Fighting in the Concrete Jungle - Understanding the Challenges of Urban Warfare
by Second Lieutenant Benjamin Phocas
A recoilless rifle round streaks across a ruined street, burrowing into the side armour of a BTR-80 before detonating in a fireball.Footnote 1 A BTR-4 rounds a corner at top speed, churning bullets through a squad of infantry caught in the open, the carnage quickly becoming obscured by smoke and dust kicked up from the rubble.Footnote 2 Soldiers bound one at a time down a stairwell as rounds are impacting in the wall just over their heads.Footnote 3 These are not scenes from a movie. They are urban combat footage from Ukraine. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, as well as recent battles in cities across the world such as Mosul, Marawi and Shusha, underscore the growing need for military forces to grasp the challenges of urban warfare.
Understanding urban warfare is becoming increasingly important because cities are centres of political, economic, logistical, environmental, military and social power.Footnote 4 Also, there are intertwined trends that demonstrate the growing relevance of urban warfare. First, there is an ongoing global shift towards urbanization, which emphasizes the centrality of ever-growing cities. With the majority of the world’s population now living in urban centres and millions more flocking to them every year, conflict too will continue to gravitate to the urban environment.Footnote 5 For instance, as of 2022 Taiwan’s population was roughly 80% urbanized.Footnote 6 That number has only increased since then. As tensions rise over the contested territorial claims, a quick look at a satellite image reveals the densely populated urban areas of Taiwan. Any major conflict will likely be fought in the streets as the various actors vie for political control, seated in the heart of Taipei.Footnote 7 This is just one example in a world of rapidly urbanizing areas and regions under threat of conflict. Second, and as argued by Anthony King, the prevalence of urban warfare is increasing due to the notably reduced sizes of contemporary land forces in comparison to historical armies.Footnote 8 As cities expand, armies have become smaller, lethality has increased and precision fires have become more effective, so the fight is shifting from large swaths of rural land to the urban streets.Footnote 9 Third, technological advancements make it favourable for the weaker enemy to operate in urban environments because of the defensive advantage.Footnote 10
The prospect of having to engage in high-intensity conflict in such an environment is grim. However, if victory over the enemy is to be achieved, there is no alternative path. Urban warfare remains a demanding form of warfare that cannot be avoided or subordinated and requires a direct and resolute approach. Western armed forces are relatively inexperienced in urban operations with regard to higher operational planning, tactics and sustainment, and potential future opponents may exploit this disparity and lack of familiarity.
In the present context, it is difficult to predict how successful NATO forces would be in an urban battlefield, even if they are able to dominate in terms of professional soldiery, technology and logistics. There is a tactical, operational and strategic knowledge gap in the armed forces when their current tactics are compared to the tactics, techniques and procedures required to operate effectively in the urban environment. Major training centres do not reflect the current operating urban environment; they still mirror the Western European and Middle Eastern countryside that NATO forces have operated in for the past decades.
The joint allied force must grasp the nuances of urban warfare to bridge the existing knowledge and training gap between large-scale combat operations and the urban battlefield. By comprehending the idiosyncrasies of urban warfare, the forces can be better prepared to engage the enemy during urban operations. Within the complex landscape of contemporary warfare, urban warfare remains relatively less well understood, and at times even subject to misunderstanding. This article aims to delve into the distinctive and demanding challenges posed by urban warfare, not only highlighting the factors that set it apart from other forms of conflict, but also presenting an understanding of the challenges faced by modern militaries.
The Urban Environment
Arguably, urban warfare is vastly different from any other form of warfare because the urban environment has been built and developed for decades, even centuries, to accommodate human life and even conflict. This results in a level of complexity that is unparalleled in other operating environments.Footnote 11 The intricacies of an urban setting create an extremely complicated condition set for soldiers and planners, with an environment that both passively and actively supports and enables both the defender and the attacker, while simultaneously degrading every combined arms element.
The word “urban” is a single catch-all term ascribed to a vast multitude of different areas. A side-by-side comparison of the slums of Mumbai and the stately boulevards of West London would yield few similarities at first glance. Cities exist on a spectrum varying from highly developed cities, such as London and Tokyo, which contain advanced, highly interconnected systems that keep what David Kilcullen calls “the organism” running.Footnote 12 These cities are extremely “healthy,” with high-functioning infrastructure and systems of flow. On the opposite end of the spectrum are “feral cities.”Footnote 13 These types of cities exist without any form of governmental control and in a state of lawlessness where non-state actors hold informal authority over the entire population or parts of it. The following paragraphs explain some of the elements that must be considered in order to understand the urban environment:
Levels – An urban environment has four physical levels: the airspace, the surface, the super-surface and the subsurface (subterranean).Footnote 14 The surface level is the easiest to identify, as it encompasses the street-level areas of a city. The term “super-surface” refers to structures that extend above the surface level, ranging from buildings to elevated roadways, mass transit, power lines, water towers and telecommunication structures. In modern cities, buildings include both residential structures and towering skyscrapers that contribute to the iconic skylines we associate with modern urban landscapes. Below the super-surface structure lies the subsurface, comprising tunnels for vehicles and pedestrians, subways, maintenance tunnels, cellars, storage areas, underground clubs and sewers. The vast subterranean networks are often poorly mapped beyond the subways and sewers, particularly in historical cities with tunnels dating back centuries.Footnote 15 Interestingly, despite some major differences, vastly different cities share some similarities, particularly in terms of the levels of urban terrain.
Flows – Within the mentioned four levels, there are flows.Footnote 16 Money and commerce flow in and out of the city, food comes in, waste goes out, and humans move between homes, workplaces, grocery stores and leisure activities. These flows occur along a network of major and minor lines of communication. Often, a few major locations bear the brunt of this traffic. Certain single bridges or intersections can become crucially important locations by virtue of their location in relation to the flows.
City Regions – Cities can be further subdivided into sectors, quarters, precincts, boroughs, neighbourhoods and districts. These diverse areas can be characterized by dramatically different physical buildings, infrastructure, demographics, and even economies and governments. Residential areas typically consist of diverse structures – including apartments or single-family homes – housing large populations, especially at night. In contrast, commercial areas experience high levels of human activity and traffic during the business day with minimal occupancy at night. Industrial areas are generally devoid of residential life but contain infrastructure critical for the sustenance of the city.
Within these sectors, more complicated characteristics emerge and are shaped by the demographics of the residents. In different neighbourhoods, particularly where shift work is common, a one-bedroom apartment may accommodate up to twelve people, and most sleep in the middle of the day. In places like New York City’s Chinatown, characterized by common shift work and numerous flammable buildings dating back to the 1890s, a single fire incident can result in disproportionately high casualties.Footnote 17 Meanwhile, financial districts can be built with more modern, flame-resistant materials, towering hundreds of feet into the sky. The vastly diverse landscapes within the city introduce an additional layer of complexity to the already intricate network of civil services, infrastructure and life-sustaining functions.
The city region may also be influenced by factors such as quality of governance and security, as well as social order. For instance, in some cities, informal power structures often extend beyond official government channels.Footnote 18 These informal power structures may act as shadow governments and conflict directly with the legal authorities. Local gangs and organized crime may control certain areas and even attack anyone who enters their “turf” without permission. Conversely, these same informal actors may provide stability in certain neighbourhoods without a formal government presence, whether for personal interest or in support of a combatant force. Informal power structures can have an immense effect—whether positive or negative—on the sentiment of residents towards occupying forces. Such factors naturally affect the public sentiments and overall dynamics of an area or region, thus shaping the operating environment.
City location – Cities develop in areas that are easily accessible for trade, primarily along major lines of communication.Footnote 19 Major waterways in particular have historically been the site of city development.Footnote 20 As global trade has increased and ports have become ever greater sources of economic wealth, more and more cities have developed in what is known as the littoral zone, the coastal areas along lakes, rivers and oceans.Footnote 21 This is important for two reasons. First, many cities rely primarily on bodies of water for their economies.Footnote 22 Second, some cities exist in extremely environmentally precarious locations.Footnote 23 Flood plains, low ground, swamps and peninsulas are all at risk of flooding in the event of hurricanes, monsoons or tropical storms. Particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, many cities sit on the verge of destruction on dangerously low ground such as Mauritius and the Solomon Islands. Military planners need to take into account not just the potential for high-intensity conflicts in cities, but also the increasing likelihood of being involved in humanitarian missions in densely populated urban areas impacted by flooding.
Although this article focuses on high-intensity conflict, it is important for planners to remember that cities and urban environment may require military involvement in various types of operations.
Physical Terrain
The urban terrain is more than just hills, ridges and valleys. It encompasses vast cityscapes of buildings, tunnels, streets and bridges constructed from millions of tons of concrete, wood and steel. From the smallest hovel in the grimiest slum to the shiniest skyscraper on the hill, these structures limit manoeuvre, create dead space, and provide cover and concealment. Windows provide endless firing positions for snipers, machine gunners and anti-tank teams. Even if these battle positions can be identified, modern building materials drastically reduce the effects of direct fire systems, shielding the enemy from harm. Buildings can be further altered to enable defenders. For instance, in Mosul, ISIS fighters intentionally rubbled buildings to turn basements into impenetrable bunkers and to block roads.Footnote 24 On the other hand, buildings can also fix the defenders’ orientation and restrict their line of sight. Context is important in such situations.
Movement and Manoeuvre – One of the formidable challenges faced by military forces in an urban battlefield is the restricted freedom of movement and manoeuvre. In urban centres there are warrens of roads, some in neat orderly rows, others in a chaotic scribble across the map. These roads are bounded on both sides by buildings, rivers or other obstacles and naturally canalize and direct the flow of human traffic. This creates natural kill zones for any mounted and dismounted infantry and armour elements attempting to manoeuvre through the area. These narrow roads also serve to compartmentalize forces, creating physical barriers between adjacent units, preventing them from supporting or sometimes even communicating with each other. Individual units can easily become isolated, creating the dangerous potential of defeat in detail as individual elements are annihilated by a well-camouflaged enemy lurking in the shadows of buildings. This compartmentalization happens at multiple echelons, from battalion down to team level, making the need for the strategic corporal ever more pressing.Footnote 25 Platoon and section leaders must be able to execute complex missions in alignment with the commander’s intent and the broader strategic mission, without the ability to communicate with higher commands.Footnote 26
Armour and infantry have a symbiotic relationship in the urban environment for mutual protection and overwatch, but urban centres become increasingly complicated for armoured force operations. For instance, without adequate support from the infantry, artillery and engineers, armoured forces are extremely vulnerable in this environment because buildings provide perfect overhead positions for anti-tank teams to target the thin top armour of vehicles. Vehicles such as the LAV 6.0 (the Canadian version of the US Army’s Stryker) lack the firepower to effectively suppress and destroy hardened targets and lack the armour to stop anti-tank guided missiles, rockets and even bullets larger than 14.5 mm.Footnote 27 This implies that combined arms manoeuvre will have to rely primarily on tanks, which require a heavier logistical train and lack organic dismounts to support them.
In an urban battlefield, vehicles and dismounted infantry rely on engineers to conduct mobility and counter-mobility operations to enable their manoeuvre. Some of the tasks include replacing destroyed bridges with temporary ones, breaching and clearing minefields and improvised explosive devices (IED), and employing bulldozers to breach or clear rubble, opening lines of communication. This puts combat engineers at the forefront, significantly increasing the risk to these valuable and limited units. Behind the front lines, construction engineer units are tasked to help rebuild destroyed infrastructure, particularly lines of communication, including roads and bridges that have been damaged, rubbled or entirely destroyed.
Fires – The challenges of modern cities, which are continually expanding vertically, pose issues for the supporting components of a combined arms force. Cities with tall buildings in a grid layout create long urban canyons. Often, these canyons are too steep to allow cannon and rocket artillery with shallow trajectories to accurately target entities on the street without risking collateral damage to buildings along the path of the projectile.Footnote 28 This forces manoeuvre elements to rely primarily on high-angle indirect fire systems such as mortars or expensive precision-guided munitions such as the “Excalibur” round that can fire over buildings into narrow streets without hitting a structure.Footnote 29 The urban terrain also greatly degrades close air support capabilities. Between tall buildings, the air corridors for close support aircraft are narrow, which creates aerial kill zones for well-placed shoulder-fired anti-air weapons. Low-flying rotary wing assets must navigate urban canyons festooned with cables, wires and other civilian detritus that can easily down a helicopter. Engagement ranges in urban warfare are historically within 50 metres, leaving little room for an Apache gunship helicopter or an 81mm mortar round to be added to the mix.Footnote 30 Even the visibility of ground forces is significantly limited by buildings, creating an extreme risk for fratricide and collateral damage.
Physical Structures – The physical structures within urban environments and particularly buildings exhibit a wide range. Some are built with the idea of luxury and style characterized by soaring glass windows that become hails of flying shrapnel at the first explosion within five blocks. Other buildings include sturdy municipal and financial centres, built with concrete and steel. Notably, even shoddy brickwork and planks can divert, splinter or entirely stop direct fire weapons systems. Newer, more modern buildings are equipped with advanced security measures designed to defend against criminals, which can become dangerous obstacles or helpful measures in an urban fight. These features may include reinforced metal doors and walls, advanced camera systems, screens and barriers in many buildings. For a competent defender, these can easily be incorporated into the defence of a building. Given their internal security, such buildings can become strongpoints for a coordinated defence-in-depth. Multiple strategically picked hard targets, bristling with firepower and full of obstacles, can halt an attacker in their tracks. For instance, during the battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942–02 February 1943) Soviet soldiers held out for more than 60 days within a single strongpointed building.Footnote 31 Internal mouseholes can be carved through walls, facilitating easy movement from room to room, and subterranean tunnels allow for the storage of weapons and ammunition caches, effective resupply and the rotation of exhausted soldiers. The Islamic State used both these tactics extensively during the Battle of Mosul in Iraq (16 October 2016–20 July 2017), relying on tunnels carved between basements to manoeuvre under entire city blocks without being spotted by coalition airborne surveillance systems.Footnote 32 In the Gaza Strip, Hamas has utilized the subterranean tunnel network for similar purposes.
Subsurface (Subterranean) – The subterranean aspect of urban warfare is an entirely separate head of the hydra worthy of its own books and articles. In fact, the U.S. Army has dedicated a separate doctrinal publication to the subject.Footnote 33 Subterranean operations are extremely complex and dangerous. Coordination by radio-frequency communications becomes nearly impossible. Fights are condensed in time and space into the confines of pitch-dark hallways that can quickly fill with toxic gas and overpressure against which modern gas masks offer no protection.Footnote 34 Underground networks provide vast protected lines of communication that stretch well beyond the limits of cities and connect individual buildings to each other. Tunnels have long been used as a means of subverting prying eyes. The stories of American tunnel rats in the Vietnam War (1959–1975) underline the horrors of subterranean warfare, but on a much smaller scale than that of the violence that takes place in the depths of far more complex modern subterranean networks. With modern uncrewed aerial systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, the importance of tunnels expands as enemies try to dodge the NATO intelligence apparatus. With the right knowledge of tunnels, a defender can appear in the exact place where an attacker hoped they would not. It is simply a matter of time and preparation, making it increasingly imperative for Western forces to think like the enemy and navigate the challenges accordingly.
Communication – At all levels—the surface, subsurface and super-surface—radio frequency communications are degraded in an urban setting. The tons of concrete and steel act as physical barriers for line of sight and satellite communications. Cities are filled with transmitters, receivers and various types of emission-based electronic devices. This will clutter airwaves, creating spoof signals, jamming and other types of issues. Buildings made of reinforced concrete act as Faraday cages, inhibiting radio communications inside them. With the addition of modern electronic warfare systems, radio communications are further jammed, tracked and degraded.Footnote 35 Urban canyons can prevent units from using their tactical communication systems to connect with their comrades a few blocks away.Footnote 36 The situation is further confounded by electromagnetic clutter.Footnote 37 The confluence of these challenges highlights the need for mission command, empowering junior leaders to take the initiative within the framework of the commander’s intent and minimizing the need to be in constant communication with the chain of command and seek regular guidance.
Logistics – High-intensity conflict within a city inevitably leads to the destruction of critical infrastructure, thus impacting logistics. The impact is especially profound in highly developed urban centres where millions rely on a limited number of central water treatment facilities to keep them hydrated, and on external supply routes for sustenance given the lack of food production within the city. In a conflict, artillery, missiles and even direct fire munitions can damage and destroy critical infrastructure very quickly. Modern munitions can crater main supply routes and sever subterranean water pipes, leaving people without access to food and clean water. The urban environment is punishing for soldiers too. Logistical convoys are forced to try to navigate through cities with damaged or blocked roadways. Supplies will frequently have to be transported manually to the forward line of troops using personnel alone, who must haul heavy boxes of ammunition, food and water, potentially for kilometres, up into tall buildings or down into subterranean spaces. Needless to say, such activities take an extreme toll on soldiers’ physical endurance. Urban combat is expected to consume four times more ammunition and two-and-a-half times more rations and water than rural combat.Footnote 38
By the same token, the three-to-six times more casualties expected to be sustained in urban combat cannot be evacuated by ambulance. They need to be carried out on stretchers, again placing the burden on exhausted muscles and forcing combat medics to extend their care long past the traditional golden hour.Footnote 39 With the dangers of human-portable air-defence systems, narrow flight corridors, and minimal room to land, resupply, and conduct medical evacuations, one cannot rely heavily on helicopters either. Casualties that occur in the underground depths or on high floors of a building must first be moved to street level, while the precious time needed to save their lives is dwindling. Urban terrain drastically increases the risk of casualties succumbing to their wounds even before reaching an ambulance, let alone a forward surgical unit.
In addition, lines of communication between forward lines and division, brigade and battalion sustainment and command echelons will need to be maintained and secured by military police (MP) units. Camps for enemy prisoners of war and internally displaced people will need to be established, and the processing of massive numbers of civilians can potentially overwhelm individual MP units attached to manoeuvre brigades.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) – Urban operations may face subtle yet perilous CBRN threats with lethal consequences. Highly developed cities generally have stable waste disposal systems to prevent the buildup of human waste. Underdeveloped and feral cities often lack them entirely. In the event of high-intensity conflict, existing waste disposal systems are disrupted. Consequently, human waste begins to accumulate in greater quantities as fighting continues.Footnote 40 Trash, bodily fluids and decomposing corpses host dangerous pathogens that can have drastic impacts on combat power. Mortuary affairs units tasked with the disposal of the dead are expected to be overwhelmed by the volume, including many bodies trapped or buried under rubble or in deep fighting positions. There is no provision for the mass cleanup of human waste other than individual-level waste bags which will be discarded and left in the city. Moving up a level, cities with manufacturing and commercial areas tend to host dangerous industrial chemicals. Any leak of these chemicals, by errant fire or deliberate action, can kill or maim anyone who encounters them. Similarly, any radiological or nuclear-powered facility, such as the Zaporizhia Nuclear Plant in Ukraine, is an extremely high-value target that will pose unimaginable risks.Footnote 41
Human Terrain
The human terrain of a city makes urban warfare increasingly daunting and demanding. Cities are populated by citizens, a term with a Latin root, “civitas,” which means “city.”Footnote 42 A city exists fundamentally for the people who occupy it, the thousands to millions of people that make up the teeming urban area where they live and work daily. In the event of a high-intensity conflict in a city, the people do not magically disappear as in the video game “Call of Duty.”Footnote 43
Before initiating operations, military forces must make significant efforts to evacuate civilian populations. Traditionally, many people choose to flee—flooding lines of communication and creating gridlock traffic across the city—and roughly 10% or even more refuse to leave and instead remain in their homes or in designated or improvised bomb shelters.Footnote 44 As a result, any offensive operation must account for the massive risk of heavy civilian casualties. Fireplans, close air support and even house-to-house manoeuvre must always take civilian casualties into consideration, and tactics must be adjusted to protect non-combatants amid the lethal storm. In the event of high-intensity urban combat, civilians will unfortunately become casualties, regardless of the efforts made by forces to mitigate collateral damage. Strategists and planners must create proactive plans on how to deal with civilians before, during and after the urban battle.
Likewise, and as witnessed in Ukraine, the defenders too must divert precious resources towards the protection, evacuation and control of the civilian populace.Footnote 45 The Russo–Ukrainian War, the Syrian Civil War and the conflict in Gaza have shown the massive international impact refugees can have. A flood of refugees moving across international borders to escape conflict zones or a humanitarian crisis puts pressure on multiple nations and governments, creating more chaos, more instability and a further crisis for the international community.Footnote 46 For valid reasons, a refugee or humanitarian crisis garners international attention and prompts calls for action, particularly in neighbouring countries not already directly involved in the conflict.Footnote 47 This serves to raise the intensity of the conflict as more external resources become involved, spiralling the conflict into ever greater magnitude.
However, defenders fighting in their native cities are often afforded a unique opportunity: the mobilization of the civilian populace. For instance, in Ukraine the mobilization of civilians may not have provided a deep reserve of combat troops, but it released experienced soldiers from rear echelon duties. This enabled them to engage actively in the fight while newly recruited civilian volunteers assumed mundane tasks that had previously diverted combat-ready troops.Footnote 48 Popular support is a major factor of the human terrain. The effort to “win hearts and minds” is not limited to counter-insurgency, as the civilian population can still play a crucial role in high-intensity conflict.Footnote 49 Civilians may choose sides based on whom they view as the friendly force, whoever best represents their interests or whoever aligns with their political or ideological leanings. This support does not always manifest in the form of large groups of civilian volunteers taking to the streets in guerrilla action as depicted in movies. Their role can be as straightforward as warning a convoy about the presence of an IED on a road or sharing a video that is recording enemy troops in the area. Such acts of support can wreak havoc on an enemy force. To put it differently, whichever side wins the popular support has a distinct advantage in the vast sea of potential human intelligence.Footnote 50 In extreme cases, where the civilian population takes up arms as part of a popular resistance force, these irregular forces can act as auxiliaries, scouts or partner forces for their chosen side, adding a hybrid layer to the more conventional combat between conventional forces.
While the fight rages on, there will be constant surveillance and recording by civilians in the vicinity. Events in Ukraine confirm that online videos can have outsized impacts.Footnote 51 Soldiers on the ground in high-intensity urban conflict remain under the scrutiny of the entire world. Operational security is tested to the limit, and possibly defeated by counter-intelligence forces acting through the cyber domain.Footnote 52 Additionally, throughout the ongoing war in Ukraine, on-the-ground video footage has been used to stir sentiments, drive recruitment and aid shipments, and even used as evidence in war crimes trials.Footnote 53 How military forces at the lowest echelons conduct themselves can have a global impact, as well as extreme implications for strategic-level conflict, reinforcing the need for the strategic corporal.
From a certain perspective, it might seem that addressing the challenges of civilian refugees is not a responsibility directly relevant to manoeuvre forces. However, as cities experience mass exodus, the supporting branches may become overwhelmed trying to process and provide aid for potentially millions of people. Soldiers of all specialties will be required to conduct humanitarian missions of some variety, whether they involve the infantry units diverted to rescue and evacuate civilians from a combat zone, the military police processing and screening displaced people, medical units providing care to countless injured and ill, or logistics units transporting and distributing tons of humanitarian rations to prevent starvation for millions of displaced persons.
The heavy density of civilians in urban areas also drastically increases the risk of war crimes against civilians. Although most NATO forces are held to an extremely high standard of conduct in accordance with international humanitarian law, there is always the risk that a small group of individuals will take advantage of the situation.Footnote 54 Likewise, the enemy may not always have qualms about brutality towards the civilian population. Sexual assault, murder and torture are likely to occur, with the potential for genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. The continual uncovering of mass graves in occupied Ukraine is indicative of adversarial behaviour towards civilians.Footnote 55
Conclusion
The worldwide trend towards urbanization, technological progress, smaller land forces and the efficacy of precision firepower all point to the likelihood of future battles being predominantly urban in nature. The challenges and dangers associated with urban combat operations are extremely daunting and pose a formidable challenge for any military force, but especially for the Western militaries given their relatively limited experience on the urban battlefield. These shifts in warfare demand greater attention and proactive adaptation by the Canadian Armed Forces and its NATO allies. Because knowledge is the most powerful tool when navigating urban warfare, this article analyzed the complexities of the urban environment—with a particular focus on the physical and human terrain—and highlighted the unique demands it places on the soldiers, sailors and aviators of today and tomorrow. Beyond sheer violence of action, successful military endeavours in urban settings require strategic planning and execution led by knowledgeable, competent leaders. Ignorance of the arduous challenges on the urban battlefield puts the lives of our soldiers, sailors and aviators at risk— an unacceptable price for incompetence. For our militaries to navigate the complexities and win the next urban battle, the first steps must be to recognize the challenge, identify the gaps in current preparations and address them effectively.
About the Author
Second Lieutenant Ben Phocas graduated from the United States Military Academy, where he specialized in defense and strategic studies. He interned at the National Center for Urban Operations and was commissioned as an armour officer in May 2024.
This article first appeared in the October, 2024 edition of Canadian Army Journal (21-1).
Page details
- Date modified: