Tactical Decision Game Scenario #1
Decision At The Blue River

Figure 1 is a schematic map showing Battle Group objectives 1, 2 and 3

In a recent issue of the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ), readers were introduced to Tactical Decision Games (TDG). Since then, TDGs have been a component of the CAJ web page. This article is a follow-up to TDG 1, and it is meant to provide a potential solution to the problem presented. This article can be used as a primer for any soldier leading a discussion about the problem, or for those who individually completed the TDG. The suggested solution includes a discussion of the relevant tactical concepts and how they apply within the context of the TDG; it also clarifies how solutions should be delivered to maximize the training value. There are multiple solutions to the problem presented in TDG 1, and which one an officer or non-commissioned member considers to be the best will reflect not only their tactical acumen, but also their appetite for risk. I hope that the solution presented here will encourage debate and discussion.

In TDG 1, the reader assumed the position of Officer Commanding (OC) I Company (I Coy) Combat Team (Cbt Tm) of the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) Battle Group (BG), conducting an attack as part of 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG) to seize the friendly side of the Blue River in preparation for a crossing by the C Squadron (C Sqn) Cbt Tm. The operation was part of a larger brigade-level task of establishing a bridgehead over the river as rapidly as possible to enable the commitment of an Armoured Brigade Combat Team which would continue the pursuit of the fleeing Donovians before they could re-establish an effective defence. After you successfully seized your objective and the enemy fled to the north, you noted that communications on the BG command net had become nearly impossible due to interference which you suspected was caused by enemy jamming. You also noted that H Coy Cbt Tm to your east sounded as though they were heavily engaged in fighting. Simultaneously, you noted a billowing dust cloud on the north side of the river that could have indicated the movement of vehicles towards BG Objective (Obj) 3. The original situation at the conclusion of your attack is diagrammed in Figure 1.

From our formative training on mission analysis, the first question we should ask ourselves in such a situation is “Has the situation changed?” Or, more specifically, “Has the situation changed sufficiently to necessitate a change in my mission?” Our original task was to seize BG Obj 1 to enable the commitment of C Sqn Cbt Tm to seize BG Obj 3. At this point in the battle, we have achieved our mission and the commanding officer (CO) should consider committing C Sqn through our position.

There are, however, three critical factors that threaten the commitment of C Sqn in this manner. It seems likely that H Coy is heavily engaged in seizing BG Obj 2. This by itself would not be a problem for the overall mission. However, as communications within the BG are currently degraded, the CO may not know that we have successfully seized our Obj. In addition, if the CO does know, it may still be impossible to reliably communicate with C Sqn in order to commit them to the river crossing. It is also important to consider the fact that we have experienced significant success. We have seized our Obj without any casualties and are well positioned to carry on offensive operations. Lastly, the dust cloud implies the movement of a large number of vehicles. That represents a potential threat, making time the critical factor in the current situation.

Possible Courses of Action

Three general courses of action (COA) present themselves. The first is to follow the plan and defend the crossing on the friendly side of the river with a view to enabling the passage of C Sqn Cbt Tm. This COA reduces the level of potential confusion by sticking to the plan. In addition, it ensures that C Sqn can be committed through I Coy if the CO is aware that our mission has been achieved or once the jamming clears. It also leaves I Coy in a position to potentially react to what might be an approaching enemy element. On the other hand, it misses a potential opportunity to exploit I Coy’s success and disrupt the enemy’s plans.

In the second COA, I Coy could look to assist H Coy with their enemy contact while retaining BG Obj 1 for the passage of C Sqn. This COA supports H Coy in what could be a very stiff contact and may result in the opening of both crossings over the river for the brigade and division. It has, however, significant downsides. Coordinating the required support for H Coy over the BG net would be hectic even if the net was not being jammed. In this case it would likely be impossible, meaning that I Coy would need to commit forces with little understanding of the situation in what could be a very confusing scenario, thereby greatly increasing the risk of fratricide. More importantly, this COA misses the BG and Bde commander’s intent to capture the bridgehead as quickly as possible and ignores what could be an approaching enemy countermoves force.

The third COA is the most aggressive, and potentially the riskiest, but it offers the largest payoff. This COA involves I Coy Cbt Tm or an element of the Cbt Tm attacking to seize BG Obj 3 and pre-empt what seems likely to be an enemy countermoves force. The solution explained below is based on this COA.

Factors

So, what is the enemy up to in this situation? From our understanding of their organization, we have a good grasp of their material capabilities. They are well equipped with relatively modern armoured vehicles (T72B and BMP 2M) capable of destroying our armoured vehicles. The assessment is that the enemy is task organized as a battalion tactical group (BTG) with significant combat support capabilities such as their own artillery, electronic warfare (EW) and air defence. Certainly, the disruption of communications experienced implies that EW is being employed at some level. It seems likely that we are dealing with a unit that has a great deal of independence in the pursuit of its mission.

Regarding the enemy’s mission, the scenario tells us that the enemy unit is conducting a rear-guard action to buy time for the protected formation preparing a main defensive area. Within the Donovian opposing force doctrine, this makes the rear guard a disruption force operating in the disruption zone of an overall area defence or manoeuvre defence. According to TC 7.100-2, Opposing Force Tactics, “within the overall structure of the area defense, the disruption zone seeks to conduct highly damaging local attacks… They choose the best terrain to inflict maximum damage on the attacking enemy and use obstacles and barriers extensively. They defend aggressively by fire and maneuver.”^{Footnote 1}  To achieve this, they have been employing delaying tactics, trading space for time. This could indicate that they are unlikely to fight hard for the river; however, they could use the river as a barrier to impose disproportionate delay on 2 CMBG, inflict heavy casualties and disrupt the commitment of heavier follow-on forces meant to engage their main body in the main defensive area. 

This is relevant when we consider the behaviour of the enemy we have just engaged and what we believe is happening to our east with H Coy. If the enemy is determined to impose maximal delay on the river, would they quickly abandon their positions when engaged by our fire base, leaving many of their dismounted infantry behind? Perhaps your attack simply broke their will to resist? Is H Coy engaged in a stiff fire fight because they have encountered a better-led, more determined enemy element, determined to fight for the south side of the river, or did something go wrong in H Coy’s attack which the opportunistic enemy is using to their advantage? And what of the dust clouds we saw through our day sight? 

Is that an approaching enemy unit and, if so, what are its intent and capabilities? How we interpret the enemy’s behaviour will largely determine how we perceive the current situation as either an opportunity to be exploited or a risk we need to mitigate.

Our higher and superior commanders’ intent should be considered in light of what we are perceiving in the changing situation. Our brigade has been tasked to secure a bridgehead over the river to enable the commitment of a friendly armoured brigade. Time is critical in operations, as this scenario reveals. The more time provided to the Donovians, the better prepared their defences will be. The fight for time has cascading effects across echelons. We and Comd 2 CMBG want to deny the enemy BTG the time to better prepare their delay along the Blue River, but more importantly we want to deny their main body time to better prepare their main defence, which is the concern of the division commander and higher.

Time is the critical consideration in this scenario. As the enemy is actively seeking to delay us, we will naturally seek to overcome that delay. This also fits within our higher commander’s intent and should provide greater options by exploiting openings rendered by unprepared defenders. A tactical concept that should be considered in this scenario is that of pre-emption. As part of the CA’s manoeuvrist approach to operations, pre-emption is one of the three means (the other two are dislocation and disruption) by which the CA attacks the enemy’s will and cohesion in an effort to defeat an opponent’s aims, as opposed to incremental attrition. Land Operations tells us that pre-emption is the preferred approach of the three and states that it means to “seize an opportunity, often fleeting, before he [the enemy] does, and deny him an advantageous course of action.”^{Footnote 2} 

As indicated by the definition of pre-emption, if you are not denying the enemy a COA they would want to pursue, then the pre-emption is worthless. We are attempting to frustrate the enemy by changing the situation in a manner that is favourable to us, thereby forcing them to adapt to our actions. What is it that the enemy is looking to pursue in this situation? One of the important, if not central, components to combat, war and competition is uncertainty. We can never know exactly what the enemy intends to do. Despite that, we can make some educated guesses based on the situation. In our doctrine, forces that conduct countermoves do so for three reasons: to block, reinforce or counter-attack.^{Footnote 3}  To determine what blocking, reinforcing or counter-attacking might look like, we need to consider the impact of terrain. We have two crossings that the enemy could employ. One is the site of H Coy’s battle. The ongoing fight for the H Coy crossing makes it less appealing except for a potential counter-attack, and the other crossing is currently held by I Coy Cbt Tm. The other significant feature is BG Obj 3, which provides positions of observation and direct fire over the entrances and exits to the crossings. The ability to provide direct fire from these locations makes them key terrain for any force looking to block, reinforce or counter-attack by fire.

We also need to consider the possibility that this approaching unit is not a countermoves force. The assumption that it is countermoves gives the enemy the benefit of the doubt, which is the safest way in which to consider the enemy. However, they are just as susceptible to friction and uncertainty as we are. We must also allow for the possibility that this approaching unit may not be a countermoves element at all. Any number of conditions could bring the approaching enemy unit to that place in time, including sheer luck. Perhaps the enemy’s original plan was to occupy the near and far side of the river, but something kept the near-side unit from arriving in a timely manner and this unit is moving up to occupy their positions as opposed to launching a counter-attack. Perhaps they are not even fully aware of the current situation and intend to occupy the position and begin a defensive routine. Either way, an enemy arriving at the scene will still be able to use their combat power in the engagement even if they are less than prepared for it. This speaks to the importance of being opportunistic. If the enemy is seeking to employ countermoves in an attempt to force a deliberate attack to seize the river, then we should seek to pre-empt and surprise the enemy by seizing the key terrain which is required in order to do so. If this is nothing more than an unaware enemy element moving up for a related or unrelated purpose, then we should achieve even greater surprise and prevent any enemy intervention.

This approach can also be considered with respect to H Coy’s situation. By seizing BG Obj 3, we will cut off the escape route and encircle the enemy element engaging H Coy. More importantly, we will have negated their mission of delaying our crossing. This situation is a good example of attacking an opponent’s will and is likely to result in a withdrawal from participation in combat once they realize that their mission, not to mention their means of escape, is now denied to them.^{Footnote 4}  Jim Storr, a former British officer, commenting on the operational analysis of 158 land campaigns, asks, “At what point is combat resolved? On reflection we see that the normal condition for tactical success or defeat is the collective withdrawal of participation.”^{Footnote 5}  He further notes, 

“[T]he general point remains the same: defeat occurs when the enemy, at whatever level you are considering, believes that he is beaten. Defeat is a psychological state.”^{Footnote 6}  In light of this, it is worth considering the impact of crossing the Blue River quickly and the effect the crossing could have on the enemy rear guard BTG’s perception of their ability to achieve their mission.

Pre-emption is not risk-free, as this scenario illustrates very clearly. Smaller units react more quickly than larger ones, due to the reduced number of levels of command in which direction must be passed and the smaller number of people, machines and supplies that must be moved. Therefore, there is a trade-off between mass and speed, so pre-emption will sometimes necessitate the commitment of a smaller force to seize the opportunity. In the words of Robert R. Leonhard, “getting there first and getting there with greater combat power than the enemy are opposite goals… the real issue in modern battle is whether to get there first or with the most [all emphasis in original].”^{Footnote 7}  In this case, pre-emption requires that we seize an unforeseen opportunity while lacking the ability to communicate that opportunity to our higher commander. The location of friendly elements north of the river in the vicinity of BG Obj 3 increases the risk of fratricide, as they may mistake us for the enemy. The increased risk of fratricide includes friendly forces who will likely be using the Blue River as a fire control measure. These risks, however, need to be balanced against the opportunities offered by pre-empting the enemy to BG Obj 3.

A Possible Solution

The purpose of this follow-up is not to present the correct solution. The main purpose of this article and any that follow will be to discuss the tactical concepts that are relevant to the scenario, as we have done above. 

As noted in the original article, “Bringing TDGs into the Canadian Army,” a discussion after the execution of the TDG facilitates the analytical portion of decision making once the intuitive, recognition portion has been employed to devise the solution. There are also some best practices for the delivery of solutions to TDGs to maximize their value as training aids. Those practices are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

The participant expresses their solution as direction to subordinates. This is not a discussion like the one presented above; that comes after a solution has been expressed as part of a group discussion. The solution needs to be expressed in the way in which a leader would give direction in the situation at hand. It should also include a sketch which will help with expressing the solution and support those executing the game with the use of doctrinal tactical graphics. A sketch may seem extraneous in some scenarios: for example, in the current one, giving orders via radio would not allow subordinates to see the OC’s sketch. In the future, however, when the CA digitizes its subunits, OCs will have the ability to transmit a sketch or map overlay to support their verbal orders; therefore, this is good practice. Having the scenario sketched on a large whiteboard prior to the session is helpful in this way.

Solutions need not be long. The participant should deliver the solution in the way they would in the given scenario.  Given the criticality of time in the current scenario, one would not want to give much time for orders delivery. We should value decisiveness and clarity of thought and expression over detailed direction.

Below is an example of a solution.

“Charlie Charlie 3 it’s 39er, orders in 1 minute.”

“Charlie Charlie 3 it’s 39er.”

“Situation: I assess that the BG comms are currently being jammed and H Coy is being heavily engaged to our east. I believe there is an enemy element of unknown size approaching BG Obj 3, likely with the intent of occupying BG Obj 3 and further delaying our crossing.”

“Mission: I Coy Cbt Tm will SEIZE BG Obj 3 to enable the forward passage of lines of the multinational division.”

“Execution: We will seize BG Obj 3, preventing its capture by the enemy and enabling a more rapid advance by the division, while maintaining the crossing at BG Obj 1.”

“Tasks: T43: SEIZE and RETAIN the EAST portion of BG Obj 3 to prevent its use by the enemy. You will be first in the order of march through the crossing.”

“31: RETAIN BG Obj 1 to support the forward passage of lines of follow-on forces. I want at least a section of dismounted infantry on the crossing to ensure its security from enemy infiltration or efforts to destroy it. Continue consolidation and detainee processing.”

“32: SEIZE and RETAIN the WEST portion of BG Obj 3 to prevent its use by the enemy. You will follow 4 Trp through the crossing.”

“G31: Move with 4 Trp and support in SEIZING and RETAINING BG Obj 3. Priority of fires goes to 4 Trp.”

“39B: Remain on BG Obj 1 and support 7 Pl in organizing its defence.

“Coordinating Instructions: Timings: Questions immediately following orders. 4 Trp begins movement following questions.”

“Svc Support: 39A, have the echelon ready to conduct ammo resupply once we’ve seized BG Obj 3. 39C, support 7 Pl in detainee processing and backloading.”

“Command and Sigs: I will locate in the vicinity of 4 Trp. 39A, continue to try and inform call sign 0 of our actions. Be prepared to send a runner if necessary. Vehicles equipped with panel markers should make them visible from the rear and above to provide identification friend or foe to friendly forces.”

“T43 any questions. Over.”

The solution sticks largely to the doctrinal formula for issuing orders, which provides a frame of reference to the OC who needs to rapidly put together information in a stressful environment. Equally important, it provides the necessary information in a way that is familiar to subordinates. In executing a TDG, it is always worth discussing how the direction is delivered and what information the participant provides and omits. 

Critically examining how the solution is communicated is just as important as the solution itself.Once the participant has delivered their solution, they can then explain why they chose it. As discussed above, the participant’s interpretation of the situation should be reflected in their solution, specifically in their situation paragraph. The participant’s interpretation of the situation is an important point of discussion and will help improve the group’s ability to read indicators in the operating environment that are habitually cloaked in uncertainty.

With an understanding of how the participant perceived the situation, we can then examine the solution. The first thing to consider is whether the solution is logically consistent with the participant’s interpretation of the situation. After that, the group can discuss the technical and tactical components of the solution.

All of this happens in a group context. A facilitator manages the discussion, but the entire group should have the freedom to examine the solutions and ask questions. In this way, the TDG teaches not just tactics but also humility. Standing in front of a group of fellow officers, or a mixed group of soldiers, NCOs and officers, and delivering a solution to a tactical problem in a short time is not easy and is an exercise in humility.

TDG 1 was meant to present an opportunity for the exploitation of success and pre-emption that was not foreseen in the original plan in conjunction with friction and enemy action that would put the onus on the subunit commander to adapt in the absence of direction from higher. There will probably be those who disagree with the solution presented here. However, in the author’s opinion, it is largely consistent with the CA’s professed warfighting philosophy. There will also be those who may agree with the solution but are less than comfortable with having to make that decision themselves or with giving subordinates the latitude to do so.  That latitude, however, is also consistent with the CA’s professed approach to command as well as the former Commander Canadian Army’s command philosophy.^{Footnote 8}   I hope that any disagreement with this article will stimulate fruitful discussions within unit lines, or perhaps even in the CAJ. Either way, by executing TDG 1 we, and our subordinates, will have sharpened our intellectual edge and our units will be more lethal than they were yesterday.