Military History: A Guide to 21st Century Urban Warfare

by Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Louis DiMarco, Ph.D.

Fighting for, in, and around cities has been a critical aspect of warfare since time immemorial. Operations to control urban areas have always been and will continue to be a vital focus of land warfare, if not its most critical one. The study of the conduct of urban operations throughout military history validates this focus. The span of military history also reveals that some characteristics of the conduct of urban operations are enduring and remain valid in the 21st century. Knowing the purpose and historical roots of modern urban operations is crucial to intellectually understanding the importance and complexity of these operations. Arguably, military history has identified some trends in the way armies approach urban operations. These approaches fall into the realm of command at the higher tactical and operational levels of land warfare. Additionally, history illustrates lower-level tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), which continue to be relevant. All these characteristics require serious understanding and consideration by land force commanders and staff contemplating or preparing for military operations in and around urban centres. 

The discussion in this article focuses on urban operations conducted in a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) environment against a peer or near-peer adversary. It is essential to realize that such an environment vastly differs from the urban environments in which many modern armies have generally operated for the last thirty years. The considerations and TTP necessary for success in LSCO are, in many ways, different from the way land forces conduct operations in an unconventional war, peacekeeping, or counterinsurgency operations. 

For much of the latter half of the twentieth century, modern armies avoided a serious discussion of conducting urban operations. Particularly regarding offensive operations, the operational and tactical solution was to bypass the centres of resistance established in urban areas. Thus, conveniently, armies in the post-World War II era, particularly during the Cold War, paid scant attention to urban warfare’s operational and tactical challenges.^{Footnote 1}  However, armies often cannot bypass or ignore large urban areas, as political and military necessity often drives them to conduct urban operations. The political reasons urban areas may be necessary include protecting or liberating a friendly urban population, controlling a religiously important symbol or artifact, and controlling a historical, cultural, or politically significant area. Urban areas also have military importance––they can harbour sizable dangerous enemy forces; they frequently contain necessary logistics infrastructure; and, often, they are positioned on the terrain that controls major manoeuvre corridors. Thus, unlike wargames, simulations, and some war planning, military commanders often have no option other than to conduct LSCO in an urban environment.^{Footnote 2} 

City Design and Tactics

Cities have been the focus of military operations throughout history. The nature of how armies conduct operations in cities is a function of city design and weapons technology. These two factors have had a substantial influence on urban operations. For much of history, military necessity strongly influenced the design of a city. The defence was a crucial consideration in early city design.^{Footnote 3}  City design then reflected the tactics and weapons available to attack a city. As city design changed over centuries, tactics and weapons for attacking the city transformed as well. 

Ancient and Medieval-Era Cities

City design remained mostly the same through most of recorded history. Cities were relatively small and surrounded by a defensive wall. Over time, leaders made numerous defensive enhancements to the walled city design, including turrets and towers, moats, inner and outer walls, and interior bastions. The TTP to meet the challenge of the walled city were relatively straightforward. The tactic was to overcome the wall. This storming of the wall, called escalade, could be accomplished in various ways. One way was through the use of siege towers and ladders. Siege towers were mobile protected stairs positioned against the wall and, together with ladders, allowed the attacking infantry to overcome the wall obstacle. Another method was to batter the wall down using catapults and trebuchets. The infantry would then storm through the breach in the wall. A final technique was to collapse the wall. This technique required mining undetected to a position under the wall and then destroying the foundation or, in later years, detonating the explosives, which would bring it down, allowing the infantry to storm through the breach.^{Footnote 4}

Fortress Cities

The advent of the development of gunpowder and cannons made the vertical city wall an obsolete defensive barrier. Cannon fire against a vertical city wall quickly breached it, and the escalade by infantry soon followed. The answer to the cannon, in terms of city design, was the fortress city.

The fortress city became the primary city design of major urban areas beginning in the 16th century and was a prominent city feature into the 19th century. Like the walled city, a wall surrounded the fortress city, but it differed from previous vertical walls. The fortress city wall was a sloping stone backed by dozens of feet of earth. Its thickness and slope made it harder to breach by cannon fire. The fortress city walls formed a star shape and included positions for defensive cannons on top of the thick walls. The star shape allowed defensive cannons to provide enfilade (flanking) fire on any forces firing on or attempting to storm any face of the wall. Broad open spaces around the fortress city ensured that attacking infantry would be exposed to defensive cannon fire throughout the approach to any wall.^{Footnote 5} 

The answer to the defensive challenge to the fortress city was deliberate siege tactics. This began with a professional engineering evaluation of the fortress and surrounding terrain to determine which face of the city fortress offered the best opportunity to attack. Then engineers designed an approach to the fortress using deeply dug siege trenches angled to protect them from the fire of defensive cannons. Once complete, attacking infantry and cannon were moved forward through these assault trenches to positions near the fortress wall. Offensive artillery then battered the wall to produce enough damage that the attacking infantry could climb the wall. The infantry in the protected assault trenches only had to cover a short distance under fire before penetrating the wall. These siege tactics were slow and resource-intensive but were invariably effective.^{Footnote 6}   The primary defence against them was for the defenders to withstand the siege until circumstances—such as the outbreak of disease among the besieging troops, a change in the weather that made trenching difficult, the failure of the besiegers’ logistics system, or the arrival of a relieving army—caused the besieging force to break off the siege. 

Modern Cities

Beginning in the 18th century and accelerating through the 19th century, the populations and physical size of cities expanded. This growth in size and population resulted from increased wealth from overseas trade and colonies and the simultaneous scientific and industrial revolutions. Advances in science, medicine, and agriculture reduced the need for agricultural labour, increased the need for industrial labour, decreased infant mortality, controlled the spread of diseases, and increased lifespans. All of this caused a population explosion and rapid urban expansion. As a result, the urban physical space spilled beyond the fortress walls, and it became apparent that it was prohibitively expensive to rebuild the walls to include the ever-growing size of the city.^{Footnote 7} 

Beginning with the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 19th century and continuing through the beginning of the 20th century, tactical urban operations were in transition. Classic siege tactics were still often used and were still time- and resource-consuming. Increasingly, cities could no longer rely on fortress walls. World War I was dominated by static trench warfare, so urban warfare was not a significant consideration. Following World War I, mechanization and combined arms warfare made the static trench system obsolete. As the World War II armies manoeuvred against each other, they discovered the modern form of urban defence and offence. The roots of modern urban warfare tactical dynamics can be traced to the late 19th century, when small arms technology took a leap forward in accuracy and rate of fire and became highly lethal. This lethality, combined with reinforced concrete and stone buildings in a large urban area, presented an attacker with an incredibly dense and diverse maze of effective, mutually-supporting defensive positions. Unlike city walls and field defensive positions, the building-based urban defence had a depth and breadth that equalled the size of the city. It could not be breached or flanked. This dense urban environment became the dominant characteristic of many decisive battles and has become even more common and decisive in the decades of war since World War II. This environment remains the major challenge for land forces preparing for war in the 21st century. 

Operational Approach

Urban warfare is more than just a small unit tactical problem. Field armies, corps, and division commands must also focus on the conduct of urban operations within their areas of operations. Arguably, the most crucial aspect of predicting success or failure at the tactical level of urban warfare is the degree to which higher tactical- and operational-level commanders and staff anticipate, plan for, and conduct operations with urban warfare central to their visualization of the battlespace. The span of military history reveals that some enduring operational approaches to urban operations remain valid in the 21st century. These include anticipating the urban battle, pre-empting the urban battle, and isolating the urban battlefield.

Anticipation

Planning and analyzing the impact of urban areas on campaigns and battles by higher tactical- and operational-level commands is critical to the success or failure of lower tactical units in the urban environment. Higher commanders must understand and evaluate the urban areas within their area of operation to include their non-military import and the military effects on both friendly and enemy forces. This evaluation should result in one of three outcomes for all significant urban areas in the area of operations: the urban area must be seized or retained, the urban area must be bypassed or abandoned, or subordinate commanders will see to the disposition of the urban area. Even if the commander makes the latter choice, in all cases, the decision must be the result of careful consideration of the value of the urban area versus the likely cost in resources and time required to capture or defend it.^{Footnote 8} 

Pre-emption

The dense urban environment provides significant advantages for defence. This fundamental consideration must be foremost when considering offensive operations at the operational or higher tactical level. Therefore, the ideal offensive operation against a city occurs before the  city is defended. The commander must anticipate the future urban battle and then act to pre-empt the defence. There are three ways to pre-empt a defence: airborne assault, amphibious assault, or rapid advance by mobile forces. The factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time dictate the particular operational approach chosen. All these types of operations require boldness and entail significant operational risk. However, the successful seizure of a city without significant opposition is a major operational coup and includes the added dividend of little or no collateral damage.^{Footnote 9}  

Examples of pre-emption of the urban defence in military history abound. One of the most dramatic was the amphibious assault at Inchon during the Korean War (1950–1953), which was aimed towards liberating the capital city of Seoul. Allied forces landed against only light opposition at Inchon on 15 September 1950, crossed the Han River on 20 September, and began the systematic capture of Seoul. By 29 September, the city was secure. The fight for the city was a challenge as the North Korean forces put up strong resistance, but it would have been much more difficult and time-consuming had not North Korean forces been surprised and not able to reinforce the city or mount a stronger, more deliberate defence.^{Footnote 10}  

Isolation

Operational circumstance only sometimes offers the opportunity to boldly seize a major urban area by a coup. However, a direct frontal assault on an urban area is the most costly and time-consuming way to conduct offensive operations in dense urban terrain and often fails. Land forces should seek to isolate the urban area before attacking it. The failure to isolate Soviet forces in Stalingrad in 1942 is one of the major reasons for the stout defence that Soviet forces were able to mount in that city through the late summer and fall of that year. Similarly, in the German’s failed long siege of the Russian city of Leningrad in World War II, they never succeeded in isolating the city. Thus, in both decisive battles, reinforcements and supplies were able to sustain the defending force. 

In contrast, an isolated force defending a city is deprived of resources and suffers a significant psychological blow. In modern warfare, successfully isolating a force defending an urban area is tantamount to winning the battle. Because of this, defending forces will commit significant combat power outside of the urban area to resist isolation. When isolation looks inevitable, defending forces have the choice of withdrawing from the urban area to preserve their force. In 1951, Chinese forces evacuated Seoul in the face of a UN counter-offensive that threatened to cut the Chinese lines of communications to the north. UN forces then occupied Seoul without significant opposition.^{Footnote 11}  If it is necessary to attack the urban area after isolating it, the offensive force does so with numerous advantages. Once a city is isolated, the attacking force picks the time and the place of the attack and can mass vastly superior combat power at the point of attack. The isolated defensive force must defend everywhere.

A critique of the isolation technique is that many 21st-century urban areas are too large to isolate. This is an oversimplified understanding of the concept. Certainly, large, sprawling urban areas are difficult, if not impossible, to isolate physically. However, in a large urban area, manoeuvre operations can be focused on systematically isolating segments of the city through manoeuvre within the urban area. This segmenting of the urban area requires a strategy of seizing the urban space in systematic phases rather than seizing the entire city in a single operation. A version of this approach was used by American forces to systematically secure the city of Ramadi in Iraq in 2006.^{Footnote 12} 

Small Unit TTP

Combined Arms

History demonstrates some valuable considerations for senior commanders and provides the 21st century forces a guide for effectively employing forces in dense urban terrain at the lower tactical levels of warfare. Most fundamentally, military history illustrates the critical importance of combined arms operations, emphasizing the infantry-armour team. It also illuminates the roles of fires, engineers, logistics, air defence, and civil affairs. Not only are these capabilities necessary for urban operations, but their integration into teams must often happen at echelons lower than that which is routine for other operations.^{Footnote 13}  Historical precedents guide 21st century leaders in training, organizing and employing their forces for tactical success in a dense urban environment.

The Infantry Armour Team

There is a dangerous misconception that tactical operations in dense urban terrain are infantry-centric. In operations below the threshold of LSCO against a peer or near-peer adversary, some tactical operations may be infantry-centric. Still, in LSCO, they are fundamentally combined arms built around an infantry-armour team.^{Footnote 14}  The seamless integration of these two arms is essential to successful tactical operations with minimal casualties. The exact organization of the infantry-armour team depends on the situation and the friendly forces available. The significant difference between the infantry-armour team in urban operations and other types of operations is the flexibility and teamwork required between the two arms.

Optimally, all assaulting formations in urban offensive operations should have armoured support. Ideally, at least two armoured vehicles should be aligned with one infantry platoon as a combined arms team at platoon level.^{Footnote 15}  A ratio less than that will likely result in infantry fighting without armour support, dramatically increasing casualties and slowing the tempo of the operation.  

As indicated above, friendly forces often dictate the composition of the infantry-armour team. In the battle for Aachen in 1944, the 2nd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, had one platoon of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers (mobile gun systems on a tank chasse) for a total of ten armoured vehicles. Because of this, the battalion commander allocated a section of three vehicles to each of his three infantry companies.^{Footnote 16}  In the initial stages of the 1968 battle for the city of Huế in Vietnam, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, only had four tanks in support of four to five infantry companies, only two of which were M-48 main battle tanks (the other two were M-67 flame thrower tanks with no cannon). In 17 days of combat, the two M-48s fired over 1,100 90-mm main gun rounds—indicating how intensely those two vehicles were involved in the battle.^{Footnote 17}  These examples reinforce the idea that the infantry-armour team is a major component of successful urban tactics and that the number of tanks is often a function of what is available versus what is desired.   

The infantry has several critical roles in the urban battle space. First and foremost, they have the mission of entering and defeating enemy forces inside urban structures in close combat. The ability of small infantry squads to close with the enemy and defeat them in the close spaces of the urban environment is critical to successful urban operations.^{Footnote 18}  In the second 2004 battle for Fallujah in Iraq, the training of small unit leadership of US Marine and Army infantry was critical to being able to clear buildings and maintain the tempo of operations while at the same time minimizing civilian casualties.^{Footnote 19}  

A second key role is protecting the armoured force from anti-armour threats. In this role, the infantry enables armour to perform its role. Close cooperation between the infantry of the 1st Infantry Division and tanks and tank destroyers was a key to the American seizure of the German city of Aachen in 1944. The infantry played the key role of watching for and suppressing German light anti-tank weapons while tank fire forced the defending German infantry into the basements of buildings. American infantry then used grenades and flamethrowers to compel the Germans to surrender.^{Footnote 20}

A final role of the infantry is to defend urban terrain. When the unit’s mission is defence, this becomes the infantry force’s primary role. In the offence, this role involves securing terrain taken from the enemy as the attack continues and protecting exposed flanks if necessary. In the defence role, small numbers of infantry can defend against far superior forces successfully for extended periods. The recent three-month Russian siege of Ukrainian forces in the city of Mariupol exemplifies how resilient small numbers of infantry defending in urban terrain can be, even though the Ukrainian forces were eventually forced to surrender.^{Footnote 21}  Armour is not as critical to a successful defence as it is to offensive operations.

The infantry has a significant ability to differentiate between combatants and noncombatants. This ability allows them to seize urban terrain while minimizing collateral damage. The infantry is generally immune to defending anti-tank weapons. However, engaging in close infantry combat inside urban structures involves the risk of significantly increasing infantry casualties and negates many technological and firepower advantages that the attacking force may have. During the Second Battle of Fallujah, most of the casualties were sustained during the phase of operations when the infantry entered and systematically cleared buildings after the major objectives were secured.^{Footnote 22}  Even though systematic building clearing is time-consuming, when anti-armour forces constitute a significant threat and collateral damage is a vital command consideration, infantry forces should lead the infantry-armour team. The infantry will also lead the infantry-armour team whenever there is a requirement to enter an underground structure or upper stories of tall buildings.^{Footnote 23}   

Not all armour is equal, nor does it have the same capability. Heavy armour is the main battle tank. Tanks are impervious to small arms and light anti-tank capability. They have the firepower to destroy defensive positions in buildings and bunkers and all armoured vehicles on the battlefield, and they have the mobility to break through some obstacles and overcome urban debris that would stop wheeled vehicles. In the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004, tanks and armoured ambulances were used for resupply and casualty evacuation because of their protection and ability to move through the obstructed streets of the city.^{Footnote 24}  Tank fires can also be used to create a quick and safe entryway for infantry into buildings without using doors and windows, which may be targeted by the enemy. This was a common tactic in Fallujah.^{Footnote 25}  Using these capabilities, the infantry-armour team can destroy defending forces without needing to enter the urban structure, and it can facilitate the close combat tasks of the infantry when they do have to enter a structure. Tanks are also the most effective means of dealing with opposing armour in an urban environment. Thus, in many circumstances, armour should lead the infantry-armour team. 

In an urban environment, tanks are vulnerable to anti-armour weapons attacking at close range and from the heights of buildings. Tanks rely on infantry to mitigate these threats. When such threats are significant because of the proliferation of anti-tank weapons or the constriction of the urban terrain, infantry should lead the team with tanks behind but in close support. The lack of close infantry and armour cooperation proved disastrous in the 1995 Russian offensive to secure the Chechen city of Grozny. Russian infantry-armour teams were poorly coordinated, and Russian infantry rarely dismounted. This left the armour susceptible to effective ambushes, which resulted in the destruction of several Russian task forces and the failure of the Russian attack. In one task force alone, 102 of 120 armoured personnel carriers and 20 of 26 tanks were destroyed.^{Footnote 26}  The Russian disaster in Grozny illustrates the necessity of close infantry-army coordination.

Light armour includes light tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armoured personnel carriers. These vehicles provide protection from small arms and have more firepower than infantry forces. However, they should not typically lead the infantry-armour team because they lack significant protection against even light anti-tank weapons. During the battle for the South Vietnamese City of Huế in 1968, there was a significant difference in the performance and tempo of South Vietnamese forces and US Marine forces. The American forces were able to conduct a much higher tempo of operations and suffered fewer casualties than the South Vietnamese even though the two allies were fighting the same enemy in the same urban environment. One of the major differences between the two forces was that South Vietnamese armour support consisted of M-41 light tanks, which were easily destroyed by the standard North Vietnamese B-40 anti-tank rocket. The American Marines were supported by M-48 main battle tanks whose armour could not be easily penetrated by the B-40 rocket. During the battle, dozens of M-41 tanks were destroyed, but only one of the M-48s supporting the Marines was lost.^{Footnote 27}  Similarly, in the 2008 battles in the Sadr City neighbourhood in Baghdad (Iraq), American commanders concluded that the Stryker (eight-wheeled armoured personnel carrier) lacked lethality and survivability compared to mechanized forces (tank and infantry fighting vehicles).^{Footnote 28}  These examples testify that even though armour is a critical asset in urban operations, individual system capabilities in terms of firepower, mobility and protection are vitally important.

Coordination between the infantry and armour elements of the infantry-armour team is vitally important. As described above, the elements of the team have unique capabilities. None by themselves are ideally suited to all aspects of the diverse urban environment. Because of this, the infantry-armour team must be very flexible and adaptable. Adapting and modifying the roles to different terrains and enemy challenges during missions will be necessary. Only close coordination and well-drilled teams will be able to respond rapidly and effectively as situations change from block to block and building to building during urban combat. 

Artillery and Fires

Fires have always been critical to urban combat. Armies that are less sensitive to collateral damage have used massive air and artillery fires to destroy an adversary defending in urban terrain. This was the Russian approach to Grozny in 2000.^{Footnote 29}  This approach reduces friendly casualties but destroys the urban infrastructure and produces significant civilian casualties. 

Air and artillery-delivered modern precision fires can facilitate operations without causing a large amount of collateral damage. Greater precision has dramatically increased the role of fires in urban operations, even when collateral damage is a priority concern. Precision fires, in some cases, can be a substitute for the availability of armour forces. They have an advantage over the direct fire of armour forces as they can be significantly more powerful and tailored to impact all three dimensions of the urban environment: subterranean, surface, and supersurface. Artillery-delivered precision fires using guided munitions proved a major combat multiplier in the 2017 battle to recapture the Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).^{Footnote 30}  Precision munitions dramatically change the ability of fires to influence close combat in urban terrain.

Conventional aviation operations can significantly assist the conduct of urban operations. However, rotary wing operations are uniquely vulnerable to defensive fire in an intense combat environment and should not be employed over unsecured urban terrain. The 1993 American raid against Somali militants in Mogadishu demonstrated the vulnerability of helicopters to relatively unsophisticated fires.^{Footnote 31}  Aviation should conduct overwatch and observation from positions in secure areas. In 2002, Israeli attack helicopters were careful to overwatch and support ground forces with fires from secure positions behind the ground forces.^{Footnote 32} 

Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces (SOF) integration, coordination, and support for combined arms urban operations can be critically important. High-value special operations targets often exist in the same urban battle space in which large-scale conventional operations are conducted. During the US invasion of Panama in 1989, special operations forces worked closely with conventional forces to free prisoners from the Cárcel Modelo prison, while a mechanized task force supported by special operations aircraft and reconnaissance captured the Panamanian military headquarters.^{Footnote 33}  In 2006, the US brigade securing the Iraqi city of Ramada integrated Navy SEALs into its standard combat outpost operations. The SEALs provided reconnaissance, precision sniper fires and early warning and security to support the conventional infantry-armour teams.^{Footnote 34}  Deconflicting conventional and special operations is essential. Coordination between SOF and integration of special operations forces into conventional operations can be a major capability enhancement in urban operations. Special forces are particularly adept at raids, subterranean operations, infiltration, and urban reconnaissance. Leveraging all these capabilities enhances the effectiveness of conventional force operations.

Engineers

Military history also indicates that there are precedents that guide the role of other arms in urban operations. Engineering has unique roles in large-scale urban operations. They have the dual roles of supporting combat and civil support operations during and after combat. The urban environment uniquely engages the Engineer arm’s tasks of mobility, counter-mobility, and protection.^{Footnote 35}  Logisticians must meet the unique logistics requirements of the combat forces, and they likely will have significant responsibilities for supporting large numbers of civilians.

Engineers have a major supporting role to play in urban combat operations. In offensive operations, the engineer’s task of mobility is critical. In the urban environment, one of the major mobility tasks is bridging. Almost all major urban areas worldwide include rivers within the city domain. The bridges within these urban areas are critical to intra-urban mobility. Thus, the destruction of bridges is expected in urban operations. In 1945, during the battle of Manila, all six bridges over the Pasig River were destroyed by the defending Japanese, forcing the Americans to conduct an opposed river crossing during the battle.^{Footnote 36}  During the battle for Seoul in 1950, all bridges across the Han River were destroyed, forcing engineers to again support an opposed river crossing into an urban area. Engineers were also critical in clearing the barricades erected as obstacles on the streets of Seoul.^{Footnote 37}  Most recently, during the 2017 battle for Mosul, all five of the city’s bridges across the Tigris River were destroyed as part of the effort to isolate ISIS forces in the city. This later presented a challenge to Iraqi forces as operational focus shifted to the western part of the city.^{Footnote 38}  Engineer bridging capability is essential to conducting offensive urban operations.

In the defence, Engineer counter-mobility and protection tasks are important. Manoeuvre corridors in dense urban terrain are narrow and compartmented, and small amounts of carefully placed obstacles greatly enhance the already formidable constriction of the terrain. Buildings in the urban area are important for cover and concealment. In Manila, US forces discovered that the Japanese had constructed bunkers within buildings that were impervious to fires from outside the building and that were only found after troops entered the building.^{Footnote 39}  With a small amount of effort, engineers can improve these formidable defensive positions, turning them into veritable fortresses. 

A final unique urban engineering requirement is to support the civilian population before, during and after combat is complete. After hostilities, critical urban infrastructure is likely to be damaged. In particular, water and power systems may be non-functioning. Military engineers are critical to getting basic infrastructure necessities operating quickly to stave off post-conflict humanitarian disasters among the civil population.

Logistics

Urban operations include unique logistics challenges. Again, military history points to some of those challenges and allows logistics planners to anticipate them. One of the significant challenges will be munitions resupply. Urban operations often are typified by high ammunition usage rates. Recent conflicts indicate that precision artillery and mortar munitions will be in high demand. During the battle for Mosul in 2017, precision guidance munitions for artillery and aviation were used extensively and, at some points in the battle, were in short supply.^{Footnote 40}  Artillery ammunition supply in the present fighting in the Russian–Ukraine battle for Ukraine’s cities is a critical issue for both sides.^{Footnote 41}  These specialized munitions are ideally suited to the urban environment, and, in large-scale operations, their use will strain both tactical logistics and the strategic supply chain. 

The civilian population is a significant logistics challenge in the urban environment. City populations are not self-sufficient and rely on a complex, robust civilian supply chain for essentials such as food and medicine. Large-scale combat operations will destroy these supply chains. In the immediate post-combat period, military logisticians have a moral and legal responsibility to support the humanitarian needs of the civilian population. These requirements can be significant—possibly more extensive than the military logistics support requirements––and must be anticipated and planned for. In 1944, the US military became responsible for feeding the population of the liberated French capital of Paris. The logistics requirements for this task—4,000 tons per day—were the equivalent of the entire theatre advancing for three days.^{Footnote 42}  Stockpiling anticipated supply needs and task-organizing with logistics and medical support beyond combat needs are two techniques for meeting the needs of the civilian population.

Conclusion

Military history provides numerous insights, considerations and lessons learned regarding LSCO in dense urban terrain. It should also stimulate considerations regarding current and future operations. The pace of technological development and innovation is such that future urban operations will require additional TTP to account for changes in the conduct of war at all levels. Attack and reconnaissance uncrewed aerial vehicles are emerging as new and significant capabilities that must be accounted for in offensive and defensive city fights. Other technologies still in their infancy, including artificial intelligence and robotics, are likely to have profound effects on the conduct of future urban operations tactics. The past is a guide to what works in urban warfare, but urban warfare is dynamic and constantly changing.

Conflict in the first two decades of the 21st century has reaffirmed that land warfare is about controlling urban areas. The fall of the Afghanistan government to the Taliban in the summer of 2021, in one of the least urbanized regions in the world, was fundamentally about which side controlled the region’s cities. The basics of urban operations, at the operational and tactical levels of war, are vividly illustrated in the many urban battles that have taken place since 1941. Studying the lessons of modern urban warfare, as revealed in military history, is a necessary starting point for all land force commanders and their staff as they prepare forces for, plan for, and execute operations in dense urban terrain in the future. 

About the Author

Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Louis DiMarco has been employed for over 20 years as a professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas, in the United States of America. He is the author of Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq. LCol DiMarco is a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point and served 24 years as an Armour officer, serving in a variety of command and staff positions, from troop commander to battalion operations officer, as well as in many division, corps and joint staff positions. He has two master’s degrees in military art & science and international relations and a Ph.D. from Kansas State University.

This article first appeared in the October, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (21-1).