination of major disruptive global events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media and its global reach, and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an uncertain environment ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
- Canada is not immune to acts of violent extremism; Individuals in Canada are exploiting this environment by spreading violent rhetoric online and some have engaged in violence.
- Since 2014, IMVE related attacks have resulted in 26 individuals who have been killed and 40 injured on Canadian soil. As you all remember, last year on June 6th in London, Ontario, we saw the threat itself in a tragic attack where four members of the same family were run down and killed because of their faith. Quite simply, this act was despicable and has no place in our society.
Rise of IMVE threat in Canada
- As reported by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in January 2016, CSIS concluded that the extent and nature of the Right Wing Extremist (RWE) threat no longer met the CSIS threshold for investigation. As such, CSIS ended its investigation into RWE in March 2016.
- In January 2017, following the attack at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City, CSIS reopened its investigation into RWE.
- At that time, CSIS observed that the motivations behind this type of violent extremism had become more complex.
- For that reason, CSIS took a leading role in developing an understanding and terminology that more accurately depicts the broad range of motivations behind this particular extremist threat facing Canada.
- Based on its findings, CSIS decided to stop using the terms “right-wing” and “left-wing” to define the threat. Instead, it uses ideologically motivated violent extremism – which has now been adopted by both Australia and New-Zealand.
- It is clear from the 2017 Mosque attack, the 2018 van attack, the 2020 spa attack in Toronto, and the 2021 van attack in London, that Canada is not immune to acts committed in whole or in part by IMVE.
Online threat environment
- Violent extremism online continues to represent a deeply concerning threat to public safety and a significant area of focus for CSIS, as it evolves in complexity.
- Online threats represent a modern challenge and demonstrate the clear need for CSIS to be equipped with the tools and authorities it requires in order to protect Canada and Canadians in the digital age.
- As technology and applications proliferate, extremist online collectives can replicate disinformation and interference campaigns that were once the reserve of state actors or large non-state organizations.
- Threat actors have access to a wealth of information online and CSIS has seen a surge in violent extremist content proliferating in that environment. Propaganda is easily disseminated using both mainstream and alternative media and social media platforms.
- We have seen a combination of misinformation and disinformation pollute the global information environment. This manipulation and propagation of information can erode confidence in our democratic values, institutions, and polarize societies while undermining trust in our democratically elected governments.
- Many of these platforms can be used anonymously or leverage encryption technologies to enable threat actors to conceal their identity and evade detection by law enforcement and security agencies, while spreading their message, inciting violence and recruiting link-minded individuals.
- If violent extremists are spreading propaganda online to recruit and fundraise for their cause, inspiring acts of violence or conducting a live terrorist act for an online audience, CSIS and law enforcement need to be informed of the threat and equipped to investigate and prevent further threat activity.
Gender-Driven IMVE
- Incel (involuntary celibate) ideology bears many of the hallmarks of more traditionally recognized ideologies, and from the Canadian perspective, conforms to our definition of terrorism and is considered within the general terrorism offence framework.
- Incels belong to a misogynistic community of males, who associate primarily through online platforms. Though they use a unified terminology, they are not an organized group and have no centralized structure or planning.
- Incels believe their genetics determine the quality of their life and relationships, meaning they blame their unattractive physical features for their inability to attract women. They attribute their perceived failings in life to women and society in general.
- The ideology/beliefs within the “Manosphere” (a network of online misogynistic and male supremacy communities) stretch from lawful discussion of men’s rights issues to glorification of violence and violent misogyny. Forums also fluidly combine their resentment of women with racist narratives involving immigrants and people of colour.
- Since 2014, individuals motivated, fully or in part, by Incel ideology have, through numerous attacks, killed and wounded more than 110 individuals in Canada and the United States.
- In Canada, Alek Minassian’s perception and beliefs were motivated in whole or in part by Incel ideology when he deliberately ran down pedestrians with his van, killing 11 and injuring 15. In May 2020, Toronto Police arrested a 17 year male and charged him with terrorist activity after he stabbed a woman to death and injured 2 more at a massage parlor, stating evidence showed the attack was inspired by Incel ideology.
Terrorist listings
- Listings are an important tool for the Government of Canada and send a signal that extremist activities are not tolerated in Canada.
- CSIS is a partner in the Public Safety-led terrorist listings regime. The Service is one of several departments and agencies charged with informing the Minister of Public Safety as to the threat that violent extremist entities may pose to Canada, from a national security perspective.
- Intelligence and evidence guide the terrorist listing process and are primary determinants for which entities are considered for listing under the Criminal Code.
- CSIS also works closely with its international partners on understanding the evolution of the global extremist landscape and emerging threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement as appropriate.
- Under Canada’s Criminal Code terrorist listing regime, there are a total of 77 entities listed as terrorist organizations or individuals. This number includes subgroups, regional affiliates, and offshoots with linkages to larger entities.
- Entities are listed based on whether they meet the definition of a terrorist entity in the Criminal Code, regardless of whether their motivations are ideological, religious, or political. For some entities, that distinction is not clear.
- Entities not on the list may nonetheless meet that threshold. This is because focus is placed on listings that provide clear operational benefits to investigative agencies.
- As we have observed a rise in ideologically motivated violent extremism over the last few years, listings of these types of organizations have also risen.
On specific groups being investigated
- CSIS does not investigate Canadians participating in lawful demonstrations or protests in Canada or elsewhere, absent other indications of threat-related activity.
- As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in section 2(c) of the CSIS Act.
- As you know, the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, and we cannot publicly comment further on operational matters and requirements.
- The Government has recently listed a number of IMVE groups as terrorist entities, including the Proud Boys, Aryan Strikeforce, Blood and Honour, Combat 18, and Atomwaffen Division, Russian Imperial Movement, The Base, the Three Percenters, and James Mason, all since 2019.
Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism
Issue: is CSIS still concerned about religiously motivated violent extremism?
Key Messages
- While CSIS has made IMVE investigations a priority in the last several years, this should not be understood to mean that the Service has deemphasized its Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE) investigations.
- RMVE remains a top investigative priority for CSIS and remains a threat to Canadian national security as attacks can be planned and executed swiftly with little warning.
- Recent acts of RMVE violence in Canada and abroad have been characterized by low-sophistication, high-impact attacks, frequently targeting civilians and public spaces.
- The October 2014 attacks in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and on Parliament Hill and the National War Memorial here in Ottawa, remind us that Canada is not immune to the threat of RMVE.
- Canadians and Canadian interests abroad have been and continue to be the targets of acts of religiously-motivated extremist violence in an ever-evolving global threat landscape.
- CSIS works very closely with the RCMP to inform possible criminal investigations or enforcement action as appropriate.
- As a result of individuals spending more time online and therefore potentially becoming more exposed to online messaging, CSIS assesses that COVID-19 has potentially increased the threat of RMVE radicalization among certain threat actors.
Canadian Extremist Travellers
Key Messages
- CSIS and the Government of Canada have continued to monitor and respond to the threat of Canadian extremist travellers (CETs).
- CETs who seek to return to Canada can pose a threat to national security.
- While I cannot go into specifics about individuals, I can generally say that individuals who travelled abroad to engage in extremist activities are of concern to CSIS.
- These individuals may leave Canada to support, facilitate, or participate in violent extremist activities.
- These individuals may have been further radicalized, and may have acquired training and combat experience abroad. Their personal experiences may also be instructive to others who are radicalized.
- Individual CETs are assessed on a case by case basis.
- CETs pose a wide range of security concerns, both while abroad and if they return to Canada. Broadly speaking, CETs have affiliations with multiple violent extremist groups and movements, and may represent IMVE, politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE), and/or RMVE perspectives.
- As you can appreciate, I cannot discuss the precise nature of our investigations for reasons of national security. But, I can assure you that CSIS takes very seriously the threats to Canada posed by violent extremists, both at home and around the world.
- Global Affairs Canada remains the Government of Canada lead on this issue given that the majority of cases are consular. GAC continues to provide guidance to the Government of Canada for the provision of urgent or extraordinary assistance to a detained CET and any children facing difficult circumstances.
If pressed on children in the camps:
- CSIS’ concern is with individuals who may pose a threat to the security of Canada. As the cases of young children are consular in nature, enquiries should be directed to Global Affairs Canada.
- The Service continues to be part of interdepartmental discussions and as per its mandate, provides advice to government partners on possible threats to Canadian national security.
Afghanistan
Issue: What is CSIS’ role in supporting the humanitarian effort with regards to Afghanistan?
Key Messages
- CSIS understands the humanitarian imperative of assisting vulnerable Afghans and unquestionably wants to protect those whose lives are at risk. However, we must ensure that threat actors cannot take advantage of Canada’s humanitarian efforts to support terrorism. This is true of any major funding programs or initiatives.
- CSIS remains a key partner to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in its efforts to evacuate vulnerable Afghans in support of this humanitarian imperative. The Service plays an important role in ensuring that threat actors cannot leverage immigration pathways to Canada.
- In light of the situation in Afghanistan, and the potential new security risks that it creates, CSIS has prioritized its collection and assessment efforts, specifically as they relate to supporting the security screening process.
- CSIS is continuing to engage domestic and international partners to assess what best practices can be applied to ensure the most robust process.
Freedom Convoy 22
CSIS mandate; s.2(c) and 2(d) definitions
- As this Committee is well aware, CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, to advise the Government on these threats, and to take measures to reduce them.
- The threats to Canada’s national security are clearly defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act and include espionage and sabotage, foreign influenced-activities, terrorism and violent extremism, and subversion.
- More specifically, section 2(c) defines them as: activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state.
- And section 2(d) also defines them as: activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.
- As such, CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. While the internet is filled with racist, bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of ‘awful but lawful’.
- As you can understand, I cannot comment on specific details regarding our operations.
- What I can say is that CSIS closely monitored the opportunities the protests could have presented to IMVE actors to promote or engage in serious acts of violence in Canada.
Anti-authority movements and conspiracy theories
- The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated xenophobic and anti-authority narratives, many of which may directly or indirectly impact national security considerations. Violent extremists continue to exploit the pandemic by amplifying false information about government measures and the virus itself on the internet.
- Some violent extremists view COVID-19 as a real but welcome crisis that could hasten the collapse of Western society. Other violent extremist entities have adopted conspiracy theories about the pandemic in an attempt to rationalize and justify violence.
- These narratives have contributed to efforts to undermine trust in the integrity of government and confidence in scientific expertise.
- While aspects of conspiracy theory rhetoric are a legitimate exercise in free expression, online rhetoric that is increasingly violent and calls for the arrest and execution of specific individuals is of concern.
- IMVE conspiracy theories are often influenced by decentralized online trends and communities of extremist influencers who interpret local, national and international events through a radical lens.
- These broader narratives are often individualized by extremists and are impacted by perceived concerns regarding economic well-being, safety and security, the COVID-19 pandemic or other special events.
Diagolon
- As you know, the Coutts case is currently before the Courts, which limits our ability to comment.
- Furthermore, the Service is also limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and investigations.
- However, let me assure you that CSIS remained engaged with the RCMP as appropriate throughout the protests, and that CSIS closely monitored the opportunities the protests could have presented to IMVE actors to promote or engage in serious acts of violence in Canada.
- As well, as I have previously said, the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated xenophobic and anti-authority narratives, and violent extremists continue to exploit the pandemic in an attempt to rationalize and justify violence.
- Some violent extremists welcome the collapse of Western society and seek opportunities to hasten it.
- CSIS and its partners, both domestic and international, remain vigilant to this threat.
- Under these considerations, CSIS does assess Diagolon to be an anti-government network.
Background (unclassified)
The Raging Dissident initially created Diagolon in January 2021 as a fictitious country to inspire unity amongst like-minded people. Diagolon was created as a symbol of defiance against the government’s COVID-19 restrictions and mandated vaccinations. Over the past year, Diagolon has expanded from an online presence to a real-world network and promotes extreme anti-government narratives centered on a range of grievances.
Protests and funding
- During the protests in Ottawa and across Canada earlier this year, CSIS remained committed to continue assessing threats to Canada's national security during the important operational activities underway by law enforcement partners.
- While the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is an important part of our democracy, individuals are not justified in breaking the law or engaging in violence. CSIS supported the City of Ottawa and the enforcement actions being taken by the Ottawa Police Service, and their law enforcement partners.
- On financial reporting, CSIS continued to work within the parameters of the CSIS Act to support the Government of Canada in implementing measures that were in effect under the Emergencies Act.
- The Emergencies Act did not expand CSIS’ powers to investigate or take threat reduction measures. CSIS continued to work within the existing authorities of the CSIS Act.
- Under the Emergencies Act, other designated entities had expanded requirements to report to CSIS certain activities linked to designated persons. CSIS engaged with its financial partners to ensure that disclosures specifically related to its national security mandate.
- With respect to foreign sources of funding, CSIS’ mandate is engaged when funds are provided at the direction of or with the support of a foreign state or when those donating the money are doing so to support an act of serious violence or terrorism.
- CSIS did not observe that this had occurred in the context of the Convoy.
FC22 and way forward
- The bringing together of individuals with differing ideological motivations around a common cause is typical of the IMVE space. However, each radicalization pathway or mobilization to violence is highly individual, and discerning common features or triggers in order to predict action is a core challenge for CSIS and law enforcement partners.
- While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from threats to the security of Canada.
- CSIS works pro-actively with the RCMP, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada to align operational efforts, and seek solutions in the interest of public safety. Indeed, we have a duty to share threat-related information within the Government of Canada in order to mitigate risks to public safety.
- In addition, CSIS works closely with its domestic and international partners on understanding the evolution of the threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement where appropriate.
- While the IMVE threats directly implicate CSIS’ mandate, there are broader strategic considerations at play. In particular, the manifestation of IMVE activities affect policy considerations related to online harms, the resilience of our democratic institutions, the security of parliamentarians, dialogue with racialized communities, and engagements on national security issues at all levels of government.
CSIS Screening
Issue: What is CSIS’ security screening mandate? What are the different screening authorities under the CSIS Act? What is CSIS’ role in advising Government on security assessments?
Key Messages
- CSIS’ security screening program is Canada’s first line of defence against terrorism, extremism, espionage, and proliferation.
- Upon request from other departments, CSIS’ security screening mandate supports government clearance processes and immigration-related security screening.
- High standards are applied across the board to support the integrity of these processes and to prevent national security threats from materializing.
- Though it supports an important element of the decision-making process, I must emphasize that CSIS provides advice to requesting departments; it does not make the decision on whether to grant, deny or revoke a security clearance, nor does it determine an individual’s eligibility or admissibility to Canada.
Government security screening mandate
- Under its mandate for Government Security Screening, CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who seek employment with the Government of Canada. This advice may also be provided to some provincial governments and other organizations, when employment requires individuals to have access to classified information or sensitive sites.
- Under reciprocal screening agreements, CSIS also provides security assessments to foreign governments, agencies and international organizations on Canadians seeking to reside and work in another country.
- On request, CSIS, in conjunction with other federal partners, conducts security checks of elected officials who are being considered for appointment as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and all Order in Council appointments.
Possible recourse action when a clearance is denied or revoked
- Individuals who have been denied a clearance or have had their clearance revoked can make a complaint to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
- CSIS fully participates in the complaints process.
If pressed on specific complaints:
- I cannot comment on specific complaints, due to privacy concerns and to the nature of the proceedings.
Duty of candour and accountability
Key Messages
- As our Director has stated since the first En Banc decision became public, protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.
- Importantly, the issue raised by the En Banc decisions has now been addressed with the passage of the National Security Act 2017, which provides CSIS with a limited justification framework to conduct activities that would otherwise constitute offences.
- The potentially illegal activities involved in this case are, in fact, routine intelligence collection activities, used around the world by national security and law enforcement agencies to investigate terrorism and keep people safe, such as: paying a source for information, or providing a cell phone to a source to assist them in undertaking their work.
- CSIS has taken concrete steps to address the Court’s concerns, which include proactively commissioning reviews conducted by external partners to ensure that CSIS duties are conducted in accordance with the law.
- The Service has also taken concrete steps to improve organizational awareness. Additional training is being provided to employees to enhance internal understanding of CSIS’ role and its obligations to the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians.
- CSIS has also welcomed and cooperated fully with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s review of the En Banc decisions, as requested by the Ministers of Public Safety and Justice.
- In addition to these measures, I would like to reiterate that CSIS works hard to protect our country and Canadians from a wide range of national security threats. The Court has acknowledged this and recognized that the consequences of failure are significant.
Modernizing CSIS Authorities
Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?
Key messages
- CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
- Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.
- For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern, digital era.
- We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
- At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
- CSIS’ work throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has made it even clearer that the private sector's partnership in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.
- However, the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders.
- This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality.
- Decisions about legislation are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
- To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.
Intelligence and Evidence
Key Messages
- CSIS and the RCMP collect information for different purposes. Under its mandate, CSIS collects intelligence to advise the Government on national security threats, whereas the RCMP collects evidence to prosecute offences. Sharing intelligence to inform evidence collection presents unique challenges.
- While sensitive CSIS intelligence may be relevant to criminal investigations and legal proceedings, its use for those purposes carries risk, including CSIS’ ability to protect and recruit human sources and its relationships with partners.
- Recognizing the need for better operational collaboration, the RCMP and CSIS had proactively a third party conduct a review of intelligence and evidence issues, and since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.
- This is a complex environment and addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.
Foreign Interference in Canada - General
Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat?
Key Messages
- Foreign Interference is one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security because it undermines Canadian sovereignty, national interests and values.
- Foreign interference is a complex modern threat. States employ foreign interference activities against a range of Canadian interests, including the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, economy and long-term prosperity, foreign policy and military, social harmony, and fundamental rights and freedoms.
- It is also a national threat. It targets all levels of government as well as communities across Canada.
- Foreign interference activities encompass a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media, and sophisticated cyber tools.
- This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.
- Last year, CSIS released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic Process. As this report shows, foreign states and their proxies target politicians, political parties, and electoral processes in order to covertly influence Canadian public policy, public opinion and ultimately undermine our democracy and democratic processes.
General Election 44 (2021) & 43 (2019)
- Although Canada’s electoral system is strong, foreign interference can erode trust and threaten the integrity of our democratic institutions, political system, fundamental rights and freedoms, and ultimately, our sovereignty.
- As indicated in our public report on foreign interference threats to Canada’s democratic process, CSIS continues to observe steady, and in some cases increasing, foreign interference activity by state actors.
- Foreign interference directed at our democratic institutions and processes can be effective ways for foreign states to achieve their immediate, medium or long-term strategic objectives.
- These activities can pose serious threats to Canadians both inside and outside Canada, and threaten Canada’s prosperity, strategic interests, social fabric, and national security.
- Given the nature of today’s geopolitical environment, we assess these activities will almost certainly intensify. As such, addressing foreign interference requires sustained efforts and the right tools.
- However, both in 2019 and in 2021, the Panel of senior civil servants responsible for the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol determined that the Government of Canada did not detect foreign interference that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, and that warranted public communication.
Foreign Interference Manifestations
Democratic institutions
- Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new.
- Hostile activities by certain state actors, such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
- Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.
- For instance, state-sponsored cyber threat actors use computer network operations to interfere with elections.
Communities
- Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.
Media
- Both traditional media outlets, such as publications, radio and television programs, and non-traditional media, such as online sources and social media, can be targeted to advance a foreign state’s intent.
- Mainstream news outlets, as well as community sources, may also be targeted by foreign states who attempt to shape public opinion, debate, and covertly influence participation in the democratic process.
Disinformation campaigns
- With regard to state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, CSIS has observed social media being leveraged to spread disinformation or run foreign influenced campaigns designed to confuse or divide public opinion, or interfere in healthy public debate.
- Foreign states attempt to manipulate social media to amplify societal differences, sow discord, and undermine confidence in fundamental government institutions or electoral processes.
- They may use a coordinated approach to amplify a single narrative while also promoting inflammatory content. Foreign states may also use cyber-enabled tracking or surveillance of dissidents, those who challenge their rhetoric, or do not support their interests in Canada.
- Such behaviour can lead to threats or blackmail if the individual fails to cooperate.
- In fulfilling our crucial mandate, CSIS developed publicly available resources on foreign interference, which were published in a range of foreign languages in order to ensure that vulnerable communities can access threat information in their language of choice.
- CSIS continues to engage with Canadian communities, advocacy groups, businesses, industry associations, academic institutions, and all levels of government (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous) to ensure they are aware of the national security threats facing our country and give them the information they need to protect their interests.
- These efforts are aimed at listening, better understanding the communities that we serve, establishing trusted relationships, and conveying threat-related information to increase awareness and resilience to foreign interference in particular.
Hotlines
- As is common in large, multicultural countries, Canadian communities are subject to clandestine and deceptive manipulation by foreign states. This is foreign interference. CSIS and the RCMP actively investigate this threat to our national security.
- Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
- Should individuals ever be concerned for their personal safety and security, it is essential that they contact their local police for immediate action.
- CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”
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