The Role of the Chief Warrant Officer within Operational Art (RCAF Journal - SUMMER 2015 - Volume 4, Issue 3)
By Chief Warrant Officer Kevin West
Reprint from The Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2010
One level of Roman Principales was the Aquilifer which was an extremely prestigious post, acting as adviser to the General
Rapid changes in technology and its employment have brought into question the roles of military personnel. These complexities have created a grey area around the traditional lines separating the role of the officer and non-commissioned member (NCM) within the Canadian Forces (CF). This is especially true at the senior leadership levels where the role of CF leaders has had to transform to meet the needs of the institution now operating in a new technology-dominated battlespace. Of all the senior leadership ranks of the CF, the chief warrant officer (CWO) / chief petty officer 1st class (CPO 1) has evolved the most.
This article will examine the evolution of the role of the NCM, focusing on the CWO / CPO 1. It will provide historical background, review the present day functions and responsibilities, and discuss what may be expected of the chiefs of the future. It will also explore the present-day strategies in the professional development of CWOs for these future roles. Supported by information provided by serving and retired senior officers and CWOs, this article will seek to determine if the chief has a role within the specifics of the operational art.
The role of what the CF calls the chief dates back for many centuries. Douglas Bland, associate professor and chair of Defence Management Studies at Queen’s University, explains the division of labour within a military and the function of each division as follows:
Labour in armies over the centuries has been divided between common soldiers, under-officers, and officers…. Soldiers in masses provide the fighting edge, under-officers provide the stern discipline that holds the line, and officers formulate plans and position troops for combat. 
The Roman principales as described by David Breeze, an honorary professor at the universities of Durham, Edinburgh and Newcastle, and chairman of the International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies, would be equivalent to the modern day non-commissioned officer (NCO). One level of principales was the aquilifer, which was an extremely prestigious post, acting as an adviser to the general. In the 16th century the British Army first instituted the rank of sergeant major, whose responsibilities were to supervise the activities of the sergeants. The sergeant major was considered an officer, not an NCO. Through modern times, the role of the senior leaders within the non-commissioned corps has been to train, discipline the lower ranks and at times assist in the development of the junior officers. There are very few definitions of the role of the CWO found within the Canadian military even today. The Guide: A Manual for the Canadian Militia published in 1880 by then Colonel (later Major-General) Otter states the requisites of a good NCO were “sobriety, activity and zeal.” Dr. Ronald Haycock, Dean of Arts at the Royal Military College of Canada, wrote that Otter also felt that “the NCO was the upholder of discipline, sound management and communications as well as tradition and ethos…. Otter also believed in a competent, morally sound, literate, wise and knowledgeable NCO who could make decisions responsibly, write orders clearly and do administration well.”
The definition by Otter closely represents the chief of today. What the Canadian military must consider is if this is the desired role. Much has changed within the world that has affected the CF and the roles of its members. The lightning speed at which technology has evolved has had a great impact on the jobs performed by military members. The changes in society that occur over time also cannot be ignored. An example of not representing the values of society occurred in 1993 in Somalia. The incident involved the brutal beating of a Somali who had infiltrated the Canadian camp; the captors eventually beat their prisoner to death. Following this incident an inquiry was conducted to determine what had gone wrong within the CF for such a deplorable event to occur. A number of issues were raised regarding the ethics and values of the CF. It was recognized that the forces needed to meet the needs of society in order to maintain legitimacy. In 2003, the official Canadian professional military doctrine was published. Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada identifies what is expected of members within the profession and what the Canadian public expects of its forces:
Incorporated in the military ethos, Canadian values mandate members of the Canadian profession of arms to perform their tasks with humanity…. Performing with humanity contributes to the honour earned by Canadian Forces members and helps make Canadians at home proud and supportive of their armed forces.
These values and expectations state how the military must behave; it must now ensure these values are understood and instilled in its troops through education and knowledge.
The differences between the officer corps and NCM corps have changed little over the years with respect to authority. “Through their commission, officers are given particular authority and responsibility for decisions on the use of force. These decisions, from the tactical through to the strategic level, set the context within which the NCMs carry out operations.” This identifies the officer as the commander and the NCM as the executer of tasks. The main difference when discussing both corps at the senior leadership level is experience. When NCMs reach the rank of chief they have accumulated a great deal of experience with vast expertise, whereas captains or majors will normally have spent less time in operations due to less time served in the forces. The experience the chief brings to the battlespace is invaluable. This is supported in Duty with Honour:
Overseeing the regulatory functions that operate throughout the profession is a major responsibility of the Officer Corps…Only by drawing extensively on the particular expertise of the NCM Corps can officers lead the force effectively and efficiently.
The CF is at a crossroads regarding the role of the CWO. In 2003, after the recommendations from the Somalia inquiry, the CF published The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member of the 21st Century. This document states eight strategic objectives and six key initiatives needed for the military to prepare its NCMs for the future. For the military to meet the future developmental needs of its chiefs, strategic objective number three (a knowledgeable NCM corps) and strategic objective number five (integral members of a strong officer / NCM team) are critical to success in the future. The document states that for NCMs to evolve and meet the challenges of the future, certain activities must occur.
The intent of this article is to identify if there is a role for the CWO within operational art. To understand operational art, war must be understood. Carl von Clausewitz, soldier and author of On War, who is considered the author of military strategy by many of the world’s armed forces, states “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” The CF elaborated on this dictum by stating that “the military response to conflict must be consistent with national policy objectives. The translation of policy goals into military action must be done in a manner which ensures clarity and preserves unity of effort.” Therefore, there is a need for those involved in war to understand the reasoning behind it if a military is to achieve its objectives.
The actual conduct of battle in war is relatively simple, it has but one aim, render the opponent powerless to resist. Howard and Paret define war as follows: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The total concept of war is much more complex, as it encompasses not just the battles but also the strategic objective desired. For these reasons war, or conflict, the term used in Canadian doctrine, is broken down into the three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. These levels spell out the links and differences from the overall objective to the actions taken to attain the objective.
As this article focuses on Canadian philosophies and the operational art, their definition of levels of conflict focusing on operational and tactical will be used:
The operational level of conflict is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives.… Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives … and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives….
The operational level is not defined by the number and size of forces or the echelon of headquarters involved. In a large-scale conflict, a corps may be the lowest level of operational command.…
The tactical level of conflict is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units.…
Canadian definitions, although quite similar to those of the United States (US), differ somewhat. The Canadian versions cover not only the military aspect but also include other instruments of power and capabilities such as political, economical, scientific and technological in order to achieve its objectives. The US definition concentrates solely on military forces.
The operational art is also defined differently between the US and Canada. Canadian doctrine defines operational art as “the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” In the book The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts, a leading academic at Queen’s University, Dr. Allan English, refers to operational art as:
the skill of translating this strategic direction into operational and tactical action. It is not dependant [sic] on the size of the committed forces, but is the vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield.... 
English states the most compelling difference between the Canadian definition and that of the US is “operational level is not defined by the size and number of forces involved, but on the outcome of an action, and that no specific level of command is solely concerned with the operational art.”
The CF must define what functions it wants its chiefs to undertake within this art. Presently within the CF there is the command team concept, which also lacks a clear definition. In current CF lexicon, the command team is often described as comprising the commander and the most senior NCM, usually a chief at the unit level or above. For this discussion it will be considered that the senior NCM is a CWO. The chief is considered one of the closest advisers to the commander. Chiefs will mainly lead people and then move into roles leading the institution as they progress to command level positions. Those on the officer career track spend less time leading people, as their command roles carry them more rapidly to the institutional leadership realm. As CWOs will have enormous experience in dealing with people, they will bring a different view based on this experience and leadership. The commander and the chief complement one another. Both members of this team look at issues and problems from different angles, thus enabling a more in-depth analysis creating more effective decisions.
As operational art is the link between strategic objectives and the tactical actions needed to achieve these objectives, the military must determine if they desire to have the CWO play a direct role in the planning and designing phases of this art. If the chief is considered one of the closest confidants of the commander, can they also be used as a staff officer within the planning and design team? Lieutenant-General Michel Maisonneuve (Retired), former Chief of Staff of Allied Command Transformation, believed that the chief as an adviser to the command team must understand the operational art:
If we expect the CWO to support the General or Flag Officer (GFO) in his/her responsibilities, we need to give them the basic understanding. Similarly, operational art will have an impact on the Non-Commissioned Members within a command…The adviser of the command team must have a role to play….
If the chief becomes part of planning or design team, is there still a need for them to be advisers? Or, vice versa, if the commander needs a chief as an adviser, should the chief be part of the operational planning team?
Brigadier-General David Fraser, Commandant of the Canadian Forces College and the Commander of Task Force Afghanistan in 2006, remarked that there was a role for the chief within the operation art, as they “can provide a fresh view/opinion to the affect [sic] commander who in turn can take this input and balance the views with the objective of generating results.” Brigadier-General Fraser also noted, “Given this nascent operational level experience I do not believe we have prepared our CWOs for this world…. Suffice to say we rely on the NCMs own experience and moxy to learn what the officer knows in theory and struggles to apply in reality.” This brings to light a concern that possibly the CF has not been preparing its chiefs for the future.
CWO Michael McDonald, Land Forces Training and Doctrine System CWO and former Task Force Afghanistan CWO in 2006 saw it this way:
I do believe that the CWO has a role in operational art. Although at the strategic level you are not directly involved with the soldiers within the units (sections, platoons, companies and even battalions) your advice to the commander may have effects that will indirectly touch the troops. The command team approach allows soldiers to feel that they are being represented at all levels and not necessarily only at their unit.
McDonald believed the importance of the chief to the command team is as an adviser. Although not directly involved in the operational art planning or designing, he has input to the commander that will concern the troops throughout the force. McDonald also mentioned that the chief at the higher operational and strategic level headquarters is advising on policy that will affect all NCMs as opposed to a single unit.
Colonel Howard Coombs, the Director Joint Command and Staff Program (Distance learning) at Canadian Forces College, agreed that the CWO has a role:
The formulation of campaign plans has, in my opinion, two components—art and design. The former is intuitive; while the latter is systemic or mechanical…. The sequencing of decisive points along selected lines of operations is an intuitive act ideally accomplished by a commander in conjunction with his/her key staff. The Force Chief Warrant Officer or equivalent should be part of that team to provide input based on experience and developed intuition which has been gathered by performing the types of missions and tasks that will fall out of the conditions needed at individual or groups of decisive points.
Coombs displayed the same concerns regarding the education of the CWO: “The shortcoming in DP3/DP4 [Development Period] education for NCMs is that they do not receive enough education in these conceptual processes and therefore are disadvantaged when asked to provide input into the planning process.”
The former CF CWO, Mr. Daniel Gilbert, was the only person surveyed who based his response on the definition of operational art. He made a very interesting observation that a chief would have little involvement in the operational art within the limits of the battlefield. Although if operational art is considered as the bridge between strategy and tactics, then the chief could have a large role, but it needs to be determined what that may be. He also made reference that commanders have been trained for many years to develop this area and not many are involved. Gilbert’s line of reasoning is valid in that the CF has been preparing the officer corps for many years in the Operational Art, but very few have ever had the opportunity to practice it.
CWO Dano Dietrich, Command CWO of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, stated “the principal value that I bring to the Op Art [sic] field is the same that all CWOs/CPO 1s bring, regardless of their respective positions: in one word, communication.… As a communicator I must be able to answer questions and reinforce desired behaviour … I must understand it. I would argue that strategic level studies are not a ‘nice to have,’ but rather a ‘must’ at our level.” He goes on to reinforce the issue of a chief having to have this knowledge by saying that the education process needs to begin at lower rank levels.
This survey has proven that there is a belief that chiefs have a role within the operational art. One main issue of concern is the lack of training and education in the art itself. None stated that these most senior NCMs do not have the capability of being involved; to the contrary, most strongly believe that their experience and strong leadership naturally gives them a role.
What the Canadian military needs to be concerned about is the universal agreement that they are not preparing their chiefs for the roles expected in the future. The Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre (NCMPDC) needs to continue to evolve its programs in order to meet needs of the Canadian military based on what the organization wants the role of the chief to be. The NCMPDC has established within its programs an introduction into the operational art. This will provide CWOs a base, enabling them to understand the language and processes within the art. It will not, however, prepare them to assume jobs as planners or designers. If this is desired, more education in this field will be required.
Does the military still need the chief in the role of custodian of the NCM corps and guardian of its customs and traditions, or does it need them to function more in the role of a staff officer? If the CF judges the need as being for a staff officer, the next question must be, is there a need for chiefs or should they become members of the commissioned officer corps? In closing, the CF has one of the most professional and respected non-commissioned corps in the world. As positive as this is to the CF, this may also be the reason that the line between the officer and CWO is difficult to distinguish at times. To some, it may seem that drastic statements were made in this article, but without clear definitions of roles and organizational requirements for the future, a grey area will continue to exist between the two corps.
A survey was conducted of various serving and retired senior officers and CWOs who have served at the operational command level and higher. The intent of this survey was to acquire the feeling of what high-ranking members of the CF believe the role of the CWO is within the operational art. The general consensus among all of the senior officers was that the chief could play a role, although they required more exposure and knowledge within the art. One CWO believed there could be a role, although it is dependent on what Canada will accept as a definition of operational art.
The following is the question that was posed, accompanied by extracts from the responses of those surveyed:
Lieutenant-General Michel Maisonneuve (Retired),
Former Chief Of Staff, Allied Command Tranformation Headquarters, Norfolk,Virginia:
As an adviser within the command team, does the CWO need to know and understand the operational art. Of course. If we expect the CWO to support the General or Flag Officer (GFO) in his/her responsibilities, we need to give them the basic understanding. Similarly, operational art will have an impact on the non-commissioned members within a command. Today we speak of “effects” on the ground, and we plan on the basis of these effects. The adviser of the command team must have a role to play in considering the effects required and how to achieve them. Plans will be developed in consultation.
Brigadier-General David Fraser,
Commandant Canadian Forces College And Former Commander Of Task Force Afghanistan:
Given this nascent operational level experience I do not believe we have prepared our CWOs for this world. The officers are grasping to understand and do this so you can figure that the NCMs are way behind. I will not discuss the lack of harmonization between the NCM and offr [officer] education (DPs) [development periods] programmes and the poor understanding between education and training. Suffice to say we rely on the NCM’s own experience and moxy to learn what the officer knows in theory and struggles to apply in reality.
Having said this, I believe that the NCM can provide a fresh view/opinion to the affect [sic] commander who in turn can take this input and balance the views with the objective of generating results. NCMs represent a part of the organization that has different edcn [education] and trg [training] foundations and experiences. These differences can add to the understanding of the situation and provide a great breadth and depth of advice to the commander. What we need to do is provide the NCM the theoretical foundations to compliment [sic] the experiential foundation in order to serve the commander and operational concerns.
So what? We need to teach NCMs the strategic and operational theory. With this foundation the NCM will be able to connect the dots in a more effective manner serving the needs of the commander and represent the opinions and needs of soldiers.
Chief Warrant Officer Michael McDonald,
Land Forces Doctrine and Training System CWO, and former Task Force Afghanistan CWO with BGen Fraser:
I do believe that the CWO has a role in operational art. Although at the strategic level you are not directly involved with the soldiers within the units (sections, platoons, companies and even battalions) your advice to the commander may have effects that will indirectly touch the troops. The command team approach allows soldiers to feel that they are being represented at all levels and not necessarily only at their unit. As the TFA [Task Force Afghanistan] CWO, I would accompany the commander on all his visits to the field units for a number of reasons. First and foremost to show the soldiers that they did have an NCM representing them at the Bde/Div [brigade/division] level who they would feel more comfortable talking to. Although, as you know Generals are just people like us, most soldiers have a hard time speaking to them, but will have no issues talking to one of their own (CWO). It also shows that we are all able to share in their hardships (especially in Afgh [Afghanistan]).
The CWO of the future will have a greater role to play at these levels as opposed [to simply being] a representative of the NCMs. The CWO at the Bn/Regt [battalion/regiment] level is directly involved in the day to day running of a unit in regards to the welfare of the soldiers, etc., whereas the higher formation CWO is indirectly involved by [inputting] ideas, sitting on boards, counsels, etc., to help to change/amend policies that will affect the soldiers at a different level (national policies, etc.). The bottom line is the CWO at all levels is there for the soldiers, but he generally brings a different perspective to the table than the Sr [senior] Officers.
CWOs at all levels are basically doing the same thing (taking care of the troops) and advising commanders on courses of action that are based on common sense, experience, and with the welfare of the soldiers in mind. At the higher levels you are advising on policy changes, etc. that will affect all NCMs as opposed to a single unit, but with the same endstate [sic] in mind. I do believe there is a requirement to have these sr [senior] level CWOs, as most nations are quite jealous of the command team approach that Canada has.
Chief Warrant Officer Daniel Gilbert (Retired),
Former Canadian Forces CWO:
Based on this definition, which limits operational art to the battlefield, I would say that CWO in the combat arms may be involved. However, if the definition is broader, the implication of CWO could also be broader. Here is what I found on CF joint force command [JFC] and operational art:
“Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, [original emphasis] campaigns, major operations, and battles.
Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives [original emphasis]. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation [original emphasis]. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs [joint force commanders], but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.
Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art focuses in particular on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.
Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions: What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends); What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways); How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means); and what is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
Operational art is characterized by the following fundamental elements: Synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, balance, leverage, timing and tempo, operational reach and approach, forces and functions, arranging operations, centers of gravity, direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, culmination and, finally, termination.”
(US Joint Publication 3-0, US Joint Operations Chapter II, para 2c and JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 5)
If this is the way we look at operational art then it could apply to more than just the battlefield. We could be, and are as CWO, more involved in operational art when it applies to achieving strategic goals that are not connected to the battlefield. A good example is the current transformation efforts, which are guided by the same principles [as] operational art.
So before you can make a compelling argument that CWO should be involved in operational art, you need to define the left and right of arc! Operational art, if limited to the battlefield, is a very limited field. Commanders have been trained for many years to develop this art (Command and Staff college, NATO war college, etc.) and not many are involved. However, if we look at operational art as the bridge between strategy and tactics (not limited to the battlefield), then the CWO have a huge role to play. You need to find out if the term operational art is limited to the battlefield, and if it is, you need to make an argument that it should not be as the principles (achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies) [original emphasis] should not be limited to the battlefield.
Colonel Howard Coombs,
Director Joint Command and Staff Program (Distance Learning):
Yes—certainly. The formulation of campaign plans has, in my opinion, two components: art and design. The former is intuitive, while the latter is systemic or mechanical. If you look at the attachment operational plans based on this current COMISAF [Commander International Security Assistance Force] direction can be laid out mechanically using the doctrinal elements of campaign design; however, the sequencing of decisive points along selected lines of operations is an intuitive act ideally accomplished by a commander in conjunction with his/her key staff. The Force Chief Warrant Officer or equivalent should be part of that team to provide input based on experience and developed intuition which has been gathered by performing the types of missions and tasks that will fall out of the conditions needed at individual or groups of decisive points. The shortcoming in DP3/DP4 education for NCMs is that they do not receive enough education in these conceptual processes and therefore are disadvantaged when asked to provide input into the planning process.
Chief Warrant Officer Dano Dietrich,
Command CWO Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command:
The essence of your question is do I believe that I have a role in Op Art [sic]? Or perhaps better put, does my boss believe I have such a role? And if so, should CWOs/CPO 1s receive better formations prior to taking on such positions? The principal value that I bring to the Op Art field is the same that all CWOs/CPO 1s bring, regardless of their respective positions: in one word, communication. Soldiers, Sailors, Airman [sic] and Airwomen today have very good knowledge of the mission and ask very relevant questions about mission focus and government intent. In a place like the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT), very junior military members work side-by-side with WoG [whole-of-government] partners. This interaction provides both sides with new knowledge about National intent and about how all partners are working towards a similar goal. As a communicator I must be able to answer questions and reinforce desired behaviour. Therefore to disseminate and explain it, I must understand it. I would argue that “strategic” level studies are not a “nice to have” but rather a “must” at our level. In fact I think a case could be made that you want to begin the education process at the WO/PO 1 [warrant officer / petty officer 1st class] level.
Although we often use the term “command team,” I’m not naive enough to believe that I have a great deal to do with ultimate decisions, but if I am to act as an adviser and confidant, I must be in my Comd’s [commander’s] head space.
Kevin West is the 8 Wing / Canadian Forces Base Trenton Chief Warrant Officer (WCWO). He has served in the Canadian Forces for 25 years in numerous positions across the country. He has a keen interest in military history and enjoys studying and teaching leadership theories, military culture and the ideologies of the profession of arms.
List of Abbreviations
CPO 1―chief petty officer, 1st class
CWO―chief warrant officer
JFC―joint force command
KPRT―Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
NCMPDC―Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development Centre
. Douglas L. Bland, ed., Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), ix. (return)
. David Breeze, “Pay Grades and Ranks below the Centurionate,” The Journal of Roman Studies 61 (1971): 130-35. (return)
. The term non-commissioned officer (NCO) is a term that is often misused. In the Canadian Forces the NCO is used for the ranks of corporal to sergeant in accordance with the Queen’s Regulations and Orders. Many books and papers relate the NCO term to all non-commissioned personnel. Although inaccurate, many identify NCOs in this manner. (return)
. Organization of the Roman Imperial Legion, available online at http://www.unrv.com/military/legion.php (accessed April 2, 2009). (return)
. Sir Chas. Oman, A History of the Arts of War in the Sixteenth Century (Wiltshire: Anthony Rowe Ltd, 1987), 378, and Bland, 13. (return)
. Sir William Dillon Otter, The Guide: A Manual for the Canadian Militia, 9th ed. (Toronto: Copp, Clark Company, 1914), 20. (return)
. Ronald G. Haycock, “The Stuff of Armies: the NCO Throughout History,” in Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army, ed. Douglas L. Bland (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 19. (return)
. David J. Bercuson, “Up from the Ashes: the Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair,” Canadian Military Journal, 9, no.3, (2009): 31. (return)
. Government of Canada, Report to the Prime Minister, March 1997. This report published by Defence Minister Doug Young made reference to the failures in leadership that had occurred and recommendations to reform the Canadian Forces. (return) (return)
. Government of Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 28–29. (return)
. Government of Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 15. (return)
. Government of Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 15. (return)
. Government of Canada, DND, The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation, (2002). This document provides the strategic guidance for the professional development of the non-commissioned members for the next 20 years. It is the product of extensive analysis of the potential challenges of the future security environment and widespread consultation on how to meet these challenges. (return)
. Government of Canada, DND, The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation, (2002). , I-28–I-29. (return)
. Government of Canada, DND, The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation, (2002). , I-28–I-29, to see all strategic objectives. (return)
. The importance and weight of this document helped lead to the establishment of the NCMPDC on 1 April 2003 in St. Jean, Quebec. The NCMPDC has as its mandate the professional development in the subjects of leadership, management, decision-making processes and many other subjects that will prepare the NCMs, from the rank of warrant officer and above, for the future requirements of the CF. (return)
. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Clausewitz: On War (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. On War is a compilation of writings by Carl von Clausewitz written over the period of 1816–1830. His wife published the book posthumously in 1832. (return)
. Government of Canada, DND, B-GG–005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations (Change 2, 15 August 2005), 1-4. (return)
. Howard and Paret, 75. (return)
.Armed Forces of the United States, US Joint Publication 3-0, US Joint Operations (Change 1, 13 Feb 2008), II-1. (return)
. Canadian doctrine refers to levels of conflict vice levels of war. This term will be used hereafter throughout this essay. (return)
. Canadian Forces Operations, 1-4 – 1-5. (return)
. US Joint Operations, II-1 – II-3, to see the US definitions of levels of war. (return)
. Canadian Forces Operations, GL-7. (return)
. Allan English et al., eds., The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context and Concepts (Winnipeg: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 8-9. (return)
. US Joint Operations, IV-2–IV-3, to see the US definition of operational art. See also The Operational Art, 9. (return)
. Appendix A, E-mail Survey of Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Members, LGen Maisonneuve’s responses. For information purposes, extracts from the survey have been reprinted in their entirety at the end of this article. (return)
. Appendix A, BGen Fraser’s responses. (return)
. Appendix A, BGen Fraser’s responses. (return)
. Appendix A, CWO McDonald’s responses. (return)
. Appendix A, CWO McDonald’s responses. (return)
. Appendix A., Col Coomb’s responses. (return)
. Appendix A., Col Coomb’s responses. DP3/DP4 describes the Developmental Periods that founded the Canadian Forces Professional Development System. In this case DP3/DP4 is the period for the ranks of warrant officer, master warrant officer and chief warrant officer. (return)
. Appendix A. CWO Gilbert (Ret’d) responses. (return)
. Appendix A. CWO Dietrich’s responses. (return)
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