Book Review - Understanding Urban Warfare - Liam Collins and John Spencer

Reviewed by Warrant Officer Peter Vandoremalen, a member of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. He served in the Urban Operations Cell at CFB Gagetown as an instructor and officer in charge of the cell.

Urban operations have become a much-discussed subject throughout the international defence community as of late, as the events unfolding in Ukraine have shown that 21st-century warfare has an exceedingly large urban component. Despite the growing salience of urban warfare in the contemporary world, modern armies have not given these complex operations the time, energy, study, and training that they deserve. Liam Collins and John Spencer address a range of critical issues in Understanding Urban Warfare. Part 1 of the book, “Understanding the Complex Operational Environment,” has six chapters that effectively attune the reader to the intricate complexities that a modern soldier/leader must be cognizant of in the urban battle space. Part 2 supports the precepts laid down in Part 1 with fifteen modern urban case studies captured in interview form with subject matter experts who, more often than not, participated in the battle. 

In Part 1, John Spencer interviews leading academics and subject matter experts. With insights from the interviews, the authors frame how the modern battle space must be understood over the course of six chapters. Taking a step back from the urban battle space, a commander must see a city for what it really is: an ecosystem consisting of multiple inputs and outputs that exist in balance. Any disruption to that balance will have a cascading effect with a multitude of first and second order effects.^{Footnote 1}  If a city of two million is deprived of garbage removal for several weeks, a major health and safety issue arises. This example is easy to reference, as most North Americans have gone through something of that nature in their lifetimes and can identify with the frustration that it brings forth. Take that example and remove water, electricity, a steady food chain, reliable access to healthcare and what remains is a restive population deprived of basic needs. This critical factor (i.e. how to manage the civilian population before, during and after the fighting), is often overlooked.^{Footnote 2}  As the authors argue, it is vital in the planning phase to identify critical infrastructure and personnel essential for continuing the services mentioned above. 

One of the critical lessons the book delves into is the need to incorporate information operations and civil affairs in all phases of the planning process, but most critically during the initial phases. These are two key enablers that provide inroads and legitimacy to an operation, and the American employment of them in the Second Battle of Fallujah (7 November–23 December 2004) and the Battle of Ramadi (2006–2007) serves as an exemplar.^{Footnote 3}  A city’s population cannot be relegated to simply one nationality; it is a fabric of many cultural and social dynamics that differ from block to block. The American experience fighting the “three block war”^{Footnote 4}  highlights the imperative to know the “human terrain” of a city.^{Footnote 5}  By front-loading civil affairs/information operations in the planning process, one becomes attuned to the human terrain, allowing these assets to shape the messaging, propagate it, and effectively respond to enemy information operations.^{Footnote 6}  The ground tactical level in an urban fight will be won in the room, but the operational level will be won in the hearts and minds of a city’s population. Failure to address the basic needs of the civilian population and get ahead of the information battle will rapidly turn a population against the military/government’s cause. 

The case studies in Part 2 provide an excellent look at the length and breadth of modern urban actions ranging from the Battle of Ortona in the Second World War (1939–1945) to the Battle of Shusha in 2020, representing an 81-year bracket. It would be a challenge to break down and analyze each case study given the space constraints of this review, so what follows is a condensed summary of the lessons learned. As identified in all the case studies, the imperative to utilize combined arms doctrine and operate harmoniously at the joint operational level was the critical driver to success. There is a degree of hesitation throughout the defence community to commit armour assets to the urban battle space, as they are vulnerable in closed terrain and deprived of the benefits of standoff, mobility and the full use of long-range optics/weaponry. This can be counterbalanced with infantry, engineer, and armour cooperation. The infantry provides intimate security and force protection to the armour. Similarly, engineers provide support for route clearance, breaching and explosive clearance, and armour provides overwatch and direct fire support. 

The urban terrain entails multi-storied buildings in close proximity to one another, power lines, and the civilian population. All these factors act as detriments to the use of indirect fire. The line of sight from the battery to the target is often blocked by buildings, and the risks of collateral damage to the population and infrastructure are high. Because of the confined battle space––usually no more than one side of a street to the next––reaction time must be immediate, making indirect fires impractical. Therefore, the presence of armour providing direct fire support is critical to mission success. The American employment of armour in the Second Battle of Fallujah (7 November– 23 December 2004) and Sadr City (26 March–11 May 2008)^{Footnote 7}  set the standard for combined arms operations in the urban battle space. In both of these cases, an enemy insurgent was intimately familiar with the terrain, was well-armed, and fought from prepared positions. In those circumstances, even a few defenders are highly effective and extremely difficult to clear out. Utilizing armour assets and breaking them into smaller combined arms elements (as the Americans did in Sadr City) demonstrated excellent flexibility and interoperability. It is worth noting that a building with fortified fighting positions can hold down a force exponentially larger than itself. This can be overcome with direct fire support from the tanks using their main armament to engage and destroy point targets that are impervious to infantry small arms. The Armed Forces of the Philippines effectively used their armour in the Battle of Marawi (23 May 2017–23 October 2017) and demonstrated this point. The lengths to which they went to employ their armoured personnel carriers by building ramps onto the second story of a building to get a line of sight speaks to the effectiveness of armour direct fire support.^{Footnote 8}   

Understanding Urban Warfare is an essential primer for soldiers and leaders serving in today’s ever-evolving operating environment. The book aptly frames how one looks at urban battle spaces and provides fresh perspectives into the crucial components. In conclusion, the authors identified a host of lessons learned that were well supported by the case studies and that leave the reader with some planning guidance and principles to reflect upon.^{Footnote 9}  I highly recommend this book to veterans and novices, as it provides a fulsome, comprehensive and balanced examination of 20th and 21st-century urban warfare. Urban warfare is the past, present, and future of warfare and is as timeless as conflict itself. Given the events and development in Ukraine, the entire defence establishment would benefit considerably from enhancing its understanding of urban operations, and this book is an excellent opportunity to achieve that. 

This article first appeared in the October, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (21-1).