Understanding Risks and Mitigating Civilian Harm in Urban Operations

by Sahr Muhammedally

The world has watched how cities of Bakhmut, Gaza, Khartoum, and Mariupol have suffered aerial bombing, artillery shelling and siege warfare, resulting in destroyed lives and infrastructure. Similar images of urban battles have been seen in Aleppo, Kyiv, Raqqa, Mosul, Marawi and Sana’a, where civilians have been maimed, killed or displaced and the social fabric has broken, impacting entire generations.^{Footnote 1}  The conflicts of today are fought in bustling neighbourhoods and markets and at people’s doorsteps. Fighting in urban areas is the most dangerous form of warfare in terms of civilian harm, with an estimated 50 million people worldwide currently bearing the brunt of it.^{Footnote 2}  War in cities disrupts education, health and livelihoods,  and it profoundly impacts a country’s human capital, economic growth, development and peacebuilding ability, all of which can take decades to rebuild. 

Cities are vulnerable to conflict because they are the centres of gravity for civilian life.^{Footnote 3}  The control of major cities is one of the clearest indicators of military progress and can determine the success or failure of a conflict. Urbanization reinforces the strategic value of cities, with 68 percent of the world’s population expected to live in urban environments by 2050.^{Footnote 4}  Belligerents may take the fighting to urban areas, as the physical and human terrain can blunt a superior military’s technology and precision capabilities. Attackers have resorted to siege warfare, including limiting supplies of food, water, medicine and electricity to the civilian population, and have used large explosive munitions such as unguided artillery, multiple-barrel rockets, large-radius bombs and mortars, and improvised explosive devices (IED), with devastating consequences for civilians.

Combat in urban areas is the most challenging type of operation, with the commingling of military objectives, civilians and civilian objects. International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict (LOAC),^{Footnote 5}  limits the mean and methods of warfare that parties to the conflict may employ and ensures protection and humane treatment of persons not taking part in hostilities, through the principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality, and precautions. Most militaries also remain ill prepared in terms of doctrine, training, weapons and equipment design for such operations. However, the heightened risk to civilians in urban war mandates changes in military training, policies and practices to address the humanitarian consequences of urban warfare while achieving mission success. In recent wars, commanders have also identified strategic reasons to reduce civilian harm, as extensive civilian casualties may undermine the legitimacy of the military mission, thus benefiting the enemy. As one commander noted, “In wars among the people—where the real battles are for legitimacy—civilian harm, even within the bounds of LOAC, can have major negative impacts on the mission.”^{Footnote 6}

As militaries prepare to improve capabilities to operate in urban environments, including large-scale combat operations, and leverage multi-domain operations^{Footnote 7}   synchronizing air, land, sea, cyber and space, it is imperative to understand the risks to civilians and civilian objects and adapt/enact new military practices to reduce civilian harm.

This article proposes that understanding the urban environment, including the terrain, population, supporting infrastructure and technology, through the lens of civilian harm mitigation is essential for enabling military planners to analyze how to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects and how to upgrade doctrine, policies, practices, training and equipment.^{Footnote 8}

Legal, Policy and Strategic Frameworks for Minimizing Harm to Civilians

Law

The law of armed conflict reflects an attempt to balance military necessity with the principle of humanity.^{Footnote 9}   LOAC may be found in treaties such as the four 1949 Geneva Conventions that were negotiated and ratified following World War II, in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, and in customary international law.^{Footnote 10}

LOAC requires that, once an attack on a verified military target is judged permissible, those responsible for planning and deciding upon that attack must apply the rules to avoid or minimize incidental civilian harm. The three main principles that apply to the conduct of hostilities are distinction, proportionality and precautions, and they apply in international and non-international armed conflicts.^{Footnote 11}  Additional Protocol I and customary international law require that parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians, civilian objects and military objectives.^{Footnote 12}  Civilians and civilian objects must not be the object of attack.^{Footnote 13}  The rule on indiscriminate attacks prohibits attacks that target military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.^{Footnote 14}

The rule on proportionality prohibits attacks that may cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.^{Footnote 15}

In all military operations, LOAC requires that constant care be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.^{Footnote 16} The term “military operations” encompasses “any movements, manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat” or “related to hostilities” and not just attacks.^{Footnote 17} Thus, measures to protect civilians must be factored into operational planning and mission execution not only as a matter of policy, but also to adhere to legal obligations, not only during war but also in preparation for war.^{Footnote 18} This can include ground operations, establishment of bases, defensive preparations and search operations.^{Footnote 19} 

LOAC imposes additional obligations to take all feasible precautions in planning an attack and requires parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks. Precautionary measures available to an attacking party may include assessing risks to civilians, providing effective advance warning, take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding incidental harm, refrain from attacks that cause disproportionate civilian harm, adjusting the timing of an attack, or cancelling attacks altogether if incidental harm will be excessive to the military advantage gained.^{Footnote 20}  A defending party is also obligated to undertake precautionary measures from the effects of an attack, which may include giving sufficient warnings of incoming attacks, remove civilian population under their control from the vicinity of military objectives, and avoiding locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.^{Footnote 21}

LOAC also prohibits the use of human shields and the starvation of civilians.^{Footnote 22}  Encirclement and siege tactics are lawful only when used directly against enemy forces, and the besieging party may not deliberately deprive civilians of supplies that are essential for survival.^{Footnote 23} 

Operations in the urban environment may blur police and military functions as areas of responsibility overlap and will require coordination between military and police, including special operations forces; police special weapons and tactics; and police intelligence teams. Plans must be made to enact appropriate policies—in adherence to international human rights law (IHL), the use of force for law enforcement—for the screening of combatants amongst the civilian population; detention/internment operations; conditions/treatment; judicial guarantees; procedural safeguards; and transfer/repatriation/release.^{Footnote 24}

Lastly, there is a growing body of analysis on the application of L^{Footnote 33} OAC principles and rules in the context of cyber and space operations.^{Footnote 25}  For example, military commentators note that, in future wars, the accelerated pace of operations may result in delegated decision-making authority with respect to subordinates and the use of automated decision-making tools.^{Footnote 26}  It is therefore vital to ensure that emerging technologies used in war sufficiently assess the foreseeable humanitarian impact and are in compliance with LOAC.^{Footnote 27}   

The complex nature of urban environments, the intermingling of militaries and civilians, and the delegation of decision-making authority require that personnel at all levels are trained on LOAC, ethical judgment and theatre-specific rules of engagement (ROE) in order to comply with LOAC and minimize civilian harm.

Policies

In recent conflicts, some militaries have enacted mission-specific policies tailored to minimizing civilian harm. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan—in response to public criticism of civilian harm—enacted several tactical directives to reduce civilian deaths and injuries as well as damage to civilian property.^{Footnote 28}  In 2011, after widespread criticism of civilian harm, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) similarly introduced a policy to restrict the use of indirect fire in populated areas.^{Footnote 29}  In 2017, the Afghan government enacted the Civilian Casualties Mitigation and Prevention Policy, which committed its forces to mitigate and respond to civilian harm through training, policies, and financial assistance to conflict victims.^{Footnote 30} 

In 2016, NATO adopted its first-ever protection of civilians (PoC) policy and reinforced the organization’s commitment to more effective civilian harm mitigation.^{Footnote 31}  It was developed partly in response to criticism of NATO’s actions, which had contributed to causing civilian casualties during its operations in Libya and Afghanistan. NATO has tried to develop a comprehensive PoC framework to not only “minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations” but also to “protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.”^{Footnote 32}  This was followed by a PoC Handbook published in 2021.^{Footnote 33}  Over a period of six years, NATO significantly elevated the development of PoC policies and frameworks, and their applicability to urban warfare is all the more critical now given the war against one of NATO’s strategic partners, Ukraine.

Most recently, in response to reports of civilian harm attributed to the US in Iraq and Syria and internal review of incidents,^{Footnote 34} in August 2022 the US Department of Defense enacted the Civilian Harm Mitigation Action and Response Plan (CHMR-AP) to improve how the US military prevents and responds to civilian harm along the spectrum of conflict, including counterterrorism operations and high-intensity conflict, and directed the military to develop a civilian protection centre of excellence; overhaul doctrine, policies, training and response plans to mitigate civilian harm; and integrate civilian harm mitigation into security cooperation and with partners and allies.^{Footnote 35}  In November 2022, 83 nations, including all NATO countries, as well as Canada, the US, and the UK, signed the Political Declaration to Limit Humanitarian Suffering from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.^{Footnote 36}

Strategic Reasons

In addition to legal obligations and policies, armed forces have strategic reasons to take measures to minimize civilian harm in populated areas. Extensive civilian harm may undermine the legitimacy of the military mission.^{Footnote 37}  It can result in a decline in political, military or financial support (both local and international), including intelligence collection from sources,^{Footnote 38}  and can become a divisive issue between multinational partners.^{Footnote 39}  Extensive civilian harm also might eliminate avenues for reconciliation, trigger more violence and, as recognized by the 2022 U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Urban Operations doctrine, turn initially neutral or positive sentiment into hostility toward the US and its partners, thereby prolonging the conflict.^{Footnote 40}  Damage to civilian objects, including critical infrastructure^{Footnote 41}  which civilians depend on for their survival, such as electricity, water, sanitation and health care, generates reverberating effects on lives and livelihoods, increases post-conflict reconstruction costs^{Footnote 42}  and risks alienating the population if services are not restored.^{Footnote 43}  Extensive destruction also impacts military operations’ ability to manoeuvre in urban terrain.^{Footnote 44} 

Militaries have cited strategic reasons to enact additional measures to minimize civilian harm. For example, ISAF’s restrictive measures were imposed to “avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.”^{Footnote 45}  AMISOM’s indirect fire policy was enacted due to the failure to protect civilians in the fight against al-Shabab, which was undermining AMISOM’s strategic and operational success.^{Footnote 46}  NATO’s Protection of Civilians Handbook notes, “[L]ack of consideration for [civilian harm mitigation] will have a negative impact on the overall mission” because such “failures will generate negative strategic effects and their consequences will reverberate at all levels of command. [Protection of Civilians] is therefore key for mission success and legitimacy.”^{Footnote 47}  Similarly, in August 2022, the US Department of Defense affirmatively acknowledged that the protection of civilians is a strategic priority as well as a moral imperative.^{Footnote 48} 

Civilian Harm Mitigation Planning Considerations in Urban Environments

Military operations are challenging in urban areas for several reasons that must be examined in order to enable planning and preparedness, including through the lens of civilian harm mitigation.^{Footnote 49}  The overlap of the terrain, the population, the infrastructure and the information systems within the urban environment will challenge all aspects of a military’s command and control structure. Urban systems are complex and interconnected and include flows of people, resources and information into and out of cities. This interconnectedness of cities magnifies the harm that occurs when there is damage to or destruction of one urban system, since that damage or destruction may have reverberating and long-term impacts on others.

Terrain

Urban areas can include horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior and subterranean forms imposed on the natural environment. A multi-storey building takes up the same land area as a small field, but the area of each storey is approximately equal to that of the ground floor. In addition, urban areas can include informal settlements ranging from shanty towns to high-rise buildings. It is the sheer volume and density created by this urban geometry that makes urban operations resource-intensive in time, personnel and materials.^{Footnote 50} 

Understanding the effects of munitions in urban terrain is vital. Over 60 percent of the world’s buildings are composed of penetrant-resistant brick or concrete, thereby impacting weapons effects and blast, fragment, ballistic or manual breaching.^{Footnote 51}  When buildings are weakened by weapon strikes, the result may be falling debris and even collapse, increasing the risk of injuries to civilians and soldiers in the area. Rubble from collapsed buildings may be contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO), posing risks and limiting manoeuvrability in the area. It also takes time and special equipment to extract people trapped under rubble, which increases the probability of death or limb amputation.^{Footnote 52}

Subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the urban terrain. Below-ground facilities are inherent physical features of today’s cities, and their number and dispersion are increasing apace with population growth and its accompanying structural spread. Subterranean tunnels have been used by armed actors such as Islamic State (ISIS) and Hamas to prevent observation and attack, as well as to target and smuggle supplies. Detecting entrances and exits to subterranean facilities can be extremely difficult, with different types of resources necessary to detect, trace and target military objectives. Identifying underground routes is nearly impossible, given the depth of some infrastructure and the clever concealment of airshafts. Even when a military objective is detected, the tunnel could lie beneath civilian infrastructure, such as homes and hospitals, necessitating application of the LOAC rule on proportionality to avoid causing excessive civilian harm. Targeting teams must also assess the dual-use nature of tunnels: they can be used not only by armed actors, who may choose to hide their command posts underground, but also by civilians as shelters or underground hospitals, as witnessed recently in Ukraine and Syria.^{Footnote 53}  

Buildings, walls, tunnels and other structures can interfere with communications signals and global positioning system (GPS) navigation systems. This can limit situational awareness and the ability to verify the locations of the adversary and civilians./p>

Ground operations can also become dispersed when forces need to move through city streets, stairwells and corridors, thereby causing command and control to be decentralized and increasing the risk to civilians. Soldiers at the tactical level, therefore, must be fully knowledgeable regarding the ROE and exercise a high standard of ethical judgment in order to comply with LOAC rules on distinction, proportionality and precautions.

Cities located near coastlines, including littoral zones such as inlets, rivers and canals, are another important facet of urban terrain. In fact, 40 percent of the world’s population lives within 60 miles (100 km) of a coastline.^{Footnote 54}  Controlling or being able to access urban littoral allows forces certain manoeuvre and logistical capabilities. This entails planning considerations, given the presence of population; infrastructure; and government, economic and industrial activity in the littoral area. Such locations also pose the risks of flooding, waterborne diseases and coastal erosion.

Moreover, coastal cities include ports and trade hubs, which energy and supply chains rely upon and which are key entry points for the movement of people and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Any disruption to port operations, including from a blockade,^{Footnote 55}  could disrupt the supply of food, water and medicine needed for the population and by hospitals, damage the local economy, and potentially impact the national and global supply chains, as occurred in Ukraine in 2022.

The sheer volume and type of terrain in urban areas challenges command, control and information-collection activities, the deployment of forces, sustainment/logistics, and heavy equipment to move and manoeuvre. It also increases the planning, resources and contingency measures required to conduct urban operations. 

Climate Change and the Natural Environment

Armed conflicts also cause environmental degradation and destruction, thereby affecting the well-being, health and survival of the population.^{Footnote 56} The effects can last for years or decades after wars, as seen in Iraq, Mali, Central African Republic and Yemen.^{Footnote 57} Extreme weather events will also have a magnifying impact in urban areas due to the density of population and infrastructure that might require disaster relief missions during military operations. Planners should examine how weather and climate affect living conditions, including the impact of extreme heat on people with limited access to water, or of cold weather on those without access to electricity or heating fuel. Direct hits to critical infrastructure, such as water pumping and purification plants and sewage facilities, lead to service failure and denial of clean water and food systems, as witnessed in Gaza and Ukraine.^{Footnote 58}

Planners should also assess the risks and consequences to the natural environment, both immediate and long term, of toxic substances and other pollutants released from explosive ordnance, including mines and explosive remnants of war.^{Footnote 59}  Toxic substances can seep into the soil, subsoil and water, contaminating those sources and spreading disease, as well as threatening civilians’ livelihood and food security and endangering the ecosystem. There is also a risk of pollutants and contaminants being released when facilities that contain hazardous materials (such as chemicals, biological agents and radiological substances) are damaged, and the spread of such materials can impact public health. Industrial, forest and agricultural fires and oil burning will also increase greenhouse gas emissions and degrade the ecosystem, as has occurred with development in Ukraine. LOAC prohibits direct attacks on dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, even if those objectives are military objectives, because of the direct and long-term impact to civilians and the natural environment.^{Footnote 60}

Population

Understanding the urban population—its composition, size and location—assists in operational planning to mitigate the effects of an attack and to defend against attacks. Knowing the race, religion, national origin, tribe, clan, economic or social class, education level, age, gender, occupation, and other significant social demographics of an urban population, as well as urban societies’ sources of power and influence (both formal and informal), enhances understanding of the population. Knowing civilians’ perceptions and intentions with regard to their safety and security, including what they perceive as threats and how they will live and move during a battle, enables commanders to better understand the human environment. Commanders need to understand how civilians contribute to adversarial efforts^{Footnote 61}  but do not meet the legal definition of direct participation in hostilities (DPH)^{Footnote 62}  or how adversaries may misuse civilians as human shields.^{Footnote 63}  Such broad understanding will also inform how security forces can communicate effectively with civilians in order to protect them during an attack and from the effects of an attack and enable efforts to shield or safely evacuate civilians from areas of combat. 

Fighting in urban areas often results in mass displacement,^{Footnote 64}  permanently changing the landscape and social fabric of many towns and cities across the world. Civilians are often left with no choice but to flee, and they often do so in great danger as they may be targeted, caught in the crossfire, mistreated by parties to armed conflict, and separated from their family members. Once the fighting is over, contamination from UXO, as well as a lack of essential services, prevent many displaced people from returning, often for years.^{Footnote 65} 

But not all civilians leave. Some are unable to do so due to age, disability or health conditions or do not have resources for transportation. Some do not want to leave their home, or they are afraid of undertaking a journey that is unsafe due to kinetic operations, or are concerned about the uncertainties of living in a refugee camp or in a new environment where basic services are unavailable. When kinetic operations begin, some civilians may move from their home temporarily to any building to seek shelter. Military commanders—both attackers and defenders—are required by LOAC to protect civilians during an attack and from the effects of attacks. Attackers must provide effective advanced warnings to allow civilians to voluntarily leave safely, but it is likely that some or many civilians will remain. Therefore, attackers operating in urban areas should assume the presence of civilians in buildings and adhere to the rules on distinction and proportionality in targeting processes. Humanitarian pauses by parties to the conflict to allow civilians who leave voluntarily to do so safely, as were implemented in the besieged city of Mariupol, should be considered.^{Footnote 66} 

Infrastructure

Urban infrastructure is designed to support a city’s inhabitants and includes interconnected systems such as commerce, culture, communications and information, administration, sanitation, water, electricity, hospitals, airfields, roads, bridges, subways, ports, trains, and transit corridors for goods and services. Urban warfare also creates food insecurity by disrupting the supply chains and markets that urban dwellers depend on to survive. 

Disrupting or degrading power infrastructure relied upon by an adversary can be militarily advantageous, but it is lawful only if such operations are judged to be compliant with LOAC rules on precautions in attack.^{Footnote 67}  However, the damage and destruction of services—sanitation, water, electricity and medical—that are essential for the survival of the population is detrimental to the civilian population, as seen in Gaza, Ukraine and Syria.^{Footnote 68}  Cuts to these basic services are aggravated when cities are besieged, when impartial humanitarian organizations are denied access to the civilian population^{Footnote 69}  or when urban conflicts become protracted as technical experts needed to restore and maintain infrastructure are killed or injured or leave for safety. Often the services require consumables (fuel, chlorine, medicine) whose availability is limited by the fighting. This can have a progressive and often irreversible impact on the functioning of critical infrastructure. 

Planners must know the locations of these structures, their condition and the likely weapons’ effects on them, including by consulting with urban engineers and experts, to enable a commander to determine appropriate courses of action that are LOAC-compliant. This might include placing elements of the infrastructure on a “No-Strike List.” Parties to conflict can also help prevent food insecurity by protecting civilian structures such as markets, warehouses, shops and water installations from attack and by ensuring the continued functioning of food logistics and markets.

Requirements to protect, restore and maintain essential services also require significant resources and personnel. These must be factored into planning to meet the urgent needs of the population and to allow the return of displaced people, in order to enable the conditions for transition toward civilian authorities, improved civil–military relations and overall operational effectiveness. 

Cyber, Artificial Intelligence and Information Warfare

In urban areas, the interconnectedness of networks and supporting infrastructure creates challenges when both state and non-state actors pursue military aims using technology. Urban areas are highly dependent on communication infrastructure, and any disruption may cause major disturbances to the normal functioning of the city. Cyberspace is predominantly used for civilian purposes, but civilian and military networks may be interconnected. Military networks may rely on civilian cyber infrastructure, such as fibre-optic cables; satellites; routers or nodes; as well as sensor networks, and, arguably, military use can turn the infrastructure into a military objective. But attacks must respect the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules of proportionality, and precautions in attack. Thus, in applying these rules, the interconnected nature of cyberspace and the risk of widespread incidental civilian harm must be considered.

For example, sophisticated cyberattacks can disrupt the provision of services essential to the civilian population, including healthcare, electrical, energy and water supply systems. The destruction of fibre-optic cables, wireless networks, data centres or sensor networks can have a sizeable impact on the city and neighbouring countries. As such, the weaponization of and targeting within the cyber domain pose a high risk to civilian populations that are reliant on such infrastructure when they also qualify as military objectives.^{Footnote 70}  

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are also being integrated into military capabilities, which would lead to a degree of operational autonomy but would introduce new risks of civilian harm if used for selecting and engaging targets.^{Footnote 71}  Future military intelligence gathering will draw from not only drone sensor feeds, high-altitude platforms and satellites but also social media, text messages and AI classifications to inform awareness. As data sources expand, risks to civilians can increase due to the limitations of technology, such as unpredictability, bias in AI algorithms,^{Footnote 72}  and demands of keeping algorithms up to date in a changing environment. Leveraging these capabilities in armed conflict need to be compliant with LOAC and ethics frameworks.^{Footnote 73} 

Technology also increases the risk of armed actors accessing data to identify, target or influence the civilian population through the manipulation of information.^{Footnote 74}  Information warfare—which includes disinformation (the spreading of false information with intent to deceive) or misinformation (the spreading of false information without specific intent to deceive)—can be used by armed actors and have negative consequences for civilians.^{Footnote 75}  While information warfare is as old as warfare itself, advancements in technology can influence opinions and behaviour on a larger scale than ever before. For example, fake information produced by AI-enabled systems through text, audio, photos and video is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from real information.^{Footnote 76}  

False content can be circulated widely on social media, inflaming ethnic tensions and violence between communities, as seen in Myanmar with attacks on Rohingya Muslims.^{Footnote 77}  As a result, civilians may be subjected to ill treatment, arrest, discrimination, denial of access to essential services, or attacks on their person or property. Disinformation has also resulted in endangering aid workers and can disrupt access to critical services during armed conflict, as experienced in Syria with attacks on Syrian Civil Defence (the White Helmets), which operates in opposition-controlled Syria.^{Footnote 78}  In current armed conflicts, private citizens have also been deputized to be “electronic armies,” “troll farms” or “web brigades” and are promoting disinformation.^{Footnote 79}  This can reinforce confirmation bias and accelerate the sharing of specious reports that can impact the quality of verifiable intelligence collection for commanders planning an attack or defending a city.^{Footnote 80} 

Training

Urban operations are resource-intensive, requiring significant logistical support, personnel, medical evacuation locations and resources for both civilians and military and sufficient coordination for facilitating humanitarian access to the civilian population. Specialized skills, experience and training are needed for urban operations, and training is hindered when it is not possible to model dense urban areas with appropriate human behaviour, infrastructure and technology. Training in urban warfare typically focuses on room clearing and entry breaching and is generally conducted in training centres lacking a realistic and representative population. Moreover, training typically happens at the company level or below and is infrequent. Staff training, which is often limited to case studies or tabletop exercises, occurs without the input of external civilian and humanitarian agencies.^{Footnote 81} 

Munitions

According to urban war experts, the primary methods of attacking an urban enemy fortification are to either destroy it or prepare the building with explosive munitions and then send infantry to enter and clear the entire building, if needed.^{Footnote 82}  Many armed actors rely on explosive weapons with wide area effects, such as large-radius bombs, unguided artillery and mortars, IEDs, and multi-launch rocket systems, to accomplish this objective. Those weapons, however, are ill adapted for use in populated areas, as they have wide area effects due to large blast and fragmentation radius and to the lack of accuracy of the delivery systems, or when the weapon system is designed to deliver multiple munitions over a wide area. When used in urban areas where military objects and civilians and civilian objects are in closer proximity, such weapons cause injury and death among civilians and damage to civilian objects on a dramatic scale.^{Footnote 83} 

In response to the humanitarian toll when such weapons are used, 83 states, including Canada, met in Dublin in November 2022 to endorse the Political Declaration to Limit Humanitarian Suffering from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.^{Footnote 84}  States are committing to strengthen adherence to IHL, enact new policies to restrict/refrain from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas “when use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects,” improve training, undertake battle damage assessments and civilian harm tracking mechanisms, and improve victim assistance programs.

Precision guided weapons can reduce civilian harm and have been used in recent urban wars, but stockpiles may be depleted quickly. In addition, when these weapons are deployed against a determined adversary using the cover offered by the urban terrain, their effectiveness can be undermined.^{Footnote 85}  Precision guided kits, which cost less and can be attached to unguided bombs to improve accuracy, have been used most recently in Ukraine. However, in a contested environment, the GPS of some munitions can be jammed, undermining precision, as has also been done in Ukraine.^{Footnote 86}  Thus, in urban warfare, constant innovation is needed to adapt and use appropriate munitions that can be effective against the military objective, remain LOAC compliant and minimize civilian harm.

The Way Forward

Militaries should better prepare their forces for the challenges of urban warfare in order to mitigate the problem of civilian harm. Forces need to understand not only the environment in which they are fighting but also how to operate in it while minimizing civilian harm, as required by law and policy. Being prepared for urban war requires the use of tools, policies, practices, munitions and training that are all contextualized for the urban environment and that sufficiently take into account risk to civilians and civilian objects. Urban operations involve combined arms fighting, which includes infantry, armoured forces, direct-fire weapon systems, artillery and indirect fires, snipers, cyber, and airstrikes to support ground forces. It also combines special forces, intelligence, civil affairs and engineers. In this context, civilian harm mitigation considerations must be integrated into all warfighting functions, in addition to their critical enablers. 

In large-scale combat operations (LSCO),^{Footnote 87}  which are conceptualized as state versus state conflict with a modern, peer or near-peer adversary, the need to innovate on civilian harm mitigation tools and adapt is critical. Excessive collateral harm impacts domestic and world opinion and also affects ongoing operations, hindering consolidation of gains and transition to stability operations. In today’s battlefield, commanders must contend with the challenges of a connected information environment in which all armed actors can use information to amplify divisions and affect strategic outcomes.^{Footnote 88}  Civilian harm mitigation tools are not just for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations where the support of the local population is a strategic goal; they are mandatory in LSCOs, given the operational challenges. The 2022 US Army and U.S. Marine Corps Urban Operations doctrine states, “long-term negative impacts of collateral damage in a populated area can overshadow any short-term positive effects on the enemy. Leaders must constantly assess the impacts of their actions and weigh the risks against the potential gains.”^{Footnote 89}  

First, civilian protection must be integrated into the commander’s intent for each mission and into their operational planning. Second, militaries must focus on comprehensive analysis of the civilian environment in the intelligence preparation phase of operations that involve population, critical infrastructure, and terrain considerations. Third, planners must have an understanding of baseline resiliencies in an urban environment, such as the capacities of communities; government institutions; critical infrastructure and systems; and the economy to withstand the shock of an outbreak of hostilities. Fourth, militaries must update doctrine and training to reflect the operational and tactical challenges of urban operations with regard to the presence of and risk to civilians. Fifth, militaries must adapt targeting practices to the urban environment and prioritize learning and adaptation. Sixth, militaries must train partner forces on best practices (and also learn from them) regarding civilian harm mitigation. 

Protection of Civilians in Commander’s Intent

From a strategic point of view, militaries should ensure that the protection of civilians is included in the commander’s objectives for each mission and is integrated into their operational plans. This was done by ISAF in Afghanistan from 2009 onward and by AMISOM in 2011, and both missions achieved a reduction in civilian harm after those changes in ROE, training and tactics took effect.^{Footnote 90}  In Iraq, PoC was a specific objective in the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) concept of operations, and the Prime Minister and religious leaders used public messages to reinforce the importance of civilian protection during military operations against ISIS. This resulted in good coordination between Iraqi forces and humanitarian organizations, but the broader strategic intent was not translated into doctrine, ROE, training or tactics on the ground.^{Footnote 91} 

Including PoC in the commander’s intent, if it is done properly, can set up the framework that minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects is not only a legal requirement and supported by policy but is also part of the commander’s direction. This would help to ensure its implementation in follow-on resources, training, tactics, tools, and coordination with external actors. Protecting civilian lives and objects is not a task solely for the Civil Affairs branch, which takes the lead on humanitarian access and stability operations. Rather, the protection of civilians must be integrated into planning, intelligence, operations, targeting and training, and it should be considered when determining what lessons can be learned from past missions. 

Understanding the Civilian Environment

A good understanding of the civilian environment is needed for future wars that will involve multiple domains and will include joint warfighting functions from land, air, maritime, space and cyber services.^{Footnote 92}  Civilians and civilian objects are a crucial dimension of urban war. Militaries, therefore, need to analyze civilian populations; civilian demographics; cyber effects on critical infrastructure; the proximity of civilians and civilian infrastructure to military objectives in determining weapons effects; and the courses of action that civilians are likely to take before, during and after military operations. Such analyses, including those for large-scale operations, would not only ensure greater fidelity to the LOAC and so fulfil legal obligations, but would also enable operational effectiveness, as population density and infrastructure in large-scale combat operations greatly determine a force’s ability to move and manoeuvre in a city. 

By better understanding civilian behaviour and patterns of life, the military can improve its information-gathering efforts in order to distinguish between civilian and military objectives for targeting purposes, especially in dynamic targeting. Such analysis can also enable the coordination of humanitarian assistance to facilitate the movement of civilians and provide food, water, shelter and medicine, even if siege-like conditions develop.^{Footnote 93}   

Although intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets can contribute significantly to understanding the operational environment, a modern peer or near-peer competitor could potentially hack intelligence systems, jam signals, engage in cyberattacks, and conduct superior misinformation and disinformation operations. In such a scenario, where airspace would likely be denied, degraded and disrupted, analog systems and non-technological tools, including human intelligence and open-source intelligence, will be essential to developing a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment to support collateral damage estimation (CDE) methodologies. There will be resource challenges in leveraging both ISR and human intelligence; thus, a commander’s intent to mitigate civilian harm can enable the prioritization of such resources.

Given the proximity of civilians and military targets in urban warfare, analysis of the environment should integrate terrain effects, the threat capabilities of the adversary, and the presence of the population. For example, in an urban environment where civilians are present, any targeting of ammunition storage facilities should include an analysis of the effects of a strike on the surrounding area, which can include electric power stations or empty buildings where displaced persons may be seeking shelter. As militaries incorporate AI-enabled technologies, creating trusted communication systems to report and update information from non-military personnel on the ground to better understand the civilian environment and integrate it into military systems should be explored.^{Footnote 94}  In choice of weapons, the weaponeering process should be tailored to the urban terrain (for example, building wall thickness, effects on underground sewage systems) to inform ways to adjust the type, fuze and size of ordnance and limit wide area effects to minimize civilian harm.

In large-scale combat operations, the emphasis on speed means that militaries will need to do more to adapt targeting tools and weapons to avoid repeating past mistakes that have resulted in civilian harm.^{Footnote 95}  Militaries can examine past operations to inform future assessments so as to learn from mistakes that were not adequately anticipated or mitigated and thus inform an assessment of what effects are “reasonably foreseeable.” What is reasonably foreseeable will vary depending on the circumstances of the attack, the target and the operational environment, including learning from past operations. Training exercises must include enough of the civilian environment dimension to make it possible to determine courses of action, inform learning, and identify resources and tactics.

Understanding Baseline Preparedness to Assist Civilian Population

Military planners should undertake a deep assessment of how local and national governments, in the event of a crisis, have plans and capacity to continue delivering and supporting essential government functions. The assessment should include baseline food and water, contingency plans for alternative supplies of food and water, cyber mitigation plans, early warning systems, mapping of healthcare and transport systems, medical supplies, personal protective gear / decontamination resources, restoration of capabilities for secure communications and critical infrastructure, ability to deal with mass casualties. and preparation for mass casualties and evacuation situations.

The following is not an exhaustive list, but preparedness should include baseline food, water and medicine, including personal protective gear / decontamination resources, and contingency plans for alternative supplies of food and water. It should also include training on  how to respond to mass casualties in the midst of combat or in the event of a disease outbreak; how to support humanitarian access and ensure food, water, trauma care and medical supplies for displaced persons, including during a siege; how to counter enemy tactics that use civilians as human shields through strategic communications aimed at delegitimizing human shields and/or tactical alternatives; how to protect critical infrastructure, including from cyberattacks; how to determine what conditions and resources will be needed to restore essential services and clear unexploded ordnance; how to establish safe routes for civilians who wish to leave an area of fighting; and how to assess what mechanisms will be effective in warning civilians of an incoming attack.^{Footnote 96} 

Doctrine and Training

Military doctrine and training need to be updated to focus on fighting not only in built-up areas where terrain is a key factor, but also in populated areas where civilians are a major consideration. Doctrine should articulate, from the strategic to the tactical level, the priority for protecting civilians across the range of operations, including large-scale combat operations, where there are significant challenges when it comes to handling the movement, displacement and evacuation of large populations, as well as the possibility of mass casualties. 

Urban warfare training is pivotal to equip soldiers for the realities they will encounter, and it must include scenarios with civilians present to help soldiers better understand how civilians will behave during the fighting. Soldiers must be guided away from the assumption that civilians will leave the area of a conflict or that the majority will be evacuated out of an area in the lead-up to operations. Any future conflict with a peer will take place amid a large civilian population. Training should simulate the challenges of urban combat, which is decentralized and must be conducted with limited visibility and intermittent communications. Virtual reality tools, wargames, and scenario discussions between commanders, forces and civilian agencies are essential to prepare forces for the realities of war.^{Footnote 97} 

Targeting Practices and Learning Lessons

Militaries must strictly apply positive target identification, timely pattern of life analysis, and effective warnings in order to reduce risk to civilians. As line-of-sight observations are degraded in urban areas, precision munitions, if available, can reduce circular error probability and improve accuracy compared to indirect munitions, but they do not remove all the dangers in urban areas. Mitigation measures such as comprehensive understanding of the civilian environment to engage military objectives and manipulating technical features of the explosive weapons (including warhead, fuze and calibre, as well as direction and angle) are essential. Where available, non-lethal weapons and low-collateral-damage munitions should also be considered to reduce the blast-affected area.^{Footnote 98}  CDE procedures should be supported with necessary subject matter experts, such as engineers or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear specialists, as well as with  access to current data sets to assess the second- and third-order effects that CDE methodology cannot account for. For dynamic targeting, with compressed time to engage the adversary, CDE should be adapted, or new tools should be leveraged to improve operator awareness of civilian movement and civilian objects.

If uncrewed aerial vehicles and loitering munitions are to be used, they must comply with LOAC and with human verification (“human in the loop”). This could include the use of full-motion video and human intelligence sources to observe the presence and movement of civilians and obtain a sufficient pattern of life analysis to minimize civilian harm.^{Footnote 99} 

Matching pre- and post-strike assessments and tracking all incidents of civilian harm are also essential in order to consider the correlation between civilian harm and the means and methods of warfare and to learn lessons and incorporate them into training, planning, policies and practices.^{Footnote 100}  As operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Ukraine and Yemen have shown, battle damage assessments done primarily via ISR or remotely do not fully capture the impact on civilians and civilian objects.^{Footnote 101}  Instead, protocols to receive and analyze information from international or local organizations on the ground, as well as media or open-source reporting is a good practice to enhance learning in order to improve military effectiveness and mitigate civilian harm.^{Footnote 102} 

Share with Partner Forces

Future wars with a peer or near-peer enemy are likely to be fought with partner forces or in support of proxy forces. Canada and its allies and partners should therefore be politically and operationally aligned in the effort to protect civilians through compatible doctrine, policies, training and ROE.^{Footnote 103}  Partners should integrate their strategies and tactics and use appropriate munitions and scenario-based training in order to mitigate and respond to civilian harm during military operations. In addition, militaries should assess the benefits and risks of supporting a partner, including what the potential effects will be on the civilian population. It should also assess whether the partner has adequately resourced capabilities for developing and implementing mitigation plans and programs.^{Footnote 104}  

Conclusion

Fighting in urban areas is the present and the future. For military forces, it is the most challenging type of operation, complicated due to the proximity of civilians and military objectives in terms of command and control, resources, training, weapons and equipment design. For civilians, it is the most dangerous form of warfare in terms of the scale of civilian harm from death and injury, infrastructure, and its impact on livelihoods and education. While the past can inform lessons that need to be integrated to avoid mistakes, militaries must adapt to the new realities of warfare. Integrating a civilian harm mitigation approach in urban war planning, policies, training, tactics and weapons usage is essential for militaries to be in compliance with LOAC and enable better strategic outcomes. 

About the Author

Sahr Muhammedally is an expert on the protection of civilians and international humanitarian and human rights law, and has advised and trained militaries on civilian harm mitigation. She has worked at various international organizations and was the Middle East and North Africa Director at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). She is a non-resident Fellow and Instructor at the U.S. Army 40th Infantry Division, Urban Warfare Center. 

This article first appeared in the October, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (21-1).