Short Bursts: Reflections from Latvia
I: Survival on the 21st Century Battlefield

by Rebecca Jensen, Ph.D

Editor’s Note:
The Canadian-led Multinational Battle Group in Latvia, Task Force Paladin (TF Paladin), includes forces from ten sending nations, as well as 438 members of the Canadian Army. Interoperability has seldom been pushed to this level, nor at this scale. In order to align TF Paladin’s approach to training and preparing to fight, the commanding officer (CO), LCol Jean-Francois Labonté, began the rotation with a weekend long meeting for leaders. After half a day of briefings on the current operating environment, small groups were tasked with developing maxims that fit under the CO’s motto, “We Fight.” This article is part of the new Short Bursts Series: “Reflections from Latvia,” which delves into some of these maxims, what they mean in practice, and why they are important.

Look Left, Look Right, Look Up

While ground forces have been aware of both threats and support from the air for over a century, the use of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) or drones—particularly small, cheap drones in large numbers—has changed the dynamic. These drones pose aerial threats that evade sensors designed for crewed aircraft, large remotely piloted aircraft like the Predator, and missiles. As a result, they often cannot be efficiently defeated by current defensive measures. Often, by the time they can be seen or heard, small UAS are already close enough to seriously damage personnel and equipment. They also provide vital intelligence to the drone operator, who may be close by, or thousands of kilometers away.

Just as soldiers have always been expected to remain aware of who and what is around them on the ground, they must also be vigilant about potential threats from the air. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are continuously enhancing their defences against enemy UAS while also refining their own use of UAS for reconnaissance and offensive action. TF Paladin is working to incorporate as many of these lessons as possible. A range of defences against enemy UAS are available and are continually being enhanced, including in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, as well as kinetic destruction of the platforms. Central to all of this is the need for constant awareness and realization that death can emerge from a few meters overhead.

There is also a broader and less literal interpretation of this maxim. Russia has been carrying out below-the-threshold actions against the Baltic states for years, interfering in their economies and domestic politics. The memory of the horrors inflicted upon Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania during the Second World War and under Soviet rule are very much alive, and if Putin achieves his full ambitions, many fear their return. Any active conflict between Russia and NATO in this theatre would be a hybrid war, in which conventional attacks by the Russian army would be coordinated with unconventional, and even non-lethal, attacks by infiltrators and sympathizers within the Baltic states. It is no longer sufficient to look out for enemy infantry or armour approaching; just as UAS introduce new aerial threats, hybrid warfare also presents threats from directions that the CAF and its NATO partners may not typically expect and monitor. Only since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have ground forces recognized the necessity of scanning for UAS at very low altitude, which means that training must adapt to instil this new practice.

Don’t Be Seen, Don’t Be Acquired

As the truism goes, if you can be seen, you can be killed. There are now more ways than ever to detect ground forces. Satellite imagery is one of the best-known detection methods, and some protection, such as camouflage or overhead cover, can help mitigate its effectiveness. Heat signatures, of both platforms and soldiers, are harder to disguise. Sensors can detect sound and vibration, and the electromagnetic spectrum has become a notable vulnerability. While the contents of information sent by radio, satellite, or cell phone can be encrypted, obscuring the origin of the signal is much more challenging, particularly outside urban areas. For context, Ukrainian soldiers have even used micro drones to look for litter or old fires that indicate Russian soldiers might be nearby.

This means that TF Paladin is becoming practiced in using visual camouflage, exploiting natural cover, and creating artificial concealment. Few tools exist to minimize infrared or sound signatures, but soldiers are learning that these can be indicators that an attentive enemy will exploit. Consequently, they are developing measures to reduce these patterns of life. TF Paladin is also experimenting with a range of techniques, some technical, while others are more established, such as using runners to carry messages, that eliminate or reduce the electromagnetic signatures that can identify armies and especially command posts.

This marks significant shift from Afghanistan, the last theatre in which the CAF was heavily engaged. The enemy there had little in the way of detection beyond what the British call the Mark One Eyeball, lacking even night vision goggles, much less the equipment necessary to intercept, much less decode, communications. Even if they had such abilities, they lacked weapons with the range and precision to exploit that information. Now, unlike ISAF against the Taliban and al Qaeda, TF Paladin faces a threat with similar, and in some cases superior, technology. State of the art communications technology remains vital, but using it intelligently means using it differently, and in some cases, using it significantly less compared to the war in Afghanistan.

Dig or Die

Roughly 80% of casualties in Ukraine are caused by artillery fire. The US in particular has access to counter battery systems that warn of incoming shelling and expedite the destruction of enemy artillery platforms. So far, TF Paladin has limited access to these capabilities. However, one widely available method to mitigate the damage of Russian artillery is the use of dug in positions. Trenches and shell scrapes can provide protection against shrapnel and some of the shockwave from shelling for personnel. Furthermore, positioning vehicles and other platforms where banked earth provides a degree of shelter offers similar protection.

It is routine, now, that whenever troops are not changing position during an exercise, they are focused on security by digging in, exploiting local features and creating new trenches and banks to provide the shelter that could help them survive incoming artillery fire. This adds to the physical burden of operations on soldiers operating under already austere conditions, especially if they must carry entrenching tools. Regardless, it must become habit, as much as the use of personal protective equipment.

The Russian war on Ukraine features almost every form of warfare seen in the 20^th century, in one time and place. The return to digging in for survival illustrates this. Trenches and earthworks are relevant again, but so are microdrones that can kill while the operator is kilometers away. Information technology means that command posts can have more information than ever, and faster than ever, at the same time as survivability might require a return to telephone wire and runners physically carrying orders or information. One of the challenges facing TF Paladin is the need to adapt, using the right tool or approach in any situation, while understanding that this could change in an instant.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Rebecca Jensen is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and an Assistant Professor at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. She is currently deployed to Latvia as advisor to the commanding officer of TF Paladin, the Multinational Battle Group, LCol Jean-Francois Labonté.

This article first appeared online in the Short Bursts section of the Canadian Army Journal (December 2024).